Esguerra Title 03 Public Order

Title Three CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER Chapter One.
REBELLION, COUP D ETAT, SEDITION AND DISLOYALTY Article committed Article Article coup Article coup d Article employees Article Article Article Article Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection how
publication and unlawful utterances Article 155. Alarms and scandals Article 156. Delivering prisoners from jail Chapter Six. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence Article 158. Evasion of service of sentence on
134-A. Coup d etat how committed 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or d etat 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit etat, rebellion or insurrection 137. Disloyalty of public officers or 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. Inciting to rebellion or sedition Sedition how committed Penalty for sedition Conspiracy to commit sedition Inciting to sedition
the
occasion of disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes or other calamities Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of Sentence Chapter Seven. COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE Article 160. Quasi- recidivism
Chapter Two. CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION Section One Crimes against legislative bodies and similar bodies Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings Section Two Violation of parliamentary immunity Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity Chapter Three. ASSOCIATIONS ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND
Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection how committed Elements: 1. There is a public uprising and taking arms against the government; 2. The purpose of the uprising or movement is a. to remove from the allegiance to the government or its laws Philippine territory or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; OR b. to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. Rebellion is more frequently used where the object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government. Insurrection is more commonly employed in reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to particular matters or subjects. The crime of rebellion or of inciting is by nature a crime of masses, of a multitude. Actual clash of arms with the government, not necessary to convict the accused who is in conspiracy C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 14
Article 146. Illegal assemblies Article 147. Illegal associations Chapter Four. ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS Article 148. Direct assaults Article 149. Indirect assaults Article 150. Disobedience to summons issued by
the
National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or he agents of such person Article 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority who shall be deemed as such Chapter Five. PUBLIC DISORDERS Article 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance Article 154. Unlawful use of means of
with others actually taking arms with the government. It is not necessary that the purpose of the rebellion be accomplished. Giving aid and comfort is not criminal in rebellion.
Rebellion Levying of war against the government during peace time for any of the purposes in Article 134 Always involves taking up arms vs. the government Treason Levying of war against the government, when performed to aid the enemy; adherence to enemy May be committed by mere adherence to the enemy, giving him aid or comfort
If Art. 48 were applied, and murder were not complexed with rebellion and the 2 crimes were punished separately, the extreme penalty could be imposed upon him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed this way, would be unfavorable to the accused. Thus, Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other crime. The SC ruled by a vote of 11 to 3 that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. That indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Ponce Enrile vs. Amin Together with the information charging Enrile with rebellion complexed with murder in the RTC of QC, prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of P.D. No. 1829 in the RTC of Makati. It is alleged that on Dec. 1, 1989 at Dasma Village, Enrile, having reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that ExCol. Gringo Honasan has committed a crime, obstructed, impeded, frustrated or delayed the apprehension of Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house. Enrile apparently gave Gringo food and comfort in the Dasma house, despite knowing that Gringo is a fugitive from justice. Is the alleged harboring or concealing by Enrile of Honasan absorbed in the complexed rebellion charge against Enrile (in Enrile vs. Salazar)? HELD: YES The rebellion charges filed against Enrile in Q.C. were based on affidavits executed by 2 employees of a hotel who stated that Gringo and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the Enrile residence in Dec 1, 1989. Based on this testimony, the prosecution concluded that Enriles talking with the rebel leader Gringo in his house in the presence of 100 armed soldiers, it can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the December coup attempt. Thus, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under P.D. 1829. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Gringo, Enriles alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a part thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. The decisive factor in political crimes is the intent or motive. If Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Gringo simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political motives, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately. Inthis case, the act or harboring or concealing Gringo is clearly a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot therefore be made basis of a separate charge. All crimes, whether punishable under special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
Enrile vs. Salazar A warrant was issued on an information filed by a panel of prosecutors, charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the failed coup attempt which took place from Nov. 29 to Dec. 10. HELD: The written and oral pleas for the defendants (Enrile et al.) presented the SC with three options: First, abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the dissent that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48, rebellion may be complexed with common offenses. Second, hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance or as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or less grave character. Third, maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or furtherance thereof. 11 members of the SC voted against abandoning Hernandez, while 2 felt the doctrine should be reexamined. Because of this, the ruling remains good law, as no new challenges are presented in this case persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that President Aquino, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, repealed P.D. No. 942 of the former regime which sought to nullify Hernandez by enacting a new provision in the RPC to the effect that when by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by the law are committed, the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender. The president has then in effect reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law by legislative fiat. The court unanimously voted to reject the second option. The consensus was that the arguments were not sufficient to overcome the thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48.
C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 15
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes themselves. People vs. Dasig One afternoon, Pfc. Manatad, Pfc. Tizon and Pfc. Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to man the traffic at 2 streets of Mandaue City. While on duty, Catamora saw 8 persons, including accused Nunez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Manatad. Catamora followed the two men, but sensing that they were being followed, the men went to the middle of the road and engage Catamora to a gun battle. Catamora then heard a series of shots from the other group and afterwards, he saw Manatad sprawled on the ground. Catamora sought refuge at a nearby building from where he saw 2 persons take Manatads gun and fired at him to make sure he was dead. The group then fled the scene. Later on, 2 teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the NPA sparrow unit in Cebu City. When they reached the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Nunez trying to escape. The two men were apprehended, and their firearms were confiscated. Dasig confessed in the hospital that he and the group of Nunez killed Manatad and that he and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit. He was found guilty of murder with direct assault. HELD: Dasig should be prosecuted for rebellion. Appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the Sparrow unit, but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. The Sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. As such, appellant is liable for rebellion and not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority, is a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate charge. People vs. Lovedioro Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along a street when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policemans right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had 3 other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the Lucilos gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. The accused-appellant was charged and was convicted of the crime of murder. HELD: In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated. If no political motive is
established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice. Appellants contentions regarding the reason for the killing of Lucilo are couched in terms so general and non-specific that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPAs subversive aims. Thus, in the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Lucilo, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.
People v. Silongan (2003) The RTC convicted appellants Abdila and Macapagal Silongan, Awal, Lamalan, Alon, Manap, and Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention for having abducted at gunpoint and detained businesman Saldana and 3 others. Saldana was made to write a letter to his wife to pay a ransom in the amount of P12 million. He was separated from the others and was transferred from one hideout to another. He was detained for 6 months. Appellants then surrendered as MILF and MNLF rebels. They argue that the fact that they are rebel surrenderees precludes conviction for the common crime of kidnapping. Citing People v. Hernandez, they contend that common crimes are absorbed in rebellion. Therefore, the trial court erred when it convicted them of kidnapping for ransom. HELD: The argument that the crime was politically motivated and that consequently, the charge should have been rebellion and not kidnapping is without merit. The Court cited the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte vs. CA, where it was held that the political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. The evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted. People v. Oliva (2001) Oliva alias Ka Ambo and Salcedo alias Ka Tony and 2 others came to the house of Magbojos. The victim was then hogtied and was brought to the mountains. The victim was never seen alive again. Two or three years after, one Tubieron told the victims brother where the victims remains were buried by his abductors. The RTC convicted Oliva alias Ka Ambo and Salcedo alias Ka Tony guilty of murder (not kidnapping with murder) for killing Magbojos. Oliva asserts that he should have been charged with rebellion instead of kidnapping with murder considering that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and a Commander of the NPA. He claims that
the killing was committed in furtherance of rebellion, hence, it should be absorbed in rebellion. HELD: Oliva's contention that he should have been charged with and tried for rebellion lacks factual and legal basis, hence, bereft of merit. True, one can be convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and kidnapping were committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollarily, offenses which were not committed in furtherance of the rebellion, but for personal reasons or other motives, are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the rebellious acts. In the instant case, there was no evidence at all to show that the killing of Jacinto Magbojos Jr. was in connection with or in furtherance of their rebellious act. Besides, it was not indubitably proved that Oliva was indeed a member of the New People's Army. Oliva and Salcedo was found guilty of of the crime of Homicide and not murder, the trial cout having erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
2.
The participants -
a.
Any person who participates or executes the commands of others in rebellion or insurrection; b. Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in undertaking a coup d etat; c. Any person not in the government service who participates, supports, finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d' etat. Public officer must take active part, to be liable; mere silence or omission is not punishable in rebellion. When the rebellion, insurrection or coup d etat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels, shall be deemed a leader of such rebellion, insurrection or couo d etat. It is not a defense in rebellion that the accused never took the oath of allegiance to, or that they never recognized the government. Those who killed persons in pursuance of the movement to overthrow the government are liable for rebellion only.
Article 134-A. committed Elements:
Coup
etat
how
1. Offender is a person or persons belonging to the military or police or holding any public office or employment; 2. It is committed by means of a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; 3. The attack is directed against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power; 4. The purpose of the attack is to seize or diminish state power.
The crime of coup d etat may be committed with or without civilian participation. Article 135. Penalty for insurrection or coup d etat rebellion,
Persons liable for rebellion, insurrection or coup d' etat:
1.
The leaders a. Any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection; or b. Any person who leads, directs or commands others to undertake a coup d' etat;
Is there a complex crime of rebellion with murder and other common crimes? NO. Engaging in war against the government necessarily imply everything that war connotes: resort to arms, requisition of property, collection of taxes, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life. When any of the acts above are committed as means to or in furtherance of subversive ends, they become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. (This is the Hernandez ruling, later reiterated in Enrile vs. Salazar) Killing, robbing etc. for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, would be separately punished and would not be absorbed in rebellion
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is intent or C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 17
motive. A crime usually regarded as common (e.g. homicide) may be stripped of its common character if perpetrated for any of the purposes of rebellion. Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d etat There is conspiracy to commit rebellion when two or more persons come to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms against government for any of the purposes of rebellion and decide to commit it. There is proposal to commit rebellion when the person who has decided to rise publicly and take arms against the government for any of the purposes of rebellion proposes its execution to some other person or persons. Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees Acts punishable: 1. By failing to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power; 2. By continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels; or 3. By accepting appointment to office under them. Offender must be a public officer or employee The crime of disloyalty of public officers presupposes the existence of rebellion by other persons. If the public officer who commits any of the acts in this article is in conspiracy with the rebels, he will be guilty of rebellion. Article 138. insurrection. Elements: 1. Offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government; 2. He incites others to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion; 3. The inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end. Inciting to rebellion or
In proposal and inciting to rebellion, the crime of rebellion should not actually be committed by the persons to whom it is proposed or who are incited. If they commit the rebellion, the proponent of the one inciting becomes a principal by inducement in the crime of rebellion.
Proposal to commit rebellion In both crimes, the offender induces another to commit rebellion It is not required that the The person who proposes offender has decided to has decided to commit commit the rebellion rebellion The act of inciting is The person who proposes done publicly uses secret means Inciting to rebellion
Article 139. Sedition how committed Elements: 1. Offenders rise publicly and tumultuously; 2. Offenders employ force, intimidation, or other means outside of legal methods; 3. Purpose is to attain any of the following objects: a. b. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular election; To prevent the national government or any provincial or municipal government, or any public officer from exercising its or his functions or prevent the execution of an administrative order; To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public officer or employee; To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social classes; To despoil for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or the national government of all its property or any part thereof.
c. d. e.
Sedition, in its general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The ultimate object is violation of public peace. Sedition may not be committed by one person only, because the word tumultuous means that it is caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence.
Are common crimes absorbed in sedition? NO, according to jurisprudence.

Sedition The purpose may be political or social It is sufficient that the public uprising must be tumultuous Rebellion The purpose is always political There must be taking up of arms against the government
Acts punishable: 1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.; Elements: a. Offender does not take direct part in the crime of sedition; b. He incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition; and c. Inciting is done by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending towards the same end. 2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace; 3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace. Uttering seditious words, publishing and circulation scurrilous libels are punishable (second and third type of inciting to sedition), when: 1. They tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office; or 2. They tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes; or 3. They suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; or 4. They lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the government. knowingly concealing such evil practices is another way of violating this article. This is ordinarily an act of an accessory after the fact, but under this article, the act is treated and punished as that of a principal. It is not necessary that the words used should in fact result in a rising of the people against the constituted authorities. Rules relative to seditious words: o Clear and present danger words must be of such a nature that by uttering them there is a danger of a C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 19
People vs. Cabrera A constabulary soldier died as a result of an encounter with a policeman. His death engendered a desire for revenge against the police force on the part of the constabulary soldiers. The next day, constabulary soldiers escaped from their barracks with rifles and ammunitions and divided into groups for an attack upon the city police force. They fired indiscriminately along the streets of Calle Real, killing a policeman and wounding civilians, including several passengers of a passing streetcar. They attacked the Luneta Police Station and the office of the secret service. HELD: The crime committed was sedition. Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The Philippine law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property or any official or agent of the Insular Government or of a Provincial or Municipal Government. It is not necessary that the offender be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary. The law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies.
Article 140. Penalty for sedition Persons liable for sedition: 1. 2. The leader of the sedition; and Other person participating in the sedition.
Article 141. sedition
Conspiracy
to
commit
There must be an agreement and a decision to rise publicly and tumultuously to attain any of the objects of sedition.
There is no crime of proposal to commit sedition. Article 142. Inciting to sedition
public uprising and that such danger should be both clear and imminent o Dangerous tendency if the words used tend to create a danger of public uprising
under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people who are in power. HELD: The essence of seditious libel is its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses or to induce people to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon their minds. A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons infested with Nazis and Fascists, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Umil vs. Ramos FACTS: CAPCOM got a tip that a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) was being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Q.C. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person was Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers. Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the CAPCOM soldiers seated inside. Dural was then transferred to another facility, under CAPCOM supervision (basically, he was arrested). Dural questions the legality of his arrest, having been made without a warrant. HELD: Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the SC in an earlier case: The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely
Seditious utterances are prohibited because the State should not be compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, before it can protect itself. Unlawful rumor mongering: Committed by any person who shall offer, publish, distribute, circulate and spread rumors, false news and information and gossip, or cause the publication, distribution, circulation or spreading of the same, which cause or tend to cause panic, divisive effects among the people, discredit or distrust for the duly constituted authorities, undermine the stability of the Government and the objectives of the New Society, endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the state. (P.D. No. 90)
US vs. Tolentino A theatrical work entitled Kahapon Ngayon at Bukas, written by Aurelio Tolentino, was presented by him and others on May 14, 1903 at the Teatro Libertad in Manila. HELD: The crime committed is inciting to sedition. The publication and presentation of the drama directly and necessarily tended to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government. The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the Government of the United States in the Philippines. Espuelas vs. People Petitioner Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation for their publication with a suicide not, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicidal, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latters supposed wife and children. The letter narrated that the reason why he committed suicide was because he was not pleased with the administration of Pres. Roxas. It also contained a request to his wife to write to President Truman and Churchill, and to tell them that the Philippine government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. As if out of desperation, he ended the letter by saying that he sacrificed his life because he has no power to put
seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified
a. b.
Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the Assembly and similar bodies Elements:
Offender uses force, intimidation, threats or fraud; The purpose of the offender is to prevent any member of Congress from o attending the meetings of the Congress or of any of its committees or constitutional commissions, etc.; o expressing his opinion; or o casting his vote.
1.
There is a projected or actual meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board; 2. Offender, who may be any person, prevents such meetings by force or fraud. Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings Elements: 1. There is a meeting of Congress or any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board; 2. Offender does any of the following acts: a. He disturbs any of such meetings; b. He behaves while in the presence of any such bodies in such a manner as to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due it. The complaint for disturbance of proceedings may be filed by a member of a legislative body. One who disturbs the proceedings of Congress may also be punished for contempt by such Congress. Article 145. immunity Acts punishable: 1. Using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of Congress from attending the meetings of Congress or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or from expressing his opinion or casting his vote; Elements: Violation of parliamentary
2. Arresting or searching any member thereof while Congress is in regular or special session, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor. Elements: a. b. c. d. Offender is a public officer of employee; He arrests or searches any member of Congress; Congress, at the time of arrest or search, is in regular or special session; The member arrested or searched has not committed a crime punishable under the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
It is not necessary that the member of Congress is actually prevented from attending. Parliamentary immunity does not protect members of Congress from responsibility before Congress itself. Under the 1987 Constitution, members of Congress are exempted from arrest, while Congress is in session, for all offenses punishable by a penalty LESS THAN PRISION MAYOR.
Thus, under the Constitution, a public officer who arrests a member of Congress who has committed a crime punishable by prision mayor (six years and one day, to 12 years) is not liable Article 145.
To be consistent with the Constitution, the phrase "by a penalty higher than prision mayor" in Article 145 should be amended to read: "by the penalty of prision mayor or higher."
R.A. 8294 Illegal Possession of Firearms Punishable acts 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition. Provided that no other crime was committed. Higher penalty shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three. Provided, however, that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'tat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'tat. The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment. (1) 2. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to 'pillbox,' 'molotov cocktail bombs,' 'fire bombs,' or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the RPC or special laws with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices, which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'tat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'tat. The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the explosives owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity, to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. (3) 3. Carrying licensed firearm outside ones residence without legal authority therefor (1) Tampering of Firearm's Serial Number any person who shall unlawfully tamper, change, deface or erase the serial number of any firearm. (5) Repacking or Altering the Composition of Lawfully Manufactured Explosives any person who shall unlawfully repack, alter or modify the composition of any lawfully manufactured explosives. (6)
4.
5.
Coverage of Unlicensed Firearm The term unlicensed firearm shall include: 1) firearms with expired license; or 2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime
Advincula vs. CA (2000) The Court of Appeals ruled that no charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms could be filed against Amando and Isagani Ocampo for two (2) reasons: First, as to Amando Ocampo, he had the requisite license to possess the firearm (from the Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office, which was established by sufficient evidence on record. Second, as to Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing evidence that he was in possession of a gun during the incident involving him, his father and petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of petitioner and one Federico San Miguel. HELD: The rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed. However, it should be noted that in People v. Ramos, citing People v. Gy Gesiong, this Court
ruled: " . . . Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor." The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if Amando had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it outside his residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by evidence, which cannot be disturbed by this Court. People vs. Tac-an (1990) Tac-an and the deceased Escao were high school classmates [and gang mates in Bronx gang]. The relationship between Tac-an and Escao turned sour as the quarrel between them escalated from September up to December 1984. While the class was still going on, Tac-an slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. Tac-an suddenly burst into the room, and upon sighting Escao Tac-an fired at scampering Escao, hitting Escao. Escao remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. Tac-an was charged with qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and of murder. After trial the RTC imposed upon him the penalty of death in both cases. HELD: P.D. 1866 is applicable. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into nonenforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to harmonize their provisions," as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions and explosives." Misolas vs. Panga (1990) Philippine Constabulary (PC) raided a suspected NPA "underground house" in Foster Village, Del Carmen, Pili the early morning. The house was searched and in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by Misolas a .20 gauge Remington shotgun and four live rounds of ammunition were found. Misolas was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866 with allegation that it was in furtherance of subversion so as to qualify the offense. HELD: Illegal possession of firearms is not absorbed in rebellion or subversion. Hernandez ruling cannot find application in this case because Misolas is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. He is not being charged with the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms. Neither is he being separately charged for subversion and for illegal possession of firearms. SC considered the fact that the Legislature had deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses:
(1) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. No. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government (R.A. No. 1700). Baylosis vs. Chavez (1991) Baylosis, de Vera and Marco Palo, all known high ranking officers of the CPP-NPA, were charged with a illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion or subversion. HELD: Charging the qualified offense of Illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 does not charge the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms, and hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good and correct rule and is applicable in CAB. People vs. Tiozon (1991)
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code. However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 because of the resulting crime of homicide or murder, the prosecution must allege in the information and prove by the quantum of evidence required for conviction violation of said section and, more specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the commission of homicide or murder.
Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one does not have the license
to possess the firearm. Even if he has the license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. It follows then that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must allege and prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a firearm. Therefore, the trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof. People vs. De Gracia (1994)
Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed. People vs. Garcia (2002)
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control and management. This has to be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing whatsoever.
Tioleco was kidnapped while he was jogging alone in the morning. His abductors took him to a house in Fairview, where the accused Rogel and Lariba were assigned to watch over him. When the police discovered the hideout, Rogel and Lariba immediately ran to a room in the house where several unlicensed firearms were stored. Both were convicted of Kidnapping for Ransom AND Illegal Possession of Firearms. HELD: Rogel and Lariba cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping for ransom - which they were perpetrating at the same time. Under R.A. 8294, if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. The language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. People vs. Castillo (2000) Wilhelmina was kidnapped by persons pretending to be interested buyers of real estate. She was brought to a safehouse in Quezon City, where the accused Gonzales was assigned to watch over her at all times. Gonzales carried an unlicensed firearm while watching over Wilhelmina. When the police discovered the safehouse, Gonzales immediately threw his firearm away from him. The police found more unlicensed firearms in another room in the house. Gonzales was convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearms, with penalty derived from P.D. 1866. HELD: The penalty imposed on him by the trial court exceeded that prescribed by law. Under Republic Act No. 8294, amending P. D. No. 1866, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm classified as high powered is prision mayor minimum or six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years and a fine of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. Here, the offense was committed on November 27, 1992. Since the amendatory law is favorable to the accused, it shall be given retroactive application. People vs. Nepomuceno (1999)
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously.
A distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that
Accused here was charged with parricide that was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The 2 charges were separately charged and tried. RA8294 was passed which said that if a homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the latter cannot be tried separately but will just be treated as an aggravating circumstance. HELD: Accused can no longer be separately charged with parricide and illegal possession of firearms. The amendment says that the latter is only to be treated as an aggravating circumstance. Being clearly favorable to the accused, the amendatory law RA8294 can be applied retroactively to this case. People vs. Evangelista (1996) Accused here was charged with murder and simple illegal possession of firearms. Accused here killed someone with a homemade gun. However the court found the accused guilty of murder and aggravated illegal possession of firearms (weapon used for murder) and sentenced him to death. Held:
a. There is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in fixed place or moving; b. The meeting is attended by armed persons; c. The purpose of the meeting is to commit any of the crimes punishable under the Code. 2. Any meeting in which the audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or assault upon person in authority or his agents. a. There is a meeting, a gathering or group of persons, whether in a fixed place or moving; b. The audience, whether armed or not, is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or direct assault. Persons liable: 1. The organizer or leaders of the meeting; 3. Persons merely present at the meeting, who must have a common intent to commit the felony of illegal assembly. Meeting includes a gathering or group, whether in a fixed place or moving. Under the first type of illegal assembly, not all persons present at the meeting must be armed to be liable under this article. The unarmed person merely present at the meeting of the first type is liable, but armed persons are punished more severely under this article.
1)
2)
Accused cannot be found guilty of aggravated illegal possession as the information simply charged simple illegal possession. That an unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of murder or homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it must be specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death without violating his right to be informed of the charge against him. He cannot even be convicted of simple illegal possession as there was no proof that the gun was unlicensed. The fact that the gun used was homemade does not mean that it cannot be licensed and therefore it is right for the court to automatically assume that it is unlicensed. Even if a homemade gun is used, it does not dispense with the required proof that the gun was indeed unlicensed.
Note: In this case, the amendatory law AR8294 had not yet been passed, therefore it was still allowed to separately charge murder and illegal possession of firearms.
Palanganas v. CA (2006) With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Note however that the person merely present must have an intent to commit the felony of illegal assembly. If he was a curious bystander, he is not liable.
Article 146. Illegal assemblies Acts punishable: 1. Any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code; Elements:
If any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm, o it is presumed that the purpose of the meeting insofar as he is concerned is to commit acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code, o He is considered a leader or organizer of the meeting. Under the first type, the audience must be actually incited to C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 25
the commission of any of the crimes enumerated. If the meeting was dispersed before there was actual inciting, there is no illegal assembly. Article 147. Illegal associations What are illegal associations?
2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force or by seriously intimidating or by seriously resisting any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Elements:
1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under the Code; 2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals. Persons liable: 1. 2. Founders, directors and president of the association; Mere members of the association.
Illegal assemblies It is necessary that there is an actual meeting or assembly for the purposes stated in Article 146 The meeting and attendance at such meeting is punished Persons liable are the organizers or leaders of the meeting and the persons present at such meeting
Illegal associations It is not necessary that there be an actual meeting The act of forming or organizing and membership in the association is punished Persons liable are the founders, directors and president, and the members
a. Offender makes an attack, employs force, makes a serious intimidation, or makes a serious resistance; b. The person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent; c. At the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties; d. Offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties. e. There is no public uprising.
Article 148. Direct assaults Acts punishable: 1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; Elements: a. Offender employs force or intimidation; b. The aim of the offender is to attain any of the purposes of the crime of rebellion or any of the objects of the crime of sedition; c. There is no public uprising.
Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds or in any other manner offers violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, shall be subject to an additional penalty under R.A. 75. In the first type of direct assault, it is not necessary that the offended party is a person in authority or his agent. If the offended party is only an agent of a person in authority, the force must be of a serious character as to indicate a determination to defy the law and its representative. The force employed need not be serious when the offended party is a person in authority (reason: penalty is even higher when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority) The intimidation or resistance must be serious whether the offended party is an agent only or he is a person in authority. To determine whether a certain public officer is a person in authority, look at his powers and duties vested by law. When persons in authority or their agents descended to matters of private nature, an attack made C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 26
by one against the other is not direct assault, because they are not considered in performance of official duties. If the person in authority or his agent provokes the offender, there is no direct assault if accused is acting in lawful self-defense. Direct assault of the second type may be committed by a public officer, because the law considers it an aggravating circumstance when the offender is a public officer or employee. Knowledge of the accused that the victim is a person in authority or his agent is essential. The information must allege such knowledge. It is not necessary that the person in authority or his agent be in the actual performance of official duty when attacked or seriously intimidated. Attack may be done by reason of the performance of duty means by reason of the past performance of official duty, even if at the time of the assault no official duty was being discharged. Evidence of motive is important when the person in authority or his agent is not in the actual performance of duty when attacked. Direct assault of the second form is qualified when: o The assault is committed with a weapon, or o The offender is a public officer of employee, or o The offender lays hands upon a person in authority. The crime of slight physical injuries is absorbed in direct assault, because it is the necessary consequence of the force or violence used. Serious physical injuries, murder or homicide may be complexed with direct assault.
People vs. Beltran Mayor Quirolgico and patrolman Tolentino went to the Puzon compound to talk to Beltran and his companions to surrender in connection with an incident where Beltran shouted vulva of your mother to Alvarado and Urbi. Mayor and patrolman suffered gunshot wounds and the mayors son died due to a simultaneous discharge of gunfire by the accused. HELD: The accused are guilty of murder and double attempted murder with direct assault (under the 2nd form of direct assault). The accused attacked and employed force against the mayor and police while the latter were
engaged in the actual performance of duty and the accused knew that they were assaulting persons in authority.
People vs. Dollantes Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start a dance when Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor making a dance movement, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone. The Barangay Captain approached him and told him to stop and keep quiet. Dollantes and his companions stabbed and eventually killed the Barangay Captain. HELD: The accused were guilty of Assault upon a person in authority, resulting in Murder. The Barangay captain was in the act of trying to pacify Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. Hence, he was killed while in the performance of duties. A Barangay Captain is a person in authority.
Article 149. Indirect assaults Elements: 1. A person in authority or his agent is the victim of any of the forms of direct assault defined in Article 148; 2. A person comes to the aid of such authority or his agent; 3. Offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person coming to the aid of the authority or his agent. Indirect assault can be committed only when direct assault is committed. Article 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commission, its committees, subcommittees or divisions Acts punishable: 1. By refusing, without legal excuse, to obey summons of Congress, its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees, subcommittees or divisions, or by any commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses; 2. By refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation while being before such legislative or constitutional body or official; 3. By refusing to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his possession,
when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions; 4. By restraining another from attending as a witness in such legislative or constitutional body; 5. By inducing disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official. Reason for this article: to give strength to the legislatures power of inquiry, which is essential to legislative functions. This article will not apply if the papers may be used in evidence against the owner, because it would be compelling him to be a witness against himself. Self-incrimination is a valid excuse. The testimony of the person summoned must be upon matters into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire. Acts punished under this article may also be punished for contempt of the Congress. Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person
Under simple disobedience, the offended party must be only an agent of a person in authority. If no force is employed by the offender against a person in authority, the crime is resistance or serious disobedience under the first type.
Resistance or serious disobedience Person in authority or his agent must be in actual performance of his duties Committed only by resisting or seriously disobeying Force employed is not so serious, as there is no manifest intention to defy the law and the officers Direct assault Person in authority or his agent must be engaged in the performance of official duties or that he is assaulted by reason thereof (2nd type) committed by attacking, employing force, seriously intimidating or seriously resisting Attack or employment of force must be serious and deliberate. But if the one resisted is a person in authority, any degree of force is direct assault.
Article 152. Persons in authority and Agents of persons in authority
Elements
of
resistance disobedience:
and
serious
A person in authority is one directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board or commission.
1. A person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; 2. Offender resists or seriously disobeys such person in authority or his agent; 3. The act of the offender is not included in the provision of Articles 148, 149 and 150. Elements of simple disobedience: 1. An agent of a person in authority is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender; 2. Offender disobeys such agent of a person in authority; 3. Such disobedience is not of a serious nature. The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure or refusal to obey DIRECT ORDER from the person in authority or his agent.
Vested with jurisdiction the power and authority to govern and execute the laws. Examples of person in authority: division superintendent of schools, president of sanitary division (in a municipality), teachers, mayor, justice of peace, barangay captain and barangay chairman
An agent of a person in authority is one who, by direct provision of law or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with (1) the maintenance of public order and (2) the protection and security of life and property.
Examples: barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader, any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, sheriff, postmaster, agents of BIR, municipal treasurer, policemen Teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 28
public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority for purposes of Articles 148 (direct assault) and 151 (disobedience). By implication, Article 149 (indirect assault) is also included.
1. Causing any serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment; 2. Interrupting or disturbing performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in Articles 131 and 132 3. Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association or public place; 4. Displaying placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of public order in such place; 5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed. If the act of disturbing or interrupting a meeting or religious ceremony is not committed by public officers, or if committed by public officers they are participants therein, this article should be applied. Outcry to shout subversive or provocative words tending to stir up the people to obtain by means of force or violence any of the objects of rebellion or sedition. If the outcry is an unconscious outburst which is not intentionally calculated to induce others to commit rebellion or sedition, it should be punished under this article. If the offender made the outcry with the thought of inducing his hearers to commit rebellion or sedition, then it is punished as inciting to rebellion/sedition. Persons causing disturbance of a tumultuous character shall be imposed a penalty next higher in degree Tumultuous If caused by more than three persons who are armed or provided with means of violence Article 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances Acts punishable: 1. Publishing or causing to be published, by means of printing, lithography or any other means of publication, as news any false news which may endanger the public order; or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State; 2. Encouraging disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or praising, justifying or extolling any act punished by law, by the same means or by words, utterances or speeches;
Article 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order tumultuous disturbance or interruption liable to cause disturbance Acts punishable:
3. Maliciously publishing or causing to be published any official resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have been published officially 4. Printing, publishing or distributing (or causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printers name, or which are classified as anonymous. may endanger means that actual public disorder or actual damage to the credit of the State is not necessary. The offender must know that the news is false, to be liable under this article. R.A. 248 prohibits the reprinting, reproduction or republication of government publications and official documents without official authority. Article 155. Alarms and scandals Acts punishable: 1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within any town or public place, calculated to cause (which produces) alarm of danger; 2. Instigating or taking an active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility; 3. Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other nocturnal amusements; 4. Causing any disturbance or scandal in public places while intoxicated or otherwise, provided Article 153 in not applicable. The discharge of firearm should not be aimed at any person, otherwise the offense is discharge of firearm under Article 254. The act in the first paragraph must produce alarm or danger as a consequence. Discharge of firecrackers or rockets during fiestas not covered by this article. Charivari a medley of discordant voices, a mock serenade of discordant noises made on kettles, tins, horns, etc. designed to annoy and insult. If the disturbance is of serious nature, the case falls under Article 153. Article 156. Delivering prisoners from jail
Elements: 1. There is a person confined in a jail or penal establishment; 2. Offender removes therefrom such person, or helps the escape of such person. Applies to any kind of prisoner, whether detention prisoner or prisoner by final judgment. Violence, intimidation or bribery increases the applicable penalty. If the escape of the prisoner takes place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the penalty is the minimum period of that prescribed. What is the liability of the prisoner who escapes? o If he is a detention prisoner, such person is not criminally liable. A prisoner is criminally liable for leaving the penal institution only when there is evasion of service of sentence, which can be committed only by a convict by final judgment.
Alberto vs. Dela Cruz Denaque escaped while working on the governors fence. Petition to include as defendants Governor Cledera and assistant provincial warden Esmeralda due to the belief that they had a hand in the escape of Pablo Denaque. Allegedly, the governor sent a note to Esmeralda asking for five men to work on his fence. HELD: The Governor and Esmeralda cannot be prosecuted for the offense. It is necessary that the public officer consented to or connived in the escape of the prisoner under his custody. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider. If the offender is a public officer, then Article 223 applies.
Article 157. sentence Elements:
Evasion
of
service
of
1. Offender is a convict by final judgment; 2. He is serving sentence which consists in the deprivation of liberty; 3. He evades service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment. Qualifying imposed: circumstances as to penalty
e. If such evasion or escape takes place -
1.
By means of unlawful entry (this should be by scaling if correct Spanish translation is used); 2. By breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors; 3. By using picklock, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation; or 4. Through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution. Escape flee from, to avoid, to get out of the way, as to flee to avoid arrest. Prisoners seen loitering a few meters away from the city jail are not considered to have escaped.
mutiny in which he has not participated; 3. He evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny; 4. He fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity. The offender must be a convict by final judgment. What is punished is not the leaving of the penal institution, but the failure of the convict to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours after the proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity. If convict fails to give himself up, he shall suffer and increase of 1/5 of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, not to exceed six months. If he gives himself up within 48 hours, he shall be entitled to 1/5 deduction of the period of his sentence. Mutiny organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer, a sedition, a revolt Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence (Violation of conditional pardon) Elements: 1. 2. 3. Offender was a convict; He was granted pardon by the Chief Executive; He violated any of the conditions of such pardon. A conditional pardon is a contract between the Chief Executive and the convict. Since it is a contract, the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its strict terms. If the penalty remitted does not exceed six years, penalty for violation of this article is prision correccional minimum. If the penalty remitted exceeds six years, the penalty under this article is the unexpired portion of the original sentence. Condition that pardoned convict should not commit another crime
This article is applicable to a sentence of destierro.

Tanega vs. Masakayan Tanega was found guilty of slander. He failed to show up on the day of the execution of the sentence imposed. HELD: Under Article 157, escape should take place while serving the sentence. For prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final judgment to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Never placed in confinement, prescription of penalty does not run in Tanegas favor. People vs. Abilong Abilong was sentenced to destierro by virtue of final judgment for attempted robbery. He violated this judgment by going beyond the limits made against him, and committed vagrancy. HELD: Abilong is guilty of evasion of service of sentence for having violated the judgment of destierro against him. Destierro is a deprivation of liberty (though partial) and he may escape from the restrictions of the penalty.
Article 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other calamities Elements: 1. Offender is a convict by final judgment, who is confined in a penal institution; 2. There is disorder, resulting from a. conflagration; b. earthquake; c. explosion; or d. similar catastrophe; or
extends to offenses punishable under special laws. If there is a condition that convict shall not commit another crime, offender must be found guilty of a subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under this article. The duration of the conditions in a pardon would be limited to the remaining period of the prisoners sentence, UNLESS an intention to extend it beyond that time was manifest from the nature of the condition or the language in which it was imposed. Violation of conditional pardon does not cause harm or injury to the right of other person nor does it disturb public order, it is merely an infringement of the terms stipulated in the contact between the Chief Executive and the convict.
Torres vs. Gonzales Torres was convicted of estafa. He was granted a conditional pardon and was released. Subsequent to his release, he was charged with 20 counts of estafa (cases pending), was convicted of sedition (appeal pending) and had a long list of crimes charged against him (grave threats, grave coercion, swindling etc.) HELD: Article 159 defines a distinct and substantive felony. Under this article, the convict must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by FINAL JUDGMENT before he can be made to suffer the penalty in said article. In proceeding against a convict who violated the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department may: 1) proceed against him under Section 64 (1) of the Revised Administrative Code or 2) proceed against him under this article of the RPC.
Quasi-recidivism does not require that the two offenses are embraced in the same title in the RPC, unlike in recidivism. Reiteracion requires that the offender has served out his sentences for the prior offense. In quasi recidivism, the offender is beginning to serve the sentence or is already serving the sentence. Quasi-recidivism cannot be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstance, because the article provides that the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the new felony. A quasi-recidivist shall be pardoned when he has reached 70 and has already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching 70, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances, he shall not be worthy of such clemency. A quasi-recidivist may NOT be pardoned even if he has reached 70 and has already served out his original sentence, if he is a habitual criminal. Take Note: Human Security Act of 2007 (RA 9372);
Define Terrorism; to
Attempt/Conspiracy Commit Terrorism;
How principals, accomplices and accessories are punished; Surveillance and Interception of suspected terrorist communication/ said communication considered classified information;
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of the penalty imposed for another previous offense Elements: 1. Offender was already convicted by final judgment of one offense; 2. He committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same. The second crime must be a felony, that is, punishable under the Revised Penal Code. But the first crime for which the offender is serving sentence need not be a felony. The new offense need not be of different character from that of the old offense.
Amount of damages paid to those detained wrongfully (P500k/day), taken from the budget of the government agency who caused his detention.

Esguerra Title 03 Public Order

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Esguerra Title 03 Public Order

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Title Three CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER Chapter One.

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 15

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 16

Article 134-A. committed Elements:

Persons liable for rebellion, insurrection or coup d' etat:

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 18

Are common crimes absorbed in sedition? NO, according to jurisprudence.

Article 141. sedition

There is no crime of proposal to commit sedition. Article 142. Inciting to sedition

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 20

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 21

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 22

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 23

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 24

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 27

Article 152. Persons in authority and Agents of persons in authority

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 29

Article 157. sentence Elements:

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 30

e. If such evasion or escape takes place -

This article is applicable to a sentence of destierro.

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 31

Attempt/Conspiracy Commit Terrorism;

C2005 Criminal Law 2 Reviewer 32

You might also like