INHERENTLY SAFE

DESIGN OF CHEMICAL
PLANTS & DESIGN OF
RELIEF DEVICES
M.B. JENNINGS
Summary of a report from Center for
Chemical Process Safety of AIChE by F.
Owen Kubias, 1966
OUTLINE
Develop concept of Inherently Safe Design
(ISD)
Indicate how control systems are included
in ISD
Present some specific design techniques
for protection devices
PRIMARY CONCEPT
Plants can be designed to prevent the
possibility of hazardous incidents
Inherently Safe Design (ISD) is
supplemented by
Control Systems
Alarms and Interlocks
Shutdown Systems
Protection Systems and Devices
Response Plans
SAFETY OPTIONS
PREVENT BY USING INHERENTLY SAFE
DESIGN METHODS
CONTROL BY INCLUDING PRIMARY
RESPONSE SYSTEMS
MITIGATE BY USING SECONDARY
RESPONSE SYSTEMS TO LIMIT IMPACT
BUFFER BY ISOLATING FACILITIES
AWAY FROM POPULATIONS
CATEGORIES OF ISD
The following keywords are used for
ISD categories
1
:
Intensification
Attenuation
Limitation
Simplification
Other means
1
Kletz, Trevor, Process Plants: A Handbook for
Inherently Safer Design, Taylor & Francis, 1998
ISD CATEGORY DETAILS - 1
Intensification minimizes inventories of hazardous
materials.

Substitution replaces hazardous materials with safer
materials.

Attenuation uses hazardous materials under the
least hazardous conditions.

Limitation changes designs or conditions to reduce
potential effects.

Simplification reduces complexity to reduce the
opportunity for error.
http://www.ehw.org/Chemical_Accidents/CHEM_RenoLtr.htm
ISD CATEGORY DETAILS - 2
Other means include using designs that:
avoid potential "domino" effects;
make incorrect assembly impossible;
tolerate misuse;
keep controls and computer software easy to
understand and use;
keep process status clear;
have well-defined instructions and procedures;
employ passive safety;
and minimize hazards throughout the material's
life-cycle
http://www.ehw.org/Chemical_Accidents/CHEM_RenoLtr.htm
INTENSIFICATION
ATTEMPT TO MINIMIZE THE
QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS IN THE
PROCESS
REACTORS
SEPARATION DEVICES
ENERGY TRANSFER
STORAGE VESSELS
MATERIALS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS
NUMBER OF TRAINS

INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLE
FOR REACTORS PHASE 1
BATCH REACTORS
REQUIRE THE LARGEST
VOLUMES OF MATERIALS
1
PLUG FLOW REACTORS
REQUIRE SMALLER
QUANTITIES AND MAY
HAVE BETTER HEAT
TRANSFER
1
www.hasbrouckengineering.com
http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~chbe403/hysys/pfex.htm
INTENSIFICATION EXAMPLE
FOR REACTORS PHASE 2
EDUCTOR OR CYCLONE REACTORS ARE
THE SMALLEST PRACTICAL VOLUME
FOR OXIDATIONS AND EXPLOSIVE
MIXTURES
www.eductor.net
http://paniit.iitd.ac.in/~chemcon/Hydrazine%20synthe
sis%20by%20cyclone%20reactor.pdf
OTHER INTENSIFICATION
OPTIONS
REDUCE INVENTORIES
REDUCE QUANTITIES IN SUMPS
USE CENTRIFUGAL MIXERS FOR
REACTORS
USE EDUCTORS FOR OTHER TYPES OF
CONTACTORS
USE PLANT LAYOUT TO MINIMIZE PIPING
SUBSTITUTION
USE OF WATER BASED SOLVENTS IN PLACE OF
ORGANIC SOLVENTS
ELIMINATION OF CFC REFRIGERANTS
USE OF CYCLOHEXANE IN PLACE OF BENZENE
SUPERCRITICAL CO
2
IN PLACE OF METHYLENE
CHLORIDE
USE MEMBRANE PROCESS TO PRODUCE Cl
2

AND ELIMINATE NEED FOR Hg
CHANGE SEQUENCE OF STEPS FOR REACTION
TO AVOID TOXIC INTERMEDIATES
ATTENUATION
REDUCE TEMPERATURES IN REACTORS
USE DILUTE REACTANTS IN SOLVENTS
USE GRAVITY OR GAS PRESSURE TO
TRANSPORT UNSTABLE LIQUIDS
USE REFRIGERATED STORAGE INSTEAD
OF PRESSURIZED STORAGE LOX

LIMITATION OF EFFECTS
MINIMIZE DIKED AREAS AROUND STORAGE
TANKS
AVOID HAVING MULTIPLE STAGE REACTIONS
IN A SINGLE VESSEL
KEEP CONDITIONS BELOW DECOMPOSITION
LEVELS
USE SUBMERGED PUMPS
MINIMIZE EQUIPMENT WITH MOVING PARTS
ISOLATE REACTIVE CHEMICAL STORAGE
USE SAFE LOCATIONS FOR OPERATING
FACILITIES
SIMPLIFICATION
INCREASE VESSEL STRENGTH TO AVOID
THE NEED FOR RELIEF VALVES
USE MATERIALS THAT CAN FUNCTION
OVER THE RANGE OF PROCESS
CONDITIONS
ELIMINATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR HUMAN
ERROR THROUGH SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS
ELIMINATE EXTRA EQUIPMENT
MINIMIZE NUMBERS OF CONTROL LOOPS
OTHER MEANS
RIGOROUSLY FOLLOW TAG-OUT
PROCEDURES
AVOID REVERSE FLOW DESIGNS
KEEP PROCESSES SEPARATED
HAVE REVIEWS BEFORE THE DESIGN
BECOMES FINALIZED
SAFE DESIGN FOR PRIMARY
CONTROL SYSTEMS - 1
INTENSIFICATION USE THE MINIMUM
NUMBER OF LOOPS FOR PROCESS
CONTROL
DETERMINE WHICH VARIABLES THAT NEEDS
TO BE CONTROLLED AND WHICH VARIABLES
ARE USED TO MAKE ADJUSTEMENTS
USE INDEPENDENT SENSORS FOR ALARMED
VARIABLES
CONSIDER FEED FORWARD AND CASCADE
CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES


SAFE DESIGN FOR PRIMARY
CONTROL SYSTEMS - 2
SPECIALIZED CONTROLS FOR START-UP, PARTIAL
SHUTDOWN, CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN TO BE ON PLC
BASE.
START-UP SHOULD BE BASED ON STANDARD TIMES AS WELL
AS ACHIEVING CONDITIONS
PARTIAL SHUTDOWN NEEDS TO CONSIDER ALL UPSTREAM
AND DOWNSTREAM UNIT OPERATIONS
COMPLETE SHUTDOWN SHOULD BE TESTED DURING
TURNAROUNDS
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWNS SHOULD ALSO HAVE A PLC
FOR BACKUP
ASSUMING THE UNIT IS EVACUATED
ASSUMING POSSIBLE LOSS OF PRIMARY UTILITIES



SAFE DESIGN FOR PRIMARY
CONTROL SYSTEMS - 3
CONSIDER ALL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
INTERCONNECTED UNIT OPERATIONS
NEED TO AVOID REVERSE FLOWS
CONSIDER OVER-PRESSURIZATION DUE TO
LOSS OF FLOWS
CONSIDER IMPACT OF MATERIALS THAT ARE
NOT AT DESIGN TEMPERATURES

ALARMS FOR NORMAL
OPERATION
FIRST STAGE ALARMS
LOW OR HIGH ALARMS
CAN BE PART OF THE PRIMARY CONTROLLER CARD
REQUIRE MANUAL INTERVENTION
OPERATOR HAS SPECIFIC ALARM NOTIFICATION
SECOND STAGE ALARMS SAFETY
INTERLOCKS
LO/LO OR HI/HI ALARMS
AUTOMATICALLY ACTIVATE SYSTEM FOR
PROTECTION
OPERATOR HAS SPECIFIC ALARM NOTIFICATION
TYPICAL DESIGN FOR
OPERATION ALARMS
HI ALARM ALERTS OPERATOR TO HIGH PROCESS
TEMPERATURE
HI/HI ALARM SHUTS OFF VALVE IN STEAM SUPPLY
LINE
DESIGNS FOR PRESSURE
RELIEF SYSTEMS
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM:
Grossel & Louvar, Design for Overpressure
and Underpressure Protection, Center for
Chemical Process Safety, AIChE, 2000.
Darby, Emergency Relief System Design,
Center for Chemical Process Safety, AIChE,
1997.
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
DESIGN DEVICE TYPES
RELIEF SYSTEMS ARE USED TO AVOID
OVERPRESSIZATION OF VESSELS
THESE CAN BE TEMPORARY DEVICES THAT RESET
AFTER THE SYSTEM PRESSURE RETURNS TO
NORMAL
ALTERNATELY THESE DEVICES DO NOT RESET
AFTER ACTIVATION AND REQUIRE REPLACEMENT
OTHER SYSTEMS USED FOR VACUUM
CONDITIONS IN TANKS, ARE NOT IN THIS
PRESENTATION
SOURCES OF PRESSURE
DEVIATIONS
OPERATING UPSET
EQUIPMENT FAILURE
PROCESS UPSET
EXTERNAL SOURCE (FIRE)
UTILITY FAILURE
TYPICAL INSTRUMENTATION
LAYOUT FOR VESSEL
PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE ALLOWS FOR OVER-PRESSURE AND
RESEATS
RUPTURE DISK WILL RELEASE AND NOT RESEAT.

SAFETY VALVE SCHEMATIC 1
SAFETY VALVE SCHEMATIC 2
SAFETY VALVE SCHEMATIC 3
RUPTURE DISC MATERIALS
OPTIONS
CHEMICALLY COMPATIBLE RUPTURE
DISCS
METALS ALL TYPES
GRAPHITE
COMPOSITE

http://www.contdisc.com
/products/reverse/Rcsp01
01.jpg
www.trane.com
TYPICAL RELIEF SYSTEM
INSTALLATION
PHASES PRESENT IN RELIEF
INCIDENTS
GAS/VAPOR

LIQUID

TWO PHASE LIQUID/VAPOR
CAPACITY OF RELIEF DEVICES
THE VOLUMETRIC CAPACITY OF THE
DEVICE MUST BE EQUAL OR GREATER
THAN THE VOLUMETRIC GENERATION
RATE IN THE VESSEL.

VESSEL CAN BE RUPTURED IF THE
CAPACITY IS TOO LOW
TYPICAL RELIEF INCIDENTS
RUNAWAY REACTION
OVERHEAT DUE TO CONTROL FAILURE
(TANK HEATER)
LINE BLOCKAGE
OVERPRESSURE DUE TO CONTROL
FAILURE (BLANKET)
OVERFILLING A TANK
EXTERNAL FIRE

INCIDENTS THAT CANNOT BE
RELIEVED







EXPLOSIONS IN OR NEAR VESSELS
TYPES OF VESSELS
BASED ON Maximum Allowable Working
Pressure (MAWP, P
MAWP
)
API 650 < 2.5 psig
API 620 2.5 to 15 psig
Pressure Vessels ASME VIII
Normal Maximum Operating Pressure is
set at >90% P
MAWP
Relief Pressure (P
SET
) is specified <
Normal Maximum Operating Pressure
RELEASE SEQUENCE
PRIOR TO RELEASE THE TANK IS AT
UNIFORM PRESSURE
WITH FLOW THERE ARE DIFFERENT
PRESSURES THROUGH THE FLOW PATH
THE UPPER LIMIT FOR FLOW IS SONIC
VELOCITY
THIS CONDITION IS CHOKED FLOW
DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE HAS NO EFFECT
ON THE FLOW WITH CHOKED FLOW
PRESSURES IN FLOW PATH
P
0
= Stagnation,
tank pressure
P
1
= Valve inlet
P
2
= Nozzle inlet
P
n
= Nozzle exit
P
b
= Valve exit
P
S
= Piping exit
FLUID VELOCITY DURING
RELEASE
BASIC EQUATION THAT APPLIES IS THE
BERNOULLI EQUATION
MASS FLOW IS OBTAINED BY
INTEGRATION FROM 0 TO n

} }
= = =
=
n
n
n
n n n n
dP
P
dP
V G
dP
VdV
0
0
2
1
2 v
u

NON-FLASHING LIQUID FLOW

OVER THE SYSTEM
9 . 0
Re
) 1 ( 950
98 . 0
Re
170
1
975 . 0 20000 Re
) ( 2
4 . 1
1 . 0
0
+

=
+
= <
= = =
|
|
|
d d
inlet valve
Nozzle
d b d n
K or K
Dia
Dia
Coef f Valve K P P K G
VELOCITY IN GAS FLOW
SUBSONIC FOR IDEAL GAS
0
2
1
1 2
0 0
1
1
2
P
P
k
k
P K G
Coef f Valve K
C
C
k Const
P
RT
PM
n
k
k
k
d n
d
v
p
k
=
(
(

|
|
.
|

\
|

|
.
|

\
|

=
= = =
(

q q q

CHOKED FLOW IN GASES

CRITICAL FLOW FOR ANY FLUID IS
APPLIED TO IDEAL GAS EQUATIONS
k
k
c d
k
k
d c
s
c
c
s
kP K
k
kP K G
P
G
G P
V c
2
1
0 0
) 1 ( 2
1
0 0
1
2
*
+

+
=
|
.
|

\
|
+
=
|
.
|

\
|
c
c
= =
(

c
c
= =
q
v
TWO PHASE FLOW
FLASHING FLOWS CAN RESULT IN
CHOKED FLOW AS THE LIQUID FLASHES
VOLUME FOR TWO PHASE FLOW IS:
vapor frac mass x x x
l g VL
= + = v v v ) 1 (
TWO PHASE FLASH P-V
RELATIONSHIP
THIS APPROACH USES THE OMEGA
METHOD
(
(

|
.
|

\
|
+
|
.
|

\
|
+ =
|
|
.
|

\
|
+
|
|
.
|

\
|
= =
|
.
|

\
|
+ =
= =
+
=
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0 0
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 1 1
2
1 1 1
) 1 (
P
P
P
P
h
P T C
h
P
P
P
k
gas f ract Vol
x x
x
VL
VL
p
VL
VL
l g
g
e e

v
v
v
o e
v
v
e

o
e o
v v
v
o
GENERAL FLASHING MASS
FLOW RELATIONSHIP
INTEGRATING THE MASS FLOW EQUATION
DERIVED FROM THE BERNOULLI EQUATION,
DIMENSIONLESS MASS FLUX IS EVALUATED:
|
|
.
|

\
|

+
= =
1
1
)] 1 )( 1 ( ln [ 2
*
0
0 0 0
0 0
q
e
q e e e
P K
G
G
d
2 PHASE CHOKED FLOW
EQUATIONS ARE BASED ON CHOKED
FLOW PRESSURE RATIO
39 . 0
0
*
0
0
2
0 0
*
0
0 0 0
*
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
66 . 0
: 4 1
) (ln 0131 . 0 ln 1356 6055 . 0
: 4
0 ) 1 ( 2 ln 2 ) 1 )( 2 (
e
e
e
e e
e
e
q

q e q e q e e q
= < <
+
= >
= =
= + + +
c
c
c
d
c
c
c c c c
G
G
P K
G
G
CONCLUSIONS
SAFETY IS A FACTOR IN CONTROL
DESIGN AT ALL LEVELS
IT IS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE RISK TO
PROCESS HAZARDS BY USING ISD
PROCESS HAZARDS ANALYSIS MAY
INDICATE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF
PROBLEMS
FINAL RELIEF DEVICES SHOULD BE THE
LAST RESORT FOR DESIGN