ca<p

Unclassified
Commission Sensitive

Ambassador Donald Petterson

9/30/03

Important Dates:

Amb. to Sudan 1991-May 1995

Demarche/Threats issued 1993

I. Background

II. Priorities during tenure?

—where did T rank? Viewed exclusively?

—why was K'toum involved?
—why was Sudan placed on the 1993 list? What were objectives? Petterson
says he did not agree—why not?
—what was being done to combat T?
—who at USG pushing T policy?
-USG tone?

III. Instruments

—tools for all topics?

-tools for T? Considered/used? Shifts?
—success rate? Why?
—"non-papers". Threat to US? Logic—use in late'90's?
—sanctions (U.S./U.N.). Success rate?
—front line states policy

IV. 1995-1998 Relations

— Petterson says "...in the late 1990's [USG] took an increasingly negative
cast toward Sudan b/c of growing prominence of two issues: slavery.. .and
belief by American Christians that the Sudanese government was engaged in
an Islamic Jihad against Southern Sudanese Christians"
1) T not a priority/overshadowed? T not reason for negative
outlook? 2) Domestic politics tying our hands?
3) Hindsight aside and given cooperation/intel at the time, was
hard-line policy an outrageous policy? Why/Why not? Used
elsewhere?
4) Pros/Cons of engagement/engagement
5) Missed opportunities?
— GS said policy was " " do you agree?
 — Described reassigning Embassy personnel to K'toum and how NSC "got
statement redacted"
—"[late 90's hard-line approach] was not working. Washington should have
provided means for direct engagement." Why no creative alternatives? "Means"?
Debate? Who and how was debate settled?
— "who takes the first step"
—How did absence of Embassy Khartoum affect relations/dialogue?

V. 1998-Present

—Petterson—"Terrorism issue seems close to being moot." How and

evidence?
—Offers to share intel? Agree? Any cooperation during your tenure?

VI. UBL in Sudan

-Arrival. USG reaction?

— Activities? Financial?
— CW assistance?
— Expulsion story?
— Post expulsion contacts?