iVIatch Point

Sports without Diplomacy

The United States, Cuba, and Basehall Thomas Garofalo
That President Richard Nixon made his signature break^

"''^'""* Garofalo is
a consultant to the New

through to Ghina with the help of "ping p o n g diplomacy" is one of the verities of U . S . diplomatic history. Since that
^ '

America Foundation's U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative and a trequent

achievement over forty years ago, those who would like to see an e n d to the long conflict between Guba a n d the United States have often looked to baseball, b o t h nations' shared
1 . i i r 1 l , l '

contributor to Th l^Toorh^Tr CathoUc Relief Se

es' Cuba program.

national pastime, as a bridge tor mutual understanding. While baseball has done its part to bring both countries together on various occasions over the years, the diplomatic impasse remains. In the United States, opposition to the Guban embargo has been constant and growing. This has been especially true since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which spelled the end of communist Guba's dreams of supporting armed revolution around the world. Yet, there rem^ain real differences today that cannot be wished away by bromides about how excessive and even counterproductive the policy may be. The embargo consists of a smothering mass of statutes, regulations, and practices that stifles much that could prove useful in addressing those differences. Ghange will come only through a concerted effort to change the infrastructure of inertia underlying relations, and cultural diplomacy can help a determined president make that effort.

^ ^

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The Obama administration has made minor changes to U.S. policy while toning down the previous administration's confrontational posture. That adjustment has also brought a small glimmer of hope that, at the right time, may facilitate more dramatic overtures. In fact, Guba and the United States share so many cultural touchstones that it is not difficult to imagine a diplomatic overture using cultural diplomacy to

mer. The trip never happened because, under the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Gontrol regulations, the U.S. government refused to accept that the Philharmonic's patrons fit under any licensable category for travel to Guba. This event was typical ofthe U.S. government's approach to Guba: it sought to prevent Guban and American citizens' efforts at public diplomacy.

Cuba and the United States share so

many cultural touchstones that it is not difficult to imagine a diplomatic overture using cultural diplomacy to advance a new relationship.
Official, bilateral diplomacy is ongoing. Ending a Bush administration hiatus in migration talks, Obama's Department of State has restarted biannual meetings. And it has pursued three longstanding avenues for official communication with the Guban governThe Difficulty of Cultural ment: information sharing on hurriEngagement and the Way canes and other meteorological monirOrWartl. Engagement of any kind toring, drug enforcement by coast guard between Gubans and Americans has services, and monthly "fence-walking" been deeply problematic. During the discussions related to the Guantanamo long years of conflict, cultural activi- Bay Naval Base. ties, including baseball, have provided Most importantly, perhaps, the rare opportunities for mutual regard Obama administration broke with the between both countries. Such activities, previous administration by lifting Bushhowever, have occurred with the bar- era bans on travel and remittances by est minimum of government support. Guban Americans. This was a substanIndeed, they have usually occurred tial move by President Obama because it in spite of government policies, not will likely have a greater impact in Guba because of them. than any of the administration's offiA recent example of this dynamic is cial, bilateral engagements. Not only the failed effort of the New York Phil- will it clear the way for a massive infuharmonic to travel to Guba's capital, sion of cash into Guba, improving genHavana, for performances last sum- eral welfare, but it will also support the advance a new relationship. Baseball, boxing, and other sports; jazz, hiphop, and salsa; literature, dance, and a host of other cultural activitiesall can be of use in bringing about a new day in U.S.-Guban relations.

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stated U.S. goal of supporting Cuba's nascent civil society in all its diversity. These changes have won the Obama administration a modicum of goodwill among allies in Latin America and around the world. But the administration has done nothing further. Indeed, as the Philharmonic failure shows, the White House is applying the brakes on bilateral relations as effectively as previous administrations have done. In fact, the United States under President Obama continues to enforce sanctions on Cuba that are tougher than those it imposes on any other government in the world. Therefore, it is unlikely that the goodwill will last. However disheartening this dynamic may be, awareness of it also points to suggestions for solutions. First, as Senator Richard Lugar recently recommended, the United States should pursue initiatives of mutual interest: greater engagement on hurricane preparation and natural disaster mitigation, drug interdiction and criminal law enforcement, and environmental study and policy. A more forward-looking policy could even seek creative opportunities to bring in non-governmental entities and to encourage more exchanges between professional counterparts in both countries. Second, the United States should stop enacting policies that run counter to its stated goals. It must avoid supporting civil society efforts that lack relevance and run afoul of Cuban law. Such initiatives often provoke unhelpful or even disastrous reactions. What purpose can cultural diplomacy serve in addressing this situation? It can do a great dealif both parties are serious about taking the relationship in a

new direction. As was the case with Nixon's China breakthrough, sports diplomacy can demystify the supposed enemy and diffuse tensions affecting both official engagement and the wider public. It is harder to demonize an adversary in the media when confronted with a different image: heavyweights from Cuba and the United States embracing one another at the end of a fight, or an American audience reduced to tears following the Cuban ballet's performance of Swan Lake. However, in the absence of a comprehensive strategy and a willingness to show that the United States in fact considers Cuba an equal and sovereign power, sports diplomacy will fall far short of achieving the kind of breakthrough that ping pong diplomacy did.

ago, diplomats at the highest levels of the American and Cuban governments were on the brink of a unique agreement that might have put their relationship on new footing after a few particularly problematic years. A U.S. baseball delegation flew to Havana in January 1999 with the blessing of the White House, only to see the enterprise go quickly and dramatically off course. In the midst of sensitive negotiations between the American delegation and senior officials in the Cuban government, the Associated Press reported that the Cubans were "annoyed that a representative from Catholic Relief Services . . . traveled to Cuba with [Baltimore Orioles owner Peter] Angelos to suggest ways to distribute the proceeds. "' Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is the U.S. Catholic Bishops' overseas devel-

The Politics of Civil Society in uh h a . A Uttle more than a decade i C C

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opment agency. Orioles owner Angelos and National Archive founder Scott Armstrong had invited CRS President Ken Hackett and Baltimore's Catholic archbishop William Cardinal Keeler to participate in the initiative.^ The organizers reasoned that a series between a Cuban team and the Baltimore Orioles would have a better chance of success if the Catholic Church was involved. In the aftermath of the highly successful visit of John Paul II to Cuba a year earlier, many reasonably expected that the Church could serve as an intermediary between the governm^ents. However, for the Cuban government^which denied that a category of poor Cubans even existeda Catholic charity's involvement in dispersing proceeds to help the less fortunate was a non-starter. The Cuban government's views notwithstanding, CRS had managed a growing program of humanitarian assistance to Cubans since 1994 in cooperation with its sister agency in Cuba, Caritas. For these Catholic social service agencies, the causes of Cuba's poverty could never be addressed until the United States and Cuba ended their mutual isolation. The two countries' longstanding political conflict punished the poor and shattered the Cuban family. The bishops hoped that the games would spark greater openness on both sides and at least provide an opportunity for dialogue. Caritas director Rolando Suarez was a strong advocate of the effort. Suarez, like most Cubans, is a baseball fan. But more than that, the idea appealed to him because the games would force the hardliners in Miami and Cuba to defend a status quo that he regarded as clearly untenable, even absurd.

Suarez is a savvy operator in the ruthless world of the Cuban conflict, and his goal has been to shake up the "status quo" as much as possible. Since the status quo was in fact a frozen relationship in which both sides eagerly avoided non-essential contact, forcing the adversaries into some kind of mutual regard was necessary. It was this Cold War constructthis status quothat Suarez intended to damage. A baseball contest between the United States and Cuba would, at minimum, force these adversaries to work out the details of the contest and, more significantly, bring m^illions of Americans and Cubans to take a second look at the dysfunctional relationship reigning over Washington, Miami, and Havana. Suarez and his American and Cuban allies wanted to drag the two rivals into a struggle over the meaning of the games and to hold the anachronism up to the stark illumination of a night baseball game. In largely the same spirit. Cardinal Jaime Ortega, Catholic archbishop of Havana, had given his imprimatur to the games. Ortega and the Cuban bishops deplored the breakdown in official relations between the United States and Cuba and had consistently opposed the embargo, denouncing it as early as 1969 as an "unjust situation . . . which adds unnecessary suffering" to Cubans.^ Orioles owner Peter vVngelos, whose love of the game and distaste for senseless policy brought Orioles and Major League Baseball officials to Havana, harbored these lofty motives as well.* Baseball fans, having experienced Cuba's unique baseball prowess, history, and folklore, viewed the U.S.-

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Cuba standoff through a different lens. They treat the matter of Cuba much like the rest of Americans do, but are more passionate about the subject: they might not like communism^ or the Castros, but they do not see the purpose of the U.S. embargo.^ The Orioles, for example, have donated baseball equipment and uniforms to Cuba and the Dominican Republic for years, relying on CRS to equitably distribute it. Baseball fans also have a more intimate view of the human cost of the conflict. The documentary Lost Son of Havanaabout famed Major League Baseball pitcher Luis Tiant's long road back to Cuba in 2008 after a forty-year absencepoignantly illustrates that cost; the Cuban experience of exile has affected generations of American ballplayers. Politics, unfortunately, failed baseball fans. The 1999 U.S.-Cuban games were a partial triumph, not of "baseball diplomacy" but of baseball alone. In that respect, they are like m.ost of the cultural events involving Cuban and U.S. participants over the years: they succeeded despite the efforts of those who opposed any kind of engagement between the peoples of the two countries. Such opponents, with diverse motivations, fear those rare moments when Cubans of different factions see themselves as one nation and one people. Months after the Havana game, as the Orioles readied for their follow-up game in Baltimore, then U.S. Representative Robert Menendez's comment to the press clearly expressed that posture: "While the Orioles think this is just an athlete contest, in my mind this is about the world series of human rights and w^e're going to be there rooting for Democracy."^

Cuba and China: Approaches

W o r l d s A p a r t . For many, the Orioles' effort evoked memories of Nixon's celebrated ping-pong diplomacy. In an unprecedented overture in April IQjl, the Chinese government welcomed the U.S. table tennis team to China. The rift between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China gave Chairman Mao an incentive to reach out to the United States. For his part. President Nixon saw rapprochement with China as a necessary step for the United States to exit Vietnam. Sports diplomacy was a way to push forward for both countries. Wildly positive media coverage rendered Nixon's diplomatic efforts easier, and he sent his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, to China for secret talks that summer. Early the following year, Nixon went himself, scoring the signature triumph of his presidency and cementing a unique diplomatic legacy. Yet, the state of U.S.-Cuban relations reveals how far-fetched this analogy is. Although the United States's relationship with Cuba festered for a few years in the 1970s, it is not appreciably different forty years later. Today, an American president intent on reshaping the relationship would certainly incur risks akin to those run by President Nixon in the China effort. However, courageous and decisive steps would serve American interests and thus yield rewards that have long eluded it. Progress on solving the conflict with Cuba is in the United States's interest for two reasons. First, the embargo and the United States's general punitive approach to Cuba present a growing problem for American alliances in Latin America and around the world.

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Where once comprehensive sanctions were formerly justified by Guban meddling in other countries, the global consensus today is that the embargo's effects are disproportionate to Guba's human rights transgressions. This is typified hy the United Nations General Assembly's annual, lopsided vote against the embargo. Second, the consensus of the policy communityfrom the Brookings Institution to the Gato Institute and, tellingly, the Guba Study Groupis that the embargo, by undermining relations with Guba, is counterproductive to enhancing U.S. security and facilitating greater progress on human rights and other issues where the United States and Guba diverge. Although a Guban-American consensus created and sustained the comprehensive sanctions that exist today, even that community is increasingly abandoning the idea that the U.S. em^bargo can bring the change they desire for their homeland.

Guban exile organization Brothers to the Rescue. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy. President Bill Glinton signed the Helms-Burton Act, tightening the embargo that he had steadfastly opposed. He also accepted a new provision in the act that mandated a congressional vote to end the embargo, placing a substantial part of U.S. Guba policy beyond executive influence. The course was set: the United States would not pursue a unilateral thaw in relations. The Guban government did not react immediately when President Glinton signed Helms-Burton into law. By 1999' however, the Gubans had reached the limits of their tolerance for U.S. legislative actions. In March, the same month in which the Orioles and Cuba's national team played their Havana contest, the Cuban National Assembly passed Law 88, which mandated prison terms of up to twenty years for any Cuban carrying out activities funded under Helms-Burton.

Th length of stagnant U.S.-Cuba reltiOnS contributes to the political inertia that President Obama seems content to prolong.
The opportunities presented to the Obama Administration are ones that did not exist during the Clinton presidency. Threatened by the Cuban-American lobby and compelled by Fidel Castro's provocative actions. President Clinton followed a different path. Whatever the administration had wanted to achieve concerning relations with Cuba was rendered unrealistic when, on 24 February 1996, the pilots of Cuban MiGs shot down two Gessnas aircraft piloted by Jos Basulto's Helms-Burton eventually led to a series of Cuba policy measures by the Clinton administration, culminating in a 5 January 1999 announcement just days before the start of the Orioles' mission to Havana. These measures included promoting people-to-people contacts through expanded, licensed categories of U.S. travelers; easing restrictions on flights to Cuba and on remittances to Cubans; authorizing direct mail service; and permitting the sale of food to non-governmental buyers in Cuba.

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One of the provisions authorized the Orioles' trip, which the media already touted as "baseball diplomacy." These moves followed a set of similar changes from the previous year that allowed direct flights to the island, modest remittances by Cuban-Americans to family on the island, and liberalized rules for the shipment of medicines to charities. Announcing these policies in a PBS NewsHour interview. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly stated that the United States intended to support the Guban people while pushing the repressive Cuban regime toward democratic change. Asked if any of the measures had been negotiated with the Cuban government, Albright responded, "Not at all."'' The administration's pronouncements reveal the shortcomings of its approach to baseball diplomacy. Indeed, if diplomacy is the art of conducting negotiations between states, the administration was not practicing diplomacy of any kind. Furthermore, by declaring that the games be played for the benefit of Caritas Cuba, Secretary Albright put both the Orioles and Garitas in an exceedingly difficult position.^ Instead of allowing the two sides to simply plan and play the games, the declaration linked the game to the broader effort to develop a civil society that the Glinton administration conceived as oppositional to the regime. By announcing the destination ofthe proceeds, the administration also effectively removed the Guban government from, a meaningful role in the negotiations. In one fell swoop, the games became a point of contentionanother front in the conflictrather than an opportunity to demonstrate goodwill.

Gonsidering the political context at the time of these sensitive negotiations, it is unsurprising that the Clinton administration was not eager to throw its weight behind the 1999 U.S.-Guban baseball games. That the games were played at all is a testament to the perseverance and strong political influence ofthe Orioles' management and Major League Baseball.

Conclusion, in retrospect, Nixon's

ping-pong diplomacy w^as the visible part of a much bolder and more decisive move to recognize the People's Republic of Ghina. Nixon realized that Ghina would factor into all American relationships in Asia, and he was therefore willing to take the steps necessary to lay the relationship's foundation. The incentives that prompted Nixon to change U.S. policy toward Ghina are almost entirely absent from the U.S.-Guba relationship. While Vietnam motivated President Nixon to seek relations with China, there is no compelling reason to "fix" the Cuba problem. The length of stagnant U.S.-Cuba relations contributes to the political inertia that President Obama seems content to prolong. In fact. President Obama's policy changes toward Cubaamong others, slackening telecommunications rules and easing travel restrictions for those with family on the islandcontained little that could be considered a gesture toward Cuba. In essence, they represented the fulfillment of campaign promises to GubanAmericans. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the tone of the Obama administration. This is in part due to the relative moderation of Obama's Cuba

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policy, following the strident posturing it is not hard to imagine that a cultural of the Bush administration. More- eventperhaps an Old Timers' Game over, potentiall breakthrough events between U.S. and Cuban All-Stars continue to present themselves. The could help warm the frozen relation"Peace Without Borders" concert, per- ship if combined with even limited talks formed by Colombian superstar Juanes on substantive matters. Human rights in Havana in August 2009, showed will remain a sticking point as long as that major cultural events can sway Cuba maintains its totalitarian tenCuban-American opinion, providing dencies. Nonetheless, once the United an opportunity for reevaluating stand- States ends the most extrem.e provisions ing U.S. policy and imagining new of its sanctions regime and engages possibilities. After one million Cubans Cuba on a multilateral basis, the two gathered in Revolution Square to hear governments can openly, and perhaps Juanes and other starsincluding some productively, discuss human rights. considered opposed to the Castro We will know whether real change is regimeprominent Cuban-American afoot if the President or his envoys use Sergio Pino wrote in the The Miami Her- a future Juanes concert as an opportuald that it was time for change in U.S. nity to justify a genuine shift in policy. policy toward Cuba. While the Cuban In the case of the New York Philhargovernment continues to force Cubans monic, if the Treasury Department had to live under "brutal and humiliating decreed that not only could the patrons conditions," it was nonetheless time go but also that all musical groups and to change U.S. policy: "Juanes opened their donors could travel under a genthe door to change . . . With three eral license to Cuba, then they would Cuban-American members of Con- have heralded a new era of relations. gress, and one in the Senate, and many The Orioles initiative fought an irrewell-meaning Cuban-American lead- sistible tide of ill will. It is something ers of hundreds of different political of a miracle that it happened at all. organizations in exile, it is time for Somedaymost likely after both Castro one of them to come forward and unite brothers have left the political scene us behind a new and more effective and change is no longer considered a approach that focuses on the Cuban synonym for defeata baseball game, people first."^ Pino's position perfectly a massive concert, or another visit by illustrates the potential for cultural a pope will lead a U.S. administration diplomacy. into new territory with its Cuba policy. While President Obama's response to the concert was decidedly reserved. Hopefully then, the long war will have ended.

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NOTES
1. Cubanet, "Angelos Wants Clinton's Help to Save Orioles-Cuba Game," 29 January 1999, Internet, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y99/ jan99/29e6.htm (date accessed: I^ March 2OIO). 2. Jeff Stein, "Foul Ball: the State Department Interferes With the Second Cuba-Orioles Came," Salon, 30 April 1999. 3. Agenzia Fides, "Cuban Bishops' Statement with Regard to Economic Measures Decided By Governments of Cuba and the United States," 7 February 2004, Internet, http://www.fides.org/ cism," 26 March 1999. Internet, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/i999/03/25'' cuba_package/ (date accessed: 14 March 2OIO). 6. Charles Cohen, "Orioles Attempt to Make Cuban Game Simply Baseball," 30 April 1999, Internet, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y99/ apr99/3Oe4.htm (date accessed: 15 March 2010). 7. PBS OnlineNewsHour, "A NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript: Online Focus Madeline Albright," 7 February 2OOO, Internet, http://www.

pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june99'' albright_I-5.html (date accessed: 14 March 2010). a e e e p p 8. Paula Pettavino and Philip Brenner, "The (date accessed: 15 March 2010). Role of Sports in Cuba's Domestic and Interna4. Mark Hyman, "Peter Angelos: The Toughest Bird in Baltimore," BusinessWeek, IO May 1999;t i o n a l Policy," Georgetown University Cuba Briefing Paper Series no. 21 (April 1999): 9-IO. David Corn, "A 37-Year Losing Streak," 14. May 9. Sergio Pino, "The Door to Change is Open," 1999' Internet, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/ Miami Herald, 9 September I999, Internet, http:// david/cornO5I499.3sp (date accessed: 14 March www.miamiherald.com/2009/09/29/i256929/ 2010). the-door-to-change-is-open.html (date accessed: 5. CNN/Sports Illustrated, "Political Hardball: 15 March 2010). Orioles' Catne in Cuba Drawing Plenty of Criti-

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