Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma Perspective on Consumer Boycotts

SANKAR SEN RHAN-CANLI ZEYNEP GU VICKI MORWITZ*

This article draws on social dilemma theory and reference group theory to understand the individual boycott decision and tests the predictions stemming from this conceptualization in two experiments. Consistent with our predictions, consumers likelihood of participating in both economic and social-issue boycotts is jointly determined by their perceptions of the boycotts likelihood of success, their susceptibility to normative social inuences, and the costs they incur in boycotting. Consumers success perceptions are, in turn, determined by their expectations of overall participation and efcacy, as well as the message frame inherent in proboycott communications. Two key determinants of consumers boycotting costs are their preference for the boycotted product and their access to its substitutes. More specically, consumers who are more susceptible to the normative inuence exerted by the reference group of potential boycotters are more inuenced by expected overall participation rates in their boycott likelihood.

U.S. consumers boycotted PepsiCo for doing business in Burma because of that countrys poor human rights record. The boycott cost PepsiCo more than it earned from its operations in Burma and it eventually heeded the boycotters demands, pulling out of Burma. (Wah 1998) California gasoline prices increased by 40 percent in one month in the spring of 1999. A group of Californian consumers called for a one-day boycott of gasoline stations on April 30, 1999. Despite the boycott, prices did not fall. (Williams 1999)

oycotts have become a pervasive and potent instrument of consumer discontent in todays marketplace. Consumers are increasingly willing (Smith 1990) to withhold patronage to curb perceived market abuses and/or increase corporate sensitivity to their economic, political, and social concerns (Economist 1990; Ferguson 1997). Such consumer activism has been greatly aided in recent years by boycott

*Sankar Sen is associate professor of marketing, School of Management, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215 (sen@bu.edu). Zeynep Gu rhanCanli is assistant professor of marketing, University of Michigan Business School, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234 (zgurhan@bus.umich.edu). Vicki Morwitz is associate professor of marketing and Edythe and George Heyman Research Fellow at the Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012 (vmorwitz@stern.nyu.edu). The authors are grateful to the editor, associate editor, and the reviewers for their input and guidance, and Sucharita Chandran for her help with data collection.

organizers use of the Internet as a quick, cheap, and effective way of informing millions of consumers about boycotts. Today, over 800 products, not to mention whole states and countries, are targeted for boycotts worldwide (Ferguson 1997). The growing signicance of boycotts for consumers, marketers, and public policy makers has spurred investigations into their historical evolution (Smith 1990), nancial impact (Miller and Sturdivant 1977), and key dimensions, such as action orientation (media-oriented vs. marketplaceoriented; Friedman 1991) and inuence type (economic pressure vs. image pressure; Garrett 1987). However, little research effort has thus far been directed toward a theoretical understanding of the individual consumers decision to participate in a particular boycott (cf. Belch and Belch 1987; Friedman 1991). This article represents an initial attempt to understand the individual boycott decision. In particular, we propose that the decision to withhold consumption of a desirable product or service in the interest of achieving a collective social or economic gain can be conceptualized as a social dilemma. Social dilemmas are situations in which the interests of individual members of a group are at odds with the collective interests of that group (van Lange et al. 1992), forcing individuals to choose between maximizing selsh and collective interests. Reference group theory suggests that in such contexts, the trade-offs consumers make between such individual and group incentives are likely to hinge signicantly on the social pressure they feel to comply with the behaviors of relevant reference group(s) (e.g., the boycotting
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group). Consequently, we draw on both social dilemma and reference group theories to investigate the determinants of and the mechanisms underlying the individual decision to participate in a boycott. In two experiments, we examine the interactive effects of consumers expectations regarding boycott success (i.e., expectation that the social problem will be solved), their susceptibility to normative reference group inuence (i.e., social pressure to comply), and the costs they incur in boycotting (i.e., the costs of cooperation) on their boycott decision (i.e., cooperation in a social dilemma).

CONSUMER BOYCOTTS
A consumer boycott is an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases [from one or more target organizations] in the marketplace (Friedman 1985, p. 97). Boycotts are of two basic types: economic or marketing policy boycotts aim to change the boycott targets marketing practices, such as lowering price (e.g., the California gas boycott; the New York City movie theater boycott [New York Times 1999]), whereas the more recent political or social/ethical control (Smith 1990) boycotts attempt to coerce their targets toward specic ethical or socially responsible actions, ranging from responsible employment and manufacturing practices to the support of specic causes (e.g., the PepsiCo boycott; the Mitsubishi boycott over its alleged destruction of rain forests; see Fitzgerald 1993). Notably, boycotts are qualitatively different from an individuals personal decision to withhold consumption of a good in that they constitute an organized, collective, but nonmandatory (i.e., no formal sanctions can be imposed on noncompliers) refusal to consume a good. In this sense, the dynamics underlying an individuals decision to participate in a boycott are similar to those underlying peoples participation in labor movements such as strikes (see Gallagher and Gramm 1997), which are organized and collective but cannot mandate individual participation. Prior research (Garrett 1987) links the individual decision to boycott to a range of disparate factors, such as boycott awareness, personal values (e.g., social responsibility), social pressure, the credibility of the boycott leader(s), boycotting costs, and the congruence between boycott goals and participant attitudes. However, both the absence of a coherent theoretical framework and the paucity of empirical support undermine the signicance of these ndings. Next, we draw on social dilemma theory and reference group theory to develop a conceptual model of the individual boycott decision.

CONSTRUCTS AND HYPOTHESES Boycotts as Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas are situations in which members of a group face a conict between maximizing their personal interests and supporting that of the group (Dawes 1980; Hardin 1968). Each individual is best off acting in her self-

interest regardless of what the other persons do, but in doing so all individuals are worse off than if they had cooperated in the collective interest. Social dilemmas are dened by three properties (van Lange et al. 1992): (1) compared to a cooperative decision, a noncooperative decision made by any given group member always yields greater utility to that individual, regardless of the decision made by others; (2) compared to a cooperative decision, a noncooperative decision is always harmful to others; and (3) the loss in aggregate utility to others resulting from a noncooperative decision is greater than the utility gained by that individual (i.e., the harm done to others by noncooperation is larger than the personal gain to the noncooperating individual). Thus, social dilemmas involve the interplay between selsh motives and cooperation that requires individual sacrice in the short run for the benet of all individuals in the long run. We suggest that consumer boycotts can be conceptualized as social dilemmas. For the typically small subset of consumers who are true believers in the boycott cause (Mahoney 1976), the personal importance of the boycott issue is likely to ensure participation even if the costs of withholding consumption of the boycotted product are high. Most consumers, however, are likely to be disinclined to participate (i.e., to act in self-interest) because the certain costs each of them incurs from withholding consumption are likely to outweigh the uncertain utility obtained through boycotting. Yet, each consumer in this group of potential boycotters is likely to be better off if most, if not all, members of this group chose to participate in the boycott, contributing to a higher likelihood of its success. While this tension between social and personal interest characterizes all boycotts, it can be most clearly understood in the case of economic boycotts (Rea 1974; Smith 1990), where consumers attempt to reverse what they consider to be an excessive or unjustied price increase for a product (e.g., the New York movie theater boycott). If the new, higher price is not prohibitive then the utility consumers derive from the product at such a price, UProduct (high price), is likely to be less than that from the regularly priced product, UProduct (regular price), but more than that derived from not consuming the product at all, UProduct (boycott). Thus, as long as the price increase does not offset the positive utility consumers gain from the products consumption (i.e., UProduct (regular price) 1 UProduct (high price) 1 UProduct (boycott)), each consumer is better off consuming the higher-priced product than not consuming it at all, regardless of others boycotting behavior (Rea 1974). However, the likelihood of the price being restored to its original level increases with the percentage of consumers who boycott. Consequently, if all, or even most, consumers free ride on the boycotting efforts of others then everyone will be worse off in the long run, consuming the product at a permanently higher price. Thus, the individual strategy of not boycotting is suboptimal, in terms of the long-term collective welfare of all affected consumers, relative to that of cooperation. A key factor affecting consumers consideration of col-

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FIGURE 1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INDIVIDUAL BOYCOTT DECISION

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lective interests in their boycott decision is the social pressure they are likely to feel, both internally and from external sources, to act in the boycotting groups interests. However, while social dilemma research has examined the effect of various group characteristics (e.g., size, cohesiveness, communication) on the individual decision to cooperate, little attention has been devoted to the extent and nature of the pressure or inuence exerted by such groups on the cooperation decision. Next we draw on reference group theory (e.g., Hyman and Singer 1968) to articulate why and for whom such social inuences might affect the boycott decision.

The Role of Reference Group Inuence

Research (see, e.g., Childers and Rao 1992) suggests that peoples consumption decisions are strongly inuenced by their reference groups (i.e., groups that an individual uses as a guide for behavior in a specic situation). Such groups can be primary or secondary, formal or informal, and aspirational or dissociative (see Hoyer and MacInnis [2000] for details). Moreover, the inuence exerted by such groups can be normative (i.e., rewards/punishment or conformance based) and/or informational (i.e., expertise based). We expect such reference group inuences to also affect consumers boycotting decisions: the set of potential boycotters constitutes a clear reference group that is likely to provide

implicit and sometimes explicit guidelines regarding cooperation. Clearly, such inuence is going to be strong when the group is primary, formal, and/or perhaps aspirational (e.g., in the case of the true believers). By providing relevant information about the boycott, this group is also likely to exert informational inuence (Burnkrant and Cousineau 1975). However, even the informal, secondary group of potential boycotters can under certain conditions exert significant inuence on individual cooperative behavior. For instance, research (e.g., Fisher and Ackerman 1998) suggests that some consumers may be particularly susceptible to the normative inuence exerted by this group, feeling pressure to comply with its expectations or to associate themselves with it through compliance. Such consumers are likely to be motivated to boycott not only to achieve its objectives but also to comply with the wishes of the boycotting group in an effort to gain group membership or approval. Next, we present a conceptual framework (g. 1) that articulates the interactive effects of consumers susceptibility to normative inuence, their expectations of boycott success, and the costs they incur in withholding consumption on their likelihood of cooperation.

Cooperation in Boycotts
According to social dilemma theory (van Lange et al. 1992), consumers expectations regarding the likelihood of

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boycott success (i.e., likelihood that the social problem will be solved) is likely to be a principal input into their estimate of the expected utility of participation. This suggests that aside from consumers susceptibility to normative inuence, their decision to cooperate is likely to depend on certain key factors in the boycott context (g. 1) that inuence the perceived likelihood of boycott success (e.g., expectations of overall participation, perceived efcacy, and proboycott communication) and the costs of withholding consumption (e.g., product substitutability and product preference).

Factors Inuencing the Perceived Likelihood of Boycott Success

Expectation of Overall Participation. Both social dilemma theory and reference group theory suggest a strong positive link between peoples expectation of overall cooperation and their own cooperation (Fisher and Ackerman 1998; Klandermans 1992). In social dilemmas, people are more likely to cooperate when widespread cooperation by others makes the solution to the social problem (i.e., boycott success) more likely. According to reference group theory, such conditional cooperation may also arise because of reference group inuence to comply with social norms, which are inferred from overall cooperative behavior or expectations thereof. Therefore, we expect consumers boycott willingness to vary positively with their expectation of overall participation. It is important to note, however, that reference group theory suggests (Bearden, Netemeyer, and Teel 1989) that participation based on compliance with such normative inuence is likely to be more pronounced for consumers who are more susceptible to it. Thus, the boycotting behavior of consumers who are more (vs. less) susceptible to normative social inuence will increase to a greater extent with increases in their expectation of overall participation.
H1: The positive effect of overall participation expectation on boycott participation likelihood will be greater for those who are more susceptible to normative social inuence than for those who are less susceptible.

their participation willingness is likely to depend largely on their expectations of overall participation. This is because consumers, under low efcacy conditions, may believe that there is strength in numbers. They may also, under such conditions, be more inclined to look to others to guide their own behavior (van Lange et al. 1992). However, if consumers feel that each boycotter (including herself) can, by herself, make a difference to the boycotts outcome (i.e., high efcacy), then their expectation of overall participation may be less relevant to their participation willingness. In other words, when consumers believe that they themselves can make a difference by participating in a boycott, their likelihood of doing so is likely to be less contingent on how others behave (Wiener 1993). Thus, we expect that: H2: The positive effect of overall participation expectation on boycott participation likelihood will be greater when perceived efcacy is low than when it is high.

Perceived Efcacy. Social dilemma research suggests that cooperation varies directly with consumers perceived efcacy, or the extent to which one believes that each participant, oneself included, can contribute signicantly to the achievement of collective goals (van Lange et al. 1992). In particular, studies attest to the negative relationship between peoples efcacy perceptions and their likelihood of free riding on the sacrice of cooperators; consumers are less likely to free ride if they perceive that their own contribution can actually make a difference. More specically, consumers efcacy perceptions are likely to interact with their expectations of overall participation to affect their perceptions of boycott success likelihood and, consequently, their participation likelihood. When consumers believe that each persons contribution can make little difference to the boycotts outcome (i.e., low efcacy),

Proboycott Communication. Consumers perceptions of boycott success likelihood are also likely to depend on the proboycott communications they are exposed to. Social dilemma research underscores the importance of persuasive communication in inducing cooperation (Klandermans 1992; Wiener and Doescher 1991), but the precise characteristics of effective communication remain largely unarticulated. Given that consumers reactions to persuasive communication are often susceptible to the frame of the communicated message (see Rothman and Salovey [1997] for a recent review), we examine how the specic message frame adopted by boycott organizers in their proboycott communications affect consumers perceptions of the likelihood of boycott success. Alternate message frames can result from whether the proboycott message highlights the positive outcomes (i.e., gains) associated with boycotting and/or boycott success or the negative outcomes (i.e., losses) that result from forgoing cooperation and/or boycott failure. Several related streams of research suggest that these alternate proboycott message frames are likely to affect consumers participation likelihood by affecting, among other things, their perceptions of the boycotts likelihood of success. In general, the outcome made more salient by a specic message frame is likely to exert a disproportionate inuence on peoples judgments by making them focus on it over the less salient, complementary outcome (Rothman and Salovey 1997). Not only are these salient outcomes more accessible at the point of judgment, but they also carry greater weight as judgmental inputs (Menon, Raghubir, and Schwarz 1995). More specically, people often generate subjective estimates of an outcomes likelihood based on its salience (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Thus, consumers subjective boycott success likelihood estimates are likely to be biased toward the outcome (success or failure) made salient by the message frame. Related to this, the frame-induced salient outcome may serve as an anchor for consumers success likelihood estimates (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Since

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subsequent additional information- or cognitive elaborationbased adjustments from such anchors are usually insufcient, the success frame is likely to yield a higher boycott success likelihood estimate than the failure frame. As a result, consumers boycott success likelihood estimates and their consequent participation willingness are likely to be greater when a proboycott communication highlights the desirable consequences of boycott success than when it highlights the undesirable consequences of boycott failure. H3a: Participation likelihood will be higher when the proboycott message has a success frame than when it has a failure frame. If the message frame affects the perceived likelihood of boycott success, then it should also moderate the interactive effect of overall participation expectation and perceived efcacy on boycott likelihood (i.e., hypothesis 2). These three items of information are all inputs into a fundamental question underlying a consumers boycott decision: is this boycott going to be successful? Moreover, research suggests that in answering this question (i.e., making a prediction about boycott success likelihood), consumers are likely to be susceptible to conrmatory biases, focusing selectively on information that conrms rather than disconrms the likelihood of boycott success (Friedrich 1993; Sanbonmatsu, Posovac, and Stasney 1997). Therefore, if a success framed proboycott communication, by itself, provides consumers with conrmatory evidence that the boycott will be successful, then such information is likely to be sufcient impetus for participation, rendering the efcacy and overall participation information somewhat redundant. In other words, consumers reliance on these alternate inputs into the success likelihood judgment and, consequently, the boycott decision, is likely to be diminished in the presence of success framed proboycott communication. However, when the proboycott communication constitutes a disconrming input (i.e., when it is failure framed) into the boycott success likelihood prediction, consumers are more likely to attend to independent conrming inputs, such as overall participation expectation and perceived efcacy, making them more relevant to the boycott success likelihood estimation process. Consequently, their inuence, under such conditions, on the boycott decision is likely to be greater. In sum, we expect consumers boycott likelihood to be more inuenced by the interactive effects of perceived efcacy and overall participation expectation (i.e., hypothesis 2) when the proboycott message has a failure rather than a success frame. Finally, if consumers use all three items of information (i.e., proboycott message, participation expectation, and efcacy) to gauge boycott success likelihood and if this likelihood estimate drives their boycott willingness, then the interactive effect of these three information items on participation should be at least partially mediated by their perceptions of boycott success likelihood. More specically, such success perceptions should mediate, at least partially, (a) the effect of the message frame on boycott likelihood

and (b) the interactive effect of participation expectation and efcacy on boycott likelihood when the message frame is negative. H3b: The interactive effect of consumers overall participation expectation and perceived efcacy on their boycott likelihood will vary with the frame of the proboycott message. This interaction is more likely to occur when the proboycott message has a failure frame than when it has a success frame. H3c: The interactive effect of these three antecedents of boycott success likelihood on consumers participation likelihood will be at least partially mediated by their perceptions of the boycotts likelihood of success.

Factors Inuencing the Costs of Withholding Consumption

While social dilemma research (Lynn and Oldenquist 1986) acknowledges the pivotal role played by the costs associated with cooperation, surprisingly little research has explicitly explored the effects of such costs on cooperation. In the boycott context, two factors that inuence the costs consumers incur in boycotting are inherent in the nature of consumption itself. The rst cost stems from consumers intrinsic preference for the boycotted product: consumers with higher (vs. lower) preference for the boycotted product will be less likely to participate in the boycott because it will be more difcult for them to withhold consumption. A perhaps more interesting cost arises from the availability in the marketplace of suitable substitutes for the boycotted product. When a satisfactory substitute exists, consumers can minimize the costs of not consuming the boycotted product by simply switching to this substitute. In the absence of substitutes, however, consumers can do little, in terms of consumption, to alleviate this cost. Therefore, we expect the availability of suitable substitutes for the boycotted product to increase consumers participation likelihood. In addition, product preference and substitutability are likely to interact with consumers expectations of overall participation. According to social dilemma theory, a key driver of peoples decision to not cooperate is their aversion to being a sucker (see Komorita and Parks [1994] for review), or to suffer by withholding consumption while free riders (i.e., noncooperators who benet from others cooperation) continue to obtain the utility associated with consumption. Research (see van Lange et al. 1992) suggests that consumers are more likely to cooperate in the face of free riders when the costs of cooperation are lower. Thus, when consumers cost of boycott cooperation is low (i.e., they have access to substitutes or their product preference is low), they are likely to be less concerned about the extent of free riding, or conversely, overall boycott participation. In contrast, when no substitutes are available or product preference is high (i.e.,

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high boycotting costs) consumers are likely to be more concerned about being a sucker, not wanting to make difcult sacrices in vain or upon which others might free ride. Consequently, the boycotting behavior of consumers in these high cost conditions is more likely to be inuenced by their expectations of overall participation. H4a: Consumers boycott participation likelihood will be higher when their preference for the boycotted product is low than when it is high. H4b: The positive effect of overall participation expectation on boycott participation likelihood will be greater when consumers preference for the boycotted product is high than when it is low. H5a: Consumers boycott participation likelihood will be higher when they have access to substitutes for the boycotted product than when they do not have access to any substitutes. H5b: The positive effect of overall participation expectation on boycott participation likelihood will be greater when consumers do not have access to any substitutes for the boycotted product than when such substitutes are accessible.

OVERVIEW OF STUDIES
We conduct two experiments to test our conceptualization of the individual boycott participation decision (g. 1). The rst study focuses, in the context of communications about a price boycott, on the three key antecedents of consumers perceptions of boycott success likelihoodexpectation of overall participation (Participation Expectation), perceived efcacy (Efcacy), and the message frame of proboycott communication (Message Frame)to understand their interactive effects on participation likelihood (hypotheses 1, 2, and 3). This study also examines the moderating effect of consumers susceptibility to normative inuence (SNI). In study 2, we focus on real, ongoing, social-issue boycotts to examine whether and how product preference and substitutability interact with consumers expectation of overall participation to affect both their participation intent and actual boycotting behavior (hypotheses 4 and 5). Subjects in both studies and all associated pretests were undergraduates at a large east coast business school.

STUDY 1 Design and Procedure

In developing the price-increase boycott scenario for this study, we sought products that subjects, faced with a sudden, unjustied, and relatively sharp price increase, would actually consider boycotting (i.e., minimize oor effect) yet would nd somewhat difcult to give up due to the lack of suitable substitutes (i.e., minimize ceiling effect). Based on

these criteria, we selected seven categories: the university bookstore, movie theaters, taxicabs, compact discs, cable TV, public transportation, college tuition, and for each, asked 47 pretest subjects to indicate (i) their involvement with the category (three seven-point scales), (ii) their usage patterns (including purchase frequency in some categories), and (iii) their willingness to boycott that category (seven-point scale) if prices suddenly and inexplicably increased by 25%. We picked movie theaters as the boycott target based on relatively high usage rates (approximately two movies per month), moderate involvement levels (rating of approximately 4), and consumers willingness to boycott a 25% price increase (rating of approximately 5). This study had a 2 (Participation Expectation) # 2 (Efcacy) # 2 (Message Frame) between-subjects design. Participation Expectation was manipulated through information in the form of survey results about the percentage of other potential boycotters who intended to participate (low p 15%, high p 80%). Efcacy was manipulated through information in the form of expert opinion about the extent to which each additional participant could affect the boycotts outcome (low p no effect, high p signicant incremental effect). Message Frame was manipulated by making salient in a proboycott message the consequences of boycott success (Success) or failure (Failure). Susceptibility to normative inuence (SNI) was measured using those eight items in Bearden et al.s (1989) susceptibility to interpersonal inuence scale that correspond to the normative inuence factor. One hundred forty-seven subjects completed this study as part of a class requirement. First, subjects were asked to read an article from a respected local newspaper about a call for a boycott of all movie theaters in a major American city by a consumer advocacy group over what it felt to be an unjustied and excessive price increase of one dollar (approximately 12%). This article contained both the Participation Expectation and Efcacy manipulations (appendix). After reading the article, subjects were exposed to a yer released by the boycott organizers that contained, among other information, the Message Frame manipulation (appendix). Subjects rst indicated their Boycott Likelihood using a seven-point multi-item scale (M p 5.3, SD p 1.4, a p .92). The rst item assessed boycott intention (Denitely not boycott/Denitely boycott). The remaining four items measured subjects attitude toward boycotting (Very negative/Very positive, Not at all favorable/Very favorable, Very bad idea/Very good idea, Not at all useful/Very useful). Next, they responded to a set of questions that served as checks for the Participation Expectation, Efcacy, and Message Frame manipulations as well as the newspaper articles believability and the yers persuasiveness. Specically, subjects (i) indicated the percent of city residents who stated that they would boycott the movie theaters (M p 45.6, SD p 32.9), (ii) expressed their level of agreement (1 p Denitely disagree, 7 p Denitely agree) with the statement: According to the newspaper article, the participation of each additional person will have a signicant effect on

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the likelihood of a successful boycott (M p 4.00, SD p 2.00), and (iii) indicated the extent to which they felt that the yer stressed the pros of boycotting versus the cons of not boycotting (1 p Only stressed the pros of boycotting, 7 p Only stressed the cons of not boycotting; M p 4.7, SD p 2.0). Three seven-point scales were used to assess both the believability of the newspaper article (Not at all believable/Highly believable, Not at all true/Absolutely true, Not at all credible/Very credible; M p 5.0, SD p 1.1, a p .87) and the persuasiveness of the arguments in the yer (Very weak/Very strong, Not very convincing/Very convincing, Not very persuasive/Very persuasive; M p 4.5, SD p 1.4, a p .92). Subjects then provided their perception of boycott success likelihood (Success Perception; appendix), followed by their SNI (M p 3.0, SD p 1.3, a p .89) ratings (Bearden et al. 1989). Finally, they provided information regarding their monthly consumption of rst-run movies (M p 2.0, SD p 1.6) and were debriefed and dismissed.

Results
All dependent variables and, as per the guidelines delineated in Perdue and Summers (1986), manipulation check items were analyzed using the full ANOVA model with Participation Expectation, Efcacy, Message Frame, SNI, and their interactions as independent factors. We obtained two SNI levels by dividing subjects into two groups (high and low) around the median value of their SNI scores. Comparable analyses using the continuous SNI measure yielded comparable results. The signicant results are presented next. Details of all analyses can be obtained from the authors.

Manipulation Checks. Subjects appeared to perceive the Participation Expectation, Efcacy, and Message Frame manipulations as intended. Subjects in the Low Participation Expectation condition recalled that 15.3% of the potential boycotters had agreed to boycott, whereas those in the High condition recalled that 76.9% had agreed to do so (F(1, 146) p 1095.9, p ! .01). Similarly, the efcacy perceptions of Low Efcacy subjects were much lower than those of the High Efcacy ones (MLow p 2.97, MHigh p 5.05; F(1, 146) p 60.7, p ! .01). Finally, subjects in the Success Message Frame condition perceived that the proboycott message stressed the pros of boycotting rather than the cons of not boycotting to a greater extent (5.65) than those in the Failure Message Frame condition (3.66; F(1, 146) p 46.9, p ! .01). No other effect was of a signicant size (as ascertained by q2) relative to the primary manipulation-check effect in any of the three ANOVAs (see Perdue and Summers [1986] for details), indicating that unintended crossover effects or contamination across the independent factors, if any, were negligible. In addition, subjects found the newspaper article to be believable (5) and the yer to be somewhat persuasive (4.5), and these perceptions did not vary signicantly across the different experimental conditions.

Effects on Boycott Likelihood. Participation Expectation had a positive main effect on Boycott Likelihood (Participation Expectation: MHigh p 5.60, MLow p 4.97; F(1, 146) p 8.5, p ! .05, h p .23). Moreover, as expected (hypothesis 1), this main effect was qualied by a signicant Participation # SNI interaction (F(1, 146) p 4.68, p ! .05, h p .17): the Boycott Likelihood of the high SNI subjects was signicantly affected by Participation Expectation (MLow p 4.63, MHigh p 5.77; F(1, 69) p 12.4, p ! .05, h p .28) whereas that of the Low SNI ones was not (MLow p 5.28, MHigh p 5.45). The main effect of Participation Expectation was also qualied by a marginally signicant Participation # Efcacy interaction (F(1, 146) p 3.0, p ! .10, h p .14). In line with hypothesis 2, Boycott Likelihood did not vary signicantly with Participation Expectation when Efcacy was High (MLow p 5.26, MHigh p 5.50), but increased signicantly with increasing Participation Expectation (MLow p 4.66, MHigh p 5.70; F(1, 71) p 10.5, p ! .01, h p .25) when Efcacy was Low. Consistent with hypothesis 3a, Message Frame also had a signicant main effect on Boycott Likelihood (MSuccess p 5.55, MFailure p 5.00; F(1, 146) p 5.8, p ! .05, h p .19). Moreover, in line with hypothesis 3b, Boycott Likelihood was more sensitive to the Efcacy # Participation Expectation interaction in the Failure Message Frame condition than in the Success one (g. 2), as revealed by the signicant Participation Expectation # Efcacy # Message Frame interaction (F(1, 146) p 5.02, p ! .05). More specically, subjects Boycott Likelihood did not vary signicantly across the different Efcacy (MLow p 5.54, MHigh p 5.56) and Participation Expectation conditions (MLow p 5.36, MHigh p 5.74) in the Success Message Frame condition. However, in the Failure Message Frame condition, we obtained a crossover interaction of Efcacy and Participation Expectation on Boycott Likelihood. While Participation Expectation did not affect Boycott Likelihood (MLow p 5.20, MHigh p 5.16) in the High Efcacy condition, Participation Expectation had a signicant positive effect on Boycott Likelihood (MLow p 4.04, MHigh p 5.72; F(1, 36) p 16.1, p ! .05, h p .31) in the Low Efcacy condition. Mediating Effect of Success Perception. We tested whether the interactive effect of the three information items on consumers Boycott Likelihood was mediated by their Success Perception (i.e., hypothesis 3c) using procedures identied by Baron and Kenny (1986). The basic test for such mediation hinges on three statistical outcomes in fullmodel ANOVAs: (a) the interactive effect of the independent variables (i.e., the Participation Expectation # Efcacy # Message Frame interaction) on the dependent variable (Boycott Likelihood) must be signicant, (b) the interactive effect of the independent variables on the mediator variable (Success Perception) must be signicant, and (c) when the mediator variable is added to the analysis in a, the interactive effect of the independent variables on Boycott Likelihood must become nonsignicant (i.e., full mediation) or diminished (i.e., partial mediation).

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FIGURE 2 STUDY 1: EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION EXPECTATION, PERCEIVED EFFICACY, AND PROBOYCOTT MESSAGE FRAME ON BOYCOTT LIKELIHOOD

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cott Likelihood. Moreover, Message Frame was a signicant predictor of Success Perception in an equivalent model (F(1, 146) p 5.37, p ! .05). Finally, when Success Perception was added to the Boycott Likelihood model, Message Frame was no longer signicant at the .05 level (F(1, 146) p 2.09, p p .15). Second, the signicant interactive effect of Participation Expectation and Efcacy (i.e., Participation Expectation # Efcacy) on Boycott Likelihood in the Failure Frame condition (i.e., hypothesis 2) should be at least partially mediated by Success Perception (i.e., a two-factor mediated moderation; see Baron and Kenny 1986, p. 1179). Based on mediation analyses conducted on subjects responses in the Failure Frame condition, we found support for this expectation as well. The Participation Expectation # Efcacy interaction was signicant (F(1, 73) p 7.5, p ! .01) in an ANOVA of Boycott Likelihood with Participation Expectation, Efcacy, SNI, and their interactions as predictors. This interaction was also signicant (F(1, 73) p 4.1, p ! .05) in an equivalent ANOVA of Success Perception. Finally, when Success Perception was added to the Boycott Likelihood ANOVA, the effect of the Participation Expectation # Efcacy interaction was substantially attenuated (F(1, 73) p 3.7, p ! .06; %Dq 2 p 68.4).

Summary
This study shows that, in line with social dilemma and reference group theories, the positive effect of subjects expectation of overall participation in a boycott on their boycott likelihood is greater for those who are more susceptible to normative inuence and who have weaker efcacy perceptions. This study also underscores the importance of message framing in proboycott communications; when a success frame is used, subjects boycott likelihood is relatively immune to variations in their participation expectation and perceived efcacy. However, when a failure frame is used, subjects boycott likelihood is an interactive product of their participation expectation and efcacy. Notably, these interactive effects of frame, overall participation expectation, and efcacy appear to be mediated by subjects perception of the boycotts likelihood of success. The next study focuses on the relationship between consumers boycotting behavior and the costs they incur from boycotting. In doing so, we also try to address some of the limitations of study 1. First, although the study 1 boycott scenarios were believable, they were hypothetical and therefore may not accurately represent real boycott situations. In study 2, we focus on real, ongoing boycotts. Also, our Participation Expectation manipulation (i.e., Low p 15%; High p 80%) may have been viewed as unrealistic. In study 2, the high and low Participation Expectation levels are based on pretest subjects own estimates of the percent of consumers that would need to boycott for the relevant boycott to succeed. Also, measuring subjects SNI after eliciting their boycott intentions may have caused the latter to inuence the former. While additional tests revealed that subjects SNI measures were no higher in the High Participation

All three outcomes were supported, conrming hypothesis 3c. First, the Participation Expectation # Efcacy # Message Frame interaction was signicant in the Boycott Likelihood ANOVA. Second, this three-way interaction was also signicant (F(1, 146) p 9.45, p ! .05) in an equivalent Success Perception ANOVA. Finally, when Success Perception was added as an independent factor to the Boycott Likelihood ANOVA, not only was it a significant predictor (F(1, 146) p 39.3, p ! .01), but also the previously signicant Participation Expectation # Efcacy # Message Frame interaction was no longer signicant at the .05 level (F(1, 146) p .70, p p .40). To further interpret our complex mediation nding, we also tested the two, more specic, expectations that constitute hypothesis 3c. First, the signicant main effect of Message Frame on Boycott Likelihood should be at least partially mediated by Success Perception (i.e., simple mediation). We found support for this expectation. In a full-model ANOVA, Message Frame is a signicant predictor of Boy-

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Expectation condition than in the Low one and the overall correlation between SNI and Boycott Intention was only .06, in study 2 we measure subjects SNI before their exposure to boycott information. Finally, study 1 focused on boycott intentions, not actual behavior. Since intentions are not perfect predictors of behavior, it is possible that actual boycott behavior may differ from subjects stated intentions. Therefore, in addition to intentions, in study 2 we measure actual boycotting behavior.

STUDY 2 Stimuli Development

This study examines the effects of product preference and substitutability (see g. 1) on subjects willingness to participate in real, ongoing social-issue boycotts. Using two pretests, we selected two social-issue boycotts that met the following criteria: (a) the boycotts be real and currently under way, (b) both the boycotted product(s) and the boycott issue(s) be somewhat relevant to the subject population, (c) this populations awareness of and participation in the boycotts not be so high as to overwhelm the experimental manipulations, and (d) substitutes for the boycotted products be available. Specically, 36 subjects in the rst pretest indicated their liking for and loyalty to the products of several current boycott targets (e.g., Nike, Colgate-Palmolive, Proctor & Gamble, grapes). For each of these boycott targets, 43 subjects in a second pretest provided information about their awareness of the boycott, their participation in the boycott, the extent to which they cared about the boycott issue, the percent of people they thought needed to participate in the boycott for it to succeed, and the perceived difculty of nding satisfactory substitutes for the boycotted products. Based on these pretests we picked the boycott of (1) Colgate-Palmolive products (including Colgate toothpaste) because of the companys use of animal testing, and (2) Proctor & Gamble (P&G) products (including Crest toothpaste) because of the companys presence in Burma, a nation with a poor human rights record. Pretest subjects awareness of these boycotts was low (MColgate p 0%, MCrest p 4.8%; z p 1.06, p p .29), and no subjects were currently participating in these boycotts. Furthermore, there were no signicant differences (based on seven-point scale ratings) in these subjects willingness to boycott (MColgate p 3.3, MCrest p 3.4; t (42) p .15, p p .88), the extent to which they cared about the boycott issues (MColgate p 3.2, MCrest p 3.7; t (42) p .91, p p .37), and their ability to nd satisfactory substitutes for the target brands (MColgate p 2.3, MCrest p 3.0; t (42) p 1.1, p p .26). Also, their preference for (MColgate p 4.7, MCrest p 4.3; t (35) p 1.1, p p .26) and loyalty toward (MColgate p 3.3, MCrest p 3.3; t (35) p .03, p p .98) these brands did not vary signicantly. It is important to note that the fact that the toothpastes (i.e., Crest and Colgate) manufactured by these two boycotted companies are substitutes of each other permitted us

an efcient operationalization of substitutability. Specically, subjects were randomly chosen to have either Crest or Colgate toothpaste be the boycott target brand and the other be the substitute brand. We manipulated substitutability by offering them either (i) a choice between the target brand and the substitute brand (i.e., both Crest and Colgate), (ii) the target brand only (i.e., Crest [Colgate] only for those exposed to the Crest [Colgate] boycott), or (iii) the substitute brand only (i.e., Crest [Colgate] only for those exposed to the Colgate [Crest] boycott). This allowed us to use the same choice sets and, therefore, compare choice shares of these two brands across the two boycott scenarios.

Design and Procedure

This experiment had a 2 (Participation Expectation) # 3 (Substitutability) between-subjects design. The Low (15%) and High (50%) levels of the Participation Expectation factor were based on the twenty-fth and seventy-fth percentiles, respectively, of pretest subjects estimates of the percentage of people who needed to participate for the relevant boycotts to succeed. Substitutability, at three levels (Target Brand p boycott target brand only, Substitute Brand p substitute brand only, and Both Brands p both brands), was operationalized at the point of product choice as described above. Finally, we measured both subjects preference for their boycott target brand (i.e., Preference; see appendix) and SNI (M p 2.9, SD p 1.1, a p .88) and divided them into two groups around each variables median rating. Notably, this experiment included additional control conditions in which subjects made toothpaste choices in the three Substitutability conditions without any prior exposure to boycott information. These choices served as baseline measures of this populations preferences for their target toothpaste brand in the different Substitutability conditions. The study was conducted in three separate sessions to minimize demand and carryover effects. One hundred sixtysix subjects completed all three sessions, which were interspersed among several other unrelated studies, as part of a class requirement. Subjects responses in the different sessions were matched using their student numbers. The rst two sessions were conducted in laboratories outside of class, while the third session was conducted in class. In the rst session, subjects completed the SNI scale (Bearden et al. 1989) and indicated their Preference for 18 different national brands, including the target Crest and Colgate ones. In the second session, subjects were assigned, at random, to read a newspaper article about either the Crest or the Colgate boycott. As in study 1, this article contained the Participation Expectation manipulation (appendix). Subjects then indicated their Boycott Likelihood using a multi-item scale (M p 4.7, SD p 1.6, a p .96). This scale was identical to the one in study 1 with the exception of two additional boycott intention items (seven-point scales; Extremely unlikely/Extremely likely, Not at all probable/Highly probable). Next, subjects indicated the importance to them of the boycott issue (Issue Importance; appendix). Because this study focused on real, social-issue boycotts, we expected

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substantial variation among subjects on this measure. As in study 1, subjects then responded to several checks, including that for the Participation Expectation manipulation (M p 33.7, SD p 18.8), the newspaper articles believability (M p 5.2, SD p 1.1, a p .86), and the persuasiveness of the arguments it contained (M p 4.8, SD p 1.4, a p .93). We assessed subjects boycotting behavior in the third session. Approximately one week after subjects were exposed to the boycott information (i.e., on the last day of class) one of the researchers (who was not present during the rst two sessions) went to all the classes that had completed the rst two sessions and informed subjects that as a reward for participating in all the marketing studies over the course of the semester (completed in three one-hour sessions) the department was offering them a free product (i.e., a thank you gift) donated by a consumer goods rm. The length of time between exposure to boycott information and choice was selected to minimize potential demand effects but ensure that subjects could still recall the boycott information. Each subject received a sheet of paper containing a list of the brand(s) corresponding to one of the three Substitutability conditions: (i) Crest toothpastes only, (ii) Colgate toothpastes only, and (iii) Crest and Colgate toothpastes. To further reduce task transparency, we included multiple Crest and Colgate product types (e.g., Tartar Control, Baking Soda, Fluoride) in the relevant choice sets (appendix). Subjects were asked to choose a brand from their choice set by checking it. It is important to note that they also had the option of not choosing any of the brands in their choice set (i.e., a no-choice option; Dhar 1997). Subjects who selected a brand received the actual product from the researcher. We lost one subject between the rst two sessions and this third one, resulting in a total of 165 observations in our choice data. Each class was debriefed after all subjects completed this choice task. While it was clear from the ensuing discussion that subjects recalled the boycott information from session 2, none of them indicated being aware of an explicit connection between the third session and the prior two. In fact, many were surprised to learn that the thank you gift was part of the boycott study, suggesting that the use of the three separate sessions run by different experimenters did help control for potential demand effects. The control choice shares for the target products were obtained using an identical procedure among students from the same population (n p 101) who had completed three hours of studies that did not include this one. In other words, these subjects participated in session 3 but not sessions 1 and 2.

analogous ANOVA of Issue Importance did not reveal any signicant variations across different experimental levels. However, because subjects responded to real boycotts, we included Issue Importance as a covariate in all analyses. Notably, excluding Issue Importance from these analyses did not alter our ndings. Finally, an ANOVA with Preference as the dependent variable and Participation Expectation, SNI, and their interaction as independent factors revealed that Preference did not vary signicantly across the experimental conditions. The signicant results are presented next. Details of all analyses can be obtained from the authors.

Manipulation Checks. As in study 1, subjects perceived the Participation Expectation manipulation as intended (MLow p 18.6%, MHigh p 48.9%; F(1, 165) p 291.7, p ! .01). There was no evidence of unintended crossover effects or contamination across the independent factors (Perdue and Summers 1986). Subjects also found the newspaper article to be believable (5.15) and its arguments to be moderately persuasive (4.82). These ratings did not vary across the experimental conditions. Boycott Likelihood. As in study 1, Participation Expectation had a positive effect on Boycott Likelihood (MLow p 4.66, MHigh p 4.75; F(1, 165) p 5.82, p ! .05, h p .13). Moreover, this main effect was qualied by a marginally signicant Participation Expectation # SNI interaction (F(1, 165) p 3.69, p ! .10); in line with hypothesis 1, Participation Expectation had a signicant effect on the High SNI subjects Boycott Likelihood (MLow p 4.65, MHigh p 4.95; F(1, 82) p 9.8, p p .05, h p .16), but not on that of the Low SNI ones (MLow p 4.66, MHigh p 4.53). As expected (hypothesis 4a), Preference had a signicant negative main effect on Boycott Likelihood (MLow p 4.90, MHigh p 4.49; F(1, 165) p 4.39, p ! .05, h p .11). However, contrary to hypothesis 4b, the effect of Participation Expectation on Boycott Likelihood did not increase with their Product Preference (Participation Expectation # Preference: F(1, 165) p .01). This suggests that the moderating effect of Product Preference on the Participation ExpectationBoycott Likelihood relationship may be nonlinear. For instance, Participation Expectation may affect subjects Boycott Likelihood the most when their Preference for the boycotted product is moderate rather than low (i.e., they will boycott regardless of others participation) or high (i.e., they will not boycott, regardless of others participation). Finally, Issue Importance (i.e., the covariate) was also a positive predictor of Boycott Likelihood (b p .78, F(1, 165) p 190.65, p ! .01). This studys main focus, however, was on boycotting behavior and its dependence on Participation Expectation, Product Preference, and Substitutability. We used subjects session 3 brand choices to create two related measures of boycotting behavior: Match and No Choice. Match reected the boycotted brands choice share in the Target Brand and Both Brands Substitutability conditions and was obtained by recoding the choice data for each subject in these con-

Results
As in study 1, Boycott Likelihood and all the manipulation check items were analyzed using the full ANOVA model with Preference, Participation Expectation, SNI, and their interactions as independent factors. While the two levels of SNI and Preference used in these analyses were obtained through median splits, analyses based on continuous measures of these variables yielded comparable results. An

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ditions. If a subject chose the boycott target brand, Match was coded as 1. If a subject chose the substitute brand or did not choose any brand, Match was coded as 0. Thus, a lower percentage of Match in a given experimental condition reects stronger boycotting behavior in that condition. No Choice captured the withholding of consumption and was obtained by recoding subjects choices in all three Substitutability conditions into a Choice/No Choice dichotomy. If a subject refrained from choosing a brand in session 3, No Choice was coded as 1. If a subject chose a brand in session 3, No Choice was coded as 0. Thus, a higher percentage of No Choice in a particular experimental condition reects stronger boycotting behavior in that condition. Since Match and No Choice are correlated (r p .56, p ! .01) and the results for both measures are very similar, only the Match results are presented. Interested readers can obtain the full set of results from the authors.

Choice: Boycott versus Control. Prior to the analyses involving Match, we contrasted the choices of the subjects in the experimental boycott conditions to the choices of those in the control conditions. As expected, exposing subjects to boycott information made them more likely to boycott the target brand. Specically, a signicantly greater percent of subjects in the boycott conditions chose not to receive any brand (27.8%, n p 165) than in the control conditions (6.8%, n p 101; z p 4.17, p ! .05). More specically, when no substitutes were available (i.e., the Target Brand and the Other Brand conditions), a signicantly lower percent of subjects in the experimental boycott conditions chose a brand (66.2%, n p 107) than in the control conditions (86.3%, n p 51; z p 2.63, p ! .05). Finally, in line with hypothesis 5a, the availability of substitutes had a bigger effect on choice in the boycott conditions than in the control ones. Specically, in the boycott conditions, more subjects chose a product when they had access to substitutes (MBoth Brands p 82.8%, n p 58) than when they did not (MTarget Brand and Other Brand p 66.2%, n p 107; z p 2.27, p ! .05). This difference was much smaller in the control conditions (MBoth Brands p 96.0%, n p 50; MTarget Brand and Other Brand p 86.3%, n p 51; z p 1.71, p ! .10). Match. We tested hypotheses 4 and 5 through an ANOVA with Participation Expectation, SNI, Preference, Substitutability, and their interactions as independent factors and Issue Importance as a covariate. Since Match has no meaning in the Other Brand Substitutability condition, in which subjects session 3 choice sets did not contain their boycott target brand, we restricted our analysis to observations in the Target Brand and Both Brand Substitutability conditions. Since Match is a dichotomous variable, we also conducted the same analysis using a logistic regression and obtained the same pattern of results. Variations in Match in the different experimental conditions supported hypothesis 4a, hypothesis 5a, and hypothesis 5b. Subjects were more likely to boycott when product preference was low (hypothesis 4a): Preference was a positive predictor of Match (MLow p .26, MHigh p .51; F(1, 109) p 8.3, p !

.05, h p .25). However, hypothesis 4b was again not supported: the effect of Participation Expectation on Match was no greater when Preference was High (MLow p .44, MHigh p .56; F(1, 55) p .7, NS) than when it was Low (MLow p .35, MHigh p .19; F(1, 51) p 1.7, NS). Subjects were also more likely to boycott when substitutes were available (hypothesis 5a): Match was lower in the Both Brands (.28) than in the Target Brand (.51) Substitutability condition (F(1, 109) p 7.2, p ! .05, h p .23). This was qualied by a signicant Substitutability # Participation Expectation interaction (F(1, 109) p 10.6, p ! .05) supporting hypothesis 5b: in the Target Brand Substitutability condition, Match was lower when Participation Expectation was High (.38) than when it was Low (.67; F(1,51) p 6.72, p ! .05, h p .22). In other words, the positive effect of participation expectation on boycott behavior was greater when no substitutes were available. Interestingly, Participation Expectation did affect Match in the Both Brands Substitutability condition: Match was actually higher when Participation Expectation was High (.40) than when it was Low (.15; F(1,55) p 4.44, p ! .05, h p .18). While this was unexpected, it could be that when substitutes were available higher overall participation encouraged subjects to free ride because they felt that the boycott would succeed regardless of their participation given that others were boycotting and it was easy for them to do so. Finally, these Participation Expectationbased variations in Match were conned largely to the High SNI subjects (Target Brand: MLow p .75, MHigh p .36, F(1, 24) p 6.8, p ! .05, h p .23; Both Brands: MLow p .08, MHigh p .57, F(1, 25) p 7.4, p ! .05, h p .24) rather than the Low SNI ones (Target Brand: MLow p .58, MHigh p .40; Both Brands: MLow p .21, MHigh p .25).

Summary
This study examines boycotting behavior in real socialissue boycotts to conrm and generalize the study 1 nding that subjects expectation of overall participation affects their likelihood of participating in a boycott and that this effect varies directly with their susceptibility to normative inuence. This study also demonstrates that subjects likelihood of participating in a boycott is inuenced by their preference for the boycotted product and the availability of substitutes for it (i.e., the costs of boycotting). The availability of substitutes (i.e., lower cost) not only increased subjects boycotting likelihood but also reduced the inuence of overall participation expectation on boycott likelihood. While lower preference for the product (i.e., lower cost) also increased subjects boycotting likelihood, it did not moderate the overall participation expectationboycotting likelihood relationship.

DISCUSSION
Much is known today about the forces affecting and underlying consumption. Less is understood, however, about when and why people resist consumption (cf. Penaloza and

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Price 1993). This article contributes to our scant but growing understanding of consumer resistance by providing insights into the determinants of and mechanisms underlying consumers decisions to withhold consumption of a good in the interest of achieving some collective benet. In particular, we propose and demonstrate that the individual participation decision in a boycott can be conceptualized as a social dilemma, inuenced by reference group effects.

the latest releases, I will not because there wont be enough people to boycott anyway in order to restore original prices, so I will suffer for nothing) or low perceived efcacy (I wont boycott . . . because theres nothing you could do about it, One person more or less would not help/hurt the boycott, I feel as though I cant make a difference) as reasons for not participating.

Theoretical and Marketing Implications

Consumer Boycotts. Extant boycott research has focused primarily on macro-level characteristics of boycotts, their targets and their sponsors. Moreover, insights into the individual boycott participation decision have revolved around a somewhat idiosyncratic set of individual- and boycott-specic factors (see Garrett [1987] for recent review). This article contributes to our understanding of consumer boycotts by highlighting the individual-versus-group tension at the heart of the individual boycott decision. In particular, our ndings suggest that consumers uncertainty about the extent to which people can (i.e., efcacy) and will (i.e., overall participation) contribute to the boycotts success is a key barrier to their willingness to participate. The importance of these uncertainties regarding collective behavior to the participation decision is corroborated by some qualitative research we conducted to understand the reasons underlying subjects decision to participate in two separate price boycotts (CD stores and movie theaters) in their local area. While several subjects referred, in their retrospective verbal reports, to the trade-offs between the short-term costs (I like music too much, Im not willing to sacrice my viewing pleasure, I will miss listening to the latest CDs) and long-term benets of boycotting (Partaking in the boycott will be economical in the long run, My extra little effort will save me in the long run, Id boycott because in the long run Ill benet with lower prices), they expressed doubts about the boycotts likelihood of success (I dont think the boycott would work, I dont imagine the boycott will be successful, [The boycott] may not necessarily achieve its goal), and more specically, widespread participation (Not enough people would boycott, Even if I did boycott, there would not be enough people who joined, so it would be unsuccessful, Other people [most of them] wouldnt think it was worth the time or effort). Some subjects explicitly linked their own participation to overall participation (My participation would revolve around how much of the public participated, Though Id boycott if many people do, I would boycott . . . because everyone else is, If others wont, I wont either) while others referred to their aversion to free riding (I feel there would be too many people that wouldnt boycott, thus rendering my efforts useless, For this action to be really effective, most of the people would have to boycott CDs. But the truth is that . . . Every person thinks that others should be the one doing the boycott, while she or he enjoys

Social Dilemmas. This article also contributes to our understanding of cooperation in social dilemmas in several ways. First, while prior social dilemma research has examined the effect of certain group characteristics (e.g., size, cohesiveness, communication) on individual cooperation behavior, the nature and extent of the inuence(s) such groups exert have received little attention. This research draws on reference group theory to implicate the normative inuence exerted by the group of potential boycotters as a key determinant of cooperative behavior. In particular, consumers susceptibility to normative inuence appears to moderate the effect of such group inuences on their cooperation behavior. At the same time, we extend reference group research in the consumption domain by demonstrating that reference groups also inuence consumer decisions to withhold consumption. Second, while researchers have conceptualized peoples overall participation expectation and perceived efcacy as interdependent inputs into their estimate of the likelihood that the social problem will be resolved (Klandermans 1992), insights into the precise relationships among these expectations have been largely elusive (Wiener 1993). Our results help disentangle these interactive effects and support the general notion that overall participation expectation and perceived efcacy are used to estimate a boycotts likelihood of success. More specically, these factors appear to be signicant inputs into consumers subjective estimates of boycott success, affecting such estimates in a specic and predictable manner when consumers have no independent reason to believe that the boycott will be successful. Third, our results underscore the importance of cooperation costs to the cooperation decision. Specically, we nd that boycott participation is greater when the costs associated with withholding consumption are lower (e.g., substitutes are available, product preference is low). Notably, these factors affecting cooperation costs do not appear to operate in the same manner: whereas the substitutability factor interacted in a predictable manner with subjects overall participation expectation to affect cooperation, this was not so for product preference. Perhaps overall participation expectation only has an effect when consumers product preference is moderate but not when it is high (and they are, therefore, unwilling to boycott regardless of what others are doing) or low (and they, therefore, do not use the product). More generally, our results suggest that cooperation in social dilemmas can be obtained without resorting to a structural solution by highlighting the availability of substitutes wherever appropriate. Finally, much social dilemma research emphasizes the importance of persuasive communication in overcoming the

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individual reluctance to cooperate (Klandermans 1992). A key contribution of this article stems from its focus on how message-related factors inuence cooperation in a social dilemma. Specically, we communicate participation and efcacy information in the context of a newspaper article and nd systematic and predictable effects of such information on consumers perceptions of boycott success likelihood and, in turn, their cooperation likelihood. More important, this article is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst to demonstrate signicant message framing effects on cooperation in social dilemmas. While framing in the social dilemma context has been conceptualized rather broadly (e.g., Klandermans 1992), research (see Schwartz-Shea and Simmons [1995] for review) has focused primarily on how alternate frames of the social problem (e.g., whether a public good is perceived as a gain or a loss) affect cooperation. Our study focuses, instead, on the procooperation message frames produced by the alternate collective outcomes (i.e., successful vs. unsuccessful resolution of the problem) of individual action to demonstrate that by merely highlighting these alternate outcomes, procooperation communication can signicantly increase cooperation likelihood. The implications of these ndings for proboycott communications are discussed next.

overall cooperation expectation and low efcacy (i.e., they are likely to be in the Negative Frame, Low Efcacy, and Low Participation Expectation condition of study 1). Our results suggest that in such situations, providing evidence of a high anticipated level of overall participation or of high efcacy can signicantly boost participation.

Limitations and Future Research

Many of this articles limitations stem from the experimental context used to examine the individual boycott decision. For instance, we use student subjects. Notably, students may be more likely, in general, to participate in boycotts because of a greater inclination toward activism during this stage of their lives. However, there is little reason to expect the dynamics underlying the boycott decision to be different for students (compared to other consumers). Nevertheless, future research on the individual boycott decision using a broader base of respondents is essential. In addition, subjects were exposed to information about overall participation levels and efcacy as well as the proboycott message in quick succession and in a specic order. Clearly, in real world boycotts, exposure to such information varies both in terms of quantity, sequence, and temporal distance. Future work is needed on how these factors affect the relationship between consumers perceptions and their participation likelihood. The related issue of source credibility, either of the boycott organizers or of the boycott target (issuing antiboycott messages), was also not examined, pointing the way to future research. Similarly, higher issue importance ratings in study 2 relative to those obtained in its pretests point to possible response biases born of information salience or social desirability. Future empirical work in this domain needs to check and, if necessary, control for such potential biases. In a real world boycott, withholding purchase is typically accompanied by monetary savings (i.e., the price) to the consumer. We chose not to simulate purchase in study 2instead, measuring boycotting in terms of subjects rejection of a free productto avoid potential ceiling effects caused by subjects unwillingness to pay for the product not only because it was being boycotted but also because they just did not want it at that time. While we believe that our boycotting measure provided a conservative test of our predictions, future research is needed to generalize our ndings to contexts where boycotting is accompanied by monetary savings. Finally, we assumed that the boycott decision is largely a rational rather than an emotional one and that, in general, boycotts are viewed either neutrally or positively by the majority of consumers. Future research needs to examine whether boycotts, in general, generate positive or negative affect, and if so, how that moderates the decision to participate in specic boycotts. The effect of the boycott targets reactions on consumers participation decision is another important issue for future research. In particular, boycott targets, in an attempt to counter proboycott messages, may attempt to repudiate boycott organizers claims, deny responsibility, or highlight a

Proboycott Communications. While consumer boycotts today are more prevalent than ever, boycott organizers are rarely successful in inducing widespread participation, regardless of the boycotts nal outcome (Ferguson 1997). This may stem, at least partly, from a lack of knowledge about the characteristics of effective proboycott communication, which is perhaps the most important and often only instrument of persuasion at the organizers disposal. This article adds to our understanding of effective proboycott communication by examining how elements of such communications form and content affect participation likelihood. Our ndings suggest that such communication may be more effective if it highlights the consequences of boycott success over failure; when proboycott communication is framed in terms of success, additional information about the expected overall participation level and each participants efcacy appears to have little effect on participation likelihood. Thus, given that overall participation and efcacy estimates are typically difcult to come by, our results suggest that the absence of such potentially persuasive information can be at least partially compensated for by merely highlighting the consequences of a successful boycott. This nding corroborates Wiener and Doeschers (1991) recommendation that the communication strategy of social marketers trying to overcome the sucker effectbased barrier to cooperation should emphasize that the collective goal is likely to be reached. Conversely, when boycott failure is salient among potential participants (as is probably often the case), our ndings suggest that both overall participation and efcacy information, if available, can have signicant effects on participation likelihood. In most boycotts, consumers low participation willingness is likely to be a function of their low

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boycotts inability to successfully resolve the focal issue. Boycott targets may also try to minimize the importance of the boycott issue (i.e., reduce cooperation utility) while highlighting that of its products (i.e., increase cooperation costs), or emphasize how and why the boycott might fail (i.e., minimize the perceived likelihood of success). Future research needs to explore the moderating effect of such boycott target reactions on boycott likelihood. The boycotted product in study 1, movies, is typically publicly consumed; most consumers go to movie theaters with members of their reference group. Even when they do go alone, others can observe their entry into the theater. On the other hand, the boycotted product in study 2, toothpaste, is usually privately consumed. While we found reference group effects for both types of products, it is likely that normative reference group inuences will be stronger in the case of publicly consumed products (e.g., driving a Mitsubishi or wearing a fur coat) or when boycott organizers or participants purposefully monitor and publicize product consumption. Future research needs to examine how the magnitude of such reference group effects varies with the domain in which the boycotted product is usually consumed. If the individual decision to boycott can indeed be conceptualized as a social dilemma for a wide range of products, issues, and people, then much can be gained from drawing on extant social dilemma research to better understand this decision. For instance, individual behavior in social dilemmas has been characterized in terms of a rich set of individual and group-related factors (see Komorita and Parks 1994; van Lange et al. 1992). These include the size, identity, cohesiveness, and interdependence structure of a group; the amount and nature of communication and commitment within groups; the identiability of group members (including expectations of future interactions); and individual differences, not only in terms of gender but also social values (i.e., emphasis on cooperation, individualism or competition), trust, and feelings of personal responsibility. Most, if not all, of these variables are relevant to a better understanding of cooperation in boycotts. Consequently, a comprehensive characterization of the individual boycott decision in terms of the interactions of these variables with the variables examined in this article represents a potentially fruitful future research agenda. More generally, social dilemma theory itself can serve as a fruitful theoretical framework in our efforts to understand any kind of consumer behavior that involves trade-offs between individual and group needs (e.g., consumption of public utilities, reaction to shortages (e.g., consumption of overharvested sh), charity and donating behavior, group dynamics and decisionmaking within families and organizations).

APPENDIX
FIGURE A1 STUDY 1: BOYCOTT SCENARIO (LOW PARTICIPATION EXPECTATION; LOW EFFICACY)

FIGURE A2 STUDY 1: PROBOYCOTT COMMUNICATION

NOTE.Top, Failure frame; bottom, Success frame.

FIGURE A3 STUDY 2: BOYCOTT SCENARIO (CREST; LOW PARTICIPATION EXPECTATION)

414

FIGURE A4 STUDY 2: CHOICE TASK

415

416
FIGURE A5 MEASURES

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[Received June 1998. Revised April 2001. David Glen Mick served as editor, and William O. Bearden served as associate editor for this article.]

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