Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language

William F. Hanks
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, California 947203710; email: wfhanks@berkeley.edu

Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 2005. 34:6783 First published online as a Review in Advance on May 23, 2005 The Annual Review of Anthropology is online at anthro.annualreviews.org doi: 10.1146/ annurev.anthro.33.070203.143907 Copyright c 2005 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved 0084-6570/05/10210067$20.00

Key Words
habitus, eld, symbolic power, discourse, linguistics

Abstract
This paper synthesizes research on linguistic practice and critically examines the legacy of Pierre Bourdieu from the perspective of linguistic anthropology. Bourdieu wrote widely about language and linguistics, but his most far reaching engagement with the topic is in his use of linguistic reasoning to elaborate broader sociological concepts including habitus, eld, standardization, legitimacy, censorship, and symbolic power. The paper examines and relates habitus and eld in detail, tracing the former to the work of Erwin Panofsky and the latter to structuralist discourse semantics. The principles of relative autonomy, boundedness, homology, and embedding apply to elds and their linkage to habitus. Authority, censorship, and euphemism are traced to the eld, and symbolic power is related to misrecognition. And last, this chapter relates recent work in linguistic anthropology to practice and indicates lines for future research.

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Contents
READING BOURDIEU . . . . . . . . . . . . HABITUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FIELD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LANGUAGE STANDARDIZATION AND CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LANGUAGE, LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . CENSORSHIP AND EUPHEMISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SYMBOLIC POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 69 72

75 76 76 77 78

READING BOURDIEU
The rst challenge for a linguistic anthropologist reading Bourdieu is Bourdieus own language. It is terse in papers like The Berber House (1973), dense and reexive in the Outline (1977) and The Field of Cultural Production (1993), and willfully obscure in Reproduction (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). He argues against theoretical programs and their terminologies but advances his own program and terminology. His vocabulary derives from elds as diverse as economics, art history, literature, linguistics, philosophy of language, statistics, and social theory (particularly structuralist and Marxist), along with the layers of specic literature bearing on North Africa, French society, and history. Yet he rejects critical presuppositions that attach to the language in its own eld (e.g., competition, monopoly, supply, demand, capital) (1985, p. 19). Throughout the writings he uses linguistic-semiotic terms, such as arbitrariness, generativity, invariance, and structure, but he dismisses much of the linguistics and semiotics from which they are drawn. He was also embedded in several debates over such basic topics as reason, intentionality, and political thought and was himself politically engaged. His linguistic wager was that he could absorb selected terms and
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concepts from other elds, while excluding much of the intellectual baggage they usually carry. The result is that readers unaware or unsympathetic to his wager will nd Bourdieus prose paradoxical, inconsistent, or opaque. It also opens him to withering criticism such as Hasan (1999), who attacks his claims about language. To understand Bourdieus language, we must situate it in the conceptual universe of practice theory, including the empirical analyses through which the theory was developed and to which it is adapted (Goodman 2003). The attempt was to join theory and analysis in empirically grounded scientic sociology (Bourdieu 1985, p. 11; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp. 22447) on the basis of the relational mode of thinking (Bourdieu 1977). This is well illustrated in the ethnographic treatment of honor, kinship, agricultural practice, domestic space, the body, the calendar (Bourdieu 1977), the use of statistics (1977, 1979), survey data on audiences and sales (1993, pp. 85, 88, 98), and historical background to generalizations about literature and art in nineteenth-century France (1993, part II). The language of practice is focused not on nished objects, but on processes of construction, networks of interarticulation, and varieties of reexivity. This is true whether the object is symbolic structure (Bourdieu 1973), political action (1991b), Flaubert (Bourdieu 1993), the French academy (1988), or the judgment of taste (1979). There is little point in proposing xed denitions of his basic terms because they get their sense from the relational work they do in analysis. A student of language can read Bourdieu in at least two ways. The rst way is to focus on what Bourdieu says about language and linguistics, on topics such as performativity and description, censorship, and legitimate language (1991b). Similarly, we could confront him on his readings of Saussure, Chomsky, Austin, Benveniste, Labov, and other language theorists (Hasan 1999). The result would be to focus on what Bourdieu claimed about language and linguistics, usually in the

course of a polemic. Important though it is, the problem with this way of reading is that it reveals more about Bourdieu than about language. A more productive approach is what can be called a second-degree reading: Bracket what Bourdieu claims about language directly, and focus instead on what he says about other aspects of social life. The fact is that his treatment of a range of social phenomena apart from language bears the trace of linguistic reasoning, sometimes ltered through structuralism and sometimes not. His intellectual debt to linguistics and semiotics as a way of thinking is greatest perhaps when it goes unexplored, for instance in the symbolic analysis of the Berber house (1973), the development of the eld concept (1985, 1991a, 1993), the principle of autonomy applying to elds, the arbitrariness of classication, and the generative capacity of habitus and the competence of those who have it. Moreover, when talking about language, Bourdieu seldom if ever approaches the level of empirical specicity needed to assess his claims, whereas on other topics he does. To borrow his own terms, the rst degree of reading denes language as the object or opus operatum about which claims are made, whereas the second degree of reading treats linguistic reasoning as a modus operandi, partly independent of what he is talking about. Although both are important, we are concerned here about the latter.

HABITUS
One of the widely cited concepts developed by Bourdieu was his idea of the habitus. At base, habitus concerns reproduction insofar as what it explains are the regularities immanent in practice. It explains regularity by reference to the social embedding of the actor, the fact that actors are socially formed with relatively stable orientations and ways of acting. The stability of the habitus is not expressed in rules, which Bourdieu rejects, but in habits, dispositions to act in certain ways, and schemes of perception that order individual perspectives along socially dened lines.

Through the habitus, society is impressed on the individual, not only in mental habits, but even more in corporeal ones. Citing Mauss (1973, p. 117), social embedding is realized in ways of moving, gesturing, gazing, and orienting in lived space (Csordas 1994, Eneld 2005, C. Goodwin 2000, Hanks 1990, Haviland 2000, Kendon 1997). For language, the habitus bears on the social denition of the speaker, mentally and physically, on routine ways of speaking, on gesture and embodied communicative actions, and on the perspectives inculcated through ordinary referential practice in a given language (Ochs 1996). We can distinguish three lines of thought joined in the concept of habitus. The rst is the Aristotelian idea of the hexis, which Bourdieu treats as the individual disposition that joins desire (intention) with judgment (evaluation). This idea will become the modus operandi of practical action, the guiding frame of reference that aligns intention with judgments of good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate. Speakers have hexis insofar as they enact through speech expressive intentions and the metalinguistic evaluations that guide both themselves and their understanding of others. The second strand in habitus is the phenomenological ideas of habituality and corporeal schema (Bourdieu 1985, p. 14; Merleau-Ponty 1962). The critical shift here is from disposition to embodiment. The corporeal schema of Merleau-Ponty (1962) is neither a representation of the body, nor a sheerly physical understanding of it. Rather, it is the prise de conscience, the momentary grasp that the actor has of being a body. This includes, grasped jointly, both the actual postural disposition of the body and the background horizon of other postural arrangements that are possible but not actual. At this point, Bourdieu, like the phenomenologists, is concerned with the familiarity and immediacy of corporeal experience, both of which are inherited by the habitus. For language, the question is how speakers grasp their own engagement in communicative practice, both verbal
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and gestural. On this point there is overlap between habitus and language ideology as studied in linguistic anthropology. The third line of habitus is more concrete and detailed. It is the approach developed by the art historian Erwin Panofsky. In general, Panofsky adapted the scholastic concept of habitus to cultural production in medieval France. Closer to mentalism than to phenomenology, Panofsky dened habitus in terms of habits of mind that lay behind Gothic architecture and scholastic philosophy, arguing in effect that cultural production is profoundly shaped by the ways of the thinking of its time. Let us look more closely at his thesis to better understand the habitus of linguistic practice. Panofsky (1976 [1951]) developed a concept of habitus that is the immediate mental counterpart of Bourdieus use of the term. Bourdieu translated Panofskys book into French in 1967, and wrote a postface to the French edition, in which he comments on the importance of the art historians notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1974 [1967]). To my knowledge, this is the rst usage of the term in Bourdieus published writing. Panofskys starting point is the observation that there are strong parallels between Gothic architecture and scholastic philosophy, which developed within a 100 mile radius of Paris, over about a century and a half (Panofsky 1976, pp. 45). Following a concise overview of trends in the two elds between 1130 and 1270, the concentrated phase of this astonishingly synchronous development, Panofsky states his central thesis: that this is more than mere parallelismit is
a genuine cause and effect inuence, but in contrast to an individual inuence, this cause-and-effect relation comes about by diffusion rather than by direct impact. It comes about by the spreading of what may be called, for want of a better term, a mental habitreducing this overworked clich e to its precise Scholastic sense as a principle that regulates the act, principium importans ordinem ad actum. Such mental habits are at
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work in all and every civilization. (Panofsky 1976, pp. 2021).

Panofsky is careful to distinguish the notional content of cultural products from what he calls the modus operandi of their production, the procedures through which they are produced. It is the modus operandi, not the opus operatum, the procedure not the work, that bears the mental habit (Panofsky 1976, p. 27). Thus, the principle of transparency governed architectural design, as clarication governed scholastic thought. Cathedrals were designed with an eye to totality, symmetry, and replication of homologous parts, as arguments were based on distinctiveness, deductive cogency, the mutual inferability among parts, and explicitness (Panofsky 1976, pp. 43 58). Using the twin Scholastic principles of manifestatio and concordatia, he argues for the existence of a visual logic that would have structured the Scholastic view of architecture, unifying, for instance, material stability with textual authority, and subtending the mental habits of clarication, contradiction, and resolution (Panofsky 1976, pp. 6868). Bourdieu was sufciently moved by this work to undertake its translation and to describe it as sans nul doute un des plus beaux d es qui ait jamais e t e lanc e au positivisme (without any doubt one of the most beautiful challenges ever leveled at positivism). As he did repeatedly in subsequent writings, he seizes on the importance of modus operandi as opposed to the notional content of cultural works, quoting Panofsky who described these as fundamental principles that support the choice and presentation of motifs as well as the production and interpretation of images, stories and allegories (Bourdieu 1974 [1967], pp. 13739).1 Among the several basic lessons

In this review, Bourdieus postface is cited as Bourdieu 1974. All translations from French by W.F. Hanks, unless otherwise noted. Bourdieu read widely in Panofskys works, citing this quoted passage from Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art.

Bourdieu draws from Panofsky is the need to reject the dichotomy between individual creativity as embodied in singular works and collective values as embodied in the habitus that guides the creation of those works (Bourdieu 1974, p. 142). He goes on to contrast structural methods, which catalog homologies between symbols and systems, with Panofskys search for the underlying, mostly unconscious principles that give rise to those homologies. The latter, inculcated in schools and embodied in the habitus, are generative schemes that cut across different spheres of cultural production, generating both works and thoughts (Bourdieu 1974, p. 152). Bourdieu suggests a comparison to Chomskys generative grammar then later refers to the Saussurian idea of parole (speech) to suggest the existence of generative schemes whose effects can be perceived only in the works (parole, performance) in which they are realized (Bourdieu 1974, p. 160).2 He writes,
. . . the habitus of the creator as a system of schemes constantly orients choices which, while not deliberate are nonetheless systematic, which without being ordered and organized expressly in relation to an ultimate end, are nonetheless bearers of a sort of nality which reveals itself only post festum: that self-constitution of a system of works united by an ensemble of signicant relations is accomplished in and through the association of contingency and sense which is made, unmade and remade ceaselessly according to principles that are all the more constant that they more completely escape consciousness. . .. (Bourdieu 1974, pp. 161 62).

TABLE 1 Mental habits

Two denitions of habitus To Bourdieu Embodied habituality Eye, gaze Inclination, posture Labor of the body Embodied schema Mobility Achieved via reproduction Exercised in ordinary practice Diachrony, emergence Occupancy of domestic space Links actor to elds Misrecognition, doxa Regulates practice

From Panofsky Evaluative perspective Desire/intention Cultural production Mental schema Execution Achieved via training Exercised in expert practice Relative synchrony (spirit of age) Design of ritual space Links philosophy to architecture Belief, ideology Regulates action

If we substitute speaker for creator we have here a cogent summary of his approach

to utterance production. The nal issue Bourdieu addresses in this Postface is innovation. Must we, he asks, revert to irreducible individual creativity to explain the work of those, like Abb e Suger, who break from the esthetic traditions of their time? In effect, he responds in the negative, asserting the necessity of habitus as the social, generative, unifying principle that makes intelligible the singularity of the individual creator (Bourdieu 1974, pp. 165 66).3 Panofskys notion of habitus is focused on design and does not extend to the embodied experience of being within the built spaces of Gothic cathedrals. By 1972, Bourdieu had explicitly rejected mentalism and proposed that the body, not the mind, was the site of habitus (1977). This shift has numerous entailments, summarized in Table 1. The left column in Table 1 summarizes Panofskys approach in terms of its elements, although not in the precise terms that he used. The mental habits that caused the homologies between philosophy and architecture have become embodied habits, engaging

This is the rst time, to my knowledge, that Bourdieu compares the habitus with a generative grammar, a misleading and ultimately failed comparison that was nonetheless salient to him in 1967, when the Postface was written (Hanks 1993).

Students of linguistic anthropology will be reminded here of Sapirs Speech as a Personality Trait, where he spells out the necessity of social basis without which individual style is unintelligible (Sapir 1985). See also Eckert & Rickford (2001). 71

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both mind and body. The evaluative perspective, once embodied, emerges as active perception, and the intentional states of desire and purpose become the inclination of body posture. On these points, which together dene hexis, Bourdieu comes to rely more on Merleau-Ponty (1945) than on Panofsky. The cultural production of the philosopher and architect becomes the labor of the body. The mental schemas become embodied schemes of perception and understanding. The active process of production works through the body in motion and gesture. The inculcation of the mental habits through specialized training becomes the discipline of the body through the repeated regularities of ordinary practice. Whereas Panofsky sought to dene the spirit of the age as a relatively synchronous system of ideas, Bourdieu foregrounds the temporal open-endedness of habitus. Where the former examined the design of monumental ritual spaces, the latter was concerned with the actual occupancy of ordinary spaces, particularly the household. Panofsky derived the regularities of philosophy and architecture from his version of habitus, and Bourdieu derived the regularities of ordinary embodied practice from his redened habitus. Finally, although Panofsky does not speak of belief or ideology, the habitus he discerns is an intellectual formation complete with principles, premises, and self-justifying judgments. These elements emerge in practice sociology as misrecognition and doxa, that is, the false belief that society operates on reason and merit and the unquestioning adherence to its order. From a language perspective, habitus corresponds to the social formation of speakers, including the disposition to use language in certain ways, to evaluate it according to socially instilled values, to embody expression in gesture, posture, and speech production (Arno 2003, Bucholtz 1999, Farnell 2000, Ochs 1996, Ruthrof 2000, Streeck 2003). It was developed to explain reproduction without rules. It follows that in a practice approach to language, regularities of usage are not explained by rules, codes, or conventions but
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by embodied dispositions and schemas, which are not followed or obeyed but are actualized in speech. Obviously, such an approach must have a way of treating context because the habitus neither arises in a vacuum, nor is it actualized in a vacuum. This leads to Bourdieus idea of the eld, to which we now turn. Habitus, he says, emerges specically in the interaction between individuals and the eld, and it has no independent existence apart from the eld (Bourdieu 1993, p. 349).

FIELD
As dened in practice theory, a eld is a form of social organization with two main aspects: (a) a conguration of social roles, agent positions, and the structures they t into and (b) the historical process in which those positions are actually taken up, occupied by actors (individual or collective). For instance, if demanding instructor or motivated student are positions in the academic eld, they are taken up in the course of such situated activities as seminar discussion, grading, and evaluation. Ready examples of elds are primary education, the academy, the eld of artistic production, discipline-based elds such as anthropology or linguistics, and the eld of organized religion. The idea is that each of these can be treated as a space of positions and position takings. Like the duality of perception schemes and practices of perceiving in the habitus, the duality of position and position taking make any eld a dynamic form of organization, not a xed structure. Within a eld, positions are dened by opposition, such as teacher = student, author = literary agent = reviewer, or judge = jury = defendant in a legal proceeding. This sense of opposition is a case of relational thinking, derived primarily from structuralism. Among his sources, Bourdieu cites Trier (Bourdieu 1993, p. 314), Tynianov and the Russian formalists (Bourdieu 1985, p. 17), Cassirer, and Jakobson (Bourdieu 1977). Thus the linguistic analogs of the concept are readily apparent: semantic eld, any paradigmatic array of opposed terms, any

system of literary genres. Moreover, like a language for the Prague School linguists, a eld is durable but not xed; it exists in a dynamic synchrony. If the positions in a eld are related to one another by opposition, the agents who take up positions are related by struggle and competition. [Compare Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1992) on communities of practice.] From the viewpoint of action, any eld is a space of strategic possibilities in which actors have potential moves and courses of action, an idea Bourdieu (1993, p. 314) credits to Foucault. This shift from structure and dynamic synchrony to action and history is intended to move beyond classic structuralism (Brubaker 1993; Calhoun 1993; de Certeau 1984, 1988; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991). It also implies another key element, namely that values circulate in any eld and are the basis of competition among agents. This circulation of value includes such things as prestige, recognition, and authority, but also material wealth and capital. Relative to a eld, any agent has a trajectory or career consisting of the positions it has occupied, how they were taken up, how they were vacated, etc. Hence from a practice perspective, speaking and discourse production are ways of taking up positions in social elds, and speakers have trajectories over the course of which they pursue various values (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 34546; compare Spitulnik 1996, Urban 2001). In so doing, they are formed by the eld. This is the point at which habitus and eld articulate: Social positions give rise to embodied dispositions. To sustain engagement in a eld is to be shaped, at least potentially, by the positions one occupies. The speaker who produces discourse in a eld like the academy comes to be shaped by the positions (s)he takes up and the forms of discourse they call forth. Already molded to the eld, the habitus shapes the individual in a way similar to Eliass (2000) civilizing process or Pascals formation of the believer through the practice of prayer and the pomp of spectacle (Pascal 1976, pp. 116, 118, 127, 139143; Bourdieu 1997). The eld

thus becomes not an external feature of context but a formative input that shapes the individual through the habitus. To describe a social phenomenon as a eld is therefore to focus on certain of its features: the space of positions, the historical processes of their occupancy, the values at stake, the career trajectories of agents, and the habitus shaped by engagement. Compared with a term like context, eld is both more specic and more consequential. The factors already cited give rise to additional features found in any eld, including three specied by Bourdieu (1985, pp. 2021): (a) a language game in which certain ends are pursued with certain discursive resources according to established guidelines, (b) a set of beliefs and assumptions that undergird the game, and (c) the specic stakes at play (what is to be lost or gained, how, and by whom). These factors could be illustrated with the language games of argument, publication, and discussion in the academy, all based on the beliefs that rational analysis and effective rhetoric are skills that mark good work, and productivity is measured by discourse production in recognized genres (Kroskrity 2000, Schieffelin et al. 1998, Woolard & Schieffelin 1994). These beliefs further feed into the denition of the habitus and are activated in the choices, hopes, and expectations of agents in the eld. Therefore, struggles over particular stakes reinforce the ground rules of the game as well as the dispositions of its players (Bourdieu 1991b, p. 57). This circularity is a type of reexivity central to practice theory. Irrespective of the intentions, aims, or understandings of any of the players, practice in the eld reproduces the demands of the eld in the embodied dispositions of the players. One nal feature contrasts the concept of eld from that of context as usually understood in language studies. Any eld is relatively bounded, not by walls or natural barriers but by constraints on who can engage in which positions. This bounding is illustrated in institutional settings by certications, specialized training, competitive selection,
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class-based exclusions or inclusions, and economic or symbolic resources. The idea is not that any eld has a discrete, accepted border around it, but that access is always differential and selective. Thus the degree granting training of scientists, the exclusivity of elite schools and companies, the religious training and disciplines of organized religions, and the limits on access to the media in politics are all boundary mechanisms that help dene the elds in which they operate. Whereas discourse context as usually understood is the surround of an utterance or form, the eld with its boundaries assumes no discursive act at its center. It exists prior to and apart from any particular utterance or engagement and is in this sense objective. There are many elds in any society, and this raises the question of how they relate to one another. One important relation is similarity of organization, which Bourdieu calls homology. There are homologies between the literary and artistic elds, in which evaluation and consumption of genres is differential in parallel ways. Similarly, access to capital and leisure is differential in the economic eld. The outsider artist is to the eld of artistic production as the poor are to the eld of economy because both stand in a relation of marginal exclusion (Bourdieu 1993). Bourdieus interest in homologies is already at work in the habitus and probably derived from his reading of Panofsky, reinforced by the premium he placed on relational thinking. For our purposes, it points toward comparison among different elds in terms of their positions, position takings, distributions of value and resources, habitus, and so forth. A study focused on language would compare elds in terms of their discursive resources, the kinds of effects they have when put to use, the sorts of strategies producers (speakers) pursue and the ends they achieve. Beyond their topological similarities, elds may be concretely articulated in what we can call embedding relations. For instance, the eld of literary production is embedded in the eld of power, which is, in turn, embed74 Hanks

ded in the eld of class relations (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 38, 319). Here there is more than homology at stake because the embedded eld is, to a degree, organized by the embedding one(s). A eld based on, contained within, or constrained by another eld is, to that degree, nonautonomous, whereas one whose organizing elements are specic to itself is autonomous. For example, an academic department in a public university in contemporary U.S.A. can be looked at as a eld embedded within the broader elds of the discipline, the institution, higher education, and the sources of research funding. To the extent that the departmental eld is organized by the mandates of these other elds it is nonautonomous, whereas it is autonomous insofar as it has its own functioning principles. (See also Bachnik & Quinn 1994.) One kind of eld central to linguistic practice is the deictic eld, namely the socially dened context of utterance in which language is used for various purposes, including reference and description, the performance of speech acts, and ordinary verbal interaction (Hanks 2005). The positions in the deictic eld include minimally the participant frames of Spr, Adr, Object, and their numerous multiparty analogs (Goffman 1981, Goodwin 1981, Hymes 1972); the spatial and temporal setting; and the indexical parameters in which participants have access to each other and the situation around them. In the course of speaking, interactants take up and vacate positions, and they act within them and upon them. Embedded within the deictic eld are settings, dened by interactive relevance, and situations, dened by the mutual perceptibility of the parties. Given that linguistic practice takes place in virtually every sphere of social life, the deictic eld is in turn embedded in one or another social elds: The interactant in verbal practice speaks as a proponent of a position in political debate, as a boss or worker, as a preacher, as legal counsel, as therapist or patient, as a kinsman in the domestic eld. The deictic eld is relatively autonomous insofar as it is dened by language, but nonautonomous

in those features imposed by the embedding social elds. In this perspective, verbal functions such as reference, description, illocutionary forces, and indirection are recast as ways of taking up positions in the eld. The boundary processes in play in all elds constrain participants differential access to positions, and individuals have meaningful trajectories of position taking over time (at whatever level we measure). Values that circulate through the deictic eld are varied, according to the embedding eld. Perhaps most important, sustained engagement in specic deictic elds helps shape the interactants habitus, their dispositions to construe settings in socially formed ways.

LANGUAGE STANDARDIZATION AND CHANGE

Much of traditional linguistics treats language as the product of an irreducible inner logic, sometimes called a code. The grammar of a language like English or Maya states the corresponding code in terms of categories (Sentence, Noun Phrase, Verb Phrase, etc.) and the processes that derive and operate on them. In traditional grammar, it is standard to assume that this code is perfectly shared by the speakers of the language, this sharedness being a common sense requisite for mutual understanding. In a move congenial to sociolinguists and anthropologists, Bourdieu notes that the apparent unity of any language is the product of a historical process of unication or standardization, and languages vary across the society in which they are spoken. According to Bourdieu, standardization is produced by suppressing nonstandard variants, a point on which sociolinguists have provided more subtle accounts (Eckert & Rickford 2001, Silverstein 1998). Whereas a grammarian uses the term code analytically, for Bourdieu it echoes the legal code in which conduct is regulated and rules are to be followed (Haviland 2003, Mertz 1994). Behind the unity of most standard languages lie power

relations, unifying administrations, economy and state formation, or governance (Herzfeld 1996). Dictionaries, grammars, and their authors are part of the same process, as is the inculcation of standard in the educational system. Access to the standard through education provides access to the positions of power in which it is used. The entire process is a kind of symbolic domination in which nonstandard varieties are suppressed, and those who speak them are excluded or inculcated. Thus individuals acquire the disposition to acquiesce to the standard as a matter of their own interest because it gives access to power. Thereby, they uphold the system of domination, just as competitors in a eld uphold the game in which they compete. Discourse strategies aimed at securing ends involve attunement to the demands of the eld, and thereby underwrite the eld with its hierarchies. The result is that social hierarchy, based on access to power, is transposed into stylistic hierarchy, on the basis of the association of different verbal styles, registers, or varieties with different positions (Agha 1994; Bourdieu 1991b, p. 55; Errington 1988; Heller 1992; Kataoka & Ide 2003; Rumsey 2002; compare Ochs 1992, Eckert 1998, Cameron 1998 on gender). Just as a practice approach splits the language into social varieties, it also distinguishes among discourse genres (Eckert 2000, Eckert & Rickford 2001, Hanks 1987, Feld & Schieffelin 1998, M. Goodwin 1990). Genres are historically specic, relatively stable types of discourse practice corresponding to different positions in social elds. French literary genres, for instance, are hierarchically ordered, each one dening a position, and to write in a genre is to take up a position (Bourdieu 1993, pp. 312, 326; see also Bauman 2001, Briggs & Bauman 1992, Hanks 1987). From this perspective, individual discourse works instantiate genres or genre blends drawn from a space of discursive possibilities (Bourdieu 1985, p. 21). The denition of the literary in terms of formal properties, such as the poetic function of Tynianov and Jakobson, is inseparable from the
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broader eld of cultural production. By delimiting the literary, it in effect afrms the autonomy of the literary eld itself, which once again illustrates the principle that action tends to reinforce the eld in which it occurs, regardless of the intentions of the actors.4

LANGUAGE, LEGITIMATE AND AUTHORITATIVE

The processes at work in standardization and hierarchies of styles and genres also give rise to what Bourdieu calls legitimation and authorization. Both of these turn on how language is socially evaluated. Legitimacy is accorded to selected ways of speaking or writing in that they are recognized by other producers, by the dominant classes and by mass audiences (Bourdieu 1993, p. 331; Garnham 1993). Inculcated in education (Collins 1993, Lave & Wenger 1991, Mertz 1996, Wortham & Rymes 2003) and the family (Ochs 1988, Ochs & Schieffelin 1995), the dominant language is legitimated in that it receives recognition and is the measure by which other varieties are evaluated (in at least some situations). Differences in social and economic position tend to be reproduced in unequal knowledge of legitimate language, which in turn reinforces constraints on access to power. At this point, Bourdieu cites Labovs work on English variation in New York (Labov 1966), suggesting that members of a speech community can share allegiance to the same standard, despite differences in the (nonstandard) varieties they themselves speak. Thus, even though nonstandard varieties are an unavoidable effect of social differences, it is the standard that is accorded recognition as legitimate. The discrepancy between what speakers do and what they consider legitimate is a force of language

change in the form of distinctive deviations from the standard. Legitimacy is closely related to authorization in Bourdieus approach (Bourdieu 1991b). The key difference is that authority is invested not in language varieties, but in the agents who use them (compare Ahearn 2001). This is also the main difference between Bourdieu (1991b) and Austin (1962), as Bourdieu himself presents it. For the most part, Austins speech acts are recast as practices in the eld, and Bourdieu derives from the eld itself the illocutionary effects that Austin attached to performative speech. To be effective, any speech act must be recognized as effective, it must be legitimate for those upon whom it has an effect. Whereas this constraint could be treated as an Alpha felicity condition by Austin, it is the core phenomenon for Bourdieu. Moreover, the speaker gets the authorizing effect from the eld, not from the language nor from his or her own best intentions. To produce authorized language is then to draw on the social eld for authority and, in so doing, to reinforce it.

CENSORSHIP AND EUPHEMISM

The ip side of authoritative and legitimate language is censorship and euphemism. To speak a language is not to command a code, but to act in a world that one accepts tacitly. Standardization and legitimation sanction certain ways of speaking, rewarding some while silencing others. The effect is to intimidate and censor speech without any discrete acts of intimidation or censoring. Any eld automatically censors the discourse that circulates through it. It calls for what Bourdieu (1991b, pp. 13762) describes as euphemism, namely the muting of critique and individual expression according to what is rewarded or sanctioned in the eld. Through euphemism, the sanctions of the eld become part of linguistic practice itself, not external conditions but internal elements. A game joining form with eld, euphemism requires competence to play effectively. Like censorship, it helps

It is questionable whether the poetic function actually reinforces the autonomy of the literary eld, given that this function is at work in much of ordinary language use, a point emphasized by Jakobson (1960) and carried forth in the ethnography of speaking.

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shape the habitus of speaking agents, both their own expressive dispositions and their evaluations of others expression. To euphemize ones speech, consciously or not, is to selfregulate: The individual is tted ever more closely to his or her position in the eld. This is one of the mechanisms by which the habitus is formed at the point where actors engage in elds.

SYMBOLIC POWER
Censorship, authorization, and the reinforcement of dominant languages are all traceable to the pervasive effects of power (compare Gal & Irvine 1997, Lindstrom 1992). Insofar as the power is symbolic, Bourdieu (1991b, p. 164) describes it as that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it, or even that they themselves exercise it. This complicity lies at the heart of practice and is explained not by any conscious concealment but by the structural relations between semiotic systems (including language), the habitus (including the perspectives it embodies), and the eld. Bourdieu arrives at this analysis stepwise. First, structuralism (from Saussure to L evi Strauss) demonstrated that symbolic systems are internally structured, have their own historical dynamics, and are logically prior to the acts in which they are instantiated. Second, citing Kant, Cassirer, Sapir, Whorf, and Americanist anthropology, he observes that these systems construct the worlds inhabited by those socialized into them. As developed under the guise of linguistic relativity, routine language use provides ready-made terms in which actors apprehend and represent reality, including language itself (Gumperz & Levinson 1996, Hill & Manheim 1992, Lucy 1992, Silverstein 2000). Hence through speaking a language one is embedded in a universe of categorization, selective distinctions, and evaluations. Symbolic systems are structuring as well as structured. Inspired by Durkheim and Mauss, Bourdieu joins the two

steps in a circular relation that foreshadows the complicity cited above: It is because symbolic systems are structured that they can order experience in the ways they do, and because they order experience they are reinforced by practice. The third step is to link the rst two steps to class divisions on the basis of relations to labor and production, and therefore to a political economy (Irvine 1998). Bourdieu took the political economy to be a sociological precondition and source of any symbolic system, thereby rejecting the arbitrariness assumed by structuralism. By bringing to bear their own categories on relations of power from which they are ultimately derived, symbolic systems reinforce domination. Much as stylistic hierarchies are motivated by social hierarchies, symbolic systems arise from and reinforce power differences. By engaging in linguistic practice, and quite apart from their intentions or aims, actors are complicit with the pervasive power relations in which their language is embedded. Competence in the standard emerges as a form of symbolic capital, often rationalized as the intrinsic value of rened or proper speaking, but ultimately derived not from language but from power relations. Why does Bourdieu claim that this elaborate circularity is invisible to the people involved in it? The chain of reasoning goes like this. Systems of distinction, including language, present themselves to native speakers as natural. This is a by-product of the circularity between distinctions made in a language on the one hand, and divisions in the social eld to which they are applied on the other. The two are partially independent but mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, in the course of ordinary practice, speakers tacitly assume systems of distinction and division from moment to moment (Cicourel 1993). Speech is produced and understood against this social horizon, whose very tacitness shelters it from scrutiny. Assumed, habituated, and schematized in the habitus, systems of difference appear self-evident. They are too thoroughly incorporated and too obvious to be easily
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noticed in ordinary practice. When they are noticed, they are usually rationalized in terms of arbitrary convention (why does table stand for table?), the functional requirements of communication (why does language have the properties it does?), or local communicative motives (why did he say that?). Furthermore, as linguistic anthropologists have established, commentary on language is itself formulated in language. Consequently, the ontological complicity between linguistic and social categories makes each of them appear natural. This naturalness is illusory though because it misrecognizes the role of power in the making of semiotic distinctions. Indeed, one of the signal concepts developed by Bourdieu is this circle of masking and misrecognition (Bourdieu 1990). Linguistic anthropologists have long known that native speakers are largely unaware of the systematic workings of their language, but misrecognition is more fundamental than awareness. It is the social effect whereby power divisions and the imposed rules of the game are underwritten by practice, however strategic, and by the rationalizing ideas people have about language and practice. Thus common sense doxa regarding correctness, elegance, clarity, or effectiveness in speech hides what is more accurately seen as the market value of speech styles relative to the dominant language. In the literary eld, for instance, the belief in individual creativity is a misrecognition based on the illusio that what is valued is intrinsic creativity. In a more accurate account, as Bourdieu sees it, what is valued is what ts the demands of the eld, and the effective producer is the one best attuned to the eld. Bourdieu & Passeron (1977) make this point in relation to education when they argue that success in school depends not on individual ability, as usually claimed, but on the selection effect whereby successful students come from the social milieux that the education system is designed to legitimate. They describe this misrecognition as genesis amnesia (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977, pp. 5, 9). In discussing the historicity of reason, Bourdieu
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generalizes the point, arguing that what legitimates reason is not reason, but rather received convention, ultimately linked to power and pageantry (Bourdieu 1997, Ch. 3). It is a small step from power misrecognized to symbolic violence. The speaker censored or obliged to euphemize in order to earn credit, show loyalty, or maintain condence is the object of symbolic violence because his or her speech is curtailed, whether by self or other. Obviously, to be classied, evaluated, stereotyped, or portrayed as such and such is to be the object of symbolic violence. Just as misrecognition is a structural relation more general than any instance of misrecognizing, symbolic violence is a structural relation. The violence in question depends neither on violent acts nor on the intentions that may animate them. Masking relations of force, symbolic violence dominates by dening as legitimate limitations that derive from and reinforce differences of power.

CONCLUSION
Many of the linguistic anthropologists cited here have addressed one or another element in Bourdieus approach to language, sometimes to great effect [Irvine (2001) on style and distinction; Ochs (1996) on socialization; Haeri (1997), Hill (1987), and Woolard (1985) on language markets; Cicourel (2001) on medical knowledge]. For the most part, broad discussions of the approach have been critical of Bourdieus claims about language, sometimes for good reason (Hasan 1999). He is usually vague where a linguist needs specicity and often specic where linguists do not tread. But if we look beyond such claims, there is a deep consonance between much of practice theory and the intellectual framing of linguistic anthropology (Goddard 2002, Hanks 1996). This is evident in the occasional citations to linguistic sources, but more pervasively in the way Bourdieu reasons about such critical concepts as habitus and eld. From these two concepts and their interactions emanate a range of phenomena of great interest to

students of language, including standardization, domination, authorization, legitimation, and their opposites. To this we add censorship, euphemism, and symbolic violence, whose relations to discourse production are direct. This list is unnished, as is Bourdieus legacy for language, but it indicates some of the sites at which work has been done and more could be done. The meanings of these terms are obviously specic to Bourdieus approach, and it is difcult to map precisely from his paradigm into the approaches typical of linguistic anthropology (Duranti 2003). Phenomena that appear unied under one view are split apart under the other. Language ideology, style, and interaction correspond to multiple ef-

fects of the relation between habitus and eld. For the linguistic anthropologist, by contrast, Bourdieus habitus splits apart into many different factors that run the gamut from grammar to speech, gesture, language ideology, and space. The contemporary focus on indexicality derives mostly from Peirces semiotics and its development in the ethnography of speaking. By contrast, Peirce and indexicality are virtually absent from practice sociology, just as Panofsky and Merleau-Ponty are all but missing in linguistic anthropology. These absences are generative sites for future research into linguistic practice, understood as both object and modus operandi, form and occupancy, ours and others.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research on which this article is based has benetted from contributions from a number of students and colleagues. I am grateful for extended discussions with Berkeley graduate students in the seminars on colonial history, practice theory and linguistic anthropology between 2000 and 2004 and from discussions with Liu Xin, in our co-taught seminar. Special thanks to Rob Hamrick and Alysoun Quinby who have assisted me in all phases of this article from bibliographic research to nal editing. Thanks nally to Jennifer Johnson-Hanks, extraordinary interlocutor.

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