350 BC METAPHYSICS by Aristotle translated by W. D. Ross Book I 1 ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of t is is t e deli!

t we take in our senses" for e#en a$art from t eir usefulness t ey are lo#ed for t emsel#es" and abo#e all ot ers t e sense of si! t. %or not only wit a #iew to action& but e#en w en we are not !oin! to do anyt in!& we $refer seein! 'one mi! t say( to e#eryt in! else. ) e reason is t at t is& most of all t e senses& makes us know and brin!s to li! t many differences between t in!s. By nature animals are born wit t e faculty of sensation& and from sensation memory is $roduced in some of t em& t ou! not in ot ers. And t erefore t e former are more intelli!ent and a$t at learnin! t an t ose w ic cannot remember" t ose w ic are inca$able of earin! sounds are intelli!ent t ou! t ey cannot be tau! t& e.!. t e bee& and any ot er race of animals t at may be like it" and t ose w ic besides memory a#e t is sense of earin! can be tau! t. ) e animals ot er t an man li#e by a$$earances and memories& and a#e but little of connected e*$erience" but t e uman race li#es also by art and reasonin!s. +ow from memory e*$erience is $roduced in men" for t e se#eral memories of t e same t in! $roduce finally t e ca$acity for a sin!le e*$erience. And e*$erience seems $retty muc like science and art& but really science and art come to men t rou! e*$erience" for ,e*$erience made art,& as -olus says& ,but ine*$erience luck., +ow art arises w en from many notions !ained by e*$erience one uni#ersal .ud!ement about a class of ob.ects is $roduced. %or to a#e a .ud!ement t at w en Callias was ill of t is disease t is did im !ood& and similarly in t e case of /ocrates and in many indi#idual cases& is a matter of e*$erience" but to .ud!e t at it as done !ood to all $ersons of a certain constitution& marked off in one class& w en t ey were ill of t is disease& e.!. to $ le!matic or bilious $eo$le w en burnin! wit fe#ers0t is is a matter of art. Wit a #iew to action e*$erience seems in no res$ect inferior to art& and men of e*$erience succeed e#en better t an t ose w o a#e t eory wit out e*$erience. ') e reason is t at e*$erience is knowled!e of indi#iduals& art of uni#ersals& and actions and $roductions are all concerned wit t e indi#idual" for t e $ ysician does not cure man& e*ce$t in an incidental way& but Callias or /ocrates or some ot er

called by some suc indi#idual name& w o a$$ens to be a man. 1f& t en& a man as t e t eory wit out t e e*$erience& and reco!ni2es t e uni#ersal but does not know t e indi#idual included in t is& e will often fail to cure" for it is t e indi#idual t at is to be cured.( But yet we t ink t at knowled!e and understandin! belon! to art rat er t an to e*$erience& and we su$$ose artists to be wiser t an men of e*$erience 'w ic im$lies t at Wisdom de$ends in all cases rat er on knowled!e(" and t is because t e former know t e cause& but t e latter do not. %or men of e*$erience know t at t e t in! is so& but do not know w y& w ile t e ot ers know t e ,w y, and t e cause. 3ence we t ink also t at t e masterworkers in eac craft are more onourable and know in a truer sense and are wiser t an t e manual workers& because t ey know t e causes of t e t in!s t at are done 'we t ink t e manual workers are like certain lifeless t in!s w ic act indeed& but act wit out knowin! w at t ey do& as fire burns&0but w ile t e lifeless t in!s $erform eac of t eir functions by a natural tendency& t e labourers $erform t em t rou! abit(" t us we #iew t em as bein! wiser not in #irtue of bein! able to act& but of a#in! t e t eory for t emsel#es and knowin! t e causes. And in !eneral it is a si!n of t e man w o knows and of t e man w o does not know& t at t e former can teac & and t erefore we t ink art more truly knowled!e t an e*$erience is" for artists can teac & and men of mere e*$erience cannot. A!ain& we do not re!ard any of t e senses as Wisdom" yet surely t ese !i#e t e most aut oritati#e knowled!e of $articulars. But t ey do not tell us t e ,w y, of anyt in!0e.!. w y fire is ot" t ey only say t at it is ot. At first e w o in#ented any art w ate#er t at went beyond t e common $erce$tions of man was naturally admired by men& not only because t ere was somet in! useful in t e in#entions& but because e was t ou! t wise and su$erior to t e rest. But as more arts were in#ented& and some were directed to t e necessities of life& ot ers to recreation& t e in#entors of t e latter were naturally always re!arded as wiser t an t e in#entors of t e former& because t eir branc es of knowled!e did not aim at utility. 3ence w en all suc in#entions were already establis ed& t e sciences w ic do not aim at !i#in! $leasure or at t e necessities of life were disco#ered& and first in t e $laces w ere men first be!an to a#e leisure. ) is is w y t e mat ematical arts were founded in 4!y$t" for t ere t e $riestly caste was allowed to be at leisure. We a#e said in t e 4t ics w at t e difference is between art and science and t e ot er kindred faculties" but t e $oint of our $resent discussion is t is& t at all men su$$ose w at is called Wisdom to deal wit t e first causes and t e $rinci$les of t in!s" so t at& as as been said before& t e man of e*$erience is t ou! t to be wiser t an t e $ossessors of any sense0$erce$tion w ate#er& t e artist

wiser t an t e men of e*$erience& t e masterworker t an t e mec anic& and t e t eoretical kinds of knowled!e to be more of t e nature of Wisdom t an t e $roducti#e. Clearly t en Wisdom is knowled!e about certain $rinci$les and causes. 5 /ince we are seekin! t is knowled!e& we must in6uire of w at kind are t e causes and t e $rinci$les& t e knowled!e of w ic is Wisdom. 1f one were to take t e notions we a#e about t e wise man& t is mi! t $er a$s make t e answer more e#ident. We su$$ose first& t en& t at t e wise man knows all t in!s& as far as $ossible& alt ou! e as not knowled!e of eac of t em in detail" secondly& t at e w o can learn t in!s t at are difficult& and not easy for man to know& is wise 'sense0$erce$tion is common to all& and t erefore easy and no mark of Wisdom(" a!ain& t at e w o is more e*act and more ca$able of teac in! t e causes is wiser& in e#ery branc of knowled!e" and t at of t e sciences& also& t at w ic is desirable on its own account and for t e sake of knowin! it is more of t e nature of Wisdom t an t at w ic is desirable on account of its results& and t e su$erior science is more of t e nature of Wisdom t an t e ancillary" for t e wise man must not be ordered but must order& and e must not obey anot er& but t e less wise must obey im. /uc and so many are t e notions& t en& w ic we a#e about Wisdom and t e wise. +ow of t ese c aracteristics t at of knowin! all t in!s must belon! to im w o as in t e i! est de!ree uni#ersal knowled!e" for e knows in a sense all t e instances t at fall under t e uni#ersal. And t ese t in!s& t e most uni#ersal& are on t e w ole t e ardest for men to know" for t ey are fart est from t e senses. And t e most e*act of t e sciences are t ose w ic deal most wit first $rinci$les" for t ose w ic in#ol#e fewer $rinci$les are more e*act t an t ose w ic in#ol#e additional $rinci$les& e.!. arit metic t an !eometry. But t e science w ic in#esti!ates causes is also instructi#e& in a i! er de!ree& for t e $eo$le w o instruct us are t ose w o tell t e causes of eac t in!. And understandin! and knowled!e $ursued for t eir own sake are found most in t e knowled!e of t at w ic is most knowable 'for e w o c ooses to know for t e sake of knowin! will c oose most readily t at w ic is most truly knowled!e& and suc is t e knowled!e of t at w ic is most knowable(" and t e first $rinci$les and t e causes are most knowable" for by reason of t ese& and from t ese& all ot er t in!s come to be known& and not t ese by means of t e t in!s subordinate to t em. And t e science w ic knows to w at end eac t in! must be done is t e most aut oritati#e of t e sciences& and more aut oritati#e t an any ancillary science" and t is end is t e !ood of t at t in!& and in !eneral t e su$reme !ood in t e w ole of nature. 7ud!ed by

all t e tests we a#e mentioned& t en& t e name in 6uestion falls to t e same science" t is must be a science t at in#esti!ates t e first $rinci$les and causes" for t e !ood& i.e. t e end& is one of t e causes. ) at it is not a science of $roduction is clear e#en from t e istory of t e earliest $ iloso$ ers. %or it is owin! to t eir wonder t at men bot now be!in and at first be!an to $ iloso$ i2e" t ey wondered ori!inally at t e ob#ious difficulties& t en ad#anced little by little and stated difficulties about t e !reater matters& e.!. about t e $ enomena of t e moon and t ose of t e sun and of t e stars& and about t e !enesis of t e uni#erse. And a man w o is $u22led and wonders t inks imself i!norant 'w ence e#en t e lo#er of myt is in a sense a lo#er of Wisdom& for t e myt is com$osed of wonders(" t erefore since t ey $ iloso$ i2ed order to esca$e from i!norance& e#idently t ey were $ursuin! science in order to know& and not for any utilitarian end. And t is is confirmed by t e facts" for it was w en almost all t e necessities of life and t e t in!s t at make for comfort and recreation ad been secured& t at suc knowled!e be!an to be sou! t. 4#idently t en we do not seek it for t e sake of any ot er ad#anta!e" but as t e man is free& we say& w o e*ists for is own sake and not for anot er,s& so we $ursue t is as t e only free science& for it alone e*ists for its own sake. 3ence also t e $ossession of it mi! t be .ustly re!arded as beyond uman $ower" for in many ways uman nature is in bonda!e& so t at accordin! to /imonides ,8od alone can a#e t is $ri#ile!e,& and it is unfittin! t at man s ould not be content to seek t e knowled!e t at is suited to im. 1f& t en& t ere is somet in! in w at t e $oets say& and .ealousy is natural to t e di#ine $ower& it would $robably occur in t is case abo#e all& and all w o e*celled in t is knowled!e would be unfortunate. But t e di#ine $ower cannot be .ealous 'nay& accordin! to t e $ro#erb& ,bards tell a lie,(& nor s ould any ot er science be t ou! t more onourable t an one of t is sort. %or t e most di#ine science is also most onourable" and t is science alone must be& in two ways& most di#ine. %or t e science w ic it would be most meet for 8od to a#e is a di#ine science& and so is any science t at deals wit di#ine ob.ects" and t is science alone as bot t ese 6ualities" for '1( 8od is t ou! t to be amon! t e causes of all t in!s and to be a first $rinci$le& and '5( suc a science eit er 8od alone can a#e& or 8od abo#e all ot ers. All t e sciences& indeed& are more necessary t an t is& but none is better. 9et t e ac6uisition of it must in a sense end in somet in! w ic is t e o$$osite of our ori!inal in6uiries. %or all men be!in& as we said& by wonderin! t at t in!s are as t ey are& as t ey do about self0mo#in! marionettes& or about t e solstices or t e incommensurability of t e dia!onal of a s6uare wit t e side" for it seems wonderful to all w o a#e not yet seen t e reason& t at t ere is

a t in! w ic cannot be measured e#en by t e smallest unit. But we must end in t e contrary and& accordin! to t e $ro#erb& t e better state& as is t e case in t ese instances too w en men learn t e cause" for t ere is not in! w ic would sur$rise a !eometer so muc as if t e dia!onal turned out to be commensurable. We a#e stated& t en& w at is t e nature of t e science we are searc in! for& and w at is t e mark w ic our searc and our w ole in#esti!ation must reac . 3 4#idently we a#e to ac6uire knowled!e of t e ori!inal causes 'for we say we know eac t in! only w en we t ink we reco!ni2e its first cause(& and causes are s$oken of in four senses. 1n one of t ese we mean t e substance& i.e. t e essence 'for t e ,w y, is reducible finally to t e definition& and t e ultimate ,w y, is a cause and $rinci$le(" in anot er t e matter or substratum& in a t ird t e source of t e c an!e& and in a fourt t e cause o$$osed to t is& t e $ur$ose and t e !ood 'for t is is t e end of all !eneration and c an!e(. We a#e studied t ese causes sufficiently in our work on nature& but yet let us call to our aid t ose w o a#e attacked t e in#esti!ation of bein! and $ iloso$ i2ed about reality before us. %or ob#iously t ey too s$eak of certain $rinci$les and causes" to !o o#er t eir #iews& t en& will be of $rofit to t e $resent in6uiry& for we s all eit er find anot er kind of cause& or be more con#inced of t e correctness of t ose w ic we now maintain. :f t e first $ iloso$ ers& t en& most t ou! t t e $rinci$les w ic were of t e nature of matter were t e only $rinci$les of all t in!s. ) at of w ic all t in!s t at are consist& t e first from w ic t ey come to be& t e last into w ic t ey are resol#ed 't e substance remainin!& but c an!in! in its modifications(& t is t ey say is t e element and t is t e $rinci$le of t in!s& and t erefore t ey t ink not in! is eit er !enerated or destroyed& since t is sort of entity is always conser#ed& as we say /ocrates neit er comes to be absolutely w en e comes to be beautiful or musical& nor ceases to be w en loses t ese c aracteristics& because t e substratum& /ocrates imself remains. .ust so t ey say not in! else comes to be or ceases to be" for t ere must be some entity0eit er one or more t an one0from w ic all ot er t in!s come to be& it bein! conser#ed. 9et t ey do not all a!ree as to t e number and t e nature of t ese $rinci$les. ) ales& t e founder of t is ty$e of $ iloso$ y& says t e $rinci$le is water 'for w ic reason e declared t at t e eart rests on water(& !ettin! t e notion $er a$s from seein! t at t e nutriment of all t in!s is moist& and t at eat itself is !enerated from t e moist and ke$t ali#e by it 'and t at from w ic t ey come to be is a $rinci$le of all t in!s(. 3e !ot is notion from t is fact&

and from t e fact t at t e seeds of all t in!s a#e a moist nature& and t at water is t e ori!in of t e nature of moist t in!s. /ome t ink t at e#en t e ancients w o li#ed lon! before t e $resent !eneration& and first framed accounts of t e !ods& ad a similar #iew of nature" for t ey made :cean and )et ys t e $arents of creation& and described t e oat of t e !ods as bein! by water& to w ic t ey !i#e t e name of /ty*" for w at is oldest is most onourable& and t e most onourable t in! is t at by w ic one swears. 1t may $er a$s be uncertain w et er t is o$inion about nature is $rimiti#e and ancient& but ) ales at any rate is said to a#e declared imself t us about t e first cause. 3i$$o no one would t ink fit to include amon! t ese t inkers& because of t e $altriness of is t ou! t. Ana*imenes and Dio!enes make air $rior to water& and t e most $rimary of t e sim$le bodies& w ile 3i$$asus of ;eta$ontium and 3eraclitus of 4$ esus say t is of fire& and 4m$edocles says it of t e four elements 'addin! a fourt 0eart 0to t ose w ic a#e been named(" for t ese& e says& always remain and do not come to be& e*ce$t t at t ey come to be more or fewer& bein! a!!re!ated into one and se!re!ated out of one. Ana*a!oras of Cla2omenae& w o& t ou! older t an 4m$edocles& was later in is $ iloso$ ical acti#ity& says t e $rinci$les are infinite in number" for e says almost all t e t in!s t at are made of $arts like t emsel#es& in t e manner of water or fire& are !enerated and destroyed in t is way& only by a!!re!ation and se!re!ation& and are not in any ot er sense !enerated or destroyed& but remain eternally. %rom t ese facts one mi! t t ink t at t e only cause is t e so0called material cause" but as men t us ad#anced& t e #ery facts o$ened t e way for t em and .oined in forcin! t em to in#esti!ate t e sub.ect. 3owe#er true it may be t at all !eneration and destruction $roceed from some one or 'for t at matter( from more elements& w y does t is a$$en and w at is t e cause< %or at least t e substratum itself does not make itself c an!e" e.!. neit er t e wood nor t e bron2e causes t e c an!e of eit er of t em& nor does t e wood manufacture a bed and t e bron2e a statue& but somet in! else is t e cause of t e c an!e. And to seek t is is to seek t e second cause& as we s ould say&0t at from w ic comes t e be!innin! of t e mo#ement. +ow t ose w o at t e #ery be!innin! set t emsel#es to t is kind of in6uiry& and said t e substratum was one& were not at all dissatisfied wit t emsel#es" but some at least of t ose w o maintain it to be one0as t ou! defeated by t is searc for t e second cause0say t e one and nature as a w ole is unc an!eable not only in res$ect of !eneration and destruction 'for t is is a $rimiti#e belief& and all a!reed in it(& but also of all ot er c an!e" and t is #iew is $eculiar to t em. :f t ose w o said t e uni#erse was one& t en none

succeeded in disco#erin! a cause of t is sort& e*ce$t $er a$s -armenides& and e only inasmuc as e su$$oses t at t ere is not only one but also in some sense two causes. But for t ose w o make more elements it is more $ossible to state t e second cause& e.!. for t ose w o make ot and cold& or fire and eart & t e elements" for t ey treat fire as a#in! a nature w ic fits it to mo#e t in!s& and water and eart and suc t in!s t ey treat in t e contrary way. W en t ese men and t e $rinci$les of t is kind ad ad t eir day& as t e latter were found inade6uate to !enerate t e nature of t in!s men were a!ain forced by t e trut itself& as we said& to in6uire into t e ne*t kind of cause. %or it is not likely eit er t at fire or eart or any suc element s ould be t e reason w y t in!s manifest !oodness and& beauty bot in t eir bein! and in t eir comin! to be& or t at t ose t inkers s ould a#e su$$osed it was" nor a!ain could it be ri! t to entrust so !reat a matter to s$ontaneity and c ance. W en one man said& t en& t at reason was $resent0as in animals& so t rou! out nature0as t e cause of order and of all arran!ement& e seemed like a sober man in contrast wit t e random talk of is $redecessors. We know t at Ana*a!oras certainly ado$ted t ese #iews& but 3ermotimus of Cla2omenae is credited wit e*$ressin! t em earlier. ) ose w o t ou! t t us stated t at t ere is a $rinci$le of t in!s w ic is at t e same time t e cause of beauty& and t at sort of cause from w ic t in!s ac6uire mo#ement. = :ne mi! t sus$ect t at 3esiod was t e first to look for suc a t in!0or some one else w o $ut lo#e or desire amon! e*istin! t in!s as a $rinci$le& as -armenides& too& does" for e& in constructin! t e !enesis of t e uni#erse& says>0 Lo#e first of all t e 8ods s e $lanned. And 3esiod says>0 %irst of all t in!s was c aos made& and t en Broad0breasted eart ... And lo#e& ,mid all t e !ods $re0eminent& w ic im$lies t at amon! e*istin! t in!s t ere must be from t e first a cause w ic will mo#e t in!s and brin! t em to!et er. 3ow t ese t inkers s ould be arran!ed wit re!ard to $riority of disco#ery let us be allowed to decide later" but since t e contraries of t e #arious forms of !ood were also $ercei#ed to be $resent in nature0not only order and t e beautiful& but also disorder and t e u!ly& and bad t in!s in !reater number t an !ood& and i!noble t in!s

t an beautiful0t erefore anot er t inker introduced friends i$ and strife& eac of t e two t e cause of one of t ese two sets of 6ualities. %or if we were to follow out t e #iew of 4m$edocles& and inter$ret it accordin! to its meanin! and not to its lis$in! e*$ression& we s ould find t at friends i$ is t e cause of !ood t in!s& and strife of bad. ) erefore& if we said t at 4m$edocles in a sense bot mentions& and is t e first to mention& t e bad and t e !ood as $rinci$les& we s ould $er a$s be ri! t& since t e cause of all !oods is t e !ood itself. ) ese t inkers& as we say& e#idently !ras$ed& and to t is e*tent& two of t e causes w ic we distin!uis ed in our work on nature0t e matter and t e source of t e mo#ement0#a!uely& owe#er& and wit no clearness& but as untrained men be a#e in fi! ts" for t ey !o round t eir o$$onents and often strike fine blows& but t ey do not fi! t on scientific $rinci$les& and so too t ese t inkers do not seem to know w at t ey say" for it is e#ident t at& as a rule& t ey make no use of t eir causes e*ce$t to a small e*tent. %or Ana*a!oras uses reason as a deus e* mac ina for t e makin! of t e world& and w en e is at a loss to tell from w at cause somet in! necessarily is& t en e dra!s reason in& but in all ot er cases ascribes e#ents to anyt in! rat er t an to reason. And 4m$edocles& t ou! e uses t e causes to a !reater e*tent t an t is& neit er does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in t eir use. At least& in many cases e makes lo#e se!re!ate t in!s& and strife a!!re!ate t em. %or w ene#er t e uni#erse is dissol#ed into its elements by strife& fire is a!!re!ated into one& and so is eac of t e ot er elements" but w ene#er a!ain under t e influence of lo#e t ey come to!et er into one& t e $arts must a!ain be se!re!ated out of eac element. 4m$edocles& t en& in contrast wit is $recessors& was t e first to introduce t e di#idin! of t is cause& not $ositin! one source of mo#ement& but different and contrary sources. A!ain& e was t e first to s$eak of four material elements" yet e does not use four& but treats t em as two only" e treats fire by itself& and its o$$osite0eart & air& and water0as one kind of t in!. We may learn t is by study of is #erses. ) is $ iloso$ er t en& as we say& as s$oken of t e $rinci$les in t is way& and made t em of t is number. Leuci$$us and is associate Democritus say t at t e full and t e em$ty are t e elements& callin! t e one bein! and t e ot er non0bein!0t e full and solid bein! bein!& t e em$ty non0bein! 'w ence t ey say bein! no more is t an non0bein!& because t e solid no more is t an t e em$ty(" and t ey make t ese t e material causes of t in!s. And as t ose w o make t e underlyin! substance one !enerate all ot er t in!s by its modifications& su$$osin! t e rare and t e dense to be t e sources of t e modifications& in t e same way t ese $ iloso$ ers say t e differences in t e elements are t e causes of all ot er 6ualities.

) ese differences& t ey say& are t ree0s a$e and order and $osition. %or t ey say t e real is differentiated only by ,r yt m and ,inter0contact, and ,turnin!," and of t ese r yt m is s a$e& inter0contact is order& and turnin! is $osition" for A differs from + in s a$e& A+ from +A in order& ; from W in $osition. ) e 6uestion of mo#ement0w ence or ow it is to belon! to t in!s0t ese t inkers& like t e ot ers& la2ily ne!lected. Re!ardin! t e two causes& t en& as we say& t e in6uiry seems to a#e been $us ed t us far by t e early $ iloso$ ers. 5 Contem$oraneously wit t ese $ iloso$ ers and before t em& t e so0called -yt a!oreans& w o were t e first to take u$ mat ematics& not only ad#anced t is study& but also a#in! been brou! t u$ in it t ey t ou! t its $rinci$les were t e $rinci$les of all t in!s. /ince of t ese $rinci$les numbers are by nature t e first& and in numbers t ey seemed to see many resemblances to t e t in!s t at e*ist and come into bein!0more t an in fire and eart and water 'suc and suc a modification of numbers bein! .ustice& anot er bein! soul and reason& anot er bein! o$$ortunity0and similarly almost all ot er t in!s bein! numerically e*$ressible(" since& a!ain& t ey saw t at t e modifications and t e ratios of t e musical scales were e*$ressible in numbers"0since& t en& all ot er t in!s seemed in t eir w ole nature to be modelled on numbers& and numbers seemed to be t e first t in!s in t e w ole of nature& t ey su$$osed t e elements of numbers to be t e elements of all t in!s& and t e w ole ea#en to be a musical scale and a number. And all t e $ro$erties of numbers and scales w ic t ey could s ow to a!ree wit t e attributes and $arts and t e w ole arran!ement of t e ea#ens& t ey collected and fitted into t eir sc eme" and if t ere was a !a$ anyw ere& t ey readily made additions so as to make t eir w ole t eory co erent. 4.!. as t e number 10 is t ou! t to be $erfect and to com$rise t e w ole nature of numbers& t ey say t at t e bodies w ic mo#e t rou! t e ea#ens are ten& but as t e #isible bodies are only nine& to meet t is t ey in#ent a tent 00t e ,counter0eart ,. We a#e discussed t ese matters more e*actly elsew ere. But t e ob.ect of our re#iew is t at we may learn from t ese $ iloso$ ers also w at t ey su$$ose to be t e $rinci$les and ow t ese fall under t e causes we a#e named. 4#idently& t en& t ese t inkers also consider t at number is t e $rinci$le bot as matter for t in!s and as formin! bot t eir modifications and t eir $ermanent states& and old t at t e elements of number are t e e#en and t e odd& and t at of t ese t e latter is limited& and t e former unlimited" and t at t e :ne $roceeds from bot of t ese 'for it is bot e#en and odd(& and number from t e :ne" and t at t e w ole ea#en& as as

been said& is numbers. :t er members of t is same sc ool say t ere are ten $rinci$les& w ic t ey arran!e in two columns of co!nates0limit and unlimited& odd and e#en& one and $lurality& ri! t and left& male and female& restin! and mo#in!& strai! t and cur#ed& li! t and darkness& !ood and bad& s6uare and oblon!. 1n t is way Alcmaeon of Croton seems also to a#e concei#ed t e matter& and eit er e !ot t is #iew from t em or t ey !ot it from im" for e e*$ressed imself similarly to t em. %or e says most uman affairs !o in $airs& meanin! not definite contrarieties suc as t e -yt a!oreans s$eak of& but any c ance contrarieties& e.!. w ite and black& sweet and bitter& !ood and bad& !reat and small. 3e t rew out indefinite su!!estions about t e ot er contrarieties& but t e -yt a!oreans declared bot ow many and w ic t eir contraricties are. %rom bot t ese sc ools& t en& we can learn t is muc & t at t e contraries are t e $rinci$les of t in!s" and ow many t ese $rinci$les are and w ic t ey are& we can learn from one of t e two sc ools. But ow t ese $rinci$les can be brou! t to!et er under t e causes we a#e named as not been clearly and articulately stated by t em" t ey seem& owe#er& to ran!e t e elements under t e ead of matter" for out of t ese as immanent $arts t ey say substance is com$osed and moulded. %rom t ese facts we may sufficiently $ercei#e t e meanin! of t e ancients w o said t e elements of nature were more t an one" but t ere are some w o s$oke of t e uni#erse as if it were one entity& t ou! t ey were not all alike eit er in t e e*cellence of t eir statement or in its conformity to t e facts of nature. ) e discussion of t em is in no way a$$ro$riate to our $resent in#esti!ation of causes& for. t ey do not& like some of t e natural $ iloso$ ers& assume bein! to be one and yet !enerate it out of t e one as out of matter& but t ey s$eak in anot er way" t ose ot ers add c an!e& since t ey !enerate t e uni#erse& but t ese t inkers say t e uni#erse is unc an!eable. 9et t is muc is !ermane to t e $resent in6uiry> -armenides seems to fasten on t at w ic is one in definition& ;elissus on t at w ic is one in matter& for w ic reason t e former says t at it is limited& t e latter t at it is unlimited" w ile ?eno$ anes& t e first of t ese $artisans of t e :ne 'for -armenides is said to a#e been is $u$il(& !a#e no clear statement& nor does e seem to a#e !ras$ed t e nature of eit er of t ese causes& but wit reference to t e w ole material uni#erse e says t e :ne is 8od. +ow t ese t inkers& as we said& must be ne!lected for t e $ur$oses of t e $resent in6uiry0two of t em entirely& as bein! a little too nai#e& #i2. ?eno$ anes and ;elissus" but -armenides seems in $laces to s$eak wit more insi! t. %or& claimin! t at& besides t e e*istent& not in! non0e*istent e*ists& e t inks t at of necessity one t in! e*ists& #i2. t e e*istent and not in! else 'on t is we a#e s$oken more clearly in our work on

nature(& but bein! forced to follow t e obser#ed facts& and su$$osin! t e e*istence of t at w ic is one in definition& but more t an one accordin! to our sensations& e now $osits two causes and two $rinci$les& callin! t em ot and cold& i.e. fire and eart " and of t ese e ran!es t e ot wit t e e*istent& and t e ot er wit t e non0e*istent. %rom w at as been said& t en& and from t e wise men w o a#e now sat in council wit us& we a#e !ot t us muc 0on t e one and from t e earliest $ iloso$ ers& w o re!ard t e first $rinci$le as cor$oreal 'for water and fire and suc t in!s are bodies(& and of w om some su$$ose t at t ere is one cor$oreal $rinci$le& ot ers t at t ere are more t an one& but bot $ut t ese under t e ead of matter" and on t e ot er and from some w o $osit bot t is cause and besides t is t e source of mo#ement& w ic we a#e !ot from some as sin!le and from ot ers as twofold. Down to t e 1talian sc ool& t en& and a$art from it& $ iloso$ ers a#e treated t ese sub.ects rat er obscurely& e*ce$t t at& as we said& t ey a#e in fact used two kinds of cause& and one of t ese0t e source of mo#ement0some treat as one and ot ers as two. But t e -yt a!oreans a#e said in t e same way t at t ere are two $rinci$les& but added t is muc & w ic is $eculiar to t em& t at t ey t ou! t t at finitude and infinity were not attributes of certain ot er t in!s& e.!. of fire or eart or anyt in! else of t is kind& but t at infinity itself and unity itself were t e substance of t e t in!s of w ic t ey are $redicated. ) is is w y number was t e substance of all t in!s. :n t is sub.ect& t en& t ey e*$ressed t emsel#es t us" and re!ardin! t e 6uestion of essence t ey be!an to make statements and definitions& but treated t e matter too sim$ly. %or t ey bot defined su$erficially and t ou! t t at t e first sub.ect of w ic a !i#en definition was $redicable was t e substance of t e t in! defined& as if one su$$osed t at ,double, and ,5, were t e same& because 5 is t e first t in! of w ic ,double, is $redicable. But surely to be double and to be 5 are not t e same" if t ey are& one t in! will be many0a conse6uence w ic t ey actually drew. %rom t e earlier $ iloso$ ers& t en& and from t eir successors we can learn t us muc . @ After t e systems we a#e named came t e $ iloso$ y of -lato& w ic in most res$ects followed t ese t inkers& but ad $ecullarities t at distin!uis ed it from t e $ iloso$ y of t e 1talians. %or& a#in! in is yout first become familiar wit Cratylus and wit t e 3eraclitean doctrines 't at all sensible t in!s are e#er in a state of flu* and t ere is no knowled!e about t em(& t ese #iews e eld e#en in later years. /ocrates& owe#er& was busyin!

imself about et ical matters and ne!lectin! t e world of nature as a w ole but seekin! t e uni#ersal in t ese et ical matters& and fi*ed t ou! t for t e first time on definitions" -lato acce$ted is teac in!& but eld t at t e $roblem a$$lied not to sensible t in!s but to entities of anot er kind0for t is reason& t at t e common definition could not be a definition of any sensible t in!& as t ey were always c an!in!. ) in!s of t is ot er sort& t en& e called 1deas& and sensible t in!s& e said& were all named after t ese& and in #irtue of a relation to t ese" for t e many e*isted by $artici$ation in t e 1deas t at a#e t e same name as t ey. :nly t e name ,$artici$ation, was new" for t e -yt a!oreans say t at t in!s e*ist by ,imitation, of numbers& and -lato says t ey e*ist by $artici$ation& c an!in! t e name. But w at t e $artici$ation or t e imitation of t e %orms could be t ey left an o$en 6uestion. %urt er& besides sensible t in!s and %orms e says t ere are t e ob.ects of mat ematics& w ic occu$y an intermediate $osition& differin! from sensible t in!s in bein! eternal and unc an!eable& from %orms in t at t ere are many alike& w ile t e %orm itself is in eac case uni6ue. /ince t e %orms were t e causes of all ot er t in!s& e t ou! t t eir elements were t e elements of all t in!s. As matter& t e !reat and t e small were $rinci$les" as essential reality& t e :ne" for from t e !reat and t e small& by $artici$ation in t e :ne& come t e +umbers. But e a!reed wit t e -yt a!oreans in sayin! t at t e :ne is substance and not a $redicate of somet in! else" and in sayin! t at t e +umbers are t e causes of t e reality of ot er t in!s e a!reed wit t em" but $ositin! a dyad and constructin! t e infinite out of !reat and small& instead of treatin! t e infinite as one& is $eculiar to im" and so is is #iew t at t e +umbers e*ist a$art from sensible t in!s& w ile t ey say t at t e t in!s t emsel#es are +umbers& and do not $lace t e ob.ects of mat ematics between %orms and sensible t in!s. 3is di#er!ence from t e -yt a!oreans in makin! t e :ne and t e +umbers se$arate from t in!s& and is introduction of t e %orms& were due to is in6uiries in t e re!ion of definitions 'for t e earlier t inkers ad no tincture of dialectic(& and is makin! t e ot er entity besides t e :ne a dyad was due to t e belief t at t e numbers& e*ce$t t ose w ic were $rime& could be neatly $roduced out of t e dyad as out of some $lastic material. 9et w at a$$ens is t e contrary" t e t eory is not a reasonable one. %or t ey make many t in!s out of t e matter& and t e form !enerates only once& but w at we obser#e is t at one table is made from one matter& w ile t e man w o a$$lies t e form& t ou! e is one& makes many tables. And t e relation of t e male to t e female is similar" for t e latter is im$re!nated by one co$ulation& but t e male im$re!nates many females" yet t ese are analo!ues of t ose first $rinci$les.

-lato& t en& declared imself t us on t e $oints in 6uestion" it is e#ident from w at as been said t at e as used only two causes& t at of t e essence and t e material cause 'for t e %orms are t e causes of t e essence of all ot er t in!s& and t e :ne is t e cause of t e essence of t e %orms(" and it is e#ident w at t e underlyin! matter is& of w ic t e %orms are $redicated in t e case of sensible t in!s& and t e :ne in t e case of %orms& #i2. t at t is is a dyad& t e !reat and t e small. %urt er& e as assi!ned t e cause of !ood and t at of e#il to t e elements& one to eac of t e two& as we say some of is $redecessors sou! t to do& e.!. 4m$edocles and Ana*a!oras. A :ur re#iew of t ose w o a#e s$oken about first $rinci$les and reality and of t e way in w ic t ey a#e s$oken& as been concise and summary" but yet we a#e learnt t is muc from t em& t at of t ose w o s$eak about ,$rinci$le, and ,cause, no one as mentioned any $rinci$le e*ce$t t ose w ic a#e been distin!uis ed in our work on nature& but all e#idently a#e some inklin! of t em& t ou! only #a!uely. %or some s$eak of t e first $rinci$le as matter& w et er t ey su$$ose one or more first $rinci$les& and w et er t ey su$$ose t is to be a body or to be incor$oreal" e.!. -lato s$oke of t e !reat and t e small& t e 1talians of t e infinite& 4m$edocles of fire& eart & water& and air& Ana*a!oras of t e infinity of t in!s com$osed of similar $arts. ) ese& t en& a#e all ad a notion of t is kind of cause& and so a#e all w o s$eak of air or fire or water& or somet in! denser t an fire and rarer t an air" for some a#e said t e $rime element is of t is kind. ) ese t inkers !ras$ed t is cause only" but certain ot ers a#e mentioned t e source of mo#ement& e.!. t ose w o make friends i$ and strife& or reason& or lo#e& a $rinci$le. ) e essence& i.e. t e substantial reality& no one as e*$ressed distinctly. 1t is inted at c iefly by t ose w o belie#e in t e %orms" for t ey do not su$$ose eit er t at t e %orms are t e matter of sensible t in!s& and t e :ne t e matter of t e %orms& or t at t ey are t e source of mo#ement 'for t ey say t ese are causes rat er of immobility and of bein! at rest(& but t ey furnis t e %orms as t e essence of e#ery ot er t in!& and t e :ne as t e essence of t e %orms. ) at for w ose sake actions and c an!es and mo#ements take $lace& t ey assert to be a cause in a way& but not in t is way& i.e. not in t e way in w ic it is its nature to be a cause. %or t ose w o s$eak of reason or friends i$ class t ese causes as !oods" t ey do not s$eak& owe#er& as if anyt in! t at e*ists eit er e*isted or came into bein! for t e sake of t ese& but as if mo#ements started from t ese. 1n t e same way t ose w o say t e :ne or t e e*istent is t e !ood& say t at it is t e cause of substance& but not t at

substance eit er is or comes to be for t e sake of t is. ) erefore it turns out t at in a sense t ey bot say and do not say t e !ood is a cause" for t ey do not call it a cause 6ua !ood but only incidentally. All t ese t inkers t en& as t ey cannot $itc on anot er cause& seem to testify t at we a#e determined ri! tly bot ow many and of w at sort t e causes are. Besides t is it is $lain t at w en t e causes are bein! looked for& eit er all four must be sou! t t us or t ey must be sou! t in one of t ese four ways. Let us ne*t discuss t e $ossible difficulties wit re!ard to t e way in w ic eac of t ese t inkers as s$oken& and wit re!ard to is situation relati#ely to t e first $rinci$les. B ) ose& t en& w o say t e uni#erse is one and $osit one kind of t in! as matter& and as cor$oreal matter w ic as s$atial ma!nitude& e#idently !o astray in many ways. %or t ey $osit t e elements of bodies only& not of incor$oreal t in!s& t ou! t ere are also incor$oreal t in!s. And in tryin! to state t e causes of !eneration and destruction& and in !i#in! a $ ysical account of all t in!s& t ey do away wit t e cause of mo#ement. %urt er& t ey err in not $ositin! t e substance& i.e. t e essence& as t e cause of anyt in!& and besides t is in li! tly callin! any of t e sim$le bodies e*ce$t eart t e first $rinci$le& wit out in6uirin! ow t ey are $roduced out of one anot ers01 mean fire& water& eart & and air. %or some t in!s are $roduced out of eac ot er by combination& ot ers by se$aration& and t is makes t e !reatest difference to t eir $riority and $osteriority. %or '1( in a way t e $ro$erty of bein! most elementary of all would seem to belon! to t e first t in! from w ic t ey are $roduced by combination& and t is $ro$erty would belon! to t e most fine0!rained and subtle of bodies. %or t is reason t ose w o make fire t e $rinci$le would be most in a!reement wit t is ar!ument. But eac of t e ot er t inkers a!rees t at t e element of cor$oreal t in!s is of t is sort. At least none of t ose w o named one element claimed t at eart was t e element& e#idently because of t e coarseness of its !rain. ':f t e ot er t ree elements eac as found some .ud!e on its side" for some maintain t at fire& ot ers t at water& ot ers t at air is t e element. 9et w y& after all& do t ey not name eart also& as most men do< %or $eo$le say all t in!s are eart 3esiod says eart was $roduced first of cor$oreal t in!s" so $rimiti#e and $o$ular as t e o$inion been.( Accordin! to t is ar!ument& t en& no one would be ri! t w o eit er says t e first $rinci$le is any of t e elements ot er t an fire& or su$$oses it to be denser t an air but rarer t an water. But '5( if t at w ic is later in !eneration is $rior in nature& and t at w ic is concocted and com$ounded is later

in !eneration& t e contrary of w at we a#e been sayin! must be true&0water must be $rior to air& and eart to water. /o muc & t en& for t ose w o $osit one cause suc as we mentioned" but t e same is true if one su$$oses more of t ese& as 4m$edocles says matter of t in!s is four bodies. %or e too is confronted by conse6uences some of w ic are t e same as a#e been mentioned& w ile ot ers are $eculiar to im. %or we see t ese bodies $roduced from one anot er& w ic im$lies t at t e same body does not always remain fire or eart 'we a#e s$oken about t is in our works on nature(" and re!ardin! t e cause of mo#ement and t e 6uestion w et er we must $osit one or two& e must be t ou! t to a#e s$oken neit er correctly nor alto!et er $lausibly. And in !eneral& c an!e of 6uality is necessarily done away wit for t ose w o s$eak t us& for on t eir #iew cold will not come from ot nor ot from cold. %or if it did t ere would be somet in! t at acce$ted t e contraries t emsel#es& and t ere would be some one entity t at became fire and water& w ic 4m$edocles denies. As re!ards Ana*a!oras& if one were to su$$ose t at e said t ere were two elements& t e su$$osition would accord t orou! ly wit an ar!ument w ic Ana*a!oras imself did not state articulately& but w ic e must a#e acce$ted if any one ad led im on to it. )rue& to say t at in t e be!innin! all t in!s were mi*ed is absurd bot on ot er !rounds and because it follows t at t ey must a#e e*isted before in an unmi*ed form& and because nature does not allow any c ance t in! to be mi*ed wit any c ance t in!& and also because on t is #iew modifications and accidents could be se$arated from substances 'for t e same t in!s w ic are mi*ed can be se$arated(" yet if one were to follow im u$& $iecin! to!et er w at e means& e would $er a$s be seen to be somew at modern in is #iews. %or w en not in! was se$arated out& e#idently not in! could be truly asserted of t e substance t at t en e*isted. 1 mean& e.!. t at it was neit er w ite nor black& nor !rey nor any ot er colour& but of necessity colourless" for if it ad been coloured& it would a#e ad one of t ese colours. And similarly& by t is same ar!ument& it was fla#ourless& nor ad it any similar attribute" for it could not be eit er of any 6uality or of any si2e& nor could it be any definite kind of t in!. %or if it were& one of t e $articular forms would a#e belon!ed to it& and t is is im$ossible& since all were mi*ed to!et er" for t e $articular form would necessarily a#e been already se$arated out& but e all were mi*ed e*ce$t reason& and t is alone was unmi*ed and $ure. %rom t is it follows& t en& t at e must say t e $rinci$les are t e :ne 'for t is is sim$le and unmi*ed( and t e :t er& w ic is of suc a nature as we su$$ose t e indefinite to be before it is defined and $artakes of some form. ) erefore& w ile e*$ressin! imself neit er ri! tly nor clearly& e means somet in! like w at t e later t inkers say and w at is now more clearly seen to be t e case.

But t ese t inkers are& after all& at ome only in ar!uments about !eneration and destruction and mo#ement" for it is $ractically only of t is sort of substance t at t ey seek t e $rinci$les and t e causes. But t ose w o e*tend t eir #ision to all t in!s t at e*ist& and of e*istin! t in!s su$$ose some to be $erce$tible and ot ers not $erce$tible& e#idently study bot classes& w ic is all t e more reason w y one s ould de#ote some time to seein! w at is !ood in t eir #iews and w at bad from t e stand$oint of t e in6uiry we a#e now before us. ) e ,-yt a!oreans, treat of $rinci$les and elements stran!er t an t ose of t e $ ysical $ iloso$ ers 't e reason is t at t ey !ot t e $rinci$les from non0sensible t in!s& for t e ob.ects of mat ematics& e*ce$t t ose of astronomy& are of t e class of t in!s wit out mo#ement(" yet t eir discussions and in#esti!ations are all about nature" for t ey !enerate t e ea#ens& and wit re!ard to t eir $arts and attributes and functions t ey obser#e t e $ enomena& and use u$ t e $rinci$les and t e causes in e*$lainin! t ese& w ic im$lies t at t ey a!ree wit t e ot ers& t e $ ysical $ iloso$ ers& t at t e real is .ust all t at w ic is $erce$tible and contained by t e so0called , ea#ens,. But t e causes and t e $rinci$les w ic t ey mention are& as we said& sufficient to act as ste$s e#en u$ to t e i! er realms of reality& and are more suited to t ese t an to t eories about nature. ) ey do not tell us at all& owe#er& ow t ere can be mo#ement if limit and unlimited and odd and e#en are t e only t in!s assumed& or ow wit out mo#ement and c an!e t ere can be !eneration and destruction& or t e bodies t at mo#e t rou! t e ea#ens can do w at t ey do. %urt er& if one eit er !ranted t em t at s$atial ma!nitude consists of t ese elements& or t is were $ro#ed& still ow would some bodies be li! t and ot ers a#e wei! t< )o .ud!e from w at t ey assume and maintain t ey are s$eakin! no more of mat ematical bodies t an of $erce$tible" ence t ey a#e said not in! w ate#er about fire or eart or t e ot er bodies of t is sort& 1 su$$ose because t ey a#e not in! to say w ic a$$lies $eculiarly to $erce$tible t in!s. %urt er& ow are we to combine t e beliefs t at t e attributes of number& and number itself& are causes of w at e*ists and a$$ens in t e ea#ens bot from t e be!innin! and now& and t at t ere is no ot er number t an t is number out of w ic t e world is com$osed< W en in one $articular re!ion t ey $lace o$inion and o$$ortunity& and& a little abo#e or below& in.ustice and decision or mi*ture& and alle!e& as $roof& t at eac of t ese is a number& and t at t ere a$$ens to be already in t is $lace a $lurality of t e e*tended bodies com$osed of numbers& because t ese attributes of number attac to t e #arious $laces&0t is bein! so& is t is number& w ic we must su$$ose eac of t ese abstractions to be& t e same number w ic is e* ibited in t e material uni#erse& or is it anot er t an t is<

-lato says it is different" yet e#en e t inks t at bot t ese bodies and t eir causes are numbers& but t at t e intelli!ible numbers are causes& w ile t e ot ers are sensible. C Let us lea#e t e -yt a!oreans for t e $resent" for it is enou! to a#e touc ed on t em as muc as we a#e done. But as for t ose w o $osit t e 1deas as causes& firstly& in seekin! to !ras$ t e causes of t e t in!s around us& t ey introduced ot ers e6ual in number to t ese& as if a man w o wanted to count t in!s t ou! t e would not be able to do it w ile t ey were few& but tried to count t em w en e ad added to t eir number. %or t e %orms are $ractically e6ual to0or not fewer t an0t e t in!s& in tryin! to e*$lain w ic t ese t inkers $roceeded from t em to t e %orms. %or to eac t in! t ere answers an entity w ic as t e same name and e*ists a$art from t e substances& and so also in t e case of all ot er !rou$s t ere is a one o#er many& w et er t e many are in t is world or are eternal. %urt er& of t e ways in w ic we $ro#e t at t e %orms e*ist& none is con#incin!" for from some no inference necessarily follows& and from some arise %orms e#en of t in!s of w ic we t ink t ere are no %orms. %or accordin! to t e ar!uments from t e e*istence of t e sciences t ere will be %orms of all t in!s of w ic t ere are sciences and accordin! to t e ,one o#er many, ar!ument t ere will be %orms e#en of ne!ations& and accordin! to t e ar!ument t at t ere is an ob.ect for t ou! t e#en w en t e t in! as $eris ed& t ere will be %orms of $eris able t in!s" for we a#e an ima!e of t ese. %urt er& of t e more accurate ar!uments& some lead to 1deas of relations& of w ic we say t ere is no inde$endent class& and ot ers introduce t e ,t ird man,. And in !eneral t e ar!uments for t e %orms destroy t e t in!s for w ose e*istence we are more 2ealous t an for t e e*istence of t e 1deas" for it follows t at not t e dyad but number is first& i.e. t at t e relati#e is $rior to t e absolute&0besides all t e ot er $oints on w ic certain $eo$le by followin! out t e o$inions eld about t e 1deas a#e come into conflict wit t e $rinci$les of t e t eory. %urt er& accordin! to t e assum$tion on w ic our belief in t e 1deas rests& t ere will be %orms not only of substances but also of many ot er t in!s 'for t e conce$t is sin!le not only in t e case of substances but also in t e ot er cases& and t ere are sciences not only of substance but also of ot er t in!s& and a t ousand ot er suc difficulties confront t em(. But accordin! to t e necessities of t e case and t e o$inions eld about t e %orms& if %orms can be s ared in t ere must be 1deas of substances only. %or t ey are not s ared in incidentally& but a t in! must s are in its %orm as in somet in! not $redicated of a sub.ect 'by ,bein! s ared in

incidentally, 1 mean t at e.!. if a t in! s ares in ,double itself,& it s ares also in ,eternal,& but incidentally" for ,eternal, a$$ens to be $redicable of t e ,double,(. ) erefore t e %orms will be substance" but t e same terms indicate substance in t is and in t e ideal world 'or w at will be t e meanin! of sayin! t at t ere is somet in! a$art from t e $articulars0t e one o#er many<(. And if t e 1deas and t e $articulars t at s are in t em a#e t e same form& t ere will be somet in! common to t ese" for w y s ould ,5, be one and t e same in t e $eris able 5,s or in t ose w ic are many but eternal& and not t e same in t e ,5, itself, as in t e $articular 5< But if t ey a#e not t e same form& t ey must a#e only t e name in common& and it is as if one were to call bot Callias and a wooden ima!e a ,man,& wit out obser#in! any community between t em. Abo#e all one mi! t discuss t e 6uestion w at on eart t e %orms contribute to sensible t in!s& eit er to t ose t at are eternal or to t ose t at come into bein! and cease to be. %or t ey cause neit er mo#ement nor any c an!e in t em. But a!ain t ey el$ in no wise eit er towards t e knowled!e of t e ot er t in!s 'for t ey are not e#en t e substance of t ese& else t ey would a#e been in t em(& or towards t eir bein!& if t ey are not in t e $articulars w ic s are in t em" t ou! if t ey were& t ey mi! t be t ou! t to be causes& as w ite causes w iteness in a w ite ob.ect by enterin! into its com$osition. But t is ar!ument& w ic first Ana*a!oras and later 4udo*us and certain ot ers used& is #ery easily u$set" for it is not difficult to collect many insu$erable ob.ections to suc a #iew. But& furt er& all ot er t in!s cannot come from t e %orms in any of t e usual senses of ,from,. And to say t at t ey are $atterns and t e ot er t in!s s are in t em is to use em$ty words and $oetical meta$ ors. %or w at is it t at works& lookin! to t e 1deas< And anyt in! can eit er be& or become& like anot er wit out bein! co$ied from it& so t at w et er /ocrates or not a man /ocrates like mi! t come to be" and e#idently t is mi! t be so e#en if /ocrates were eternal. And t ere will be se#eral $atterns of t e same t in!& and t erefore se#eral %orms" e.!. ,animal, and ,two0footed, and also ,man imself, will be %orms of man. A!ain& t e %orms are $atterns not only sensible t in!s& but of %orms t emsel#es also" i.e. t e !enus& as !enus of #arious s$ecies& will be so" t erefore t e same t in! will be $attern and co$y. A!ain& it would seem im$ossible t at t e substance and t at of w ic it is t e substance s ould e*ist a$art" ow& t erefore& could t e 1deas& bein! t e substances of t in!s& e*ist a$art< 1n t e - aedo, t e case is stated in t is way0t at t e %orms are causes bot of bein! and of becomin!" yet w en t e %orms e*ist& still t e t in!s t at s are in t em do not come into bein!& unless t ere is somet in! to ori!inate mo#ement" and many ot er t in!s come into bein! 'e.!. a ouse or a rin!( of w ic we say t ere are no %orms. Clearly& t erefore& e#en t e

ot er t in!s can bot be and come into bein! owin! to suc causes as $roduce t e t in!s .ust mentioned. A!ain& if t e %orms are numbers& ow can t ey be causes< 1s it because e*istin! t in!s are ot er numbers& e.!. one number is man& anot er is /ocrates& anot er Callias< W y t en are t e one set of numbers causes of t e ot er set< 1t will not make any difference e#en if t e former are eternal and t e latter are not. But if it is because t in!s in t is sensible world 'e.!. armony( are ratios of numbers& e#idently t e t in!s between w ic t ey are ratios are some one class of t in!s. 1f& t en& t is00t e matter00is some definite t in!& e#idently t e numbers t emsel#es too will be ratios of somet in! to somet in! else. 4.!. if Callias is a numerical ratio between fire and eart and water and air& is 1dea also will be a number of certain ot er underlyin! t in!s" and man imself& w et er it is a number in a sense or not& will still be a numerical ratio of certain t in!s and not a number $ro$er& nor will it be a of number merely because it is a numerical ratio. A!ain& from many numbers one number is $roduced& but ow can one %orm come from many %orms< And if t e number comes not from t e many numbers t emsel#es but from t e units in t em& e.!. in 10&000& ow is it wit t e units< 1f t ey are s$ecifically alike& numerous absurdities will follow& and also if t ey are not alike 'neit er t e units in one number bein! t emsel#es like one anot er nor t ose in ot er numbers bein! all like to all(" for in w at will t ey differ& as t ey are wit out 6uality< ) is is not a $lausible #iew& nor is it consistent wit our t ou! t on t e matter. %urt er& t ey must set u$ a second kind of number 'wit w ic arit metic deals(& and all t e ob.ects w ic are called ,intermediate, by some t inkers" and ow do t ese e*ist or from w at $rinci$les do t ey $roceed< :r w y must t ey be intermediate between t e t in!s in t is sensible world and t e t in!s0t emsel#es< %urt er& t e units in must eac come from a $rior but t is is im$ossible. %urt er& w y is a number& w en taken all to!et er& one< A!ain& besides w at as been said& if t e units are di#erse t e -latonists s ould a#e s$oken like t ose w o say t ere are four& or two& elements" for eac of t ese t inkers !i#es t e name of element not to t at w ic is common& e.!. to body& but to fire and eart & w et er t ere is somet in! common to t em& #i2. body& or not. But in fact t e -latonists s$eak as if t e :ne were omo!eneous like fire or water" and if t is is so& t e numbers will not be substances. 4#idently& if t ere is a :ne itself and t is is a first $rinci$le& ,one, is bein! used in more t an one sense" for ot erwise t e t eory is im$ossible. W en we wis to reduce substances to t eir $rinci$les& we state t at lines come from t e s ort and lon! 'i.e. from a kind of small and

!reat(& and t e $lane from t e broad and narrow& and body from t e dee$ and s allow. 9et ow t en can eit er t e $lane contain a line& or t e solid a line or a $lane< %or t e broad and narrow is a different class from t e dee$ and s allow. ) erefore& .ust as number is not $resent in t ese& because t e many and few are different from t ese& e#idently no ot er of t e i! er classes will be $resent in t e lower. But a!ain t e broad is not a !enus w ic includes t e dee$& for t en t e solid would a#e been a s$ecies of $lane. %urt er& from w at $rinci$le will t e $resence of t e $oints in t e line be deri#ed< -lato e#en used to ob.ect to t is class of t in!s as bein! a !eometrical fiction. 3e !a#e t e name of $rinci$le of t e line0and t is e often $osited0to t e indi#isible lines. 9et t ese must a#e a limit" t erefore t e ar!ument from w ic t e e*istence of t e line follows $ro#es also t e e*istence of t e $oint. 1n !eneral& t ou! $ iloso$ y seeks t e cause of $erce$tible t in!s& we a#e !i#en t is u$ 'for we say not in! of t e cause from w ic c an!e takes its start(& but w ile we fancy we are statin! t e substance of $erce$tible t in!s& we assert t e e*istence of a second class of substances& w ile our account of t e way in w ic t ey are t e substances of $erce$tible t in!s is em$ty talk" for ,s arin!,& as we said before& means not in!. +or a#e t e %orms any conne*ion wit w at we see to be t e cause in t e case of t e arts& t at for w ose sake bot all mind and t e w ole of nature are o$erati#e&0wit t is cause w ic we assert to be one of t e first $rinci$les" but mat ematics as come to be identical wit $ iloso$ y for modern t inkers& t ou! t ey say t at it s ould be studied for t e sake of ot er t in!s. %urt er& one mi! t su$$ose t at t e substance w ic accordin! to t em underlies as matter is too mat ematical& and is a $redicate and differentia of t e substance& ie. of t e matter& rat er t an matter itself" i.e. t e !reat and t e small are like t e rare and t e dense w ic t e $ ysical $ iloso$ ers s$eak of& callin! t ese t e $rimary differentiae of t e substratum" for t ese are a kind of e*cess and defect. And re!ardin! mo#ement& if t e !reat and t e small are to e mo#ement& e#idently t e %orms will be mo#ed" but if t ey are not to be mo#ement& w ence did mo#ement come< ) e w ole study of nature as been anni ilated. And w at is t ou! t to be easy0to s ow t at all t in!s are one0is not done" for w at is $ro#ed by t e met od of settin! out instances is not t at all t in!s are one but t at t ere is a :ne itself&0if we !rant all t e assum$tions. And not e#en t is follows& if we do not !rant t at t e uni#ersal is a !enus" and t is in some cases it cannot be. +or can it be e*$lained eit er ow t e lines and $lanes and solids t at come after t e numbers e*ist or can e*ist& or w at si!nificance t ey a#e" for t ese can neit er be %orms 'for t ey are not numbers(& nor t e intermediates 'for t ose are t e ob.ects of

mat ematics(& nor t e $eris able t in!s. ) is is e#idently a distinct fourt class. 1n !eneral& if we searc for t e elements of e*istin! t in!s wit out distin!uis in! t e many senses in w ic t in!s are said to e*ist& we cannot find t em& es$ecially if t e searc for t e elements of w ic t in!s are made is conducted in t is manner. %or it is surely im$ossible to disco#er w at ,actin!, or ,bein! acted on,& or ,t e strai! t,& is made of& but if elements can be disco#ered at all& it is only t e elements of substances" t erefore eit er to seek t e elements of all e*istin! t in!s or to t ink one as t em is incorrect. And ow could we learn t e elements of all t in!s< 4#idently we cannot start by knowin! anyt in! before. %or as e w o is learnin! !eometry& t ou! e may know ot er t in!s before& knows none of t e t in!s wit w ic t e science deals and about w ic e is to learn& so is it in all ot er cases. ) erefore if t ere is a science of all t in!s& suc as some assert to e*ist& e w o is learnin! t is will know not in! before. 9et all learnin! is by means of $remisses w ic are 'eit er all or some of t em( known before&0w et er t e learnin! be by demonstration or by definitions" for t e elements of t e definition must be known before and be familiar" and learnin! by induction $roceeds similarly. But a!ain& if t e science were actually innate& it were stran!e t at we are unaware of our $ossession of t e !reatest of sciences. A!ain& ow is one to come to know w at all t in!s are made of& and ow is t is to be made e#ident< ) is also affords a difficulty" for t ere mi! t be a conflict of o$inion& as t ere is about certain syllables" some say 2a is made out of s and d and a& w ile ot ers say it is a distinct sound and none of t ose t at are familiar. %urt er& ow could we know t e ob.ects of sense wit out a#in! t e sense in 6uestion< 9et we ou! t to& if t e elements of w ic all t in!s consist& as com$le* sounds consist of t e clements $ro$er to sound& are t e same. 10 1t is e#ident& t en& e#en from w at we a#e said before& t at all men seem to seek t e causes named in t e - ysics& and t at we cannot name any beyond t ese" but t ey seek t ese #a!uely" and t ou! in a sense t ey a#e all been described before& in a sense t ey a#e not been described at all. %or t e earliest $ iloso$ y is& on all sub.ects& like one w o lis$s& since it is youn! and in its be!innin!s. %or e#en 4m$edocles says bone e*ists by #irtue of t e ratio in it. +ow t is is t e essence and t e substance of t e t in!. But it is similarly necessary t at fles and eac of t e ot er tissues s ould be t e ratio of its elements& or t at not one of t em s ould" for it is

on account of t is t at bot fles and bone and e#eryt in! else will e*ist& and not on account of t e matter& w ic e names&0fire and eart and water and air. But w ile e would necessarily a#e a!reed if anot er ad said t is& e as not said it clearly. :n t ese 6uestions our #iews a#e been e*$ressed before" but let us return to enumerate t e difficulties t at mi! t be raised on t ese same $oints" for $er a$s we may !et from t em some el$ towards our later difficulties. Book II 1 )34 in#esti!ation of t e trut is in one way ard& in anot er easy. An indication of t is is found in t e fact t at no one is able to attain t e trut ade6uately& w ile& on t e ot er and& we do not collecti#ely fail& but e#ery one says somet in! true about t e nature of t in!s& and w ile indi#idually we contribute little or not in! to t e trut & by t e union of all a considerable amount is amassed. ) erefore& since t e trut seems to be like t e $ro#erbial door& w ic no one can fail to it& in t is res$ect it must be easy& but t e fact t at we can a#e a w ole trut and not t e $articular $art we aim at s ows t e difficulty of it. -er a$s& too& as difficulties are of two kinds& t e cause of t e $resent difficulty is not in t e facts but in us. %or as t e eyes of bats are to t e bla2e of day& so is t e reason in our soul to t e t in!s w ic are by nature most e#ident of all. 1t is .ust t at we s ould be !rateful& not only to t ose wit w ose #iews we may a!ree& but also to t ose w o a#e e*$ressed more su$erficial #iews" for t ese also contributed somet in!& by de#elo$in! before us t e $owers of t ou! t. 1t is true t at if t ere ad been no )imot eus we s ould a#e been wit out muc of our lyric $oetry" but if t ere ad been no - rynis t ere would a#e been no )imot eus. ) e same olds !ood of t ose w o a#e e*$ressed #iews about t e trut " for from some t inkers we a#e in erited certain o$inions& w ile t e ot ers a#e been res$onsible for t e a$$earance of t e former. 1t is ri! t also t at $ iloso$ y s ould be called knowled!e of t e trut . %or t e end of t eoretical knowled!e is trut & w ile t at of $ractical knowled!e is action 'for e#en if t ey consider ow t in!s are& $ractical men do not study t e eternal& but w at is relati#e and in t e $resent(. +ow we do not know a trut wit out its cause" and a t in! as a 6uality in a i! er de!ree t an ot er t in!s if in #irtue of it t e similar 6uality belon!s to t e ot er t in!s as well 'e.!. fire is t e ottest of t in!s" for it is t e cause of t e eat of all ot er t in!s(" so t at t at causes deri#ati#e trut s to be true is most true. 3ence t e $rinci$les of eternal t in!s must be always most true 'for t ey are not merely sometimes true& nor is t ere any

cause of t eir bein!& but t ey t emsel#es are t e cause of t e bein! of ot er t in!s(& so t at as eac t in! is in res$ect of bein!& so is it in res$ect of trut . 5 But e#idently t ere is a first $rinci$le& and t e causes of t in!s are neit er an infinite series nor infinitely #arious in kind. %or neit er can one t in! $roceed from anot er& as from matter& ad infinitum 'e.!. fles from eart & eart from air& air from fire& and so on wit out sto$$in!(& nor can t e sources of mo#ement form an endless series 'man for instance bein! acted on by air& air by t e sun& t e sun by /trife& and so on wit out limit(. /imilarly t e final causes cannot !o on ad infinitum&0walkin! bein! for t e sake of ealt & t is for t e sake of a$$iness& a$$iness for t e sake of somet in! else& and so one t in! always for t e sake of anot er. And t e case of t e essence is similar. %or in t e case of intermediates& w ic a#e a last term and a term $rior to t em& t e $rior must be t e cause of t e later terms. %or if we ad to say w ic of t e t ree is t e cause& we s ould say t e first" surely not t e last& for t e final term is t e cause of none" nor e#en t e intermediate& for it is t e cause only of one. '1t makes no difference w et er t ere is one intermediate or more& nor w et er t ey are infinite or finite in number.( But of series w ic are infinite in t is way& and of t e infinite in !eneral& all t e $arts down to t at now $resent are alike intermediates" so t at if t ere is no first t ere is no cause at all. +or can t ere be an infinite $rocess downwards& wit a be!innin! in t e u$ward direction& so t at water s ould $roceed from fire& eart from water& and so always some ot er kind s ould be $roduced. %or one t in! comes from anot er in two ways0not in t e sense in w ic ,from, means ,after, 'as we say ,from t e 1st mian !ames come t e :lym$ian,(& but eit er 'i( as t e man comes from t e boy& by t e boy,s c an!in!& or 'ii( as air comes from water. By ,as t e man comes from t e boy, we mean ,as t at w ic as come to be from t at w ic is comin! to be, or ,as t at w ic is finis ed from t at w ic is bein! ac ie#ed, 'for as becomin! is between bein! and not bein!& so t at w ic is becomin! is always between t at w ic is and t at w ic is not" for t e learner is a man of science in t e makin!& and t is is w at is meant w en we say t at from a learner a man of science is bein! made(" on t e ot er and& comin! from anot er t in! as water comes from air im$lies t e destruction of t e ot er t in!. ) is is w y c an!es of t e former kind are not re#ersible& and t e boy does not come from t e man 'for it is not t at w ic comes to be somet in! t at comes to be as a result of comin! to be& but t at w ic e*ists after t e comin! to be" for it is t us t at t e day& too& comes from t e

mornin!0in t e sense t at it comes after t e mornin!" w ic is t e reason w y t e mornin! cannot come from t e day(" but c an!es of t e ot er kind are re#ersible. But in bot cases it is im$ossible t at t e number of terms s ould be infinite. %or terms of t e former kind& bein! intermediates& must a#e an end& and terms of t e latter kind c an!e back into one anot er& for t e destruction of eit er is t e !eneration of t e ot er. At t e same time it is im$ossible t at t e first cause& bein! eternal& s ould be destroyed" for since t e $rocess of becomin! is not infinite in t e u$ward direction& t at w ic is t e first t in! by w ose destruction somet in! came to be must be non0eternal. %urt er& t e final cause is an end& and t at sort of end w ic is not for t e sake of somet in! else& but for w ose sake e#eryt in! else is" so t at if t ere is to be a last term of t is sort& t e $rocess will not be infinite" but if t ere is no suc term& t ere will be no final cause& but t ose w o maintain t e infinite series eliminate t e 8ood wit out knowin! it 'yet no one would try to do anyt in! if e were not !oin! to come to a limit(" nor would t ere be reason in t e world" t e reasonable man& at least& always acts for a $ur$ose& and t is is a limit" for t e end is a limit. But t e essence& also& cannot be reduced to anot er definition w ic is fuller in e*$ression. %or t e ori!inal definition is always more of a definition& and not t e later one" and in a series in w ic t e first term as not t e re6uired c aracter& t e ne*t as not it eit er. %urt er& t ose w o s$eak t us destroy science" for it is not $ossible to a#e t is till one comes to t e unanalysable terms. And knowled!e becomes im$ossible" for ow can one a$$re end t in!s t at are infinite in t is way< %or t is is not like t e case of t e line& to w ose di#isibility t ere is no sto$& but w ic we cannot t ink if we do not make a sto$ 'for w ic reason one w o is tracin! t e infinitely di#isible line cannot be countin! t e $ossibilities of section(& but t e w ole line also must be a$$re ended by somet in! in us t at does not mo#e from $art to $art.0A!ain& not in! infinite can e*ist" and if it could& at least t e notion of infinity is not infinite. But if t e kinds of causes ad been infinite in number& t en also knowled!e would a#e been im$ossible" for we t ink we know& only w en we a#e ascertained t e causes& t at but t at w ic is infinite by addition cannot be !one t rou! in a finite time. 3 ) e effect w ic lectures $roduce on a earer de$ends on is abits" for we demand t e lan!ua!e we are accustomed to& and t at w ic is different from t is seems not in kee$in! but somew at unintelli!ible and forei!n because of its unwontedness. %or it is

t e customary t at is intelli!ible. ) e force of abit is s own by t e laws& in w ic t e le!endary and c ildis elements $re#ail o#er our knowled!e about t em& owin! to abit. ) us some $eo$le do not listen to a s$eaker unless e s$eaks mat ematically& ot ers unless e !i#es instances& w ile ot ers e*$ect im to cite a $oet as witness. And some want to a#e e#eryt in! done accurately& w ile ot ers are annoyed by accuracy& eit er because t ey cannot follow t e conne*ion of t ou! t or because t ey re!ard it as $ettifo!!ery. %or accuracy as somet in! of t is c aracter& so t at as in trade so in ar!ument some $eo$le t ink it mean. 3ence one must be already trained to know ow to take eac sort of ar!ument& since it is absurd to seek at t e same time knowled!e and t e way of attainin! knowled!e" and it is not easy to !et e#en one of t e two. ) e minute accuracy of mat ematics is not to be demanded in all cases& but only in t e case of t in!s w ic a#e no matter. 3ence met od is not t at of natural science" for $resumably t e w ole of nature as matter. 3ence we must in6uire first w at nature is> for t us we s all also see w at natural science treats of 'and w et er it belon!s to one science or to more to in#esti!ate t e causes and t e $rinci$les of t in!s(. Book III 1 W4 must& wit a #iew to t e science w ic we are seekin!& first recount t e sub.ects t at s ould be first discussed. ) ese include bot t e ot er o$inions t at some a#e eld on t e first $rinci$les& and any $oint besides t ese t at a$$ens to a#e been o#erlooked. %or t ose w o wis to !et clear of difficulties it is ad#anta!eous to discuss t e difficulties well" for t e subse6uent free $lay of t ou! t im$lies t e solution of t e $re#ious difficulties& and it is not $ossible to untie a knot of w ic one does not know. But t e difficulty of our t inkin! $oints to a ,knot, in t e ob.ect" for in so far as our t ou! t is in difficulties& it is in like case wit t ose w o are bound" for in eit er case it is im$ossible to !o forward. 3ence one s ould a#e sur#eyed all t e difficulties before and& bot for t e $ur$oses we a#e stated and because $eo$le w o in6uire wit out first statin! t e difficulties are like t ose w o do not know w ere t ey a#e to !o" besides& a man does not ot erwise know e#en w et er e as at any !i#en time found w at e is lookin! for or not" for t e end is not clear to suc a man& w ile to im w o as first discussed t e difficulties it is clear. %urt er& e w o as eard all t e contendin! ar!uments& as if t ey were t e $arties to a case& must be in a better $osition for .ud!in!. ) e first $roblem concerns t e sub.ect w ic we discussed in our $refatory remarks. 1t is t is0'1( w et er t e in#esti!ation of t e

causes belon!s to one or to more sciences& and '5( w et er suc a science s ould sur#ey only t e first $rinci$les of substance& or also t e $rinci$les on w ic all men base t eir $roofs& e.!. w et er it is $ossible at t e same time to assert and deny one and t e same t in! or not& and all ot er suc 6uestions" and '3( if t e science in 6uestion deals wit substance& w et er one science deals wit all substances& or more t an one& and if more& w et er all are akin& or some of t em must be called forms of Wisdom and t e ot ers somet in! else. And '=( t is itself is also one of t e t in!s t at must be discussed0w et er sensible substances alone s ould be said to e*ist or ot ers also besides t em& and w et er t ese ot ers are of one kind or t ere are se#eral classes of substances& as is su$$osed by t ose w o belie#e bot in %orms and in mat ematical ob.ects intermediate between t ese and sensible t in!s. 1nto t ese 6uestions& t en& as we say& we must in6uire& and also '5( w et er our in#esti!ation is concerned only wit substances or also wit t e essential attributes of substances. %urt er& wit re!ard to t e same and ot er and like and unlike and contrariety& and wit re!ard to $rior and $osterior and all ot er suc terms about w ic t e dialecticians try to in6uire& startin! t eir in#esti!ation from $robable $remises only&0w ose business is it to in6uire into all t ese< %urt er& we must discuss t e essential attributes of t ese t emsel#es" and we must ask not only w at eac of t ese is& but also w et er one t in! always as one contrary. A!ain '@(& are t e $rinci$les and elements of t in!s t e !enera& or t e $arts $resent in eac t in!& into w ic it is di#ided" and 'A( if t ey are t e !enera& are t ey t e !enera t at are $redicated $ro*imately of t e indi#iduals& or t e i! est !enera& e.!. is animal or man t e first $rinci$le and t e more inde$endent of t e indi#idual instance< And 'B( we must in6uire and discuss es$ecially w et er t ere is& besides t e matter& any t in! t at is a cause in itself or not& and w et er t is can e*ist a$art or not& and w et er it is one or more in number& and w et er t ere is somet in! a$art from t e concrete t in! 'by t e concrete t in! 1 mean t e matter wit somet in! already $redicated of it(& or t ere is not in! a$art& or t ere is somet in! in some cases t ou! not in ot ers& and w at sort of cases t ese are. A!ain 'C( we ask w et er t e $rinci$les are limited in number or in kind& bot t ose in t e definitions and t ose in t e substratum" and '10( w et er t e $rinci$les of $eris able and of im$eris able t in!s are t e same or different" and w et er t ey are all im$eris able or t ose of $eris able t in!s are $eris able. %urt er '11( t ere is t e 6uestion w ic is ardest of all and most $er$le*in!& w et er unity and bein!& as t e -yt a!oreans and -lato said& are not attributes of somet in! else but t e substance of e*istin! t in!s& or t is is not t e case& but t e substratum is somet in! else&0as 4m$edocles says& lo#e" as some one else says& fire" w ile anot er says water or air.

A!ain '15( we ask w et er t e $rinci$les are uni#ersal or like indi#idual t in!s& and '13( w et er t ey e*ist $otentially or actually& and furt er& w et er t ey are $otential or actual in any ot er sense t an in reference to mo#ement" for t ese 6uestions also would $resent muc difficulty. %urt er '1=(& are numbers and lines and fi!ures and $oints a kind of substance or not& and if t ey are substances are t ey se$arate from sensible t in!s or $resent in t em< Wit re!ard to all t ese matters not only is it ard to !et $ossession of t e trut & but it is not easy e#en to t ink out t e difficulties well. 5 '1( %irst t en wit re!ard to w at we mentioned first& does it belon! to one or to more sciences to in#esti!ate all t e kinds of causes< 3ow could it belon! to one science to reco!ni2e t e $rinci$les if t ese are not contrary< %urt er& t ere are many t in!s to w ic not all t e $rinci$les $ertain. %or ow can a $rinci$le of c an!e or t e nature of t e !ood e*ist for unc an!eable t in!s& since e#eryt in! t at in itself and by its own nature is !ood is an end& and a cause in t e sense t at for its sake t e ot er t in!s bot come to be and are& and since an end or $ur$ose is t e end of some action& and all actions im$ly c an!e< /o in t e case of unc an!eable t in!s t is $rinci$le could not e*ist& nor could t ere be a !ood itself. ) is is w y in mat ematics not in! is $ro#ed by means of t is kind of cause& nor is t ere any demonstration of t is kind0,because it is better& or worse," indeed no one e#en mentions anyt in! of t e kind. And so for t is reason some of t e /o$ ists& e.!. Aristi$$us& used to ridicule mat ematics" for in t e arts ' e maintained(& e#en in t e industrial arts& e.!. in car$entry and cobblin!& t e reason always !i#en is ,because it is better& or worse&, but t e mat ematical sciences take no account of !oods and e#ils. But if t ere are se#eral sciences of t e causes& and a different science for eac different $rinci$le& w ic of t ese sciences s ould be said to be t at w ic we seek& or w ic of t e $eo$le w o $ossess t em as t e most scientific knowled!e of t e ob.ect in 6uestion< ) e same t in! may a#e all t e kinds of causes& e.!. t e mo#in! cause of a ouse is t e art or t e builder& t e final cause is t e function it fulfils& t e matter is eart and stones& and t e form is t e definition. )o .ud!e from our $re#ious discussion of t e 6uestion w ic of t e sciences s ould be called Wisdom& t ere is reason for a$$lyin! t e name to eac of t em. %or inasmuc as it is most arc itectonic and aut oritati#e and t e ot er sciences& like sla#ewomen& may not e#en contradict it& t e science of t e end and of t e !ood is of t e nature of Wisdom 'for t e ot er t in!s are for

t e sake of t e end(. But inasmuc as it was described, as dealin! wit t e first causes and t at w ic is in t e i! est sense ob.ect of knowled!e& t e science of substance must be of t e nature of Wisdom. %or since men may know t e same t in! in many ways& we say t at e w o reco!ni2es w at a t in! is by its bein! so and so knows more fully t an e w o reco!ni2es it by its not bein! so and so& and in t e former class itself one knows more fully t an anot er& and e knows most fully w o knows w at a t in! is& not e w o knows its 6uantity or 6uality or w at it can by nature do or a#e done to it. And furt er in all cases also we t ink t at t e knowled!e of eac e#en of t e t in!s of w ic demonstration is $ossible is $resent only w en we know w at t e t in! is& e.!. w at s6uarin! a rectan!le is& #i2. t at it is t e findin! of a mean" and similarly in all ot er cases. And we know about becomin!s and actions and about e#ery c an!e w en we know t e source of t e mo#ement" and t is is ot er t an and o$$osed to t e end. ) erefore it would seem to belon! to different sciences to in#esti!ate t ese causes se#erally. But '5(& takin! t e startin!0$oints of demonstration as well as t e causes& it is a dis$utable 6uestion w et er t ey are t e ob.ect of one science or of more 'by t e startin!0$oints of demonstration 1 mean t e common beliefs& on w ic all men base t eir $roofs(" e.!. t at e#eryt in! must be eit er affirmed or denied& and t at a t in! cannot at t e same time be and not be& and all ot er suc $remisses>0t e 6uestion is w et er t e same science deals wit t em as wit substance& or a different science& and if it is not one science& w ic of t e two must be identified wit t at w ic we now seek.01t is not reasonable t at t ese to$ics s ould be t e ob.ect of one science" for w y s ould it be $eculiarly a$$ro$riate to !eometry or to any ot er science to understand t ese matters< 1f t en it belon!s to e#ery science alike& and cannot belon! to all& it is not $eculiar to t e science w ic in#esti!ates substances& any more t an to any ot er science& to know about t ese to$ics.0And& at t e same time& in w at way can t ere be a science of t e first $rinci$les< %or we are aware e#en now w at eac of t em in fact is 'at least e#en ot er sciences use t em as familiar(" but if t ere is a demonstrati#e science w ic deals wit t em& t ere will a#e to be an underlyin! kind& and some of t em must be demonstrable attributes and ot ers must be a*ioms 'for it is im$ossible t at t ere s ould be demonstration about all of t em(" for t e demonstration must start from certain $remisses and be about a certain sub.ect and $ro#e certain attributes. ) erefore it follows t at all attributes t at are $ro#ed must belon! to a sin!le class" for all demonstrati#e sciences use t e a*ioms. But if t e science of substance and t e science w ic deals wit t e a*ioms are different& w ic of t em is by nature more aut oritati#e and $rior< ) e a*ioms are most uni#ersal and are

$rinci$les of all t in!s. And if it is not t e business of t e $ iloso$ er& to w om else will it belon! to in6uire w at is true and w at is untrue about t em< '3( 1n !eneral& do all substances fall under one science or under more t an one< 1f t e latter& to w at sort of substance is t e $resent science to be assi!ned<0:n t e ot er and& it is not reasonable t at one science s ould deal wit all. %or t en t ere would be one demonstrati#e science dealin! wit all attributes. %or e#er demonstrati#e science in#esti!ates wit re!ard to some sub.ect its essential attributes& startin! from t e common beliefs. ) erefore to in#esti!ate t e essential attributes of one class of t in!s& startin! from one set of beliefs& is t e business of one science. %or t e sub.ect belon!s to one science& and t e $remisses belon! to one& w et er to t e same or to anot er" so t at t e attributes do so too& w et er t ey are in#esti!ated by t ese sciences or by one com$ounded out of t em. '5( %urt er& does our in#esti!ation deal wit substances alone or also wit t eir attributes< 1 mean for instance& if t e solid is a substance and so are lines and $lanes& is it t e business of t e same science to know t ese and to know t e attributes of eac of t ese classes 't e attributes about w ic t e mat ematical sciences offer $roofs(& or of a different science< 1f of t e same& t e science of substance also must be a demonstrati#e science& but it is t ou! t t at t ere is no demonstration of t e essence of t in!s. And if of anot er& w at will be t e science t at in#esti!ates t e attributes of substance< ) is is a #ery difficult 6uestion. '=( %urt er& must we say t at sensible substances alone e*ist& or t at t ere are ot ers besides t ese< And are substances of one kind or are t ere in fact se#eral kinds of substances& as t ose say w o assert t e e*istence bot of t e %orms and of t e intermediates& wit w ic t ey say t e mat ematical sciences deal<0) e sense in w ic we say t e %orms are bot causes and self0de$endent substances as been e*$lained in our first remarks about t em" w ile t e t eory $resents difficulties in many ways& t e most $arado*ical t in! of all is t e statement t at t ere are certain t in!s besides t ose in t e material uni#erse& and t at t ese are t e same as sensible t in!s e*ce$t t at t ey are eternal w ile t e latter are $eris able. %or t ey say t ere is a man0 imself and a orse0itself and ealt 0itself& wit no furt er 6ualification&0a $rocedure like t at of t e $eo$le w o said t ere are !ods& but in uman form. %or t ey were $ositin! not in! but eternal men& nor are t e -latonists makin! t e %orms anyt in! ot er t an eternal sensible t in!s. %urt er& if we are to $osit besides t e %orms and t e sensibles t e intermediates between t em& we s all a#e many difficulties. %or clearly on t e same $rinci$le t ere will be lines besides t e lines0t emsel#es and t e sensible lines& and so wit eac of t e ot er

classes of t in!s" so t at since astronomy is one of t ese mat ematical sciences t ere will also be a ea#en besides t e sensible ea#en& and a sun and a moon 'and so wit t e ot er ea#enly bodies( besides t e sensible. 9et ow are we to belie#e in t ese t in!s< 1t is not reasonable e#en to su$$ose suc a body immo#able& but to su$$ose it mo#in! is 6uite im$ossible.0And similarly wit t e t in!s of w ic o$tics and mat ematical armonics treat" for t ese also cannot e*ist a$art from t e sensible t in!s& for t e same reasons. %or if t ere are sensible t in!s and sensations intermediate between %orm and indi#idual& e#idently t ere will also be animals intermediate between animals0t emsel#es and t e $eris able animals.0We mi! t also raise t e 6uestion& wit reference to w ic kind of e*istin! t in!s we must look for t ese sciences of intermediates. 1f !eometry is to differ from mensuration only in t is& t at t e latter deals wit t in!s t at we $ercei#e& and t e former wit t in!s t at are not $erce$tible& e#idently t ere will also be a science ot er t an medicine& intermediate between medical0science0itself and t is indi#idual medical science& and so wit eac of t e ot er sciences. 9et ow is t is $ossible< ) ere would a#e to be also ealt y t in!s besides t e $erce$tible ealt y t in!s and t e ealt y0itself.00And at t e same time not e#en t is is true& t at mensuration deals wit $erce$tible and $eris able ma!nitudes" for t en it would a#e $eris ed w en t ey $eris ed. But on t e ot er and astronomy cannot be dealin! wit $erce$tible ma!nitudes nor wit t is ea#en abo#e us. %or neit er are $erce$tible lines suc lines as t e !eometer s$eaks of 'for no $erce$tible t in! is strai! t or round in t e way in w ic e defines ,strai! t, and ,round," for a oo$ touc es a strai! t ed!e not at a $oint& but as -rota!oras used to say it did& in is refutation of t e !eometers(& nor are t e mo#ements and s$iral orbits in t e ea#ens like t ose of w ic astronomy treats& nor a#e !eometrical $oints t e same nature as t e actual stars.0+ow t ere are some w o say t at t ese so0called intermediates between t e %orms and t e $erce$tible t in!s e*ist& not a$art from t e $erce$tible t in!s& owe#er& but in t ese" t e im$ossible results of t is #iew would take too lon! to enumerate& but it is enou! to consider e#en suc $oints as t e followin!>01t is not reasonable t at t is s ould be so only in t e case of t ese intermediates& but clearly t e %orms also mi! t be in t e $erce$tible t in!s" for bot statements are $arts of t e same t eory. %urt er& it follows from t is t eory t at t ere are two solids in t e same $lace& and t at t e intermediates are not immo#able& since t ey are in t e mo#in! $erce$tible t in!s. And in !eneral to w at $ur$ose would one su$$ose t em to e*ist indeed& but to e*ist in $erce$tible t in!s< %or t e same $arado*ical results will follow w ic we a#e already mentioned" t ere will be a ea#en besides t e ea#en& only it will be not a$art but in t e same $lace" w ic is

still more im$ossible. 3 '@( A$art from t e !reat difficulty of statin! t e case truly wit re!ard to t ese matters& it is #ery ard to say& wit re!ard to t e first $rinci$les& w et er it is t e !enera t at s ould be taken as elements and $rinci$les& or rat er t e $rimary constituents of a t in!" e.!. it is t e $rimary $arts of w ic articulate sounds consist t at are t ou! t to be elements and $rinci$les of articulate sound& not t e common !enus0articulate sound" and we !i#e t e name of ,elements, to t ose !eometrical $ro$ositions& t e $roofs of w ic are im$lied in t e $roofs of t e ot ers& eit er of all or of most. %urt er& bot t ose w o say t ere are se#eral elements of cor$oreal t in!s and t ose w o say t ere is one& say t e $arts of w ic bodies are com$ounded and consist are $rinci$les" e.!. 4m$edocles says fire and water and t e rest are t e constituent elements of t in!s& but does not describe t ese as !enera of e*istin! t in!s. Besides t is& if we want to e*amine t e nature of anyt in! else& we e*amine t e $arts of w ic & e.!. a bed consists and ow t ey are $ut to!et er& and t en we know its nature. )o .ud!e from t ese ar!uments& t en& t e $rinci$les of t in!s would not be t e !enera" but if we know eac t in! by its definition& and t e !enera are t e $rinci$les or startin!0$oints of definitions& t e !enera must also be t e $rinci$les of definable t in!s. And if to !et t e knowled!e of t e s$ecies accordin! to w ic t in!s are named is to !et t e knowled!e of t in!s& t e !enera are at least startin!0$oints of t e s$ecies. And some also of t ose w o say unity or bein!& or t e !reat and t e small& are elements of t in!s& seem to treat t em as !enera. But& a!ain& it is not $ossible to describe t e $rinci$les in bot ways. %or t e formula of t e essence is one" but definition by !enera will be different from t at w ic states t e constituent $arts of a t in!. 'A( Besides t is& e#en if t e !enera are in t e i! est de!ree $rinci$les& s ould one re!ard t e first of t e !enera as $rinci$les& or t ose w ic are $redicated directly of t e indi#iduals< ) is also admits of dis$ute. %or if t e uni#ersals are always more of t e nature of $rinci$les& e#idently t e u$$ermost of t e !enera are t e $rinci$les" for t ese are $redicated of all t in!s. ) ere will& t en& be as many $rinci$les of t in!s as t ere are $rimary !enera& so t at bot bein! and unity will be $rinci$les and substances" for t ese are most of all $redicated of all e*istin! t in!s. But it is not $ossible t at eit er unity or bein! s ould be a sin!le !enus of t in!s" for t e differentiae of any !enus must eac of t em bot a#e bein! and be one& but it is not $ossible for t e !enus taken a$art from its s$ecies 'any more t an for t e s$ecies of t e !enus( to

be $redicated of its $ro$er differentiae" so t at if unity or bein! is a !enus& no differentia will eit er a#e bein! or be one. But if unity and bein! are not !enera& neit er will t ey be $rinci$les& if t e !enera are t e $rinci$les. A!ain& t e intermediate kinds& in w ose nature t e differentiae are included& will on t is t eory be !enera& down to t e indi#isible s$ecies" but as it is& some are t ou! t to be !enera and ot ers are not t ou! t to be so. Besides t is& t e differentiae are $rinci$les e#en more t an t e !enera" and if t ese also are $rinci$les& t ere comes to be $ractically an infinite number of $rinci$les& es$ecially if we su$$ose t e i! est !enus to be a $rinci$le.0But a!ain& if unity is more of t e nature of a $rinci$le& and t e indi#isible is one& and e#eryt in! indi#isible is so eit er in 6uantity or in s$ecies& and t at w ic is so in s$ecies is t e $rior& and !enera are di#isible into s$ecies for man is not t e !enus of indi#idual men(& t at w ic is $redicated directly of t e indi#iduals will a#e more unity.0%urt er& in t e case of t in!s in w ic t e distinction of $rior and $osterior is $resent& t at w ic is $redicable of t ese t in!s cannot be somet in! a$art from t em 'e.!. if two is t e first of numbers& t ere will not be a +umber a$art from t e kinds of numbers" and similarly t ere will not be a %i!ure a$art from t e kinds of fi!ures" and if t e !enera of t ese t in!s do not e*ist a$art from t e s$ecies& t e !enera of ot er t in!s will scarcely do so" for !enera of t ese t in!s are t ou! t to e*ist if any do(. But amon! t e indi#iduals one is not $rior and anot er $osterior. %urt er& w ere one t in! is better and anot er worse& t e better is always $rior" so t at of t ese also no !enus can e*ist. %rom t ese considerations& t en& t e s$ecies $redicated of indi#iduals seem to be $rinci$les rat er t an t e !enera. But a!ain& it is not easy to say in w at sense t ese are to be taken as $rinci$les. %or t e $rinci$le or cause must e*ist alon!side of t e t in!s of w ic it is t e $rinci$le& and must be ca$able of e*istin! in se$aration from t em" but for w at reason s ould we su$$ose any suc t in! to e*ist alon!side of t e indi#idual& e*ce$t t at it is $redicated uni#ersally and of all< But if t is is t e reason& t e t in!s t at are more uni#ersal must be su$$osed to be more of t e nature of $rinci$les" so t at t e i! est !enera would be t e $rinci$les. = 'B( ) ere is a difficulty connected wit t ese& t e ardest of all and t e most necessary to e*amine& and of t is t e discussion now awaits us. 1f& on t e one and& t ere is not in! a$art from indi#idual t in!s& and t e indi#iduals are infinite in number& ow t en is it $ossible to !et knowled!e of t e infinite indi#iduals< %or all t in!s t at we come to know& we come to know in so far as t ey a#e some unity and identity& and in so far as some attribute belon!s to t em uni#ersally.

But if t is is necessary& and t ere must be somet in! a$art from t e indi#iduals& it will be necessary t at t e !enera e*ist a$art from t e indi#iduals& eit er t e lowest or t e i! est !enera" but we found by discussion .ust now t at t is is im$ossible. %urt er& if we admit in t e fullest sense t at somet in! e*ists a$art from t e concrete t in!& w ene#er somet in! is $redicated of t e matter& must t ere& if t ere is somet in! a$art& be somet in! a$art from eac set of indi#iduals& or from some and not from ot ers& or from none< 'A( 1f t ere is not in! a$art from indi#iduals& t ere will be no ob.ect of t ou! t& but all t in!s will be ob.ects of sense& and t ere will not be knowled!e of anyt in!& unless we say t at sensation is knowled!e. %urt er& not in! will be eternal or unmo#able" for all $erce$tible t in!s $eris and are in mo#ement. But if t ere is not in! eternal& neit er can t ere be a $rocess of comin! to be" for t ere must be somet in! t at comes to be& i.e. from w ic somet in! comes to be& and t e ultimate term in t is series cannot a#e come to be& since t e series as a limit and since not in! can come to be out of t at w ic is not. %urt er& if !eneration and mo#ement e*ist t ere must also be a limit" for no mo#ement is infinite& but e#ery mo#ement as an end& and t at w ic is inca$able of com$letin! its comin! to be cannot be in $rocess of comin! to be" and t at w ic as com$leted its comin! to be must e as soon as it as come to be. %urt er& since t e matter e*ists& because it is un!enerated& it is a fortiori reasonable t at t e substance or essence& t at w ic t e matter is at any time comin! to be& s ould e*ist" for if neit er essence nor matter is to be& not in! will be at all& and since t is is im$ossible t ere must be somet in! besides t e concrete t in!& #i2. t e s a$e or form. But a!ain 'B( if we are to su$$ose t is& it is ard to say in w ic cases we are to su$$ose it and in w ic not. %or e#idently it is not $ossible to su$$ose it in all cases" we could not su$$ose t at t ere is a ouse besides t e $articular ouses.0Besides t is& will t e substance of all t e indi#iduals& e.!. of all men& be one< ) is is $arado*ical& for all t e t in!s w ose substance is one are one. But are t e substances many and different< ) is also is unreasonable.0At t e same time& ow does t e matter become eac of t e indi#iduals& and ow is t e concrete t in! t ese two elements< 'C( A!ain& one mi! t ask t e followin! 6uestion also about t e first $rinci$les. 1f t ey are one in kind only& not in! will be numerically one& not e#en unity0itself and bein!0itself" and ow will knowin! e*ist& if t ere is not to be somet in! common to a w ole set of indi#iduals< But if t ere is a common element w ic is numerically one& and eac of t e $rinci$les is one& and t e $rinci$les are not as in t e case of $erce$tible t in!s different for different t in!s 'e.!. since t is $articular syllable is t e same in kind w ene#er it occurs&

t e elements it are also t e same in kind" only in kind& for t ese also& like t e syllable& are numerically different in different conte*ts(&0if it is not like t is but t e $rinci$les of t in!s are numerically one& t ere will be not in! else besides t e elements 'for t ere is no difference of meanin! between ,numerically one, and ,indi#idual," for t is is .ust w at we mean by t e indi#idual0t e numerically one& and by t e uni#ersal we mean t at w ic is $redicable of t e indi#iduals(. ) erefore it will be .ust as if t e elements of articulate sound were limited in number" all t e lan!ua!e in t e world would be confined to t e ABC& since t ere could not be two or more letters of t e same kind. '10( :ne difficulty w ic is as !reat as any as been ne!lected bot by modern $ iloso$ ers and by t eir $redecessors0w et er t e $rinci$les of $eris able and t ose of im$eris able t in!s are t e same or different. 1f t ey are t e same& ow are some t in!s $eris able and ot ers im$eris able& and for w at reason< ) e sc ool of 3esiod and all t e t eolo!ians t ou! t only of w at was $lausible to t emsel#es& and ad no re!ard to us. %or& assertin! t e first $rinci$les to be !ods and born of !ods& t ey say t at t e bein!s w ic did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal" and clearly t ey are usin! words w ic are familiar to t emsel#es& yet w at t ey a#e said about t e #ery a$$lication of t ese causes is abo#e our com$re ension. %or if t e !ods taste of nectar and ambrosia for t eir $leasure& t ese are in no wise t e causes of t eir e*istence" and if t ey taste t em to maintain t eir e*istence& ow can !ods w o need food be eternal<0But into t e subtleties of t e myt olo!ists it is not wort our w ile to in6uire seriously" t ose& owe#er& w o use t e lan!ua!e of $roof we must cross0e*amine and ask w y& after all& t in!s w ic consist of t e same elements are& some of t em& eternal in nature& w ile ot ers $eris . /ince t ese $ iloso$ ers mention no cause& and it is unreasonable t at t in!s s ould be as t ey say& e#idently t e $rinci$les or causes of t in!s cannot be t e same. 4#en t e man w om one mi! t su$$ose to s$eak most consistently04m$edocles& e#en e as made t e same mistake" for e maintains t at strife is a $rinci$le t at causes destruction& but e#en strife would seem no less to $roduce e#eryt in!& e*ce$t t e :ne" for all t in!s e*ce$tin! 8od $roceed from strife. At least e says>0 %rom w ic all t at was and is and will be ereafter0 )rees& and men and women& took t eir !rowt & And beasts and birds and water0nouris ed fis & And lon!0a!ed !ods. ) e im$lication is e#ident e#en a$art from t ese words" for if strife ad not been $resent in t in!s& all t in!s would a#e been one& accordin! to im" for w en t ey a#e come to!et er& ,t en strife stood

outermost., 3ence it also follows on is t eory t at 8od most blessed is less wise t an all ot ers" for e does not know all t e elements" for e as in im no strife& and knowled!e is of t e like by t e like. ,%or by eart &, e says& we see eart & by water water& By et er !odlike et er& by fire wastin! fire& Lo#e by lo#e& and strife by !loomy strife. But0and t is is t e $oint we started from t is at least is e#ident& t at on is t eory it follows t at strife is as muc t e cause of e*istence as of destruction. And similarly lo#e is not s$ecially t e cause of e*istence" for in collectin! t in!s into t e :ne it destroys all ot er t in!s. And at t e same time 4m$edocles mentions no cause of t e c an!e itself& e*ce$t t at t in!s are so by nature. But w en strife at last wa*ed !reat in t e limbs of t e /$ ere& And s$ran! to assert its ri! ts as t e time was fulfilled W ic is fi*ed for t em in turn by a mi! ty oat . ) is im$lies t at c an!e was necessary" but e s ows no cause of t e necessity. But yet so far at least e alone s$eaks consistently" for e does not make some t in!s $eris able and ot ers im$eris able& but makes all $eris able e*ce$t t e elements. ) e difficulty we are s$eakin! of now is& w y some t in!s are $eris able and ot ers are not& if t ey consist of t e same $rinci$les. Let t is suffice as $roof of t e fact t at t e $rinci$les cannot be t e same. But if t ere are different $rinci$les& one difficulty is w et er t ese also will be im$eris able or $eris able. %or if t ey are $eris able& e#idently t ese also must consist of certain elements 'for all t in!s t at $eris & $eris by bein! resol#ed into t e elements of w ic t ey consist(" so t at it follows t at $rior to t e $rinci$les t ere are ot er $rinci$les. But t is is im$ossible& w et er t e $rocess as a limit or $roceeds to infinity. %urt er& ow will $eris able t in!s e*ist& if t eir $rinci$les are to be annulled< But if t e $rinci$les are im$eris able& w y will t in!s com$osed of some im$eris able $rinci$les be $eris able& w ile t ose com$osed of t e ot ers are im$eris able< ) is is not $robable& but is eit er im$ossible or needs muc $roof. %urt er& no one as e#en tried to maintain different $rinci$les" t ey maintain t e same $rinci$les for all t in!s. But t ey swallow t e difficulty we stated first as if t ey took it to be somet in! triflin!. '11( ) e in6uiry t at is bot t e ardest of all and t e most

necessary for knowled!e of t e trut is w et er bein! and unity are t e substances of t in!s& and w et er eac of t em& wit out bein! anyt in! else& is bein! or unity res$ecti#ely& or we must in6uire w at bein! and unity are& wit t e im$lication t at t ey a#e some ot er underlyin! nature. %or some $eo$le t ink t ey are of t e former& ot ers t ink t ey are of t e latter c aracter. -lato and t e -yt a!oreans t ou! t bein! and unity were not in! else& but t is was t eir nature& t eir essence bein! .ust unity and bein!. But t e natural $ iloso$ ers take a different line" e.!. 4m$edocles0as t ou! reducin! to somet in! more intelli!ible0says w at unity is" for e would seem to say it is lo#e> at least& t is is for all t in!s t e cause of t eir bein! one. :t ers say t is unity and bein!& of w ic t in!s consist and a#e been made& is fire& and ot ers say it is air. A similar #iew is e*$ressed by t ose w o make t e elements more t an one" for t ese also must say t at unity and bein! are $recisely all t e t in!s w ic t ey say are $rinci$les. 'A( 1f we do not su$$ose unity and bein! to be substances& it follows t at none of t e ot er uni#ersals is a substance" for t ese are most uni#ersal of all& and if t ere is no unity itself or bein!0itself& t ere will scarcely be in any ot er case anyt in! a$art from w at are called t e indi#iduals. %urt er& if unity is not a substance& e#idently number also will not e*ist as an entity se$arate from t e indi#idual t in!s" for number is units& and t e unit is $recisely a certain kind of one. But 'B( if t ere is a unity0itself and a bein! itself& unity and bein! must be t eir substance" for it is not somet in! else t at is $redicated uni#ersally of t e t in!s t at are and are one& but .ust unity and bein!. But if t ere is to be a bein!0itself and a unity0itself& t ere is muc difficulty in seein! ow t ere will be anyt in! else besides t ese&01 mean& ow t in!s will be more t an one in number. %or w at is different from bein! does not e*ist& so t at it necessarily follows& accordin! to t e ar!ument of -armenides& t at all t in!s t at are are one and t is is bein!. ) ere are ob.ections to bot #iews. %or w et er unity is not a substance or t ere is a unity0itself& number cannot be a substance. We a#e already said w y t is result follows if unity is not a substance" and if it is& t e same difficulty arises as arose wit re!ard to bein!. %or w ence is t ere to be anot er one besides unity0itself< 1t must be not0one" but all t in!s are eit er one or many& and of t e many eac is one. %urt er& if unity0itself is indi#isible& accordin! to Deno,s $ostulate it will be not in!. %or t at w ic neit er w en added makes a t in! !reater nor w en subtracted makes it less& e asserts to a#e no bein!& e#idently assumin! t at w ate#er as bein! is a s$atial ma!nitude. And if it is a ma!nitude& it is cor$oreal" for t e cor$oreal as bein! in e#ery dimension& w ile t e ot er ob.ects of

mat ematics& e.!. a $lane or a line& added in one way will increase w at t ey are added to& but in anot er way will not do so& and a $oint or a unit does so in no way. But& since is t eory is of a low order& and an indi#isible t in! can e*ist in suc a way as to a#e a defence e#en a!ainst im 'for t e indi#isible w en added will make t e number& t ou! not t e si2e& !reater(&0yet ow can a ma!nitude $roceed from one suc indi#isible or from many< 1t is like sayin! t at t e line is made out of $oints. But e#en if ore su$$oses t e case to be suc t at& as some say& number $roceeds from unity0itself and somet in! else w ic is not one& none t e less we must in6uire w y and ow t e $roduct will be sometimes a number and sometimes a ma!nitude& if t e not0one was ine6uality and was t e same $rinci$le in eit er case. %or it is not e#ident ow ma!nitudes could $roceed eit er from t e one and t is $rinci$le& or from some number and t is $rinci$le. 5 '1=( A 6uestion connected wit t ese is w et er numbers and bodies and $lanes and $oints are substances of a kind& or not. 1f t ey are not& it baffles us to say w at bein! is and w at t e substances of t in!s are. %or modifications and mo#ements and relations and dis$ositions and ratios do not seem to indicate t e substance of anyt in!" for all are $redicated of a sub.ect& and none is a ,t is,. And as to t e t in!s w ic mi! t seem most of all to indicate substance& water and eart and fire and air& of w ic com$osite bodies consist& eat and cold and t e like are modifications of t ese& not substances& and t e body w ic is t us modified alone $ersists as somet in! real and as a substance. But& on t e ot er and& t e body is surely less of a substance t an t e surface& and t e surface t an t e line& and t e line t an t e unit and t e $oint. %or t e body is bounded by t ese" and t ey are t ou! t to be ca$able of e*istin! wit out body& but body inca$able of e*istin! wit out t ese. ) is is w y& w ile most of t e $ iloso$ ers and t e earlier amon! t em t ou! t t at substance and bein! were identical wit body& and t at all ot er t in!s were modifications of t is& so t at t e first $rinci$les of t e bodies were t e first $rinci$les of bein!& t e more recent and t ose w o were eld to be wiser t ou! t numbers were t e first $rinci$les. As we said& t en& if t ese are not substance& t ere is no substance and no bein! at all" for t e accidents of t ese it cannot be ri! t to call bein!s. But if t is is admitted& t at lines and $oints are substance more t an bodies& but we do not see to w at sort of bodies t ese could belon! 'for t ey cannot be in $erce$tible bodies(& t ere can be no substance.0%urt er& t ese are all e#idently di#isions of body&0one in breadt & anot er in de$t & anot er in len!t . Besides t is& no sort of s a$e is $resent in t e solid more t an any ot er" so t at if t e

3ermes is not in t e stone& neit er is t e alf of t e cube in t e cube as somet in! determinate" t erefore t e surface is not in it eit er" for if any sort of surface were in it& t e surface w ic marks off t e alf of t e cube would be in it too. And t e same account a$$lies to t e line and to t e $oint and t e unit. ) erefore& if on t e one and body is in t e i! est de!ree substance& and on t e ot er and t ese t in!s are so more t an body& but t ese are not e#en instances of substance& it baffles us to say w at bein! is and w at t e substance of t in!s is.0%or besides w at as been said& t e 6uestions of !eneration and instruction confront us wit furt er $arado*es. %or if substance& not a#in! e*isted before& now e*ists& or a#in! e*isted before& afterwards does not e*ist& t is c an!e is t ou! t to be accom$anied by a $rocess of becomin! or $eris in!" but $oints and lines and surfaces cannot be in $rocess eit er of becomin! or of $eris in!& w en t ey at one time e*ist and at anot er do not. %or w en bodies come into contact or are di#ided& t eir boundaries simultaneously become one in t e one case w en t ey touc & and two in t e ot er0w en t ey are di#ided" so t at w en t ey a#e been $ut to!et er one boundary does not e*ist but as $eris ed& and w en t ey a#e been di#ided t e boundaries e*ist w ic before did not e*ist 'for it cannot be said t at t e $oint& w ic is indi#isible& was di#ided into two(. And if t e boundaries come into bein! and cease to be& from w at do t ey come into bein!< A similar account may also be !i#en of t e ,now, in time" for t is also cannot be in $rocess of comin! into bein! or of ceasin! to be& but yet seems to be always different& w ic s ows t at it is not a substance. And e#idently t e same is true of $oints and lines and $lanes" for t e same ar!ument a$$lies& since t ey are all alike eit er limits or di#isions. @ 1n !eneral one mi! t raise t e 6uestion w y after all& besides $erce$tible t in!s and t e intermediates& we a#e to look for anot er class of t in!s& i.e. t e %orms w ic we $osit. 1f it is for t is reason& because t e ob.ects of mat ematics& w ile t ey differ from t e t in!s in t is world in some ot er res$ect& differ not at all in t at t ere are many of t e same kind& so t at t eir first $rinci$les cannot be limited in number '.ust as t e elements of all t e lan!ua!e in t is sensible world are not limited in number& but in kind& unless one takes t e elements of t is indi#idual syllable or of t is indi#idual articulate sound0w ose elements will be limited e#en in number" so is it also in t e case of t e intermediates" for t ere also t e members of t e same kind are infinite in number(& so t at if t ere are not0besides $erce$tible and mat ematical ob.ects0ot ers suc as some maintain t e %orms to be& t ere will be no substance w ic is one in number& but only in kind&

nor will t e first $rinci$les of t in!s be determinate in number& but only in kind>0if t en t is must be so& t e %orms also must t erefore be eld to e*ist. 4#en if t ose w o su$$ort t is #iew do not e*$ress it articulately& still t is is w at t ey mean& and t ey must be maintainin! t e %orms .ust because eac of t e %orms is a substance and none is by accident. But if we are to su$$ose bot t at t e %orms e*ist and t at t e $rinci$les are one in number& not in kind& we a#e mentioned t e im$ossible results t at necessarily follow. '13( Closely connected wit t is is t e 6uestion w et er t e elements e*ist $otentially or in some ot er manner. 1f in some ot er way& t ere will be somet in! else $rior to t e first $rinci$les" for t e $otency is $rior to t e actual cause& and it is not necessary for e#eryt in! $otential to be actual.0But if t e elements e*ist $otentially& it is $ossible t at e#eryt in! t at is s ould not be. %or e#en t at w ic is not yet is ca$able of bein!" for t at w ic is not comes to be& but not in! t at is inca$able of bein! comes to be. '15( We must not only raise t ese 6uestions about t e first $rinci$les& but also ask w et er t ey are uni#ersal or w at we call indi#iduals. 1f t ey are uni#ersal& t ey will not be substances" for e#eryt in! t at is common indicates not a ,t is, but a ,suc ,& but substance is a ,t is,. And if we are to be allowed to lay it down t at a common $redicate is a ,t is, and a sin!le t in!& /ocrates will be se#eral animals0 imself and ,man, and ,animal,& if eac of t ese indicates a ,t is, and a sin!le t in!. 1f& t en& t e $rinci$les are uni#ersals& t ese uni#ersal. ) erefore if t ere is to be results follow" if t ey are not uni#ersals but of knowled!e of t e $rinci$les t ere must be t e nature of indi#iduals& t ey will not be ot er $rinci$les $rior to t em& namely t ose knowable" for t e knowled!e of anyt in! is t at are uni#ersally $redicated of t em. Book 1E 1 )34R4 is a science w ic in#esti!ates bein! as bein! and t e attributes w ic belon! to t is in #irtue of its own nature. +ow t is is not t e same as any of t e so0called s$ecial sciences" for none of t ese ot ers treats uni#ersally of bein! as bein!. ) ey cut off a $art of bein! and in#esti!ate t e attribute of t is $art" t is is w at t e mat ematical sciences for instance do. +ow since we are seekin! t e first $rinci$les and t e i! est causes& clearly t ere must be some t in! to w ic t ese belon! in #irtue of its own nature. 1f t en t ose w o sou! t t e elements of e*istin! t in!s were seekin! t ese same $rinci$les& it is necessary t at t e elements must be elements of bein! not by accident but .ust because it is bein!. ) erefore it is of bein! as bein! t at we also must !ras$

t e first causes. 5 ) ere are many senses in w ic a t in! may be said to ,be,& but all t at ,is, is related to one central $oint& one definite kind of t in!& and is not said to ,be, by a mere ambi!uity. 4#eryt in! w ic is ealt y is related to ealt & one t in! in t e sense t at it $reser#es ealt & anot er in t e sense t at it $roduces it& anot er in t e sense t at it is a sym$tom of ealt & anot er because it is ca$able of it. And t at w ic is medical is relati#e to t e medical art& one t in! bein! called medical because it $ossesses it& anot er because it is naturally ada$ted to it& anot er because it is a function of t e medical art. And we s all find ot er words used similarly to t ese. /o& too& t ere are many senses in w ic a t in! is said to be& but all refer to one startin!0$oint" some t in!s are said to be because t ey are substances& ot ers because t ey are affections of substance& ot ers because t ey are a $rocess towards substance& or destructions or $ri#ations or 6ualities of substance& or $roducti#e or !enerati#e of substance& or of t in!s w ic are relati#e to substance& or ne!ations of one of t ese t in! of substance itself. 1t is for t is reason t at we say e#en of non0bein! t at it is nonbein!. As& t en& t ere is one science w ic deals wit all ealt y t in!s& t e same a$$lies in t e ot er cases also. %or not only in t e case of t in!s w ic a#e one common notion does t e in#esti!ation belon! to one science& but also in t e case of t in!s w ic are related to one common nature" for e#en t ese in a sense a#e one common notion. 1t is clear t en t at it is t e work of one science also to study t e t in!s t at are& 6ua bein!.0But e#eryw ere science deals c iefly wit t at w ic is $rimary& and on w ic t e ot er t in!s de$end& and in #irtue of w ic t ey !et t eir names. 1f& t en& t is is substance& it will be of substances t at t e $ iloso$ er must !ras$ t e $rinci$les and t e causes. +ow for eac one class of t in!s& as t ere is one $erce$tion& so t ere is one science& as for instance !rammar& bein! one science& in#esti!ates all articulate sounds. 3ence to in#esti!ate all t e s$ecies of bein! 6ua bein! is t e work of a science w ic is !enerically one& and to in#esti!ate t e se#eral s$ecies is t e work of t e s$ecific $arts of t e science. 1f& now& bein! and unity are t e same and are one t in! in t e sense t at t ey are im$lied in one anot er as $rinci$le and cause are& not in t e sense t at t ey are e*$lained by t e same definition 't ou! it makes no difference e#en if we su$$ose t em to be like t at0in fact t is would e#en stren!t en our case(" for ,one man, and ,man, are t e same t in!& and so are ,e*istent man, and ,man,& and t e doublin! of t e words in ,one man and one e*istent man, does not

e*$ress anyt in! different 'it is clear t at t e two t in!s are not se$arated eit er in comin! to be or in ceasin! to be(" and similarly ,one e*istent man, adds not in! to ,e*istent man,& and t at it is ob#ious t at t e addition in t ese cases means t e same t in!& and unity is not in! a$art from bein!" and if& furt er& t e substance of eac t in! is one in no merely accidental way& and similarly is from its #ery nature somet in! t at is>0all t is bein! so& t ere must be e*actly as many s$ecies of bein! as of unity. And to in#esti!ate t e essence of t ese is t e work of a science w ic is !enerically one01 mean& for instance& t e discussion of t e same and t e similar and t e ot er conce$ts of t is sort" and nearly all contraries may be referred to t is ori!in" let us take t em as a#in! been in#esti!ated in t e ,/election of Contraries,. And t ere are as many $arts of $ iloso$ y as t ere are kinds of substance& so t at t ere must necessarily be amon! t em a first $ iloso$ y and one w ic follows t is. %or bein! falls immediately into !enera" for w ic reason t e sciences too will corres$ond to t ese !enera. %or t e $ iloso$ er is like t e mat ematician& as t at word is used" for mat ematics also as $arts& and t ere is a first and a second science and ot er successi#e ones wit in t e s$ ere of mat ematics. +ow since it is t e work of one science to in#esti!ate o$$osites& and $lurality is o$$osed to unity0and it belon!s to one science to in#esti!ate t e ne!ation and t e $ri#ation because in bot cases we are really in#esti!atin! t e one t in! of w ic t e ne!ation or t e $ri#ation is a ne!ation or $ri#ation 'for we eit er say sim$ly t at t at t in! is not $resent& or t at it is not $resent in some $articular class" in t e latter case difference is $resent o#er and abo#e w at is im$lied in ne!ation" for ne!ation means .ust t e absence of t e t in! in 6uestion& w ile in $ri#ation t ere is also em$loyed an underlyin! nature of w ic t e $ri#ation is asserted(>0in #iew of all t ese facts& t e contraries of t e conce$ts we named abo#e& t e ot er and t e dissimilar and t e une6ual& and e#eryt in! else w ic is deri#ed eit er from t ese or from $lurality and unity& must fall wit in t e $ro#ince of t e science abo#e named. And contrariety is one of t ese conce$ts" for contrariety is a kind of difference& and difference is a kind of ot erness. ) erefore& since t ere are many senses in w ic a t in! is said to be one& t ese terms also will a#e many senses& but yet it belon!s to one science to know t em all" for a term belon!s to different sciences not if it as different senses& but if it as not one meanin! and its definitions cannot be referred to one central meanin!. And since all t in!s are referred to t at w ic is $rimary& as for instance all t in!s w ic are called one are referred to t e $rimary one& we must say t at t is olds !ood also of t e same and t e ot er and of contraries in !eneral" so t at after distin!uis in! t e #arious

senses of eac & we must t en e*$lain by reference to w at is $rimary in t e case of eac of t e $redicates in 6uestion& sayin! ow t ey are related to it" for some will be called w at t ey are called because t ey $ossess it& ot ers because t ey $roduce it& and ot ers in ot er suc ways. 1t is e#ident& t en& t at it belon!s to one science to be able to !i#e an account of t ese conce$ts as well as of substance 't is was one of t e 6uestions in our book of $roblems(& and t at it is t e function of t e $ iloso$ er to be able to in#esti!ate all t in!s. %or if it is not t e function of t e $ iloso$ er& w o is it w o will in6uire w et er /ocrates and /ocrates seated are t e same t in!& or w et er one t in! as one contrary& or w at contrariety is& or ow many meanin!s it as< And similarly wit all ot er suc 6uestions. /ince& t en& t ese are essential modifications of unity 6ua unity and of bein! 6ua bein!& not 6ua numbers or lines or fire& it is clear t at it belon!s to t is science to in#esti!ate bot t e essence of t ese conce$ts and t eir $ro$erties. And t ose w o study t ese $ro$erties err not by lea#in! t e s$ ere of $ iloso$ y& but by for!ettin! t at substance& of w ic t ey a#e no correct idea& is $rior to t ese ot er t in!s. %or number 6ua number as $eculiar attributes& suc as oddness and e#enness& commensurability and e6uality& e*cess and defect& and t ese belon! to numbers eit er in t emsel#es or in relation to one anot er. And similarly t e solid and t e motionless and t at w ic is in motion and t e wei! tless and t at w ic as wei! t a#e ot er $eculiar $ro$erties. /o too t ere are certain $ro$erties $eculiar to bein! as suc & and it is about t ese t at t e $ iloso$ er as to in#esti!ate t e trut .0An indication of t is may be mentioned> dialecticians and so$ ists assume t e same !uise as t e $ iloso$ er& for so$ istic is Wisdom w ic e*ists only in semblance& and dialecticians embrace all t in!s in t eir dialectic& and bein! is common to all t in!s" but e#idently t eir dialectic embraces t ese sub.ects because t ese are $ro$er to $ iloso$ y.0%or so$ istic and dialectic turn on t e same class of t in!s as $ iloso$ y& but t is differs from dialectic in t e nature of t e faculty re6uired and from so$ istic in res$ect of t e $ur$ose of t e $ iloso$ ic life. Dialectic is merely critical w ere $ iloso$ y claims to know& and so$ istic is w at a$$ears to be $ iloso$ y but is not. A!ain& in t e list of contraries one of t e two columns is $ri#ati#e& and all contraries are reducible to bein! and non0bein!& and to unity and $lurality& as for instance rest belon!s to unity and mo#ement to $lurality. And nearly all t inkers a!ree t at bein! and substance are com$osed of contraries" at least all name contraries as t eir first $rinci$les0some name odd and e#en& some ot and cold& some limit and t e unlimited& some lo#e and strife. And all t e ot ers as well are e#idently reducible to unity and $lurality 't is reduction we must take for !ranted(& and t e $rinci$les stated by ot er t inkers

fall entirely under t ese as t eir !enera. 1t is ob#ious t en from t ese considerations too t at it belon!s to one science to e*amine bein! 6ua bein!. %or all t in!s are eit er contraries or com$osed of contraries& and unity and $lurality are t e startin!0$oints of all contraries. And t ese belon! to one science& w et er t ey a#e or a#e not one sin!le meanin!. -robably t e trut is t at t ey a#e not" yet e#en if ,one, as se#eral meanin!s& t e ot er meanin!s will be related to t e $rimary meanin! 'and similarly in t e case of t e contraries(& e#en if bein! or unity is not a uni#ersal and t e same in e#ery instance or is not se$arable from t e $articular instances 'as in fact it $robably is not" t e unity is in some cases t at of common reference& in some cases t at of serial succession(. And for t is reason it does not belon! to t e !eometer to in6uire w at is contrariety or com$leteness or unity or bein! or t e same or t e ot er& but only to $resu$$ose t ese conce$ts and reason from t is startin!0$oint.00:b#iously t en it is t e work of one science to e*amine bein! 6ua bein!& and t e attributes w ic belon! to it 6ua bein!& and t e same science will e*amine not only substances but also t eir attributes& bot t ose abo#e named and t e conce$ts ,$rior, and ,$osterior,& ,!enus, and ,s$ecies,& ,w ole, and ,$art,& and t e ot ers of t is sort. 3 We must state w et er it belon!s to one or to different sciences to in6uire into t e trut s w ic are in mat ematics called a*ioms& and into substance. 4#idently& t e in6uiry into t ese also belon!s to one science& and t at t e science of t e $ iloso$ er" for t ese trut s old !ood for e#eryt in! t at is& and not for some s$ecial !enus a$art from ot ers. And all men use t em& because t ey are true of bein! 6ua bein! and eac !enus as bein!. But men use t em .ust so far as to satisfy t eir $ur$oses" t at is& as far as t e !enus to w ic t eir demonstrations refer e*tends. ) erefore since t ese trut s clearly old !ood for all t in!s 6ua bein! 'for t is is w at is common to t em(& to im w o studies bein! 6ua bein! belon!s t e in6uiry into t ese as well. And for t is reason no one w o is conductin! a s$ecial in6uiry tries to say anyt in! about t eir trut or falsity&0neit er t e !eometer nor t e arit metician. /ome natural $ iloso$ ers indeed a#e done so& and t eir $rocedure was intelli!ible enou! " for t ey t ou! t t at t ey alone were in6uirin! about t e w ole of nature and about bein!. But since t ere is one kind of t inker w o is abo#e e#en t e natural $ iloso$ er 'for nature is only one $articular !enus of bein!(& t e discussion of t ese trut s also will belon! to im w ose in6uiry is uni#ersal and deals wit $rimary substance. - ysics also is a kind of Wisdom& but it is not t e first kind.0And t e attem$ts of some of t ose w o discuss t e terms on w ic trut s ould be acce$ted& are due to a want of trainin! in

lo!ic" for t ey s ould know t ese t in!s already w en t ey come to a s$ecial study& and not be in6uirin! into t em w ile t ey are listenin! to lectures on it. 4#idently t en it belon!s to t e $ iloso$ er& i.e. to im w o is studyin! t e nature of all substance& to in6uire also into t e $rinci$les of syllo!ism. But e w o knows best about eac !enus must be able to state t e most certain $rinci$les of is sub.ect& so t at e w ose sub.ect is e*istin! t in!s 6ua e*istin! must be able to state t e most certain $rinci$les of all t in!s. ) is is t e $ iloso$ er& and t e most certain $rinci$le of all is t at re!ardin! w ic it is im$ossible to be mistaken" for suc a $rinci$le must be bot t e best known 'for all men may be mistaken about t in!s w ic t ey do not know(& and non0 y$ot etical. %or a $rinci$le w ic e#ery one must a#e w o understands anyt in! t at is& is not a y$ot esis" and t at w ic e#ery one must know w o knows anyt in!& e must already a#e w en e comes to a s$ecial study. 4#idently t en suc a $rinci$le is t e most certain of all" w ic $rinci$le t is is& let us $roceed to say. 1t is& t at t e same attribute cannot at t e same time belon! and not belon! to t e same sub.ect and in t e same res$ect" we must $resu$$ose& to !uard a!ainst dialectical ob.ections& any furt er 6ualifications w ic mi! t be added. ) is& t en& is t e most certain of all $rinci$les& since it answers to t e definition !i#en abo#e. %or it is im$ossible for any one to belie#e t e same t in! to be and not to be& as some t ink 3eraclitus says. %or w at a man says& e does not necessarily belie#e" and if it is im$ossible t at contrary attributes s ould belon! at t e same time to t e same sub.ect 't e usual 6ualifications must be $resu$$osed in t is $remiss too(& and if an o$inion w ic contradicts anot er is contrary to it& ob#iously it is im$ossible for t e same man at t e same time to belie#e t e same t in! to be and not to be" for if a man were mistaken on t is $oint e would a#e contrary o$inions at t e same time. 1t is for t is reason t at all w o are carryin! out a demonstration reduce it to t is as an ultimate belief" for t is is naturally t e startin!0$oint e#en for all t e ot er a*ioms. = ) ere are some w o& as we said& bot t emsel#es assert t at it is $ossible for t e same t in! to be and not to be& and say t at $eo$le can .ud!e t is to be t e case. And amon! ot ers many writers about nature use t is lan!ua!e. But we a#e now $osited t at it is im$ossible for anyt in! at t e same time to be and not to be& and by t is means a#e s own t at t is is t e most indis$utable of all $rinci$les.0/ome indeed demand t at e#en t is s all be demonstrated& but t is t ey do t rou! want of education& for not to know of w at t in!s one s ould demand demonstration& and of w at one s ould not& ar!ues want of education. %or it is im$ossible t at t ere s ould be

demonstration of absolutely e#eryt in! 't ere would be an infinite re!ress& so t at t ere would still be no demonstration(" but if t ere are t in!s of w ic one s ould not demand demonstration& t ese $ersons could not say w at $rinci$le t ey maintain to be more self0e#ident t an t e $resent one. We can& owe#er& demonstrate ne!ati#ely e#en t at t is #iew is im$ossible& if our o$$onent will only say somet in!" and if e says not in!& it is absurd to seek to !i#e an account of our #iews to one w o cannot !i#e an account of anyt in!& in so far as e cannot do so. %or suc a man& as suc & is from t e start no better t an a #e!etable. +ow ne!ati#e demonstration 1 distin!uis from demonstration $ro$er& because in a demonstration one mi! t be t ou! t to be be!!in! t e 6uestion& but if anot er $erson is res$onsible for t e assum$tion we s all a#e ne!ati#e $roof& not demonstration. ) e startin!0$oint for all suc ar!uments is not t e demand t at our o$$onent s all say t at somet in! eit er is or is not 'for t is one mi! t $er a$s take to be a be!!in! of t e 6uestion(& but t at e s all say somet in! w ic is si!nificant bot for imself and for anot er" for t is is necessary& if e really is to say anyt in!. %or& if e means not in!& suc a man will not be ca$able of reasonin!& eit er wit imself or wit anot er. But if any one !rants t is& demonstration will be $ossible" for we s all already a#e somet in! definite. ) e $erson res$onsible for t e $roof& owe#er& is not e w o demonstrates but e w o listens" for w ile disownin! reason e listens to reason. And a!ain e w o admits t is as admitted t at somet in! is true a$art from demonstration 'so t at not e#eryt in! will be ,so and not so,(. %irst t en t is at least is ob#iously true& t at t e word ,be, or ,not be, as a definite meanin!& so t at not e#eryt in! will be ,so and not so,. A!ain& if ,man, as one meanin!& let t is be ,two0footed animal," by a#in! one meanin! 1 understand t is>0if ,man, means ,?,& t en if A is a man ,?, will be w at ,bein! a man, means for im. '1t makes no difference e#en if one were to say a word as se#eral meanin!s& if only t ey are limited in number" for to eac definition t ere mi! t be assi!ned a different word. %or instance& we mi! t say t at ,man, as not one meanin! but se#eral& one of w ic would a#e one definition& #i2. ,two0footed animal,& w ile t ere mi! t be also se#eral ot er definitions if only t ey were limited in number" for a $eculiar name mi! t be assi!ned to eac of t e definitions. 1f& owe#er& t ey were not limited but one were to say t at t e word as an infinite number of meanin!s& ob#iously reasonin! would be im$ossible" for not to a#e one meanin! is to a#e no meanin!& and if words a#e no meanin! our reasonin! wit one anot er& and indeed wit oursel#es& as been anni ilated" for it is im$ossible to t ink of anyt in! if we do not t ink of one t in!" but if t is is $ossible& one name mi! t be assi!ned to t is t in!.(

Let it be assumed t en& as was said at t e be!innin!& t at t e name as a meanin! and as one meanin!" it is im$ossible& t en& t at ,bein! a man, s ould mean $recisely ,not bein! a man,& if ,man, not only si!nifies somet in! about one sub.ect but also as one si!nificance 'for we do not identify , a#in! one si!nificance, wit ,si!nifyin! somet in! about one sub.ect,& since on t at assum$tion e#en ,musical, and ,w ite, and ,man, would a#e ad one si!nificance& so t at all t in!s would a#e been one" for t ey would all a#e ad t e same si!nificance(. And it will not be $ossible to be and not to be t e same t in!& e*ce$t in #irtue of an ambi!uity& .ust as if one w om we call ,man,& ot ers were to call ,not0man," but t e $oint in 6uestion is not t is& w et er t e same t in! can at t e same time be and not be a man in name& but w et er it can in fact. +ow if ,man, and ,not0man, mean not in! different& ob#iously ,not bein! a man, will mean not in! different from ,bein! a man," so t at ,bein! a man, will be ,not bein! a man," for t ey will be one. %or bein! one means t is0bein! related as ,raiment, and ,dress, are& if t eir definition is one. And if ,bein! a man, and ,bein! a not0man, are to be one& t ey must mean one t in!. But it was s own earlier, t at t ey mean different t in!s.0) erefore& if it is true to say of anyt in! t at it is a man& it must be a two0footed animal 'for t is was w at ,man, meant(" and if t is is necessary& it is im$ossible t at t e same t in! s ould not at t at time be a two0footed animal" for t is is w at ,bein! necessary, means0t at it is im$ossible for t e t in! not to be. 1t is& t en& im$ossible t at it s ould be at t e same time true to say t e same t in! is a man and is not a man. ) e same account olds !ood wit re!ard to ,not bein! a man,& for ,bein! a man, and ,bein! a not0man, mean different t in!s& since e#en ,bein! w ite, and ,bein! a man, are different" for t e former terms are muc more different so t at t ey must a fortiori mean different t in!s. And if any one says t at ,w ite, means one and t e same t in! as ,man,& a!ain we s all say t e same as w at was said before& t at it would follow t at all t in!s are one& and not only o$$osites. But if t is is im$ossible& t en w at we a#e maintained will follow& if our o$$onent will only answer our 6uestion. And if& w en one asks t e 6uestion sim$ly& e adds t e contradictories& e is not answerin! t e 6uestion. %or t ere is not in! to $re#ent t e same t in! from bein! bot a man and w ite and countless ot er t in!s> but still& if one asks w et er it is or is not true to say t at t is is a man& our o$$onent must !i#e an answer w ic means one t in!& and not add t at ,it is also w ite and lar!e,. %or& besides ot er reasons& it is im$ossible to enumerate its accidental attributes& w ic are infinite in number" let im& t en& enumerate eit er all or none. /imilarly& t erefore& e#en if t e same t in! is a t ousand times a man and a not0man& e must not&

in answerin! t e 6uestion w et er t is is a man& add t at it is also at t e same time a not0man& unless e is bound to add also all t e ot er accidents& all t at t e sub.ect is or is not" and if e does t is& e is not obser#in! t e rules of ar!ument. And in !eneral t ose w o say t is do away wit substance and essence. %or t ey must say t at all attributes are accidents& and t at t ere is no suc t in! as ,bein! essentially a man, or ,an animal,. %or if t ere is to be any suc t in! as ,bein! essentially a man, t is will not be ,bein! a not0man, or ,not bein! a man, 'yet t ese are ne!ations of it(" for t ere was one t in! w ic it meant& and t is was t e substance of somet in!. And denotin! t e substance of a t in! means t at t e essence of t e t in! is not in! else. But if its bein! essentially a man is to be t e same as eit er bein! essentially a not0man or essentially not bein! a man& t en its essence will be somet in! else. ) erefore our o$$onents must say t at t ere cannot be suc a definition of anyt in!& but t at all attributes are accidental" for t is is t e distinction between substance and accident0,w ite, is accidental to man& because t ou! e is w ite& w iteness is not is essence. But if all statements are accidental& t ere will be not in! $rimary about w ic t ey are made& if t e accidental always im$lies $redication about a sub.ect. ) e $redication& t en& must !o on ad infinitum. But t is is im$ossible" for not e#en more t an two terms can be combined in accidental $redication. %or '1( an accident is not an accident of an accident& unless it be because bot are accidents of t e same sub.ect. 1 mean& for instance& t at t e w ite is musical and t e latter is w ite& only because bot are accidental to man. But '5( /ocrates is musical& not in t is sense& t at bot terms are accidental to somet in! else. /ince t en some $redicates are accidental in t is and some in t at sense& 'a( t ose w ic are accidental in t e latter sense& in w ic w ite is accidental to /ocrates& cannot form an infinite series in t e u$ward direction" e.!. /ocrates t e w ite as not yet anot er accident" for no unity can be !ot out of suc a sum. +or a!ain 'b( will ,w ite, a#e anot er term accidental to it& e.!. ,musical,. %or t is is no more accidental to t at t an t at is to t is" and at t e same time we a#e drawn t e distinction& t at w ile some $redicates are accidental in t is sense& ot ers are so in t e sense in w ic ,musical, is accidental to /ocrates" and t e accident is an accident of an accident not in cases of t e latter kind& but only in cases of t e ot er kind& so t at not all terms will be accidental. ) ere must& t en& e#en so be somet in! w ic denotes substance. And if t is is so& it as been s own t at contradictories cannot be $redicated at t e same time. A!ain& if all contradictory statements are true of t e same sub.ect at t e same time& e#idently all t in!s will be one. %or t e same t in! will be a trireme& a wall& and a man& if of e#eryt in! it

is $ossible eit er to affirm or to deny anyt in! 'and t is $remiss must be acce$ted by t ose w o s are t e #iews of -rota!oras(. %or if any one t inks t at t e man is not a trireme& e#idently e is not a trireme" so t at e also is a trireme& if& as t ey say& contradictory statements are bot true. And we t us !et t e doctrine of Ana*a!oras& t at all t in!s are mi*ed to!et er" so t at not in! really e*ists. ) ey seem& t en& to be s$eakin! of t e indeterminate& and& w ile fancyin! t emsel#es to be s$eakin! of bein!& t ey are s$eakin! about non0bein!" for it is t at w ic e*ists $otentially and not in com$lete reality t at is indeterminate. But t ey must $redicate of e#ery sub.ect t e affirmation or t e ne!ation of e#ery attribute. %or it is absurd if of eac sub.ect its own ne!ation is to be $redicable& w ile t e ne!ation of somet in! else w ic cannot be $redicated of it is not to be $redicable of it" for instance& if it is true to say of a man t at e is not a man& e#idently it is also true to say t at e is eit er a trireme or not a trireme. 1f& t en& t e affirmati#e can be $redicated& t e ne!ati#e must be $redicable too" and if t e affirmati#e is not $redicable& t e ne!ati#e& at least& will be more $redicable t an t e ne!ati#e of t e sub.ect itself. 1f& t en& e#en t e latter ne!ati#e is $redicable& t e ne!ati#e of ,trireme, will be also $redicable" and& if t is is $redicable& t e affirmati#e will be so too. ) ose& t en& w o maintain t is #iew are dri#en to t is conclusion& and to t e furt er conclusion t at it is not necessary eit er to assert or to deny. %or if it is true t at a t in! is a man and a not0man& e#idently also it will be neit er a man nor a not0man. %or to t e two assertions t ere answer two ne!ations& and if t e former is treated as a sin!le $ro$osition com$ounded out of two& t e latter also is a sin!le $ro$osition o$$osite to t e former. A!ain& eit er t e t eory is true in all cases& and a t in! is bot w ite and not0w ite& and e*istent and non0e*istent& and all ot er assertions and ne!ations are similarly com$atible or t e t eory is true of some statements and not of ot ers. And if not of all& t e e*ce$tions will be contradictories of w ic admittedly only one is true" but if of all& a!ain eit er t e ne!ation will be true w ere#er t e assertion is& and t e assertion true w ere#er t e ne!ation is& or t e ne!ation will be true w ere t e assertion is& but t e assertion not always true w ere t e ne!ation is. And 'a( in t e latter case t ere will be somet in! w ic fi*edly is not& and t is will be an indis$utable belief" and if non0bein! is somet in! indis$utable and knowable& t e o$$osite assertion will be more knowable. But 'b( if it is e6ually $ossible also to assert all t at it is $ossible to deny& one must eit er be sayin! w at is true w en one se$arates t e $redicates 'and says& for instance& t at a t in! is w ite& and a!ain t at it is not0w ite(& or not. And if 'i( it is not true to a$$ly t e $redicates se$arately& our o$$onent is not sayin! w at e

$rofesses to say& and also not in! at all e*ists" but ow could non0e*istent t in!s s$eak or walk& as e does< Also all t in!s would on t is #iew be one& as as been already said& and man and 8od and trireme and t eir contradictories will be t e same. %or if contradictories can be $redicated alike of eac sub.ect& one t in! will in no wise differ from anot er" for if it differ& t is difference will be somet in! true and $eculiar to it. And 'ii( if one may wit trut a$$ly t e $redicates se$arately& t e abo#e0mentioned result follows none t e less& and& furt er& it follows t at all would t en be ri! t and all would be in error& and our o$$onent imself confesses imself to be in error.0And at t e same time our discussion wit im is e#idently about not in! at all" for e says not in!. %or e says neit er ,yes, nor ,no,& but ,yes and no," and a!ain e denies bot of t ese and says ,neit er yes nor no," for ot erwise t ere would already be somet in! definite. A!ain if w en t e assertion is true& t e ne!ation is false& and w en t is is true& t e affirmation is false& it will not be $ossible to assert and deny t e same t in! truly at t e same time. But $er a$s t ey mi! t say t is was t e #ery 6uestion at issue. A!ain& is e in error w o .ud!es eit er t at t e t in! is so or t at it is not so& and is e ri! t w o .ud!es bot < 1f e is ri! t& w at can t ey mean by sayin! t at t e nature of e*istin! t in!s is of t is kind< And if e is not ri! t& but more ri! t t an e w o .ud!es in t e ot er way& bein! will already be of a definite nature& and t is will be true& and not at t e same time also not true. But if all are alike bot wron! and ri! t& one w o is in t is condition will not be able eit er to s$eak or to say anyt in! intelli!ible" for e says at t e same time bot ,yes, and ,no., And if e makes no .ud!ement but ,t inks, and ,does not t ink,& indifferently& w at difference will t ere be between im and a #e!etable<0) us& t en& it is in t e i! est de!ree e#ident t at neit er any one of t ose w o maintain t is #iew nor any one else is really in t is $osition. %or w y does a man walk to ;e!ara and not stay at ome& w en e t inks e ou! t to be walkin! t ere< W y does e not walk early some mornin! into a well or o#er a $reci$ice& if one a$$ens to be in is way< W y do we obser#e im !uardin! a!ainst t is& e#idently because e does not t ink t at fallin! in is alike !ood and not !ood< 4#idently& t en& e .ud!es one t in! to be better and anot er worse. And if t is is so& e must also .ud!e one t in! to be a man and anot er to be not0a0man& one t in! to be sweet and anot er to be not0sweet. %or e does not aim at and .ud!e all t in!s alike& w en& t inkin! it desirable to drink water or to see a man& e $roceeds to aim at t ese t in!s" yet e ou! t& if t e same t in! were alike a man and not0a0man. But& as was said& t ere is no one w o does not ob#iously a#oid some t in!s and not ot ers. ) erefore& as it seems& all men make un6ualified .ud!ements& if not about all t in!s& still

about w at is better and worse. And if t is is not knowled!e but o$inion& t ey s ould be all t e more an*ious about t e trut & as a sick man s ould be more an*ious about is ealt t an one w o is ealt y" for e w o as o$inions is& in com$arison wit t e man w o knows& not in a ealt y state as far as t e trut is concerned. A!ain& owe#er muc all t in!s may be ,so and not so,& still t ere is a more and a less in t e nature of t in!s" for we s ould not say t at two and t ree are e6ually e#en& nor is e w o t inks four t in!s are fi#e e6ually wron! wit im w o t inks t ey are a t ousand. 1f t en t ey are not e6ually wron!& ob#iously one is less wron! and t erefore more ri! t. 1f t en t at w ic as more of any 6uality is nearer t e norm& t ere must be some trut to w ic t e more true is nearer. And e#en if t ere is not& still t ere is already somet in! better founded and liker t e trut & and we s all a#e !ot rid of t e un6ualified doctrine w ic would $re#ent us from determinin! anyt in! in our t ou! t. 5 %rom t e same o$inion $roceeds t e doctrine of -rota!oras& and bot doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. %or on t e one and& if all o$inions and a$$earances are true& all statements must be at t e same time true and false. %or many men old beliefs in w ic t ey conflict wit one anot er& and t ink t ose mistaken w o a#e not t e same o$inions as t emsel#es" so t at t e same t in! must bot be and not be. And on t e ot er and& if t is is so& all o$inions must be true" for t ose w o are mistaken and t ose w o are ri! t are o$$osed to one anot er in t eir o$inions" if& t en& reality is suc as t e #iew in 6uestion su$$oses& all will be ri! t in t eir beliefs. 4#idently& t en& bot doctrines $roceed from t e same way of t inkin!. But t e same met od of discussion must not be used wit all o$$onents" for some need $ersuasion& and ot ers com$ulsion. ) ose w o a#e been dri#en to t is $osition by difficulties in t eir t inkin! can easily be cured of t eir i!norance" for it is not t eir e*$ressed ar!ument but t eir t ou! t t at one as to meet. But t ose w o ar!ue for t e sake of ar!ument can be cured only by refutin! t e ar!ument as e*$ressed in s$eec and in words. ) ose w o really feel t e difficulties a#e been led to t is o$inion by obser#ation of t e sensible world. '1( ) ey t ink t at contradictories or contraries are true at t e same time& because t ey see contraries comin! into e*istence out of t e same t in!. 1f& t en& t at w ic is not cannot come to be& t e t in! must a#e e*isted before as bot contraries alike& as Ana*a!oras says all is mi*ed in all& and Democritus too" for e says t e #oid and t e full e*ist alike in e#ery $art& and yet one of t ese is bein!& and t e ot er non0bein!. )o t ose& t en& w ose belief rests on t ese !rounds& we s all say t at in a sense t ey s$eak ri! tly and in a sense t ey err. %or ,t at w ic

is, as two meanin!s& so t at in some sense a t in! can come to be out of t at w ic is not& w ile in some sense it cannot& and t e same t in! can at t e same time be in bein! and not in bein!0but not in t e same res$ect. %or t e same t in! can be $otentially at t e same time two contraries& but it cannot actually. And a!ain we s all ask t em to belie#e t at amon! e*istin! t in!s t ere is also anot er kind of substance to w ic neit er mo#ement nor destruction nor !eneration at all belon!s. And '5( similarly some a#e inferred from obser#ation of t e sensible world t e trut of a$$earances. %or t ey t ink t at t e trut s ould not be determined by t e lar!e or small number of t ose w o old a belief& and t at t e same t in! is t ou! t sweet by some w en t ey taste it& and bitter by ot ers& so t at if all were ill or all were mad& and only two or t ree were well or sane& t ese would be t ou! t ill and mad& and not t e ot ers. And a!ain& t ey say t at many of t e ot er animals recei#e im$ressions contrary to ours" and t at e#en to t e senses of eac indi#idual& t in!s do not always seem t e same. W ic & t en& of t ese im$ressions are true and w ic are false is not ob#ious" for t e one set is no more true t an t e ot er& but bot are alike. And t is is w y Democritus& at any rate& says t at eit er t ere is no trut or to us at least it is not e#ident. And in !eneral it is because t ese t inkers su$$ose knowled!e to be sensation& and t is to be a $ ysical alteration& t at t ey say t at w at a$$ears to our senses must be true" for it is for t ese reasons t at bot 4m$edocles and Democritus and& one may almost say& all t e ot ers a#e fallen #ictims to o$inions of t is sort. %or 4m$edocles says t at w en men c an!e t eir condition t ey c an!e t eir knowled!e" %or wisdom increases in men accordin! to w at is before t em. And elsew ere e says t at>0 /o far as t eir nature c an!ed& so far to t em always Came c an!ed t ou! ts into mind. And -armenides also e*$resses imself in t e same way> %or as at eac time t e muc 0bent limbs are com$osed& /o is t e mind of men" for in eac and all men ,)is one t in! t inks0t e substance of t eir limbs> %or t at of w ic t ere is more is t ou! t. A sayin! of Ana*a!oras to some of is friends is also related&0t at t in!s would be for t em suc as t ey su$$osed t em to

be. And t ey say t at 3omer also e#idently ad t is o$inion& because e made 3ector& w en e was unconscious from t e blow& lie ,t inkin! ot er t ou! ts,&0w ic im$lies t at e#en t ose w o are bereft of t ou! t a#e t ou! ts& t ou! not t e same t ou! ts. 4#idently& t en& if bot are forms of knowled!e& t e real t in!s also are at t e same time ,bot so and not so,. And it is in t is direction t at t e conse6uences are most difficult. %or if t ose w o a#e seen most of suc trut as is $ossible for us 'and t ese are t ose w o seek and lo#e it most(0if t ese a#e suc o$inions and e*$ress t ese #iews about t e trut & is it not natural t at be!inners in $ iloso$ y s ould lose eart< %or to seek t e trut would be to follow flyin! !ame. But t e reason w y t ese t inkers eld t is o$inion is t at w ile t ey were in6uirin! into t e trut of t at w ic is& t ey t ou! t& ,t at w ic is, was identical wit t e sensible world" in t is& owe#er& t ere is lar!ely $resent t e nature of t e indeterminate0of t at w ic e*ists in t e $eculiar sense w ic we a#e e*$lained" and t erefore& w ile t ey s$eak $lausibly& t ey do not say w at is true 'for it is fittin! to $ut t e matter so rat er t an as 4$ic armus $ut it a!ainst ?eno$ anes(. And a!ain& because t ey saw t at all t is world of nature is in mo#ement and t at about t at w ic c an!es no true statement can be made& t ey said t at of course& re!ardin! t at w ic e#eryw ere in e#ery res$ect is c an!in!& not in! could truly be affirmed. 1t was t is belief t at blossomed into t e most e*treme of t e #iews abo#e mentioned& t at of t e $rofessed 3eracliteans& suc as was eld by Cratylus& w o finally did not t ink it ri! t to say anyt in! but only mo#ed is fin!er& and critici2ed 3eraclitus for sayin! t at it is im$ossible to ste$ twice into t e same ri#er" for e t ou! t one could not do it e#en once. But we s all say in answer to t is ar!ument also t at w ile t ere is some .ustification for t eir t inkin! t at t e c an!in!& w en it is c an!in!& does not e*ist& yet it is after all dis$utable" for t at w ic is losin! a 6uality as somet in! of t at w ic is bein! lost& and of t at w ic is comin! to be& somet in! must already be. And in !eneral if a t in! is $eris in!& will be $resent somet in! t at e*ists" and if a t in! is comin! to be& t ere must be somet in! from w ic it comes to be and somet in! by w ic it is !enerated& and t is $rocess cannot !o on ad infinitum.0But& lea#in! t ese ar!uments& let us insist on t is& t at it is not t e same t in! to c an!e in 6uantity and in 6uality. 8rant t at in 6uantity a t in! is not constant" still it is in res$ect of its form t at we know eac t in!.0And a!ain& it would be fair to critici2e t ose w o old t is #iew for assertin! about t e w ole material uni#erse w at t ey saw only in a minority e#en of sensible t in!s. %or only t at re!ion of t e sensible world w ic immediately surrounds us is always in $rocess

of destruction and !eneration" but t is is0so to s$eak0not e#en a fraction of t e w ole& so t at it would a#e been .uster to ac6uit t is $art of t e world because of t e ot er $art& t an to condemn t e ot er because of t is.0And a!ain& ob#iously we s all make to t em also t e same re$ly t at we made lon! a!o" we must s ow t em and $ersuade t em t at t ere is somet in! w ose nature is c an!eless. 1ndeed& t ose w o say t at t in!s at t e same time are and are not& s ould in conse6uence say t at all t in!s are at rest rat er t an t at t ey are in mo#ement" for t ere is not in! into w ic t ey can c an!e& since all attributes belon! already to all sub.ects. Re!ardin! t e nature of trut & we must maintain t at not e#eryt in! w ic a$$ears is true" firstly& because e#en if sensation0at least of t e ob.ect $eculiar to t e sense in 6uestion0is not false& still a$$earance is not t e same as sensation.0A!ain& it is fair to e*$ress sur$rise at our o$$onents, raisin! t e 6uestion w et er ma!nitudes are as !reat& and colours are of suc a nature& as t ey a$$ear to $eo$le at a distance& or as t ey a$$ear to t ose close at and& and w et er t ey are suc as t ey a$$ear to t e ealt y or to t e sick& and w et er t ose t in!s are ea#y w ic a$$ear so to t e weak or t ose w ic a$$ear so to t e stron!& and t ose t in!s true w ic a$$ear to t e slee in! or to t e wakin!. %or ob#iously t ey do not t ink t ese to be o$en 6uestions" no one& at least& if w en e is in Libya e as fancied one ni! t t at e is in At ens& starts for t e concert all.0And a!ain wit re!ard to t e future& as -lato says& surely t e o$inion of t e $ ysician and t at of t e i!norant man are not e6ually wei! ty& for instance& on t e 6uestion w et er a man will !et well or not.0And a!ain& amon! sensations t emsel#es t e sensation of a forei!n ob.ect and t at of t e a$$ro$riate ob.ect& or t at of a kindred ob.ect and t at of t e ob.ect of t e sense in 6uestion& are not e6ually aut oritati#e& but in t e case of colour si! t& not taste& as t e aut ority& and in t e case of fla#our taste& not si! t" eac of w ic senses ne#er says at t e same time of t e same ob.ect t at it simultaneously is ,so and not so,.0But not e#en at different times does one sense disa!ree about t e 6uality& but only about t at to w ic t e 6uality belon!s. 1 mean& for instance& t at t e same wine mi! t seem& if eit er it or one,s body c an!ed& at one time sweet and at anot er time not sweet" but at least t e sweet& suc as it is w en it e*ists& as ne#er yet c an!ed& but one is always ri! t about it& and t at w ic is to be sweet is of necessity of suc and suc a nature. 9et all t ese #iews destroy t is necessity& lea#in! not in! to be of necessity& as t ey lea#e no essence of anyt in!" for t e necessary cannot be in t is way and also in t at& so t at if anyt in! is of necessity& it will not be ,bot so and not so,. And& in !eneral& if only t e sensible e*ists& t ere would be not in! if animate t in!s were not" for t ere would be no faculty of

sense. +ow t e #iew t at neit er t e sensible 6ualities nor t e sensations would e*ist is doubtless true 'for t ey are affections of t e $ercei#er(& but t at t e substrata w ic cause t e sensation s ould not e*ist e#en a$art from sensation is im$ossible. %or sensation is surely not t e sensation of itself& but t ere is somet in! beyond t e sensation& w ic must be $rior to t e sensation" for t at w ic mo#es is $rior in nature to t at w ic is mo#ed& and if t ey are correlati#e terms& t is is no less t e case. @ ) ere are& bot amon! t ose w o a#e t ese con#ictions and amon! t ose w o merely $rofess t ese #iews& some w o raise a difficulty by askin!& w o is to be t e .ud!e of t e ealt y man& and in !eneral w o is likely to .ud!e ri! tly on eac class of 6uestions. But suc in6uiries are like $u22lin! o#er t e 6uestion w et er we are now aslee$ or awake. And all suc 6uestions a#e t e same meanin!. ) ese $eo$le demand t at a reason s all be !i#en for e#eryt in!" for t ey seek a startin!0$oint& and t ey seek to !et t is by demonstration& w ile it is ob#ious from t eir actions t at t ey a#e no con#iction. But t eir mistake is w at we a#e stated it to be" t ey seek a reason for t in!s for w ic no reason can be !i#en" for t e startin!0$oint of demonstration is not demonstration. ) ese& t en& mi! t be easily $ersuaded of t is trut & for it is not difficult to !ras$" but t ose w o seek merely com$ulsion in ar!ument seek w at is im$ossible" for t ey demand to be allowed to contradict t emsel#es0a claim w ic contradicts itself from t e #ery first.0But if not all t in!s are relati#e& but some are self0e*istent& not e#eryt in! t at a$$ears will be true" for t at w ic a$$ears is a$$arent to some one" so t at e w o says all t in!s t at a$$ear are true& makes all t in!s relati#e. And& t erefore& t ose w o ask for an irresistible ar!ument& and at t e same time demand to be called to account for t eir #iews& must !uard t emsel#es by sayin! t at t e trut is not t at w at a$$ears e*ists& but t at w at a$$ears e*ists for im to w om it a$$ears& and w en& and to t e sense to w ic & and under t e conditions under w ic it a$$ears. And if t ey !i#e an account of t eir #iew& but do not !i#e it in t is way& t ey will soon find t emsel#es contradictin! t emsel#es. %or it is $ossible t at t e same t in! may a$$ear to be oney to t e si! t& but not to t e taste& and t at& since we a#e two eyes& t in!s may not a$$ear t e same to eac & if t eir si! t is unlike. %or to t ose w o for t e reasons named some time a!o say t at w at a$$ears is true& and t erefore t at all t in!s are alike false and true& for t in!s do not a$$ear eit er t e same to all men or always t e same to t e same man& but often a#e contrary a$$earances at t e same time 'for touc says t ere are two ob.ects w en we cross our fin!ers& w ile si! t says t ere is one(0to t ese we s all say ,yes& but not to t e same sense

and in t e same $art of it and under t e same conditions and at t e same time,& so t at w at a$$ears will be wit t ese 6ualifications true. But $er a$s for t is reason t ose w o ar!ue t us not because t ey feel a difficulty but for t e sake of ar!ument& s ould say t at t is is not true& but true for t is man. And as as been said before& t ey must make e#eryt in! relati#e0relati#e to o$inion and $erce$tion& so t at not in! eit er as come to be or will be wit out some one,s first t inkin! so. But if t in!s a#e come to be or will be& e#idently not all t in!s will be relati#e to o$inion.0A!ain& if a t in! is one& it is in relation to one t in! or to a definite number of t in!s" and if t e same t in! is bot alf and e6ual& it is not to t e double t at t e e6ual is correlati#e. 1f& t en& in relation to t at w ic t inks& man and t at w ic is t ou! t are t e same& man will not be t at w ic t inks& but only t at w ic is t ou! t. And if eac t in! is to be relati#e to t at w ic t inks& t at w ic t inks will be relati#e to an infinity of s$ecifically different t in!s. Let t is& t en& suffice to s ow '1( t at t e most indis$utable of all beliefs is t at contradictory statements are not at t e same time true& and '5( w at conse6uences follow from t e assertion t at t ey are& and '3( w y $eo$le do assert t is. +ow since it is im$ossible t at contradictories s ould be at t e same time true of t e same t in!& ob#iously contraries also cannot belon! at t e same time to t e same t in!. %or of contraries& one is a $ri#ation no less t an it is a contrary0and a $ri#ation of t e essential nature" and $ri#ation is t e denial of a $redicate to a determinate !enus. 1f& t en& it is im$ossible to affirm and deny truly at t e same time& it is also im$ossible t at contraries s ould belon! to a sub.ect at t e same time& unless bot belon! to it in $articular relations& or one in a $articular relation and one wit out 6ualification. A But on t e ot er and t ere cannot be an intermediate between contradictories& but of one sub.ect we must eit er affirm or deny any one $redicate. ) is is clear& in t e first $lace& if we define w at t e true and t e false are. )o say of w at is t at it is not& or of w at is not t at it is& is false& w ile to say of w at is t at it is& and of w at is not t at it is not& is true" so t at e w o says of anyt in! t at it is& or t at it is not& will say eit er w at is true or w at is false" but neit er w at is nor w at is not is said to be or not to be.0A!ain& t e intermediate between t e contradictories will be so eit er in t e way in w ic !rey is between black and w ite& or as t at w ic is neit er man nor orse is between man and orse. 'a( 1f it were of t e latter kind& it could not c an!e into t e e*tremes 'for c an!e is from not0!ood to !ood& or from !ood to not0!ood(& but as a matter of fact w en t ere is

an intermediate it is always obser#ed to c an!e into t e e*tremes. %or t ere is no c an!e e*ce$t to o$$osites and to t eir intermediates. 'b( But if it is really intermediate& in t is way too t ere would a#e to be a c an!e to w ite& w ic was not from not0w ite" but as it is& t is is ne#er seen.0A!ain& e#ery ob.ect of understandin! or reason t e understandin! eit er affirms or denies0t is is ob#ious from t e definition0w ene#er it says w at is true or false. W en it connects in one way by assertion or ne!ation& it says w at is true& and w en it does so in anot er way& w at is false.0A!ain& t ere must be an intermediate between all contradictories& if one is not ar!uin! merely for t e sake of ar!ument" so t at it will be $ossible for a man to say w at is neit er true nor untrue& and t ere will be a middle between t at w ic is and t at w ic is not& so t at t ere will also be a kind of c an!e intermediate between !eneration and destruction.0A!ain& in all classes in w ic t e ne!ation of an attribute in#ol#es t e assertion of its contrary& e#en in t ese t ere will be an intermediate" for instance& in t e s$ ere of numbers t ere will be number w ic is neit er odd nor not0odd. But t is is im$ossible& as is ob#ious from t e definition.0A!ain& t e $rocess will !o on ad infinitum& and t e number of realities will be not only alf as !reat a!ain& but e#en !reater. %or a!ain it will be $ossible to deny t is intermediate wit reference bot to its assertion and to its ne!ation& and t is new term will be some definite t in!" for its essence is somet in! different.0A!ain& w en a man& on bein! asked w et er a t in! is w ite& says ,no,& e as denied not in! e*ce$t t at it is" and its not bein! is a ne!ation. /ome $eo$le a#e ac6uired t is o$inion as ot er $arado*ical o$inions a#e been ac6uired" w en men cannot refute eristical ar!uments& t ey !i#e in to t e ar!ument and a!ree t at t e conclusion is true. ) is& t en& is w y some e*$ress t is #iew" ot ers do so because t ey demand a reason for e#eryt in!. And t e startin!0$oint in dealin! wit all suc $eo$le is definition. +ow t e definition rests on t e necessity of t eir meanin! somet in!" for t e form of words of w ic t e word is a si!n will be its definition.0W ile t e doctrine of 3eraclitus& t at all t in!s are and are not& seems to make e#eryt in! true& t at of Ana*a!oras& t at t ere is an intermediate between t e terms of a contradiction& seems to make e#eryt in! false" for w en t in!s are mi*ed& t e mi*ture is neit er !ood nor not0!ood& so t at one cannot say anyt in! t at is true. B 1n #iew of t ese distinctions it is ob#ious t at t e one0sided t eories w ic some $eo$le e*$ress about all t in!s cannot be #alid0on t e one and t e t eory t at not in! is true 'for& say t ey& t ere is not in! to $re#ent e#ery statement from bein! like t e statement

,t e dia!onal of a s6uare is commensurate wit t e side,(& on t e ot er and t e t eory t at e#eryt in! is true. ) ese #iews are $ractically t e same as t at of 3eraclitus" for e w o says t at all t in!s are true and all are false also makes eac of t ese statements se$arately& so t at since t ey are im$ossible& t e double statement must be im$ossible too.0A!ain& t ere are ob#iously contradictories w ic cannot be at t e same time true0nor on t e ot er and can all statements be false" yet t is would seem more $ossible in t e li! t of w at as been said.0But a!ainst all suc #iews we must $ostulate& as we said abo#e&, not t at somet in! is or is not& but t at somet in! as a meanin!& so t at we must ar!ue from a definition& #i2. by assumin! w at falsity or trut means. 1f t at w ic it is true to affirm is not in! ot er t an t at w ic it is false to deny& it is im$ossible t at all statements s ould be false" for one side of t e contradiction must be true. A!ain& if it is necessary wit re!ard to e#eryt in! eit er to assert or to deny it& it is im$ossible t at bot s ould be false" for it is one side of t e contradiction t at is false.0) erefore all suc #iews are also e*$osed to t e often e*$ressed ob.ection& t at t ey destroy t emsel#es. %or e w o says t at e#eryt in! is true makes e#en t e statement contrary to is own true& and t erefore is own not true 'for t e contrary statement denies t at it is true(& w ile e w o says e#eryt in! is false makes imself also false.0And if t e former $erson e*ce$ts t e contrary statement& sayin! it alone is not true& w ile t e latter e*ce$ts is own as bein! not false& none t e less t ey are dri#en to $ostulate t e trut or falsity of an infinite number of statements" for t at w ic says t e true statement is true is true& and t is $rocess will !o on to infinity. 4#idently& a!ain& t ose w o say all t in!s are at rest are not ri! t& nor are t ose w o say all t in!s are in mo#ement. %or if all t in!s are at rest& t e same statements will always be true and t e same always false&0but t is ob#iously c an!es" for e w o makes a statement& imself at one time was not and a!ain will not be. And if all t in!s are in motion& not in! will be true" e#eryt in! t erefore will be false. But it as been s own t at t is is im$ossible. A!ain& it must be t at w ic is t at c an!es" for c an!e is from somet in! to somet in!. But a!ain it is not t e case t at all t in!s are at rest or in motion sometimes& and not in! for e#er" for t ere is somet in! w ic always mo#es t e t in!s t at are in motion& and t e first mo#er is itself unmo#ed. Book E 1 ,B481++1+8, means '1( t at $art of a t in! from w ic one would start first& e.! a line or a road as a be!innin! in eit er of t e contrary directions. '5( ) at from w ic eac t in! would best be

ori!inated& e.!. e#en in learnin! we must sometimes be!in not from t e first $oint and t e be!innin! of t e sub.ect& but from t e $oint from w ic we s ould learn most easily. '=( ) at from w ic & as an immanent $art& a t in! first comes to be& e&!& as t e keel of a s i$ and t e foundation of a ouse& w ile in animals some su$$ose t e eart& ot ers t e brain& ot ers some ot er $art& to be of t is nature. '=( ) at from w ic & not as an immanent $art& a t in! first comes to be& and from w ic t e mo#ement or t e c an!e naturally first be!ins& as a c ild comes from its fat er and its mot er& and a fi! t from abusi#e lan!ua!e. '5( ) at at w ose will t at w ic is mo#ed is mo#ed and t at w ic c an!es c an!es& e.!. t e ma!istracies in cities& and oli!arc ies and monarc ies and tyrannies& are called ar c ai& and so are t e arts& and of t ese es$ecially t e arc itectonic arts. '@( ) at from w ic a t in! can first be known&0t is also is called t e be!innin! of t e t in!& e.!. t e y$ot eses are t e be!innin!s of demonstrations. 'Causes are s$oken of in an e6ual number of senses" for all causes are be!innin!s.( 1t is common& t en& to all be!innin!s to be t e first $oint from w ic a t in! eit er is or comes to be or is known" but of t ese some are immanent in t e t in! and ot ers are outside. 3ence t e nature of a t in! is a be!innin!& and so is t e element of a t in!& and t ou! t and will& and essence& and t e final cause0for t e !ood and t e beautiful are t e be!innin! bot of t e knowled!e and of t e mo#ement of many t in!s. 5 ,Cause, means '1( t at from w ic & as immanent material& a t in! comes into bein!& e.!. t e bron2e is t e cause of t e statue and t e sil#er of t e saucer& and so are t e classes w ic include t ese. '5( ) e form or $attern& i.e. t e definition of t e essence& and t e classes w ic include t is 'e.!. t e ratio 5>1 and number in !eneral are causes of t e octa#e(& and t e $arts included in t e definition. '3( ) at from w ic t e c an!e or t e restin! from c an!e first be!ins" e.!. t e ad#iser is a cause of t e action& and t e fat er a cause of t e c ild& and in !eneral t e maker a cause of t e t in! made and t e c an!e0$roducin! of t e c an!in!. '=( ) e end& i.e. t at for t e sake of w ic a t in! is" e.!. ealt is t e cause of walkin!. %or ,W y does one walk<, we say" ,t at one may be ealt y," and in s$eakin! t us we t ink we a#e !i#en t e cause. ) e same is true of all t e means t at inter#ene before t e end& w en somet in! else as $ut t e $rocess in motion& as e.!. t innin! or $ur!in! or dru!s or instruments inter#ene before ealt is reac ed" for all t ese are for t e sake of t e end& t ou! t ey differ from one anot er in t at some are instruments and ot ers are actions. ) ese& t en& are $ractically all t e senses in w ic causes are s$oken of& and as t ey are s$oken of in se#eral senses it follows bot t at t ere are se#eral causes of t e same t in!& and in no

accidental sense 'e.!. bot t e art of scul$ture and t e bron2e are causes of t e statue not in res$ect of anyt in! else but 6ua statue" not& owe#er& in t e same way& but t e one as matter and t e ot er as source of t e mo#ement(& and t at t in!s can be causes of one anot er 'e.!. e*ercise of !ood condition& and t e latter of e*ercise" not& owe#er& in t e same way& but t e one as end and t e ot er as source of mo#ement(.0A!ain& t e same t in! is t e cause of contraries" for t at w ic w en $resent causes a $articular t in!& we sometimes c ar!e& w en absent& wit t e contrary& e.!. we im$ute t e s i$wreck to t e absence of t e steersman& w ose $resence was t e cause of safety" and bot 0t e $resence and t e $ri#ation0are causes as sources of mo#ement. All t e causes now mentioned fall under four senses w ic are t e most ob#ious. %or t e letters are t e cause of syllables& and t e material is t e cause of manufactured t in!s& and fire and eart and all suc t in!s are t e causes of bodies& and t e $arts are causes of t e w ole& and t e y$ot eses are causes of t e conclusion& in t e sense t at t ey are t at out of w ic t ese res$ecti#ely are made" but of t ese some are cause as t e substratum 'e.!. t e $arts(& ot ers as t e essence 't e w ole& t e synt esis& and t e form(. ) e semen& t e $ ysician& t e ad#iser& and in !eneral t e a!ent& are all sources of c an!e or of rest. ) e remainder are causes as t e end and t e !ood of t e ot er t in!s" for t at for t e sake of w ic ot er t in!s are tends to be t e best and t e end of t e ot er t in!s" let us take it as makin! no difference w et er we call it !ood or a$$arent !ood. ) ese& t en& are t e causes& and t is is t e number of t eir kinds& but t e #arieties of causes are many in number& t ou! w en summari2ed t ese also are com$arati#ely few. Causes are s$oken of in many senses& and e#en of t ose w ic are of t e same kind some are causes in a $rior and ot ers in a $osterior sense& e.!. bot ,t e $ ysician, and ,t e $rofessional man, are causes of ealt & and bot ,t e ratio 5>1, and ,number, are causes of t e octa#e& and t e classes t at include any $articular cause are always causes of t e $articular effect. A!ain& t ere are accidental causes and t e classes w ic include t ese" e.!. w ile in one sense ,t e scul$tor, causes t e statue& in anot er sense ,-olyclitus, causes it& because t e scul$tor a$$ens to be -olyclitus" and t e classes t at include t e accidental cause are also causes& e.!. ,man,0or in !eneral ,animal,0is t e cause of t e statue& because -olyclitus is a man& and man is an animal. :f accidental causes also some are more remote or nearer t an ot ers& as& for instance& if ,t e w ite, and ,t e musical, were called causes of t e statue& and not only ,-olyclitus, or ,man,. But besides all t ese #arieties of causes& w et er $ro$er or accidental& some are called causes as bein! able to act& ot ers as actin!" e.!. t e cause of t e ouse,s bein! built is a builder& or a

builder w o is buildin!.0) e same #ariety of lan!ua!e will be found wit re!ard to t e effects of causes" e.!. a t in! may be called t e cause of t is statue or of a statue or in !eneral of an ima!e& and of t is bron2e or of bron2e or of matter in !eneral" and similarly in t e case of accidental effects. A!ain& bot accidental and $ro$er causes may be s$oken of in combination" e.!. we may say not ,-olyclitus, nor ,t e scul$tor, but ,-olyclitus t e scul$tor,. 9et all t ese are but si* in number& w ile eac is s$oken of in two ways" for 'A( t ey are causes eit er as t e indi#idual& or as t e !enus& or as t e accidental& or as t e !enus t at includes t e accidental& and t ese eit er as combined& or as taken sim$ly" and 'B( all may be taken as actin! or as a#in! a ca$acity. But t ey differ inasmuc as t e actin! causes& i.e. t e indi#iduals& e*ist& or do not e*ist& simultaneously wit t e t in!s of w ic t ey are causes& e.!. t is $articular man w o is ealin!& wit t is $articular man w o is reco#erin! ealt & and t is $articular builder wit t is $articular t in! t at is bein! built" but t e $otential causes are not always in t is case" for t e ouse does not $eris at t e same time as t e builder. 3 ,4lement, means '1( t e $rimary com$onent immanent in a t in!& and indi#isible in kind into ot er kinds" e.!. t e elements of s$eec are t e $arts of w ic s$eec consists and into w ic it is ultimately di#ided& w ile t ey are no lon!er di#ided into ot er forms of s$eec different in kind from t em. 1f t ey are di#ided& t eir $arts are of t e same kind& as a $art of water is water 'w ile a $art of t e syllable is not a syllable(. /imilarly t ose w o s$eak of t e elements of bodies mean t e t in!s into w ic bodies are ultimately di#ided& w ile t ey are no lon!er di#ided into ot er t in!s differin! in kind" and w et er t e t in!s of t is sort are one or more& t ey call t ese elements. ) e so0called elements of !eometrical $roofs& and in !eneral t e elements of demonstrations& a#e a similar c aracter" for t e $rimary demonstrations& eac of w ic is im$lied in many demonstrations& are called elements of demonstrations" and t e $rimary syllo!isms& w ic a#e t ree terms and $roceed by means of one middle& are of t is nature. '5( -eo$le also transfer t e word ,element, from t is meanin! and a$$ly it to t at w ic & bein! one and small& is useful for many $ur$oses" for w ic reason w at is small and sim$le and indi#isible is called an element. 3ence come t e facts t at t e most uni#ersal t in!s are elements 'because eac of t em bein! one and sim$le is $resent in a $lurality of t in!s& eit er in all or in as many as $ossible(& and t at unity and t e $oint are t ou! t by some to be first $rinci$les. +ow& since t e so0called !enera are uni#ersal and indi#isible 'for t ere is no definition of t em(& some say t e

!enera are elements& and more so t an t e differentia& because t e !enus is more uni#ersal" for w ere t e differentia is $resent& t e !enus accom$anies it& but w ere t e !enus is $resent& t e differentia is not always so. 1t is common to all t e meanin!s t at t e element of eac t in! is t e first com$onent immanent in eac . = ,+ature, means '1( t e !enesis of !rowin! t in!s0t e meanin! w ic would be su!!ested if one were to $ronounce t e ,u, in $ usis lon!. '5( ) at immanent $art of a !rowin! t in!& from w ic its !rowt first $roceeds. '3( ) e source from w ic t e $rimary mo#ement in eac natural ob.ect is $resent in it in #irtue of its own essence. ) ose t in!s are said to !row w ic deri#e increase from somet in! else by contact and eit er by or!anic unity& or by or!anic ad esion as in t e case of embryos. :r!anic unity differs from contact" for in t e latter case t ere need not be anyt in! besides t e contact& but in or!anic unities t ere is somet in! identical in bot $arts& w ic makes t em !row to!et er instead of merely touc in!& and be one in res$ect of continuity and 6uantity& t ou! not of 6uality.0'=( ,+ature, means t e $rimary material of w ic any natural ob.ect consists or out of w ic it is made& w ic is relati#ely uns a$ed and cannot be c an!ed from its own $otency& as e.!. bron2e is said to be t e nature of a statue and of bron2e utensils& and wood t e nature of wooden t in!s" and so in all ot er cases" for w en a $roduct is made out of t ese materials& t e first matter is $reser#ed t rou! out. %or it is in t is way t at $eo$le call t e elements of natural ob.ects also t eir nature& some namin! fire& ot ers eart & ot ers air& ot ers water& ot ers somet in! else of t e sort& and some namin! more t an one of t ese& and ot ers all of t em.0'5( ,+ature, means t e essence of natural ob.ects& as wit t ose w o say t e nature is t e $rimary mode of com$osition& or as 4m$edocles says>0 +ot in! t at is as a nature& But only mi*in! and $artin! of t e mi*ed& And nature is but a name !i#en t em by men. 3ence as re!ards t e t in!s t at are or come to be by nature& t ou! t at from w ic t ey naturally come to be or are is already $resent& we say t ey a#e not t eir nature yet& unless t ey a#e t eir form or s a$e. ) at w ic com$rises bot of t ese e*ists by nature& e.!. t e animals and t eir $arts" and not only is t e first matter nature 'and t is in two senses& eit er t e first& countin! from t e t in!& or t e first in !eneral" e.!. in t e case of works in bron2e& bron2e is first wit reference to t em& but in !eneral $er a$s water is first& if all t in!s t at can be melted are water(& but also t e form or essence& w ic is t e end of t e $rocess of becomin!.0'@( By an

e*tension of meanin! from t is sense of ,nature, e#ery essence in !eneral as come to be called a ,nature,& because t e nature of a t in! is one kind of essence. %rom w at as been said& t en& it is $lain t at nature in t e $rimary and strict sense is t e essence of t in!s w ic a#e in t emsel#es& as suc & a source of mo#ement" for t e matter is called t e nature because it is 6ualified to recei#e t is& and $rocesses of becomin! and !rowin! are called nature because t ey are mo#ements $roceedin! from t is. And nature in t is sense is t e source of t e mo#ement of natural ob.ects& bein! $resent in t em some ow& eit er $otentially or in com$lete reality. 5 We call ,necessary, '1( 'a( t at wit out w ic & as a condition& a t in! cannot li#e" e.!. breat in! and food are necessary for an animal" for it is inca$able of e*istin! wit out t ese" 'b( t e conditions wit out w ic !ood cannot be or come to be& or wit out w ic we cannot !et rid or be freed of e#il" e.!. drinkin! t e medicine is necessary in order t at we may be cured of disease& and a man,s sailin! to Ae!ina is necessary in order t at e may !et is money.0'5( ) e com$ulsory and com$ulsion& i.e. t at w ic im$edes and tends to inder& contrary to im$ulse and $ur$ose. %or t e com$ulsory is called necessary 'w ence t e necessary is $ainful& as 4#enus says> ,%or e#ery necessary t in! is e#er irksome,(& and com$ulsion is a form of necessity& as /o$ ocles says> ,But force necessitates me to t is act,. And necessity is eld to be somet in! t at cannot be $ersuaded0and ri! tly& for it is contrary to t e mo#ement w ic accords wit $ur$ose and wit reasonin!.0'3( We say t at t at w ic cannot be ot erwise is necessarily as it is. And from t is sense of ,necessary, all t e ot ers are some ow deri#ed" for a t in! is said to do or suffer w at is necessary in t e sense of com$ulsory& only w en it cannot act accordin! to its im$ulse because of t e com$ellin! forces0w ic im$lies t at necessity is t at because of w ic a t in! cannot be ot erwise" and similarly as re!ards t e conditions of life and of !ood" for w en in t e one case !ood& in t e ot er life and bein!& are not $ossible wit out certain conditions& t ese are necessary& and t is kind of cause is a sort of necessity. A!ain& demonstration is a necessary t in! because t e conclusion cannot be ot erwise& if t ere as been demonstration in t e un6ualified sense" and t e causes of t is necessity are t e first $remisses& i.e. t e fact t at t e $ro$ositions from w ic t e syllo!ism $roceeds cannot be ot erwise. +ow some t in!s owe t eir necessity to somet in! ot er t an t emsel#es" ot ers do not& but are t emsel#es t e source of necessity in ot er t in!s. ) erefore t e necessary in t e $rimary and strict sense is t e sim$le" for t is does not admit of more states

t an one& so t at it cannot e#en be in one state and also in anot er" for if it did it would already be in more t an one. 1f& t en& t ere are any t in!s t at are eternal and unmo#able& not in! com$ulsory or a!ainst t eir nature attac es to t em. @ ,:ne, means '1( t at w ic is one by accident& '5( t at w ic is one by its own nature. '1( 1nstances of t e accidentally one are ,Coriscus and w at is musical,& and ,musical Coriscus, 'for it is t e same t in! to say ,Coriscus and w at is musical,& and ,musical Coriscus,(& and ,w at is musical and w at is .ust,& and ,musical Coriscus and .ust Coriscus,. %or all of t ese are called one by #irtue of an accident& ,w at is .ust and w at is musical, because t ey are accidents of one substance& ,w at is musical and Coriscus, because t e one is an accident of t e ot er" and similarly in a sense ,musical Coriscus, is one wit ,Coriscus, because one of t e $arts of t e $ rase is an accident of t e ot er& i.e. ,musical, is an accident of Coriscus" and ,musical Coriscus, is one wit ,.ust Coriscus, because one $art of eac is an accident of one and t e same sub.ect. ) e case is similar if t e accident is $redicated of a !enus or of any uni#ersal name& e.!. if one says t at man is t e same as ,musical man," for t is is eit er because ,musical, is an accident of man& w ic is one substance& or because bot are accidents of some indi#idual& e.!. Coriscus. Bot & owe#er& do not belon! to im in t e same way& but one $resumably as !enus and included in is substance& t e ot er as a state or affection of t e substance. ) e t in!s& t en& t at are called one in #irtue of an accident& are called so in t is way. '5( :f t in!s t at are called one in #irtue of t eir own nature some 'a( are so called because t ey are continuous& e.!. a bundle is made one by a band& and $ieces of wood are made one by !lue" and a line& e#en if it is bent& is called one if it is continuous& as eac $art of t e body is& e.!. t e le! or t e arm. :f t ese t emsel#es& t e continuous by nature are more one t an t e continuous by art. A t in! is called continuous w ic as by its own nature one mo#ement and cannot a#e any ot er" and t e mo#ement is one w en it is indi#isible& and it is indi#isible in res$ect of time. ) ose t in!s are continuous by t eir own nature w ic are one not merely by contact" for if you $ut $ieces of wood touc in! one anot er& you will not say t ese are one $iece of wood or one body or one continuum of any ot er sort. ) in!s& t en& t at are continuous in any way called one& e#en if t ey admit of bein! bent& and still more t ose w ic cannot be bent" e.!. t e s in or t e t i! is more one t an t e le!& because t e mo#ement of t e le! need not be one. And t e strai! t line is more one t an t e bent" but t at w ic is bent and as an an!le we call bot one and not one& because its mo#ement may be eit er simultaneous or not simultaneous" but t at of t e

strai! t line is always simultaneous& and no $art of it w ic as ma!nitude rests w ile anot er mo#es& as in t e bent line. 'b('i( ) in!s are called one in anot er sense because t eir substratum does not differ in kind" it does not differ in t e case of t in!s w ose kind is indi#isible to sense. ) e substratum meant is eit er t e nearest to& or t e fart est from& t e final state. %or& one t e one and& wine is said to be one and water is said to be one& 6ua indi#isible in kind" and& on t e ot er and& all .uices& e.!. oil and wine& are said to be one& and so are all t in!s t at can be melted& because t e ultimate substratum of all is t e same" for all of t ese are water or air. 'ii( ) ose t in!s also are called one w ose !enus is one t ou! distin!uis ed by o$$osite differentiae0t ese too are all called one because t e !enus w ic underlies t e differentiae is one 'e.!. orse& man& and do! form a unity& because all are animals(& and indeed in a way similar to t at in w ic t e matter is one. ) ese are sometimes called one in t is way& but sometimes it is t e i! er !enus t at is said to be t e same 'if t ey are infimae s$ecies of t eir !enus(0t e !enus abo#e t e $ro*imate !enera" e.!. t e isosceles and t e e6uilateral are one and t e same fi!ure because bot are trian!les" but t ey are not t e same trian!les. 'c( )wo t in!s are called one& w en t e definition w ic states t e essence of one is indi#isible from anot er definition w ic s ows us t e ot er 't ou! in itself e#ery definition is di#isible(. ) us e#en t at w ic as increased or is diminis in! is one& because its definition is one& as& in t e case of $lane fi!ures& is t e definition of t eir form. 1n !eneral t ose t in!s t e t ou! t of w ose essence is indi#isible& and cannot se$arate t em eit er in time or in $lace or in definition& are most of all one& and of t ese es$ecially t ose w ic are substances. %or in !eneral t ose t in!s t at do not admit of di#ision are called one in so far as t ey do not admit of it" e.!. if two t in!s are indistin!uis able 6ua man& t ey are one kind of man" if 6ua animal& one kind of animal" if 6ua ma!nitude& one kind of ma!nitude.0+ow most t in!s are called one because t ey eit er do or a#e or suffer or are related to somet in! else t at is one& but t e t in!s t at are $rimarily called one are t ose w ose substance is one&0and one eit er in continuity or in form or in definition" for we count as more t an one eit er t in!s t at are not continuous& or t ose w ose form is not one& or t ose w ose definition is not one. W ile in a sense we call anyt in! one if it is a 6uantity and continuous& in a sense we do not unless it is a w ole& i.e. unless it as unity of form" e.!. if we saw t e $arts of a s oe $ut to!et er any ow we s ould not call t em one all t e same 'unless because of t eir continuity(" we do t is only if t ey are $ut to!et er so as to be a s oe and to a#e already a certain sin!le form. ) is

is w y t e circle is of all lines most truly one& because it is w ole and com$lete. '3( ) e essence of w at is one is to be some kind of be!innin! of number" for t e first measure is t e be!innin!& since t at by w ic we first know eac class is t e first measure of t e class" t e one& t en& is t e be!innin! of t e knowable re!ardin! eac class. But t e one is not t e same in all classes. %or ere it is a 6uarter0tone& and t ere it is t e #owel or t e consonant" and t ere is anot er unit of wei! t and anot er of mo#ement. But e#eryw ere t e one is indi#isible eit er in 6uantity or in kind. +ow t at w ic is indi#isible in 6uantity is called a unit if it is not di#isible in any dimension and is wit out $osition& a $oint if it is not di#isible in any dimension and as $osition& a line if it is di#isible in one dimension& a $lane if in two& a body if di#isible in 6uantity in all00i.e. in t ree00dimensions. And& re#ersin! t e order& t at w ic is di#isible in two dimensions is a $lane& t at w ic is di#isible in one a line& t at w ic is in no way di#isible in 6uantity is a $oint or a unit&0t at w ic as not $osition a unit& t at w ic as $osition a $oint. A!ain& some t in!s are one in number& ot ers in s$ecies& ot ers in !enus& ot ers by analo!y" in number t ose w ose matter is one& in s$ecies t ose w ose definition is one& in !enus t ose to w ic t e same fi!ure of $redication a$$lies& by analo!y t ose w ic are related as a t ird t in! is to a fourt . ) e latter kinds of unity are always found w en t e former are" e.!. t in!s t at are one in number are also one in s$ecies& w ile t in!s t at are one in s$ecies are not all one in number" but t in!s t at are one in s$ecies are all one in !enus& w ile t in!s t at are so in !enus are not all one in s$ecies but are all one by analo!y" w ile t in!s t at are one by analo!y are not all one in !enus. 4#idently ,many, will a#e meanin!s o$$osite to t ose of ,one," some t in!s are many because t ey are not continuous& ot ers because t eir matter0eit er t e $ro*imate matter or t e ultimate0is di#isible in kind& ot ers because t e definitions w ic state t eir essence are more t an one. A ) in!s are said to ,be, '1( in an accidental sense& '5( by t eir own nature. '1( 1n an accidental sense& e.!. we say ,t e ri! teous doer is musical,& and ,t e man is musical,& and ,t e musician is a man,& .ust as we say ,t e musician builds,& because t e builder a$$ens to be musical or t e musician to be a builder" for ere ,one t in! is anot er, means ,one is an accident of anot er,. /o in t e cases we a#e mentioned" for w en we say ,t e man is musical, and ,t e musician is a man,& or , e w o is $ale is musical, or ,t e musician is $ale,&

t e last two mean t at bot attributes are accidents of t e same t in!" t e first t at t e attribute is an accident of t at w ic is& w ile ,t e musical is a man, means t at ,musical, is an accident of a man. '1n t is sense& too& t e not0$ale is said to be& because t at of w ic it is an accident is.( ) us w en one t in! is said in an accidental sense to be anot er& t is is eit er because bot belon! to t e same t in!& and t is is& or because t at to w ic t e attribute belon!s is& or because t e sub.ect w ic as as an attribute t at of w ic it is itself $redicated& itself is. '5( ) e kinds of essential bein! are $recisely t ose t at are indicated by t e fi!ures of $redication" for t e senses of ,bein!, are .ust as many as t ese fi!ures. /ince& t en& some $redicates indicate w at t e sub.ect is& ot ers its 6uality& ot ers 6uantity& ot ers relation& ot ers acti#ity or $assi#ity& ot ers its ,w ere,& ot ers its ,w en,& ,bein!, as a meanin! answerin! to eac of t ese. %or t ere is no difference between ,t e man is reco#erin!, and ,t e man reco#ers,& nor between ,t e man is walkin! or cuttin!, and ,t e man walks, or ,cuts," and similarly in all ot er cases. '3( A!ain& ,bein!, and ,is, mean t at a statement is true& ,not bein!, t at it is not true but falses0and t is alike in t e case of affirmation and of ne!ation" e.!. ,/ocrates is musical, means t at t is is true& or ,/ocrates is not0$ale, means t at t is is true" but ,t e dia!onal of t e s6uare is not commensurate wit t e side, means t at it is false to say it is. '=( A!ain& ,bein!, and ,t at w ic is, mean t at some of t e t in!s we a#e mentioned ,are, $otentially& ot ers in com$lete reality. %or we say bot of t at w ic sees $otentially and of t at w ic sees actually& t at it is ,seein!,& and bot of t at w ic can actuali2e its knowled!e and of t at w ic is actuali2in! it& t at it knows& and bot of t at to w ic rest is already $resent and of t at w ic can rest& t at it rests. And similarly in t e case of substances" we say t e 3ermes is in t e stone& and t e alf of t e line is in t e line& and we say of t at w ic is not yet ri$e t at it is corn. W en a t in! is $otential and w en it is not yet $otential must be e*$lained elsew ere. B We call ,substance, '1( t e sim$le bodies& i.e. eart and fire and water and e#eryt in! of t e sort& and in !eneral bodies and t e t in!s com$osed of t em& bot animals and di#ine bein!s& and t e $arts of t ese. All t ese are called substance because t ey are not $redicated of a sub.ect but e#eryt in! else is $redicated of t em.0'5( ) at w ic & bein! $resent in suc t in!s as are not $redicated of a sub.ect& is t e cause of t eir bein!& as t e soul is of t e bein! of an animal.0'3( ) e $arts w ic are $resent in suc t in!s& limitin! t em and markin! t em as indi#iduals& and by w ose destruction t e

w ole is destroyed& as t e body is by t e destruction of t e $lane& as some say& and t e $lane by t e destruction of t e line" and in !eneral number is t ou! t by some to be of t is nature" for if it is destroyed& t ey say& not in! e*ists& and it limits all t in!s.0'=( ) e essence& t e formula of w ic is a definition& is also called t e substance of eac t in!. 1t follows& t en& t at ,substance, as two senses& 'A( ultimate substratum& w ic is no lon!er $redicated of anyt in! else& and 'B( t at w ic & bein! a ,t is,& is also se$arable and of t is nature is t e s a$e or form of eac t in!. C ,) e same, means '1( t at w ic is t e same in an accidental sense& e.!. ,t e $ale, and ,t e musical, are t e same because t ey are accidents of t e same t in!& and ,a man, and ,musical, because t e one is an accident of t e ot er" and ,t e musical, is ,a man, because it is an accident of t e man. ') e com$le* entity is t e same as eit er of t e sim$le ones and eac of t ese is t e same as it" for bot ,t e man, and ,t e musical, are said to be t e same as ,t e musical man,& and t is t e same as t ey.( ) is is w y all of t ese statements are made not uni#ersally" for it is not true to say t at e#ery man is t e same as ,t e musical, 'for uni#ersal attributes belon! to t in!s in #irtue of t eir own nature& but accidents do not belon! to t em in #irtue of t eir own nature(" but of t e indi#iduals t e statements are made wit out 6ualification. %or ,/ocrates, and ,musical /ocrates, are t ou! t to be t e same" but ,/ocrates, is not $redicable of more t an one sub.ect& and t erefore we do not say ,e#ery /ocrates, as we say ,e#ery man,. /ome t in!s are said to be t e same in t is sense& ot ers '5( are t e same by t eir own nature& in as many senses as t at w ic is one by its own nature is so" for bot t e t in!s w ose matter is one eit er in kind or in number& and t ose w ose essence is one& are said to be t e same. Clearly& t erefore& sameness is a unity of t e bein! eit er of more t an one t in! or of one t in! w en it is treated as more t an one& ie. w en we say a t in! is t e same as itself" for we treat it as two. ) in!s are called ,ot er, if eit er t eir kinds or t eir matters or t e definitions of t eir essence are more t an one" and in !eneral ,ot er, as meanin!s o$$osite to t ose of ,t e same,. ,Different, is a$$lied '1( to t ose t in!s w ic t ou! ot er are t e same in some res$ect& only not in number but eit er in s$ecies or in !enus or by analo!y" '5( to t ose w ose !enus is ot er& and to contraries& and to an t in!s t at a#e t eir ot erness in t eir essence. ) ose t in!s are called ,like, w ic a#e t e same attributes in e#ery res$ect& and t ose w ic a#e more attributes t e same t an

different& and t ose w ose 6uality is one" and t at w ic s ares wit anot er t in! t e !reater number or t e more im$ortant of t e attributes 'eac of t em one of two contraries( in res$ect of w ic t in!s are ca$able of alterin!& is like t at ot er t in!. ) e senses of ,unlike, are o$$osite to t ose of ,like,. 10 ) e term ,o$$osite, is a$$lied to contradictories& and to contraries& and to relati#e terms& and to $ri#ation and $ossession& and to t e e*tremes from w ic and into w ic !eneration and dissolution take $lace" and t e attributes t at cannot be $resent at t e same time in t at w ic is rece$ti#e of bot & are said to be o$$osed&0eit er t emsel#es of t eir constituents. 8rey and w ite colour do not belon! at t e same time to t e same t in!" ence t eir constituents are o$$osed. ) e term ,contrary, is a$$lied '1( to t ose attributes differin! in !enus w ic cannot belon! at t e same time to t e same sub.ect& '5( to t e most different of t e t in!s in t e same !enus& '3( to t e most different of t e attributes in t e same reci$ient sub.ect& '=( to t e most different of t e t in!s t at fall under t e same faculty& '5( to t e t in!s w ose difference is !reatest eit er absolutely or in !enus or in s$ecies. ) e ot er t in!s t at are called contrary are so called& some because t ey $ossess contraries of t e abo#e kind& some because t ey are rece$ti#e of suc & some because t ey are $roducti#e of or susce$tible to suc & or are $roducin! or sufferin! t em& or are losses or ac6uisitions& or $ossessions or $ri#ations& of suc . /ince ,one, and ,bein!, a#e many senses& t e ot er terms w ic are deri#ed from t ese& and t erefore ,same,& ,ot er,& and ,contrary,& must corres$ond& so t at t ey must be different for eac cate!ory. ) e term ,ot er in s$ecies, is a$$lied to t in!s w ic bein! of t e same !enus are not subordinate t e one to t e ot er& or w ic bein! in t e same !enus a#e a difference& or w ic a#e a contrariety in t eir substance" and contraries are ot er t an one anot er in s$ecies 'eit er all contraries or t ose w ic are so called in t e $rimary sense(& and so are t ose t in!s w ose definitions differ in t e infima s$ecies of t e !enus 'e.!. man and orse are indi#isible in !enus& but t eir definitions are different(& and t ose w ic bein! in t e same substance a#e a difference. ,) e same in s$ecies, as t e #arious meanin!s o$$osite to t ese. 11 ) e words ,$rior, and ,$osterior, are a$$lied '1( to some t in!s 'on t e assum$tion t at t ere is a first& i.e. a be!innin!& in eac class( because t ey are nearer some be!innin! determined eit er absolutely and by nature& or by reference to somet in! or in some

$lace or by certain $eo$le" e.!. t in!s are $rior in $lace because t ey are nearer eit er to some $lace determined by nature 'e.!. t e middle or t e last $lace(& or to some c ance ob.ect" and t at w ic is fart er is $osterior.0:t er t in!s are $rior in time" some by bein! fart er from t e $resent& i.e. in t e case of $ast e#ents 'for t e )ro.an war is $rior to t e -ersian& because it is fart er from t e $resent(& ot ers by bein! nearer t e $resent& i.e. in t e case of future e#ents 'for t e +emean !ames are $rior to t e -yt ian& if we treat t e $resent as be!innin! and first $oint& because t ey are nearer t e $resent(.0:t er t in!s are $rior in mo#ement" for t at w ic is nearer t e first mo#er is $rior 'e.!. t e boy is $rior to t e man(" and t e $rime mo#er also is a be!innin! absolutely.0:t ers are $rior in $ower" for t at w ic e*ceeds in $ower& i.e. t e more $owerful& is $rior" and suc is t at accordin! to w ose will t e ot er0i.e. t e $osterior0must follow& so t at if t e $rior does not set it in motion t e ot er does not mo#e& and if it sets it in motion it does mo#e" and ere will is a be!innin!.0:t ers are $rior in arran!ement" t ese are t e t in!s t at are $laced at inter#als in reference to some one definite t in! accordin! to some rule& e.!. in t e c orus t e second man is $rior to t e t ird& and in t e lyre t e second lowest strin! is $rior to t e lowest" for in t e one case t e leader and in t e ot er t e middle strin! is t e be!innin!. ) ese& t en& are called $rior in t is sense& but '5( in anot er sense t at w ic is $rior for knowled!e is treated as also absolutely $rior" of t ese& t e t in!s t at are $rior in definition do not coincide wit t ose t at are $rior in relation to $erce$tion. %or in definition uni#ersals are $rior& in relation to $erce$tion indi#iduals. And in definition also t e accident is $rior to t e w ole& e.!. ,musical, to ,musical man,& for t e definition cannot e*ist as a w ole wit out t e $art" yet musicalness cannot e*ist unless t ere is some one w o is musical. '3( ) e attributes of $rior t in!s are called $rior& e.!. strai! tness is $rior to smoot ness" for one is an attribute of a line as suc & and t e ot er of a surface. /ome t in!s t en are called $rior and $osterior in t is sense& ot ers '=( in res$ect of nature and substance& i.e. t ose w ic can be wit out ot er t in!s& w ile t e ot ers cannot be wit out t em&0a distinction w ic -lato used. '1f we consider t e #arious senses of ,bein!,& firstly t e sub.ect is $rior& so t at substance is $rior" secondly& accordin! as $otency or com$lete reality is taken into account& different t in!s are $rior& for some t in!s are $rior in res$ect of $otency& ot ers in res$ect of com$lete reality& e.!. in $otency t e alf line is $rior to t e w ole line& and t e $art to t e w ole& and t e matter to t e concrete substance& but in com$lete reality t ese are $osterior" for it is only w en t e w ole as been dissol#ed t at t ey will e*ist in com$lete reality.( 1n a sense&

t erefore& all t in!s t at are called $rior and $osterior are so called wit reference to t is fourt sense" for some t in!s can e*ist wit out ot ers in res$ect of !eneration& e.!. t e w ole wit out t e $arts& and ot ers in res$ect of dissolution& e.!. t e $art wit out t e w ole. And t e same is true in all ot er cases. 15 ,-otency, means '1( a source of mo#ement or c an!e& w ic is in anot er t in! t an t e t in! mo#ed or in t e same t in! 6ua ot er" e.!. t e art of buildin! is a $otency w ic is not in t e t in! built& w ile t e art of ealin!& w ic is a $otency& may be in t e man ealed& but not in im 6ua ealed. ,-otency, t en means t e source& in !eneral& of c an!e or mo#ement in anot er t in! or in t e same t in! 6ua ot er& and also '5( t e source of a t in!,s bein! mo#ed by anot er t in! or by itself 6ua ot er. %or in #irtue of t at $rinci$le& in #irtue of w ic a $atient suffers anyt in!& we call it ,ca$able, of sufferin!" and t is we do sometimes if it suffers anyt in! at all& sometimes not in res$ect of e#eryt in! it suffers& but only if it suffers a c an!e for t e better00'3( ) e ca$acity of $erformin! t is well or accordin! to intention" for sometimes we say of t ose w o merely can walk or s$eak but not well or not as t ey intend& t at t ey cannot s$eak or walk. /o too '=( in t e case of $assi#ity00'5( ) e states in #irtue of w ic t in!s are absolutely im$assi#e or unc an!eable& or not easily c an!ed for t e worse& are called $otencies" for t in!s are broken and crus ed and bent and in !eneral destroyed not by a#in! a $otency but by not a#in! one and by lackin! somet in!& and t in!s are im$assi#e wit res$ect to suc $rocesses if t ey are scarcely and sli! tly affected by t em& because of a ,$otency, and because t ey ,can, do somet in! and are in some $ositi#e state. ,-otency, a#in! t is #ariety of meanin!s& so too t e ,$otent, or ,ca$able, in one sense will mean t at w ic can be!in a mo#ement 'or a c an!e in !eneral& for e#en t at w ic can brin! t in!s to rest is a ,$otent, t in!( in anot er t in! or in itself 6ua ot er" and in one sense t at o#er w ic somet in! else as suc a $otency" and in one sense t at w ic as a $otency of c an!in! into somet in!& w et er for t e worse or for t e better 'for e#en t at w ic $eris es is t ou! t to be ,ca$able, of $eris in!& for it would not a#e $eris ed if it ad not been ca$able of it" but& as a matter of fact& it as a certain dis$osition and cause and $rinci$le w ic fits it to suffer t is" sometimes it is t ou! t to be of t is sort because it as somet in!& sometimes because it is de$ri#ed of somet in!" but if $ri#ation is in a sense , a#in!, or , abit,& e#eryt in! will be ca$able by a#in! somet in!& so t at t in!s are ca$able bot by a#in! a $ositi#e abit and $rinci$le& and by a#in! t e $ri#ation of t is& if it is $ossible to a#e a $ri#ation" and if $ri#ation is not in a

sense , abit,& ,ca$able, is used in two distinct senses(" and a t in! is ca$able in anot er sense because neit er any ot er t in!& nor itself 6ua ot er& as a $otency or $rinci$le w ic can destroy it. A!ain& all of t ese are ca$able eit er merely because t e t in! mi! t c ance to a$$en or not to a$$en& or because it mi! t do so well. ) is sort of $otency is found e#en in lifeless t in!s& e.!. in instruments" for we say one lyre can s$eak& and anot er cannot s$eak at all& if it as not a !ood tone. 1nca$acity is $ri#ation of ca$acity0i.e. of suc a $rinci$le as as been described eit er in !eneral or in t e case of somet in! t at would naturally a#e t e ca$acity& or e#en at t e time w en it would naturally already a#e it" for t e senses in w ic we s ould call a boy and a man and a eunuc ,inca$able of be!ettin!, are distinct.0A!ain& to eit er kind of ca$acity t ere is an o$$osite inca$acity0bot to t at w ic only can $roduce mo#ement and to t at w ic can $roduce it well. /ome t in!s& t en& are called adunata in #irtue of t is kind of inca$acity& w ile ot ers are so in anot er sense" i.e. bot dunaton and adunaton are used as follows. ) e im$ossible is t at of w ic t e contrary is of necessity true& e.!. t at t e dia!onal of a s6uare is commensurate wit t e side is im$ossible& because suc a statement is a falsity of w ic t e contrary is not only true but also necessary" t at it is commensurate& t en& is not only false but also of necessity false. ) e contrary of t is& t e $ossible& is found w en it is not necessary t at t e contrary is false& e.!. t at a man s ould be seated is $ossible" for t at e is not seated is not of necessity false. ) e $ossible& t en& in one sense& as as been said& means t at w ic is not of necessity false" in one& t at w ic is true" in one& t at w ic may be true.0A ,$otency, or ,$ower, in !eometry is so called by a c an!e of meanin!.0) ese senses of ,ca$able, or ,$ossible, in#ol#e no reference to $otency. But t e senses w ic in#ol#e a reference to $otency all refer to t e $rimary kind of $otency" and t is is a source of c an!e in anot er t in! or in t e same t in! 6ua ot er. %or ot er t in!s are called ,ca$able,& some because somet in! else as suc a $otency o#er t em& some because it as not& some because it as it in a $articular way. ) e same is true of t e t in!s t at are inca$able. ) erefore t e $ro$er definition of t e $rimary kind of $otency will be ,a source of c an!e in anot er t in! or in t e same t in! 6ua ot er,. 13 ,Fuantum, means t at w ic is di#isible into two or more constituent $arts of w ic eac is by nature a ,one, and a ,t is,. A 6uantum is a $lurality if it is numerable& a ma!nitude if it is a measurable. ,-lurality, means t at w ic is di#isible $otentially into non0continuous $arts& ,ma!nitude, t at w ic is di#isible into

continuous $arts" of ma!nitude& t at w ic is continuous in one dimension is len!t " in two breadt & in t ree de$t . :f t ese& limited $lurality is number& limited len!t is a line& breadt a surface& de$t a solid. A!ain& some t in!s are called 6uanta in #irtue of t eir own nature& ot ers incidentally" e.!. t e line is a 6uantum by its own nature& t e musical is one incidentally. :f t e t in!s t at are 6uanta by t eir own nature some are so as substances& e.!. t e line is a 6uantum 'for ,a certain kind of 6uantum, is $resent in t e definition w ic states w at it is(& and ot ers are modifications and states of t is kind of substance& e.!. muc and little& lon! and s ort& broad and narrow& dee$ and s allow& ea#y and li! t& and all ot er suc attributes. And also !reat and small& and !reater and smaller& bot in t emsel#es and w en taken relati#ely to eac ot er& are by t eir own nature attributes of w at is 6uantitati#e" but t ese names are transferred to ot er t in!s also. :f t in!s t at are 6uanta incidentally& some are so called in t e sense in w ic it was said t at t e musical and t e w ite were 6uanta& #i2. because t at to w ic musicalness and w iteness belon! is a 6uantum& and some are 6uanta in t e way in w ic mo#ement and time are so" for t ese also are called 6uanta of a sort and continuous because t e t in!s of w ic t ese are attributes are di#isible. 1 mean not t at w ic is mo#ed& but t e s$ace t rou! w ic it is mo#ed" for because t at is a 6uantum mo#ement also is a 6uantum& and because t is is a 6uantum time is one. 1= ,Fuality, means '1( t e differentia of t e essence& e.!. man is an animal of a certain 6uality because e is two0footed& and t e orse is so because it is four0footed" and a circle is a fi!ure of $articular 6uality because it is wit out an!les&0w ic s ows t at t e essential differentia is a 6uality.0) is& t en& is one meanin! of 6uality0t e differentia of t e essence& but '5( t ere is anot er sense in w ic it a$$lies to t e unmo#able ob.ects of mat ematics& t e sense in w ic t e numbers a#e a certain 6uality& e.!. t e com$osite numbers w ic are not in one dimension only& but of w ic t e $lane and t e solid are co$ies 't ese are t ose w ic a#e two or t ree factors(" and in !eneral t at w ic e*ists in t e essence of numbers besides 6uantity is 6uality" for t e essence of eac is w at it is once& e.!. t at of is not w at it is twice or t rice& but w at it is once" for @ is once @. '3( All t e modifications of substances t at mo#e 'e.!. eat and cold& w iteness and blackness& ea#iness and li! tness& and t e ot ers of t e sort( in #irtue of w ic & w en t ey c an!e& bodies are said to alter. '=( Fuality in res$ect of #irtue and #ice& and in !eneral& of e#il and !ood. Fuality& t en& seems to a#e $ractically two meanin!s& and one

of t ese is t e more $ro$er. ) e $rimary 6uality is t e differentia of t e essence& and of t is t e 6uality in numbers is a $art" for it is a differentia of essences& but eit er not of t in!s t at mo#e or not of t em 6ua mo#in!. /econdly& t ere are t e modifications of t in!s t at mo#e& 6ua mo#in!& and t e differentiae of mo#ements. Eirtue and #ice fall amon! t ese modifications" for t ey indicate differentiae of t e mo#ement or acti#ity& accordin! to w ic t e t in!s in motion act or are acted on well or badly" for t at w ic can be mo#ed or act in one way is !ood& and t at w ic can do so in anot er00t e contrary00way is #icious. 8ood and e#il indicate 6uality es$ecially in li#in! t in!s& and amon! t ese es$ecially in t ose w ic a#e $ur$ose. 15 ) in!s are ,relati#e, '1( as double to alf& and treble to a t ird& and in !eneral t at w ic contains somet in! else many times to t at w ic is contained many times in somet in! else& and t at w ic e*ceeds to t at w ic is e*ceeded" '5( as t at w ic can eat to t at w ic can be eated& and t at w ic can cut to t at w ic can be cut& and in !eneral t e acti#e to t e $assi#e" '3( as t e measurable to t e measure& and t e knowable to knowled!e& and t e $erce$tible to $erce$tion. '1( Relati#e terms of t e first kind are numerically related eit er indefinitely or definitely& to numbers t emsel#es or to 1. 4.!. t e double is in a definite numerical relation to 1& and t at w ic is ,many times as !reat, is in a numerical& but not a definite& relation to 1& i.e. not in t is or in t at numerical relation to it" t e relation of t at w ic is alf as bi! a!ain as somet in! else to t at somet in! is a definite numerical relation to a number" t at w ic is nG1Hn times somet in! else is in an indefinite relation to t at somet in!& as t at w ic is ,many times as !reat, is in an indefinite relation to 1" t e relation of t at w ic e*ceeds to t at w ic is e*ceeded is numerically 6uite indefinite" for number is always commensurate& and ,number, is not $redicated of t at w ic is not commensurate& but t at w ic e*ceeds is& in relation to t at w ic is e*ceeded& so muc and somet in! more" and t is somet in! is indefinite" for it can& indifferently& be eit er e6ual or not e6ual to t at w ic is e*ceeded.0All t ese relations& t en& are numerically e*$ressed and are determinations of number& and so in anot er way are t e e6ual and t e like and t e same. %or all refer to unity. ) ose t in!s are t e same w ose substance is one" t ose are like w ose 6uality is one" t ose are e6ual w ose 6uantity is one" and 1 is t e be!innin! and measure of number& so t at all t ese relations im$ly number& t ou! not in t e same way. '5( ) in!s t at are acti#e or $assi#e im$ly an acti#e or a $assi#e $otency and t e actuali2ations of t e $otencies" e.!. t at w ic is ca$able of eatin! is related to t at w ic is ca$able of bein! eated& because it can eat it& and& a!ain& t at w ic eats is

related to t at w ic is eated and t at w ic cuts to t at w ic is cut& in t e sense t at t ey actually do t ese t in!s. But numerical relations are not actuali2ed e*ce$t in t e sense w ic as been elsew ere stated" actuali2ations in t e sense of mo#ement t ey a#e not. :f relations w ic im$ly $otency some furt er im$ly $articular $eriods of time& e.!. t at w ic as made is relati#e to t at w ic as been made& and t at w ic will make to t at w ic will be made. %or it is in t is way t at a fat er is called t e fat er of is son" for t e one as acted and t e ot er as been acted on in a certain way. %urt er& some relati#e terms im$ly $ri#ation of $otency& i.e. ,inca$able, and terms of t is sort& e.!. ,in#isible,. Relati#e terms w ic im$ly number or $otency& t erefore& are all relati#e because t eir #ery essence includes in its nature a reference to somet in! else& not because somet in! else in#ol#es a reference to it" but '3( t at w ic is measurable or knowable or t inkable is called relati#e because somet in! else in#ol#es a reference to it. %or ,t at w ic is t inkable, im$lies t at t e t ou! t of it is $ossible& but t e t ou! t is not relati#e to ,t at of w ic it is t e t ou! t," for we s ould t en a#e said t e same t in! twice. /imilarly si! t is t e si! t of somet in!& not ,of t at of w ic it is t e si! t, 't ou! of course it is true to say t is(" in fact it is relati#e to colour or to somet in! else of t e sort. But accordin! to t e ot er way of s$eakin! t e same t in! would be said twice&0,t e si! t is of t at of w ic it is., ) in!s t at are by t eir own nature called relati#e are called so sometimes in t ese senses& sometimes if t e classes t at include t em are of t is sort" e.!. medicine is a relati#e term because its !enus& science& is t ou! t to be a relati#e term. %urt er& t ere are t e $ro$erties in #irtue of w ic t e t in!s t at a#e t em are called relati#e& e.!. e6uality is relati#e because t e e6ual is& and likeness because t e like is. :t er t in!s are relati#e by accident" e.!. a man is relati#e because e a$$ens to be double of somet in! and double is a relati#e term" or t e w ite is relati#e& if t e same t in! a$$ens to be double and w ite. 1@ W at is called ,com$lete, is '1( t at outside w ic it is not $ossible to find any& e#en one& of its $arts" e.!. t e com$lete time of eac t in! is t at outside w ic it is not $ossible to find any time w ic is a $art $ro$er to it.0'5( ) at w ic in res$ect of e*cellence and !oodness cannot be e*celled in its kind" e.!. we a#e a com$lete doctor or a com$lete flute0$layer& w en t ey lack not in! in res$ect of t e form of t eir $ro$er e*cellence. And t us& transferrin! t e word to bad t in!s& we s$eak of a com$lete scandal0mon!er and a com$lete t ief" indeed we e#en call t em !ood& i.e. a !ood t ief and a !ood scandal0mon!er. And e*cellence is a

com$letion" for eac t in! is com$lete and e#ery substance is com$lete& w en in res$ect of t e form of its $ro$er e*cellence it lacks no $art of its natural ma!nitude.0'3( ) e t in!s w ic a#e attained t eir end& t is bein! !ood& are called com$lete" for t in!s are com$lete in #irtue of a#in! attained t eir end. ) erefore& since t e end is somet in! ultimate& we transfer t e word to bad t in!s and say a t in! as been com$letely s$oilt& and com$letely destroyed& w en it in no wise falls s ort of destruction and badness& but is at its last $oint. ) is is w y deat & too& is by a fi!ure of s$eec called t e end& because bot are last t in!s. But t e ultimate $ur$ose is also an end.0) in!s& t en& t at are called com$lete in #irtue of t eir own nature are so called in all t ese senses& some because in res$ect of !oodness t ey lack not in! and cannot be e*celled and no $art $ro$er to t em can be found outside t em& ot ers in !eneral because t ey cannot be e*ceeded in t eir se#eral classes and no $art $ro$er to t em is outside t em" t e ot ers $resu$$ose t ese first two kinds& and are called com$lete because t ey eit er make or a#e somet in! of t e sort or are ada$ted to it or in some way or ot er in#ol#e a reference to t e t in!s t at are called com$lete in t e $rimary sense. 1A ,Limit, means '1( t e last $oint of eac t in!& i.e. t e first $oint beyond w ic it is not $ossible to find any $art& and t e first $oint wit in w ic e#ery $art is" '5( t e form& w ate#er it may be& of a s$atial ma!nitude or of a t in! t at as ma!nitude" '3( t e end of eac t in! 'and of t is nature is t at towards w ic t e mo#ement and t e action are& not t at from w ic t ey are0t ou! sometimes it is bot & t at from w ic and t at to w ic t e mo#ement is& i.e. t e final cause(" '=( t e substance of eac t in!& and t e essence of eac " for t is is t e limit of knowled!e" and if of knowled!e& of t e ob.ect also. 4#idently& t erefore& ,limit, as as many senses as ,be!innin!,& and yet more" for t e be!innin! is a limit& but not e#ery limit is a be!innin!. 1B ,) at in #irtue of w ic , as se#eral meanin!s>0'1( t e form or substance of eac t in!& e.!. t at in #irtue of w ic a man is !ood is t e !ood itself& '5( t e $ro*imate sub.ect in w ic it is t e nature of an attribute to be found& e.!. colour in a surface. ,) at in #irtue of w ic ,& t en& in t e $rimary sense is t e form& and in a secondary sense t e matter of eac t in! and t e $ro*imate substratum of eac .01n !eneral ,t at in #irtue of w ic , will found in t e same number of senses as ,cause," for we say indifferently '3( in #irtue of w at as e come<, or ,for w at end as e come<," and '=( in #irtue of w at as e inferred wron!ly& or inferred<, or

,w at is t e cause of t e inference& or of t e wron! inference<,0%urt er '5( Iat , d is used in reference to $osition& e.!. ,at w ic e stands, or ,alon! w ic e walks" for all suc $ rases indicate $lace and $osition. ) erefore ,in #irtue of itself, must likewise a#e se#eral meanin!s. ) e followin! belon! to a t in! in #irtue of itself>0'1( t e essence of eac t in!& e.!. Callias is in #irtue of imself Callias and w at it was to be Callias"0'5( w ate#er is $resent in t e ,w at,& e.!. Callias is in #irtue of imself an animal. %or ,animal, is $resent in is definition" Callias is a $articular animal.0'3( W ate#er attribute a t in! recei#es in itself directly or in one of its $arts" e.!. a surface is w ite in #irtue of itself& and a man is ali#e in #irtue of imself" for t e soul& in w ic life directly resides& is a $art of t e man.0'=( ) at w ic as no cause ot er t an itself" man as more t an one cause00animal& two0footed00but yet man is man in #irtue of imself.0'5( W ate#er attributes belon! to a t in! alone& and in so far as t ey belon! to it merely by #irtue of itself considered a$art by itself. 1C ,Dis$osition, means t e arran!ement of t at w ic as $arts& in res$ect eit er of $lace or of $otency or of kind" for t ere must be a certain $osition& as e#en t e word ,dis$osition, s ows. 50 ,3a#in!, means '1( a kind of acti#ity of t e a#er and of w at e as0somet in! like an action or mo#ement. %or w en one t in! makes and one is made& between t em t ere is a makin!" so too between im w o as a !arment and t e !arment w ic e as t ere is a a#in!. ) is sort of a#in!& t en& e#idently we cannot a#e" for t e $rocess will !o on to infinity& if it is to be $ossible to a#e t e a#in! of w at we a#e.0'5( ,3a#in!, or , abit, means a dis$osition accordin! to w ic t at w ic is dis$osed is eit er well or ill dis$osed& and eit er in itself or wit reference to somet in! else" e.!. ealt is a , abit," for it is suc a dis$osition.0'3( We s$eak of a , abit, if t ere is a $ortion of suc a dis$osition" and so e#en t e e*cellence of t e $arts is a , abit, of t e w ole t in!. 51 ,Affection, means '1( a 6uality in res$ect of w ic a t in! can be altered& e.!. w ite and black& sweet and bitter& ea#iness and li! tness& and all ot ers of t e kind.0'5( ) e actuali2ation of t ese0t e already accom$lis ed alterations.0'3( 4s$ecially& in.urious alterations and mo#ements& and& abo#e all $ainful in.uries.0'=( ;isfortunes and $ainful e*$eriences w en on a lar!e scale are called affections.

55 We s$eak of ,$ri#ation, '1( if somet in! as not one of t e attributes w ic a t in! mi! t naturally a#e& e#en if t is t in! itself would not naturally a#e it" e.!. a $lant is said to be ,de$ri#ed, of eyes.0'5( 1f& t ou! eit er t e t in! itself or its !enus would naturally a#e an attribute& it as it not" e.!. a blind man and a mole are in different senses ,de$ri#ed, of si! t" t e latter in contrast wit its !enus& t e former in contrast wit is own normal nature.0'3( 1f& t ou! it would naturally a#e t e attribute& and w en it would naturally a#e it& it as it not" for blindness is a $ri#ation& but one is not ,blind, at any and e#ery a!e& but only if one as not si! t at t e a!e at w ic one would naturally a#e it. /imilarly a t in! is called blind if it as not si! t in t e medium in w ic & and in res$ect of t e or!an in res$ect of w ic & and wit reference to t e ob.ect wit reference to w ic & and in t e circumstances in w ic & it would naturally a#e it.0'=( ) e #iolent takin! away of anyt in! is called $ri#ation. 1ndeed t ere are .ust as many kinds of $ri#ations as t ere are of words wit ne!ati#e $refi*es" for a t in! is called une6ual because it as not e6uality t ou! it would naturally a#e it& and in#isible eit er because it as no colour at all or because it as a $oor colour& and a$odous eit er because it as no feet at all or because it as im$erfect feet. A!ain& a $ri#ati#e term may be used because t e t in! as little of t e attribute 'and t is means a#in! it in a sense im$erfectly(& e.!. ,kernel0less," or because it as it not easily or not well 'e.!. we call a t in! uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well(" or because it as not t e attribute at all" for it is not t e one0eyed man but e w o is si! tless in bot eyes t at is called blind. ) is is w y not e#ery man is ,!ood, or ,bad,& ,.ust, or ,un.ust,& but t ere is also an intermediate state. 53 )o , a#e, or , old, means many t in!s>0'1( to treat a t in! accordin! to one,s own nature or accordin! to one,s own im$ulse" so t at fe#er is said to a#e a man& and tyrants to a#e t eir cities& and $eo$le to a#e t e clot es t ey wear.0'5( ) at in w ic a t in! is $resent as in somet in! rece$ti#e of it is said to a#e t e t in!" e.!. t e bron2e as t e form of t e statue& and t e body as t e disease.0'3( As t at w ic contains olds t e t in!s contained" for a t in! is said to be eld by t at in w ic it is as in a container" e.!. we say t at t e #essel olds t e li6uid and t e city olds men and t e s i$ sailors" and so too t at t e w ole olds t e $arts.0'=( ) at w ic inders a t in! from mo#in! or actin! accordin! to its own im$ulse is said to old it& as $illars old t e incumbent wei! ts&

and as t e $oets make Atlas old t e ea#ens& im$lyin! t at ot erwise t ey would colla$se on t e eart & as some of t e natural $ iloso$ ers also say. 1n t is way also t at w ic olds t in!s to!et er is said to old t e t in!s it olds to!et er& since t ey would ot erwise se$arate& eac accordin! to its own im$ulse. ,Bein! in somet in!, as similar and corres$ondin! meanin!s to , oldin!, or , a#in!,. 5= ,)o come from somet in!, means '1( to come from somet in! as from matter& and t is in two senses& eit er in res$ect of t e i! est !enus or in res$ect of t e lowest s$ecies" e.!. in a sense all t in!s t at can be melted come from water& but in a sense t e statue comes from bron2e.0'5( As from t e first mo#in! $rinci$le" e.!. ,w at did t e fi! t come from<, %rom abusi#e lan!ua!e& because t is was t e ori!in of t e fi! t.0'3( %rom t e com$ound of matter and s a$e& as t e $arts come from t e w ole& and t e #erse from t e 1liad& and t e stones from t e ouse" 'in e#ery suc case t e w ole is a com$ound of matter and s a$e&( for t e s a$e is t e end& and only t at w ic attains an end is com$lete.0'=( As t e form from its $art& e.!. man from ,two0footed,and syllable from ,letter," for t is is a different sense from t at in w ic t e statue comes from bron2e" for t e com$osite substance comes from t e sensible matter& but t e form also comes from t e matter of t e form.0/ome t in!s& t en& are said to come from somet in! else in t ese senses" but '5( ot ers are so described if one of t ese senses is a$$licable to a $art of t at ot er t in!" e.!. t e c ild comes from its fat er and mot er& and $lants come from t e eart & because t ey come from a $art of t ose t in!s.0'@( 1t means comin! after a t in! in time& e.!. ni! t comes from day and storm from fine weat er& because t e one comes after t e ot er. :f t ese t in!s some are so described because t ey admit of c an!e into one anot er& as in t e cases now mentioned" some merely because t ey are successi#e in time& e.!. t e #oya!e took $lace ,from, t e e6uino*& because it took $lace after t e e6uino*& and t e festi#al of t e ) ar!elia comes ,from, t e Dionysia& because after t e Dionysia. 55 ,-art, means '1( 'a( t at into w ic a 6uantum can in any way be di#ided" for t at w ic is taken from a 6uantum 6ua 6uantum is always called a $art of it& e.!. two is called in a sense a $art of t ree. 1t means 'b(& of t e $arts in t e first sense& only t ose w ic measure t e w ole" t is is w y two& t ou! in one sense it is& in anot er is not& called a $art of t ree.0'5( ) e elements into w ic a kind mi! t be di#ided a$art from t e 6uantity are also called $arts of it" for w ic reason we say t e s$ecies are $arts of t e

!enus.0'3( ) e elements into w ic a w ole is di#ided& or of w ic it consists0t e ,w ole, meanin! eit er t e form or t at w ic as t e form" e.!. of t e bron2e s$ ere or of t e bron2e cube bot t e bron2e0i.e. t e matter in w ic t e form is0and t e c aracteristic an!le are $arts.0'=( ) e elements in t e definition w ic e*$lains a t in! are also $arts of t e w ole" t is is w y t e !enus is called a $art of t e s$ecies& t ou! in anot er sense t e s$ecies is $art of t e !enus. 5@ ,A w ole, means '1( t at from w ic is absent none of t e $arts of w ic it is said to be naturally a w ole& and '5( t at w ic so contains t e t in!s it contains t at t ey form a unity" and t is in two senses0eit er as bein! eac se#erally one sin!le t in!& or as makin! u$ t e unity between t em. %or 'a( t at w ic is true of a w ole class and is said to old !ood as a w ole 'w ic im$lies t at it is a kind w ole( is true of a w ole in t e sense t at it contains many t in!s by bein! $redicated of eac & and by all of t em& e.!. man& orse& !od& bein! se#erally one sin!le t in!& because all are li#in! t in!s. But 'b( t e continuous and limited is a w ole& w en it is a unity consistin! of se#eral $arts& es$ecially if t ey are $resent only $otentially& but& failin! t is& e#en if t ey are $resent actually. :f t ese t in!s t emsel#es& t ose w ic are so by nature are w oles in a i! er de!ree t an t ose w ic are so by art& as we said in t e case of unity also& w oleness bein! in fact a sort of oneness. A!ain '3( of 6uanta t at a#e a be!innin! and a middle and an end& t ose to w ic t e $osition does not make a difference are called totals& and t ose to w ic it does& w oles. ) ose w ic admit of bot descri$tions are bot w oles and totals. ) ese are t e t in!s w ose nature remains t e same after trans$osition& but w ose form does not& e.!. wa* or a coat" t ey are called bot w oles and totals" for t ey a#e bot c aracteristics. Water and all li6uids and number are called totals& but ,t e w ole number, or ,t e w ole water, one does not s$eak of& e*ce$t by an e*tension of meanin!. )o t in!s& to w ic 6ua one t e term ,total, is a$$lied& t e term ,all, is a$$lied w en t ey are treated as se$arate" ,t is total number&, ,all t ese units., 5A 1t is not any c ance 6uantitati#e t in! t at can be said to be ,mutilated," it must be a w ole as well as di#isible. %or not only is two not ,mutilated, if one of t e two ones is taken away 'for t e $art remo#ed by mutilation is ne#er e6ual to t e remainder(& but in !eneral no number is t us mutilated" for it is also necessary t at t e essence remain" if a cu$ is mutilated& it must still be a cu$" but t e number is no lon!er t e same. %urt er& e#en if t in!s consist of unlike $arts& not e#en t ese t in!s can all be said to be mutilated&

for in a sense a number as unlike $arts 'e.!. two and t ree( as well as like" but in !eneral of t e t in!s to w ic t eir $osition makes no difference& e.!. water or fire& none can be mutilated" to be mutilated& t in!s must be suc as in #irtue of t eir essence a#e a certain $osition. A!ain& t ey must be continuous" for a musical scale consists of unlike $arts and as $osition& but cannot become mutilated. Besides& not e#en t e t in!s t at are w oles are mutilated by t e $ri#ation of any $art. %or t e $arts remo#ed must be neit er t ose w ic determine t e essence nor any c ance $arts& irres$ecti#e of t eir $osition" e.!. a cu$ is not mutilated if it is bored t rou! & but only if t e andle or a $ro.ectin! $art is remo#ed& and a man is mutilated not if t e fles or t e s$leen is remo#ed& but if an e*tremity is& and t at not e#ery e*tremity but one w ic w en com$letely remo#ed cannot !row a!ain. ) erefore baldness is not a mutilation. 5B ) e term ,race, or ,!enus, is used '1( if !eneration of t in!s w ic a#e t e same form is continuous& e.!. ,w ile t e race of men lasts, means ,w ile t e !eneration of t em !oes on continuously,.0'5( 1t is used wit reference to t at w ic first brou! t t in!s into e*istence" for it is t us t at some are called 3ellenes by race and ot ers 1onians& because t e former $roceed from 3ellen and t e latter from 1on as t eir first be!etter. And t e word is used in reference to t e be!etter more t an to t e matter& t ou! $eo$le also !et a race0name from t e female& e.!. ,t e descendants of -yrr a,.0'3( ) ere is !enus in t e sense in w ic ,$lane, is t e !enus of $lane fi!ures and solid, of solids" for eac of t e fi!ures is in t e one case a $lane of suc and suc a kind& and in t e ot er a solid of suc and suc a kind" and t is is w at underlies t e differentiae. A!ain '=( in definitions t e first constituent element& w ic is included in t e ,w at,& is t e !enus& w ose differentiae t e 6ualities are said to be ,8enus, t en is used in all t ese ways& '1( in reference to continuous !eneration of t e same kind& '5( in reference to t e first mo#er w ic is of t e same kind as t e t in!s it mo#es& '3( as matter" for t at to w ic t e differentia or 6uality belon!s is t e substratum& w ic we call matter. ) ose t in!s are said to be ,ot er in !enus, w ose $ro*imate substratum is different& and w ic are not analysed t e one into t e ot er nor bot into t e same t in! 'e.!. form and matter are different in !enus(" and t in!s w ic belon! to different cate!ories of bein! 'for some of t e t in!s t at are said to ,be, si!nify essence& ot ers a 6uality& ot ers t e ot er cate!ories we a#e before distin!uis ed(" t ese also are not analysed eit er into one anot er or into some one t in!.

5C ,) e false, means '1( t at w ic is false as a t in!& and t at 'a( because it is not $ut to!et er or cannot be $ut to!et er& e.!. ,t at t e dia!onal of a s6uare is commensurate wit t e side, or ,t at you are sittin!," for one of t ese is false always& and t e ot er sometimes" it is in t ese two senses t at t ey are non0e*istent. 'b( ) ere are t in!s w ic e*ist& but w ose nature it is to a$$ear eit er not to be suc as t ey are or to be t in!s t at do not e*ist& e.!. a sketc or a dream" for t ese are somet in!& but are not t e t in!s t e a$$earance of w ic t ey $roduce in us. We call t in!s false in t is way& t en&0eit er because t ey t emsel#es do not e*ist& or because t e a$$earance w ic results from t em is t at of somet in! t at does not e*ist. '5( A false account is t e account of non0e*istent ob.ects& in so far as it is false. 3ence e#ery account is false w en a$$lied to somet in! ot er t an t at of w ic it is true" e.!. t e account of a circle is false w en a$$lied to a trian!le. 1n a sense t ere is one account of eac t in!& i.e. t e account of its essence& but in a sense t ere are many& since t e t in! itself and t e t in! itself wit an attribute are in a sense t e same& e.!. /ocrates and musical /ocrates 'a false account is not t e account of anyt in!& e*ce$t in a 6ualified sense(. 3ence Antist enes was too sim$le0minded w en e claimed t at not in! could be described e*ce$t by t e account $ro$er to it&0one $redicate to one sub.ect" from w ic t e conclusion used to be drawn t at t ere could be no contradiction& and almost t at t ere could be no error. But it is $ossible to describe eac t in! not only by t e account of itself& but also by t at of somet in! else. ) is may be done alto!et er falsely indeed& but t ere is also a way in w ic it may be done truly" e.!. ei! t may be described as a double number by t e use of t e definition of two. ) ese t in!s& t en& are called false in t ese senses& but '3( a false man is one w o is ready at and fond of suc accounts& not for any ot er reason but for t eir own sake& and one w o is !ood at im$ressin! suc accounts on ot er $eo$le& .ust as we say t in!s are w ic $roduce a false a$$earance. ) is is w y t e $roof in t e 3i$$ias t at t e same man is false and true is misleadin!. %or it assumes t at e is false w o can decei#e 'i.e. t e man w o knows and is wise(" and furt er t at e w o is willin!ly bad is better. ) is is a false result of induction0for a man w o lim$s willin!ly is better t an one w o does so unwillin!ly0by ,lim$in!, -lato means ,mimickin! a lim$,& for if t e man were lame willin!ly& e would $resumably be worse in t is case as in t e corres$ondin! case of moral c aracter. 30

,Accident, means '1( t at w ic attac es to somet in! and can be truly asserted& but neit er of necessity nor usually& e.!. if some one in di!!in! a ole for a $lant as found treasure. ) is0t e findin! of treasure0is for t e man w o du! t e ole an accident" for neit er does t e one come of necessity from t e ot er or after t e ot er& nor& if a man $lants& does e usually find treasure. And a musical man mi! t be $ale" but since t is does not a$$en of necessity nor usually& we call it an accident. ) erefore since t ere are attributes and t ey attac to sub.ects& and some of t em attac to t ese only in a $articular $lace and at a $articular time& w ate#er attac es to a sub.ect& but not because it was t is sub.ect& or t e time t is time& or t e $lace t is $lace& will be an accident. ) erefore& too& t ere is no definite cause for an accident& but a c ance cause& i.e. an indefinite one. 8oin! to Ae!ina was an accident for a man& if e went not in order to !et t ere& but because e was carried out of is way by a storm or ca$tured by $irates. ) e accident as a$$ened or e*ists&0not in #irtue of t e sub.ect,s nature& owe#er& but of somet in! else" for t e storm was t e cause of is comin! to a $lace for w ic e was not sailin!& and t is was Ae!ina. ,Accident, as also '5( anot er meanin!& i.e. all t at attac es to eac t in! in #irtue of itself but is not in its essence& as a#in! its an!les e6ual to two ri! t an!les attac es to t e trian!le. And accidents of t is sort may be eternal& but no accident of t e ot er sort is. ) is is e*$lained elsew ere. Book E1 1 W4 are seekin! t e $rinci$les and t e causes of t e t in!s t at are& and ob#iously of t em 6ua bein!. %or& w ile t ere is a cause of ealt and of !ood condition& and t e ob.ects of mat ematics a#e first $rinci$les and elements and causes& and in !eneral e#ery science w ic is ratiocinati#e or at all in#ol#es reasonin! deals wit causes and $rinci$les& more or less $recise& all t ese sciences mark off some $articular bein!0some !enus& and in6uire into t is& but not into bein! sim$ly nor 6ua bein!& nor do t ey offer any discussion of t e essence of t e t in!s of w ic t ey treat" but startin! from t e essence0some makin! it $lain to t e senses& ot ers assumin! it as a y$ot esis0t ey t en demonstrate& more or less co!ently& t e essential attributes of t e !enus wit w ic t ey deal. 1t is ob#ious& t erefore& t at suc an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of t e essence& but some ot er way of e* ibitin! it. And similarly t e sciences omit t e 6uestion w et er t e !enus wit w ic t ey deal e*ists or does not e*ist& because it belon!s to t e same kind of t inkin! to s ow w at it is and t at it is. And since natural science& like ot er sciences& is in fact about

one class of bein!& i.e. to t at sort of substance w ic as t e $rinci$le of its mo#ement and rest $resent in itself& e#idently it is neit er $ractical nor $roducti#e. %or in t e case of t in!s made t e $rinci$le is in t e maker0it is eit er reason or art or some faculty& w ile in t e case of t in!s done it is in t e doer0#i2. will& for t at w ic is done and t at w ic is willed are t e same. ) erefore& if all t ou! t is eit er $ractical or $roducti#e or t eoretical& $ ysics must be a t eoretical science& but it will t eori2e about suc bein! as admits of bein! mo#ed& and about substance0as0defined for t e most $art only as not se$arable from matter. +ow& we must not fail to notice t e mode of bein! of t e essence and of its definition& for& wit out t is& in6uiry is but idle. :f t in!s defined& i.e. of ,w ats,& some are like ,snub,& and some like ,conca#e,. And t ese differ because ,snub, is bound u$ wit matter 'for w at is snub is a conca#e nose(& w ile conca#ity is inde$endent of $erce$tible matter. 1f t en all natural t in!s are a analo!ous to t e snub in t eir nature" e.!. nose& eye& face& fles & bone& and& in !eneral& animal" leaf& root& bark& and& in !eneral& $lant 'for none of t ese can be defined wit out reference to mo#ement0t ey always a#e matter(& it is clear ow we must seek and define t e ,w at, in t e case of natural ob.ects& and also t at it belon!s to t e student of nature to study e#en soul in a certain sense& i.e. so muc of it as is not inde$endent of matter. ) at $ ysics& t en& is a t eoretical science& is $lain from t ese considerations. ;at ematics also& owe#er& is t eoretical" but w et er its ob.ects are immo#able and se$arable from matter& is not at $resent clear" still& it is clear t at some mat ematical t eorems consider t em 6ua immo#able and 6ua se$arable from matter. But if t ere is somet in! w ic is eternal and immo#able and se$arable& clearly t e knowled!e of it belon!s to a t eoretical science&0not& owe#er& to $ ysics 'for $ ysics deals wit certain mo#able t in!s( nor to mat ematics& but to a science $rior to bot . %or $ ysics deals wit t in!s w ic e*ist se$arately but are not immo#able& and some $arts of mat ematics deal wit t in!s w ic are immo#able but $resumably do not e*ist se$arately& but as embodied in matter" w ile t e first science deals wit t in!s w ic bot e*ist se$arately and are immo#able. +ow all causes must be eternal& but es$ecially t ese" for t ey are t e causes t at o$erate on so muc of t e di#ine as a$$ears to us. ) ere must& t en& be t ree t eoretical $ iloso$ ies& mat ematics& $ ysics& and w at we may call t eolo!y& since it is ob#ious t at if t e di#ine is $resent anyw ere& it is $resent in t in!s of t is sort. And t e i! est science must deal wit t e i! est !enus. ) us& w ile t e t eoretical sciences are more to be desired t an t e ot er sciences& t is is more to be desired t an t e ot er t eoretical sciences. %or one mi! t raise t e 6uestion w et er first $ iloso$ y is uni#ersal& or deals wit one !enus& i.e. some

one kind of bein!" for not e#en t e mat ematical sciences are all alike in t is res$ect&0!eometry and astronomy deal wit a certain $articular kind of t in!& w ile uni#ersal mat ematics a$$lies alike to all. We answer t at if t ere is no substance ot er t an t ose w ic are formed by nature& natural science will be t e first science" but if t ere is an immo#able substance& t e science of t is must be $rior and must be first $ iloso$ y& and uni#ersal in t is way& because it is first. And it will belon! to t is to consider bein! 6ua bein!0bot w at it is and t e attributes w ic belon! to it 6ua bein!. 5 But since t e un6ualified term ,bein!, as se#eral meanin!s& of w ic one was seen, to be t e accidental& and anot er t e true ',non0bein!, bein! t e false(& w ile besides t ese t ere are t e fi!ures of $redication 'e.!. t e ,w at,& 6uality& 6uantity& $lace& time& and any similar meanin!s w ic ,bein!, may a#e(& and a!ain besides all t ese t ere is t at w ic ,is, $otentially or actually>0since ,bein!, as many meanin!s& we must say re!ardin! t e accidental& t at t ere can be no scientific treatment of it. ) is is confirmed by t e fact t at no science $ractical& $roducti#e& or t eoretical troubles itself about it. %or on t e one and e w o $roduces a ouse does not $roduce all t e attributes t at come into bein! alon! wit t e ouse" for t ese are innumerable" t e ouse t at as been made may 6uite well be $leasant for some $eo$le& urtful for some& and useful to ot ers& and different0to $ut it s ortly from all t in!s t at are" and t e science of buildin! does not aim at $roducin! any of t ese attributes. And in t e same way t e !eometer does not consider t e attributes w ic attac t us to fi!ures& nor w et er ,trian!le, is different from ,trian!le w ose an!les are e6ual to two ri! t an!les,.0And t is a$$ens naturally enou! " for t e accidental is $ractically a mere name. And so -lato was in a sense not wron! in rankin! so$ istic as dealin! wit t at w ic is not. %or t e ar!uments of t e so$ ists deal& we may say& abo#e all wit t e accidental" e.!. t e 6uestion w et er ,musical, and ,lettered, are different or t e same& and w et er ,musical Coriscus, and ,Coriscus, are t e same& and w et er ,e#eryt in! w ic is& but is not eternal& as come to be,& wit t e $arado*ical conclusion t at if one w o was musical as come to be lettered& e must also a#e been lettered and a#e come to be musical& and all t e ot er ar!uments of t is sort" t e accidental is ob#iously akin to non0bein!. And t is is clear also from ar!uments suc as t e followin!> t in!s w ic are in anot er sense come into bein! and $ass out of bein! by a $rocess& but t in!s w ic are accidentally do not. But still we must& as far as we can& say furt er& re!ardin! t e accidental& w at its nature is and from w at cause it $roceeds" for it will $er a$s at t e same time become clear w y t ere is no science of it.

/ince& amon! t in!s w ic are& some are always in t e same state and are of necessity 'not necessity in t e sense of com$ulsion but t at w ic we assert of t in!s because t ey cannot be ot erwise(& and some are not of necessity nor always& but for t e most $art& t is is t e $rinci$le and t is t e cause of t e e*istence of t e accidental" for t at w ic is neit er always nor for t e most $art& we call accidental. %or instance& if in t e do!0days t ere is wintry and cold weat er& we say t is is an accident& but not if t ere is sultry eat& because t e latter is always or for t e most $art so& but not t e former. And it is an accident t at a man is $ale 'for t is is neit er always nor for t e most $art so(& but it is not by accident t at e is an animal. And t at t e builder $roduces ealt is an accident& because it is t e nature not of t e builder but of t e doctor to do t is&0but t e builder a$$ened to be a doctor. A!ain& a confectioner& aimin! at !i#in! $leasure& may make somet in! w olesome& but not in #irtue of t e confectioner,s art" and t erefore we say ,it was an accident,& and w ile t ere is a sense in w ic e makes it& in t e un6ualified sense e does not. %or to ot er t in!s answer faculties $roducti#e of t em& but to accidental results t ere corres$onds no determinate art nor faculty" for of t in!s w ic are or come to be by accident& t e cause also is accidental. ) erefore& since not all t in!s eit er are or come to be of necessity and always& but& t e ma.ority of t in!s are for t e most $art& t e accidental must e*ist" for instance a $ale man is not always nor for t e most $art musical& but since t is sometimes a$$ens& it must be accidental 'if not& e#eryt in! will be of necessity(. ) e matter& t erefore& w ic is ca$able of bein! ot erwise t an as it usually is& must be t e cause of t e accidental. And we must take as our startin!0$oint t e 6uestion w et er t ere is not in! t at is neit er always nor for t e most $art. /urely t is is im$ossible. ) ere is& t en& besides t ese somet in! w ic is fortuitous and accidental. But w ile t e usual e*ists& can not in! be said to be always& or are t ere eternal t in!s< ) is must be considered later&, but t at t ere is no science of t e accidental is ob#ious" for all science is eit er of t at w ic is always or of t at w ic is for t e most $art. '%or ow else is one to learn or to teac anot er< ) e t in! must be determined as occurrin! eit er always or for t e most $art& e.!. t at oney0water is useful for a $atient in a fe#er is true for t e most $art.( But t at w ic is contrary to t e usual law science will be unable to state& i.e. w en t e t in! does not a$$en& e.!.,on t e day of new moon," for e#en t at w ic a$$ens on t e day of new moon a$$ens t en eit er always or for t e most $art" but t e accidental is contrary to suc laws. We a#e stated& t en& w at t e accidental is& and from w at cause it arises& and t at t ere is no science w ic deals wit it. 3

) at t ere are $rinci$les and causes w ic are !enerable and destructible wit out e#er bein! in course of bein! !enerated or destroyed& is ob#ious. %or ot erwise all t in!s will be of necessity& since t at w ic is bein! !enerated or destroyed must a#e a cause w ic is not accidentally its cause. Will A e*ist or not< 1t will if B a$$ens" and if not& not. And B will e*ist if C a$$ens. And t us if time is constantly subtracted from a limited e*tent of time& one will ob#iously come to t e $resent. ) is man& t en& will die by #iolence& if e !oes out" and e will do t is if e !ets t irsty" and e will !et t irsty if somet in! else a$$ens" and t us we s all come to t at w ic is now $resent& or to some $ast e#ent. %or instance& e will !o out if e !ets t irsty" and e will !et t irsty if e is eatin! $un!ent food" and t is is eit er t e case or not" so t at e will of necessity die& or of necessity not die. And similarly if one .um$s o#er to $ast e#ents& t e same account will old !ood" for t is01 mean t e $ast condition0is already $resent in somet in!. 4#eryt in!& t erefore& t at will be& will be of necessity" e.!. it is necessary t at e w o li#es s all one day die" for already some condition as come into e*istence& e.!. t e $resence of contraries in t e same body. But w et er e is to die by disease or by #iolence is not yet determined& but de$ends on t e a$$enin! of somet in! else. Clearly t en t e $rocess !oes back to a certain startin!0$oint& but t is no lon!er $oints to somet in! furt er. ) is t en will be t e startin!0$oint for t e fortuitous& and will a#e not in! else as cause of its comin! to be. But to w at sort of startin!0$oint and w at sort of cause we t us refer t e fortuitous0w et er to matter or to t e $ur$ose or to t e moti#e $ower& must be carefully considered. = Let us dismiss accidental bein!" for we a#e sufficiently determined its nature. But since t at w ic is in t e sense of bein! true& or is not in t e sense of bein! false& de$ends on combination and se$aration& and trut and falsity to!et er de$end on t e allocation of a $air of contradictory .ud!ements 'for t e true .ud!ement affirms w ere t e sub.ect and $redicate really are combined& and denies w ere t ey are se$arated& w ile t e false .ud!ement as t e o$$osite of t is allocation" it is anot er 6uestion& ow it a$$ens t at we t ink t in!s to!et er or a$art" by ,to!et er, and ,a$art, 1 mean t inkin! t em so t at t ere is no succession in t e t ou! ts but t ey become a unity(" for falsity and trut are not in t in!s0it is not as if t e !ood were true& and t e bad were in itself false0but in t ou! t" w ile wit re!ard to sim$le conce$ts and ,w ats, falsity and trut do not e*ist e#en in t ou! t00t is bein! so& we must consider later w at as to be discussed wit re!ard to t at w ic is or is not in t is sense. But since t e combination and t e

se$aration are in t ou! t and not in t e t in!s& and t at w ic is in t is sense is a different sort of ,bein!, from t e t in!s t at are in t e full sense 'for t e t ou! t attac es or remo#es eit er t e sub.ect,s ,w at, or its a#in! a certain 6uality or 6uantity or somet in! else(& t at w ic is accidentally and t at w ic is in t e sense of bein! true must be dismissed. %or t e cause of t e former is indeterminate& and t at of t e latter is some affection of t e t ou! t& and bot are related to t e remainin! !enus of bein!& and do not indicate t e e*istence of any se$arate class of bein!. ) erefore let t ese be dismissed& and let us consider t e causes and t e $rinci$les of bein! itself& 6ua bein!. '1t was clear in our discussion of t e #arious meanin!s of terms& t at ,bein!, as se#eral meanin!s.( Book E11 1 )34R4 are se#eral senses in w ic a t in! may be said to ,be,& as we $ointed out $re#iously in our book on t e #arious senses of words", for in one sense t e ,bein!, meant is ,w at a t in! is, or a ,t is,& and in anot er sense it means a 6uality or 6uantity or one of t e ot er t in!s t at are $redicated as t ese are. W ile ,bein!, as all t ese senses& ob#iously t at w ic ,is, $rimarily is t e ,w at,& w ic indicates t e substance of t e t in!. %or w en we say of w at 6uality a t in! is& we say t at it is !ood or bad& not t at it is t ree cubits lon! or t at it is a man" but w en we say w at it is& we do not say ,w ite, or , ot, or ,t ree cubits lon!,& but ,a man, or ,a ,!od,. And all ot er t in!s are said to be because t ey are& some of t em& 6uantities of t at w ic is in t is $rimary sense& ot ers 6ualities of it& ot ers affections of it& and ot ers some ot er determination of it. And so one mi! t e#en raise t e 6uestion w et er t e words ,to walk,& ,to be ealt y,& ,to sit, im$ly t at eac of t ese t in!s is e*istent& and similarly in any ot er case of t is sort" for none of t em is eit er self0subsistent or ca$able of bein! se$arated from substance& but rat er& if anyt in!& it is t at w ic walks or sits or is ealt y t at is an e*istent t in!. +ow t ese are seen to be more real because t ere is somet in! definite w ic underlies t em 'i.e. t e substance or indi#idual(& w ic is im$lied in suc a $redicate" for we ne#er use t e word ,!ood, or ,sittin!, wit out im$lyin! t is. Clearly t en it is in #irtue of t is cate!ory t at eac of t e ot ers also is. ) erefore t at w ic is $rimarily& i.e. not in a 6ualified sense but wit out 6ualification& must be substance. +ow t ere are se#eral senses in w ic a t in! is said to be first" yet substance is first in e#ery sense0'1( in definition& '5( in order of knowled!e& '3( in time. %or '3( of t e ot er cate!ories none can e*ist inde$endently& but only substance. And '1( in

definition also t is is first" for in t e definition of eac term t e definition of its substance must be $resent. And '5( we t ink we know eac t in! most fully& w en we know w at it is& e.!. w at man is or w at fire is& rat er t an w en we know its 6uality& its 6uantity& or its $lace" since we know eac of t ese $redicates also& only w en we know w at t e 6uantity or t e 6uality is. And indeed t e 6uestion w ic was raised of old and is raised now and always& and is always t e sub.ect of doubt& #i2. w at bein! is& is .ust t e 6uestion& w at is substance< %or it is t is t at some assert to be one& ot ers more t an one& and t at some assert to be limited in number& ot ers unlimited. And so we also must consider c iefly and $rimarily and almost e*clusi#ely w at t at is w ic is in t is sense. 5 /ubstance is t ou! t to belon! most ob#iously to bodies" and so we say t at not only animals and $lants and t eir $arts are substances& but also natural bodies suc as fire and water and eart and e#eryt in! of t e sort& and all t in!s t at are eit er $arts of t ese or com$osed of t ese 'eit er of $arts or of t e w ole bodies(& e.!. t e $ ysical uni#erse and its $arts& stars and moon and sun. But w et er t ese alone are substances& or t ere are also ot ers& or only some of t ese& or ot ers as well& or none of t ese but only some ot er t in!s& are substances& must be considered. /ome t ink t e limits of body& i.e. surface& line& $oint& and unit& are substances& and more so t an body or t e solid. %urt er& some do not t ink t ere is anyt in! substantial besides sensible t in!s& but ot ers t ink t ere are eternal substances w ic are more in number and more real" e.!. -lato $osited two kinds of substance0t e %orms and ob.ects of mat ematics0as well as a t ird kind& #i2. t e substance of sensible bodies. And /$eusi$$us made still more kinds of substance& be!innin! wit t e :ne& and assumin! $rinci$les for eac kind of substance& one for numbers& anot er for s$atial ma!nitudes& and t en anot er for t e soul" and by !oin! on in t is way e multi$lies t e kinds of substance. And some say %orms and numbers a#e t e same nature& and t e ot er t in!s come after t em0lines and $lanes0until we come to t e substance of t e material uni#erse and to sensible bodies. Re!ardin! t ese matters& t en& we must in6uire w ic of t e common statements are ri! t and w ic are not ri! t& and w at substances t ere are& and w et er t ere are or are not any besides sensible substances& and ow sensible substances e*ist& and w et er t ere is a substance ca$able of se$arate e*istence 'and if so w y and ow( or no suc substance& a$art from sensible substances" and we must first sketc t e nature of substance. 3

) e word ,substance, is a$$lied& if not in more senses& still at least to four main ob.ects" for bot t e essence and t e uni#ersal and t e !enus& are t ou! t to be t e substance of eac t in!& and fourt ly t e substratum. +ow t e substratum is t at of w ic e#eryt in! else is $redicated& w ile it is itself not $redicated of anyt in! else. And so we must first determine t e nature of t is" for t at w ic underlies a t in! $rimarily is t ou! t to be in t e truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of t e nature of substratum& in anot er& s a$e& and in a t ird& t e com$ound of t ese. 'By t e matter 1 mean& for instance& t e bron2e& by t e s a$e t e $attern of its form& and by t e com$ound of t ese t e statue& t e concrete w ole.( ) erefore if t e form is $rior to t e matter and more real& it will be $rior also to t e com$ound of bot & for t e same reason. We a#e now outlined t e nature of substance& s owin! t at it is t at w ic is not $redicated of a stratum& but of w ic all else is $redicated. But we must not merely state t e matter t us" for t is is not enou! . ) e statement itself is obscure& and furt er& on t is #iew& matter becomes substance. %or if t is is not substance& it baffles us to say w at else is. W en all else is stri$$ed off e#idently not in! but matter remains. %or w ile t e rest are affections& $roducts& and $otencies of bodies& len!t & breadt & and de$t are 6uantities and not substances 'for a 6uantity is not a substance(& but t e substance is rat er t at to w ic t ese belon! $rimarily. But w en len!t and breadt and de$t are taken away we see not in! left unless t ere is somet in! t at is bounded by t ese" so t at to t ose w o consider t e 6uestion t us matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter 1 mean t at w ic in itself is neit er a $articular t in! nor of a certain 6uantity nor assi!ned to any ot er of t e cate!ories by w ic bein! is determined. %or t ere is somet in! of w ic eac of t ese is $redicated& w ose bein! is different from t at of eac of t e $redicates 'for t e $redicates ot er t an substance are $redicated of substance& w ile substance is $redicated of matter(. ) erefore t e ultimate substratum is of itself neit er a $articular t in! nor of a $articular 6uantity nor ot erwise $ositi#ely c aracteri2ed" nor yet is it t e ne!ations of t ese& for ne!ations also will belon! to it only by accident. 1f we ado$t t is $oint of #iew& t en& it follows t at matter is substance. But t is is im$ossible" for bot se$arability and ,t isness, are t ou! t to belon! c iefly to substance. And so form and t e com$ound of form and matter would be t ou! t to be substance& rat er t an matter. ) e substance com$ounded of bot & i.e. of matter and s a$e& may be dismissed" for it is $osterior and its nature is ob#ious. And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must in6uire into t e t ird kind of substance" for t is is t e most $er$le*in!. /ome of t e sensible substances are !enerally admitted to be

substances& so t at we must look first amon! t ese. %or it is an ad#anta!e to ad#ance to t at w ic is more knowable. %or learnin! $roceeds for all in t is way0t rou! t at w ic is less knowable by nature to t at w ic is more knowable" and .ust as in conduct our task is to start from w at is !ood for eac and make w at is wit out 6ualification !ood !ood for eac & so it is our task to start from w at is more knowable to oneself and make w at is knowable by nature knowable to oneself. +ow w at is knowable and $rimary for $articular sets of $eo$le is often knowable to a #ery small e*tent& and as little or not in! of reality. But yet one must start from t at w ic is barely knowable but knowable to oneself& and try to know w at is knowable wit out 6ualification& $assin!& as as been said& by way of t ose #ery t in!s w ic one does know. = /ince at t e start we distin!uis ed t e #arious marks by w ic we determine substance& and one of t ese was t ou! t to be t e essence& we must in#esti!ate t is. And first let us make some lin!uistic remarks about it. ) e essence of eac t in! is w at it is said to be $ro$ter se. %or bein! you is not bein! musical& since you are not by your #ery nature musical. W at& t en& you are by your #ery nature is your essence. +or yet is t e w ole of t is t e essence of a t in!" not t at w ic is $ro$ter se as w ite is to a surface& because bein! a surface is not identical wit bein! w ite. But a!ain t e combination of bot 0,bein! a w ite surface,0is not t e essence of surface& because ,surface, itself is added. ) e formula& t erefore& in w ic t e term itself is not $resent but its meanin! is e*$ressed& t is is t e formula of t e essence of eac t in!. ) erefore if to be a w ite surface is to be a smoot surface& to be w ite and to be smoot are one and t e same. But since t ere are also com$ounds answerin! to t e ot er cate!ories 'for t ere is a substratum for eac cate!ory& e.!. for 6uality& 6uantity& time& $lace& and motion(& we must in6uire w et er t ere is a formula of t e essence of eac of t em& i.e. w et er to t ese com$ounds also t ere belon!s an essence& e.!. ,w ite man,. Let t e com$ound be denoted by ,cloak,. W at is t e essence of cloak< But& it may be said& t is also is not a $ro$ter se e*$ression. We re$ly t at t ere are .ust two ways in w ic a $redicate may fail to be true of a sub.ect $ro$ter se& and one of t ese results from t e addition& and t e ot er from t e omission& of a determinant. :ne kind of $redicate is not $ro$ter se because t e term t at is bein! defined is combined wit anot er determinant& e.!. if in definin! t e essence of w ite one were to state t e formula of w ite man" t e ot er because in t e sub.ect anot er determinant is combined wit t at w ic is e*$ressed in t e formula& e.!. if ,cloak, meant ,w ite

man,& and one were to define cloak as w ite" w ite man is w ite indeed& but its essence is not to be w ite. But is bein!0a0cloak an essence at all< -robably not. %or t e essence is $recisely w at somet in! is" but w en an attribute is asserted of a sub.ect ot er t an itself& t e com$le* is not $recisely w at some ,t is, is& e.!. w ite man is not $recisely w at some ,t is, is& since t isness belon!s only to substances. ) erefore t ere is an essence only of t ose t in!s w ose formula is a definition. But we a#e a definition not w ere we a#e a word and a formula identical in meanin! 'for in t at case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions" for t ere will be some name for any set of words w ate#er& so t at e#en t e 1liad will be a definition(& but w ere t ere is a formula of somet in! $rimary" and $rimary t in!s are t ose w ic do not im$ly t e $redication of one element in t em of anot er element. +ot in!& t en& w ic is not a s$ecies of a !enus will a#e an essence0only s$ecies will a#e it& for t ese are t ou! t to im$ly not merely t at t e sub.ect $artici$ates in t e attribute and as it as an affection& or as it by accident" but for e#er t in! else as well& if it as a name& t ere be a formula of its meanin!0#i2. t at t is attribute belon!s to t is sub.ect" or instead of a sim$le formula we s all be able to !i#e a more accurate one" but t ere will be no definition nor essence. :r as ,definition,& like ,w at a t in! is,& se#eral meanin!s< ,W at a t in! is, in one sense means substance and t e ,t is,& in anot er one or ot er of t e $redicates& 6uantity& 6uality& and t e like. %or as ,is, belon!s to all t in!s& not owe#er in t e same sense& but to one sort of t in! $rimarily and to ot ers in a secondary way& so too ,w at a t in! is, belon!s in t e sim$le sense to substance& but in a limited sense to t e ot er cate!ories. %or e#en of a 6uality we mi! t ask w at it is& so t at 6uality also is a ,w at a t in! is,&0not in t e sim$le sense& owe#er& but .ust as& in t e case of t at w ic is not& some say& em$ asi2in! t e lin!uistic form& t at t at is w ic is not is0not is sim$ly& but is non0e*istent" so too wit 6uality. We must no doubt in6uire ow we s ould e*$ress oursel#es on eac $oint& but certainly not more t an ow t e facts actually stand. And so now also& since it is e#ident w at lan!ua!e we use& essence will belon!& .ust as ,w at a t in! is, does& $rimarily and in t e sim$le sense to substance& and in a secondary way to t e ot er cate!ories also&0not essence in t e sim$le sense& but t e essence of a 6uality or of a 6uantity. %or it must be eit er by an e6ui#ocation t at we say t ese are& or by addin! to and takin! from t e meanin! of ,are, 'in t e way in w ic t at w ic is not known may be said to be known(&0t e trut bein! t at we use t e word neit er ambi!uously nor in t e same sense& but .ust as we a$$ly t e word ,medical, by #irtue of a reference to one and t e same t in!& not meanin! one and t e same

t in!& nor yet s$eakin! ambi!uously" for a $atient and an o$eration and an instrument are called medical neit er by an ambi!uity nor wit a sin!le meanin!& but wit reference to a common end. But it does not matter at all in w ic of t e two ways one likes to describe t e facts" t is is e#ident& t at definition and essence in t e $rimary and sim$le sense belon! to substances. /till t ey belon! to ot er t in!s as well& only not in t e $rimary sense. %or if we su$$ose t is it does not follow t at t ere is a definition of e#ery word w ic means t e same as any formula" it must mean t e same as a $articular kind of formula" and t is condition is satisfied if it is a formula of somet in! w ic is one& not by continuity like t e 1liad or t e t in!s t at are one by bein! bound to!et er& but in one of t e main senses of ,one,& w ic answer to t e senses of ,is," now ,t at w ic is, in one sense denotes a ,t is,& in anot er a 6uantity& in anot er a 6uality. And so t ere can be a formula or definition e#en of w ite man& but not in t e sense in w ic t ere is a definition eit er of w ite or of a substance. 5 1t is a difficult 6uestion& if one denies t at a formula wit an added determinant is a definition& w et er any of t e terms t at are not sim$le but cou$led will be definable. %or we must e*$lain t em by addin! a determinant. 4.!. t ere is t e nose& and conca#ity& and snubness& w ic is com$ounded out of t e two by t e $resence of t e one in t e ot er& and it is not by accident t at t e nose as t e attribute eit er of conca#ity or of snubness& but in #irtue of its nature" nor do t ey attac to it as w iteness does to Callias& or to man 'because Callias& w o a$$ens to be a man& is w ite(& but as ,male, attac es to animal and ,e6ual, to 6uantity& and as all so0called ,attributes $ro$ter se, attac to t eir sub.ects. And suc attributes are t ose in w ic is in#ol#ed eit er t e formula or t e name of t e sub.ect of t e $articular attribute& and w ic cannot be e*$lained wit out t is" e.!. w ite can be e*$lained a$art from man& but not female a$art from animal. ) erefore t ere is eit er no essence and definition of any of t ese t in!s& or if t ere is& it is in anot er sense& as we a#e said. But t ere is also a second difficulty about t em. %or if snub nose and conca#e nose are t e same t in!& snub and conca#e will be t e t in!" but if snub and conca#e are not t e same 'because it is im$ossible to s$eak of snubness a$art from t e t in! of w ic it is an attribute $ro$ter se& for snubness is conca#ity0in0a0nose(& eit er it is im$ossible to say ,snub nose, or t e same t in! will a#e been said twice& conca#e0nose nose" for snub nose will be conca#e0nose nose. And so it is absurd t at suc t in!s s ould a#e an essence" if t ey a#e& t ere will be an infinite re!ress" for in snub0nose nose yet anot er ,nose, will be in#ol#ed.

Clearly& t en& only substance is definable. %or if t e ot er cate!ories also are definable& it must be by addition of a determinant& e.!. t e 6ualitati#e is defined t us& and so is t e odd& for it cannot be defined a$art from number" nor can female be defined a$art from animal. 'W en 1 say ,by addition, 1 mean t e e*$ressions in w ic it turns out t at we are sayin! t e same t in! twice& as in t ese instances.( And if t is is true& cou$led terms also& like ,odd number,& will not be definable 'but t is esca$es our notice because our formulae are not accurate.(. But if t ese also are definable& eit er it is in some ot er way or& as we definition and essence must be said to a#e more t an one sense. ) erefore in one sense not in! will a#e a definition and not in! will a#e an essence& e*ce$t substances& but in anot er sense ot er t in!s will a#e t em. Clearly& t en& definition is t e formula of t e essence& and essence belon!s to substances eit er alone or c iefly and $rimarily and in t e un6ualified sense. @ We must in6uire w et er eac t in! and its essence are t e same or different. ) is is of some use for t e in6uiry concernin! substance" for eac t in! is t ou! t to be not different from its substance& and t e essence is said to be t e substance of eac t in!. +ow in t e case of accidental unities t e two would be !enerally t ou! t to be different& e.!. w ite man would be t ou! t to be different from t e essence of w ite man. %or if t ey are t e same& t e essence of man and t at of w ite man are also t e same" for a man and a w ite man are t e same t in!& as $eo$le say& so t at t e essence of w ite man and t at of man would be also t e same. But $er a$s it does not follow t at t e essence of accidental unities s ould be t e same as t at of t e sim$le terms. %or t e e*treme terms are not in t e same way identical wit t e middle term. But $er a$s t is mi! t be t ou! t to follow& t at t e e*treme terms& t e accidents& s ould turn out to be t e same& e.!. t e essence of w ite and t at of musical" but t is is not actually t ou! t to be t e case. But in t e case of so0called self0subsistent t in!s& is a t in! necessarily t e same as its essence< 4.!. if t ere are some substances w ic a#e no ot er substances nor entities $rior to t em0substances suc as some assert t e 1deas to be<01f t e essence of !ood is to be different from !ood0itself& and t e essence of animal from animal0itself& and t e essence of bein! from bein!0itself& t ere will& firstly& be ot er substances and entities and 1deas besides t ose w ic are asserted& and& secondly& t ese ot ers will be $rior substances& if essence is substance. And if t e $osterior substances and t e $rior are se#ered from eac ot er& 'a( t ere will be no knowled!e of t e former& and 'b( t e latter will a#e no bein!. 'By ,se#ered, 1 mean& if t e !ood0itself as not t e essence of !ood&

and t e latter as not t e $ro$erty of bein! !ood.( %or 'a( t ere is knowled!e of eac t in! only w en we know its essence. And 'b( t e case is t e same for ot er t in!s as for t e !ood" so t at if t e essence of !ood is not !ood& neit er is t e essence of reality real& nor t e essence of unity one. And all essences alike e*ist or none of t em does" so t at if t e essence of reality is not real& neit er is any of t e ot ers. A!ain& t at to w ic t e essence of !ood does not belon! is not !ood.0) e !ood& t en& must be one wit t e essence of !ood& and t e beautiful wit t e essence of beauty& and so wit all t in!s w ic do not de$end on somet in! else but are self0subsistent and $rimary. %or it is enou! if t ey are t is& e#en if t ey are not %orms" or rat er& $er a$s& e#en if t ey are %orms. 'At t e same time it is clear t at if t ere are 1deas suc as some $eo$le say t ere are& it will not be substratum t at is substance" for t ese must be substances& but not $redicable of a substratum" for if t ey were t ey would e*ist only by bein! $artici$ated in.( 4ac t in! itself& t en& and its essence are one and t e same in no merely accidental way& as is e#ident bot from t e $recedin! ar!uments and because to know eac t in!& at least& is .ust to know its essence& so t at e#en by t e e* ibition of instances it becomes clear t at bot must be one. 'But of an accidental term& e.!.,t e musical, or ,t e w ite,& since it as two meanin!s& it is not true to say t at it itself is identical wit its essence" for bot t at to w ic t e accidental 6uality belon!s& and t e accidental 6uality& are w ite& so t at in a sense t e accident and its essence are t e same& and in a sense t ey are not" for t e essence of w ite is not t e same as t e man or t e w ite man& but it is t e same as t e attribute w ite.( ) e absurdity of t e se$aration would a$$ear also if one were to assi!n a name to eac of t e essences" for t ere would be yet anot er essence besides t e ori!inal one& e.!. to t e essence of orse t ere will belon! a second essence. 9et w y s ould not some t in!s be t eir essences from t e start& since essence is substance< But indeed not only are a t in! and its essence one& but t e formula of t em is also t e same& as is clear e#en from w at as been said" for it is not by accident t at t e essence of one& and t e one& are one. %urt er& if t ey are to be different& t e $rocess will !o on to infinity" for we s all a#e '1( t e essence of one& and '5( t e one& so t at to terms of t e former kind t e same ar!ument will be a$$licable. Clearly& t en& eac $rimary and self0subsistent t in! is one and t e same as its essence. ) e so$ istical ob.ections to t is $osition& and t e 6uestion w et er /ocrates and to be /ocrates are t e same t in!& are ob#iously answered by t e same solution" for t ere is no difference eit er in t e stand$oint from w ic t e 6uestion would be asked& or in t at from w ic one could answer it

successfully. We a#e e*$lained& t en& in w at sense eac t in! is t e same as its essence and in w at sense it is not. A :f t in!s t at come to be& some come to be by nature& some by art& some s$ontaneously. +ow e#eryt in! t at comes to be comes to be by t e a!ency of somet in! and from somet in! and comes to be somet in!. And t e somet in! w ic 1 say it comes to be may be found in any cate!ory" it may come to be eit er a ,t is, or of some si2e or of some 6uality or somew ere. +ow natural comin!s to be are t e comin!s to be of t ose t in!s w ic come to be by nature" and t at out of w ic t ey come to be is w at we call matter" and t at by w ic t ey come to be is somet in! w ic e*ists naturally" and t e somet in! w ic t ey come to be is a man or a $lant or one of t e t in!s of t is kind& w ic we say are substances if anyt in! is0all t in!s $roduced eit er by nature or by art a#e matter" for eac of t em is ca$able bot of bein! and of not bein!& and t is ca$acity is t e matter in eac 0and& in !eneral& bot t at from w ic t ey are $roduced is nature& and t e ty$e accordin! to w ic t ey are $roduced is nature 'for t at w ic is $roduced& e.!. a $lant or an animal& as a nature(& and so is t at by w ic t ey are $roduced00t e so0called ,formal, nature& w ic is s$ecifically t e same 't ou! t is is in anot er indi#idual(" for man be!ets man. ) us& t en& are natural $roducts $roduced" all ot er $roductions are called ,makin!s,. And all makin!s $roceed eit er from art or from a faculty or from t ou! t. /ome of t em a$$en also s$ontaneously or by luck .ust as natural $roducts sometimes do" for t ere also t e same t in!s sometimes are $roduced wit out seed as well as from seed. Concernin! t ese cases& t en& we must in6uire later& but from art $roceed t e t in!s of w ic t e form is in t e soul of t e artist. 'By form 1 mean t e essence of eac t in! and its $rimary substance.( %or e#en contraries a#e in a sense t e same form" for t e substance of a $ri#ation is t e o$$osite substance& e.!. ealt is t e substance of disease 'for disease is t e absence of ealt (" and ealt is t e formula in t e soul or t e knowled!e of it. ) e ealt y sub.ect is $roduced as t e result of t e followin! train of t ou! t>0since t is is ealt & if t e sub.ect is to be ealt y t is must first be $resent& e.!. a uniform state of body& and if t is is to be $resent& t ere must be eat" and t e $ ysician !oes on t inkin! t us until e reduces t e matter to a final somet in! w ic e imself can $roduce. ) en t e $rocess from t is $oint onward& i.e. t e $rocess towards ealt & is called a ,makin!,. ) erefore it follows t at in a sense ealt comes from ealt and ouse from ouse& t at wit matter from t at wit out matter" for t e medical art and t e buildin! art are t e form of ealt and of t e ouse& and w en 1 s$eak

of substance wit out matter 1 mean t e essence. :f t e $roductions or $rocesses one $art is called t inkin! and t e ot er makin!&0t at w ic $roceeds from t e startin!0$oint and t e form is t inkin!& and t at w ic $roceeds from t e final ste$ of t e t inkin! is makin!. And eac of t e ot er& intermediate& t in!s is $roduced in t e same way. 1 mean& for instance& if t e sub.ect is to be ealt y is bodily state must be made uniform. W at t en does bein! made uniform im$ly< ) is or t at. And t is de$ends on is bein! made warm. W at does t is im$ly< /omet in! else. And t is somet in! is $resent $otentially" and w at is $resent $otentially is already in t e $ ysician,s $ower. ) e acti#e $rinci$le t en and t e startin! $oint for t e $rocess of becomin! ealt y is& if it a$$ens by art& t e form in t e soul& and if s$ontaneously& it is t at& w ate#er it is& w ic starts t e makin!& for t e man w o makes by art& as in ealin! t e startin!0$oint is $er a$s t e $roduction of warmt 'and t is t e $ ysician $roduces by rubbin!(. Warmt in t e body& t en& is eit er a $art of ealt or is followed 'eit er directly or t rou! se#eral intermediate ste$s( by somet in! similar w ic is a $art of ealt " and t is& #i2. t at w ic $roduces t e $art of ealt & is t e limitin!0$oint00and so too wit a ouse 't e stones are t e limitin!0$oint ere( and in all ot er cases. ) erefore& as t e sayin! !oes& it is im$ossible t at anyt in! s ould be $roduced if t ere were not in! e*istin! before. :b#iously t en some $art of t e result will $re0e*ist of necessity" for t e matter is a $art" for t is is $resent in t e $rocess and it is t is t at becomes somet in!. But is t e matter an element e#en in t e formula< We certainly describe in bot ways w at bra2en circles are" we describe bot t e matter by sayin! it is brass& and t e form by sayin! t at it is suc and suc a fi!ure" and fi!ure is t e $ro*imate !enus in w ic it is $laced. ) e bra2en circle& t en& as its matter in its formula. As for t at out of w ic as matter t ey are $roduced& some t in!s are said& w en t ey a#e been $roduced& to be not t at but ,t aten," e.!. t e statue is not !old but !olden. And a ealt y man is not said to be t at from w ic e as come. ) e reason is t at t ou! a t in! comes bot from its $ri#ation and from its substratum& w ic we call its matter 'e.!. w at becomes ealt y is bot a man and an in#alid(& it is said to come rat er from its $ri#ation 'e.!. it is from an in#alid rat er t an from a man t at a ealt y sub.ect is $roduced(. And so t e ealt y sub.ect is not said to e an in#alid& but to be a man& and t e man is said to be ealt y. But as for t e t in!s w ose $ri#ation is obscure and nameless& e.!. in brass t e $ri#ation of a $articular s a$e or in bricks and timber t e $ri#ation of arran!ement as a ouse& t e t in! is t ou! t to be $roduced from t ese materials& as in t e former case t e ealt y man is $roduced from an in#alid. And so& as t ere

also a t in! is not said to be t at from w ic it comes& ere t e statue is not said to be wood but is said by a #erbal c an!e to be wooden& not brass but bra2en& not !old but !olden& and t e ouse is said to be not bricks but bricken 't ou! we s ould not say wit out 6ualification& if we looked at t e matter carefully& e#en t at a statue is $roduced from wood or a ouse from bricks& because comin! to be im$lies c an!e in t at from w ic a t in! comes to be& and not $ermanence(. 1t is for t is reason& t en& t at we use t is way of s$eakin!. B /ince anyt in! w ic is $roduced is $roduced by somet in! 'and t is 1 call t e startin!0$oint of t e $roduction(& and from somet in! 'and let t is be taken to be not t e $ri#ation but t e matter" for t e meanin! we attac to t is as already been e*$lained(& and since somet in! is $roduced 'and t is is eit er a s$ ere or a circle or w ate#er else it may c ance to be(& .ust as we do not make t e substratum 't e brass(& so we do not make t e s$ ere& e*ce$t incidentally& because t e bra2en s$ ere is a s$ ere and we make t e forme. %or to make a ,t is, is to make a ,t is, out of t e substratum in t e full sense of t e word. '1 mean t at to make t e brass round is not to make t e round or t e s$ ere& but somet in! else& i.e. to $roduce t is form in somet in! different from itself. %or if we make t e form& we must make it out of somet in! else" for t is was assumed. 4.!. we make a bra2en s$ ere" and t at in t e sense t at out of t is& w ic is brass& we make t is ot er& w ic is a s$ ere.( 1f& t en& we also make t e substratum itself& clearly we s all make it in t e same way& and t e $rocesses of makin! will re!ress to infinity. :b#iously t en t e form also& or w ate#er we ou! t to call t e s a$e $resent in t e sensible t in!& is not $roduced& nor is t ere any $roduction of it& nor is t e essence $roduced" for t is is t at w ic is made to be in somet in! else eit er by art or by nature or by some faculty. But t at t ere is a bra2en s$ ere& t is we make. %or we make it out of brass and t e s$ ere" we brin! t e form into t is $articular matter& and t e result is a bra2en s$ ere. But if t e essence of s$ ere in !eneral is to be $roduced& somet in! must be $roduced out of somet in!. %or t e $roduct will always a#e to be di#isible& and one $art must be t is and anot er t at" 1 mean t e one must be matter and t e ot er form. 1f& t en& a s$ ere is ,t e fi!ure w ose circumference is at all $oints e6uidistant from t e centre,& $art of t is will be t e medium in w ic t e t in! made will be& and $art will be in t at medium& and t e w ole will be t e t in! $roduced& w ic corres$onds to t e bra2en s$ ere. 1t is ob#ious& t en& from w at as been said& t at t at w ic is s$oken of as form or substance is not $roduced& but t e concrete t in! w ic !ets its name from t is is $roduced& and t at

in e#eryt in! w ic is !enerated matter is $resent& and one $art of t e t in! is matter and t e ot er form. 1s t ere& t en& a s$ ere a$art from t e indi#idual s$ eres or a ouse a$art from t e bricks< Rat er we may say t at no ,t is, would e#er a#e been comin! to be& if t is ad been so& but t at t e ,form, means t e ,suc ,& and is not a ,t is,0a definite t in!" but t e artist makes& or t e fat er be!ets& a ,suc , out of a ,t is," and w en it as been be!otten& it is a ,t is suc ,. And t e w ole ,t is,& Callias or /ocrates& is analo!ous to ,t is bra2en s$ ere,& but man and animal to ,bra2en s$ ere, in !eneral. :b#iously& t en& t e cause w ic consists of t e %orms 'taken in t e sense in w ic some maintain t e e*istence of t e %orms& i.e. if t ey are somet in! a$art from t e indi#iduals( is useless& at least wit re!ard to comin!s0to0be and to substances" and t e %orms need not& for t is reason at least& be self0subsistent substances. 1n some cases indeed it is e#en ob#ious t at t e be!etter is of t e same kind as t e be!otten 'not& owe#er& t e same nor one in number& but in form(& i.e. in t e case of natural $roducts 'for man be!ets man(& unless somet in! a$$ens contrary to nature& e.!. t e $roduction of a mule by a orse. 'And e#en t ese cases are similar" for t at w ic would be found to be common to orse and ass& t e !enus ne*t abo#e t em& as not recei#ed a name& but it would doubtless be bot in fact somet in! like a mule.( :b#iously& t erefore& it is 6uite unnecessary to set u$ a %orm as a $attern 'for we s ould a#e looked for %orms in t ese cases if in any" for t ese are substances if anyt in! is so(" t e be!etter is ade6uate to t e makin! of t e $roduct and to t e causin! of t e form in t e matter. And w en we a#e t e w ole& suc and suc a form in t is fles and in t ese bones& t is is Callias or /ocrates" and t ey are different in #irtue of t eir matter 'for t at is different(& but t e same in form" for t eir form is indi#isible. C ) e 6uestion mi! t be raised& w y some t in!s are $roduced s$ontaneously as well as by art& e.!. ealt & w ile ot ers are not& e.!. a ouse. ) e reason is t at in some cases t e matter w ic !o#erns t e $roduction in t e makin! and $roducin! of any work of art& and in w ic a $art of t e $roduct is $resent&0some matter is suc as to be set in motion by itself and some is not of t is nature& and of t e former kind some can mo#e itself in t e $articular way re6uired& w ile ot er matter is inca$able of t is" for many t in!s can be set in motion by t emsel#es but not in some $articular way& e.!. t at of dancin!. ) e t in!s& t en& w ose matter is of t is sort& e.!. stones& cannot be mo#ed in t e $articular way re6uired& e*ce$t by somet in! else& but in anot er way t ey can mo#e t emsel#es0and so it is wit fire. ) erefore some t in!s will not e*ist a$art from some one w o as t e art of makin! t em& w ile ot ers will" for motion

will be started by t ese t in!s w ic a#e not t e art but can t emsel#es be mo#ed by ot er t in!s w ic a#e not t e art or wit a motion startin! from a $art of t e $roduct. And it is clear also from w at as been said t at in a sense e#ery $roduct of art is $roduced from a t in! w ic s ares its name 'as natural $roducts are $roduced(& or from a $art of itself w ic s ares its name 'e.!. t e ouse is $roduced from a ouse& 6ua $roduced by reason" for t e art of buildin! is t e form of t e ouse(& or from somet in! w ic contains a art of it&0if we e*clude t in!s $roduced by accident" for t e cause of t e t in!,s $roducin! t e $roduct directly $er se is a $art of t e $roduct. ) e eat in t e mo#ement caused eat in t e body& and t is is eit er ealt & or a $art of ealt & or is followed by a $art of ealt or by ealt itself. And so it is said to cause ealt & because it causes t at to w ic ealt attac es as a conse6uence. ) erefore& as in syllo!isms& substance is t e startin!0$oint of e#eryt in!. 1t is from ,w at a t in! is, t at syllo!isms start" and from it also we now find $rocesses of $roduction to start. ) in!s w ic are formed by nature are in t e same case as t ese $roducts of art. %or t e seed is $roducti#e in t e same way as t e t in!s t at work by art" for it as t e form $otentially& and t at from w ic t e seed comes as in a sense t e same name as t e offs$rin! only in a sense& for we must not e*$ect $arent and offs$rin! always to a#e e*actly t e same name& as in t e $roduction of , uman bein!, from , uman, for a ,woman, also can be $roduced by a ,man,0unless t e offs$rin! be an im$erfect form" w ic is t e reason w y t e $arent of a mule is not a mule. ) e natural t in!s w ic 'like t e artificial ob.ects $re#iously considered( can be $roduced s$ontaneously are t ose w ose matter can be mo#ed e#en by itself in t e way in w ic t e seed usually mo#es it" t ose t in!s w ic a#e not suc matter cannot be $roduced e*ce$t from t e $arent animals t emsel#es. But not only re!ardin! substance does our ar!ument $ro#e t at its form does not come to be& but t e ar!ument a$$lies to all t e $rimary classes alike& i.e. 6uantity& 6uality& and t e ot er cate!ories. %or as t e bra2en s$ ere comes to be& but not t e s$ ere nor t e brass& and so too in t e case of brass itself& if it comes to be& it is its concrete unity t at comes to be 'for t e matter and t e form must always e*ist before(& so is it bot in t e case of substance and in t at of 6uality and 6uantity and t e ot er cate!ories likewise" for t e 6uality does not come to be& but t e wood of t at 6uality& and t e 6uantity does not come to be& but t e wood or t e animal of t at si2e. But we may learn from t ese instances a $eculiarity of substance& t at t ere must e*ist before and in com$lete reality anot er substance w ic $roduces it& e.!. an animal if an animal is $roduced" but it is not necessary t at a 6uality or 6uantity

s ould $re0e*ist ot erwise t an $otentially. 10 /ince a definition is a formula& and e#ery formula as $arts& and as t e formula is to t e t in!& so is t e $art of t e formula to t e $art of t e t in!& t e 6uestion is already bein! asked w et er t e formula of t e $arts must be $resent in t e formula of t e w ole or not. %or in some cases t e formulae of t e $arts are seen to be $resent& and in some not. ) e formula of t e circle does not include t at of t e se!ments& but t at of t e syllable includes t at of t e letters" yet t e circle is di#ided into se!ments as t e syllable is into letters.0And furt er if t e $arts are $rior to t e w ole& and t e acute an!le is a $art of t e ri! t an!le and t e fin!er a $art of t e animal& t e acute an!le will be $rior to t e ri! t an!le and fin!er to t e man. But t e latter are t ou! t to be $rior" for in formula t e $arts are e*$lained by reference to t em& and in res$ect also of t e $ower of e*istin! a$art from eac ot er t e w oles are $rior to t e $arts. -er a$s we s ould rat er say t at ,$art, is used in se#eral senses. :ne of t ese is ,t at w ic measures anot er t in! in res$ect of 6uantity,. But let t is sense be set aside" let us in6uire about t e $arts of w ic substance consists. 1f t en matter is one t in!& form anot er& t e com$ound of t ese a t ird& and bot t e matter and t e form and t e com$ound are substance e#en t e matter is in a sense called $art of a t in!& w ile in a sense it is not& but only t e elements of w ic t e formula of t e form consists. 4.!. of conca#ity fles 'for t is is t e matter in w ic it is $roduced( is not a $art& but of snubness it is a $art" and t e bron2e is a $art of t e concrete statue& but not of t e statue w en t is is s$oken of in t e sense of t e form. '%or t e form& or t e t in! as a#in! form& s ould be said to be t e t in!& but t e material element by itself must ne#er be said to be so.( And so t e formula of t e circle does not include t at of t e se!ments& but t e formula of t e syllable includes t at of t e letters" for t e letters are $arts of t e formula of t e form& and not matter& but t e se!ments are $arts in t e sense of matter on w ic t e form su$er#enes" yet t ey are nearer t e form t an t e bron2e is w en roundness is $roduced in bron2e. But in a sense not e#en e#ery kind of letter will be $resent in t e formula of t e syllable& e.!. $articular wa*en letters or t e letters as mo#ements in t e air" for in t ese also we a#e already somet in! t at is $art of t e syllable only in t e sense t at it is its $erce$tible matter. %or e#en if t e line w en di#ided $asses away into its al#es& or t e man into bones and muscles and fles & it does not follow t at t ey are com$osed of t ese as $arts of t eir essence& but rat er as matter" and t ese are $arts of t e concrete t in!& but not also of t e form& i.e. of t at to w ic t e formula

refers" w erefore also t ey are not $resent in t e formulae. 1n one kind of formula& t en& t e formula of suc $arts will be $resent& but in anot er it must not be $resent& w ere t e formula does not refer to t e concrete ob.ect. %or it is for t is reason t at some t in!s a#e as t eir constituent $rinci$les $arts into w ic t ey $ass away& w ile some a#e not. ) ose t in!s w ic are t e form and t e matter taken to!et er& e.!. t e snub& or t e bron2e circle& $ass away into t ese materials& and t e matter is a $art of t em" but t ose t in!s w ic do not in#ol#e matter but are wit out matter& and w ose formulae are formulae of t e form only& do not $ass away&0eit er not at all or at any rate not in t is way. ) erefore t ese materials are $rinci$les and $arts of t e concrete t in!s& w ile of t e form t ey are neit er $arts nor $rinci$les. And t erefore t e clay statue is resol#ed into clay and t e ball into bron2e and Callias into fles and bones& and a!ain t e circle into its se!ments" for t ere is a sense of ,circle, in w ic in#ol#es matter. %or ,circle, is used ambi!uously& meanin! bot t e circle& un6ualified& and t e indi#idual circle& because t ere is no name $eculiar to t e indi#iduals. ) e trut as indeed now been stated& but still let us state it yet more clearly& takin! u$ t e 6uestion a!ain. ) e $arts of t e formula& into w ic t e formula is di#ided& are $rior to it& eit er all or some of t em. ) e formula of t e ri! t an!le& owe#er& does not include t e formula of t e acute& but t e formula of t e acute includes t at of t e ri! t an!le" for e w o defines t e acute uses t e ri! t an!le" for t e acute is ,less t an a ri! t an!le,. ) e circle and t e semicircle also are in a like relation" for t e semicircle is defined by t e circle" and so is t e fin!er by t e w ole body& for a fin!er is ,suc and suc a $art of a man,. ) erefore t e $arts w ic are of t e nature of matter& and into w ic as its matter a t in! is di#ided& are $osterior" but t ose w ic are of t e nature of $arts of t e formula& and of t e substance accordin! to its formula& are $rior& eit er all or some of t em. And since t e soul of animals 'for t is is t e substance of a li#in! bein!( is t eir substance accordin! to t e formula& i.e. t e form and t e essence of a body of a certain kind 'at least we s all define eac $art& if we define it well& not wit out reference to its function& and t is cannot belon! to it wit out $erce$tion(& so t at t e $arts of soul are $rior& eit er all or some of t em& to t e concrete ,animal,& and so too wit eac indi#idual animal" and t e body and $arts are $osterior to t is& t e essential substance& and it is not t e substance but t e concrete t in! t at is di#ided into t ese $arts as its matter>0t is bein! so& to t e concrete t in! t ese are in a sense $rior& but in a sense t ey are not. %or t ey cannot e#en e*ist if se#ered from t e w ole" for it is not a fin!er in any and e#ery state t at is t e fin!er of a li#in! t in!& but a dead fin!er is a fin!er only in name. /ome $arts are neit er $rior nor $osterior to t e w ole& i.e.

t ose w ic are dominant and in w ic t e formula& i.e. t e essential substance& is immediately $resent& e.!. $er a$s t e eart or t e brain" for it does not matter in t e least w ic of t e two as t is 6uality. But man and orse and terms w ic are t us a$$lied to indi#iduals& but uni#ersally& are not substance but somet in! com$osed of t is $articular formula and t is $articular matter treated as uni#ersal" and as re!ards t e indi#idual& /ocrates already includes in im ultimate indi#idual matter" and similarly in all ot er cases. ,A $art, may be a $art eit er of t e form 'i.e. of t e essence(& or of t e com$ound of t e form and t e matter& or of t e matter itself. But only t e $arts of t e form are $arts of t e formula& and t e formula is of t e uni#ersal" for ,bein! a circle, is t e same as t e circle& and ,bein! a soul, t e same as t e soul. But w en we come to t e concrete t in!& e.!. t is circle& i.e. one of t e indi#idual circles& w et er $erce$tible or intelli!ible '1 mean by intelli!ible circles t e mat ematical& and by $erce$tible circles t ose of bron2e and of wood(&0of t ese t ere is no definition& but t ey are known by t e aid of intuiti#e t inkin! or of $erce$tion" and w en t ey $ass out of t is com$lete reali2ation it is not clear w et er t ey e*ist or not" but t ey are always stated and reco!ni2ed by means of t e uni#ersal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself. And some matter is $erce$tible and some intelli!ible& $erce$tible matter bein! for instance bron2e and wood and all matter t at is c an!eable& and intelli!ible matter bein! t at w ic is $resent in $erce$tible t in!s not 6ua $erce$tible& i.e. t e ob.ects of mat ematics. We a#e stated& t en& ow matters stand wit re!ard to w ole and $art& and t eir $riority and $osteriority. But w en any one asks w et er t e ri! t an!le and t e circle and t e animal are $rior& or t e t in!s into w ic t ey are di#ided and of w ic t ey consist& i.e. t e $arts& we must meet t e in6uiry by sayin! t at t e 6uestion cannot be answered sim$ly. %or if e#en bare soul is t e animal or t e li#in! t in!& or t e soul of eac indi#idual is t e indi#idual itself& and ,bein! a circle, is t e circle& and ,bein! a ri! t an!le, and t e essence of t e ri! t an!le is t e ri! t an!le& t en t e w ole in one sense must be called $osterior to t e art in one sense& i.e. to t e $arts included in t e formula and to t e $arts of t e indi#idual ri! t an!le 'for bot t e material ri! t an!le w ic is made of bron2e& and t at w ic is formed by indi#idual lines& are $osterior to t eir $arts(" w ile t e immaterial ri! t an!le is $osterior to t e $arts included in t e formula& but $rior to t ose included in t e $articular instance& and t e 6uestion must not be answered sim$ly. 1f& owe#er& t e soul is somet in! different and is not identical wit t e animal& e#en so some $arts must& as we a#e maintained& be called $rior and ot ers must not. 11

Anot er 6uestion is naturally raised& #i2. w at sort of $arts belon! to t e form and w at sort not to t e form& but to t e concrete t in!. 9et if t is is not $lain it is not $ossible to define any t in!" for definition is of t e uni#ersal and of t e form. 1f t en it is not e#ident w at sort of $arts are of t e nature of matter and w at sort are not& neit er will t e formula of t e t in! be e#ident. 1n t e case of t in!s w ic are found to occur in s$ecifically different materials& as a circle may e*ist in bron2e or stone or wood& it seems $lain t at t ese& t e bron2e or t e stone& are no $art of t e essence of t e circle& since it is found a$art from t em. :f t in!s w ic are not seen to e*ist a$art& t ere is no reason w y t e same may not be true& .ust as if all circles t at ad e#er been seen were of bron2e" for none t e less t e bron2e would be no $art of t e form" but it is ard to eliminate it in t ou! t. 4.!. t e form of man is always found in fles and bones and $arts of t is kind" are t ese t en also $arts of t e form and t e formula< +o& t ey are matter" but because man is not found also in ot er matters we are unable to $erform t e abstraction. /ince t is is t ou! t to be $ossible& but it is not clear w en it is t e case& some $eo$le already raise t e 6uestion e#en in t e case of t e circle and t e trian!le& t inkin! t at it is not ri! t to define t ese by reference to lines and to t e continuous& but t at all t ese are to t e circle or t e trian!le as fles and bones are to man& and bron2e or stone to t e statue" and t ey reduce all t in!s to numbers& and t ey say t e formula of ,line, is t at of ,two,. And of t ose w o assert t e 1deas some make ,two, t e line0itself& and ot ers make it t e %orm of t e line" for in some cases t ey say t e %orm and t at of w ic it is t e %orm are t e same& e.!. ,two, and t e %orm of two" but in t e case of ,line, t ey say t is is no lon!er so. 1t follows t en t at t ere is one %orm for many t in!s w ose form is e#idently different 'a conclusion w ic confronted t e -yt a!oreans also(" and it is $ossible to make one t in! t e %orm0itself of all& and to old t at t e ot ers are not %orms" but t us all t in!s will be one. We a#e $ointed out& t en& t at t e 6uestion of definitions contains some difficulty& and w y t is is so. And so to reduce all t in!s t us to %orms and to eliminate t e matter is useless labour" for some t in!s surely are a $articular form in a $articular matter& or $articular t in!s in a $articular state. And t e com$arison w ic /ocrates t e youn!er used to make in t e case of ,animal, is not sound" for it leads away from t e trut & and makes one su$$ose t at man can $ossibly e*ist wit out is $arts& as t e circle can wit out t e bron2e. But t e case is not similar" for an animal is somet in! $erce$tible& and it is not $ossible to define it wit out reference to mo#ement0nor& t erefore& wit out reference to t e $arts, bein! in a

certain state. %or it is not a and in any and e#ery state t at is a $art of man& but only w en it can fulfil its work& and t erefore only w en it is ali#e" if it is not ali#e it is not a $art. Re!ardin! t e ob.ects of mat ematics& w y are t e formulae of t e $arts not $arts of t e formulae of t e w oles" e.!. w y are not t e semicircles included in t e formula of t e circle< 1t cannot be said& ,because t ese $arts are $erce$tible t in!s," for t ey are not. But $er a$s t is makes no difference" for e#en some t in!s w ic are not $erce$tible must a#e matter" indeed t ere is some matter in e#eryt in! w ic is not an essence and a bare form but a ,t is,. ) e semicircles& t en& will not be $arts of t e uni#ersal circle& but will be $arts of t e indi#idual circles& as as been said before" for w ile one kind of matter is $erce$tible& t ere is anot er w ic is intelli!ible. 1t is clear also t at t e soul is t e $rimary substance and t e body is matter& and man or animal is t e com$ound of bot taken uni#ersally" and ,/ocrates, or ,Coriscus,& if e#en t e soul of /ocrates may be called /ocrates& as two meanin!s 'for some mean by suc a term t e soul& and ot ers mean t e concrete t in!(& but if ,/ocrates, or ,Coriscus, means sim$ly t is $articular soul and t is $articular body& t e indi#idual is analo!ous to t e uni#ersal in its com$osition. W et er t ere is& a$art from t e matter of suc substances& anot er kind of matter& and one s ould look for some substance ot er t an t ese& e.!. numbers or somet in! of t e sort& must be considered later. %or it is for t e sake of t is t at we are tryin! to determine t e nature of $erce$tible substances as well& since in a sense t e in6uiry about $erce$tible substances is t e work of $ ysics& i.e. of second $ iloso$ y" for t e $ ysicist must come to know not only about t e matter& but also about t e substance e*$ressed in t e formula& and e#en more t an about t e ot er. And in t e case of definitions& ow t e elements in t e formula are $arts of t e definition& and w y t e definition is one formula 'for clearly t e t in! is one& but in #irtue of w at is t e t in! one& alt ou! it as $arts<(&0t is must be considered later. W at t e essence is and in w at sense it is inde$endent& as been stated uni#ersally in a way w ic is true of e#ery case& and also w y t e formula of t e essence of some t in!s contains t e $arts of t e t in! defined& w ile t at of ot ers does not. And we a#e stated t at in t e formula of t e substance t e material $arts will not be $resent 'for t ey are not e#en $arts of t e substance in t at sense& but of t e concrete substance" but of t is t ere is in a sense a formula& and in a sense t ere is not" for t ere is no formula of it wit its matter& for t is is indefinite& but t ere is a formula of it wit reference to its $rimary substance0e.!. in t e case of man t e formula of t e soul0& for t e substance is t e indwellin! form& from

w ic and t e matter t e so0called concrete substance is deri#ed" e.!. conca#ity is a form of t is sort& for from t is and t e nose arise ,snub nose, and ,snubness,(" but in t e concrete substance& e.!. a snub nose or Callias& t e matter also will be $resent. And we a#e stated t at t e essence and t e t in! itself are in some cases t e same" ie. in t e case of $rimary substances& e.!. cur#ature and t e essence of cur#ature if t is is $rimary. 'By a ,$rimary, substance 1 mean one w ic does not im$ly t e $resence of somet in! in somet in! else& i.e. in somet in! t at underlies it w ic acts as matter.( But t in!s w ic are of t e nature of matter& or of w oles t at include matter& are not t e same as t eir essences& nor are accidental unities like t at of ,/ocrates, and ,musical," for t ese are t e same only by accident. 15 +ow let us treat first of definition& in so far as we a#e not treated of it in t e Analytics" for t e $roblem stated in t em is useful for our in6uiries concernin! substance. 1 mean t is $roblem>0w erein can consist t e unity of t at& t e formula of w ic we call a definition& as for instance& in t e case of man& ,two0footed animal," for let t is be t e formula of man. W y& t en& is t is one& and not many& #i2. ,animal, and ,two0footed,< %or in t e case of ,man, and ,$ale, t ere is a $lurality w en one term does not belon! to t e ot er& but a unity w en it does belon! and t e sub.ect& man& as a certain attribute" for t en a unity is $roduced and we a#e ,t e $ale man,. 1n t e $resent case& on t e ot er and& one does not s are in t e ot er" t e !enus is not t ou! t to s are in its differentiae 'for t en t e same t in! would s are in contraries" for t e differentiae by w ic t e !enus is di#ided are contrary(. And e#en if t e !enus does s are in t em& t e same ar!ument a$$lies& since t e differentiae $resent in man are many& e.!. endowed wit feet& two0footed& feat erless. W y are t ese one and not many< +ot because t ey are $resent in one t in!" for on t is $rinci$le a unity can be made out of all t e attributes of a t in!. But surely all t e attributes in t e definition must be one" for t e definition is a sin!le formula and a formula of substance& so t at it must be a formula of some one t in!" for substance means a ,one, and a ,t is,& as we maintain. We must first in6uire about definitions reac ed by t e met od of di#isions. ) ere is not in! in t e definition e*ce$t t e first0named and t e differentiae. ) e ot er !enera are t e first !enus and alon! wit t is t e differentiae t at are taken wit it& e.!. t e first may be ,animal,& t e ne*t ,animal w ic is two0footed,& and a!ain ,animal w ic is two0footed and feat erless,& and similarly if t e definition includes more terms. And in !eneral it makes no difference w et er it includes many or few terms&0nor& t erefore&

w et er it includes few or sim$ly two" and of t e two t e one is differentia and t e ot er !enus" e.!. in ,two0footed animal, ,animal, is !enus& and t e ot er is differentia. 1f t en t e !enus absolutely does not e*ist a$art from t e s$ecies0of0a0!enus& or if it e*ists but e*ists as matter 'for t e #oice is !enus and matter& but its differentiae make t e s$ecies& i.e. t e letters& out of it(& clearly t e definition is t e formula w ic com$rises t e differentiae. But it is also necessary t at t e di#ision be by t e differentia of t e diferentia" e.!. ,endowed wit feet, is a differentia of ,animal," a!ain t e differentia of ,animal endowed wit feet, must be of it 6ua endowed wit feet. ) erefore we must not say& if we are to s$eak ri! tly& t at of t at w ic is endowed wit feet one $art as feat ers and one is feat erless 'if we do t is we do it t rou! inca$acity(" we must di#ide it only into clo#en0footed and not clo#en" for t ese are differentiae in t e foot" clo#en0footedness is a form of footedness. And t e $rocess wants always to !o on so till it reac es t e s$ecies t at contain no differences. And t en t ere will be as many kinds of foot as t ere are differentiae& and t e kinds of animals endowed wit feet will be e6ual in number to t e differentiae. 1f t en t is is so& clearly t e last differentia will be t e substance of t e t in! and its definition& since it is not ri! t to state t e same t in!s more t an once in our definitions" for it is su$erfluous. And t is does a$$en" for w en we say ,animal endowed wit feet and two0footed, we a#e said not in! ot er t an ,animal a#in! feet& a#in! two feet," and if we di#ide t is by t e $ro$er di#ision& we s all be sayin! t e same t in! more t an once0as many times as t ere are differentiae. 1f t en a differentia of a differentia be taken at eac ste$& one differentia0t e last0will be t e form and t e substance" but if we di#ide accordin! to accidental 6ualities& e.!. if we were to di#ide t at w ic is endowed wit feet into t e w ite and t e black& t ere will be as many differentiae as t ere are cuts. ) erefore it is $lain t at t e definition is t e formula w ic contains t e differentiae& or& accordin! to t e ri! t met od& t e last of t ese. ) is would be e#ident& if we were to c an!e t e order of suc definitions& e.!. of t at of man& sayin! ,animal w ic is two0footed and endowed wit feet," for ,endowed wit feet, is su$erfluous w en ,two0footed, as been said. But t ere is no order in t e substance" for ow are we to t ink t e one element $osterior and t e ot er $rior< Re!ardin! t e definitions& t en& w ic are reac ed by t e met od of di#isions& let t is suffice as our first attem$t at statin! t eir nature. 13 Let us return to t e sub.ect of our in6uiry& w ic is substance.

As t e substratum and t e essence and t e com$ound of t ese are called substance& so also is t e uni#ersal. About two of t ese we a#e s$oken" bot about t e essence and about t e substratum& of w ic we a#e said t at it underlies in two senses& eit er bein! a ,t is,0w ic is t e way in w ic an animal underlies its attributes0or as t e matter underlies t e com$lete reality. ) e uni#ersal also is t ou! t by some to be in t e fullest sense a cause& and a $rinci$le" t erefore let us attack t e discussion of t is $oint also. %or it seems im$ossible t at any uni#ersal term s ould be t e name of a substance. %or firstly t e substance of eac t in! is t at w ic is $eculiar to it& w ic does not belon! to anyt in! else" but t e uni#ersal is common& since t at is called uni#ersal w ic is suc as to belon! to more t an one t in!. :f w ic indi#idual t en will t is be t e substance< 4it er of all or of none" but it cannot be t e substance of all. And if it is to be t e substance of one& t is one will be t e ot ers also" for t in!s w ose substance is one and w ose essence is one are t emsel#es also one. %urt er& substance means t at w ic is not $redicable of a sub.ect& but t e uni#ersal is $redicable of some sub.ect always. But $er a$s t e uni#ersal& w ile it cannot be substance in t e way in w ic t e essence is so& can be $resent in t is" e.!. ,animal, can be $resent in ,man, and , orse,. ) en clearly it is a formula of t e essence. And it makes no difference e#en if it is not a formula of e#eryt in! t at is in t e substance" for none t e less t e uni#ersal will be t e substance of somet in!& as ,man, is t e substance of t e indi#idual man in w om it is $resent& so t at t e same result will follow once more" for t e uni#ersal& e.!. ,animal,& will be t e substance of t at in w ic it is $resent as somet in! $eculiar to it. And furt er it is im$ossible and absurd t at t e ,t is,& i.e. t e substance& if it consists of $arts& s ould not consist of substances nor of w at is a ,t is,& but of 6uality" for t at w ic is not substance& i.e. t e 6uality& will t en be $rior to substance and to t e ,t is,. W ic is im$ossible" for neit er in formula nor in time nor in comin! to be can t e modifications be $rior to t e substance" for t en t ey will also be se$arable from it. %urt er& /ocrates will contain a substance $resent in a substance& so t at t is will be t e substance of two t in!s. And in !eneral it follows& if man and suc t in!s are substance& t at none of t e elements in t eir formulae is t e substance of anyt in!& nor does it e*ist a$art from t e s$ecies or in anyt in! else" 1 mean& for instance& t at no ,animal, e*ists a$art from t e $articular kinds of animal& nor does any ot er of t e elements $resent in formulae e*ist a$art. 1f& t en& we #iew t e matter from t ese stand$oints& it is $lain t at no uni#ersal attribute is a substance& and t is is $lain also from t e fact t at no common $redicate indicates a ,t is,& but rat er a ,suc ,. 1f not& many difficulties follow and es$ecially t e

,t ird man,. ) e conclusion is e#ident also from t e followin! consideration. A substance cannot consist of substances $resent in it in com$lete reality" for t in!s t at are t us in com$lete reality two are ne#er in com$lete reality one& t ou! if t ey are $otentially two& t ey can be one 'e.!. t e double line consists of two al#es0$otentially" for t e com$lete reali2ation of t e al#es di#ides t em from one anot er(" t erefore if t e substance is one& it will not consist of substances $resent in it and $resent in t is way& w ic Democritus describes ri! tly" e says one t in! cannot be made out of two nor two out of one" for e identifies substances wit is indi#isible ma!nitudes. 1t is clear t erefore t at t e same will old !ood of number& if number is a synt esis of units& as is said by some" for two is eit er not one& or t ere is no unit $resent in it in com$lete reality. But our result in#ol#es a difficulty. 1f no substance can consist of uni#ersals because a uni#ersal indicates a ,suc ,& not a ,t is,& and if no substance can be com$osed of substances e*istin! in com$lete reality& e#ery substance would be incom$osite& so t at t ere would not e#en be a formula of any substance. But it is t ou! t by all and was stated lon! a!o t at it is eit er only& or $rimarily& substance t at can defined" yet now it seems t at not e#en substance can. ) ere cannot& t en& be a definition of anyt in!" or in a sense t ere can be& and in a sense t ere cannot. And w at we are sayin! will be $lainer from w at follows. 1= 1t is clear also from t ese #ery facts w at conse6uence confronts t ose w o say t e 1deas are substances ca$able of se$arate e*istence& and at t e same time make t e %orm consist of t e !enus and t e differentiae. %or if t e %orms e*ist and ,animal, is $resent in ,man, and , orse,& it is eit er one and t e same in number& or different. '1n formula it is clearly one" for e w o states t e formula will !o t rou! t e formula in eit er case.( 1f t en t ere is a ,man0in0 imself, w o is a ,t is, and e*ists a$art& t e $arts also of w ic e consists& e.!. ,animal, and ,two0footed,& must indicate ,t ises,& and be ca$able of se$arate e*istence& and substances" t erefore ,animal,& as well as ,man,& must be of t is sort. +ow '1( if t e ,animal, in ,t e orse, and in ,man, is one and t e same& as you are wit yourself& 'a( ow will t e one in t in!s t at e*ist a$art be one& and ow will t is ,animal, esca$e bein! di#ided e#en from itself< %urt er& 'b( if it is to s are in ,two0footed, and ,many0footed,& an im$ossible conclusion follows" for contrary attributes will belon! at t e same time to it alt ou! it is one and a ,t is,. 1f it is not to s are in t em& w at is t e relation im$lied w en one says t e animal is two0footed or $ossessed of feet< But

$er a$s t e two t in!s are ,$ut to!et er, and are ,in contact,& or are ,mi*ed,. 9et all t ese e*$ressions are absurd. But '5( su$$ose t e %orm to be different in eac s$ecies. ) en t ere will be $ractically an infinite number of t in!s w ose substance is animal," for it is not by accident t at ,man, as ,animal, for one of its elements. %urt er& many t in!s will be ,animal0itself,. %or 'i( t e ,animal, in eac s$ecies will be t e substance of t e s$ecies" for it is after not in! else t at t e s$ecies is called" if it were& t at ot er would be an element in ,man,& i.e. would be t e !enus of man. And furt er& 'ii( all t e elements of w ic ,man, is com$osed will be 1deas. +one of t em& t en& will be t e 1dea of one t in! and t e substance of anot er" t is is im$ossible. ) e ,animal,& t en& $resent in eac s$ecies of animals will be animal0itself. %urt er& from w at is t is ,animal, in eac s$ecies deri#ed& and ow will it be deri#ed from animal0itself< :r ow can t is ,animal,& w ose essence is sim$ly animality& e*ist a$art from animal0itself< %urt er& '3(in t e case of sensible t in!s bot t ese conse6uences and ot ers still more absurd follow. 1f& t en& t ese conse6uences are im$ossible& clearly t ere are not %orms of sensible t in!s in t e sense in w ic some maintain t eir e*istence. 15 /ince substance is of two kinds& t e concrete t in! and t e formula '1 mean t at one kind of substance is t e formula taken wit t e matter& w ile anot er kind is t e formula in its !enerality(& substances in t e former sense are ca$able of destruction 'for t ey are ca$able also of !eneration(& but t ere is no destruction of t e formula in t e sense t at it is e#er in course of bein! destroyed 'for t ere is no !eneration of it eit er" t e bein! of ouse is not !enerated& but only t e bein! of t is ouse(& but wit out !eneration and destruction formulae are and are not" for it as been s own t at no one be!ets nor makes t ese. %or t is reason& also& t ere is neit er definition of nor demonstration about sensible indi#idual substances& because t ey a#e matter w ose nature is suc t at t ey are ca$able bot of bein! and of not bein!" for w ic reason all t e indi#idual instances of t em are destructible. 1f t en demonstration is of necessary trut s and definition is a scientific $rocess& and if& .ust as knowled!e cannot be sometimes knowled!e and sometimes i!norance& but t e state w ic #aries t us is o$inion& so too demonstration and definition cannot #ary t us& but it is o$inion t at deals wit t at w ic can be ot erwise t an as it is& clearly t ere can neit er be definition of nor demonstration about sensible indi#iduals. %or $eris in! t in!s are obscure to t ose w o a#e t e rele#ant knowled!e& w en t ey a#e $assed from our $erce$tion" and t ou! t e formulae remain in t e soul unc an!ed& t ere will no lon!er be eit er definition or demonstration. And so w en one of t e

definition0mon!ers defines any indi#idual& e must reco!ni2e t at is definition may always be o#ert rown" for it is not $ossible to define suc t in!s. +or is it $ossible to define any 1dea. %or t e 1dea is& as its su$$orters say& an indi#idual& and can e*ist a$art" and t e formula must consist of words" and e w o defines must not in#ent a word 'for it would be unknown(& but t e establis ed words are common to all t e members of a class" t ese t en must a$$ly to somet in! besides t e t in! defined" e.!. if one were definin! you& e would say ,an animal w ic is lean, or ,$ale,& or somet in! else w ic will a$$ly also to some one ot er t an you. 1f any one were to say t at $er a$s all t e attributes taken a$art may belon! to many sub.ects& but to!et er t ey belon! only to t is one& we must re$ly first t at t ey belon! also to bot t e elements" e.!. ,two0footed animal, belon!s to animal and to t e two0footed. 'And in t e case of eternal entities t is is e#en necessary& since t e elements are $rior to and $arts of t e com$ound" nay more& t ey can also e*ist a$art& if ,man, can e*ist a$art. %or eit er neit er or bot can. 1f& t en& neit er can& t e !enus will not e*ist a$art from t e #arious s$ecies" but if it does& t e differentia will also.( /econdly& we must re$ly t at ,animal, and ,two0footed, are $rior in bein! to ,two0footed animal," and t in!s w ic are $rior to ot ers are not destroyed w en t e ot ers are. A!ain& if t e 1deas consist of 1deas 'as t ey must& since elements are sim$ler t an t e com$ound(& it will be furt er necessary t at t e elements also of w ic t e 1dea consists& e.!. ,animal, and ,two0footed,& s ould be $redicated of many sub.ects. 1f not& ow will t ey come to be known< %or t ere will t en be an 1dea w ic cannot be $redicated of more sub.ects t an one. But t is is not t ou! t $ossible0e#ery 1dea is t ou! t to be ca$able of bein! s ared. As as been said& t en& t e im$ossibility of definin! indi#iduals esca$es notice in t e case of eternal t in!s& es$ecially t ose w ic are uni6ue& like t e sun or t e moon. %or $eo$le err not only by addin! attributes w ose remo#al t e sun would sur#i#e& e.!. ,!oin! round t e eart , or ,ni! t0 idden, 'for from t eir #iew it follows t at if it stands still or is #isible& it will no lon!er be t e sun" but it is stran!e if t is is so" for ,t e sun, means a certain substance(" but also by t e mention of attributes w ic can belon! to anot er sub.ect" e.!. if anot er t in! wit t e stated attributes comes into e*istence& clearly it will be a sun" t e formula t erefore is !eneral. But t e sun was su$$osed to be an indi#idual& like Cleon or /ocrates. After all& w y does not one of t e su$$orters of t e 1deas $roduce a definition of an 1dea< 1t would become clear& if t ey tried& t at w at as now been said is true. 1@

4#idently e#en of t e t in!s t at are t ou! t to be substances& most are only $otencies&0bot t e $arts of animals 'for none of t em e*ists se$arately" and w en t ey are se$arated& t en too t ey e*ist& all of t em& merely as matter( and eart and fire and air" for none of t em is a unity& but as it were a mere ea$& till t ey are worked u$ and some unity is made out of t em. :ne mi! t most readily su$$ose t e $arts of li#in! t in!s and t e $arts of t e soul nearly related to t em to turn out to be bot & i.e. e*istent in com$lete reality as well as in $otency& because t ey a#e sources of mo#ement in somet in! in t eir .oints" for w ic reason some animals li#e w en di#ided. 9et all t e $arts must e*ist only $otentially& w en t ey are one and continuous by nature&0not by force or by !rowin! into one& for suc a $ enomenon is an abnormality. /ince t e term ,unity, is used like t e term ,bein!,& and t e substance of t at w ic is one is one& and t in!s w ose substance is numerically one are numerically one& e#idently neit er unity nor bein! can be t e substance of t in!s& .ust as bein! an element or a $rinci$le cannot be t e substance& but we ask w at& t en& t e $rinci$le is& t at we may reduce t e t in! to somet in! more knowable. +ow of t ese conce$ts ,bein!, and ,unity, are more substantial t an ,$rinci$le, or ,element, or ,cause,& but not e#en t e former are substance& since in !eneral not in! t at is common is substance" for substance does not belon! to anyt in! but to itself and to t at w ic as it& of w ic it is t e substance. %urt er& t at w ic is one cannot be in many $laces at t e same time& but t at w ic is common is $resent in many $laces at t e same time" so t at clearly no uni#ersal e*ists a$art from its indi#iduals. But t ose w o say t e %orms e*ist& in one res$ect are ri! t& in !i#in! t e %orms se$arate e*istence& if t ey are substances" but in anot er res$ect t ey are not ri! t& because t ey say t e one o#er many is a %orm. ) e reason for t eir doin! t is is t at t ey cannot declare w at are t e substances of t is sort& t e im$eris able substances w ic e*ist a$art from t e indi#idual and sensible substances. ) ey make t em& t en& t e same in kind as t e $eris able t in!s 'for t is kind of substance we know(00,man0 imself, and , orse0itself,& addin! to t e sensible t in!s t e word ,itself,. 9et e#en if we ad not seen t e stars& none t e less& 1 su$$ose& would t ey a#e been eternal substances a$art from t ose w ic we knew" so t at now also if we do not know w at non0sensible substances t ere are& yet it is doubtless necessary t at t ere s ould e some.0Clearly& t en& no uni#ersal term is t e name of a substance& and no substance is com$osed of substances. 1A Let us state w at& i.e. w at kind of t in!& substance s ould be said to be& takin! once more anot er startin!0$oint" for $er a$s

from t is we s all !et a clear #iew also of t at substance w ic e*ists a$art from sensible substances. /ince& t en& substance is a $rinci$le and a cause& let us $ursue it from t is startin!0$oint. ) e ,w y, is always sou! t in t is form00,w y does one t in! attac to some ot er<, %or to in6uire w y t e musical man is a musical man& is eit er to in6uire00as we a#e said w y t e man is musical& or it is somet in! else. +ow ,w y a t in! is itself, is a meanin!less in6uiry 'for 'to !i#e meanin! to t e 6uestion ,w y,( t e fact or t e e*istence of t e t in! must already be e#ident0e.!. t at t e moon is ecli$sed0but t e fact t at a t in! is itself is t e sin!le reason and t e sin!le cause to be !i#en in answer to all suc 6uestions as w y t e man is man& or t e musician musical,& unless one were to answer ,because eac t in! is inse$arable from itself& and its bein! one .ust meant t is," t is& owe#er& is common to all t in!s and is a s ort and easy way wit t e 6uestion(. But we can in6uire w y man is an animal of suc and suc a nature. ) is& t en& is $lain& t at we are not in6uirin! w y e w o is a man is a man. We are in6uirin!& t en& w y somet in! is $redicable of somet in! 't at it is $redicable must be clear" for if not& t e in6uiry is an in6uiry into not in!(. 4.!. w y does it t under< ) is is t e same as ,w y is sound $roduced in t e clouds<, ) us t e in6uiry is about t e $redication of one t in! of anot er. And w y are t ese t in!s& i.e. bricks and stones& a ouse< -lainly we are seekin! t e cause. And t is is t e essence 'to s$eak abstractly(& w ic in some cases is t e end& e.!. $er a$s in t e case of a ouse or a bed& and in some cases is t e first mo#er" for t is also is a cause. But w ile t e efficient cause is sou! t in t e case of !enesis and destruction& t e final cause is sou! t in t e case of bein! also. ) e ob.ect of t e in6uiry is most easily o#erlooked w ere one term is not e*$ressly $redicated of anot er 'e.!. w en we in6uire ,w at man is,(& because we do not distin!uis and do not say definitely t at certain elements make u$ a certain w ole. But we must articulate our meanin! before we be!in to in6uire" if not& t e in6uiry is on t e border0line between bein! a searc for somet in! and a searc for not in!. /ince we must a#e t e e*istence of t e t in! as somet in! !i#en& clearly t e 6uestion is w y t e matter is some definite t in!" e.!. w y are t ese materials a ouse< Because t at w ic was t e essence of a ouse is $resent. And w y is t is indi#idual t in!& or t is body a#in! t is form& a man< ) erefore w at we seek is t e cause& i.e. t e form& by reason of w ic t e matter is some definite t in!" and t is is t e substance of t e t in!. 4#idently& t en& in t e case of sim$le terms no in6uiry nor teac in! is $ossible" our attitude towards suc t in!s is ot er t an t at of in6uiry. /ince t at w ic is com$ounded out of somet in! so t at t e w ole is one& not like a ea$ but like a syllable0now t e syllable is not its elements& ba is not t e same as b and a& nor is fles

fire and eart 'for w en t ese are se$arated t e w oles& i.e. t e fles and t e syllable& no lon!er e*ist& but t e elements of t e syllable e*ist& and so do fire and eart (" t e syllable& t en& is somet in!0not only its elements 't e #owel and t e consonant( but also somet in! else& and t e fles is not only fire and eart or t e ot and t e cold& but also somet in! else>0if& t en& t at somet in! must itself be eit er an element or com$osed of elements& '1( if it is an element t e same ar!ument will a!ain a$$ly" for fles will consist of t is and fire and eart and somet in! still furt er& so t at t e $rocess will !o on to infinity. But '5( if it is a com$ound& clearly it will be a com$ound not of one but of more t an one 'or else t at one will be t e t in! itself(& so t at a!ain in t is case we can use t e same ar!ument as in t e case of fles or of t e syllable. But it would seem t at t is ,ot er, is somet in!& and not an element& and t at it is t e cause w ic makes t is t in! fles and t at a syllable. And similarly in all ot er cases. And t is is t e substance of eac t in! 'for t is is t e $rimary cause of its bein!(" and since& w ile some t in!s are not substances& as many as are substances are formed in accordance wit a nature of t eir own and by a $rocess of nature& t eir substance would seem to be t is kind of ,nature,& w ic is not an element but a $rinci$le. An element& on t e ot er and& is t at into w ic a t in! is di#ided and w ic is $resent in it as matter" e.!. a and b are t e elements of t e syllable. Book E111 1 W4 must reckon u$ t e results arisin! from w at as been said& and com$ute t e sum of t em& and $ut t e finis in! touc to our in6uiry. We a#e said t at t e causes& $rinci$les& and elements of substances are t e ob.ect of our searc . And some substances are reco!ni2ed by e#ery one& but some a#e been ad#ocated by $articular sc ools. ) ose !enerally reco!ni2ed are t e natural substances& i.e. fire& eart & water& air& Jc.& t e sim$le bodies" second $lants and t eir $arts& and animals and t e $arts of animals" and finally t e $ ysical uni#erse and its $arts" w ile some $articular sc ools say t at %orms and t e ob.ects of mat ematics are substances. But t ere are ar!uments w ic lead to t e conclusion t at t ere are ot er substances& t e essence and t e substratum. A!ain& in anot er way t e !enus seems more substantial t an t e #arious s$ccies& and t e uni#ersal t an t e $articulars. And wit t e uni#ersal and t e !enus t e 1deas are connected" it is in #irtue of t e same ar!ument t at t ey are t ou! t to be substances. And since t e essence is substance& and t e definition is a formula of t e essence& for t is reason we a#e discussed definition and essential $redication. /ince t e definition is a formula& and a formula as $arts& we ad to consider also wit res$ect to t e notion of ,$art,& w at are $arts of t e substance and

w at are not& and w et er t e $arts of t e substance are also $arts of t e definition. %urt er& too& neit er t e uni#ersal nor t e !enus is a substance" we must in6uire later into t e 1deas and t e ob.ects of mat ematics" for some say t ese are substances as well as t e sensible substances. But now let us resume t e discussion of t e !enerally reco!ni2ed substances. ) ese are t e sensible substances& and sensible substances all a#e matter. ) e substratum is substance& and t is is in one sense t e matter 'and by matter 1 mean t at w ic & not bein! a ,t is, actually& is $otentially a ,t is,(& and in anot er sense t e formula or s a$e 't at w ic bein! a ,t is, can be se$arately formulated(& and t irdly t e com$le* of t ese two& w ic alone is !enerated and destroyed& and is& wit out 6ualification& ca$able of se$arate e*istence" for of substances com$letely e*$ressible in a formula some are se$arable and some are se$arable and some are not. But clearly matter also is substance" for in all t e o$$osite c an!es t at occur t ere is somet in! w ic underlies t e c an!es& e.!. in res$ect of $lace t at w ic is now ere and a!ain elsew ere& and in res$ect of increase t at w ic is now of one si2e and a!ain less or !reater& and in res$ect of alteration t at w ic is now ealt y and a!ain diseased" and similarly in res$ect of substance t ere is somet in! t at is now bein! !enerated and a!ain bein! destroyed& and now underlies t e $rocess as a ,t is, and a!ain underlies it in res$ect of a $ri#ation of $ositi#e c aracter. And in t is c an!e t e ot ers are in#ol#ed. But in eit er one or two of t e ot ers t is is not in#ol#ed" for it is not necessary if a t in! as matter for c an!e of $lace t at it s ould also a#e matter for !eneration and destruction. ) e difference between becomin! in t e full sense and becomin! in a 6ualified sense as been stated in our $ ysical works. 5 /ince t e substance w ic e*ists as underlyin! and as matter is !enerally reco!ni2ed& and t is t at w ic e*ists $otentially& it remains for us to say w at is t e substance& in t e sense of actuality& of sensible t in!s. Democritus seems to t ink t ere are t ree kinds of difference between t in!s" t e underlyin! body& t e matter& is one and t e same& but t ey differ eit er in r yt m& i.e. s a$e& or in turnin!& i.e. $osition& or in inter0contact& i.e. order. But e#idently t ere are many differences" for instance& some t in!s are c aracteri2ed by t e mode of com$osition of t eir matter& e.!. t e t in!s formed by blendin!& suc as oney0water" and ot ers by bein! bound to!et er& e.!. bundle" and ot ers by bein! !lued to!et er& e.!. a book" and ot ers by bein! nailed to!et er& e.!. a casket" and ot ers in more t an one of t ese ways" and ot ers by $osition& e.!. t res old and lintel 'for t ese differ by bein! $laced in a certain

way(" and ot ers by time& e.!. dinner and breakfast" and ot ers by $lace& e.!. t e winds" and ot ers by t e affections $ro$er to sensible t in!s& e.!. ardness and softness& density and rarity& dryness and wetness" and some t in!s by some of t ese 6ualities& ot ers by t em all& and in !eneral some by e*cess and some by defect. Clearly& t en& t e word ,is, as .ust as many meanin!s" a t in! is a t res old because it lies in suc and suc a $osition& and its bein! means its lyin! in t at $osition& w ile bein! ice means a#in! been solidified in suc and suc a way. And t e bein! of some t in!s will be defined by all t ese 6ualities& because some $arts of t em are mi*ed& ot ers are blended& ot ers are bound to!et er& ot ers are solidified& and ot ers use t e ot er differentiae" e.!. t e and or t e foot re6uires suc com$le* definition. We must !ras$& t en& t e kinds of differentiae 'for t ese will be t e $rinci$les of t e bein! of t in!s(& e.!. t e t in!s c aracteri2ed by t e more and t e less& or by t e dense and t e rare& and by ot er suc 6ualities" for all t ese are forms of e*cess and defect. And anyt in! t at is c aracteri2ed by s a$e or by smoot ness and rou! ness is c aracteri2ed by t e strai! t and t e cur#ed. And for ot er t in!s t eir bein! will mean t eir bein! mi*ed& and t eir not bein! will mean t e o$$osite. 1t is clear& t en& from t ese facts t at& since its substance is t e cause of eac t in!,s bein!& we must seek in t ese differentiae w at is t e cause of t e bein! of eac of t ese t in!s. +ow none of t ese differentiae is substance& e#en w en cou$led wit matter& yet it is w at is analo!ous to substance in eac case" and as in substances t at w ic is $redicated of t e matter is t e actuality itself& in all ot er definitions also it is w at most resembles full actuality. 4.!. if we ad to define a t res old& we s ould say ,wood or stone in suc and suc a $osition,& and a ouse we s ould define as ,bricks and timbers in suc and suc a $osition,&'or a $ur$ose may e*ist as well in some cases(& and if we ad to define ice we s ould say ,water fro2en or solidified in suc and suc a way,& and armony is ,suc and suc a blendin! of i! and low," and similarly in all ot er cases. :b#iously& t en& t e actuality or t e formula is different w en t e matter is different" for in some cases it is t e com$osition& in ot ers t e mi*in!& and in ot ers some ot er of t e attributes we a#e named. And so& of t e $eo$le w o !o in for definin!& t ose w o define a ouse as stones& bricks& and timbers are s$eakin! of t e $otential ouse& for t ese are t e matter" but t ose w o $ro$ose ,a rece$tacle to s elter c attels and li#in! bein!s,& or somet in! of t e sort& s$eak of t e actuality. ) ose w o combine bot of t ese s$eak of t e t ird kind of substance& w ic is com$osed of matter and form 'for t e formula t at !i#es t e differentiae seems to be an account of t e form or actuality& w ile t at w ic !i#es t e com$onents is rat er

an account of t e matter(" and t e same is true of t e kind of definitions w ic Arc ytas used to acce$t" t ey are accounts of t e combined form and matter. 4.!. w at is still weat er< Absence of motion in a lar!e e*$anse of air" air is t e matter& and absence of motion is t e actuality and substance. W at is a calm< /moot ness of sea" t e material substratum is t e sea& and t e actuality or s a$e is smoot ness. 1t is ob#ious t en& from w at as been said& w at sensible substance is and ow it e*ists0one kind of it as matter& anot er as form or actuality& w ile t e t ird kind is t at w ic is com$osed of t ese two. 3 We must not fail to notice t at sometimes it is not clear w et er a name means t e com$osite substance& or t e actuality or form& e.!. w et er , ouse, is a si!n for t e com$osite t in!& ,a co#erin! consistin! of bricks and stones laid t us and t us,& or for t e actuality or form& ,a co#erin!,& and w et er a line is ,twoness in len!t , or ,twoness,& and w et er an animal is soul in a body, or ,a soul," for soul is t e substance or actuality of some body. ,Animal, mi! t e#en be a$$lied to bot & not as somet in! definable by one formula& but as related to a sin!le t in!. But t is 6uestion& w ile im$ortant for anot er $ur$ose& is of no im$ortance for t e in6uiry into sensible substance" for t e essence certainly attac es to t e form and t e actuality. %or ,soul, and ,to be soul, are t e same& but ,to be man, and ,man, are not t e same& unless e#en t e bare soul is to be called man" and t us on one inter$retation t e t in! is t e same as its essence& and on anot er it is not. 1f we e*amine we find t at t e syllable does not consist of t e letters G .u*ta$osition& nor is t e ouse bricks G .u*ta$osition. And t is is ri! t" for t e .u*ta$osition or mi*in! does not consist of t ose t in!s of w ic it is t e .u*ta$osition or mi*in!. And t e same is true in all ot er cases" e.!. if t e t res old is c aracteri2ed by its $osition& t e $osition is not constituted by t e t res old& but rat er t e latter is constituted by t e former. +or is man animal G bi$ed& but t ere must be somet in! besides t ese& if t ese are matter&0somet in! w ic is neit er an element in t e w ole nor a com$ound& but is t e substance" but t is $eo$le eliminate& and state only t e matter. 1f& t en& t is is t e cause of t e t in!,s bein!& and if t e cause of its bein! is its substance& t ey will not be statin! t e substance itself. ') is& t en& must eit er be eternal or it must be destructible wit out bein! e#er in course of bein! destroyed& and must a#e come to be wit out e#er bein! in course of comin! to be. But it as been $ro#ed and e*$lained elsew ere t at no one makes or be!ets t e form& but it is t e indi#idual t at is made& i.e. t e com$le* of form and matter t at is !enerated. W et er t e substances of destructible

t in!s can e*ist a$art& is not yet at all clear" e*ce$t t at ob#iously t is is im$ossible in some cases0in t e case of t in!s w ic cannot e*ist a$art from t e indi#idual instances& e.!. ouse or utensil. -er a$s& indeed& neit er t ese t in!s t emsel#es& nor any of t e ot er t in!s w ic are not formed by nature& are substances at all" for one mi! t say t at t e nature in natural ob.ects is t e only substance to be found in destructible t in!s.( ) erefore t e difficulty w ic used to be raised by t e sc ool of Antist enes and ot er suc uneducated $eo$le as a certain timeliness. ) ey said t at t e ,w at, cannot be defined 'for t e definition so called is a ,lon! ri!marole,( but of w at sort a t in!& e.!. sil#er& is& t ey t ou! t it $ossible actually to e*$lain& not sayin! w at it is& but t at it is like tin. ) erefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated& i.e. t e com$osite kind& w et er it be $erce$tible or intelli!ible" but t e $rimary $arts of w ic t is consists cannot be defined& since a definitory formula $redicates somet in! of somet in!& and one $art of t e definition must $lay t e $art of matter and t e ot er t at of form. 1t is also ob#ious t at& if substances are in a sense numbers& t ey are so in t is sense and not& as some say& as numbers of units. %or a definition is a sort of number" for '1( it is di#isible& and into indi#isible $arts 'for definitory formulae are not infinite(& and number also is of t is nature. And '5( as& w en one of t e $arts of w ic a number consists as been taken from or added to t e number& it is no lon!er t e same number& but a different one& e#en if it is t e #ery smallest $art t at as been taken away or added& so t e definition and t e essence will no lon!er remain w en anyt in! as been taken away or added. And '3( t e number must be somet in! in #irtue of w ic it is one& and t is t ese t inkers cannot state& w at makes it one& if it is one 'for eit er it is not one but a sort of ea$& or if it is& we ou! t to say w at it is t at makes one out of many(" and t e definition is one& but similarly t ey cannot say w at makes it one. And t is is a natural result" for t e same reason is a$$licable& and substance is one in t e sense w ic we a#e e*$lained& and not& as some say& by bein! a sort of unit or $oint" eac is a com$lete reality and a definite nature. And '=( as number does not admit of t e more and t e less& neit er does substance& in t e sense of form& but if any substance does& it is only t e substance w ic in#ol#es matter. Let t is& t en& suffice for an account of t e !eneration and destruction of so0called substances in w at sense it is $ossible and in w at sense im$ossible00and of t e reduction of t in!s to number. = Re!ardin! material substance we must not for!et t at e#en if all t in!s come from t e same first cause or a#e t e same t in!s for

t eir first causes& and if t e same matter ser#es as startin!0$oint for t eir !eneration& yet t ere is a matter $ro$er to eac & e.!. for $ le!m t e sweet or t e fat& and for bile t e bitter& or somet in! else" t ou! $er a$s t ese come from t e same ori!inal matter. And t ere come to be se#eral matters for t e same t in!& w en t e one matter is matter for t e ot er" e.!. $ le!m comes from t e fat and from t e sweet& if t e fat comes from t e sweet" and it comes from bile by analysis of t e bile into its ultimate matter. %or one t in! comes from anot er in two senses& eit er because it will be found at a later sta!e& or because it is $roduced if t e ot er is analysed into its ori!inal constituents. W en t e matter is one& different t in!s may be $roduced owin! to difference in t e mo#in! cause" e.!. from wood may be made bot a c est and a bed. But some different t in!s must a#e t eir matter different" e.!. a saw could not be made of wood& nor is t is in t e $ower of t e mo#in! cause" for it could not make a saw of wool or of wood. But if& as a matter of fact& t e same t in! can be made of different material& clearly t e art& i.e. t e mo#in! $rinci$le& is t e same" for if bot t e matter and t e mo#in! cause were different& t e $roduct would be so too. W en one in6uires into t e cause of somet in!& one s ould& since ,causes, are s$oken of in se#eral senses& state all t e $ossible causes. w at is t e material cause of man< / all we say ,t e menstrual fluid,< W at is mo#in! cause< / all we say ,t e seed,< ) e formal cause< 3is essence. ) e final cause< 3is end. But $er a$s t e latter two are t e same.01t is t e $ro*imate causes we must state. W at is t e material cause< We must name not fire or eart & but t e matter $eculiar to t e t in!. Re!ardin! t e substances t at are natural and !enerable& if t e causes are really t ese and of t is number and we a#e to learn t e causes& we must in6uire t us& if we are to in6uire ri! tly. But in t e case of natural but eternal substances anot er account must be !i#en. %or $er a$s some a#e no matter& or not matter of t is sort but only suc as can be mo#ed in res$ect of $lace. +or does matter belon! to t ose t in!s w ic e*ist by nature but are not substances" t eir substratum is t e substance. 4.! w at is t e cause of ecli$se< W at is its matter< ) ere is none" t e moon is t at w ic suffers ecli$se. W at is t e mo#in! cause w ic e*tin!uis ed t e li! t< ) e eart . ) e final cause $er a$s does not e*ist. ) e formal $rinci$le is t e definitory formula& but t is is obscure if it does not include t e cause. 4.!. w at is ecli$se< De$ri#ation of li! t. But if we add ,by t e eart ,s comin! in between,& t is is t e formula w ic includes t e cause. 1n t e case of slee$ it is not clear w at it is t at $ro*imately as t is affection. / all we say t at it is t e animal< 9es& but t e animal in #irtue of w at& i.e. w at is t e $ro*imate sub.ect< ) e eart or some ot er $art. +e*t& by w at is it $roduced< +e*t& w at is t e affection0t at of t e $ro*imate sub.ect& not of

t e w ole animal< / all we say t at it is immobility of suc and suc a kind< 9es& but to w at $rocess in t e $ro*imate sub.ect is t is due< 5 /ince some t in!s are and are not& wit out comin! to be and ceasin! to be& e.!. $oints& if t ey can be said to be& and in !eneral forms 'for it is not ,w ite, comes to be& but t e wood comes to be w ite& if e#eryt in! t at comes to be comes from somet in! and comes to be somet in!(& not all contraries can come from one anot er& but it is in different senses t at a $ale man comes from a dark man& and $ale comes from dark. +or as e#eryt in! matter& but only t ose t in!s w ic come to be and c an!e into one anot er. ) ose t in!s w ic & wit out e#er bein! in course of c an!in!& are or are not& a#e no matter. ) ere is difficulty in t e 6uestion ow t e matter of eac t in! is related to its contrary states. 4.!. if t e body is $otentially ealt y& and disease is contrary to ealt & is it $otentially bot ealt y and diseased< And is water $otentially wine and #ine!ar< We answer t at it is t e matter of one in #irtue of its $ositi#e state and its form& and of t e ot er in #irtue of t e $ri#ation of its $ositi#e state and t e corru$tion of it contrary to its nature. 1t is also ard to say w y wine is not said to be t e matter of #ine!ar nor $otentially #ine!ar 't ou! #ine!ar is $roduced from it(& and w y a li#in! man is not said to be $otentially dead. 1n fact t ey are not& but t e corru$tions in 6uestion are accidental& and it is t e matter of t e animal t at is itself in #irtue of its corru$tion t e $otency and matter of a cor$se& and it is water t at is t e matter of #ine!ar. %or t e cor$se comes from t e animal& and #ine!ar from wine& as ni! t from day. And all t e t in!s w ic c an!e t us into one anot er must !o back to t eir matter" e.!. if from a cor$se is $roduced an animal& t e cor$se first !oes back to its matter& and only t en becomes an animal" and #ine!ar first !oes back to water& and only t en becomes wine. @ )o return to t e difficulty w ic as been stated wit res$ect bot to definitions and to numbers& w at is t e cause of t eir unity< 1n t e case of all t in!s w ic a#e se#eral $arts and in w ic t e totality is not& as it were& a mere ea$& but t e w ole is somet in! beside t e $arts& t ere is a cause" for e#en in bodies contact is t e cause of unity in some cases& and in ot ers #iscosity or some ot er suc 6uality. And a definition is a set of words w ic is one not by bein! connected to!et er& like t e 1liad& but by dealin! wit one ob.ect.0W at t en& is it t at makes man one" w y is e one and not many& e.!. animal G bi$ed& es$ecially if t ere are& as some

say& an animal0itself and a bi$ed0itself< W y are not t ose %orms t emsel#es t e man& so t at men would e*ist by $artici$ation not in man& nor in0one %orm& but in two& animal and bi$ed& and in !eneral man would be not one but more t an one t in!& animal and bi$ed< Clearly& t en& if $eo$le $roceed t us in t eir usual manner of definition and s$eec & t ey cannot e*$lain and sol#e t e difficulty. But if& as we say& one element is matter and anot er is form& and one is $otentially and t e ot er actually& t e 6uestion will no lon!er be t ou! t a difficulty. %or t is difficulty is t e same as would arise if ,round bron2e, were t e definition of ,cloak," for t is word would be a si!n of t e definitory formula& so t at t e 6uestion is& w at is t e cause of t e unity of ,round, and ,bron2e,< ) e difficulty disa$$ears& because t e one is matter& t e ot er form. W at& t en& causes t is0t at w ic was $otentially to be actually0e*ce$t& in t e case of t in!s w ic are !enerated& t e a!ent< %or t ere is no ot er cause of t e $otential s$ ere,s becomin! actually a s$ ere& but t is was t e essence of eit er. :f matter some is intelli!ible& some $erce$tible& and in a formula t ere is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality" e.!. t e circle is ,a $lane fi!ure,. But of t e t in!s w ic a#e no matter& eit er intelli!ible or $erce$tible& eac is by its nature essentially a kind of unity& as it is essentially a kind of bein!0indi#idual substance& 6uality& or 6uantity 'and so neit er ,e*istent, nor ,one, is $resent in t eir definitions(& and t e essence of eac of t em is by its #ery nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of bein!0and so none of t ese as any reason outside itself& for bein! one& nor for bein! a kind of bein!" for eac is by its nature a kind of bein! and a kind of unity& not as bein! in t e !enus ,bein!, or ,one, nor in t e sense t at bein! and unity can e*ist a$art from $articulars. :win! to t e difficulty about unity some s$eak of ,$artici$ation,& and raise t e 6uestion& w at is t e cause of $artici$ation and w at is it to $artici$ate" and ot ers s$eak of ,communion,& as Lyco$ ron says knowled!e is a communion of knowin! wit t e soul" and ot ers say life is a ,com$osition, or ,conne*ion, of soul wit body. 9et t e same account a$$lies to all cases" for bein! ealt y& too& will on t is s owin! be eit er a ,communion, or a ,conne*ion, or a ,com$osition, of soul and ealt & and t e fact t at t e bron2e is a trian!le will be a ,com$osition, of bron2e and trian!le& and t e fact t at a t in! is w ite will be a ,com$osition, of surface and w iteness. ) e reason is t at $eo$le look for a unifyin! formula& and a difference& between $otency and com$lete reality. But& as as been said& t e $ro*imate matter and t e form are one and t e same t in!& t e one $otentially& and t e ot er actually. ) erefore it is like askin! w at in !eneral is t e cause of unity and of a t in!,s bein! one" for eac t in! is a unity& and t e $otential and t e actual are

some ow one. ) erefore t ere is no ot er cause ere unless t ere is somet in! w ic caused t e mo#ement from $otency into actuality. And all t in!s w ic a#e no matter are wit out 6ualification essentially unities. Book 1? 1 W4 a#e treated of t at w ic is $rimarily and to w ic all t e ot er cate!ories of bein! are referred0i.e. of substance. %or it is in #irtue of t e conce$t of substance t at t e ot ers also are said to be06uantity and 6uality and t e like" for all will be found to in#ol#e t e conce$t of substance& as we said in t e first $art of our work. And since ,bein!, is in one way di#ided into indi#idual t in!& 6uality& and 6uantity& and is in anot er way distin!uis ed in res$ect of $otency and com$lete reality& and of function& let us now add a discussion of $otency and com$lete reality. And first let us e*$lain $otency in t e strictest sense& w ic is& owe#er& not t e most useful for our $resent $ur$ose. %or $otency and actuality e*tend beyond t e cases t at in#ol#e a reference to motion. But w en we a#e s$oken of t is first kind& we s all in our discussions of actuality, e*$lain t e ot er kinds of $otency as well. We a#e $ointed out elsew ere t at ,$otency, and t e word ,can, a#e se#eral senses. :f t ese we may ne!lect all t e $otencies t at are so called by an e6ui#ocation. %or some are called so by analo!y& as in !eometry we say one t in! is or is not a ,$ower, of anot er by #irtue of t e $resence or absence of some relation between t em. But all $otencies t at conform to t e same ty$e are ori!inati#e sources of some kind& and are called $otencies in reference to one $rimary kind of $otency& w ic is an ori!inati#e source of c an!e in anot er t in! or in t e t in! itself 6ua ot er. %or one kind is a $otency of bein! acted on& i.e. t e ori!inati#e source& in t e #ery t in! acted on& of its bein! $assi#ely c an!ed by anot er t in! or by itself 6ua ot er" and anot er kind is a state of insusce$tibility to c an!e for t e worse and to destruction by anot er t in! or by t e t in! itself 6ua ot er by #irtue of an ori!inati#e source of c an!e. 1n all t ese definitions is im$lied t e formula if $otency in t e $rimary sense.0And a!ain t ese so0called $otencies are $otencies eit er of merely actin! or bein! acted on& or of actin! or bein! acted on well& so t at e#en in t e formulae of t e latter t e formulae of t e $rior kinds of $otency are some ow im$lied. :b#iously& t en& in a sense t e $otency of actin! and of bein! acted on is one 'for a t in! may be ,ca$able, eit er because it can itself be acted on or because somet in! else can be acted on by it(& but in a sense t e $otencies are different. %or t e one is in t e t in! acted on" it is because it contains a certain ori!inati#e source& and because e#en t e matter is an ori!inati#e source& t at t e

t in! acted on is acted on& and one t in! by one& anot er by anot er" for t at w ic is oily can be burnt& and t at w ic yields in a $articular way can be crus ed" and similarly in all ot er cases. But t e ot er $otency is in t e a!ent& e.!. eat and t e art of buildin! are $resent& one in t at w ic can $roduce eat and t e ot er in t e man w o can build. And so& in so far as a t in! is an or!anic unity& it cannot be acted on by itself" for it is one and not two different t in!s. And ,im$otence,and ,im$otent, stand for t e $ri#ation w ic is contrary to $otency of t is sort& so t at e#ery $otency belon!s to t e same sub.ect and refers to t e same $rocess as a corres$ondin! im$otence. -ri#ation as se#eral senses" for it means '1( t at w ic as not a certain 6uality and '5( t at w ic mi! t naturally a#e it but as not it& eit er 'a( in !eneral or 'b( w en it mi! t naturally a#e it& and eit er 'a( in some $articular way& e.!. w en it as not it com$letely& or 'b( w en it as not it at all. And in certain cases if t in!s w ic naturally a#e a 6uality lose it by #iolence& we say t ey a#e suffered $ri#ation. 5 /ince some suc ori!inati#e sources are $resent in soulless t in!s& and ot ers in t in!s $ossessed of soul& and in soul& and in t e rational $art of t e soul& clearly some $otencies will& be non0rational and some will be non0rational and some will be accom$anied by a rational formula. ) is is w y all arts& i.e. all $roducti#e forms of knowled!e& are $otencies" t ey are ori!inati#e sources of c an!e in anot er t in! or in t e artist imself considered as ot er. And eac of t ose w ic are accom$anied by a rational formula is alike ca$able of contrary effects& but one non0rational $ower $roduces one effect" e.!. t e ot is ca$able only of eatin!& but t e medical art can $roduce bot disease and ealt . ) e reason is t at science is a rational formula& and t e same rational formula e*$lains a t in! and its $ri#ation& only not in t e same way" and in a sense it a$$lies to bot & but in a sense it a$$lies rat er to t e $ositi#e fact. ) erefore suc sciences must deal wit contraries& but wit one in #irtue of t eir own nature and wit t e ot er not in #irtue of t eir nature" for t e rational formula a$$lies to one ob.ect in #irtue of t at ob.ect,s nature& and to t e ot er& in a sense& accidentally. %or it is by denial and remo#al t at it e* ibits t e contrary" for t e contrary is t e $rimary $ri#ation& and t is is t e remo#al of t e $ositi#e term. +ow since contraries do not occur in t e same t in!& but science is a $otency w ic de$ends on t e $ossession of a rational formula& and t e soul $ossesses an ori!inati#e source of mo#ement" t erefore& w ile t e w olesome $roduces only ealt and t e calorific only eat and t e fri!orific only cold& t e scientific man $roduces bot t e contrary effects. %or t e rational formula is one

w ic a$$lies to bot & t ou! not in t e same way& and it is in a soul w ic $ossesses an ori!inati#e source of mo#ement" so t at t e soul will start bot $rocesses from t e same ori!inati#e source& a#in! linked t em u$ wit t e same t in!. And so t e t in!s w ose $otency is accordin! to a rational formula act contrariwise to t e t in!s w ose $otency is non0rational" for t e $roducts of t e former are included under one ori!inati#e source& t e rational formula. 1t is ob#ious also t at t e $otency of merely doin! a t in! or a#in! it done to one is im$lied in t at of doin! it or a#in! it done well& but t e latter is not always im$lied in t e former> for e w o does a t in! well must also do it& but e w o does it merely need not also do it well. 3 ) ere are some w o say& as t e ;e!aric sc ool does& t at a t in! ,can, act only w en it is actin!& and w en it is not actin! it ,cannot, act& e.!. t at e w o is not buildin! cannot build& but only e w o is buildin!& w en e is buildin!" and so in all ot er cases. 1t is not ard to see t e absurdities t at attend t is #iew. %or it is clear t at on t is #iew a man will not be a builder unless e is buildin! 'for to be a builder is to be able to build(& and so wit t e ot er arts. 1f& t en& it is im$ossible to a#e suc arts if one as not at some time learnt and ac6uired t em& and it is t en im$ossible not to a#e t em if one as not sometime lost t em 'eit er by for!etfulness or by some accident or by time" for it cannot be by t e destruction of t e ob.ect& for t at lasts for e#er(& a man will not a#e t e art w en e as ceased to use it& and yet e may immediately build a!ain" ow t en will e a#e !ot t e art< And similarly wit re!ard to lifeless t in!s" not in! will be eit er cold or ot or sweet or $erce$tible at all if $eo$le are not $ercei#in! it" so t at t e u$ olders of t is #iew will a#e to maintain t e doctrine of -rota!oras. But& indeed& not in! will e#en a#e $erce$tion if it is not $ercei#in!& i.e. e*ercisin! its $erce$tion. 1f& t en& t at is blind w ic as not si! t t ou! it would naturally a#e it& w en it would naturally a#e it and w en it still e*ists& t e same $eo$le will be blind many times in t e day0and deaf too. A!ain& if t at w ic is de$ri#ed of $otency is inca$able& t at w ic is not a$$enin! will be inca$able of a$$enin!" but e w o says of t at w ic is inca$able of a$$enin! eit er t at it is or t at it will be will say w at is untrue" for t is is w at inca$acity meant. ) erefore t ese #iews do away wit bot mo#ement and becomin!. %or t at w ic stands will always stand& and t at w ic sits will always sit& since if it is sittin! it will not !et u$" for t at w ic & as we are told& cannot !et u$ will be inca$able of !ettin! u$. But we cannot say t is& so t at e#idently $otency and actuality are different

'but t ese #iews make $otency and actuality t e same& and so it is no small t in! t ey are seekin! to anni ilate(& so t at it is $ossible t at a t in! may be ca$able of bein! and not e& and ca$able of not bein! and yet e& and similarly wit t e ot er kinds of $redicate" it may be ca$able of walkin! and yet not walk& or ca$able of not walkin! and yet walk. And a t in! is ca$able of doin! somet in! if t ere will be not in! im$ossible in its a#in! t e actuality of t at of w ic it is said to a#e t e ca$acity. 1 mean& for instance& if a t in! is ca$able of sittin! and it is o$en to it to sit& t ere will be not in! im$ossible in its actually sittin!" and similarly if it is ca$able of bein! mo#ed or mo#in!& or of standin! or makin! to stand& or of bein! or comin! to be& or of not bein! or not comin! to be. ) e word ,actuality,& w ic we connect wit ,com$lete reality,& as& in t e main& been e*tended from mo#ements to ot er t in!s" for actuality in t e strict sense is t ou! t to be identical wit mo#ement. And so $eo$le do not assi!n mo#ement to non0e*istent t in!s& t ou! t ey do assi!n some ot er $redicates. 4.!. t ey say t at non0e*istent t in!s are ob.ects of t ou! t and desire& but not t at t ey are mo#ed" and t is because& w ile e* y$ot esi t ey do not actually e*ist& t ey would a#e to e*ist actually if t ey were mo#ed. %or of non0e*istent t in!s some e*ist $otentially" but t ey do not e*ist& because t ey do not e*ist in com$lete reality. = 1f w at we a#e described is identical wit t e ca$able or con#ertible wit it& e#idently it cannot be true to say ,t is is ca$able of bein! but will not be,& w ic would im$ly t at t e t in!s inca$able of bein! would on t is s owin! #anis . /u$$ose& for instance& t at a man0one w o did not take account of t at w ic is inca$able of bein!0were to say t at t e dia!onal of t e s6uare is ca$able of bein! measured but will not be measured& because a t in! may well be ca$able of bein! or comin! to be& and yet not be or be about to be. But from t e $remisses t is necessarily follows& t at if we actually su$$osed t at w ic is not& but is ca$able of bein!& to be or to a#e come to be& t ere will be not in! im$ossible in t is" but t e result will be im$ossible& for t e measurin! of t e dia!onal is im$ossible. %or t e false and t e im$ossible are not t e same" t at you are standin! now is false& but t at you s ould be standin! is not im$ossible. At t e same time it is clear t at if& w en A is real& B must be real& t en& w en A is $ossible& B also must be $ossible. %or if B need not be $ossible& t ere is not in! to $re#ent its not bein! $ossible. +ow let A be su$$osed $ossible. ) en& w en A was $ossible& we a!reed t at not in! im$ossible followed if A were su$$osed to be real" and t en B must of course be real. But we su$$osed B to be im$ossible. Let it be im$ossible t en. 1f& t en& B is im$ossible& A also must be so.

But t e first was su$$osed im$ossible" t erefore t e second also is im$ossible. 1f& t en& A is $ossible& B also will be $ossible& if t ey were so related t at if A&is real& B must be real. 1f& t en& A and B bein! t us related& B is not $ossible on t is condition& and B will not be related as was su$$osed. And if w en A is $ossible& B must be $ossible& t en if A is real& B also must be real. %or to say t at B must be $ossible& if A is $ossible& means t is& t at if A is real bot at t e time w en and in t e way in w ic it was su$$osed ca$able of bein! real& B also must t en and in t at way be real. 5 As all $otencies are eit er innate& like t e senses& or come by $ractice& like t e $ower of $layin! t e flute& or by learnin!& like artistic $ower& t ose w ic come by $ractice or by rational formula we must ac6uire by $re#ious e*ercise but t is is not necessary wit t ose w ic are not of t is nature and w ic im$ly $assi#ity. /ince t at w ic is ,ca$able, is ca$able of somet in! and at some time in some way 'wit all t e ot er 6ualifications w ic must be $resent in t e definition(& and since some t in!s can $roduce c an!e accordin! to a rational formula and t eir $otencies in#ol#e suc a formula& w ile ot er t in!s are nonrational and t eir $otencies are non0rational& and t e former $otencies must be in a li#in! t in!& w ile t e latter can be bot in t e li#in! and in t e lifeless" as re!ards $otencies of t e latter kind& w en t e a!ent and t e $atient meet in t e way a$$ro$riate to t e $otency in 6uestion& t e one must act and t e ot er be acted on& but wit t e former kind of $otency t is is not necessary. %or t e nonrational $otencies are all $roducti#e of one effect eac & but t e rational $roduce contrary effects& so t at if t ey $roduced t eir effects necessarily t ey would $roduce contrary effects at t e same time" but t is is im$ossible. ) ere must& t en& be somet in! else t at decides" 1 mean by t is& desire or will. %or w ic e#er of two t in!s t e animal desires decisi#ely& it will do& w en it is $resent& and meets t e $assi#e ob.ect& in t e way a$$ro$riate to t e $otency in 6uestion. ) erefore e#eryt in! w ic as a rational $otency& w en it desires t at for w ic it as a $otency and in t e circumstances in w ic it as t e $otency& must do t is. And it as t e $otency in 6uestion w en t e $assi#e ob.ect is $resent and is in a certain state" if not it will not be able to act. ')o add t e 6ualification ,if not in! e*ternal $re#ents it, is not furt er necessary" for it as t e $otency on t e terms on w ic t is is a $otency of actin!& and it is t is not in all circumstances but on certain conditions& amon! w ic will be t e e*clusion of e*ternal indrances" for t ese are barred by some of t e $ositi#e 6ualifications.( And so e#en if one as a rational wis & or an a$$etite& to do two t in!s or contrary t in!s at t e same time& one will not do t em" for it is not on t ese terms t at one

as t e $otency for t em& nor is it a $otency of doin! bot at t e same time& since one will do t e t in!s w ic it is a $otency of doin!& on t e terms on w ic one as t e $otency. @ /ince we a#e treated of t e kind of $otency w ic is related to mo#ement& let us discuss actuality0w at& and w at kind of t in!& actuality is. %or in t e course of our analysis it will also become clear& wit re!ard to t e $otential& t at we not only ascribe $otency to t at w ose nature it is to mo#e somet in! else& or to be mo#ed by somet in! else& eit er wit out 6ualification or in some $articular way& but also use t e word in anot er sense& w ic is t e reason of t e in6uiry in t e course of w ic we a#e discussed t ese $re#ious senses also. Actuality& t en& is t e e*istence of a t in! not in t e way w ic we e*$ress by ,$otentially," we say t at $otentially& for instance& a statue of 3ermes is in t e block of wood and t e alf0line is in t e w ole& because it mi! t be se$arated out& and we call e#en t e man w o is not studyin! a man of science& if e is ca$able of studyin!" t e t in! t at stands in contrast to eac of t ese e*ists actually. :ur meanin! can be seen in t e $articular cases by induction& and we must not seek a definition of e#eryt in! but be content to !ras$ t e analo!y& t at it is as t at w ic is buildin! is to t at w ic is ca$able of buildin!& and t e wakin! to t e slee$in!& and t at w ic is seein! to t at w ic as its eyes s ut but as si! t& and t at w ic as been s a$ed out of t e matter to t e matter& and t at w ic as been wrou! t u$ to t e unwrou! t. Let actuality be defined by one member of t is antit esis& and t e $otential by t e ot er. But all t in!s are not said in t e same sense to e*ist actually& but only by analo!y0as A is in B or to B& C is in D or to D" for some are as mo#ement to $otency& and t e ot ers as substance to some sort of matter. But also t e infinite and t e #oid and all similar t in!s are said to e*ist $otentially and actually in a different sense from t at w ic a$$lies to many ot er t in!s& e.!. to t at w ic sees or walks or is seen. %or of t e latter class t ese $redicates can at some time be also truly asserted wit out 6ualification" for t e seen is so called sometimes because it is bein! seen& sometimes because it is ca$able of bein! seen. But t e infinite does not e*ist $otentially in t e sense t at it will e#er actually a#e se$arate e*istence" it e*ists $otentially only for knowled!e. %or t e fact t at t e $rocess of di#idin! ne#er comes to an end ensures t at t is acti#ity e*ists $otentially& but not t at t e infinite e*ists se$arately. /ince of t e actions w ic a#e a limit none is an end but all are relati#e to t e end& e.!. t e remo#in! of fat& or fat0remo#al& and t e bodily $arts t emsel#es w en one is makin! t em t in are in mo#ement in t is way 'i.e. wit out bein! already t at at w ic t e mo#ement

aims(& t is is not an action or at least not a com$lete one 'for it is not an end(" but t at mo#ement in w ic t e end is $resent is an action. 4.!. at t e same time we are seein! and a#e seen& are understandin! and a#e understood& are t inkin! and a#e t ou! t 'w ile it is not true t at at t e same time we are learnin! and a#e learnt& or are bein! cured and a#e been cured(. At t e same time we are li#in! well and a#e li#ed well& and are a$$y and a#e been a$$y. 1f not& t e $rocess would a#e ad sometime to cease& as t e $rocess of makin! t in ceases> but& as t in!s are& it does not cease" we are li#in! and a#e li#ed. :f t ese $rocesses& t en& we must call t e one set mo#ements& and t e ot er actualities. %or e#ery mo#ement is incom$lete0makin! t in& learnin!& walkin!& buildin!" t ese are mo#ements& and incom$lete at t at. %or it is not true t at at t e same time a t in! is walkin! and as walked& or is buildin! and as built& or is comin! to be and as come to be& or is bein! mo#ed and as been mo#ed& but w at is bein! mo#ed is different from w at as been mo#ed& and w at is mo#in! from w at as mo#ed. But it is t e same t in! t at at t e same time as seen and is seein!& seein!& or is t inkin! and as t ou! t. ) e latter sort of $rocess& t en& 1 call an actuality& and t e former a mo#ement. A W at& and w at kind of t in!& t e actual is& may be taken as e*$lained by t ese and similar considerations. But we must distin!uis w en a t in! e*ists $otentially and w en it does not" for it is not at any and e#ery time. 4.!. is eart $otentially a man< +o0but rat er w en it as already become seed& and $er a$s not e#en t en. 1t is .ust as it is wit bein! ealed" not e#eryt in! can be ealed by t e medical art or by luck& but t ere is a certain kind of t in! w ic is ca$able of it& and only t is is $otentially ealt y. And '1( t e delimitin! mark of t at w ic as a result of t ou! t comes to e*ist in com$lete reality from a#in! e*isted $otentially is t at if t e a!ent as willed it it comes to $ass if not in! e*ternal inders& w ile t e condition on t e ot er side0#i2. in t at w ic is ealed0is t at not in! in it inders t e result. 1t is on similar terms t at we a#e w at is $otentially a ouse" if not in! in t e t in! acted on0i.e. in t e matter0$re#ents it from becomin! a ouse& and if t ere is not in! w ic must be added or taken away or c an!ed& t is is $otentially a ouse" and t e same is true of all ot er t in!s t e source of w ose becomin! is e*ternal. And '5( in t e cases in w ic t e source of t e becomin! is in t e #ery t in! w ic comes to be& a t in! is $otentially all t ose t in!s w ic it will be of itself if not in! e*ternal inders it. 4.!. t e seed is not yet $otentially a man" for it must be de$osited in somet in! ot er t an itself and under!o a c an!e. But w en t rou! its own moti#e $rinci$le it as already !ot suc and suc attributes& in t is state

it is already $otentially a man" w ile in t e former state it needs anot er moti#e $rinci$le& .ust as eart is not yet $otentially a statue 'for it must first c an!e in order to become brass.( 1t seems t at w en we call a t in! not somet in! else but ,t aten,0e.!. a casket is not ,wood, but ,wooden,& and wood is not ,eart , but ,eart en,& and a!ain eart will illustrate our $oint if it is similarly not somet in! else but ,t aten,0t at ot er t in! is always $otentially 'in t e full sense of t at word( t e t in! w ic comes after it in t is series. 4.!. a casket is not ,eart en, nor ,eart ,& but ,wooden," for t is is $otentially a casket and t is is t e matter of a casket& wood in !eneral of a casket in !eneral& and t is $articular wood of t is $articular casket. And if t ere is a first t in!& w ic is no lon!er& in reference to somet in! else& called ,t aten,& t is is $rime matter" e.!. if eart is ,airy, and air is not ,fire, but ,fiery,& fire is $rime matter& w ic is not a ,t is,. %or t e sub.ect or substratum is differentiated by bein! a ,t is, or not bein! one" i.e. t e substratum of modifications is& e.!. a man& i.e. a body and a soul& w ile t e modification is ,musical, or ,$ale,. ') e sub.ect is called& w en music comes to be $resent in it& not ,music, but ,musical,& and t e man is not ,$aleness, but ,$ale,& and not ,ambulation, or ,mo#ement, but ,walkin!, or ,mo#in!,&0w ic is akin to t e ,t aten,.( W ere#er t is is so& t en& t e ultimate sub.ect is a substance" but w en t is is not so but t e $redicate is a form and a ,t is,& t e ultimate sub.ect is matter and material substance. And it is only ri! t t at ,t aten, s ould be used wit reference bot to t e matter and to t e accidents" for bot are indeterminates. We a#e stated& t en& w en a t in! is to be said to e*ist $otentially and w en it is not. B %rom our discussion of t e #arious senses of ,$rior,& it is clear t at actuality is $rior to $otency. And 1 mean by $otency not only t at definite kind w ic is said to be a $rinci$le of c an!e in anot er t in! or in t e t in! itself re!arded as ot er& but in !eneral e#ery $rinci$le of mo#ement or of rest. %or nature also is in t e same !enus as $otency" for it is a $rinci$le of mo#ement0not& owe#er& in somet in! else but in t e t in! itself 6ua itself. )o all suc $otency& t en& actuality is $rior bot in formula and in substantiality" and in time it is $rior in one sense& and in anot er not. '1( Clearly it is $rior in formula" for t at w ic is in t e $rimary sense $otential is $otential because it is $ossible for it to become acti#e" e.!. 1 mean by ,ca$able of buildin!, t at w ic can build& and by ,ca$able of seein!, t at w ic can see& and by ,#isible, t at w ic can be seen. And t e same account a$$lies to

all ot er cases& so t at t e formula and t e knowled!e of t e one must $recede t e knowled!e of t e ot er. '5( 1n time it is $rior in t is sense> t e actual w ic is identical in s$ecies t ou! not in number wit a $otentially e*istin! t in! is to it. 1 mean t at to t is $articular man w o now e*ists actually and to t e corn and to t e seein! sub.ect t e matter and t e seed and t at w ic is ca$able of seein!& w ic are $otentially a man and corn and seein!& but not yet actually so& are $rior in time" but $rior in time to t ese are ot er actually e*istin! t in!s& from w ic t ey were $roduced. %or from t e $otentially e*istin! t e actually e*istin! is always $roduced by an actually e*istin! t in!& e.!. man from man& musician by musician" t ere is always a first mo#er& and t e mo#er already e*ists actually. We a#e said in our account of substance t at e#eryt in! t at is $roduced is somet in! $roduced from somet in! and by somet in!& and t at t e same in s$ecies as it. ) is is w y it is t ou! t im$ossible to be a builder if one as built not in! or a ar$er if one as ne#er $layed t e ar$" for e w o learns to $lay t e ar$ learns to $lay it by $layin! it& and all ot er learners do similarly. And t ence arose t e so$ istical 6uibble& t at one w o does not $ossess a science will be doin! t at w ic is t e ob.ect of t e science" for e w o is learnin! it does not $ossess it. But since& of t at w ic is comin! to be& some $art must a#e come to be& and& of t at w ic & in !eneral& is c an!in!& some $art must a#e c an!ed 't is is s own in t e treatise on mo#ement(& e w o is learnin! must& it would seem& $ossess some $art of t e science. But ere too& t en& it is clear t at actuality is in t is sense also& #i2. in order of !eneration and of time& $rior to $otency. But '3( it is also $rior in substantiality" firstly& 'a( because t e t in!s t at are $osterior in becomin! are $rior in form and in substantiality 'e.!. man is $rior to boy and uman bein! to seed" for t e one already as its form& and t e ot er as not(& and because e#eryt in! t at comes to be mo#es towards a $rinci$le& i.e. an end 'for t at for t e sake of w ic a t in! is& is its $rinci$le& and t e becomin! is for t e sake of t e end(& and t e actuality is t e end& and it is for t e sake of t is t at t e $otency is ac6uired. %or animals do not see in order t at t ey may a#e si! t& but t ey a#e si! t t at t ey may see. And similarly men a#e t e art of buildin! t at t ey may build& and t eoretical science t at t ey may t eori2e" but t ey do not t eori2e t at t ey may a#e t eoretical science& e*ce$t t ose w o are learnin! by $ractice" and t ese do not t eori2e e*ce$t in a limited sense& or because t ey a#e no need to t eori2e. %urt er& matter e*ists in a $otential state& .ust because it may come to its form" and w en it e*ists actually& t en it is in its form. And t e same olds !ood in all cases& e#en t ose in w ic t e end is a mo#ement. And so& as teac ers t ink t ey a#e ac ie#ed

t eir end w en t ey a#e e* ibited t e $u$il at work& nature does likewise. %or if t is is not t e case& we s all a#e -auson,s 3ermes o#er a!ain& since it will be ard to say about t e knowled!e& as about t e fi!ure in t e $icture& w et er it is wit in or wit out. %or t e action is t e end& and t e actuality is t e action. And so e#en t e word ,actuality, is deri#ed from ,action,& and $oints to t e com$lete reality. And w ile in some cases t e e*ercise is t e ultimate t in! 'e.!. in si! t t e ultimate t in! is seein!& and no ot er $roduct besides t is results from si! t(& but from some t in!s a $roduct follows 'e.!. from t e art of buildin! t ere results a ouse as well as t e act of buildin!(& yet none t e less t e act is in t e former case t e end and in t e latter more of an end t an t e $otency is. %or t e act of buildin! is reali2ed in t e t in! t at is bein! built& and comes to be& and is& at t e same time as t e ouse. W ere& t en& t e result is somet in! a$art from t e e*ercise& t e actuality is in t e t in! t at is bein! made& e.!. t e act of buildin! is in t e t in! t at is bein! built and t at of wea#in! in t e t in! t at is bein! wo#en& and similarly in all ot er cases& and in !eneral t e mo#ement is in t e t in! t at is bein! mo#ed" but w ere t ere is no $roduct a$art from t e actuality& t e actuality is $resent in t e a!ents& e.!. t e act of seein! is in t e seein! sub.ect and t at of t eori2in! in t e t eori2in! sub.ect and t e life is in t e soul 'and t erefore well0bein! also" for it is a certain kind of life(. :b#iously& t erefore& t e substance or form is actuality. Accordin! to t is ar!ument& t en& it is ob#ious t at actuality is $rior in substantial bein! to $otency" and as we a#e said& one actuality always $recedes anot er in time ri! t back to t e actuality of t e eternal $rime mo#er. But 'b( actuality is $rior in a stricter sense also" for eternal t in!s are $rior in substance to $eris able t in!s& and no eternal t in! e*ists $otentially. ) e reason is t is. 4#ery $otency is at one and t e same time a $otency of t e o$$osite" for& w ile t at w ic is not ca$able of bein! $resent in a sub.ect cannot be $resent& e#eryt in! t at is ca$able of bein! may $ossibly not be actual. ) at& t en& w ic is ca$able of bein! may eit er be or not be" t e same t in!& t en& is ca$able bot of bein! and of not bein!. And t at w ic is ca$able of not bein! may $ossibly not be" and t at w ic may $ossibly not be is $eris able& eit er in t e full sense& or in t e $recise sense in w ic it is said t at it $ossibly may not be& i.e. in res$ect eit er of $lace or of 6uantity or 6uality" ,in t e full sense, means ,in res$ect of substance,. +ot in!& t en& w ic is in t e full sense im$eris able is in t e full sense $otentially e*istent 't ou! t ere is not in! to $re#ent its bein! so in some res$ect& e.!. $otentially of a certain 6uality or in a certain $lace(" all

im$eris able t in!s& t en& e*ist actually. +or can anyt in! w ic is of necessity e*ist $otentially" yet t ese t in!s are $rimary" for if t ese did not e*ist& not in! would e*ist. +or does eternal mo#ement& if t ere be suc & e*ist $otentially" and& if t ere is an eternal mobile& it is not in motion in #irtue of a $otentiality& e*ce$t in res$ect of ,w ence, and ,w it er, 't ere is not in! to $re#ent its a#in! matter w ic makes it ca$able of mo#ement in #arious directions(. And so t e sun and t e stars and t e w ole ea#en are e#er acti#e& and t ere is no fear t at t ey may sometime stand still& as t e natural $ iloso$ ers fear t ey may. +or do t ey tire in t is acti#ity" for mo#ement is not for t em& as it is for $eris able t in!s& connected wit t e $otentiality for o$$osites& so t at t e continuity of t e mo#ement s ould be laborious" for it is t at kind of substance w ic is matter and $otency& not actuality& t at causes t is. 1m$eris able t in!s are imitated by t ose t at are in#ol#ed in c an!e& e.!. eart and fire. %or t ese also are e#er acti#e" for t ey a#e t eir mo#ement of t emsel#es and in t emsel#es. But t e ot er $otencies& accordin! to our $re#ious discussion& are all $otencies for o$$osites" for t at w ic can mo#e anot er in t is way can also mo#e it not in t is way& i.e. if it acts accordin! to a rational formula" and t e same non0rational $otencies will $roduce o$$osite results by t eir $resence or absence. 1f& t en& t ere are any entities or substances suc as t e dialecticians say t e 1deas are& t ere must be somet in! muc more scientific t an science0itself and somet in! more mobile t an mo#ement0itself" for t ese will be more of t e nature of actualities& w ile science0itself and mo#ement0itself are $otencies for t ese. :b#iously& t en& actuality is $rior bot to $otency and to e#ery $rinci$le of c an!e. C ) at t e actuality is also better and more #aluable t an t e !ood $otency is e#ident from t e followin! ar!ument. 4#eryt in! of w ic we say t at it can do somet in!& is alike ca$able of contraries& e.!. t at of w ic we say t at it can be well is t e same as t at w ic can be ill& and as bot $otencies at once" for t e same $otency is a $otency of ealt and illness& of rest and motion& of buildin! and t rowin! down& of bein! built and bein! t rown down. ) e ca$acity for contraries& t en& is $resent at t e same time" but contraries cannot be $resent at t e same time& and t e actualities also cannot be $resent at t e same time& e.!. ealt and illness. ) erefore& w ile t e !ood must be one of t em& t e ca$acity is bot alike& or neit er" t e actuality& t en& is better. Also in t e case of bad t in!s t e end or actuality must be worse t an t e $otency" for

t at w ic ,can, is bot contraries alike. Clearly& t en& t e bad does not e*ist a$art from bad t in!s" for t e bad is in its nature $osterior to t e $otency. And t erefore we may also say t at in t e t in!s w ic are from t e be!innin!& i.e. in eternal t in!s& t ere is not in! bad& not in! defecti#e& not in! $er#erted 'for $er#ersion is somet in! bad(. 1t is an acti#ity also t at !eometrical constructions are disco#ered" for we find t em by di#idin!. 1f t e fi!ures ad been already di#ided& t e constructions would a#e been ob#ious" but as it is t ey are $resent only $otentially. W y are t e an!les of t e trian!le e6ual to two ri! t an!les< Because t e an!les about one $oint are e6ual to two ri! t an!les. 1f& t en& t e line $arallel to t e side ad been already drawn u$wards& t e reason would a#e been e#ident to any one as soon as e saw t e fi!ure. W y is t e an!le in a semicircle in all cases a ri! t an!le< 1f t ree lines are e6ual t e two w ic form t e base& and t e $er$endicular from t e centre0t e conclusion is e#ident at a !lance to one w o knows t e former $ro$osition. :b#iously& t erefore& t e $otentially e*istin! constructions are disco#ered by bein! brou! t to actuality" t e reason is t at t e !eometer,s t inkin! is an actuality" so t at t e $otency $roceeds from an actuality" and t erefore it is by makin! constructions t at $eo$le come to know t em 't ou! t e sin!le actuality is later in !eneration t an t e corres$ondin! $otency(. '/ee dia!ram.( 10 ) e terms ,bein!, and ,non0bein!, are em$loyed firstly wit reference to t e cate!ories& and secondly wit reference to t e $otency or actuality of t ese or t eir non0$otency or nonactuality& and t irdly in t e sense of true and false. ) is de$ends& on t e side of t e ob.ects& on t eir bein! combined or se$arated& so t at e w o t inks t e se$arated to be se$arated and t e combined to be combined as t e trut & w ile e w ose t ou! t is in a state contrary to t at of t e ob.ects is in error. ) is bein! so& w en is w at is called trut or falsity $resent& and w en is it not< We must consider w at we mean by t ese terms. 1t is not because we t ink truly t at you are $ale& t at you are $ale& but because you are $ale we w o say t is a#e t e trut . 1f& t en& some t in!s are always combined and cannot be se$arated& and ot ers are always se$arated and cannot be combined& w ile ot ers are ca$able eit er of combination or of se$aration& ,bein!, is bein! combined and one& and ,not bein!, is bein! not combined but more t an one. Re!ardin! contin!ent facts& t en& t e same o$inion or t e same statement comes to be false and true& and it is $ossible for it to be at one time correct and at anot er erroneous" but re!ardin! t in!s t at cannot be ot erwise o$inions are not at one time true and at anot er false& but t e same

o$inions are always true or always false. But wit re!ard to incom$osites& w at is bein! or not bein!& and trut or falsity< A t in! of t is sort is not com$osite& so as to ,be, w en it is com$ounded& and not to ,be, if it is se$arated& like ,t at t e wood is w ite, or ,t at t e dia!onal is incommensurable," nor will trut and falsity be still $resent in t e same way as in t e $re#ious cases. 1n fact& as trut is not t e same in t ese cases& so also bein! is not t e same" but 'a( trut or falsity is as follows00contact and assertion are trut 'assertion not bein! t e same as affirmation(& and i!norance is non0contact. %or it is not $ossible to be in error re!ardin! t e 6uestion w at a t in! is& sa#e in an accidental sense" and t e same olds !ood re!ardin! non0com$osite substances 'for it is not $ossible to be in error about t em(. And t ey all e*ist actually& not $otentially" for ot erwise t ey would a#e come to be and ceased to be" but& as it is& bein! itself does not come to be 'nor cease to be(" for if it ad done so it would a#e ad to come out of somet in!. About t e t in!s& t en& w ic are essences and actualities& it is not $ossible to be in error& but only to know t em or not to know t em. But we do in6uire w at t ey are& #i2. w et er t ey are of suc and suc a nature or not. 'b( As re!ards t e ,bein!, t at answers to trut and t e ,non0bein!, t at answers to falsity& in one case t ere is trut if t e sub.ect and t e attribute are really combined& and falsity if t ey are not combined" in t e ot er case& if t e ob.ect is e*istent it e*ists in a $articular way& and if it does not e*ist in t is way does not e*ist at all. And trut means knowin! t ese ob.ects& and falsity does not e*ist& nor error& but only i!norance0and not an i!norance w ic is like blindness" for blindness is akin to a total absence of t e faculty of t inkin!. 1t is e#ident also t at about unc an!eable t in!s t ere can be no error in res$ect of time& if we assume t em to be unc an!eable. 4.!. if we su$$ose t at t e trian!le does not c an!e& we s all not su$$ose t at at one time its an!les are e6ual to two ri! t an!les w ile at anot er time t ey are not 'for t at would im$ly c an!e(. 1t is $ossible& owe#er& to su$$ose t at one member of suc a class as a certain attribute and anot er as not" e.!. w ile we may su$$ose t at no e#en number is $rime& we may su$$ose t at some are and some are not. But re!ardin! a numerically sin!le number not e#en t is form of error is $ossible" for we cannot in t is case su$$ose t at one instance as an attribute and anot er as not& but w et er our .ud!ement be true or false& it is im$lied t at t e fact is eternal. Book ? 1 W4 a#e said $re#iously& in our distinction of t e #arious

meanin!s of words& t at ,one, as se#eral meanin!s" t e t in!s t at are directly and of t eir own nature and not accidentally called one may be summari2ed under four eads& t ou! t e word is used in more senses. '1( ) ere is t e continuous& eit er in !eneral& or es$ecially t at w ic is continuous by nature and not by contact nor by bein! to!et er" and of t ese& t at as more unity and is $rior& w ose mo#ement is more indi#isible and sim$ler. '5( ) at w ic is a w ole and as a certain s a$e and form is one in a still i! er de!ree" and es$ecially if a t in! is of t is sort by nature& and not by force like t e t in!s w ic are unified by !lue or nails or by bein! tied to!et er& i.e. if it as in itself t e cause of its continuity. A t in! is of t is sort because its mo#ement is one and indi#isible in $lace and time" so t at e#idently if a t in! as by nature a $rinci$le of mo#ement t at is of t e first kind 'i.e. local mo#ement( and t e first in t at kind 'i.e. circular mo#ement(& t is is in t e $rimary sense one e*tended t in!. /ome t in!s& t en& are one in t is way& 6ua continuous or w ole& and t e ot er t in!s t at are one are t ose w ose definition is one. :f t is sort are t e t in!s t e t ou! t of w ic is one& i.e. t ose t e t ou! t of w ic is indi#isible" and it is indi#isible if t e t in! is indi#isible in kind or in number. '3( 1n number& t en& t e indi#idual is indi#isible& and '=( in kind& t at w ic in intelli!ibility and in knowled!e is indi#isible& so t at t at w ic causes substances to be one must be one in t e $rimary sense. ,:ne,& t en& as all t ese meanin!s0t e naturally continuous and t e w ole& and t e indi#idual and t e uni#ersal. And all t ese are one because in some cases t e mo#ement& in ot ers t e t ou! t or t e definition is indi#isible. But it must be obser#ed t at t e 6uestions& w at sort of t in!s are said to be one& and w at it is to be one and w at is t e definition of it& s ould not be assumed to be t e same. ,:ne, as all t ese meanin!s& and eac of t e t in!s to w ic one of t ese kinds of unity belon!s will be one" but ,to be one, will sometimes mean bein! one of t ese t in!s& and sometimes bein! somet in! else w ic is e#en nearer to t e meanin! of t e word ,one, w ile t ese ot er t in!s a$$ro*imate to its a$$lication. ) is is also true of ,element, or ,cause,& if one ad bot to s$ecify t e t in!s of w ic it is $redicable and to render t e definition of t e word. %or in a sense fire is an element 'and doubtless also ,t e indefinite, or somet in! else of t e sort is by its own nature t e element(& but in a sense it is not" for it is not t e same t in! to be fire and to be an element& but w ile as a $articular t in! wit a nature of its own fire is an element& t e name ,element, means t at it as t is attribute& t at t ere is somet in! w ic is made of it as a $rimary constituent. And so wit ,cause, and ,one, and all suc terms. %or t is reason& too& ,to be one, means ,to be indi#isible& bein! essentially one means a Kt isK and ca$able of bein! isolated eit er in

$lace& or in form or t ou! t," or $er a$s ,to be w ole and indi#isible," but it means es$ecially ,to be t e first measure of a kind,& and most strictly of 6uantity" for it is from t is t at it as been e*tended to t e ot er cate!ories. %or measure is t at by w ic 6uantity is known" and 6uantity 6ua 6uantity is known eit er by a ,one, or by a number& and all number is known by a ,one,. ) erefore all 6uantity 6ua 6uantity is known by t e one& and t at by w ic 6uantities are $rimarily known is t e one itself" and so t e one is t e startin!0$oint of number 6ua number. And ence in t e ot er classes too ,measure, means t at by w ic eac is first known& and t e measure of eac is a unit0in len!t & in breadt & in de$t & in wei! t& in s$eed. ') e words ,wei! t, and ,s$eed, are common to bot contraries" for eac of t em as two meanin!s0,wei! t, means bot t at w ic as any amount of !ra#ity and t at w ic as an e*cess of !ra#ity& and ,s$eed, bot t at w ic as any amount of mo#ement and t at w ic as an e*cess of mo#ement" for e#en t e slow as a certain s$eed and t e com$arati#ely li! t a certain wei! t.( 1n all t ese& t en& t e measure and startin!0$oint is somet in! one and indi#isible& since e#en in lines we treat as indi#isible t e line a foot lon!. %or e#eryw ere we seek as t e measure somet in! one and indi#isible" and t is is t at w ic is sim$le eit er in 6uality or in 6uantity. +ow w ere it is t ou! t im$ossible to take away or to add& t ere t e measure is e*act ' ence t at of number is most e*act" for we $osit t e unit as indi#isible in e#ery res$ect(" but in all ot er cases we imitate t is sort of measure. %or in t e case of a furlon! or a talent or of anyt in! com$arati#ely lar!e any addition or subtraction mi! t more easily esca$e our notice t an in t e case of somet in! smaller" so t at t e first t in! from w ic & as far as our $erce$tion !oes& not in! can be subtracted& all men make t e measure& w et er of li6uids or of solids& w et er of wei! t or of si2e" and t ey t ink t ey know t e 6uantity w en t ey know it by means of t is measure. And indeed t ey know mo#ement too by t e sim$le mo#ement and t e 6uickest" for t is occu$ies least time. And so in astronomy a ,one, of t is sort is t e startin!0$oint and measure 'for t ey assume t e mo#ement of t e ea#ens to be uniform and t e 6uickest& and .ud!e t e ot ers by reference to it(& and in music t e 6uarter0tone 'because it is t e least inter#al(& and in s$eec t e letter. And all t ese are ones in t is sense00not t at ,one, is somet in! $redicable in t e same sense of all of t ese& but in t e sense we a#e mentioned. But t e measure is not always one in number00sometimes t ere are se#eral" e.!. t e 6uarter0tones 'not to t e ear& but as determined by t e ratios( are two& and t e articulate sounds by w ic we measure are more t an one& and t e dia!onal of t e s6uare and its side are measured by two 6uantities& and all s$atial ma!nitudes re#eal similar #arieties of unit. ) us& t en& t e one is t e measure of all

t in!s& because we come to know t e elements in t e substance by di#idin! t e t in!s eit er in res$ect of 6uantity or in res$ect of kind. And t e one is indi#isible .ust because t e first of eac class of t in!s is indi#isible. But it is not in t e same way t at e#ery ,one, is indi#isible e.!. a foot and a unit" t e latter is indi#isible in e#ery res$ect& w ile t e former must be $laced amon! t in!s w ic are undi#ided to $erce$tion& as as been said already0only to $erce$tion& for doubtless e#ery continuous t in! is di#isible. ) e measure is always omo!eneous wit t e t in! measured" t e measure of s$atial ma!nitudes is a s$atial ma!nitude& and in $articular t at of len!t is a len!t & t at of breadt a breadt & t at of articulate sound an articulate sound& t at of wei! t a wei! t& t at of units a unit. '%or we must state t e matter so& and not say t at t e measure of numbers is a number" we ou! t indeed to say t is if we were to use t e corres$ondin! form of words& but t e claim does not really corres$ond0it is as if one claimed t at t e measure of units is units and not a unit" number is a $lurality of units.( Inowled!e& also& and $erce$tion& we call t e measure of t in!s for t e same reason& because we come to know somet in! by t em0w ile as a matter of fact t ey are measured rat er t an measure ot er t in!s. But it is wit us as if some one else measured us and we came to know ow bi! we are by seein! t at e a$$lied t e cubit0measure to suc and suc a fraction of us. But -rota!oras says ,man is t e measure of all t in!s,& as if e ad said ,t e man w o knows, or ,t e man w o $ercei#es," and t ese because t ey a#e res$ecti#ely knowled!e and $erce$tion& w ic we say are t e measures of ob.ects. /uc t inkers are sayin! not in!& t en& w ile t ey a$$ear to be sayin! somet in! remarkable. 4#idently& t en& unity in t e strictest sense& if we define it accordin! to t e meanin! of t e word& is a measure& and most $ro$erly of 6uantity& and secondly of 6uality. And some t in!s will be one if t ey are indi#isible in 6uantity& and ot ers if t ey are indi#isible in 6uality" and so t at w ic is one is indi#isible& eit er absolutely or 6ua one. 5 Wit re!ard to t e substance and nature of t e one we must ask in w ic of two ways it e*ists. ) is is t e #ery 6uestion t at we re#iewed in our discussion of $roblems& #i2. w at t e one is and ow we must concei#e of it& w et er we must take t e one itself as bein! a substance 'as bot t e -yt a!oreans say in earlier and -lato in later times(& or t ere is& rat er& an underlyin! nature and t e one s ould be described more intelli!ibly and more in t e manner of t e $ ysical $ iloso$ ers& of w om one says t e one is lo#e& anot er says it is air& and anot er t e indefinite.

1f& t en& no uni#ersal can be a substance& as as been said our discussion of substance and bein!& and if bein! itself cannot be a substance in t e sense of a one a$art from t e many 'for it is common to t e many(& but is only a $redicate& clearly unity also cannot be a substance" for bein! and unity are t e most uni#ersal of all $redicates. ) erefore& on t e one and& !enera are not certain entities and substances se$arable from ot er t in!s" and on t e ot er and t e one cannot be a !enus& for t e same reasons for w ic bein! and substance cannot be !enera. %urt er& t e $osition must be similar in all t e kinds of unity. +ow ,unity, as .ust as many meanin!s as ,bein!," so t at since in t e s$ ere of 6ualities t e one is somet in! definite0some $articular kind of t in!0and similarly in t e s$ ere of 6uantities& clearly we must in e#ery cate!ory ask w at t e one is& as we must ask w at t e e*istent is& since it is not enou! to say t at its nature is .ust to be one or e*istent. But in colours t e one is a colour& e.!. w ite& and t en t e ot er colours are obser#ed to be $roduced out of t is and black& and black is t e $ri#ation of w ite& as darkness of li! t. ) erefore if all e*istent t in!s were colours& e*istent t in!s would a#e been a number& indeed& but of w at< Clearly of colours" and t e ,one, would a#e been a $articular ,one,& i.e. w ite. And similarly if all e*istin! t in!s were tunes& t ey would a#e been a number& but a number of 6uarter0tones& and t eir essence would not a#e been number" and t e one would a#e been somet in! w ose substance was not to be one but to be t e 6uarter0tone. And similarly if all e*istent t in!s ad been articulate sounds& t ey would a#e been a number of letters& and t e one would a#e been a #owel. And if all e*istent t in!s were rectilinear fi!ures& t ey would a#e been a number of fi!ures& and t e one would a#e been t e trian!le. And t e same ar!ument a$$lies to all ot er classes. /ince& t erefore& w ile t ere are numbers and a one bot in affections and in 6ualities and in 6uantities and in mo#ement& in all cases t e number is a number of $articular t in!s and t e one is one somet in!& and its substance is not .ust to be one& t e same must be true of substances also" for it is true of all cases alike. ) at t e one& t en& in e#ery class is a definite t in!& and in no case is its nature .ust t is& unity& is e#ident" but as in colours t e one0itself w ic we must seek is one colour& so too in substance t e one0itself is one substance. ) at in a sense unity means t e same as bein! is clear from t e facts t at its meanin!s corres$ond to t e cate!ories one to one& and it is not com$rised wit in any cate!ory 'e.!. it is com$rised neit er in ,w at a t in! is, nor in 6uality& but is related to t em .ust as bein! is(" t at in ,one man, not in! more is $redicated t an in ,man, '.ust as bein! is not in! a$art from substance or 6uality or 6uantity(" and t at to be one is .ust to be a $articular t in!.

3 ) e one and t e many are o$$osed in se#eral ways& of w ic one is t e o$$osition of t e one and $lurality as indi#isible and di#isible" for t at w ic is eit er di#ided or di#isible is called a $lurality& and t at w ic is indi#isible or not di#ided is called one. +ow since o$$osition is of four kinds& and one of t ese two terms is $ri#ati#e in meanin!& t ey must be contraries& and neit er contradictory nor correlati#e in meanin!. And t e one deri#es its name and its e*$lanation from its contrary& t e indi#isible from t e di#isible& because $lurality and t e di#isible is more $erce$tible t an t e indi#isible& so t at in definition $lurality is $rior to t e indi#isible& because of t e conditions of $erce$tion. )o t e one belon!& as we indicated !ra$ ically in our distinction of t e contraries& t e same and t e like and t e e6ual& and to $lurality belon! t e ot er and t e unlike and t e une6ual. ,) e same, as se#eral meanin!s" '1( we sometimes mean ,t e same numerically," a!ain& '5( we call a t in! t e same if it is one bot in definition and in number& e.!. you are one wit yourself bot in form and in matter" and a!ain& '3( if t e definition of its $rimary essence is one" e.!. e6ual strai! t lines are t e same& and so are e6ual and e6ual0an!led 6uadrilaterals" t ere are many suc & but in t ese e6uality constitutes unity. ) in!s are like if& not bein! absolutely t e same& nor wit out difference in res$ect of t eir concrete substance& t ey are t e same in form" e.!. t e lar!er s6uare is like t e smaller& and une6ual strai! t lines are like" t ey are like& but not absolutely t e same. :t er t in!s are like& if& a#in! t e same form& and bein! t in!s in w ic difference of de!ree is $ossible& t ey a#e no difference of de!ree. :t er t in!s& if t ey a#e a 6uality t at is in form one and same0e.!. w iteness0in a !reater or less de!ree& are called like because t eir form is one. :t er t in!s are called like if t e 6ualities t ey a#e in common are more numerous t an t ose in w ic t ey differ0eit er t e 6ualities in !eneral or t e $rominent 6ualities" e.!. tin is like sil#er& 6ua w ite& and !old is like fire& 6ua yellow and red. 4#idently& t en& ,ot er, and ,unlike, also a#e se#eral meanin!s. And t e ot er in one sense is t e o$$osite of t e same 'so t at e#eryt in! is eit er t e same as or ot er t an e#eryt in! else(. 1n anot er sense t in!s are ot er unless bot t eir matter and t eir definition are one 'so t at you are ot er t an your nei! bour(. ) e ot er in t e t ird sense is e*em$lified in t e ob.ects of mat ematics. ,:t er or t e same, can t erefore be $redicated of e#eryt in! wit re!ard to e#eryt in! else0but only if t e t in!s are one and e*istent& for ,ot er, is not t e contradictory of ,t e same," w ic is w y it is not $redicated of non0e*istent t in!s 'w ile

,not t e same, is so $redicated(. 1t is $redicated of all e*istin! t in!s" for e#eryt in! t at is e*istent and one is by its #ery nature eit er one or not one wit anyt in! else. ) e ot er& t en& and t e same are t us o$$osed. But difference is not t e same as ot erness. %or t e ot er and t at w ic it is ot er t an need not be ot er in some definite res$ect 'for e#eryt in! t at is e*istent is eit er ot er or t e same(& but t at w ic is different is different from some $articular t in! in some $articular res$ect& so t at t ere must be somet in! identical w ereby t ey differ. And t is identical t in! is !enus or s$ecies" for e#eryt in! t at differs differs eit er in !enus or in s$ecies& in !enus if t e t in!s a#e not t eir matter in common and are not !enerated out of eac ot er 'i.e. if t ey belon! to different fi!ures of $redication(& and in s$ecies if t ey a#e t e same !enus ',!enus, meanin! t at identical t in! w ic is essentially $redicated of bot t e different t in!s(. Contraries are different& and contrariety is a kind of difference. ) at we are ri! t in t is su$$osition is s own by induction. %or all of t ese too are seen to be different" t ey are not merely ot er& but some are ot er in !enus& and ot ers are in t e same line of $redication& and t erefore in t e same !enus& and t e same in !enus. We a#e distin!uis ed elsew ere w at sort of t in!s are t e same or ot er in !enus. = /ince t in!s w ic differ may differ from one anot er more or less& t ere is also a !reatest difference& and t is 1 call contrariety. ) at contrariety is t e !reatest difference is made clear by induction. %or t in!s w ic differ in !enus a#e no way to one anot er& but are too far distant and are not com$arable" and for t in!s t at differ in s$ecies t e e*tremes from w ic !eneration takes $lace are t e contraries& and t e distance between e*tremes0and t erefore t at between t e contraries0is t e !reatest. But surely t at w ic is !reatest in eac class is com$lete. %or t at is !reatest w ic cannot be e*ceeded& and t at is com$lete beyond w ic not in! can be found. %or t e com$lete difference marks t e end of a series '.ust as t e ot er t in!s w ic are called com$lete are so called because t ey a#e attained an end(& and beyond t e end t ere is not in!" for in e#eryt in! it is t e e*treme and includes all else& and t erefore t ere is not in! beyond t e end& and t e com$lete needs not in! furt er. %rom t is& t en& it is clear t at contrariety is com$lete difference" and as contraries are so called in se#eral senses& t eir modes of com$leteness will answer to t e #arious modes of contrariety w ic attac to t e contraries. ) is bein! so& it is clear t at one t in! a#e more t an one contrary 'for neit er can t ere be anyt in! more e*treme t an t e

e*treme& nor can t ere be more t an two e*tremes for t e one inter#al(& and& to $ut t e matter !enerally& t is is clear if contrariety is a difference& and if difference& and t erefore also t e com$lete difference& must be between two t in!s. And t e ot er commonly acce$ted definitions of contraries are also necessarily true. %or not only is '1( t e com$lete difference t e !reatest difference 'for we can !et no difference beyond it of t in!s differin! eit er in !enus or in s$ecies" for it as been s own t at t ere is no ,difference, between anyt in! and t e t in!s outside its !enus& and amon! t e t in!s w ic differ in s$ecies t e com$lete difference is t e !reatest(" but also '5( t e t in!s in t e same !enus w ic differ most are contrary 'for t e com$lete difference is t e !reatest difference between s$ecies of t e same !enus(" and '3( t e t in!s in t e same rece$ti#e material w ic differ most are contrary 'for t e matter is t e same for contraries(" and '=( of t e t in!s w ic fall under t e same faculty t e most different are contrary 'for one science deals wit one class of t in!s& and in t ese t e com$lete difference is t e !reatest(. ) e $rimary contrariety is t at between $ositi#e state and $ri#ation0not e#ery $ri#ation& owe#er 'for ,$ri#ation, as se#eral meanin!s(& but t at w ic is com$lete. And t e ot er contraries must be called so wit reference to t ese& some because t ey $ossess t ese& ot ers because t ey $roduce or tend to $roduce t em& ot ers because t ey are ac6uisitions or losses of t ese or of ot er contraries. +ow if t e kinds of o$$osition are contradiction and $ri#ation and contrariety and relation& and of t ese t e first is contradiction& and contradiction admits of no intermediate& w ile contraries admit of one& clearly contradiction and contrariety are not t e same. But $ri#ation is a kind of contradiction" for w at suffers $ri#ation& eit er in !eneral or in some determinate way& eit er t at w ic is 6uite inca$able of a#in! some attribute or t at w ic & bein! of suc a nature as to a#e it& as it not" ere we a#e already a #ariety of meanin!s& w ic a#e been distin!uis ed elsew ere. -ri#ation& t erefore& is a contradiction or inca$acity w ic is determinate or taken alon! wit t e rece$ti#e material. ) is is t e reason w y& w ile contradiction does not admit of an intermediate& $ri#ation sometimes does" for e#eryt in! is e6ual or not e6ual& but not e#eryt in! is e6ual or une6ual& or if it is& it is only wit in t e s$ ere of t at w ic is rece$ti#e of e6uality. 1f& t en& t e comin!s0to0be w ic a$$en to t e matter start from t e contraries& and $roceed eit er from t e form and t e $ossession of t e form or from a $ri#ation of t e form or s a$e& clearly all contrariety must be $ri#ation& but $resumably not all $ri#ation is contrariety 't e reason bein! t at t at as suffered $ri#ation may a#e suffered it in se#eral ways(" for it is only t e e*tremes from w ic c an!es $roceed t at are contraries.

And t is is ob#ious also by induction. %or e#ery contrariety in#ol#es& as one of its terms& a $ri#ation& but not all cases are alike" ine6uality is t e $ri#ation of e6uality and unlikeness of likeness& and on t e ot er and #ice is t e $ri#ation of #irtue. But t e cases differ in a way already described" in one case we mean sim$ly t at t e t in! as suffered $ri#ation& in anot er case t at it as done so eit er at a certain time or in a certain $art 'e.!. at a certain a!e or in t e dominant $art(& or t rou! out. ) is is w y in some cases t ere is a mean 't ere are men w o are neit er !ood nor bad(& and in ot ers t ere is not 'a number must be eit er odd or e#en(. %urt er& some contraries a#e t eir sub.ect defined& ot ers a#e not. ) erefore it is e#ident t at one of t e contraries is always $ri#ati#e" but it is enou! if t is is true of t e first0i.e. t e !eneric0contraries& e.!. t e one and t e many" for t e ot ers can be reduced to t ese. 5 /ince one t in! as one contrary& we mi! t raise t e 6uestion ow t e one is o$$osed to t e many& and t e e6ual to t e !reat and t e small. %or if we used t e word ,w et er, only in an antit esis suc as ,w et er it is w ite or black,& or ,w et er it is w ite or not w ite, 'we do not ask ,w et er it is a man or w ite,(& unless we are $roceedin! on a $rior assum$tion and askin! somet in! suc as ,w et er it was Cleon or /ocrates t at came, as t is is not a necessary dis.unction in any class of t in!s" yet e#en t is is an e*tension from t e case of o$$osites" for o$$osites alone cannot be $resent to!et er" and we assume t is incom$atibility ere too in askin! w ic of t e two came" for if t ey mi! t bot a#e come& t e 6uestion would a#e been absurd" but if t ey mi! t& e#en so t is falls .ust as muc into an antit esis& t at of t e ,one or many,& i.e. ,w et er bot came or one of t e two,>0if& t en& t e 6uestion ,w et er, is always concerned wit o$$osites& and we can ask ,w et er it is !reater or less or e6ual,& w at is t e o$$osition of t e e6ual to t e ot er two< 1t is not contrary eit er to one alone or to bot " for w y s ould it be contrary to t e !reater rat er t an to t e less< %urt er& t e e6ual is contrary to t e une6ual. ) erefore if it is contrary to t e !reater and t e less& it will be contrary to more t in!s t an one. But if t e une6ual means t e same as bot t e !reater and t e less to!et er& t e e6ual will be o$$osite to bot 'and t e difficulty su$$orts t ose w o say t e une6ual is a ,two,(& but it follows t at one t in! is contrary to two ot ers& w ic is im$ossible. A!ain& t e e6ual is e#idently intermediate between t e !reat and t e small& but no contrariety is eit er obser#ed to be intermediate& or& from its definition& can be so" for it would not be com$lete if it were intermediate between any two t in!s& but rat er it always as somet in! intermediate between its own terms.

1t remains& t en& t at it is o$$osed eit er as ne!ation or as $ri#ation. 1t cannot be t e ne!ation or $ri#ation of one of t e two" for w y of t e !reat rat er t an of t e small< 1t is& t en& t e $ri#ati#e ne!ation of bot . ) is is w y ,w et er, is said wit reference to bot & not to one of t e two 'e.!. ,w et er it is !reater or e6ual, or ,w et er it is e6ual or less,(" t ere are always t ree cases. But it is not a necessary $ri#ation" for not e#eryt in! w ic is not !reater or less is e6ual& but only t e t in!s w ic are of suc a nature as to a#e t ese attributes. ) e e6ual& t en& is t at w ic is neit er !reat nor small but is naturally fitted to be eit er !reat or small" and it is o$$osed to bot as a $ri#ati#e ne!ation 'and t erefore is also intermediate(. And t at w ic is neit er !ood nor bad is o$$osed to bot & but as no name" for eac of t ese as se#eral meanin!s and t e reci$ient sub.ect is not one" but t at w ic is neit er w ite nor black as more claim to unity. 9et e#en t is as not one name& t ou! t e colours of w ic t is ne!ation is $ri#ati#ely $redicated are in a way limited" for t ey must be eit er !rey or yellow or somet in! else of t e kind. ) erefore it is an incorrect criticism t at is $assed by t ose w o t ink t at all suc $ rases are used in t e same way& so t at t at w ic is neit er a s oe nor a and would be intermediate between a s oe and a and& since t at w ic is neit er !ood nor bad is intermediate between t e !ood and t e bad0as if t ere must be an intermediate in all cases. But t is does not necessarily follow. %or t e one $ rase is a .oint denial of o$$osites between w ic t ere is an intermediate and a certain natural inter#al" but between t e ot er two t ere is no ,difference," for t e t in!s& t e denials of w ic are combined& belon! to different classes& so t at t e substratum is not one. @ We mi! t raise similar 6uestions about t e one and t e many. %or if t e many are absolutely o$$osed to t e one& certain im$ossible results follow. :ne will t en be few& w et er few be treated ere as sin!ular or $lural" for t e many are o$$osed also to t e few. %urt er& two will be many& since t e double is multi$le and ,double, deri#es its meanin! from ,two," t erefore one will be few" for w at is t at in com$arison wit w ic two are many& e*ce$t one& w ic must t erefore be few< %or t ere is not in! fewer. %urt er& if t e muc and t e little are in $lurality w at t e lon! and t e s ort are in len!t & and w ate#er is muc is also many& and t e many are muc 'unless& indeed& t ere is a difference in t e case of an easily0bounded continuum(& t e little 'or few( will be a $lurality. ) erefore one is a $lurality if it is few" and t is it must be& if two are many. But $er a$s& w ile t e ,many, are in a sense said to be also ,muc ,& it is wit a difference" e.!. water is muc but not many. But ,many, is

a$$lied to t e t in!s t at are di#isible" in t e one sense it means a $lurality w ic is e*cessi#e eit er absolutely or relati#ely 'w ile ,few, is similarly a $lurality w ic is deficient(& and in anot er sense it means number& in w ic sense alone it is o$$osed to t e one. %or we say ,one or many,& .ust as if one were to say ,one and ones, or ,w ite t in! and w ite t in!s,& or to com$are t e t in!s t at a#e been measured wit t e measure. 1t is in t is sense also t at multi$les are so called. %or eac number is said to be many because it consists of ones and because eac number is measurable by one" and it is ,many, as t at w ic is o$$osed to one& not to t e few. 1n t is sense& t en& e#en two is many0not& owe#er& in t e sense of a $lurality w ic is e*cessi#e eit er relati#ely or absolutely" it is t e first $lurality. But wit out 6ualification two is few" for it is first $lurality w ic is deficient 'for t is reason Ana*a!oras was not ri! t in lea#in! t e sub.ect wit t e statement t at ,all t in!s were to!et er& boundless bot in $lurality and in smallness,0w ere for ,and in smallness, e s ould a#e said ,and in fewness," for t ey could not a#e been boundless in fewness(& since it is not one& as some say& but two& t at make a few. ) e one is o$$osed t en to t e many in numbers as measure to t in! measurable" and t ese are o$$osed as are t e relati#es w ic are not from t eir #ery nature relati#es. We a#e distin!uis ed elsew ere t e two senses in w ic relati#es are so called>0'1( as contraries" '5( as knowled!e to t in! known& a term bein! called relati#e because anot er is relati#e to it. ) ere is not in! to $re#ent one from bein! fewer t an somet in!& e.!. t an two" for if one is fewer& it is not t erefore few. -lurality is as it were t e class to w ic number belon!s" for number is $lurality measurable by one& and one and number are in a sense o$$osed& not as contrary& but as we a#e said some relati#e terms are o$$osed" for inasmuc as one is measure and t e ot er measurable& t ey are o$$osed. ) is is w y not e#eryt in! t at is one is a number" i.e. if t e t in! is indi#isible it is not a number. But t ou! knowled!e is similarly s$oken of as relati#e to t e knowable& t e relation does not work out similarly" for w ile knowled!e mi! t be t ou! t to be t e measure& and t e knowable t e t in! measured& t e fact t at all knowled!e is knowable& but not all t at is knowable is knowled!e& because in a sense knowled!e is measured by t e knowable.0-lurality is contrary neit er to t e few 't e many bein! contrary to t is as e*cessi#e $lurality to $lurality e*ceeded(& nor to t e one in e#ery sense" but in t e one sense t ese are contrary& as as been said& because t e former is di#isible and t e latter indi#isible& w ile in anot er sense t ey are relati#e as knowled!e is to knowable& if $lurality is number and t e one is a measure. A

/ince contraries admit of an intermediate and in some cases a#e it& intermediates must be com$osed of t e contraries. %or '1( all intermediates are in t e same !enus as t e t in!s between w ic t ey stand. %or we call t ose t in!s intermediates& into w ic t at w ic c an!es must c an!e first" e.!. if we were to $ass from t e i! est strin! to t e lowest by t e smallest inter#als& we s ould come sooner to t e intermediate notes& and in colours if we were to $ass from w ite to black& we s ould come sooner to crimson and !rey t an to black" and similarly in all ot er cases. But to c an!e from one !enus to anot er !enus is not $ossible e*ce$t in an incidental way& as from colour to fi!ure. 1ntermediates& t en& must be in t e same !enus bot as one anot er and as t e t in!s t ey stand between. But '5( all intermediates stand between o$$osites of some kind" for only between t ese can c an!e take $lace in #irtue of t eir own nature 'so t at an intermediate is im$ossible between t in!s w ic are not o$$osite" for t en t ere would be c an!e w ic was not from one o$$osite towards t e ot er(. :f o$$osites& contradictories admit of no middle term" for t is is w at contradiction is0an o$$osition& one or ot er side of w ic must attac to anyt in! w ate#er& i.e. w ic as no intermediate. :f ot er o$$osites& some are relati#e& ot ers $ri#ati#e& ot ers contrary. :f relati#e terms& t ose w ic are not contrary a#e no intermediate" t e reason is t at t ey are not in t e same !enus. %or w at intermediate could t ere be between knowled!e and knowable< But between !reat and small t ere is one. '3( 1f intermediates are in t e same !enus& as as been s own& and stand between contraries& t ey must be com$osed of t ese contraries. %or eit er t ere will be a !enus includin! t e contraries or t ere will be none. And if 'a( t ere is to be a !enus in suc a way t at it is somet in! $rior to t e contraries& t e differentiae w ic constituted t e contrary s$ecies0of0a0!enus will be contraries $rior to t e s$ecies" for s$ecies are com$osed of t e !enus and t e differentiae. '4.!. if w ite and black are contraries& and one is a $iercin! colour and t e ot er a com$ressin! colour& t ese differentiae0,$iercin!, and ,com$ressin!,0are $rior" so t at t ese are $rior contraries of one anot er.( But& a!ain& t e s$ecies w ic differ contrariwise are t e more truly contrary s$ecies. And t e ot er.s$ecies& i.e. t e intermediates& must be com$osed of t eir !enus and t eir differentiae. '4.!. all colours w ic are between w ite and black must be said to be com$osed of t e !enus& i.e. colour& and certain differentiae. But t ese differentiae will not be t e $rimary contraries" ot erwise e#ery colour would be eit er w ite or black. ) ey are different& t en& from t e $rimary contraries" and t erefore t ey will be between t e $rimary contraries" t e $rimary differentiae are ,$iercin!, and ,com$ressin!,.( ) erefore it is 'b( wit re!ard to t ese contraries w ic do not fall wit in a !enus t at we must first ask of w at t eir intermediates

are com$osed. '%or t in!s w ic are in t e same !enus must be com$osed of terms in w ic t e !enus is not an element& or else be t emsel#es incom$osite.( +ow contraries do not in#ol#e one anot er in t eir com$osition& and are t erefore first $rinci$les" but t e intermediates are eit er all incom$osite& or none of t em. But t ere is somet in! com$ounded out of t e contraries& so t at t ere can be a c an!e from a contrary to it sooner t an to t e ot er contrary" for it will a#e less of t e 6uality in 6uestion t an t e one contrary and more t an t e ot er. ) is also& t en& will come between t e contraries. All t e ot er intermediates also& t erefore& are com$osite" for t at w ic as more of a 6uality t an one t in! and less t an anot er is com$ounded some ow out of t e t in!s t an w ic it is said to a#e more and less res$ecti#ely of t e 6uality. And since t ere are no ot er t in!s $rior to t e contraries and omo!eneous wit t e intermediates& all intermediates must be com$ounded out of t e contraries. ) erefore also all t e inferior classes& bot t e contraries and t eir intermediates& will be com$ounded out of t e $rimary contraries. Clearly& t en& intermediates are '1( all in t e same !enus and '5( intermediate between contraries& and '3( all com$ounded out of t e contraries. B ) at w ic is ot er in s$ecies is ot er t an somet in! in somet in!& and t is must belon! to bot " e.!. if it is an animal ot er in s$ecies& bot are animals. ) e t in!s& t en& w ic are ot er in s$ecies must be in t e same !enus. %or by !enus 1 mean t at one identical t in! w ic is $redicated of bot and is differentiated in no merely accidental way& w et er concei#ed as matter or ot erwise. %or not only must t e common nature attac to t e different t in!s& e.!. not only must bot be animals& but t is #ery animality must also be different for eac 'e.!. in t e one case e6uinity& in t e ot er umanity(& and so t is common nature is s$ecifically different for eac from w at it is for t e ot er. :ne& t en& will be in #irtue of its own nature one sort of animal& and t e ot er anot er& e.!. one a orse and t e ot er a man. ) is difference& t en& must be an ot erness of t e !enus. %or 1 !i#e t e name of ,difference in t e !enus, an ot erness w ic makes t e !enus itself ot er. ) is& t en& will be a contrariety 'as can be s own also by induction(. %or all t in!s are di#ided by o$$osites& and it as been $ro#ed t at contraries are in t e same !enus. %or contrariety was seen to be com$lete difference" and all difference in s$ecies is a difference from somet in! in somet in!" so t at t is is t e same for bot and is t eir !enus. '3ence also all contraries w ic are different in s$ecies and not in !enus are in t e same line of $redication& and ot er t an one anot er in t e i! est de!ree0for t e difference is com$lete0& and cannot be $resent alon! wit one

anot er.( ) e difference& t en& is a contrariety. ) is& t en& is w at it is to be ,ot er in s$ecies,0to a#e a contrariety& bein! in t e same !enus and bein! indi#isible 'and t ose t in!s are t e same in s$ecies w ic a#e no contrariety& bein! indi#isible(" we say ,bein! indi#isible,& for in t e $rocess of di#ision contrarieties arise in t e intermediate sta!es before we come to t e indi#isibles. 4#idently& t erefore& wit reference to t at w ic is called t e !enus& none of t e s$ecies0of0a0!enus is eit er t e same as it or ot er t an it in s$ecies 'and t is is fittin!" for t e matter is indicated by ne!ation& and t e !enus is t e matter of t at of w ic it is called t e !enus& not in t e sense in w ic we s$eak of t e !enus or family of t e 3eraclidae& but in t at in w ic t e !enus is an element in a t in!,s nature(& nor is it so wit reference to t in!s w ic are not in t e same !enus& but it will differ in !enus from t em& and in s$ecies from t in!s in t e same !enus. %or a t in!,s difference from t at from w ic it differs in s$ecies must be a contrariety" and t is belon!s only to t in!s in t e same !enus. C :ne mi! t raise t e 6uestion& w y woman does not differ from man in s$ecies& w en female and male are contrary and t eir difference is a contrariety" and w y a female and a male animal are not different in s$ecies& t ou! t is difference belon!s to animal in #irtue of its own nature& and not as $aleness or darkness does" bot ,female, and ,male, belon! to it 6ua animal. ) is 6uestion is almost t e same as t e ot er& w y one contrariety makes t in!s different in s$ecies and anot er does not& e.!. ,wit feet, and ,wit win!s, do& but $aleness and darkness do not. -er a$s it is because t e former are modifications $eculiar to t e !enus& and t e latter are less so. And since one element is definition and one is matter& contrarieties w ic are in t e definition make a difference in s$ecies& but t ose w ic are in t e t in! taken as includin! its matter do not make one. And so $aleness in a man& or darkness& does not make one& nor is t ere a difference in s$ecies between t e $ale man and t e dark man& not e#en if eac of t em be denoted by one word. %or man is ere bein! considered on is material side& and matter does not create a difference" for it does not make indi#idual men s$ecies of man& t ou! t e fles and t e bones of w ic t is man and t at man consist are ot er. ) e concrete t in! is ot er& but not ot er in s$ecies& because in t e definition t ere is no contrariety. ) is is t e ultimate indi#isible kind. Callias is definition G matter& t e $ale man& t en& is so also& because it is t e indi#idual Callias t at is $ale" man& t en& is $ale only incidentally. +eit er do a bra2en and a wooden circle& t en& differ in s$ecies" and if a bra2en trian!le and a wooden circle differ in s$ecies& it is not because of t e matter&

but because t ere is a contrariety in t e definition. But does t e matter not make t in!s ot er in s$ecies& w en it is ot er in a certain way& or is t ere a sense in w ic it does< %or w y is t is orse ot er t an t is man in s$ecies& alt ou! t eir matter is included wit t eir definitions< Doubtless because t ere is a contrariety in t e definition. %or w ile t ere is a contrariety also between $ale man and dark orse& and it is a contrariety in s$ecies& it does not de$end on t e $aleness of t e one and t e darkness of t e ot er& since e#en if bot ad been $ale& yet t ey would a#e been ot er in s$ecies. But male and female& w ile t ey are modifications $eculiar to ,animal,& are so not in #irtue of its essence but in t e matter& ie. t e body. ) is is w y t e same seed becomes female or male by bein! acted on in a certain way. We a#e stated& t en& w at it is to be ot er in s$ecies& and w y some t in!s differ in s$ecies and ot ers do not. 10 /ince contraries are ot er in form& and t e $eris able and t e im$eris able are contraries 'for $ri#ation is a determinate inca$acity(& t e $eris able and t e im$eris able must be different in kind. +ow so far we a#e s$oken of t e !eneral terms t emsel#es& so t at it mi! t be t ou! t not to be necessary t at e#ery im$eris able t in! s ould be different from e#ery $eris able t in! in form& .ust as not e#ery $ale t in! is different in form from e#ery dark t in!. %or t e same t in! can be bot & and e#en at t e same time if it is a uni#ersal 'e.!. man can be bot $ale and dark(& and if it is an indi#idual it can still be bot " for t e same man can be& t ou! not at t e same time& $ale and dark. 9et $ale is contrary to dark. But w ile some contraries belon! to certain t in!s by accident 'e.!. bot t ose now mentioned and many ot ers(& ot ers cannot& and amon! t ese are ,$eris able, and ,im$eris able,. %or not in! is by accident $eris able. %or w at is accidental is ca$able of not bein! $resent& but $eris ableness is one of t e attributes t at belon! of necessity to t e t in!s to w ic t ey belon!" or else one and t e same t in! may be $eris able and im$eris able& if $eris ableness is ca$able of not belon!in! to it. -eris ableness t en must eit er be t e essence or be $resent in t e essence of eac $eris able t in!. ) e same account olds !ood for im$eris ableness also" for bot are attributes w ic are $resent of necessity. ) e c aracteristics& t en& in res$ect of w ic and in direct conse6uence of w ic one t in! is $eris able and anot er im$eris able& are o$$osite& so t at t e t in!s must be different in kind. 4#idently& t en& t ere cannot be %orms suc as some maintain& for t en one man would be $eris able and anot er im$eris able. 9et t e %orms are said to be t e same in form wit t e indi#iduals and not

merely to a#e t e same name" but t in!s w ic differ in kind are fart er a$art t an t ose w ic differ in form. Book ?1 1 )3A) Wisdom is a science of first $rinci$les is e#ident from t e introductory c a$ters& in w ic we a#e raised ob.ections to t e statements of ot ers about t e first $rinci$les" but one mi! t ask t e 6uestion w et er Wisdom is to be concei#ed as one science or as se#eral. 1f as one& it may be ob.ected t at one science always deals wit contraries& but t e first $rinci$les are not contrary. 1f it is not one& w at sort of sciences are t ose wit w ic it is to be identified< %urt er& is it t e business of one science& or of more t an one& to e*amine t e first $rinci$les of demonstration< 1f of one& w y of t is rat er t an of any ot er< 1f of more& w at sort of sciences must t ese be said to be< %urt er& does Wisdom in#esti!ate all substances or not< 1f not all& it is ard to say w ic " but if& bein! one& it in#esti!ates t em all& it is doubtful ow t e same science can embrace se#eral sub.ect0matters. %urt er& does it deal wit substances only or also wit t eir attributes< 1f in t e case of attributes demonstration is $ossible& in t at of substances it is not. But if t e two sciences are different& w at is eac of t em and w ic is Wisdom< 1f we t ink of it as demonstrati#e& t e science of t e attributes is Wisdom& but if as dealin! wit w at is $rimary& t e science of substances claims t e tide. But a!ain t e science we are lookin! for must not be su$$osed to deal wit t e causes w ic a#e been mentioned in t e - ysics. %or 'A( it does not deal wit t e final cause 'for t at is t e nature of t e !ood& and t is is found in t e field of action and mo#ement" and it is t e first mo#er0for t at is t e nature of t e end0but in t e case of t in!s unmo#able t ere is not in! t at mo#ed t em first(& and 'B( in !eneral it is ard to say w et er $erc ance t e science we are now lookin! for deals wit $erce$tible substances or not wit t em& but wit certain ot ers. 1f wit ot ers& it must deal eit er wit t e %orms or wit t e ob.ects of mat ematics. +ow 'a( e#idently t e %orms do not e*ist. 'But it is ard to say& e#en if one su$$ose t em to e*ist& w y in t e world t e same is not true of t e ot er t in!s of w ic t ere are %orms& as of t e ob.ects of mat ematics. 1 mean t at t ese t inkers $lace t e ob.ects of mat ematics between t e %orms and $erce$tible t in!s& as a kind of t ird set of t in!s a$art bot from t e %orms and from t e t in!s in t is world" but t ere is not a t ird man or orse besides t e ideal and t e indi#iduals. 1f on t e ot er and it is not as t ey say& wit w at sort of t in!s must t e

mat ematician be su$$osed to deal< Certainly not wit t e t in!s in t is world" for none of t ese is t e sort of t in! w ic t e mat ematical sciences demand.( +or 'b( does t e science w ic we are now seekin! treat of t e ob.ects of mat ematics" for none of t em can e*ist se$arately. But a!ain it does not deal wit $erce$tible substances" for t ey are $eris able. 1n !eneral one mi! t raise t e 6uestion& to w at kind of science it belon!s to discuss t e difficulties about t e matter of t e ob.ects of mat ematics. +eit er to $ ysics 'because t e w ole in6uiry of t e $ ysicist is about t e t in!s t at a#e in t emsel#es a $rinci$le. of mo#ement and rest(& nor yet to t e science w ic in6uires into demonstration and science" for t is is .ust t e sub.ect w ic it in#esti!ates. 1t remains t en t at it is t e $ iloso$ y w ic we a#e set before oursel#es t at treats of t ose sub.ects. :ne mi! t discuss t e 6uestion w et er t e science we are seekin! s ould be said to deal wit t e $rinci$les w ic are by some called elements" all men su$$ose t ese to be $resent in com$osite t in!s. But it mi! t be t ou! t t at t e science we seek s ould treat rat er of uni#ersals" for e#ery definition and e#ery science is of uni#ersals and not of infimae s$ecies& so t at as far as t is !oes it would deal wit t e i! est !enera. ) ese would turn out to be bein! and unity" for t ese mi! t most of all be su$$osed to contain all t in!s t at are& and to be most like $rinci$les because t ey are by nature" for if t ey $eris all ot er t in!s are destroyed wit t em" for e#eryt in! is and is one. But inasmuc as& if one is to su$$ose t em to be !enera& t ey must be $redicable of t eir differentiae& and no !enus is $redicable of any of its differentiae& in t is way it would seem t at we s ould not make t em !enera nor $rinci$les. %urt er& if t e sim$ler is more of a $rinci$le t an t e less sim$le& and t e ultimate members of t e !enus are sim$ler t an t e !enera 'for t ey are indi#isible& but t e !enera are di#ided into many and differin! s$ecies(& t e s$ecies mi! t seem to be t e $rinci$les& rat er t an t e !enera. But inasmuc as t e s$ecies are in#ol#ed in t e destruction of t e !enera& t e !enera are more like $rinci$les" for t at w ic in#ol#es anot er in its destruction is a $rinci$le of it. ) ese and ot ers of t e kind are t e sub.ects t at in#ol#e difficulties. 5 %urt er& must we su$$ose somet in! a$art from indi#idual t in!s& or is it t ese t at t e science we are seekin! treats of< But t ese are infinite in number. 9et t e t in!s t at are a$art from t e indi#iduals are !enera or s$ecies" but t e science we now seek treats of neit er of t ese. ) e reason w y t is is im$ossible as been stated. 1ndeed& it is in !eneral ard to say w et er one must assume t at t ere is a se$arable substance besides t e sensible substances

'i.e. t e substances in t is world(& or t at t ese are t e real t in!s and Wisdom is concerned wit t em. %or we seem to seek anot er kind of substance& and t is is our $roblem& i.e. to see if t ere is somet in! w ic can e*ist a$art by itself and belon!s to no sensible t in!.0%urt er& if t ere is anot er substance a$art from and corres$ondin! to sensible substances& w ic kinds of sensible substance must be su$$osed to a#e t is corres$ondin! to t em< W y s ould one su$$ose men or orses to a#e it& more t an eit er t e ot er animals or e#en all lifeless t in!s< :n t e ot er and to set u$ ot er and eternal substances e6ual in number to t e sensible and $eris able substances would seem to fall beyond t e bounds of $robability.0But if t e $rinci$le we now seek is not se$arable from cor$oreal t in!s& w at as a better claim to t e name matter< ) is& owe#er& does not e*ist in actuality& but e*ists in $otency. And it would seem rat er t at t e form or s a$e is a more im$ortant $rinci$le t an t is" but t e form is $eris able& so t at t ere is no eternal substance at all w ic can e*ist a$art and inde$endent. But t is is $arado*ical" for suc a $rinci$le and substance seems to e*ist and is sou! t by nearly all t e most refined t inkers as somet in! t at e*ists" for ow is t ere to be order unless t ere is somet in! eternal and inde$endent and $ermanent< %urt er& if t ere is a substance or $rinci$le of suc a nature as t at w ic we are now seekin!& and if t is is one for all t in!s& and t e same for eternal and for $eris able t in!s& it is ard to say w y in t e world& if t ere is t e same $rinci$le& some of t e t in!s t at fall under t e $rinci$le are eternal& and ot ers are not eternal" t is is $arado*ical. But if t ere is one $rinci$le of $eris able and anot er of eternal t in!s& we s all be in a like difficulty if t e $rinci$le of $eris able t in!s& as well as t at of eternal& is eternal" for w y& if t e $rinci$le is eternal& are not t e t in!s t at fall under t e $rinci$le also eternal< But if it is $eris able anot er $rinci$le is in#ol#ed to account for it& and anot er to account for t at& and t is will !o on to infinity. 1f on t e ot er and we are to set u$ w at are t ou! t to be t e most unc an!eable $rinci$les& bein! and unity& firstly& if eac of t ese does not indicate a ,t is, or substance& ow will t ey be se$arable and inde$endent< 9et we e*$ect t e eternal and $rimary $rinci$les to be so. But if eac of t em does si!nify a ,t is, or substance& all t in!s t at are are substances" for bein! is $redicated of all t in!s 'and unity also of some(" but t at all t in!s t at are are substance is false. %urt er& ow can t ey be ri! t w o say t at t e first $rinci$le is unity and t is is substance& and !enerate number as t e first $roduct from unity and from matter& assert t at number is substance< 3ow are we to t ink of ,two,& and eac of t e ot er numbers com$osed of units& as one< :n t is $oint neit er do t ey say anyt in! nor is it easy to say anyt in!. But if we are to

su$$ose lines or w at comes after t ese '1 mean t e $rimary surfaces( to be $rinci$les& t ese at least are not se$arable substances& but sections and di#isions0t e former of surfaces& t e latter of bodies 'w ile $oints are sections and di#isions of lines(" and furt er t ey are limits of t ese same t in!s" and all t ese are in ot er t in!s and none is se$arable. %urt er& ow are we to su$$ose t at t ere is a substance of unity and t e $oint< 4#ery substance comes into bein! by a !radual $rocess& but a $oint does not" for t e $oint is a di#ision. A furt er difficulty is raised by t e fact t at all knowled!e is of uni#ersals and of t e ,suc ,& but substance is not a uni#ersal& but is rat er a ,t is,0a se$arable t in!& so t at if t ere is knowled!e about t e first $rinci$les& t e 6uestion arises& ow are we to su$$ose t e first $rinci$le to be substance< %urt er& is t ere anyt in! a$art from t e concrete t in! 'by w ic 1 mean t e matter and t at w ic is .oined wit it(& or not< 1f not& we are met by t e ob.ection t at all t in!s t at are in matter are $eris able. But if t ere is somet in!& it must be t e form or s a$e. +ow it is ard to determine in w ic cases t is e*ists a$art and in w ic it does not" for in some cases t e form is e#idently not se$arable& e.!. in t e case of a ouse. %urt er& are t e $rinci$les t e same in kind or in number< 1f t ey are one in number& all t in!s will be t e same. 3 /ince t e science of t e $ iloso$ er treats of bein! 6ua bein! uni#ersally and not in res$ect of a $art of it& and ,bein!, as many senses and is not used in one only& it follows t at if t e word is used e6ui#ocally and in #irtue of not in! common to its #arious uses& bein! does not fall under one science 'for t e meanin!s of an e6ui#ocal term do not form one !enus(" but if t e word is used in #irtue of somet in! common& bein! will fall under one science. ) e term seems to be used in t e way we a#e mentioned& like ,medical, and , ealt y,. %or eac of t ese also we use in many senses. )erms are used in t is way by #irtue of some kind of reference& in t e one case to medical science& in t e ot er to ealt & in ot ers to somet in! else& but in eac case to one identical conce$t. %or a discussion and a knife are called medical because t e former $roceeds from medical science& and t e latter is useful to it. And a t in! is called ealt y in a similar way" one t in! because it is indicati#e of ealt & anot er because it is $roducti#e of it. And t e same is true in t e ot er cases. 4#eryt in! t at is& t en& is said to ,be, in t is same way" eac t in! t at is is said to ,be, because it is a modification of bein! 6ua bein! or a $ermanent or a transient state or a mo#ement of it& or somet in! else of t e sort. And since e#eryt in! t at is may be referred to somet in! sin!le and

common& eac of t e contrarieties also may be referred to t e first differences and contrarieties of bein!& w et er t e first differences of bein! are $lurality and unity& or likeness and unlikeness& or some ot er differences" let t ese be taken as already discussed. 1t makes no difference w et er t at w ic is be referred to bein! or to unity. %or e#en if t ey are not t e same but different& at least t ey are con#ertible" for t at w ic is one is also some ow bein!& and t at w ic is bein! is one. But since e#ery $air of contraries falls to be e*amined by one and t e same science& and in eac $air one term is t e $ri#ati#e of t e ot er t ou! one mi! t re!ardin! some contraries raise t e 6uestion& ow t ey can be $ri#ately related& #i2. t ose w ic a#e an intermediate& e.!. un.ust and .ust0in all suc cases one must maintain t at t e $ri#ation is not of t e w ole definition& but of t e infima s$ecies. if t e .ust man is ,by #irtue of some $ermanent dis$osition obedient to t e laws,& t e un.ust man will not in e#ery case a#e t e w ole definition denied of im& but may be merely ,in some res$ect deficient in obedience to t e laws,& and in t is res$ect t e $ri#ation will attac to im" and similarly in all ot er cases. As t e mat ematician in#esti!ates abstractions 'for before be!innin! is in#esti!ation e stri$s off all t e sensible 6ualities& e.!. wei! t and li! tness& ardness and its contrary& and also eat and cold and t e ot er sensible contrarieties& and lea#es only t e 6uantitati#e and continuous& sometimes in one& sometimes in two& sometimes in t ree dimensions& and t e attributes of t ese 6ua 6uantitati#e and continuous& and does not consider t em in any ot er res$ect& and e*amines t e relati#e $ositions of some and t e attributes of t ese& and t e commensurabilities and incommensurabilities of ot ers& and t e ratios of ot ers" but yet we $osit one and t e same science of all t ese t in!s00!eometry(00t e same is true wit re!ard to bein!. %or t e attributes of t is in so far as it is bein!& and t e contrarieties in it 6ua bein!& it is t e business of no ot er science t an $ iloso$ y to in#esti!ate" for to $ ysics one would assi!n t e study of t in!s not 6ua bein!& but rat er 6ua s arin! in mo#ement" w ile dialectic and so$ istic deal wit t e attributes of t in!s t at are& but not of t in!s 6ua bein!& and not wit bein! itself in so far as it is bein!" t erefore it remains t at it is t e $ iloso$ er w o studies t e t in!s we a#e named& in so far as t ey are bein!. /ince all t at is is to ,be, in #irtue of somet in! sin!le and common& t ou! t e term as many meanin!s& and contraries are in t e same case 'for t ey are referred to t e first contrarieties and differences of bein!(& and t in!s of t is sort can fall under one science& t e difficulty we stated at t e be!innin! a$$ears to be sol#ed&01 mean t e 6uestion ow t ere can be a sin!le science of t in!s w ic are many and different in !enus. =

/ince e#en t e mat ematician uses t e common a*ioms only in a s$ecial a$$lication& it must be t e business of first $ iloso$ y to e*amine t e $rinci$les of mat ematics also. ) at w en e6uals are taken from e6uals t e remainders are e6ual& is common to all 6uantities& but mat ematics studies a $art of its $ro$er matter w ic it as detac ed& e.!. lines or an!les or numbers or some ot er kind of 6uantity0not& owe#er& 6ua bein! but in so far as eac of t em is continuous in one or two or t ree dimensions" but $ iloso$ y does not in6uire about $articular sub.ects in so far as eac of t em as some attribute or ot er& but s$eculates about bein!& in so far as eac $articular t in! is.0- ysics is in t e same $osition as mat ematics" for $ ysics studies t e attributes and t e $rinci$les of t e t in!s t at are& 6ua mo#in! and not 6ua bein! 'w ereas t e $rimary science& we a#e said& deals wit t ese& only in so far as t e underlyin! sub.ects are e*istent& and not in #irtue of any ot er c aracter(" and so bot $ ysics and mat ematics must be classed as $arts of Wisdom. 5 ) ere is a $rinci$le in t in!s& about w ic we cannot be decei#ed& but must always& on t e contrary reco!ni2e t e trut &0#i2. t at t e same t in! cannot at one and t e same time be and not be& or admit any ot er similar $air of o$$osites. About suc matters t ere is no $roof in t e full sense& t ou! t ere is $roof ad ominem. %or it is not $ossible to infer t is trut itself from a more certain $rinci$le& yet t is is necessary if t ere is to be com$leted $roof of it in t e full sense. But e w o wants to $ro#e to t e asserter of o$$osites t at e is wron! must !et from im an admission w ic s all be identical wit t e $rinci$le t at t e same t in! cannot be and not be at one and t e same time& but s all not seem to be identical" for t us alone can is t esis be demonstrated to t e man w o asserts t at o$$osite statements can be truly made about t e same sub.ect. ) ose& t en& w o are to .oin in ar!ument wit one anot er must to some e*tent understand one anot er" for if t is does not a$$en ow are t ey to .oin in ar!ument wit one anot er< ) erefore e#ery word must be intelli!ible and indicate somet in!& and not many t in!s but only one" and if it si!nifies more t an one t in!& it must be made $lain to w ic of t ese t e word is bein! a$$lied. 3e& t en& w o says ,t is is and is not, denies w at e affirms& so t at w at t e word si!nifies& e says it does not si!nify" and t is is im$ossible. ) erefore if ,t is is, si!nifies somet in!& one cannot truly assert its contradictory. %urt er& if t e word si!nifies somet in! and t is is asserted truly& t is conne*ion must be necessary" and it is not $ossible t at t at w ic necessarily is s ould e#er not be" it is not $ossible t erefore to make t e o$$osed affirmations and ne!ations truly of

t e same sub.ect. %urt er& if t e affirmation is no more true t an t e ne!ation& e w o says ,man, will be no more ri! t t an e w o says ,not0man,. 1t would seem also t at in sayin! t e man is not a orse one would be eit er more or not less ri! t t an in sayin! e is not a man& so t at one will also be ri! t in sayin! t at t e same $erson is a orse" for it was assumed to be $ossible to make o$$osite statements e6ually truly. 1t follows t en t at t e same $erson is a man and a orse& or any ot er animal. W ile& t en& t ere is no $roof of t ese t in!s in t e full sense& t ere is a $roof w ic may suffice a!ainst one w o will make t ese su$$ositions. And $er a$s if one ad 6uestioned 3eraclitus imself in t is way one mi! t a#e forced im to confess t at o$$osite statements can ne#er be true of t e same sub.ects. But& as it is& e ado$ted t is o$inion wit out understandin! w at is statement in#ol#es. But in any case if w at is said by im is true& not e#en t is itself will be true0#i2. t at t e same t in! can at one and t e same time bot be and not be. %or as& w en t e statements are se$arated& t e affirmation is no more true t an t e ne!ation& in t e same way0t e combined and com$le* statement bein! like a sin!le affirmation0t e w ole taken as an affirmation will be no more true t an t e ne!ation. %urt er& if it is not $ossible to affirm anyt in! truly& t is itself will be false0t e assertion t at t ere is no true affirmation. But if a true affirmation e*ists& t is a$$ears to refute w at is said by t ose w o raise suc ob.ections and utterly destroy rational discourse. @ ) e sayin! of -rota!oras is like t e #iews we a#e mentioned" e said t at man is t e measure of all t in!s& meanin! sim$ly t at t at w ic seems to eac man also assuredly is. 1f t is is so& it follows t at t e same t in! bot is and is not& and is bad and !ood& and t at t e contents of all ot er o$$osite statements are true& because often a $articular t in! a$$ears beautiful to some and t e contrary of beautiful to ot ers& and t at w ic a$$ears to eac man is t e measure. ) is difficulty may be sol#ed by considerin! t e source of t is o$inion. 1t seems to a#e arisen in some cases from t e doctrine of t e natural $ iloso$ ers& and in ot ers from t e fact t at all men a#e not t e same #iews about t e same t in!s& but a $articular t in! a$$ears $leasant to some and t e contrary of $leasant to ot ers. ) at not in! comes to be out of t at w ic is not& but e#eryt in! out of t at w ic is& is a do!ma common to nearly all t e natural $ iloso$ ers. /ince& t en& w ite cannot come to be if t e $erfectly w ite and in no res$ect not0w ite e*isted before& t at w ic becomes w ite must come from t at w ic is not w ite" so t at it must come to be out of t at w ic is not 'so t ey ar!ue(& unless t e

same t in! was at t e be!innin! w ite and not0w ite. But it is not ard to sol#e t is difficulty" for we a#e said in our works on $ ysics in w at sense t in!s t at come to be come to be from t at w ic is not& and in w at sense from t at w ic is. But to attend e6ually to t e o$inions and t e fancies of dis$utin! $arties is c ildis " for clearly one of t em must be mistaken. And t is is e#ident from w at a$$ens in res$ect of sensation" for t e same t in! ne#er a$$ears sweet to some and t e contrary of sweet to ot ers& unless in t e one case t e sense0or!an w ic discriminates t e aforesaid fla#ours as been $er#erted and in.ured. And if t is is so t e one $arty must be taken to be t e measure& and t e ot er must not. And say t e same of !ood and bad& and beautiful and u!ly& and all ot er suc 6ualities. %or to maintain t e #iew we are o$$osin! is .ust like maintainin! t at t e t in!s t at a$$ear to $eo$le w o $ut t eir fin!er under t eir eye and make t e ob.ect a$$ear two instead of one must be two 'because t ey a$$ear to be of t at number( and a!ain one 'for to t ose w o do not interfere wit t eir eye t e one ob.ect a$$ears one(. 1n !eneral& it is absurd to make t e fact t at t e t in!s of t is eart are obser#ed to c an!e and ne#er to remain in t e same state& t e basis of our .ud!ement about t e trut . %or in $ursuin! t e trut one must start from t e t in!s t at are always in t e same state and suffer no c an!e. /uc are t e ea#enly bodies" for t ese do not a$$ear to be now of one nature and a!ain of anot er& but are manifestly always t e same and s are in no c an!e. %urt er& if t ere is mo#ement& t ere is also somet in! mo#ed& and e#eryt in! is mo#ed out of somet in! and into somet in!" it follows t at t at t at w ic is mo#ed must first be in t at out of w ic it is to be mo#ed& and t en not be in it& and mo#e into t e ot er and come to be in it& and t at t e contradictory statements are not true at t e same time& as t ese t inkers assert t ey are. And if t e t in!s of t is eart continuously flow and mo#e in res$ect of 6uantity0if one were to su$$ose t is& alt ou! it is not true0w y s ould t ey not endure in res$ect of 6uality< %or t e assertion of contradictory statements about t e same t in! seems to a#e arisen lar!ely from t e belief t at t e 6uantity of bodies does not endure& w ic & our o$$onents old& .ustifies t em in sayin! t at t e same t in! bot is and is not four cubits lon!. But essence de$ends on 6uality& and t is is of determinate nature& t ou! 6uantity is of indeterminate. %urt er& w en t e doctor orders $eo$le to take some $articular food& w y do t ey take it< 1n w at res$ect is ,t is is bread, truer t an ,t is is not bread,< And so it would make no difference w et er one ate or not. But as a matter of fact t ey take t e food w ic is ordered& assumin! t at t ey know t e trut about it and t at it is bread. 9et t ey s ould not& if t ere were no fi*ed constant nature

in sensible t in!s& but all natures mo#ed and flowed for e#er. A!ain& if we are always c an!in! and ne#er remain t e same& w at wonder is it if to us& as to t e sick& t in!s ne#er a$$ear t e same< '%or to t em also& because t ey are not in t e same condition as w en t ey were well& sensible 6ualities do not a$$ear alike" yet& for all t at& t e sensible t in!s t emsel#es need not s are in any c an!e& t ou! t ey $roduce different& and not identical& sensations in t e sick. And t e same must surely a$$en to t e ealt y if t e afore0said c an!e takes $lace.( But if we do not c an!e but remain t e same& t ere will be somet in! t at endures. As for t ose to w om t e difficulties mentioned are su!!ested by reasonin!& it is not easy to sol#e t e difficulties to t eir satisfaction& unless t ey will $osit somet in! and no lon!er demand a reason for it" for it is only t us t at all reasonin! and all $roof is accom$lis ed" if t ey $osit not in!& t ey destroy discussion and all reasonin!. ) erefore wit suc men t ere is no reasonin!. But as for t ose w o are $er$le*ed by t e traditional difficulties& it is easy to meet t em and to dissi$ate t e causes of t eir $er$le*ity. ) is is e#ident from w at as been said. 1t is manifest& t erefore& from t ese ar!uments t at contradictory statements cannot be truly made about t e same sub.ect at one time& nor can contrary statements& because e#ery contrariety de$ends on $ri#ation. ) is is e#ident if we reduce t e definitions of contraries to t eir $rinci$le. /imilarly& no intermediate between contraries can be $redicated of one and t e same sub.ect& of w ic one of t e contraries is $redicated. 1f t e sub.ect is w ite we s all be wron! in sayin! it is neit er black nor w ite& for t en it follows t at it is and is not w ite" for t e second of t e two terms we a#e $ut to!et er is true of it& and t is is t e contradictory of w ite. We could not be ri! t& t en& in acce$tin! t e #iews eit er of 3eraclitus or of Ana*a!oras. 1f we were& it would follow t at contraries would be $redicated of t e same sub.ect" for w en Ana*a!oras says t at in e#eryt in! t ere is a $art of e#eryt in!& e says not in! is sweet any more t an it is bitter& and so wit any ot er $air of contraries& since in e#eryt in! e#eryt in! is $resent not $otentially only& but actually and se$arately. And similarly all statements cannot be false nor all true& bot because of many ot er difficulties w ic mi! t be adduced as arisin! from t is $osition& and because if all are false it will not be true to say e#en t is& and if all are true it will not be false to say all are false. A 4#ery science seeks certain $rinci$les and causes for eac of its ob.ects0e.!. medicine and !ymnastics and eac of t e ot er sciences& w et er $roducti#e or mat ematical. %or eac of t ese

marks off a certain class of t in!s for itself and busies itself about t is as about somet in! e*istin! and real&0not owe#er 6ua real" t e science t at does t is is anot er distinct from t ese. :f t e sciences mentioned eac !ets some ow t e ,w at, in some class of t in!s and tries to $ro#e t e ot er trut s& wit more or less $recision. /ome !et t e ,w at, t rou! $erce$tion& ot ers by y$ot esis" so t at it is clear from an induction of t is sort t at t ere is no demonstration. of t e substance or ,w at,. ) ere is a science of nature& and e#idently it must be different bot from $ractical and from $roducti#e science. %or in t e case of $roducti#e science t e $rinci$le of mo#ement is in t e $roducer and not in t e $roduct& and is eit er an art or some ot er faculty. And similarly in $ractical science t e mo#ement is not in t e t in! done& but rat er in t e doers. But t e science of t e natural $ iloso$ er deals wit t e t in!s t at a#e in t emsel#es a $rinci$le of mo#ement. 1t is clear from t ese facts& t en& t at natural science must be neit er $ractical nor $roducti#e& but t eoretical 'for it must fall into some one of t ese classes(. And since eac of t e sciences must some ow know t e ,w at, and use t is as a $rinci$le& we must not fall to obser#e ow t e natural $ iloso$ er s ould define t in!s and ow e s ould state t e definition of t e essence0w et er as akin to ,snub, or rat er to ,conca#e,. %or of t ese t e definition of ,snub, includes t e matter of t e t in!& but t at of ,conca#e, is inde$endent of t e matter" for snubness is found in a nose& so t at we look for its definition wit out eliminatin! t e nose& for w at is snub is a conca#e nose. 4#idently t en t e definition of fles also and of t e eye and of t e ot er $arts must always be stated wit out eliminatin! t e matter. /ince t ere is a science of bein! 6ua bein! and ca$able of e*istin! a$art& we must consider w et er t is is to be re!arded as t e same as $ ysics or rat er as different. - ysics deals wit t e t in!s t at a#e a $rinci$le of mo#ement in t emsel#es" mat ematics is t eoretical& and is a science t at deals wit t in!s t at are at rest& but its sub.ects cannot e*ist a$art. ) erefore about t at w ic can e*ist a$art and is unmo#able t ere is a science different from bot of t ese& if t ere is a substance of t is nature '1 mean se$arable and unmo#able(& as we s all try to $ro#e t ere is. And if t ere is suc a kind of t in! in t e world& ere must surely be t e di#ine& and t is must be t e first and most dominant $rinci$le. 4#idently& t en& t ere are t ree kinds of t eoretical sciences0$ ysics& mat ematics& t eolo!y. ) e class of t eoretical sciences is t e best& and of t ese t emsel#es t e last named is best" for it deals wit t e i! est of e*istin! t in!s& and eac science is called better or worse in #irtue of its $ro$er ob.ect. :ne mi! t raise t e 6uestion w et er t e science of bein! 6ua bein! is to be re!arded as uni#ersal or not. 4ac of t e

mat ematical sciences deals wit some one determinate class of t in!s& but uni#ersal mat ematics a$$lies alike to all. +ow if natural substances are t e first of e*istin! t in!s& $ ysics must be t e first of sciences" but if t ere is anot er entity and substance& se$arable and unmo#able& t e knowled!e of it must be different and $rior to $ ysics and uni#ersal because it is $rior. B /ince ,bein!, in !eneral as se#eral senses& of w ic one is ,bein! by accident,& we must consider first t at w ic ,is, in t is sense. 4#idently none of t e traditional sciences busies itself about t e accidental. %or neit er does arc itecture consider w at will a$$en to t ose w o are to use t e ouse 'e.!. w et er t ey a#e a $ainful life in it or not(& nor does wea#in!& or s oemakin!& or t e confectioner,s art& do t e like" but eac of t ese sciences considers only w at is $eculiar to it& i.e. its $ro$er end. And as for t e ar!ument t at ,w en e w o is musical becomes lettered e,ll be bot at once& not a#in! been bot before" and t at w ic is& not always a#in! been& must a#e come to be" t erefore e must a#e at once become musical and lettered,&0t is none of t e reco!ni2ed sciences considers& but only so$ istic" for t is alone busies itself about t e accidental& so t at -lato is not far wron! w en e says t at t e so$ ist s$ends is time on non0bein!. ) at a science of t e accidental is not e#en $ossible will be e#ident if we try to see w at t e accidental really is. We say t at e#eryt in! eit er is always and of necessity 'necessity not in t e sense of #iolence& but t at w ic we a$$eal to in demonstrations(& or is for t e most $art& or is neit er for t e most $art& nor always and of necessity& but merely as it c ances" e.!. t ere mi! t be cold in t e do!days& but t is occurs neit er always and of necessity& nor for t e most $art& t ou! it mi! t a$$en sometimes. ) e accidental& t en& is w at occurs& but not always nor of necessity& nor for t e most $art. +ow we a#e said w at t e accidental is& and it is ob#ious w y t ere is no science of suc a t in!" for all science is of t at w ic is always or for t e most $art& but t e accidental is in neit er of t ese classes. 4#idently t ere are not causes and $rinci$les of t e accidental& of t e same kind as t ere are of t e essential" for if t ere were& e#eryt in! would be of necessity. 1f A is w en B is& and B is w en C is& and if C e*ists not by c ance but of necessity& t at also of w ic C was cause will e*ist of necessity& down to t e last causatum as it is called 'but t is was su$$osed to be accidental(. ) erefore all t in!s will be of necessity& and c ance and t e $ossibility of a t in!,s eit er occurrin! or not occurrin! are remo#ed entirely from t e ran!e of e#ents. And if t e cause be su$$osed not to e*ist but to be comin! to be& t e same results will follow" e#eryt in! will

occur of necessity. %or to0morrow,s ecli$se will occur if A occurs& and A if B occurs& and B if C occurs" and in t is way if we subtract time from t e limited time between now and to0morrow we s all come sometime to t e already e*istin! condition. ) erefore since t is e*ists& e#eryt in! after t is will occur of necessity& so t at all t in!s occur of necessity. As to t at w ic ,is, in t e sense of bein! true or of bein! by accident& t e former de$ends on a combination in t ou! t and is an affection of t ou! t 'w ic is t e reason w y it is t e $rinci$les& not of t at w ic ,is, in t is sense& but of t at w ic is outside and can e*ist a$art& t at are sou! t(" and t e latter is not necessary but indeterminate '1 mean t e accidental(" and of suc a t in! t e causes are unordered and indefinite. Ada$tation to an end is found in e#ents t at a$$en by nature or as t e result of t ou! t. 1t is ,luck, w en one of t ese e#ents a$$ens by accident. %or as a t in! may e*ist& so it may be a cause& eit er by its own nature or by accident. Luck is an accidental cause at work in suc e#ents ada$ted to an end as are usually effected in accordance wit $ur$ose. And so luck and t ou! t are concerned wit t e same s$ ere" for $ur$ose cannot e*ist wit out t ou! t. ) e causes from w ic lucky results mi! t a$$en are indeterminate" and so luck is obscure to uman calculation and is a cause by accident& but in t e un6ualified sense a cause of not in!. 1t is !ood or bad luck w en t e result is !ood or e#il" and $ros$erity or misfortune w en t e scale of t e results is lar!e. /ince not in! accidental is $rior to t e essential& neit er are accidental causes $rior. 1f& t en& luck or s$ontaneity is a cause of t e material uni#erse& reason and nature are causes before it. C /ome t in!s are only actually& some $otentially& some $otentially and actually& w at t ey are& #i2. in one case a $articular reality& in anot er& c aracteri2ed by a $articular 6uantity& or t e like. ) ere is no mo#ement a$art from t in!s" for c an!e is always accordin! to t e cate!ories of bein!& and t ere is not in! common to t ese and in no one cate!ory. But eac of t e cate!ories belon!s to all its sub.ects in eit er of two ways 'e.!. ,t is0ness,0for one kind of it is ,$ositi#e form,& and t e ot er is ,$ri#ation," and as re!ards 6uality one kind is ,w ite, and t e ot er ,black,& and as re!ards 6uantity one kind is ,com$lete, and t e ot er ,incom$lete,& and as re!ards s$atial mo#ement one is ,u$wards, and t e ot er ,downwards,& or one t in! is ,li! t, and anot er , ea#y,(" so t at t ere are as many kinds of mo#ement and c an!e as of bein!. ) ere bein! a distinction in eac class of t in!s between t e $otential and t e com$letely real& 1 call t e actuality of t e $otential as suc & mo#ement. ) at w at we say is true& is $lain from t e

followin! facts. W en t e ,buildable,& in so far as it is w at we mean by ,buildable,& e*ists actually& it is bein! built& and t is is t e $rocess of buildin!. /imilarly wit learnin!& ealin!& walkin!& lea$in!& a!ein!& ri$enin!. ;o#ement takes w en t e com$lete reality itself e*ists& and neit er earlier nor later. ) e com$lete reality& t en& of t at w ic e*ists $otentially& w en it is com$letely real and actual& not 6ua itself& but 6ua mo#able& is mo#ement. By 6ua 1 mean t is> bron2e is $otentially a statue" but yet it is not t e com$lete reality of bron2e 6ua bron2e t at is mo#ement. %or it is not t e same t in! to be bron2e and to be a certain $otency. 1f it were absolutely t e same in its definition& t e com$lete reality of bron2e would a#e been a mo#ement. But it is not t e same. ') is is e#ident in t e case of contraries" for to be ca$able of bein! well and to be ca$able of bein! ill are not t e same0for if t ey were& bein! well and bein! ill would a#e been t e same0it is t at w ic underlies and is ealt y or diseased& w et er it is moisture or blood& t at is one and t e same.( And since it is not. t e same& as colour and t e #isible are not t e same& it is t e com$lete reality of t e $otential& and as $otential& t at is mo#ement. ) at it is t is& and t at mo#ement takes $lace w en t e com$lete reality itself e*ists& and neit er earlier nor later& is e#ident. %or eac t in! is ca$able of bein! sometimes actual& sometimes not& e.!. t e buildable 6ua buildable" and t e actuality of t e buildable 6ua buildable is buildin!. %or t e actuality is eit er t is0t e act of buildin!0or t e ouse. But w en t e ouse e*ists& it is no lon!er buildable" t e buildable is w at is bein! built. ) e actuality& t en& must be t e act of buildin!& and t is is a mo#ement. And t e same account a$$lies to all ot er mo#ements. ) at w at we a#e said is ri! t is e#ident from w at all ot ers say about mo#ement& and from t e fact t at it is not easy to define it ot erwise. %or firstly one cannot $ut it in any class. ) is is e#ident from w at $eo$le say. /ome call it ot erness and ine6uality and t e unreal" none of t ese& owe#er& is necessarily mo#ed& and furt er& c an!e is not eit er to t ese or from t ese any more t an from t eir o$$osites. ) e reason w y $eo$le $ut mo#ement in t ese classes is t at it is t ou! t to be somet in! indefinite& and t e $rinci$les in one of t e two ,columns of contraries, are indefinite because t ey are $ri#ati#e& for none of t em is eit er a ,t is, or a ,suc , or in any of t e ot er cate!ories. And t e reason w y mo#ement is t ou! t to be indefinite is t at it cannot be classed eit er wit t e $otency of t in!s or wit t eir actuality" for neit er t at w ic is ca$able of bein! of a certain 6uantity& nor t at w ic is actually of a certain 6uantity& is of necessity mo#ed& and mo#ement is t ou! t to be an actuality& but incom$lete" t e reason is t at t e $otential& w ose actuality it is& is incom$lete. And t erefore it is ard to !ras$ w at mo#ement is" for it must be classed eit er under

$ri#ation or under $otency or under absolute actuality& but e#idently none of t ese is $ossible. ) erefore w at remains is t at it must be w at we said0bot actuality and t e actuality we a#e described0w ic is ard to detect but ca$able of e*istin!. And e#idently mo#ement is in t e mo#able" for it is t e com$lete reali2ation of t is by t at w ic is ca$able of causin! mo#ement. And t e actuality of t at w ic is ca$able of causin! mo#ement is no ot er t an t at of t e mo#able. %or it must be t e com$lete reality of bot . %or w ile a t in! is ca$able of causin! mo#ement because it can do t is& it is a mo#er because it is acti#e" but it is on t e mo#able t at it is ca$able of actin!& so t at t e actuality of bot is one& .ust as t ere is t e same inter#al from one to two as from two to one& and as t e stee$ ascent and t e stee$ descent are one& but t e bein! of t em is not one" t e case of t e mo#er and t e mo#ed is similar. 10 ) e infinite is eit er t at w ic is inca$able of bein! tra#ersed because it is not its nature to be tra#ersed 't is corres$onds to t e sense in w ic t e #oice is ,in#isible,(& or t at w ic admits only of incom$lete tra#erse or scarcely admits of tra#erse& or t at w ic & t ou! it naturally admits of tra#erse& is not tra#ersed or limited" furt er& a t in! may be infinite in res$ect of addition or of subtraction& or bot . ) e infinite cannot be a se$arate& inde$endent t in!. %or if it is neit er a s$atial ma!nitude nor a $lurality& but infinity itself is its substance and not an accident of it& it will be indi#isible" for t e di#isible is eit er ma!nitude or $lurality. But if indi#isible& it is not infinite& e*ce$t as t e #oice is in#isible" but $eo$le do not mean t is& nor are we e*aminin! t is sort of infinite& but t e infinite as untra#ersable. %urt er& ow can an infinite e*ist by itself& unless number and ma!nitude also e*ist by t emsel#ess0since infinity is an attribute of t ese< %urt er& if t e infinite is an accident of somet in! else& it cannot be 6ua infinite an element in t in!s& as t e in#isible is not an element in s$eec & t ou! t e #oice is in#isible. And e#idently t e infinite cannot e*ist actually. %or t en any $art of it t at mi! t be taken would be infinite 'for ,to be infinite, and ,t e infinite, are t e same& if t e infinite is substance and not $redicated of a sub.ect(. ) erefore it is eit er indi#isible& or if it is $artible& it is di#isible into infinites" but t e same t in! cannot be many infinites 'as a $art of air is air& so a $art of t e infinite would be infinite& if t e infinite is substance and a $rinci$le(. ) erefore it must be im$artible and indi#isible. But t e actually infinite cannot be indi#isible" for it must be of a certain 6uantity. ) erefore infinity belon!s to its sub.ect incidentally. But if so& t en 'as we a#e said( it cannot be it t at is a $rinci$le& but t at of w ic it

is an accident0t e air or t e e#en number. ) is in6uiry is uni#ersal" but t at t e infinite is not amon! sensible t in!s& is e#ident from t e followin! ar!ument. 1f t e definition of a body is ,t at w ic is bounded by $lanes,& t ere cannot be an infinite body eit er sensible or intelli!ible" nor a se$arate and infinite number& for number or t at w ic as a number is numerable. Concretely& t e trut is e#ident from t e followin! ar!ument. ) e infinite can neit er be com$osite nor sim$le. %or 'a( it cannot be a com$osite body& since t e elements are limited in multitude. %or t e contraries must be e6ual and no one of t em must be infinite" for if one of t e two bodies falls at all s ort of t e ot er in $otency& t e finite will be destroyed by t e infinite. And t at eac s ould be infinite is im$ossible. %or body is t at w ic as e*tension in all directions& and t e infinite is t e boundlessly e*tended& so t at if t e infinite is a body it will be infinite in e#ery direction. +or 'b( can t e infinite body be one and sim$le0neit er& as some say& somet in! a$art from t e elements& from w ic t ey !enerate t ese 'for t ere is no suc body a$art from t e elements" for e#eryt in! can be resol#ed into t at of w ic it consists& but no suc $roduct of analysis is obser#ed e*ce$t t e sim$le bodies(& nor fire nor any ot er of t e elements. %or a$art from t e 6uestion ow any of t em could be infinite& t e All& e#en if it is finite& cannot eit er be or become any one of t em& as 3eraclitus says all t in!s sometime become fire. ) e same ar!ument a$$lies to t is as to t e :ne w ic t e natural $ iloso$ ers $osit besides t e elements. %or e#eryt in! c an!es from contrary to contrary& e.!. from ot to cold. %urt er& a sensible body is somew ere& and w ole and $art a#e t e same $ro$er $lace& e.!. t e w ole eart and $art of t e eart . ) erefore if 'a( t e infinite body is omo!eneous& it will be unmo#able or it will be always mo#in!. But t is is im$ossible" for w y s ould it rat er rest& or mo#e& down& u$& or anyw ere& rat er t an anyw ere else< 4.!. if t ere were a clod w ic were $art of an infinite body& w ere will t is mo#e or rest< ) e $ro$er $lace of t e body w ic is omo!eneous wit it is infinite. Will t e clod occu$y t e w ole $lace& t en< And ow< ') is is im$ossible.( W at t en is its rest or its mo#ement< 1t will eit er rest e#eryw ere& and t en it cannot mo#e" or it will mo#e e#eryw ere& and t en it cannot be still. But 'b( if t e All as unlike $arts& t e $ro$er $laces of t e $arts are unlike also& and& firstly& t e body of t e All is not one e*ce$t by contact& and& secondly& t e $arts will be eit er finite or infinite in #ariety of kind. %inite t ey cannot be" for t en t ose of one kind will be infinite in 6uantity and t ose of anot er will not 'if t e All is infinite(& e.!. fire or water would be infinite& but suc an infinite element would be destruction to t e contrary elements. But if t e $arts are infinite and sim$le& t eir $laces

also are infinite and t ere will be an infinite number of elements" and if t is is im$ossible& and t e $laces are finite& t e All also must be limited. 1n !eneral& t ere cannot be an infinite body and also a $ro$er $lace for bodies& if e#ery sensible body as eit er wei! t or li! tness. %or it must mo#e eit er towards t e middle or u$wards& and t e infinite eit er t e w ole or t e alf of it0cannot do eit er" for ow will you di#ide it< :r ow will $art of t e infinite be down and $art u$& or $art e*treme and $art middle< %urt er& e#ery sensible body is in a $lace& and t ere are si* kinds of $lace& but t ese cannot e*ist in an infinite body. 1n !eneral& if t ere cannot be an infinite $lace& t ere cannot be an infinite body" 'and t ere cannot be an infinite $lace&( for t at w ic is in a $lace is somew ere& and t is means eit er u$ or down or in one of t e ot er directions& and eac of t ese is a limit. ) e infinite is not t e same in t e sense t at it is a sin!le t in! w et er e* ibited in distance or in mo#ement or in time& but t e $osterior amon! t ese is called infinite in #irtue of its relation to t e $rior" i.e. a mo#ement is called infinite in #irtue of t e distance co#ered by t e s$atial mo#ement or alteration or !rowt & and a time is called infinite because of t e mo#ement w ic occu$ies it. 11 :f t in!s w ic c an!e& some c an!e in an accidental sense& like t at in w ic ,t e musical, may be said to walk& and ot ers are said& wit out 6ualification& to c an!e& because somet in! in t em c an!es& i.e. t e t in!s t at c an!e in $arts" t e body becomes ealt y& because t e eye does. But t ere is somet in! w ic is by its own nature mo#ed directly& and t is is t e essentially mo#able. ) e same distinction is found in t e case of t e mo#er" for it causes mo#ement eit er in an accidental sense or in res$ect of a $art of itself or essentially. ) ere is somet in! t at directly causes mo#ement" and t ere is somet in! t at is mo#ed& also t e time in w ic it is mo#ed& and t at from w ic and t at into w ic it is mo#ed. But t e forms and t e affections and t e $lace& w ic are t e terminals of t e mo#ement of mo#in! t in!s& are unmo#able& e.!. knowled!e or eat" it is not eat t at is a mo#ement& but eatin!. C an!e w ic is not accidental is found not in all t in!s& but between contraries& and t eir intermediates& and between contradictories. We may con#ince oursel#es of t is by induction. ) at w ic c an!es c an!es eit er from $ositi#e into $ositi#e& or from ne!ati#e into ne!ati#e& or from $ositi#e into ne!ati#e& or from ne!ati#e into $ositi#e. 'By $ositi#e 1 mean t at w ic is e*$ressed by an affirmati#e term.( ) erefore t ere must be t ree c an!es" t at from ne!ati#e into ne!ati#e is not c an!e& because

'since t e terms are neit er contraries nor contradictories( t ere is no o$$osition. ) e c an!e from t e ne!ati#e into t e $ositi#e w ic is its contradictory is !eneration0absolute c an!e absolute !eneration& and $artial c an!e $artial !eneration" and t e c an!e from $ositi#e to ne!ati#e is destruction0absolute c an!e absolute destruction& and $artial c an!e $artial destruction. 1f& t en& ,t at w ic is not, as se#eral senses& and mo#ement can attac neit er to t at w ic im$lies $uttin! to!et er or se$aratin!& nor to t at w ic im$lies $otency and is o$$osed to t at w ic is in t e full sense 'true& t e not0w ite or not0!ood can be mo#ed incidentally& for t e not0w ite mi! t be a man" but t at w ic is not a $articular t in! at all can in no wise be mo#ed(& t at w ic is not cannot be mo#ed 'and if t is is so& !eneration cannot be mo#ement" for t at w ic is not is !enerated" for e#en if we admit to t e full t at its !eneration is accidental& yet it is true to say t at ,not0bein!, is $redicable of t at w ic is !enerated absolutely(. /imilarly rest cannot be lon! to t at w ic is not. ) ese conse6uences& t en& turn out to be awkward& and also t is& t at e#eryt in! t at is mo#ed is in a $lace& but t at w ic is not is not in a $lace" for t en it would be somew ere. +or is destruction mo#ement" for t e contrary of mo#ement is rest& but t e contrary of destruction is !eneration. /ince e#ery mo#ement is a c an!e& and t e kinds of c an!e are t e t ree named abo#e& and of t ese t ose in t e way of !eneration and destruction are not mo#ements& and t ese are t e c an!es from a t in! to its contradictory& it follows t at only t e c an!e from $ositi#e into $ositi#e is mo#ement. And t e $ositi#es are eit er contrary or intermediate 'for e#en $ri#ation must be re!arded as contrary(& and are e*$ressed by an affirmati#e term& e.!. ,naked, or ,toot less, or ,black,. 15 1f t e cate!ories are classified as substance& 6uality& $lace& actin! or bein! acted on& relation& 6uantity& t ere must be t ree kinds of mo#ement0of 6uality& of 6uantity& of $lace. ) ere is no mo#ement in res$ect of substance 'because t ere is not in! contrary to substance(& nor of relation 'for it is $ossible t at if one of two t in!s in relation c an!es& t e relati#e term w ic was true of t e ot er t in! ceases to be true& t ou! t is ot er does not c an!e at all&0so t at t eir mo#ement is accidental(& nor of a!ent and $atient& or mo#er and mo#ed& because t ere is no mo#ement of mo#ement nor !eneration of !eneration& nor& in !eneral& c an!e of c an!e. %or t ere mi! t be mo#ement of mo#ement in two senses" '1( mo#ement mi! t be t e sub.ect mo#ed& as a man is mo#ed because e c an!es from $ale to dark&0so t at on t is s owin! mo#ement& too& may be eit er eated or cooled or c an!e its $lace or increase. But t is is im$ossible" for c an!e is not a sub.ect. :r '5( some ot er

sub.ect mi! t c an!e from c an!e into some ot er form of e*istence 'e.!. a man from disease into ealt (. But t is also is not $ossible e*ce$t incidentally. %or e#ery mo#ement is c an!e from somet in! into somet in!. 'And so are !eneration and destruction" only& t ese are c an!es into t in!s o$$osed in certain ways w ile t e ot er& mo#ement& is into t in!s o$$osed in anot er way.( A t in! c an!es& t en& at t e same time from ealt into illness& and from t is c an!e itself into anot er. Clearly& t en& if it as become ill& it will a#e c an!ed into w ate#er may be t e ot er c an!e concerned 't ou! it may be at rest(& and& furt er& into a determinate c an!e eac time" and t at new c an!e will be from somet in! definite into some ot er definite t in!" t erefore it will be t e o$$osite c an!e& t at of !rowin! well. We answer t at t is a$$ens only incidentally" e.!. t ere is a c an!e from t e $rocess of recollection to t at of for!ettin!& only because t at to w ic t e $rocess attac es is c an!in!& now into a state of knowled!e& now into one of i!norance. %urt er& t e $rocess will !o on to infinity& if t ere is to be c an!e of c an!e and comin! to be of comin! to be. W at is true of t e later& t en& must be true of t e earlier" e.!. if t e sim$le comin! to be was once comin! to be& t at w ic comes to be somet in! was also once comin! to be" t erefore t at w ic sim$ly comes to be somet in! was not yet in e*istence& but somet in! w ic was comin! to be comin! to be somet in! was already in e*istence. And t is was once comin! to be& so t at at t at time it was not yet comin! to be somet in! else. +ow since of an infinite number of terms t ere is not a first& t e first in t is series will not e*ist& and t erefore no followin! term e*ist. +ot in!& t en& can eit er come term wi to be or mo#e or c an!e. %urt er& t at w ic is ca$able of a mo#ement is also ca$able of t e contrary mo#ement and rest& and t at w ic comes to be also ceases to be. ) erefore t at w ic is comin! to be is ceasin! to be w en it as come to be comin! to be" for it cannot cease to be as soon as it is comin! to be comin! to be& nor after it as come to be" for t at w ic is ceasin! to be must be. %urt er& t ere must be a matter underlyin! t at w ic comes to be and c an!es. W at will t is be& t en&0w at is it t at becomes mo#ement or becomin!& as body or soul is t at w ic suffers alteration< And" a!ain& w at is it t at t ey mo#e into< %or it must be t e mo#ement or becomin! of somet in! from somet in! into somet in!. 3ow& t en& can t is condition be fulfilled< ) ere can be no learnin! of learnin!& and t erefore no becomin! of becomin!. /ince t ere is not mo#ement eit er of substance or of relation or of acti#ity and $assi#ity& it remains t at mo#ement is in res$ect of 6uality and 6uantity and $lace" for eac of t ese admits of contrariety. By 6uality 1 mean not t at w ic is in t e substance 'for e#en t e differentia is a 6uality(& but t e $assi#e 6uality& in #irtue of w ic a t in! is said to be acted on or to be inca$able of bein! acted on. ) e immobile is eit er t at w ic is

w olly inca$able of bein! mo#ed& or t at w ic is mo#ed wit difficulty in a lon! time or be!ins slowly& or t at w ic is of a nature to be mo#ed and can be mo#ed but is not mo#ed w en and w ere and as it would naturally be mo#ed. ) is alone amon! immobiles 1 describe as bein! at rest" for rest is contrary to mo#ement& so t at it must be a $ri#ation in t at w ic is rece$ti#e of mo#ement. ) in!s w ic are in one $ro*imate $lace are to!et er in $lace& and t in!s w ic are in different $laces are a$art> t in!s w ose e*tremes are to!et er touc > t at at w ic a c an!in! t in!& if it c an!es continuously accordin! to its nature& naturally arri#es before it arri#es at t e e*treme into w ic it is c an!in!& is between. ) at w ic is most distant in a strai! t line is contrary in $lace. ) at is successi#e w ic is after t e be!innin! 't e order bein! determined by $osition or form or in some ot er way( and as not in! of t e same class between it and t at w ic it succeeds& e.!. lines in t e case of a line& units in t at of a unit& or a ouse in t at of a ouse. ') ere is not in! to $re#ent a t in! of some ot er class from bein! between.( %or t e successi#e succeeds somet in! and is somet in! later" ,one, does not succeed ,two,& nor t e first day of t e mont t e second. ) at w ic & bein! successi#e& touc es& is conti!uous. '/ince all c an!e is between o$$osites& and t ese are eit er contraries or contradictories& and t ere is no middle term for contradictories& clearly t at w ic is between is between contraries.( ) e continuous is a s$ecies of t e conti!uous. 1 call two t in!s continuous w en t e limits of eac & wit w ic t ey touc and by w ic t ey are ke$t to!et er& become one and t e same& so t at $lainly t e continuous is found in t e t in!s out of w ic a unity naturally arises in #irtue of t eir contact. And $lainly t e successi#e is t e first of t ese conce$ts 'for t e successi#e does not necessarily touc & but t at w ic touc es is successi#e" and if a t in! is continuous& it touc es& but if it touc es& it is not necessarily continuous" and in t in!s in w ic t ere is no touc in!& t ere is no or!anic unity(" t erefore a $oint is not t e same as a unit" for contact belon!s to $oints& but not to units& w ic a#e only succession" and t ere is somet in! between two of t e former& but not between two of t e latter. Book ?11 1 ) e sub.ect of our in6uiry is substance" for t e $rinci$les and t e causes we are seekin! are t ose of substances. %or if t e uni#erse is of t e nature of a w ole& substance is its first $art" and if it co eres merely by #irtue of serial succession& on t is #iew also substance is first& and is succeeded by 6uality& and t en by 6uantity. At t e same time t ese latter are not e#en bein! in t e full sense& but are 6ualities and mo#ements of it&0or else e#en t e not0w ite

and t e not0strai! t would be bein!" at least we say e#en t ese are& e.!. ,t ere is a not0w ite,. %urt er& none of t e cate!ories ot er t an substance can e*ist a$art. And t e early $ iloso$ ers also in $ractice testify to t e $rimacy of substance" for it was of substance t at t ey sou! t t e $rinci$les and elements and causes. ) e t inkers of t e $resent day tend to rank uni#ersals as substances 'for !enera are uni#ersals& and t ese t ey tend to describe as $rinci$les and substances& owin! to t e abstract nature of t eir in6uiry(" but t e t inkers of old ranked $articular t in!s as substances& e.!. fire and eart & not w at is common to bot & body. ) ere are t ree kinds of substance0one t at is sensible 'of w ic one subdi#ision is eternal and anot er is $eris able" t e latter is reco!ni2ed by all men& and includes e.!. $lants and animals(& of w ic we must !ras$ t e elements& w et er one or many" and anot er t at is immo#able& and t is certain t inkers assert to be ca$able of e*istin! a$art& some di#idin! it into two& ot ers identifyin! t e %orms and t e ob.ects of mat ematics& and ot ers $ositin!& of t ese two& only t e ob.ects of mat ematics. ) e former two kinds of substance are t e sub.ect of $ ysics 'for t ey im$ly mo#ement(" but t e t ird kind belon!s to anot er science& if t ere is no $rinci$le common to it and to t e ot er kinds. 5 /ensible substance is c an!eable. +ow if c an!e $roceeds from o$$osites or from intermediates& and not from all o$$osites 'for t e #oice is not0w ite& 'but it does not t erefore c an!e to w ite((& but from t e contrary& t ere must be somet in! underlyin! w ic c an!es into t e contrary state" for t e contraries do not c an!e. %urt er& somet in! $ersists& but t e contrary does not $ersist" t ere is& t en& some t ird t in! besides t e contraries& #i2. t e matter. +ow since c an!es are of four kinds0eit er in res$ect of t e ,w at, or of t e 6uality or of t e 6uantity or of t e $lace& and c an!e in res$ect of ,t isness, is sim$le !eneration and destruction& and c an!e in 6uantity is increase and diminution& and c an!e in res$ect of an affection is alteration& and c an!e of $lace is motion& c an!es will be from !i#en states into t ose contrary to t em in t ese se#eral res$ects. ) e matter& t en& w ic c an!es must be ca$able of bot states. And since t at w ic ,is, as two senses& we must say t at e#eryt in! c an!es from t at w ic is $otentially to t at w ic is actually& e.!. from $otentially w ite to actually w ite& and similarly in t e case of increase and diminution. ) erefore not only can a t in! come to be& incidentally& out of t at w ic is not& but also all t in!s come to be out of t at w ic is& but is $otentially& and is not actually. And t is is t e ,:ne, of Ana*a!oras" for instead of ,all t in!s were to!et er,0and t e ,;i*ture, of 4m$edocles and Ana*imander and t e account !i#en by Democritus0it is

better to say ,all t in!s were to!et er $otentially but not actually,. ) erefore t ese t inkers seem to a#e ad some notion of matter. +ow all t in!s t at c an!e a#e matter& but different matter" and of eternal t in!s t ose w ic are not !enerable but are mo#able in s$ace a#e matter0not matter for !eneration& owe#er& but for motion from one $lace to anot er. :ne mi! t raise t e 6uestion from w at sort of non0bein! !eneration $roceeds" for ,non0bein!, as t ree senses. 1f& t en& one form of non0bein! e*ists $otentially& still it is not by #irtue of a $otentiality for any and e#ery t in!& but different t in!s come from different t in!s" nor is it satisfactory to say t at ,all t in!s were to!et er," for t ey differ in t eir matter& since ot erwise w y did an infinity of t in!s come to be& and not one t in!< %or ,reason, is one& so t at if matter also were one& t at must a#e come to be in actuality w ic t e matter was in $otency. ) e causes and t e $rinci$les& t en& are t ree& two bein! t e $air of contraries of w ic one is definition and form and t e ot er is $ri#ation& and t e t ird bein! t e matter. 3 +ote& ne*t& t at neit er t e matter nor t e form comes to be0and 1 mean t e last matter and form. %or e#eryt in! t at c an!es is somet in! and is c an!ed by somet in! and into somet in!. ) at by w ic it is c an!ed is t e immediate mo#er" t at w ic is c an!ed& t e matter" t at into w ic it is c an!ed& t e form. ) e $rocess& t en& will !o on to infinity& if not only t e bron2e comes to be round but also t e round or t e bron2e comes to be" t erefore t ere must be a sto$. +ote& ne*t& t at eac substance comes into bein! out of somet in! t at s ares its name. '+atural ob.ects and ot er t in!s bot rank as substances.( %or t in!s come into bein! eit er by art or by nature or by luck or by s$ontaneity. +ow art is a $rinci$le of mo#ement in somet in! ot er t an t e t in! mo#ed& nature is a $rinci$le in t e t in! itself 'for man be!ets man(& and t e ot er causes are $ri#ations of t ese two. ) ere are t ree kinds of substance0t e matter& w ic is a ,t is, in a$$earance 'for all t in!s t at are c aracteri2ed by contact and not& by or!anic unity are matter and substratum& e.!. fire& fles & ead" for t ese are all matter& and t e last matter is t e matter of t at w ic is in t e full sense substance(" t e nature& w ic is a ,t is, or $ositi#e state towards w ic mo#ement takes $lace" and a!ain& t irdly& t e $articular substance w ic is com$osed of t ese two& e.!. /ocrates or Callias. +ow in some cases t e ,t is, does not e*ist a$art from t e com$osite substance& e.!. t e form of ouse does not so e*ist& unless t e art of buildin! e*ists a$art 'nor is t ere !eneration and destruction of t ese forms& but it is in

anot er way t at t e ouse a$art from its matter& and ealt & and all ideals of art& e*ist and do not e*ist(" but if t e ,t is, e*ists a$art from t e concrete t in!& it is only in t e case of natural ob.ects. And so -lato was not far wron! w en e said t at t ere are as many %orms as t ere are kinds of natural ob.ect 'if t ere are %orms distinct from t e t in!s of t is eart (. ) e mo#in! causes e*ist as t in!s $recedin! t e effects& but causes in t e sense of definitions are simultaneous wit t eir effects. %or w en a man is ealt y& t en ealt also e*ists" and t e s a$e of a bron2e s$ ere e*ists at t e same time as t e bron2e s$ ere. 'But we must e*amine w et er any form also sur#i#es afterwards. %or in some cases t ere is not in! to $re#ent t is" e.!. t e soul may be of t is sort0not all soul but t e reason" for $resumably it is im$ossible t at all soul s ould sur#i#e.( 4#idently t en t ere is no necessity& on t is !round at least& for t e e*istence of t e 1deas. %or man is be!otten by man& a !i#en man by an indi#idual fat er" and similarly in t e arts" for t e medical art is t e formal cause of ealt . = ) e causes and t e $rinci$les of different t in!s are in a sense different& but in a sense& if one s$eaks uni#ersally and analo!ically& t ey are t e same for all. %or one mi! t raise t e 6uestion w et er t e $rinci$les and elements are different or t e same for substances and for relati#e terms& and similarly in t e case of eac of t e cate!ories. But it would be $arado*ical if t ey were t e same for all. %or t en from t e same elements will $roceed relati#e terms and substances. W at t en will t is common element be< %or '1( 'a( t ere is not in! common to and distinct from substance and t e ot er cate!ories& #i2. t ose w ic are $redicated" but an element is $rior to t e t in!s of w ic it is an element. But a!ain 'b( substance is not an element in relati#e terms& nor is any of t ese an element in substance. %urt er& '5( ow can all t in!s a#e t e same elements< %or none of t e elements can be t e same as t at w ic is com$osed of elements& e.!. b or a cannot be t e same as ba. '+one& t erefore& of t e intelli!ibles& e.!. bein! or unity& is an element" for t ese are $redicable of eac of t e com$ounds as well.( +one of t e elements& t en& will be eit er a substance or a relati#e term" but it must be one or ot er. All t in!s& t en& a#e not t e same elements. :r& as we are wont to $ut it& in a sense t ey a#e and in a sense t ey a#e not" e.!. $er a$s t e elements of $erce$tible bodies are& as form& t e ot& and in anot er sense t e cold& w ic is t e $ri#ation" and& as matter& t at w ic directly and of itself $otentially as t ese attributes" and substances com$rise bot t ese and t e t in!s com$osed of t ese& of w ic t ese are t e $rinci$les& or any unity w ic is $roduced out of t e ot and t e cold& e.!. fles or bone" for t e $roduct must be different from t e elements. ) ese

t in!s t en a#e t e same elements and $rinci$les 't ou! s$ecifically different t in!s a#e s$ecifically different elements(" but all t in!s a#e not t e same elements in t is sense& but only analo!ically" i.e. one mi! t say t at t ere are t ree $rinci$les0t e form& t e $ri#ation& and t e matter. But eac of t ese is different for eac class" e.!. in colour t ey are w ite& black& and surface& and in day and ni! t t ey are li! t& darkness& and air. /ince not only t e elements $resent in a t in! are causes& but also somet in! e*ternal& i.e. t e mo#in! cause& clearly w ile ,$rinci$le, and ,element, are different bot are causes& and ,$rinci$le, is di#ided into t ese two kinds" and t at w ic acts as $roducin! mo#ement or rest is a $rinci$le and a substance. ) erefore analo!ically t ere are t ree elements& and four causes and $rinci$les" but t e elements are different in different t in!s& and t e $ro*imate mo#in! cause is different for different t in!s. 3ealt & disease& body" t e mo#in! cause is t e medical art. %orm& disorder of a $articular kind& bricks" t e mo#in! cause is t e buildin! art. And since t e mo#in! cause in t e case of natural t in!s is0for man& for instance& man& and in t e $roducts of t ou! t t e form or its contrary& t ere will be in a sense t ree causes& w ile in a sense t ere are four. %or t e medical art is in some sense ealt & and t e buildin! art is t e form of t e ouse& and man be!ets man" furt er& besides t ese t ere is t at w ic as first of all t in!s mo#es all t in!s. 5 /ome t in!s can e*ist a$art and some cannot& and it is t e former t at are substances. And t erefore all t in!s a#e t e same causes& because& wit out substances& modifications and mo#ements do not e*ist. %urt er& t ese causes will $robably be soul and body& or reason and desire and body. And in yet anot er way& analo!ically identical t in!s are $rinci$les& i.e. actuality and $otency" but t ese also are not only different for different t in!s but also a$$ly in different ways to t em. %or in some cases t e same t in! e*ists at one time actually and at anot er $otentially& e.!. wine or fles or man does so. 'And t ese too fall under t e abo#e0named causes. %or t e form e*ists actually& if it can e*ist a$art& and so does t e com$le* of form and matter& and t e $ri#ation& e.!. darkness or disease" but t e matter e*ists $otentially" for t is is t at w ic can become 6ualified eit er by t e form or by t e $ri#ation.( But t e distinction of actuality and $otentiality a$$lies in anot er way to cases w ere t e matter of cause and of effect is not t e same& in some of w ic cases t e form is not t e same but different" e.!. t e cause of man is '1( t e elements in man '#i2. fire and eart as matter& and t e $eculiar form(& and furt er '5( somet in! else outside& i.e. t e fat er& and

'3( besides t ese t e sun and its obli6ue course& w ic are neit er matter nor form nor $ri#ation of man nor of t e same s$ecies wit im& but mo#in! causes. %urt er& one must obser#e t at some causes can be e*$ressed in uni#ersal terms& and some cannot. ) e $ro*imate $rinci$les of all t in!s are t e ,t is, w ic is $ro*imate in actuality& and anot er w ic is $ro*imate in $otentiality. ) e uni#ersal causes& t en& of w ic we s$oke do not e*ist. %or it is t e indi#idual t at is t e ori!inati#e $rinci$le of t e indi#iduals. %or w ile man is t e ori!inati#e $rinci$le of man uni#ersally& t ere is no uni#ersal man& but -eleus is t e ori!inati#e $rinci$le of Ac illes& and your fat er of you& and t is $articular b of t is $articular ba& t ou! b in !eneral is t e ori!inati#e $rinci$le of ba taken wit out 6ualification. %urt er& if t e causes of substances are t e causes of all t in!s& yet different t in!s a#e different causes and elements& as was said" t e causes of t in!s t at are not in t e same class& e.!. of colours and sounds& of substances and 6uantities& are different e*ce$t in an analo!ical sense" and t ose of t in!s in t e same s$ecies are different& not in s$ecies& but in t e sense t at t e causes of different indi#iduals are different& your matter and form and mo#in! cause bein! different from mine& w ile in t eir uni#ersal definition t ey are t e same. And if we in6uire w at are t e $rinci$les or elements of substances and relations and 6ualities0w et er t ey are t e same or different0clearly w en t e names of t e causes are used in se#eral senses t e causes of eac are t e same& but w en t e senses are distin!uis ed t e causes are not t e same but different& e*ce$t t at in t e followin! senses t e causes of all are t e same. ) ey are '1( t e same or analo!ous in t is sense& t at matter& form& $ri#ation& and t e mo#in! cause are common to all t in!s" and '5( t e causes of substances may be treated as causes of all t in!s in t is sense& t at w en substances are remo#ed all t in!s are remo#ed" furt er& '3( t at w ic is first in res$ect of com$lete reality is t e cause of all t in!s. But in anot er sense t ere are different first causes& #i2. all t e contraries w ic are neit er !eneric nor ambi!uous terms" and& furt er& t e matters of different t in!s are different. We a#e stated& t en& w at are t e $rinci$les of sensible t in!s and ow many t ey are& and in w at sense t ey are t e same and in w at sense different. @ /ince t ere were t ree kinds of substance& two of t em $ ysical and one unmo#able& re!ardin! t e latter we must assert t at it is necessary t at t ere s ould be an eternal unmo#able substance. %or substances are t e first of e*istin! t in!s& and if t ey are all destructible& all t in!s are destructible. But it is im$ossible t at

mo#ement s ould eit er a#e come into bein! or cease to be 'for it must always a#e e*isted(& or t at time s ould. %or t ere could not be a before and an after if time did not e*ist. ;o#ement also is continuous& t en& in t e sense in w ic time is" for time is eit er t e same t in! as mo#ement or an attribute of mo#ement. And t ere is no continuous mo#ement e*ce$t mo#ement in $lace& and of t is only t at w ic is circular is continuous. But if t ere is somet in! w ic is ca$able of mo#in! t in!s or actin! on t em& but is not actually doin! so& t ere will not necessarily be mo#ement" for t at w ic as a $otency need not e*ercise it. +ot in!& t en& is !ained e#en if we su$$ose eternal substances& as t e belie#ers in t e %orms do& unless t ere is to be in t em some $rinci$le w ic can cause c an!e" nay& e#en t is is not enou! & nor is anot er substance besides t e %orms enou! " for if it is not to act& t ere will be no mo#ement. %urt er e#en if it acts& t is will not be enou! & if its essence is $otency" for t ere will not be eternal mo#ement& since t at w ic is $otentially may $ossibly not be. ) ere must& t en& be suc a $rinci$le& w ose #ery essence is actuality. %urt er& t en& t ese substances must be wit out matter" for t ey must be eternal& if anyt in! is eternal. ) erefore t ey must be actuality. 9et t ere is a difficulty" for it is t ou! t t at e#eryt in! t at acts is able to act& but t at not e#eryt in! t at is able to act acts& so t at t e $otency is $rior. But if t is is so& not in! t at is need be" for it is $ossible for all t in!s to be ca$able of e*istin! but not yet to e*ist. 9et if we follow t e t eolo!ians w o !enerate t e world from ni! t& or t e natural $ iloso$ ers w o say t at ,all t in!s were to!et er,& t e same im$ossible result ensues. %or ow will t ere be mo#ement& if t ere is no actually e*istin! cause< Wood will surely not mo#e itself0t e car$enter,s art must act on it" nor will t e menstrual blood nor t e eart set t emsel#es in motion& but t e seeds must act on t e eart and t e semen on t e menstrual blood. ) is is w y some su$$ose eternal actuality0e.!. Leuci$$us and -lato" for t ey say t ere is always mo#ement. But w y and w at t is mo#ement is t ey do say& nor& if t e world mo#es in t is way or t at& do t ey tell us t e cause of its doin! so. +ow not in! is mo#ed at random& but t ere must always be somet in! $resent to mo#e it" e.!. as a matter of fact a t in! mo#es in one way by nature& and in anot er by force or t rou! t e influence of reason or somet in! else. '%urt er& w at sort of mo#ement is $rimary< ) is makes a #ast difference.( But a!ain for -lato& at least& it is not $ermissible to name ere t at w ic e sometimes su$$oses to be t e source of mo#ement0t at w ic mo#es itself" for t e soul is later& and coe#al wit t e ea#ens& accordin! to is account. )o su$$ose $otency $rior to actuality& t en& is in a sense ri! t& and in a sense not" and we

a#e s$ecified t ese senses. ) at actuality is $rior is testified by Ana*a!oras 'for is ,reason, is actuality( and by 4m$edocles in is doctrine of lo#e and strife& and by t ose w o say t at t ere is always mo#ement& e.!. Leuci$$us. ) erefore c aos or ni! t did not e*ist for an infinite time& but t e same t in!s a#e always e*isted 'eit er $assin! t rou! a cycle of c an!es or obeyin! some ot er law(& since actuality is $rior to $otency. 1f& t en& t ere is a constant cycle& somet in! must always remain& actin! in t e same way. And if t ere is to be !eneration and destruction& t ere must be somet in! else w ic is always actin! in different ways. ) is must& t en& act in one way in #irtue of itself& and in anot er in #irtue of somet in! else0eit er of a t ird a!ent& t erefore& or of t e first. +ow it must be in #irtue of t e first. %or ot erwise t is a!ain causes t e motion bot of t e second a!ent and of t e t ird. ) erefore it is better to say ,t e first,. %or it was t e cause of eternal uniformity" and somet in! else is t e cause of #ariety& and e#idently bot to!et er are t e cause of eternal #ariety. ) is& accordin!ly& is t e c aracter w ic t e motions actually e* ibit. W at need t en is t ere to seek for ot er $rinci$les< A /ince '1( t is is a $ossible account of t e matter& and '5( if it were not true& t e world would a#e $roceeded out of ni! t and ,all t in!s to!et er, and out of non0bein!& t ese difficulties may be taken as sol#ed. ) ere is& t en& somet in! w ic is always mo#ed wit an unceasin! motion& w ic is motion in a circle" and t is is $lain not in t eory only but in fact. ) erefore t e first ea#en must be eternal. ) ere is t erefore also somet in! w ic mo#es it. And since t at w ic mo#es and is mo#ed is intermediate& t ere is somet in! w ic mo#es wit out bein! mo#ed& bein! eternal& substance& and actuality. And t e ob.ect of desire and t e ob.ect of t ou! t mo#e in t is way" t ey mo#e wit out bein! mo#ed. ) e $rimary ob.ects of desire and of t ou! t are t e same. %or t e a$$arent !ood is t e ob.ect of a$$etite& and t e real !ood is t e $rimary ob.ect of rational wis . But desire is conse6uent on o$inion rat er t an o$inion on desire" for t e t inkin! is t e startin!0$oint. And t ou! t is mo#ed by t e ob.ect of t ou! t& and one of t e two columns of o$$osites is in itself t e ob.ect of t ou! t" and in t is& substance is first& and in substance& t at w ic is sim$le and e*ists actually. ') e one and t e sim$le are not t e same" for ,one, means a measure& but ,sim$le, means t at t e t in! itself as a certain nature.( But t e beautiful& also& and t at w ic is in itself desirable are in t e same column" and t e first in any class is always best& or analo!ous to t e best. ) at a final cause may e*ist amon! unc an!eable entities is s own by t e distinction of its meanin!s. %or t e final cause is 'a(

some bein! for w ose !ood an action is done& and 'b( somet in! at w ic t e action aims" and of t ese t e latter e*ists amon! unc an!eable entities t ou! t e former does not. ) e final cause& t en& $roduces motion as bein! lo#ed& but all ot er t in!s mo#e by bein! mo#ed. +ow if somet in! is mo#ed it is ca$able of bein! ot erwise t an as it is. ) erefore if its actuality is t e $rimary form of s$atial motion& t en in so far as it is sub.ect to c an!e& in t is res$ect it is ca$able of bein! ot erwise&0in $lace& e#en if not in substance. But since t ere is somet in! w ic mo#es w ile itself unmo#ed& e*istin! actually& t is can in no way be ot erwise t an as it is. %or motion in s$ace is t e first of t e kinds of c an!e& and motion in a circle t e first kind of s$atial motion" and t is t e first mo#er $roduces. ) e first mo#er& t en& e*ists of necessity" and in so far as it e*ists by necessity& its mode of bein! is !ood& and it is in t is sense a first $rinci$le. %or t e necessary as all t ese senses0t at w ic is necessary $erforce because it is contrary to t e natural im$ulse& t at wit out w ic t e !ood is im$ossible& and t at w ic cannot be ot erwise but can e*ist only in a sin!le way. :n suc a $rinci$le& t en& de$end t e ea#ens and t e world of nature. And it is a life suc as t e best w ic we en.oy& and en.oy for but a s ort time 'for it is e#er in t is state& w ic we cannot be(& since its actuality is also $leasure. 'And for t is reason are wakin!& $erce$tion& and t inkin! most $leasant& and o$es and memories are so on account of t ese.( And t inkin! in itself deals wit t at w ic is best in itself& and t at w ic is t inkin! in t e fullest sense wit t at w ic is best in t e fullest sense. And t ou! t t inks on itself because it s ares t e nature of t e ob.ect of t ou! t" for it becomes an ob.ect of t ou! t in comin! into contact wit and t inkin! its ob.ects& so t at t ou! t and ob.ect of t ou! t are t e same. %or t at w ic is ca$able of recei#in! t e ob.ect of t ou! t& i.e. t e essence& is t ou! t. But it is acti#e w en it $ossesses t is ob.ect. ) erefore t e $ossession rat er t an t e rece$ti#ity is t e di#ine element w ic t ou! t seems to contain& and t e act of contem$lation is w at is most $leasant and best. 1f& t en& 8od is always in t at !ood state in w ic we sometimes are& t is com$els our wonder" and if in a better t is com$els it yet more. And 8od is in a better state. And life also belon!s to 8od" for t e actuality of t ou! t is life& and 8od is t at actuality" and 8od,s self0de$endent actuality is life most !ood and eternal. We say t erefore t at 8od is a li#in! bein!& eternal& most !ood& so t at life and duration continuous and eternal belon! to 8od" for t is is 8od. ) ose w o su$$ose& as t e -yt a!oreans and /$eusi$$us do& t at su$reme beauty and !oodness are not $resent in t e be!innin!& because t e be!innin!s bot of $lants and of animals are causes& but beauty and com$leteness are in t e effects of t ese& are wron! in

t eir o$inion. %or t e seed comes from ot er indi#iduals w ic are $rior and com$lete& and t e first t in! is not seed but t e com$lete bein!" e.!. we must say t at before t e seed t ere is a man&0not t e man $roduced from t e seed& but anot er from w om t e seed comes. 1t is clear t en from w at as been said t at t ere is a substance w ic is eternal and unmo#able and se$arate from sensible t in!s. 1t as been s own also t at t is substance cannot a#e any ma!nitude& but is wit out $arts and indi#isible 'for it $roduces mo#ement t rou! infinite time& but not in! finite as infinite $ower" and& w ile e#ery ma!nitude is eit er infinite or finite& it cannot& for t e abo#e reason& a#e finite ma!nitude& and it cannot a#e infinite ma!nitude because t ere is no infinite ma!nitude at all(. But it as also been s own t at it is im$assi#e and unalterable" for all t e ot er c an!es are $osterior to c an!e of $lace. B 1t is clear& t en& w y t ese t in!s are as t ey are. But we must not i!nore t e 6uestion w et er we a#e to su$$ose one suc substance or more t an one& and if t e latter& ow many" we must also mention& re!ardin! t e o$inions e*$ressed by ot ers& t at t ey a#e said not in! about t e number of t e substances t at can e#en be clearly stated. %or t e t eory of 1deas as no s$ecial discussion of t e sub.ect" for t ose w o s$eak of 1deas say t e 1deas are numbers& and t ey s$eak of numbers now as unlimited& now as limited by t e number 10" but as for t e reason w y t ere s ould be .ust so many numbers& not in! is said wit any demonstrati#e e*actness. We owe#er must discuss t e sub.ect& startin! from t e $resu$$ositions and distinctions we a#e mentioned. ) e first $rinci$le or $rimary bein! is not mo#able eit er in itself or accidentally& but $roduces t e $rimary eternal and sin!le mo#ement. But since t at w ic is mo#ed must be mo#ed by somet in!& and t e first mo#er must be in itself unmo#able& and eternal mo#ement must be $roduced by somet in! eternal and a sin!le mo#ement by a sin!le t in!& and since we see t at besides t e sim$le s$atial mo#ement of t e uni#erse& w ic we say t e first and unmo#able substance $roduces& t ere are ot er s$atial mo#ements0t ose of t e $lanets0w ic are eternal 'for a body w ic mo#es in a circle is eternal and unrestin!" we a#e $ro#ed t ese $oints in t e $ ysical treatises(& eac of t ese mo#ements also must be caused by a substance bot unmo#able in itself and eternal. %or t e nature of t e stars is eternal .ust because it is a certain kind of substance& and t e mo#er is eternal and $rior to t e mo#ed& and t at w ic is $rior to a substance must be a substance. 4#idently& t en& t ere must be substances w ic are of t e same number as t e mo#ements of t e stars& and in t eir nature eternal& and in t emsel#es unmo#able& and wit out ma!nitude& for t e reason before mentioned. ) at t e mo#ers are substances& t en& and t at one of t ese is first

and anot er second accordin! to t e same order as t e mo#ements of t e stars& is e#ident. But in t e number of t e mo#ements we reac a $roblem w ic must be treated from t e stand$oint of t at one of t e mat ematical sciences w ic is most akin to $ iloso$ y0#i2. of astronomy" for t is science s$eculates about substance w ic is $erce$tible but eternal& but t e ot er mat ematical sciences& i.e. arit metic and !eometry& treat of no substance. ) at t e mo#ements are more numerous t an t e bodies t at are mo#ed is e#ident to t ose w o a#e !i#en e#en moderate attention to t e matter" for eac of t e $lanets as more t an one mo#ement. But as to t e actual number of t ese mo#ements& we now0to !i#e some notion of t e sub.ect06uote w at some of t e mat ematicians say& t at our t ou! t may a#e some definite number to !ras$" but& for t e rest& we must $artly in#esti!ate for oursel#es& -artly learn from ot er in#esti!ators& and if t ose w o study t is sub.ect form an o$inion contrary to w at we a#e now stated& we must esteem bot $arties indeed& but follow t e more accurate. 4udo*us su$$osed t at t e motion of t e sun or of t e moon in#ol#es& in eit er case& t ree s$ eres& of w ic t e first is t e s$ ere of t e fi*ed stars& and t e second mo#es in t e circle w ic runs alon! t e middle of t e 2odiac& and t e t ird in t e circle w ic is inclined across t e breadt of t e 2odiac" but t e circle in w ic t e moon mo#es is inclined at a !reater an!le t an t at in w ic t e sun mo#es. And t e motion of t e $lanets in#ol#es& in eac case& four s$ eres& and of t ese also t e first and second are t e same as t e first two mentioned abo#e 'for t e s$ ere of t e fi*ed stars is t at w ic mo#es all t e ot er s$ eres& and t at w ic is $laced beneat t is and as its mo#ement in t e circle w ic bisects t e 2odiac is common to all(& but t e $oles of t e t ird s$ ere of eac $lanet are in t e circle w ic bisects t e 2odiac& and t e motion of t e fourt s$ ere is in t e circle w ic is inclined at an an!le to t e e6uator of t e t ird s$ ere" and t e $oles of t e t ird s$ ere are different for eac of t e ot er $lanets& but t ose of Eenus and ;ercury are t e same. Calli$$us made t e $osition of t e s$ eres t e same as 4udo*us did& but w ile e assi!ned t e same number as 4udo*us did to 7u$iter and to /aturn& e t ou! t two more s$ eres s ould be added to t e sun and two to t e moon& if one is to e*$lain t e obser#ed facts" and one more to eac of t e ot er $lanets. But it is necessary& if all t e s$ eres combined are to e*$lain t e obser#ed facts& t at for eac of t e $lanets t ere s ould be ot er s$ eres 'one fewer t an t ose it erto assi!ned( w ic counteract t ose already mentioned and brin! back to t e same $osition t e outermost s$ ere of t e star w ic in eac case is situated below t e star in 6uestion" for only t us can all t e forces at work $roduce t e obser#ed motion of t e $lanets. /ince& t en& t e s$ eres

in#ol#ed in t e mo#ement of t e $lanets t emsel#es are00ei! t for /aturn and 7u$iter and twenty0fi#e for t e ot ers& and of t ese only t ose in#ol#ed in t e mo#ement of t e lowest0situated $lanet need not be counteracted t e s$ eres w ic counteract t ose of t e outermost two $lanets will be si* in number& and t e s$ eres w ic counteract t ose of t e ne*t four $lanets will be si*teen" t erefore t e number of all t e s$ eres00bot t ose w ic mo#e t e $lanets and t ose w ic counteract t ese00will be fifty0fi#e. And if one were not to add to t e moon and to t e sun t e mo#ements we mentioned& t e w ole set of s$ eres will be forty0se#en in number. Let t is& t en& be taken as t e number of t e s$ eres& so t at t e unmo#able substances and $rinci$les also may $robably be taken as .ust so many" t e assertion of necessity must be left to more $owerful t inkers. But if t ere can be no s$atial mo#ement w ic does not conduce to t e mo#in! of a star& and if furt er e#ery bein! and e#ery substance w ic is immune from c an!e and in #irtue of itself as attained to t e best must be considered an end& t ere can be no ot er bein! a$art from t ese we a#e named& but t is must be t e number of t e substances. %or if t ere are ot ers& t ey will cause c an!e as bein! a final cause of mo#ement" but t ere cannot e ot er mo#ements besides t ose mentioned. And it is reasonable to infer t is from a consideration of t e bodies t at are mo#ed" for if e#eryt in! t at mo#es is for t e sake of t at w ic is mo#ed& and e#ery mo#ement belon!s to somet in! t at is mo#ed& no mo#ement can be for t e sake of itself or of anot er mo#ement& but all t e mo#ements must be for t e sake of t e stars. %or if t ere is to be a mo#ement for t e sake of a mo#ement& t is latter also will a#e to be for t e sake of somet in! else" so t at since t ere cannot be an infinite re!ress& t e end of e#ery mo#ement will be one of t e di#ine bodies w ic mo#e t rou! t e ea#en. '4#idently t ere is but one ea#en. %or if t ere are many ea#ens as t ere are many men& t e mo#in! $rinci$les& of w ic eac ea#en will a#e one& will be one in form but in number many. But all t in!s t at are many in number a#e matter" for one and t e same definition& e.!. t at of man& a$$lies to many t in!s& w ile /ocrates is one. But t e $rimary essence as not matter" for it is com$lete reality. /o t e unmo#able first mo#er is one bot in definition and in number" so too& t erefore& is t at w ic is mo#ed always and continuously" t erefore t ere is one ea#en alone.( :ur forefat ers in t e most remote a!es a#e anded down to t eir $osterity a tradition& in t e form of a myt & t at t ese bodies are !ods& and t at t e di#ine encloses t e w ole of nature. ) e rest of t e tradition as been added later in myt ical form wit a #iew to t e $ersuasion of t e multitude and to its le!al and utilitarian e*$ediency" t ey say t ese !ods are in t e form of men or like some of t e ot er animals& and t ey say ot er t in!s conse6uent on and similar to t ese w ic

we a#e mentioned. But if one were to se$arate t e first $oint from t ese additions and take it alone0t at t ey t ou! t t e first substances to be !ods& one must re!ard t is as an ins$ired utterance& and reflect t at& w ile $robably eac art and eac science as often been de#elo$ed as far as $ossible and as a!ain $eris ed& t ese o$inions& wit ot ers& a#e been $reser#ed until t e $resent like relics of t e ancient treasure. :nly t us far& t en& is t e o$inion of our ancestors and of our earliest $redecessors clear to us. C ) e nature of t e di#ine t ou! t in#ol#es certain $roblems" for w ile t ou! t is eld to be t e most di#ine of t in!s obser#ed by us& t e 6uestion ow it must be situated in order to a#e t at c aracter in#ol#es difficulties. %or if it t inks of not in!& w at is t ere ere of di!nity< 1t is .ust like one w o slee$s. And if it t inks& but t is de$ends on somet in! else& t en 'since t at w ic is its substance is not t e act of t inkin!& but a $otency( it cannot be t e best substance" for it is t rou! t inkin! t at its #alue belon!s to it. %urt er& w et er its substance is t e faculty of t ou! t or t e act of t inkin!& w at does it t ink of< 4it er of itself or of somet in! else" and if of somet in! else& eit er of t e same t in! always or of somet in! different. Does it matter& t en& or not& w et er it t inks of t e !ood or of any c ance t in!< Are t ere not some t in!s about w ic it is incredible t at it s ould t ink< 4#idently& t en& it t inks of t at w ic is most di#ine and $recious& and it does not c an!e" for c an!e would be c an!e for t e worse& and t is would be already a mo#ement. %irst& t en& if ,t ou! t, is not t e act of t inkin! but a $otency& it would be reasonable to su$$ose t at t e continuity of its t inkin! is wearisome to it. /econdly& t ere would e#idently be somet in! else more $recious t an t ou! t& #i2. t at w ic is t ou! t of. %or bot t inkin! and t e act of t ou! t will belon! e#en to one w o t inks of t e worst t in! in t e world& so t at if t is ou! t to be a#oided 'and it ou! t& for t ere are e#en some t in!s w ic it is better not to see t an to see(& t e act of t inkin! cannot be t e best of t in!s. ) erefore it must be of itself t at t e di#ine t ou! t t inks 'since it is t e most e*cellent of t in!s(& and its t inkin! is a t inkin! on t inkin!. But e#idently knowled!e and $erce$tion and o$inion and understandin! a#e always somet in! else as t eir ob.ect& and t emsel#es only by t e way. %urt er& if t inkin! and bein! t ou! t of are different& in res$ect of w ic does !oodness belon! to t ou! t< %or to e an act of t inkin! and to e an ob.ect of t ou! t are not t e same t in!. We answer t at in some cases t e knowled!e is t e ob.ect. 1n t e $roducti#e sciences it is t e substance or essence of t e ob.ect& matter omitted& and in t e t eoretical sciences t e

definition or t e act of t inkin! is t e ob.ect. /ince& t en& t ou! t and t e ob.ect of t ou! t are not different in t e case of t in!s t at a#e not matter& t e di#ine t ou! t and its ob.ect will be t e same& i.e. t e t inkin! will be one wit t e ob.ect of its t ou! t. A furt er 6uestion is left0w et er t e ob.ect of t e di#ine t ou! t is com$osite" for if it were& t ou! t would c an!e in $assin! from $art to $art of t e w ole. We answer t at e#eryt in! w ic as not matter is indi#isible0as uman t ou! t& or rat er t e t ou! t of com$osite bein!s& is in a certain $eriod of time 'for it does not $ossess t e !ood at t is moment or at t at& but its best& bein! somet in! different from it& is attained only in a w ole $eriod of time(& so t rou! out eternity is t e t ou! t w ic as itself for its ob.ect. 10 We must consider also in w ic of two ways t e nature of t e uni#erse contains t e !ood& and t e i! est !ood& w et er as somet in! se$arate and by itself& or as t e order of t e $arts. -robably in bot ways& as an army does" for its !ood is found bot in its order and in its leader& and more in t e latter" for e does not de$end on t e order but it de$ends on im. And all t in!s are ordered to!et er some ow& but not all alike&0bot fis es and fowls and $lants" and t e world is not suc t at one t in! as not in! to do wit anot er& but t ey are connected. %or all are ordered to!et er to one end& but it is as in a ouse& w ere t e freemen are least at liberty to act at random& but all t in!s or most t in!s are already ordained for t em& w ile t e sla#es and t e animals do little for t e common !ood& and for t e most $art li#e at random" for t is is t e sort of $rinci$le t at constitutes t e nature of eac . 1 mean& for instance& t at all must at least come to be dissol#ed into t eir elements& and t ere are ot er functions similarly in w ic all s are for t e !ood of t e w ole. We must not fail to obser#e ow many im$ossible or $arado*ical results confront t ose w o old different #iews from our own& and w at are t e #iews of t e subtler t inkers& and w ic #iews are attended by fewest difficulties. All make all t in!s out of contraries. But neit er ,all t in!s, nor ,out of contraries, is ri! t" nor do t ese t inkers tell us ow all t e t in!s in w ic t e contraries are $resent can be made out of t e contraries" for contraries are not affected by one anot er. +ow for us t is difficulty is sol#ed naturally by t e fact t at t ere is a t ird element. ) ese t inkers owe#er make one of t e two contraries matter" t is is done for instance by t ose w o make t e une6ual matter for t e e6ual& or t e many matter for t e one. But t is also is refuted in t e same way" for t e one matter w ic underlies any $air of contraries is contrary to

not in!. %urt er& all t in!s& e*ce$t t e one& will& on t e #iew we are critici2in!& $artake of e#il" for t e bad itself is one of t e two elements. But t e ot er sc ool does not treat t e !ood and t e bad e#en as $rinci$les" yet in all t in!s t e !ood is in t e i! est de!ree a $rinci$le. ) e sc ool we first mentioned is ri! t in sayin! t at it is a $rinci$le& but ow t e !ood is a $rinci$le t ey do not say0w et er as end or as mo#er or as form. 4m$edocles also as a $arado*ical #iew" for e identifies t e !ood wit lo#e& but t is is a $rinci$le bot as mo#er 'for it brin!s t in!s to!et er( and as matter 'for it is $art of t e mi*ture(. +ow e#en if it a$$ens t at t e same t in! is a $rinci$le bot as matter and as mo#er& still t e bein!& at least& of t e two is not t e same. 1n w ic res$ect t en is lo#e a $rinci$le< 1t is $arado*ical also t at strife s ould be im$eris able" t e nature of is ,e#il, is .ust strife. Ana*a!oras makes t e !ood a moti#e $rinci$le" for is ,reason, mo#es t in!s. But it mo#es t em for an end& w ic must be somet in! ot er t an it& e*ce$t accordin! to our way of statin! t e case" for& on our #iew& t e medical art is in a sense ealt . 1t is $arado*ical also not to su$$ose a contrary to t e !ood& i.e. to reason. But all w o s$eak of t e contraries make no use of t e contraries& unless we brin! t eir #iews into s a$e. And w y some t in!s are $eris able and ot ers im$eris able& no one tells us" for t ey make all e*istin! t in!s out of t e same $rinci$les. %urt er& some make e*istin! t in!s out of t e none*istent" and ot ers to a#oid t e necessity of t is make all t in!s one. %urt er& w y s ould t ere always be becomin!& and w at is t e cause of becomin!<0t is no one tells us. And t ose w o su$$ose two $rinci$les must su$$ose anot er& a su$erior $rinci$le& and so must t ose w o belie#e in t e %orms" for w y did t in!s come to $artici$ate& or w y do t ey $artici$ate& in t e %orms< And all ot er t inkers are confronted by t e necessary conse6uence t at t ere is somet in! contrary to Wisdom& i.e. to t e i! est knowled!e" but we are not. %or t ere is not in! contrary to t at w ic is $rimary" for all contraries a#e matter& and t in!s t at a#e matter e*ist only $otentially" and t e i!norance w ic is contrary to any knowled!e leads to an ob.ect contrary to t e ob.ect of t e knowled!e" but w at is $rimary as no contrary. A!ain& if besides sensible t in!s no ot ers e*ist& t ere will be no first $rinci$le& no order& no becomin!& no ea#enly bodies& but eac $rinci$le will a#e a $rinci$le before it& as in t e accounts of t e t eolo!ians and all t e natural $ iloso$ ers. But if t e %orms or t e numbers are to e*ist& t ey will be causes of not in!" or if not t at& at least not of mo#ement. %urt er& ow is e*tension& i.e. a continuum& to be $roduced out of une*tended $arts< %or number will not& eit er as mo#er or as form& $roduce a continuum. But a!ain t ere cannot be any contrary t at is also essentially a $roducti#e

or mo#in! $rinci$le" for it would be $ossible for it not to be. :r at least its action would be $osterior to its $otency. ) e world& t en& would not be eternal. But it is" one of t ese $remisses& t en& must be denied. And we a#e said ow t is must be done. %urt er& in #irtue of w at t e numbers& or t e soul and t e body& or in !eneral t e form and t e t in!& are one0of t is no one tells us anyt in!" nor can any one tell& unless e says& as we do& t at t e mo#er makes t em one. And t ose w o say mat ematical number is first and !o on to !enerate one kind of substance after anot er and !i#e different $rinci$les for eac & make t e substance of t e uni#erse a mere series of e$isodes 'for one substance as no influence on anot er by its e*istence or none*istence(& and t ey !i#e us many !o#ernin! $rinci$les" but t e world refuses to be !o#erned badly. ,) e rule of many is not !ood" one ruler let t ere be., Book ?111 1 W4 a#e stated w at is t e substance of sensible t in!s& dealin! in t e treatise on $ ysics wit matter& and later wit t e substance w ic as actual e*istence. +ow since our in6uiry is w et er t ere is or is not besides t e sensible substances any w ic is immo#able and eternal& and& if t ere is& w at it is& we must first consider w at is said by ot ers& so t at& if t ere is anyt in! w ic t ey say wron!ly& we may not be liable to t e same ob.ections& w ile& if t ere is any o$inion common to t em and us& we s all a#e no $ri#ate !rie#ance a!ainst oursel#es on t at account" for one must be content to state some $oints better t an one,s $redecessors& and ot ers no worse. )wo o$inions are eld on t is sub.ect" it is said t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics0i.e. numbers and lines and t e like0are substances& and a!ain t at t e 1deas are substances. And '1( since some reco!ni2e t ese as two different classes0t e 1deas and t e mat ematical numbers& and '5( some reco!ni2e bot as a#in! one nature& w ile '3( some ot ers say t at t e mat ematical substances are t e only substances& we must consider first t e ob.ects of mat ematics& not 6ualifyin! t em by any ot er c aracteristic0not askin!& for instance& w et er t ey are in fact 1deas or not& or w et er t ey are t e $rinci$les and substances of e*istin! t in!s or not& but only w et er as ob.ects of mat ematics t ey e*ist or not& and if t ey e*ist& ow t ey e*ist. ) en after t is we must se$arately consider t e 1deas t emsel#es in a !eneral way& and only as far as t e acce$ted mode of treatment demands" for most of t e $oints a#e been re$eatedly made e#en by t e discussions outside our sc ool& and& furt er& t e !reater $art of our account must finis by t rowin! li! t on t at in6uiry& #i2. w en we e*amine w et er t e substances and t e $rinci$les of

e*istin! t in!s are numbers and 1deas" for after t e discussion of t e 1deas t is remans as a t ird in6uiry. 1f t e ob.ects of mat ematics e*ist& t ey must e*ist eit er in sensible ob.ects& as some say& or se$arate from sensible ob.ects 'and t is also is said by some(" or if t ey e*ist in neit er of t ese ways& eit er t ey do not e*ist& or t ey e*ist only in some s$ecial sense. /o t at t e sub.ect of our discussion will be not w et er t ey e*ist but ow t ey e*ist. 5 ) at it is im$ossible for mat ematical ob.ects to e*ist in sensible t in!s& and at t e same time t at t e doctrine in 6uestion is an artificial one& as been said already in our discussion of difficulties we a#e $ointed out t at it is im$ossible for two solids to be in t e same $lace& and also t at accordin! to t e same ar!ument t e ot er $owers and c aracteristics also s ould e*ist in sensible t in!s and none of t em se$arately. ) is we a#e said already. But& furt er& it is ob#ious t at on t is t eory it is im$ossible for any body w ate#er to be di#ided" for it would a#e to be di#ided at a $lane& and t e $lane at a line& and t e line at a $oint& so t at if t e $oint cannot be di#ided& neit er can t e line& and if t e line cannot& neit er can t e $lane nor t e solid. W at difference& t en& does it make w et er sensible t in!s are suc indi#isible entities& or& wit out bein! so t emsel#es& a#e indi#isible entities in t em< ) e result will be t e same" if t e sensible entities are di#ided t e ot ers will be di#ided too& or else not e#en t e sensible entities can be di#ided. But& a!ain& it is not $ossible t at suc entities s ould e*ist se$arately. %or if besides t e sensible solids t ere are to be ot er solids w ic are se$arate from t em and $rior to t e sensible solids& it is $lain t at besides t e $lanes also t ere must be ot er and se$arate $lanes and $oints and lines" for consistency re6uires t is. But if t ese e*ist& a!ain besides t e $lanes and lines and $oints of t e mat ematical solid t ere must be ot ers w ic are se$arate. '%or incom$osites are $rior to com$ounds" and if t ere are& $rior to t e sensible bodies& bodies w ic are not sensible& by t e same ar!ument t e $lanes w ic e*ist by t emsel#es must be $rior to t ose w ic are in t e motionless solids. ) erefore t ese will be $lanes and lines ot er t an t ose t at e*ist alon! wit t e mat ematical solids to w ic t ese t inkers assi!n se$arate e*istence" for t e latter e*ist alon! wit t e mat ematical solids& w ile t e ot ers are $rior to t e mat ematical solids.( A!ain& t erefore& t ere will be& belon!in! to t ese $lanes& lines& and $rior to t em t ere will a#e to be& by t e same ar!ument& ot er lines and $oints" and $rior to t ese $oints in t e $rior lines t ere will a#e to be ot er $oints& t ou! t ere will be no ot ers $rior to t ese. +ow '1(

t e accumulation becomes absurd" for we find oursel#es wit one set of solids a$art from t e sensible solids" t ree sets of $lanes a$art from t e sensible $lanes0t ose w ic e*ist a$art from t e sensible $lanes& and t ose in t e mat ematical solids& and t ose w ic e*ist a$art from t ose in t e mat ematical solids" four sets of lines& and fi#e sets of $oints. Wit w ic of t ese& t en& will t e mat ematical sciences deal< Certainly not wit t e $lanes and lines and $oints in t e motionless solid" for science always deals wit w at is $rior. And 't e same account will a$$ly also to numbers" for t ere will be a different set of units a$art from eac set of $oints& and also a$art from eac set of realities& from t e ob.ects of sense and a!ain from t ose of t ou! t" so t at t ere will be #arious classes of mat ematical numbers. A!ain& ow is it $ossible to sol#e t e 6uestions w ic we a#e already enumerated in our discussion of difficulties< %or t e ob.ects of astronomy will e*ist a$art from sensible t in!s .ust as t e ob.ects of !eometry will" but ow is it $ossible t at a ea#en and its $arts0or anyt in! else w ic as mo#ement0s ould e*ist a$art< /imilarly also t e ob.ects of o$tics and of armonics will e*ist a$art" for t ere will be bot #oice and si! t besides t e sensible or indi#idual #oices and si! ts. ) erefore it is $lain t at t e ot er senses as well& and t e ot er ob.ects of sense& will e*ist a$art" for w y s ould one set of t em do so and anot er not< And if t is is so& t ere will also be animals e*istin! a$art& since t ere will be senses. A!ain& t ere are certain mat ematical t eorems t at are uni#ersal& e*tendin! beyond t ese substances. 3ere t en we s all a#e anot er intermediate substance se$arate bot from t e 1deas and from t e intermediates&0a substance w ic is neit er number nor $oints nor s$atial ma!nitude nor time. And if t is is im$ossible& $lainly it is also im$ossible t at t e former entities s ould e*ist se$arate from sensible t in!s. And& in !eneral& conclusion contrary alike to t e trut and to t e usual #iews follow& if one is to su$$ose t e ob.ects of mat ematics to e*ist t us as se$arate entities. %or because t ey e*ist t us t ey must be $rior to sensible s$atial ma!nitudes& but in trut t ey must be $osterior" for t e incom$lete s$atial ma!nitude is in t e order of !eneration $rior& but in t e order of substance $osterior& as t e lifeless is to t e li#in!. A!ain& by #irtue of w at& and w en& will mat ematical ma!nitudes be one< %or t in!s in our $erce$tible world are one in #irtue of soul& or of a $art of soul& or of somet in! else t at is reasonable enou! " w en t ese are not $resent& t e t in! is a $lurality& and s$lits u$ into $arts. But in t e case of t e sub.ects of mat ematics& w ic are di#isible and are 6uantities& w at is t e cause of t eir bein! one and oldin! to!et er<

A!ain& t e modes of !eneration of t e ob.ects of mat ematics s ow t at we are ri! t. %or t e dimension first !enerated is len!t & t en comes breadt & lastly de$t & and t e $rocess is com$lete. 1f& t en& t at w ic is $osterior in t e order of !eneration is $rior in t e order of substantiality& t e solid will be $rior to t e $lane and t e line. And in t is way also it is bot more com$lete and more w ole& because it can become animate. 3ow& on t e ot er and& could a line or a $lane be animate< ) e su$$osition $asses t e $ower of our senses. A!ain& t e solid is a sort of substance" for it already as in a sense com$leteness. But ow can lines be substances< +eit er as a form or s a$e& as t e soul $er a$s is& nor as matter& like t e solid" for we a#e no e*$erience of anyt in! t at can be $ut to!et er out of lines or $lanes or $oints& w ile if t ese ad been a sort of material substance& we s ould a#e obser#ed t in!s w ic could be $ut to!et er out of t em. 8rant& t en& t at t ey are $rior in definition. /till not all t in!s t at are $rior in definition are also $rior in substantiality. %or t ose t in!s are $rior in substantiality w ic w en se$arated from ot er t in!s sur$ass t em in t e $ower of inde$endent e*istence& but t in!s are $rior in definition to t ose w ose definitions are com$ounded out of t eir definitions" and t ese two $ro$erties are not coe*tensi#e. %or if attributes do not e*ist a$art from t e substances 'e.!. a ,mobile, or a $ale,(& $ale is $rior to t e $ale man in definition& but not in substantiality. %or it cannot e*ist se$arately& but is always alon! wit t e concrete t in!" and by t e concrete t in! 1 mean t e $ale man. ) erefore it is $lain t at neit er is t e result of abstraction $rior nor t at w ic is $roduced by addin! determinants $osterior" for it is by addin! a determinant to $ale t at we s$eak of t e $ale man. 1t as& t en& been sufficiently $ointed out t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics are not substances in a i! er de!ree t an bodies are& and t at t ey are not $rior to sensibles in bein!& but only in definition& and t at t ey cannot e*ist somew ere a$art. But since it was not $ossible for t em to e*ist in sensibles eit er& it is $lain t at t ey eit er do not e*ist at all or e*ist in a s$ecial sense and t erefore do not ,e*ist, wit out 6ualification. %or ,e*ist, as many senses. 3 %or .ust as t e uni#ersal $ro$ositions of mat ematics deal not wit ob.ects w ic e*ist se$arately& a$art from e*tended ma!nitudes and from numbers& but wit ma!nitudes and numbers& not owe#er 6ua suc as to a#e ma!nitude or to be di#isible& clearly it is $ossible t at t ere s ould also be bot $ro$ositions and demonstrations about sensible ma!nitudes& not owe#er 6ua sensible but 6ua $ossessed of

certain definite 6ualities. %or as t ere are many $ro$ositions about t in!s merely considered as in motion& a$art from w at eac suc t in! is and from t eir accidents& and as it is not t erefore necessary t at t ere s ould be eit er a mobile se$arate from sensibles& or a distinct mobile entity in t e sensibles& so too in t e case of mobiles t ere will be $ro$ositions and sciences& w ic treat t em owe#er not 6ua mobile but only 6ua bodies& or a!ain only 6ua $lanes& or only 6ua lines& or 6ua di#isibles& or 6ua indi#isibles a#in! $osition& or only 6ua indi#isibles. ) us since it is true to say wit out 6ualification t at not only t in!s w ic are se$arable but also t in!s w ic are inse$arable e*ist 'for instance& t at mobiles e*ist(& it is true also to say wit out 6ualification t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics e*ist& and wit t e c aracter ascribed to t em by mat ematicians. And as it is true to say of t e ot er sciences too& wit out 6ualification& t at t ey deal wit suc and suc a sub.ect0not wit w at is accidental to it 'e.!. not wit t e $ale& if t e ealt y t in! is $ale& and t e science as t e ealt y as its sub.ect(& but wit t at w ic is t e sub.ect of eac science0wit t e ealt y if it treats its ob.ect 6ua ealt y& wit man if 6ua man>0so too is it wit !eometry" if its sub.ects a$$en to be sensible& t ou! it does not treat t em 6ua sensible& t e mat ematical sciences will not for t at reason be sciences of sensibles0nor& on t e ot er and& of ot er t in!s se$arate from sensibles. ;any $ro$erties attac to t in!s in #irtue of t eir own nature as $ossessed of eac suc c aracter" e.!. t ere are attributes $eculiar to t e animal 6ua female or 6ua male 'yet t ere is no ,female, nor ,male, se$arate from animals(" so t at t ere are also attributes w ic belon! to t in!s merely as len!t s or as $lanes. And in $ro$ortion as we are dealin! wit t in!s w ic are $rior in definition and sim$ler& our knowled!e as more accuracy& i.e. sim$licity. ) erefore a science w ic abstracts from s$atial ma!nitude is more $recise t an one w ic takes it into account" and a science is most $recise if it abstracts from mo#ement& but if it takes account of mo#ement& it is most $recise if it deals wit t e $rimary mo#ement& for t is is t e sim$lest" and of t is a!ain uniform mo#ement is t e sim$lest form. ) e same account may be !i#en of armonics and o$tics" for neit er considers its ob.ects 6ua si! t or 6ua #oice& but 6ua lines and numbers" but t e latter are attributes $ro$er to t e former. And mec anics too $roceeds in t e same way. ) erefore if we su$$ose attributes se$arated from t eir fellow attributes and make any in6uiry concernin! t em as suc & we s all not for t is reason be in error& any more t an w en one draws a line on t e !round and calls it a foot lon! w en it is not" for t e error is not included in t e $remisses. 4ac 6uestion will be best in#esti!ated in t is way0by settin! u$ by an act of se$aration w at is not se$arate& as t e arit metician and t e !eometer do. %or a man 6ua man is one

indi#isible t in!" and t e arit metician su$$osed one indi#isible t in!& and t en considered w et er any attribute belon!s to a man 6ua indi#isible. But t e !eometer treats im neit er 6ua man nor 6ua indi#isible& but as a solid. %or e#idently t e $ro$erties w ic would a#e belon!ed to im e#en if $erc ance e ad not been indi#isible& can belon! to im e#en a$art from t ese attributes. ) us& t en& !eometers s$eak correctly" t ey talk about e*istin! t in!s& and t eir sub.ects do e*ist" for bein! as two forms0it e*ists not only in com$lete reality but also materially. +ow since t e !ood and t e beautiful are different 'for t e former always im$lies conduct as its sub.ect& w ile t e beautiful is found also in motionless t in!s(& t ose w o assert t at t e mat ematical sciences say not in! of t e beautiful or t e !ood are in error. %or t ese sciences say and $ro#e a !reat deal about t em" if t ey do not e*$ressly mention t em& but $ro#e attributes w ic are t eir results or t eir definitions& it is not true to say t at t ey tell us not in! about t em. ) e c ief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness& w ic t e mat ematical sciences demonstrate in a s$ecial de!ree. And since t ese 'e.!. order and definiteness( are ob#iously causes of many t in!s& e#idently t ese sciences must treat t is sort of causati#e $rinci$le also 'i.e. t e beautiful( as in some sense a cause. But we s all s$eak more $lainly elsew ere about t ese matters. = /o muc t en for t e ob.ects of mat ematics" we a#e said t at t ey e*ist and in w at sense t ey e*ist& and in w at sense t ey are $rior and in w at sense not $rior. +ow& re!ardin! t e 1deas& we must first e*amine t e ideal t eory itself& not connectin! it in any way wit t e nature of numbers& but treatin! it in t e form in w ic it was ori!inally understood by t ose w o first maintained t e e*istence of t e 1deas. ) e su$$orters of t e ideal t eory were led to it because on t e 6uestion about t e trut of t in!s t ey acce$ted t e 3eraclitean sayin!s w ic describe all sensible t in!s as e#er $assin! away& so t at if knowled!e or t ou! t is to a#e an ob.ect& t ere must be some ot er and $ermanent entities& a$art from t ose w ic are sensible" for t ere could be no knowled!e of t in!s w ic were in a state of flu*. But w en /ocrates was occu$yin! imself wit t e e*cellences of c aracter& and in conne*ion wit t em became t e first to raise t e $roblem of uni#ersal definition 'for of t e $ ysicists Democritus only touc ed on t e sub.ect to a small e*tent& and defined& after a fas ion& t e ot and t e cold" w ile t e -yt a!oreans ad before t is treated of a few t in!s& w ose definitions0e.!. t ose of o$$ortunity& .ustice& or marria!e0t ey connected wit numbers" but it was natural t at /ocrates s ould be seekin! t e essence& for e was seekin! to syllo!i2e& and ,w at a

t in! is, is t e startin!0$oint of syllo!isms" for t ere was as yet none of t e dialectical $ower w ic enables $eo$le e#en wit out knowled!e of t e essence to s$eculate about contraries and in6uire w et er t e same science deals wit contraries" for two t in!s may be fairly ascribed to /ocrates0inducti#e ar!uments and uni#ersal definition& bot of w ic are concerned wit t e startin!0$oint of science(>0but /ocrates did not make t e uni#ersals or t e definitions e*ist a$art> t ey& owe#er& !a#e t em se$arate e*istence& and t is was t e kind of t in! t ey called 1deas. ) erefore it followed for t em& almost by t e same ar!ument& t at t ere must be 1deas of all t in!s t at are s$oken of uni#ersally& and it was almost as if a man wis ed to count certain t in!s& and w ile t ey were few t ou! t e would not be able to count t em& but made more of t em and t en counted t em" for t e %orms are& one may say& more numerous t an t e $articular sensible t in!s& yet it was in seekin! t e causes of t ese t at t ey $roceeded from t em to t e %orms. %or to eac t in! t ere answers an entity w ic as t e same name and e*ists a$art from t e substances& and so also in t e case of all ot er !rou$s t ere is a one o#er many& w et er t ese be of t is world or eternal. A!ain& of t e ways in w ic it is $ro#ed t at t e %orms e*ist& none is con#incin!" for from some no inference necessarily follows& and from some arise %orms e#en of t in!s of w ic t ey t ink t ere are no %orms. %or accordin! to t e ar!uments from t e sciences t ere will be %orms of all t in!s of w ic t ere are sciences& and accordin! to t e ar!ument of t e ,one o#er many, t ere will be %orms e#en of ne!ations& and accordin! to t e ar!ument t at t ou! t as an ob.ect w en t e indi#idual ob.ect as $eris ed& t ere will be %orms of $eris able t in!s" for we a#e an ima!e of t ese. A!ain& of t e most accurate ar!uments& some lead to 1deas of relations& of w ic t ey say t ere is no inde$endent class& and ot ers introduce t e ,t ird man,. And in !eneral t e ar!uments for t e %orms destroy t in!s for w ose e*istence t e belie#ers in %orms are more 2ealous t an for t e e*istence of t e 1deas" for it follows t at not t e dyad but number is first& and t at $rior to number is t e relati#e& and t at t is is $rior to t e absolute0besides all t e ot er $oints on w ic certain $eo$le& by followin! out t e o$inions eld about t e %orms& came into conflict wit t e $rinci$les of t e t eory. A!ain& accordin! to t e assum$tion on t e belief in t e 1deas rests& t ere will be %orms not only of substances but also of many ot er t in!s" for t e conce$t is sin!le not only in t e case of substances& but also in t at of non0substances& and t ere are sciences of ot er t in!s t an substance" and a t ousand ot er suc difficulties confront t em. But accordin! to t e necessities of t e case and t e o$inions about t e %orms& if t ey can be s ared in t ere must be 1deas of substances only. %or t ey are not s ared in incidentally& but

eac %orm must be s ared in as somet in! not $redicated of a sub.ect. 'By ,bein! s ared in incidentally, 1 mean t at if a t in! s ares in ,double itself,& it s ares also in ,eternal,& but incidentally" for ,t e double, a$$ens to be eternal.( ) erefore t e %orms will be substance. But t e same names indicate substance in t is and in t e ideal world 'or w at will be t e meanin! of sayin! t at t ere is somet in! a$art from t e $articulars0t e one o#er many<(. And if t e 1deas and t e t in!s t at s are in t em a#e t e same form& t ere will be somet in! common> for w y s ould ,5, be one and t e same in t e $eris able 5,s& or in t e 5,s w ic are many but eternal& and not t e same in t e ,5 itself, as in t e indi#idual 5< But if t ey a#e not t e same form& t ey will a#e only t e name in common& and it is as if one were to call bot Callias and a $iece of wood a ,man,& wit out obser#in! any community between t em. But if we are to su$$ose t at in ot er res$ects t e common definitions a$$ly to t e %orms& e.!. t at ,$lane fi!ure, and t e ot er $arts of t e definition a$$ly to t e circle itself& but ,w at really is, as to be added& we must in6uire w et er t is is not absolutely meanin!less. %or to w at is t is to be added< )o ,centre, or to ,$lane, or to all t e $arts of t e definition< %or all t e elements in t e essence are 1deas& e.!. ,animal, and ,two0footed,. %urt er& t ere must be some 1deal answerin! to ,$lane, abo#e& some nature w ic will be $resent in all t e %orms as t eir !enus. 5 Abo#e all one mi! t discuss t e 6uestion w at in t e world t e %orms contribute to sensible t in!s& eit er to t ose t at are eternal or to t ose t at come into bein! and cease to be" for t ey cause neit er mo#ement nor any c an!e in t em. But a!ain t ey el$ in no wise eit er towards t e knowled!e of ot er t in!s 'for t ey are not e#en t e substance of t ese& else t ey would a#e been in t em(& or towards t eir bein!& if t ey are not in t e indi#iduals w ic s are in t em" t ou! if t ey were& t ey mi! t be t ou! t to be causes& as w ite causes w iteness in a w ite ob.ect by enterin! into its com$osition. But t is ar!ument& w ic was used first by Ana*a!oras& and later by 4udo*us in is discussion of difficulties and by certain ot ers& is #ery easily u$set" for it is easy to collect many and insu$erable ob.ections to suc a #iew. But& furt er& all ot er t in!s cannot come from t e %orms in any of t e usual senses of ,from,. And to say t at t ey are $atterns and t e ot er t in!s s are in t em is to use em$ty words and $oetical meta$ ors. %or w at is it t at works& lookin! to t e 1deas< And any t in! can bot be and come into bein! wit out bein! co$ied from somet in! else& so t at& w et er /ocrates e*ists or not& a man like /ocrates mi! t come to be. And e#idently t is mi! t be so e#en if /ocrates were eternal. And t ere will be se#eral $atterns of t e

same t in!& and t erefore se#eral %orms" e.!. ,animal, and ,two0footed,& and also ,man0 imself,& will be %orms of man. A!ain& t e %orms are $atterns not only of sensible t in!s& but of %orms t emsel#es also" i.e. t e !enus is t e $attern of t e #arious forms0of0a0!enus" t erefore t e same t in! will be $attern and co$y. A!ain& it would seem im$ossible t at substance and t at w ose substance it is s ould e*ist a$art" ow& t erefore& could t e 1deas& bein! t e substances of t in!s& e*ist a$art< 1n t e - aedo t e case is stated in t is way0t at t e %orms are causes bot of bein! and of becomin!. 9et t ou! t e %orms e*ist& still t in!s do not come into bein!& unless t ere is somet in! to ori!inate mo#ement" and many ot er t in!s come into bein! 'e.!. a ouse or a rin!( of w ic t ey say t ere are no %orms. Clearly t erefore e#en t e t in!s of w ic t ey say t ere are 1deas can bot be and come into bein! owin! to suc causes as $roduce t e t in!s .ust mentioned& and not owin! to t e %orms. But re!ardin! t e 1deas it is $ossible& bot in t is way and by more abstract and accurate ar!uments& to collect many ob.ections like t ose we a#e considered. @ /ince we a#e discussed t ese $oints& it is well to consider a!ain t e results re!ardin! numbers w ic confront t ose w o say t at numbers are se$arable substances and first causes of t in!s. 1f number is an entity and its substance is not in! ot er t an .ust number& as some say& it follows t at eit er '1( t ere is a first in it and a second& eac bein! different in s$ecies&0and eit er 'a( t is is true of t e units wit out e*ce$tion& and any unit is inassociable wit any unit& or 'b( t ey are all wit out e*ce$tion successi#e& and any of t em are associable wit any& as t ey say is t e case wit mat ematical number" for in mat ematical number no one unit is in any way different from anot er. :r 'c( some units must be associable and some not" e.!. su$$ose t at 5 is first after 1& and t en comes 3 and t en t e rest of t e number series& and t e units in eac number are associable& e.!. t ose in t e first 5 are associable wit one anot er& and t ose in t e first 3 wit one anot er& and so wit t e ot er numbers" but t e units in t e ,50itself, are inassociable wit t ose in t e ,30itself," and similarly in t e case of t e ot er successi#e numbers. And so w ile mat ematical number is counted t us0after 1& 5 'w ic consists of anot er 1 besides t e former 1(& and 3 w ic consists of anot er 1 besides t ese two(& and t e ot er numbers similarly& ideal number is counted t us0after 1& a distinct 5 w ic does not include t e first 1& and a 3 w ic does not include t e 5 and t e rest of t e number series similarly. :r '5( one kind of number must be like t e first t at was named& one like t at w ic t e mat ematicians s$eak of& and t at w ic we a#e named last must be a t ird kind.

A!ain& t ese kinds of numbers must eit er be se$arable from t in!s& or not se$arable but in ob.ects of $erce$tion 'not owe#er in t e way w ic we first considered& in t e sense t at ob.ects of $erce$tion consists of numbers w ic are $resent in t em(0eit er one kind and not anot er& or all of t em. ) ese are of necessity t e only ways in w ic t e numbers can e*ist. And of t ose w o say t at t e 1 is t e be!innin! and substance and element of all t in!s& and t at number is formed from t e 1 and somet in! else& almost e#ery one as described number in one of t ese ways" only no one as said all t e units are inassociable. And t is as a$$ened reasonably enou! " for t ere can be no way besides t ose mentioned. /ome say bot kinds of number e*ist& t at w ic as a before and after bein! identical wit t e 1deas& and mat ematical number bein! different from t e 1deas and from sensible t in!s& and bot bein! se$arable from sensible t in!s" and ot ers say mat ematical number alone e*ists& as t e first of realities& se$arate from sensible t in!s. And t e -yt a!oreans& also& belie#e in one kind of number0t e mat ematical" only t ey say it is not se$arate but sensible substances are formed out of it. %or t ey construct t e w ole uni#erse out of numbers0only not numbers consistin! of abstract units" t ey su$$ose t e units to a#e s$atial ma!nitude. But ow t e first 1 was constructed so as to a#e ma!nitude& t ey seem unable to say. Anot er t inker says t e first kind of number& t at of t e %orms& alone e*ists& and some say mat ematical number is identical wit t is. ) e case of lines& $lanes& and solids is similar. %or some t ink t at t ose w ic are t e ob.ects of mat ematics are different from t ose w ic come after t e 1deas" and of t ose w o e*$ress t emsel#es ot erwise some s$eak of t e ob.ects of mat ematics and in a mat ematical way0#i2. t ose w o do not make t e 1deas numbers nor say t at 1deas e*ist" and ot ers s$eak of t e ob.ects of mat ematics& but not mat ematically" for t ey say t at neit er is e#ery s$atial ma!nitude di#isible into ma!nitudes& nor do any two units taken at random make 5. All w o say t e 1 is an element and $rinci$le of t in!s su$$ose numbers to consist of abstract units& e*ce$t t e -yt a!oreans" but t ey su$$ose t e numbers to a#e ma!nitude& as as been said before. 1t is clear from t is statement& t en& in ow many ways numbers may be described& and t at all t e ways a#e been mentioned" and all t ese #iews are im$ossible& but some $er a$s more t an ot ers. A %irst& t en& let us in6uire if t e units are associable or inassociable& and if inassociable& in w ic of t e two ways we distin!uis ed. %or it is $ossible t at any unity is inassociable

wit any& and it is $ossible t at t ose in t e ,itself, are inassociable wit t ose in t e ,itself,& and& !enerally& t at t ose in eac ideal number are inassociable wit t ose in ot er ideal numbers. +ow '1( all units are associable and wit out difference& we !et mat ematical number0only one kind of number& and t e 1deas cannot be t e numbers. %or w at sort of number will man0 imself or animal0itself or any ot er %orm be< ) ere is one 1dea of eac t in! e.!. one of man0 imself and anot er one of animal0itself" but t e similar and undifferentiated numbers are infinitely many& so t at any $articular 3 is no more man0 imself t an any ot er 3. But if t e 1deas are not numbers& neit er can t ey e*ist at all. %or from w at $rinci$les will t e 1deas come< 1t is number t at comes from t e 1 and t e indefinite dyad& and t e $rinci$les or elements are said to be $rinci$les and elements of number& and t e 1deas cannot be ranked as eit er $rior or $osterior to t e numbers. But '5( if t e units are inassociable& and inassociable in t e sense t at any is inassociable wit any ot er& number of t is sort cannot be mat ematical number" for mat ematical number consists of undifferentiated units& and t e trut s $ro#ed of it suit t is c aracter. +or can it be ideal number. %or 5 will not $roceed immediately from 1 and t e indefinite dyad& and be followed by t e successi#e numbers& as t ey say ,5&3&=, for t e units in t e ideal are !enerated at t e same time& w et er& as t e first older of t e t eory said& from une6uals 'comin! into bein! w en t ese were e6uali2ed( or in some ot er way0since& if one unit is to be $rior to t e ot er& it will be $rior also to 5 t e com$osed of t ese" for w en t ere is one t in! $rior and anot er $osterior& t e resultant of t ese will be $rior to one and $osterior to t e ot er. A!ain& since t e 10itself is first& and t en t ere is a $articular 1 w ic is first amon! t e ot ers and ne*t after t e 10itself& and a!ain a t ird w ic is ne*t after t e second and ne*t but one after t e first 1&0so t e units must be $rior to t e numbers after w ic t ey are named w en we count t em" e.!. t ere will be a t ird unit in 5 before 3 e*ists& and a fourt and a fift in 3 before t e numbers = and 5 e*ist.0+ow none of t ese t inkers as said t e units are inassociable in t is way& but accordin! to t eir $rinci$les it is reasonable t at t ey s ould be so e#en in t is way& t ou! in trut it is im$ossible. %or it is reasonable bot t at t e units s ould a#e $riority and $osteriority if t ere is a first unit or first 1& and also t at t e 5,s s ould if t ere is a first 5" for after t e first it is reasonable and necessary t at t ere s ould be a second& and if a second& a t ird& and so wit t e ot ers successi#ely. 'And to say bot t in!s at t e same time& t at a unit is first and anot er unit is second after t e ideal 1& and t at a 5 is first after it& is im$ossible.( But t ey make a first unit or 1& but not also a second and a t ird& and a first 5& but not also a second and a t ird. Clearly& also& it is not $ossible& if all t e

units are inassociable& t at t ere s ould be a 50itself and a 30itself" and so wit t e ot er numbers. %or w et er t e units are undifferentiated or different eac from eac & number must be counted by addition& e.!. 5 by addin! anot er 1 to t e one& 3 by addin! anot er 1 to t e two& and similarly. ) is bein! so& numbers cannot be !enerated as t ey !enerate t em& from t e 5 and t e 1" for 5 becomes $art of 3 and 3 of = and t e same a$$ens in t e case of t e succeedin! numbers& but t ey say = came from t e first 5 and t e indefinite w ic makes it two 5,s ot er t an t e 50itself" if not& t e 50itself will be a $art of = and one ot er 5 will be added. And similarly 5 will consist of t e 10itself and anot er 1" but if t is is so& t e ot er element cannot be an indefinite 5" for it !enerates one unit& not& as t e indefinite 5 does& a definite 5. A!ain& besides t e 30itself and t e 50itself ow can t ere be ot er 3,s and 5,s< And ow do t ey consist of $rior and $osterior units< All t is is absurd and fictitious& and t ere cannot be a first 5 and t en a 30itself. 9et t ere must& if t e 1 and t e indefinite dyad are to be t e elements. But if t e results are im$ossible& it is also im$ossible t at t ese are t e !eneratin! $rinci$les. 1f t e units& t en& are differentiated& eac from eac & t ese results and ot ers similar to t ese follow of necessity. But '3( if t ose in different numbers are differentiated& but t ose in t e same number are alone undifferentiated from one anot er& e#en so t e difficulties t at follow are no less. 4.!. in t e 100itself t eir are ten units& and t e 10 is com$osed bot of t em and of two 5,s. But since t e 100itself is not any c ance number nor com$osed of any c ance 5,s00or& for t at matter& units00t e units in t is 10 must differ. %or if t ey do not differ& neit er will t e 5,s of w ic t e 10 consists differ" but since t ese differ& t e units also will differ. But if t ey differ& will t ere be no ot er 5,s in t e 10 but only t ese two& or will t ere be ot ers< 1f t ere are not& t is is $arado*ical" and if t ere are& w at sort of 10 will consist of t em< %or t ere is no ot er in t e 10 but t e 10 itself. But it is actually necessary on t eir #iew t at t e = s ould not consist of any c ance 5,s" for t e indefinite as t ey say& recei#ed t e definite 5 and made two 5,s" for its nature was to double w at it recei#ed. A!ain& as to t e 5 bein! an entity a$art from its two units& and t e 3 an entity a$art from its t ree units& ow is t is $ossible< 4it er by one,s s arin! in t e ot er& as ,$ale man, is different from ,$ale, and ,man, 'for it s ares in t ese(& or w en one is a differentia of t e ot er& as ,man, is different from ,animal, and ,two0footed,. A!ain& some t in!s are one by contact& some by intermi*ture& some by $osition" none of w ic can belon! to t e units of w ic t e 5

or t e 3 consists" but as two men are not a unity a$art from bot & so must it be wit t e units. And t eir bein! indi#isible will make no difference to t em" for $oints too are indi#isible& but yet a $air of t em is not in! a$art from t e two. But t is conse6uence also we must not for!et& t at it follows t at t ere are $rior and $osterior 5 and similarly wit t e ot er numbers. %or let t e 5,s in t e = be simultaneous" yet t ese are $rior to t ose in t e B and as t e 5 !enerated t em& t ey !enerated t e =,s in t e B0itself. ) erefore if t e first 5 is an 1dea& t ese 5,s also will be 1deas of some kind. And t e same account a$$lies to t e units" for t e units in t e first 5 !enerate t e four in =& so t at all t e units come to be 1deas and an 1dea will be com$osed of 1deas. Clearly t erefore t ose t in!s also of w ic t ese a$$en to be t e 1deas will be com$osite& e.!. one mi! t say t at animals are com$osed of animals& if t ere are 1deas of t em. 1n !eneral& to differentiate t e units in any way is an absurdity and a fiction" and by a fiction 1 mean a forced statement made to suit a y$ot esis. %or neit er in 6uantity nor in 6uality do we see unit differin! from unit& and number must be eit er e6ual or une6ual0all number but es$ecially t at w ic consists of abstract units0so t at if one number is neit er !reater nor less t an anot er& it is e6ual to it" but t in!s t at are e6ual and in no wise differentiated we take to be t e same w en we are s$eakin! of numbers. 1f not& not e#en t e 5 in t e 100itself will be undifferentiated& t ou! t ey are e6ual" for w at reason will t e man w o alle!es t at t ey are not differentiated be able to !i#e< A!ain& if e#ery unit G anot er unit makes two& a unit from t e 50itself and one from t e 30itself will make a 5. +ow 'a( t is will consist of differentiated units" and will it be $rior to t e 3 or $osterior< 1t rat er seems t at it must be $rior" for one of t e units is simultaneous wit t e 3 and t e ot er is simultaneous wit t e 5. And we& for our $art& su$$ose t at in !eneral 1 and 1& w et er t e t in!s are e6ual or une6ual& is 5& e.!. t e !ood and t e bad& or a man and a orse" but t ose w o old t ese #iews say t at not e#en two units are 5. 1f t e number of t e 30itself is not !reater t an t at of t e 5& t is is sur$risin!" and if it is !reater& clearly t ere is also a number in it e6ual to t e 5& so t at t is is not different from t e 50itself. But t is is not $ossible& if t ere is a first and a second number. +or will t e 1deas be numbers. %or in t is $articular $oint t ey are ri! t w o claim t at t e units must be different& if t ere are to be 1deas" as as been said before. %or t e %orm is uni6ue" but if t e units are not different& t e 5,s and t e 3,s also will not be different. ) is is also t e reason w y t ey must say t at w en we count t us0,1&5,0we do not $roceed by addin! to t e !i#en number"

for if we do& neit er will t e numbers be !enerated from t e indefinite dyad& nor can a number be an 1dea" for t en one 1dea will be in anot er& and all %orms will be $arts of one %orm. And so wit a #iew to t eir y$ot esis t eir statements are ri! t& but as a w ole t ey are wron!" for t eir #iew is #ery destructi#e& since t ey will admit t at t is 6uestion itself affords some difficulty0w et er& w en we count and say 01&5&30we count by addition or by se$arate $ortions. But we do bot " and so it is absurd to reason back from t is $roblem to so !reat a difference of essence. B %irst of all it is well to determine w at is t e differentia of a number0and of a unit& if it as a differentia. Lnits must differ eit er in 6uantity or in 6uality" and neit er of t ese seems to be $ossible. But number 6ua number differs in 6uantity. And if t e units also did differ in 6uantity& number would differ from number& t ou! e6ual in number of units. A!ain& are t e first units !reater or smaller& and do t e later ones increase or diminis < All t ese are irrational su$$ositions. But neit er can t ey differ in 6uality. %or no attribute can attac to t em" for e#en to numbers 6uality is said to belon! after 6uantity. A!ain& 6uality could not come to t em eit er from t e 1 or t e dyad" for t e former as no 6uality& and t e latter !i#es 6uantity" for t is entity is w at makes t in!s to be many. 1f t e facts are really ot erwise& t ey s ould state t is 6uite at t e be!innin! and determine if $ossible& re!ardin! t e differentia of t e unit& w y it must e*ist& and& failin! t is& w at differentia t ey mean. 4#idently t en& if t e 1deas are numbers& t e units cannot all be associable& nor can t ey be inassociable in eit er of t e two ways. But neit er is t e way in w ic some ot ers s$eak about numbers correct. ) ese are t ose w o do not t ink t ere are 1deas& eit er wit out 6ualification or as identified wit certain numbers& but t ink t e ob.ects of mat ematics e*ist and t e numbers are t e first of e*istin! t in!s& and t e 10itself is t e startin!0$oint of t em. 1t is $arado*ical t at t ere s ould be a 1 w ic is first of 1,s& as t ey say& but not a 5 w ic is first of 5,s& nor a 3 of 3,s" for t e same reasonin! a$$lies to all. 1f& t en& t e facts wit re!ard to number are so& and one su$$oses mat ematical number alone to e*ist& t e 1 is not t e startin!0$oint 'for t is sort of 1 must differ from t e0ot er units" and if t is is so& t ere must also be a 5 w ic is first of 5,s& and similarly wit t e ot er successi#e numbers(. But if t e 1 is t e startin!0$oint& t e trut about t e numbers must rat er be w at -lato used to say& and t ere must be a first 5 and 3 and numbers must not be associable wit one anot er. But if on t e ot er and one su$$oses t is& many im$ossible results& as we a#e said&

follow. But eit er t is or t e ot er must be t e case& so t at if neit er is& number cannot e*ist se$arately. 1t is e#ident& also& from t is t at t e t ird #ersion is t e worst&0t e #iew ideal and mat ematical number is t e same. %or two mistakes must t en meet in t e one o$inion. '1( ;at ematical number cannot be of t is sort& but t e older of t is #iew as to s$in it out by makin! su$$ositions $eculiar to imself. And '5( e must also admit all t e conse6uences t at confront t ose w o s$eak of number in t e sense of ,%orms,. ) e -yt a!orean #ersion in one way affords fewer difficulties t an t ose before named& but in anot er way as ot ers $eculiar to itself. %or not t inkin! of number as ca$able of e*istin! se$arately remo#es many of t e im$ossible conse6uences" but t at bodies s ould be com$osed of numbers& and t at t is s ould be mat ematical number& is im$ossible. %or it is not true to s$eak of indi#isible s$atial ma!nitudes" and owe#er muc t ere mi! t be ma!nitudes of t is sort& units at least a#e not ma!nitude" and ow can a ma!nitude be com$osed of indi#isibles< But arit metical number& at least& consists of units& w ile t ese t inkers identify number wit real t in!s" at any rate t ey a$$ly t eir $ro$ositions to bodies as if t ey consisted of t ose numbers. 1f& t en& it is necessary& if number is a self0subsistent real t in!& t at it s ould e*ist in one of t ese ways w ic a#e been mentioned& and if it cannot e*ist in any of t ese& e#idently number as no suc nature as t ose w o make it se$arable set u$ for it. A!ain& does eac unit come from t e !reat and t e small& e6uali2ed& or one from t e small& anot er from t e !reat< 'a( 1f t e latter& neit er does eac t in! contain all t e elements& nor are t e units wit out difference" for in one t ere is t e !reat and in anot er t e small& w ic is contrary in its nature to t e !reat. A!ain& ow is it wit t e units in t e 30itself< :ne of t em is an odd unit. But $er a$s it is for t is reason t at t ey !i#e 10itself t e middle $lace in odd numbers. 'b( But if eac of t e two units consists of bot t e !reat and t e small& e6uali2ed& ow will t e 5 w ic is a sin!le t in!& consist of t e !reat and t e small< :r ow will it differ from t e unit< A!ain& t e unit is $rior to t e 5" for w en it is destroyed t e 5 is destroyed. 1t must& t en& be t e 1dea of an 1dea since it is $rior to an 1dea& and it must a#e come into bein! before it. %rom w at& t en< +ot from t e indefinite dyad& for its function was to double. A!ain& number must be eit er infinite or finite" for t ese t inkers t ink of number as ca$able of e*istin! se$arately& so t at it is not $ossible t at neit er of t ose alternati#es s ould be true. Clearly it cannot be infinite" for infinite number is neit er odd nor e#en& but t e !eneration of numbers is always t e !eneration eit er of an odd or of an e#en number" in one way& w en 1 o$erates

on an e#en number& an odd number is $roduced" in anot er way& w en 5 o$erates& t e numbers !ot from 1 by doublin! are $roduced" in anot er way& w en t e odd numbers o$erate& t e ot er e#en numbers are $roduced. A!ain& if e#ery 1dea is an 1dea of somet in!& and t e numbers are 1deas& infinite number itself will be an 1dea of somet in!& eit er of some sensible t in! or of somet in! else. 9et t is is not $ossible in #iew of t eir t esis any more t an it is reasonable in itself& at least if t ey arran!e t e 1deas as t ey do. But if number is finite& ow far does it !o< Wit re!ard to t is not only t e fact but t e reason s ould be stated. But if number !oes only u$ to 10 as some say& firstly t e %orms will soon run s ort" e.!. if 3 is man0 imself& w at number will be t e orse0itself< ) e series of t e numbers w ic are t e se#eral t in!s0t emsel#es !oes u$ to 10. 1t must& t en& be one of t e numbers wit in t ese limits" for it is t ese t at are substances and 1deas. 9et t ey will run s ort" for t e #arious forms of animal will outnumber t em. At t e same time it is clear t at if in t is way t e 3 is man0 imself& t e ot er 3,s are so also 'for t ose in identical numbers are similar(& so t at t ere will be an infinite number of men" if eac 3 is an 1dea& eac of t e numbers will be man0 imself& and if not& t ey will at least be men. And if t e smaller number is $art of t e !reater 'bein! number of suc a sort t at t e units in t e same number are associable(& t en if t e =0itself is an 1dea of somet in!& e.!. of , orse, or of ,w ite,& man will be a $art of orse& if man is 1t is $arado*ical also t at t ere s ould be an 1dea of 10 but not of 11& nor of t e succeedin! numbers. A!ain& t ere bot are and come to be certain t in!s of w ic t ere are no %orms" w y& t en& are t ere not %orms of t em also< We infer t at t e %orms are not causes. A!ain& it is $arado*ical0if t e number series u$ to 10 is more of a real t in! and a %orm t an 10 itself. ) ere is no !eneration of t e former as one t in!& and t ere is of t e latter. But t ey try to work on t e assum$tion t at t e series of numbers u$ to 10 is a com$lete series. At least t ey !enerate t e deri#ati#es0e.!. t e #oid& $ro$ortion& t e odd& and t e ot ers of t is kind0wit in t e decade. %or some t in!s& e.!. mo#ement and rest& !ood and bad& t ey assi!n to t e ori!inati#e $rinci$les& and t e ot ers to t e numbers. ) is is w y t ey identify t e odd wit 1" for if t e odd im$lied 3 ow would 5 be odd< A!ain& s$atial ma!nitudes and all suc t in!s are e*$lained wit out !oin! beyond a definite number" e.!. t e first& t e indi#isible& line& t en t e 5 Jc." t ese entities also e*tend only u$ to 10. A!ain& if number can e*ist se$arately& one mi! t ask w ic is $rior0 1& or 3 or 5< 1nasmuc as t e number is com$osite& 1 is $rior& but inasmuc as t e uni#ersal and t e form is $rior& t e number is $rior" for eac of t e units is $art of t e number as its matter& and t e number acts as form. And in a sense t e ri! t an!le is $rior

to t e acute& because it is determinate and in #irtue of its definition" but in a sense t e acute is $rior& because it is a $art and t e ri! t an!le is di#ided into acute an!les. As matter& t en& t e acute an!le and t e element and t e unit are $rior& but in res$ect of t e form and of t e substance as e*$ressed in t e definition& t e ri! t an!le& and t e w ole consistin! of t e matter and t e form& are $rior" for t e concrete t in! is nearer to t e form and to w at is e*$ressed in t e definition& t ou! in !eneration it is later. 3ow t en is 1 t e startin!0$oint< Because it is not di#isiable& t ey say" but bot t e uni#ersal& and t e $articular or t e element& are indi#isible. But t ey are startin!0$oints in different ways& one in definition and t e ot er in time. 1n w ic way& t en& is 1 t e startin!0$oint< As as been said& t e ri! t an!le is t ou! t to be $rior to t e acute& and t e acute to t e ri! t& and eac is one. Accordin!ly t ey make 1 t e startin!0$oint in bot ways. But t is is im$ossible. %or t e uni#ersal is one as form or substance& w ile t e element is one as a $art or as matter. %or eac of t e two is in a sense one0in trut eac of t e two units e*ists $otentially 'at least if t e number is a unity and not like a ea$& i.e. if different numbers consist of differentiated units& as t ey say(& but not in com$lete reality" and t e cause of t e error t ey fell into is t at t ey were conductin! t eir in6uiry at t e same time from t e stand$oint of mat ematics and from t at of uni#ersal definitions& so t at '1( from t e former stand$oint t ey treated unity& t eir first $rinci$le& as a $oint" for t e unit is a $oint wit out $osition. ) ey $ut t in!s to!et er out of t e smallest $arts& as some ot ers also a#e done. ) erefore t e unit becomes t e matter of numbers and at t e same time $rior to 5" and a!ain $osterior& 5 bein! treated as a w ole& a unity& and a form. But '5( because t ey were seekin! t e uni#ersal t ey treated t e unity w ic can be $redicated of a number& as in t is sense also a $art of t e number. But t ese c aracteristics cannot belon! at t e same time to t e same t in!. 1f t e 10itself must be unitary 'for it differs in not in! from ot er 1,s e*ce$t t at it is t e startin!0$oint(& and t e 5 is di#isible but t e unit is not& t e unit must be liker t e 10itself t an t e 5 is. But if t e unit is liker it& it must be liker to t e unit t an to t e 5" t erefore eac of t e units in 5 must be $rior to t e 5. But t ey deny t is" at least t ey !enerate t e 5 first. A!ain& if t e 50itself is a unity and t e 30itself is one also& bot form a 5. %rom w at& t en& is t is 5 $roduced< C /ince t ere is not contact in numbers& but succession& #i2. between t e units between w ic t ere is not in!& e.!. between t ose in 5 or in 3 one mi! t ask w et er t ese succeed t e 10itself or not& and w et er& of t e terms t at succeed it& 5 or eit er of t e units in 5 is $rior.

/imilar difficulties occur wit re!ard to t e classes of t in!s $osterior to number&0t e line& t e $lane& and t e solid. %or some construct t ese out of t e s$ecies of t e ,!reat and small," e.!. lines from t e ,lon! and s ort,& $lanes from t e ,broad and narrow,& masses from t e ,dee$ and s allow," w ic are s$ecies of t e ,!reat and small,. And t e ori!inati#e $rinci$le of suc t in!s w ic answers to t e 1 different t inkers describe in different ways& And in t ese also t e im$ossibilities& t e fictions& and t e contradictions of all $robability are seen to be innumerable. %or 'i( !eometrical classes are se#ered from one anot er& unless t e $rinci$les of t ese are im$lied in one anot er in suc a way t at t e ,broad and narrow, is also ,lon! and s ort, 'but if t is is so& t e $lane will be line and t e solid a $lane" a!ain& ow will an!les and fi!ures and suc t in!s be e*$lained<(. And 'ii( t e same a$$ens as in re!ard to number" for ,lon! and s ort,& Jc.& are attributes of ma!nitude& but ma!nitude does not consist of t ese& any more t an t e line consists of ,strai! t and cur#ed,& or solids of ,smoot and rou! ,. 'All t ese #iews s are a difficulty w ic occurs wit re!ard to s$ecies0of0a0!enus& w en one $osits t e uni#ersals& #i2. w et er it is animal0itself or somet in! ot er t an animal0itself t at is in t e $articular animal. )rue& if t e uni#ersal is not se$arable from sensible t in!s& t is will $resent no difficulty" but if t e 1 and t e numbers are se$arable& as t ose w o e*$ress t ese #iews say& it is not easy to sol#e t e difficulty& if one may a$$ly t e words ,not easy, to t e im$ossible. %or w en we a$$re end t e unity in 5& or in !eneral in a number& do we a$$re end a t in!0itself or somet in! else<(. /ome& t en& !enerate s$atial ma!nitudes from matter of t is sort& ot ers from t e $oint 0and t e $oint is t ou! t by t em to be not 1 but somet in! like 10and from ot er matter like $lurality& but not identical wit it" about w ic $rinci$les none t e less t e same difficulties occur. %or if t e matter is one& line and $lane0and soli will be t e same" for from t e same elements will come one and t e same t in!. But if t e matters are more t an one& and t ere is one for t e line and a second for t e $lane and anot er for t e solid& t ey eit er are im$lied in one anot er or not& so t at t e same results will follow e#en so" for eit er t e $lane will not contain a line or it will e a line. A!ain& ow number can consist of t e one and $lurality& t ey make no attem$t to e*$lain" but owe#er t ey e*$ress t emsel#es& t e same ob.ections arise as confront t ose w o construct number out of t e one and t e indefinite dyad. %or t e one #iew !enerates number from t e uni#ersally $redicated $lurality& and not from a $articular $lurality" and t e ot er !enerates it from a $articular $lurality& but t e first" for 5 is said to be a ,first $lurality,. ) erefore t ere is $ractically no difference& but t e same difficulties will follow&0is it intermi*ture or $osition or blendin! or !eneration< and so on.

Abo#e all one mi! t $ress t e 6uestion ,if eac unit is one& w at does it come from<, Certainly eac is not t e one0itself. 1t must& t en& come from t e one itself and $lurality& or a $art of $lurality. )o say t at t e unit is a $lurality is im$ossible& for it is indi#isible" and to !enerate it from a $art of $lurality in#ol#es many ot er ob.ections" for 'a( eac of t e $arts must be indi#isible 'or it will be a $lurality and t e unit will be di#isible( and t e elements will not be t e one and $lurality" for t e sin!le units do not come from $lurality and t e one. A!ain& '&t e older of t is #iew does not in! but $resu$$ose anot er number" for is $lurality of indi#isibles is a number. A!ain& we must in6uire& in #iew of t is t eory also& w et er t e number is infinite or finite. %or t ere was at first& as it seems& a $lurality t at was itself finite& from w ic and from t e one comes t e finite number of units. And t ere is anot er $lurality t at is $lurality0itself and infinite $lurality" w ic sort of $lurality& t en& is t e element w ic co0o$erates wit t e one< :ne mi! t in6uire similarly about t e $oint& i.e. t e element out of w ic t ey make s$atial ma!nitudes. %or surely t is is not t e one and only $oint" at any rate& t en& let t em say out of w at eac of t e $oints is formed. Certainly not of some distance G t e $oint0itself. +or a!ain can t ere be indi#isible $arts of a distance& as t e elements out of w ic t e units are said to be made are indi#isible $arts of $lurality" for number consists of indi#isibles& but s$atial ma!nitudes do not. All t ese ob.ections& t en& and ot ers of t e sort make it e#ident t at number and s$atial ma!nitudes cannot e*ist a$art from t in!s. A!ain& t e discord about numbers between t e #arious #ersions is a si!n t at it is t e incorrectness of t e alle!ed facts t emsel#es t at brin!s confusion into t e t eories. %or t ose w o make t e ob.ects of mat ematics alone e*ist a$art from sensible t in!s& seein! t e difficulty about t e %orms and t eir fictitiousness& abandoned ideal number and $osited mat ematical. But t ose w o wis ed to make t e %orms at t e same time also numbers& but did not see& if one assumed t ese $rinci$les& ow mat ematical number was to e*ist a$art from ideal& made ideal and mat ematical number t e same0in words& since in fact mat ematical number as been destroyed" for t ey state y$ot eses $eculiar to t emsel#es and not t ose of mat ematics. And e w o first su$$osed t at t e %orms e*ist and t at t e %orms are numbers and t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics e*ist& naturally se$arated t e two. ) erefore it turns out t at all of t em are ri! t in some res$ect& but on t e w ole not ri! t. And t ey t emsel#es confirm t is& for t eir statements do not a!ree but conflict. ) e cause is t at t eir y$ot eses and t eir $rinci$les are false. And it is ard to make a !ood case out of bad materials& accordin! to 4$ic armus> ,as soon as ,tis said& ,tis seen to be wron!., But re!ardin! numbers t e 6uestions we a#e raised and t e

conclusions we a#e reac ed are sufficient 'for w ile e w o is already con#inced mi! t be furt er con#inced by a lon!er discussion& one not yet con#inced would not come any nearer to con#iction(" re!ardin! t e first $rinci$les and t e first causes and elements& t e #iews e*$ressed by t ose w o discuss only sensible substance a#e been $artly stated in our works on nature& and $artly do not belon! to t e $resent in6uiry" but t e #iews of t ose w o assert t at t ere are ot er substances besides t e sensible must be considered ne*t after t ose we a#e been mentionin!. /ince& t en& some say t at t e 1deas and t e numbers are suc substances& and t at t e elements of t ese are elements and $rinci$les of real t in!s& we must in6uire re!ardin! t ese w at t ey say and in w at sense t ey say it. ) ose w o $osit numbers only& and t ese mat ematical& must be considered later" but as re!ards t ose w o belie#e in t e 1deas one mi! t sur#ey at t e same time t eir way of t inkin! and t e difficulty into w ic t ey fall. %or t ey at t e same time make t e 1deas uni#ersal and a!ain treat t em as se$arable and as indi#iduals. ) at t is is not $ossible as been ar!ued before. ) e reason w y t ose w o described t eir substances as uni#ersal combined t ese two c aracteristics in one t in!& is t at t ey did not make substances identical wit sensible t in!s. ) ey t ou! t t at t e $articulars in t e sensible world were a state of flu* and none of t em remained& but t at t e uni#ersal was a$art from t ese and somet in! different. And /ocrates !a#e t e im$ulse to t is t eory& as we said in our earlier discussion& by reason of is definitions& but e did not se$arate uni#ersals from indi#iduals" and in t is e t ou! t ri! tly& in not se$aratin! t em. ) is is $lain from t e results" for wit out t e uni#ersal it is not $ossible to !et knowled!e& but t e se$aration is t e cause of t e ob.ections t at arise wit re!ard to t e 1deas. 3is successors& owe#er& treatin! it as necessary& if t ere are to be any substances besides t e sensible and transient substances& t at t ey must be se$arable& ad no ot ers& but !a#e se$arate e*istence to t ese uni#ersally $redicated substances& so t at it followed t at uni#ersals and indi#iduals were almost t e same sort of t in!. ) is in itself& t en& would be one difficulty in t e #iew we a#e mentioned. 10 Let us now mention a $oint w ic $resents a certain difficulty bot to t ose w o belie#e in t e 1deas and to t ose w o do not& and w ic was stated before& at t e be!innin!& amon! t e $roblems. 1f we do not su$$ose substances to be se$arate& and in t e way in w ic indi#idual t in!s are said to be se$arate& we s all destroy substance in t e sense in w ic we understand ,substance," but if we concei#e substances to be se$arable& ow are we to concei#e t eir elements and t eir $rinci$les<

1f t ey are indi#idual and not uni#ersal& 'a( real t in!s will be .ust of t e same number as t e elements& and 'b( t e elements will not be knowable. %or 'a( let t e syllables in s$eec be substances& and t eir elements elements of substances" t en t ere must be only one ,ba, and one of eac of t e syllables& since t ey are not uni#ersal and t e same in form but eac is one in number and a ,t is, and not a kind $ossessed of a common name 'and a!ain t ey su$$ose t at t e ,.ust w at a t in! is, is in eac case one(. And if t e syllables are uni6ue& so too are t e $arts of w ic t ey consist" t ere will not& t en& be more a,s t an one& nor more t an one of any of t e ot er elements& on t e same $rinci$le on w ic an identical syllable cannot e*ist in t e $lural number. But if t is is so& t ere will not be ot er t in!s e*istin! besides t e elements& but only t e elements. 'b( A!ain& t e elements will not be e#en knowable" for t ey are not uni#ersal& and knowled!e is of uni#ersals. ) is is clear from demonstrations and from definitions" for we do not conclude t at t is trian!le as its an!les e6ual to two ri! t an!les& unless e#ery trian!le as its an!les e6ual to two ri! t an!les& nor t at t is man is an animal& unless e#ery man is an animal. But if t e $rinci$les are uni#ersal& eit er t e substances com$osed of t em are also uni#ersal& or non0substance will be $rior to substance" for t e uni#ersal is not a substance& but t e element or $rinci$le is uni#ersal& and t e element or $rinci$le is $rior to t e t in!s of w ic it is t e $rinci$le or element. All t ese difficulties follow naturally& w en t ey make t e 1deas out of elements and at t e same time claim t at a$art from t e substances w ic a#e t e same form t ere are 1deas& a sin!le se$arate entity. But if& e.!. in t e case of t e elements of s$eec & t e a,s and t e b,s may 6uite well be many and t ere need be no a0itself and b0itself besides t e many& t ere may be& so far as t is !oes& an infinite number of similar syllables. ) e statement t at an knowled!e is uni#ersal& so t at t e $rinci$les of t in!s must also be uni#ersal and not se$arate substances& $resents indeed& of all t e $oints we a#e mentioned& t e !reatest difficulty& but yet t e statement is in a sense true& alt ou! in a sense it is not. %or knowled!e& like t e #erb ,to know,& means two t in!s& of w ic one is $otential and one actual. ) e $otency& bein!& as matter& uni#ersal and indefinite& deals wit t e uni#ersal and indefinite" but t e actuality& bein! definite& deals wit a definite ob.ect& bein! a ,t is,& it deals wit a ,t is,. But $er accidens si! t sees uni#ersal colour& because t is indi#idual colour w ic it sees is colour" and t is indi#idual a w ic t e !rammarian in#esti!ates is an a. %or if t e $rinci$les must be uni#ersal& w at is deri#ed from t em must also be uni#ersal& as in demonstrations" and if t is is so& t ere will be not in! ca$able of se$arate e*istence0i.e. no

substance. But e#idently in a sense knowled!e is uni#ersal& and in a sense it is not. Book ?1E 1 R48ARD1+8 t is kind of substance& w at we a#e said must be taken as sufficient. All $ iloso$ ers make t e first $rinci$les contraries> as in natural t in!s& so also in t e case of unc an!eable substances. But since t ere cannot be anyt in! $rior to t e first $rinci$le of all t in!s& t e $rinci$le cannot be t e $rinci$le and yet be an attribute of somet in! else. )o su!!est t is is like sayin! t at t e w ite is a first $rinci$le& not 6ua anyt in! else but 6ua w ite& but yet t at it is $redicable of a sub.ect& i.e. t at its bein! w ite $resu$$oses its bein! somet in! else" t is is absurd& for t en t at sub.ect will be $rior. But all t in!s w ic are !enerated from t eir contraries in#ol#e an underlyin! sub.ect" a sub.ect& t en& must be $resent in t e case of contraries& if anyw ere. All contraries& t en& are always $redicable of a sub.ect& and none can e*ist a$art& but .ust as a$$earances su!!est t at t ere is not in! contrary to substance& ar!ument confirms t is. +o contrary& t en& is t e first $rinci$le of all t in!s in t e full sense" t e first $rinci$le is somet in! different. But t ese t inkers make one of t e contraries matter& some makin! t e une6ual w ic t ey take to be t e essence of $lurality0matter for t e :ne& and ot ers makin! $lurality matter for t e :ne. ') e former !enerate numbers out of t e dyad of t e une6ual& i.e. of t e !reat and small& and t e ot er t inker we a#e referred to !enerates t em out of $lurality& w ile accordin! to bot it is !enerated by t e essence of t e :ne.( %or e#en t e $ iloso$ er w o says t e une6ual and t e :ne are t e elements& and t e une6ual is a dyad com$osed of t e !reat and small& treats t e une6ual& or t e !reat and t e small& as bein! one& and does not draw t e distinction t at t ey are one in definition& but not in number. But t ey do not describe ri! tly e#en t e $rinci$les w ic t ey call elements& for some name t e !reat and t e small wit t e :ne and treat t ese t ree as elements of numbers& two bein! matter& one t e form" w ile ot ers name t e many and few& because t e !reat and t e small are more a$$ro$riate in t eir nature to ma!nitude t an to number" and ot ers name rat er t e uni#ersal c aracter common to t ese0,t at w ic e*ceeds and t at w ic is e*ceeded,. +one of t ese #arieties of o$inion makes any difference to s$eak of& in #iew of some of t e conse6uences" t ey affect only t e abstract ob.ections& w ic t ese t inkers take care to a#oid because t e demonstrations t ey t emsel#es offer are abstract&0wit t is e*ce$tion& t at if t e e*ceedin! and t e e*ceeded are t e $rinci$les& and not t e !reat and t e small& consistency re6uires t at number s ould come from t e elements

before does" for number is more uni#ersal t an as t e e*ceedin! and t e e*ceeded are more uni#ersal t an t e !reat and t e small. But as it is& t ey say one of t ese t in!s but do not say t e ot er. :t ers o$$ose t e different and t e ot er to t e :ne& and ot ers o$$ose $lurality to t e :ne. But if& as t ey claim& t in!s consist of contraries& and to t e :ne eit er t ere is not in! contrary& or if t ere is to be anyt in! it is $lurality& and t e une6ual is contrary to t e e6ual& and t e different to t e same& and t e ot er to t e t in! itself& t ose w o o$$ose t e :ne to $lurality a#e most claim to $lausibility& but e#en t eir #iew is inade6uate& for t e :ne would on t eir #iew be a few" for $lurality is o$$osed to fewness& and t e many to t e few. ,) e one, e#idently means a measure. And in e#ery case t ere is some underlyin! t in! wit a distinct nature of its own& e.!. in t e scale a 6uarter0tone& in s$atial ma!nitude a fin!er or a foot or somet in! of t e sort& in r yt ms a beat or a syllable" and similarly in !ra#ity it is a definite wei! t" and in t e same way in all cases& in 6ualities a 6uality& in 6uantities a 6uantity 'and t e measure is indi#isible& in t e former case in kind& and in t e latter to t e sense(" w ic im$lies t at t e one is not in itself t e substance of anyt in!. And t is is reasonable" for ,t e one, means t e measure of some $lurality& and ,number, means a measured $lurality and a $lurality of measures. ') us it is natural t at one is not a number" for t e measure is not measures& but bot t e measure and t e one are startin!0$oints.( ) e measure must always be some identical t in! $redicable of all t e t in!s it measures& e.!. if t e t in!s are orses& t e measure is , orse,& and if t ey are men& ,man,. 1f t ey are a man& a orse& and a !od& t e measure is $er a$s ,li#in! bein!,& and t e number of t em will be a number of li#in! bein!s. 1f t e t in!s are ,man, and ,$ale, and ,walkin!,& t ese will scarcely a#e a number& because all belon! to a sub.ect w ic is one and t e same in number& yet t e number of t ese will be a number of ,kinds, or of some suc term. ) ose w o treat t e une6ual as one t in!& and t e dyad as an indefinite com$ound of !reat and small& say w at is #ery far from bein! $robable or $ossible. %or 'a( t ese are modifications and accidents& rat er t an substrata& of numbers and ma!nitudes0t e many and few of number& and t e !reat and small of ma!nitude0like e#en and odd& smoot and rou! & strai! t and cur#ed. A!ain& 'b( a$art from t is mistake& t e !reat and t e small& and so on& must be relati#e to somet in!" but w at is relati#e is least of all t in!s a kind of entity or substance& and is $osterior to 6uality and 6uantity" and t e relati#e is an accident of 6uantity& as was said& not its matter& since somet in! wit a distinct nature of its own must ser#e as matter bot to t e relati#e in !eneral and to its $arts and kinds. %or t ere is not in! eit er !reat or small& many or few& or& in

!eneral& relati#e to somet in! else& w ic wit out a#in! a nature of its own is many or few& !reat or small& or relati#e to somet in! else. A si!n t at t e relati#e is least of all a substance and a real t in! is t e fact t at it alone as no $ro$er !eneration or destruction or mo#ement& as in res$ect of 6uantity t ere is increase and diminution& in res$ect of 6uality alteration& in res$ect of $lace locomotion& in res$ect of substance sim$le !eneration and destruction. 1n res$ect of relation t ere is no $ro$er c an!e" for& wit out c an!in!& a t in! will be now !reater and now less or e6ual& if t at wit w ic it is com$ared as c an!ed in 6uantity. And 'c( t e matter of eac t in!& and t erefore of substance& must be t at w ic is $otentially of t e nature in 6uestion" but t e relati#e is neit er $otentially nor actually substance. 1t is stran!e& t en& or rat er im$ossible& to make not0substance an element in& and $rior to& substance" for all t e cate!ories are $osterior to substance. A!ain& 'd( elements are not $redicated of t e t in!s of w ic t ey are elements& but many and few are $redicated bot a$art and to!et er of number& and lon! and s ort of t e line& and bot broad and narrow a$$ly to t e $lane. 1f t ere is a $lurality& t en& of w ic t e one term& #i2. few& is always $redicated& e.!. 5 'w ic cannot be many& for if it were many& 1 would be few(& t ere must be also one w ic is absolutely many& e.!. 10 is many 'if t ere is no number w ic is !reater t an 10(& or 10&000. 3ow t en& in #iew of t is& can number consist of few and many< 4it er bot ou! t to be $redicated of it& or neit er" but in fact only t e one or t e ot er is $redicated. 5 We must in6uire !enerally& w et er eternal t in!s can consist of elements. 1f t ey do& t ey will a#e matter" for e#eryt in! t at consists of elements is com$osite. /ince& t en& e#en if a t in! e*ists for e#er& out of t at of w ic it consists it would necessarily also& if it ad come into bein!& a#e come into bein!& and since e#eryt in! comes to be w at it comes to be out of t at w ic is it $otentially 'for it could not a#e come to be out of t at w ic ad not t is ca$acity& nor could it consist of suc elements(& and since t e $otential can be eit er actual or not&0t is bein! so& owe#er e#erlastin! number or anyt in! else t at as matter is& it must be ca$able of not e*istin!& .ust as t at w ic is any number of years old is as ca$able of not e*istin! as t at w ic is a day old" if t is is ca$able of not e*istin!& so is t at w ic as lasted for a time so lon! t at it as no limit. ) ey cannot& t en& be eternal& since t at w ic is ca$able of not e*istin! is not eternal& as we ad occasion to s ow in anot er conte*t. 1f t at w ic we are now sayin! is true uni#ersally0t at no substance is eternal unless it is actuality0and if t e elements are matter t at underlies substance& no eternal substance can a#e elements $resent in it& of w ic it consists.

) ere are some w o describe t e element w ic acts wit t e :ne as an indefinite dyad& and ob.ect to ,t e une6ual,& reasonably enou! & because of t e ensuin! difficulties" but t ey a#e !ot rid only of t ose ob.ections w ic ine#itably arise from t e treatment of t e une6ual& i.e. t e relati#e& as an element" t ose w ic arise a$art from t is o$inion must confront e#en t ese t inkers& w et er it is ideal number& or mat ematical& t at t ey construct out of t ose elements. ) ere are many causes w ic led t em off into t ese e*$lanations& and es$ecially t e fact t at t ey framed t e difficulty in an obsolete form. %or t ey t ou! t t at all t in!s t at are would be one '#i2. Bein! itself(& if one did not .oin issue wit and refute t e sayin! of -armenides> ,%or ne#er will t is e $ro#ed& t at t in!s t at are not are., ) ey t ou! t it necessary to $ro#e t at t at w ic is not is" for only t us0of t at w ic is and somet in! else0could t e t in!s t at are be com$osed& if t ey are many. But& first& if ,bein!, as many senses 'for it means sometimes substance& sometimes t at it is of a certain 6uality& sometimes t at it is of a certain 6uantity& and at ot er times t e ot er cate!ories(& w at sort of ,one,& t en& are all t e t in!s t at are& if non0bein! is to be su$$osed not to be< 1s it t e substances t at are one& or t e affections and similarly t e ot er cate!ories as well& or all to!et er0so t at t e ,t is, and t e ,suc , and t e ,so muc , and t e ot er cate!ories t at indicate eac some one class of bein! will all be one< But it is stran!e& or rat er im$ossible& t at t e comin! into $lay of a sin!le t in! s ould brin! it about t at $art of t at w ic is is a ,t is,& $art a ,suc ,& $art a ,so muc ,& $art a , ere,. /econdly& of w at sort of non0bein! and bein! do t e t in!s t at are consist< %or ,nonbein!, also as many senses& since ,bein!, as" and ,not bein! a man, means not bein! a certain substance& ,not bein! strai! t, not bein! of a certain 6uality& ,not bein! t ree cubits lon!, not bein! of a certain 6uantity. W at sort of bein! and non0bein!& t en& by t eir union $lurali2e t e t in!s t at are< ) is t inker means by t e non0bein! t e union of w ic wit bein! $lurali2es t e t in!s t at are& t e false and t e c aracter of falsity. ) is is also w y it used to be said t at we must assume somet in! t at is false& as !eometers assume t e line w ic is not a foot lon! to be a foot lon!. But t is cannot be so. %or neit er do !eometers assume anyt in! false 'for t e enunciation is e*traneous to t e inference(& nor is it non0bein! in t is sense t at t e t in!s t at are are !enerated from or resol#ed into. But since ,non0bein!, taken in its #arious cases as as many senses as t ere are cate!ories& and besides t is t e false is said not to be& and so is t e $otential&

it is from t is t at !eneration $roceeds& man from t at w ic is not man but $otentially man& and w ite from t at w ic is not w ite but $otentially w ite& and t is w et er it is some one t in! t at is !enerated or many. ) e 6uestion e#idently is& ow bein!& in t e sense of ,t e substances,& is many" for t e t in!s t at are !enerated are numbers and lines and bodies. +ow it is stran!e to in6uire ow bein! in t e sense of t e ,w at, is many& and not ow eit er 6ualities or 6uantities are many. %or surely t e indefinite dyad or ,t e !reat and t e small, is not a reason w y t ere s ould be two kinds of w ite or many colours or fla#ours or s a$es" for t en t ese also would be numbers and units. But if t ey ad attacked t ese ot er cate!ories& t ey would a#e seen t e cause of t e $lurality in substances also" for t e same t in! or somet in! analo!ous is t e cause. ) is aberration is t e reason also w y in seekin! t e o$$osite of bein! and t e one& from w ic wit bein! and t e one t e t in!s t at are $roceed& t ey $osited t e relati#e term 'i.e. t e une6ual(& w ic is neit er t e contrary nor t e contradictory of t ese& and is one kind of bein! as ,w at, and 6uality also are. ) ey s ould a#e asked t is 6uestion also& ow relati#e terms are many and not one. But as it is& t ey in6uire ow t ere are many units besides t e first 1& but do not !o on to in6uire ow t ere are many une6uals besides t e une6ual. 9et t ey use t em and s$eak of !reat and small& many and few 'from w ic $roceed numbers(& lon! and s ort 'from w ic $roceeds t e line(& broad and narrow 'from w ic $roceeds t e $lane(& dee$ and s allow 'from w ic $roceed solids(" and t ey s$eak of yet more kinds of relati#e term. W at is t e reason& t en& w y t ere is a $lurality of t ese< 1t is necessary& t en& as we say& to $resu$$ose for eac t in! t at w ic is it $otentially" and t e older of t ese #iews furt er declared w at t at is w ic is $otentially a ,t is, and a substance but is not in itself bein!0#i2. t at it is t e relati#e 'as if e ad said ,t e 6ualitati#e,(& w ic is neit er $otentially t e one or bein!& nor t e ne!ation of t e one nor of bein!& but one amon! bein!s. And it was muc more necessary& as we said& if e was in6uirin! ow bein!s are many& not to in6uire about t ose in t e same cate!ory0 ow t ere are many substances or many 6ualities0but ow bein!s as a w ole are many" for some are substances& some modifications& some relations. 1n t e cate!ories ot er t an substance t ere is yet anot er $roblem in#ol#ed in t e e*istence of $lurality. /ince t ey are not se$arable from substances& 6ualities and 6uantities are many .ust because t eir substratum becomes and is many" yet t ere ou! t to be a matter for eac cate!ory" only it cannot be se$arable from substances. But in t e case of ,t ises,& it is $ossible to e*$lain ow t e ,t is, is many t in!s& unless a t in! is to be treated as bot a ,t is, and a !eneral c aracter. ) e difficulty arisin! from t e

facts about substances is rat er t is& ow t ere are actually many substances and not one. But furt er& if t e ,t is, and t e 6uantitati#e are not t e same& we are not told ow and w y t e t in!s t at are are many& but ow 6uantities are many. %or all ,number, means a 6uantity& and so does t e ,unit,& unless it means a measure or t e 6uantitati#ely indi#isible. 1f& t en& t e 6uantitati#e and t e ,w at, are different& we are not told w ence or ow t e ,w at, is many" but if any one says t ey are t e same& e as to face many inconsistencies. :ne mi! t fi* one,s attention also on t e 6uestion& re!ardin! t e numbers& w at .ustifies t e belief t at t ey e*ist. )o t e belie#er in 1deas t ey $ro#ide some sort of cause for e*istin! t in!s& since eac number is an 1dea& and t e 1dea is to ot er t in!s some ow or ot er t e cause of t eir bein!" for let t is su$$osition be !ranted t em. But as for im w o does not old t is #iew because e sees t e in erent ob.ections to t e 1deas 'so t at it is not for t is reason t at e $osits numbers(& but w o $osits mat ematical number& w y must we belie#e is statement t at suc number e*ists& and of w at use is suc number to ot er t in!s< +eit er does e w o says it e*ists maintain t at it is t e cause of anyt in! ' e rat er says it is a t in! e*istin! by itself(& nor is it obser#ed to be t e cause of anyt in!" for t e t eorems of arit meticians will all be found true e#en of sensible t in!s& as was said before. 3 As for t ose& t en& w o su$$ose t e 1deas to e*ist and to be numbers& by t eir assum$tion in #irtue of t e met od of settin! out eac term a$art from its instances0of t e unity of eac !eneral term t ey try at least to e*$lain some ow w y number must e*ist. /ince t eir reasons& owe#er& are neit er conclusi#e nor in t emsel#es $ossible& one must not& for t ese reasons at least& assert t e e*istence of number. A!ain& t e -yt a!oreans& because t ey saw many attributes of numbers belon!in! te sensible bodies& su$$osed real t in!s to be numbers0not se$arable numbers& owe#er& but numbers of w ic real t in!s consist. But w y< Because t e attributes of numbers are $resent in a musical scale and in t e ea#ens and in many ot er t in!s. ) ose& owe#er& w o say t at mat ematical number alone e*ists cannot accordin! to t eir y$ot eses say anyt in! of t is sort& but it used to be ur!ed t at t ese sensible t in!s could not be t e sub.ect of t e sciences. But we maintain t at t ey are& as we said before. And it is e#ident t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics do not e*ist a$art" for if t ey e*isted a$art t eir attributes would not a#e been $resent in bodies. +ow t e -yt a!oreans in t is $oint are o$en to no ob.ection" but in t at t ey construct natural bodies out of numbers& t in!s t at a#e li! tness and wei! t out of t in!s t at a#e not wei! t or li! tness& t ey seem to s$eak of anot er

ea#en and ot er bodies& not of t e sensible. But t ose w o make number se$arable assume t at it bot e*ists and is se$arable because t e a*ioms would not be true of sensible t in!s& w ile t e statements of mat ematics are true and ,!reet t e soul," and similarly wit t e s$atial ma!nitudes of mat ematics. 1t is e#ident& t en& bot t at t e ri#al t eory will say t e contrary of t is& and t at t e difficulty we raised .ust now& w y if numbers are in no way $resent in sensible t in!s t eir attributes are $resent in sensible t in!s& as to be sol#ed by t ose w o old t ese #iews. ) ere are some w o& because t e $oint is t e limit and e*treme of t e line& t e line of t e $lane& and t e $lane of t e solid& t ink t ere must be real t in!s of t is sort. We must t erefore e*amine t is ar!ument too& and see w et er it is not remarkably weak. %or 'i( e*tremes are not substances& but rat er all t ese t in!s are limits. %or e#en walkin!& and mo#ement in !eneral& as a limit& so t at on t eir t eory t is will be a ,t is, and a substance. But t at is absurd. +ot but w at 'ii( e#en if t ey are substances& t ey will all be t e substances of t e sensible t in!s in t is world" for it is to t ese t at t e ar!ument a$$lied. W y t en s ould t ey be ca$able of e*istin! a$art< A!ain& if we are not too easily satisfied& we may& re!ardin! all number and t e ob.ects of mat ematics& $ress t is difficulty& t at t ey contribute not in! to one anot er& t e $rior to t e $osterior" for if number did not e*ist& none t e less s$atial ma!nitudes would e*ist for t ose w o maintain t e e*istence of t e ob.ects of mat ematics only& and if s$atial ma!nitudes did not e*ist& soul and sensible bodies would e*ist. But t e obser#ed facts s ow t at nature is not a series of e$isodes& like a bad tra!edy. As for t e belie#ers in t e 1deas& t is difficulty misses t em" for t ey construct s$atial ma!nitudes out of matter and number& lines out of t e number $lanes doubtless out of solids out of or t ey use ot er numbers& w ic makes no difference. But will t ese ma!nitudes be 1deas& or w at is t eir manner of e*istence& and w at do t ey contribute to t in!s< ) ese contribute not in!& as t e ob.ects of mat ematics contribute not in!. But not e#en is any t eorem true of t em& unless we want to c an!e t e ob.ects of mat ematics and in#ent doctrines of our own. But it is not ard to assume any random y$ot eses and s$in out a lon! strin! of conclusions. ) ese t inkers& t en& are wron! in t is way& in wantin! to unite t e ob.ects of mat ematics wit t e 1deas. And t ose w o first $osited two kinds of number& t at of t e %orms and t at w ic is mat ematical& neit er a#e said nor can say ow mat ematical number is to e*ist and of w at it is to consist. %or t ey $lace it between ideal and sensible number. 1f 'i( it consists of t e !reat and small& it will be t e same as t e ot er0ideal0number ' e makes s$atial ma!nitudes out of some ot er small and !reat(. And if 'ii( e names some ot er element& e

will be makin! is elements rat er many. And if t e $rinci$le of eac of t e two kinds of number is a 1& unity will be somet in! common to t ese& and we must in6uire ow t e one is t ese many t in!s& w ile at t e same time number& accordin! to im& cannot be !enerated e*ce$t from one and an indefinite dyad. All t is is absurd& and conflicts bot wit itself and wit t e $robabilities& and we seem to see in it /imonides ,lon! ri!marole, for t e lon! ri!marole comes into $lay& like t ose of sla#es& w en men a#e not in! sound to say. And t e #ery elements0t e !reat and t e small0seem to cry out a!ainst t e #iolence t at is done to t em" for t ey cannot in any way !enerate numbers ot er t an t ose !ot from 1 by doublin!. 1t is stran!e also to attribute !eneration to t in!s t at are eternal& or rat er t is is one of t e t in!s t at are im$ossible. ) ere need be no doubt w et er t e -yt a!oreans attribute !eneration to t em or not" for t ey say $lainly t at w en t e one ad been constructed& w et er out of $lanes or of surface or of seed or of elements w ic t ey cannot e*$ress& immediately t e nearest $art of t e unlimited be!an to be constrained and limited by t e limit. But since t ey are constructin! a world and wis to s$eak t e lan!ua!e of natural science& it is fair to make some e*amination of t eir $ ysical t eorics& but to let t em off from t e $resent in6uiry" for we are in#esti!atin! t e $rinci$les at work in unc an!eable t in!s& so t at it is numbers of t is kind w ose !enesis we must study. = ) ese t inkers say t ere is no !eneration of t e odd number& w ic e#idently im$lies t at t ere is !eneration of t e e#en" and some $resent t e e#en as $roduced first from une6uals0t e !reat and t e small0w en t ese are e6uali2ed. ) e ine6uality& t en& must belon! to t em before t ey are e6uali2ed. 1f t ey ad always been e6uali2ed& t ey would not a#e been une6ual before" for t ere is not in! before t at w ic is always. ) erefore e#idently t ey are not !i#in! t eir account of t e !eneration of numbers merely to assist contem$lation of t eir nature. A difficulty& and a re$roac to any one w o finds it no difficulty& are contained in t e 6uestion ow t e elements and t e $rinci$les are related to t e !ood and t e beautiful" t e difficulty is t is& w et er any of t e elements is suc a t in! as we mean by t e !ood itself and t e best& or t is is not so& but t ese are later in ori!in t an t e elements. ) e t eolo!ians seem to a!ree wit some t inkers of t e $resent day& w o answer t e 6uestion in t e ne!ati#e& and say t at bot t e !ood and t e beautiful a$$ear in t e nature of t in!s only w en t at nature as made some $ro!ress. ') is t ey do to a#oid a real ob.ection w ic confronts t ose w o say& as some do& t at t e one is a first $rinci$le. ) e ob.ection arises not from t eir ascribin! !oodness to t e first $rinci$le as an

attribute& but from t eir makin! t e one a $rinci$le0and a $rinci$le in t e sense of an element0and !eneratin! number from t e one.( ) e old $oets a!ree wit t is inasmuc as t ey say t at not t ose w o are first in time& e.!. +i! t and 3ea#en or C aos or :cean& rei!n and rule& but Deus. ) ese $oets& owe#er& are led to s$eak t us only because t ey t ink of t e rulers of t e world as c an!in!" for t ose of t em w o combine t e two c aracters in t at t ey do not use myt ical lan!ua!e t rou! out& e.!. - erecydes and some ot ers& make t e ori!inal !eneratin! a!ent t e Best& and so do t e ;a!i& and some of t e later sa!es also& e.!. bot 4m$edocles and Ana*a!oras& of w om one made lo#e an element& and t e ot er made reason a $rinci$le. :f t ose w o maintain t e e*istence of t e unc an!eable substances some say t e :ne itself is t e !ood itself" but t ey t ou! t its substance lay mainly in its unity. ) is& t en& is t e $roblem&0w ic of t e two ways of s$eakin! is ri! t. 1t would be stran!e if to t at w ic is $rimary and eternal and most self0sufficient t is #ery 6uality00self0sufficiency and self0maintenance00belon!s $rimarily in some ot er way t an as a !ood. But indeed it can be for no ot er reason indestructible or self0sufficient t an because its nature is !ood. ) erefore to say t at t e first $rinci$le is !ood is $robably correct" but t at t is $rinci$le s ould be t e :ne or& if not t at& at least an element& and an element of numbers& is im$ossible. -owerful ob.ections arise& to a#oid w ic some a#e !i#en u$ t e t eory '#i2. t ose w o a!ree t at t e :ne is a first $rinci$le and element& but only of mat ematical number(. %or on t is #iew all t e units become identical wit s$ecies of !ood& and t ere is a !reat $rofusion of !oods. A!ain& if t e %orms are numbers& all t e %orms are identical wit s$ecies of !ood. But let a man assume 1deas of anyt in! e $leases. 1f t ese are 1deas only of !oods& t e 1deas will not be substances" but if t e 1deas are also 1deas of substances& all animals and $lants and all indi#iduals t at s are in 1deas will be !ood. ) ese absurdities follow& and it also follows t at t e contrary element& w et er it is $lurality or t e une6ual& i.e. t e !reat and small& is t e bad0itself. '3ence one t inker a#oided attac in! t e !ood to t e :ne& because it would necessarily follow& since !eneration is from contraries& t at badness is t e fundamental nature of $lurality" w ile ot ers say ine6uality is t e nature of t e bad.( 1t follows& t en& t at all t in!s $artake of t e bad e*ce$t one00t e :ne itself& and t at numbers $artake of it in a more undiluted form t an s$atial ma!nitudes& and t at t e bad is t e s$ace in w ic t e !ood is reali2ed& and t at it $artakes in and desires t at w ic tends to destroy it" for contrary tends to destroy contrary. And if& as we were sayin!& t e matter is t at w ic is $otentially eac t in!& e.!. t at of actual fire is t at w ic is $otentially fire& t e bad will be .ust t e $otentially !ood.

All t ese ob.ections& t en& follow& $artly because t ey make e#ery $rinci$le an element& $artly because t ey make contraries $rinci$les& $artly because t ey make t e :ne a $rinci$le& $artly because t ey treat t e numbers as t e first substances& and as ca$able of e*istin! a$art& and as %orms. 5 1f& t en& it is e6ually im$ossible not to $ut t e !ood amon! t e first $rinci$les and to $ut it amon! t em in t is way& e#idently t e $rinci$les are not bein! correctly described& nor are t e first substances. +or does any one concei#e t e matter correctly if e com$ares t e $rinci$les of t e uni#erse to t at of animals and $lants& on t e !round t at t e more com$lete always comes from t e indefinite and incom$lete0w ic is w at leads t is t inker to say t at t is is also true of t e first $rinci$les of reality& so t at t e :ne itself is not e#en an e*istin! t in!. ) is is incorrect& for e#en in t is world of animals and $lants t e $rinci$les from w ic t ese come are com$lete" for it is a man t at $roduces a man& and t e seed is not first. 1t is out of $lace& also& to !enerate $lace simultaneously wit t e mat ematical solids 'for $lace is $eculiar to t e indi#idual t in!s& and ence t ey are se$arate in $lace" but mat ematical ob.ects are now ere(& and to say t at t ey must be somew ere& but not say w at kind of t in! t eir $lace is. ) ose w o say t at e*istin! t in!s come from elements and t at t e first of e*istin! t in!s are t e numbers& s ould a#e first distin!uis ed t e senses in w ic one t in! comes from anot er& and t en said in w ic sense number comes from its first $rinci$les. By intermi*ture< But '1( not e#eryt in! is ca$able of intermi*ture& and '5( t at w ic is $roduced by it is different from its elements& and on t is #iew t e one will not remain se$arate or a distinct entity" but t ey want it to be so. By .u*ta$osition& like a syllable< But t en '1( t e elements must a#e $osition" and '5( e w o t inks of number will be able to t ink of t e unity and t e $lurality a$art" number t en will be t is0a unit and $lurality& or t e one and t e une6ual. A!ain& comin! from certain t in!s means in one sense t at t ese are still to be found in t e $roduct& and in anot er t at t ey are not" w ic sense does number come from t ese elements< :nly t in!s t at are !enerated can come from elements w ic are $resent in t em. Does number come& t en& from its elements as from seed< But not in! can be e*creted from t at w ic is indi#isible. Does it come from its contrary& its contrary not $ersistin!< But all t in!s t at come in t is way come also from somet in! else w ic does $ersist. /ince& t en& one t inker $laces t e 1 as contrary to $lurality& and anot er $laces it as contrary to t e une6ual& treatin! t e 1 as e6ual&

number must be bein! treated as comin! from contraries. ) ere is& t en& somet in! else t at $ersists& from w ic and from one contrary t e com$ound is or as come to be. A!ain& w y in t e world do t e ot er t in!s t at come from contraries& or t at a#e contraries& $eris 'e#en w en all of t e contrary is used to $roduce t em(& w ile number does not< +ot in! is said about t is. 9et w et er $resent or not $resent in t e com$ound t e contrary destroys it& e.!. ,strife, destroys t e ,mi*ture, 'yet it s ould not" for it is not to t at t at is contrary(. :nce more& it as not been determined at all in w ic way numbers are t e causes of substances and of bein!0w et er '1( as boundaries 'as $oints are of s$atial ma!nitudes(. ) is is ow 4urytus decided w at was t e number of w at 'e.!. one of man and anot er of orse(& #i2. by imitatin! t e fi!ures of li#in! t in!s wit $ebbles& as some $eo$le brin! numbers into t e forms of trian!le and s6uare. :r '5( is it because armony is a ratio of numbers& and so is man and e#eryt in! else< But ow are t e attributes0w ite and sweet and ot0numbers< 4#idently it is not t e numbers t at are t e essence or t e causes of t e form" for t e ratio is t e essence& w ile t e number t e causes of t e form" for t e ratio is t e essence& w ile t e number is t e matter. 4.!. t e essence of fles or bone is number only in t is way& ,t ree $arts of fire and two of eart ,. And a number& w ate#er number it is& is always a number of certain t in!s& eit er of $arts of fire or eart or of units" but t e essence is t at t ere is so muc of one t in! to so muc of anot er in t e mi*ture" and t is is no lon!er a number but a ratio of mi*ture of numbers& w et er t ese are cor$oreal or of any ot er kind. +umber& t en& w et er it be number in !eneral or t e number w ic consists of abstract units& is neit er t e cause as a!ent& nor t e matter& nor t e ratio and form of t in!s. +or& of course& is it t e final cause. @ :ne mi! t also raise t e 6uestion w at t e !ood is t at t in!s !et from numbers because t eir com$osition is e*$ressible by a number& eit er by one w ic is easily calculable or by an odd number. %or in fact oney0water is no more w olesome if it is mi*ed in t e $ro$ortion of t ree times t ree& but it would do more !ood if it were in no $articular ratio but well diluted t an if it were numerically e*$ressible but stron!. A!ain& t e ratios of mi*tures are e*$ressed by t e addin! of numbers& not by mere numbers" e.!. it is ,t ree $arts to two,& not ,t ree times two,. %or in any multi$lication t e !enus of t e t in!s multi$lied must be t e same" t erefore t e $roduct 1?5?3 must be measurable by 1& and =?5?@ by = and t erefore all $roducts into w ic t e same factor enters must be measurable by t at factor. ) e number of fire& t en& cannot be 5?5?3?@ and at t e same time

t at of water 5?3. 1f all t in!s must s are in number& it must follow t at many t in!s are t e same& and t e same number must belon! to one t in! and to anot er. 1s number t e cause& t en& and does t e t in! e*ist because of its number& or is t is not certain< 4.!. t e motions of t e sun a#e a number& and a!ain t ose of t e moon&0yes& and t e life and $rime of eac animal. W y& t en& s ould not some of t ese numbers be s6uares& some cubes& and some e6ual& ot ers double< ) ere is no reason w y t ey s ould not& and indeed t ey must mo#e wit in t ese limits& since all t in!s were assumed to s are in number. And it was assumed t at t in!s t at differed mi! t fall under t e same number. ) erefore if t e same number ad belon!ed to certain t in!s& t ese would a#e been t e same as one anot er& since t ey would a#e ad t e same form of number" e.!. sun and moon would a#e been t e same. But w y need t ese numbers be causes< ) ere are se#en #owels& t e scale consists of se#en strin!s& t e -leiades are se#en& at se#en animals lose t eir teet 'at least some do& t ou! some do not(& and t e c am$ions w o fou! t a!ainst ) ebes were se#en. 1s it t en because t e number is t e kind of number it is& t at t e c am$ions were se#en or t e -leiad consists of se#en stars< /urely t e c am$ions were se#en because t ere were se#en !ates or for some ot er reason& and t e -leiad we count as se#en& as we count t e Bear as twel#e& w ile ot er $eo$les count more stars in bot . +ay t ey e#en say t at ?& -s and D are concords and t at because t ere are t ree concords& t e double consonants also are t ree. ) ey 6uite ne!lect t e fact t at t ere mi! t be a t ousand suc letters" for one symbol mi! t be assi!ned to 8-. But if t ey say t at eac of t ese t ree is e6ual to two of t e ot er letters& and no ot er is so& and if t e cause is t at t ere are t ree $arts of t e mout and one letter is in eac a$$lied to si!ma& it is for t is reason t at t ere are only t ree& not because t e concords are t ree" since as a matter of fact t e concords are more t an t ree& but of double consonants t ere cannot be more. ) ese $eo$le are like t e old0fas ioned 3omeric sc olars& w o see small resemblances but ne!lect !reat ones. /ome say t at t ere are many suc cases& e.!. t at t e middle strin!s are re$resented by nine and ei! t& and t at t e e$ic #erse as se#enteen syllables& w ic is e6ual in number to t e two strin!s& and t at t e scansion is& in t e ri! t alf of t e line nine syllables& and in t e left ei! t. And t ey say t at t e distance in t e letters from al$ a to ome!a is e6ual to t at from t e lowest note of t e flute to t e i! est& and t at t e number of t is note is e6ual to t at of t e w ole c oir of ea#en. 1t may be sus$ected t at no one could find difficulty eit er in statin! suc analo!ies or in findin! t em in eternal t in!s& since t ey can be found e#en in $eris able t in!s. But t e lauded c aracteristics of numbers& and t e contraries of t ese& and !enerally t e mat ematical relations& as some describe

t em& makin! t em causes of nature& seem& w en we ins$ect t em in t is way& to #anis " for none of t em is a cause in any of t e senses t at a#e been distin!uis ed in reference to t e first $rinci$les. 1n a sense& owe#er& t ey make it $lain t at !oodness belon!s to numbers& and t at t e odd& t e strai! t& t e s6uare& t e $otencies of certain numbers& are in t e column of t e beautiful. %or t e seasons and a $articular kind of number !o to!et er" and t e ot er a!reements t at t ey collect from t e t eorems of mat ematics all a#e t is meanin!. 3ence t ey are like coincidences. %or t ey are accidents& but t e t in!s t at a!ree are all a$$ro$riate to one anot er& and one by analo!y. %or in eac cate!ory of bein! an analo!ous term is found0as t e strai! t is in len!t & so is t e le#el in surface& $er a$s t e odd in number& and t e w ite in colour. A!ain& it is not t e ideal numbers t at are t e causes of musical $ enomena and t e like 'for e6ual ideal numbers differ from one anot er in form" for e#en t e units do(" so t at we need not assume 1deas for t is reason at least. ) ese& t en& are t e results of t e t eory& and yet more mi! t be brou! t to!et er. ) e fact t at our o$$onnts a#e muc trouble wit t e !eneration of numbers and can in no way make a system of t em& seems to indicate t at t e ob.ects of mat ematics are not se$arable from sensible t in!s& as some say& and t at t ey are not t e first $rinci$les. 0)34 4+D0 .