1990001658

INDEPENDENT
ORBITER
ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT OFTHE MAN NED MANEUVERING UNIT
19 FEBRUARY
1988
MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS HOUSTON
ASTRONAUTICS DIVISION
COMPANY
SPACE
TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM
ENGINEERING
AND
OPERATIONS
SUPPORT
WORKING
PAPER
NO.
1.0-WP-VA88003-11
INDEPENDENT ASSESMENT OF THE
ORBITER MANNED
ASSESSMENT MANEUVERING UNIT
12
FEBRUARY
1988
This Task
Working Order
No.
Paper is VA88003,
Submitted Contract
to NASA under NAS 9-17650
PREPARED
BY: MMU Analyst Independent Assessment
M_ .u_
MMU Ahalyst Independent Assessment Orbiter Orbiter
PREPARED
BY:
" _-_'M.J. - l_ai_idf Lead Analyst Independent Assessment Orbiter
A._. Mar/no/ Section/Manager-FMEA/CIL Independent Orbiter
APPROVE
__ _.
/_,.'/J
J_
APPROVED
/_-__.
K_
.... ,._-_
Manager Orbiter
_.
(
I.
Project SEOS
M_Phers_n
Manager
_/_7__/,"Technical <-7 j' _ Independent / Assessment
CO_E_B Page 1.0 2.0 EXECUTIVE INTRODUCTION 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.0 Purpose Scope Analysis Approach MMU Ground Rules DESCRIPTION Function and Locations SUMMARY 1 3 3 3 3 4 5 5 12 12 21 25 ACRONYMS DEFINITIONS, Definitions Project Subsystem C D E F Level Ground Rules Specific Ground WORKSHEETS ITEMS WORKSHEETS TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS and Rules Assumptions and Assumptions GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS A-I B-I B-2 B-4 B-6 C-I D-I E-I F-I
and
Assumptions
SUBSYSTEM 3.1 3.2 3.3
Design and Interfaces Hierarchy RESULTS
4.0 5.0
ASSESSMENT REFERENCES A B
APPENDIX APPENDIX B.I B.2 B.3 APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT CRITICAL ANALYSIS NASA FMEA
REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
List
of
Figures Page
Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13
MMU FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY MANNED MANEUVERING UNIT (MMU) FLIGHT SUPPORT STATION PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM SCHEMATIC ELECTRICAL/POWER SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW MMU-EMU INTERFACES MMU-FSS ENVELOPE - PORT SIDE MMU-FSS ENVELOPE - STARBOARD SIDE MMU - TOP LEVEL HIERARCHY PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY ELECTRICAL/POWER SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY HIEARCHY OF SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND MECHANISMS FSS HIERARCHY
2 6 7 8 9 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
List
of
Tables Page
Table Table Table
I II III-
SUMMARY SUMMARY
OF OF
IOA IOA IOA
FMEA CIL
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT
ISSUES ISSUES
22 23
SUMMARY OF CRITICALITIES SUMMARY IOA OF
RECOMENDED
FAILURE 23
Table Table
IV V
IOA
RECOMENDED NUMBERS
CRITICAL
ITEMS
24 24
WORKSHEET
ii
Assessment
Independent of the
Orbiter Assessment Manned Maneuvering
Unit
FMEA/CIL
I.
EXECUTXVE McDonnell 1986 Failure to
SUMMARY Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
The June the
perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions for preparation of FMEA and CIL. l0 October 1986. of the failure
The IOA effort first completed Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
an analysis (Reference 6) hardware, generating draft
modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contain within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL Post 51-L updates (Reference 7). A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. However, due to the cancellation of the Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL task, and subsequent cancellation of the IOA FMEA/CIL task, the resolution of these discrepancies were not attempted. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This the Orbiter The mode report documents MMU hardware. the results of this comparison for
IOA product "worksheets"
for the MMU analysis that resulted in
95
consisted potential
of 204 failure critical items
being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline (as of January 5, 1987) which consisted of 179 FMEAs and ii0 CIL items. The comparison determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced agreement on all but 121 FMEAs which caused differences in 92 CIL items. Figure 1 presents a comparison recommended The issues of the proposed baseline, and arose preparation due to Post 51-L any issues. NASA baseline, with the IOA
differences
between
the
NASA
and
IOA
FMEA/CIL
instructions.
ul .-1 tu
._
"_ Q0
Z "_ _
1.1.1
Figure
1 - MMU
FMEA/CIL
ASSESSMENT
2.0 2.1
INTRODUCTION Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment of the Orbiter and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2
Scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses functions, internal and external interfaces, and requirements for all mission phases.
The scope encompasses identified Contractor hardware, operational
2.3
Analysis
Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following assessment of performed and Steps 1.0 through the NASA and Prime documented at a 3.0. Step Contractor date. 4.0 summarizes FMEAs/CILs the that is
later
Step
1.0 Subsystem familiarization 1.1 Define subsystem functions 1.2 Define subsystem components 1.3 Define subsystem specific assumptions
ground
rules
and
Step
2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram 2.1 Define subsystem 2.2 Define major assemblies 2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations 3.0 Failure events definition 3.1 Construct matrix of failure 3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step
modes
Step
4.0 Compare IOA analysis 4.1 Resolve differences 4.2 Review in-house 4.3 Document assessment 4.4 Forward findings to
data
to
NASA
FMEA/CIL
issues Project Manager
2.4
MMU
Ground
Rules
and
Assumptions
Due to the unique functions performed by the MMU, the IOA project determined it necessary to establish groundrules and assumptions applicable solely to the MMU (reference Appendix B). These ground rules and assumptions, in addition to those established project wide (also provided in Appendix B), are intended to both complement and supplement those defined in NSTS 22206. Additionally, they ensure that the IOA MMU analysis is capable of being understood by personnel who did not directly participate in the analysis.
3.0 3.1
SYSTEMDESCRIPTION Design and Function self-contained,
The MMU, reference Figure 2, is a modular, propulsive backpack designed to attach to
the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) and to be donned and doffed by one unassisted crewmember. When used, the MMU increases the Orbiter crew's Extravehicular Activity (EVA) mobility by extending the range of their activities from the payload bay to other portions of the spacecraft, to appendages of payloads bay, or to other spacecraft entirely. is stowed in the forward payload bay Station on each The IOA propulsion structures (FSS), Orbiter reference mission. Figure 3. protruding from the cargo When not in use, the MMU on the Flight Support Two MMUs are typically flown
analysis has defined the MMU as being comprised subsystem, electrical/power subsystem, support and mechanisms, and the FSS. These subsystems operate singly or in an integrated functions: propulsion, control, and crewmember restraint/fit.
of
a and
hardware can four primary and stowage,

i.
manner to perform system maintenance
P_opulsion are each rotational
Subsystem - Two independent, identical subsystems capable of providing the translational and forces necessary for propulsion. Inert GN2 stored in isolation two pressure val_e (open) vessels. allows Activation GN2 to flow of to
propellant is a motor-driven
a pressure regulator and then to the thruster manifolds which consist of four 3-thruster (triad) assemblies for each of the two subsystems. Based on hand-controller and gyro inputs, electrical power to the thruster solenoid valves result in expansion of the nitrogen gas through a nozzle to produce propulsion. The two systems are isolated but can be interconnected through hand-actuated toggle valves. Quickdisconnect valves provide GN2 recharge capability for the pressure 4 is a vessels schematic when the MMU is of the propulsion Subsystem the power 5 presents stowed in subsystem. the FSS. Figure
Electrical/Power electronics and the MMU. Figure The hand maneuvering controllers
- Encompasses storage and an overview
the control distribution within of this subsystem. elements Assembly - two (CEA).
control comprises and the Control
three main Electronics
These operate together to provide signals to the propulsion system for rotational or translational motion. The Rotational Hand Controller (RHC) furnishes switching logic that converts rotary motions of commands. The RHC also supplies hold function. The Translational provides handle also in switching logic three axes to the the handle to rotational control for the attitude Hand Controller (THC) the motions commands. valve. of the The THC
that converts translational isolation
controls
propellant
ORfL_NAL
PA_L
_o
OF POOR qUALrTY
c-GNz
Pressure
Cage
(l)
I
i
Cue {2)
;hruscers (24) Contact y Button (2) Lucator Light ,_CN Switch z Cross Feed/ (&)
(2)
PLSS Arm Circuit Breakers Rotationai Hand Con Adjustable Arm (2) ---Latch Stowage (2) Lock----'_ --Ancil Attach (3 Each mPropellan Recharge _Recharge --GSE :(4 _" CEA Power A and B External Power Switches Translational Hand Cyro Control Power Arm Locator Light (3) --Arm and Attach Each Hinge Lock QD (2) Tether Points Bracket(2, Equip. Points Side) Recharge Valve GN 2 Tanks (2)
Side)
Switches
_External Connector
Power
Arm Length
Angle
Adjustment
Lever
(2)
Alternate Control Hode Switch
Adjustment
L=v_r
(_)
Figure
- MANNED
MANEUVERING 6
UNIT
(MMU)
GN2 -
Service
Station Connectors,
(2) Valves,
Redundant and Hoses Vent Fill from Operates
Provision Capability: Orbiter GN 2
for
Flex
Hoses
Recharge Tanks Separation Nuts Capability Camera
Locatlon/Design - Clearance Provided Tests at Fit-Check
for Orbiter TV Based on WETF JSC Tool and Slotted
Mounting Holes Compat ib ill ty - Design for Horizontal Designed Starboard
Ensure
Orbiter
Both Vertical and Orbiter Installation Port and
for Both Mounting
Crew
Mobility
Aids
and
Restraints
q
- Recharge - Subway -
Tether Straps Lever
Bracket
Actuation (Shown
for
MMU
Release
in Capture Tether
Position)
- Safety -
Retainer Hand Rails
Fixed-Posltlon
Foot Restraint Adjustments, 4.0-in. down and 10.0-in. up in 1-in. Increments Adjustable Onorbic and MMU Heel Restraints Don and Doff for Servicing,
- Toe and
Figure
FLIGHT 7
SUPPORT
STATION
System
A Thrusters i
!
Resulacor
Tos|le
Valve
System
GN2 Tank
Figure
4 -
PROPULSION 8
SUBSYSTEM
SCHEMATIC
>
SLde
To
I Sl4e
_lJu8
Figure
5 -
ELECTRICAL/POWER 9
SUBSYSTEM
OVERVIEW
The CEA contains circuitry to operate the propulsion system, and circuitry controller commands for translational
the thruster to respond to and rotational
valves hand-
of
control. Gyro circuitry provides attitude and rate information. Phase-plane circuitry furnishes inputs thruster select logic for the automatic attitude hold of operation.
for the mode
The thruster select logic uses either or both redundant thruster sets to convert manual and/or attitude hold commands to thrust commands. Valve drive amplifiers amplify the thruster valve signals to levels required for valve operation. from the Thruster commands The power Isolation valves, pressure vessels to cue and lights allow a isolation valve two when open, the pressure allow GN 2 regulators. of to flow
visible indication operation. batteries
thruster
comprises
silver-zinc
and
two
separate power distribution systems that include the circuit breakers, switches, and relays required for MMU operation. Power conditioners in the CEA, fed from the batteries, supply power to the CEA and hand controllers. Locator lights provide visible indication of the location of the EVA crewmember to an observing crewmember inside the Orbiter. The locator lights consist of a converter assembly and three light assemblies. The batteries also furnish heater power for the propulsion heaters and hand controller case heaters. Heaters are required for both orbital storage and EVA operations During EVA, skin temperatures can be as low as -120 degrees F, whereas most components must be above -60 degrees F for operation.
SUDDort
Structures
and
Mechanisms
The
basic
MMU
structure
consists of two side towers connected by the center structure and two arms. The towers support the thrusters and provide mounting for the MMU/FSS retention latches and the propulsion subsystem Quick Disconnects (QDs). The center structure supports the two batteries, eight circuit breakers, the CEA, two pressure vessels, and propulsion equipment. Also supported are the external power connector, and thermal cover, and the thermal covers for the batteries. In conjunction with the towers, the center structure
supports the retention system for the EMU. This EMU/MMU retention system consists of two independent manually activated latches, guide ramps, and back-support points. The arms can be pivoted and extended for flight or located in the stowed position.
i0
Fliaht
SUDDOrt
Station
/FSSI
The
FSS,
reference
Figure and side
3, of
provides MMU stowage, GN2 pressure vessel recharge, stowage heaters for the MMU on the port or starboard the Orbiter near the EVA airlock and hatch.
The FSS structure comprises the side arms, foot restraints, and the Orbiter mounting structure. A locking handle and butterfly latch are provided for flight docking, capture, and release of the MMU. The foot restraints are adjustable on orbit to accommodate the full range of astronaut anthropometry. Shock provided to attenuate MMU is secured in the bolts and Gas Actuated astronaut release, the nuts mounts (vibration isolators) are the Orbiter launch environment. The FSS during launch with four capture Nuts (GANs) installed in the MMU. On MMU bolts operations,
operation, the nuts will actuate and allowing FSS egress. For contingency can be manually engaged or disengaged
The pneumatic portion of the FSS consists of a dual Orbiter interface which routes GN2 to redundant charging systems, either one of which can recharge the MMU propulsion system Each charging system contains a charging valve, flex hose, and one-half of the QD. GN2 can also to the GANs used for MMU-to-FSS launch attachment. vent be valve, supplied
FSS heaters are supplied 28-Vdc power from the Orbiter through two independent power buses. Breakers in the Orbiter cabin furnish circuit protection. Five temperature sensors are provided for crew temperature monitoring of the MMU during orbital storage.
II
3.2
Interfaces
and
Locations
Interfaces occur Space Transportation specific areas.
between the MMU (including the FSS) and other System (STS) Orbiter elements in three First, the MMU itself interfaces with the FSS.
Second, structural, mechanical, electrical, and nitrogen recharge interfaces exist between the Orbiter and the FSS. Third, mechanical and man/machine interfaces exist between the crewmember in the EMU and the MMU. When not in use the MMU is of the Orbiter on the FSS. continually EMU to MMU interfaces and 8. exposed interfaces envelopes to stowed in the front Due to this location of the payload the MMU is bay
the space environment are depicted in Figure in the payload bay are
when in 6. The depicted
orbit. The MMU to FSS in Figures 7
3.3
Hierarchy 9 through 13 illustrate the hierarchical relationships the MMU, subsystems, and components employed for the IOA analysis.
Figures between enclosed
12
Spring-Loaded
,_U/PLSS
-La_
Belt
Figure
MMU-EMU
INTERFACES
13
_L OF POOR
PAGE
IS
QUALITY
Figure
- MMU-FSS
ENVELOPE 14
- PORT
SIDE
OF POOR Q_AL|TY
I i I
I
I
i
I
i i
Figure
8 - MMU-FS5
ENVELOPE 15
- STARBOARD
SIDE
CC
CD
m
..J u_
m UJQ_ ..J W
Figure
9 - MMU
- TOP 16 --
LEVEL
HIERARCHY
Figure
i0
PROPULSION 17
SUBSYSTEM
HIERARCHY
OO
Q.
Q.
"C
x_oj=
uu
-['-U
I-_..J
zuJ
-J
_.)
o__
eu_
m vw
7--1-I-
U_ L&J W
,aC ZZ .< 0 ,m I b-. i n zLL_

ULJ m m A
.J .<
, _-,-I 01,_ ] Z31 -,

'
_
uJ
I
I
=
",.-
uJ 0 Q. 0
"-_
)-
Figure
ii
ELECTRICAL/POWER 18
SUBSYSTEM
HIERARCHY
Figure
12
HIERARCHY
OF
SUPPORT 19
STRUCTURES
AND
MECHANISMS
_.=.,
O_ OO
i, >
i i
_=
I
!
I
.=..
E
uu F--
o t _
I uu
Figure
13
FSS 20
HIERARCHY
4.0
_SSESSNENT
RESULTS
The MMU assessment was done based on the FMEA/CIL data received from Martin Marietta dated January 5, 1987 (Reference 7). Subsequent to the receipt of these data, a meeting was held on April 14, 1987 with Ms. Susan Goudy of the Martin Marietta Corporation and some of the significant issues were discussed. Resolution of these issues remained for a later date, and was not pursued after the cancellation of the Martin Marietta FMEA/CIL task by NASA. In this report, an attempt has been made to compare the IOA analysis results (Reference 6) to those of Reference 7, and bring the assessment process up to date with change 2 of NSTS-22206. some of the significant issues identified are summarized below: o The Martin Marietta analysis format lacked a
comprehensive definition of the flight phases, screens, and the item(s) under study. All the flight phases were not always analyzed for prep, ops, and post ops for each failure mode. The screens A and B were not specifically designated per NSTS-22206. IOA had to interpret their status based on very limited information provided. The screen C was not addressed, and it was therefore left blank throughout the assessment. The Martin Marietta analysis did not address a specific hardware item in some cases, but used an assembly instead. This made it very difficult to investigate failure modes and effects of a particular item and its impact o on the overall and was system.
The MMU PREP clear and it criticalities.
POST-OPS definitions were not too consequently difficult to match their IOA considered every MMU activity to
begin with PRE-OPS activities and end with POST-OPS activities prior to the start of the next MMU OPS. The Martin Marietta definition seems to suggest that the PREP activities start with the first MMU PRE-OPS and stop the o There after the last planned were a last MMU OPS activity. MMU OPS will then be of issues related The period POST-OPS. to the after
number
treatment
of the multi-position switches. The Martin Marietta used a more broad and general failure mode approach, such as open or closed. IOA considered and investigated the failure of single contact positions for open and closed and assigned the worst case criticality. Multi-position switches to fail open or closed were in general considered to be unreasonable. o Electrical items, such as d_odes, resistors, relays, etc., associated with an LRU circuit were not studied by Martin Marietta. IOA provided analysis for these items to be incorporated into the final FMEA/CIL study. 21
The IOA analysis of the MMUhardware initially generated 136 failure mode worksheets and identified 69 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, 57 additional failure mode analysis worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 179 FMEAs and ii0 CIL items, which was generated using the NSTS-22206 FMEA/CIL
instructions. FMEAs remained these issues Apendix C. Upon completion of the assessment, 121 of as issues to be resolved. The explanations are provided on individual assessment sheets the 204 for in
Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains the IOA additional analysis worksheets supplementing previous analysis. Appendix provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also summarized. Table I presents the associated a summary issue counts. of the FMEA and IOA criticalities and
Table
Summary
of
IOA
FMEA
Assessment IOA 36 87 35 46 204
Issues Issues 19 5O 27 25 121
Component Propulsion Electrical/ Power Structures Mechanism FSS TOTAL
NASA 32 78 and 29 40 179
22
Table exist
II presents a summary of the CIL assessment for each component.

Table II Summary of NASA 22 49 and 24 15 ii0 IOA CIL Assessment IOA 28 43 17 7 95
issues
that
Issues Issues 16 37 23 16 92
Component Propulsion Electrical/ Power Structures Mechanism FSS TOTAL
Table III criticalities
presents for
a breakdown the Post 51-L
of the IOA recommended FMEA baseline.
failure
TABLE
III
Summary i/I 1 9 and
of
IOA 2/IR 23 26
Recommended 2/2 2 8 12 5 3/IR

o
Failure 3/2R 8 17 i0 27 62
Criticalities 3/3 2 21 i0 12 45 TOTAL 36 87 35 46 204
Criticality: Propulsion Electrical/ Power Structures Mechanism FSS TOTAL
6
D
2 8
I0
52
27
23
Of the critical
failure modes analyzed, ninety-five were determined to be items, distributed throughout MMUas shown in Table IV. TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Critical
1/1
i 9 and 2/IR 23 26 2/2 2 8 12 5 10 52 27 3/IR
I
Items
3/3 TOTAL 28 43 17 7 95
Criticality: Propulsion Electrical/ Power Structures Mechanism FSS TOTAL
3/2R 2
m
2 2 6
The scheme (Appendix
for assigning E) worksheet
IOA numbers
assessment is shown
(Appendix in Table
C) V.
and
analysis
Table Component Propulsion
V IOA
IOA ID
Worksheet Number
Numbers
Electrical/ Power
Structures Mechanism FSS
and
MMU-100 1031X, 1251X, MMU-128 145A, 169A, 1281X, 1731X, MMU-189 4000X, 4014X. MMU-208 2391X, 4011X.
to 127, 106A, 106B, 1051X, II41X, II91X, 1252X, 1253X. to 188, 130A, 131A, 146A, 151A, 152A, 153A, 171A, 174A, 177A, 178A, 1681X, 1701X to 1704X, 1861X, 1862X, 4015X. to 207, 192A, 196A, 4001X, 4005X, 4006X, to 245, 219A, 2392X, 4002X, 2111X, 4003X,
I06C, 1211X,
125A, 1001X, 1212X,
134A, 135A, 144A, 154A, 157A, 179A, 185A, 1721X to 1724X, 1891X 4012X, 2141X 4004X, to 1899X, 4013X, 1981X to 2144X, 4007X to
24
5.0
REFERENCES documentation The documentation available used from NASA was used in the
Reference analysis.
i.
included: of Failure Items List Modes (CIL),
NSTS 22206, and Effects i0 October MMU-SE-17-73, Program,
Instructions for Preparation Analysis (FMEA) and Critical 1986 Manned Operational Maneuvering Data Book, Unit, Volume Unit, Volume
Space I, Rev.
Shuttle B, July 1985
MMU-SE-17-73, Manned Program, Operational 852MM000019, 852CD0000825, September MDAC 1986 Martin Analysis, IOA Propulsion Electrical 1986 MMU Working
Maneuvering Data Book, Flow Check
Space Shuttle II, October Rev FSS C, and 15
1984 1986
Diagrams, Diagram
April 9
MMU,
Paper
NO.-WP-VA86001-09,
21
November
Marietta Rev A.,
Informal January
Data, 1987
MMU
Failure
Modes
and
Effect
25
APPENDIX ACRONYMS Automatic Circuit Control Critical Attitude Breaker Electronics Items List Hold
AH
CB CEA CIL EMU EVA F FMEA FM FSS GAN GFE
Assembly Unit
Extravehicular Extravehicular Functional Failure Modes Failure Mode Flight Support Gas Actuated
Mobility Activity and Effects
Analysis
Station Nut Equipment
GN HC HUT IOA IVA JSC LED Lts MDAC MMU NSTS PCI PLB PLSS QD RHC Stab SMM SOS STS TCS THC TPAD VDA -
Government Furnished Gaseous Nitrogen Hardware Hand Controller
Hard Upper Torso Independent Orbiter Assessment Intravehicular Activity Johnson Space Center Light Emitting Diode Lights McDonnell Douglas Astronautic Manned Maneuvering Unit National Space Transportation Potential Critical Item Payload Bay Portable Life-Support System Quick Disconnect Rotational Hand Controller Satellite Stabilization Solar Maximum Mission Space Operations Simulator Space Transportation System Thermal Control System Translational Hand Controller Trunnion Pin Attach Device Valve Drive Amplifier
Company System
Sat
A-I
APPENDIX
DEFINITIONS,
GROUND
RULES,
AND
ASSUMPTIONS
B.I B.2 B.3
Definitions Project Level Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules Ground and Rules Assumptions and Assumptions
B-I
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
Definitions contained in NSTS i0 October 1986, and additions. DEFINITIONS: begins at transition 9, post-flight to OPS 6 and ends at transition 22206, were Instructions used with the For Preparation following
Definitions of FMEA/CIL, amplifications INTACT ABORT RTLS to OPS
TAL - begins at declaration of transition to OPS 9, post-flight AOA - begins at declaration of transition to OPS 9, post-flight ATO - begins at declaration of transition to OPS 9, post-flight
the
abort
and
ends
at
the
abort
and
ends
at
the
abort
and
ends
at
CREDIBLE (CAUSE} - an event that can be predicted anticipated operational environmental conditions. event where multiple failures must first occur to environmental extremes CONTINGENCY the standard cards EARLY planned MISSION end of CREW PROCEDURES malfunction
or expected Excludes result in
in an
- procedures that are utilized beyond procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
TERMINATION mission -
termination
of
onorbit
phase
prior
to
EFFECTS/RATIONALE highest criticality HIGHEST determined MAJOR (OPS) M C (PASS) CRITICALITY in the (MM) -
description
of
the
case
which
generated
the
- the highest phase-by-phase major sub-mode
functional analysis of software
criticality
MODE
operational
sequence
Memory
Configuration
of
Primary
Avionics
Software
System
MISSION - assigned payload/objective altitude (excludes middeck P/L, etc.)
performance of a specific accomplishments including secondary payloads such
Orbiter flight with orbit phasing and as GAS cans,
B-2
MULTIPLE cause or function
ORDER event
FAILURE of all
- describes units which
the failure due to perform a necessary
a single (critical)
OFF-NOMINAL the standard cards OP__SSPRIMARY tives PHASE software
CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
operational OBJECTIVES to mission
sequence - worst case objectives primary mission objec-
MISSION are equal DEFINITIONS: PRELAUNCH power-up LIFTOFF ends at ONORBIT ends at DEORBIT 301 and
PHASE and ends MISSION transition PHASE transition PHASE ends at
begins at at moding
launch to OPS at 1
count-down Major Mode SRB ignition (Synonymous to OPS to gear 8 OPS 2
Orbiter 102 (liftoff) (MM 102) with ASCENT) or OPS 8 and
PHASE - begins out of OPS begins out begins first at of at main
transition OPS 2 or transition landing
and
OPS Major touchdown
Mode
LANDING/SAFING PHASE touchdown and ends with safing operations
begins at first the completion
main gear of post-landing
B-3
DEFINITIONS,
APPENDIX B GROUND RULES,
AND
ASSUMPTIONS
B.2
IOA
Project
Level
Ground
Rules
and
Assumptions
The philosophy embodied Preparation of FMEA/CIL, following amplifications
in NSTS 22206, Instructions for I0 October 1986, was employed with and additions
the
i.
The operational implementation (FSSRs). RATIONALE:
flight of the
software is Flight System
an accurate Software
Requirements
Software verification this task.
is
out-of-scope
of
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy Screen B for its corresponding hardware item. RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability and/or the actual monitoring by the crew is beyond the scope of this task. to be mission
Any data employed with flight software is assumed functional for the specific vehicle and specific being flown. RATIONALE: Mission data this task. (including the design verification is
out-of-scope
of
All hardware assembled to RATIONALE:
firmware) is manufactured specifications/drawings.
and
Acceptance and verification testing is designed to detect and identify problems before the item is approved for use. crew and procedures will not will include be assumed human error
All Flight Data File performed as written, their performance. RATIONALE:
in
Failures caused are out-of-scope
by human of this
operational task.
error
B-4
All hardware analyses will, as the level of analysis existent Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be hardware detail levels but not RATIONALE:
a minimum, be performed at within NASA/Prime Contractor permitted to go to greater lesser. with analyses of
Comparison of IOA analysis results other analyses requires that both be performed to a comparable level detail. a telemetry parameter is actually AOS by ground-based personnel is
Verification monitored required.
that during
not
RATIONALE:
Analysis of mission-dependent availability and/or the actual applicable data by ground-based beyond the scope of this task.
telemetry monitoring personnel
of is
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case effects for the phase of interest. RATIONALE: Assigning thorough phase criticalities and complete analysis. cables, warranted and will ensures a
Analysis of wire harnesses, to determine if FMEAs are nor FMEAs assessed RATIONALE: Analysis to NSTS welds or performed
electrical not be
connectors performed
was 22206
substantially ground rule
complete redirection be
prior
i0.
Analysis will not
of be
brazed joints that nor FMEAs assessed. was 22206
cannot
inspected
RATIONALE:
Analysis to NSTS
substantially ground rule
complete redirection.
prior
ii.
Emergency system or hardware will exclude the EMU Secondary relief valves and the landing RATIONALE: Clarify ensure
will include burst discs and Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure gear pyrotechnics. of emergency throughout systems to IOA project.
definition consistency
B-5
DEFINITIONS,
APPENDIX B GROUND RULES,
AND
ASSUMPTIONS
B.3
MMU
I ,
Ground
Rules
and
Assumptions attitude or vehicle hold capability threatening,
Loss of the MMU's automatic will not be considered life a mission impact Rationale:
or
To date no normal operation has been which would require hold capability
or contingency identified or the automatic
MMU envisioned attitude
The availability of the Orbiter a stranded crewperson will not determining the criticality of mode. Rationale: The IOA project is necessary to analysis results criticality
to perform be considered the applicable
rescue in failure
of
believes such ensure worst in the most
an exclusion case scenario appropriate
For all analyses, it is required for planned or up to initiation of the Rationale: The above occuring analyzed missions.
assumed that the MMU may be contingency operations anytime Orbiter deorbit phase ensures to a MMU effect on that failures mission are subsequent MMU
assumption subsequent for their
The following MMU flight phase definitions applicable for the analyses provided in Pre-Ops: The timeframe extending in the Orbiter to removal orbit) from the FSS The the on-orbit MMU is duration manned and from of
are Appendix
C:
installation the MMU (on-
Ops:
of time during not stowed in to prior
which the FSS
Post-Ops:
Any timeframe subsequent stowage of the MMU and mission completion MMUs are flown is performed of the second
on-orbit to Orbiter
Although two (2) cality assignment the availability Rationale:
on each without MMU.
mission, consideration
critito
The assignment ensured by this
of worst case assumption
criticality
is
B-6
APPENDIX DETAILED This during these section contains the IOA
C ASSESSMENT
assessment subsystem. the comparison
worksheets The of
generated on FMEA/CIL
the assessment of this worksheets facilitates
information the NASA
(Pre and included NASA FMEA
Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed in Appendix E. Each of these being assessed, corresponding
analysis worksheets worksheets identifies the MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND
FOR
IOA
ASSESSMENT
WORKSHEETS
Hardware 1 2 3 Functional IR 2R
= = =
Criticalities: Loss of life or Loss of mission (like or unlike) All others Criticalities: Redundant hardware if failed, could Redundant hardware if failed, could Screens Passed Failed Not A, B Screen Screen
vehicle or next could
failure cause loss
of
any of
redundant life/vehicle
item
= =
items (like cause loss of items (like cause loss of C:
or unlike) all life or vehicle or unlike) all mission
of of
which, which,
Redundancy P F NA NASA
and
= = =
Applicable
Data : Baseline New Item X : =
= =
NASA FMEA/CIL Baseline with
Proposed
Post
51-L
Changes
CIL
Included
in
CIL
Compare N
Row : = Non
compare
for
that
column
(deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-100 1.1.2 MMU I00 GN2
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST:
TANK HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X ] * IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-2
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-102 1.5.3 MMU 102 TOGGLE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [ 3 /2R ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from F ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] BE BE
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH DETECTED DURING ISOLATED, OR A
THE FMEA, HOWEVER, FLIGHT UNTIL THE RECHARGE IS
THIS FAILURE TIME WHEN ONE AFTER EVA.
COULD NOT TANK IS TO
ATTEMPTED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-3
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC N_A IOA [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ X [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
]
(If
[
from
[ N ]
NASA)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] SHOULD BE
REMARKS FAIL LEFT
: CLOSED. BLANK. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-4
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-104 1.4.1 MMU 104 ISOLATION DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 2 [ /IR /2 /N ] ] ] [ REDUNDANCY A P ] B [ F ] [ SCREENS C ] CIL ITEM
[p] [ ]
IF] [ ]
[P] IN]
[ X] IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2 /2
.[
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ]
REMARKS: VALVE FAILED OPEN IS NOMINAL OPERATING POSITION. HOWEVER, IT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE GN2 TANK FROM THRUSTERS IN THE EVENT OF A DOWNSTREAM LEAK. LOSS OF FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY DOES NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE AS INDICATED BY THE FMEA. IOA CONSIDERS EVA LOST WITH THIS HARDWARE CRITICALITY, SINCE THIS FAILURE ALONE MAY BE ONE STEP AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE (EVA CREW BEING STRANDED WITH THIS FAILURE AND A LEAK) - CANCEL THE EVA AND RETURN TO ORBITER. AN ITEM OF MAJOR CONCERN IS THAT THIS FAILURE WILL NOT BE DETECTED UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE WHICH REQUIRES ISOLATING THE TANK FROM THE THRUSTERS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-5
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-105 1.4.2 MMU 105 ISOLATION DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
HDW/_NC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] [ [ [
A
P P ] ] ] [ [
S
P F ] ] ]
C
[ [ F [ N ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] *
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FAILURE ] ] WILL EVA
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE UNTIL NOT FMEA CRITICALITY. HOWEVER THIS NOT BE DETECTED CREWPERSON COULD FAILURE FROM THRUSTERS DISTINGUISH OR ARE TO BE FIRED, AND THIS FAILURE FROM A SOLENOID VALVES. THEN THE SIMILAR
REGULATORS,
THRUSTERS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-6
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-106 1.7.3 MMU 106 GN2 LINES (ISOL VLV SAIIDI -
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
REGULATOR)
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 2 /i /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ x ] * CIL ITEM
IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
]
(If
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: [ 2 /IR ]
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LEAK. THE FMEA CRITICALITY SHARPNEL AFTER LINE RUPTURE. "RUPTURE" IN THE LINE TO BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE WILL FORCE LOSS OF A SYSTEM (TWO LINES LEAK) STRANDED-POSSIBLE
ASSUMES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO IOA FEELS THAT FAILURE MODE NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. THEREFORE ANY CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE, THUS AND WITH CREWPERSON LOSS OF IS SUBJECT BOTH TO SYSTEMS BEING
(MISSION IMPACT). DURING OPS, THE LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-7
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-106A 1.7.4 MMU 106 GN2 DUFFY, LINES (REG-THRUSTERS) SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 1 [ 2 [ N /i /IR /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X] [X] [ ]
IN]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LEAK. THE FMEA CRITICALITY SHARPNEL AFTER LINE RUPTURE. "RUPTURE" IN THE LINE TO BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE LOSS OF A SYSTEM (TWO LINES LEAK) STRANDED-POSSIBLE ASSUMES POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO IOA FEELS THAT FAILURE MODE NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE. THEREFORE ANY
WILL FORCE CLOSING THE ISOLATION VALVE, THUS (MISSION IMPACT). AND WITH LOSS OF BOTH SYSTEMS DURING OPS, THE CREWPERSON IS SUBJECT TO BEING LOSS OF LIFE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-8

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-106B 1.7.1 MMU 106 GN2 LINES (XFEED VLV XFEED VLV) NASA DATA: BASELINE NEW
[ [
] ]
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /I /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ p [ p [ ] ] ] B [ P [ p [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ [ X X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
P N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ ] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LEAK. A LEAK IN THIS AREA (BETWEEN XFEED VALVES) HAS NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SINCE THE TANKS ARE CHARGED PRELAUNCH, AND THE XFEED VALVES REMAIN CLOSED THROUGHOUT PRE-OPS AND OPS. HOWEVER, DURING POST-OPS RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST IN SUBSEQUENT EVA/MMU ACTIVITIES. ALSO IT WILL CREATE CONDIJTION FOR A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF ONE/TWO OR XFEED VALVES WERE TO OPEN DURING OPS THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTED DURING PRE-OPS OPS. FAIL AND
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-9
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-106C 1.7.2 MMU 106 GN2 DUFFY, LINES (TANK-ISOL SAIIDI VLV)
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 1 [ 2 /I /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ B P ] [ SCREENS C ] CIL ITEM
[P]
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
[p]
[ N ]
[ X ] * IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ LOSS BE ] ] OF BOTH
REMARKS: LEAK. SYSTEMS LOSS OF GN2 RESULTING FAILURE) IN LOSS OF OPS A SYSTEM. COULD (REDUNDANCY DURINGS CATASTROPHIC.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-10
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ASSESSMENTDATE:

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: ID: #: NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
12/05/86 MMU-II0
BASELINE NEW
MMU ii0 THRUSTER DUFFY,
MANIFOLD HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[P]
[
[P]
[
[ P
]
] ]
[ ] * IX]
[ N ]
[ N
[N]
(If different [ P ]
[N]
from [ P ]
[ N
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: LEAK.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-ll
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
_SESS_NT ASSESSMENT NASA F_A SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEm4: LEAD
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 _n_U-lll
N_A
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
iii I_4RUSTER DUFFY,
[ X ]
M_IFOLD HUYNH, SAIIDI
A/qALYST:
_SESS_NT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMP_d_E [ [ / /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ p ]
[ N ]
[ ] * IX] [N]
[ N
RECO_fENDATIONS: [ 2 /IR ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
N_A) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
P_TENTION
RATIONAI_:
(If
[ [
] ]
REM_: CONSTRIC_fION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-12
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-II2 1.6.2 MMU 112 THRUSTER DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] B
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
[p] [P]
[P] [P]
[ [P]
[ X
ix] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-13
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 2 /2R /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (AD_DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL CLOSED. LOSS MISSION IMPACT OR CREWPERSON STRANDED OF CONTROL, SAT STAT, EVA LOSS. FUNCTIONAL DURING OPS. AND LOSS AAH WILL RESULTING IN LEAVE THE EVA
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-14
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [P] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
] ]
[ X] [x] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ GIVEN ] ] IN MMU-
REMARKS: IOA AGREES 113.
WITH
THE
FMEA,
BASED
ON
THE
EXPLANATION
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-15
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-II6 1.2.4 MMU 116 GN2
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
REGULATOR HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ X [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
]
(If
C
from
C N ]
NASA)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA. HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE DURING PRE-OPS AND POST-OPS WILL NOT BE DETECTED, AND DURING OPS PHASE IT CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM A SIMILAR FAILURE FROM OTHER VALVES IN THE LINE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-16
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-II7 1.2.3 MMU 117 GN2
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [P] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
] ]
[ X] IX] [ ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-17
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-II9 1.2.6 MMU 119 GN2 DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A B C p [F] ] [ N
SCREENS C ] [ [P] [ N ]
CIL ITEM
NASA IOA
COMPARE
[ 3 /2R [ 2 /2
[ N /N
] ]
]
[P] [P] [
[ IX]
[ N
] *
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LOSS OF PRESSURE REGULATION WITH VERY LOW TOLERANCE. FUNCTIONAL LOSS DURING OPS MAY LEAVE THE CREW STRANDED - POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE. THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE MORE APPROPRIATELY CALLED OUT OF TOLERANCE (HIGH/LOW RESPONSE) - SEE MMU-1191.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-18
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-120 1.2.2 MMU 120 GN2
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
RELIEF
VALVE SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [P] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
] ]
ix] [ ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ OF THE ] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FAILURE AND ACCEPTS
FMEA. IOA WITHDRAWS THE FMEA CAUSES.
THE
CAUSES
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-19
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-121
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 121 GN2
RELIEF
VALVE SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P ] ] B [ [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
[ N
[ N ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from F ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ NOT ] ] POSE ANY
REMARKS: FAIL CLOSED. THE RELIEF VALVE FAILED CLOSED DOES IMMEDIATE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THE VENT CAPABILITY IS LOST AND NOT AVAILABLE WHEN NEEDED AFTER A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE, LIKE REGULATOR FAILED OPEN. KNOWING THIS SCENARIO, THIS FAILURE WILL THEREFORE CREATE A CONDITION THAT IS NOT ADVISABLE TO CONTINUE THE MISSION, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS REGULATOR FAILED OPEN COULD BE CATASTROPHIC DURING OPS PHASE. THIS FAILURE IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE UNTIL A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE (BEG FAILED OPEN).
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-20
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-122 1.8.1 MMU 122 PRESSURE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
GAGE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ] CIL ITEM
[X]* IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-21
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
GAGE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ C 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P C ] ] ] B [ P [ F C N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LOSS OF ACCURATE GN2 PRESSURE INDICATION - EVA CREW PERSON WILL NOT KNOW QUANTITY OF PROPELLANT REMAINING TO SUCCESSFULLY CONTINUE EVA. EVA CREW PERSON MUST RELY ON OTHER GAGE OR GROUND INSTRUCTION. ANOMALY IN THE TWO GAGE READINGS WILL INDICATE AN ERROR.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-22
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID : #:
12/05/86 MMU-124 1.8.2 MMU 124 PRESSURE
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
GAGE HUYNH, SAIIDI
: :
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT
CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ]
REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] C [ B p F
SCREENS C ] ]
CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
]
(If
[N]
[N]
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LOSS OF ACCURATE GN2 PRESSURE INDICATION - EVA CREW PERSON WILL NOT KNOW QUANTITY OF PROPELLANT REMAINING TO SUCCESSFULLY CONTINUE EVA. EVA CREW PERSON MUST RELY ON OTHER GAGE OR GROUND INSTRUCTION. ANOMALY IN THE TWO GAGE READINGS WILL INDICATE AN ERROR.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-23
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-125 1.3.2 MMU 125 RECHARGE DUFFY, QUICK HUYNH, DISCONNECT SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ F [ N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [3/3 ]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [D] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN/LEAK. FURTHERMORE, THE THE FSS. DURING CAN BE RECHARGED THIS FAILURE WILL IN NO IMPACT SINCE QD's HAVE CAP's PRE/POST-OPS, NO AND ISOLATED BY NOT BE READILY WHEN THE XFEED VALVES ARE CLOSED, AND INSTALLED AFTER DISCONNECT FROM IMPACT IS SEEN SINCE THE TANKS THE XFEED VALVES. DETECTED. THE FMEA SEEMS TO BE TO 1.3.5.
CONFLICT/INCONSISTENT
COMPARED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-24
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-125A 1.3.6 MMU 125 RECHARGE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
QUICK HUYNH,
DISCONNECT SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 3 [ 2 [ N /2R /2 /N ] ] ] [ REDUNDANCY A P ] B [ P ] [ SCREENS C ] CIL ITEM
[p]
[ ]
IF]
[ N ]
[P]
[ N ]
[ ] * [x] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3 /3
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN/LEAK. FURTHERMORE, THE THE FSS. DURING CAN BE RECHARGED THIS FAILURE WILL IN NO IMPACT SINCE QD's HAVE CAP's PRE/POST-OPS, NO AND ISOLATED BY NOT BE READILY WHEN THE XFEED VALVES ARE CLOSED, AND INSTALLED AFTER DISCONNECT FROM IMPACT IS SEEN SINCE THE TANKS THE XFEED VALVES. DETECTED. THE FMEA SEEMS TO BE TO 1.3.5.
CONFLICT/INCONSISTENT
COMPARED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-25
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-126 1.3.3 MMU 126 RECHARGE DUFFY, QUICK HUYNH, DISCONNECT SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 3 [ 3 /2R /2R ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ [
] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ RECHARGE AND NOT ] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, WITH CAPABILITY/ACTIVITY IS PART OF INDICATED BY THE FMEA. THE THE EXCEPTION POST-OPS THAT PHASE PREP AS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-26
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-127
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 127 GN2
TEST
PORT HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
[
[ [ P N
]
] ]
[
[ P
]
] ]
[
[ P
]
]
[ ] * IX]
[ N ]
[ N
[ N
[N]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [
REMARKS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-27
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-128 3.11.1 MMU 128 BATTERY DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [ P ]
[ ]
[P] [ P ]
[ ]
[ [ P
[ N
] ]
]
[ x ] * IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-28
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-129
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 129 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI POWER SWITCH
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[
[ P [N]
]
]
C CP] CN]
[ IX]
[ N
] *
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REM_:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-29
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-130 3.14.3 MMU 130 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI POWER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SWITCH
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: NO EFFECT DURING MMU OPS THE FIRST PRE AND POST-OPS ORBITER POWER TO STORAGE IN LOSS VIOLATION RECOGNIZES STORAGE RECHARGING OF SINCE THIS IT WILL HEATERS. IS NORMAL POSITION. DURING RESULT IN LOSS OF DIRECT IOA CONSIDERED THIS TO RESULT LIMIT THE IN THE
CEA/BATTERY DUE TO COLD/UNDER TEMPERATURE CEA THUS LOSS OF ONE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, IOA ALSO THAT A POSSIBILITY EXISTS TO PROVIDE POWER TO HEATERS BY TURNING THE MAIN POWER SWITCH ON WHILE THE BATTERY - THIS OPERATION COULD BE MONITORED
AIRLOCK, BUT THE EFFECT OF 28V POWER TO OTHER ELECTRICAL COMPONENT IS NOT INVESTIGATED. FINALLY, THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT (3/3) ON MISSIONS WITH ONLY ONE MMU ACTIVITY, AND WILL LOSS OF MISSION FOR MULTIPLE MMU OPS AS SHOWN ABOVE.
BE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-30
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-130A 3.14.4 MMU 130 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI POWER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SWITCH
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /2 /2 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ X [ X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FAILURE BY THE FMEA, POSITION/CONTACT CONSIDER "A CONTACT OPEN MODE, ELECTRICALLY FAILS IN INT POSITION, AS STATED IS NOT CREDIBLE. THE SWITCH IS A MULTISWITCH AND IT WILL BE ONLY APPROPRIATE TO SINGLE CONTACT OPEN" - IN THIS CASE, THE WORST SINGLE IS FOR EXTERNAL POWER TO THE STORAGE HEATERS DURING
PRE/POST OPS ACTIVITY, OR MAIN POWER CONTACT OPEN (PINS 5-6) DURING OPS ACTIVITY. EITHER ONE OF THESE FAILURES, CONSIDERED SEPARATELY, WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF A SYSTEM, THUS EVA TERMINATION AS EXPLAINED BY MMU-130. SEE ALSO MMU-131A FOR A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FAILURE MODES. THOSE ANALYSIS MAY HAVE BE RE-WRITTEN TO CLARIFY THE FAILURE MODES.
TO
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-31
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-131 3.14.1 MMU 131 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI POWER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SWITCH
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [ P ]
C ]
[P] [ P
C
]
]
[ [ P
[ N
] ]
]
[ X ] * [X]
[ ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: NO EFFECT DURING PRE/POST OPS ACTIVITY SINCE THAT IS ITS NOMINAL POSITION. DURING OPS AND WITH INADVERTENT SWITCHING TO EXT POSITION (OTHERWISE IT IS NOT APPLICABLE), BATTERY POWER WILL BE DENIED TO ONE SYSTEM - LOSS OF A SYSTEM. MISSIONS WITH SAT-STAT REQUIREMENT CAN NOT BE MET. FUNCTIONAL LOSS MAY STRAND THE CREW WITH NO THRUSTER POWER TO RETURN TO ORBITER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-32
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-131A 3.14.2 MMU 131 INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI POWER
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
SWITCH
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 [ /2 /IR /N
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ P ] [ B P
SCREENS C ] [ ]
CIL ITEM
[ X
[p] [
(If
[P] ] [
from [ ]
[P] ] [N]
NASA) [ ]
ix] [ ]
COMPARE
different [ ]
[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ SINCE ] ] THE
REMARKS: THIS FMEA
FAILURE
MODE
WAS
CONSIDERED
NON-CREDIBLE,
SWITCH IS A MULTI POSITION/CONTACT SWITCH. IT WILL BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO FAIL CLOSED THE SWITCH IN ONE SINGLE CONTACT AT THE TIME. ANY SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FROM EXT/INT PINS HAS NO EFFECT WHEN THE SWITCH IS AT EXT/INT POSITION ACCORDINGLY NOMINAL POSITION. A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED ON EXT PINS WHEN THE SWITCH IS IN INT HAS NO EFFECT ALSO SINCE THE MMU IS DURING OPS AND SEPARATED FROM ORBITER POWER. ON THE OTHER HAND, A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED FROM INT PINS WHEN THE SWITCH IS IN EXT POSITION WILL HAVE A POSSIBILITY OF DRAINING POWER FROM ORBITER AND THE BATTERIES IF THE MAIN POWER SWITCH REMAINS ON. THIS CASE WAS REJECTED SINCE DURING EXT POWER NOMINAL CREW ACTION WILL TURN OFF BATTERY POWER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-33
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-132
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 132 TERMINAL DUFFY,
[ X ]
BOARD HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] * IX] IN]
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-34
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-133
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 133 TERMINAL DUFFY,
BOARD HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /IR /N
[
[ P
]
]
[
C P [N]
]
]
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[ ] * [x] [N]
[ N
[N]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-35
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-134 3.13.1 MMU 134 MAIN DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P]
[ ]
[P] [P]
[ ]
[ [P]
[ N
[ x
IX]
] [ ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ WHEN THE ] ]
REMARKS: THE FMEA BATTERY PERIOD, CONSIDERED ANALYZED
CONSIDERED
THIS
FAILURE
DURING
PREP
ONLY
POWER IS TURNED THE INADVERTENT DUE TO SHOCK BY A SEPARATE
OFF (SWITCH OFF). HOWEVER, DURING OPS SWITCHING ACTION TO OFF POSITION MUST BE OR VIBRATION. THIS LATER CASE MAY BE FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-36
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-134A 3.13.2 MMU 134 MAIN
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST :
POWER HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ p [ p [ ] ] ] B [ p [ p [ ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ [ X X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[2/2
(ADD/DELETE) * CIL _ RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ]
REMARKS : THIS FAILURE SHOULD ONLY CONSIDER A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN OR CLOSED AT A TIME. A COMPLETE LOSS OF POWER REQUIRES BOTH CONTACTS TO BE OPEN - NON-CREDIBLE. THIS ANALYSIS IS DONE FOR A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN - SEE ALSO MMU-135A FOR A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED. LOSS OF BATTERY RECHARGE CAPABILITY DURING PRE/POST OPS, OTHERWISE NO EFFECT SINCE THE BATTERY POWER CAN BE MAINTAINED THROUGH A REDUNDANT CONTACT ON THE SWITCH. LOSS OF RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL PRECLUDE SUBSEQUENT EVA/MMU ACTIVITIES.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-37
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-135 3.13.3 MMU 135 MAIN DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
POWER HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 2 N /3 /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C ] CP]
[ N ]
[ ] CP]
[ N ]
C ] CP]
[ N ]
[ [x] [N]
] *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-38
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-135A 3.13.4 MMU 135 MAIN DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 2 /3 /2 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P p ] ] ] [ [ [ B P p ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [ 1 /I ]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ A 28V ] ] POWER A TO
REMARKS: THIS FAILURE THE BATTERY. POTENTIAL FOR
DURING THIS LOSS
THE MAY OF
FIRST
PRE-OPS BATTERY
WILL
APPLY EXPLOSION
RESULT IN LIFE/VEHICLE.
CAUSING
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-39
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-136 3.9.1 MMU 136 LTS/HTR.cb
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A C P [ P [ ] ] ] C [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X IX] [
] *
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-40
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-137 3.9.2 MMU 137 LTS/HTR.Cb
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /IR /2R /N
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [
SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ ] ] ]
CIL ITEM
[ [N]
COMPARE
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from
r
NASA) ] [ ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] (OVER
REMARKS: THE FMEA
AND
ORIGINAL
IOA
STUDY
ASSUMED
THAT
FAILURE
CURRENT) HAS ALREADY OCCURED AND THE CB HAS ALSO FAILED CLOSED. THIS SCENARIO IS MULTIPLE FAILURE CASE FOR WHICH THE FAILURES SHOULD BE STUDIED SEPARATELY. THE CB FAILED CLOSED HAS NO CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECT, AND NOT DETECTABLE UNLESS ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURS. AT ANY RATE, POWER THE MAIN LIGHTS/HEATERS POWER SWITCH CAN ALSO BE TO COMPENSATE CUT OFF BY EXT/INT FOR THE BREAKERS. SWITCH AND/OR
TO
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-41
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-138 3.8.1 MMU 138 CEA DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CIRCUIT HUYNH,
BREAKER SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [P] SCREENS C [ [P] ] CIL ITEM
[X]* IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS
(I f
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE
(If
REMARKS : IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-42
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-139 3.8.2 MMU 139 CEA
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CIRCUIT HUYNH,
BREAKER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 3 [ N /IR /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A p P ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [ D (ADD/DE ] LETE
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN PROGRESS WHICH DRAWS OVERCURRENT AND THE CB HAS FAILED CLOSED. THIS IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA PROCEDURE. THIS FAILURE POSES NO MAJOR PROBLEM EXCEPT FOR LOSS OF ABILITY TO DENY POWER TO THE CEA. HOWEVER, THE POWER MAY BE DENIED BY CEA OR MAIN POWER SWITCH IF NEEDED. THIS FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE UNTIL AN OVERCURRENT FAILURE OCCURS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-43
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-140 3.10.2 MMU 140 GYRO DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
PWR
cb SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ]
] *
CIL ITEM
] [ ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
REN_: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-44
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ASSESSMENT DATE:

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ITEM: LEAD ID: ID: #: NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
12/05/86 MMU-141 3.10.1 MMU 141 GYRO DUFFY, PWR cb SAIIDI
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 3 [ N /2 /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [323 ]
(If
different [ ] [
from 3
NASA) [ ] [D3 (AD_DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN PROGRESS WHICH DREW OVERCURRENT WHILE THE CB HAD FAILED CLOSED. THIS SCENARIO IS MULTIPLE FAILURE CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. THIS CB FAILED CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT SINCE IT HAS FAILED IN ITS NOMINAL POSITION. THE FAILURE WILL HOWEVER DENY CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE CIRCUIT, BUT THIS SWITCH OR MAIN POWER SWITCH. COULD BE MANUALLY DONE BY GYRO POWER
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-45
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/05/86

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: ID: #: MMU-142 3.7.1 MMU 142 VDA DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
cb HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ C 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P]
[ ]
[P] [P]
[ ]
[ [P]
[ N
[X]* IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
IOA
AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-46
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-143 3.7.2 MMU 143 VDA
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
cb HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ p [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
HDW/ NC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /2R /N
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FMEA AND ORIGINAL IOA STUDY ASSUMED A FAILURE ALREADY IN PROGRESS WHICH DRAWS OVERCURRENT WHILE THE CB HAS FAILED CLOSED. THIS CASE IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO AND SHOULD NOT DRIVE THE CRITICALITY. THE CB FAILURE ALONE IS ONE STEP AWAY FROM THIS SCENARIO WHICH IS CONSIDERED LOSS OF MISSION. THIS FAILURE POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT SINCE THE CB HAS FAILED IN ITS NOMINAL POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-47
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-144 3.17.1 MMU 144 LOCATOR DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ APPLY ] ] SHOULD
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH BE LEFT BLANK. THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS DO NOT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-48
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-144A 3.17.2 MMU 144 LOCATOR DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [

] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH SCREENS DO NOT SHOULD ADDRESS POSITION. THIS OPEN - SEE ALSO
THE FMEA CRIT WITH THE FOLLOWING TWO COMMENTS: I) APPLY - SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK 2) THE FAILURE MODE ANY SINGLE CONTACT FAILED IN EITHER OPEN OR CLOSED FAILURE SEEMS TO BE A SINGLE CONTACT MMU-145A FOR A SINGLE CONTACT CLOSED.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-49

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-145 3.17.3 MMU 145 LOCATOR DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 3 [ 3 /3 /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ BE LEFT ] ] BLANK.
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-50
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ [

] *
CIL ITEM
]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ LEFT AS A ] ] BLANK. SINGLE
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH ALSO THE FAILURE CONTACT CLOSED
THE FMEA, BUT MODE IS MORE FOR THIS CASE.
THE SCREENS APPROPRIATELY
SHOULD BE DEFINED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-51
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ NA] [ [ B P ] NA] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N ]
[ N ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA,
BUT
THE
SCREENS
SHOULD
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-52
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LIGHT HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ NA] [ N ] B [ P ] [ NA] [ N ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ N ] [ [ [
] *
CIL ITEM
]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ LEFT AS A ] ] BLANK. SINGLE
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH ALSO, THE FAILURE CONTACT CLOSED.
THE FMEA, MODE IS
BUT MORE
THE SCREENS APPROPRIATELY
SHOULD BE STATED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-53
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LIGHT HUYNH,
POWER SAIIDI
CONVERTER
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A C P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] C [ SCREENS C ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ [
[
] * ]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-54
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-148 3.19.1 MMU 148 LIGHT DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
NASA IOA COMPARE
[ 3 /3 [ 3 /3 [ /
] ] ]
[p]
[ P ]
[P]
[ P ]
[
[ P
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES
WITH
THE
FMEA,
BUT
THE
SCREENS
SHOULD
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-55
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ NA] B [ P ] [ NA] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ [
] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N
C N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FMEA ] ]
REMARKS: IOA RECOMMENDS
THE
ABOVE
CRITICALITY
BASED
ON
THE
EXPLANATION GIVEN FOR THE GYROS CIRCUIT BREAKER 3.10.2, THAT IS: - COMPLETE LOSS OF GYROS WILL ALSO NEGATE THE FUNCTION OF AAH & ALT ATTITUDE CONTROL SWITCHES WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR SOME MISSIONS. - CREW MAY MAINTAIN ALTITUDE MANUALLY AS A BACK-UP REDUNDANCY TO AUTOMATIC CONTROL.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-56
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 3 [ 3 /3 /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ [

] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
(ADD/DELETE) * CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA, BUT THE SCREENS SHOULD BE LEFT BLANK. [ [ ] ]
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-57
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SUPPLY SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ [ ] ] CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ p ] [ ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE [ [ ] ]
REMARKS:
INADEQUATE
THIS FAILURE WILL PREVENT AAH OPERATION, BUT, MANUAL ATTITUDE CONTROL IS AVAILABLE THROUGH RHC TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. HOWEVER, SOME MISSIONS (SOLAR MAX) WILL REQUIRE AAH OPERATION CONJUNCTION WITH THE ALT CONTROL SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION AND RHC WILL PRECLUDE Y,R,P SEQUENCE, THUS LOSS OF MISSION AND RETURN TO THE ORBITER - SEE ALSO 3.10.2 FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.
IN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-58
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-151A 3.3.7 MMU 151 GYRO DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
SUPPLY SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ p [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ N ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THIS FAILURE CONTROL IS
WILL PREVENT AAH OPERATION, BUT, AVAILABLE THROUGH RHC TO COMPENSATE
MANUAL ATTITUDE FOR THE LOSS. IN
HOWEVER, SOME MISSIONS CONJUNCTION WITH THE AND RHC WILL PRECLUDE RETURN TO THE ORBITER
(SOLAR MAX) WILL REQUIRE AAH OPERATION ALT CONTROL SWITCH. LOSS OF THIS FUNCTION Y,R,P SEQUENCE, THUS LOSS OF MISSION AND - SEE ALSO 3.10.2 FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-59
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-152 3.12.5 MMU 152 CEA
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ C 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P C ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ,[ N ] ] ] [ [ C X X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2 /2
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FAILURE ] ] MODE
REMARKS: IOA ACCEPTS FOR MODE
THE
PREP
CRITICALITY
AND
REJECTS
THIS i)
THE FLIGHT PHASE DUE TO FOLLOWING REMARKS: "MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ISO" IS NOT REALISTIC IS PLACED MORE CREW A FAII//RE IN "ON" ACTION ALREADY POSITION THROUGHOUT IS ANTICIPATED/REQUIRED, IN PROGRESS WHICH THE
THE FAILURE BECAUSE THE FLIGHT 2) THE WARRANT PHASE, FMEA
SWITCH AND NO ASSUMES
WOULD
SWITCHING ACTION FROM "ON" TO "ISO", AND THEN JAMMING IN "ISO" POSITION. THIS IS MULTIPLE FAILURE SCENARIO, AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS-22206 GROUND RULES, 3) AN INADVERTENT OPERATION DOES NOT APPLY EITHER BECAUSE IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A 2/IR CRIT, THE SWITCH MUST GO THROUGH TWO FAILURES: A. INADVERTENT OPERATION FROM "ON" TO RIGHT AFTER INADVERTENT CREW FROM THEREFORE, ACCEPTED "ISO", B. OPERATION "ISO" WHICH POSITION WOULD JAMMED PREVENT THE EVA CRIT IS
REACTIVATING/SWITCHING FLIGHT CRITICALITY WHICH WOULD PREVENT
BACK TO "ON" IS NOT APPLICABLE, FLIGHT PHASE MMU
POSITION. AND PREP OPS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-60
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-152A 3.12.6 MMU 152 CEA
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ [ X X ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ BE TO ] ] STUDIED BE A
REMARKS: IOA FOR AGREES WITH THE A SINGLE CONTACT CONTACT THE FMEA, OPEN IN BUT AND THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD CLOSED. THIS FMEA SEEM
SINGLE HOWEVER, POSITION POSITIONS ISOLATION
CLOSED POSSIBILITY
ISO PINS DUE OF THE SWITCH
TO CONTAMINATION/CORROSION. BEING IN "ON" ACROSS "ISO" IN REGARD TO OR "OFF" THE
(DURING SHOULD VALVE
FLIGHT) AND HAVING A SHORT BE INVESTIGATED ESPECIALLY POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-61
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-153 3.12.3 MMU 153 CEA DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 3 N /IR /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P]
[ ]
[P] [P]
[ ]
[ IF]
[ N
[X]* [ ]
[ N ]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FAILURE OF THIS POSES NO IMMEDIATE POSITION. HOWEVER, SWITCH PROBLEM IT WILL (MECHANICALLY JAMMED IN "ON" POSITION) SINCE IT FAILED IN NORMAL OPERATING DENY CAPABILITY FOR CLOSING A SYSTEM
CEA DUE TO A FAILURE - THIS ACTION CAN BE COMPENSATED FOR, THROUGH MAIN POWER SWITCH OR THE THC HANDLE (SHUTS OFF BOTH ISO VALVE, TURN OFF MAIN POWER SWITCHES, REACTIVATES THE GOOD MAIN POWER SWITCH) AND RETURN TO ORBITER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-62
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-153A 3.12.4 MMU 153 CEA DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P]
[ P ]
[P]
[ P ]
[
[ Y
]
]
[ X ] * [ ]
[ N ]
[ N
IN]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ]. [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FAILURE IDENTIFIED POSITIONS. EFFECT AS - MMU-153. (ELECTRONICALLY FAILS "ON") AS A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN FOR THE INABILITY TO TURN OFF A THE SWITCH FAILED MECHANICALLY IS MORE APPROPRIATELY EITHER "ISO" OR "OFF" CEA WILL HAVE THE SAME IN "ON" POSITION
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-63
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-154 3.12.1 MMU 154 CEA
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
P N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2/2
]_
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA ACCEPTS THE PHASE CRITICALITY PREP PHASE BASED ON CRITICALITY, THE EXPLANATION BUT REJECTS THE OPS/FLT GIVEN FOR MMU-152.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-64
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-154A 3.12.2 MMU 154 CEA
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ p [ p [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B p p ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR /
P N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] MODE BE "OFF"). PINS ARE
REMARKS: IOA ACCEPTS THE CRITICALITY, IDENTIFIED AS A SINGLE CONTACT HOWEVER, DURING OPS WHEN THE CLOSED - THE FAILURE MUST BE
BUT SUGGEST THAT THE FAILURE CLOSED (IN THIS FMEA, PINS SWITCH IS ON, AND THE "OFF" INVESTIGATED.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-65
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-155
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 155 CEA DUFFY,
[ X
POWER
SWITCH SAIIDI
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C CP]
[ N
C CP]
[ N
C CP]
[ N
]
] [ ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ OR ] ] "FAILED THIS IN
REMARKS: THIS FAILURE MODE IS SAME OFF" AS STUDIED BY MMU-153 ANALYSIS MAY BE WITHDRAWN. AS EITHER "FAILED IN ON" AND MMU-154 RESPECTIVELY.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-66

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-156 3.21.1 MMU 156 PRESSURE DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
GAGE HUYNH,
LIGHT SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ]
] *
CIL ITEM
]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA AGREES WITH WILL RESULT IN GN2 LEAK; WHICH
THE LOSS MAY
FMEA, SINCE THE TOTAL LOSS OF PRESSURE GAGES OF CREWPERSON ABILITY TO DETECT GN2 LEVEL AND JEPARDIZE THE CREWPERSON'S SAFETY. TO CANCEL THE MMU AFTER FUNCTIONAL LOSS AND HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THIS LIKELY MADE REAL TIME DEPENDENT UPON THE
THEREFORE, IOA AGREES RETURN TO THE ORBITER. DECISION WILL BE MOST CIRCUMSTANCES.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-67
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-157 3.3.4 MMU 157 THRUSTER DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
CUE HUYNH,
LT. SAIIDI
ANALYST:
NASA IOA
COMPARE
[ 3 /3 [ 3 /3
[ /
] ]
]
[ P [ P
[
] ]
]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ [
[
] * ]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ BE ] ] LEFT
REMARKS: IOA IS BLANK. IN AGREEMENT WITH SEE ALSO MMU-157A FMEA, BUT (3.20.1). THE SCREEN SHOULD
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-68

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-157A 3.20.1 MMU 157 THRUSTER DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CUE HUYNH,
LT. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM C
HDW/FUNC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ]
A
[ P [ P [ ] ] ]
B
[ P [ P [ ] ] ]
[
[ [ P N
]
] ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ SHOULD ] ] BE LEFT
REMARKS: IOA IS BLANK.
IN
AGREEMENT SEE
WITH MMU-157
THE
FMEA,
BUT
THE
SCREEN
ALSO
(3.3.4).
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-69
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-158
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 158 CONTROL DUFFY,
ELECTRONICS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSEMBLY
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C / [ 2/iR]
[ N /N
[ ] C P 3
[ N ]
C ] CP]
[ N ]
C ] CP]
[ N ]
[ ] * IX] [N]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ]
[A] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-70
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WOP_KSHEET
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA _4EA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: I_EAD
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 _4U-159 3.3.1 MMU 159 CONTROL DUFFY,
N_A
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
ASSEMBLY
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUND_NCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [N] ] ] [ [ [ X X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
P_CO_fENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ PIECE OF SEPARATELY ] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS IN ELECTRONIC ITS FAILURE AGREEMENT EQUIPMENT MODE(S) WITH THE FMEA, HOWEVER, IN THE CEA SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. EACH STUDIED AND
P_I_DRT
DATE
02/18/88
C-71
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-160 3.3.3 MMU 160 CONTROL DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSEMBLY
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ] CIL ITEM
IX]* IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2 /1R
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE ERRATIC CREWPERSON CONTROL. LEAVE THE
RESPONSE FROM THE THRUSTERS TO SHUTDOWN A SYSTEM IN ORDER LOSS OF BOTH SIDES UNDER SEVER EVA CREWPERSON STRANDED. SEE
MAY FORCE THE EVA TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE ERRATIC RESPONSE MAY ALSO NOTE MMU-159.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-72
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-161 3.3.3 MMU 161 CONTROL DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSEMBLY
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /2 /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[p] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ ] [P] IN]
[ x
IX] [ ]
COMPARE
/N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE ERRATIC CREWPERSON CONTROL. LEAVE THE
RESPONSE FROM THE THRUSTERS TO SHUTDOWN A SYSTEM IN ORDER LOSS OF BOTH SIDES UNDER SEVER EVA CREWPERSON STRANDED. SEE
MAY FORCE THE EVA TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE ERRATIC RESPONSE MAY ALSO NOTE MMU-159.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-73
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-162
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 162 ISOLATION DUFFY,
VALVE HUYNH,
TIMER SAIIDI
[ [ P
[ N
] ]
]
[ ] [ F ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] * IX]
[ N ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[2/2
[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-74
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-163
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH,
TIMER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
[
[P]
[
[F]
[
[ P
]
]
[ ] * [x]
[ N ]
[ N
[N]
[N]
[N]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-75
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-164
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH,
TIMER SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 [ N / /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from F ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DE_TE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ CLOSE ] ] THE VALVE
REMARKS: CONTINUOUS MAY BURN THE SIGNAL MOTOR TO THE ISOLATION AND DRAIN THE VALVE BATTERY. MOTOR TO
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-76
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-166 3.3.2 MMU 166 VALVE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ] NEW
BASELINE
DRIVER HUYNH,
AMPLIFIER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] [ [ [ B F F ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FOR ] ] MMU-159.
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA
SEE
ALSO
REMARKS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-77
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-167
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 167 VALVE DUFFY, DRIVER HUYNH, AMPLIFIER SAIIDI
[ X
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /IR /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ p ] [ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL ON
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-78
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-168
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 168 VALVE DUFFY,
DRIVER HUYNH,
AMPLIFIER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA [ [ / /IR
[
[ P
]
]
[
[ P
]
]
[ ] [p] [N]
[ ] * IX] [N]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[N]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS: NOISY THIS ANALYSIS
MAY
BE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-79
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-169 3.2.1 MMU 169 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND SAIIDI
CONTROLLER
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 1 /I /i ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ ] [P] [ N ]
[ X
ix] [ ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
REMARKS.FAIL ON
1-3
AXES
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-80

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-169A 3.2.2 MMU 169 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND SAIIDI
CONTROLLER
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 1 /IR /i ] ] [ REDUNDANCY A P ] [ B P ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [ ]
[P] [ ]
[ ] CP] [N]
[x] IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [ 1/1 ]
(If
different [P] [
from P]
NASA) [ P]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTIONRATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL ON
1-3
AXES
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-81
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-170
NASA DATA: BASELINE
NEW
MMU 170 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH,
[ X ]
HAND SAIIDI
CONTROLLER
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ / [ 1 /I [ N /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ NA]
[ N ]
[ ] [ NA]
[ N ]
[ ] * CX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THIS ASSESSMENT ARE SUPERCEEDED
AND CORRESPONDING WORKSHEETS BY ITEMS MMU 1701X, 1702X,
ARE VOIDED. THEY 1703X, AND 1704X.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-82
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-171 3.1.1 MMU 171 ROTATIONAL DUFFY,
NASA DATA: BASELINE NEW
[ [ X
] ]
HAND
CONTROLLER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 1 /i [ 1 /i ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ N ]
[ ] [ NA] [ N ]
[ X] IX] [ ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL ON (1-3 AXES)
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-83
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-171A 3.1.2 MMU 171 ROTATIONAL DUFFY, HAND HUYNH, CONTROLLER SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 1 /IR /I ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P ] [ NA] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA]
CIL ITEM
[ X IX] [
] *
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 1/1
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ABORT ] ] REQUIRED.
REMARKS: FAIL ON (1-3 AXES). FAILURE RESCUE REQUIRED. CREW PERSON CANNOT BE STRANDED. ISOLATED.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-84
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-172
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST:
MMU 172 ROTATIONAL DUFFY,
HAND HUYNH,
CONTROLLER SAIIDI
NASA IOA COMPARE
[ / [ 1 /i [ N /N
] ] ]
[
[ P [ N
]
] ]
[
[ NA] [ N
[
[ NA]
[ ] * IX] IN]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OFF WORKSHEETS 1722X, (1-3 AXES). ARE VOIDED. 1723X, AND THIS THEY ASSESSMENT AND CORRESPONDING ANALYSIS ARE REPLACED WITH ITEMS MMU-1721X,
1724X.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-85
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-173 3.2.7 MMU 173 THC DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ISOLATE HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 1 /IR /1 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P ] [ NA] [ [ SCREENS C ] NA] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
IX] ] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE FAILURE IS ELECTRICAL, ISO SWITCH HAS ONE BACKUP IN THE ALTERNATE SYSTEM. IF THE FUNCTION IS LOST, THE ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED. THE PILOT IS STRANDED WITH NO PROPULSIVE POWER. IOA ACCEPTS THE CRITICALITY.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-86
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-174 3.2.9 MMU 174 THC DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ISOLATE HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P ] [ NA] [ N ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ N ] CIL ITEM
,[x]* IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ I/i
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE THC ISOLATE DURING FLIGHT. BACKUP TO STOP NOT CONSIDERED ANALYSIS.
SWITCH IS ONLY USED DURING CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS UNDER THIS SCENARIO, THE PILOT HAS NO OTHER THE EXISTING PROPULSION/LEAK. ORBITER RESCUE IS AS CONTINGENCY FOR COMPONENT FAILURE MODE EFFECTS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-87
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-174A 3.2.10 MMU 174 THC
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ISOLATE HUYNH,
SWITCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P ] [ NA] [ N ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] NA] N ] CIL ITEM
[ x IX]
[
] *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 1/.1
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] CONTINGENCY PILOT OTHER HAS NO RESCUE
REMARKS: FAIL OFF.
THE
THC
ISOLATE
SWITCH
IS
ONLY
USED
DURING THE FAILURE
SITUATIONS DURING FLIGHT. UNDER OTHER BACKUP TO STOP THE EXISTING IS NOT CONSIDERED AS CONTINGENCY MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS.
THIS SCENARIO, PROPULSION/LEAK. FOR COMPONENT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-88

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-175 3.1.8 MMU 175 AUTOMATIC DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ATTITUDE HUYNH, SAIIDI
HOLD
SWITCH
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 2 /3 /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B P F N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS : FAIL ON. THERE IS NO MISSION IMPACT. AAH IS POWER IS ON. EXCESSIVE USE OF PROPELLANT CAN TURNING GYRO POWER OFF FOR ROTATIONAL MANEUVERS. FMEA.
ACTIVE WHEN GYRO BE AVOIDED BY IOA ACCEPTS
THE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-89
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-176 3.1.7 MMU 176 AUTOMATIC DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ATTITUDE HUYNH, SAIIDI
HOLD
SWITCH
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P ] ] [ [ B ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [

] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
[ N ]
[ N ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ IS ] ] TO EASE
REMARKS: FAIL OFF. THE PILOT AUTOMATICALLY THE FAILURE SEVERITY REMAINING TANKS.
THE PURPOSE OF THE AUTOMATIC WORKLOAD WHILE SAVING GAS. OF CONTROLLING THIS ITEM BE
ATTITUDE HOLD THIS IS DONE BY AND ROLL IMPACT. ON GAS TIME LEFT
THE PITCH, YAW, MAY HAVE MISSION TIME AND
OF THE MMU. THE DEGREE OF IN FAILURE, THE
OF
HAS TO MISSION
JUDGE REAL DIFFICULTY,
DEPENDING AMOUNT OF
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-90
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-177 3.15.3 MMU 177 ALTERNATE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 3 /3 [ 2 /2 [ N /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ F [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ F [ N ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] * ] ] CIL ITEM
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THIS FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS IN NORM". THE PILOT WORKLOAD MAY BE INCREASED BY THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE AAH WITH AXIS INHIBIT. IN ADDITION, SATELLITE STABILIZATION CANNOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE THE THRUSTER LOGIC. FURTHER, BOTH OPERATIONS PERFORMED MANUALLY WILL REQUIREMORE TIME AND GAS. THE COMBINATIONS OF UNCERTANINTIES WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-91
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-177A 3.15.4 MMU 177 ALTERNATE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 2 /3 /2 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ F [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
F N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3 /2R
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ] (AD_DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FAILURE MODE IS "FAILS IN NORM". THE PILOT WORKLOAD MAY BE INCREASED BY THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE AAH WITH AXIS INHIBIT. IN ADDITION, SATELLITE STABILIZATION CANNOT BE PERFORMED DUE TO THE INABILITY TO ENGAGE THE THRUSTER LOGIC. FURTHER, BOTH OPERATIONS PERFORMED MANUALLY WILL REQUIRE MORE TIME AND GAS. THE COMBINATIONS OF UNCERTAINTIES WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-92

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-178 3.15.1 MMU 178 ALTERNATE DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] [ REDUNDANCY A P ] [ B P ] [ SCREENS C ] CIL ITEM
[p] [ ]
IF] IN]
IF] IN]
C C [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
.1
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL ON SATELLITE STABILIZER. THIS FAILURE MAY TERMINATE MISSION DUE TO THE PILOT INABILITY TO CONTROL TRANSLATIONS AND THE HIGH RATE OF GAS USED. PILOT'S ACTION IS REQUIRED TO TURN OFF ONE CEA SIDE TO INITIATE BACKUP LOGIC. UNDER THIS MODE, THE AAH DOES NOT OPERATE, WHICH ITSELF IS A MISSION IMPACT DUE TO HIGHER RATE OF GAS USED (SEE MMU-176) AND INABILITY TO USE AXIS INHIBIT. THE MISSION SCENARIO WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME. IOA AGREES WITH THE FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-93
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 3 /2R [ 3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [p] [ ]
[P] [F] [ N ]
[ ] IF] [ N ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
/N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] AGREES
REMARKS: FAIL ON SATELLITE WITH THE FMEA.
STABILIZER.
SEE
REMARKS
FOR
MMU-178-IOA
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-94
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-179 3.15.5 MMU 179 ALTERNATE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ F [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ F [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL ON SELECTED
IN "AXIS INHIBIT". AXIS AND ENGAGE
THE SYSTEM FAILS SATELLITE STABILIZATION
TO
FLY AAH IN THE WHEN NEEDED. WORKLOAD, EVALUATED AND
THERE MAY BE MISSION IMPACT DUE TO INCREASED USE OF GAS. THE MISSION SCENARIO WILL HAVE AND A GO/NO GO DECISION MADE REAL TIME.
PILOT TO BE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-95
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CONTROL HUYNH,
MODES
SWITCH
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ F [ N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE SYSTEM FAILS TO FLY AAH IN THE SELECTED SATELLITE STABILIZATION WHEN NEEDED. THERE DUE TO INCREASED PILOT WORKLOAD, AND USE OF SCENARIO WILL HAVE TO BE EVALUATED AND GO/NO REAL TIME. AXIS MAY GAS. GO AND ENGAGE BE MISSION IMPACT THE MISSION DECISION MADE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-96
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-180
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 180 GYRO DUFFY,
PHASE
PLANE
LOGIC
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B [ ] [ NA] [ N ] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA] [ N ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ WORK ] ] WITHOUT
REMARKS: FAILS OFF THIS ITEM,
1-3 SEE
CH.
AUTOMATIC
ATTITUDE
HOLD
DOES
NOT
MMU-176.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-97
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-181
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 181 GYRO DUFFY,
PHASE HUYNH,
PLANE
LOGIC
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P ] ] [ [ B ] NA] SCREENS C [ ] [ NA]
] *
CIL ITEM
] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
]
(If
[ N ]
different [ P ]
[ N ]
from [ P ]
[ N ]
NASA) [ P ]
[ ] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ SHUTDOWN ] ] OF
REMARKS: NOISY/FALSE AAH, SEE OUTPUTS. MMU-176. THIS FAILURE WILL FORCE THE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-98
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-182 3.3.1 MMU 182 CEA DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
PWR
SPLY HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X IX] [
] *
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
.[
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-99
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-183 3.4.1 MMU 183 WIRE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
HARNESS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] CIL ITEM
[ x] [X] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
(ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE REMARKS: SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT.
[ [
] ]
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-100
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-184 3.5.1 MMU 184 EXTERNAL DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
CONNECTOR SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[P] [N]
[
[P] [N]
[
[ F
]
]
[x]* IX] [ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN, 1 OR MORE PINS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-101
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-185 4.1.1 MMU 185 HEATERS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /2 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ F [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ F [ N ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
ix]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OFF. HEATER FUNCTION STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS FAILURE OF A HEATER WILL
IS TO MAINTAIN THE MMU AND FSS WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TEMPERATURE RANGE. BE NOTICED BY THE PILOT DUE TO SLUGGISH
PERFORMANCE OR FREEZE UP, WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL, CEA CASE, AND LOCATOR LIGHT CONTROL (FOR THIS REASON SCREEN B IS FAILED). SECOND SYSTEM HEATER FAILURE IS LIFE THREATENING. IOA AGREES WITH FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I02
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-185A 4.2.1 MMU 185 HEATERS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B F P N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
(If
different [ p ] [
from F ]
NASA) [ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
FAIL OFF. HEATER FUNCTION STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS FAILURE OF A HEATER WILL PERFORMANCE OR FREEZE PANEL, CEA CASES, AND SCREEN B IS FAILED). THREATENING.
IS TO MAINTAIN THE MMU AND FSS WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE TEMPERATURE RANGE. BE NOTICED BY THE PILOT DUE TO SLUGGISH BREAKER REASON LIFE
UP, WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CIRCUIT LOCATOR LIGHT CONTROL (FOR THIS SECOND SYSTEM HEATER FAILURE IS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I03
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-186
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 186 HEATERS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
[ X ]
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL ON THERMOSTAT COVERED (CEA). THIS FMEA IS VOIDED. FOR THE CEA HEATERS. THIS WITH FMEA 1861 AND ASSESSMENT THE ITEM ITEM AND WORKSHEET FAILED IS THE FAILURE ARE MMU-1861.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I04
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-187 3.3.9 MMU 187 GYROS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P ] ] B [ [ F ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N ]
[ N ]
[ N ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] SEE MMU-
REMARKS: DRIFT 176. WITH DEGRADED GYRO PERFORMANCE AAH CANNOT OPERATE,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-105
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-188 3.3.8 MMU 188 GYROS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X
ANALYST:
N_A IOA COMPARE
[3/3 [ 3 /3 [ /
] ] ]
[ [ P [ N
] ] ]
[ [ F
] ]
[ ] [ F ] [ N ]
[ [ [
] ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS [ 3 /2R
: ]
(I f
different [ P ] [
from p ]
NASA) [ p ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ MMU-176.
REMARKS: FAIL OFF WITHOUT GYROS AAH DOES NOT OPERATE, SEE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I06
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-189
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 189 ARM
ANGLE
ADJUST SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P ] ] [ [ B ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
[ N ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: ARM DOES NOT LATCH TO FLIGHT POSITION (UNLATCHED, LATCHED STOWED, LATCHED WORKSITE, LATCHED FLIGHT). THIS ASSESSMENT AND FMEA WORKSHEET ASSOCIATED WITH IT (MMU-189 AND 189, RESPECTIVELY) ARE VOIDED AND SUPERCEEDED BY WORKSHEETS 1891X THRU 1899X; AND ASSESSMENTS MMU-1891X THRU 1899X RESPECTIVELY.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I07
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-190 2.1.9 MMU 190 ARM DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LENGTH
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
[ ] [ P ] [ N ]
[ [ P [ N
] ] ]
[ [ p
] ]
[ X] IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL UNLATCHED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I08
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-191
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 191 ARM
LENGTH
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
[ ] [P]
[N]
[ ] [P]
[N]
[
[ P
]
]
[ ] * IX]
[ N ]
[ N
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[2/2
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE
[ p]
:
[ P]
[ p]
[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
RYe: FAIL
LATCHED
SHORT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-i09
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-192 2.1.7 MMU 192 ARM DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LENGTH
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 2 /I /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ B ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
P N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2/2
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] THE SUCH
REMARKS: PILOTS INCONVENIENCE, POOR FIT AND DIFFICULT TO OPERATE CONTROLS FOR TRANSLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. THE DESIGN IS THE SMALLEST PILOT CAN OPERATE A FULLY EXTENDED ARM. THAT,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-II0
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-192A 2.1.8 MMU 192 ARM
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LENGTH
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /2 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X IX] [
] *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[2/2
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] THE SUCH
REMARKS: PILOTS INCONVENIENCE, POOR FIT AND DIFFICULT TO OPERATE CONTROLS FOR TRANSLATIONS OR ROTATIONS. THE DESIGN IS THE SMALLEST PILOT CAN OPERATE A FULLY EXTENDED ARM. THAT,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-Ill
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
CONNECTOR SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 2 [ /2 /2 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [ P ]
[ ]
[P] [ P ]
[ ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL CONNECTED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I12
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW[X]
POWER HUYNN,
CONNECTOR SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ IF] [ N ] CIL ITEM
[X]* IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
3-
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE
(If
REMARKS: FAIL DISCONNECTED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-i13
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-196 2.5.1 MMU 196 PLSS LATCHES HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [F] SCREENS C [ [P] ]
CIL ITEM
[x]* IX] [ ]
COMPARE
]
(If
[ N ]
from
[ N ]
NASA)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
RYe: FAIL
OPEN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I14
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-196A 2.5.3 MMU 196 PLSS DUFFY,
[ [ X
] ]
LATCHES HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A B [ P [ F
SCREENS C ] ]
CIL ITEM
HDW/FUNC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 /2 [ 2 /IR [ /N ] ] ]
[p] [p] [
(If
[
[ P CN]
]
]
[ x] IX] [ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
from
NASA)
[ 2 /IR
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-115
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-197 2.5.2 MMU 197 PLSS DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LATCHES HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 3 N /IR /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] [ [ B P F ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ X X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ PLSS ] ] RELEASE. WITH MMU
REMARKS: FAIL CLOSED. IF ALL ATTACHED LATCHES AND
ONLY
ONE
LATCH
NEEDS
TO
OPERATE ENTERS IMPACTED.
FOR
FAIL CLOSED, CREWMEMBER SUBSEQUENT MISSIONS ARE
AIRLOCK
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-116
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-198
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
MMU 198 MMU
BATTERY HUYNH,
LATCHES SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT H DW/FUN NASA IOA [ [ / /2 C ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [ P
] ]
C ] [ P ]
[ [ P
] ]
C ] * IX] C N ]
COMPARE
C N /N
[ N ]
[ N ]
C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3/3
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL UNLATCHED. LAUNCH/LANDING. POST-OPS) HAS NO
SEE
MDAC
MMU-1981
FOR
ANALYSIS
DURING OPS, AND
THE LATCH FAILURE MISSION IMPACT.
ONORBIT
(PRE-OPS,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I17
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-199 2.3.2 MMU 199 MMU
NASA DATA: BASELINE
NEW
[ X
BATTERY HUYNH,
LATCHES SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] B
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
NASA IOA
[ 2 /2 [ 2 /2
[ [P] [ N
[ [P] [ N
[ [P] [ N
[ X ] * [X] [ ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL LATCHED.
FAILURE
SHOULD
BE
"FAILS
TO
UNLATCH"
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I18
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-200
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 200 BACKUP DUFFY,
ARM HUYNH,
LATCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ / /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
2 N
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] * IX] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C2/2
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL LATCHED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-I19
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-201
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ARM
LATCH SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 [ N / /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ IX]
[ N
] *
RECOMMENDATIONS: [2/2]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [A] (AD_DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL UNLATCHED. SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED WITH THIS CRITICALITY.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-120
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-202 4.6.1 MMU 202 QD THERMAL DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
COVERS SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[ x [
[ N
] * ]
]
[ N
[N]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-121
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-203 4.6.1 MMU 203 BATTERY DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
THERMAL HUYNH,
COVER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /2 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ] [X]* CIL ITEM
IX]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2/2
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FOR ] ] THE
REM_: FAIL OPEN RECOMMENDED
DURING STOWAGE. CRITICALITY.
SCREENS
ARE
NOT
REQUIRED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-122
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-204 4.6.1 MMU 204 BATTERY DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
THERMAL HUYNH,
COVER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 /IR 3/3 N /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [ F ]
[ N ]
[ [ F
[ N
] ]
]
[ X ] * [ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[3/3
[D] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FOR THE ] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN RECOMMENDED
DURING FLIGHT. CRITICALITY.
SCREENS
ARE
NOT
REQUIRED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-123
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-205 4.6.1 MMU 205 EXT. DUFFY, PWR. THERMAL COVER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [p]
[ ]
[P] [p]
[ ]
[ IF]
[ N
[X]* [ ]
[ N ]
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [D] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FOR THE ] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN RECOMMENDED DURING FLIGHT. CRITICALITY. SCREENS ARE NOT REQUIRED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-124
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-206 5.4.1 MMU 206 BACKUP DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
PLSS HUYNH,
LATCHES SAIIDI
(LAP
BELTS)
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
ix] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN
DURING
FLIGHT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-125

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM : DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-207 NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
PLSS HUYNH,
LATCHES SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT
[ [P] [ N
[ [P]
[ [P] [ N
[ IX] [N]
] *
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA).
[ 2/2
[ A ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL CLOSED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-126
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ITEM: LEAD ID:
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-208 1.9.1 MMU 208 GN2 DUFFY, LINES HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 1 [ 3 [ N /i /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] AN TO
REMARKS: LEAK. EXTERNAL CHARGE
RUPTURE LEAK THE MMU
IS NOT A REALISTIC FAILURE IN THE FSS LINES MAY LIMIT TANKS.
FOR THESE THE CHARGE
LINES. OR FAIL
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-127
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-210
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 210 GN2 DUFFY,
LINES HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ C p C N
] ] ]
[ ] [ p ] [ N ]
[ ] [ p ] [ N ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ]
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FMEA.
REMARKS: FSS BLOCKED LINES HAS NOT BEEN ASSESSED BY A NASA
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-128
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-211 i. I0.I MMU 211 PRESSURE DUFFY,
[ [ X
] ]
GAUGE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] A
REMARKS: FSS PRESSURE GAUGE LEAK SWITCH TO THE REDUNDANT FAILURE.
WHILE SYSTEM.
CHARGING LOSS
THE MMU TANKS WILL FORCE OF REDUNANCY IS MISSION
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-129
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-212 1.12.3 MMU 212 VENT DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ]
] *
CIL ITEM
]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
['
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: DIFFICULT TO MATE FSS/MMU QD DUE TO INCONVENIENCE. IOA AGREES WITH THE DO NOT NEED TO BE SPECIFIED. HIGH FMEA, PRESSURE EXCEPT LINE, CREW THAT THE SCREENS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-130
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [N] ]
] *
CIL ITEM
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-131
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P]
[ ]
[P] [P]
[ ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-132
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-215 1.3.6 MMU 215 QD-HOSE DUFFY, END HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] SYSTEM
REMARKS: LOSS OF FAILS. RECHARGE CAPABILITY, IOA AGREES WITH THE LOSS FMEA. OF MISSION IF REDUNDANT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-133
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-216 1.3.3 MMU 216 QD-HOSE END HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P]
[ ]
[P] [P]
C ]
[ [P]
C N
[ [ [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-134
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-217 1.3.2 MMU 217 QD-FIXED HALF HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 3 [ N /2 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C [ [P] [ N ] [x]* CIL ITEM
[
]
[N]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: LEAK, FAILED OPEN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-135
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-218 1.3.3 MMU 218 QD-FIXED DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HALF HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] CIL ITEM
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ C
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-136
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-219 2.6.2 MMU 219 GAS ACTUATED HUYNH, NUTS SAIIDI (4)
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /IR /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] B [P] [P] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
R_:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-137
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-219A 2.6.3 MMU 219 GAS ACTUATED HUYNH, NUTS SAIIDI (4)
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /IR ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
/N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ AS ] ] 2.6.2,
REMARKS: FAIL AND OPEN. THEREFORE THIS FMEA TREATED WILL THE RESULT IN SAME WAY. THE SAME EFFEDCT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-138
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-220 2.6.1 NNU 220 GAS ACTUATED DUFFY, HUYNH,
[ [ X
] ]
NUTS
(4)
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 /2 [ 2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X] IX] [ ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-139
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-221
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 221 FILTER DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ [
] *
CIL ITEM
]
]
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3 /2R
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ NASA ] ] FMEA.
REMARKS: LEAK.
FSS
FILTER
LEAK
HAS
NOT
BEEN
ASSESSED
BY
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-140
APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/05/86

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: ID: #: MMU-222 NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 222 FILTER DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ X [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: C 3 /2R ]
(If
different C P ] C
from F ]
NASA) [ P ] C A ] (AD_DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ BY A ] ] NASA
REMARKS: FRACTURE. FMEA.
FSS
FILTER
FRACTURE
HAS
NOT
BEEN
ASSESSED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-141
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-223 4.2.1 MMU 223 GAN
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HEATERS HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 3 N /2 /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DE_TE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ON THE ] ] FSS CAN
REMARKS: OPEN. MANUALLY THE ASTRONAUT, UNBOLT AND USING REBOLT A SPECIAL ALL NUTS TOOL STOWED AND BOLTS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-142
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-224 4.2.1 MMU 224 HEATER DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
FOR
FSS
RECHARGE SAIIDI
SYSTEM
PNEUMATIC
FILTER
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 3 [ N /2 /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
[ N
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ F ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: WITH THE FSS HEATER FAILED OFF, AND FRACTURE. DEBRIS MAY CAUSE SIMILAR FAILURE IN THE ALTERNATE TERMINATION. THE FILTER WILL BECOME EMBRITTLED OTHER MALFUNCTIONS DOWNSTREAM. SYSTEM WILL CAUSE MISSION A
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-143
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH,
HEATERS SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ 3 [ N /2 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ X
[
[ N
]
]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: OPEN CIRCUIT, SHORT CIRCUIT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-144
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
GAUGE HUYNH,
HEATERS SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
HDW/FUNC
NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /2 /3 ] ]
[ ] [P] IN]
[ ] [P] IN]
C ] [p] CN]
[ x] * [ ] [N]
COMPARE
[ N /N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[3/3
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
RE_FAIL OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-145
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-227 4.2.1 MMU 227 QD HEATERS HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 3 N /2 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OFF, OPEN OR FAIL CAUSING SIDES IS LOSS CIRCUIT, THE LOSS OF MISSION. SHORT CIRCUIT. OF ONE RECHARGE FSS QD SIDE. MAY BE INOPERABLE LOSS OF BOTH
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-146
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: # :
12/05/86 MMU-228 4.4.2 MMU 228 HEATER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
THERMOSTATS HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A CP] [P] C ] B [P] CP] C ] SCREENS c CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
] ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL OPEN. FAILS. MMU
MISSION IS TERMINATED WILL NOT FLY WITHOUT
WHEN FLIGHT REDUNDANT
CRITICAL COMPONENT SYSTEM AVAILABLE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-147
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-229 4.4.1 MMU 229 HEATER DUFFY,
[ [ X
] ]
THERMOSTATS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 3 /2R [ 3 /3 [ /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ P [P]
[
[ F [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ X] * [ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2/2
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: FAIL CLOSED. FAILS. MMU
MISSION WILL NOT
IS FLY
TERMINATE WHEN FLIGHT CRITICAL COMPONENT WITHOUT A REDUNDANT SYSTEM AVAILABLE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-148
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
VALVE HUYNH,
TEMP. SAIIDI
SENSORS
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [

] *
CIL ITEM
P N
]
]
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] SENSOR REQUIRE
REMARKS: LOSS OF IS NOT SCREENS.
SIGNAL. MISSION
THE
FSS
SUPPLY THIS
TOGGLE FAILURE
VALVE MODE
TEMPERATURE DOES NOT
ESSENTIAL.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-149
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-231
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 231 TOGGLE DUFFY, VALVE HUYNH, TEMP. SAIIDI SENSORS
ANALYST:
C ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] CP]
[ N ]
C C [
] * ] ]
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL HIGH
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-150
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-232
[ [
] ]
MMU 232 TOGGLE DUFFY,
VALVE HUYNH,
TEMP. SAIIDI
SENSORS
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[P]
[
[P]
[ [P] [N]
[ C [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[N]
[N]
(If
different [ 3 [
from ]
NASA) [ ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
RE_: FAIL
LOW
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-151
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-233
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 233 ORBITER DUFFY,
POWER HUYNH,
CONNECTOR SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [
CIL ITEM
]
]
[ N
[ N
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] WITH ITEM
REMARKS: THIS ITEM MMU-184. AND FAILURE MODE ARE VOIDED. THIS IS COVERED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-152
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-234
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 234 EXTERNAL : DUFFY, POWER HUYNH, LINE/CONNECTOR SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
HDW/_NC
NASA IOA [ [ 3 / /3
[ ] [P] [N]
[ ] [P] [N]
[
[ P
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] BE
REMARKS: OPEN CIRCUIT. VOIDED.
THIS
IOA
IS
SAME
AS
MMU-184,
AND
MAY
THEREFORE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-153
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-235 2.4.1 MMU 235 ORBITER DUFFY, ADAPTOR HUYNH, BEAM SAIIDI MOUNTS
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
(6)
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 1 3 N /i /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE RECOMMENDATION ARE NOT WITHIN STRUCTURE, AND UNLIKELY. THE ITS IS NOT TO CONSIDER SPECIFICATION OF FAILURE MODE AND THESE FAILURES 22206. THIS ITEM CAUSE RELATIONSHIP SINCE THEY IS PART OF ARE VERY
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-154
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-237
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 237 BACKBEAM DUFFY, SHOCK HUYNH, MOUNTS SAIIDI (4)
ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /2R /N
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ P [ N ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N
SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ ] ] ]
CIL ITEM
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ SINCE ITEM ] ] THEY IS
REMARKS: THE RECOMMENDATION ARE NOT WITHIN PART ARE OF VERY
THE
IS NOT TO SPECIFICATION
CONSIDER OF
THESE FAILURES NSTS-22206. THIS
STRUCTURE, UNLIKELY.
AND ITS FAILURE THIS FAILURE
MODE AND CAUSE RELATIONSHIP MODE MAY BE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-155

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-238 NASA DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 238 FOOT DUFFY,
[ X ]
RESTRAINT HUYNH,
ADJUST SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [P] [ N
[ [P] [ N
[ [p] [ N
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[3/3
[ P]
[ P]
[ p]
(ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE REMARKS:
C C
] ]
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-156
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-239 2.2.2 MMU 239 FOOT DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
RESTRAINT HUYNH,
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[
[ P
]
]
C
[ P
]
]
E [ [
] * ] ]
[N]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
REMARKS: JAM LOCKED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-157
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-240 2.7.2 MMU 240 MMU
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
LATCH HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P C ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ [
[
] * ]
]
C N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] LOSS TO AGREES
REMARKS: JAM OPEN. LOSS OF FUNCTION (TO LATCH MMU TO OF MISSION, IF THE UNIT CANNOT BE RECHARGED. REENTRY, THE MMU CAN BE STRAPPED DOWN IN THE WITH THE FMEA. FSS) COULD BE HOWEVER PRIOR MIDDECK. IOA
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-158
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-241 2.7.1 MMU 241 MMULATCH DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] [ [ [ B P P ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ [
[
] * ]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
i
RATIONALE:
1
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
REMARKS: JAM CLOSED. ATTACHED TO AGREES WITH
THE MISSION THE FAILED THE FMEA.
IS LATCH
TERMINATED DOES NOT
IF REDUNDANT LANYARD BREAK THE SHEAR PIN.
IOA
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-159
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-242
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT
MMU 242 MUSHROOM DUFFY, KNOBS HUYNH, (8) SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY
SCREENS
CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ / /3 /N ] ] ]
A
[ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [
B
] ] ] [ [
C
] ] ]
C [ [
] * ] ]
[ N
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3/3
[ p]
[ p]
[ p]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
R_:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-160
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-243
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 243 THERMAL DUFFY,
BLANKETS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ / /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C [P]
[ N
C ] [P]
[ N ]
[ [P]
[ N
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] MAY OF
REMARKS: FSS THERMAL RESULT IN MISSION.
BLANKET LOSS OF
FAILURE RECHARGE
TO COVER CAPABILITY
SENSITIVE COMPONENT THUS POSSIBLE LOSS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-161
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-244
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
MMU 244 TETHER DUFFY,
[ X ]
REEL HUYNH,
RESTRAINT SAIIDI
ANALYST:
[ ] CP]
[ N ]
[ CP]
[ N
C CP]
[ N
[ [
[
] * ]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ IS ] ] CONNECTED
REMARKS: FRACTURE. TO THE EMU.
THIS
MALFUNCTION
IS
VOIDED
SINCE
THE
ITEM
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-162
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-245
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 245 TETHER DUFFY,
REEL HUYNH,
RESTRAINT SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 [ N / /3 /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ] [
]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ TO ] ] THE
REMARKS: THIS MALFUNCTION EMU.
IS
VOIDED
SINCE
THE
ITEM
IS
CONNECTED
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-163

ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: ID: #: MMU-1001X I.I.i MMU I001 GN2 NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
TANK HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 1 /i /I ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ C [
] ] ]
C C [
] ] ]
IX]* IX] [ ]
COXPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-164
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1031X 1.5.1 MMU 1031 TOGGLE DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /IR /IR
VALVES HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] [P] [P] B [P] [P]
SCREENS C [ [P] ]
CIL ITEM
[X]*
IX] [ ]
COMPARE
]
(If
[
from
[ N ]
NASA)
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
[ C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-165
DATE: ID: #:
MMU-1051X 1.4.3 MMU 1051 ISOLATION DUFFY,
[ [ X
] ]
VALVE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 /IR [ 2 /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [P] [ ] B [ P [P] [ ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ x
] *
IX] [ ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C
* CILRETENTION
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
RATIONALE:
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-166
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-II41X 1.6.1 MMU 1141 THRUSTER DUFFY,
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
TRIAD HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[
[ P
]
]
[ x
ix] [ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-167
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1191X
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
1.2.6
MMU 1191 REGULATOR DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
NEW
[ X
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 2 /2R /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B p P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [ X ] ] , CIL ITEM
[ N
IN]
IN]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADD/DE_TE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ OPEN, LEAVE ] ] THUS THE CREW
REMARKS: HIGH PRESSURE DOWNSTREAM LOSS OF GN2 OR LOSS OF PERSON STRANDED. WILL SIDE. FORCE THE FUNCTIONAL VENT LOSS VALVE MAY
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-168
DATE ID: #:
: MMU-1211X 1.2.1 MMU 1211 GN2 REGULATOR
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 2 /I /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[
[ P
]
]
[
[ P
]
]
ix] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
IN]
IN]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 2 /ZR
[ P ]
[ P
[ P
[ ] (ADD/DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: THE FMEA FULLY EXPLAINS THE CORRECTIVE ACTION, BUT CRITICALITY INAPPROPRIATELY. THE LOSS OF REGULATOR CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE IMMEDIATELY. ISO VALVE WILL BE STOP THE LEAKAGE.
ASSIGNED THE DOES NOT SHUTOFF TO
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-169
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1212X 1.2.5 MMU 1212 GN2
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR /
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B P P
SCREENS C ] ]
CIL ITEM
[ ] [p]
[ N ]
[ x
ix] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ .] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-170
DATE ID: #:
: MMU-1251X 1.3.1 MMU 1251 QUICK DISCONNECT HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
: :
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT
CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 1 3 N /i /2R /N ] ] ]
REDUNDANCY A B
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ X
[
] [ N
]
]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ON QD ] ] IS SELF
REMARKS: THE FMEA SEALING RECHARGE INDICATED
DID
NOT
CONSIDER
THE
FACT
THAT SUCH A DURING
THE
COUPLER
WHICH STOPS LEAKAGE UNDER ACTIVITY IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FMEA.
CIRCUMSTANCE. POST-OPS NOT
ALSO, PREP AS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-171
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1252X 1.3.4 MMU 1252 QUICK DISCONNECT HUYNH, SAIIDI
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] IS DONE
REMARKS: IOA IS DURING IN AGREEMENT POST-OPS. WITH THE FMEA, EXCEPT THAT RECHARGE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-172
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1253X 1.3.5 MMU 1253 QUICK DUFFY, DISCONNECT HUYNH, SAIIDI
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [ ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-173
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1281X 3.11.2 MMU 1281 BATTERY DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /2 /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C ] [P]
[ N ]
C ] CP]
[ N ]
C ] CP]
[ N ]
[
[ N
]
]
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D (AD_DE_TE) ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] WITH
REMARKS: FMEA DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ANOTHER ONE STORED IN REPLACING ORBITER. THE AFFECTED BATTERY
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-174
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-1681X 3.3.5 MMU 1681 GYRO DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
POWER HUYNH,
SUPPLY SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [P] IN]
[ [P] IN]
[ [P] IN]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
IN
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ SWITCH MAX. FOR ] ]
REMARKS: LOSS OF GYRO RESULTS IN LOSS OF AAH & CAPABILITY NEEDED FOR CERTAIN MISSIONS RHC CONTROL IS AVAILABLE AS A BACK-UP
ALT CONTROL LIKE SOLAR TO COMPENSATE
MANUAL THE LOSS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-175
DATE: ID: #:
3/16/87 MMU-1701X 3.2.3 MMU 1701 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH, HAND SAIIDI CONTROLLER
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /2 /IR ] ] C C REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] CIL ITEM
[ X] * [ ] IN]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA CONSIDERS THE AXES REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-176
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-1702X 3.2.4 MMU 1702 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND SAIIDI
CONTROLLER
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /2 /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[ X [
[ N
] * ]
]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA CONSIDERS
THE
AXES
REDUNDANT
TO
EACH
OTHER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-177
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /2 /IR ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] B [ P ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
] ]
[P] [ ]
[p] [ ]
[ x] * [ ]
[ N ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA CONSIDERS THE AXES REDUNDANT TO EACH OTHER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-178
DATE: ID: #:
3/16/87 MMU-1704X 3.2.6 MMU 1704 TRANSLATIONAL DUFFY, HUYNH,
[ [ X
] ]
HAND SAIIDI
CONTROLLER
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 /IR [ 2 /IR [ / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] CIL ITEM
[ x ] * IX] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C [
] ]
REMARKS: FAILS OFF
IN
ALL
THREE
AXIS.
SEE
ANALYSIS
WORKSHEET.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-179
DATE: ID: #:
3/16/87 MMU-172 3.1.3 MMU 1721 ROTATIONAL DUFFY,
NASA iX
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND HUYNH,
CONTROLLER SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C2/2 [3/IR]
[ N /N
[ ] C P ]
[ N ]
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P] [N]
[X]* [ ] [N]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ p ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OFF ONE AXIS. SEE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 1721.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-180

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA DATE: ID: #: 12/05/86 MMU-1722X 3.1.4 MMU 1722 ROTATIONAL DUFFY, NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND HUYNH,
CONTROLLER SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /2 /IR /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
P N
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ p ]
from [ P ]
CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: LOSS OF IN OTHER STRANDED
ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT IF UNABLE TO SIGHT THE ORBITER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-181
DATE: ID: #:
12/05/86 MMU-1723X 3.1.5 MMU 1723 ROTATIONAL DUFFY, HAND HUYNH, CONTROLLER SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 3 /2 /IR ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ P [ P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] CP] CN]
[ X
[ [N]
COMPARE
[ N /N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3 /1R
[ P ]
[ p ]
[ p ]
[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REMARKS: FAIL OFF (1-3 AXES), SEE ALSO MMU-1721A.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-182
DATE: ID: #:
3/16/87 MMU-1724X 3.1.6 MMU 1724 ROTATIONAL DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HAND HUYNH,
CONTROLLER SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 1 /IR /i ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P ] ] B [ P [ ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ C C
] ] ]
[ X] [X] C ]
COSPARE
[ N /N
[ N ]
C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 1/1
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: SEE ANALYSIS
WORKSHEET
1722.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-183
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ C 1 1 /i /i ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] [ [ B ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ X [ x ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: MECHANICALLY JAMS IN ISO MODE. IF THE FAILURE IS MECHANICAL, BOTH ISO VALVES ARE CLOSED. THE HANDLE CANNOT BE RETURNED TO NORMAL POSITION. PILOT IS STRANDED WITH NO PROPULSIVE POWER.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-184
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1861X 4.3.2 MMU 1861 CEA THERMOSTATS DUFFY, HUYNH,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
(2 SAIIDI
SETS)
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ 2 [ 2 /IR /IR ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P
]
]
[ X IX] [
] *
COMPARE
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAILS CLOSE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-185
DATE: ID: #:
4/14/87 MMU-1862X 4.3.1 MMU 1862 MMU THERMOSTATS HUYNH, SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW [ X ]
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /IR /IR ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] B [ F [ P ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P ] ] [ x ] * CIL ITEM
IX] [ ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
(If
REMARKS: FAILS OPEN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-186
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1891X 2.1.1 MMU 1891 ARM
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANGLE
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /I /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
C
[P] [N]
C
C P [N]
]
]
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[x]* [ ]
[ N ]
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (ADD/DELETE
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED
POSITION, BEFORE IT
THE PILOT IS PLACED
CAN FLY BACK IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-187
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1892X 2.1.2 MMU 1892 ARM ANGLE DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ADJUST SAIIDI
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P [ ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED POSITION, BEFORE IT THE PILOT IS PLACED CAN FLY BACK IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-188
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ C 1 3 /i /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] C [ B ] ] C [ SCREENS C ] ] C [

] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
C N /N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE ARM FAILS OPERATE THE MMU SHORTENED BEFORE TO FROM IT LOCK BACK THE WORK IS PLACED TO FLIGHT POSITION, THE PILOT CAN POSITION SINCE THE ARM MUST BE IN THE WORK POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-189
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1894X 2.1.4 MMU 1894 ARM ANGLE ADJUST SAIIDI
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 2 3 /IR /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P ] ] ] [ [ B P ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ [ X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-190
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1895X 2.1.5 MMU 1895 ARM
NASA
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
ANGLE
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ 3 [ 3 [ /2R /3 /N ] ] ]
A
[ P ] [ ]
[ N ]
B
[ P ] [ ]
[ N ]
C
[ [
[
] ]
]
[ [
[
] ]
]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[3/3
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-191

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: 3/19/87 MMU-1896X 2.1.6 MMU 1896 ARM NASA DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANGLE
ADJUST SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /I /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ [ B ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ X [ X [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
F N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS [ 3 /2R
: ]
(I f
different [ P ] [
from F ]
CILkRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ THE ARM ] ] IS
REMARKS: THE ALSO FAILURE SECURED IS, "INADVERTENTLY WITH A STRAP. UNLOCKS". HOWEVER,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-192
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1897X 2.1.I0 MMU 1897 ARM ANGLE DUFFY,
[ [ X
] ]
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A [ P [P] [ ] B [ P [P] [ ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
_DW/FUNC
NASA IOA [ 3 /2R [ 3 /2R ] ]
[
[ P
]
] ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMP_
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
* CI_
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK POSITION, SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED BEFORE IT
THE PILOT IS PLACED
CAN FLY BACK IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-193
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD
DATE: ID: #:
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ADJUST SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /2R /N ] ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ [ ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ 3 /2R
[ P ]
[ P
[ p
[ ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF THE ARM JAMS IN THE WORK SINCE IT MUST BE SHORTENED POSITION, BEFORE IT THE PILOT IS PLACED CAN FLY BACK IN THAT POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-194
DATE: ID: #:
3/19/87 MMU-1899X
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 1899 ARM
ANGLE
ADJUST SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
[ [ P
[ N
] ]
]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ [x]
[ N
] *
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: [ 2 IIR ]
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ A ] (ADDDELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: FAILS FROM
WORK
TO
LAUNCH
POSITION.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-195
APPENDIX
ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
3/24/87 MMU-1981X 2.3.1 MMU 1981 MMU DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
BATTERY HUYNH,
LATCHES SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /i /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[
[ F [N]
]
]
[
[ P [N]
]
]
[X]*
[x] [ ]
[ N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ F ]
NASA) [ P ]
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-196
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-2111X 1.10.2 MMU 2111 FSS
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
PRESSURE HUYNH,
GAUGES SAIIDI
DUFFY,
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
[ ] [ P ]
[ N ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
C
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-197
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUPPLY
VALVE SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 3 /2R /NA /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[P] C ]
[ N ]
C C
[
] ]
]
[ [
[
] * ]
]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IOA RECOMMENDS DELETING THIS IS THE FSS SUPPLY VALVE AND VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER. THIS FAILURE IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. UNDER ARPCS-230 TO BE 3/2R FAILURE MODE, SINCE THE ITEM STUDIED THE FAILURE MODE IS FOR THE SUPPLY IS NOT CONSISTENT - IT ASSUMES A MMU SUPPLY VALVE CB IS STUDIED (P,P,P).
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-198
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-2142X 1.13.2 MMU 2142 FSS DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUPPLY
VALVE SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] [ [
] *
CIL ITEM
] ]
COMPARE
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ THAT ] ] RECHARGING
REMARKS: IOA IS IS DONE
IN AGREEMENT WITH DURING POST-OPS.
THE
FMEA,
BUT
RECOGNIZES
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-199
DATE: ID: #:
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: : CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 2 /2R /2
SUPPLY
VALVE SAIIDI
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] B
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
[P] [P] C ]
[p] [p] [ ]
[ [p] IN]
[ [X] [N]
] *
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [A] (AD_DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS: IF A SEVERE LEAKAGE OCCURS THAT CANNOT BE STOPPED BY THE VALVE ITSELF, THEN GN2 FROM ORBITER AND MMU WILL ESCAPE OUTSIDE. RECHARGE CAPABILITY WILL BE LOST FOR THAT MMU. ONLY ONE MMU REMAINING TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION, AND THAT IS REAL TIME CALL DEPENDENT UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-200
DATE: ID: #:
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUPPLY
VALVE SAIIDI
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ B P ] [ SCREENS C ] CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
C
[ N
]
]
C
[
]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-201
DATE ID: #:
: MMU-218 I.ii.I MMU 2181 FLEX DUFFY, IX
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
HOSE HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A P P ] ] ] B [ P [ P [ ] ] ] [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ [ ] ] * CIL ITEM
COMPARE
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] IS
REMARKS: IOA IS IN UNDERSTOOD AGREEMENT WITH THE TO BE DONE DURING FMEA, EXCEPT THAT POST-OPS PERIOD. RECHARGING
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-202
DATE: ID: #:
3/27/87 MMU-2391X 2.2.1 MMU 2391 FOOT DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
RESTRAINT HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /i /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ [ P [ N ] ] ] B [ [ P [ N ] ] ] SCREENS C [ [ P [ N ] ] ] [ [ X ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
NASA) [ P ] [ D ] (AD_DE_TE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ IS ] ] RESERVED
REMARKS: CRITICALITY FOR UNTIL MODIFICATION
IOA
IS PRELIMINARY. TO THE RESTRAINT
FINAL ANALYSIS IS AVAILABLE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-203

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA DATE: ID: #: NASA MMU-2392X 2.2.3 MMU 2392 FSS DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
SUBS YSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST:
FOOT
RESTRAINT HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] [ [ B ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [ [
] ] ]
[ [ [
] ] ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-204
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
3/23/87 MMU-4000X
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
MMU 4000 ARM : : CRITICALITY FLIGHT H DW/FUN C ] ] ]
STRAP HUYNH, SAIIDI
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A B
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
NASA IOA COMPARE
[ [
/ /3 /N
[ ] [P] IN]
[ ] [P] IN]
[ ] [p]
[ N ]
C [ [
] * ] ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS: C 3/3 ]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) C
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
REMARKS
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-205
DATE: ID: #:
3/23/87 MMU-4001X 5.1.1 MMU 4001 ARM DUFFY,
NASA
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
STRAPS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 1 [ 3 [ N /i /3 /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [ [ [ B ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: [3/3]
(If
different [ ] [
from ]
NASA) [ ] [D] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ TO ] ] BECOME A
REMARKS: TWO LATCHES PROJECTILE
AND THIS HINGE IN THIS PAYLOAD
HAVE BAY.
TO
FAIL
FOR
THE
ARM
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-206
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4002X 5.2.1 MMU 4002 MMU DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
BATTERY HUYNH,
RECHARGE SAIIDI
CABLE
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 3 /i /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[ ] [P]
[ N ]
[
[ N
]
]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ FOR ] ] WHICH
REMARKS: THE FMEA THE IOA
CONSIDERED ANALYSIS
POSSIBILITY DISAGREED.
OF
BATTERY
EXPLOSION
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-207
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4003X 5.2.1 MMU 4003 MMU
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
BATTERY HUYNH,
RECHARGE SAIIDI
CABLE
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 1 3 /i /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[P] [N]
[
[P] [N]
[
[ P
]
] ]
[X]* [ ] [N]
COMPARE
[ N /N
[ N
(If
different [ P ] [
from P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: SEE MMU-4002
REMARKS.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-208
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4004X 5.3.1 MMU 4004 TRUNNION DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
PIN HUYNH,
ATTACHMENT SAIIDI
DEVICE
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ 1 3 /i /2R /N ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ [P]
[ N
[ X] * [ ]
[ N ]
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS [ 3 12R
: ]
(If
different
from
NASA)
[P]
[P]
[P]
[ D ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ NEEDED A ] ] FOR
REMARKS: THE FMEA
ASSUMES
THAT
EQUIPMENT OPERATION. AND THEREFORE
TO
BE
ATTACHED
ARE ASSUMES FAILURE.
RESCUE (LIFE CONTINGENCY
SAVING) SCENARIO
THIS ALREADY MULTIPLE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-209
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4005X 5.5.1 MMU 4005 BATTERY DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
TRANSFER HUYNH,
BAG SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 3 /2 /2R ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ B P ] [ SCREENS C ] [ X ] * CIL ITEM
[p]
[ ]
IF]
[ N ]
[P]
[ N ]
[
[ N
]
]
COMPARE
[ N /N
(If
different [ P ]
from [ P ]
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ AND ] ] ALSO HAS
REMARKS: ADDITIONAL A TETHER BATTERIES ATTACHED EXIST TO REPLACE THE LOST SEE FMEA 5.6.1 (MMU-4006). ONE,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-210
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4006X 5.6.1 MMU 4006 BATTERY DUFFY,
DATA: [ ]
BASELINE
NEW
[ X ]
TETHER HUYNH,
STRAP SAI!DI
ASSESSMENT
REDUNDANCY A B [P] [P]
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
NASA IOA COMPARE
[ 2 /2 [ 3 /2R [ N /N
] ] ]
[P] [ P
[
[ P
]
]
[x]* [ ] [N]
[N]
(If
different [ p ]
from [ P ]
* CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] ALSO, MMU).
REMARKS: IOA CONSIDERED BACK-UP THE FAILED TETHER CAN
BATTERIES BE REPLACED
TO REPLACE THE LOST ONE. WITH ANOTHER ONE (OTHER
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-211
APPENDIX ASSESSMENT
C WORKSHEET
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4007X 5.7.1 MMU 4007 CONTINGENCY DUFFY, HUYNH,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
TOOL SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 2 /2 /2 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [P]
[N]
[ ] [P]
[N]
[
[ P
]
]
[X]*
IX] [ ]
COHPARE
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
C C
] ]
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-212
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4008X 5.7.2 MMU 4008 CONTINGENCY
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
TOOL SAIIDI
: :
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT
CRITICALITY FLIGHT
REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] [P] [P] [ ] B [P] [P] [
SCREENS C
CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R /
[ ] [P]
]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[
* CIL RETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-213
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4009X 5.8.1 MMU 4009 5/16" DUFFY, THIN WALL SOCKET SAIIDI
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT REDUNDANCY A ] ] [ [ P P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
HDW/nmC
NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R
[ ] [P] [N]
NASA)
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-214
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4010X 5.8.2 MMU 4010 5/16" DUFFY, THIN WALL SOCKET SAIIDI
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /2R /2R / ] ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P [ P ] ] [ [ B P P ] ] SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [P] IN]
C C [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-215
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4011X 5.9.1 MMU 4011 SUBWAY DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
STRAPS HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 / ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ C C
] ] ]
C C [
] ] ]
C C [
] * ] ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-216
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4012X 5.10.1 MMU 4012 THRUSTER DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
CUE HUYNH,
LIGHT SAIIDI
EXTENDER
ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] REDUNDANCY A B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ ] [P] IN]
[ [ [
] ] ]
[ [ [
] ] ]
[ [ [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
]
(If
RECOMMENDATIONS:
different
from
NASA)
[
* CILRETENTION
]
RATIONALE:
]
(If
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
C C
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-217
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4013X 5.11.1 MMU 4013 CAMERA DUFFY,
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
BRACKET HUYNH, SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 3 3 /3 /3 ] ] [ [ REDUNDANCY A ] ] B SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[ [ [
] ] ]
[ [ [
] ] ]
[ C [
] * ] ]
COMPARE
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
[ [
] ]
REMARKS: IOA IS
IN
AGREEMENT
WITH
THE
FMEA.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-218
APPENDIX C
DATE: ID: #:
NASA MMU-4014X 4.7.1 MMU 4014 SUNSHIELD DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI
DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA COMPARE [ 2 [ [ N /IR /NA /N ] ] ] [ [ [ REDUNDANCY A p ] ] ] [ [ B P ] ] ] [ [ [ SCREENS C ] ] ] [ X [ [ N ] ] ] * CIL ITEM
[ N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CIL
RETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ ] ] 1)THE SKIN_
REMARKS: THIS FAILURE COMPONENT IS
MODE WAS CONSIDERED
CONSIDERED IN THE
NOT APPLICABLE SAME FASHION AS
DUE TO: THE ORBITER
AND THEREFORE NOT CONSIDERED, 2)THE CAUSE OF FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC, 3)THE ONLY POSSIBILITY FOR FAILURE MAY BE THROUGH VIBRATION AND SHOCK. HOWEVER THIS CAN ONLY OCCUR DURING LIFTOFF AND THE FSS ISOLATE THE SYSTEM.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-219

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: DATE: ID: #: NASA MMU-4015X 4.2.2 MMU 4015 HEATERS DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI DATA: [ [ X ] ]
BASELINE NEW
ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC NASA IOA [ [ 2 /2 /NA ] ] REDUNDANCY A [ P ] [ B P ] [ SCREENS C CIL ITEM
[
[ N
]
]
[
[ N
]
]
[
[
] ]
]
IX]* [ ]
[ N ]
COMPARE
[ N /N
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(If
different
from
NASA)
[ ] (ADD/DELETE)
CILRETENTION
RATIONALE:
(If
applicable) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE [ [ IS NOT ] ]
REMARKS: IOA RECOMMENDS CREDIBLE.
DELETING
THIS
FAILURE
MODE
SINCE
IT
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
C-220
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL
ITEMS
D-I
APPENDIX D POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

NASA FMEA MDAC-ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
1.1.2 1.5.3 1.5.2 1.4.1 1.4.2 1.7.3 1.7.4 1.7.1 1.7.2
1.6.2 1.6.4 1.6.3 1.2.4 1.2.3 1.2.6 1.2.2 1.8.1 3.11.1 3.14.3 3.14.4 3.14.1
i00 102 103 104 105 106 106 106 106 Ii0 iii 112 113 114 i16 i17 119 120 121 122 127 128 129 130 130 131 132 133 134 134 135 136 138 142 152 152 154 154 158 159 160
GN2 TANK TOGGLE VALVE TOGGLE VALVE ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATION VALVE GN2 LINES (ISOL VLV - REG GN2 LINES (REG-THRUSTERS) GN2 LINES (XFEED VLV - XF GN2 LINES (TANK-ISOL VLV) THRUSTER MANIFOLD THRUSTER MANIFOLD THRUSTER THRUSTER THRUSTER GN2 REGULATOR GN2 REGULATOR GN2 REGULATOR GN2 RELIEF VALVE GN2 RELIEF VALVE PRESSURE GAGE GN2 TEST PORT BATTERY INT/EXT INT/EXT INT/EXT INT/EXT POWER POWER POWER POWER SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
LEAK FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSED FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSE LEAK LEAK LEAK LEAK LEAK CONSTRICTION FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSED LEAK FAIL CLOSED FAIL OPEN FAIL LOW FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSED LEAK LEAK NO OUTPUT-LOW OUTPUT FAIL OPEN FAIL TO INTERNAL POSITION FAIL TO INTERNAL POSITION FAIL TO EXTERNAL POSITION SHORT FAIL OPEN FAIL OFF FAIL OFF FAIL ON FAIL OPEN FAIL OPEN FAIL OPEN FAIL ON IN ISO. FAIL ON IN ISO. FAIL OFF FAIL OFF FAIL ON 1-12 CH. FAIL OFF 1-12 CH. NOISY OUTPUT
3.13.1 3.13.2 3.13.4 3.9.1 3.8.1 3.7.1 3.12.5 3.12.6 3.12.1 3.12.2 3.3.1 3.3.3
TERMINAL BOARD TERMINAL BOARD MAIN POWER SWITCH MAIN POWER SWITCH MAIN POWER SWITCH LTS/HTR. cb CEA CIRCUIT VDA cb CEA POWER CEA POWER CEA POWER CEA POWER CEA CEA CEA BREAKER SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
D-2
NASA
FMEA
MDAC-ID
ITEM
FAILURE
MODE
3.3.3
161 162 163 164 166 167 169 169 171 171 173 174 174 182 183 184 185 185 190 191 192 192 194 195 196 196 199 2OO 201 203 206 207 220 222 224 228 229 i001 1031 1051 1141 1704 1191 1211 1212 1724 1731 1861
3.3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.1.1 3.1.2 3.2.7 3.2.9 3.2. I0 3.3.1 3.4.1 3.5.1 4.1.1 4.2.1 2.1.9 2.1.7 2.1.8 3.6.1 3.6.2 2.5.1 2.5.3 2.3.2
4.6.1 5.4.1 2.6.1 4.2.1 4.4.2 4.4.1 1.1.1 1.5.1 1.4.3 1.6.1 3.2.6 i. 2.6 1.2.1 1.2.5 3.1.6 3.2.8 4.3.2
CEA ISOLATION VALVE TIMER ISOLATION VALVE TIMER ISOLATION VALVE TIMER VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER VALVE DRIVER AMPLIFIER THC THC RHC RHC THC ISOLATE SWITCH THC ISOLATE SWITCH THC ISOLATE SWITCH CEA PWR SPLY WIRE HARNESS EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR HEATERS HEATERS ARM LENGTH ADJUST ARM LENGTH ADJUST ARM LENGTH ADJUST ARM LENGTH ADJUST EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR EXTERNAL POWER CONNECTOR PLSS LATCHES PLSS LATCHES MMU BATTERY LATCHES BACKUP ARM LATCH BACKUP ARM LATCH BATTERY THERMAL COVER BACKUP BACKUP PLSS PLSS LATCHES LATCHES (LAP
LOGIC FAILURE FAIL OFF TOO SHORT FAILS ON FAIL OFF FAIL ON FAIL ON 1-3 FAIL ON 1-3
AXES AXES
GAS ACTUATED NUTS (4) F I LTER HEATER FOR FSS RECHARGE HEATER THERMOSTATS HEATER THERMOSTATS GN2 TANK TOGGLE VALVES ISOLATION VALVE THRUSTER TRIAD THC REGULATOR GN2 REGULATOR GN2 REGULATOR RHC THC CEA THERMOSTATS (2 SETS)
FAIL ON (1-3 AXES) FAIL ON (1-3 AXES) FAIL ON FAIL OFF FAIL OFF FAIL HIGH OR LOW SHORT OR OPEN CIRCUIT FAIL OPEN FAIL OFF FAIL OFF FAIL UNLATCHED FAIL LATCHED SHORT FAIL LATCHED LONG FAIL LATCHED LONG FAIL CONNECTED FAIL DISCONNECTED FAIL OPEN FAIL OPEN FAIL LATCHED FAIL LATCHED FAIL UNLATCHED FAIL OPEN FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSED FAIL CLOSED FRACTURE FAIL OPEN FAIL OPEN FAIL CLOSED RUPTURE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE SHORT IN SOLENOID FAILS OFF OUT OF TOLERANCE PISTON JAMMED EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAIL OFF THREE AXES MECHANICALLY JAMS FAILED CLOSED
D-3
NASA
FMEA
MDAC-ID
ITEM
FAILURE
MODE
4.3.1 2.1.6 2.3.1 1.13.3 5.7.1
1862 1896 1899 1981 2143 4007
MMU THERMOSTATS ARM ANGLE ADJUST ARM ANGLE ADJUST MMU BATTERY LATCHES FSS SUPPLY VALVE CONTINGENCY TOOL
FAILS OFF INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS FAILS FROM WORK LATCH FAILS OPEN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILS TO RELEASE FLEX
D-4
APPENDIX E DET_TLED ANALYB'r
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA8600109, Analysis of the Manned Maneuvering Unit, (21 November 1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in _$T$ 22_06, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, I0 october 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the top. LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware 1 2 3 Functional 1R 2R
Criticalities: Loss of life or Loss of mission (like or unlike) = All others = = Criticalities: Redundant hardware if failed, could Redundant hardware if failed, could
vehicle or next could
failure of any redundant cause loss of life/vehicle
item
= =
items (like cause loss of items (like cause loss of
or unlike) all life or vehicle. or unlike) all mission.
of of
which, which,
Redundancy 1 2 3 NA Redundancy P F NA
= = = =
Screen A: Is Checked Out PreFlight Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight Not Applicable Screens Passed Failed Not B and Screen Screen C:
= = =
Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD HIGHEST MMU I001 GN2 TANK RUPTURE DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/Ft_C
1/1
MODE:
ANALYST:
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
i)
2)
MMU
PROPULSION
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITI CALITIES FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC PRE-OPS : 1/1 OPS : 1/1 POST-OPS : i/1 REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: FATIGUE, MATERIAL FAILURE SCREENS : A [ ]
B[
C[
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: POSSIBLE LOSS OF DELTA V.
CREW/VEHICLE
FROM
SHARPNEL
AND/OR
IMPULSIVE
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT : HDW/FUNC 2/IR
MMU 1031 TOGGLE EXTERNAL DUFFY, VALVES LEAKAGE HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
1)
2 ) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
PROPULSION
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SEAL SCREENS: SIDE A A OR [ B 2 ] B
HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
(O-RING)
FAILURE,
SEAT
GALLED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF GN2 ON THE SIDE WITH LEAK. POSSIBLE BY STRANDING IF OTHER SIDE ALSO FAILS.
LOSS
OF
CREWPERSON
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST MMU 1051 ISOLATION EXTERNAL DUFFY, : VALVE LEAKAGE SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 2/IR
MODE ANALYST:
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2 ) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) B) 9)
MMU
PROPULSION SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SEAL SCREENS: SIDE A A OR [ 2 B ] HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/IR 2/2
B[P]
(O-RING)
FAILURE/DAMAGE,
SEAT
GALLED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF GN2 FROM THE SIDE WITH LEAKING CREWMEMBER BY STRANDING IF OTHER GN2
VALVE. POSSIBLE SIDE FAILS.
LOSS
OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-4
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 2/IR
MMU 1141 THRUSTER SHORT IN DUFFY, TRIAD SOLENOID SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
HUYNH,
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
i)
2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
PROPULSION
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: FAILURE SCREENS: SIDE A A OR [ 2 B ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/1R 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
CONTAMINATION,
CHAFFING
FROM
VIBRATION,
INSULATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF SIDE DUE DRAIN. POSSIBLE FAILS DURING EVA
TO CIRCUIT STRANDING OPS.
BREAKER OF THE
TRIPPING CREW PERSON
OR EXCESSIVE BATTERY IF OTHER SIDE ALSO
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-5
MMU 1191 REGULATOR MODE: OUT DUFFY, OF TOLERANCE HUYNH, SAIIDI (HIGH) SUBSYS
ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SUBSYSTEM
i)
2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
PROPULSION A OR B SIDE REGULATOR
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: A OR B A SIDE [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
CONTAMINATION,
SPRING
FAILURE,
INCORRECT
CALIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: IF DOWNSTREAM LOSS OF SIDE SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE RESULTS. IMPACT. SUFFICIENTLY AT PRESSURES LOSS OF BOTH HIGH, RELIEF BELOW RELIEF SIDES STRANDS VALVE OPENS, OPENING, NO CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-6
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC 2/IR
MMU 1211 GN2 REGULATOR PISTON JAMMED DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
i)
2 ) 3) 4) S) 6) 7) 8) S)
MMU
PROPULSION
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST=OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, VIBRATION SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 2/IR 3/3 P ]
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: A POSIBILITY EXISTS WHICH MAY FAIL THE POSITION. IN THE THRUSTERS AFFECTED SIDE MMU ACTIVITY REFERENCES:
TO HAVE REGULATOR
THE IN
PISTON JAMMED OPEN AND THE PRESSURE ATTITUDE
IN VENT
SUCH PORT
MANNER IN CLOSED DAMAGE CANCEL
THIS CASE, THE HIGH MANIFOLD AND LOOSE
DOWNSTREAM CONTROL.
MAY THE
MUST BE ISOLATED THROUGH AND RETURN TO ORBITER.
ISOLATION
VALVE,
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-7
HDW/FUNC 2/1R
MMU 1212 GN2 REGULATOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) 8) 9)
HIERARCHY:
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF SIDE REQUIRING CREWPERSON STRANDING SCREENS: SIDE A A OR [ 2 B ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
IF
IT BE OTHER
ISOLATED. POSSIBLE SIDE FAILS.
LOSS
OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1251 QUICK DISCONNECT PREMATURE OPERATION DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
MMU
PROPULSION
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, PART FAILURE SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE QD COMING PROBLEM SINCE CAPABILITY AT MISSION.
OFF PREMATURELY DURING RECHARGE POSES NO IMMEDIATE IT HAS SELF-SEALING CAPABILITY. NO RECHARGE WORST CASE WILL CANCEL MMU ACTIVITY THUS LOSS OF
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-9
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1252 QUICK DISCONNECT INABILITY TO MATE DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
MMU
PROPULSION
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC /NA /NA 3/2R [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF RECHARGE RECHARGE MISSION CAPABILITY LOSS WITH
CAPABILITY WILL MULTIPLE
FROM CANCEL MMU
ONE
PORT.
TOTAL MMU
LOSS
OF THUS
SUBSEQUENT OPS.
ACTIVITY
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-10
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1253 QUICK DISCONNECT INABILITY TO DEMATE DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
MMU
PROPULSION
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE HOSE MUST QD. MMU THIS OPS. WILL
BE
CUT
BY
EMERGENCY NEGATE
TOOL
TO
REMOVE
FLEX FOR
HOSE
FROM
HOWEVER
RECHARGE
CAPABILITY
SUBSEQUENT
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-11
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST MMU 1281 BATTERY INABILITY DUFFY, HUYNH, CRITICALITY FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MODE: ANALYST:
TO
MATE SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) 8) S)
HIERARCHY:
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: MECHANICAL (PIN BENT), CORROSION/CONTAMINATION SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE AFFECTED BATTERY ORBITER AND MMUACTIVITY RESUME CANNOT
NEEDS MMU BE
TO
BE
CHANGED
WITH
GOOD
ONE
FROM THEN
ACTIVITIES. ACCOMPLISHED
IF NO BATTERY EXISTS, - MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-12
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST MMU 1681 GYRO POWER UNCOMMANDED DUFFY, : HUYNH, SUPPLY OUTPUT SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI CRITICALITY FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MODE: ANALYST:
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2 ) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) 8) 9)
MMU
ELECTRICAL SUBSYSTEM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SHORT SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/2R 3/3 P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: UNCOMMANDED RATES OF POWER TO POWER SOLAR MAX) MAY ACCOMPLISH THE MANUAL ATTITUDE REFERENCES:
PROVIDED SUPPLY
TO AND
MMU LOSS
PROPULSION. OF AAH.
SOME
REQUIRES MISSION TO
REMOVAL (LIKE
REQUIRE MISSION CONTROL
AAH AND ALT CONTROL GOAL. LOSS OF AUTO THROUGH RHC.
SWITCH CONTROL,
SUCCESSFULLY WILL LEAVE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE : SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE 3/13/87 MMU 1701 TRANSLATIONAL MODE: FAILS OFF
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HAND CONTROLLER IN ONE AXIS (+, -, OR + AND HDW/FUNC 3/IR
ELECTRICALLY
-)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
i)
2)
MMU
THC
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: LOOSE CONTAMINATION, EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE
MECHANICAL
JAMMING,
CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
IN ONE DIRECTION ON OTHER AXES. STRANDED.
OR BOTH. LOSS OF
THE ALL
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE 3/13/87 MMU 1702 TRANSLATIONAL FAILS OFF HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HAND CONTROLLER MECHANICALLY IN ONE HDW/FUNC 3/IR
MODE:
AXIS
(+,
-,
OR
AND
-)
LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, : HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY SYSTEM
i)
2 )
MMU
THC
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) s)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: LOSSEMAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE MECHANICAL JAMMING, SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/1R 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
CONTAMINATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
OR BOTH. LOSS OF
THE ALL
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE MAGNET LEAD 3/13/87 MMU 1703 TRANSLATIONAL MODE: FAILS OFF IN HAND ONE SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/IR
CONTROLLER AXIS (+, -, OR + AND -)-DETACHED
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
I)
2)
MMU
THC
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: LOOSE CONTAMINATION, MAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE MECHANICAL JAMMING, SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/1R 2/2 P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: CANNOT TRANSLATE IN ONE AXIS, PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT
OR BOTH. LOSS OF
THE ALL
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-16
3/16/87
1704 TRANSLATIONAL FAILS OFF DUFFY, HUYNH,
HDW/FUNC 2/1R
MODE: ANALYST:
IN
HAND CONTROLLER ALL THREE AXIS SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
I)
2 )
MMU
THC
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: FAILURE LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING, PIECE PART SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/1R 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THC FAILS ON ALL THREE AXES, PILOT CANNOT TRANSLATE. THIS FAILURE CAN BE WORKED AROUND USING THE SATELLITE STABILIZATION FUNCTION AND THE ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER YAW COMMANDS WHICH WILL RESULT IN TRANSLATION ALONG THE Y AXIS. WE CONSIDER THIS UNLIKE REDUNDANT SYSTEM FOR TRANSLATION. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF PILOT/VEHICLE. REFERENCES:
AN
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-17
3/16/87
MMU 1721 ROTATIONAL FAILS OFF DUFFY, : HUYNH,
HDW/FUNC 3/1R
MODE: ANALYST:
HAND CONTROLLER ELECTRICALLY ONE SAIIDI
AXIS SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY SYSTEM
i)
2 )
MMU
RHC
3) 4) s) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: LOOSE CONTAMINATION, MAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE. MECHANICAL JAMMING, SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD 9/19/86 1722 ROTATIONAL FAIL OFF DUFFY,
MODE: ANALYST:
HAND CONTROLLER MECHANICALLY IN SAIIDI
ONE
AXIS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SUBSYS
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
i)
2)
MMU
RHC
3) 4) s) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE MECHANICAL JAMMING SCREENS: A [ 2 ] HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/1R 2/2
B[P]
C[P]
CONTAMINATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD 9/19/86 1723 ROTATIONAL MODE: ANALYST: FAIL DUFFY, OFF
HDW/FUNC 3/1R
HAND (1-3
CONTROLLER AXES)-DETACHED MAGNET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
I)
2) 3) 4) S) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
RHC
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: LOOSE MAGNET/CONNECTOR, MECHANICAL JAMMING SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 3/IR 2/2 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF ROTATION IN ONE AXIS. THE PILOT CAN ROTATE AND TRANSLATE IN OTHER AXES. LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONS WILL LEAVE THE PILOT STRANDED IF UNABLE TO SIGHT ORBITER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-20
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC
3/16/8_
MMU 1724 ROTATIONAL FAIL OFF DUFFY, HAND THREE
1/1
MODE: ANALYST:
CONTROLLER AXES SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
I)
2)
MMU
RHC
3) 4) s) 6) v) s) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES : LOOSE CONTAMINATION, EFFECTS/RATIONALE: NO ROTATIONAL MAGNET/CONNECTOR, PIECE PART FAILURE MECHANICAL JAMMING, SCREENS : A [ ] HDW/FUNC 2/2 i/1 2/2
BC
cc
CONTROL.
THE
PILOT
IS
STRANDED
IF
UNABLE
TO
SIGHT
THE ORBITER. THIS CRITICALITY CAN BE DOWNGRADED PROVES FEASIBLE FOR THE PILOT TO PUT A HAND ON PROPULSIVE NOZZLES WHILE FIRING TRANSLATION TO MOTION. REFERENCES:
TO A 2/IR IF IT ONE OF THE FORCE A ROTATIONAL
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD 3/16/87 MMU 1731 TRANSLATIONAL MECHANICALLY DUFFY, : HUYNH,
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HAND JAMS SAIIDI CONTROLLER IN ISO MODE SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI HDW/FUNC i/i
MODE: ANALYST:
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY SYSTEM
i)
2 ) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
THC
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE SCREENS: A [ ] HDW/FUNC 2/2 1/1 2/2
C [
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ISOLATION VALVES PILOT IS STRANDED.
ARE
CLOSED.
LOSS
OF
ALL
PROPULSIVE
CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC
MMU 1861 CEA THERMOSTATS FAILED CLOSED DUFFY, HUYNH, (2 SETS) (HEATERS ON SAIIDI
2/IR
MODE: ANALYST:
CONTINUOUSLY) SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
MMU
CEA
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THIS FAILURE WILL MAINTAIN THE CONTROL ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLY HEATERS ON CONTINUOUSLY. LOSS OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT IN THE CEA SUCH AS THE VALVE DRIVE AMPLIFIERS WILL FOLLOW, FORCING THE SHUTDOWN OF ONE SIDE. FUNCTION FAILURE MAY LEAVE PILOT STRANDED. SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/1R 2/2 P ] C [ P ]
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-23
MMU 1862 MMU THERMOSTATS FAILS OFF DUFFY, : HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
I)
2)
MMU
CEA
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC /NA 2/1R /NA [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: HEATER WITH THE COMPONENT FAILURE
FAILED THERMOSTAT IF TEMPERATURE
WILL EXCEEDS
NOT OPERATE. LOWER LIMITS. OF
POSSIBLE IF FLIGHT IF
CRITICAL COMPONENT, POSSIBLE OTHER SIDE ALSO FAILS.
STRANDING/LOSS
CREWMEMBER
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-24

DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE ARM LEAD HIGHEST MMU 1891 ARM ANGLE UNABLE TO ADJUST MOVE FROM CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MODE:
WORK
TO
FLIGHT
POSITION-LEFT
ANALYST:
DUFFY, :
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2) 3)
MMU
MECHANICAL ARM ASSEMBLY
4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT OR A [ 2 ] MMU ARM B HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/2R 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK,
JAMMING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, LATCH BOLTS CAN BE REMOVED AND ARM PLACED IN FLIGHT POSITION WITH PIP PINS. HOWEVER, THIS CORRECTIVE ACTION FREEZES THE ARM IN FLIGHT POSITION AND MAY PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. DURING THE OPS PHASE THIS FAILURE MAY PREVENT COMPLETION OF THE MISSION. POST-OPS THE ARM CAN BE LEFT IN THE FLIGHT POSITION AND CAN BE SECURED FOR LANDING WITH PIP PINS. REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-25
MMU 1892 ARM ANGLE UNABLE TO DUFFY, ADJUST MOVE SYSTEM SAIIDI
MODE: ANALYST:
WORK
TO SUBSYS
FLIGHT-RIGHT LEAD: M.J.
ARM SAIIDI
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1)
2 ) 3 )
MMU
4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT OR A [ 2 ] MMU ARM B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/2R 3/3 P ]
c[p]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK,
JAMMING
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE SINGLE LEAD MMU 1893 ARM LEFT ANGLE ARM SUBSYSTEM
ORBITER ANALYSIS
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/3
MODE: POSITION ANALYST:
ADJUST FAILS TO
LOCK,
INADVERTENTLY
UNLOCKS,
ANY
DUFFY, :
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2) 3)
MMU
MECHANICAL i_ ASSEMBLY
4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT MMU A [ ARM ] HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3 3/3
B[
C[
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: IF FAILURE OCCURS PRE-OPS, CREW INCONVENIENCE, ARM MAY HAVE TO PINNED IN POSITION. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING OPERATIONS (I.E., AFTER SATELLITE SERVICING) AND ARM FAILS TO LOCK BACK IN FLIGHT POSITION, NO IMPACT. CREW INCONVENIENCE TO TRAVEL WITH UNLOCKED ARM. POST-OPS, WHILE PREPPING TO RETURN, THE ARM CAN STRAPPED OR LOCKED IN A DIFFERENT POSITION. REFERENCES:
BE
BE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ITEM: ID: SUBSYSTEM
ORBITER ANALYSIS
MMU 1894 ARM ANGLE ARM ADJUST FAILS TO LOCK, INADVERTENTLY UNLOCKS,
FAILURE MODE: RIGHT ANY SINGLE POSITION LEAD ANALYST: DUFFY, :
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2 ) 3 ) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS RIGHT : A MMU [ ARM ] HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3 3/3
B[
C[
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK
BE
BE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE POSITION LEAD
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/3
MMU 1895 ARM ANGLEADJUST FAILS TO LOCK,
MODE:
INADVERTENTLY
UNLOCKS,
ANY
SINGLE
ANALYST:
DUFFY,
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i)
2 ) 3 )
MMU
4) 5) 6) v) s) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST'OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS LEFT : OR A [ ] MMU ARM B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3 3/3 ]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK
BE
BE
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ITEM: FAILURE STAY IN LEAD MODE: LAUNCH ID:
MMU 1896 ARM ANGLE ADJUST UNLOCKS (LAUNCH, LANDING), FAILS TO
INADVERTENTLY POSITION DUFFY, HUYNH,
ANALYST:
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i)
2) 3)
MMU
4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT OR A [ 2 ] MMU ARM B HDW/FUNC 3/2R /* 3/2R [ F ]
c[p]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: *SEE MDAC ID-1891 THE ARMS HAVE LOCKS LAUNCH MISSION OR LANDING. MAY BE LOST
PLUS
STRAPS
TO
KEEP
THEM ARM.
IN FAIL,
POSITION THIS MMU
DURING
SHOULD DUE TO
ALL REDUNDANCIES AN INOPERABLE
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-30
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1897 ARM ANGLE UNABLE TO DUFFY, ADJUST MOVE FROM SAIIDI
MODE: ANALYST:
LAUNCH
TO
WORK/FLIGHT LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SUBSYS
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1)
2) 3)
MMU
4) 5) 6) 7) s) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT OR A [ 2 ] MMU ARM B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/2R 3/3 P ] C [ P ]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK,
JAMMING
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ITEM: FAILURE LEAD MODE: ANALYST: ID: SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1898 ARM UNABLE DUFFY, ANGLE TO HUYNH, ADJUST RELEASE SAIIDI ARM FROM FLIGHT SUBSYS TO LEAD: LAUNCH/WORK M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
I)
2 ) 3 )
MMU
4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE SCREENS: LEFT OR A [ 2 ] MMU ARM B HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/2R 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
RIGHT
PART
FAILURE,
VIBRATION,
SHOCK,
JAMMING
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-32
MMU 1899 ARM ANGLE FAILS FROM DUFFY, : ADJUST WORK
MODE: ANALYST:
TO
LAUNCH
POSITION SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
1)
2 ) 3 )
MMU
4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, SHOCK SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 2/2 2/IR 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: PRE-OPS, PILOT WILL NOT PROCEED WITH THE MISSION IF PROBLEM CANNOT BE CORRECTED. DURING OPERATIONS, THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY IS BASED ON THE PILOTS ABILITY TO TETHER HIMSELF TO THE MMU, DOFF TO CORRECT THE ARM POSITION BACK TO FLIGHT AND DONNING IT FOR THE FLIGHT BACK. FAILURE TO CORRECT THIS CONDITION AND DONN THE MMU AGAIN MAY RESULT IN CREWMAN BEING STRANDED AWAY FROM THE ORBITER. REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-33
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 1981 MMU BATTERY LATCH FAILS DUFFY, HUYNH, LATCHES OPEN-LAUNCH SAIIDI
MODE: ANALYST:
AND
LANDING SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i)
2 )
MMU
BATTERY
3) 4) s) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: *SEE ANALYSIS SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R /* 3/2R [ F ] C [ P ]
MDAC
ID-198.
DURING LIFTOFF, IF THE LATCH FAILS OPEN, THE VELCRO THERMAL COVER WILL HOLD THE LATCH FROM TRAVELING. THIS WILL KEEP THE BATTERY IN PLACE. THE MOMENT ARM BETWEEN THE BATTERY PIN AND THE LATCH HINGE POINT IS SMALL COMPARED TO THE MOMENT ARM BETWEEN THE END OF THE LATCH (AGAINST THE VELCRO COVER) AND THE SAME LATCH HINGE POINT. SHOULD THE SYSTEM FAIL, THE BATTERY MAY BECOME UNHINGED, CAUSING LOSS OF BATTERY AND HINGES, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-34
MMU 2111 FSS PRESSURE ERRONEOUS-HIGH DUFFY, HUYNH, GAUGES OR LOW SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) S) 9)
HIERARCHY:
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: FSS A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
CONTAMINATION,
MECHANISM
BINDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: NO EFFECT DUE
TO
NO
IMPACT
ON
THE
SYSTEMS
(MMU
OR
FSS).
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-35
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC /NA
MMU 2141 FSS SUPPLY FAILED OPEN DUFFY, HUYNH, VALVE
MODE: ANALYST:
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
HIERARCHY:
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THIS WILL FAILURE AFFECT MODE WAS STUDIED UNDER MMU RECHARGE CAPABILITY THE ARPCS (ARPCS-230) DURING PRE/POST OPS. WHICH SCREENS : A [ ] HDW/FUNC /NA / /NA
B[
C[
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-36
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 2142 FSS SUPPLY VALVE FAILS CLOSED DUFFY, : HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i)
2) 3 )
MMU
FSS PROPULSION
4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION, MECHANICAL FAILURE SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE FAILURE WILL THE FIRST MMU-OPS. SUBSEQUENT MMU-OPS.
HAVE
NO LOSS
EFFECT UNTIL OF RECHARGE
RECHARGE CAPABILITY
IS ATTEMPTED WILL CANCEL
AFTER
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER
MMU 2143 FSS SUPPLY VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DUFFY, : HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
I) 2)
3 ) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU FSS
PROPULSION
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 2/2 P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: A SEVERE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE (IF NOT ABLE TO BE ISOLATED BY THE VALVE-DOWNSTREAM SIDE) WILL PREVENT THE MMU FROM BEING RECHARGED - GAS (GN2) WILL ESCAPE FROM ORBITER AND MMU TANKS. THUS MMU-OPS WILL BE LOST AFTER THE FIRST MMU ACTIVITY. ONLY ONE MMU REMAINING. REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-38
MMU 2144 FSS SUPPLY FAILED OPEN DUFFY, : HUYNH, VALVE
MODE: ANALYST:
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
1)
2) 3 )
MMU
FSS PROPULSION
4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: VIBRATION, CORROSION, SHOCK, CONTAMINATION SCREENS : A [ ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/3 ]
c [
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT IS VALVES AND MMU CROSSFED
RECOGNIZED, VALVES MAY
SINCE THE ORBITER BE USED TO ISOLATE
MMU SUPPLY THE LINE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-39
MMU 2181 FLEX HOSE EXTERNAL DUFFY,
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAKAGE SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) 8) 9)
HIERARCHY:
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EXCESS MATERIAL ALLOWABLE FAILURE BEND DUE TO RADIUS. THERMAL CYCLING OR STRESSED IN SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
OF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF GN2 TO CHANGE TO MMU. ALSO FAILED.
SPACE. MISSION
PROBABLE IMPACT
INEFFICIENT IF REDUNDANT
AND FSS
UNACCEPTABLE CHARGE CAPABILITY
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-40
3/27/87
NNU 2391 FOOT BOOT DUFFY, RESTRAINT JAMS IN HUYNH,
MODE: ANALYST:
FOOT SAIIDI
RESTRAINT SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN 1) 2)
HIERARCHY:
FSS MECHANICAL
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: FOOT RESTRAINT IS BEING MODIFIED SUCH THAT OFF IF THE FOOT JAMS INSIDE. FINAL ANALYSIS UNTIL MODIFICATION IS AVAILABLE TO IOA. SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA 3/2R P ] C [ P ]
THE
HEEL SHOULD
CLIP CAN COME BE RESERVED
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-41
MMU 2392 FSS FOOT INABILITY DUFFY, RESTRAINT TO CAPTURE SAIIDI
MODE: ANALYST:
BOOT SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN i) FSS 2) FOOT
HIERARCHY: RESTRAINT
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: WEAR, SCREENS FSS, : A RIGHT [ OR ] LEFT B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3 3/3 ] C [ ]
RESTRAINT
DAMAGE
TO
BOOT
OR
FOOT
RESTRAINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: IF BOTH RESTRAINTS
FAIL,
GREATER
EFFORT
IN
HOLDING
POSITION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD 9/23/87 HMU 4000 ARM STRAP FAILS LATCHED DUFFY, HUYNH,
MODE: ANALYST:
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: ASSEMBLY
i)
2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) S)
MMU
ARM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, JAMMING SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: STRAP CAN BE FORCEFULLY LATCH CAN BEAR ENTRY POSITION.
UNLATCHED OR IT CAN BE CUT. LOADS, OR ARM CAN BE PINNED IN
THE PRIMARY THE FLIGHT
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD 3/23/87 4001 ARM STRAPS FAILS UNLATCHED DUFFY, HUYNH,
MODE: ANALYST:
SAIIDI
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: ASSEMBLY
i)
2) 3) 4) S) 6) V) 8) S)
MMU
ARM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: EFFECTS/RATIONALE: *SEE MDAC-201. THIS PRIMARY LATCH REFERENCES: SCREENS : A [ ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /* 3/3 ]
HOLDS
THE
ARM
IN
PLACE.
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-44
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 4002 MMU BATTERY FAILURE TO DUFFY, HUYNH, RECHARGE PROVIDE SAIIDI CABLE RECHARGE SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
INTERFACE LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
MMU
FSS
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ORBITER A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA 3/2R [ P ] C [ P ]
AIRLOCK
MECHANICAL
FAILURE,
ELECTRICAL
OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: LOSS OF INTERFACE MISSION IMPACT IF FAILED.
PREVENTS RECHARGE OTHER BATTERIES
OF AND
BATTERY RECHARGING
AND
RESULTS FUNCTIONS
IN A ARE
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-45
MMU 4003 MMU BATTERY FAILURE TO DUFFY, : HUYNH, RECHARGE PROVIDE SAIIDI CABLE RECHARGE SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
INTERFACE LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
i) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) S)
MMU FSS
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SHORT SCREENS: ORBITER A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/3 3/3 P ] C [ P ]
AIRLOCK
DUE
TO
CONTAMINATION,
FRAYED
CONNECTOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW AIRLOCK RPC AUTOMATICALLY
FROM
ORBITER OPENING.
WHICH
WILL
LIKELY
RESULT
IN
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-46

DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD HIGHEST MMU 4004 TRUNNION FAILS TO DUFFY, PIN ATTACHMENT DEVICE PROVIDE ATTACHMENT SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MODE: ANALYST:
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
MMU FSS
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE, MISALIGNMENT (BENT) SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R 3/2R 3/3 [ P ] C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO ATTACH IMPACT IF REMAINING
MISSION DEVICE
SPECIFIC AUXILI2%RY ALSO FAILS.
HARDWARE.
MISSION
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-47

DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD HIGHEST MMU 4005 BATTERY FAILS DUFFY, TRANSFER OPEN HUYNH, SAIIDI BAG CRITICALITY FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MODE: ANALYST:
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: MMU l) STRUCTURE AND 2)
MECHANISM
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) s)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA /NA [ F ] C [ P ]
EQUIPMENT
MATERIAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: POSSIBLE LOSS ENTIRE BATTERY.
OF
BATTERY
IF
OPENING
SUFFICIENT
ENOUGH
TO
LOSE
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-48
MMU 4006 BATTERY FAILS DUFFY, TETHER RETAIN STRAP BATTERY SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
TO
HUYNH,
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: MMU i) STRUCTURE AND 2) 3) 4) S) 6) V) S) 9)
MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES : MATERIAL FAILURE, BRACKET FRACTURES, SNAP SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA /NA P ] C [ P ]
FRACTURES/RELEASES EFFECTS/RATIONALE: BATTERY LOST TO FUNCTIONAL.
SPACE.
MISSION
IMPACT
IF
OTHER
TETHER
ALSO
NON-
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-49
MMU 4007 CONTINGENCY MODE: FAILS DUFFY, : TO TOOL RELEASE SAIIDI FLEX HOSE FROM SUBSYS
QD LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
ANALYST:
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY
1)
2 )
MMU
FSS
3) 4) s) 6) 7) 8) s)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ 2 ] B [ HDW/FUNC 2/2 /NA /NA P ]
c[p]
EQUIPMENT
BINDING,
MATERIAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO REMOVE/SEPARATE FLEX FSS AND UNAVAILABLE FOR MISSION.
HOSE
FROM
QD.
MMU
RETAINED
IN
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-50
MMU 4008 CONTINGENCY FAILS TO DUFFY, TOOL RELEASE
MODE: ANALYST:
ARMANGLE
MECHANISM SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
MMU
FSS
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA /NA [ P ] C [ P ]
EQUIPMENT
BINDING,
MATERIAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO RELEASE TOOL HAS ALSO FAILED.
ARM
WOULD
RESULT
IN
MISSION
IMPACT
IF
POWER
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-51
MMU 4009 5/16" FAILS DUFFY, THIN WALL SOCKET TO INTERFACE HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) S) 9)
MMU FSS
CRITI FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ 2 ]
CALITIES HDW/FUNC 3/2R /NA 3/2R B [ P ] C [ P ]
EQUIPMENT
MATERIAL
FAILURE,
SOCKET
STRIPPED
OR
BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO EMPLOY SOCKET ON LAUNCH BOLTS OR BOLTS. IF CONTINGENCY TOOL ALSO FAILED MISSION FROM INABILITY TO RELEASE MMU.
ARM
CONTINGENCY IMPACT RESULTS
REFERENCES
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-52
INDEPENDENTORBITER
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC 3/2R
MMU 4010 5/16" FAILS DUFFY, THIN WALL SOCKET TO INTERFACE HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
MMU
FSS
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS : OPS : POST-OPS : REDUNDANCY LOCATION : PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ 2 ] B HDW/FUNC 3/2R / 3/2R [ P ] C [ P ]
EQUIPMENT
MATERIAL
FAILURE,
SOCKET
STRIPPED
OR
BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO EMPLOY SOCKET ON LAUNCH BOLTS OR BOLTS. IF CONTINGENCY TOOL ALSO FAILED MISSION FROM INABILITY TO RELEASE MMU.
ARM
CONTINGENCY IMPACT RESULTS
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-53
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC
MMU 4011 SUBWAY STRAPS SEPARATES FROM DUFFY, HUYNH,
3/3
MODE: ANALYST:
DONNING SAIIDI
STATION SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
MMU
FSS
3) 4) 5) 6) v) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE SCREENS : A [ ] B [ HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA 3/3 ] C [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: NO EFFECTS DUE PROCESSES.
TO
STRAPS
BEING
NON-CRITICAL
IN
DONNING
OR
DOFFING
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-54
MMU 4012 THRUSTER DOES NOT DUFFY, CUE LIGHT OPERATE SAIIDI EXTENDER
MODE: ANALYST:
HUYNH,
SUBSYS
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: MMU 1) STRUCTURE AND 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) V) 8) 9)
MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS:
HDW/FUNC 3/3 3/3
POST-OPS:
REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [
3/3
] C [ ]
ANCILLARY
EQUIPMENT
FRACTURED,
MATERIAL
FAILURE,
SEPARATED
FROM
MMU
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: CREW INCONVENIENCE,
OTHERWISE
NO
MAJOR
IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-55
MMU 4013 CAMERA FAILS DUFFY, : MECHANISM BRACKET TO INTERFACE HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS
MODE: ANALYST:
LEAD:
M.J.
SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY MMU 1) STRUCTURE AND 2) 3) 4) S) 6) 7) B) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SCREENS: ANCILLARY A [ ] HDW/FUNC 3/3 /NA /NA
B[
C[
EQUIPMENT
MATERIAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: INABILITY TO ATTACH CRITICAL OPERATION. COMPONENT
CAMERA. FOR MISSION
THE
CAMERA SUCCESS,
IS LIFE
NOT
CONSIDERED OR
A VEHICLE
SUPPORT,
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-56
ORBITER DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: FAILURE LEAD SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST MMU 4014 SUNSHIELD LOSS OF DUFFY, CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC /NA
MODE: ANALYST:
THERMAL
PROTECTION SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
HUYNH,
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: MMU 1) STRUCTURES AND 2) 3)
MECHANISM
4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: MATERIAL FAILURE SCREENS: A [ ] HDW/FUNC /NA /NA /NA
B[
C[
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE COMPONENT IS SKIN AND THEREFORE
CONSIDERED IN THE SAME FASHION NOT CONSIDERED FOR ANALYSIS.
AS
THE
ORBITER
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-57
ORBITER ASSESSMENT ANALYSIS WORKSHEET HIGHEST CRITICALITY FLIGHT: HDW/FUNC /NA
MMU 4015 HEATERS FAILS DUFFY,
MODE: ANALYST:
ON HUYNH, SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI
BREAKDOWN
HIERARCHY: SYSTEM
1)
2 )
MMU
ELECTRICAL
3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES FLIGHT PHASE PRE-OPS: OPS: POST-OPS: REDUNDANCY LOCATION: PART NUMBER: CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT SCREENS : A [ ] B [ HDW/FUNC /NA /NA /NA ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE CAUSE FOR
FAILURE
IS
NOT
CREDIBLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT
DATE
02/18/88
E-58
APPENDIX F
NABA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CR088 REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS between the NASA FMEA included in Appendix Number, IOA Assessment screen data, and IOA and E.
This section corresponding The Appendix Number, NASA recommendations.
provides a cross reference IOA analysis worksheet(s) F identifies: NASA FMEA criticality and redundancy
Appendix Code 1
Legend
Definition IOA recommends described in IOA recommends changing effects deleting the second field. the IOA failure mode
the
failure
mode.
F-I
01: IK)OR
pAGE IS QUALITY .........
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MCDONNELL 16055
DOUGLAS
ASTRONAUTICS SERVICES HOUSTON,
COMPANYTEXAS 77062
ENGINEERING SPACE CENTER BLVD,

1990001658

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INDEPENDENT

ASSESSMENT OFTHE MAN NED MANEUVERING UNIT

INDEPENDENT ASSESMENT OF THE

ASSESSMENT MANEUVERING UNIT

to NASA under NAS 9-17650

BY: MMU Analyst Independent Assessment

" _-_'M.J. - l_ai_idf Lead Analyst Independent Assessment Orbiter

A._. Mar/no/ Section/Manager-FMEA/CIL Independent Orbiter

_/_7__/,"Technical <-7 j' _ Independent / Assessment

SUBSYSTEM 3.1 3.2 3.3

Design and Interfaces Hierarchy RESULTS

APPENDIX APPENDIX B.I B.2 B.3 APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX

ASSESSMENT CRITICAL ANALYSIS NASA FMEA

Table Table Table

IOA IOA IOA

SUMMARY OF CRITICALITIES SUMMARY IOA OF

Orbiter Assessment Manned Maneuvering

EXECUTXVE McDonnell 1986 Failure to

SUMMARY Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in

The June the

The IOA effort first completed Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)

an analysis (Reference 6) hardware, generating draft

IOA product "worksheets"

for the MMU analysis that resulted in

of 204 failure critical items

The scope encompasses identified Contractor hardware, operational

issues Project Manager

SYSTEMDESCRIPTION Design and Function self-contained,

The MMU, reference Figure 2, is a modular, propulsive backpack designed to attach to

hardware can four primary and stowage,

manner to perform system maintenance

P_opulsion are each rotational

- Encompasses storage and an overview

control comprises and the Control

three main Electronics

that converts translational isolation

Alternate Control Hode Switch

Redundant and Hoses Vent Fill from Operates

Provision Capability: Orbiter GN 2

Recharge Tanks Separation Nuts Capability Camera

Locatlon/Design - Clearance Provided Tests at Fit-Check

for Orbiter TV Based on WETF JSC Tool and Slotted

Mounting Holes Compat ib ill ty - Design for Horizontal Designed Starboard

Both Vertical and Orbiter Installation Port and

for Both Mounting

Tether Straps Lever

Retainer Hand Rails

the thruster to respond to and rotational

for the mode

visible indication operation. batteries

Figure and side

Interfaces occur Space Transportation specific areas.

when in 6. The depicted

orbit. The MMU to FSS in Figures 7

Figures between enclosed

,aC ZZ .< 0 ,m I b-. i n zLL_

, _-,-I 01,_ ] Z31 -,

The MMU PREP clear and it criticalities.

Assessment IOA 36 87 35 46 204

Issues Issues 19 5O 27 25 121

Component Propulsion Electrical/ Power Structures Mechanism FSS TOTAL

NASA 32 78 and 29 40 179

II presents a summary of the CIL assessment for each component.