Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mistake Proofing Techniques: Learning Objectives
Mistake Proofing Techniques: Learning Objectives
Learning Objectives
At the end of this section delegates will be able to: Explain the role of Mistake Proofing within Lean Six Sigma Recognise that defects can be eliminated (100% of the time) Understand that Mistake Proofing should be focused on process steps that rely on operator vigilance and concentration Recognise that simple, low cost devices can be the most effective solutions Use a simple process for implementing a Mistake Proofing system
Human Error
Humans make mistakes (errors) because of
- Forgetfulness - Lack of experience/skills - Laziness - Rushing - Misunderstanding - Lack of concentration - Lack of standards - Taking short cuts
Errors (can) lead to defects Defects are not inevitable and can be eliminated by the use of simple, low cost methods zero defects Mistake Proofing should take over repetitive tasks that depend on vigilance or memory
Types of Error
Four main types of error: Processing
1.
Omitted Processing - Step in process not carried out Eg form not checked, discount not included, invoice not sent, hole not drilled, part not cleaned
2.
Processing Errors - step in process carried out incorrectly Eg wrong discount included, invoice sent to wrong address, hole drilled in wrong place
Materials
3.
Missing materials/information Eg form not filled out completely, order not complete, screw left out Wrong materials/information Eg wrong form filled out, wrong information supplied, wrong screw used
4.
Safety Example
Original Box Cutter Sharp point
Rounded point
Spring loaded-when operator lets go, the blade goes back in
Blade can stay out without operator touching it Guard protecting blade only releases when button is pushed
Extra safety guards make it difficult to accidentally contact blade
10
Elevators
Some common safety features are listed below:
Doors sensors detect if an object/person is blocking entrance, if so they automatically open 2 separate braking systems used. The first is opened by electrical current, if power is lost the brake closes under high spring tension. The second is a centrifugal brake governing the maximum speed A host of switches and sensors control the positioning of the elevator Acceleration/deceleration alters with weight in carriage
11
Medicine (Bottles)
Up to one in five toddlers can open medicine bottles and chemical containers, even if they have child-resistant tops Every year 25,000 under-fives are taken to casualty, suspected of swallowing substances ranging from medicines to household cleaning products One in five are admitted to hospital for treatment Child-resistant tops are now commonplace on most medicine bottles and household chemicals but they are child-resistant, not child-proof
Source BBC News
SSG06101ENUK Delegate Slides/Issue 1.1/ September 2008
12
Electrical (Household)
RCD (Residual Current Device)
Automatically cuts off power supply if a leakage current to ground is detected
Mains Socket
Earth pin first to make and last to break contact Earth pin has to enter socket to move protective shields from Live and NEUTRAL connections Shape prevents incorrect fitment
3 Pin Plug
Only fits one way round Ergonomically designed so it is picked up by the case Insulation on Live and Neutral to prevent accidental touching of pins If wired correctly and plug pulled out by cable, Live first to pull out, Neutral second, Earth last Fuse standard for plug no other fuses will fit. Maximum fuse size 13 amp If cover is not in place pins push back and cannot enter socket
13
Electrical (General)
Shapes and colours extensively used to prevent equipment being incorrectly connected
14
Appliances
Microwave
Will not work until the door is shut
Washing machine
Will not start until door is closed Will not allow door to be opened until cycle is complete
15
16
17
18
19
Safety interlocks or light beams used to automatically shut down or stop processes
20
Using Checklists
Pre-flight Checklist
1 2 3 4 5 6 Fuel level (min 1500 Max 2500) Altimeter calibration (+50 Metres) Ailerons functional Hydraulic pressure (Min 30 bar Max 40 bar) Generator voltage (Min 220v Max 250V) Backup generator functional
10
21
Ladies
Gents
22
11
23
Target Practice?!
12
History of FMEA
First used in the 1960s in the aerospace industry during the Apollo missions In 1974, the US Navy developed MIL-STD-1629 regarding the use of FMEA In the late 1970s, driven by product liability costs, FMEA moved into U.S automotive applications
Outputs
List of actions to prevent causes or to detect failure modes History of actions taken
13
FMEA Team
Team approach is necessary Responsible black/green belt leads the team Recommended representatives:
Operators/administrators/supervisors Design Engineering Operations Distribution Finance Information Technology Human Resources
Completing an FMEA
(1-10)
Process Step/Input Potential Failure Mode Potential Failure Effects S E V Potential Causes
(1-10)
O C C Current Controls
(1-10)
D E T R P N Actions Recommended
How 0 often?
0
How 0 0 well?
0 0
14
Examples
Temperature too high: paint cracks Incorrect PO number: accounts receivable traceability errors Surface contamination: poor adhesion Dropped call: customer dissatisfaction Paint too thin: poor coverage
15
Examples
Temperature too high: thermocouple out of calibration Incorrect PO number: typographical error Surface contamination: overhead hoist systems Dropped call: insufficient number of CS representatives Paint too thin: high solvent content
16
Potential failure modes, Effects, and Current ability of the process to detect the failures before reaching the customer
Calculated as the product of three quantitative ratings, each one related to the effects, causes, and controls:
RPN = Severity X Occurrence X Detection Effects Causes Controls Effects Causes Controls
17
Definition of Terms
Severity (of Effect) (1 = Not Severe, 10 = Very Severe)
Importance of effect on customer requirements Could also be concerned with safety and other risks if failure occurs
Detection (Capability of Current Controls) (1 = Likely to Detect, 10 = Not Likely at all to Detect)
Ability of current control scheme to detect or prevent:
The causes before creating failure mode The failure modes before causing effect
18
37
Effects
Waste d Bee r/ We t La p
Causes
Drunk Glass too sma ll Not pa ying a tte ntion
Current Controls
None Visua l None
No tilt
Visua l Visua l and ope rator tra ining Visua l and ope rator tra ining Ex pira tion da te
No Foa m
Fla t be e r
Tilte d glass Slow Pour Empty gla ss No drink Too drunk Broke n Glass
Visua l Opera tor tra ining None Visua l Job / Proce ss Ex ce lle nce - big bonus Pe rsona lity
No Money
No Frie nds
38
FMEA Hints
Keep it simple; not complex (no wall charts) Must involve a team, no lone ranger development Update it as you move through the roadmap Make sure the FMEA is an action tool, not just a document; use the right half of the tool
19
39
In what ways does the Key What is the impact on the Key Input go wrong? Output Variables (Customer Requirements) or internal requirements?
What are the existing controls and procedures (inspection and test) that prevent eith the cause or the Failure Mode? Should include an SOP number.
Good POKA YOKE devices drive down occurrence and detection rankings.
40
Shutdown/Control/Warn
(Delete as appropriate)
20
41
Shutdown/Control/Warn
(Delete as appropriate)
After Improvement:
Correct
42
shutdown/control/warn
(Delete as appropriate)
Storage Rack
21
43
44
22
45
46
23
47
Solutions
24
49
Shutdown/Control/Warn
(Delete as appropriate)
Stopper
50
Shutdown/Control/Warn
(Delete as appropriate)
After Improvement:
Notch
Upside down Work piece
Correct
25
51
Shutdown/Control/Warn
(Delete as appropriate)
Storage rack
52
26
53
54
27
55
28