FM 90-8

counterguerrilla
operation/
...
AUGUST 1986
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FM 90-8
CHAPTER 6. COMBAT SUPPORT
Section I. General ............................................ 6-1
II. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units ............. 6-2
Ill. Fire Support Units ................................. 6-7
CHAPTER 7. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Section I. General ............................................ 7-1
II. Bases ............................................. 7-1
Ill. Use of Assets ...................................... 7-3
APPENDIX A. SUBSURFACE OPERATIONS
Section I. General ............................................ A-1
II. Tunneling .......................................... A-2
Ill. Destroying Underground Facilities ................. A-12
APPENDIX B. THE URBAN GUERRILLA
Section I. General ............................................ B-1
II. Techniques to Counter the Urban Guerrilla .......... B-2
APPENDIX C. AMBUSH PATROLS
Section I. General ............................................ C-1
II. Attack Fundamentals .............................. C-2
Ill. Planning ........................................... C-3
IV. Point Ambush Formations .......................... C-7
V. Area Ambush Formations ......................... C-18
VI. Unusual Ambush Techniques ...................... C-21
APPENDIX D. PATROLLING
Section I. General ............................................ D-1
II. Planning ........................................... D-2
Ill. Reconnaissance Patrols ............................ D-7
IV. Combat Patrols .................................... D-8
V. Motorized Patrols .................................. D-9
VI. Dismounted Movement ........................... D-14
APPENDIX E. BASES
Section I. General ............................................ E-1
II. Patrol Bases ................................... , ... E-1
Ill. Battalion Operational Support Bases ............... E-9
IV. Brigade, Division Support Base .................... E-12
APPENDIX F. SMOKE. FLAME. HERBICIDES, AND
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS ......................... F-1
APPENDIX G. OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES
Section I. General ............................................ G-1
II. Operations ........................................ G-1
Ill. Civil Disturbances and Searches .................... G-5
IV. Movement Security ............................... G-13
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FM 90-8
Page
APPENDIX H. RELATED OPERATIONS
Section I. General ............................................ H-1
II. Intelligence ........................................ H-1
Ill. Psychological Operations .......................... H-7
IV. Civil Affairs ....................................... H-11
v. Populace and Resources Control .................. H -14
VI. Advisory Assistance .............................. H-16
APPENDIX I. STAFF FUNCTIONS ................................ 1-1
APPENDIX J. COMBINED OPERATIONS
Section I. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J -1
II. Nature of Combined Operations .................... J-1
Ill. Command and Control ............................. J-1
IV. Intelligence ........................................ J-2
v. Operational Procedures ............................ J-2
VI. Combat Service Support ........................... J-2
GLOSSARY ................................................. Glossary-1
REFERENCES ............................................ References-1
INDEX ......................................................... lndex-1
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FM 90- 8
Preface
This is another type of war new in its intensity,
ancient in its origins war by guerrillas, subver-
sives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush
instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of
aggression, seeking victory by eroding and ex-
hausting the enemy instead of engaging him...it
requires in those situations where we must counter
it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different
kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly
different kind of military training.
John F. Kennedy, 1962
The ai ms, objecti ves, and methods of guerri l l a warfare di ffer greatl y
from those of conventi onal warfare. To be successful i n counteri ng thi s
type of war, the pl anners of counterguerri l l a operati ons must
understand the enemy and the uni que envi ronment i n whi ch he
oper ates.
Thi s manual provi des commanders and staffs of bri gade el ements and
bel ow wi th concepts and doctri ne concerni ng the conduct of counter-
guerri l l a operati ons by US forces i n i nsurgency and conventi onal
confl i ct envi ronments. I t provi des a general overvi ew of US counteri n-
surgency strategy and the i mpact that strategy has on counterguerri l l a
operati ons. I t provi des pl anni ng, trai ni ng, and operati onal gui dance
for commanders and staffs conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons.
The doctri ne provi des pri nci pl es to gui de the acti ons of US forces
conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons. I n appl yi ng these pri nci pl es,
the commander must be aware that the si tuati on i n each counterguerri l l a
operati on i s uni que. Techni ques and tacti cs appl i ed successful l y i n one
si tuati on may not be sui tabl e i f appl i ed i n the same manner i n another
si tuati on. The pri nci pl es i n thi s manual are gui des to be adapted to
each counterguerri l l a si tuati on.
The proponent of thi s publ i cati on i s HQ TRADOC. Submi t changes for
i mprovi ng thi s publ i cati on on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes
to Publ i cati ons and Bl ank Forms) and forward to the Commandant,
US Army I nfantry School , ATTN: ATSH-B-I D, Fort Benni ng, GA
31905.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both
men and women are included.
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FM 90- 8
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Section I. General
1-1. Overview.
Thi s chapter di scusses the type of acti vi ty that i s characteri sti c of an
i nsurgency. A general overvi ew of i nsurgency i s provi ded to i ntroduce
the pl anner of counterguerri l l a operati ons to the i nsurgent. The host
governments method to defeat the i nsurgency i s di scussed, as i s the
di fference between counteri nsurgency and counterguerri l l a operati ons.
The methods of response by Uni ted States (US) forces, and the general
doctri ne for thei r use, are al so presented.
1-2. Types of conflict.
a. The ri sk to nati onal survi val i s greatest i n a conventi onal confl i ct,
but the probabi l i ty of such confl i cts occurri ng i s rel ati vel y l ow. On
the other hand, the ri sk to nati onal survi val i s not as great i n a
counteri nsurgency confl i ct, but the probabi l i ty of these types of
confl i cts occurri ng i s much greater.
b. Conventi onal confl i cts i mpl y a state of open bel l i gerency between
nati ons and a di rect confrontati on of thei r armed forces. An
i nsurgency i mpl i es a si tuati on where a country i s threatened by
an i nternal attempt, frequentl y assi sted by external support, to
overthrow the l egi ti mate government. counterguerri l l a si tuati ons
faced by US forces are l i kel y to occur i n an i nsurgency envi ronment,
but may al so occur i n conventi onal confl i ct envi ronments.
Counterguerri l l a operati ons i n support of a conventi onal confl i ct
(such as the parti san operati ons that occurred behi nd German
l i nes duri ng Worl d War I I ) are di scussed i n Chapter 4.
Section Il. Insurgency
1-3. Concept.
a. The concept of resi stance appl i es to an organi zed effort by some
porti on of the ci vi l popul ati on of a country to resi st, oppose, or
overthrow the exi sti ng government. Many of the methods of
resi stance are part of the stock-i n-trade of revol uti onary acti vi ty.
There can be no revolution wi thout a resi stance movement, but
there can be a resi stance movement wi thout a revol uti on when the
objecti ves of the resi stors do not envi si on a real l ocati on of power.
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FM 90-8
b.
b. Thi s concept appl i es to an organi zed i nsurgent movement that
seeks to overthrow the establ i shed government. I n thi s manner,
an i nsurgent organi zati on can be consi dered a type of resi stance
organi zati on.
1-4. Prerequisites.
There are three requi rements that must exi st before an i nsurgency can
occur .
a. Vulnerable population. For whatever the reasons soci al ,
pol i ti cal , or economi c the popul ati on i s general l y open to
change. The i nsurgents wi l l offer hope for change and expl oi t
di ssati sfacti on wi th the current government.
Leadership available for direction. A vul nerabl e popul ati on
al one wi l l not support an i nsurgent movement. There must be a
l eadershi p el ement that can di rect the frustrati ons of a di ssati sfi ed
popul ace al ong the l i nes del i neated by the overal l i nsurgent
str ategy.
c. Lack of government control. Lack of government control may
be real or percei ved. The greater the control the government has
over the si tuati on, the l ess l i kel y are the chances for i nsurgent
success The opposi te i s al so true: the l ess control the government
has, the greater i s the chance for i nsurgent success.
1-5. Other required conditions.
There are a number of other condi ti ons that must exi st or be produced
for an i nsurgent movement to succeed.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Popular support. Support can be passi ve or acti ve. I t i s not
necessary that the enti re popul ati on acti vel y support an
i nsurgency, but the majori ty of the popul ati on must passi vel y
support i t.
Unity of effort. The overal l thrust of an i nsurgent movement
must provi de a strength of uni ty that dedi cates those i nvol ved to
achi evi ng the same goal .
Will to resist. I t i s not enough for the popul ati on to resi st thei r
government passi vel y; at l east a porti on must be wi l l i ng to resi st
acti vel y.
Leadership. The acti vi ti es and effort of the i nsurgent movement
must be properl y di rected through the exerci se of effecti ve
l eader shi p.
Discipline. The aspect of the movement must be strongl y
mai ntai ned to ensure securi ty and obedi ence.
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FM 90-8
f. Intelligence. Because the i nsurgent movement i s usual l y
i nferi or i n numbers and combat power i n rel ati on to government
forces, the i ntel l i gence effort must provi de securi ty for the
i nsurgent organi zati on and i nformati on to conduct successful
oper ati ons.
g.
Propaganda. I t i s used to gai n popul ar support and i ntensi fy
the popul aces di ssati sfacti on wi th the government.
h.
Favorable environment. Thi s i ncl udes atti tudes of the peopl e,
the pol i ti cal envi ronment, and the economi c si tuati on.
i . External support. The precedi ng ei ght condi ti ons are theoreti cal l y
the onl y ones that an i nsurgency must have to succeed.
Hi stori cal l y, however, there seems to be one addi ti onal condi ti on
that must exi st the condi ti on of external support. Thi s support
may be physi cal or psychol ogi cal . Exampl es of physi cal external
support are equi pment, weapons, suppl i es, ammuni ti on, sanctuari es,
personnel , and combat uni ts. Exampl es of psychol ogi cal external
support i ncl ude the pol i ti cal support gi ven to the resi stance when
a country recogni zes that movement i n the worl d arena and the
pressure a government mi ght exert pol i ti cal l y or economi cal l y to
i nfl uence worl d opi ni on i n favor of the movement.
1-6. Insurgent organization.
An i nsurgent organi zati on may have both an overt and a covert
el ement. The overt el ement, the guerri l l a, i s readi l y i denti fi ed. I t i s
supported by a cl andesti ne el ement whi ch makes up the i nsurgent
i nfrastructure. The i nsurgent organi zati on al so has pol i ti cal and
mi l i tary structures.
1-7. Phases of development.
a. Once an i nsurgent organi zati on i s establ i shed and begi ns i ts
acti vi ti es, i t progresses through several phases i n i ts effort to
overthrow the government. When the i nsurgency moves from one
phase to another i s di ffi cul t to determi ne. The acti vi ti es that occur
i n the earl i er phases wi l l conti nue through the l ater phases. These
phases range from the weak i nsurgent movement unti l the ti me
the i nsurgent can confront government forces di rectl y.
b.
There i s al so the possi bi l i ty that an i nsurgency may move di rectl y
from Phase I to Phase I I I . Addi ti onal l y, dependi ng upon the l ack
of success of the movement, there may al so be a reversi on from
Phase I I I to Phase I I or even back to Phase I .
(1) Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Acti vi ty i n
thi s phase ranges from subversi ve acti vi ty that i s onl y a
potenti al threat to si tuati ons i n whi ch frequent subversi ve
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FM 90-8
i nci dents and acti vi ti es occur i n an organi zed pattern. I t
i nvol ves no major outbreak of vi ol ence or uncontrol l ed
i nsurgent acti vi ty. The guerri l l a force does not conduct
conti nuous operati ons but rather sel ected acts of terrori sm.
(2) Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. Thi s phase i s reached
when the i nsurgent movement, havi ng gai ned suffi ci ent
l ocal or external support, i ni ti ates organi zed conti nuous
guerri l l a warfare or rel ated forms of vi ol ence agai nst the
government. Thi s i s an attempt to force government forces
i nto a defensi ve rol e. As the guerri l l a becomes stronger, he
begi ns to conduct l arger operati ons.
(3) Phase III: War of movement. When the guerri l l a attai ns
the force structure and capabi l i ty to di rectl y engage
government forces i n deci si ve combat, then he wi l l progres-
si vel y begi n to use more conventi onal tacti cs and may obtai n
combat forces from an external source. He may al so begi n to
conduct more extensi ve defensi ve operati ons i n thi s phase to
protect the areas he control s.
c. The goal of the i nsurgent movement, i f achi eved, wi l l resul t i n the
repl acement of the establ i shed government wi th a government
structure devel oped by the i nsurgent movement. I f thi s occurs, i t
i s a pol i ti cal vi ctory for the i nsurgents. The i nsurgent movement
does not need to defeat host country forces to accompl i sh thi s. A
paral l el or shadow government may al so be devel oped by an
i nsurgent force. I t must, however, wi n the support of the peopl e
away from the establ i shed government to achi eve thi s pol i ti cal
vi ctory.
Section Ill. Counterinsurgency
1-8. Three target groups.
The governments weapon to combat i nsurgency i s counteri nsurgency
(COI N). The COI N mi ssi on i ncl udes a ful l range of measures used by a
government to free and protect i ts soci ety from subversi on, l awl essness,
and i nsurgency. They are acti ons taken by a nati on to promote i ts
growth by bui l di ng vi abl e i nsti tuti ons (pol i ti cal , mi l i tary, economi c,
soci al ) that respond to the needs of the peopl e. There are three target
groups that the government addresses: the popul ati on, i nsurgents, and
external actors.
1-9. Population.
The government must wi n back the support of the peopl e. I t does thi s
through provi di ng them securi ty and showi ng an honest effort to
correct those condi ti ons whi ch caused di ssati sfacti on.
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FM 90-8
1-10. Insurgents.
a. The government must i sol ate the i nsurgent from the popul ati on,
both physi cal l y and psychol ogi cal l y, thereby denyi ng hi m
personnel , materi el , and i ntel l i gence support.
b. The COI N strategy i s based on the concept of bal anced devel opment,
mobi l i zati on, and neutral i zati on. These three components are
i nterdependent and must occur si mul taneousl y. I f COI N strategy
achi eves i ts goal , the government wi l l regai n popul ace support.
c. The mi l i tary assi sts the COI N program through the conduct of si x
major operati ons: i ntel l i gence, psychol ogi cal operati ons, ci vi l
affai rs, popul ace and resources control , advi sory assi stance, and
tacti cal operati ons. The successful empl oyment of these operati ons
contri butes to the success of the COI N program. They are
normal l y conducted si mul taneousl y, i n conjuncti on wi th each
other, and requi re cl ose coordi nati on of di verse government
agenci es.
1-11. External actors.
Current i nsurgenci es target on external actors for support, passi ve or
acti ve. Both the government and the i nsurgents use thi s tacti c. The
i nsurgent tri es to separate the government from i ts forei gn support.
The government seeks to retai n i ts support and separate the i nsurgent
from hi s forei gn support.
1-12. Counterinsurgency counterguerrilla.
There i s a di fference i n the terms counterinsurgency and counter-
guerrilla. The i nternal defense and devel opment (I DAD) program i s
geared to counter the whol e i nsurgency. I t does thi s through
al l evi ati ng condi ti ons whi ch may cause i nsurgency. Thi s program,
whi ch addresses both the popul ace and the i nsurgent, can be termed
counteri nsurgency. Counterguerri l l a operati ons are geared to the
acti ve mi l i tary el ement of the i nsurgent movement onl y. To thi s end,
counterguerri l l a operati ons are vi ewed as a supporti ng component of
the counteri nsurgency effort.
Section IV. Foreign Internal Defense
1-13. US assistance.
a. Al l ci vi l mi l i tary acti on by a government to assi st a host
government and to achi eve a standard l evel of protecti on from
l awl essness, subversi on, and i nsurgency i s termed foreign
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FM 90-8
internal defense (FI D). The Uni ted States (US) Army has been
assi gned a major rol e i n provi di ng mi l i tary assi stance to sel ected
nati ons i n support of US nati onal i nterests. The degree of
parti ci pati on by US Army uni ts i s determi ned by US pol i cy and
i nterests, an anal ysi s of the i nsurgent threat, and the capabi l i ti es
and desi res of the host countrys government.
b. The i ntroducti on of US combat forces i nto an i nsurgency to
conduct counterguerri l l a operati ons i s somethi ng that i s done
when al l other US and host country responses have been
i nadequate. US combat forces are never the fi rst uni ts i nto a
country. They are normal l y the l ast. Precedi ng them i s an array of
advi sors, securi ty assi stance forces, mobi l e trai ni ng teams,
combat servi ce support uni ts, and combat support uni ts. Combat
commanders depl oyi ng to conduct counterguerri l l a operati ons
shoul d understand thi s and the fact that neutral i zati on of the
guerri l l a i s onl y one-thi rd of the COI N strategy. Bal anced
devel opment of the country and mobi l i zati on of the popul ace
agai nst the i nsurgents must occur si mul taneousl y for the
i nsurgency to be defeated.
1-14. US activities.
a. When depl oyed i n FI D operati ons, US forces ensure that thei r
pl anned acti vi ti es support the goal s and consequences of the host
countrys COI N program. Acti ons by US forces must not
undermi ne or be detri mental to COI N goal s.
b. The response of US forces i n any gi ven si tuati on must meet the
fol l owi ng requi rements:
(1) Be appropriate response i s appropri ate to the l evel of
threat and acti vi ty.
(2) Be justifiable acti ons taken are justi fi abl e i n the eyes of
the host countrys popul ati on and the US publ i c.
(3) Use minimum force the goal i s to restri ct the use of force
and the l evel of commi tment to the mi ni mum feasi bl e to
accompl i sh the mi ssi on. However, the pri nci pl e of mi ni mum
necessary force does not al ways i mpl y mi ni mum necessary
troops. A l arge number of men depl oyed at the ri ght ti me may
enabl e a commander to use l ess force than he mi ght
otherwi se have done, or even to avoi d usi ng any force at al l .
Commanders must, however, keep i n mi nd that a peaceful
si tuati on coul d become hosti l e because of the provocati ve
di spl ay of an overl arge force. Doi ng too much may be a
greater danger than doi ng too l i ttl e.
(4) Do maximum benefit US forces shoul d sel ect operati ons
so they accompl i sh posi ti ve benefi t for the popul ati on. I f thi s
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FM 90-8
i s not possi bl e then the operati onal concept i s wrong and
shoul d not be executed.
(5) Do minimum damage US forces ensure that operati ons
precl ude unnecessary damage to faci l i ti es, acti vi ti es, and
resources. Si nce thi s i s al most an i mpossi bi l i ty, compensati on
for any damage to property must be made and the property
restored, as much as possi bl e, to i ts ori gi nal state. I n any
case, a major consi derati on i s to pl an acti vi ti es to l i mi t
damage.
Section V. AirLand BattIe and Counterguerrilla Operations
1-15. Challenges.
Ai rLand Battl e i s the Armys operati onal concept for combat. I t i s
desi gned to deal wi th the worl dwi de chal l enges the Army faces. The
four basi c chal l enges to the Army are the battl efi el d, l eadershi p,
readi ness, and trai ni ng. The basi c concepts of Ai rLand Battl e doctri ne
can be appl i ed to counterguerri l l a operati ons.
1-16. The battlefield.
The Army faces an enemy that may stri ke from any di recti on. I t must
contend not onl y wi th mi l i tary consi derati ons i n thi s envi ronment but
wi th the pol i ti cal , economi c, and soci al consi derati ons whi ch may
oftenti mes outwei gh mi l i tary consi derati ons. The Army must be abl e
to operate i n al l geographi cal areas and cl i mates, and on al l types of
terrai n, wi th onl y the weapons, tacti cs, and assets permi tted by the
pol i ti cal , soci al , and economi c envi ronment. The enemy wi l l stri ke at
weak poi nts and seek to avoi d di rect combat.
1-17. Leadership.
The compl exi ti es of counterguerri l l a operati ons pl ace a premi um on
i nformed and trai ned l eadershi p and i ndependent operati ons. These
condi ti ons demand more l eader experti se and the abi l i ty to operate
i ndependentl y at l ower command l evel s than do hi gher l evel s of
confl i ct. The l eader appl i es ski l l , i magi nati on, and fl exi bi l i ty. He
effecti vel y l eads hi s troops and hel ps them to understand the probl ems
of counterguerri l l a operati ons. He must be wi l l i ng to reorgani ze hi s
assets to better accompl i sh hi s mi ssi on.
1-18. Readi n es s .
Uni ts tasked to conduct counterguerri l l a operati ons are prepared to
depl oy and operate on short noti ce. Each sol di er i s prepared for battl e
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FM 90-8
and i s abl e to perform hi s duti es. Uni ts trai n to operate i n areas of the
worl d where they may be tasked to fi ght.
1-19. Training.
a.
b.
Trai ni ng i s the cornerstone for success and a ful l -ti me job for
commanders. The commander ensures that sol di ers are profi ci ent
i n tradi ti onal , basi c ski l l s and al so fami l i ar wi th more compl ex
ski l l s requi red for success i n a counterguerri l l a envi ronment.
These ski l l s i ncl ude i ntel l i gence, ci vi l affai rs, popul ace and
resources control , psychol ogi cal operati ons, and advi sory
assi stance.
Ai rLand Battl e concepts outl i ne the pri nci pl es the Army must
appl y when engaged i n combat. Combat operati ons based on thi s
doctri ne seek to l ocate, harass, and neutral i ze the guerri l l a force
and deny i t the capabi l i ty to conduct offensi ve acti ons by
severi ng i ts l i nkage wi th the popul ati on. Coordi nated efforts of
mi l i tary and ci vi l i an organi zati ons are requi red to achi eve the
overal l objecti ve.
1-20. Operational concepts for AirLand Battle.
a.
b.
General l y, the purpose of mi l i tary operati ons i s to defeat the
opposi ng force. The use of armed forces i n a counterguerri l l a rol e
i s pri mari l y to provi de enough i nternal securi ty to enabl e the host
country to i ni ti ate counteri nsurgency programs and pursue
nati onal objecti ves.
The fi nal resol uti on wi l l not be by mi l i tary means, but by
pol i ti cal , soci al , and economi c acti on. Wi th thi s i n mi nd,
successful mi l i tary operati ons are a means to an end. Success i n
combat depends on the basi c tenets of Ai rLand Battl e doctri ne:
i ni ti ati ve, depth, agi l i ty, and synchroni zati on.
(1) Initiative. To preserve the i ni ti ati ve, subordi nates act
i ndependentl y wi thi n the context of the overal l pl an. The
overal l atti tude of the Army i s one of acti on, not reacti on, to
the enemys i ni ti ati ves. The characteri sti cs of i mprovi sati on,
i ni ti ati ve, and aggressi veness, tempered wi th i ntel l i gent and
prudent deci si on-maki ng, must be strong.
(2) Depth. Thi s refers to ti me, di stance, and resources. The
commander i s abl e to operate overl arge areas wi th mi ni mum
l ogi sti cal support whi l e retai ni ng the abi l i ty to react to
unexpected attacks. Thi s battl e-i n-depth i s desi gned to del ay,
di srupt, or destroy the guerri l l as uncommi tted forces and
base areas. Reserves are kept to a mi ni mum to al l ow
maxi mum use of the force, whi l e sti l l retai ni ng the capabi l i ty
to meet most threats.
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FM 90-8
(3) Agility. Thi s requi res fl exi bl e organi zati ons and l eaders
who can qui ckl y adapt to changi ng si tuati ons. The factors of
mi ssi on, enemy, terrai n (and weather), troops (avai l abl e),
and ti me (avai l abl e) (METT-T) and the way they i nterface
wi th envi ronmental consi derati ons determi ne the type of
organi zati on i nvol ved. The l eader i s i nnovati ve and fl exi bl e,
and he adapts to di fferent si tuati ons. Mobi l i ty enhances the
agi l i ty of the force engaged i n counterguerri l l a operati ons,
but the force i s not ti ed to i ts vehi cl es. At a mi ni mum, the
force has mobi l i ty equal to that of the guerri l l as.
(4) Synchronization. Thi s means more than coordi nated
acti on to achi eve maxi mum combat power. I n the counter-
guerri l l a envi ronment, i t encompasses the effecti ve, coordi -
nated use of avai l abl e combat power and i ts i nterface wi th
noncombat operati ons. Tacti cal and nontacti cal , ci vi l i an
and mi l i tary, host country and US force operati ons are
coordi nated and supporti ve of each other to achi eve the
overal l objecti ve. Addi ti onal l y, US mi l i tary operati ons are
al i gned wi th US pol i cy and ai ms i n the host country. Thi s i n
turn may pl ace certai n restri cti ons on US forces.
1-21. Combat imperatives.
a. The seven combat i mperati ves of Ai rLand Battl e doctri ne fi nd
thei r basi s i n the pri nci pl es of war. These i mperati ves are:
(1) Ensure unity of effort. The pri nci pl es for thi s i mperati ve
are the objecti ve, uni ty of command, and si mpl i ci ty. Uni ty of
effort requi res the commander to understand the overal l US
objecti ve and how hi s operati ons support that objecti ve. He
appl i es the pri nci pl es underl yi ng thi s i mperati ve i n such a
way that the effects of hi s operati ons are not a detri ment to
attai ni ng the overal l US objecti ve.
(2) Direct friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses.
The pri nci pl es for thi s i mperati ve are maneuver and
surpri se. The commander mi ni mi zes and protects hi s
weaknesses and uses hi s strengths agai nst the guerri l l as
weak poi nts. To do thi s, he knows the enemys organi zati on,
equi pment, and tacti cs. I n addi ti on to knowi ng how the
guerri l l a fi ghts, i t i s i mportant for the commander to
understand why the guerri l l a fi ghts.
(3) Designate and sustain the main effort. The pri nci pl es
for thi s i mperati ve are mass and economy of force. The Army
cannot be everywhere at once. I t cannot do everythi ng at
once. Pri ori ti es are set at tacti cal and operati onal l evel s to
determi ne where the mai n effort i s to occur and what goal i s
to be achi eved.
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FM 90-8
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Sustain the fight. The force may have to operate for
extended peri ods on l i mi ted l ogi sti cs. To sustai n momentum,
the commander depl oys forces i n adequate depth and
arranges for servi ce support when needed. The commander
i s audaci ous and presses sol di ers and systems to the l i mi ts of
endur ance.
Move fast, strike hard, and finish rapidly. The pri nci pl es
for thi s i mperati ve are maneuver and mass. Speed and
mobi l i ty are essenti al . To avoi d detecti on, US forces empl oy
decepti on techni ques, communi cati ons securi ty (COMSEC),
and operati ons securi ty (OPSEC). Whi l e the overal l confl i ct
may be prol onged, the tacti cal operati ons are executed wi th
speed to retai n i ni ti ati ve and freedom of acti on. Thi s i s
bal anced agai nst the need for pati ence.
Use terrain and weather. The guerri l l a force i s fami l i ar
wi th the terrai n and comfortabl e wi th the cl i mate. Recon-
nai ssance and i ntel l i gence (i f accompl i shed effecti vel y) gi ve
the commander a deci si ve edge i n anti ci pati ng di ffi cul ti es
wi th terrai n and weather. He uses both to hi s advantage.
Protect the force. Successful commanders preserve the
strength of thei r force. They do so through securi ty, keepi ng
troops heal thy and equi pment ready, and by sustai ni ng
di sci pl i ne and moral e. The guerri l l a seeks to degrade the
moral e of the force through the use of psychol ogi cal
operati ons (PSYOPS) and harassment. Hi s tacti cs are
geared to wear down hi s opponents wi l l to fi ght. The
commander trai ns hi s sol di ers and constantl y remi nds them
of exactl y what the mi ssi on i s and why i t i s i mportant to
compl ete the mi ssi on.
b.
Doctri ne i s a gui de that del i neates pri nci pl es and fundamental
concepts. The commander uses these pri nci pl es and concepts
when anal yzi ng the si tuati on and then uses them as a gui de i n
sel ecti ng hi s acti ons.
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CHAPTER 2
The Threat
Section I. General
2-1. Operations.
a. The guerri l l a must be understood before he can be defeated. Thi s
chapter di scusses the characteri sti cs, tacti cs, and envi ronment of
guerri l l a operati ons.
b. The guerri l l a i s the overt combat el ement of the i nsurgent
organi zati on. The members of the guerri l l a force are organi zed
under mi l i tary concepts to conduct mi l i tary and parami l i tary
operati ons. Thei r duti es usual l y i ncl ude al l the overt acti ons that
are conducted by the i nsurgent organi zati on but may i ncl ude
covert and cl andesti ne operati ons. They are usual l y most acti ve
i n i nsurgent-control l ed or contested areas. However, when the
i nsurgency cal l s for operati ons i n government-control l ed areas,
the guerri l l a may conduct these operati ons.
2-2. Ai ms and goal s.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Support overall goal of the insurgent movement. To thi s
end, the guerri l l a operates to support the major goal of the
i nsurgent movement to repl ace the establ i shed government.
Gain support for insurgent movement. The guerri l l a tri es to
gai n support for the i nsurgent movement through propaganda,
coerci on, and terror. I f he cannot gai n acti ve support, then he wi l l
seek passi ve support: Si l ence on the part of the popul ace
concerni ng i nsurgent acti vi ti es i s consi dered passi ve support for
the i nsurgent.
Increase populations vulnerability. Through the use of
sel ecti ve terrori sm, the guerri l l a attacks or destroys economi c and
pol i ti cal symbol s upon whi ch the government i s founded.
Overreacti on on the part of government forces or other el ements
of authori ty contri butes to the popul ati ons di ssati sfacti on wi th
the government and i ts subsequent support to the i nsurgency.
Lessen government control. By defeati ng smal l government
forces and stri ki ng where government forces are not, the guerri l l a
adds to the percepti on that the government cannot or wi l l not
provi de securi ty for the popul ati on and i ts property. Thi s adds to
the percepti on that the government cannot control the i nsurgents.
Provide psychological victories. To thi s end, the guerri l l a
seeks to gai n vi ctori es that psychol ogi cal l y benefi t the i nsurgent
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FM 90-8
movement, whether or not these vi ctori es are si gni fi cant i n terms
of materi al damage to the government or i ts armed forces. I t i s the
psychol ogi cal advantage the guerri l l a seeks.
f. Tie up government resources. By forci ng the government to
expend resources on mi l i tary operati ons agai nst the guerri l l a, the
guerri l l a seeks to ti e up resources that coul d best be uti l i zed by the
government i n devel opment programs.
g.
Weaken resolve of government military forces. By defeati ng
smal l er el ements of the governments mi l i tary forces, the
guerri l l a further weakens the usual l y l i mi ted assets the government
has avai l abl e. He al so psychol ogi cal l y weakens the government
forces resol ve to conti nue wagi ng war.
Section Il. Environment
2-3. Factors.
The envi ronment that the guerri l l a operates i n must be exami ned from
more than a geographi cal poi nt of vi ew. Whi l e terrai n and cl i mate are
i mportant factors, the pol i ti cal , soci ol ogi cal , and economi c aspects of
the envi ronment take on added i mportance.
2-4. Terrain.
The rural guerri l l a wi l l prefer to conti nue to l i ve i n hi s own home. He
wi l l go to camps i f securi ty does not permi t hi m to l i ve at home. He
favors l evel , wel l -drai ned campsi tes wi th good water suppl y, natural
fuel , cover, and adequate vegetati on to provi de conceal ment from
aeri al observati on. The preferred camps are al so chosen wi th a vi ew
toward easy access to the target popul ati on, access to a fri endl y or
neutral border, good escape routes, and good observati on of approach
routes used by government counterguerri l l a forces. When counterguerri l l a
operati ons by government forces force the guerri l l a out of hi s preferred
base camps, he tends to establ i sh camps i n rugged i nhospi tabl e areas
not easi l y penetrated by government forces.
2-5. Climate.
The fact that the guerri l l a i s usual l y a nati ve to the area and i s used to
the cl i mate gi ves hi m an added advantage. I f the government forces
are al so fami l i ar wi th thi s type of cl i mate, then the advantage to the
guerri l l a i s l essened. I f the government forces are not fami l i ar wi th
operati ng i n the cl i mate, then the advantage to the guerri l l a i ncreases.
General l y, the cl i mate of the area does not favor ei ther the guerri l l a or
the government forces to any great degree unl ess there are extremes
i nvol ved. Then the i mpact i s on the l ogi sti cal systems.
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FM 90-8
2-6. Political factors.
The amount of government control i n a gi ven area di rectl y i mpacts on
the abi l i ty of the guerri l l a to operate. The more government control , the
l ess successful are guerri l l a acti vi ti es, whereas l ess government
control of an area i mproves chances for guerri l l a success. The guerri l l a
wi l l attempt to di srupt normal government functi ons and destroy key
government faci l i ti es and personnel to reduce the l evel of government
control i n an area.
2-7. Sociological factors.
The more fragmented a soci ety i s, the greater the opportuni ty for
di ssati sfacti on among the popul ace. The guerri l l a wi l l attempt to
i ncrease fri cti on between di fferent groups i n soci ety. These groups may
be al i gned al ong raci al , ethni c, rel i gi ous, or soci al l i nes. Language
di fferences or tradi ti on may al so be a reason for al i gnment. Rel i gi ous
i nfl uences may pl ay a si gni fi cant rol e i n the soci ol ogi cal factors that
affect the guerri l l a.
2-8. Economic factors.
Low standards of l i vi ng and desi res for economi c reforms may be
popul ar causes of di ssati sfacti on wi th the government. As wi th
pol i ti cal and soci ol ogi cal factors, the greater the degree of di ssati sfacti on
wi th the governments economi c pol i ci es, the better the guerri l l as
chances for success. The guerri l l a seeks to expl oi t thi s si tuati on
through the use of psychol ogi cal operati ons. Si nce the guerri l l a deri ves
a major porti on of hi s l ogi sti cal support from the l ocal economy, he wi l l
normal l y not di srupt i t drasti cal l y. Guerri l l a forces wi l l destroy a l ocal
economy of an area as a l esson to the peopl e l i vi ng there to exact more
support or obedi ence from them.
2-9. I mpact.
a. The i mpact that each of the factors has on the guerri l l a, and hi s
abi l i ty to successful l y operate, changes i n each si tuati on. A
careful anal ysi s by the commander and hi s staff of each of the
factors i s necessary to determi ne what the i mpact of each i s pri or
to conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons. I n al l cases, each
factor must be anal yzed to determi ne the pecul i ari ti es, weaknesses,
and strengths i t may have i n rel ati on to the guerri l l a.
b. I n pl anni ng for counterguerri l l a operati ons, the commander
expl oi ts di scl osed guerri l l a weaknesses and depri ves the
guerri l l a, wherever possi bl e, of any opportuni ti es to expl oi t
government weaknesses.
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FM 90-8
Section Ill. Characteristics
2-10. Considerations.
a. By understandi ng the general characteri sti cs of the guerri l l a, i t i s
easi er to determi ne strengths whi ch must be reduced or avoi ded
and weaknesses whi ch can be expl oi ted.
b. The characteri sti cs di scussed are general , and the commander
pl anni ng counterguerri l l a operati ons must anal yze a parti cul ar
si tuati on to di scover how these consi derati ons appl y.
2-11. Guerrilla strengths.
a. Intelligence. The i ntel l i gence networks i n the i nfrastructure
usual l y provi de conti nuous and current i nformati on on government
force di sposi ti ons, strengths, weaknesses, and capabi l i ti es. The
need for secrecy as an el ement of survi val for the i nsurgent
organi zati on makes government penetrati on and di srupti on of
these i ntel l i gence networks di ffi cul t. However, thei r structures
are vul nerabl e to penetrati on and careful , detai l ed anal ysi s.
I ntel l i gence col l ecti ng and anal yses must be pl aced on a robust
footi ng earl y to bui l d data bases. Pattern anal ysi s and other
techni ques can rob the guerri l l a of thi s advantage. counterguerri l l a
forces can al so overcome thi s i ntel l i gence advantage through the
comprehensi ve use of decepti on, operati ons securi ty, and
communi cati ons securi ty.
b. Indigenous characteristics.
(1) Guerri l l as usual l y have the abi l i ty to bl end wi th the l ocal
popul ace. I n many cases they are part of the l ocal popul ace.
Thi s enhances thei r capabi l i ty to operate wi th secrecy i n a
gi ven area.
(2) The counterguerri l l a force must i denti fy the guerri l l a and
remove hi m from the ci vi l i an popul ace. Thi s i s best
accompl i shed through the effecti ve use of popul ati on and
resources control .
(3) Care must be taken to ensure that ci vi l i ans are not i njured or
mi streated as a resul t of counterguerri l l a operati ons.
c. Knowledge.
(1) The guerri l l as knowl edge of the l ocal popul ace and terrai n i s
a strength. I t gi ves hi m the abi l i ty to uti l i ze psychol ogi cal
operati ons effecti vel y. The guerri l l a can usual l y devel op a
worki ng rel ati onshi p wi th the popul ace because they
i denti fy to some degree wi th hi s cause. I f he cannot persuade
them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerri l l a
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FM 90-8
d.
e.
f.
g.
force must try to overcome thi s advantage by fosteri ng a
strong rel ati onshi p between the government forces and the
popul ace. The creati on of a l ocal ci vi l i an defense force by the
government and the counterguerri l l a forces cooperati on
wi th i t i s one way to do thi s.
(2) By knowi ng the envi ronment he operates i n, the gueri l l a has
a major advantage. Thi s advantage may be overcome by
conti nuous counterguerri l l a operati ons i n a gi ven area by a
permanentl y stati oned counterguerri l l a force and ski l l ful
use of nati ve assets.
Motivation and discipline. The guerri l l a l eaders are trai ned
and moti vated. They rei nforce moti vati on wi thi n the guerri l l a
force through the i mmedi ate appl i cati on of di sci pl i ne. Usual l y,
the guerri l l a i s devoted to a cause al most to the poi nt of
fanati ci sm.
Limited responsibilities. The guerri l l a usual l y does not have
the responsi bi l i ty to mai ntai n normal governmental obl i gati ons
toward soci ety. Thi s frees al l hi s efforts to conduct operati ons i n
support of the i nsurgency goal s. However, the guerri l l a force may
be tasked to perform certai n pol i ti cal servi ces (such as tax
col l ecti on) by the i nsurgency shadow government.
Tactics. The guerri l l a can uti l i ze a broad range of tacti cs, from
terror and sabotage through conventi onal warfare. Thi s enabl es
hi m to escal ate or deescal ate anti government acti vi ty al most at
wi l l .
Physical condition.
(1)
Guerri l l as are usual l y of an age whi ch pl aces them i n thei r
years of greatest physi cal stami na. One of the major
advantages the guerri l l a has i s hi s abi l i ty to endure
hardshi p. Usual l y, because of the si tuati on, he has to make
do wi th l ess. Thi s forces hi m to adapt and be i nnovati ve.
(2)
The general strengths descri bed are desi gned to provi de a
base to anal yze the speci fi c guerri l l a threat. No two guerri l l a
forces are i denti cal . These strengths are appl i ed agai nst the
speci fi c si tuati on bei ng addressed. Whatever the resul ts of
that anal ysi s, the obvi ous strengths must be reduced or
ci r cumvented.
2-12. Guerrilla weaknesses.
a. Limited personnel and resources. The guerri l l a normal l y
l acks the personnel and the l ogi sti cs to i ntenti onal l y become
deci si vel y engaged wi th government forces. Di ffi cul ty i n
recrui tment and resuppl y to repl ace hi s combat l osses i n
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FM 90-8
personnel and materi el may l i mi t hi s operati ons. The counter-
guerri l l a force shoul d expl oi t these weaknesses by i nterdi cti ng
suppl y routes and faci l i ti es, forci ng deserti on because of
hardshi ps; and by i nfl i cti ng combat l osses that are hard to
r epl ace.
b. Individual factors. Basi cal l y, the guerri l l a endures a l i fe of
physi cal danger and pri vati on. These stresses can be expl oi ted by
counterguerri l l a forces. Numeri cal l y i nferi or to the government
forces faci ng hi m, fear of bei ng treated as a cri mi nal i f captured by
the government, and fear of vi ol ence to hi msel f and hi s fami l y
(i mposed by the guerri l l a organi zati on to ensure hi s cooperati on)
are stress factors i n addi ti on to constant combat and a hosti l e
envi ronment that weaken guerri l l a resol ve. I n some soci eti es,
good treatment, pardon, protecti on, food, shel ter, and parti ci pati on
i n the government may be stronger i ncenti ves than the fear of
cri mi nal puni shment to i nduce guerri l l a deserti ons.
c. Operational factors. Operati onal weaknesses may i ncl ude
securi ty, whi ch requi res extensi ve resources and sl ows down
responsi veness; bases that are di ffi cul t to acqui re and operate;
and the l ack of technol ogy or abi l i ty to mai ntai n captured
hi gh-technol ogy i tems. The dependence of the guerri l l a on
popul ar support i s al so a weakness, si nce i f that support wavers or
i s wi thdrawn, then the guerri l l a wi l l not be abl e to operate
effecti vel y. Another operati onal weakness may be the l ack of
sophi sti cated communi cati ons, whi ch coul d requi re the guerri l l a
to spend an excessi ve amount of ti me prepari ng to l aunch an
oper ati on.
2-13. Guerrilla support.
A major concern common to al l guerri l l as i s support. Support can be
di vi ded i nto two general categori es.
a. Popular support.
(1) As di scussed previ ousl y, the guerri l l a must have ei ther the
acti ve or passi ve support of the popul ace to succeed. Popul ar
support al one wi l l not ensure the success of guerri l l a
operati ons. I neffecti ve operati ons, unwi se deci si ons, and
poor l eadershi p are exampl es of defi ci enci es that woul d
precl ude hi s success. Popul ar support shoul d be vi ewed,
i nstead, as a condi ti on that must exi st for the guerri l l a to
i ni ti ate and conduct operati ons i n a gi ven area over a peri od
of ti me. I f popul ar support does not exi st or i s wi thdrawn, the
guerri l l a wi l l not be abl e to conduct operati ons wi th any hope
of success. Therefore, one of the pri me consi derati ons for the
counterguerri l l a force i s to gai n and mai ntai n the support of
the popul ace. Areas where acti ve support i s gi ven to the
2- 6
FM 90-8
(2)
guerri l l a are excel l ent targets for psychol ogi cal operati ons.
Popul ace and resources control operati ons wi l l pl ay a vi tal
rol e i n wi nni ng support away from the guerri l l a.
I n areas where onl y passi ve support i s gi ven to the guerri l l a,
then government efforts through psychol ogi cal operati ons
and ci vi l affai rs, as wel l as the provi si on of securi ty, must be
i ni ti ated to gai n acti ve support and trust of the government.
I n areas that the government control s and where the
popul ace supports the government, i ncreased emphasi s i s
pl aced on al l si x major operati ons i n I DAD to mai ntai n that
suppor t.
b. Logistical support.
(1) Thi s i s one of the guerri l l as most vul nerabl e areas. I n earl y
operati ons, the guerri l l a rel i es on hi s base of popul ar support
for l ogi sti cal requi rements. As the guerri l l a force devel ops
and expands, i ts l ogi sti cal needs may i ncrease to the poi nt
that the i nternal support base can no l onger provi de for al l of
the guerri l l as l ogi sti cal requi rements. I f the i nsurgent
movement has not reached the poi nt where the attai nment of
i ts overal l goal s i s i mmi nent, then the guerri l l a may have to
recei ve addi ti onal l ogi sti cal support from another source.
(2) I f the guerri l l a recei ves support from external sources, then
he i s faced wi th the probl em of securi ty for suppl y l i nes,
transport means, and storage faci l i ti es. External support
shoul d not be consi dered a prerequi si te for the i ni ti ati on of
counterguerri l l a operati ons. I t i s an addi ti onal factor that, i f
present and effecti ve, wi l l enhance the capabi l i ti es of the
guerri l l a. I n any case, the counterguerri l l a force shoul d seek
to i nterdi ct the l ogi sti c support that the guerri l l a i s recei vi ng,
whether i t be i nternal or external .
(3) Si nce the guerri l l a operates al ong mi l i tary l i nes, he wi l l
usual l y have temporary si tes for headquarters, i nstal l ati ons,
faci l i ti es, and operati onal uni ts. These temporary si tes are
cal l ed guerri l l a base camps. I t i s i n these camps that the
guerri l l a has hi s command posts, trai ni ng areas, communi -
cati ons faci l i ti es, medi cal stati ons, and l ogi sti cs centers. The
guerri l l a may al so use these camps for rest, retrai ni ng, and
r eequi ppi ng.
(4) I t must be understood that these camps do not equate wi th
conventi onal force operati onal bases si nce the guerri l l a does
not seek to defend them i f they are di scovered. They are
temporary and depend on secrecy for thei r exi stence. I f
di scovered, the guerri l l a wi l l usual l y abandon the si te and
move hi s operati on. These bases are kept smal l , and usual l y
2 - 7
FM 90-8
there i s more than one base i n the guerri l l as area of oper-
ati on.
(5) Characteri sti cs of a base camp area are:
(a) Cover and concealment. The guerri l l a wi l l attempt
to l ocate base camps i n areas where cover and con-
ceal ment provi de securi ty agai nst detecti on.
(b)
Rough, inaccessible terrain. Usual l y, the rougher
the terrai n, the l ess l i kel y i s the chance of bei ng
surpri sed by government forces. Terrai n i s chosen to
provi de securi ty agai nst detecti on. Key terrai n, as seen
by the conventi onal force, i s usual l y avoi ded. Whi l e
guerri l l as avoi d defensi ve combat, they emphasi ze
short-term defensi ve acti on i n the base camp vi ci ni ty to
ai d evacuati on, i f necessary.
(c) Suitable for bivouac. The area sel ected i s a sui tabl e
bi vouac area. Consi derati on i s gi ven to food and water
suppl y, grade or sl ope of terrai n, access to trai l s, and
protecti ve envi ronment.
(d) Remoteness. Base camps are usual l y i n rel ati vel y
remote areas for securi ty. To precl ude acci dental
di scovery, base camps are not usual l y near i nhabi ted
areas. However, because the guerri l l a must be abl e to
fi l l hi s l ogi sti cal needs, hi s base camp usual l y wi l l not
be more than one days march from a vi l l age or town. I f
the counterguerri l l a force can l ocate and di srupt these
camps, then the guerri l l a can be kept off bal ance and
on the run, al l owi ng the counterguerri l l a force to gai n
the i ni ti ati ve.
Section IV. Tactics
2-14. Terrorism and harassment.
a. When guerri l l a forces fi rst become operati onal , they usual l y
engage i n l i mi ted or smal l -scal e acti vi ti es and operati ons. I f they
reach more sophi sti cated l evel s of organi zati on, equi pment, and
trai ni ng, then l arger operati ons uti l i zi ng more conventi onal
tacti cs may be expected.
b. Guerri l l a tacti cs are characteri zed by el usi veness, surpri se, and
bri ef, vi ol ent acti on. These tacti cs i n the earl y phases can be
di vi ded i nto terrori sm and harassment.
(1) Terrorism. The guerri l l a may use terrori sm i f i t fi ts a gi ven
si tuati on and accompl i shes hi s goal s. Terrori st techni ques
i ncl ude bombi ngs, assassi nati ons, ki dnappi ngs, threats,
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muti l ati on, murder, torture, and bl ackmai l . I t must be
recogni zed that al l guerri l l as do not use terrori sm as a tool . I f
terrori sm i s uti l i zed, i t i s usual l y for coerci on, provocati on, or
i nti mi dati on.
(a) Coercion. Thi s i s used to persuade i ndi vi dual s to act
favorabl y i n gi ven si tuati ons toward the guerri l l a or
the i nsurgent movement. As an exampl e, terrori sm
mi ght be used to persuade a l ocal mayor to revi se pol i cy
concerni ng the guerri l l a.
(b) Provocation. Thi s i s used to provoke an overreacti on
on the part of government forces so that the popul ati on
wi l l be al i enated by government forces acti ons.
Targets are usual l y government sol di ers, l eaders, or
pol i cemen.
(c) Intimidation. Thi s i s used to modi fy behavi or.
Usual l y, threats or fear of harm, ei ther to the i ndi vi dual
or hi s fami l y and fri ends, are used. I nti mi dati on can be
used to i nduce the popul ace to si l ence or noncooperati on
wi th government forces. I t i s used to di scourage
competent ci ti zens from accepti ng cri ti cal l ow-l evel
governmental posi ti ons.
(2) Harassment.
(a) Most guerri l l a operati ons are offensi ve, not defensi ve.
There i s sel dom an attempt to sei ze and defend
objecti ves for any l ength of tome.
(b)
The guerri l l a uses di spersi on duri ng hi s movements,
but near the target area, smal l guerri l l a el ements mass
and then conduct operati ons.
(c) Whi l e the guerri l l a i s outnumbered by government
forces, he seeks to attai n l ocal numeri cal superi ori ty. I n
thi s way he can attai n vi ctory over smal l el ements of
the government forces. These tacti cs, i f successful ,
compel government forces to commi t l arger el ements to
defensi ve tasks. Once government forces move to the
defensi ve, they l ose the i ni ti ati ve and become reacti ve.
Thi s al l ows the guerri l l a ti me and space to devel op to a
poi nt where he has the capabi l i ty to engage l arger
government forces wi th more conventi onal tacti cs.
(d) The most common techni ques empl oyed by the guerri l l a
are the ambush, rai d, and smal l -scal e attacks. These
techni ques are usual l y targeted agai nst securi ty posts,
smal l forces, faci l i ti es, and l i nes of communi cati on.
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(e) Harassi ng tacti cs are uti l i zed to keep government
forces on the defensi ve. I f successful , they make
government forces react to guerri l l a operati ons, taki ng
away the governments abi l i ty to conduct offensi ve
operati ons that woul d prevent successful guerri l l a
oper ati ons.
(f) Harassi ng tacti cs are al so effecti ve i n weakeni ng the
governments resources and di srupti ng l i nes of com-
muni cati on. One advantage of harassment i s the
percei ved i mage i t gi ves of the guerri l l a bei ng abl e to
stri ke anywhere at wi l l . I t al so makes the government
appear i neffecti ve and i ncompetent by conti nuousl y
l osi ng smal l battl es.
2-15. Maos principles.
The pri nci pl es of guerri l l a tacti cs have been stated by Chi nas Mao
Tse-Tung:
Enemy advances, we retreat.
Enemy hal ts, we harass.
Enemy ti res, we attack.
Enemy retreats, we pursue.
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CHAPTER 3
Counterinsurgency Operations
Section I. General
3-1. Different conditions.
a. As descri bed i n chapters 1 and 2, the nature of counterguerri l l a
operati ons di ffers from the condi ti ons most sol di ers expect to face
i n combat. The counterguerri l l a commander faces an enemy
whose objecti ves, tacti cs, and concepts are usual l y di fferent from
hi s own.
b. Thi s chapter exami nes the rol e of tacti cal counterguerri l l a
operati ons i n rel ati on to the COI N program. I n addi ti on, i t
di scusses pl anni ng consi derati ons and pri nci pl es for the
successful conduct of counterguerri l l a operati ons, as wel l as
rel ated operati ons that the counterguerri l l a force must be
acquai nted wi th.
3-2. US role.
The most common rol e i n whi ch US forces wi l l conduct counter-
guerri l l a operati ons wi l l be as a forei gn i nternal defense (FI D) force.
The FI D i s desi gned to support the host countrys nati onal objecti ves
and COI N pl an. Two of the pri mary consi derati ons for the FI D
commander are the fi nal goal s of the host country COI N program and
how to coordi nate hi s operati ons to support hose goal s.
Section Il. Considerations
3-3. FID operations.
a. Most US forces conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons wi l l be
part of an FI D force. The commander must understand how FI D
operati ons support the host country COI N pl an. I n thi s sense, the
goal s of the host country COI N pl an become the goal s for the FI D
force and the counterguerri l l a commander.
b. The pri mary consi derati on when pl anni ng counterguerri l l a
operati ons i s the effect operati ons wi l l have on the popul ace.
Commanders must attempt to wi n the acti ve support of the
popul ati on for the government. At a mi ni mum, counterguerri l l a
acti vi ti es must el i mi nate i nci dents whi ch the guerri l l a may
expl oi t i n hi s psychol ogi cal operati ons.
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FM 90-8
3-4. Support of coin.
a. US forces commi tted to FI D i n the host country have a dual
mi ssi on. Fi rst, they must defeat or neutral i ze the guerri l l a
mi l i tari l y so the host country government can begi n or resume
functi oni ng i n previ ousl y contested or guerri l l a-control l ed areas.
Second, they must support the overal l COI N program by
conducti ng noncombat operati ons to provi de an envi ronment
where the host country government can wi n the trust and support
of i ts peopl e and ul ti matel y become sel f-sustai ni ng. Both aspects
of the COI N mi ssi on are of equal i mportance and are usual l y
conducted si mul taneousl y.
b. A common mi stake made by FI D forces when tryi ng to gai n
popul ar support i s that they someti mes wi n popul ar support onl y
for themsel ves. The commander must ensure that popul ar
support, i n the end, i s for the host country government. Credi t for
successful campai gns agai nst the guerri l l as, or programs to hel p
the peopl e, shoul d go to the host country government and not to
the FI D force commander.
3-5. Purpose of tactical operations.
Tacti cal counterguerri l l a operati ons are conducted to reduce the
guerri l l a threat or acti vi ty i n the area, and to provi de a favorabl e
envi ronment for the host countrys devel opment program. These
purposes are compl ementary. When the guerri l l a threat i s reduced,
i nternal devel opment can begi n, and when i nternal devel opment
works, the causes of di ssati sfacti on whi ch gave ri se to the i nsurgency
are al l evi ated. Thi s depri ves the guerri l l a of both popul ar support and a
reason for fi ghti ng (whi ch he needs to survi ve).
3-6. Planning considerations METT-T.
a. Mission.
(1) Forei gn i nternal defense operati ons fal l i nto si x areas:
(a)
I ntel l i gence operati ons.
(b)
Psychol ogi cal operati ons.
(c)
Popul ace and resources control operati ons.
(d) Mi l i tary-ci vi c acti on.
(e) Tacti cal operati ons (both stri ke and consol i dati on).
(f)
Ad v i s or y a s s i s t a n ce .
(2) The combat bri gade i s most often concerned wi th tacti cal
operati ons, but because of the nature of counterguerri l l a
warfare, a speci fi c tacti cal operati on or campai gn wi l l
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FM 90-8
probabl y i nvol ve el ements of the fi ve other operati ons to
some degree. The commanders gui dance for counterguerri l l a
operati ons i s more detai l ed and comprehensi ve than for
more conventi onal operati ons and must accommodate al l
operati onal aspects i nherent i n bri gade counterguerri l l a
oper ati ons.
(3) Before recei pt of a speci fi c mi ssi on, the commanders
gui dance and subsequent pl anni ng i s based on al l probabl e
mi ssi ons, to i ncl ude supporti ng consol i dati on operati ons or
conducti ng stri ke operati ons, as wel l as on the speci fi c
characteri sti cs of the guerri l l a, terrai n, and popul ati on i n the
speci fi c operati onal area. After recei pt of the mi ssi on, hi s
gui dance becomes more speci fi c and i ncl udes the extent to
whi ch the bri gade wi l l become i nvol ved i n each of the si x
areas of FI D operati ons.
b. Enemy. When eval uati ng the guerri l l a capabi l i ti es and l i mi tati ons,
the commander consi ders:
(1) Nati onal and regi onal ori gi ns.
(2) Organi zati on, to i ncl ude effecti veness and uni ty of command.
(3) Strength, moral e, and status of trai ni ng.
(4) Tacti cs bei ng empl oyed and tacti cal profi ci ency.
(5) Capabi l i ty to attack, defend, and rei nforce.
(6) Resources avai l abl e:
(a) Food and water.
(b) Arms, ammuni ti on, demol i ti ons, fuel s, medi ci nes, and
necl ear, bi ol ogi cal , chemi cal (NBC) protecti ve equi pment
(agents, detecti on devi ces, and empl oyment assets);
external support personnel , materi el , and moral e.
(7) Leaders and thei r personal i ti es.
(8) Rel ati ons wi th the ci vi l i an popul ati on.
(9) Status of suppl i es.
(10) Effecti veness of communi cati ons.
(11) Effecti veness of i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence, to
i ncl ude the extent of i nfi l trati on of host country ci vi l and
mi l i tary establ i shments.
(12) Li nes of communi cati ons.
(13) Vul nerabi l i ti es.
(14) External support.
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FM 90-8
c. Terrain and weather. When eval uati ng the effects of terrai n
and weather on counterguerri l l a operati ons, the commander
consi der s:
(1) Effects of seasons of the year (to i ncl ude pl anti ng and
harvesti ng peri ods), phases of the moon, and coastal ti des.
Parti cul ar attenti on i s focused on the effects of the weather
on men, equi pment, vi si bi l i ty, and mobi l i ty (on both US
forces and the guerri l l a).
(2) Sui tabi l i ty of terrai n (to i ncl ude l andi ng zones and pi ckup
zones) and road nets for tacti cal and l ogi sti cal operati ons. As
wi th weather, parti cul ar attenti on i s focused on the effects
the terrai n has on men, equi pment, vi si bi l i ty, and mobi l i ty
(on both US forces and the guerri l l a).
d. Troops and resources available.
(1) The commander has a vari ety of combat, combat support,
and combat servi ce support assets at hi s di sposal . These
assets may be from US forces and ci vi l i an agenci es, or from
host country forces and ci vi l i an agenci es, or from a
combi nati on of al l these.
(2) Successful counterguerri l l a operati ons depend upon the
commander uti l i zi ng hi s avai l abl e assets to maxi mi ze thei r
strengths and mi ni mi ze thei r weaknesses. To do thi s, the
commander real i sti cal l y apprai ses the capabi l i ti es and
l i mi tati ons of hi s assets and then organi zes and empl oys
them on sui tabl e mi ssi ons. Oftenti mes, the commander fi nds
he l acks assets whi ch woul d greatl y faci l i tate mi ssi on
accompl i shment. I n these i nstances, he shoul d request what
he needs from hi s hi gher headquarters. I f hi s needs cannot
be met, he has the opti on of i mprovi si ng a sol uti on or doi ng
wi thout.
(3) The pecul i ar ci rcumstances of counterguerri l l a warfare
requi re that seni or commanders al l ow subordi nate l eaders,
at al l l evel s, a great deal of fl exi bi l i ty i n accompl i shi ng thei r
mi ssi ons.
e. Time.
(1) Ti me i s rel ati ve. The condi ti ons l eadi ng to the devel opment
of the i nsurgency di d not appear overni ght, and they wi l l not
di sappear overni ght, ei ther.
(2) US forces i nvol ved i n FI D operati ons shoul d anti ci pate
stayi ng i n the host country onl y as l ong as requi red to
compl ete thei r mi ssi on. Usual l y, thi s wi l l onl y be as l ong as i t
takes the host country forces to assume mi ssi ons the
counterguerri l l a force i s accompl i shi ng. No matter how
3- 4
FM 90-8
(3)
(4)
(5)
3-7.
a.
b.
c.
successful FI D forces are mi l i tari l y, the i nsurgency i s not
defeated unti l the pol i ti cal , economi c, and soci al probl ems
whi ch l ed to i t are corrected or si gni fi cantl y al l evi ated. Thi s
usual l y takes a consi derabl e l ength of ti me.
I n the area of tacti cal operati ons, ti me avai l abl e for pl anni ng
and executi on vari es. When pl anni ng for l ong-term acti ons,
such as consol i dati on campai gns, a l ong l ead ti me i s
necessary to permi t pl anni ng i n meti cul ous detai l . However,
when pl anni ng shorter term acti ons, such as stri ke campai gns
or offensi ve operati ons agai nst fl eeti ng guerri l l a targets,
pl anni ng ti me i s usual l y short.
Commanders at al l l evel s can use the ti me avai l abl e to them
more effi ci entl y by pl anni ng for conti ngency mi ssi ons. Lack
of hard i nformati on precl udes pl anni ng i n detai l , but routi ne
tasks common to si mi l ar mi ssi ons shoul d be codi fi ed i n
standi ng operati ng procedures (SOP) and understood by al l
concerned. When the need to execute a conti ngency mi ssi on
ari ses, the basi c pl an can be revi ewed and pl anni ng
expedi ted by maki ng mi nor adjustment as requi red.
Pl anni ng ti me i s often extremel y l i mi ted. Warni ng and
operati on orders are normal l y i ssued oral l y. I n these
i nstances, the one-thi rd rul e appl i es: the commander uti l i zes
one thi rd of the avai l abl e ti me for hi s own pl anni ng and
al l ows two thi rds of the avai l abl e ti me for hi s subordi nates to
devel op thei r pl ans and i ssue thei r orders. I n many cases,
pl anni ng ti me wi l l be so l i mi ted that formal pl anni ng i s
precl uded. I n these i nstances, commanders di rect thei r
subordi nates by usi ng fragmentary orders.
Restrictions.
US forces engaged i n counterguerri l l a operati ons functi on under
restri cti ons not encountered i n other types of warfare. These
restri cti ons may appear to hamper efforts to fi nd and destroy the
guerri l l a. For exampl e, the safety of noncombatants and the
preservati on of thei r property i s vi tal l y i mportant to wi nni ng
them over to the governments si de.
The guerri l l a knows thi s and wi l l attempt to capi tal i ze on i t by
engagi ng US forces at l ocati ons where US fi re woul d endanger
ci vi l i ans or damage thei r property. Whi l e the temptati on to return
fi re may be great, a few dead or i njured enemy wi l l i n no way
compensate for the i l l wi l l of the l ocal popul ace i f some i nnocent
ci vi l i ans are ki l l ed or i njured or thei r homes and property
destr oyed.
Pol i ti cal consi derati ons i nfl uence the conduct of counterguerri l l a
operati ons. I t i s essenti al l y a contest between the host government
3-5
FM 90-8
and guerri l l as concerni ng pol i ti cal , soci al , rel i gi ous, or economi c
i ssues. The government and i ts representati ves must present
themsel ves and thei r program as the better choi ce.
d. Commanders must be prepared to operate i n a broad range of
pol i ti cal atmospheres. The host countrys form of government
may be anythi ng from an absol ute, and not too benevol ent,
di ctatorshi p to a democracy struggl i ng to establ i sh i tsel f, or
anythi ng i n between.
e. No matter what pol i ti cal atmosphere prevai l s i n the host country,
the bri gade commander must engage the guerri l l a wi th every
asset at the commanders di sposal . He must real i ze that
democrati c pri nci pl es may not be i mmedi atel y appl i cabl e.
However, he shoul d act wi thi n the l i mi ts of hi s authori ty to
i mprove the ci rcumstances of the government he was sent to
support. Any i nci dents of deep-rooted corrupti on, gross i neffi ci ency,
or vi ol ati on of human ri ghts shoul d be documented and reported
to hi gher headquarters. The commander can al so offer other
al ternati ves to accompl i sh the same objecti ve. It is the respon-
sibility of the US Government to influence the host
governments attitude toward democratic principles; it is
not the responsibility of the commander.
f . There wi l l be si tuati ons where wel l -defi ned responsi bi l i ti es i n a
l ocal area may not be readi l y apparent. I t i s the duty of the hi gher
headquarters to determi ne these responsi bi l i ti es and make them
known pri or to the i nserti on of US forces, especi al l y i n the
executi on of stri ke mi ssi ons. However, there maybe eventual i ti es
i n whi ch the counterguerri l l a force commander may be requi red to
coordi nate wi th numerous governmental offi ci al s to l ocate
sources of authori ty and deci si on. I f the commander encounters
government offi ci al s who habi tual l y hi nder operati ons agai nst
the guerri l l as through i ncompetence, sel f-i nterest, or suspected
sympathy for the guerri l l a cause, he shoul d document hi s case
and forward i t to the next hi gher commander for di sposi ti on.
3-8. Operating principles.
a. Intelligence. Tacti cal i ntel l i gence i s the key to defeati ng the
guerri l l a. I t provi des the commander wi th i nformati on about
guerri l l a l ocati ons, acti vi ti es, strengths, weaknesses, and pl ans
whi ch enabl e the commander to sei ze the i ni ti ati ve. Wi thout
i ntel l i gence sources, the chances of success (parti cul arl y i n
offensi ve operati ons) are l i mi ted and the commander must react
to guerri l l a i ni ti ati ves rather than control l i ng the si tuati on i n the
area of operati ons. Every rel evant source of i nformati on about the
commanders area of operati on shoul d be expl oi ted and i ncl ude:
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FM 90-8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The bri gade i ntel l i gence secti on (and augmentati on):
(a) Gr ound sur vei l l ance r adar (augmentati on fr om
di vi si on).
(b)
Ground sensors (augmentati on from di vi si on).
(c)
Long-range survei l l ance uni t (augmentati on from
di vi si on).
(d)
Avi ati on assets (augmentati on from di vi si on).
(e) Aeri al i magery reconnai ssance (from corps).
The maneuver battal i ons i ntel l i gence secti on and recon-
nai ssance pl atoons.
The maneuver compani es si ghti ngs and reports (combat
i nformati on).
Combat support uni ts target acqui si ti on batteri es, mi l i tary
pol i ce, chemi cal reconnai ssance uni ts (i f avai l abl e), and
si ghti ngs and reports (combat i nformati on).
Combat servi ce support uni ts si ghti ngs and reports (combat
i nformati on).
Other sources:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Local popul ace.
I ntel l i gence agents (from di vi si on and corps).
Host government ci vi l i an agenci es.
Captured enemy documents (from di vi si on and corps).
Enemy pri soners (from di vi si on and corps).
I ntercepted enemy communi cati ons (from di vi si on and
cor ps).
Speci al operati on forces.
b. Tactical situation. The organi zati on for, and conduct of,
counterguerri l l a operati ons i s dependent on the tacti cal si tuati on.
Uni ts are organi zed and empl oyed to counter the current guerri l l a
threat. For exampl e, i f guerri l l as are operati ng i n pl atoon-si ze
uni ts, then pl atoon- or company-si ze uni ts are used agai nst them.
These uni ts conduct i ndependent operati ons such as patrol s and
ambushes, under central i zed control (company or battal i on). Thi s
enabl es them to cover more area si mul taneousl y than a l arger
uni t and sti l l have the fi repower to deal wi th the typi cal guerri l l a
uni t they mi ght encounter. Empl oyi ng a l arge force to counter a
si gni fi cantl y smal l er guerri l l a force i s i neffi ci ent because i t
compromi ses the chance of achi evi ng surpri se, reduces the area
3 - 7
FM 90-8
that can be covered at any one ti me, and i s more di ffi cul t to move
(than a smal l er force) i f i t i s requi red el sewhere. However, sendi ng
a smal l force to counter a si gni fi cantl y l arger guerri l l a force may
prove di sastrous unl ess the smal l er force i s supported by fi re or
can be rapi dl y rei nforced.
c. Flexibility. Forces engaged i n counterguerri l l a operati ons are
fl exi bl e and capabl e of adapti ng to rapi dl y changi ng tacti cal
si tuati ons. The nature of counterguerri l l a warfare necessi tates
bei ng abl e to make swi ft transi ti ons from l arge to smal l uni t
operati ons; to adjust to extremes of terrai n, weather, and
vi si bi l i ty; to move on foot, by vehi cl e, or by ai rcraft; and to
functi on i n offensi ve or defensi ve modes. Adapti ng to changi ng
tacti cal si tuati ons keeps the guerri l l a force off bal ance and
prevents i t from devel opi ng effecti ve tacti cal operati ons.
d. Mobility.
(1) Counterguerri l l a forces most possess mobi l i ty equal to or
greater than that of the guerri l l a i n order to fi nd, fi x, fi ght,
and pursue hi m. Si nce the guerri l l a i s pri mari l l y footmobi l e,
counterguerri l l a forces equi pped wi th motori zed, mechani zed,
or ai r transportati on assets woul d appear to have a
si gni fi cant mobi l i ty advantage. However, the guerri l l a
typi cal l y operates from terrai n that precl udes (or severel y
l i mi ts) speed on a ground approach. The counterguerri l l a
forces mobi l i ty advantage may not be as great as i t fi rst
appears to be. When terrai n, weather, or the guerri l l a force
di sposi ti on precl udes cl osi ng on guerri l l a posi ti ons by
hi gh-speed ai r or ground transport, then counterguerri l l a
forces shoul d be moved by the fastest avai l abl e transportati on
to the nearest sui tabl e, safe area to l aunch footmobi l e
operati ons. A wel l -trai ned, footmobi l e counterguerri l l a force,
that can use terrai n better than the enemy, can achi eve a
tacti cal mobi l i ty advantage.
(2) Commanders shoul d not overburden sol di ers wi th excessi ve
l oads because the guerri l l as wi l l be abl e to outrun them.
Sol di ers shoul d carry onl y the thi ngs they need to fi nd and
fi x the guerri l l a. Once thi s i s accompl i shed, they can be
resuppl i ed by ground or ai r.
e. Minimum use of force.
(1) Onl y the mi ni mal fi repower needed to accompl i sh a gi ven
mi ssi on i s empl oyed. I f US forces come under guerri l l a fi re,
and i f by returni ng fi re noncombatant ci vi l i ans maybe
i njured or thei r homes and property destroyed, then onl y the
amount of fi re necessary to protect US forces i s returned.
Under these ci rcumstances, the commander attempts to
suppress the guerri l l as wi th mi ni mal return fi re (possi bl y
3- 8
FM 90-8
usi ng sni pers) and moves hi s forces to advantageous
posi ti ons from whi ch he may engage the guerri l l as whi l e not
endangeri ng ci vi l i an l i fe or property. He may use smoke and,
i f authori zed, ri ot control agents to faci l i tate maneuver. I f
the guerri l l as cannot be engaged wi thout endangeri ng
ci vi l i an l i fe or property, the commander moves hi s forces
(over covered or conceal ed routes) to posi ti ons that cut off
thei r escape routes and enci rcl e them. Then he begi ns to
ti ghten the ri ng around them.
(2) The unrestri cted use of fi repower i n the vi ci ni ty of ci vi l i ans
or thei r property wi l l resul t i n turni ng thei r anger toward the
government and may turn them to the i nsurgent cause. US
sol di ers must understand thi s and fol l ow stri ct rul es of
engagement. However, the ri ght to sel f defense i s never
deni ed.
(3) Al l avai l abl e fi re may be brought to bear on guerri l l as when
i t does not endanger ci vi l i an l i fe or property. However, the
expendi ture of ammuni ti on shoul d be appropri ate: mortars
to knock out a machi ne gun posi ti on; smal l arms to ki l l a
sni per. The use of i ndi rect fi re, whi l e effecti ve i n some cases,
i s not a substi tute for maneuver.
f. Patience. Counterguerri l l a forces must anti ci pate l ong peri ods
wi thout maki ng contact. The guerri l l a knows he i s outnumbered
and outgunned and avoi ds engagement unl ess i t i s on hi s terms.
Counterguerri l l a forces shoul d not devel op a fal se sense of
securi ty i f i t appears the guerri l l a has ceased operati ons i n thei r
area. I t must be assumed that the guerri l l a i s al ways observi ng
the operati ng patterns of the counterguerri l l a force for weak
poi nts, and wai ti ng for l ax securi ty to stri ke wi th mi ni mum ri sk. A
guerri l l a attack must be expected at any ti me.
g.
Reserves.
(1) The commander al ways mai ntai ns a reserve to take
advantage of sudden opportuni ti es, and to counter guerri l l a
i ni ti ati ves. The si ze of the reserve depends on the si ze of i ts
parent uni t and the tacti cal si tuati on.
(2) I n offensi ve operati ons, a company mi ght keep a squad i n
reserve; battal i ons, a pl atoon; and bri gade, a company.
(3) I n defensi ve operati ons, because of the need for 360-degree
securi ty, a reserve at company and battal i on i s compl i cated
by the fact that the on-l i ne strength of the peri meter i s
reduced.
(4) The company or battal i on commander may have to spread
hi s forces thi n to protect hi s peri meter. I n these i nstances,
the commander has four opti ons: establ i sh a smal l , central l y
3- 9
160- 739 - 94 - 2
FM 90-8
(5)
(6)
(7)
l ocated reserve at the expense of on-l i ne strength; establ i sh
no reserve but speci fy uni ts on-l i ne to be prepared to shi ft a
porti on of thei r strength to other secti ons of the peri meter;
establ i sh no reserve but rei nforce the most heavi l y contested
secti on of the peri meter by fi re; and consi der reduci ng the
si ze of the peri meter.
Bri gades too shoul d mai ntai n a company i n reserve i n
defensi ve operati ons. Thi s mi ssi on shoul d be rotated among
compani es, wi th the company that has spent the most ti me
i n the fi el d (or that has seen the heavi est acti on) bei ng
desi gnated as the reserve. The reserve company can rest,
rearm, and trai n duri ng the ti me i t has the reserve mi ssi on.
The reserve uni t shoul d be hi ghl y mobi l e. Ai r transport i s the
preferred method for movi ng the reserve because i t i s fast
and not dependent on open ground routes as are motori zed or
mechani zed modes of transport. Whatever i ts mode of
transportati on, the reserves vehi cl es are dedi cated to the
reserve and i mmedi atel y avai l abl e for empl oyment.
Reserve uni ts are prepared for conti ngency mi ssi ons. I f the
reserve i s commi tted, the commander desi gnates a new
reserve. I n thi s case, hi s l east commi tted uni t i s the fi rst
choi ce.
Section III. Strike Campaigns
3-9. Targets.
Thi s secti on provi des gui dance on the organi zati on, mi ssi ons,
concepts, and operati ons of stri ke campai gns. Stri ke campai gns
consi st of a seri es of major combat operati ons targeted agai nst
i nsurgent tacti cal forces and bases i n contested or i nsurgent-control l ed
zones. Other i nternal defense acti vi ti es may support tacti cal forces
duri ng stri ke operati ons. Stri ke campai gn operati ons are usual l y of
rel ati vel y short durati on (general l y, one day to several weeks). Whi l e
the gui dance outl i ned here i s focused on the i nfantry bri gade, thi s
secti on may be extended to appl y to any combi ned arms organi zati on
conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons.
3-10. Organization.
Bri gades assi gned stri ke campai gn mi ssi ons ei ther are rel i eved from
area responsi bi l i ty i n advance of the mi ssi on or, preferabl y, are
consti tuted as speci al i zed forces hel d at the nati onal or regi onal l evel s.
Bri gade stri ke forces are organi zed as sel f-suffi ci ent task forces
capabl e of operati ng i n areas remote from l ogi sti cal bases. Bri gades
are assi gned support bases i n secure areas for el ements not commi tted
to operati ons.
3 - 1 0
FM 90-8
3-11. Missions.
Stri ke campai gns are conducted agai nst guerri l l a forces and bases.
They serve to keep guerri l l a forces movi ng and off bal ance. Stri ke
campai gn areas are usual l y outsi de of those undergoi ng consol i dati on
or those under fri endl y control . Ground or water means of entry maybe
used, but ai r assaul t or parachute del i veri es can be empl oyed.
3-12. Concepts.
a. Stri ke campai gns i ncl ude offensi ve tacti cs such as rai ds,
reconnai ssance i n force, hasty or del i berate attacks, and pursui t
(or combi nati ons of these operati ons).
b.
Bri gade stri ke campai gn operati ons are conducted to:
(1) Harass the guerri l l a to prevent the bui l dup of personnel and
l ogi sti cal resources.
(2) Destroy the guerri l l a force and i ts base compl exes.
(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for the
popul ace i n the l ocal area.
(4) Expand consol i dati on areas.
3-13. Operations.
a. Bri gades commi tted to stri ke campai gns are assi gned a tacti cal
area of responsi bi l i ty. The bri gade commander normal l y assi gns
operati onal areas to the subordi nate battal i ons whi ch, i n turn,
may assi gn areas to compani es. Company commanders may
assi gn speci fi c areas to pl atoons at ti mes; however, pl atoons are
normal l y assi gned speci fi c mi ssi ons rather than operati onal
areas. Each battal i on normal l y establ i shes a separate operati onal
support base (OSB). Compani es normal l y operate from patrol
bases, but at ti mes may operate separate company OSBs. When
the areas assi gned to uni ts are too l arge to be reconnoi tered
concurrentl y by subordi nate uni ts, commanders establ i sh an
order of pri ori ty for reconnai ssance of the areas.
b. Battal i on commanders mai ntai n reserve forces (ready forces) to
react qui ckl y to si tuati ons requi ri ng an i mmedi ate response. Each
ri fl e company patrol s i ts area of operati ons conti nuousl y and
aggressi vel y. The l ocati on of the company patrol base and patrol
routes are vari ed to ensure compl ete coverage of the area.
c. The ri fl e company moves to, secures, and occupi es the company
patrol base wi th suffi ci ent suppl i es to permi t l i mi ted i ndependent
operati ons. I f i t i s to operate i n the same area for a peri od of ti me, i t
shoul d consi der establ i shi ng smal l rati on and ammuni ti on
reserves.
3- 11
FM 90-8
d. The company area i s patrol l ed to provi de compl ete coverage day
and ni ght wi th emphasi s on ni ght patrol s. General l y, pl atoon-si ze
patrol s have suffi ci ent fi repower to handl e the si tuati on i f a
guerri l l a force i s encountered. I f addi ti onal support i s needed, the
company commander may maneuver hi s other pl atoons agai nst
the guerri l l as, or he may request assi stance from the battal i on
reserve (ready force). Emphasi s i s pl aced on engagi ng the
guerri l l a wi th organi c means of fi re and movement (i f requi red)
and on empl oyi ng supporti ng arti l l ery and ai r support.
e. Orders i ssued to the company commanders i ncl ude the area
assi gned and resuppl y i nstructi ons. The conduct of operati ons i s
based on decentral i zed pl anni ng and executi on. Company
commanders pl an and coordi nate pl atoon acti vi ti es to ensure
compl eti on of the overal l company mi ssi on. Pl atoons on patrol
carry l i ght rati ons and store unneeded equi pment at OSBs.
f. Ri fl e company mortars may (at ti mes) be l ocated i n battal i on
OSBs whi l e fi re support teams (FI ST) move wi th the compani es. I f
the terrai n and si tuati on permi t, battal i on OSBs may be moved as
the compani es move thei r patrol bases. I f ci vi l i an communi ti es
are i n the area, and i f securi ty condi ti ons permi t, battal i on bases
may be near (but not wi thi n) the communi ty. Here, the battal i on
may conduct psychol ogi cal , i ntel l i gence, and mi l i tary-ci vi c
acti on operati on.
g.
Bri gade commanders use al l avai l abl e means to l ocate guerri l l a
forces and bases, and they gi ve pri ori ty to destroyi ng the guerri l l a
forces. An attack on a guerri l l a force normal l y requi res superi or
combat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to i mmedi atel y
engage and destroy movi ng guerri l l a forces before they can
di sperse. Dependi ng on the si tuati on, ei ther hasty or del i berate
attacks are made on guerri l l a bases that contai n forti fi cati ons.
After a successful attack on guerri l l a forces, troops thoroughl y
search the area for guerri l l a personnel , suppl i es, equi pment, and
documents. Pursui t operati ons are undertaken to destroy or
capture forces attempti ng to fl ee. Arti l l ery, ai r support, and ai r
assaul t forces support ground pursui t.
h. The bri gade does not normal l y occupy the area defensi vel y for an
extended ti me fol l owi ng a successful attack. Operati ons to search
out guerri l l as conti nue. El ements of the bri gade may be rotated
through the bri gade support base for peri ods of rest and trai ni ng.
i . Speed and surpri se are i mportant i n stri ke operati ons, especi al l y
when attacki ng a known guerri l l a stronghol d. The sudden and
unexpected del i very of combat forces i nto a guerri l l a-hel d or
contested area provi des si gni fi cant advantages to the counter-
guerri l l a commander. I f caught by surpri se, the guerri l l a maybe
unabl e to react i n ti me to save hi msel f. He i s confused i ni ti al l y and
3- 12
FM 90-8
may pani c. I n the ti me i t takes hi m to become aware of the tacti cal
si tuati on, or to take effecti ve acti on, the counterguerri l l a forces
may enci rcl e hi m. Speed and surpri se may be achi eved by usi ng
ai r assaul t tacti cs to i nsert the fi rst counterguerri l l a forces i nto
the area of operati ons. Subsequent forces can be del i vered on l ater
ai rl i fts or by other modes of transportati on.
j.
Stri ke forces are most vul nerabl e just after enteri ng a new area of
operati ons. I ni ti al l y, there i s some confusi on unti l patrol bases
are establ i shed and patrol s are sent out. counterguerri l l a forces
must be especi al l y securi ty consci ous the fi rst few hours i n a new
l ocati on. Upon arri val , they shoul d i mmedi atel y establ i sh target
reference poi nts, observati on posts, and l i steni ng posts.
Section IV. Consolidation Campaigns
3-14. Control.
a. Thi s secti on provi des the bri gade gui dance on the mi ssi ons,
organi zati on, and operati ons of consol i dati on compai gns.
Consol i dati on campai gns are the appl i cati on of al l ci vi l and
mi l i tary aspects of i nternal defense and i nternal devel opment
programs. They are desi gned to establ i sh, regai n, or mai ntai n
control of speci fi c areas.
b. The bri gade parti ci pates i n consol i dati on campai gns by conducti ng
tacti cal , i ntel l i gence, psychol ogi cal , ci vi l affai rs, popul ace and
resources control , and advi sory assi stance operati ons.
c. Bri gades commi tted to consol i dati on campai gns support the
overal l host country i nternal defense and devel opment (I DAD)
effort by appl yi ng thei r resources i n the fol l owi ng manner:
(1) I n the preparati on and offensi ve phases, tacti cal operati ons
are stressed. I ni ti al area control i s establ i shed by cl eari ng
guerri l l a forces from an area, expandi ng i t, and l i nki ng i t to
other areas as they are cl eared.
(2) I n the devel opment phase, the pri mary mi ssi on i s tacti cal
operati ons to mai ntai n securi ty of the cl eared area. Concur-
rentl y, the bri gade performs i ntel l i gence, psychol ogi cal ,
popul ace and resources control , ci vi l affai rs, and advi sory
assi stance operati ons. The bri gade al so conducts mi l i tary-ci vi c
acti on i n conjuncti on wi th ci vi l affai rs programs.
(3) Duri ng the compl eti on phase, when guerri l l a acti vi ty wi thi n
a consol i dated area has been l argel y neutral i zed and host
country agenci es have resumed control of the area, the
bri gade begi ns to phase out i ts parti ci pati on i n l ocal
operati ons and prepares to conduct operati ons i n another
ar ea.
3 - 1 3
FM 90-8
3-15. Preparatory phase.
Consol i dati on campai gn pl ans are detai l ed and provi de for l ong-range
commi tment of both personnel and materi el . Pl ans are coordi nated
wi th al l agenci es i nvol ved i n the consol i dati on campai gn. I n addi ti on
to pl anni ng, the bri gade conducts necessary trai ni ng and becomes
engaged i n i ntel l i gence and other FI D acti vi ti es.
3-16. Offensive phase.
a. The offensi ve phase of a consol i dati on campai gn i nvol ves
movi ng the ci vi l -mi l i tary task force i nto the operati onal area,
neutral i zi ng guerri l l a forces and sympathi zers, and removi ng
i nsurgent personnel who may have i nfi l trated the l ocal govern-
ment.
b. Patrol l i ng, area survei l l ance, ambushes, and other smal l -uni t
acti ons are used extensi vel y. Offensi ve operati ons, such as
movements to contact, hasty or del i berate attacks, rai ds, or
pursui ts fol l ow the smal l uni t reconnai ssance as targets are
l ocated.
c. Care i s taken that once cl eared, the fri endl y, control l ed areas are
not al l owed to revert to guerri l l a domi nati on.
3-17. Development and completion phases.
a. Duri ng the devel opment and compl eti on phases of a consol i dati on
campai gn, bri gade operati ons i nvol ve hol di ng an area to permi t
government agenci es to conduct thei r i nternal defense and
devel opment programs. Operati ons al so i nvol ve trai ni ng l ocal
forces to assume the defensi ve and securi ty mi ssi ons from the
regul ar armed forces. Aggressi ve defensi ve operati ons provi de
securi ty agai nst guerri l l a attack, deny guerri l l as access to
support, and provi de a secure base from whi ch to expand the
consol i dated areas. Offensi ve acti on i s conti nued to destroy
guerri l l a forces; however, defense must be provi ded for popul ati on
centers, tacti cal bases, l ogi sti cal i nstal l ati ons, ai rbases and
ai rfi el ds, and l i nes of communi cati on.
b. Defensi ve acti ons are conducted to accompl i sh one or more of the
fol l owi ng:
(1) Destroy or capture guerri l l a forces.
(2) Reduce guerri l l a capabi l i ty and opportuni ty for offensi ve
acti on.
(3) Deny guerri l l a entry i nto an area.
3 - 1 4
FM 90-8
(4) Provi de securi ty and thus devel op favorabl e condi ti ons for
other I DAD operati ons.
c. The normal defense i n consol i dati on campai gn operati ons
empl oys smal l -uni t tacti cs, usi ng ai r assaul t and other reserve
forces (ready forces) to i mmedi atel y react to i ntel l i gence or an
i nsurgent attack. Arti l l ery and ai r support i s prearranged to the
degree possi bl e, and pl ans are adjusted as requi red.
d. Securi ty forces conduct extensi ve patrol l i ng throughout the area.
The bul k of the bri gade force may be assi gned areas of responsi bi l i ty
and be heavi l y engaged i n patrol l i ng and supporti ng efforts of
l ocal securi ty forces.
e. The composi ti on of the bri gade reserve vari es wi th the si ze of the
area, nature of the enemy threat, and the terrai n. Some bri gade
uni ts may be fragmented i nto smal l el ements and requi red to
defend di spersed i nstal l ati ons. I n thi s si tuati on, the reserve
el ements are assi gned conti ngency mi ssi ons to provi de reacti on
forces for several i nstal l ati ons.
f.
Area coverage may requi re assi gnment of fi re support uni ts to a
much l ower l evel than i s normal i n conventi onal operati ons. To
support di spersed securi ty el ements, decentral i zati on of fi re
support may be requi red. Di rect fi re supporti ng weapons
(i ncl udi ng arti l l ery i n the di rect fi re rol e) can be effecti ve at short
ranges when usi ng ti me and super qui ck fuze. Di rect fi re support
weapons are i mportant i f the guerri l l a force moves wi thi n the
mi ni mum range of i ndi rect fi re weapons.
g.
Al l mi l i tary and cri ti cal ci vi l i an i nstal l ati ons and popul ati on
centers must be protected agai nst sabotage and attack.
h.
The l arger i nstal l ati ons and communi ti es and the surroundi ng
smal l er ones mutual l y assi st each other i n thei r defense. Fi re
support from several i nstal l ati ons and communi ti es can contri bute
to mutual defense.
i . The defense of communi ti es i s pri mari l y the task of l ocal
parami l i tary forces and pol i ce. The defense of communi ti es i s
conducted wi th speci al emphasi s on physi cal securi ty and
popul ace and resources control measures. I n pl anni ng the
defense, mi l i tary uni ts may be requi red to secure l i nes of
communi cati on i n the area. They may do so by survei l l ance,
occupati on of tacti cal posi ti ons, or use of guards for convoy
securi ty, patrol l i ng, and securi ty posts. Al ong l i nes of communi -
cati on, fi xed securi ty posts protect cri ti cal poi nts such as
termi nal s, tunnel s, bri dges, and road or rai l way juncti ons. The
si ze of the securi ty post depends on the mi ssi on and the type and
si ze of the hosti l e forces whi ch may attack i t. Securi ty posts i n
remote areas are l arger than those near supporti ng forces.
3- 15
FM 90-8
Section V. Offensive Operations
3-18. Three phases.
Thi s secti on di scusses offensi ve operati ons whi ch bri gades (and
subordi nate uni ts) may have to conduct. For purposes of organi zati on
and cl ari ty, operati ons are di scussed under those phases of an
i nsurgency i n whi ch they wi l l most often have to be conducted.
Dependi ng on the tacti cal si tuati on, these operati ons, or vari ati ons
and combi nati ons of them, may be conducted duri ng any of the three
phases of i nsurgent acti vi ty: l atent and i nci pi ent i nsurgency; guerri l l a
warfare; and war of movement.
3-19. Phase I Latent and incipient insurgency.
a. Thi s phase ranges from subversi ve acti vi ty that i s onl y a
potenti al threat, l atent or i nci pi ent, to si tuati ons i n whi ch
frequent subversi ve i nci dents and acti vi ti es occur i n an organi zed
pattern. I t i nvol ves no major outbreak of vi ol ence or uncontrol l ed
i nsurgency acti vi ty.
b. Possi bl e i nsurgent acti vi ti es duri ng Phase I i ncl ude attacks on
pol i ce forces, other terrori sti c acti vi ti es, and some mi nor mi l i tary
operati ons carri ed out to gai n addi ti onal i nfl uence over the
popul ati on (or provi de arms for the movement) and to chal l enge
the governments abi l i ty to mai ntai n l aw and order. Furthermore,
groundwork i s l ai d for extensi ve external materi el support whi ch
i s essenti al i n most cases for the expansi on of the i nsurgency and
i ts eventual success.
3-20. Police-type operations.
a.
b.
c.
To control the movement of i nsurgents or guerri l l as, and thei r
materi el , pol i ce-type operati ons are conducted. These operati ons
are executed by host country pol i ce, parami l i tary, or mi l i tary
forces. For vari ous reasons, thi s may not be possi bl e, and US
forces may have to conduct pol i ce-type operati ons unti l host
country forces are avai l abl e to rel i eve them. (Under US l aw, the
mi l i tary cannot advi se or trai n forei gn pol i ce forces.)
I f US forces must conduct thi s type of operati on, mi l i tary pol i ce
uni ts are sui tabl e for thi s functi on. I f they are not avai l abl e,
combat forces do the job.
When conducti ng pol i ce operati ons, host government representati ves
are wi th US troops to serve as i nterpreters and advi se on l ocal
customs and courtesi es. When performi ng these duti es, US troops
treat passi ve ci vi l i ans and thei r property wi th as much courtesy
and respect as the si tuati on permi ts.
3- 16
FM 90-8
3-21. Searches.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
The need for a counterguerri l l a force to conduct search operati ons
or to empl oy search procedures i s a conti nuous requi rement. Most
search operati ons support stri ke operati ons or consol i dati on
operati ons, or they may be conducted as the mai n effort i n
popul ace and resources control operati ons. A search maybe
ori ented to peopl e, to materi el , to bui l di ngs, or to terrai n. I t usual l y
i nvol ves both ci vi l pol i ce and mi l i tary personnel .
Si nce mi suse of search authori ty can adversel y affect the ul ti mate
outcome of operati ons agtai nst guerri l l as, sei zure of contraband,
evi dence, i ntel l i gence materi al , suppl i es, or mi nor i tems duri ng
searches must be accompl i shed l awful l y and properl y recorded to
be of future l egal val ue. Proper use of authori ty i n searches gai ns
the respect and support of the peopl e. Abusi ve, excessi ve, or
i nconsi derate search methods may temporari l y suppress the
guerri l l a force or expose el ements of i t, but at the same ti me such
methods may ul ti matel y i ncrease the ci vi l i an popul ati ons
sympathy for and/or support of the guerri l l a.
Authori ty for search operati ons i s careful l y revi ewed. Mi l i tary
personnel must be aware that they perform searches onl y i n areas
wi thi n mi l i tary juri sdi cti on (or where otherwi se l awful ) for
purposes of apprehendi ng suspects or securi ng evi dence that
tends to prove an offense has been commi tted. Usual l y, there are
speci al l aws regul ati ng the search powers of the mi l i tary forces.
These l aws are gi ven wi de di ssemi nati on.
Search teams have detai l ed i nstructi on on control l ed i tems. Li sts
of prohi bi ted or control l ed-di stri buti on i tems such as chemi cal s,
medi ci nes, machi ne tool s, and other i tems shoul d be di stri buted.
The mi l i tary or ci vi l pol i ce who admi ni ster the popul ace and
resources control program are contacted before the conduct of
search operati ons, or peri odi cal l y i f search operati ons are a
conti nui ng acti vi ty.
Search operati ons i nvol vi ng US forces maybe i neffecti ve when
l anguage di ffi cul ti es prevent ful l communi cati on wi th the
i ndi genous popul ati on. US uni ts gi ven a search mi ssi on are
provi ded wi th i nterpreters as requi red.
The pace at whi ch a search operati on i s conducted i s sl ow enough
to al l ow for an effecti ve search but not so sl ow as to al l ow the
guerri l l a force ti me to react to the threat of the search.
I f acti ve resi stance devel ops to the search operati on, offensi ve
operati ons are conducted to el i mi nate the resi stance.
Consi derati on i s fi ven to returni ng to a searched area after the
compl eti on of an i ni ti al search to surpri se and el i mi nate
3 - 1 7
FM 90-8
guerri l l as or thei r i nfrastructure that may have remai ned
undetected or may have returned.
3-22. Search of individuals.
The fact that anyone i n an area to be searched can be a guerri l l a or a
guerri l l a sympathi zer i s stressed i n al l search operati ons. However,
searchers are tactful to avoi d maki ng an enemy out of a suspect who
may, i n fact, support the host country government. I t i s duri ng the
i ni ti al handl i ng of a person about to be searched that the greatest
cauti on i s requi red. Duri ng the search of an i ndi vi dual , one member of
a search team al ways covers the other member who makes the actual
search. (For i nformati on on how to conduct searches, see Appendi x G.)
3-23. Checkpoints, roadblocks, and vehicle searches.
a. I t wi l l be necessary to mai ntai n a conti nuous check on road
movement to apprehend suspects and to prevent smuggl i ng of
control l ed i tems. Thi s requi res the use of checkpoi nts. Si nce
checkpoi nts cause consi derabl e i nconveni ence and even fear, i t i s
i mportant that the ci vi l popul ati on understands that checkpoi nts
are a preventi ve and not a puni ti ve measure.
b.
Checkpoi nts maybe descri bed as ei ther del i berate or hasty. The
del i berate checkpoi nt i s posi ti oned i n a town or i n the open
country, often on a mai n road. I t acts as a useful deterrent to
unl awful movement. The hasty checkpoi nt i s hi ghl y mobi l e and i s
qui ckl y posi ti oned i n a town or i n the open country. The actual
l ocati on of the hasty checkpoi nt i s desi gned to achi eve qui ck
success.
c. Conceal ment of a checkpoi nt i s desi rabl e, but often i mpossi bl e.
The l ocati on shoul d make i t di ffi cul t for a person to turn back or
reverse a vehi cl e wi thout bei ng observed. Cul verts, bri dges, or
deep cuts may be sui tabl e l ocati ons. Posi ti ons beyond sharp
curves have the advantage that dri vers do not see the checkpoi nt
i n suffi ci ent ti me to avoi d i nspecti on. Safety di sadvantages may
outwei gh the advantages of such posi ti ons. A scarci ty of good
roads i ncreases the effect of a wel l -pl aced checkpoi nt.
d.
A checkpoi nt requi res adequate troops to prevent ambush and
surpri se by a guerri l l a force. An el ement of the checkpoi nt force i s
posi ti oned and conceal ed an appropri ate di stance (one hundred to
several hundred meters) from the checkpoi nt to prevent the escape
of any vehi cl e or person attempti ng to turn back upon si ghti ng the
checkpoi nt. The vehi cl e, dri ver, and passengers are searched. I f
the checkpoi nt i s manned for any l ength of ti me, part of the force
i s al l owed to rest. The rest area i s l ocated near the search area so
that the troops can be assembl ed qui ckl y as a reserve force. (For
3- 18
FM 90-8
i nformati on on how to conduct checkpoi nts and roadbl ocks, see
Appendi x G.)
3-24. Search of built-up areas - cordon and search
operations.
a. Techniques. Search techni ques i n bui l t-up areas are practi ced
by pol i ce and mi l i tary forces operati ng i n popul ated areas. These
techni ques are requi red for searchi ng ei ther a few i sol ated huts or
bui l di ngs, or for searchi ng wel l -devel oped urban secti ons. Search
operati ons i n bui l t-up areas requi re thorough preparati on and
rehearsal . Speci al emphasi s shoul d be gi ven to the fol l owi ng:
(1) Di vi de the area to be searched i nto zones, and assi gn a
search party to each. A search party consi sts of a search
element (to conduct the search), a security element (to
enci rcl e the area and prevent entrance and exi t, and to secure
open areas), and a reserve element (to assi st, as requi red).
(a) The search el ement conducts the mi ssi on assi gned for
the operati on. Normal l y i t i s organi zed i nto speci al
teams.
(b) The securi ty el ement surrounds the area whi l e the
search el ement moves i n. Members of the securi ty
el ement ori ent pri mari l y upon evaders from the
popul ated area; however, they can cut off any i nsurgents
tryi ng to rei nforce. Checkpoi nts and road bl ocks are
establ i shed. Subsurface routes of escape, such as
subways and sewers, must be consi dered when operati ng
i n ci ti es.
(c)
The reserve el ement i s a mobi l e force wi thi n a nearby
area. I ts speci fi c mi ssi on i s to assi st the other two
el ements shoul d they meet resi stance they cannot
handl e. I n addi ti on, i t i s capabl e of repl aci ng or
rei nforci ng ei ther of the other two el ements shoul d the
need ari se.
(2) Consi der any enemy materi al found, i ncl udi ng propaganda
si gns and l eafl ets, to be booby-trapped unti l i nspecti on
proves i t i s safe.
(3) Thoroughl y search underground and underwater areas. Any
freshl y excavated ground can be a hi di ng pl ace. Use mi ne
detectors to l ocate metal objects underground and under-
water .
(4) Depl oy rapi dl y, especi al l y when a guerri l l a force i s sti l l i n the
area to be searched. The enti re area to be searched i s
3 - 1 9
FM 90-8
surrounded si mul taneousl y. I f thi s i s not possi bl e, observed
fi re must cover that porti on not covered by sol di ers.
b.
Principles. A basi c pri nci pl e when searchi ng a bui l t-up area i s
to conduct i t wi th l i mi ted i nconveni ence to the popul ati on. The
popul ace may be i nconveni enced to the poi nt where they
di scourage guerri l l as and i nsurgent sympathi zers from remai ni ng
i n the l ocal e, but not to the poi nt that they col l aborate wi th the
guerri l l a force as a resul t of the search. The l arge-scal e search of a
bui l t-up area i s normal l y a combi ned ci vi l pol i ce and mi l i tary
operati on. I t i s pl anned i n detai l and rehearsed when possi bl e.
Physi cal reconnai ssance of the area just pri or to a search i s
avoi ded. I nformati on needed about the terrai n may be obtai ned
from aeri al photographs. I n l arger towns or ci ti es, the l ocal pol i ce
may have detai l ed maps showi ng rel ati ve si ze and l ocati on of
bui l di ngs. For success, the search pl an must be si mpl e and be
executed swi ftl y.
c. Command and control. Normal l y, a search i nvol vi ng a
battal i on or l arger force i s best control l ed by the mi l i tary
commander wi th the ci vi l pol i ce i n support. A search i nvol vi ng a
smal l er force i s best control l ed by the ci vi l pol i ce wi th the mi l i tary
i n support. Regardl ess of the control l i ng agency, the actual search
i s performed by host country pol i ce when they are avai l abl e i n
adequate numbers and have been trai ned i n search operati ons.
(For detai l ed i nformati on on how to conduct cordon and search
operati ons, see Appendi x G.)
3-25. Aerial search operations.
a.
b.
c.
d.
Search uni te mounted i n armed hel i copters use the mobi l i ty and
fi repower of these ai rcraft to the maxi mum. (Thi s may seri ousl y
affect the moral e of the guerri l l a force.)
Ai r assaul t combat patrol s, conducti ng an aeri al search,
reconnoi ter an assi gned area or route i n search of guerri l l a forces.
When a guerri l l a force i s l ocated, the ai r assaul t combat patrol
may engage i t from the ai r or may l and and engage i t on the
ground. Thi s techni que has l i ttl e val ue i n areas of dense
vegetati on. Use of ai r assaul t combat patrol s shoul d be l i mi ted to
those operati ons i n whi ch suffi ci ent i ntel l i gence exi sts to justi fy
thei r use and then normal l y i n conjuncti on wi th ground oper-
ati ons.
I n ground search operati ons, hel i copters drop off troops i n an area
suspected of contai ni ng guerri l l a el ements. Wi th the hel i copters
overmatchi ng from the ai r, troops search the area. Troops are then
pi cked up and the process i s repeated i n other areas.
Members of ai r assaul t combat patrol s shoul d be trai ned i n
tracki ng procedures i n order to fol l ow guerri l l as to thei r base. I f
3 - 2 0
FM 90-8
the patrol encounters a l arge guerri l l a force, the reserve (ready
forces) are commi tted. Pl ans must provi de for evacuati on of
pri soners, casual ti es, and materi el .
3-26. Civil disturbance and riot control.
a. US forces parti ci pati ng i n counterguerri l l a operati ons may be
tasked to assi st host country pol i ce and mi l i tary forces i n
restori ng order di srupted by ci vi l di sturbance or ri ot. I f thi s
occurs, US force parti ci pati on shoul d be l i mi ted to contai ni ng the
di sturbance and protecti ng US l i ves and property.
b. The suppressi on of demonstrators or ri oters shoul d be l eft enti rel y
to host country forces. Any di rect acti on by US troops agai nst
demonstrators or ri oters wi l l be mi srepresented by the i nsurgents
and thei r sympathi zers as brutal suppressi on of l egi ti mate
di ssent and be used by them as a propaganda weapon. (For
further i nformati on on speci fi c techni ques, see FM 19-15.)
3-27. Phase II Guerrilla warfare.
a. Phase I I i s reached when the subversi ve movement, havi ng
gai ned suffi ci ent l ocal or external support, i ni ti ates organi zed
guerri l l a warfare or rel ated forms of vi ol ence agai nst the
government. Exampl es of i nsurgent acti vi ti es duri ng Phase I I
i ncl ude:
(1) Acti vi ti es i ni ti ated i n Phase I are conti nued and expanded.
I nsurgent control , both pol i ti cal and mi l i tary, over terri tory
and popul ace, i s i ntensi fi ed.
(2) Guerri l l a warfare i s used on a l arger scal e, and l i mi ted
defense i s conducted i n some geographi c areas.
(3) An i nsurgent government i s establ i shed i n i nsurgent-
domi nated areas as the mi l i tary si tuati on permi ts. I n areas
not yet control l ed, efforts are made to neutral i ze actual or
potenti al opposi ti on groups and to i ncrease i nfi l trati on i nto
government agenci es. I nti mi dati on through terror and
threat of guerri l l a acti on i ncreases and thus becomes more
si gni fi cant.
b. Mi l i tari l y, the major goal i s to control addi ti onal areas; the
government i s forced to strai n i ts resources tryi ng to protect
everythi ng at the same ti me. I nsurgent forces attempt to ti e down
government troops i n stati c defense tasks, i nterdi ct and destroy
l i nes of communi cati ons, and capture or destroy suppl i es and
other government resources.
3- 21
FM 90-8
3-28. Small-unit operations.
Smal l -uni t operati ons are used agai nst guerri l l a acti vi ti es i n the
second phase of an i nsurgency. They are effecti ve si nce smal l uni ts can
cover more terri tory than a l arge uni t, they keep the guerri l l a off
bal ance, and thei r fri endl y fi repower (that can be rapi dl y massed) may
provi de a favorabl e rati o i n meeti ng engagements. I n Phase I I , the
guerri l l a i s usual l y operati ng i n smal l er uni ts, too.
3-29. Raid.
a.
b.
c.
A rai d i s an operati on i nvol vi ng a swi ft penetrati on of hosti l e
terri tory to secure i nformati on, harass the guerri l l a force, or
destroy the guerri l l a force and i ts i nstal l ati on. I t ends i n a
pl anned wi thdrawal upon compl eti on of the assi gned mi ssi on. A
successful rai d i s based on accurate, ti mel y, and detai l ed
i nformati on. Rai ds are usual l y targeted agai nst si ngl e, i sol ated
guerri l l a base camps. To assi st i n attai ni ng surpri se, the rai di ng
force uses i ncl ement weather, l i mi ted vi si bi l i ty, or terrai n
normal l y consi dered i mpassabl e.
The rai di ng force i s normal l y organi zed i nto an assaul t el ement
and a securi ty el ement. A l arger rai di ng force may add a support
el ement whi l e a smal l rai di ng force i ncl udes supporti ng weapons
i n the assaul t el ement.
The use of ai rborne and ai r assaul t forces for a rai d enhances
surpri se. I f ni ght ai rborne or ai r assaul t rai ds are conducted, the
force must be accuratel y i nserted and ori ented on the ground. Ai r
assaul t forces supported by armed hel i copters offer i nfi ni te
possi bi l i ti es for conducti ng rai ds. Thi s type of rai d force can move
i n, stri ke the objecti ve, and wi thdraw wi thout extensi ve preparati on
or support from other sources. (For further i nformati on on the
composi ti on and organi zati on of rai d forces, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10,
and FM 7-20.)
3-30. Patrols.
a. Conventi onal patrol l i ng doctri ne normal l y appl i es to counter-
guerri l l a operati ons, but some techni ques must be ori ented to meet
the guerri l l as acti vi ti es and the operati onal envi ronment.
Patrol l i ng becomes more si gni fi cant i n counterguerri l l a operati ons
because of the di ffi cul ty i n l ocati ng and i denti fyi ng guerri l l a
forces and determi ni ng thei r i ntenti ons. Patrol l i ng i s used when
l i mi ted (or no) i ntel l i gence on guerri l l a acti vi ty i s avai l abl e.
Personnel shoul d be thoroughl y bri efed, carry onl y mi ssi on-essenti al
equi pment, and be physi cal l y fi t. Routes are pl anned careful l y
and coordi nated wi th hi gher, l ower, and adjacent uni ts, to i ncl ude
ai r and ground fi re support el ements and reserve forces.
3- 22
FM 90-8
b.
Patrol l i ng i s done to fi nd and destroy the guerri l l a, and to deny
hi m use of an area. Patrol s are usual l y categori zed as ei ther
combat or reconnai ssance.
c. Patrol s can be empl oyed to:
(1) Saturate areas of suspected guerri l l a acti vi ty.
(2) Control cri ti cal roads and trai l s.
(3) Mai ntai n contact between vi l l ages and uni ts.
(4) Establ i sh popul ati on checkpoi nts.
(5) Provi de securi ty for fri endl y forces.
(6) I nterdi ct guerri l l a routes of suppl y and communi cati on.
(7) Establ i sh ambushes.
(8) Pursue, mai ntai n contact wi th, and destroy guerri l l as.
(9) Provi de i nternal securi ty i n rural areas.
(10) Locate guerri l l a uni ts and base camps.
d. Saturati on patrol l i ng i s extremel y effecti ve i n Phase I I si tuati ons.
I n thi s techni que, patrol s are conducted by many l i ghtl y armed,
smal l , fast-movi ng uni ts and provi de thorough area coverage.
Patrol s move over pl anned and coordi nated routes whi ch are
changed frequentl y to avoi d establ i shi ng patterns. Use of
saturati on patrol l i ng resul ts i n the sustai ned deni al of an area to
guerri l l a forces as they seek to avoi d contact wi th the counter-
guerri l l a uni ts. I n addi ti on to harassment and di scovery of
guerri l l a tacti cal forces, thi s techni que provi des:
(1)
An opportuni ty to gai n an i nti mate knowl edge of the area of
oper ati ons.
(2) A form of reassurance to the l ocal popul ati on that the
government i s concerned about thei r protecti on and securi ty.
(3) A means by whi ch i nformati on about the guerri l l a can be
obtai ned. (For further i nformati on on preparati on, executi on,
and operati onal techni ques of patrol s, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20,
and Appendi x D.)
3-31. Ambush
a. An ambush i s a surpri se attack from a conceal ed posi ti on upon
a movi ng or temporari l y hal ted target. Ambushes gi ve the
counterguerri l l a force several advantages:
(1) An ambush does not requi re ground to be sei zed or hel d.
(2) Smal l er forces wi th l i mi ted weapons and equi pment can
harass or destroy l arger, better armed forces.
3 - 2 3
FM 90-8
(3) Guerri l l as can be forced to engage i n deci si ve combat at
unfavorabl e ti mes and pl aces.
(4) Guerri l l as can be deni ed freedom of movement and depri ved
of weapons and equi pment that are di ffi cul t to repl ace.
b. Wel l -pl anned and wel l -executed ambushes maybe the most
successful operati onal techni que empl oyed agai nst guerri l l as. I t
i s an effecti ve techni que to i nterdi ct movement of guerri l l a forces
wi thi n an area. Sel ecti on of the si te i s a key step i n devel opi ng a
wel l -organi zed ambush. Al so, l eaders must be profi ci ent i n usi ng
mi nes, anti handl i ng devi ces, demol i ti ons, and expedi ent devi ces
for organi zati on of the posi ti on. Fi re support i s prepared for
i mmedi ate del i very on cal l .
3-32. Night ambush.
Ambush duri ng darkness i s di ffi cul t to control , but darkness i ncreases
the securi ty of the ambush party and the confusi on of those bei ng
ambushed. A smal l ambush party general l y i s more practi cal ;
however, the si ze of the party depends on factors such as the si ze of the
uni t to be ambushed and the esti mated guerri l l a strength i n the area.
(For further i nformati on on preparati on, executi on, and operati onal
ambush techni ques, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and Appendi x C.)
3-33. Encirclement.
a. Enci rcl ement offers the best chance to fi x guerri l l a forces i n
posi ti on and achi eve deci si ve resul ts. The battal i on and l arger
uni ts wi l l usual l y pl an and conduct enci rcl ements. The company
and smal l er uni ts normal l y do not have the manpower and
command and control capabi l i ty to execute enci rcl ements except
as part of a l arger force.
b. Enci rcl ements requi re accurate i ntel l i gence on the l ocati on of
guerri l l a el ements. Si nce i t requi res a major porti on of the
counterguerri l l a force to execute thi s maneuver, i t i s usual l y
targeted agai nst l arge guerri l l a forces or guerri l l a base compl exes,
a seri es of smal l er base camps cl ustered wi thi n an area.
c. Pl anni ng, preparati on, and executi on are ai med at enci rcl i ng the
guerri l l a force rapi dl y. Maxi mum securi ty and surpri se can be
gai ned by occupyi ng the i ni ti al enci rcl ement posi ti ons duri ng
dar kness.
d. I n l arge operati ons, ai r assaul t and ai rborne troops add speed and
surpri se to the operati on. Posi ti ons are occupi ed si mul taneousl y
i n order to bl ock escape. I f si mul taneous occupati on i s not
possi bl e, probabl e escape routes are covered fi rst. I ni ti al
occupati on i s the most cri ti cal peri od of the operati on. When the
guerri l l as become aware that they are bei ng enci rcl ed, they wi l l
3 - 2 4
FM 90-8
e.
f.
g.
h.
i .
probabl y probe for gaps or attack weak poi nts and attempt to
break out.
Enci rcl i ng uni ts provi de strong combat patrol s far to thei r front to
gi ve earl y warni ng of attempted breakouts. Mobi l e reserves are
posi ti oned to counter a breakout and to rei nforce di ffi cul t areas
such as broken terrai n or areas wi th caves, tunnel s, or
forti fi cati on compl exes.
I ndi rect fi re support can serve to cl oak an enci rcl ement by
gai ni ng and hol di ng the guerri l l as attenti on. Fi res are pl anned i n
detai l to support the enci rcl ement.
Fol l owi ng compl eti on of the enci rcl ement, the ci rcl e i s contracted
to capture or destroy the guerri l l a force. As the ci rcl e i s contracted,
uni ts may be removed from the l i ne and added to the reserve.
Agai nst smal l guerri l l a forces, the enci rcl ed area may be cl eared
by contracti on and a fi nal sweep. Agai nst l arger guerri l l a forces,
however, at some poi nt, some acti on other than contracti on wi l l be
requi red.
One techni que consi sts of dri vi ng a wedge through the guerri l l a
force to di vi de i t and then destroyi ng the guerri l l as i n each
subar ea.
Another techni que, empl oyed after some degree of contracti on, i s
to empl oy a bl ocki ng force on one or more si des of the peri meter
whi l e the remai nder of the enci rcl i ng force dri ves the guerri l l as
agai nst the bl ocki ng force. Ei ther el ement may accompl i sh the
actual destructi on. Thi s techni que i s effecti ve when the bl ocki ng
force can be l ocated on, or i mmedi atel y i n the rear of, a natural
terrai n obstacl e. (For further i nformati on, see Appendi x G.)
3-34. Phase III War of movement.
The si tuati on moves from Phase I I to Phase I I I when i nsurgency
becomes pri mari l y a war of movement between organi zed i nsurgent
forces and forces of the establ i shed government. Duri ng Phase I I I ,
i nsurgent acti vi ti es conducted i n Phases I and I I are conti nued and
expanded. Larger i nsurgent uni ts are used to fi ght government forces
and to capture key geographi cal and pol i ti cal objecti ves to be used to
defeat government forces.
3-35. Large-unit operations.
When an i nsurgency enters Phase I I I , the guerri l l a begi ns to mass hi s
forces and chal l enge government forces openl y. He may begi n to use
conventi onal warfare tacti cs to a greater degree. He may even el ect to
stand and fi ght i n defense of terrai n i f he feel s that i t i s i n hi s i nterest to
retai n i t or i f he feel s that he can deal government forces a seri ous
mi l i tary or pol i ti cal defeat by defendi ng. I n thi s phase, conventi onal
3- 25
FM 90-8
warfare tacti cs can be effecti vel y empl oyed to defeat the guerri l l a. (For
further i nformati on on how to empl oy these tacti cs, see FM 7-8, FM
7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)
3-36. Movement to contact.
a. Movement to contact i n counterguerri l l a tacti cal operati ons i s
basi cal l y the same as i n conventi onal confl i cts. Ni ght movement,
cl andesti ne movement, and counterambush precauti ons are
emphasi zed.
b. Care i s taken to avoi d ambushes i n movement to contact. The
i nfantry mai ntai ns contact by aggressi ve frontal and fl ank
patrol l i ng by smal l securi ty el ements, thereby exposi ng a
mi ni mum of troops to ambush. Supporti ng fi res are pl aced
cl ose-i n al ong, and paral l el to, the route of advance.
3-37. Reconnaissance in force.
a. Reconnai ssance i n force i s a l i mi ted-objecti ve operati on to
di scover and test guerri l l a posi ti ons, l ocati ons, and strength, and
to gather i nformati on. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons, the
objecti ve i s col l ecti on of i nformati on about guerri l l as and the
destructi on of uni ts and faci l i ti es. The commander i s prepared to
expl oi t meeti ng engagements and i ntel l i gence to achi eve tacti cal
success by conducti ng a hasty or del i berate attack to destroy
di scovered guerri l l a uni ts and faci l i ti es. The recon force may
conduct the operati on as a uni t, or sel ected subordi nate uni ts may
be commi tted on a l i mi ted scal e.
b. Reconnai ssance-i n-force operati ons normal l y devel op i nformati on
more rapi dl y and i n more detai l than do other reconnai ssance
methods. When fi rm i ntel l i gence i s l acki ng, the pri nci pal effort of
the recon uni t may be a wi despread and conti nuous reconnai s-
sance-i n-force operati on coupl ed wi th mandatory securi ty
mi ssi ons. I n arri vi ng at a deci si on to reconnoi ter i n force, the
commander consi ders:
(1) Hi s overal l mi ssi on.
(2) Hi s knowl edge of the enemy si tuati on.
(3) The urgency and i mportance of other i nformati on,
(4) The effi ci ency and speed of other i ntel l i gence col l ecti on
agenci es.
(5) The possi bi l i ty that the reconnai ssance may l ead to a
general engagement under favorabl e condi ti ons.
(6) The conti nui ng requi rements for l ocal and area securi ty.
3- 26
FM 90-8
(7) The avai l abi l i ty of adequate reserves (reacti on forces) and
the resources to del i ver them qui ckl y to the area to be
expl oi ted.
(8) The avai l abi l i ty of adequate, al l -weather fi re support means.
c. The reconnai ssance el ements i n the force shoul d have mobi l i ty at
l east equal to that of the enemy. Mobi l e reserves (ready forces)
qui ckl y expl oi t guerri l l a weaknesses and i nfl uence the acti on.
3-38. Hasty attack.
a.
b.
c.
d .
Once contact wi th the enemy i s made, the commander depl oys hi s
force, coordi nati ng movement, fi res, ai r support, and other means
i n an attempt to i mmedi atel y destroy the enemy or ful l y devel op
the si tuati on. General l y, i f the l eadi ng el ement contacti ng the
enemy cannot defeat hi m qui ckl y, the commander must deci de
whether to conduct a hasty attack or to take ti me to devel op the
si tuati on more careful l y and then conduct a del i berate attack.
At ti mes, the i ntel l i gence avai l abl e to the commander i ndi cates
cl earl y whi ch course he shoul d fol l ow. At other ti mes, however,
judgment may di ctate that he conduct a hasty attack to avoi d
bei ng hel d up by i nferi or forces and bei ng unnecessari l y del ayed.
At the same ti me, he must be careful to avoi d bei ng drawn i nto
ambush.
Conduct of a hasty attack i s a di ffi cul t and chal l engi ng operati on.
I deal l y, there shoul d be no pause i n the forward momentum of the
force upon i ni ti al contact. Maneuver uni ts swi ng i nto acti on
i mmedi atel y, usi ng movement techni ques appropri ate to the
enemy and terrai n.
The commander cal l s for avai l abl e fi re support. He coordi nates
and maneuvers resources so as to appl y the combat power needed
agai nst the enemy. The hasty attack tri es to fi x enemy el ements i n
pl ace wi th fi repower and ei ther overrun or enci rcl e them. Speed i s
essenti al . The reserve force has to be depl oyed earl y i f maneuver
el ements are hel d up. I f momentum i s l ost, the hasty attack fai l s.
3-39. Deliberate attack.
a . When the force commander knows he has encountered a strong
enemy force i n wel l -prepared defensi ve posi ti ons, he may
concl ude that a del i berate attack i s necessary.
A del i berate attack i s characteri zed by detai l ed (and wi del y
di stri buted) knowl edge of enemy posi ti ons, by l arge vol umes of
effecti vel y del i vered supporti ng fi res, by extensi ve decepti on, by
ful l expl oi tati on of el ectroni c warfare (EW), and by empl oyi ng
b.
3 - 2 7
FM 90-8
measures beyond those possi bl e i n a hasty attack. Conti nued
contact wi th the guerri l l a force must be mai ntai ned to prevent i ts
escape.
3-40. Exploitation.
a. I f an attack succeeds, expl oi tati on and pursui t fol l ow. Expl oi tati on
i s an operati on undertaken to fol l ow up success i n the attack.
Fol l owi ng the pri nci pl e of rei nforci ng success, i mmedi ate
expl oi tati on usi ng an uncommi tted el ement of the force i s
advi sabl e.
b.
The expl oi ti ng force dri ves swi ftl y to di srupt guerri l l a command
and control functi ons, severs escape routes, destroys reserves and
equi pment, and deni es the enemy an opportuni ty to reorgani ze hi s
defense. The expl oi tati on force i s l arge, reasonabl y sel f-suffi ci ent,
and wel l -supported by tacti cal ai r, ai r caval ry, and attack
hel i copters. I t does not pause to achi eve mi nor tacti cal successes
agai nst i sol ated or fl eei ng enemy uni ts; i t attempts to fi x them
whi l e concentrati ng on destroyi ng the mai n guerri l l a force. The
commander provi des mobi l e support, i ncl udi ng hel i copters for
emergency suppl y of petrol eum, oi l , and l ubri cants (POL) and
ammuni ti on, and ensures suffi ci ent fol l ow-on forces to attack
guerri l l a forces bypassed or fi xed by the expl oi ti ng force.
3-41. Pursuit.
a .
b.
c.
d.
Pursui t i s an offensi ve acti on agai nst a retreati ng enemy. I t i s the
fi nal phase of the expl oi tati on and occurs when a l arge guerri l l a
force attempts to di sengage. Normal l y, i t attempts to cut off
escape routes and enci rcl e and destroy the guerri l l a force. I t
mai ntai ns pressure wi th an expl oi ti ng force.
As the guerri l l a uni t di si ntegrates, expl oi tati on may devel op i nto
pursui t. Pursui t may devel op i n any operati on i n whi ch the enemy
has l ost hi s abi l i ty to operate effecti vel y and attempts to fl ee.
Pursui t requi res energy and resol uti on to press on despi te fati gue,
dwi ndl i ng suppl i es, or the approach of darkness. Ni ghtti me
pursui t i ncreases the enemys confusi on and speeds hi s di si nte-
grati on.
The pri mary purpose of pursui t i s to destroy the guerri l l a force.
Al though terrai n objecti ves may be assi gned as control measures,
the pri mary objecti ve i s the guerri l l a force.
I n pursui t, the requi rements and command rel ati onshi ps for
forces whi ch fol l ow and support are the same as i n expl oi tati on.
They destroy bypassed enemy stronghol ds, rel i eve supported
uni ts that have hal ted to contai n enemy forces, guard pri soners,
3- 28
FM 90-8
open and secure l i nes of communi cati ons, and control refugees. I n
conducti ng a pursui t, the commander mai ntai ns unremi tti ng,
di rect pressure agai nst the enemy whi l e tryi ng to envel op hi m to
cut hi s l i ne of retreat. When condi ti ons permi t, the commander
orders doubl e envel opments of the retreati ng guerri l l a force. He
makes maxi mum use of fi re support, ai r assaul t forces, and
offensi ve el ectroni c warfare.
Section VI. Defensive Operations
3-42. Variations.
a. Thi s secti on di scusses defensi ve operati ons whi ch bri gades and
subordi nate uni ts may have to conduct. Dependi ng on the tacti cal
si tuati on, these operati ons, or vari ati ons of them, may be
conducted duri ng any phase of an i nsurgency. I n some i nstances,
the type of operati on under consi derati on i s i denti cal to one
al ready di scussed i n Secti on V. The di fference i s the purpose.
b.
For exampl e, patrol l i ng maybe ei ther offensi ve or defensi ve i n
purpose. When i ts purpose i s offensi ve, i t i s done to l ocate the
enemy and destroy hi m. When i ts purpose i s defensi ve, i t i s done to
deny the enemy access to an area, and to keep hi m from
organi zi ng for offensi ve operati on. (For si mi l ari ti es of offensi ve
and defensi ve operati ons, see Secti on V.)
c. Thi s secti on al so provi des gui dance to commanders concerned
wi th the defense of vari ous types of temporary or semi permanent
bases, such as l ogi sti cal i nstal l ati ons, OSBS, ai rfi el ds, and
ai rbases, under varyi ng condi ti ons of securi ty that may exi st i n
an area of operati ons.
d. I t i s al so appl i cabl e to the defense of ci vi l i an communi ti es.
Commanders responsi bl e for bases, faci l i ti es, and communi ti es
shoul d exerci se those pri nci pl es and techni ques di scussed whi ch
appl y to thei r parti cul ar si tuati on.
3-43. Base defense environment.
a . Defense and securi ty of tacti cal uni ts and i nstal l ati ons are
i ntegral parts of combat mi ssi ons. (The term base i s used to
i ncl ude al l types of faci l i ti es to be defended.)
b. Base defense operati ons are executed under the gui dance of an
area commander whose responsi bi l i ti es i ncl ude protecti ng the
resources of hi s area from i nterrupti ons caused by enemy
acti vi ti es. Thi s i s a terri tori al responsi bi l i ty i n whi ch base
commanders provi de for the l ocal defense of thei r i mmedi ate base
areas. I n addi ti on, base commanders may be asked to provi de
3- 29
FM 90- 8
resources for other acti vi ti es whi ch may be cl assi fi ed as rear
battl e.
c. The base defense envi ronment i s establ i shed i n an area general l y
control l ed by fri endl y forces but not suffi ci entl y secure to prevent
guerri l l as from movi ng i n smal l groups, establ i shi ng fi ri ng
posi ti ons, or mounti ng smal l -scal e attacks.
d. Condi ti ons whi ch may characteri ze the envi ronment for base
defense i ncl ude:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
3-44.
US forces are i n a host country.
Other nati ons i n si mi l ar rol es may be i n the same host
countr y.
Uni ty of command or a combi ned headquarters may or may
not exi st.
Al though there i s organi zed armed confl i ct, there i s no
recogni zed state of war.
Many of the guerri l l as do not wear di sti ncti ve uni forms. At
ti mes, some may appear dressed i n government uni forms.
Guerri l l as cannot al ways be di sti ngui shed from government
supporters or neutral s even when they are conducti ng overt
oper ati ons.
External support may be provi ded to the guerri l l as, both
overtl y and covertl y. Nati ons or groups supporti ng the
guerri l l as may provi de sanctuari es where guerri l l a forces
may establ i sh base areas.
Parami l i tary forces may assume i ncreased responsi bi l i ti es.
No mi l i tary "frontl i ne" exi sts where conti nuous contact can
be mai ntai ned.
Guerri l l as usual l y do not hol d terri tory. They may di sperse
and avoi d combat at the appearance of a stronger force.
Missions, functions, and responsibilities.
a. Base defense consi sts of both normal and emergency l ocal
mi l i tary measures taken to nul l i fy or reduce the effecti veness of
enemy attacks or sabotage. Base defense i s conducted to ensure
the conti nued effecti veness of i ts faci l i ti es and uni ts to ful fi l l thei r
mi ssi ons.
The commander of an area or a subarea that contai ns a base i s
responsi bl e for i ts overal l defense. The base commander, however,
i s responsi bl e for i ts l ocal defense; he must have under hi s
operati onal control al l forces, regardl ess of branch of servi ce, that
are assi gned to the base pri mari l y for i ts defense. Forces assi gned
b.
3- 30
FM 90-8
to the base for other pri mary purposes wi l l al so assi st i n l ocal
defense duri ng an attack. Each commander of forces l ocated at a
base i s responsi bl e for:
(1)
Parti ci pati ng i n preparati on of base defense pl ans. Trai ni ng
hi s forces for base defense.
(2) Provi di ng appropri ate faci l i ti es and essenti al personnel for
the base defense operati ons center and appropri ate personnel
for the base defense force staff.
(3) Provi di ng for i nternal securi ty of hi s own command.
3-45. Passive defense.
I n addi ti on to thei r assi gned defense mi ssi ons, al l uni ts i n the base area
are responsi bl e for maxi mum i mpl ementati on of passi ve defense.
Passi ve defense consi sts of measures taken to reduce the probabi l i ty
(and to mi ni mi ze the effects) of damage caused by hosti l e acti on,
wi thout the expectati on of taki ng the i ni ti ati ve. Responsi bi l i ty for the
conduct of speci al i zed passi ve defense measures i s assi gned to
fi refi ghti ng uni ts, chemi cal uni ts, medi cal uni ts, and other appropri ate
organi zati ons capabl e of sati sfyi ng passi ve defense requi rements.
Addi ti onal l y, al l uni ts assi gned to the base i ni ti ate passi ve defense
measures, such as di spersi on, camoufl age, bl ackout, and use of
shel ters. These measures assi st i n preservi ng the operati ng i ntegri ty of
the base and ensuri ng deci si ve and effecti ve acti on agai nst enemy
attack.
3-46. Command relationships.
Command rel ati onshi ps for base defense operati ons provi de uni ty of
command whi l e preservi ng si mpl i ci ty. The urgency of base defense
operati ons requi res cl ear-cut authori ty.
3-47. Fundamentals of base defense.
a . Base defense. I t i s establ i shed to provi de al l -round securi ty for
the base wi th avai l abl e forces and i s characteri zed by detai l ed
pl anni ng and central i zed control . Securi ty measures may al so
i ncl ude provi si ons to protect adjacent ci vi l i an communi ti es, i f
feasi bl e. Constant and aggressi ve acti on by fri endl y el ements
agai nst enemy forces consti tutes a major el ement of base defense.
Vi gi l ance and sound securi ty measures reduce enemy i nterference
wi th operati ons at the base and al so tend to cause enemy forces to
di vert thei r operati ons from the area.
Use of terrain. Proper eval uati on and organi zati on of the area
are essenti al to hol d down the number of addi ti onal forces
requi red for base defense. Factors consi dered are:
b .
3- 31
FM 9 0 - 8
(1) Natural defensi ve characteri sti cs of the terrai n.
Use of arti fi ci al obstacl es to enhance the natural defensi ve
characteri sti cs of the terrai n.
(2)
Exi sti ng roads and waterways used for mi l i tary l i nes of
communi cati ons and ci vi l i an commerce.
(3)
Control of l and areas surroundi ng the base compl ex to a
range beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets, and al so
control of water approaches.
(4)
c. Security. Earl y warni ng of pendi ng acti ons ensures the base
commander ti me to react to any threat. Outposts, patrol s, ground
survei l l ance andcountermortar radar, i nfantry scout dogs (i f
avai l abl e), and ai r reconnai ssance and survei l l ance provi de earl y
warni ng. Ci vi l i an i nformants and acti ons of i ndi genous personnel
near the base are excel l ent i ndi cators of pendi ng enemy acti ons.
Securi ty measures vary wi th enemy threat, forces avai l abl e, and
other factors; al l -round securi ty i s essenti al .
d. Mutual support. Defendi ng forces are posi ti oned to ensure
mutual empl oyment of defensi ve resources, whi ch i ncl ude fi res,
observati on, and maneuver el ements. Mutual support between
defensi ve el ements requi res careful pl anni ng, posi ti oni ng, and
coordi nati on because of the ci rcul ar aspects of the base area.
Survei l l ance, obstacl es, prearranged fi res, and maneuver are used
to control gaps. Defense pl ans provi de for use of al l avai l abl e
support, i ncl udi ng attack hel i copters and cl ose ai r support.
e. All-round defense. I n defensi ve pl anni ng, the base commander
has to be prepared to defend agai nst enemy attack from any
di recti on. Pl ans are suffi ci entl y fl exi bl e, and reserves are
posi ti oned to permi t reacti on to any threat. Base defense forces
(BDF) are assi gned pri mary and al ternate posi ti ons and sectors of
responsi bi l i ty. Al l personnel are assi gned duty stati ons or
shel ters.
f . Defense in depth. Al ternate and suppl ementary posi ti ons,
combat outposts, and mutual l y supporti ng strongpoi nts i n front
of the base forward defense area extend the depth. The commander
pl ans fi res throughout the defensi ve area up to the maxi mum
range of avai l abl e weapons. Portabl e obstacl es may be pl aced
around cri ti cal targets duri ng reduced vi si bi l i ty to di srupt the
enemys pl an and add depth to the defense.
Responsiveness. Attacks agai nst a base may range from
l ong-range sni per, mortar, or rocket fi re to attacks by sui ci de
demol i ti on squads or major forces. The enemy has the advantage
of deci di ng when, where, and wi th what force he wi l l attack. The
defender posi ti ons hi s forces and pl ans fi res and movement so he
can respond to the wi dest possi bl e range of enemy acti ons. The
g.
3- 32
FM 90-8
defender prepares pl ans, to i ncl ude counterattack pl ans, and
rehearses, eval uates, and revi ses them as necessary.
h . Maximum use of offensive action. Si nce the objecti ve of the
base defense i s to mai ntai n a secure base, the defender uses
offensi ve acti on to the maxi mum to engage enemy forces outsi de
the base. On i ni ti al occupati on of the base si te, fri endl y forces take
offensi ve acti ons to destroy enemy forces i n the i mmedi ate area.
The area commander empl oys patrol s, rai ds, ambushes, ai r
attacks, and supporti ng fi res to harass and destroy any
remai ni ng enemy force. Once the enemy has been cl eared from the
area, the base can be defended by a smal l er force. The BDF
commander mai ntai ns constant l i ai son wi th major tacti cal uni t
commanders i n the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the
thr eat.
3-48. Defense preparations.
a. I mpl ementati on of base defense measures i n a new base begi ns
before base uni ts arri ve, i f possi bl e. Normal l y, combat uni ts
provi de the i ni ti al defense i n a new base area, These combat forces
remai n i n the base area, conducti ng aggressi ve offensi ve acti ons,
unti l base uni ts are capabl e of assumi ng the mi ssi on.
When base uni ts arri ve, they i mmedi atel y start organi zi ng the
base defense. They perform many of the tasks concurrentl y, but
some tasks requi re pri ori ty. The base commander speci fi es the
sequence for preparati on of the defense system. (FM 7-8, FM 7-10,
and FM 7-20 provi de a recommended sequence for tacti cal
defense. For more i nformati on on base defense, see Appendi x E.)
3-49. Patrols.
b.
a .
b.
c .
Base defense operati ons to counter smal l groups of enemy forces
i ncl ude aggressi ve, frequent patrol l i ng by squad- and pl atoon-si ze
forces to detect and capture or destroy smal l groups of guerri l l as.
I nfantry scout dogs, i f avai l abl e, maybe used to add securi ty and
addi ti onal detecti on abi l i ty to patrol operati ons.
Patrol l i ng i s conducted by smal l , hi ghl y mobi l e uni ts movi ng on
foot or by vehi cl es duri ng dayl i ght and darkness. I t may i ncl ude
the use of ai rcraft or boats. Popul ated areas near the base are
searched, and surpri se checkpoi nts are establ i shed al ong known
or suspected routes of guerri l l a communi cati ons.
Dug-i n or conceal ed ni ght ambush si tes are manned outsi de the
barri er system trace on a random basi s. I ndi genous personnel
shoul d accompany ambushes near popul ated areas. Thei r
knowl edge of l ocal popul ace and terrai n assi sts the ambush
mi ssi on. Arti l l ery and mortar targets are regi stered and pl otted to
3-33
FM 90-8
provi de rapi d on-cal l support. Detectors and sensors are empl aced
to provi de earl y warni ng.
d. BDF or other base uni t reconnai ssance patrol s obtai n target
acqui si ti on data. They may penetrate known guerri l l a-control l ed
terri tory to i nstal l sensors that report the enemys presence al ong
i nfi l trati on and suppl y routes. I n addi ti on, such patrol s observe
known i nfi l trati on and suppl y routes and report any acti vi ty
al ong these routes. They provi de earl y warni ng of guerri l l a
assembl y of personnel ; movement of weapons, ammuni ti on, or
other suppl i es; and preparati on of mortar and rocket fi ri ng si tes.
I n addi ti on to the acqui si ti on of speci fi c targets, reconnai ssance
patrol s may be used to l ocate suspected areas where other types of
survei l l ance or acqui si ti on systems may be empl oyed to obtai n
i nformati on. I ndi genous personnel are val uabl e assets to
reconnai ssance patrol s. Thei r knowl edge of the terrai n, abi l i ty to
operate effecti vel y i n the envi ronment, knowl edge of the
l anguage, and fami l i ari ty wi th l ocal customs are useful .
e. Combat patrol s, when used for base defense, are empl oyed i n
di ffi cul t terrai n some di stance from the base but wi thi n range of
supporti ng arti l l ery. Combat patrol s empl oy ranger-type tacti cs
and remai n commi tted for rel ati vel y l ong peri ods. They may be
suppl i ed by ai r and equi pped to communi cate wi th the base and
supporti ng ai rcraft. Such patrol s may vary i n si ze from squad to
pl atoon. They have the mi ssi on of maki ng pl anned searches to
l ocate areas used by guerri l l as to hi de suppl i es, regroup, rest,
trai n, or otherwi se prepare for offensi ve acti ons. Smal l groups of
guerri l l as are engaged and destroyed. Large groups are reported
and kept under survei l l ance unti l they are attacked. Augmentati on
i n the form of l ocal parami l i tary gui des or trackers i ncreases the
effecti veness of combat patrol s.
(1) Reaction force operations. When a guerri l l a uni t i s
l ocated, the reacti on force i s depl oyed rapi dl y to engage the
uni t, di srupt i ts cohesi on, and destroy i t. I f the guerri l l a force
cannot be contai ned and destroyed, contact i s mai ntai ned;
rei nforcements are di spatched i f needed; and the guerri l l as
are pursued. When escape routes have been effecti vel y
bl ocked, the attack i s conti nued to destroy the enemy force.
The requi red mobi l i ty i s provi ded by ground and ai r vehi cl es
and by rapi d foot movement. Wheel ed vehi cl es for reacti on
forces are predesi gnated.
(a) Reacti on operati ons are si mpl e, pl anned, and rehearsed
day and ni ght. Pri mary and al ternate poi nts are
predesi gnated for the rel ease of reacti on forces from
central i zed control to faci l i tate movement agai nst
mul ti pl e targets. Such poi nts are reconnoi tered and
photographed for use i n pl anni ng and bri efi ng. Wi thi n
securi ty l i mi tati ons, actual rel ease poi nts are used
3- 34
FM 90-8
duri ng rehearsal s to promote compl ete fami l i ari ty wi th
the area.
(b)
I mmedi ate reacti on to any type of attack i s essenti al
and i s attai ned through empl oyment of fi repower and
movement of forces and thei r equi pment. I mmedi ate
reacti on to accurate and ti mel y i ntel l i gence may
permi t destructi on of the guerri l l a force before an
attack. I mmedi ate reacti on to standoff mortar or rocket
fi re may permi t destructi on of the guerri l l a force duri ng
an assaul t on the base and faci l i tate bl ocki ng routes of
wi thdrawal .
(2 )
Host and third country forces. The BDF commander
normal l y consi ders the i ntegrati on of host and thi rd country
forces i n the overal l base defense effort. Parti cul ar emphasi s
i s on i ntegrati on of host country forces i n patrol and
popul ace control acti vi ti es. Both host and thi rd country
forces provi de l ocal securi ty for thei r own uni ts; however, to
ensure maxi mum benefi t, al l such l ocal pl ans shoul d be
coordi nated wi th, and i ntegrated i n, the base master defense
pl an. The degree of parti ci pati on i n base defense by host and
thi rd country forces depends on the orders and gui dance of
thei r governments.
3-50. Securing lines of communication (LOC).
a . Guerri l l as may attempt to sever l i nes of communi cati ons (LOC)
by vari ous methods. Roads, waterways, and rai l ways can be
mi ned, or ambush si tes l ocated adjacent to them. Bri dges and
tunnel s can be destroyed by demol i ti ons. I t i s i mpossi bl e to
absol utel y secure l ong l i nes of communi cati on, but measures can
be taken to mi ni mi ze the effect of guerri l l a acti vi ty agai nst them.
b . Patrol l i ng by counterguerri l l a forces i ncreases the chances of
detecti ng guerri l l as before they can empl ace mi nes or demol i ti ons,
or establ i sh ambushes or roadbl ocks. Duri ng Phases I and 11 of an
i nsurgent acti on, mi l i tary pol i ce can do most of the patrol l i ng of
ground l i nes of communi cati on, but the tacti cal si tuati on may
di ctate combat forces havi ng to perform thi s mi ssi on.
c. Patrol l i ng i s done regul arl y, but patrol s shoul d not establ i sh a
routi ne whi ch enabl es the guerri l l a to avoi d or ambush them.
Patrol s must pay parti cul ar attenti on to probabl e ambush si tes
and chokepoi nts where roadbl ocks or mi nes and demol i ti ons
woul d be effecti ve.
d.
Aeri al patrol s are effecti ve for coveri ng l arge areas i n a short ti me.
e. Surface patrol s are sl ower, but they can check routes i n greater
detai l . Surface patrol members must be trai ned i n the detecti on of
mi nes and booby traps. Mi ne detectors and i nfantry scout dogs, i f
avai l abl e, may ai d them i n thi s task.
3- 35
FM 90-8
f .
g .
h .
i .
j .
The pri mary functi on of a patrol i s to check the securi ty of the
routes i t patrol s. Ordi nari l y, manpower constrai nts prohi bi t a
patrol from bei ng organi zed and equi pped to counter a l arge
guerri l l a force; however, rei nforcement by arti l l ery and attack
hel i copters i ncreases a patrol s capabi l i ty to deal wi th guerri l l as
they encounter. Patrol s are organi zed wi th enough combat power
to survi ve an i ni ti al contact. Recent guerri l l a acti vi ty provi des
gui dance on how patrol s are organi zed. I f the guerri l l a i s found i n
strength, hi s destructi on i s the reacti on force mi ssi on.
Patrol s al ways attempt to make i ni ti al contact wi th the smal l est
of thei r el ements, and they must be thoroughl y profi ci ent i n counter-
ambush techni ques.
Roadbl ocks, checkpoi nts, and guardposts at cri ti cal chokepoi nts
(such as bri dges and tunnel s) are effecti ve i n preventi ng acts of
sabotage. Vehi cl es and persons are stopped and searched before
bei ng al l owed to proceed. Vehi cl es are not al l owed to stop on or
under bri dges or i n tunnel s.
Cri ti cal chokepoi nts are watched careful l y at ni ght. Personnel
guardi ng them are equi pped wi th ni ght vi si on equi pment, and
ground survei l l ance radar and sensors are used to cover the
i mmedi ate, surroundi ng area. Curves on rai l roads are al so
watched. Mi ni ng i ndi rect approaches to sensi ti ve areas may hel p
to l essen the chances of ground attack. The area i s ri nged wi th
pl anned arti l l ery fi res, and bunkers are constructed to protect
guard personnel and provi de them posi ti ons from whi ch to fi ght
unti l rei nforced. Underwater approaches to bri dges are rei nforced
by booby-trapped obstacl es.
Engi neers are used to hel p keep l i nes of communi cati on open.
They can l ocate and cl ear mi nes, cl ear potenti al ambush si tes,
and repai r damage. They may al so prepare defensi ve systems around
chokepoi nts.
3-51. Defending against guerrilla offensive.
a . When i nsurgent acti on enters Phase I I I , the guerri l l a may begi n
to attack usi ng conventi onal tacti cs wi th the i ntenti on of
capturi ng and hol di ng faci l i ti es, i nstal l ati ons, bases, communi ti es,
and t.errori ty. He al so attemps to permanentl y sever cri ti cal l i nes
of communi cati on. These attacks are si mi l ar to attacks conducted
by conventi onal i nfantry except the i ni ti al absence of establ i shed
l i nes enabl es the guerri l l a to stri ke from any di recti on, or from
many di recti ons at once. As host government and US forces react
to these i ni ti ati ves, enemy and fri endl y l i nes may evol ve;
however, duri ng the i ni ti al stages of the guerri l l as offensi ve
campai gn, fri endl y bases, faci l i ti es, i nstal l ati on, and even ci ti es
may be surrounded and come under si ege.
3 - 3 6
FM 90-8
The organi zati on of the defense and the constructi on of physi cal
defenses must be at l east parti al l y compl eted pri or to the
guerri l l as attack i f the defenders are expected to hol d unti l a
counteroffense can begi n.
c . Once enemy and fri endl y l i nes are establ i shed, conventi onal
tacti cs are empl oyed by both si des. I ni ti al l y, however, US forces
may have to conduct l i mi ted attacks to reopen l i nes of communi -
cati on or to rel i eve besi eged areas.
Section VII. Common Operations
Operati ons common to offensi ve and defensi ve counterguerri l l a
operati ons may be conducted duri ng any of the three phases of an
i nsurgency. The degree to whi ch these operati ons are uti l i zed i s
dependent on the tacti cal si tuati on.
3-52. Movement security.
a. Al l movements of troops and suppl i es are pl anned and conducted
as tacti cal operati ons wi th emphasi s on extensi ve securi ty
measures. These securi ty measures may i ncl ude:
b.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Secrecy when pl anni ng and di ssemi nati ng orders, stri ct
noi se and l i ght di sci pl i ne duri ng movement when appropri ate,
and varyi ng routes and schedul es of movement.
Securi ty forces organi zed and equi pped to ensure effecti ve
front, fl ank, and rear securi ty duri ng movement and hal ts.
Pre-posi ti oni ng securi ty el ements al ong the route of movement
hel ps i n performi ng route reconnai ssance and movement
secur i ty.
Coordi nati on wi th supporti ng ai r uni ts to ensure a thorough
understandi ng of ai r support used to assi st the movement,
both i n taki ng preventi ve measures and i n cl ose combat
operati ons. The need for secrecy may precl ude i ni ti al ai r
cover, but i t wi l l not precl ude use of cl ose ai r support when
requi red. The use of aeri al photographs i s cri ti cal .
Fi re support el ements whi ch provi de cl ose and conti nuous
fi re support for the movement.
Maneuver for counterambush acti ons, to i ncl ude conti ngency
pl ans for i mmedi ate acti on agai nst an ambush and use of
formati ons whi ch al l ow part of the col umn to be i n posi ti on to
maneuver agai nst an ambush force.
Communi cati ons wi th supporti ng uni ts, adjacent host
country forces, and hi gher headquarters, to i ncl ude ai rborne
radi o rel ay.
3 - 3 7
FM 90-8
Var yi ng the l ocati on of l eader s, communi cati ons, and
automati c weapons wi thi n the movement formati on.
(8)
Questi oni ng l ocal ci vi l i ans al ong the movement route for
i ntel l i gence i nformati on, to i ncl ude possi bl e guerri l l a
ambush si tes.
(9) Movement by bounds wi th overmatchi ng fi re.
(10) Use of i nfantry scout dogs, i f avai l abl e, and other ambush
detecti on means.
(7)
b. Organi zati on of the movement depends upon the type of
movement, whether by ground, ai r, or water.
c . Pl anni ng for movement i s coordi nated wi th mi l i tary uni ts al ong
routes of movement and consi ders the fol l owi ng:
(1) Communications. Communi cati ons are vi tal to the
success of movements. Radi o communi cati on i s pl anned and
avai l abl e between convoy seri al s and march uni ts, wi th
arti l l ery forward observers and ai r control l ers, and wi th
uni ts and popul ati on centers i n the areas al ong the route of
movement. Vi sual and sound si gnal s, whi ch i ncl ude col ored
smoke, i denti fi cati on panel s, and whi stl e or horn si gnal s, are
prearranged. Whi l e l i mi ted, these communi cati on means are
effecti ve when prearranged meani ngs and responses are
understood and rehearsed.
(2) Artillery and mortar support. Arti l l ery and mortar
support may be provi ded by uni ts wi thi n range of the route of
movement or by arti l l ery and mortars whi ch may be
posi ti oned wi thi n range of the proposed route. Movements
requi ri ng arti l l ery and mortar support have observers ei ther
wi th them or i n supporti ng observati on ai rcraft. Stri p maps
marked wi th pl anned targets enabl e personnel (other than
forward observers) to request fi res. Coordi nati on wi th fi re
di recti on centers (FDC) capabl e of provi di ng fi re al ong the
route of movement ensures that forward observers can enter
the FDC net, make routi ne l ocati on reports, and request and
adjust fi res. Cal l si gns, frequenci es, authenti cati ons, areas
of possi bl e empl oyment, schedul es of movement, and target
numbers are coordi nated.
(3) Aircraft. Experi ence has shown that the presence of
ai rcraft deters ambushes. Col umn movement covered by
travel i ng overwatch or boundi ng overwatch attack hel i copters,
i n conjuncti on wi th a route reconnai ssance by scout
hel i copters or fi xed-wi ng stri ke ai rcraft, maybe requested.
Pl anni ng i ncl udes the type, number, and method of empl oy-
ment of ai rcraft. Methods of empl oyment i ncl ude col umn
cover, ai r al ert, and ground al ert. Col umn cover by fi ghter
3- 38
FM 90-8
ai rcraft i s expensi ve i n terms of crew fati gue and equi pment
mai ntenance; therefore, l i ght observati on-type ai rcraft that
can di rect on-cal l ai r support are used for short movements
over frequentl y used routes i n more secure areas. When ai r
support i s pl anned, communi cati ons i nformati on concerni ng
radi o frequenci es, cal l si gns, and i denti fi cati on procedures i s
provi ded to al l who may need to use them. I n addi ti on, the
supporti ng ai r uni t knows the maneuver i ntenti ons of the
ground el ement i n case of ambush.
(4)
Route clearing. Thi s operati on may be conducted before
certai n cri ti cal movements. The use of route-cl eari ng
operati ons depends upon the avai l abi l i ty of troops, the
i mportance of the movement, and the guerri l l a threat wi thi n
the area. Normal l y the uni ts responsi bl e for the area through
whi ch the movement wi l l pass are used i n route-cl eari ng
operati ons. These route-cl eari ng forces normal l y i ncl ude
both mounted and di smounted el ements. I n addi ti on to a
thorough reconnai ssance of the mai n route of movement,
cri ti cal terrai n near the route i s secured. Thi s maybe done by
pl aci ng pi ckets al ong cri ti cal stretches of the route or by
sel ecti ve pl acement of tacti cal uni ts.
(5) Reserves. Reserves (ready forces) are vi tal to counteri ng
ambushes. The guerri l l a must be convi nced that ambushes
produce a fast, rel entl ess, hard-hi tti ng response by counter-
guerri l l a supporti ng forces, to i ncl ude ai rstri kes and ground
pursui t. Pri or to a movement, reserve force commanders and
avi ators are bri efed on the general area of operati ons;
l andi ng areas, known and suspected guerri l l a l ocati ons, and
communi cati ons are emphasi zed. I f the di stance to be
covered from a si ngl e l ocati on prevents qui ck reacti on,
reserve ready forces are desi gnated i n successi ve areas. (For
further i nformati on on movement securi ty, see Appendi x G.)
3-53. Motor movement.
a . Speci al escort attachments may not be avai l abl e to support al l
motor movements; therefore, many convoys must be prepared to
secure themsel ves for part or al l of the di stance. When a maneuver
uni t i s desi gnated to provi de escort for a vehi cl e convoy, el ements
of the uni t provi de escort through thei r respecti ve areas of
responsi bi l i ty. Armor or armored caval ry uni ts are i deal l y sui ted
to provi de convoy escorts. Reconnai ssance of the route i mmedi atel y
pri or to the passage of the convoy i s desi rabl e. When a si ngl e uni t
i s to provi de escort through other uni ts areas of responsi bi l i ty,
the si ngl e uni t coordi nates cl osel y wi th those other uni ts to ensure
adequate fi re support and avai l abl e rei nforcements duri ng
passage of the convoy.
3- 39
FM 90-8
Si nce there i s sel dom ti me to i ssue orders duri ng an ambush, the
securi ty detachments acti ons are pl anned and, when possi bl e,
rehearsed by dri l l s pri or to the movement.
c. Convoy command responsi bi l i ty i s cl earl y fi xed throughout the
chai n of command. The commander and as many of hi s
subordi nates as possi bl e are bri efed on the l atest i nformati on
about the area through whi ch they are to pass. The commander
formul ates hi s pl ans and i ssues hi s orders to i ncl ude formati on,
i nterval s between echel ons and vehi cl es, rate of travel , and
detai l ed pl ans for acti on i f a guerri l l a force attacks the convoy. Al l
personnel board thei r vehi cl e i n such a way that they can
di smount rapi dl y i nto predri l l ed formati ons. Arms and ammuni ti on
are readi ed for i mmedi ate acti on, and vehi cl e commanders are
responsi bl e for keepi ng personnel al ert (Fi gure 3-1 ).
d. Convoys may be escorted by reconnai ssance ai rcraft or attack
hel i copters and may have tacti cal ai r support on cal l . The use of
reconnai ssance Army ai rcraft to survey routes i mmedi atel y
b.
forward of a convoy often provi des earl y warni ng of danger.
-
3- 40
FM 90-8
3-54. Armor and cavalry movement.
a. Duri ng movements, uni t vehi cl es and equi pment are arranged to
faci l i tate thei r empl oyment upon contact wi th, or i nterference
from, the enemy. Travel i ng, travel i ng overwatch, and boundi ng
overwatch techni ques are used i n movement. (See FM 71-2 for
armor ground movement securi ty techni ques, and FM 17-95 for
caval ry movement techni ques.)
Ai r caval ry can be used to provi de col umn cover and to gi ve earl y
warni ng of hosti l e acti vi ty. Securi ty measures are empl oyed to
keep the enemy from l earni ng of the movement or i ts desti nati on
once the col umn has begun movi ng.
b.
c. Terrai n and weather permi tti ng, aground securi ty force (advance
guard, fl ank securi ty, and/or rear guards) are used to provi de
securi ty. When terrai n precl udes the use of these ground securi ty
el ements, ai r caval ry may perform these acti vi ti es as part of the
securi ty mi ssi on.
3-55. Rail movement.
a . Mission. The pri mary mi ssi on of trai n personnel and combat or
securi ty troops i s to get the trai n to i ts desti nati on.
b .
Concept. As l ong as the trai n conti nues to move, control
remai ns wi th the trai n crew; however, i f an ambush or fi refi ght
devel ops and the trai n i s unabl e to di sengage by movement
forward or backward, the escort commander takes command and
undertakes defense of the trai n wi th al l avai l abl e personnel . I f
there i s no escort, the seni or mi l i tary member aboard takes
command. Radi o communi cati ons are used to cal l for assi stance.
Securi ty detachments guardi ng the ri ght of way have thei r own
communi cati on system whi ch may be ti ed i nto the rai l way
communi cati on system, when requi red.
c . Organization. Rai l way i nstal l ati ons and rai l traffi c are secured
by establ i shi ng defi ned areas of responsi bi l i ty. Standi ng
operati ng procedures on organi zati on for rai l movement are
normal l y publ i shed by the hi ghest l evel of command. Rai l
securi ty i s coordi nated wi th area and tacti cal commands whi ch
provi de support.
d .
Operations. Armored trai ns may be used for patrol l i ng track
where guerri l l a acti vi ty may be expected. Armored trai ns operate
tacti cal l y under orders of the appropri ate mi l i tary commander.
Si nce the operati on of an armored trai n i s qui te di fferent from that
of other trai ns, the mi l i tary transportati on servi ce assi gns a
speci al l y sel ected trai n crew. Thi s crew coordi nates the trai n
movement wi th that of other trai ns and wi th proper regard for the
tacti cal si tuati on. Rai l way gondol as may be prepared for defense
3- 41
160-739 - 94 - 3
FM 90-8
by pi l i ng sandbags on the fl oor and at the si des and by mounti ng
machi ne guns, mortars, and rocket l aunchers. These cars must
not be pl aced next to cars contai ni ng gasol i ne, ammuni ti on, or
other fl ammabl es. Locomoti ves shoul d be preceded by two or more
cars l oaded wi th sandbags, rocks, or scrap materi al for protecti on
agai nst mi nes and obstructi ons. On a si ngl e-track rai l di vi si on
subject to guerri l l a attack, the posi ti ve-bl ock method of operati ons
i s empl oyed. I n thi s method of operati on, a fol l owi ng trai n i s not
permi tted to enter a bl ock unti l the precedi ng trai n has cl eared i t.
Thi s permi ts the trai n i n the bl ock, i f attacked, to back up i f
necessary and to recei ve rei nforcements by trai n from ei ther
di r ecti on.
3-56. Water movement and riverine operations.
Counterguerri l l a operati ons may be conducted i n l arge i nundated
areas (l akes, coastal waters, fl ooded del ta areas, and i nl and waterways)
whi ch are i nhabi ted by l arge popul ati on segments and whi ch have
l i mi ted, or no, rai l and road nets. The abi l i ty of the counterguerri l l a
force to operate i n these areas i s a requi rement for successful mi ssi ons.
(See FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for amphi bi ous operati ons.)
a . Mission and concept. Boats may be used to perform a vari ety of
tacti cal as wel l as l ogi sti cal tasks. Waterway movement of troops
and suppl i es i s pl anned and conducted i n much the same manner
as mounted movements on l and; however, speci al characteri sti cs
of water transportati on must be consi dered. The counterguerri l l a
force may parti ci pate i n ri veri ne operati ons al ong wi th host
country regul ar forces (parti cul arl y naval forces), parami l i tary
forces, US Army waterborne transportati on forces, and US naval
for ces.
b. Organization. When a l arge waterborne force moves, i t adopts a
march formati on si mi l ar to a ground convoy. Advance and rear
guards i n boats are organi zed. Fl ank securi ty maybe provi ded by
patrol s i n boats i n adjacent streams or on foot on the banks.
Unl i ke ground convoy procedures, movement i s not necessari l y i n
fi l e or col umn formati on. The formati on depends upon the
purpose of the movement, the strength of the fri endl y force, and
the wi dth of the stream. I t i s based on the same consi derati ons as
those for combat formati ons on l and, to i ncl ude control , securi ty,
fl exi bi l i ty, speed of reacti on, observati on, and fi el ds of fi re.
c . Operations.
(1) Waterways afford l i ttl e cover and conceal ment. Power-dri ven
boats are noi sy and attract attenti on. Boats can be seen and
fi red on easi l y i n dayl i ght, but thi s di sadvantage can be
reduced by ni ght movement and by travel i ng cl ose to the
stream banks where shadow and overhead branches ai d
3- 42
FM 90-8
conceal ment. Boats must go to or near the shore to unl oad,
thus affecti ng the reacti on ti me i n case of an ambush.
Landi ng operati ons may be di ffi cul t because of unfavorabl e
characteri sti cs al ong the banks. Transported troops shoul d
be assi gned fi ri ng posi ti ons on board thei r vessel s for
defense agai nst ambush. The transported uni ts shoul d
posi ti on the maxi mum number of crew-served weapons on
board to engage enemy on the near bank or both banks of the
waterway.
(2) Combi nati ons of bl ocki ng, attacki ng, and screeni ng tacti cal
acti ons can be devi sed by the counterguerri l l a force uti l i zi ng
the mobi l i ty of naval forces (ri ver assaul t groups) and ai r
assaul t uni ts. Teamwork between ground forces movi ng
al ong ri ver banks, and supporti ng naval craft fi repower and
fl oati ng arti l l ery, can resul t i n successful operati ons agai nst
guerri l l a forces i n water areas.
(3) The amount of ti me requi red for pl anni ng i ncreases wi th the
si ze of the force i nvol ved. Pl anni ng shoul d be as detai l ed as
ti me permi ts, but qui ck reacti on i s necessary to capi tal i ze on
current i ntel l i gence.
Pl anni ng i ncl udes:
(4)
(a)
Reduci ng al l pl anni ng facets of embarki ng and
debarki ng of troops and equi pment to SOP.
I ntegrati ng and combi ni ng pl ans for US, al l i ed, and
host country mi l i tary forces and ci vi l i an agenci es.
(b)
(c)
Faci l i tati ng command and control means to uni fy
command and coordi nati on of fi res and other support.
(d) Reduci ng rehearsal s to a mi ni mum, based on habi tual
empl oyment; reduci ng acti vi ti es to SOP; reduci ng
equi pment and l ogi sti cal requi rements.
Obtai ni ng detai l ed i ntel l i gence from the popul ati on
and ci vi l i an pol i ce.
(e)
(f) Obtai ni ng i nformati on on currents and ti des at
H-hour, beach condi ti ons, and condi ti ons of banks or
shores for exi t routes.
(5)
Crew-served weapons transported on water craft must be i n
posi ti on at al l ti mes to engage guerri l l a ambush forces.
3-57. Foot and air movement.
a. Foot movement. Di smounted movements by smal l uni ts are
pl anned and conducted usi ng the pri nci pl es for patrol l i ng; for
3 - 4 3
FM 90-8
l arger uni ts, the pri nci pl es for movement to contact wi l l appl y
(FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and FM 7-20).
b .
Air movement. Ai r movements are an i ntegral part of counter-
guerri l l a operati ons. The pri nci pl es governi ng securi ty of such
movements are contai ned i n FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 90-4.
3-58. Border operati ons.
a. Whi l e operati ons to control borders are normal l y a ci vi l i an
securi ty agency mi ssi on, the bri gade may be requi red to
parti ci pate i n these operati ons by rei nforci ng or assumi ng
responsi bi l i ty for border survei l l ance and control .
b. Bri gades conducti ng or supporti ng consol i dati on or stri ke
operati ons may become i nvol ved i n border control acti vi ti es. I n
some cases, the scope and combat requi rements of control l i ng a
border may make border operati ons more a tacti cal than a ci vi l i an
securi ty force probl em, and may requi re the conduct of successi ve
stri ke operati ons by the bri gade i n i ts area of operati ons.
(1) Purpose. Bor der contr ol oper ati ons r equi r e effecti ve
measures to secure extensi ve l and border or seacoast areas
and to precl ude communi cati on and suppl y operati ons (to
i ncl ude aeri al resuppl y) between an external sponsori ng
power and guerri l l a forces.
(a) Concept. I n Phase I i nsurgency, operati ons i n border
areas are normal l y a functi on of pol i ce, customs, and
other government organi zati ons. Armed and parami l i -
tary forces may assi st these organi zati ons, parti cul arl y
i n remote areas. I n Phases I I and I I I , deni al of external
suppor t for the i nsur gency may r equi r e combat
operati ons i n border areas. These operati ons requi re
cl ose coordi nati on and cooperati on between the armed
for ces, par ami l i tar y for ces, and al l gover nment
agenci es i nvol ved. Physi cal l y seal i ng the border may
not be possi bl e si nce i t coul d requi re the commi tment of
more government forces and materi el than overal l
nati onal resources permi t. Si nce pl aci ng forces and
barri ers at al l possi bl e crossi ngs or entry si tes maybe
i mpossi bl e, pri ori ti es shoul d be establ i shed. Natural
barri ers must be used wherever possi bl e. Usi ng patrol s,
sensors, and obstacl es i n sel ected areas i ncreases the
effecti veness of natural barri ers. Barri er and deni al
operati ons are establ i shed after careful consi derati on
of the threat, the envi ronment, and the l ocati on of the
i nfi l trators probabl e targets and methods of oper-
ati on.
3 - 4 4
FM 90-8
(b )
(c)
(d)
Organization. Nati onal border forces may be com-
posed of border pol i ce and guards and may i ncl ude
parami l i tary forces and regul ar armed forces wi th
supporti ng or di rect responsi bi l i ty for porti ons of the
i nternati onal border.
Command and control. Border operati ons are
pl anned, di rected, and supervi sed from the nati onal
l evel . Authori ty to conduct these operati ons may be
del egated to subnati onal and other area commanders.
Structuring. Border task forces are tai l ored uni ts
desi gned to meet requi rements i n thei r assi gned areas.
They shoul d contai n suffi ci ent combat support and
combat servi ce support el ements to support operati ons
for extended peri ods.
(2) Operations.
(a)
Restri cted zones or fri endl y popul ati on buffer zones
can be establ i shed i f needed. Ei ther of these operati ons,
whi ch coul d requi re rel ocati ng many persons, must be
careful l y pl anned. Al though armed forces may assi st,
ci vi l authori ti es normal l y are responsi bl e for pl anni ng
and carryi ng out a rel ocati on program. Forced rel ocati on
i s hel d to a mi ni mum. The 1949 Geneva Conventi ons
prohi bi t forced popul ati on resettl ement unl ess there i s
cl ear mi l i tary necessi ty.
(b) Whi l e speci fi c porti ons of an i nternati onal l and border
or shorel i ne maybe pl aced under effecti ve survei l l ance
and control by use of stati c securi ty posts, reserve
forces, ground and aeri al observers, el ectroni c l i steni ng
posts, and patrol s, the conti nuous survei l l ance and
control of an extensi ve l and border or shorel i ne i s
di ffi cul t. Si nce i t may not be possi bl e to pl ace bri gade
forces at al l the crossi ng or l andi ng si tes, a pri ori ty
system for the si tes requi ri ng mi l i tary forces i s
establ i shed.
(3) Surveillance. Conti nuous and detai l ed survei l l ance i s
requi red to determi ne i nfi l trati on and exfi l trati on routes and
support si tes, frequency and vol ume of traffi c, type of
transportati on, number and type of personnel , amount and
type of materi el , terrai n and traffi c condi ti ons, and the
probabl e l ocati on of base areas and sanctuari es. Survei l l ance
and control of extensi ve coastal areas normal l y requi re the
use of coordi nated ground patrol s on the shorel i ne, coordi nated
offshore patrol s, aeri al survei l l ance, strategi c observati on
posts al ong the shorel i ne, and an effecti ve system of
3- 45
FM 90-8
l i censi ng and i denti fyi ng fri endl y mi l i tary and ci vi l i an
water cr aft.
(4) Military operations. Border uni ts establ i sh operati onal
support bases at battal i on and company l evel s to di rect
operati ons. Avi ati on, si gnal , engi neer, and fi re support
augmentati on usual l y i s requi red. These are normal l y found
i n the bri gade support base i f not augmenti ng subordi nate
uni ts.
(5) Border control methods. Two operati onal concepts for
the control of extensi ve l and borders are the restri cted zone
and the fri endl y popul ati on buffer.
(a) Restricted zone. Under thi s concept, an area of
predetermi ned wi dth al ong the border i s decl ared a
restri cted zone. Appropri ate procl amati ons are i ssued
to the popul ati on so that everyone understands that
any i ndi vi dual or group encountered i n the zone wi l l be
consi dered as an el ement of the guerri l l a force,
parami l i tary force, or si mi l ar organi zati on. So far as
practi cabl e, the restri cted zone i s cl eared of vegetati on
and other obstacl es to observati on over the area.
Earth-movi ng equi pment may be used for thi s purpose.
Defol i ants, i f authori zed, may al so be used for thi s
purpose, but thi s shoul d be consi dered when no other
method i s feasi bl e. Si nce the cl earance of the zone
al ong the enti re border i s normal l y not feasi bl e, a
pri ori ty of areas for cl earance i s usual l y necessary. The
restri cted zone i s control l ed by the use of ground and
aeri al observers, el ectroni c sensor devi ces, l i steni ng
posts, patrol s, mi nes, and obstacl es. I t i s preferabl e
that these acti vi ti es be conducted by host country ci vi l
pol i ce and parami l i tary forces to economi ze on the
avai l abl e regul ar armed forces combat power whi ch
can be better uti l i zed i n tacti cal operati ons.
(b) Friendly population buffer. The ci vi l i an popul ati on
i n the area of operati ons i s redi stri buted as necessary
to ensure that al l ci vi l i ans resi di ng near the border are
sympatheti c to the host country government. Thi s may
entai l the screeni ng of al l persons settl ed al ong the
border, rel ocati on of those persons of doubtful sympathy,
and suppl ementary resettl ement of the border area
wi th fri endl y el ements of the ci vi l i an popul ati on. Thi s
concept provi des a potenti al i nformant net al ong the
border, i t provi des fri endl y l ocal ci vi l i ans for empl oyment
i n sel f-defense uni ts to control the border area, and i t
deni es potenti al ci vi l i an contacts and houses of refuge
for use by the guerri l l as i n border-crossi ng acti vi ti es.
3- 46
FM 90-8
Rel ocati on of ci vi l i ans i s a sensi ti ve l egal and pol i ti cal
i ssue and shoul d be undertaken wi th host country
authori ty i n compl i ance wi th host country l aw. US
personnel shoul d not be acti vel y i nvol ved. US rel ocati on
acti vi ti es i n an i nternati onal confl i ct envi ronment
must compl y wi th appl i cabl e provi si ons of Geneva
Conventi ons I V. Rel ocati on operati ons must be pre-
ceded by detai l ed economi c, soci al , psychol ogi cal , and
pol i ti cal preparati on so the soci o-economi c stabi l i ty of
the area i s not endangered by the shi fts i n popul ati on.
The conduct of these operati ons wi thout such preparati on
can resul t i n such undesi rabl e effects i n the area as
pol i ti cal i nstabi l i ty, extensi ve unempl oyment, i nequi ti es
i n l and di stri buti on, i nadequate publ i c uti l i ti es,
i nadequate housi ng, and i ntermi ngl i ng of popul ati on
wi th confl i cti ng rel i gi ous bel i efs and soci al mores.
(6) Waterline borders. I n addi ti on to use of restri cted zones
and fri endl y popul ati on buffers, as di scussed above for l and
borders, the survei l l ance and control of extensi ve coastal
areas and shorel i nes normal l y requi re the use of:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
Coordi nated ground patrol s on the shorel i ne.
Coordi nated offshore sea patrol s of the shorel i ne and
ri ver del ta areas.
Rei nforci ng aeri al , vi sual , and photographi c survei l l ance
of the offshore waters and the shorel i ne.
Observati on posts al ong the shorel i ne i n the vi ci ni ty of
ri ver mouths, ground l i nes of communi cati on, and
accessi bl e porti ons of the shorel i ne.
An effecti ve system of l i censi ng and i denti fyi ng al l
fri endl y mi l i tary and ci vi l i an watercraft usi ng the
offshore waters.
Effecti ve, central i zed control and coordi nati on of al l
these acti vi ti es.
(7) Sanctuaries. Guerri l l as may establ i sh base camps and
conduct cross-border operati ons from countri es adjacent to
the host country. They wi l l take advantage of an i nternati onal
boundary to l aunch operati ons or evade pursui t wi th
i mpuni ty. Commanders operati ng i n border areas must
respect the sancti ty of i nternati onal boundari es, but they
can conduct combat operati ons agai nst the guerri l l a force
once i t crosses back over the border. Ambush patrol s are an
excel l ent means of deal i ng wi th guerri l l as who attempt to
use an i nternati onal border as a sanctuary.
3-47
FM 90-8
3-59. Urban operations.
a. Operati ons i n an urban envi ronment requi re di fferent emphasi s
and di fferent techni ques than those i n rural areas. The presence
of many peopl e and the characteri sti cs of the area i nfl uence both
i nsurgent and government operati ons. Duri ng Phases I and I I ,
these areas are usual l y unfavorabl e for guerri l l a operati ons.
Guerri l l as wi l l not normal l y fi ght i n these areas; however, other
i nsurgent el ements i n the urban areas may i nci te ri oti ng, use
terrori st tacti cs, or sei ze porti ons of the ci ty and key faci l i ti es.
Armed forces may be requi red to rei nforce pol i ce i n combatti ng
ri ots and di sorders provoked by the i nsurgents. Tacti cal
operati ons may be necessary i f the guerri l l as take di rect acti on to
sei ze urban areas or cri ti cal i nstal l ati ons wi thi n them. Thi s may
occur i n smal l er urban areas duri ng Phase I I , and may occur i n
l arge urban areas i n the l ater stages of Phase I I I . (FM 90-10
di scusses tacti cal operati ons i n urban areas. FM 19-15 di scusses
ci vi l di sturbances.)
b. The popul ati on densi ty requi res emphasi s on the use of nonl ethal
weapons and the careful use of weapons of destructi on when force
i s necessary. The appl i cati on of mi ni mum essenti al force to
mi ni mi ze l oss of l i fe and destructi on of property requi res detai l ed
pl anni ng, coordi nati on, and control .
c. Covert i nsurgent acti vi ty i s extensi ve i n urban areas. The
government must emphasi ze i ntel l i gence and pol i ce operati ons to
counter cl andesti ne organi zati onal , i ntel l i gence, l ogi sti cal , and
terrori st acti vi ti es. I DAD operati ons i n urban areas maybe part
of a consol i dati on campai gn.
d . Urban areas are cri ti cal and requi re a conti nui ng I DAD effort
whether or not they are i ncl uded i n a speci fi c campai gn. Mi l i tary
forces shoul d parti ci pate i n I DAD pl anni ng and operati ons i n
urban areas duri ng al l phases of i nsurgency to be prepared to
assi st other nati onal securi ty and l aw enforcement agenci es i f
si tuati ons requi ri ng mi l i tary forces devel op.
(1)
Operational environment. The characteri sti cs of an
urban area normal l y i ncl ude:
(a) A l arge, concentrated popul ati on.
(b) Government faci l i ti es.
(c) I ndustri al compl exes.
(d) Communi cati ons faci l i ti es.
3- 48
(e) Transportati on termi nal s.
(f) Stor age faci l i ti es.
(g) Food mar kets.
FM 90-8
(h) Medi cal faci l i ti es.
(i ) Publ i c uti l i ti es.
(j) Educati onal centers.
(k) Ethni c, rel i gi ous, and economi c groups.
(l ) Man-made features (mul ti story bui l di ngs and subter-
ranean faci l i ti es).
(m) Pol i ce force, parami l i tary force, and other l aw en-
forcement agenci es.
(2)
Government activity. Urban areas need more government
functi ons and servi ces than rural areas. Thi s requi res more
and possi bl y l arger government organi zati ons for operati ons.
The acti vi ti es and capabi l i ti es of al l government agenci es
shoul d be consi dered i n pl anni ng and executi ng I DAD
oper ati ons.
(3) Subversive activities. A subversi ve el ement i ntent on
destroyi ng the government may strai n the capabi l i ti es of
l ocal authori ti es. The i nsurgents wi l l attempt to expl oi t l ocal
ci vi l i an organi zati ons by subverti ng thei r goal s and
objecti ves. They wi l l try to pl ace them i n opposi ti on to the
government. Terrori st acti vi ti es and psychol ogi cal operati ons
wi l l take pl ace al ong wi th covert i nsurgent organi zati onal ,
i ntel l i gence, and l ogi sti cal operati ons. Pol i ce, i nternal
securi ty, and other government organi zati ons wi l l be hi gh
pri ori ty targets of the i nsurgents.
(4) Operations. Operati ons requi re careful pl anni ng and
coor di nati on, par ti cul ar l y those oper ati ons i nvol vi ng
appl i cati on of force. Mi l i tary forces desi gnated to provi de
assi stance, i f needed, make pl ans and prepare to i mpl ement
them. Mi l i tary forces must be abl e to communi cate wi th
pol i ce and other agenci es i nvol ved i n the operati ons. They
must col l ect and have readi l y avai l abl e detai l ed i nformati on
on area characteri sti cs and cri ti cal i nstal l ati ons.
(5) Tactical operations.
(a ) Tacti cal operati ons may be requi red i nsi de or near an
urban area to defeat an i nsurgent attack. Any i nsurgent
attempt to sei ze and hol d an urban area wi l l probabl y
i nvol ve operati ons i n nearby areas as wel l . When the
pol i ce and other i nternal securi ty forces can cope wi th
the attack i nsi de the urban area, mi l i tary forces can
best parti ci pate by establ i shi ng securi ty around the
urban area and by denyi ng the i nsurgent rei nforcement
or support. When mi l i tary forces are requi red to
rei nforce pol i ce or defeat i nsurgent forces i nsi de the
3- 49
FM 90-8
urban area, operati ons must be cl osel y control l ed and
coordi nated. Mi l i tary forces shoul d be wi thdrawn as
soon as pol i ce forces can handl e the si tuati on.
(b) When an urban area has been sei zed by i nsurgent
forces, an eval uati on must be made from both a tacti cal
and psychol ogi cal perspecti ve whether to recapture i t
usi ng major mi l i tary force or usi ng other techni ques.
The amount of force and the speci fi c techni ques to be
used to recapture the area are deci ded based on the
probabl e psychol ogi cal i mpact on the enemy, noncom-
batant ci vi l i ans, and fri endl y troops; the safety of
ci vi l i ans and fri endl y troops; the destructi on of
bui l di ngs; and the mi l i tary forces avai l abl e. The
pri nci pl e of mi ni mum essenti al force wi l l hel p reduce
casual ti es i n the noncombatant ci vi l i an popul ati on.
(c) Ri ot control muni ti ons can be used agai nst targets so
that mi l i tary forces can cl ose wi th and capture the
enemy wi th mi ni mum i njury to the noncombatants.
Operati ons may be i n the form of assi stance to ci vi l i an
pol i ce. I n any event, mi l i tary operati ons must be
coordi nated wi th the ci vi l i an pol i ce. (For i nformati on
on combat i n forti fi ed and bui l t-up areas, see FM 90-10
and FM 90-10-1.)
3 - 5 0
CHAPTER 4
Counterguerrilla Operations
in Conventional Conflicts
Section I. General
4-1. Rear areas.
The condi ti ons of conventi onal confl i cts di ffer greatl y from an
i nsurgency. Thi s chapter di scusses factors the commander must
consi der when pl anni ng counterguerri l l a operati ons duri ng a
conventi onal confl i ct. The nature of the threat and tacti cs sui tabl e to
counter the threat are di scussed. The materi al i n thi s chapter i s general
and refers onl y to counteri ng guerri l l a acti vi ti es i n the rear areas of
fri endl y forces engaged i n conventi onal confl i cts (Fi gure 4-1).
Figure 4-1. Guerrilla rear action.
4-2. Threat.
A guerri l l a threat may not exi st i n these si tuati ons. However, i f i t does
exi st, i t normal l y occurs i n support of enemy forces engaged i n
conventi onal combat wi th fri endl y forces and occurs i n the fri endl y
force rear areas. (For further i nformati on on rear area operati ons, see
FM 90-14.)
4-1
FM 90-8
Section Il. Considerations
4-3. Guerrilla support.
a. Si nce a major goal of parti ci pants i n a conventi onal confl i ct i s to
gai n control of terri tory through the use of regul ar armed forces,
the forms of guerri l l a acti vi ty change. Guerri l l a operati ons i n thi s
case support the mai n effort of the enemy force by di srupti ng
command, control , communi cati ons, and l ogi sti cal operati ons of
fri endl y forces. The guerri l l a force al so serves to cause commi tment
of fri endl y forces, best used i n the cl ose battl e, to the rear battl e.
b.
The abi l i ty of the guerri l l a force to operate successful l y does not
rel y on the attai nment of popul ar support. Rather, the guerri l l a
force rel i es more on i ts abi l i ty to cause confusi on i n rear areas.
4-4. Guerrilla objectives.
a. The objecti ves of a guerri l l a force i n a conventi onal confl i ct are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Disruption. The guerri l l a force seeks to di srupt command,
control , communi cati ons, and l ogi sti cs operati ons and
faci l i ti es. He may accompl i sh thi s by attacki ng key
i nstal l ati ons such as headquarters, communi cati ons si tes,
suppl y depots, mai ntenance faci l i ti es, and ai rfi el ds. The
guerri l l a force al so seeks to cut l i nes of communi cati on and
suppl y by i nterdi cti ng suppl y col umns, bri dges, hi ghways,
and communi cati ons l i nes.
Confusion. By destroyi ng key faci l i ti es and i nterdi cti ng
l i nes of communi cati on and suppl y, the guerri l l a force
causes confusi on wi thi n the fri endl y force rear areas. The
greater the amount of confusi on created, the greater the
abi l i ty of the mai n enemy force to di scover and expl oi t
weaknesses of the fri endl y force.
Harassment. The guerri l l a force remai ns a source of
harassment as l ong as i t operates i n the rear area. I t may not
have to conduct conti nuous operati ons to achi eve i ts goal .
The mere knowl edge that the guerri l l a exi sts wi thi n the rear
area, even though undetected, may be enough.
Support. By di srupti ng, confusi ng, and harassi ng vi tal
areas, the guerri l l a supports the mai n enemy force by tyi ng
up fri endl y combat uni ts i n counteri ng the threat.
b . The guerri l l a force may possess weapons, communi cati ons, and
technol ogy equal to or superi or to the rear battl e forces. I t must be
anti ci pated that nucl ear, chemi cal , and bi ol ogi cal , as wel l as
conventi onal weapons and tacti cs may be uti l i zed to achi eve
guerri l l a goal s.
4 - 2
FM 90-8
4-5. Factors affecting operations.
When consi deri ng the envi ronment that the parti ci pants wi l l be
i nvol ved i n, the commanders pl ans for counterguerri l l a operati ons
must consi der terrai n and cl i mate, as wel l as pol i ti cal , soci ol ogi cal ,
economi c, and psychol ogi cal factors.
a. Terrain. Terrai n affects men, equi pment, traffi cabi l i ty, vi si bi l i ty,
and the empl oyment of NBC weapons. The terrai n aspects of each
area of operati ons must be eval uated to determi ne the i mpact on
both guerri l l a and counterguerri l l a forces. General l y, guerri l l as
favor rough, i naccessi bl e terrai n wi th cover and conceal ment,
affordi ng them routes of escape and wi thdrawal i f confronted or
detected by counterguerri l l a forces. Rol l i ng, open terrai n wi th l ess
cover and conceal ment usual l y favors counterguerri l l a forces i n
detecti ng and pursui ng a guerri l l a force.
b.
Climate. Each geographi c area i s anal yzed to determi ne the
effects of cl i mate si nce no two areas have i denti cal cl i mates.
General l y, a mi l d cl i mate favors the guerri l l a force si nce i t
i nduces l ess physi cal hardshi p, and may provi de year-round
vegetati on for subsi stence, cover, and conceal ment. The cl i mate i s
al so anal yzed to determi ne the effect i t wi l l have on guerri l l a
operati ons as regards traffi cabi l i ty, vi si bi l i ty, and equi pment. A
col d cl i mate usual l y favors the counterguerri l l a force and
hampers guerri l l a operati ons si nce i t i ncreases the l ogi sti cs
requi red to support the guerri l l a. The commander must al so
consi der that the effect of seasonal vari ati ons can ei ther i ncrease
or decrease hi s abi l i ty to conduct operati ons.
c. Political factors. Pol i ti cal consi derati ons are reduced. Gen-
eral l y, the rel ati onshi p between the counterguerri l l a force and the
ci vi l i an popul ati on i s governed by restri cti ons and agreements
that the US has wi th the government(s) of the country (or
countri es) i n whi ch the confl i ct takes pl ace. I n the event that the
confl i ct takes pl ace i n enemy terri tory that i s occupi ed, then the
pol i ci es concerni ng i nteracti on the the ci vi l i an popul ace wi l l be
formul ated at theater l evel i n consonance wi th gui dance from the
US government. I t must be recogni zed that, i n some si tuati ons,
the pol i ti cal system of the area wi l l be sympatheti c to the
guerri l l as.
d . Sociological factors. As wi th pol i ti cal factors, soci al factors
are consi dered, but thei r i mpact i s usual l y reduced. Usual l y, when
US forces operate i n fri endl y terri tory or l i berate previ ousl y
captured fri endl y terri tory, the soci ol ogi cal factors general l y
favor the counterguerri l l a force. When US forces operate i n
captured enemy terri tory, then the soci ol ogi cal factors may favor
the guerri l l a force. I n thi s si tuati on, the guerri l l a force may be
recei vi ng some support from the popul ace.
4 - 3
FM 90-8
e. Economic factors. General l y, the counterguerri l l a force pl ans
i ts operati ons to mi ni mi ze damage to the economi c structure of an
area. The standard of l i vi ng must be recogni zed as a contri buti ng
factor to the psychol ogi cal cl i mate wi thi n the area. I f the
counterguerri l l a force damages ci vi l i an property and economi c
structures, then i t may have an adverse psychol ogi cal i mpact.
Usual l y, a poor economi c cl i mate wi l l favor the counterguerri l l a
force si nce i t wi l l reduce the resources avai l abl e to the guerri l l a.
The counterguerri l l a force, on the other hand, i s usual l y not
dependent on the economy for i ts l ogi sti cs. A strong economi c
cl i mate usual l y does not favor ei ther force.
f .
f .
Psychological factors. A popul ati on that acti vel y supports the
counterguerri l l a force greatl y enhances the capabi l i ty to detect
guerri l l a forces. Usual l y, thi s type of popul ati on i s found when US
forces operate i n fri endl y terri tory or l i berate areas opposed to the
goal s of the enemy force. Popul ati on support for the goal s of the
enemy force usual l y favors the guerri l l a. That si tuati on may
occur when US forces operate i n captured enemy terri tory. I n most
cases, however, the mi l i tary objecti ve of destroyi ng the guerri l l a
force takes precedence over other consi derati ons as l ong as
operati ons are pl anned to mi ni mi ze damage to ci vi l i an property.
US forces must, i n al l cases, treat the ci vi l i an popul ace i n a fai r
and just manner whether the peopl e support the US presence or
not. I nhumane treatment and cri mi nal acts (murder, rape, or
theft, even under stress of combat and wi th provocati on) are
seri ous and puni shabl e vi ol ati ons under i nternati onal l aw, the
l aw of l and warfare, and the US Uni form Code of Mi l i tary Justi ce.
4-6. Appl yi ng ME TT-T.
a . The commander of a counterguerri l l a force i n a conventi onal
confl i ct pl ans hi s operati ons by anal yzi ng the factors of METT-T.
An understandi ng of the goal s of a guerri l l a force operati ng i n
rear areas and a general anal ysi s of the envi ronment of the area of
operati ons provi de a framework for pl anni ng. An anal ysi s of the
factors of METT-T wi l l provi de the speci fi c i nformati on and
i ndi cati ons to compl ete operati onal pl ans.
b . Some of the major consi derati ons of METT-T are:
(1) Mi s s i on.
(a )
Al l aspects of the mi ssi on must be anal yzed. I n thi s
anal ysi s, the commander and hi s staff determi ne al l
speci fi ed and i mpl i ed tasks:
I s the mi ssi on offensi ve?
I s the mi ssi on defensi ve?
I s the mi ssi on a combi nati on of offense and
defense?
4 - 4
FM 90-8
(b)
The authori ty a commander can exert wi thi n hi s area
of operati ons i s cri ti cal . I f the command and support
rel ati onshi ps are not cl earl y del i neated i n the i ni ti al
order, then the commander must ensure that he
recei ves that gui dance pri or to commencement of
operati ons. The restri cti ons, l i mi tati ons, and rul es of
engagement that the counterguerri l l a force adheres to
must be defi ned. These may i ncl ude speci fi c l i mi tati ons
regardi ng the use of fi repower and types of weapons, or
they may be general regardi ng the rel ati onshi p of the
counterguerri l l a force wi th the ci vi l i an popul ati on.
(2) Enemy.
(a ) Si nce the general goal s of the enemy are known,
speci fi c i nformati on i s gathered to produce a more
compl ete pi cture. The capabi l i ti es of the enemy are
exami ned. Some of the questi ons that shoul d be
answered are:
Can the guerri l l a stri ke at wi l l ?
What i s the si ze(s) of hi s uni t(s)?
What type of weapons does he possess?
I s thi s a true guerri l l a force consi sti ng mai nl y of
l ocal l y recrui ted i ndi genous personnel , or i s thi s an
enemy regul ar mi l i tary uni t speci al l y trai ned and
usi ng guerri l l a tacti cs?
Does he have fi re or ai r support?
Does he have an offensi ve NBC capabi l i ty?
How l ong can he operate i n the area?
(b)
The commander exami nes not onl y guerri l l a capabi l i ti es
but al so hi s vul nerabl e aspects, whi ch i ncl ude l ogi sti cs
and abi l i ty to remai n undetected. Usual l y, guerri l l as
operati ng i n a rear area then acqui re l ogi sti cal support
from external sources, from captured equi pment and
suppl i es, and from the ci vi l i an popul ace.
(c)
External support by the enemy mai n force may occur
through cl andesti ne parachute drop or through
waterborne, surface, or subsurface i nfi l trati on. I f the
guerri l l as onl y source of resuppl y i s external , then
i nterdi cti on of hi s suppl y l i nes can decrease or hal t
operati ons as the guerri l l as suppl i es are exhausted.
(d)
I f the counterguerri l l a force prevents the capture of
fri endl y equi pment and suppl i es, then agai n the
4 - 5
FM 90-8
guerri l l a must decrease and fi nal l y hal t operati ons
because of l ack of suppl i es.
(e) Rel i ance by the guerri l l a on the ci vi l i an popul ace for
support may occur more often i n occupi ed enemy
terri tory or i n terri tori es where the popul ati on favors
the enemy force. Effecti ve use of popul ace and resources
control operati ons and psychol ogi cal operati ons can
reduce the l ogi sti cal support recei ved through the
popul ace.
(f )
Because the guerri l l a operates i n rear areas, the
di ffi cul ty of mai ntai ni ng hi s l i nes of resuppl y usual l y
keeps the si ze of hi s force at a rel ati vel y stati c l evel . I f
the counterguerri l l a force can detect the guerri l l a force,
then i t i s onl y a matter of ti me unti l the guerri l l as are
fi xed and engaged. The commander uti l i zes al l avai l abl e
human i ntel l i gence (HUMI NT), i magery i ntel l i gence
(I MI NT), and si gnal i ntel l i gence (SI GI NT). I n addi ti on,
the counterguerri l l a force maxi mi zes al l i nformati on
that can be gai ned from tacti cal operati ons to l ocate
the guerri l l a force.
(g ) Probabl e courses of enemy acti on are i denti fi ed. What
may be the l east l i kel y course of acti on for a conventi onal
force may be the most l i kel y for the guerri l l a force.
Often, the guerri l l a stri kes i n thi s manner to gai n the
advantage of surpri se. The counterguerri l l a force
i denti fi es l i kel y targets and takes measures to protect
them. I n addi ti on, faci l i ti es and operati ons that may
not seem l i kel y targets may i n fact be guerri l l a targets
sol el y because of thei r vul nerabi l i ty. The counterguerri l l a
force commander must real i ze that destructi on of
numerous i nsi gni fi cant targets may cause more
damage and confusi on than the destructi on or damage
of one i mportant target.
(3)
Terrain. The terrai n consi derati on al so i ncl udes consi der-
ati on of weather. The weather i s anal yzed to determi ne i ts
effect on both the guerri l l a and the counterguernl l a force. I t
i s anal yzed i n terms of i ts effect on men and equi pment,
traffi cabi l i ty, and vi si bi l i ty. Si nce the guerri l l a force may
have the capabi l i ty to use NBC, the effect of weather on NBC
and smoke i s al so addressed. The terrai n i s studi ed i n
rel ati on to the factors of OCOKA: Observati on and fi el ds of
fi re, Cover and conceal ment, Obstacl es, Key terrai n (to
i ncl ude l i kel y guerri l l a targets and base camps), and
Avenues of approach or escape. The effect of those factors on
the guerri l l a and counterguerri l l a forces i s esti mated, then
the counterguerri l l a force commander uses hi s esti mate i n
4-6
F M 9 0 - 8
formul ati ng hi s pl an to attack the guerri l l a weaknesses
whi l e protecti ng hi s own vul nerabl e areas.
(4) Troops available. The counterguerri l l a force commander
may or may not have control over al l forces i n the rear area
for empl oyment i n rear battl e operati ons. Forces he may
have mi ght i ncl ude combat, combat support, and combat
servi ce support uni ts. I n addi ti on, the commander may have
al l i ed regul ar, parami l i tary, and i rregul ar forces under hi s
control i n certai n si tuati ons. The counterguerri l l a force
commander wi l l be provi ded gui del i nes and di recti ves on the
current joi nt and combi ned procedures for establ i shi ng an
effecti ve rear defense. He wi l l effect l i ai son wi th al l forces
operati ng i n hi s area of responsi bi l i ty, fi x speci fi c responsi -
bi l i ti es, and exerci se overal l control of defensi ve operati ons
i n response to a guerri l l a threat.
(5) Time available. The ti me avai l abl e for pl anni ng must be
wi sel y uti l i zed. I n most cases, the one-thi rd rul e may be
appl i ed. The commander uses one thi rd of the avai l abl e ti me
for pl anni ng and l eaves two thi rds for subordi nate pl anni ng
and preparati on. However, reacti on to i ntel l i gence may
requi re an i mmedi ate response. Operati onal pl anni ng i s
conducted as earl y as possi bl e.
Section Ill. The Threat
4-7. Type forces.
a. The guerri l l a acti on supports the enemys mai n forces by causi ng
di srupti on, confusi on, and harassment. These acti ons may be
conducted by conventi onal or unconventi onal forces uti l i zi ng
guerri l l a warfare tacti cs.
b.
Conventi onal forces that may conduct guerri l l a warfare i ncl ude
forces that have been cut off or that i ntenti onal l y stay behi nd as
thei r mai n force wi thdraws or retreats. These forces general l y
possess the weapons and equi pment of the mai n enemy force.
Thei r combat power may suffer from ki l l ed and wounded
personnel and l ost or damaged equi pment, and they may have
l ogi sti cal di ffi cul ti es. Another type of force may be an armored
and/or mechani zed uni t wi th a mi ssi on to penetrate fri endl y rear
areas and cause di srupti on, confusi on, and harassment. Onl y i f
thi s force uses guerri l l a warfare tacti cs i s i t consi dered a guerri l l a
force. I f i t conti nues to operate wi thi n the area that can be
i nfl uenced by the mai n enemy forces, or i f i t uti l i zes conventi onal
tacti cs, then i t i s not consi dered a guerri l l a force. Ai rborne,
hel i borne, or waterborne l i ght i nfantry forces may al so compose a
4 - 7
FM 90-8
guerri l l a force i f i nserted to conduct guerri l l a warfare operati ons
(di srupti on, harassment, or confusi on).
c. I n al l cases where conventi onal enemy forces are usi ng guerri l l a
warfare tacti cs, the counterguerri l l a force commander must
expect thei r degree of trai ni ng, equi pment, and sophi sti cati on to
match that found i n the mai n enemy force.
4-8. Special units.
a. Unconventi onal warface forces that may conduct guerri l l a
warfare consi st of speci al uni ts trai ned speci fi cal l y for guerri l l a
warfare and i ndi genous guerri l l a forces sponsored by the mai n
enemy force. Speci al uni ts trai ned for guerri l l a warfare usual l y
have a pri mary mi ssi on to conduct guerri l l a warfare operati ons
agai nst targets of opportuni ty wi th a fol l ow-on mi ssi on to trai n an
i ndi genous guerri l l a force.
b.
I ni ti al l y, these uni ts may possess weapons and equi pment equal
to, or greater i n sophi sti cati on than, US forces. The l onger these
uni ts operate, the more they expend thei r assets. I f they stay i n the
operati onal area for a prol onged peri od wi th no external resuppl y,
then thei r l evel of effi ci ency decreases unti l US forces possess an
equal capabi l i ty. Thei r l evel of trai ni ng i s usual l y hi gh, and these
uni ts are ski l l ed i n weapons, demol i ti ons, communi cati ons,
medi ci ne, operati ons, and the abi l i ty to i mprovi se when needed.
These speci al uni ts may enter a fri endl y area through the use of
hi gh al ti tude, l ow openi ng (HALO); hi gh al ti tude, hi gh openi ng
(HAHO); or l ow l evel parachute techni ques. They I.., also be
ski l l ed i n and use overl and and waterborne (both surface and
subsurface) techni ques to enter the area.
c. I n many cases, the i ndi genous guerri l l a uni t may be trai ned by
speci al uni ts i nserted by the enemy force. Usual l y, the i ndi genous
guerri l l a force must rel y on external support for i ts l ogi sti cs
requi rements. I n some cases, i f the guerri l l a force i s not too l arge,
then i t may rel y on captured or i mprovi sed equi pment and
materi el .
d . The tacti cs used by both conventi onal and unconventi onal
guerri l l a forces remai n the same. They are characteri zed by
el usi veness, surpri se, and bri ef, vi ol ent acti on. The techni ques
used by these forces usual l y consi st of rai ds and ambushes.
Dependi ng on the composi ti on of the guerri l l a force, i t may have
avi ati on and fi re support assets avai l abl e to i t.
e . The counterguerri l l a force commander must be aware that the
guerri l l a force may have NBC weapons avai l abl e to i t. Because of
the capabi l i ty of NBC weapons to cause a maxi mum amount of
confusi on wi th a l i mi ted amount of personnel , thei r use must be
consi dered as a method that the guerri l l a may empl oy.
4 - 8
FM 90-8
Section IV. Tactics and Operations
4-9. Rear battle.
Rear battl e (FM 90-14) i s defi ned as those acti ons, i ncl udi ng area
damage control , taken by al l uni ts si ngl y or i n a combi ned effort to
secure the force, neutral i ze or defeat enemy operati ons i n the rear area,
and ensure freedom of acti on i n the deep and cl ose-i n battl es. The basi c
phi l osophy of rear battl e doctri ne i s to maxi mi ze the capabi l i ty of
combat support and combat servi ce support el ements to defend
themsel ves and render mutual support wi thout requi ri ng assi stance
from tacti cal combat forces. I f a tacti cal combat force i s assi gned to the
rear battl e, i t wi l l be pl aced under the operati onal control (OPCON) of
the rear battl e offi cer. Once i t compl etes the tacti cal mi ssi on and
noti fi es the rear area operati ons center, i t wi l l be rel eased to i ts parent
uni t.
4-10. Concepts.
a . The concepts di scussed i n thi s chapter are geared to the needs of
the tacti cal commander but can be used by the rear battl e offi cer
as wel l . I n al l i nstances, i t i s i mperati ve that the pri nci pl e of uni ty
of command be mai ntai ned to mi ni mi ze confusi on and i ndeci si on
that wi l l occur i f there i s an i nabi l i ty to determi ne who i s i n
command.
The techni ques used i n rear battl e operati ons are dependent upon
METT-T. Some of these factors i ncl ude the force composi ti on,
avi ati on assets, fi re support assets, mobi l i ty, equi pment, and si ze
of the counterguerri l l a force. These same factors must be
exami ned regardi ng the guerri l l a force. General l y, these
techni ques can be cl assi fi ed as ei ther offensive or defensive.
b .
(1) Offensi ve techni ques are used to l ocate, fi x, and engage
guerri l l a forces. These operati on i ncl ude reconnai ssance
patrol s, ambushes, attacks, enci rcl ements, and movements
to contact.
(2) Defensi ve techni ques are used to prevent di srupti on,
harassment, or confusi on. They are al so used to mi ni mi ze
damage to a target i f i t i s attacked. Preventi ve defensi ve
techni ques i ncl ude movement securi ty, securi ty patrol l i ng,
and combat patrol l i ng, among others. Exampl es of techni ques
desi gned to mi ni mi ze damage once an acti on starts i ncl ude
base defense, counterambush, and reacti on forces.
c. The di sti ncti ons between offensi ve and defensi ve techni ques are
someti mes di ffi cul t to di scern. Many offensi ve techni ques can be
used as a type of defensi ve techni que and vi ce versa. (Offensi ve
and defensi ve techni ques are di scussed i n Chapter 3.)
4 - 9
CHAPTER 5
Combat Units
Section I. General
5-1. Composition.
The mi l i tary force conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons may not
necessari l y consi st of onl y l i ght i nfantry. Thi s chapter di scusses the
vari ous types of combat uni ts that maybe avai l abl e to the counterguerri l l a
force. The composi ti on of the tacti cal force to be used i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons i n other words, whether to use forces other than l i ght
i nfantry depends upon the forces avai l abl e and the threat that i s
faced.
5-2. Restricted firepower.
General l y, because of pol i ti cal , economi c, and soci ol ogi cal consi derati ons
that restri ct the use of fi repower, the farther the i nsurgency moves
toward Phase I I I , the greater the combat power that can be uti l i zed
(Fi gure 5-1 ). I n a conventi onal confl i ct, the same factors of avai l abi l i ty
of forces and the Threat are consi dered, but combat power can be
appl i ed at hi gher l evel s.
Figure 5-1. Combat power can be applied at higher levels.
5-1
FM 90-8
Section II. Counterinsurgency Environment
5-3. Type forces.
The types of forces that maybe empl oyed (other than l i ght i nfantry)
are i nfantry, ai rborne, ai r assaul t, mechani zed i nfantry, armor,
armored caval ry, and avi ati on. Terrai n, enemy forces, and capabi l i ti es
must be thoroughl y assessed when deci di ng how to uti l i ze these forces.
The i mpact of these forces on the popul ace must al so be assessed before
they are empl oyed. Normal l y, the majori ty of ground combat el ements
are organi zed to fi ght as l i ght i nfantry. However, the proper use of
other combat forces can provi de the counterguerri l l a force advantages.
5-4. Use of combat power.
a. The pri mary consi derati on i s that counterguerri l l a operati ons
support the host countrys I DAD pl an. Extensi ve use of combat
forces (other than i nfantry) i n thi s envi ronment i s usual l y
restri cted because of l i mi tati ons on the use of heavy weapons and
thei r col l ateral damage. I n addi ti on, the guerri l l a habi tual l y
chooses to operate from terrai n that affords hi m protecti on
(Fi gure 5-l ). Usual l y, thi s type of.terrai n i s rough, i naccessi bl e,
and restri cti ve to ground vehi cl es. Mi l i tary forces engaged i n
counterguerri l l a warfare must make maxi mum effecti ve use of al l
avai l abl e assets, even i f thi s means reorgani zi ng and retrai ni ng
as l i ght i nfantry, uti l i zi ng organi c combat vehi cl es i n a
supporti ng rol e for transportati on onl y.
b .
The measure of effecti veness of an asset i s contai ned i n the
concept of sui tabi l i ty. The extent to whi ch vari ous types of forces
can be effecti vel y uti l i zed must be measured agai nst the fol l owi ng
cri teri a to determi ne i f they wi l l be sui tabl e.
5-5. Impact on the populace.
The commander must determi ne both the physi cal and psychol ogi cal
i mpact of usi ng addi ti onal combat assets. I n al l cases, thei r use must
fal l wi thi n any restri cti ons stated i n the rul es of engagement. I n
addi ti on, the psychol ogi cal effect of the expanded use of fi repower or
assets mi ght resul t i n the percepti on that the government forces are
l osi ng or i neffecti ve.
5-6. Meets the threat.
The commander must ensure that the addi ti onal assets he pl ans to
empl oy do not overki l l the threat. I f the threat i s a l i ght i nfantry force
of company si ze worki ng i n groups of fi ve to ten men, then i t i s not
real l y sui tabl e to have a battal i on of armor arrayed agai nst i t.
5- 2
FM 90-8
5-7. Capability to accomplish assigned mission.
a. The addi ti onal assets uti l i zed must have the capabi l i ty to perform
tacti cal and I DAD mi ssi ons. When determi ni ng i f the addi ti onal
assets do have the capabi l i ty, the threats capabi l i ti es, structure,
weapons, and l evel of trai ni ng must be consi dered.
b. I n addi ti on, the i mpact of the terrai n on the force must be
determi ned. Al l of these factors must be wei ghed to determi ne i f
the type of force that i s goi ng to be used wi l l be an asset or a
l i abi l i ty. These same factors, pl us the psychol ogi cal factor,
determi ne i f the force can support the accompl i shment of the
overal l I DAD objecti ve, whi ch i s to defeat the i nsurgency by
wi nni ng the support of the popul ace for the host country
government.
(1) Airborne.
(a)
The essenti al di fference between ai rborne forces and
other combat forces empl oyed agai nst guerri l l as i s the
capabi l i ty of parachuti ng i nto an area. An ai rborne
i nfantry uni t conducts ground tacti cal operati ons i n
the same general manner as other i nfantry uni ts.
(b)
Si nce ai rborne forces become l i ght i nfantry upon
i nserti on i nto an operati onal area, they can be used
effecti vel y i n counterguerri l l a operati ons. The pri mary
advantage of usi ng thi s type of force i s that i t enabl es
the commander to posi ti on a l arge i nfantry force i n a
short peri od. I n addi ti on, when i nserti ng smal l
el ements i nto a guerri l l a-control l ed or contested area,
thi s method may provi de a rel ati vel y cl andesti ne
means of i nserti on. Ai rborne operati ons are dependent
on several factors, to i ncl ude drop zone avai l abi l i ty,
ai rframe avai l abi l i ty, terrai n, and weather. I n most
cases, ai rborne operati ons can be used effecti vel y to
i nsert forces i nto sui tabl e areas i n al l phases of
i nsurgency. (For further i nformati on on ai rborne
operati ons, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)
(2) Air assault.
(a) The hel i copter provi des battl efi el d mobi l i ty to the
counterguerri l l a force that usual l y cannot be matched
by the guerri l l a force. Ai r assaul t forces provi de a
val uabl e contri buti on through the tacti c of verti cal
envel opment. They gi ve the force commander the
means to rapi dl y di sperse and concentrate forces at the
cri ti cal ti me and pl ace and then qui ckl y extract the
force and empl oy i t i n a di fferent area, i f needed. The
fundamental characteri sti c of ai r assaul t operati ons i s
5 - 3
FM 90-8
the use of hel i copters to provi de a tacti cal mobi l i ty
advantage over the enemy. No other force on the
battl efi el d can respond to a tacti cal si tuati on and move
consi derabl e di stances as rapi dl y as ai r assaul t forces.
(b)
Ai r assaul t forces can:
Attack enemy posi ti ons from any di recti on.
Stri ke objecti ves i n otherwi se i naccessi bl e areas.
Overfl y or bypass barri ers and obstacl es, to i ncl ude
NBC area contami nati on.
Conduct rai ds usi ng hel i copters to i nsert and
wi thdraw forces.
Concentrate, di sperse, or redepl oy rapi dl y to
extended thei r area of i nfl uence.
Provi de the commander fl exi bi l i ty by al l owi ng hi m
to retai n a smal l er reserve and commi t a l arger
porti on of hi s force to acti on.
React rapi dl y to tacti cal opportuni ti es and necessi ti es.
Pl ace forces rapi dl y at tacti cal l y deci si ve poi nts i n
the battl e area.
Provi de survei l l ance over a wi de area.
(c ) Ai r assaul t forces, whi l e sui ted to counterguerri l l a
operati ons, have l i mi tati ons that must be consi dered:
Weather extremes that hamper or stop ai rcraft
f l i g h t s .
Hel i copter l i ft capaci ty that restri cts the type and
quanti ty of supporti ng weapons and equi pment
that can be ai rl i fted i nto the battl e area.
Ai r l i nes of communi cati ons, once i nserted.
Enemy tacti cal ai rcraft, ai r defense, and el ectroni c
warfare systems.
Reduced mobi l i ty on compl eti on of ai r movement.
I ncreased vul nerabi l i ty duri ng l oadi ng and l andi ng
ph as es .
(d)
Fl exi bi l i ty, mobi l i ty, and speed are the key advantages
of uti l i zi ng ai r assaul t forces. I n counterguerri l l a
operati ons, the effecti ve use of these advantages may
be a cri ti cal functi on for the commander. Whi l e seeki ng
to empl oy thi s type of force to maxi mi ze i ts strengths,
the commander must al so ensure that he real i zes these
5 - 4
FM 90-8
(3)
operati ons have l i mi tati ons and vul nerabi l i ti es. The
advantages and l i mi tati ons must be wei ghed i n terms
of the concept of sui tabi l i ty to determi ne i f ai r assaul t
forces shoul d be used i n a gi ven si tuati on. I n al most al l
cases, ai r assaul t forces are wel l sui ted for use i n al l
phases of i nsurgency. (For further i nformati on on ai r
assaul t operati ons, see FM 90-4.)
Mechanized infantry.
(a)
Mechani zed i nfantry forces, fi ghti ng mounted, are not
parti cul arl y sui ted for engagi ng guerri l l a forces i n
combat acti on on restri cted terrai n. However, terrai n
permi tti ng, the abi l i ty of i nfantry fi ghti ng vehi cl es
and armored personnel carri ers to move forces rapi dl y
about the battl efi el d may gi ve the counterguerri l l a
force a mobi l i ty advantage and a di sti nct fi repower
advantage. These advantages l et the force cl ose on
guerri l l a l ocati ons mounted and then compl ete i ts
mi ssi on.
(b)
Because of the terrai n the guerri l l a habi tual l y operates
on, and the tacti cs he normal l y empl oys, opportuni ti es
to conduct tradi ti onal mechani zed i nfantry operati ons
agai nst hi m are extremel y l i mi ted. When thi s i s the
case, the mechani zed force must be prepared to ei ther
abandon i ts carri ers or use them onl y as a means of
transport to the battl e area where the mechani zed force
wi l l fi ght on foot. Terrai n permi tti ng, the advantage i n
speed and mobi l i ty may al l ow for a l arger area of
operati ons than i s wi thi n the capabi l i ty of a total l y
l i ght force of si mi l ar si ze.
(c) I n most cases, mechani zed forces may have a rol e i n:

Provi di ng convoy escort.

Provi di ng mobi l i ty for reserves.

Conducti ng show-of-force operati ons.

Assi sti ng i n base defenses.

Parti ci pati ng i n an economy-of-force rol e when

l arge areas requi re speed and mobi l i ty for adequate
coverage whi l e crossi ng NBC contami nated areas.
Provi di ng l i mi ted armor protecti on agai nst l i ght
smal l arms fi re.

Parti ci pati ng i n ai r assaul t operati ons.

(d) Mechani zed forces are normal l y sui tabl e to be empl oyed
as a maneuver combat el ement onl y i n the l ater stages
of Phase I I I i nsurgency.
5- 5
FM 90-8
(e) I n Phases I and I I , dependeni ng upon the si tuati on,
mechani zed forces may be used for transport to the
battl e area because of thei r speed and mobi l i ty. (For
further i nformati on on mechani zed i nfantry empl oyment,
see FM 71-1, FM 71-2, and FM 71-3.)
(4) Ar mor .
(a) Armor forces are usual l y empl oyed wi th accompanyi ng
i nfantry, but as wi th mechani zed i nfantry forces,
armor forces are not parti cul arl y sui ted for use as a
maneuver combat el ement i n a counteri nsurgency
envi ronment. An armored force does provi de fi repower,
protecti on, speed, and shock effect. These are usual l y
advantages. I ts capabi l i ti es are decreased and i ts
vul nerabi l i ti es are i ncreased i n cl ose and rough ter-
rai n. The di ffi cul ty i n usi ng armored forces i s due to the
restri cti ons pl aced on the use of fi repower and i ncreased
vul nerabi l i ty because of envi ronment. Normal l y, the
terrai n that i s i nvol ved i s cl ose, restri cti ve, and
general l y sui ted to l i ght i nfantry forces. Further
restri cti ons pl aced on what i s general l y consi dered i ts
strongpoi nt fi repower resul t i n an overal l i ncrease
i n vul nerabi l i ti es and a decrease i n capabi l i ti es when
usi ng an armored force i n counterguerri l l a operati ons.
(b)
I n most cases, armored forces maybe used i n:
Provi di ng convoy escort.
Provi di ng mobi l i ty for reserves.

Conducti ng show-of-force operati ons.

Assi sti ng i n base defenses.

Parti ci pati ng i n an economy-of-force rol e when
l arge areas requi re speed and mobi l i ty for adequate
cover age.
(c) Duri ng counterguerri l l a operati ons, an armored force
can usual l y be used as a maneuver combat el ement
onl y i n the l ater stages of Phase 111. I n Phases I and I I ,
i ts rol e i s very l i mi ted. I n these phases, armored forces
are usual l y effecti ve when supporti ng base defenses
and show-of-force operati ons. (For further i nformati on
on armor operati ons, see FM 71-1, FM 71-2, and
FM 71-3.)
(5) Armored cavalry.
(a) The basi c tasks of an armored caval ry uni t are
reconnai ssance and securi ty. Terrai n permi tti ng, such
uni ts may hel p the comma nder cover l arger areas
5- 6
F M 9 0 - 8
because of thei r speed and mobi l i ty. The armored
caval ry force wi l l suffer the same vul nerabi l i ti es as
mechani zed i nfantry and armor i f the members or the
force remai n ti ed to thei r vehi cl es. For these reasons,
they can best be used for:
Securi ng bases.
Patrol l i ng l arge areas.
Provi di ng qui ck reacti on forces and mobi l e
reserves.
(b) When properl y uti l i zed and tai l ored to fi t the si tuati on,
armored caval ry can accompl i sh the speci fi c mi ssi ons
l i sted i n al l phases of an i nsurgency. As the confl i ct
progresses i nto Phase I I , terrai n permi tti ng, armored
caval ry uni ts begi n to take on a more tradi ti onal rol e
and operate i n a conventi onal manner. (For further
i nformati on on armored caval ry operati ons, see
FM 17-95.)
(6) Aviation.
(a)
Types. Three types of avi ati on uni ts maybe avai l abl e
for use i n counterguerri l l a operati ons: ai r caval ry
troops, attack hel i copter battal i ons, and combat
avi ati on compani es.
Air cavalry troops. These perform the same mi ssi ons
of reconnai ssance and securi ty as ground caval ry.
Because of i ts greater mobi l i ty, ai r caval ry can
reconnoi ter and mai ntai n survei l l ance over a much
l arger area than i ts ground counterpart. For thi s
reason, dependi ng upon the si tuati on, ai r caval ry uni ts
are usual l y sui ted for empl oyment i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons i n al l phases of an i nsurgency.
(c) Attack helicopter battalions. These provi de hi ghl y
maneuverabl e, aeri al -del i vered fi repower. When these
assets are used, the ordnance mi x must refl ect the type
of threat bei ng faced. I n Phases I and I I , the threat i s
usual l y l i ght i nfantry, and a hi gher proporti on of
20-mm rounds and 2.75-i nch rockets i s preferabl e to
heavi er anti armor ordnance. As the confl i ct moves i nto
Phase I I I , and i f the guerri l l a force starts to use
mechani zed or armored assets, a hi gher proporti on of
anti armor ordnance maybe preferabl e. Attack hel i cop-
ters use natural cover and speed to compensate for thei r
vul nerabi l i ti es. They are sui ted for si tuati ons i n whi ch
rapi d reacti on ti me i s i mportant or where terrai n
restri cts ground forces. A vi tal el ement to the effecti veness
of these uni ts i s the suppressi on of enemy ai r defense
(b)
5 - 7
FM 90-8
(SEAD). SEAD i s any acti vi ty that neutral i zes,
destroys, or temporari l y degrades enemy ai r defense
systems i n a speci fi c area. Means of doi ng thi s i ncl ude
the empl oyment of arti l l ery or Uni ted States Ai r Force
(USAF) and Army forces. Dependi ng on the si tuati on,
attack hel i copter uni ts are usual l y sui ted for combat i n
al l phases of an i nsurgency.
(d) Combat aviation companies. These uni ts gi ve
di smounted i nfantry tacti cal mobi l i ty by movi ng
combat el ements as the commander di ctates. They can
al so provi de cri ti cal suppl i es to areas when ground
l i nes of communi cati on have been i nterdi cted or
overl oaded. Dependi ng on the si tuati on, combat
support avi ati on uni ts are sui ted to al l phases of an
i nsurgency. Because of thei r speed, mobi l i ty, and
fl exi bi l i ty, avi ati on assets can provi de an advantage i f
properl y empl oyed i n most si tuati ons. (For further
i nformati on on avi ati on operati ons, see FM 1-100, FM
17-50, and FM 90-4.)
Section Ill. Conventional Conflict Environments
5-8. Concepts.
I n conventi onal confl i ct counterguerri l l a operati ons, forces other than
i nfantry take on l arger rol es. Thei r parti ci pati on conforms more to the
concepts outl i ned for thei r use i n rear battl e doctri ne. I n these
envi ronments, there are usual l y fewer restri cti ons on the use of
fi r epower .
5-9. Considerations.
a.
b .
c .
d.
Two major consi derati ons, when empl oyi ng forces other than
i nfantry, are sui tabi l i ty and avai l abi l i ty.
Maneuver force mi ssi on sui tabi l i ty i s usual l y di scussed i n terms
of METT-T. The commander must wei gh the advantages and
di sadvantages of usi ng hi s force agai nst the factors of METT-T. I f
the advantages outwei gh the di sadvantages, then the force i s
empl oyed.
The commander must make the most effecti ve use of al l the forces
he has avai l abl e. I f a parti cul ar force woul d be more sui tabl e but i s
not readi l y avai l abl e, the commander shoul d seek to procure i t. I f
he cannot, then he maxi mi zes the effects of those assets that he
has avai l abl e.
I n conventi onal confl i cts, the use of combi ned arms i s more
effecti ve i n al most al l si tuati ons rather than the use of any si ngl e
type of combat force.
5- 8
FM 90-8
e . The pri mary consi derati ons i n pl anni ng counterguerri l l a
operati ons, usi ng combi ned arms, are the factors of METT-T
(FM 100-5).
5- 9
CHAPTER 6
Combat Support
Section I. General
6-1. Support units.
a.
b.
c.
d.
I n addi ti on to combat uni ts, reconnai ssance and survei l l ance
(R&S), fi re support, i ntel l i gence, engi neer, si gnal , mi l i tary pol i ce,
and ai r defense arti l l ery forces are i ntegrated i nto counterguerri l l a
force operati ons by the commander. Thi s chapter expl ai ns the
extent to whi ch these assets are used, dependi ng on thei r
sui tabi l i ty to the si tuati on.
The rol e of reconnai ssance and survei l l ance i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons at al l l evel s of confl i ct i s of pri me i mportance.
Reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni ts are cri ti cal ; wi thout them
the chance of success i n counterguerri l l a operati ons i s si gni fi cantl y
decr eased.
The types of reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni ts the counter-
guerri l l a force may have are i ts organi c scout el ements and any
l ong-range survei l l ance uni ts attached from corps and di vi si on. A
bri gade-si ze force may al so have supporti ng i ntel l i gence
col l ectors from the di vi si onal combat el ectroni c warfare i ntel l i gence
(CEWI ) battal i on. These assets may i ncl ude SI GI NT col l ectors,
remote sensors, and ground survei l l ance radars.
The types of fi re support uni ts the counterguerri l l a force may have
are mortar pl atoons, anti tank pl atoons or compani es, fi el d
arti l l ery uni ts, tacti cal ai r support, naval gunfi re support, and ai r
defense arti l l ery uni ts.
6-2. Firepower constraints.
a. I n counteri nsurgenci es, fi repower i s usual l y restri cted i n order to
l i mi t damage. The use of fi re support depends on i ts sui tabi l i ty
and prevai l i ng restri cti ons.
b.
The same restri cti ons do not usual l y exi st to the same degree i n
conventi onal confl i cts. The use of fi re support assets i n these
confl i cts i s expanded si nce restri cti ons are rel axed. Sui tabi l i ty i n
these confl i cts usual l y depends on the avai l abi l i ty of fi re support.
6-1
FM 90-8
Section II. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units
6-3. Techniques.
a . Reconnai ssance and survei l l ance are i mportant techni ques i n
gai ni ng current and accurate i ntel l i gence on guerri l l a forces.
Current, accurate i ntel l i gence on the l ocati on, si ze, composi ti on,
equi pment, and moral e of guerri l l a forces i s an absol ute necessi ty
for successful counterguerri l l a operati ons.
b. Whi l e al l tacti cal uni ts have the capabi l i ty to conduct
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance duri ng operati ons, there are two
uni ts that are trai ned and organi zed to ful fi l l these speci fi c
tacti cal mi ssi ons. These uni ts are the scout pl atoon and the l ong-
range survei l l ance uni t (detachment or company).
c. The scout pl atoon i s organi c to battal i ons; the l ong-range
survei l l ance detachment i s organi c to di vi si ons; and the
l ong-range survei l l ance company i s organi c to corps. Each
one works di rectl y for i ts (di vi si on, corps) commander. El ements
of these uni ts may be attached to subordi nate uni ts, when
requi red.
d. I f the reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni t has vehi cl es, thei r use
for purposes other than transportati on i s determi ned by the
si tuati on. I n most cases, vehi cl es are used for transport to the
general area where the operati on i s to begi n. The operati on i s then
conducted di smounted to enhance securi ty.
6-4. Countering the guerrilla force.
a. One method that may be successful i n counteri ng guerri l l a forces
i s to di vi de the reconnai ssance and survei l l ance assets i nto teams
of three or four men. These teams are i nserted i nto the operati onal
area to saturate i t. Si nce guerri l l as travel i n smal l uni ts and
then mass at a predetermi ned poi nt pri or to the attack, thi s tacti c
i ncreases the chances of di scoveri ng one or more of these guerri l l a
uni ts before they mass. The chance of thi s method bei ng
successful i ncreases i n proporti on to the number of teams i nserted
and operati ng.
b.
The reconnai ssance and survei l l ance el ement i s di vi ded i nto as
many teams of three or four men as possi bl e and depl oyed to cover
an area. Of the seven teams depl oyed i n thi s si tuati on, onl y two
(three and si x) di scover enemy uni ts (fi gure 6-1).
6- 2
FM 90-8
Figure 6-1. The reconnaissance and surveillance element.
c. Thi s method shoul d be used conti nuousl y to provi de the
counterguerri l l a force greater opportuni ty to act rather than react.
Once contact i s made, the counterguerri l l a commander has three
i mmedi ate opti ons avai l abl e (Fi gure 6-2).
6 - 3
160-739 - 94 - 4
FM 9 0 - 8
Figure 6-2. Three immediate options of the counterguerrilla commander.
6- 4
. .
\ ~
\ IL...J
~
~
/
~
~
\ \
\
\ el-l
~ 0
~
r!KJ,
Option 1 -continue surveillance and tracking to try
and discover an assembly area or base camp.
\ I
\ I
~ ~
~ \ /
Option 2 - react with maneuver
forces to engage known guerrilla
units.
I I I \
\ I I I
I I
~ 0
h 3 - combine op<iono 1 ond
2 to reduce guerrilla force strength
while maintaining critical information
flow with other R&S teams.
FM 90-8
d.
e.
f .
I n most cases, opti on 3 presents the best possi bi l i ty for conti nued
success i f the counterguerri l l a force commander has ti me
constrai nts pl aced on hi s mi ssi on. I t enabl es hi m to engage a
porti on of the guerri l l a force and weaken i ts overal l capabi l i ty
wi thout l osi ng a vi tal source of i ntel l i gence.
Opti on 1 maybe best i n si tuati ons where the counterguerri l l a force
does not have constrai nts pl aced on i t and seeks to deci si vel y
engage a l arger guerri l l a force. I n any case, the commander
shoul d wai t unti l i ntel l i gence i ndi cates that the guerri l l a force has
reached i ts assembl y area or base camp before he reacts wi th
maneuver forces.
He shoul d pl ace hi s reconnai ssance and survei l l ance el ements i n
posi ti ons where they can best di scover escapi ng guerri l l as who
have sl i pped through the bl ocki ng forces (Fi gure 6-3).
Figure 6-3. Emplacement of R&S teams to discover fleeing guerrilla forces.
g. He begi ns the process agai n i f guerri l l a uni ts escape (Fi gure 6-4).
6- 5
FM 90-8
Figure 6-4. If guerrilla elements escape, R&S teams begin process again.
h.
The key to reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni ts operati ng
successful l y i n a counteri nsurgency envi ronment i s the abi l i ty to
remai n undetected. Thi s capabi l i ty i s the resul t of comprehensi ve
trai ni ng and experi ence. Communi cati ons equi pment sui tabl e for
the mi ssi on i s al so a pri me factor. I t does no good to gather
i ntel l i gence i f the counterguerri l l a force cannot use i t i n a ti mel y
manner .
i . I n conventi onal counterguerri l l a confl i cts, the use of the
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni ts i s more i n l i ne wi th thei r
conventi onal mi ssi ons. They can al so empl oy modi fi cati ons of the
tacti cs descri bed for a counteri nsurgency. The mi ssi on of the
scout pl atoon i s to perform reconnai ssance, provi de l i mi ted
securi ty, and assi st i n control l i ng movement of the battal i on or i ts
el ements. The types of operati ons a scout pl atoon can perform are
route, zone, and area reconnai ssance, and screeni ng.
6-5. LRSU.
a . The mi ssi on of the l ong-range survei l l ance uni t {LRSU} (company
or detachment) i s to obser ve, r ecor d, and r epor t enemy
di sposi ti ons, faci l i ti es, and acti vi ti es as wel l as battl efi el d
condi ti ons.
b. The LRSU provi des the commander wi th a dedi cated, speci al l y
trai ned and equi pped, and hi ghl y rel i abl e human i ntel l i gence
col l ecti on capabi l i ty. A HUMI NT col l ecti on uni t provi des the
commander wi th the capabi l i ty to gather ti mel y, hi ghl y rel i abl e
i nformati on that does not requi re l engthy processi ng and
anal ysi s. The trai ned observer augmented wi th modem sensor
6- 6
FM 90-8
and communi cati on systems i s a rel i abl e, fl exi bl e, and val uabl e
i nformati on-gatheri ng asset and i s essenti al to conducti ng
successful operati ons.
c. The LRSU i s organi zed, trai ned, and equi pped to enter enemy
areas to observe and report enemy movements and acti vi ti es, as
wel l as battl efi el d condi ti ons. At ni ght, or duri ng other peri ods of
reduced vi si bi l i ty, survei l l ance teams i nfi l trate by ai r, ground, or
water to sel ected areas occupi ed by enemy forces or to areas where
enemy acti vi ty i s expected.
d. Whi l e avoi di ng contact wi th the enemy and l ocal ci vi l i ans, these
el ements empl oy a vari ety of sensors and speci al purpose
equi pment to detect, observe, and moni tor enemy acti vi ti es and
perform other speci fi ed tasks. As i nformati on i s obtai ned,
peri odi c reports are sent to the LRSU operati ons el ement uti l i zi ng
secure, rapi d-transmi ssi on communi cati ons equi pment. Thi s
operati onal el ement provi des the reported data to the mi l i tary
i ntel l i gence (MI ) operati on center for anal ysi s and di ssemi nati on.
At a predesi gnated ti me, or on order, survei l l ance el ements are
ei ther extracted or evade enemy personnel to exfi l trate the enemy
area, or they l i nk up wi th fri endl y forces. Members of the
survei l l ance el ements are physi cal l y and mental l y prepared to
remai n i n enemy terri tory for extended peri ods to accompl i sh
thei r mi ssi on.
Section Ill. Fire Support Units
6-6. Fire support planning.
a. The types of fi re support uni ts the counterguerri l l a force may have
avai l abl e are mortar pl atoons, anti tank pl atoons or compani es,
fi el d arti l l ery uni ts, naval gunfi re, tacti cal ai r, and ai r defense
arti l l ery uni ts.
b. An i mportant factor i n pl anni ng fi re support i s the restri cti on(s)
pl aced on i ts use. I n counteri nsurgency envi ronments, restri cti ons
on i ts use (and damage caused) are greater than i n conventi onal
confl i ct envi ronments. The commander operates under the
concept of mi ni mum essenti al force i n counteri nsurgency
envi ronments. He i ntegrates hi s fi re support i nto hi s tacti cal pl an
i n accordance wi th prevai l i ng restri cti ons, but al ways ensures he
has adequate fi re support for l i kel y conti ngenci es. I n many cases,
thi s means l i ttl e or no use of fi re support.
c. Thi s di ffi cul ty i s not as great i n conventi onal confl i cts, but i n
these envi ronments there are al so restri cti ons. Usual l y these
restri cti ons do not hi nge on the amount of fi repower used, but
rather on col l ateral damage and coordi nati on and control
6 - 7
FM 90-8
measures. Addi ti onal l y, fi re support may not be readi l y avai l abl e
to the counterguerri l l a commander because i t may be commi tted
to fi ght i n the mai n battl e area.
d. Due to restri cti ons that may precl ude the use of fi re support, the
counterguerri l l a force i s prepared to operate wi th l i ttl e or no fi re
suppor t.
e. Si nce areas of operati on are usual l y l arger i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons (than i n more conventi onal operati ons), the counter-
guerri l l a force must not become ti ed to the range of i ts fi re support.
Operati ons wi l l take pl ace outsi de of fi re support weapon ranges.
I n such cases, the commander provi des for i ncreased capabi l i ty to
rei nforce or extract hi s engaged uni ts, dependi ng upon the
si tuati on. I n al l cases, restri cted or not, the fi re support forces
avai l abl e are ready to respond on short noti ce i f restri cti ons are
l i fted or when needed for sel f-defense.
6-7. Mortar platoons.
I n a counteri nsurgency, the fi ri ng el ements of the mortar pl atoon
normal l y occupy posi ti ons wi thi n the battal i on operati onal support
base. I f el ements are requi red to move to fi ri ng posi ti ons outsi de of the
base, addi ti onal securi ty must be provi ded. The mortar pl atoon i s
usual l y kept under battal i on control and provi des the most responsi ve
i ndi rect fi re capabi l i ty avai l abl e to a battal i on. Dependi ng on the
si tuati on, the mortar pl atoon may or may not work from an establ i shed
base i n a conventi onal confl i ct.
6-8. Antitank platoons and companies.
a. I n an i nsurgency, the anti tank uni ts are not usual l y empl oyed i n
thei r pri mary rol e. I n those si tuati ons where no armor threat
exi sts, consi derati on may be gi ven to l eavi ng the tube-l aunched,
opti cal l y-tracked, wi re-gui ded (TOW) mi ssi l e i n a secure stagi ng
area, ei ther i n or out of country, and usi ng the crews as i nfantry.
Si nce these personnel are usual l y not experi enced i n l i ght
i nfantry tacti cs, they may be best used as part of the securi ty force
for the OSB.
b. I n conventi onal confl i ct envi ronments, the same si tuati on may
appl y when no armor threat exi sts. However, because of the
conti ngenci es that the counterguerri l l a force must be prepared to
encounter, the TOWS must remai n wi th the anti tank uni t whi l e i t
i s empl oyed i n a securi ty rol e. These conti ngenci es may i ncl ude
counteri ng enemy armor penetrati ons, or a change i n mi ssi on
from rear battl e to rei nforci ng frontl i ne uni ts, or even attacki ng or
defendi ng as part of the mai n force.
6- 8
FM 90-8
6-9. Field artillery units.
a.
b.
As stated previ ousl y, the use of fi el d arti l l ery may be extremel y
l i mi ted because of restri cti ons on the use of fi repower. I n al l cases,
the appl i cati on of fi repower must refl ect the pri nci pl e of
mi ni mum essenti al force. The fi el d arti l l ery (FA) support
normal l y provi ded to l i ght i nfantry di vi si ons consi sts of the
105-mm howi tzer. Arti l l ery of l arger cal i bers maybe provi ded by
arti l l ery uni ts augmenti ng the di vi si onal arti l l ery. I f the
counterguerri l l a uni t i s not l i ght i nfantry, i ts organi c capabi l i ty
may consi st of 155-mm howi tzers. I t i s normal for arti l l ery
batteri es to operate from the battal i on OSB when the battal i ons
are wi del y di spersed. Normal fi el d arti l l ery mi ssi ons i ncl ude
di rect support, rei nforci ng, general support, and general support
rei nforci ng.
There i s a fi re support coordi nati on center at each l evel of
maneuver command from company through bri gade. They are
manned by personnel from the bri gades di rect support FA
battal i on.
c. When the si tuati on permi ts the use of i ndi rect fi re support, FA
uni ts must be responsi ve and fl exi bl e. Ti mel y and effecti ve
arti l l ery fi re i n response to guerri l l a acti vi ty may di scourage
subsequent guerri l l a acti vi ty wi thi n arti l l ery range. Qui ck
reacti on ti mes and the capabi l i ty to shi ft arti l l ery fi res over wi de
areas requi re a responsi ve and effecti ve means of communi cati on.
To provi de effecti ve fi re support, arti l l ery i s empl oyed to obtai n
maxi mum area coverage wi th avai l abl e weapons whi l e retai ni ng
the capabi l i ty to mass fi res. I n addi ti on to supporti ng tacti cal
operati ons, arti l l ery may be posi ti oned to provi de area fi re
support to defend depots, l ogi sti cal compl exes, popul ati on
centers, and other cri ti cal i nstal l ati ons. Fi res may be requested by
sel f-defense forces, pol i ce, securi ty el ements protecti ng l ogi sti cal
compl exes, and other support uni ts, i n addi ti on to the supported
tacti cal force.
The seni or fi el d arti l l ery offi cer at each echel on of maneuver
command i s desi gnated the fi re support coordi nator. (FM 6-20
gi ves i nformati on on fi re support coordi nati on for i ndi rect fi res
and fi res from tacti cal ai r support. ) Fi res must be cl osel y
coordi nated not onl y wi th tacti cal operati ons i n the area but al so
wi th ci vi l i an acti vi ti es.
e. Counterguerri l l a operati ons normal l y di ctate:
d.
(1) A greater decentral i zati on of organi c, attached, and re-
i nforci ng fi re support.
(2) A reduced capabi l i ty for bri gade-l evel control and coordi nati on
of fi res wi thi n the operati onal area.
6- 9
FM 90-8
(3) Greater securi ty requi rements for fi ri ng posi ti ons of i ndi rect
fi re weapons to i ncl ude pl anni ng of di rect fi res for defense.
(4) A requi rement to fi re i n al l di recti ons.
(5) Provi si on for support to l ocal defense forces and stati c
securi ty posts.
(6) Di scri mi nate use of fi re support to avoi d noncombatant
casual ti es that woul d al i enate the popul ati on and produce
hosti l e atti tudes toward the host government.
(7) Cl ose coordi nati on wi th host country offi ci al s i n the
operati onal area.
f.
Lack of ti me may precl ude the preparati on of a formal , coordi nated,
and i ntegrated fi re support pl an for every conti ngency; however,
SOP shoul d provi de for al l l i kel y conti ngenci es. Cl ose l i ai son and
conti nuous contact between the supported commander and the
fi re support coordi nators provi de the requi red coordi nati on;
however, i n operati ons i nvol vi ng extensi ve empl oyment of
maneuver and support forces, such as i n the fi nal phase of an
enci rcl ement, coordi nati on measures must be used to ensure that
convergi ng fri endl y uni ts do not cal l fi re upon one another.
g.
I n conventi onal confl i cts, the use of FA uni ts i s more al ong
conventi onal l i nes.
6-10. Naval gunfire support.
a. Naval gunfi re support i s del i vered by shi p batteri es to support
amphi bi ous operati ons and maneuver uni ts operati ng i n coastal
areas. When support i s provi ded by naval gunfi re, each gunfi re
shi p i s assi gned the tacti cal mi ssi on of ei ther di rect support or
general support. A shi p i n di rect support normal l y supports a
battal i on and del i vers pl anned and i mmedi ate fi res. A shi p i n
general support normal l y supports a bri gade and del i vers
adjusted fi res, or i t may be assi gned on a fi re-mi ssi on basi s to a
subordi nate maneuver uni t. The counterguerri l l a force commander
must take i nto consi derati on the fact that naval gunfi re i s
normal l y hi gh vel oci ty, l ow trajectory fi re.
b.
I n a counteri nsurgency, the use of thi s asset wi l l be governed by
the same restri cti ons and the pri nci pl e of mi ni mum essenti al
force that pertai ns to fi repower when usi ng fi el d arti l l ery.
General l y, i f FA can be used i n an i nsurgency, naval gunfi re can
al so be used, i f avai l abl e. The same i s true of naval gunfi re i n
conventi onal confl i cts. One advantage of naval gunfi re i s that the
supported ground uni ts do not have to provi de securi ty to the
fi ri ng batteri es.
6 - 1 0
FM 90-8
c. A l i ai son pl atoon (from the US Mari ne Corps) wi l l normal l y be
attached to the bri gade to provi de speci al i sts and communi cati ons
needed to control , coordi nate, and recommend empl oyment of
naval gunfi re or naval ai r.
6-11. Tactical air operations.
Tacti cal ai r operati ons are fl own by the US Ai r Force i n support of
counterguerri l l a operati ons and cover si x mi ssi on areas (some
mi ssi ons coul d be fl own by Navy or Mari ne ai r assets) and speci al
oper ati ons.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Counter air. Objecti ves are to gai n control of the ai rspace
envi ronment. Counter ai r operati ons protect fri endl y forces,
ensure freedom to use the ai rspace to perform assi gned mi ssi ons
and tasks, and deny use of ai rspace to a hosti l e force. The goal i s
ai r supremacy.
Offensive counter air (OCA). Ai r operati ons seek out and
neutral i ze or destroy hosti l e ai r forces at a chosen ti me and pl ace.
Offensi ve counter ai r i s desi gned to sei ze the offensi ve at the
i ni ti ati on of hosti l i ti es, conduct operati ons i n hosti l e ai r space,
and neutral i ze or destroy hosti l e ai r forces and the i nfrastructure
that supports thei r operati ons.
Suppression of enemy air defenses. These oper ati ons
neutral i ze, destroy, or temporari l y degrade hosti l e ai r defensi ve
systems i n a speci fi c area by physi cal or el ectroni c attack. SEAD
operati ons provi de a favorabl e si tuati on to perform mi ssi ons
effecti ve y wi thout i nterference from hosti l e ai r defenses.
Defensive counter air (DCA). These operati ons detect,
i denti fy, i ntercept, and destroy hosti l e ai r forces attempti ng to
attack fri endl y forces or penetrate fri endl y ai rspace. DCA defends
fri endl y l i nes of communi cati on, protects fri endl y bases, and
supports fri endl y l and and naval forces whi l e denyi ng hosti l e
forces the freedom to carry out offensi ve operati ons.
Air interdiction (AI).
AI del ays, di srupts, di verts, or destroys hosti l e mi l i tary
potenti al before i t can be brought to bear effecti vel y agai nst
fri endl y forces. These operati ons are performed at such
di stances from fri endl y forces that detai l ed i ntegrati on of
speci fi c acti ons wi th fri endl y fi re and movement forces i s not
normal l y requi red. AI attacks are usual l y executed agai nst
hosti l e surface forces; movement networks (i ncl udi ng l i nes
of communi cati on); command, control and communi cati ons
networks; and combat suppl i es. I nterdi cti on can del ay the
arri val or bui l dup of hosti l e forces and suppl i es, di srupt the
(1)
6- 11
FM 90-8
hosti l e scheme of operati on and control of forces, di vert
hosti l e resources to other uses, and destroy forces and
suppl i es.
(2) AI i s normal l y executed by an ai r commander as part of a
systemati c and persi stent campai gn. Al though an AI
campai gn can bean i ndependent ai r effort, an ai r commander
normal l y coordi nates the campai gn wi th a surface force
commander. A campai gn i s devel oped to l i mi t the enemys
mobi l i ty to maneuver forces, whi l e forci ng the enemy i nto
hi gh rates of consumpti on, and to create opportuni ti es for
fri endl y forces to expl oi t the di sabi l i ti es produced by
i nterdi cti on. The wei ght, phasi ng, and ti mi ng of i nterdi cti on
attacks can provi de fri endl y forces the opportuni ty to sei ze
the i ni ti ati ve.
(3) AI agai nst targets whi ch coul d have a near-term effect on
fri endl y l and forces i s referred to as battl efi el d ai r i nterdi cti on.
The pri mary di fference between battl efi el d ai r i nterdi cti on
and the rest of the ai r i nterdi cti on effort i s the l evel of i nterest
and emphasi s the l and commander pl aces on the process of
i denti fyi ng, sel ecti ng, and attacki ng certai n targets.
Therefore, battl efi el d ai r i nterdi cti on requi res joi nt coordi nati on
at the component l evel duri ng pl anni ng, but once pl anned,
battl efi el d ai r i nterdi cti on i s control l ed and executed by the
ai r commander as an i ntegral part of a total ai r i nterdi cti on
campai gn.
f. Close air support (CAS).
(1) CAS supports surface operati ons by attacki ng hosti l e
targets near fri endl y surface forces. CAS can support
offensi ve, counteroffensi ve, and defensi ve surface force
operati ons wi th pl anned or i mmedi ate attacks. Al l such
mi ssi ons requi re detai l ed coordi nati on and i ntegrati on wi th
the fi re and maneuver pl ans of fri endl y surface forces. CAS
mi ssi ons requi re corri dors to the battl efi el d, ti mel y i ntel l i gence
i nformati on, and accurate weapons del i very.
(2) CAS enhances surface force operati ons by del i veri ng a wi de
range of weapons and massed fi repower at deci si ve poi nts. I t
can surpri se the hosti l e force, create opportuni ti es for the
maneuver or advance of fri endl y forces through shock effect
and concentrated attacks, protect the fl anks of fri endl y
forces, bl unt hosti l e offensi ves, and protect the rear of
surface forces duri ng rear battl e maneuvers.
6- 12
g.
Special operations.
(1) These operati ons i nfl uence the accompl i shment of strategi c
or tacti cal objecti ves through the conduct of l ow vi si bi l i ty,
FM 90-8
covert, or cl andesti ne mi l i tary acti ons. Speci al operati ons
are usual l y conducted i n hosti l e terri tory or pol i ti cal l y
sensi ti ve areas and may compl ement fri endl y force opera-
ti ons.
(2) Vi rtual l y al l aerospace forces have the potenti al for
empl oyment i n speci al operati ons. Addi ti onal l y, the Ai r
Force organi zes, trai ns, and equi ps uni que uni ts to conduct
speci al operati ons as a pri mary mi ssi on. To execute speci al
operati ons, forces are normal l y organi zed and empl oyed i n
smal l formati ons capabl e of support acti ons and i ndependent
operati ons that enabl e ti mel y and tai l ored responses
throughout the spectrum of confl i ct. Speci al operati on forces
may conduct or support unconventi onal warfare, counter-
terrori st operati ons, col l ecti ve securi ty, psychol ogi cal
operati ons, certai n rescue operati ons, and other mi ssi ons
such as i nterdi cti on or offensi ve counter ai r operati ons.
(a) Airlift. Ai rl i fts depl oy, empl oy, and sustai n mi l i tary
forces under varyi ng condi ti ons, rangi ng from peace to
war. As a combat mi ssi on, ai rl i fts provi de combat
power through ai rdrops, extracti ons, and ai rl andi ng of
ground forces and suppl i es. Through mobi l i ty operati ons,
the joi nt or combi ned force commander can maneuver
fi ghti ng forces to expl oi t hosti l e weaknesses. As a
combat support mi ssi on, ai rl i fts provi de l ogi sti cal
support through the transportati on of personnel and
equi pment. I n peaceti me, ai rl i fts provi de the opportuni ty
to enhance nati onal objecti ves by provi di ng mi l i tary
assi stance and ci vi l i an rel i ef programs. I n addi ti on to
the speci al operati ons noted above, ai rcraft assets may
be used to di spense fl ares and l eafl ets as wel l as
equi pped wi th speakers or sprayi ng apparatus for
forest fi re fi ghti ng. Ai rl i fts, therefore, accompl i sh the
ti mel y movement, del i very and recovery of personnel ,
equi pment, and suppl i es, and further mi l i tary and
nati onal goal s. Ai rl i fts may be strategi c or tacti cal .
Strategi c (i ntertheater) ai rl i fts transcend the boundary
of any one theater and are executed under the central
di recti on of hi gher authori ty, normal l y i n support of an
overal l effort. I n contrast, tacti cal (i ntratheater)
ai rl i fts are performed wi thi n a theater of operati ons
and support theater objecti ves through the rapi d and
responsi ve movement of personnel and suppl i es.
(b) Aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance. The
objecti ves are to col l ect i nformati on from ai rborne,
orbi tal , and surfacebased sensors. Ai r Force survei l l ance
and reconnai ssance efforts are part of the nati onal
i ntel l i gence gatheri ng effort and a systemati c observa-
6 - 1 3
FM 90-8
ti on process. These operati ons provi de much i nformati on
that i s key to the devel opment of nati onal securi ty
pol i cy, force postures, pl anni ng acti ons, force empl oy-
ment, and i nformed responses i n ti mes of cri ses.
Survei l l ance operati ons col l ect i nformati on conti nuousl y
from the aerospace and from the earths surface and
subsurface. Reconnai ssance operati ons are di rected
toward l ocal i zd or speci fi c targets. Through survei l l ance
and reconnai ssance, vari ed data are col l ected, such as
meteorol ogi cal , hydrographi c, geographi c, el ectroni c,
and communi cati ons characteri sti cs. The products of
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance operati ons have
strategi c and tacti cal appl i cati ons i n both peace and
war. Strategi c and tacti cal survei l l ance and reconnai s-
sance provi de ti mel y noti fi cati on of hosti l e i ntent and
acti ons as wel l as other i nformati on vi tal to the
nati onal command authori ti es and combat commanders.
These operati ons are i nstrumental i n i denti fyi ng the
composi ti on and capabi l i ty of potenti al l y hosti l e
forces. The Ai r Force al so performs the fol l owi ng
speci al i zed tasks that coul d support counterguerri l l a
operati ons:
(c) Electronic combat (EC). Thi s i s a speci al i zed task
performed by aerospace forces to control sel ected parts
of the el ectromagneti c spectrum i n support of strategi c
and tacti cal operati ons. El ectroni c combat i nvol ves
acti ons to protect fri endl y el ectromagneti c capabi l i ti es
and acti ons to neutral i ze or destroy hosti l e el ectro-
magneti c capabi l i ti es. Thi s enhances the abi l i ty of
fri endl y war-fi ghti ng systems to achi eve objecti ves,
si nce the use of the el ectromagneti c spectrum can have
a major i mpact on the success or fai l ure of mi l i tary
operati ons. EC i ncl udes el ectroni c warfare (EW), as
wel l as el ements of command, control , and communi -
cati ons countermeasures (C
3
CM) and suppressi on of
enemy ai r defenses. EW i s mi l i tary acti on usi ng
el ectromagneti c energy to determi ne, expl oi t, reduce, or
prevent hosti l e use of the el ectromagneti c spectrum
and al so i ncl udes acti ons desi gned to retai n the
fri endl y use of that spectrum. C
3
CM i nvol ves defensi ve
and offensi ve operati ons desi gned to deny i nformati on,
protect fri endl y command, control , and communi cati ons
(C
3
), i nfl uence hosti l e acti ons, and degrade or destroy
hosti l e C
3
capabi l i ti es. C
3
CM, supported by i ntel l i gence
operati ons, i ntegrates the use of operati ons securi ty,
mi l i tary decepti on, jammi ng, and physi cal destructi on.
SEAD, as an essenti al el ement of the counter ai r
mi ssi on, i s ai med at gai ni ng freedom of acti on to
6 - 1 4
FM 90-8
perform Ai r Force mi ssi ons by neutral i zi ng, destroyi ng,
or temporari l y degradi ng hosti l e ai r defense systems.
EC contri butes heavi l y to SEAD i n counter ai r ob-
jecti ves.
(d) Psychological operations. Thi s i s a speci al i zed
task performed to support nati onal objecti ves by
i nfl uenci ng the atti tudes and behavi or of hosti l e,
neutral , or fri endl y groups. Al l Ai r Force commands
and agenci es are responsi bl e for the conduct or support
of psychol ogi cal operati ons. I n pl anni ng and executi ng
operati ons, commanders shoul d consi der the psycho-
l ogi cal i mpl i cati ons and opportuni ti es i nherent i n
every acti on, and they must make a concerted effort to
ensure that the si gnal s transmi tted are percei ved as
i ntended. Both acti on and i nacti on may communi cate
i nformati on (whi ch can exert i nfl uence and may be
used to rei nforce acti ons) to enhance percepti ons of
capabi l i ti es or to i nfl uence others to support fri endl y
objecti ves. Dependi ng on the medi um of communi cati ons,
nati onal objecti ves, and pl anned acti ons, vari ous
psychol ogi cal efforts can be created to rei nforce
operati ons. These i ncl ude pl anned communi cati ons
through el ectroni c means or pri nted materi al ; a show
of force or demonstrati ons of superi ori ty; an attack on a
speci fi c, si gni fi cant target for psychol ogi cal effect;
acti ons to harass and di srupt hosti l e operati ons;
surpri se, shock acti on, and decepti on; or humani tari an
oper ati ons.
(e) Weather service. Thi s i s a speci al i zed task performed
to provi de ti mel y and accurate envi ronmental i nfor-
mati on to support strategi c, tacti cal , and mobi l i ty
operati ons. The Ai r Force weather servi ce gathers,
anal yzes, and provi des meteorol ogi cal and exoatmo-
spheri c data for mi ssi on pl anni ng. Envi ronmental
i nformati on i s essenti al i n conducti ng both ai rspace
and surface operati ons. The envi ronmental i nformati on
provi ded by the weather servi ce di rectl y i nfl uences the
deci si on process for empl oyi ng forces, i ncl udi ng the
sel ecti on of weapon systems, routes, targets, and
del i very tacti cs.
6-12. Air defense artillery units.
a. Ai r defense i s a combi nati on of al l acti ve and passi ve measures to
counter hosti l e ai r operati ons. I n an i nsurgency, the hosti l e ai r
threat may be mi ni mal . I n thi s case, consi derati on maybe gi ven
to l eavi ng ai r defense arti l l ery (ADA) weapons i n a rear stagi ng
6- 15
FM 90-8
area and usi ng ADA personnel as addi ti onal securi ty forces for
the OSB. I f thi s course of acti on i s sel ected, the ground
commander must recogni ze that an i nsurgency does not equate to
a l ow i ntensi ty ai r threat. I f ADA personnel are separated from
thei r ADA weapons, even a mi ni mal ai r attack coul d resul t i n the
destructi on of fri endl y force uni ts. Commanders must pl an for
such an attack by hosti l e or sympatheti c forces.
When the guerri l l a force has the potenti al to mount an ai r threat,
or when an ai r threat exi sts, the ADA assets must mai ntai n the
capabi l i ty to i mmedi atel y react to an ai r threat. I n a conventi onal
counterguerri l l a envi ronment, the rol es of ADA are al ong more
conventi onal l i nes. (For further i nformati on on ai r defense
operati ons i ntegrated wi th i nfantry operati ons, see FM 44-1, FM
44-3, and FM 44-18.)
b.
6-13. Military intelligence.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
I ntel l i gence at the tacti cal l evel i s of pri me i mportance i n
counterguerri l l a operati ons. MI el ements organi c to uni ts
conducti ng counterguerri l l a operati ons are CEWI battal i ons at
di vi si on l evel , and staff secti ons at bri gade and battal i on l evel .
Because of the decentral i zed nature of counterguerri l l a operati ons,
porti ons of the di vi si onal assets are usual l y attached to bri gades,
whi ch may i n turn attach el ements down to the battal i ons. The
tacti cal MI assets coordi nate thei r efforts wi th the exi sti ng
i ntel l i gence operati ons (ei ther host country or US) i n thei r area.
Di vi si on l evel MI assets are not capabl e of l ong-term, area-ori ented
i ntel l i gence producti on wi thout echel ons above di vi si on support
and assi stance. However, they are capabl e of short-term
col l ecti on and producti on efforts i n support of the i mmedi ate
tacti cal operati on.
The tacti cal MI el ement has two mi ssi ons that are conducted
si mul taneousl y. The fi rst i s to col l ect, process, and anal yze
i ntel l i gence i nformati on. There are two categori es of i nformati on
whi ch are i mportant to combat commanders: combat i nformati on
and i ntel l i gence. Combat i nformati on i s raw data that can be used
for fi re and maneuver deci si ons as recei ved wi thout further
processi ng, i nterpretati on, or i ntegrati on wi th other data.
Combat i nformati on i s sel dom devel oped above battal i on l evel
and i s a component part of i ntel l i gence. I ntel l i gence i s data
requi ri ng some form of val i dati on, i ntegrati on, and compari son
wi th other data (or anal ysi s) before i t can be used or ful l y
expl oi ted.
The di sci pl i nes from whi ch these data are produced and col l ected
are HUMI NT, SI GI NT, and I MI NT. I n a counterguerri l l a
6 - 1 6
FM 90-8
confl i ct, the area of HUMI NT provi des a l arge porti on of
avai l abl e i ntel l i gence. Techni cal and el ectroni c assets, i f used
effecti vel y, can provi de addi ti onal data to enhance the counter-
guerri l l a forces i ntel l i gence advantage. Some of these assets
i ncl ude ground survei l l ance radar, sensors, communi cati ons
i ntercept (COMI NT), and si de-l ooki ng ai rborne radar (I MI NT).
f . The second mi ssi on of the tacti cal MI el ement i s to attempt to
di srupt or del ay the enemys i ntel l i gence col l ecti on processes. The
di sci pl i ne that accompl i shes thi s task i s termed counteri ntel l i gence.
These functi ons i ncl ude decepti on operati ons, OPSEC, COMSEC,
and are for the most part performed by HUMI NT assets. (For
further i nformati on on i ntel l i gence operati ons, see FM 34-1 and
FM 34-10.)
6-14. Engineers.
a. Engi neer assets are usual l y found at di vi si on l evel and above.
Porti ons of these assets maybe attached to bri gades and, i n turn,
to battal i ons. The engi neer system i s di vi ded i nto four areas:
mobi l i ty, countermobi l i ty, survi vabi l i ty, and general engi neeri ng.
b. Mobi l i ty i s geared toward i mprovi ng the movement of maneuver
uni ts and movement of cri ti cal suppl i es. I t i s ori ented toward
reduci ng or negati ng the effects of obstacl es. Exampl es of
mobi l i ty operati ons i ncl ude l andi ng zone constructi on, reducti on
of roadbl ocks, constructi on of combat trai l s, and assaul t bri dgi ng.
c. Countermobi l i ty i s desi gned to reduce the enemys mobi l i ty and
effecti veness. Thi s i s general l y done through the i nstal l ati on of
obstacl es. Some obstacl es may destroy targets; most enhance or
compl ement weapon effecti veness. Exampl es of conventi onal
obstacl es are mi nefi el d and wi re entangl ements.
d. Survi vabi l i ty i s the devel opment of protecti ve posi ti ons. Exampl es
i ncl ude constructi on of peri meter defense posi ti ons i n operati onal
support bases.
e. General engi neeri ng mi ssi ons do not contri bute di rectl y to
commi tted maneuver uni ts. Exampl es of general engi neeri ng
mi ssi ons i ncl ude:
(1) I mprovi ng and mai ntai ni ng essenti al suppl y routes.
(2) Devel opi ng areas for essenti al l ogi sti cs.
(3) Repl aci ng assaul t (or destroyed) bri dges wi th tacti cal
br i dgi ng.
(4) Carryi ng out ci vi c acti on.
f. Engi neer uni ts spend most of thei r ti me and effort i n survi vabi l i ty
and general engi neeri ng tasks, even though al l four areas of
6 - 1 7
FM 90-8
g.
h.
engi neer effort may be addressed. When determi ni ng i f a project
shoul d be consi dered general engi neeri ng or one of the other three,
the rul e i s: i f the projects pri mary purpose i s to hel p the popul ace,
i t i s general engi neeri ng; i f i ts pri mary purpose i s to enhance
tacti cal operati ons, i t wi l l usual l y be one of the other three
categor i es.
Si nce engi neers spend much of thei r ti me i nterfaci ng wi th the
popul ace duri ng ci vi c acti on projects, i t i s essenti al that engi neers
understand the i mpact of thei r rol e on nati onal objecti ves.
Engi neer assets can be used to enhance i nfantry combat
operati ons as a conti ngency mi ssi on. Engi neers are effecti ve i n
thei r pri mary mi ssi on and are uti l i zed i n thei r secondary rol e as a
l ast resort. Engi neers can be used as trai ners on basi c mobi l i ty,
countermobi l i ty, and survi vabi l i ty ski l l s to i ncl ude i denti fi cati on
of booby traps, mi nes, and obstacl es, and empl acement constructi on.
They contri bute more toward the achi evement of nati onal goal s
as ci vi c acti on uni ts than as addi ti onal i nfantry. Engi neers may
be used as i nfantry:
(1) Duri ng attacks on the operati onal support base.
(2) When al l tacti cal uni ts are commi tted and a threat ari ses.
(3) As reserves i n si tuati ons where the guerri l l a threat has
al ready caused the commi tment of al l avai l abl e reserves.
(For further i nformati on on engi neer operati ons and
capabi l i ti es, see FM 5-100.)
6-15. Military police.
a. Mi l i tary pol i ce uni ts can perform thei r normal functi ons as an
effecti ve part of any counterguerri l l a force. They provi de a
di sti nct advantage i n pol i ce operati ons i n the popul ace and
resources control program. Mi l i tary pol i ce operate i n conjuncti on
wi th host country ci vi l and mi l i tary pol i ce.
b. Mi l i tary pol i ce functi ons i ncl ude:
(1) Populace and resources control operations. Oper ati ons
i n an i nsurgency may i nvol ve extensi ve pol i ce acti vi ti es to
control the host country popul ace and materi el resources,
i ncl udi ng screeni ng, i denti fi cati on, regi strati on, enforcement
of curfews, operati on of patrol s and checkpoi nts, and
i nvesti gati on of cri me.
(2) Intelligence operations. Si nce guerri l l a acti vi ti es often
overl ap wi th cri mi nal acti vi ti es, pol i ce acti vi ti es over a
peri od of ti me can devel op i nformants and i nformant nets
whi ch produce i ntel l i gence and/or i nformati on.
6- 18
FM 90-8
(3) Searches. Mi l i tary pol i ce may conduct searches i n support
of cordon-and-search operati ons. They support the operati on
by manni ng or supervi si ng search parti es, securi ng persons
or property captured, and evacuati ng pri soners.
(4) Securing ground lines of communication. Mi l i tar y
pol i ce assi st i n securi ng l i nes of communi cati on by road and
aer i al patr ol l i ng, establ i shi ng tr affi c contr ol poi nts,
escorti ng convoys, and conducti ng reconnai ssance i n thei r
area of responsi bi l i ty. I n securi ng such l i nes, they may
apprehend i ndi vi dual guerri l l as and thei r supporters and are
prepared to combat smal l groups of guerri l l as or to act as a
fi xi ng el ement unti l combat uni ts arri ve.
(5) Physical security. Mi l i tar y pol i ce pr ovi de physi cal
securi ty to i ndi vi dual s and i nstal l ati ons. Thi s may i ncl ude
desi gnated communi ti es.
(6) Prisoners. Mi l i tary pol i ce process, secure, and evacuate
captured persons and detai nees i n accordance wi th FM 19-40
and Department of the Army di recti ves.
c. A di vi si on usual l y has one mi l i tary pol i ce company. Dependi ng
on the si tuati on, el ements of thi s company may be attached to
bri gades or battal i ons. They are uti l i zed more i n consol i dati on
operati ons than i n stri ke operati ons. (For further i nformati on on
mi l i tary pol i ce acti vi ti es, see FM 19-1, FM 19-4, and FM 19-40.)
6-16. Si gnal .
a. Radi o i s the pri mary means of communi cati on i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons. Pl anni ng and i mpl ementi ng radi o communi cati on
nets for the bri gade and i ts maneuver battal i ons may become
hi ghl y compl ex. The bri gade si gnal offi cer i s prepared to advi se
on the capabi l i ty of avai l abl e communi cati ons means to support
each course of acti on bei ng consi dered.
Provi di ng suffi ci ent radi o communi cati on equi pment to conduct
operati ons i s a hi gh pri ori ty i n an i nsurgency. Aeri al and ground
rel ay stati ons may be requi red to extend the range of FM
equi pment. Si nce the bri gade communi cati on pl atoon has no
reserve from whi ch to provi de augmentati on, speci al communi cati on
needs of bri gade el ements are provi ded ei ther by redi stri buti ng
equi pment or by augmenti ng the tabl e of organi zati on and
equi pment. For l ong-range radi o communi cati ons between
battal i on operati onal support bases and patrol bases, communi -
cati on support teams may be requi red.
b.
c. Extensi ve use of radi o expands the communi cati ons securi ty
probl em. Never consi der the guerri l l a force too unsophi sti cated to
acqui re communi cati ons i ntel l i gence. Conventi onal communi ca-
6- 19
FM 90-8
ti ons securi ty measures are empl oyed wi th emphasi s on changi ng
operati onal codes frequentl y at the l ower tacti cal echel ons. Secure
voi ce nets wi l l be provi ded from company l evel upward.
d. Long-range reconnai ssance and survei l l ance uni ts empl oyed i n
counterguerri l l a operati ons shoul d possess a secure, l ong-range
capabi l i ty to enhance communi cati ons securi ty.
e. Use of mul ti channel , hi gh-frequency voi ce radi o, radi o tel etype,
and tacti cal satel l i te shoul d be consi dered for i nterconnecti ng
operati onal support bases. Normal l y, i sol ated rel ay stati ons
cannot be establ i shed i n the counterguerri l l a operati onal
envi ronment. Therefore, the l ocati on of operati onal support or
patrol bases, and di stance between them, seri ousl y i mpacts on the
si gnal uni ts abi l i ty to provi de a rel i abl e mul ti channel communi -
cati ons system. The si gnal offi cer consi ders thi s when presenti ng
hi s recommendati ons on base l ocati ons to the commander.
f. The composi ti on of the si gnal el ement commi tted i n support of the
counterguerri l l a force i s modi fi ed to meet mi ssi on and si tuati on
requi rements. The si gnal support el ement can be ei ther i n di rect
support or attached. A di rect support rol e i s desi rabl e as i t affords
the si gnal offi cer wi der l ati tude and greater fl exi bi l i ty to meet
changi ng support requi rements. I n al l cases, the supported uni t
provi des securi ty forces for the si gnal el ements. (For further
i nformati on on si gnal operati ons and capabi l i ti es, see FM 24-1.)
6- 20
FM 90-8
CHAPTER 7
Combat Service Support
Section I. General
7-1. Assets.
b.
a. Thi s chapter expl ai ns how combat servi ce support assets enhance
tacti cal operati ons and assi st the uni t i n accompl i shi ng i ts overal l
mi ssi on.
These assets i ncl ude medi cal , suppl y, transportati on, mai ntenance,
and personnel and admi ni strati on. They normal l y operate from
bases that support uni t tacti cal operati ons. Dependi ng on the si ze
of the uni t, these assets may be organi c or attached.
7-2. Essential elements.
Combat servi ce support uni ts i ncl ude those el ements essenti al to the
tacti cal mi ssi on and those el ements that are not essenti al but are
necessary to the normal functi oni ng of the battal i on and bri gade.
Usual l y, onl y essenti al combat servi ce support assets are l ocated at the
battal i on operati onal support base. Both essenti al and nonessenti al
tacti cal support el ements can be found i n the bri gades support base.
Section Il. Bases
7-3. Operational support.
a.
Operati onal support bases are usual l y establ i shed by battal i ons.
I n consol i dati on operati ons, these bases are usual l y semi permanent.
I n stri ke operati ons, they operate onl y as l ong as requi red by the
uni t mi ssi on. The pri mary functi on of the battal i on operati onal
support base i s to support tacti cal operati ons. I t may provi de a
stagi ng area for operati ons; a command, control , and communi -
cati on center; a l i mi ted l ogi sti cs base (battal i on combat trai ns); a
fi re support base; or a combi nati on of al l these functi ons. The
speci fi c support functi ons i t provi des are determi ned by avai l abi l i ty
and necessi ty. These bases have the mi ni mum personnel
necessary to operate and provi de securi ty. Al l nonessenti al
per sonnel those not cruci al to the tacti cal mi ssi on are
posi ti oned i n the bri gade support base.
b. Battal i on operati onal support bases provi de certai n advantages.
They:
(1) Establ i sh a government presence i n the area of operati ons.
7- 1
FM 90-8
(2) Ai d i n l i mi ti ng guerri l l a mobi l i ty i n the i mmedi ate vi ci ni ty.
(3) Provi de a measure of securi ty to popul ated areas cl ose by.
c. These advantages are secondary and do not take precedence over
the pri mary functi on to support tacti cal operati ons.
7-4. OSB location.
a. When sel ecti ng a l ocati on for the operati onal support base,
several factors are consi dered. The l ocati on i ncl udes an area l arge
enough to meet the uni ts requi rements, and i t i s on defensi bl e
terrai n. I f the uni t i s goi ng to use the base for fi re support, i t
provi des the maxi mum possi bl e coverage for i ndi rect fi re
weapons.
The operati onal support base i s l ocated far enough away from
popul ati on centers to precl ude ci vi l i an i nterference wi th operati ons
and to mi ni mi ze the possi bi l i ty of the popul ati on center becomi ng
a col l ateral target.
b.
c. The OSB i s l ocated so that i t has, as a mi ni mum, two methods for
resuppl y. For exampl e, i f the pri mary means for resuppl y i s by ai r,
i t shoul d al so have a secondary means, such as a road, i n case
weather precl udes the use of ai rcraft.
d. The bri gade support base provi des depl oyed battal i ons wi th
command, control and communi cati ons faci l i ti es; l ogi sti cs
support (bri gade support area, BSA); stagi ng areas; and
i ntel l i gence acti vi ti es. The support base i s usual l y i n a secured
area wi thi n a government-control l ed area. I t i s l arger than a
battal i on operati onal support base. The bri gade support base
provi des essenti al tacti cal and necessary operati onal support to
depl oyed battal i ons, and al so provi des a rear l ocati on for
nondepl oyed el ements of the depl oyed battal i ons (battal i on fi el d
trai ns).
e. Al l combat servi ce support el ements, whether operati ng from
battal i on or bri gade bases, ensure that thei r acti vi ti es support the
overal l nati onal objecti ve. Si nce these operati ons usual l y i nvol ve
more i nteracti on wi th the ci vi l i an popul ace than tacti cal
operati ons, i t i s necessary that personnel i nvol ved understand the
host countrys cul ture. Such understandi ng wi l l precl ude any
acti on that mi ght be detri mental to the accompl i shment of the
overal l nati onal objecti ve.
The combat servi ce support assets that normal l y operate from the
battal i on operati onal base are medi cal and suppl y. These same
assets can al so operate from the bri gade support base. The
addi ti onal assets of transportati on, mai ntenance, and personnel
and admi ni strati on usual l y operate from the bri gade support
f.
7 - 2
FM 90-8
base. The si ze of the el ement at each base depends on the
si tuati on. A nonessenti al el ement (operati onal or tacti cal ) shoul d
not be depl oyed from the home stati on. I t i s i mportant that
depl oyed el ements consi st onl y of those assets cri ti cal to the
tacti cal or operati onal functi oni ng of the uni t.
Section Ill. Use of Assets
7-5. Support levels.
Most of the combat servi ce support assets are found at di vi si on or
hi gher l evel and are attached to bri gades as needed. I n some cases, the
bri gade may recei ve a l arger porti on of the di vi si on assets than normal
i f the si tuati on requi res i t.
7-6. Medical.
a. The mi ssi on of medi cal uni ts i s to conserve the fi ghti ng strength
of the counterguerri l l a force by preventi ve medi cal and sani tary
measures and by appropri ate medi cal and surgi cal treatment. I n
support of the I DAD effort, medi cal uni ts and personnel may
provi de medi cal assi stance, advi ce, and trai ni ng to host country
medi cal personnel . These uni ts may al so provi de l i mi ted medi cal
support to the l ocal popul ace on a temporary basi s. However, such
support i s conducted under the auspi ces of the host country and to
the credi t of that government.
b. Ai dmen are at company l evel and gi ve emergency medi cal
treatment wi thi n thei r capabi l i ti es. They al so ensure that
pati ents who need to be evacuated are properl y prepared and
promptl y moved.
c. An ai d stati on i s usual l y at battal i on l evel . I n counterguerri l l a
si tuati ons, the stati on i s wi thi n the battal i on operati onal support
base. Ai d stati on functi ons i ncl ude:
(1) Recei vi ng, recordi ng, exami ni ng, and sorti ng pati ents and
returni ng the physi cal l y fi t to duty.
(2) Gi vi ng emergency medi cal treatment and prepari ng pati ents
for evacuati on.
(3) Provi di ng l i mi ted medi cal support through mi l i tary ci vi c
acti on programs, as desi gnated.
d. The battal i on ai d stati on i s normal l y supervi sed by a physi ci an or
physi ci ans assi stant.
e. Dependi ng on the seri ousness of the wound, the pati ent maybe
moved di rectl y to a di vi si on treatment stati on i n the bri gade
support base, or to a corps l evel hospi tal . Evacuati on to medi cal
7 - 3
FM 90-8
f .
support faci l i ti es may be by ground, but aeromedi cal evacuati on
i s the preferred means i n counterguerri l l a operati ons because of
the speed and securi ty of aeri al transport.
Any medi cal faci l i ty maybe bypassed, and the pati ent evacuated
to a hi gher l evel when hi s condi ti on warrants i t and the means of
evacuati on permi t. Evacuati on of wounded personnel does not
take precedence over mi ssi on accompl i shment.
7-7. Supply.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
Suppl y uni ts i n counterguerri l l a operati ons, as i n conventi onal
operati ons, provi de al l necessary cl asses of suppl i es to uni ts
i nvol ved i n tacti cal operati ons. Si nce the battal i on operati onal
support base i s as smal l as possi bl e and provi des onl y a l i mi ted
l ogi sti cs base, the suppl y el ement at battal i on i s smal l .
A majori ty of the combat trai ns are col l ocated wi th fi el d trai ns i n
the bri gade support base, so i t i s essenti al that suppl y l i nes to
battal i ons be mai ntai ned. Both aeri al and ground resuppl y are
consi dered to ensure a backup system i n case one method i s
di sr upted.
The bri gade usual l y recei ves i ts porti on of di vi si onal assets, but i t
may be augmented wi th addi ti onal assets as requi red.
Resuppl yi ng tacti cal uni ts must not set a pattern. Resuppl y
shoul d not occur on a regul ar basi s, but onl y as requested by
tacti cal uni ts.
Uni t messes normal l y do not operate from battal i on operati onal
support bases. Uni t mess teams may move to (and operate from)
battal i on bases for short peri ods to i mprove moral e, or prepare hot
meal s i n the bri gade base and transport them to the battal i on
base. I n some cases, l ocal procurement of foodstuffs maybe
authori zed to hel p bol ster the l ocal economy.
Currentl y prescri bed suppl y systems and procedures can
adequatel y support counterguerri l l a operati ons wi th mi nor
vari ati ons.
(For further i nformati on on suppl y operati ons and procedures, see
FM 29-51.)
7-8. Transportation.
a. Transportati on requi rements are cl assi fi ed as tacti cal and
nontacti cal . Tacti cal transportati on deal s wi th the reposi ti oni ng
of men and materi el i n the battl e area, and i s di rectl y associ ated
wi th combat. Nontacti cal transportati on deal s wi th the movement
of men and materi el i n a noncombat acti on.
7- 4
FM 90-8
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
There are two major types of transportati on means avai l abl e to
counterguerri l l a forces: ground and ai r transport. Less common
means of transportati on are rai l roads, watercraft, and pack
ani mal s.
Tacti cal transportati on by avi ati on assets i s preferred because of
thei r speed and fl exi bi l i ty. On occasi ons when avi ati on assets are
not sui tabl e, ground transportati on i s uti l i zed. Ground transpor-
tati on requi res i ncreased securi ty. Once the uni t i s reposi ti oned,
sol di ers move on foot to accompl i sh thei r mi ssi on.
Avi ati on uni ts are l ocated at di vi si on l evel and above. Ai rcraft for
bri gade operati ons, or bel ow, are attached or pl aced i n support of
the usi ng uni t(s).
Nontacti cal transportati on i s accompl i shed by ei ther avi ati on or
ground transportati on assets. General l y, nontacti cal transportati on
i s used to move suppl i es and equi pment, and for medi cal
evacuati on. Ground transportati on assets may be organi c to uni ts
at company and above. The use of ground transport i s dependent
upon di stance, securi ty, terrai n, and avai l abi l i ty of routes, among
other factors.
Ground transportati on requests are made through S4 channel s,
consol i dated at bri gade S4, and forwarded to the di vi si on
transportati on offi cer. He assi gns pri ori ti es and mi ssi ons to the
di vi si ons track assets or requests addi ti onal assets from corps.
Requests for Army avi ati on are made through S3 channel s and
forwarded to the assi stant di vi si on avi ati on offi cer. He assi gns
pri ori ti es and mi ssi ons to the di vi si ons combat avi ati on bri gade
or requests addi ti onal assets from corps.
(For further i nformati on on transportati on assets and operati ons, see
FM 55-2.)
7-9. Maintenance.
Mai ntenance i nvol ves al l acti ons to keep equi pment operati onal l y
ready or to restore i t to that status. Battal i on mai ntenance el ements are
l ocated at the OSB (combat trai ns) and the bri gade support base (fi el d
trai ns). I n addi ti on, mai ntenance contact teams from the mai ntenance
uni t supporti ng the bri gade (forward support mai ntenance company or
forward support battal i on) wi l l al so be l ocated wi th the OSB.
Mai ntenance doctri ne (fi x as far forward as possi bl e) i s modi fi ed
sl i ghtl y i n an effort to keep the OSB as smal l as possi bl e. As a resul t,
most mai ntenance, other than mi nor repai r or repl acement of parts,
wi l l take pl ace at the bri gade support base i n a rel ati vel y secure area.
(For further i nformati on on mai ntenance operati ons, see FM 29-2, FM
29-23, and FM 29-30-1.)
7 - 5
FM 90- 8
7-10. Personnel and administration.
a. To remai n an effecti ve fi ghti ng force, the counterguerri l l a uni t
requi res personnel and admi ni strati ve support. Most, i f not al l , of
thi s support functi on occurs i n the fi el d trai ns at the bri gade
support base.
The adjutant (S1) i s at the battal i on operati onal support base wi th
the suppl y offi cer (S4). The S1 i s responsi bl e for headquarters
management of the battal i on base as wel l as S1 functi ons and
l i ai son wi th bri gade. The headquarters commandant i s wi th the
fi el d trai ns of the battal i on i n the bri gade base. Thi s arrangement
keeps the battal i on base as smal l as possi bl e.
b.
c. Personnel and admi ni strati ve support for counterguerri l l a
operati ons i s essenti al l y the same as i n conventi onal operati ons.
Admi ni strati ve operati ons remai n rel ati vel y the same and
fl exi bl e to support the si tuati on.
(For further i nformati on on personnel and admi ni strati ve support
functi ons, see FM 7-20 and FM 71-2.)
7 - 6
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX A
Subsurface Operations
Section 1. General
A-1. Type facilities.
a. Thi s appendi x expl ai ns how guerri l l as may use natural caves or
construct underground faci l i ti es i n the course of thei r operati ons.
These may be used for command and control centers, l ogi sti cal
stagi ng areas, hospi tal s, or even forti fi cati ons.
b.
The l arger underground faci l i ti es may be compl ex. Caves may
have many l arge chambers connected by passageways, whi l e
tunnel systems may have many l arge rooms joi ned by i ntercon-
necti ng tunnel s. Underground faci l i ti es may be wi red for
el ectri ci ty and communi cati ons and may even have pumpi ng
stati ons for suppl yi ng ai r to l ower l evel s.
A-2. Tunnel uses.
Tunnel s may be dug wi th zi gzags and sumps to l essen the effects of
smal l arms fi re, expl osi ves, and gas i nsi de them. Some tunnel s and
rooms, or passageways and chambers, may contai n conceal ed exi ts to
al l ow guerri l l as to hi de or escape i f the compl ex or cave i s penetrated
whi l e others may be booby-trapped to ki l l i ntruders. Tunnel s and caves
are di ffi cul t to detect from the ai r or ground, and thei r constructi on may
make them i mpossi bl e to destroy wi th conventi onal ammuni ti on.
Tunnel entrances are normal l y covered by fi re from another poi nt i n
the compl ex.
a. Guerri l l as may use tunnel s i n penetrati on operati ons to gai n
access to restri cted areas. I n bui l t-up areas they may i nfi l trate
through sewers, or tunnel from the basement of a nearby bui l di ng,
or subway tunnel , or sewer to thei r target. When they are bel ow
the target, they may ei ther construct an exi t and penetrate the
target from bel ow or fi l l the tunnel wi th expl osi ves and bl ow up
the target.
b. Tunnel s may al so be dug i n the basements of safehouses for use as
escape routes i f a house i s compromi sed.
c. Tunnel s are used for approach and escape. They are used to obtai n
access to caves and underground bunkers for use as fi ri ng
posi ti ons and protecti on agai nst i ndi rect fi res. They are al so used
as a common method of stori ng food and materi al s i n underground
caches. Some tunnel compl exes are l arge enough to house
underground hopi tal s and base camps.
A-1
FM 90- 8
Section Il. Tunneling
A-3 . Categories.
Tunnel s vary from the si mpl e to the compl ex. They are categori zed as
hi di ng hol es, access and escape routes, underground base areas,
forti fi ed base camps, and bunkers.
a. Hiding holes. There are three basi c types of hol es used by
(1)
guerri l l as. They are cl assi fi ed more by thei r l ocati on than by thei r
constructi on. Methods of constructi on and di mensi ons can be
expected to vary, dependi ng on the area of operati ons.
Bamboo hole. Thi s i s easi l y and qui ckl y camoufl aged
(Fi gure A-1 ). The entrances to the hol es di ffer as do the
techni ques of camoufl age. Most of the entrances are wi thi n
the edge of a bamboo cl ump or dense thi cket or just outsi de
the edge. The hol e cover, or trapdoor, contai ns camoufl age
materi al . Some have pi eces of cut bamboo or other vegetati on
affi xed to the top of the door. The edges of the door fi t snugl y
i nto the structure of the entrance. Other entrances may be
covered by spreadi ng materi al s over them.
Figure A-1. Under bamboo hole.
A- 2
FM 90- 8
(2) Air hole.
Another characteri sti c common to smal l tunnel s i s the
ai r hol e, whi ch i s normal l y made from a hol l ow pi ece of
bamboo or pi pe 3 to 4 i nches i n di ameter and i nserted
i nto the tunnel and camoufl aged on the surface.
(a)
(b) The ai r hol e i s the onl y tel l tal e i ndi cator i n a beach hol e
or tunnel . I t di ffers from the bamboo hol e i n that i t i s
constructed i n sand or di rt and constructed from cut
ti mbers (Fi gure A-2). I t does not depend on roots to add
ri gi di ty to the roof. The entrance i s hard to l ocate as i t i s
often buri ed under afoot of l oose sand or di rt; however,
i t can be found by fi rst fi ndi ng the breathi ng tubes.
Some ai r hol es are a conti nuati on of the supports that
hol d up l ocal bui l di ngs. Other ai r hol es may be exposed
by pul l i ng up pl ants that grow nearby.
Figure A-2. Beach hole.
(3) Water entrance hole. Thi s hol e or tunnel (Fi gure A-3) i s
l ocated near a smal l stream or besi de an ol d bomb crater
fi l l ed wi th water. These hol es have no door and depend on
natural growth to hi de the entrance. Someti mes the entrance
i s compl etel y submerged.
A- 3
FM 90- 8
Figure A-3. Water entrance hole.
b. Access and escape routes. Guerri l l as use tunnel s to i nfi l trate
or exfi l trate an area. They may l ead to vi l l ages, roads, or hi ghl y
forti fi ed bunker systems (Fi gure A-4).
Figure A-4. Access and escape routes.
A- 4
FM 90- 8
c. Base area. Thi s may house a command post, ordnance shop, or
hospi tal . Thi s type of tunnel system i s not-as common as the ones
found i n a forti fi ed vi l l age or used as access or escape routes. I t i s
normal l y deep i n guerri l l a-control l ed areas. Thi s type of tunnel
compl ex may have several rooms, such as a 4- by 6-foot area or a
l arge 10-foot-square area wi th a 15-foot cei l i ng. They may al so
i ncl ude el ectri c l i ghti ng or other comfort features (Fi gure A-5).
Figure A-5. Underground base area.
d .
Base camps. These are usual l y forti fi ed posi ti ons. They may
consi st of a-central bunker, 18 i nches above ground, and tunnel s
100 to 150 meters l ong, connecti ng outer bunkers to the central
bunker. Al l bunkers have overhead cover and camoufl aged fi ri ng
apertures. They are posi ti oned to provi de mutual support and
deny observati on of the enti re compl ex from any one l ocati on on
the ground (Fi gure A-6).
A- 5
FM 90-8
Figure A-6. Fortified base camps.
e. Bunkers. Entrances are often i n a house under a bed or tabl e,
and have an outsi de exi t. I n many cases, bunkers are constructed
wi th wal l s up to 3 feet thi ck. The fl oor i s bel ow ground l evel . The
roof i s normal l y constructed of l ogs covered wi th di rt, mud, or rock
from 3 to 6 feet thi ck. Someti mes, smal l l ogs (dri ven 3 to 6 feet i nto
the ground and extendi ng upward to roof l evel ) serve to rei nforce
the wal l s. I n some cases, the bunker maybe constructed enti rel y
of concrete. Most often, bunkers have one overt entrance and one
or more covert exi ts. The pri mary use of bunkers i s to provi de
cover and conceal ment. Fi ri ng apertures are just above ground
(Fi gure A-7).
A- 6
FM 90-8
Figure A-7. Bunkers.
A- 7
Log bunker.
l-+---12 to 1
Concrete bunker.
FM 90-8
A-4. Construction methods.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
One feature common to al most al l tunnel compl exes i s the method
of excavati on. The l aborers are di vi ded i nto a number of work
uni ts and assi gned tunnel secti ons. The uni ts are pl aced
approxi matel y 20 meters al ong the axi s of the pl anned tunnel .
Each uni t then di gs a wel l or shaft to the desi red depth where a
worki ng area i s enl arged. From thi s poi nt, the uni ts begi n di ggi ng
toward each other. As the tunnel grows, the workers are formed i n
a l i ne to pass the soi l out the excavati on shaft. The soi l i s spead
evenl y over the ground or a road, or under the forest canopy to
prevent detecti on. Once the mai n tunnel has been excavated, the
shaft i s fi l l ed and camoufl aged.
As the tunnel becomes more extensi ve, l ower l evel s may be
constructed to provi de addi ti onal room and better protecti on. The
degree of sophi sti cati on i s dependent upon the purpose of the
tunnel and frequency of i ts use. Most of the tunnel s constructed by
guerri l l a forces are hi di ng pl aces or escape routes; therefore, they
may be extensi ve i n l ength, but not compl ex i n desi gn.
Whether thei r constructi on i s compl ex or not, care i s taken to
provi de securi ty throughout the tunnel s. Fal se corri dors are
constructed, as are trapdoors and fal se wal l s. A U-shaped desi gn
i s often formed to gi ve the i mpressi on that the corri dor i s a
deadend when actual l y a trapdoor l eads to the way out.
Most tunnel systems requi re substanti al pl anni ng before actual
constructi on. The systems are never haphazard. The tunnel i s
rei nforced by reveti ng or other means. One common method used
to rei nforce tunnel s i s to coat wal l s wi th mud 3 to 6 i nches thi ck
and bui l d fi res throughout the system to bake the mud, turni ng i t
i nto a cerami c texture.
Tunnel systems are usual l y not constructed i n a strai ght l i ne.
They wi l l fol l ow a zi gzag or serpenti ne course. Thi s type of
constructi on i s used to protect the occupants from smal l arms fi re
i n the event that tunnel systems are detected and breached.
Tool s for di ggi ng are si mpl e. A bucket and pi ck or shovel are the
mai n tool s. Common methods of i l l umi nati on i ncl ude carbi de
l amps, fl ashl i ghts, candl es, and i n l arger compl exes, smal l ,
fuel -dri ven generators for el ectri c l i ghti ng.
Secrecy of l ocati on i s consi dered of utmost i mportance. Al l means
are taken to camoufl age and conceal tunnel entrances. Often,
tunnel s are hi dden i n tombs, wal l s, fl oors, or under water.
Extensi ve use of booby traps and mi nes shoul d be expected i n and
around tunnel compl exes. Some common booby traps are mortar
and arti l l ery duds ri gged for command detonati on. These may be
buri ed or suspended i n trees i n the i mmedi ate vi ci ni ty. Hand
A- 8
FM 90-8
grenades and homemade bombs are used to booby-trapdoors and
hatches. Poi sonous snakes may be pl aced i n tunnel s to i nfl i ct
casual ti es.
A-5. Detection of tunnels.
a. The fi rst step i n detecti ng or l ocati ng tunnel s i s to reduce a l arge
geographi cal area of i nterest to a smal l er area of probabl e
l ocati ons. Thi s can be accompl i shed by studyi ng general
i ndi cati ons of probabl e tunnel l ocati ons.
b.
Some i ndi cators that tunnel s are bei ng empl oyed by guerri l l a
forces are:
(1) Movement of guerri l l as i n a speci fi c di recti on after bei ng
spotted by ai rcraft.
(2) Sni per fi re occurri ng from areas where there are no obvi ous
avenues of wi thdrawal .
(3) Vegetabl e gardens far from pl aces of habi tati on.
(4) Operati ons where guerri l l as i nfl i ct casual ti es at rel ati vel y
l ong range and di sappear wi thout maki ng cl ose contact or
bei ng detected by fri endl y forces.
(5) The smel l of burni ng wood or food cooki ng i n an area l acki ng
habi tati on.
c. Conventi onal ai r photography produces resul ts i f the appearance
of the surface and vegetati on are changed from normal . Thi s
requi res ski l l ed personnel to i nterpret photos. I n a jungl e
envi ronment, ai r photography may be prohi bi ted because dense
vegetati on, such as doubl e or tri pl e canopy jungl e, obscures the
gr ound.
d. Once determi ned that a speci fi c area may contai n a tunnel
system, there are several i ndi cators that are hel pful i n detecti ng
tunnel s. Vi sual i nspecti ons often di scl ose the general area of a
tunnel , but not i ts preci se l ocati on. The key to fi ndi ng a tunnel
system i s the appl i cati on of common sense to the si tuati on. A
pl atoon or company shoul d be assi gned a smal l search area, never
l arger than a 1000-meter gri d square for a company. These smal l
areas are pi cked based on i ntel l i gence reports or past acti ons of
the guerri l l a force. The uni t searches every square meter of the
area. Some vi sual i ndi cators usual l y found are:
(1) Worn pl aces on trees that the guerri l l a uses as handhol ds.
(2) A smal l trai l , much l i ke a game trai l , through the brush i nto a
cl ump of smal l trees.
(3) Cut trees, al though not a sure si gn.
A - 9
160-739 - 94 - 5
FM 90- 8
(4) Li mbs ti ed near tree top to conceal the use of a tunnel from
ai rcraft.
(5) Sl i ght depressi on i n or around a group of smal l trees.
(6) Ai r hol es, a sure i ndi cator.
(7) A l one i ndi vi dual , especi al l y a femal e, i n the area.
(8) Fresh cooked food wi th no one attendi ng the si te.
(9) Fresh human feces i n an area.
e. Al l these i ndi cators are good. However, i n di fferent areas they
may vary. The pl aces to l ook for i ndi cators are i n the corners of
hedgerows, i n the corners of vi l l age huts, and i n the secl uded
corners of trai l s and streams. The enemy often hi des i n these
pl aces so he can see whi l e not bei ng seen. Addi ti onal l y, hi di ng i n
these pl aces al l ows those who put the fi ni shi ng touches on the
camoufl age to escape undetected. The guerri l l a i s aware of the
danger of establ i shi ng a pattern. However, he must have a
l ocati on that provi des hi m wi th observati on as wel l as conceal ment.
So l ook for observati on posts that al l ow hi m to move i nto or out of
an area undetected.
f. Occasi onal l y, the speci fi c l ocati on of a tunnel can be obtai ned by
i nterrogati ng the l ocal popul ace, or pri soners of war (PW) who
may have occupi ed, or hel ped i n di ggi ng, the system. Because of
the method of constructi ng a tunnel system, that of usi ng an
excavati on shaft to reach the l evel of the tunnel and then cl osi ng
thi s shaft once the tunnel i s compl eted, the i ndi vi dual may not be
abl e to l ocate an entrance or exi t unl ess he has seen or used the
compl eted tunnel .
A-6. Tunnel search operations.
b.
a. Enteri ng an area where a tunnel compl ex i s l ocated requi res a
methodi cal approach. Securi ty to the fl anks and rear i s i mper-
ati ve.
The si ze of the objecti ve area of operati ons determi nes the
strength of the uni t assi gned the search mi ssi on. Basi cal l y, the
uni t, company, or pl atoon i s task-organi zed for tunnel operati ons.
c. A company i s di vi ded i nto three el ements: securi ty, search, and
reserve. (The headquarters el ement remai ns wi th the securi ty
el ement.)
(1) Securi ty one pl atoon pl us headquarters el ement to cordon
sear ch ar ea.
A- 10
(2) Search one pl atoon to search i mmedi ate area for tunnel s.
The search el ement i s subdi vi ded i nto search and securi ty
teams.
FM 90- 8
(3) Reser ve one pl atoon to assi st i n cordon and rei nforce as
necessary.
d. A pl atoon i s di vi ded i nto three el ements:
(1) Securi ty one squad pl us headquarters el ement to cordon
ar ea.
(2) Search one squad to search area for tunnel s. The search
el ement i s subdi vi ded i nto search and securi ty teams.
(3) Reserve one squad to assi st i n cordon and rei nforce as
necessar y.
e. The techni ques of del i berate search are centered around the ri fl e
squad. Each squad i s di vi ded i nto a securi ty and a search team.
f. A sl ow, methodi cal search i s conducted i n the area of operati ons.
Once assi gned a search area, the squad systemati cal l y searches
every square meter. The securi ty el ement move toward the l i mi ts
of the search area. Once a hol e (tunnel ) i s di scovered, the securi ty
el ement surrounds the area whi l e the search team prepares to
destroy or neutral i ze the hol e (tunnel ).
A-7. Special equipment.
The uni t may requi re the fol l owi ng speci al i tems to perform tunnel
oper ati ons:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Mi ne detector used to detect ammuni ti on and weapon caches.
Grenades fragmentary, chemi cal (CS) gas, chemi cal (HC)
smoke, whi l e phosphorus (WP), and concussi on types. Grenades
shoul d not be used after fri endl y forces have entered a tunnel .
Demol i ti ons used to destroy tunnel system. Because of the
compl exi ty of charges needed to destroy some tunnel compl exes,
an engi neer team shoul d support the search uni t. Al so, the l arge
amount of demol i ti ons requi red for some operati ons may present
uni que l ogi sti cal probl ems, especi al l y i n a jungl e envi ronment.
Ai r generator used to force smoke i nto tunnel compl ex.
Fl ashl i ghts to search tunnel s.
Weapons cal i ber .45 pi stol shoul d be used i nsi de tunnel s. The
pi stol has good stoppi ng power and i s effecti ve at cl ose range.
Loudspeaker used to cal l enemy from tunnel s.
A- 1 1
FM 90- 8
Section Ill. Destroying Underground Facilities
A-8. Four-step process.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
The destructi on of a tunnel i s a four-step process, begi nni ng (1)
wi th a sol di er fi ri ng one or two magazi nes from a ri fl e i nto the
tunnel entrance. Thi s has a tendency to di scourage the enemy
from stayi ng cl ose to the entrance.
After gai ni ng the attenti on of the guerri l l as, they are tol d to
vacate the hol e or tunnel or be ki l l ed. They may gi ve up wi thout a
fi ght, savi ng not onl y the efforts of ki l l i ng, but of excavati ng the
hol e or tunnel for weapons and documents.
I f thi s fai l s, breachi ng operati ons are used(2). A grenade i s pl aced
on the entrance cover to gai n access. The entrance cover i s
removed i n thi s manner to mi ni mi ze the effects of any attached booby
traps.
Once the entrance cover i s destroyed, the fol l owi ng measures are
used (dependi ng on the mi ssi on):
(1) I nsert grenades (3), fragmentary or concussi on, to ki l l the
guerri l l as. Ensure that the grenades are cooked-off pri or to
throwi ng them i n the hol e or tunnel .
(2) I nsert a combi nati on of HC smoke and CS chemi cal
grenades. Thi s serves two purposes: HC smoke may reveal
the l ocati ons of other entrances or exi ts, and CS may force
the guerri l l as to evacuate the hol e or tunnel . Captured
guerri l l as become a source of i ntel l i gence i n fi ndi ng other
hol es or tunnel s.
The l ast step (4) i s the entry of sol di ers to ensure that al l weapons
and documents are recovered and al l enemy dead, wounded, and
l i vi ng are removed. The hol e or tunnel i s thoroughl y searched for
smal l compartments bui l t to hi de weapons and ammuni ti on. I f a
tunnel compl ex proves to be extensi ve wi th bunkers and l arge
rooms, i t i s cl eared systemati cal l y. Bunkers are destroyed or
occupi ed to prevent the enemy from reoccupyi ng them through
another tunnel . Do not clear more bunkers than friendly
forces can hold.
Del i berate search techni ques emphasi ze where to l ook for the
enemy (l ocati ons that provi de hi m wi th observati on, cover,
conceal ment, and an escape route). When the sol di er l earns what
to l ook for (a game trai l , worn and cut trees, an ai r hol e, human
feces, a depressi on, fresh food, a l one i ndi vi dual ), any of these
i ndi cators i s l i kel y to tri gger a mental al ert that the enemy i s not
far away. After the tunnel i s searched, i t i s destroyed wi th
expl osi ves.
A- 12
FM 90- 8
A-9. Neutralization-demolition procedures.
a. Tunnels. Si nce each tunnel system di ffers i n si ze and constructi on,
a di fferent quanti ty and pl acement of expl osi ves i s needed for
each type.
(1) The use of bl ock expl osi ves to destroy a tunnel system has a
di sadvantage: al l the expl osi ve power i s concentrated at one
poi nt. Thus, the destructi on i s l ocal i zed, and often porti ons of
the tunnel are unaffected. However, a l arge (10-to 12-pound)
bl ock of expl osi ve tamped agai nst the cei l i ng may cause an
enti re tunnel to col l apse.
(2) Advantages of bl ock-type expl osi ves ar e the ease of em-
pl acement, ease of procurement, and feasi bi l i ty of aeri al
resuppl y. Al so, bl ock or satchel charges are effecti ve i n the
destructi on of bunkers, sunken l i vi ng quarters, and under-
gr ound r ooms. Cr ater i ng char ges ar e al so effecti ve for
underground rooms. Short tunnel s can be destroyed effecti vel y
by bl ock expl osi ves.
(3) The shaped charge i n tunnel destructi on i s successful when
used i n speci fi c ci r cumstances. A shaped char ge pl aced
underground i n the mi ddl e of a tunnel compl ex, and ai med
downward, destroys an area of the tunnel compl ex around
and above the charge. Al so, a shaped charge pl aced i n a deep
compl ex and ai med upward resul ts i n extensi ve destructi on.
(4) Another effecti ve method of tunnel destr ucti on uti l i zes
bangal ore torpedos pl aced throughout the tunnel l ength
(regardl ess of depth). The constant l ength of expl osi ves
throughout the tunnel ensures compl ete destructi on. The
bangal ore (5 feet l ong) i s adaptabl e to the twi sts and turns i n
tunnel s. Each tunnel where i t can be pushed through). A
di sadvantage of bangal ore torpedoes i s the l ogi sti cal
probl em ari si ng from thei r si ze and wei ght. There may be a
probl em wi th resuppl y i f l arge quanti ti es are used to
compl etel y destroy a tunnel system.
Bunkers. Underground l i vi ng quarters, bunkers, and underground
hi deaways can be destroyed by bl ock or satchel charges pl aced
strategi cal l y i nsi de the room. The fol l owi ng are exampl es of
structures and the si ze and pl acement of charges.
b.
(1) Bunkers dug i nto the ground and covered by dense brush
(average si ze 4 by 8 by 4 feet) can be destroyed wi th 3 pounds
of expl osi ves pl aced next to a wal l .
(2) Thi s bunker (8 by 5 by 4 feet) can be destroyed by pl aci ng a
5-pound charge agai nst the roof toward the si de of the
strongest beam (Fi gure A-8).
A- 13
FM 90-8
(3) Thi s 4-i nch-thi ck concrete wal l bunker (6 by 6 by 5 feet) can
be destroyed by pl aci ng 8 to 9 pounds of expl osi ves at the
poi nt where the tunnel enters the bunker, and wi l l al so
destroy a porti on of the tunnel (Fi gure A-9).
Fi gure A-9. Rei nforced underground bunker.
(4) Thi s bunker depi cts an underground hospi tal capabl e of
hol di ng 10 to 12 persons. I t i s about 10 feet bel ow the surface.
Usual l y 15 feet l ong by 8 feet wi de by 6 feet hi gh, i t i s
constructed of cement and steel I -beams. The room i s
compl etel y destroyed by i nterl aci ng three bangal ore
torpedoes i n the I -beam rafters (Fi gure A-10).
Figure A-10. Underground hospital.
A- 14
FM 90-8
(5) Thi s bunker desi gn requi res 10 to 12 pounds of expl osi ves to
destroy i t (Fi gure A-11).
A- 15
SIDE VIEW 3 TO 5 FEET OF EARTH
C !l LOGS - 12 TO 20 INCHES
rr fi 7? AROUND
. _____F: ;; EARTH MOUND
___ ___
BUNKER
TOP VIEW


FM 90- 8
APPENDIX B
The Urban Guerrilla
Section I. General
B-1. Effects of the urban environment.
a. Ci ti es and towns are vul nerabl e to urban guerri l l a vi ol ence
because they are the focus of economi c and pol i ti cal power. I n
many cases, publ i c uti l i ti es and servi ces can be di srupted. Thus,
the government may appear to have l ost control of the si tuati on.
The concentrati on of a l arge number of peopl e i n a rel ati vel y smal l
area provi des cover for the guerri l l a. However, the i nsurgent may
fi nd support onl y i n certai n areas of a town or ci ty. I n any event,
the urban guerri l l a l i ves i n a communi ty that i s fri endl y to hi m or,
as a mi ni mum, i s too fri ghtened to wi thhol d i ts support or i nform
on hi m. He has a cl ose rel ati onshi p wi th l eaders and other
guerri l l as, and may have a communi cati on system usi ng women
and chi l dren who al so provi de cover for other acti vi ti es.
b.
c. The urban guerri l l a can operate more bol dl y than hi s rural
counterpart as refl ected by hi s tacti cs: the sni per compl ements the
more conventi onal ambush and often repl aces i t; expl osi ve
devi ces may be used ei ther as i nstruments agai nst the communi ty
or more sel ecti vel y agai nst i ndi vi dual s or groups.
The avai l abi l i ty of l arge numbers of peopl e ensures that crowds
can be assembl ed and demonstr ati ons mani pul ated wi th
comparati ve ease. The presence of women and chi l dren restri cts
counterguerri l l a force reacti ons, and a cl umsy reacti on may
ensure a major i nci dent that provi des the guerri l l a wi th
propaganda. Publ i ci ty i s easi l y achi eved i n an urban area
because no major i nci dent can be conceal ed from the l ocal
popul ati on even i f i t i s not wi del y reported by the news medi a.
Terrori st successes may be expl oi ted to di scredi t the abi l i ty of the
pol i ce, counterguerri l l a force, and ci vi l government to provi de
protecti on and control the guerri l l as.
d.
e . The urban guerri l l a cannot, l i ke hi s rural counterpart, establ i sh
bases and recrui t l arge mi l i tary uni ts. He i s an i ndi vi dual , a
member of a rel ati vel y smal l group, rel yi ng on the cover afforded
by the peopl e of the ci ty and on terror to avoi d betrayal .
I ndi vi dual s and smal l groups are effecti ve i n an urban envi ronment
because i t i s easi er for them to avoi d capture; i f captured, however,
the terrori st may be abl e to expose onl y two or three persons to
government or counterguerri l l a forces.
B-1
FM 90- 8
B-2. Guerrilla tactics.
a. The urban guerri l l a works al one or i n smal l cel l s, and hi s tacti cs
are di fferent from those of hi s rural counterpart.
b. They i ncl ude:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Di srupti ng i ndustry and publ i c servi ces by stri kes and
sabotage.
Generati ng wi despread di sturbances desi gned to stretch the
resources of the counterguerri l l a force.
Creati ng i nci dents or massi ng crowds i n order to l ure the
counterguerri l l a force i nto a trap.
Provoki ng the counterguerri l l a force i n the hope that i t may
overreact and provi de hosti l e propaganda.
Fomenti ng i nterfacti onal stri fe.
Sni pi ng at roadbl ocks, outposts, and sentri es.
Attacki ng vehi cl es and bui l di ngs wi th rockets and mortars.
Pl anti ng expl osi ve devi ces, ei ther agai nst speci fi c targets or
i ndi scri mi natel y, to cause confusi on and destructi on, and to
l ower publ i c moral e.
Ambushi ng patrol s and fi ri ng on hel i copters.
Section Il. Techniques to Counter the Urban Guerrilla
B-3. Urban counterguerrilla operations.
a. Operati ons agai nst urban guerri l l as may vary from a passi ve
pol i cy desi gned to curtai l terrori st acti vi ti es so that communi ty
l i fe can conti nue (under certai n constrai nts), to an acti ve pol i cy
whi ch i nvol ves the counterguerri l l a force seeki ng out and
capturi ng or ki l l i ng the enemy. The l evel of i ntensi ty at whi ch
operati ons are conducted wi l l be determi ned by the ci vi l govern-
ment.
Fi ghti ng the urban guerri l l a i s general l y a pol i ce mi ssi on.
However, the mi l i tary counterguerri l l a force commander maybe
requi red to assi st the pol i ce i n thi s mi ssi on or even take i t over.
The techni ques used are si mi l ar to the ones used i n rural areas.
Before operati ons are conducted, i nformati on must be obtai ned
about the enemy, hi s envi ronment, and operati ons (Appendi x H).
The techni ques i ncl ude:
(1) I nstal l ati on of base defense (Appendi x E).
(2) Roadbl ocks and checkpoi nts (Chapter 3).
b.
B-2
FM 90- 8
(3) Crowd di spersal (FM 19-15).
(4) Cordon-and-search operati ons (Chapter 3).
(5) Patrol s (Chapter 3 and Appendi x D).
B-4. Minimum force.
The pri nci pl es remai n the same, but i n an urban envi ronment the
pri nci pl e of mi ni mum force becomes more i mportant and i s di rectl y
rel ated to the rul es of engagement. There i s greater danger of i njuri ng
or ki l l i ng i nnocent ci vi l i ans i n heavi l y popul ated centem. Si nce there
are sel dom l arge groups of guerri l l as i n ci ti es, there are no base camps,
onl y safe houses. Opportuni ti es for del i berate attacks rarel y occur. Just
as fi ghti ng guerri l l as i n a rural envi ronment, ki l l i ng or capturi ng the
urban guerri l l a i s not a mi ssi on that i s qui ckl y accompl i shed.
B-3
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX C
Ambush Patrols
Section 1. General
C-1. Purpose of ambushes.
The ambush patrol s di scussed i n thi s appendi x are combat patrol s
wi th mi ssi ons to establ i sh and execute ambushes to harass or destroy
targets and/or capture personnel and equi pment. Ambushes general l y
are executed to reduce the guerri l l as overal l combat effecti veness.
Destructi on i s the pri mary purpose of an ambush si nce guerri l l as ki l l ed
and/or captured, and equi pment and/or suppl i es destroyed or
captured, cri ti cal l y affect the guerri l l a force. Harassment, the
secondary purpose, di verts guerri l l as from other mi ssi ons. A seri es of
successful ambushes causes the guerri l l a force to be l ess aggressi ve
and more defensi ve; to be apprehensi ve and overl y cauti ous; and to be
rel uctant to go on patrol s and move i n convoys or i n smal l groups.
C-2. Types of ambushes.
a. There are two types of ambushes. A poi nt ambush i nvol ves patrol
el ements depl oyed to support the attack of a si ngl e ki l l i ng zone.
An area ambush i nvol ves patrol el ements depl oyed as mul ti pl e,
rel ated, poi nt ambushes.
b. An ambush i s categori zed as ei ther hasty or del i berate. A hasty
ambush i s an i mmedi ate acti on dri l l , an acti on of a combat patrol
wi l th l i ttl e or no i nformati on. When i nformati on does not permi t
detai l ed pl anni ng requi red for a del i berate ambush, a hasty
ambush i s pl anned. I n thi s case, the ambush patrol pl ans and
prepares to attack the fi rst sui tabl e guerri l l a force. A del i berate
ambush i s pl anned as a speci fi c acti on agai nst a speci fi c target.
Detai l ed i nformati on of the guerri l l a force i s requi red: si ze, nature,
organi zati on, armament, equi pment, route and di recti on of
movement, and ti mes the force wi l l reach or pass certai n poi nts on
i ts route. Del i berate ambushes are pl anned when:
(1) Rel i abl e i nformati on i s recei ved on the i ntended movement
of a speci fi c force.
(2) Patrol s, convoys, carryi ng parti es, or si mi l ar forces establ i sh
patterns of si ze, ti me, and movement suffi ci ent to permi t
detai l ed pl anni ng for the ambush.
c. A uni t conducti ng a combat patrol , before departi ng, pl ans and
rehearses the ambush of the type of guerri l l a force i t may
C-1
FM 90- 8
encounter. I t establ i shes and executes ambushes as opportuni ti es
ar i se.
Section Il. Attack Fundamentals
C-3. Three elements.
Surpri se, coordi nated fi res, and control are basi c to a successful
ambush.
C-4. Surprise.
Surpri se must be achi eved or el se the attack i s not an ambush. Surpri se,
whi ch di sti ngui shes an ambush from other forms of attack, al l ows the
ambush force to sei ze and retai n control of the si tuati on. Surpri se i s
achi eved by careful pl anni ng, preparati on, and executi on. Guerri l l as
are attacked i n a manner they l east expect.
C-5. Coordinated fires.
Al l weapons, i ncl udi ng mi nes and demol i ti ons, are posi ti oned, and al l
di rect and i ndi rect fi res are coordi nated to achi eve:
a. I sol ati on of the ki l l zone to prevent escape or rei nforcement.
Surpri se del i very of a l arge vol ume of concentrated fi res i nto the
ki l l zone to i nfl i ct maxi mum damage so the target can be
assaul ted and destroyed.
b.
C-6. Control.
a. Cl ose control i s mai ntai ned duri ng movement to, occupati on of,
and wi thdrawal from the ambush si te.
The ambush commanders control of al l el ements i s cri ti cal at the
ti me of target approach. Control measures provi de for
b.
(1) Earl y warni ng of target approach.
(2) Wi thhol di ng fi re unti l the target moves i nto the ki l l zone.
(3) Openi ng fi re at the proper ti me.
(4) I ni ti ati ng appropri ate acti ons i f the ambush i s prematurel y
detected.
(5) Li fti ng or shi fti ng supporti ng fi res when the ambush
i ncl udes assaul t of the target.
(6) Ti mel y and orderl y wi thdrawal to an easi l y recogni zed
ral l yi ng poi nt.
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FM 90- 8
c. Personnel conducti ng the ambush remai n sti l l and qui et whi l e
wai ti ng for the target to appear. They may have to forgo smoki ng;
endure i nsect bi tes and thi rst i n si l ence; and resi st sl eepi ng,
easi ng cramped muscl es, and performi ng normal body functi ons.
(Ambushes shoul d have a rest pl an and a mess pl an.) When the
target approaches, they do not open fi re before the si gnal i s gi ven.
Section Ill. Planning
C-7. Flexibility.
a. An ambush i s pl anned and prepared usi ng troop l eadi ng
procedures. Pl anni ng consi derati ons i ncl ude whether the ambush
i s to be a del i berate ambush or a hasty ambush. I n a del i berate
ambush, more target i ntel l i gence i s avai l abl e to permi t pl anni ng
for every course of acti on at the target. Pl anni ng for a hasty
ambush i ncl udes tentati ve pl ans both for the types of targets that
may be ambushed and for varyi ng si tuati ons. Both pl ans are
fl exi bl e enough to al l ow modi fyi ng, as appropri ate, at the ambush
si te. Al l pl ans are rehearsed i n detai l .
b. Pl anni ng provi des for the fol l owi ng:
(1) Simplicity. Every sol di er must thoroughl y understand
what he i s to do at every stage of the operati on. I n an
ambush, more so than i n other operati ons, the fai l ure of even
one sol di er to perform exactl y as pl anned can cause fai l ure.
(2) Type of ambush. The type of ambush affects the organi za-
ti on, number of men, and amount of equi pment and
communi cati ons requi red.
(3) Deployment. Each possi bl e formati on i s consi dered for i ts
advantages and di sadvantages.
C-8. Manner of attack.
The attack may be by fi re onl y (harassi ng ambush) or may i ncl ude
assaul t of the target (destructi on ambush).
C-9. Size of ambush force.
The force i s tai l ored for i ts mi ssi on. Two men may be adequate for a
harassi ng ambush. A destructi on ambush may requi re the enti re uni t
(squad, pl atoon, company).
a. Organization. An ambush patrol i s organi zed i n the same
manner as other combat patrol s to i ncl ude a headquarters, an
assaul t el ement, a support el ement, and a securi ty el ement. The
assaul t and support el ements are the attack force; the securi ty
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FM 90- 8
el ement i s the securi ty force. When appropri ate, the attack force i s
further organi zed to provi de a reserve force. When an ambush si te
i s to be occupi ed for an extended peri od, doubl e ambush forces
may be organi zed. One ambush force occupi es the si te whi l e the
other rests, eats, and tends to personal needs at the objecti ve
rai l yi ng poi nt or other conceal ed l ocati on. They al ternate after a
gi ven ti me, whi ch i s usual l y 8 hours. I f the wai ti ng peri od i s over
24 hours, three ambush forces maybe organi zed.
Equipment. The sel ecti on of equi pment and suppl i es i s based on
the:
(1) Mi ssi on.
b.
(2) Si ze of the guerri l l a force.
(3) Means of transportati on.
(4) Di stance and terrai n.
(5) Wei ght and bul k of equi pment.
d.
c. Routes. A pri mary route i s pl anned whi ch al l ows the uni t to
enter the ambush si te from the rear. The ki l l zone i s not entered i f
entry can be avoi ded. I f the ki l l zone must be entered to pl ace
mi nes or expl osi ves, care i s taken to remove any tracks or si gns
that mi ght al ert the guerri l l as and compromi se the ambush. I f
mi nes, mantraps, or expl osi ves are to be pl aced on the far si de, or
i f the appearance of the si te mi ght cause the guerri l l as to check i t,
then a wi de detour around the ki l l zone i s made. Here, too, care i s
taken to remove any traces whi ch mi ght reveal the ambush. Al so,
an al ternate route from the ambush si te i s pl anned.
Site. Maps and aeri al photographs are used to anal yze the
terrai n. When possi bl e, anon-the-ground reconnai ssance i s made.
As far as possi bl e, so-cal l ed i deal ambush si tes are avoi ded.
Al ert guerri l l as are suspi ci ous of these areas, avoi d them i f
possi bl e, and i ncrease vi gi l ance and securi ty when they must be
entered; surpri se i s even more di ffi cul t to achi eve i n these areas.
I nstead, apparentl y unl i kel y si tes are chosen, when possi bl e.
Consi deri ng thi s, an ambush si te must provi de:
(1) Fi el ds of fi re.
(2) Conceal ed posi ti ons.
(3) Canal i zati on of the guerri l l as i nto the ki l l i ng zone.
(4) Covered routes of wi thdrawal (to enabl e the ambush force to
break contact and avoi d pursui t).
(5) No exi t route for the guerri l l a force.
e. Occupation of the site. As a rul e, the ambush force occupi es the
ambush si te at the l atest possi bl e ti me permi tted by the tacti cal
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FM 90- 8
f.
g.
h.
si tuati on and the amount of si te preparati on requi red. Thi s not
onl y reduces the ri sk of di scovery but al so reduces the ti me that
sol di ers must remai n sti l l and qui et i n posi ti on.
Positions. The uni t moves i nto the ambush si te from the rear.
Securi ty el ements are posi ti oned fi rst to prevent surpri se whi l e the
ambush i s bei ng establ i shed. Automati c weapons are then
posi ti oned so that each can fi re al ong the enti re ki l l i ng zone. I f
thi s i s not possi bl e, they are gi ven overl appi ng sectors of fi re so
that the enti re ki l l i ng zone i s covered. The uni t l eader then sel ects
hi s posi ti on, l ocated where he can see when to i ni ti ate the ambush.
Cl aymore mi nes, expl osi ves, and M203 grenade l aunchers maybe
used to cover any dead space l eft by the automati c weapons. Al l
weapons are assi gned sectors of fi re to provi de mutual support.
The uni t l eader sets a ti me by whi ch posi ti ons are to be prepared.
The degree of preparati on depends on the ti me al l owed. Al l men
work at top speed duri ng the al l otted ti me.
Camouflage. Camoufl age i s i mportant. Each sol di er must be
hi dden from the target. Duri ng preparati on for the patrol , each
sol di er camoufl ages hi msel f and hi s equi pment and secures hi s
equi pment to prevent noi se. At the ambush si te, posi ti ons are
prepared wi th mi ni mal change i n the natural appearance of the
si te. Al l debri s resul ti ng from preparati on of posi ti ons i s con-
ceal ed.
Movement, noise, and light discipline. Movement i s kept to a
mi ni mum and the number of men movi ng at a ti me i s cl osel y
control l ed. Every man i s as qui et as possi bl e, especi al l y at ni ght.
Li ght di sci pl i ne i s ri gi dl y enforced at ni ght. Smoki ng i s forbi dden
at ni ght and i s cl osel y control l ed i n the day.
C-10. Execution.
a.
b.
Three si gnal s, often four, are needed to execute the ambush.
Audi bl e and vi sual si gnal s, such as whi stl es and pyrotechni cs,
must be changed often to avoi d establ i shi ng patterns. Too
frequentl y, use of the same si gnal s may resul t i n thei r becomi ng
known to the enemy. A guerri l l a mi ght recogni ze a si gnal and be
abl e to react i n ti me to avoi d the ful l effects of an ambush. For
exampl e, i f whi te star cl uster i s habi tual l y used to si gnal
wi thdrawal i n a ni ght ambush, an al ert guerri l l a mi ght fi re one
and cause premature wi thdrawal .
A si gnal by the securi ty force to al ert the patrol l eader to the
guerri l l as approach may be gi ven by:
(1) Arm-and-hand si gnal s.
(2) Radi o, as a qui et voi ce message, by transmi tti ng a prearranged
number of taps, or by si gnal i ng wi th the push-to-tal k swi tch.
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FM 90- 8
(3) Fi el d tel ephone, when there i s no danger that wi re between
posi ti ons wi l l compromi se the ambush.
c. A si gnal to i ni ti ate the ambush, gi ven by the patrol l eader or a
desi gnated i ndi vi dual , may be a shot or the detonati on of mi nes or
expl osi ves. The ambush shoul d be i ni ti ated wi th a mass casual ty
produci ng weapon (Cl aymore anti personnel mi ne or M60
machi ne gun).
A si gnal for l i fti ng or shi fti ng fi res, i f the guerri l l a force i s to be
assaul ted, may be gi ven by voi ce command, whi stl es, or
pyrotechni cs. Al l fi re stops i mmedi atel y so that the assaul t can be
made before the guerri l l a can react.
d.
e. A si gnal for wi thdrawal may al so be by voi ce command, whi stl es,
or pyrotechni cs.
C-11. Fire discipline.
Thi s i s a key part of the ambush. Fi re i s wi thhel d unti l the si gnal i s
gi ven, then i mmedi atel y del i vered wi th the heavi est, most accurate
vol ume possi bl e. Properl y ti med and del i vered fi res contri bute to the
achi evement of surpri se as wel l as to destructi on of the guerri l l a force.
When the guerri l l as are to be assaul ted, the l i fti ng or shi fti ng of fi res i s
equal l y preci se. Otherwi se, the assaul t i s del ayed, and the guerri l l as
have an opportuni ty to recover and react.
C-12. Withdrawal to the objective rallying point.
a. The objecti ve ral l yi ng poi nt i s far enough from the ambush si te so
that i t wi l l not be overrun i f the guerri l l a force attacks the
ambush. Routes of wi thdrawal to the objecti ve ral l yi ng poi nt are
reconnoi tered. I f possi bl e, each person wal ks the route he i s to use
and pi cks out checkpoi nts. When the ambush i s to be executed at
ni ght, each person must be abl e to fol l ow hi s route i n the dark.
On si gnal , the uni t qui ckl y but qui etl y wi thdraws to the objecti ve
ral l yi ng poi nt, reorgani zes, and begi ns i ts return march.
b.
c. I f the ambush was not successful and the uni t i s pursued,
wi thdrawal may be by bounds. The l ast group may arm mi nes,
previ ousl y pl aced al ong the wi thdrawal route, to further del ay
pur sui t.
C-13. Four ambush techniques.
a. A near ambush i s a poi nt ambush wi th the assaul t el ement wi thi n
reasonabl e assaul ti ng di stance of the ki l l zone (l ess than 50
meters). Cl ose terrai n, such as jungl e and heavy woods, may
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FM 90-8
requi re thi s posi ti oni ng. I t may al so be appropri ate i n open terrai n
i n a ri se from the ground ambush.
A far ambush i s a poi nt ambush wi th the assaul t el ement beyond
reasonabl e assaul ti ng di stance of the ki l l zone (beyond 50 meters).
Thi s l ocati on may be appropri ate i n open terrai n offeri ng good
fi el ds of fi re or when attack i s by fi re for a harassi ng ambush.
b.
c. A harassing ambush i s an ambush i n whi ch attack i s by fi re
onl y.
d. A destruction ambush i s an ambush whi ch i ncl udes assaul t to
cl ose wi th and deci si vel y engage the guerri l l a force.
Section IV. Point Ambush Formations
C-14. Positions.
a. A poi nt ambush, whether i ndependent or part of an area ambush,
i s posi ti oned al ong the expected route of approach of the guerri l l a
force. Formati on i s i mportant because, to a great extent, i t
determi nes whether a poi nt ambush can del i ver the heavy vol ume
of hi ghl y concentrated fi re necessary to i sol ate, trap, and destroy
the guerri l l as.
b. The formati on to be used i s determi ned by careful l y consi deri ng
possi bl e formati ons and the advantages and di sadvantages of
each i n rel ati on to terrai n; condi ti ons of vi si bi l i ty, forces,
weapons, and equi pment ease or di ffi cul ty of control ; force to be
attacked; and overal l combat si tuati on.
c. Thi s secti on di scusses formati ons devel oped for the depl oyment of
poi nt ambushes. The formati ons are i denti fi ed wi th names that
correspond to the general pattern formed on the ground by
depl oyment of the attack el ement. They i ncl ude:
(1) Li ne formati on (two techni ques, Paragraph C-15).
(2) L-formati on (two techni ques wi th vari ati ons, Paragraph
C-16).
(3) Z-formati on (Paragraph C-17).
(4) T-formati on (two techni ques, Paragraph C-18).
(5) V-formati on (two techni ques, Paragraph C-19).
(6) Tri angl e formati on (cl osed; open wi th vari ati ons, Paragraph
C-20).
(7) Box formati on (two techni ques, Paragraph C-21).
C-15. Line formation.
a. The attack el ement i s depl oyed general l y paral l el to the guerri l l a
forces route of movement (road, trai l , stream). Thi s posi ti ons the
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FM 90- 8
attack el ement paral l el to the l ong axi s of the ki l l zone and
subjects the guerri l l a force to heavy fl anki ng fi re. The si ze of the
force that can be trapped i n the ki l l zone i s l i mi ted by the area
whi ch the attack el ement can effecti vel y cover wi th hi ghl y
concentrated fi re. The force i s trapped i n the ki l l zone by natural
obstacl es. mi nes (Cl aymore, anti vehi cul ar, anti personnel ),
demol i ti ons, and di rect and i ndi rect fires (Fi gure C-1).
Figure C-1. Line formation: harassing or destruction ambush.
A di sadvantage of the l i ne formati on i s the chance that l ateral
di spersi on of the force maybe too great for effecti ve coverage. The
l i ne formati on i s appropri ate i n cl ose terrai n that restri cts
guerri l l a maneuver and i n open terrai n where one fl ank i s
restri cted by mi nes, demol i ti ons, or mantraps. Si mi l ar obstacl es
can be pl aced between the attack el ement and the ki l l zone to
provi de protecti on from guerri l l a counterambush measures.
When a destructi on ambush i s depl oyed i n thi s manner, access
l anes are l eft so that the force i n the ki l l i ng zone can be assaul ted.
The l i ne formati on can be effecti vel y used by a ri se from the
ground ambush i n terrai n seemi ngl y unsui tabl e for ambush
(Fi gure C-2).
b.
C- 8
FM 90- 8
Figure C-2. Line formation: destruction ambush with access lanes for assault of target.
c. An advantage of the l i ne formati on i s i ts rel ati ve ease of control
under al l condi ti ons of vi si bi l i ty.
C-16. L-formation.
a. The L-shaped formati on i s a vari ati on of the l i ne formati on. The
l ong si de of the attack el ement i s paral l el to the ki l l zone and
del i vers fl anki ng fi re. The short si de of the attack el ement i s at the
end of, and at ri ght angl es to, the ki l l zone and del i vers enfi l adi ng
fi re that i nterl ocks wi th fi re from the other l eg (Fi gure C-3).
Fi gure C-3. L-formati on: destructi on ambush.
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FM 90- 8
b. Thi s formati on i s fl exi bl e. I t can be establ i shed on a strai ght
stretch of a trai l or stream or at a sharp bend i n a trai l or stream
(Fi gure C-4).
Figure C-4. L-formation: destruction ambush at bend of trail or stream.
c. When appropri ate, fi re from the short l eg can be shi fted to paral l el
the l ong l eg i f the guerri l l a force attempts to assaul t or escape i n
the opposi te di recti on. I n addi ti on, the short l eg prevents escape
i n that di recti on or rei nforcement from that di recti on (Fi gure C-5).
Figure C-5, L-formation: short leg prevents escape or reinforcement.
C-17. Z-formation.
The Z-shaped formati on i s another vari ati on of the L-formati on. The
attack force i s depl oyed as i n the L-formati on but wi th an addi ti onal
si de so that the formati on resembl es the l etter Z. The addi ti onal si de
may serve to (Fi gure C-6):
Engage a force attempti ng to rel i eve or rei nforce the guerri l l as.
Restri ct a fl ank.
Prevent envel opment (of the ambush force).
Seal the end of the ki l l zone.
C- 10
FM 90- 8
Figure C-6. Z-formation: destruction ambush.
C-18. T-formation.
a.
b.
c.
I n the T-shaped formati on, the attack el ement i s depl oyed across,
and at ri ght angl es to, the route of movement of the hosti l e force so
that the attack el ement and the target form the l etter T. Thi s
formati on can be used day or ni ght to establ i sh a purel y harassi ng
ambush, and at ni ght to establ i sh an ambush to i nterdi ct
movement through open, hard-to-seal areas (such as ri ce paddi es).
A smal l uni t can use the T-formati on to harass, sl ow, and
di sorgani ze a l arger force. When the l ead guerri l l a el ements are
engaged, they wi l l normal l y attempt to maneuver ri ght or l eft to
cl ose wi th the ambush force. Mi nes, mantraps, and other
obstacl es pl aced to the fl anks of the ki l l zone sl ow the guerri l l as
movement and permi t the uni t to del i ver heavy fi re and then
wi thdraw wi thout becomi ng deci si vel y engaged. (Fi gure C-7).
The T-formati on can be used to i nterdi ct smal l groups attempti ng
ni ght movement across open areas. For exampl e, the attack
el ement may be depl oyed al ong a ri ce paddy di ke wi th every
second member faci ng i n the opposi te di recti on. The attack of a
force approachi ng from ei ther di recti on requi res onl y that every
second member shi ft to the opposi te si de of the di ke. Each member
fi res onl y to hi s front and onl y when the target i s at cl ose range.
Attack i s by fi re onl y, and each member keeps the guerri l l a force
under fi re as l ong as i t remai ns to hi s front. I f the force attempts to
escape i n ei ther di recti on al ong the di ke, each member takes i t
under fi re as i t comes i nto hi s vi ci ni ty. The T-formati on i s effecti ve
at hal ti ng i nfi l trati on. (Fi gure C-8).
C-11
FM 90- 8
Figure C-7. T-formation: harassing ambush.
d. I t has one chi ef di sadvantage: there i s a possi bi l i ty that whi l e
spread out the ambush wi l l engage a superi or force. Use of thi s
formati on must, therefore, fi t the l ocal enemy si tuati on.
Figure C-8. T-formation: rice paddy harassing ambush where guerrilla approach
may be from either direction.
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FM 90- 8
C-19. V-formation.
a. The V-shaped attack el ement i s depl oyed al ong both si des of the
guerri l l a route of movement so that i t forms a V. Care i s taken to
ensure that nei ther group (or l eg) fi res i nto the other. Thi s
for mati on subjects the guer r i l l a to both enfi l adi ng and
-.
i nterl ocki ng fi re (Fi gure C-9).
Figure C-9. V-formation.
b. The V-formati on i s sui ted for fai rl y open terrai n but can al so be
used i n the jungl e. When establ i shed i n the jungl e, the l egs of the
V cl ose i n as the l ead el ements of the guerri l l a force approach the
apex of the V; el ements then open fi re from cl ose range. Here, even
more than i n open terrai n, al l movement and fi re i s careful l y
coordi nated and control l ed to ensure that the fi re of one l eg does
not endanger the other. Wi der separati on of the el ements makes
thi s formati on di ffi cul t to control , and there are fewer si tes that
favor i ts use. I ts mai n advantage i s that i t i s di ffi cul t for the
guerri l l a to detect the ambush unti l wel l i nto the ki l l zone (Fi gure
C-10).
Figure C-10. V-formation (close range).
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FM 90- 8
C-20. Triangle formation.
Thi s i s a vari ati on of the V-formati on and can be empl oyed i n three
ways:
a. Closed triangle. The attack el ement i s depl oyed i n three
groups, posi ti oned so that they form a tri angl e (or cl osed V). An
automati c weapon i s pl aced at each poi nt of the tri angl e and
posi ti oned so that i t can be shi fted qui ckl y to i nterl ock wi th ei ther
of the others. El ements are posi ti oned so that thei r fi el ds of fi re
overl ap. Mortars may be posi ti oned i nsi de the tri angl e. When
depl oyed i n thi s manner, the tri angl e ambush becomes a smal l
uni t strongpoi nt whi ch i s used to i nterdi ct ni ght movement
through open areas, when guerri l l a approach i s l i kel y to be from
any di recti on. The formati on provi des al l -round securi ty, and
securi ty el ements are depl oyed onl y when they can be posi ti oned
so that, i f detected by an approachi ng target, they wi l l not
compromi se the ambush. Attack i s by fi re onl y, and the target i s
al l owed to approach wi thi n cl ose range before the ambush force
opens fi re (Fi gure C-11).
(1)
(2)
Figure C-11. Closed triangle.
Advantages i ncl ude ease of control , al l -round securi ty, and
guerri l l as approachi ng from any di recti on can be fi red on by
at l east two automati c weapons.
Di sadvantages i ncl ude the requi rement for an ambush force
of pl atoon si ze or l arger to reduce the danger of bei ng overrun
by a l arge guerri l l a force; one or more l egs of the tri angl e may
come under guerri l l a enfi l ade fi re; and l ack of di spersi on,
parti cul arl y at the poi nts, i ncreases danger from guerri l l a
mortar fi re.
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FM 90- 8
b. Open triangle (harassing ambush). Thi s vari ati on of the
tri angl e ambush i s desi gned to enabl e a smal l uni t to harass, sl ow,
and i nfl i ct heavy casual ti es upon a l arger force wi thout bei ng
deci si vel y engaged. The attack group i s depl oyed i n three
el ements, posi ti oned so that each el ement becomes a corner of a
tri angl e contai ni ng the ki l l zone. When the guerri l l as enter the ki l l
zone, the el ement to the guerri l l as front opens fi re on the l ead
guerri l l as. When the guerri l l as counterattack, the el ement
wi thdraws and an assaul t el ement to the fl ank opens fi re. When
thi s group i s attacked, the el ement to the opposi te fl ank opens fi re.
Thi s process i s repeated unti l the guerri l l as are pul l ed apart. Each
el ement reoccupi es i ts posi ti on, i f possi bl e, and conti nues to
i nfl i ct maxi mum damage wi thout becomi ng deci si vel y engaged
(Fi gure C-12).
Figure C-12. Open triangle formation: harassing ambush.
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FM 90- 8
c. Open triangle (destruction ambush). The attack group i s
agai n depl oyed i n three el ements, posi ti oned so that each el ement
i s a poi nt of the tri angl e, 200 to 300 meters apart. The ki l l zone i s
the area wi thi n the tri angl e. The guerri l l as are al l owed to enter
the ki l l i ng zone; the nearest el ement attacks by fi re. As the
guerri l l as attempt to maneuver or wi thdraw, the other el ements
open fi re. One or more assaul t el ements, as di rected, assaul t or
maneuver to envel op or destroy the guerri l l as (Fi gure C-13).
Figure C-13. Open triangle formation: destruction ambush.
(1) As a destructi on ambush, thi s formati on i s sui tabl e for
pl atoon-si ze or l arger uni ts; a uni t smal l er than a pl atoon
woul d be i n danger of bei ng overrun.
C-16
FM 90- 8
(2)
C-21.
Al so, control , i n assaul ti ng or maneuveri ng, i s di ffi cul t.
Cl ose coordi nati on and control are necessary to ensure that
assaul ti ng or maneuveri ng assaul t el ements are not fi red on
by another party; and the ambush si te must be a fai rl y l evel ,
open area that provi des (around i ts border) conceal ment for
the ambush el ements (unl ess i t i s a ri se from the ground
ambush).
Box formation.
a. Thi s formati on i s si mi l ar i n purpose to the open tri angl e ambush.
The uni t i s depl oyed i n four el ements posi ti oned so that each
el ement becomes a corner of a square or rectangl e contai ni ng the
ki l l zone (Fi gure C-14).
Figure C-14. Box formation: harassing ambush.
b. I t can be used as a harassi ng ambush or a destructi on ambush i n
the same manner as the two vari ati ons of the open tri angl e
ambush (Fi gure C-15).
C-17
FM 90- 8
Figure C-15. Box formation: destruction ambush.
Section V. Area Ambush Formations
C-22. Kill zone.
A poi nt ambush i s establ i shed at a si te havi ng several trai l s or other
escape routes l eadi ng away from i t. The si te may be a water hol e,
guerri l l a campsi te, or known rendezvous poi nt, or a frequentl y travel ed
trai l . Thi s si te i s the central ki l l zone.
C-23. Area ambush: multiple point
a. Poi nt ambushes are establ i shed al ong the trai l s or other escape
routes l eadi ng away from the central ki l l zone (Fi gure C-16).
C-18
FM 90- 8
Figure C-16. Area (multiple point) ambush.
b. The guerri l l a force, whether a si ngl e group or several parti es
approachi ng from di fferent di recti ons, i s permi tted to move to the
central ki l l zone. Outl yi ng ambushes do not attack (unl ess di s-
cover ed).
c. The ambush i s i ni ti ated when the guerri l l as move i nto the central
ki l l zone.
d. When the guerri l l as break contact and attempt to di sperse,
escapi ng porti ons are i ntercepted and destroyed by the outl yi ng
ambushes.
e. The mul ti pl e poi nt ambush i ncreases casual ti es and harassment
and produces confusi on.
f. Thi s versi on of the area ambush i s best sui ted i n terrai n where
movement i s l argel y restri cted to trai l s. I t provi des best resul ts
when establ i shed as a del i berate ambush. When there i s not
suffi ci ent i ntel l i gence for a del i berate ambush, an area ambush of
opportuni ty (hasty ambush) may be establ i shed. The outl yi ng
ambushes are permi tted to attack guerri l l as approachi ng the
central ki l l zone, i f the guerri l l a force i s smal l . I f i t i s too l arge for
the parti cul ar outl yi ng ambush, the guerri l l as are al l owed to
conti nue and they are attacked i n the central ki l l zone.
C- 19
FM 90- 8
C-24. Area ambush: baited trap
a. A vari ati on of the area ambush i s the bai ted trap ambush.
b. A central ki l l zone i s establ i shed al ong the guerri l l as route of
approach.
c. Poi nt ambushes are establ i shed al ong the routes over whi ch uni ts
rel i evi ng or rei nforci ng the guerri l l a wi l l have to approach.
d. The guerri l l a force i n the central ki l l zone serves as bai t to l ure
rel i evi ng or rei nforci ng guerri l l a uni ts i nto the ki l l zones of the
outl yi ng ambushes. A fri endl y force can al so be used as the bai t.
e. The outl yi ng poi nt ambushes need not be strong enough to
destroy thei r targets. They may be smal l harassi ng ambushes
that del ay, di sorgani ze, and cause casual ti es by successi ve
contacts.
f. Thi s versi on can be vari ed by usi ng a fi xed i nstal l ati on as bai t
to l ure rel i evi ng or rei nforci ng guerri l l a uni ts i nto the ki l l zone of
one or more of the outl yi ng ambushes. The i nstal l ati on repl aces
the central ki l l zone and i s attacked. The attack may i ntend to
overcome the i nstal l ati on or may use i t as a ruse.
g.
These vari ati ons are best sui ted for si tuati ons where routes of
approach for rel i evi ng or rei nforci ng guerri l l a uni ts are l i mi ted to
those favorabl e for ambush (Fi gure C-17).
Figure C-17. Area (baited trap) ambush
C- 20
FM 90- 8
Section VI. Unusual Ambush Techniques
C-25. Spider hole ambush.
a. Thi s poi nt ambush i s desi gned for open areas that l ack the cover
and conceal ment and other features normal l y desi rabl e i n a
good ambush si te. The attack el ement i s depl oyed i n the
formati on best sui ted to the overal l si tuati on (Fi gure C-18).
b.
c.
d.
e.
Figure C-18. Spider hole ambush.
The attack el ement i s conceal ed i n the spi der hol e type of
covered foxhol e. Soi l i s careful l y removed and posi ti ons expertl y
camoufl aged.
When the ambush i s i ni ti ated, the attack el ement members throw
back the covers and l i teral l y ri se from the ground to attack.
Thi s ambush takes advantage of the tendency of patrol s, and
other uni ts, to rel ax i n areas that do not appear to favor ambush.
The chi ef di sadvantage i s that the ambush el ement i s vul nerabl e
i f detected prematurel y.
C- 21
160-739 O - 94 - 6
FM 90- 8
C-26. Demolition ambush.
a. Dual pri med, el ectri cal l y detonated mi nes or demol i ti on charges
are pl anted i n an area over whi ch a guerri l l a force i s expected to
pass. Thi s may be a porti on of a road or trai l , an open fi el d, or any
area that can be observed from a di stance. Acti vati ng wi res are
run to a conceal ed observati on poi nt suffi ci entl y di stant to ensure
safety of the ambush el ement.
b. As l arge a force as desi red or necessary can be used to mi ne the
area. The ambush el ement remai ns to fi re the charges; other
personnel return to the uni t.
c. When a guerri l l a force enters the mi ned area (ki l l zone), the
el ement on si te detonates the expl osi ves and wi thdraws i mmedi atel y
to avoi d detecti on and pursui t (Fi gure C-19).
Figure C-19. Demolition ambush.
C-27. Special ambush situation.
Attacks agai nst col umns protected by armored vehi cl es depend on the
type and l ocati on of armored vehi cl es i n a col umn, and the weapons of
the ambush force. I f possi bl e, armored vehi cl es are destroyed or
di sabl ed by fi re of anti tank weapons, l andmi nes, and Mol otov
cocktai l s, or by throwi ng hand grenades i nto open hatches. An effort i s
made to i mmobi l i ze armored vehi cl es at a poi nt where they are unabl e
to gi ve protecti on to the rest of the convoy and where they wi l l bl ock the
route of other supporti ng vehi cl es.
C- 22
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX D
Patrol l i ng
Section I. General
D-1. Patrols.
a. Thi s appendi x provi des gui dance on patrol l i ng. I t descri bes
vari ous types of patrol s and patrol l i ng techni ques.
b. A patrol i s a mi ssi on. The uni t that has the mi ssi on organi zes for
the conduct of the patrol . When organi zi ng for the patrol , uni t
i ntegri ty i s mai ntai ned as much as possi bl e.
c. The requi rements of the mi ssi on determi ne the si ze, organi zati on,
and equi pment of a patrol . Some mi ssi ons may requi re onl y two or
three men, l i ghtl y armed wi th no speci al equi pment; some
mi ssi ons may requi re a squad or pl atoon, speci al l y armed and
equi pped. A uni t i s al ways tai l ored for the mi ssi on i t i s to execute.
d. The effecti veness of a patrol i s l i mi ted onl y by the i ngenui ty of the
pl anner and the ski l l and aggressi veness of the uni t l eader. For
thi s reason, they are one of the commanders most val ued tool s.
Patrol s are especi al l y val uabl e i n counterguerri l l a operati ons.
Aggressi ve patrol l i ng i n an area greatl y reduces the guerri l l as
freedom of movement, hampers thei r operati ons, and weakens
thei r i nfl uence on the l ocal popul ati on.
e. Patrol s are cl assi fi ed accordi ng to the nature of the mi ssi on
assi gned.
D-2. Reconnaissance patrols.
They col l ect i nformati on and confi rm or di sprove the accuracy of
i nformati on previ ousl y recei ved. Reconnai ssance patrol s are further
cl assi fi ed as:
Zone reconnai ssance patrol s.
Area reconnai ssance patrol s.
D-3. Combat patrols.
They provi de securi ty and harass, destroy, or capture enemy
personnel , equi pment, and i nstal l ati ons. Combat patrol s al so col l ect
and report i nformati on whether i t i s rel ated to the assi gned mi ssi on or
not.
D-1
FM 90- 8
Section Il. Planning
D-4. Five phases.
There are fi ve phases i nvol ved i n mi ssi on pl anni ng: patrol steps,
reverse pl anni ng sequence, the warni ng order, the ti me schedul e, and
the operati on order. The patrol l eader uses patrol steps (deri ved from
troop l eadi ng procedures as di scussed i n FM 7-10) i n pl anni ng the
mi ssi on. The l eader consi ders al l steps but executes onl y those requi red
by the mi ssi on. The steps may occur i n vari ous sequences, and some are
consi dered and accompl i shed si mul taneousl y.
D-5. Patrol steps.
(Consi der al l steps; accompl i sh those necessary; sequence may vary.)

Study the mi ssi on.

Pl an use of ti me.
Study terrai n and si tuati on.
Organi ze the patrol .
Sel ect men, weapons, equi pment.
I ssue warni ng order.
Coordi nate (conti nuous throughout).
Make reconnai ssance.
Compl ete detai l ed pl ans.
I ssue operati on order.
Supervi se (at al l ti mes), i nspect, rehearse.
Execute the mi ssi on.
D-6. Reverse planning
The uni t l eader uses reverse pl anni ng sequence to al l ot ti me for each
acti on of the patrol . He pl ans thi s schedul e around any cri ti cal ti mes
speci fi ed i n hi s order.
D- 2
FM 90- 8
D-7. Warning order.
There are two orders that the uni t l eader i ssues: the warni ng order and
the operati on order. The warni ng order i s i ssued as soon as a tentati ve
pl an i s made so that the men may have maxi mum ti me to prepare for
the patrol .
D-3
0300-
0200-0300
2330-0200
2300-2330
2230-2300
2000-2230
2000-
1945-2000
1930-1945
1845-1930
1800-1845
1745-1800
1700-1745
1630-1700
1530-1630
1430-1530
1415-1430
1330-1415
-1330
REVERSE PLANNING SEQUENCE
Debrief.
Return to friendly area.
Movement en route.
Accomplish mission, reorganize.
Leaders' reconnaissance.
Movement en route.
Depart friendly area.
Movement to departure area.
Final inspection.
Night rehearsals.
Day rehearsals.
Inspection.
Supper meal.
Issue operation order.
Complete detailed plans.
Reconnoiter.
Issue warning order.
Preliminary planning.
Select men, weapons, equipment.
Organize the patrol.
Study terrain and situation.
Plan use of time.
Study the mission.
Operation order received.
FM 90- 8
D-8. Time schedule.
When the warni ng order i s i ssued, a ti me schedul e i s gi ven for al l
acti vi ti es that must take pl ace.
D- 4
FM 90-8
D-9. Operation order.
The second order that the uni t l eader gi ves i s the operati on order. Thi s
i s i ssued i n a standard (fi ve-paragraph) fi el d order format. The
si tuati on determi nes whether the order i s wri tten i n detai l or prepared
i n note form. The operati on order, as wel l as the warni ng order, maybe
shortened by reference to uni t SOPs. I n addi ti on, i tems unchanged
from the warni ng order are covered by stati ng "same as warni ng
or der ."
D- 5
FM 90-8
D- 6
(5) Activity.
(6) Strength.
b. Friendly forces.
(1) Mission of next higher unit.
(2) Location and planned actions of units on left, right, front,
and rear.
(3) Mission and route of adjacent patrols.
(4) Fire support available.
c. Attachments and detachments.
2. MISSION
A clear, concise statement of the ta"sk that must be accom-
plished. It ansvvers the questions V'JHO, V'JHAT, \ l V H E ~ ~ , \lVHY,
and WHERE. In stating the WHERE, terrain features or grid
coordinates must be used. Since the mission statement is
mtended to stand alone without reference to any document
(other than a map), using terrain features, such as a hill or a road
junction, followed by a grid coordinate, is the correct procedure.
(Paragraph 2 never has subparagraphs.)
3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of operation.
(i) Scheme of maneuver.
(2) Fire support.
b. Subunit missions.
(1) Squads and/or teams.
(2) Special teams or key individuals.
c. Coordinating instructions.
(1) Time of departure and return.
(2) Formations and order of movement (include sketch).
(3) Route (include fire support and suppression targets).
(4) Alternate routes.
(5) Passage of friendly positions (include sketch).
(a) Passage out.
(b) Reentry.
(6) Rallying points.
(7) Actions at rallying points.
(8) Actions on enemy contact.
(9) Actions at danger areas (include sketch).
(iOi Actions at objective area (inciude sketch;.
FM 90- 8
Section Ill. Reconnaissance Patrols
D-10. Information requirements.
a. Reconnai ssance patrol s provi de the commander wi th ti mel y,
accurate i nformati on of guerri l l as and the terrai n they control .
Thi s i nformati on i s vi tal i n maki ng tacti cal deci si ons.
b. The commander may requi re i nformati on of a speci fi c l ocati on or
smal l speci fi c area, usual l y a known or suspected posi ti on or
acti vi ty. An area reconnai ssance patrol secures thi s i nformati on
by reconnoi teri ng the l ocati on or by mai ntai ni ng survei l l ance
over the l ocati on.
c. The commander may requi re i nformati on of an extended area, or
may desi re i nformati on of several l ocati ons wi thi n an area. A
zone reconnai ssance patrol secures thi s i nformati on by recon-
noi teri ng the area, by mai ntai ni ng survei l l ance over the area, or
D- 7
FM 90- 8
by maki ng the coordi nated area reconnai ssance of desi gnated
l ocati ons wi thi n the area.
D-11. Security.
a. I n addi ti on to reachi ng the objecti ve wi thout di scovery, i f
possi bl e, a reconnai ssance patrol al so tri es to conduct i ts
reconnai ssance or survei l l ance wi thout bei ng di scovered. Steal th,
pati ence, and maxi mum use of conceal ment are mandatory.
b. A reconnai ssance patrol fi ghts onl y to protect i tsel f or, when
authori zed, to accompl i sh i ts mi ssi on. The commander di spatchi ng
the patrol i s responsi bl e for i nformi ng tha patrol whether i t i s to
fi ght, i f necessary, to accompl i sh the mi ssi on.
c. Day and ni ght reconnai ssance patrol s use essenti al l y the same
techni ques. The pri nci pal di fferences are:
(1) Day reconnai ssance requi res greater use of conceal ment.
The patrol i s more l i kel y to be seen than at ni ght and usual l y
wi l l not be abl e to move as cl ose to the objecti ve.
(2) Ni ght reconnai ssance requi res steal th. Sounds carry farther
at ni ght, and reduced vi si bi l i ty usual l y requi res a cl oser
approach to the objecti ve.
d. When two or more teams of a patrol are to assembl y at a l i nkup
poi nt, one team i s desi gnated to secure the l i nkup poi nt for the
arri val of other teams. The route and tasks of thi s team are
arranged so that i t can reach the l i nkup poi nt fi rst and
accompl i sh these tasks.
Section IV. Combat Patrols
D-12. Seek and attack.
a. A combat patrol has the general mi ssi on of seeki ng out and
attacki ng targets of opportuni ty. An ambush i s a combat patrol
(Appendi x C).
b. I n conventi onal operati ons, the enemys general l ocati on i s
usual l y defi ned. Speci fi c targets for patrol s are not di ffi cul t to
l ocate and desi gnate. Mi ssi ons for patrol s can be, and usual l y are,
speci fi c and l i mi ted.
c. Thi s si tuati on sel dom exi sts i n counterguerri l l a operati ons,
however. Speci fi c targets for rai ds and for other forms of attack
are much more l i mi ted, because of the characteri sti cs of
guerri l l as. They are el usi ve and hi ghl y mobi l e; they avoi d deci si ve
engagement; they avoi d prepared posi ti ons and establ i sh
rel ati vel y few fi xed i nstal l ati ons.
D- 8
FM 90- 8
d. A combat patrol searches for and, wi thi n i ts capabi l i ty, engages
targets when and where found. Engagement i s by rai d, ambush,
or any form of attack sui tabl e to the si tuati on.
D-13. Flexibility.
a. The combat patrol i s one of the commanders most fl exi bl e
weapons. Uses vary from a two-man patrol executi ng a harassi ng
ambush of opportuni ty to a rei nforced pl atoon conducti ng rai ds,
ambushes, and target-of-opportuni ty operati ons. I n some
i nstances, a patrol encounteri ng a superi or force may mai ntai n
contact wi th the force unti l rei nforcements permi t deci si ve
engagement. Effecti veness of the patrol depends, not on si ze, but
on the sui tabi l i ty to a gi ven si tuati on.
b. The use of combat patrol s forces guerri l l as to engage i n deci si ve
combat at unfavorabl e ti mes and pl aces. They can be used to
l ocate and destroy enemy camps, el ements, and suppl y poi nts.
Saturati on of an area wi th patrol s forces the guerri l l as to ei ther
curtai l operati ons or consol i date i n l arger groups, whi ch are
favorabl e targets for ai r, arti l l ery, and l arge-scal e attack.
c. Patrol s may be i nserted by parachute, hel i copter, surface or
subsurface watercraft, or ground methods. The conduct of the
patrol i tsel f remai ns unchanged, even though the method of
i nserti on changes.
Section V. Motorized Patrols
D-14. Missions, organization.
a. Patrol s may be motori zed (usual l y as an economy-of-force
measure) to al l ow them to:
(1) Cover greater di stances i n l ess ti me than di smounted patrol s.
(2) Operate i n contami nated areas too dangerous for di smounted
patr ol s.
(3) Carry more or heavi er equi pment, weapons, and ammuni -
ti on .
b. A motori zed patrol i s organi zed i nto el ements and teams i n the
same manner as a di smounted patrol . Substi tuti on of tracked
carri ers for wheel ed vehi cl es provi des an i ncreased potenti al for
battl efi el d mobi l i ty (Fi gure D-1).
c. When sol di ers are assi gned to vehi cl es, squad or fi re team
i ntegri ty i s mai ntai ned as far as possi bl e. One sol di er i s
desi gnated commander of each vehi cl e.
D- 9
FM 90- 8
Figure D-1. Organization of a motorized reconnaissance patrol.
d. A motori zed patrol i s prepared i n the same general manner as a
di smounted patr ol . I n addi ti on, however , vehi cl es must be
checked to ensure that they are i n good mechani cal condi ti on and
properl y suppl i ed wi th fuel , oi l , and water. Dri vers and other
personnel are as thoroughl y prepared for the mi ssi on as regul ar
patrol members.
e . Motori zi ng enabl es a patrol to carry heavy and bul ky equi pment
such as:
(1) Anti tank weapons and ammuni ti on are pl aced near the front
and rear of the patrol . Personnel are desi gnated to man and
support these weapons when they are empl oyed.
(2) Sur vei l l ance equi pment.
(3) Addi ti onal automati c weapons and ammuni ti on.
f. Communi cati on between vehi cl es and between the patr ol and
hi gher headquarters i s essenti al . Wi thi n the patrol , radi os, voi ce
commands, and vi sual si gnal s may be used. Vehi cul ar-mounted
radi os are usual l y the best means for communi cati on wi th hi gher
headquarters. Li ght ai rcraft may be used to drop messages and to
rel ay radi o messages.
D-15. Movement.
A motori zed patrol moves by one of three methods: conti nuous
movement, successi ve bounds, and al ternate bounds:
D- 1 0
FM 90- 8
a. I n conti nuous movement, al l vehi cl es travel at a moderate rate of
speed, wi th al l personnel al ert. The l ead vehi cl es stops to
i nvesti gate onl y those areas that appear dangerous. Thi s i s the
fastest, but l east secure, method of movement.
I n successi ve bounds, vehi cl es keep thei r rel ati ve posi ti ons i n the b.
col umn. The fi rst and second vehi cl es operate as a team i n movi ng
from one observati on poi nt to another. The second vehi cl e i s
pl aced i n a conceal ed posi ti on, occupants di smounti ng i f
necessary, to cover movement of the fi rst vehi cl e to an observati on
poi nt. On reachi ng thi s poi nt, occupants of the fi rst vehi cl e
observe and reconnoi ter, di smounti ng i f necessary. When the area
i s determi ned to be cl ear, the second vehi cl e i s si gnal ed forward to
joi n the fi rst vehi cl e. The commander of the fi rst vehi cl e careful l y
observes the terrai n to the front for si gns of guerri l l as and sel ects
the next stoppi ng poi nt. The fi rst vehi cl e then moves out and the
process i s repeated. Movement di stance of the l ead vehi cl e does
not exceed the l i mi t of observati on or the range of effecti ve fi re
support from the second vehi cl e. The l ead vehi cl e and personnel
are repl aced frequentl y to ensure constant al ertness. The other
vehi cl es i n the col umn move by bounds from one conceal ed
posi ti on to the next. Each vehi cl e mai ntai ns vi sual contact wi th
the vehi cl e ahead but avoi ds cl osi ng up (Fi gure D-2).
Figure D-2. Lead vehicle moves by bounds.
D- 11
FM 90- 8
c. I n al ternate bounds, al l except the fi rst two vehi cl es keep thei r
rel ati ve pl aces i n the col umn. The fi rst two vehi cl es al ternate as
l ead vehi cl es on each bound. Each covers the bound of the other.
Thi s method provi des more rapi d advance than movement by
successi ve bounds but i s l ess secure; i t does not al l ow sol di ers i n
the second vehi cl e enough ti me to thoroughl y observe the terrai n
to the front before passi ng the fi rst vehi cl e. Securi ty i s obtai ned by
the vehi cl e commander who assi gns each sol di er a di recti on of
observati on: to the front, fl ank(s), or rear. Thi s provi des each
vehi cl e wi th some securi ty agai nst surpri se fi re from every
di recti on and provi des vi sual contact wi th vehi cl es to the front
and rear. For maxi mum observati on, al l canvas i s removed from
the vehi cl es.
D-16. Actions at danger areas.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
The commander of the l eadi ng vehi cl e i mmedi atel y noti fi es the
uni t l eader when he encounters an obstacl e or other danger area.
Desi gnated sol di ers reconnoi ter these pl aces under cover of the
weapons i n the vehi cl e. Obstacl es are bypassed, i f possi bl e. When
they cannot be bypassed, they are cauti ousl y removed.
Si de roads i ntersecti ng the route of advance are i nvesti gated.
Sol di ers from one vehi cl e secure the road juncti on; one or two
vehi cl es i nvesti gate the si de road. The amount of reconnai ssance
of si de roads i s determi ned by the patrol l eaders knowl edge of the
si tuati on. Men i nvesti gati ng si de roads do not, however, move
past supporti ng di stance of the mai n body of the patrol .
Bri dges, road juncti ons, defi l es, and curves (that deny observati on
beyond the turn) are danger areas. Sol di ers di smount and take
advantage of avai l abl e cover and conceal ment to i nvesti gate
these areas. The vehi cl e i s moved off the road i nto a covered or
conceal ed posi ti on; weapons from the vehi cl e cover the advance of
the i nvesti gati ng personnel (Fi gure D-3).
When approachi ng a vi l l age, two or three sol di ers may go forward
on foot to reconnoi ter. Other sol di ers cover thei r movement from
covered or conceal ed posi ti ons.
Acti ons on contacti ng guerri l l as depend on whether the mi ssi on
permi ts or prohi bi ts engagi ng i n combat. For exampl e, i f the
mi ssi on permi ts or requi res the expl oi tati on of opportuni ti es for
combat and the l ead vehi cl e detects, or i s attacked by, an ambush,
then sol di ers i n the l ead vehi cl e move to posi ti ons from whi ch the
guerri l l as can be brought under fi re. The sol di ers di smount and
maneuver to destroy the ambush. Hi gher headquarters i s noti fi ed
of the si tuati on.
D- 12
FM 90- 8
Figure D-3. Soldiers dismount to investigate danger areas.
f. I n any si tuati on where the sol di ers di smount, dri vers remai n wi th
and protect thei r vehi cl es. The vehi cl es are moved off the road,
after ensuri ng that the shoul ders of the road are not mi ned. I f
possi bl e, they are posi ti oned so that the dri vers can support the
attack. At l east one automati c weapon remai ns wi th the vehi cl es.
g. Hi gher headquarters i s noti fi ed when the acti on i s compl eted and
the uni t conti nues the mi ssi on.
D- 13
FM 90- 8
Section VI. Dismounted Movement
D-17. Techniques.
There are many movement techni ques that can be uti l i zed. Thi s secti on
descri bes basi c and l i near movements, and combat, zone, and area
reconnai ssance.
D-18. Basic movements.
a. I n al l cases, the uni t moves from a start poi nt (SP) to an objecti ve
ral l y poi nt (ORP) and then on to i ts objecti ve (OBJ) area (Fi gure
D-4).
Figure D-4. Basic movement sequence.
b. The uni t may then return to the ORP upon mi ssi on accompl i shment,
or i t may proceed through the objecti ve area and onto a l i nkup
poi nt (LUP) (Fi gure D-5). From there the uni t conti nues wi th a
fol l ow-on mi ssi on, or returns to base.
Figure D-5. Other basic techniques.
D- 14
FM 90- 8
D-19. Linear movement.
a. Stream and trail. Thi s techni que of movement cal l s for the uni t
to use a trai l or stream as a navi gati on gui de. The uni t may not be
travel i ng on the trai l or stream, but onl y i n the vi ci ni ty of i t for
securi ty (1).
Contour. The uni t sel ects a contour i nterval and fol l ows that
el evati on (2).
c. Cross-compartment. The uni t travel s i n a general l y strai ght
b.
path regardl ess of terrai n features (3). Reference Fi gure D-6.
Figure D-6. Stream and trail (1), contour (2), and cross-compartment (3).
D-20. Combat and zone reconnaissance patrols.
These techni ques are general and i l l ustrate how uni ts operate on
secti ons of terrai n i n guerri l l a terri tory (Fi gures D-7).
D- 15
FM 90- 8
Figure D-7. Combat and zone reconnaissance patrols.
D- 16
RIVER
=---------

1/ /
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? AREA AND CONTINUE
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SUCCESSIVE SECTORS
TECHNIQUE
BOX TECHNIQUE
FM 90- 8
D-21. Area reconnaissance patrol.
a. Thi s type of patrol di ffers from the others i n that i t has a speci fi c
l ocati on to be observed for i ntel l i gence. There are several methods
that may be uti l i zed by an area reconnai ssance patrol to conduct
i ts mi ssi on. Four of the most common are i l l ustrated (Fi gure D-8).
Figure D-8. Area reconnaissance patrol
D-17
FM 90- 8
b. The movement techni ques descri bed i n thi s secti on are basi c
methods. Many other techni ques may be devel oped dependi ng
upon the terrai n, the mi ssi on, and the uni t l eaders i ni ti ati ve. The
l eader al ways ensures, however, that no outl i ne or pattern i s
establ i shed that woul d al l ow a guerri l l a force to ambush hi s uni t.
D- 18
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX E
Bases
Section I. General
E-1. Three types.
Thi s appendi x expl ai ns the three types of bases general l y used i n a
counteri nsurgency: patrol bases, operati onal support bases, and
support bases.
E-2. Tactical uses.
Patrol bases are used by a company or smal l er uni ts. Operati onal
support bases are used by battal i ons, and support bases are used by
bri gades and l arger uni ts.
Section Il. Patrol Bases
E-3. Planning.
a. When a uni t hal ts for an extended peri od, i t takes acti ve and
passi ve measures to provi de maxi mum securi ty. The l eader
sel ects, occupi es, and organi zes an area so l ocated that i t provi des
passi ve securi ty from enemy detecti on. Thi s i s a patrol base.
Pl anni ng a patrol base i s usual l y a part of the patrol s operati on;
or i t may be an on-the-spot deci si on. The l ength of ti me a patrol
base i s occupi ed depends on the need for secrecy. I n most
si tuati ons, occupati on shoul d not exceed 24 hours except i n an
emergency. A patrol base i s occupi ed the mi ni mum ti me
necessary to accompl i sh the mi ssi on. The same base i s not
(usual l y) used agai n.
b.
c. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons, patrol base secrecy i s requi red;
and evacuati on (i f di scovered) depends on the degree of control the
guerri l l a force has i n the base area, thei r abi l i ty to react to the
di scovery of a base, and thei r abi l i ty to affect the uni ts mi ssi on.
When a guerri l l a force i s rel ati vel y smal l and weak, patrol base
secrecy may not bean overri di ng consi derati on; and i f the base i s
di scovered, evacuati on may not be requi red. I n an area control l ed
by a l arge guerri l l a force wi th a hi gh degree of combat capabi l i ty,
patrol base secrecy i s mandatory; and i f di scovered, evacuati on i s
requi red.
E-1
FM 90- 8
d. Typi cal si tuati ons that requi re pl anni ng for a patrol base i ncl ude:
(1) A requi rement to cease al l movement to avoi d detecti on.
(2) A requi rement to hi de the uni t duri ng a l engthy, detai l ed
reconnai ssance of the objecti ve area.
(3) A need to prepare food, mai ntai n weapons and equi pment,
and rest after extended movement.
(4) A need to formul ate a fi nal pl an and i ssue orders for acti ons
at the objecti ve.
(5) A requi rement for reorgani zati on after a patrol has i nfi l trated
the enemy area i n smal l groups (used i n conjuncti on wi th a
l i nkup poi nt).
(6) A need for a base from whi ch to conduct several consecuti ve
or concurrent operati ons such as ambush, rai d, reconnai ssance,
or survei l l ance patrol s.
e. Any unforeseen si tuati on occurri ng duri ng a patrol mi ssi on coul d
l ead to an on-the-spot deci si on to establ i sh a patrol base.
E-4. Selection.
a. The l ocati on for a patrol base i s usual l y sel ected by map
reconnai ssance duri ng pl anni ng. Sel ecti on may al so be by aeri al
reconnai ssance or based on pri or knowl edge of a sui tabl e l ocati on.
b. A patrol base establ i shed as the resul t of an on-the-spot deci si on
requi res reconnoi teri ng, securi ng, expandi ng, and organi zi ng the
area occupi ed duri ng a securi ty hal t.
c. A patrol base l ocati on sel ected by map or aeri al reconnai ssance,
or by pri or knowl edge of an area, i s tentati ve. I ts sui tabi l i ty i s
confi rmed by ground reconnai ssance, and i t i s secured before
occupati on.
d. Pl ans to establ i sh a patrol base i ncl ude consi derati on of:
(1) Al ternate l ocati on. Thi s i s used i f the i ni ti al l ocati on
proves unsui tabl e or i f the uni t i s requi red to evacuate the
i ni ti al l ocati on prematurel y. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons,
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance of an al ternate l ocati on,
unti l occupi ed or no l onger needed, are desi rabl e.
(2) Li nkup poi nt. Thi s i s used i f the uni t evacuates the patrol
base by exfi l trati on i n groups. The l i nkup poi nt does not
have to be reconnoi tered.
(3) Ral l yi ng poi nt. Thi s i s used i f the uni t i s di spersed from
the patrol base. I t i s a poi nt over whi ch the uni t has
previ ousl y passed, and i t i s known to al l .
E-2
FM 90- 8
E-5. Considerations.
a. When pl anni ng for a patrol base, passi ve and acti ve securi ty
measures are consi dered, as wel l as the mi ssi on.
b. Wi th regard to passi ve securi ty measures, base sel ecti on
i ncl udes:
(1) Di ffi cul t terrai n that i mpedes foot movement and has l i ttl e
tacti cal val ue.
(2) An area wi th dense vegetati on (bushes and trees that spread
out cl ose to the ground).
(a) An area remote from human habi tati on.
(b) An area near a water source.
(c) An area that avoi ds known or suspected enemy
posi ti ons; bui l t-up areas; ri dgel i nes and topographi c
crests (except as necessary for mai ntai ni ng adequate
communi cati ons); roads or trai l s and natural l i nes of
dri ft; and wet areas, steep sl opes, and smal l val l eys
that may be l i nes of dri ft.
c. Wi th regard to acti ve securi ty measures, base sel ecti on i n-
cl udes:
(1) Outpost and l i steni ng post systems coveri ng avenues of
approach i nto the area.
(2) Communi cati ons wi th outposts and l i steni ng posts.
(3) Defense of the patrol base (i f requi red).
(4) Wi thdrawal , to i ncl ude mul ti pl e wi thdrawal routes (i f
r equi r ed).
(5) An al ert pl an.
(6) Enforcement of camoufl age, noi se, and l i ght di sci pl i ne.
(7) Conduct of necessary acti vi ti es wi th mi ni mum movement
and noi se.
E-6. Occupation and operation of a patrol base.
a. A patrol base maybe occupi ed i n two ways:
(1) By movi ng to a sel ected si te and organi zi ng the area i n the
same manner as an on-the-spot establ i shment.
(2) By hal ti ng near the sel ected si te and sendi ng forward
reconnai ssance forces.
E-3
FM 90- 8
b. The method i s thoroughl y pl anned and rehearsed. The use of
patrol base dri l l s (i n ei ther method) assi sts i n the swi ft and
effi ci ent establ i shment of patrol bases.
(1) Approach. The uni t i s hal ted at a sui tabl e posi ti on wi thi n
200 meters of the tentati ve patrol base l ocati on. Cl ose-i n
securi ty i s establ i shed. Previ ousl y desi gnated i ndi vi dual s
(preferabl y l eaders of the uni ts major subuni ts) joi n the uni t
l eader (Fi gure E-1).
Figure E-1 Approach and reconnaissance.
(2) Reconnaissance. The l eader desi gnates a poi nt of entry
i nto the patrol base l ocati on as 6 ocl ock, assi gns areas by the
cl ock system, desi gnates the center of the base as headquarters,
and moves there. Subordi nate l eaders then reconnoi ter
assi gned areas for sui tabi l i ty and return to the uni t l eader.
Usual l y, two men are di spatched to bri ng the uni t forward.
(3) Occupation. The uni t l eaves i ts l i ne of march at ri ght
angl es and enters the base i n si ngl e fi l e, movi ng to the center
of the base. Desi gnated men remove si gns of the uni ts
movement. Each l eader peel s off hi s uni t and l eads i t to the
l eft fl ank of the uni t sector. Each uni t occupi es i ts porti on of
the peri meter by movi ng cl ockwi se to the l eft fl ank of the
next sector. The uni t l eader checks the peri meter by meeti ng
each l eader at the l eft fl ank of hi s sector, movi ng cl ockwi se
(Fi gure E-2).
E-4
Figure E-2. Occupation, initial phase.
(a) Each l eader reconnoi ters forward of hi s sector by
movi ng a desi gnated di stance out from the l eft fl ank of
the sector, movi ng cl ockwi se to the ri ght l i mi t of the
sector, and reenteri ng at the ri ght fl ank of the sector.
He reports i ndi cati ons of the enemy or ci vi l i ans,
sui tabl e observati on and l i steni ng post posi ti ons,
ral l yi ng poi nts, and wi thdrawal routes (Fi gure E-3).
FM 90- 8
E-5
FM 90- 8
Figure E-3. Occupation, final phase.
(b) The uni t l eader desi gnates ral l yi ng poi nts, posi ti ons
for OPs and l i steni ng posts, and wi thdrawal routes.
Each uni t puts out one two-man observati on post (OP)
(day), and one three-man l i steni ng post (LP) (ni ght),
and establ i shes communi cati ons (Fi gure E-4).
Figure E-4. Typical patrol base layout.
E-6
FM 90- 8
(4) Operation security. Onl y one poi nt of base entry and exi t
i s used. I t i s camoufl aged and guarded at al l ti mes. Fi res are
bui l t onl y when necessary and, as a rul e, onl y i n dayl i ght.
Whether day or ni ght, onl y necessary fi res are bui l t, and they
are kept as smal l as possi bl e. Where terrai n permi ts, fi res are
bui l t i n pi ts and, i f bui l t at ni ght, are careful l y covered and
shi el ded. Bui l di ng fi res i n pi ts reduces the danger of vi sual
detecti on and faci l i tates exti ngui shi ng the fi res and
camoufl agi ng the si tes. The dri est and hardest wood
avai l abl e i s used (to reduce smoke). I n most areas, the best
ti me for bui l di ng fi res i s when the ai r i s thi n and smoke
di ssi pates qui ckl y (usual l y around noon); earl y morni ng
may be appropri ate, however, i n areas where there i s ground
fog. The ri sk of detecti on, because of l i ngeri ng odor, must be
wei ghed agai nst the ri sk of detecti on due to vi si bl e smoke.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Noi sy tasks, such as cutti ng branches, are accom-
pl i shed at desi gnated ti mes, as earl y as possi bl e
after occupati on but never at ni ght nor duri ng the
qui et peri ods of earl y morni ng and l ate eveni ng.
When possi bl e, noi sy tasks are performed when
other sounds wi l l cover them, such as the sounds of
ai rcraft, arti l l ery, or di stant battl e noi ses.
Movement, both i nsi de and outsi de the patrol base,
i s restri cted to the mi ni mum.
Ci vi l i ans who di scover the l ocati on of the patrol
base are detai ned unti l the base i s moved or unti l
they can be evacuated to hi gher headquarters. Care
i s taken to prevent detai ned ci vi l i ans from l earni ng
about base operati on and future pl ans. I f necessary,
they are ti ed and bl i ndfol ded and thei r ears are
cover ed.
When suffi ci ent personnel are avai l abl e, OPs are
manned by at l east two men so they can al ternate
and ensure al ertness at al l ti mes. Thi s al so removes
the need for traffi c between the OP and the patrol
base. Li steni ng posts are manned by at l east two,
preferabl y three, i ndi vi dual s so they can al ternate
and remai n al ert.
A 1-hour stand-to i s observed morni ng and eveni ng:
30 mi nutes before and 30 mi nutes after l i ght i n the
morni ng, and 30 mi nutes before and 30 mi nutes after
dark i n the eveni ng. Thi s ensures that every man i s
accl i mated to changi ng l i ght condi ti ons, and i s
dressed, equi pped, and ready for acti on.
E- 7
FM 90- 8
(f) Each man knows the l ocati ons of men and posi ti ons
to hi s fl anks, front, and rear, and knows the ti mes
and routes of any expected movement wi thi n, i nto,
and out of the patrol base.
(5) Defense. Defensi ve measures are pl anned, but a patrol
base i s usual l y defended onl y when evacuati on i s not
possi bl e. El aborate fi ri ng posi ti ons are not constructed;
nonethel ess, camoufl age and conceal ment are stressed.
(a) Ar ti l l er y and mor tar fi r es may be pl anned, i f
avai l abl e. Earl y warni ng devi ces may be pl aced on
avenues of approach. I f the base i s to be defended,
then mi nes and tri p fl ares may be pl aced on avenues
of approach and i n areas that cannot be covered by
fi re. The val ue of these devi ces i s wei ghed agai nst
the fact that thei r di scovery automati cal l y com-
promi ses the patrol base.
(b) An al ert pl an i ncl udes evacuati on and defense. Al l
members know the pl ans and the si gnal s or orders
for thei r i mpl ementati on. Pl ans cover pursui t and
destructi on of the attacki ng force.
(6) Communications. Communi cati ons ar e establ i shed
wi th hi gher headquarters, subordi nate uni ts, OPs, and
l i steni ng posts. The system provi des for every man to be
al erted qui ckl y and qui etl y. Radi os, an excel l ent means of
communi cati on, are careful l y control l ed. Wi re can be used
wi thi n the patrol base i f i ts bul k and wei ght, and the ti me
requi red to l ay and pi ck up, are not di sadvantages. Tug, or
pul l , wi res may be used for si gnal i ng. They are qui et and
reduce radi o or tel ephone traffi c. Messengers maybe used
wi thi n the patrol base.
(7) Maintenance. Weapons and equi pment are cl eaned and
mai ntai ned as requi red.
(8) Sanitation and personal hygiene. I n dayl i ght, cathol es
outsi de the peri meter are used. The user i s guarded. At
ni ght, cathol es are used i nsi de the peri meter. Men wash,
shave, and brush thei r teeth as needed, consi stent wi th
the si tuati on (i ncl udi ng avai l abi l i ty of water). Cans, food,
and other trash are taken wi th the departi ng patrol for
secur i ty.
(9) Messing. Men eat at staggered ti mes, as pl anned and
control l ed. Preparati on of meal s i s pl anned (i f requi red).
(10) Water. Guar ded water par ti es pr ovi de water . Lone
i ndi vi dual s do not vi si t the water source. No more than
E-8
FM 90- 8
two vi si ts to the source are made i n a 24-hour peri od. Use
of water i s control l ed (as requi red).
(11) Rest. Rest and sl eep are permi tted after al l work i s done.
Rest peri ods are staggered to mai ntai n securi ty. Consi stent
wi th work and securi ty requi rements, as much sl eep and rest
as possi bl e are schedul ed for each man.
(12) Resupply. I f the uni t i s to be resuppl i ed by ai r, the fl i ght
path, drop zone or l andi ng zone, and cache are l ocated so that
nei ther the base nor possi bl e objecti ves are compromi sed.
(13) Planning and conduct of operations. Detai l s of operati ons
are passed to al l uni t members. Members are not assembl ed
atone ti me as thi s woul d endanger base securi ty. Rehearsal s
are l i mi ted to terrai n model s, wi th part of the uni t rehearsi ng
whi l e the remai nder provi des securi ty. Weapons are not test
fi red. I f part of the uni t i s absent on an operati on, the
peri meter i s adjusted, i f necessary, to ensure securi ty. Orders
are as bri ef as possi bl e. Maxi mum practi cal use i s made of
fragmentary orders and references to SOPs.
(14) Departure. Al l si gns of the uni ts presence are removed or
conceal ed. Thi s may prevent the enemy from l earni ng that
the uni t i s i n the area, prevent pursui t, or prevent the enemy
from l earni ng how the patrol base i s operated. Ni ght
evacuati on (i n case of attack) i s avoi ded i f possi bl e.
Evacuati on i s conducted as a uni t when possi bl e.
Section Ill. Battalion Operational Support Bases
E-7. Purpose.
When engaged i n counterguerri l l a operati ons, battal i on el ements often
establ i sh a base for command and control and fi re support resources,
protected by a peri meter defense. These resources are cal l ed the
battal i on operati onal support base.
E-8. Perimeter defense.
a. The OSB peri meter defense l ocati on depends upon:
(1) Forces avai l abl e to defend the combat base.
(2) Abi l i ty to support subordi nate uni ts wi th i ndi rect fi re.
(3) Defensi bi l i ty of terrai n.
(4) Abi l i ty to communi cate wi th subordi nate uni ts.
E-9
FM 90- 8
b. Before establ i shi ng the battal i on OSB, the commander reconnoi ters
to determi ne terrai n defensi bi l i ty. He al so pl ans the defense force.
c. Whi l e the defense i s desi gned to defeat the heavi est attack the
enemy i s l i kel y to conduct, i t uses mi ni mal forces. Essenti al
el ements (rei nforced as necessary) of the headquarters and
headquarters company (HHC) compose the force avai l abl e to
prepare and defend the peri meter.
E-9. OSB commander.
a. The battal i on commander normal l y desi gnates the HHC
commander as battal i on OSB commander i n charge of peri meter
defense. Forces normal l y under control of the OSB commander
i ncl ude:
(1) An anti tank pl atoon.
(2) An ai r defense secti on, i f attached (to man the peri meter and
provi de anti ai rcraft fi re).
(3) A heavy mortar pl atoon (to man the peri meter and provi de
fi re support).
(4) A ri fl e pl atoon (i f provi ded for peri meter defense or as a
reacti on force).
b. The scout pl atoon i s normal l y used for patrol l i ng or screeni ng
mi ssi ons, rather than peri meter defense. Use of speci al ty uni t
personnel (ai r defense and mortar) for manni ng the peri meter wi l l
reduce the responsi veness of those systems. An el ement of ri sk i s
i nvol ved.
c. Duri ng defense works constructi on, the peri meter i s vul nerabl e to
attack, so i t i s compl eted as qui ckl y as possi bl e. Maxi mum
securi ty i s provi ded duri ng constructi on.
E-10. Infiltration.
a. Guerri l l as may be abl e to conduct l arge-scal e attacks on forti fi ed
posi ti ons, but they may di srupt operati ons by i nfi l trati ng one or
two men through the peri meter to pl ace expl osi ve devi ces on
command and control faci l i ti es, arti l l ery pi eces or mortars, or
ammuni ti on storage areas.
b.
Thi s i nfi l trati on often fol l ows a decepti ve attack or probe. The
peri meter defense force mai ntai ns constant securi ty, usi ng earl y
warni ng systems and conti nuous patrol l i ng. Starl i ght scopes,
OPs, unattended ground sensors, ground survei l l ance radars, and
tri p fl ares are al so used. Wi re obstacl es shoul d be used to keep
i nfi l trators out of cri ti cal faci l i ti es.
E- 10
FM 90- 8
c. A battal i on OSB may have to remai n i n pl ace for an extended
peri od, but i t i s not a permanent base. Conti nuous fi ri ng of
mortars and l andi ng of hel i copters make conceal i ng i ts l ocati on
di ffi cul t. These factors requi re that the peri meter defense be
hardened. Overhead cover and sandbagged bunkers are provi ded
for al l fi ghti ng posi ti ons. The tacti cal operati ons center and
command post (CP) requi re si mi l ar protecti on (or they maybe dug
underground). Mortars and arti l l ery pi eces are dug i n or forti fi ed
wi th sandbags.
E-11. Reserves.
a. A reserve for the defense i s made up from attachments (engi neers,
i f avai l abl e, or from off-shi ft personnel from tacti cal operati on
center [TOC] and CP el ements).
The reserve reacts to enemy attacks and rei nforces the defense or
counterattack. I t i s rehearsed on si gnal s and acti ons. Mortars are
empl oyed to provi de cl ose-i n fi re support. Arti l l ery pi eces maybe
abl e to provi de di rect fi re but may not be abl e to provi de i ndi rect
fi re i n support of the peri meter. Hence, the peri meter shoul d be
wi thi n range of other arti l l ery and mortar uni ts for addi ti onal
pr otecti on.
E-12. Work priorities.
a. A pri ori ty of work i s schedul ed to construct the battal i on OSB.
The pri ori ty pl aced on acti ons i s dependent upon the tacti cal
si tuati on and the avai l abi l i ty of resources. Work i s accompl i shed
i n the fol l owi ng sequence, consi stent wi th the tacti cal si tuati on
and the avai l abi l i ty of resources.
b.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Step 1. Ai r assaul t and/or ground assaul t sei zes the si te;
i mmedi ate securi ty i s establ i shed to i ncl ude OPs; area i s
swept for booby traps; and mortars are l ai d.
Step 2. Communi cati ons are establ i shed; CP i s set up; TOC
posi ti on i s dug i n; and sel ected TOC personnel are di spl aced
to peri meter defense.
Step 3. Peri meter posi ti ons are establ i shed; fi el ds of fi re are
cl eared; reserve force i s establ i shed; and wi re i s l ai d to al l
posi ti ons.
Step 4. Barri ers and obstacl es are pl aced around peri meter
defense; earl y warni ng devi ces are empl aced; securi ty and
ambush patrol pl ans are establ i shed; and fi nal protecti ve
fi re (FPF) i s cal l ed i n.
Step 5. Posi ti ons are sustai ned; posi ti ons are hardened
wi th overhead cover; al l other posi ti ons are i mproved; more
E-11
FM 90- 8
fi el ds of fi re are cl eared; the l andi ng zone i s enl arged; and the
l atri ne, generators, and ammuni ti on suppl y poi nt are estab-
l i shed.
NOTE: Camouflage is applied throughout base preparations.
b. The si ze of the base i s dependent upon the si tuati on and the
terrai n avai l abl e. When arti l l ery i s wi thi n the peri meter, then the
OSB i s l arger to accommodate the guns and supporti ng equi pment
(Fi gure E-5).
Figure E-5. Example of OSB.
Section IV. Brigade, Division Support Base
E-13. Permanent-type base.
a. A bri gade or di vi si on support base i s l arger and more permanent.
I t i s usual l y near an ai rfi el d and/or general l y i n consol i dati on
E-12
FM 90- 8
b.
areas. Thi s secti on descri bes the responsi bi l i ti es and organi zati on
found i n the defense of more permanent i nstal l ati ons.
An area command i s composed of those organi zed el ements of one
or more of the armed servi ces desi gnated to operate i n a speci fi c
geographi cal area; these armed servi ces are pl aced under a si ngl e
commander. The area command may range i n si ze from an area
(theater) of operati ons to a smal l urban compl ex. The purpose of
such area assi gnment i s to:
(1) Secure uni ty of effort i n such operati onal mi ssi ons as may be
assi gned to commanders.
(2) Coordi nate defense, l ogi sti cs, and the use of avai l abl e
faci l i ti es.
c. To provi de for the effecti ve defense of a base wi thi n hi s command
or for joi nt pl anni ng wi thi n hi s area of responsi bi l i ty, the
commander must:
(1) Assi gn the responsi bi l i ty for defense of the base and
surroundi ng l ocal defense areas.
(2) Establ i sh the method of command or coordi nati on to be
exer ci sed.
(3) Ensure the establ i shment of appropri ate command rel ati on-
shi ps between subordi nate area and base commanders.
d.
Command rel ati onshi ps, securi ty, and defense responsi bi l i ti es
vary at the base command l evel because of the possi bl e mul ti nati onal
and mul ti servi ce force combi nati ons i nvol ved i n the overal l
defense effort of a gi ven base. I n most cases, base ownershi p,
nati onal -l evel agreements, and mutual agreements among seni or
commanders determi ne rel ati onshi ps and responsi bi l i ti es. The
rel ati onshi p between US servi ce components and host country
forces i s i ncl uded i n the di recti ve of the US establ i shi ng authori ty.
Thi s rel ati onshi p i s general l y one of mutual coordi nati on and
cooperati on. Rel ati onshi ps among US servi ce components usi ng
the same base are al so outl i ned i n the di recti ve of the establ i shi ng
authori ty. These rel ati onshi ps fol l ow the pri nci pl es desi gnated
for joi nt operati ons, attachment, or support gi ven i n JCS
Publ i cati on 2.
E-14. Organization of forces.
The overal l organi zati on for base defense i ncl udes three basi c
el ements: permanent, as requi red, and as avai l abl e.
E- 13
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FM 90- 8
a. Permanent. Permanentl y assi gned el ements for base defense
and/or securi ty responsi bi l i ti es are:
(1) Provisional-type base defense forces whi ch have been
assi gned a pri mary mi ssi on to defend the base. Thi s force
i ncl udes personnel and equi pment for command and control ;
conduct of patrol s; manni ng of outposts, l i steni ng posts, and
the base peri meter; and reserve and/or reacti on force
acti vi ti es.
(2) Component police and security elements make up the
i nternal securi ty force. Al though not normal l y a part of the
BDF, these forces perform thei r routi ne securi ty duti es i n
cl ose coordi nati on wi th the defense force commander to
ensure compl ete protecti on and i ntegrati on of defensi ve
pl anni ng.
(3) Combat support and combat service support units ar e
rel ati vel y stati c support uni ts, such as communi cati ons and
mai ntenance el ements, whi ch exerci se thei r support capabi l -
i ti es from wi thi n the peri meter of the base.
As requi red. El ements assi gned base defense responsi bi l i ti es
on an as requi red basi s i ncl ude uni ts, or el ements of uni ts,
normal l y occupyi ng or operati ng i n the base area whose pri mary
mi ssi on i s not base defense. These el ements, referred to as the
emergency augmentati on force, suppl ement the capabi l i ti es of the
BDF when the degree of threat or i ntensi ty of guerri l l a attack
di ctates that they cease thei r pri mary functi ons and assi st i n base
defense. The emergency augmentati on force may consi sts of US,
host country, or al l i ed ground, naval , or ai r forces.
b.
c . As avai l abl e. El ements assi gned base defense responsi bi l i ti es
on an as avai l abl e basi s i ncl ude:
(1) Transi ent uni ts of US, host country, or al l i ed mi l i tary forces
temporari l y i n the base area.
(2) Tenant uni ts on the base between operati ons.
(3) Host uni ts or uni ts of other nati on(s) normal l y i n areas
adjacent to the base peri meter that have been desi gnated, by
thei r commanders, to provi de assi stance to the base when
thei r own operati ons do not requi re total effort.
E-15. Operational concepts.
a. Base defense i ncl udes al l acti ons that uni ts occupyi ng the base
must take to protect themsel ves from enemy acts. Such acti ons
E-14
FM 90- 8
i nevi tabl y i nterfere to some degree wi th the pri mary mi ssi on of
some of the el ements i nvol ved. To reduce thi s i nterference, the
fol l owi ng pri nci pl es appl y:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Tenant uni ts not assi gned pri mari l y for base defense are
normal l y used i n the rol e or confi gurati on for whi ch they are
organi zed and trai ned except when requi red for duty as
emergency augmentati on forces duri ng an al l -out attack on
the base.
Combat, combat support, and combat servi ce support
el ements are speci fi cal l y al l ocated for base defense mi ssi ons
when guerri l l a acti ons are frequent, prol onged, or severe.
When emergency augmentati on forces are used i n base
defense si tuati ons, they must be returned to thei r pri mary
functi ons as soon as the si tuati on permi ts.
Base tenant uni t personnel are responsi bl e for l ocal securi ty.
b.
The organi zati on of a provi si onal defense force or the
assi gnment of a combat uni t to provi de securi ty for the base
does not rel i eve them of thi s responsi bi l i ty.
The overal l concept of base defense i ncl udes al l acti ons requi red to
preseve the operati ng i ntegri ty of the base.
c. Regardl ess of the mi l i tary measures appl i ed, there i s no defense
that prevents guerri l l as from attacki ng and damagi ng a base i f
they are wi l l i ng to pay the pri ce i n manpower and materi el .
Maki ng them pay a hi gh pri ce hol ds down the number of attacks.
d. Defense of the cri ti cal areas i s a pri mary consi derati on. The
cri ti cal areas are faci l i ti es and i nstal l ati ons whose conti nued
operati on i s essenti al for the accompl i shment of the pri mary
mi ssi on. These faci l i ti es and i nstal l ati ons are desi gnated by the
base commander or hi gher authori ty and i ncl ude power stati ons;
petrol eum, oi l s, and l ubri cants storage si tes; ammuni ti on storage
si tes; ai rcraft faci l i ti es; and arti l l ery empl acements.
e. Defense of a mi l i tary base i nvol ves a combi nati on of area deni al
acti ons, aggressi ve offensi ve operati ons, and i mmedi ate reacti on
to guerri l l a threat or attack. Whi l e hardeni ng of faci l i ti es and
mai ntai ni ng an i mmedi ate reacti on force are the responsi bi l i ty of
the base commander, area deni al acti ons and major offensi ve
operati ons are the responsi bi l i ty of the area commander. Use of
barri ers, fi el d expedi ent fl ame weapons, natural obstacl es, and
aggressi ve offensi ve acti ons deny guerri l l as access to the area
i mmedi atel y surroundi ng the base. I f they are kept at a di stance,
they cannot l aunch damagi ng rocket attacks on the base. I f they
E-15
FM 90- 8
penetrate far enough to use rockets or other l ong-range weapons,
hardeni ng and di spersal of base resources may reduce the
damage.
Pl ans are prepared to counter the threat or attack, and reacti on
forces are kept ready to i mmedi atel y i mpl ement these pl ans. Thi s
preparati on i ncl udes pl ans by area commanders to commi t other
forces to base defense. Base defense pl ans are coordi nated wi th
host country offi ci al s and other al l i ed forces through use of the
area coordi nati on center.
f.
g.
Responsi ve, rapi d fi re support i s requi red for base defense
operati ons. Arti l l ery and mortar fi re can provi de qui ck reacti on to
the i nfi l trati on and standoff attack threats. I f i n range, naval
gunfi re i s used the same as arti l l ery fi re. I n base defense
operati ons, base-posi ti oned fi re support uni ts fol l ow normal fi re
support procedures. Fi re support uni ts posi ti oned outsi de the base
area, but wi thi n support range, are i ncl uded i n the overal l base
defense fi re support pl an. Al so i ncl uded are the fi re support
capabi l i ti es of host country and other al l i ed forces.
h. The fi re support coordi nati on center i s operati onal 24 hours a day.
I t must have i mmedi ate access to host country offi ci al s who can
autho ri ze fi re wi thi n areas not predesi gnated as free fi re zones.
E-16. Base commander.
a. The mi ssi on of the base commander i s to exerci se command,
control , and admi ni strati on of the base and al so to exerci se
necessary control of resi dent and transi ent uni ts not a part of the
base command.
b. A base commander may al so be the area commander. At the same
ti me, he may al so be the component Army, Navy, Mari ne Corps,
or Ai r Force commander; or he may be desi gnated separatel y.
c. The base commanders responsi bi l i ti es i ncl ude establ i shi ng the
overal l defense organi zati on as wel l as pl anni ng, prepari ng, and
executi ng al l defense measures. I f the base mounts or supports
operati ons of two or more servi ces that occupy and operate
separate nonadjoi ni ng faci l i ti es wi thi n the base area, the base
commander, as base defense coordi nati ng authori ty, pl ans and
di rects the empl oyment of these forces i n base defense rol es. The
base commander normal l y appoi nts a base defense force
commander to assi st hi m i n executi ng base defense functi ons
(Fi gure E-6).
E-16
FM 90- 8
Figure E-6. Organization of base defense.
E-17. Base defense force commander.
a.
b.
The base defense force commanders normal l y appoi nted to
supervi se the preparati on of detai l ed defense pl ans to i ncl ude
establ i shi ng defense sectors, conducti ng requi red trai ni ng,
provi di ng for or coordi nati ng l ogi sti cal support, and control l i ng
base defense operati ons. As the base commanders speci al
representati ve, the BDF commander coordi nates the pl anni ng
efforts of al l el ements schedul ed to parti ci pate i n the base defense.
Duri ng the defense, he exerci ses command authori ty over these
el ements.
Commanders of base el ements maybe gi ven responsi bi l i ty for the
defense trai ni ng of thei r forces or for maki ng thei r forces
avai l abl e to the BDF commander for trai ni ng. Addi ti onal
requi rements such as procurement and storage of essenti al
suppl i es, constructi on of defense i nstal l ati ons, medi cal support,
and communi cati ons assi stance may al so be l evi ed agai nst these
commanders, consi stent wi th overal l requi rements.
E- 17
FM 90- 8
E-18. Base defense force.
a. The mi ssi on of the BDF, whether i t be an assi gned or a
provi si onal force, i s to prevent or resi st an enemy attack by
destroy i n the enemy force, reduci ng the enemy capaci ty for
offensi ve acti on, and denyi ng the enemy entry i nto the base area.
Detecti ng and destroyi ng enemy forces (organi zed i n strength)
are responsi bi l i ti es of the area commander; however, the BDF
commander may i ni ti ate offensi ve acti on i n areas over whi ch he
has operati onal control .
b. The accompl i shment of thi s basi c mi ssi on requi res thorough
pl anni ng for an aggressi ve defense ful l y supported by other forces
of the area command.
E-19. Major tenant units.
a. Al l uni ts assi gned to the base consti tute el ements of the overal l
defense force of the base. Duri ng an enemy attack or threat, some
el ements maybe requi red to conti nue thei r pri mary functi on
l onger than others. I n thi s respect, al l l ocal uni t defenses are
coordi nated by the BDF commander to ensure that each
contri butes to the overal l defense of the base as wel l as to the l ocal
securi ty of the areas i n whi ch the uni t i s quartered or empl oyed.
b. Si nce al l tenant uni ts may not be organi zed and equi pped for base
defense tasks, they must be provi ded wi th appropri ate weapons,
ammuni ti on, and equi pment, as wel l as combat and l ogi sti cal
support.
E-20. Transient units.
Transi ent uni ts, or other uni ts not a part of the base command, maybe
pl aced under operati onal control of the base commander, or the BDF
commander, for emergency defense. Transi ent uni ts may be el ements
of US components, host country, or other al l i ed mi l i tary forces.
E-21. Employment of forces.
Forces whose pri mary mi ssi on i s base defense patrol aggressi vel y,
devel op and occupy defensi ve posi ti ons wi thi n thei r assi gned sectors,
and prepare i mmedi ate reacti on forces to counter any guerri l l a acti on.
These forces may be uni servi ce, joi nt, or combi ned, dependi ng on the
composi ti on of base area forces.
E-22. Defensive construction.
a. Shel ters. Constructi on of personnel shel ters throughout the
bi l l eti ng, admi ni strati ve, and mai ntenance areas provi des
E- 18
FM 90- 8
b.
c.
d.
i ndi vi dual protecti on agai nst standoff attacks. Dependi ng on
resources avai l abl e, these shel ters vary i n constructi on. Shi ppi ng
contai ners, dugouts, and doubl e-wal l ed pl ywood shel ters wi th
sand or gravel fi l l , al l wi th sandbag rei nforcement and overhead
cover, provi de acceptabl e protecti on. These shel ters are cl ose to
the bi l l ets and work areas to permi t rapi d access.
Bunkers. Fi ghti ng bunkers may be constructed on posi ti on or
prefabri cated and moved to posi ti on for assembl y. These bunkers
shoul d be strong enough to wi thstand di rect hi t by recoi l l ess ri fl e
fi re on the front and si des and a di rect hi t by a mortar round on the
top.
Revetments. Constructi on of revetments for cri ti cal resources
provi des addi ti onal protecti on agai nst mortar and rocket
fragmentati on. These revetments may be of sand-fi l l ed, doubl e-
wal l ed constructi on, wi th ei ther pl ywood or steel pl ate si des.
Overhead cover i s provi ded when possi bl e.
Wire. Tacti cal wi re barri ers shoul d be used wi thi n the peri meter
to l i mi t and canal i ze penetrati ons by enemy groups or i ndi vi dual s.
I ni ti al l y, these barri ers can be as si mpl e as a si ngl e strand of wi re
3 to 4 feet hi gh. General l y, they shoul d be pl aced to prevent a
di rect approach to vi tal i nstal l ati ons, and they shoul d be covered
by automati c weapons fi re. The barri ers are constructed as
i nconspi cuousl y as possi bl e and rel ocated peri odi cal l y to di srupt
enemy pl ans. Further, the barri ers must not precl ude freedom of
movement by the reacti on or reserve forces. These forces, and
other personnel , become thoroughl y fami l i ar wi th the l ocati on of
al l barri ers duri ng the course of dayl i ght and ni ght dri l l s.
E-23. Defense positions.
a. The key base defense posi ti ons consi st pri mari l y of bunkers and
towers i n the base peri meter area. The posi ti oni ng of bunkers and
towers affords maxi mum observati on and mutual l y supporti ng
fi res over the area forward of the peri meter to i ncl ude the
peri meter barri er and sensor system.
(1) Bunkers. Ful l -ti me observati on and al l -round defense of
the base are essenti al . To reduce the number of personnel
conducti ng stati c defense mi ssi ons, however, i t may be
possi bl e to desi gnate key bunkers around the peri meter to be
manned at al l ti mes and the remai nder to be ful l y manned
duri ng darkness, reduced vi si bi l i ty, and i ncreased enemy
threat. I ndi vi dual fi ghti ng posi ti ons are prepared near the
bunkers to provi de coveri ng fi res. Ni ght and day vi si on
devi ces, automati c weapons, grenade l aunchers, and hand
grenades are common to the posi ti ons. Anti tank weapons
cover possi bl e vehi cl e approaches.
E-1 9
FM 90- 8
(2) Towers. When coupl ed wi th ni ght and day vi si on ai ds,
sensors, and fl ash-rangi ng devi ces, el evated pl atforms
enhance the capabi l i ty of detecti ng peri meter i nfi l trati on
and the l ocati on of guerri l l a mortar and/or rocket fi ri ng
posi ti ons. Ei ther standard mi l i tary towers or towers
constructed from l ocal materi al s can be used. The i nstal l ati on
of sandbags or steel pl ati ng around observati on pl atforms
provi des protecti on agai nst automati c weapons and smal l
arms fi re. Constructi on of a ground-l evel bunker provi des
addi ti onal protecti on when fi res are di rected agai nst the
tower. Access to the bunker maybe by means of a fi remans
pol e or a l adder arrangement. Tower safety measures for
consi derati on i ncl ude:
(a) Li ghtni ng arresters.
(b) Constructi on to wi thstand strong wi nds and to support
two observers and thei r equi pment.
(c) Encl osed mounti ng l adder.
(d) Provi si on of safety nets round the tower when warranted
by tower hei ght.
(e) Pai nti ng i t a dark col or to reduce refl ecti on from moon-
l i gh t.
(f) I nstal l ati on of a sui tabl e roof to shi el d personnel from
the el ements wi thout i nterference to observati on. A
doubl e-roof desi gn coul d cause mortar rounds to
detonate at a hei ght that affords some protecti on to
obs er v er s .
b. Control i s the key to a successful base defense. To achi eve the
necessary control , a communi cati on capabi l i ty must be establ i shed
between the base defense operati ons center and commanders of
sectors of responsi bi l i ty, and between the sector commander and
hi s bunkers, towers, and reserve. Addi ti onal l y, bunkers wi thi n
each secti on can communi cate l ateral l y wi thi n the sector, and
fl ank bunkers of one sector can communi cate wi th fl ank bunkers
of adjacent sectors.
E-24. Training considerations.
a. Individual and collective training. Most of the trai ni ng
requi red i n support of base defense operati ons i s currentl y a part
of i ndi vi dual and col l ecti ve trai ni ng programs. I ndi vi dual s
desi gnated to take any part i n base defense operati ons wi l l
probabl y requi re addi ti onal trai ni ng i n areas appl i cabl e to thei r
rol es i n the base defense effort. Trai ni ng may be on:
E- 20
FM 90- 8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Techni ques of ambushes and rai ds and defensi ve measures
agai nst these types of operati ons.
Use of heari ng, si ght, and smel l as detecti on means.
Pol i ce-type patrol l i ng and the operati on of roadbl ocks and
checkpoi nts.
Ni ght operati ons to i ncl ude use of ni ght observati on devi ces
and sensors and speci al chal l enge, si gn, and countersi gn
techni ques.
I ndi vi dual and crew-served weapons cross-trai ni ng wi thi n
the uni t.
Marksmanshi p, especi al l y ni ght fi ri ng.
Observati on post operati ons wi th emphasi s on securi ty,
sound and l i ght di sci pl i ne, and reporti ng procedures.
Operati on and operator mai ntenance of speci al devi ces such
as radars, sensors, and ni ght observati on devi ces (i f
empl oyed).
Fami l i ari zati on wi th al l communi cati ons equi pment avai l abl e
wi thi n the uni t and communi cati on techni ques.
Barri er constructi on, mi nes, and booby traps.
Patrol l i ng of al l types.
Counter attack.
Fi re control .
b.
Area orientation. Al l i ndi vi dual s requi re an ori entati on on the
guerri l l a and hi s tacti cs, l ocal customs, soci al val ues, and the
ci vi l i an popul ati on i n the area. The capabi l i ti es and procedures of
ci vi l pol i ce and i ndi genous forces are expl ai ned, si nce el ements of
the base and base defense force may operate i n conjuncti on wi th
them. Status-of-forces agreements and rul es of engagement
concerni ng use of weapons must be covered.
c. Technical training. The most up-to-date survei l l ance, target
acqui si ti on, and ni ght observati on (STANO) equi pment shoul d be
used i n base defense operati ons. I ts i nstal l ati on and operati on
requi re speci al trai ni ng. I f enough speci al i sts are not avai l abl e,
the scope of trai ni ng i s expanded. Addi ti onal mai ntenance
speci al i sts are al so requi red to keep equi pment operati onal and to
advi se and assi st operators on thei r mai ntenance responsi bi l i ti es.
Mai ntenance and operator trai ni ng i s schedul ed peri odi cal l y to
ensure a current capabi l i ty to use the equi pment.
d. Morale and psychological factors. The moral e and psycho-
l ogi cal pressures on troops empl oyed i n base defense operati ons
di ffer from those normal l y found i n regul ar combat operati ons.
Many of these pressures are caused by i nfrequent contact wi th
E-21
160-739 O - 94 - 8
FM 90- 8
guerri l l as and the requi rement for constant vi gi l ance. Other
factors i ncl ude:
(1) Boredom caused by recurri ng routi ne tasks, whi ch tends to
l ead to l axi ty.
(2) The tendency to become i nattenti ve, whi ch occurs because
l i ttl e physi cal acti vi ty i s requi red i n operati ng or moni tori ng
observati on devi ces or sensor equi pment.
(3) The di srupti on of normal sl eep and eati ng routi nes, whi ch
occurs when operati ons conti nue day and ni ght.
(4) Long peri ods of rel ati ve i nacti vi ty, whi ch may resul t i f
trai ni ng i s not pursued vi gorousl y.
e. Leader participation. Leaders at al l echel ons must carry out a
conti nui ng i ndoctri nati on and moti vati on program to offset
psychol ogi cal pressures. Thi s i s an i mportant part of the trai ni ng
program. Physi cal trai ni ng and athl eti c and recreati on programs
are essenti al to mai ntai ni ng hi gh moral e.
E-25. Defense exerci ses.
a. Defense exerci ses provi de a means for rehearsi ng the BDF
defense pl ans, to i ncl ude testi ng of the base defense al arm and
communi cati on systems, and for trai ni ng and di verse el ements of
the defense force to act i n a coordi nated effort.
b.
Defense exerci ses are the fi nal and most i mportant step i n the
trai ni ng cycl e. These exerci ses fami l i ari ze al l el ements of the
defense force, and the base tenant uni ts, wi th thei r assi gnments
i n base defense. The exerci ses are conducted frequentl y, under
vari ous weather condi ti ons, and duri ng both dayl i ght and dark-
ness.
c. Exerci ses i ncl ude, but are not l i mi ted to:
(1) Defense of sectors of responsi bi l i ty to i ncl ude rehearsi ng
counterattacks and manni ng defense posi ti ons.
(2)
Empl oyment of the reserve for counterattacki ng and for
rei nforci ng the defense posi ti ons.
(3)
Coordi nati on of supporti ng fi res and other means of support.
(4)
I ntegrati on of the emergency augmentati on force wi th other
uni ts of the defense force.
(5) Coordi nati on wi th other forces of the base, such as the ai r
defense uni ts that may be used i n a ground defense rol e.
d. Command post exerci ses shoul d be hel d frequentl y to:
(1) Trai n the staffs of al l headquarters i nvol ved i n base defense.
E- 22
FM 90- 8
(2)
Trai n fi re support coordi nati on agenci es.
(3) Test communi cati ons.
(4)
Obtai n the necessary coordi nati on and l i ai son between the
base defense headquarters and the headquarters of base
tenant forces.
E- 23
FM 90-8
APPENDIX F
Smoke, Fl ame, Herbi ci des, and Ri ot Control Agents
F-1. Employment.
a. Thi s appendi x provi des gui dance on the empl oyment of chemi cal
agents and muni ti ons i n counterguerri l l a operati ons.
b.
The muni ti ons are useful where there i s di ffi cul ty i n pi npoi nti ng
guerri l l a l ocati ons, and where the area coverage provi ded by ri ot
control muni ti ons woul d be greater than that of other avai l abl e
weapon systems.
F-2. Smoke.
a.
b.
c.
Smoke may be used to i denti fy, si gnal , obscure, decei ve, and
screen. I t may be used to i denti fy and si gnal targets, suppl y and
evacuati on poi nt, and fri endl y uni t posi ti ons. I t may al so provi de
the counterguerri l l a commander wi th prearranged battl efi el d
communi cati ons.
Obscuri ng smoke i s used on guerri l l a posi ti ons to reduce thei r
abi l i ty to see and engage fri endl y targets. Decepti ve smoke i s used
to mi sl ead guerri l l as as to fri endl y force i ntenti ons. Screeni ng
smoke i s used i n fri endl y operati onal areas, or between fri endl y
and guerri l l a forces to deny guerri l l a observati on of areas where
fri endl y uni ts are maneuveri ng, or resuppl y or recovery operati ons
are i n progress. Thi s type of smoke empl oyment usual l y i s not
requi red by the counterguerri l l a commander unti l the l ater stages
of Phases I I and I I I .
Smoke sources i ncl ude:
(1)
Mechani cal smoke generators (l arge screen areas).
(2)
Smoke grenades (smal l screens, si gnal i ng, i denti fyi ng).
(3)
M110-pound smoke pot (smal l screen).
(4)
ABC-M5 30-pound smoke pot (smal l screen).
(5)
M42A and M207A1 fl oati ng smoke pot (smal l screens,
ground or water base).
(6)
WP mortar and WP and HC arti l l ery rounds (obscuri ng,
si gnal i ng, decei vi ng, i denti fyi ng).
(7)
WP tank rounds, 90-mm and 105-mm (smal l screens,
obscuri ng, si gnal i ng, i denti fyi ng).
(8)
Grenade-l aunched round by tanks, Bradl ey fi ghti ng vehi cl e,
and M203 (smal l , i ndi vi dual screens).
F-1
FM 90- 8
(9) Vehi cl e engi ne exhaust smoke systems, tanks, and Bradl ey
fi ghti ng vehi cl e (smal l , i ndi vi dual screens).
(10) Ai rcraft-del i vered smoke ordnance (l arge screens).
d .
Dependi ng on the weather and terrai n, smoke screeni ng may not
al ways be effecti ve. For exampl e, the wi nd coul d be too strong or
be bl owi ng from the wrong di recti on. Si gnal i ng, i denti fyi ng, and
obscuri ng are al l good smoke mi ssi ons i n al l phases of a
counterguerri l l a operati on.
F-3. Flame expedients and the M202.
a. Fl ami ng fuel and hot shrapnel , expl odi ng over an area up to 100
meters i n di ameter, i s an effecti ve defensi ve weapon. I f a target i s
to be pi npoi nted, then the M202 rocket can be used to fl ame a
hosti l e posi ti on.
b.
The fl ame mi ne i s an omni di recti onal expedi ent that can be
command detonated or acti vated by a tri pwi re. I t wi l l scatter
fl ame and shrapnel over an area 20 to 80 meters i n di ameter,
dependi ng on the si ze of the mi ne.
c. The fougasse (fl ame/shrapnel ) expedi ent i s si mi l ar to the mi ne
except that i ts expl osi ve force i s di recti onal (rather than
al l -round). A 55-gal l on barrel i s often used as a contai ner for fuel
and shrapnel . The barrel i s pl aced i n a V-trench, sandbagged i n
pl ace, and an expl osi ve charge i s pl aced behi nd the barrel . When
expl oded, the fl ami ng fuel and pi eces of metal are bl own out to a
di stance of 100 meters or more (i n a broad V-pattern).
d.
The M202 rocket l auncher contai ns four rockets that burst i nto
fl ame on i mpact. The ai mi ng devi ce on the l auncher provi des
on-target accuracy for cl ose-i n combat.
F-4. Her bi ci des.
a. The Uni ted States renounces fi rst use of herbi ci des i n war except
use, under regul ati ons appl i cabl e to thei r domesti c use and the
rul es of engagement, for control of vegetati on wi thi n US bases
and i nstal l ati ons or around thei r i mmedi ate defensi ve peri meters
to cl ear observati on and fi el ds of fi re.
b. Herbi ci des have the potenti al to destroy food producti on and
defol i ate l arge areas. The US wi l l not use herbi ci des i n thi s way,
unl ess they are fi rst used agai nst US forces and the Presi dent
di rects thei r use i n retal i ati on.
F-5. Ri ot control agents.
a . The Uni ted States renounces the fi rst use of ri ot control agents
(RCA) i n war, except defensi vel y to save l i ves. The use of RCA i s
F-2
FM 90-8
not governed by the same pol i cy as chemi cal agents. Si nce they
are not used to i njure or ki l l and thei r effects are short l i ved, there
are ti mes when the use of RCA i s more appropri ate than
conventi onal weapons.
b. Commonl y used not control agents contai n chemi cal s that cause
vomi ti ng, sneezi ng, and wateri ng (tears) of the eyes.
c. RCA contai ners i ncl ude hand grenades and 40-mm cartri dge
grenades (M203 l auncher). When used, the grenades, whether
thrown or fi red, are di rected upwi nd of the target so the chemi cal
parti cul ate (vapor) wi l l dri ft onto the hosti l e posi ti on.
d.
RCAs are used to force guerri l l as from tunnel s, caves, and
bui l di ngs i n an effort to take them pri soner. When counterguerri l l a
uni ts probe possi bl e ambush si tes, RCAs may be empl oyed to
fl ush guerri l l as and take pri soners.
e. When counterguerri l l a uni ts are i n defensi ve posi ti ons, cani ster of
RCA (contai ni ng the agent i n powder form) maybe detonated by
remote control . Thi s type of agent causes reacti ons si mi l ar to RCA
vapor agents and bl i sters the ski n.
f.
Counterguerri l l a personnel wi l l wear the protecti ve mask and
cover exposed ski n areas when empl oyi ng RCAs. Decontami nati on,
after RCA mi ssi ons, requi res troops to wash ski n areas and brush
or wash cl othi ng.
F-3
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX G
Operations and Techniques
Section I. General
G-1. Tactical variations.
a. Chapter 3 presents an overvi ew of the most common types of
tacti cal counterguerri l l a operati ons conducted i n an i nsurgency.
Thi s appendi x presents techni ques that may be empl oyed when
conducti ng those operati ons.
b.
Chart G-1 presents some of the most common operati ons and
techni ques that a counterguerri l l a force empl oys. General l y,
l arge-scal e operati ons are more sui ted to the l ater stages of an
i nsurgency whi l e smal l uni t tacti cs are more sui ted to the whol e
spectrum (see page G-2).
G-2. Standard operations.
Wi th mi nor adaptati ons (Chapter 3), some operati ons di scussed i n FM
7-10 and FM 7-20 can be used for counterguerri l l a warfare. These
operati ons i ncl ude rai ds, movements to contact, hasty attacks,
del i berate attacks, reconnai ssance i n force, expl oi tati ons, and
pursui ts.
Section Il. Operations.
G-3. Encirclement.
a. Enci rcl ement i s desi gned to cut off al l ground routes for escape
and rei nforcement of the enci rcl ed guerri l l a force. I t offers the best
possi bi l i ty for fi xi ng guerri l l a forces i n posi ti on and achi evi ng
deci si ve resul ts. Battal i on and l arger uni ts may conduct en-
ci r cl ements.
b.
The company and smal l er uni ts normal l y l ack enough men and
command and control capabi l i ty to conduct enci rcl ements (except
agai nst smal l , concentrated guerri l l a forces). Al l uni ts of the
bri gade may parti ci pate i n enci rcl ements conducted by a l arger
for ce.
c. Pl anni ng, preparati on, and executi on are ai med at compl ete
enci rcl ement of the guerri l l a force. Maxi mum securi ty and
surpri se can be gai ned by compl eti ng the enci rcl ement duri ng
dar kness.
d.
Enci rcl i ng movements are executed rapi dl y. Use of ai r assaul t
and ai rborne troops can contri bute speed and surpri se to the earl y
G-1
FM 90- 8
Char t G- 1. Compar i son of oper at i ons.
phases of an enci rcl ement. Posi ti ons are occupi ed si mul taneousl y
i n order to bl ock escape. I f si mul taneous occupati on i s not
possi bl e, escape routes most l i kel y to be used are covered fi rst.
G- 2
FM 90- 8
I ni ti al occupati on i s the most cri ti cal peri od of an enci rcl ement. I f
l arge guerri l l a formati ons real i ze that they are bei ng enci rcl ed,
they can be expected to react i mmedi atel y to probe for gaps or
attack weak poi nts to force a gap.
e. Uni ts occupyi ng the enci rcl i ng posi ti ons provi de strong combat
patrol s wel l to thei r front to gi ve earl y warni ng of attempted
breakouts and to bl ock escape routes. Mobi l e reserves are
posi ti oned for i mmedi ate movement to counter any threat of a
breakout, and to rei nforce di ffi cul t areas such as deep ravi nes or
areas contai ni ng cave or tunnel compl exes.
f.
I ndi rect fi re support can cl oak an i mpendi ng enci rcl ement by
gai ni ng and mai ntai ni ng the guerri l l as attenti on whi l e enci rcl i ng
uni ts move i nto posi ti on. Fi res, i ncl udi ng fi el d arti l l ery, shoul d be
pl anned i n detai l to support the enci rcl ement after i t i s di scovered.
G-4. Contraction.
a. Fol l owi ng the i ni ti al enci rcl ement, the capture or destructi on of
the guerri l l a force i s methodi cal and thorough. Fi re and maneuver
are used i n a si mul taneous, control l ed contracti on of the en-
ci r cl ement.
b.
As the l i ne of enci rcl ement i s contracted, and dependi ng on
terrai n, uni ts may be removed from the l i ne and added to the
reserve. Agai nst smal l guerri l l a forces, the enti re enci rcl ed area
may be cl eared by contracti on; however, agai nst l arger guerri l l a
forces, i t i s probabl e that, at some poi nt, some acti on other than
further contracti on wi l l be requi red (Fi gure G-l ).
Fi gure G-1. Contracti on techni que.
G- 3
FM 90- 8
c. One techni que, empl oyed after some degree of contracti on, i s to
empl oy a bl ocki ng force on one or more si des of the peri meter
whi l e part of the enci rcl ement forces the guerri l l as agai nst the
bl ocki ng force by offensi ve acti on. Ei ther el ement may accompl i sh
the actual destructi on, but i t i s usual l y accompl i shed by the
attacki ng el ement. Thi s techni que i s most effecti ve when the
bl ocki ng force i s l ocated on, or i mmedi atel y to the rear of, a
natural terrai n obstacl e.
G-5. Hammer and anvil.
I n thi s method, one or more uni ts i n the enci rcl ement remai n
stati onary whi l e the others dri ve the guerri l l a uni t agai nst i t (Fi gure
G-2).
Figure G-2. Hammer and anvil technique.
G-6. The wedge.
Thi s method i s used after some contracti on. A uni t i s used to di vi de the
enemy whi l e the enci rcl i ng el ements remai n i n pl ace. After the
guerri l l a force has been broken up i nto smal l er el ements, ei ther
contracti on or the hammer and anvi l techni que i s used (Fi gure G-3).
G- 4
FM 90- 8
Figure G-3. Wedge technique.
Section III. Civil Disturbances and Searches
G-7. US involvement.
Whi l e i t i s preferabl e to have host country forces control ci vi l
di sturbances, US forces may be forced by ci rcumstances to conduct
them and be i nvol ved i n search operati ons. (The type of ci vi l
di sturbance provi des the necessary counteracti on gui del i nes; for
detai l ed i nformati on refer to FM 19-15.)
G-8. Search techniques.
Searches are commonl y used i n popul ati on and resources control
operati ons. They i ncl ude use of checkpoi nts and roadbl ocks to control
traffi c and to reduce the capabi l i ty of the guerri l l a to move personnel
and materi el freel y.
a. Special equipment required. For a checkpoi nt to achi eve
maxi mum resul ts, speci al equi pment i s requi red. Portabl e si gns i n
the nati ve l anguage and i n Engl i sh shoul d be avai l abl e. Si gns
shoul d denote the speed l i mi t of approach, vehi cl e search area,
vehi cl e parki ng area, mal e and femal e search areas, and
di smount poi nt. Li ghti ng i s needed for the search area at ni ght.
Communi cati on i s requi red between the vari ous troop uni ts
supporti ng the checkpoi nt operati on. Barbed-wi re obstacl es
G- 5
FM 90- 8
across the road and around the search area shoul d be provi ded.
Troops must have adequate fi repower to wi thstand an attack or to
hal t a vehi cl e attempti ng to fl ee or crash through the checkpoi nt.
b.
Method. The checkpoi nt i s establ i shed by pl aci ng two paral l el
obstacl es (each wi th a gap) across the road. The di stance (i n
meters) between obstacl es depends on the amount of traffi c that i s
hel d i n the search area. The bl ocked secti on of road can be used as
the search area. I f possi bl e, there shoul d be a pl ace (adjacent to the
road) where l arge vehi cl es can be searched wi thout del ayi ng the
fl ow of other traffi c (whi ch can be deal t wi th more qui ckl y). Areas
are requi red for searchi ng femal e suspects and detai ni ng persons
for further i nterrogati on. I f possi bl e, the personnel manni ng a
checkpoi nt shoul d i ncl ude a member of the ci vi l pol i ce, an
i nterpreter, and a trai ned femal e searcher. When searchi ng a
vehi cl e, al l occupants are made to get out and stand cl ear of the
vehi cl e. The dri ver shoul d be made to observe the search of hi s
vehi cl e. The searcher i s al ways covered by an assi stant. When
searchi ng, pol i teness and consi derati on are shown at al l ti mes.
The occupants of the vehi cl e can be searched si mul taneousl y, i f
suffi ci ent searchers are avai l abl e (Fi gure G-4).
Figure G-4. Area search technique.
G- 6
FM 90- 8
G-9. Search of persons, areas.
Searches can be cl assi fi ed as searches of i ndi vi dual s and searches of
popul ated areas.
a. Searching individuals.
(1)
Frisk search. The fri sk i s a qui ck search of an i ndi vi dual
for weapons, evi dence, or contraband. I t i s conducted
preferabl y i n the presence of an assi stant and a wi tness. I n
conducti ng the fri sk, the searcher stands behi nd the suspect.
The searchers assi stant takes a posi ti on from whi ch he can
cover the suspect wi th hi s weapon. The suspect i s requi red to
rai se hi s arms. The searcher then sl i des hi s hands over the
i ndi vi dual s enti re body, crushi ng the cl othi ng to l ocate
conceal ed objects.
(2)
Wall search. Based on the pri nci pl e of renderi ng the
suspect harml ess by pl aci ng hi m i n a strai ned, awkward
posi ti on, the wal l search affords the searcher a degree of
safety. I t i s parti cul arl y useful when two searchers must
search several suspects. Any upri ght surface, such as a wal l ,
vehi cl e, or a tree, may be uti l i zed.
(a)
Position of suspect. The suspect i s requi red to face
the wal l (or other object) and l ean agai nst i t, supporti ng
hi msel f wi th hi s uprai sed hands pl aced far apart and
fi ngers spread. Hi s feet are pl aced wel l apart, turned
out, paral l el to the wal l , and as far from the wal l as
possi bl e. Hi s head i s kept down.
(b)
Position of searchers assistant. The searchers
assi stant stands on the opposi te si de of the suspect
(from the searcher) and to the rear. He covers the
suspect wi th hi s weapon. When the searcher moves
from hi s ori gi nal posi ti on to the opposi te si de of the
suspect, the assi stant al so changes posi ti on. The
searcher wal ks around hi s assi stant duri ng thi s
change to avoi d comi ng between hi s assi stant and the
suspect.
(c) Position of searcher. The searcher approaches the
suspect from the ri ght si de. The searchers weapon
must not be i n such a posi ti on that the suspect can grab
i t. When searchi ng from the ri ght si de, the searcher
pl aces hi s ri ght foot i n front of the suspects ri ght foot
and makes and mai ntai ns ankl e-to-ankl e contact.
From thi s posi ti on, i f the suspect offers resi stance, the
suspects ri ght foot can be pushed back from under
hi m. When searchi ng from the l eft si de of the suspect
G- 7
FM 90- 8
(3)
the searcher pl aces hi s l eft foot i n front of the suspects
l eft foot and agai n mai ntai ns ankl e-to-ankl e contact.
(d) Initial position. I n taki ng hi s i ni ti al posi ti on, the
searcher shoul d be al ert to prevent the suspect from
suddenl y attempti ng to di sarm or i njure hi m. The
searcher fi rst searches the suspects headgear. The
searcher then checks the suspects hands, arms, ri ght
si de of the body, and ri ght l eg, i n sequence. The
searcher repeats the procedure i n searchi ng the
suspects l eft si de. He crushes the suspects cl othi ng
between hi s fi ngers; he does not merel y pat i t. He pays
cl ose attenti on to armpi ts, back, wai st, l egs and tops of
boots or shoes. Any i tem found that i s not consi dered a
weapon or evi dence i s repl aced i n the suspects pocket.
I f the suspect resi sts or attempts escape and has to be
thrown down pri or to compl eti ng the search, the search
i s started over from the begi nni ng.
(e)
Switch of multiple suspects. When two or more
suspects are to be searched, they must assume a
posi ti on agai nst the same wal l or object but far enough
apart so that they cannot reach one another. The
searchers assi stant takes hi s posi ti on a few paces to
the rear of the l i ne wi th hi s weapon ready. The search i s
begun wi th the suspect on the ri ght of the l i ne. On
compl eti ng the search of one suspect, he i s moved to the
l eft of the l i ne and resumes the posi ton agai nst the
wal l . Thus, i n approachi ng and searchi ng the next
suspect, the searcher i s not between hi s assi stant and a
suspect.
Strip search. Thi s type of search i s usual l y necessary
when the i ndi vi dual i s suspected of bei ng a guerri l l a l eader or
i mportant messenger. The search i s conducted preferabl y i n
an encl osed space, such as a room or tent. The searchi ng
techni que can be vari ed. One method i s to use two unarmed
searchers whi l e an assi stant, who i s armed, stands guard.
The suspects cl othi ng and shoes are removed and searched
careful l y. A search i s then made of hi s person, i ncl udi ng hi s
mouth, nose, ears, hai r, armpi ts, crotch, and other areas of
possi bl e conceal ment.
(4)
Search of females. The guerri l l a force wi l l make maxi mum
use of femal es for al l types of tasks where search may be a
threat. Counterguerri l l a forces must make maxi mum use of
femal e searchers. I f femal e searchers cannot be provi ded, a
doctor or ai dman shoul d be consi dered for use i n searchi ng
femal e suspects. The search of femal es i s an extremel y
G- 8
FM 90- 8
del i cate matter. When mal e sol di ers must search femal es,
every possi bl e measure must be taken to prevent even the
sl i ghtest i nference of sexual mol estati on or assaul t.
b. Searching populated areas. There are four fundamental s used
when conducti ng a search.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Approach. On some operati ons, the si tuati on may al l ow
mounted movement di rectl y i nto the area to be searched. On
others, the si tuati on may di ctate di smounted movement i nto
the area. Emphasi s i s pl aced on rapi d and coordi nated
entrance i nto the area.
Surrounding the area. Duri ng darkness, troops approach
si l entl y by as many di fferent routes as possi bl e. At fi rst
dayl i ght, the area can be occupi ed by a chai n of observati on
posts wi th gaps covered by patrol s. Normal l y, a l arge area
cannot be compl etel y surrounded for any l ength of ti me
because of the number of troops requi red. I f necessary, troops
di g i n, take advantage of natural cover, and use barbed wi re
to hel p mai ntai n thei r l i ne.
Reserves. I f there i s a chance that hosti l e el ements from
outsi de the area coul d i nterfere, measures are taken to
prevent them from joi ni ng the i nhabi tants of the area under
search. Ai r observers can assi st by detecti ng and gi vi ng
earl y warni ng of any l arge-scal e movement toward the occupi ed
ar ea.
Search parties.
(a)
The offi cer i n command of the operati on i nforms the
i nhabi tants that the area i s to be searched, that a house
curfew i s i n force, and that al l i nhabi tants must remai n
i ndoors. Or, he may requi re the i nhabi tants to gather at
a central poi nt and then have the search party move i n
and begi n the search. Search parti es are usual l y
composed of search teams.
(b)
When a deci si on i s made to gather i nhabi tants at a
central poi nt, the head of the house shoul d accompany
the search party when hi s house i s searched. I f thi s i s
not done, he can deny knowl edge of anythi ng i ncri mi -
nati ng that i s found, or he can accuse the troops of theft
and l ooti ng. I n smal l searches, i t may be practi cal to
ask the head of each househol d to si gn a certi fi cate
stati ng that nothi ng has been i l l egal l y removed, but i n
a l arge search thi s may be i mpracti cal . I n order to
avoi d accusati ons of theft, wi tnesses shoul d be present
duri ng the search. A promi nent member of the com-
G- 9
FM 90- 8
muni ty shoul d accompany each search team, i f
possi bl e.
(c)
Bui l di ngs are searched from top to bottom, i f possi bl e.
Mi ne detectors are used to search for arms and
ammuni ti on. Every effort i s made to avoi d unnecessary
damage. Each house or bui l di ng searched i s marked
wi th a coded desi gnati on. Thi s same desi gnati on can
be used to l i st occupants who must be accounted for i n
subsequent searches, and the desi gnati on hel ps ensure
that no bui l di ng i s overl ooked i n the search.
(d)
I f a house i s vacant, or i f an occupant refuses entry, i t
may be necessary to force entry. I f a house contai ni ng
property i s searched whi l e i ts occupants are away, i t
shoul d be secured to prevent l ooti ng. Before troops
depart, the commander shoul d make arrangements
wi th the communi ty to protect such houses unti l the
occupants return.
(5) Search teams.
(a)
Speci al teams may be formed for search operati ons. I n
searchi ng smal l areas (a few bui l di ngs), smal l uni ts
can conduct a search wi thout speci al teams for each
functi on.
(b)
Search teams may requi re these capabi l i ti es:

Reconnai ssance.
Physi cal or vi sual search.
Fi re support.
Contr ol .
Pri soner detecti on.
Mi ne detecti on.
Scout dogs.
Ri ot control agents, fl ame weapons, and demo-
l i ti ons.
Tunnel reconnai ssance team.
I nter r ogati on.
Documentati on.
Psychol ogi cal /ci vi l affai rs operati ons.
G- 10
FM 90- 8
(6) House search. Each search party assi gned to search an
occupi ed bui l di ng shoul d consi st of at l east one l ocal
pol i ceman, a protecti ve escort, and a femal e searcher, i f
appropri ate. The search party must fi rst assembl e everyone.
The ci vi l pol i ce may gi ve the necessary orders and do the
actual searchi ng. The object of thi s search i s to screen for
suspected persons. Apprehended persons are evacuated as
soon as possi bl e. Troops may perform thi s task. Escort
parti es and transportati on must be pl anned i n advance.
(7)
Village search.
(a)
Pri or to conducti ng search operati ons i n a vi l l age, a
reconnai ssance patrol i s sent out to gai n i nformati on
about the vi l l age and i ts i nhabi tants. The patrol avoi ds
detecti on. A porti on of the patrol mai ntai ns survei l l ance
over the vi l l age whi l e the remai nder of the patrol
returns wi th i nformati on. Thi s i s done to detect any
changes whi ch may take pl ace pri or to the securi ty
el ement goi ng i nto posi ti on. I nformati on of val ue to a
commander i ncl udes:

Si ze and exact l ocati on of the vi l l age.

Forti fi cati ons (mantraps, spi ketraps).

Warni ng systems.

Tunnel systems.

Where does the i nsurgent l i ve? Does he l i ve i n the

forest at ni ght and i nhabi t the vi l l age duri ng the
day, or does he stay i n the vi l l age ni ght and day?
Does he i nhabi t one or more huts?

How many peopl e are there i n the vi l l age?

(b)
The securi ty and search el ements use one of two
general methods of movement.

I f avi ati on support i s avai l abl e, a qui ck-stri ke ai r

assaul t operati on i s empl oyed. Thi s type of operati on
i s characteri zed by speed.

I f the el ements conduct a di smounted operati on,

they normal l y use desi gnated routes. Thi s type of
operati on i s characteri zed by secure and rapi d
movement.

A vi l l age may be searched as fol l ows:

Fi rst method assembl e i nhabi tants i n a central

l ocati on (i f they appear to be hosti l e). Thi s method
provi des maxi mum control , faci l i tates a thorough
search, deni es i nsurgents an opportuni ty to conceal
G- 11
FM 90- 8
evi dence, and al l ows for detai l ed i nterrogati on. I t
has the di sadvantage of taki ng the i nhabi tants
away from thei r dwel l i ngs, thus encouragi ng
l ooti ng whi ch, i n turn, engenders i l l feel i ngs.

Second method restri ct i nhabi tants to thei r

homes. Thi s method prohi bi ts movement of ci vi l i ans,
al l ows them to stay i n thei r dwel l i ngs, and di scour-
ages l ooti ng. The di sadvantages are that i t makes
control and i nterrogati on di ffi cul t and gi ves
i nhabi tants ti me to conceal evi dence i n thei r
homes.

Thi rd method control head of househol d. The

head of each househol d i s tol d to remai n i n front of
hi s house whi l e al l others are brought to a central
l ocati on. Duri ng the search, the head of each
househol d accompani es the search team through
hi s house. Looti ng i s mi ni mi zed, and the head of
the househol d can see that the search team di d not
steal property. Thi s i s the best method for control l i ng
the popul ati on.
(d)
Search teams must search thoroughl y for i nsurgent
personnel , equi pment, escape tunnel s, or caches. Cattl e
pens, wel l s, haystacks, gardens, fence l i nes, and
cemeteri es shoul d be i nvesti gated. Search teams are
constantl y al ert for booby traps.
(e)
After the house search i s compl eted, the peri meter and
area between the securi ty el ement and the vi l l age i s
searched. There are two methods:
One i f the securi ty el ement has not been
di scovered, the search el ement may be formed i nto
secti ons, each secti on searchi ng a porti on of the
peri meter. Shoul d any secti on fl ush an i nsurgent
out of the vegetati on or tunnel exi t, the securi ty
el ement captures the person, or shoots at hi m, i f he
attempts to escape.

Two i f the securi ty el ement has been di scovered,

i t conducts the peri meter search. Part of thi s
el ement keeps the vi l l age i sol ated, whi l e the
remai nder conducts the search. Such a search
coul d take hours i f the terrai n i s extremel y dense.
Regardl ess of the terrai n, the search uni t checks
possi bl e l ocati ons for caches of materi el or i nsurgents
i n hi di ng.
(f )
I n areas where tunnel s have been reported, i t i s
i mperati ve that the search uni t have a tunnel recon-
G- 12
FM 90- 8
nai ssance team attached. Thi s team shoul d be composed
of vol unteers trai ned for thi s type of operati on. They
shoul d have speci al equi pment such as fl ashl i ghts or
mi ner hel mets, protecti ve masks, communi cati on wi th
the surface, and si l encer-equi pped pi stol s. They shoul d
know how to sketch a tunnel system, and they shoul d
recover al l i tems of i ntel l i gence i nterest.
Section IV. Movement Security
G-10. TWO categories.
Movement securi ty can be di vi ded i nto two categori es: securi ty of
convoys wi th strong securi ty detachments, and securi ty of convoys
wi th weak securi ty detachments.
G-11. Strong convoy security.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Speci al combi ned-arms teams may be organi zed and trai ned to
accompany and protect convoys. The securi ty detachment i s
organi zed wi th adequate combat power to suppress guerri l l a
ambushes. I ts si ze and composi ti on depend upon the physi cal
characteri sti cs of the area, the capabi l i ty of the enemy force, and
the si ze and composi ti on of the convoy.
I n any case, the securi ty detachment shoul d have the fol l owi ng
subordi nate el ements:
(1) A headquarters el ement to provi de command, control , and
communi cati on.
(2)
A medi cal support el ement.
(3)
An armored el ement to provi de fi repower and shock effect.
(4)
A mechani zed or motori zed i nfantry el ement.
(5)
A combat engi neer el ement to make mi nor repai rs to bri dges
and roads and to detect and remove mi nes and obstacl es.
For l arge convoys, the securi ty detachment shoul d i ncl ude fi el d
arti l l ery. I deal l y, hal f of the arti l l ery woul d be pl aced wel l forward
i n the col umn and hal f near the rear of the col umn. The arti l l ery
command and control el ement woul d move i n the vi ci ni ty of the
securi ty detachment headquarters. Thi s arrangement al l ows the
most fl exi bi l i ty for provi di ng arti l l ery fi re support to el ements of
the col umn i n the event of ambush.
The combi ned-arms securi ty detachment i s usual l y i nterspersed
throughout the convoy so that the vari ous el ements can be
empl oyed ei ther as a fi xi ng el ement or attacki ng el ement, as
requi red.
The formati on of a securi ty detachment and i ts i ntegrati on i nto a
convoy vari es because the enemy may be expected to observe
G- 13
FM 90- 8
f.
g.
h.
i .
j.
k.
l .
convoy patterns and prepare thei r ambushes to cope wi th
expected formati ons. Tanks l ead the convoy to gai n maxi mum
advantage from thei r mobi l i ty and fi repower. I f no tanks are
avai l abl e, a heavy vehi cl e wi th sandbags pl aced to protect
personnel from mi nes shoul d l ead the convoy.
A strong attack el ement i s pl aced at the rear of the convoy
formati on where i t has maxi mum fl exi bi l i ty i n movi ng forward to
attack any force attempti ng to ambush the head or center of the
convoy.
The enemy force may al l ow the advance guard to pass the si te of
the mai n ambush and then bl ock the road and attack the mai n
body and the advance guard separatel y.
At the fi rst i ndi cati on of an ambush, vehi cl es attempt to move out
of the ki l l zone. I f necessary to hal t, vehi cl es stop i n pl ace; they do
not dri ve to the roadsi des or shoul ders, whi ch may be mi ned.
Speci fi ed i ndi vi dual s (fol l owi ng the uni t SOP) i mmedi atel y return
fi re from i nsi de vehi cl es to cover di smounti ng personnel . These
i ndi vi dual s di smount l ast under cover of fi re by those who
di smounted fi rst. Upon di smounti ng, personnel caught i n the ki l l
zone open fi re and i mmedi atel y assaul t toward the ambush force
and then establ i sh a base of fi re. Tanks open fi re and maneuver
toward the ambush force or to the most favorabl e ground i n the
i mmedi ate vi ci ni ty.
Whi l e the engaged el ement conti nues i ts acti on to protect the
convoy, the commander rapi dl y surveys the si tuati on and i ssues
orders to the desi gnated attack el ements to begi n predri l l ed
offensi ve maneuvers agai nst the guerri l l a force. The fi re of the
engaged securi ty el ement i s used to fi x the ambush force and i s
coordi nated wi th that of the attacki ng el ement.
After the guerri l l a force i s destroyed or neutral i zed, securi ty
detai l s are posted to cover convoy reorgani zati on. The convoy
commander, usi ng the fastest communi cati on avai l abl e, bri efs
hi s commander on the engagement. Captured guerri l l a personnel
are i nterrogated as to where they pl anned to reassembl e, and thi s
i nformati on i s reported i mmedi atel y to hi gher headquarters.
After an ambush, patrol s maybe sent to i nterrogate and, i f
necessary, apprehend suspected ci vi l i ans l i vi ng near or al ong the
routes of approach to the ambush posi ti ons.
G-12. Weak convoy security.
a. I f the securi ty detachment accompanyi ng a convoy i s too weak for
deci si ve acti on agai nst a guerri l l a attack or ambush, the
fol l owi ng pri nci pl es appl y:
G- 14
FM 90- 8
(1)
Some of the troops are pl aced wel l forward i n the convoy, and
the remai nder are pl aced a short di stance to the rear.
(2)
Radi o contact i s mai ntai ned between the two groups.
(3)
Sharp curves, steep grades, or other areas where sl ow speeds
are necessary are reconnoi tered by foot troops before
passage.
b.
At the fi rst i ndi cati on of ambush, l eadi ng vehi cl es, i f the road
appears cl ear, i ncrease speed to the safe maxi mum i n an effort to
smash through the ambush area. Troops from vehi cl es hal ted i n
the ambush area di smount and i mmedi atel y return fi re. Troops
from vehi cl es breaki ng through the ambush di smount and
assaul t the fl anks of the ambush posi ti on. Both attacki ng groups
must exerci se care that they do not fi re on each other.
c. I f the enemy force al l ows the mai n convoy to pass through and
then ambushes the rear guard, troops from the mai n body return
and attack the fl anks of the ambush posi ti on.
G- 15
FM 90-8
APPENDIX H
Related Operations
Section I. General
H-1. Five operations.
Thi s appendi x descri bes the fi ve major operati ons found i n i nternal
defense and devel opment, and i n forei gn i nternal defense besi des
tacti cal operati ons. They are: i ntel l i gence, psychol ogi cal operati ons,
ci vi l affai rs, popul ace and resources control , and advi sory assi stance.
H-2. IDAD support.
Whi l e the bri gade commander i s pri mari l y concerned wi th tacti cal
operati ons i n stri ke campai gns, he al so recogni zes that these fi ve
operati ons exi st and support a whol e range of acti vi ti es i n a COI N
program. I n consol i dati on campai gns, these operati ons normal l y take
precedence, and tacti cal operati ons assume a supporti ng rol e. Whi l e
the emphasi s on any si ngl e operati on may shi ft i n response to the
requi rements of the si tuati on, al l of these operati ons occur si mul taneousl y
and conti nuousl y.
Section Il. Intelligence
H-3. Information sources.
a. When operati ng i n a counteri nsurgency envi ronment, the
popul ati on i s consi dered a major source of i ntel l i gence. Si nce the
confl i ct revol ves around the popul ati on, the popul ace usual l y has
a weal th of i nformati on that can be expl oi ted.
b.
I n FI D, i ntel l i gence organi zati on requi rements fal l i nto three
areas: preparedness, advi ce and assi stance, and support of US
uni ts.
(1)
The fi rst area i s preparedness. I n thi s area, i ntel l i gence
requi rements are generated and fi l l ed i n anti ci pati on of a
counteri nsurgency. Thi s i ntel l i gence producti on i s desi gned
to ful fi l l conti ngency requi rements. Exampl es of these
requi rements are background bi ographi es, area studi es, and
order of battl e for guerri l l a forces i n areas l i kel y to become
i nvol ved i n an i nsurgency.
(2)
The second area. i s advi ce and assi stance to host country
i ntel l i gence organi zati ons. Thi s advi ce and assi stance i s
H-1
FM 90-8
desi gned to i ncrease the capabi l i ti es of the host country
i ntel l i gence organi zati on.
(3)
The thi rd area i s desi gned to ful fi l l operati onal requi rements
for commi tted US uni ts.
c. Some of the pri mary objecti ves of US i ntel l i gence organi zati ons
i n FI D are to:
(1)
Determi ne the i ndi cators of an i mpendi ng i nsurgency.
(2)
Obtai n or devel op enemy i ntel l i gence whi ch can be uti l i zed to
l aunch surgi cal stri kes by US forces.
(3)
Obtai n i nformati on about the i nsurgent, weather, terrai n,
and popul ati on.
(4)
Reduce to a mi ni mum i nsurgent espi onage; subversi on, and
sabotage.
(5)
I denti fy the mai n sources of di scontent among the peopl e.
(6)
I denti fy the true nature, ai ms, l eadershi p, potenti al power,
and most l i kel y course of acti on of the i nsurgency.
(7)
I denti fy and penetrate the i nsurgent i nfrastructure.
d.
The i nternal defense i ntel l i gence system consi sts of al l host
country mi l i tary and ci vi l i an i ntel l i gence systems pl us al l US
i ntel l i gence resources whi ch are commi tted i n-country to assi st i n
preventi ng or defeati ng an i nsurgency. These agenci es are
coordi nated and i ntegrated under a si ngl e di rectorshi p i n the
Nati onal I nternal Defense Coordi nati on Center. The i ntel l i gence
resources of commi tted counterguerri l l a forces are an i ntegral
part of thi s i ntel l i gence system. Nati onal agenci es are usual l y
targeted toward more strategi c demands that requi re l ong-term
i ntel l i gence networks and systems. Counterguerri l l a force
i ntel l i gence assets are usual l y targeted toward tacti cal battl efi el d
i ntel l i gence requi rements and use i ntel l i gence gai ned through
nati onal systems.
H-4. Intelligence production.
I ntel l i gence producti on i n counterguerri l l a operati ons i n forei gn
i nternal defense operati ons i s done i n accordance wi th the i ntel l i gence
cycl e whi ch consi sts of di recti ng the i ntel l i gence effort, col l ecti ng raw
i nformati on, processi ng thi s i nformati on i nto fi ni shed i ntel l i gence,
and di ssemi nati ng the i ntel l i gence for use by the commander and hi s
staff.
a. Directing. The i ntel l i gence effort i s di rected by the i ntel l i gence
offi cer. He transl ates the commanders gui dance and concept of
the operati on i nto speci fi c, pri ori ti zed i ntel l i gence requi rements.
H- 2
FM 90- 8
A conti nuousl y updated col l ecti on pl an provi des the i ntel l i gence
offi cer wi th a l ogi cal , orderl y system for di recti ng the col l ecti on
effort. I deal l y, i t ensures that al l i nformati on necessary i s
col l ected i n ti me to be of use and that al l possi bl e sources of
i nformati on are expl oi ted by appropri ate col l ecti on agenci es.
b. Collecting. The need to expl oi t al l sources of i nformati on wi l l
requi re resourceful , fl exi bl e, and aggressi ve di recti on and
coordi nati on of the i ntel l i gence col l ecti on effort. I t i s essenti al
that commanders and i ntel l i gence offi cers be ful l y aware of the
capabi l i ti es and l i mi tati ons of al l avai l abl e i ntel l i gence resources
i n order to make the best use of them. Among the col l ecti on
techni ques empl oyed i s the use of standard procedures as wel l as
the use of expedi ents and i mprovi sati ons necessi tated or
permi tted by l ocal condi ti ons and resources, and the empl oyment
of speci al i zed i ntel l i gence personnel and equi pment whi ch may be
pl aced i n support of the bri gade.
c. Processing. Processi ng i s the phase of the i ntel l i gence cycl e
whereby i nformati on becomes i ntel l i gence. Raw (combat)
i nformati on from al l sources i s eval uated, correl ated, and
anal yzed to produce an al l -source product. The effort to produce
i ntel l i gence necessary to support counterguerri l l a operati ons i n
forei gn i nternal defense wi l l requi re conti nual and cl ose
coordi nati on wi th hi gher, subordi nate, adjacent, supporti ng, and
cooperati ng ci vi l and mi l i tary i ntel l i gence agenci es and el ements.
d.
Disseminating and using. The ti mel y di ssemi nati on of
avai l abl e i ntel l i gence and i ts i mmedi ate use i s of vi tal i mportance
i n counterguerri l l a operati ons i n forei gn i nternal defense.
Pri mary, al ternate, and speci al i ntel l i gence channel s of communi -
cati on may be establ i shed when faci l i ti es and resources permi t.
H-5. Civilian population.
Expl oi tati on of ci vi l i an sources of i nformati on i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons normal l y requi res a sophi sti cated i ntel l i gence organi zati on
whi ch i s resi dent wi thi n the popul ati on. However, as the countergueri l l a
campai gn progresses, the ci vi l i an popul ace can be expected to
vol unteer i ncreasi ng amounts of i ntel l i gence i nformati on wi thi n the
bri gade operati onal area.
a. Type of information. Ci vi l i an sources or i nformants normal l y
may be expected to provi de the fol l owi ng i nformati on:
(1)
Detai l s of the l ocal terrai n.
(2)
I deol ogi cal moti vati on and sympathi es of l ocal resi dents.
(3)
Logi sti cal support avai l abl e, or potenti al l y avai l abl e, to
guerri l l as operati ng i n the area.
H- 3
FM 90- 8
(4)
Potenti al guerri l l a targets or objecti ves.
(5)
I denti fi cati on of covert or part-ti me members of the guerri l l a
for ce.
(6)
Sabotage, espi onage, and terrori sm techni ques and acti vi ti es
of the guerri l l a and underground support organi zati ons.
(7)
Weaknesses and vul nerabi l i ti es of the guerri l l a force.
b.
(8) Psychol ogi cal operati ons by the guerri l l a force and the
i mpact on the l ocal popul ati on.
Information source file. To expedi te the eval uati on of
i nformati on provi ded by the ci vi l i an popul ace, i t may become
necessary for bri gade i ntel l i gence personnel to establ i sh records
whi ch qui ckl y i denti fy l ocal sources of i nformati on and the degree
of rel i abi l i ty of such sources. When establ i shed, thi s i nformati on
source fi l e shoul d i ncl ude such i nformati on as:
(1)
Name, photograph, and physi cal descri pti on of source.
(2)
Area i n whi ch source(s) can obtai n i nformati on.
(3)
Factors contri buti ng to sources moti vati on to cooperate
wi th countergueri l l a forces.
(4) I nformati on col l ecti on capabi l i ti es of source, to i ncl ude
i ndi cati on of trai ni ng recei ved.
(5)
Method by whi ch source i s contacted.
(6) Record of payments or other remunerati on, i f made to source.
(7)
Record of producti vi ty and rel i abi l i ty of source.
c. Overt exploitation of civilian sources. I n overt expl oi tati on,
a source i s contacted openl y by the i ntel l i gence offi cer or one of hi s
recogni zabl e agenci es, and i nformati on i s sol i ci ted di rectl y. Thi s
method has the advantage of provi di ng for the i mmedi ate
col l ecti on of i nformati on, but frequentl y entai l s si gni fi cant
di sadvantages, to i ncl ude:
(1)
The i nformati on requi rements of the bri gade or battal i on are
made apparent to the source, thus entai l i ng a securi ty ri sk.
(2)
The source may not cooperate ful l y because of l ack of
moti vati on or because of fear of repri sal .
d.
Clandestine exploitation of civilian sources. Cl andesti ne
i ntel l i gence techni ques are necessary i n counterguerri l l a
operati ons i n forei gn i nternal defense to compl ement overt
col l ecti on efforts i n determi ni ng l ocati on, strength, and capabi l i ty
of guerri l l a forces, underground cel l s, and ci vi l i an supporters.
Normal l y, at bri gade or battal i on l evel , i t i s di ffi cul t, i f not
i mpossi bl e, to establ i sh an ori gi nal cl andesti ne col l ecti on or
H- 4
FM 90- 8
i nformant system duri ng the ti me the bri gade or battal i on i s i n a
parti cul ar area of operati ons. Therefore, the S2 shoul d support
and uti l i ze rel i abl e i nformant or cl andesti ne col l ecti on operati ons
bei ng conducted by other US, al l i ed, or host country agenci es
wi thi n the bri gade or battal i on area of i nterest. I ntel l i gence
col l ected through cl andesti ne expl oi tati on of ci vi l i an sources of
i nformati on i s made avai l abl e to counterguerri l l a commanders
through an area control center, joi nt operati ons-i ntel l i gence
center, or a si mi l ar faci l i ty establ i shed to coordi nate i nternal
defense and devel opment operati ons.
H-6. Counterintelligence.
Counteri ntel l i gence i ncreases the securi ty of al l forces and i ncreases
the probabi l i ty of attai ni ng surpri se i n operati ons agai nst guerri l l a
forces. Adequate securi ty measures are devel oped and conti nuousl y
enforced to prevent penetrati on of the i ntel l i gence operati on by hosti l e
el ements and to detect hosti l e el ements al ready wi thi n the operati on.
Si nce guerri l l a forces are usual l y numeri cal l y i nferi or to those of the
host country, al l i ed, and US forces opposi ng them, the guerri l l a
depends heavi l y on i ntel l i gence for successful operati ons. US bri gades,
i n coordi nati on wi th host country authori ti es, must habi tual l y pl ace
emphasi s on counteri ntel l i gence measures.
a. Denial measures. Deni al measures parti cul arl y appl i cabl e to
counterguerri l l a operati ons may i ncl ude:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Removal of compromi sed i nformant sources from the area of
oper ati ons.
Restri cti ons on movement and communi cati on faci l i ti es of
the ci vi l i an popul ati on wi thi n the area of operati ons.
Thorough bri efi ng of al l US, al l i ed, and attached host
country personnel i n the i ntel l i gence practi ces and techni ques
used by the guerri l l a and hi s underground support organi zati on
and on the securi ty of i nformati on.
Emphasi s on the secure di sposal of trash and waste matter.
Empl oyment of si l ent weapons by patrol s.
Normal acti vi ty, whi l e prepari ng for operati ons, to precl ude
i ndi cati on to the guerri l l a force of a change i n routi ne.
Mai ntenance of stri ct securi ty concerni ng current or
projected l ogi sti cal movements and the nature of suppl i es.
Conduct of major troop movements under the conceal ment of
darkness or duri ng i ncl ement weather and by the most rapi d
means of movement avai l abl e.
H- 5
FM 90- 8
b. Detection measures. Appropri ate detecti on measures i n
counterguerri l l a operati ons may i ncl ude:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Background i nvesti gati ons and screeni ng of al l ci vi l i ans
empl oyed by, or operati ng wi th, US and host country forces,
and those i n ci vi l posi ti ons. Parti cul ar attenti on i s gi ven to
the control of gui des or trackers who are fami l i ar wi th the
l ocati on, di sposi ti on, and objecti ves of the fri endl y forces.
Survei l l ance of al l known or suspected members of the
guerri l l a force and i ts i nfrastructure.
Extensi ve empl oyment of tri p fl ares and ambushes i n areas
of suspected guerri l l a reconnai ssance acti vi ty.
Empl oyment of i nfantry scout dogs, i f avai l abl e, i n conjuncti on
wi th other securi ty measures.
Maxi mum emphasi s on vi sual and el ectroni c observati on.
Augmentati on of organi c vi sual ai ds and el ectroni c detecti on
devi ces i s frequentl y requi red.
Moni tori ng ci vi l communi cati on medi a.
Empl oyment of ci vi l pol i cewomen for search and i nterrogati on
of women and chi l dren.
Counteri ntel l i gence screeni ng of the enti re popul ati on of
settl ements suspected of i ntel l i gence acti vi ti es i n support of
guerri l l a force.
Wi de di stri buti on of photographs of known guerri l l as or key
underground personnel to assi st i n the apprehensi on.
Offeri ng rewards for i nformati on l eadi ng to the capture of
i nformants or other agents supporti ng the guerri l l a force.
Peri odi c photographs of al l resi dents of vi l l ages wi thi n the
guerri l l a area of i nfl uence and compari son of these photo-
graphs to determi ne addi ti ons to, or del eti ons from, the
popul ati on duri ng the i nteri m peri od.
I ssue of cl osel y control l ed i denti fi cati on cards to al l resi dents
of the area of operati ons. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons,
counteri ntel l i gence acti vi ti es normal l y are compl i cated by
the presence of l arge numbers of ci vi l i ans of unknown
rel i ance; i t i s di ffi cul t to di sti ngui sh among the fri endl y,
neutral , and hosti l e el ements. Al l possi bl e securi ty measures
whi ch faci l i tate i denti fi cati on of these el ements are empl oyed
conti nual l y.
c. Deception measures. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons, uni ts
habi tual l y pl an and execute smal l -scal e cover and decepti on.
H- 6
FM 90- 8
Section Ill. Psychological Operations
H-7. Create support.
Psychol ogi cal operati ons i n forei gn i nternal defense i ncl ude propaganda
and other measures to i nfl uence the opi ni ons, emoti ons, atti tudes, and
behavi or of hosti l e, neutral , or fri endl y groups to support the
achi evement of nati onal objecti ves. (For further i nformati on on
psychol ogi cal operati ons, see FM 33-1.)
H-8. Brigade PSYOP.
The purpose of bri gade psychol ogi cal operati ons i s to enhance the
probabi l i ty of accompl i shi ng the bri gades vari ous forei gn i nternal
defense mi ssi ons. Thi s i s achi eved by empl oyi ng psychol ogi cal
pri nci pl es to l essen or expl oi t the effects of tacti cal or nontacti cal
operati ons upon the popul ati on and/or the guerri l l a force.
H-9. Concept.
a. The overal l psychol ogi cal operati on program for a gi ven host
country i s establ i shed at the nati onal l evel by a US-host country
agency. Thi s program provi des gui del i nes for succeedi ng l ower
mi l i tary and ci vi l an echel ons to use i n the quest for popul ar
suppor t.
b. Counterguerri l l a uni ts must ensure that thei r PSYOP i s consi stent
wi th and supports US nati onal objecti ves and the host country
nati onal PSYOP program. The bri gade empl oys psychol ogi cal
operati ons to support i ts tacti cal stri ke and consol i dati on
mi ssi ons and to support i ntel l i gence operati ons, ci vi l affai rs
operati ons, and advi sory assi stance operati ons. Care i s exerci sed
to ensure that the al l egi ance of the peopl e i s di rected toward the
host country rather than toward US bri gade forces, and that
announced programs and projects are attai nabl e. Coordi nati on i s
accompl i shed i n the l ocal area control center.
H-10. Organization.
a. The psychol ogi cal operati ons staff offi cer(s) and uni t(s) perform
assi gned mi ssi ons i n the same manner as other speci al i zed uni ts
or staff members that are attached to, or pl aced i n support of, the
bri gade or battal i on. When such support i s not avai l abl e, a
member or secti on of the uni t staff i s assi gned responsi bi l i ty for
i ncorporati ng psychol ogi cal operati on consi derati ons i nto pl ans,
acti on, and operati ons.
H- 7
FM 90- 8
b.
Psychol ogi cal operati on resources are provi ded ei ther from
hi gher headquarters uni ts or from TOE resources. Psychol ogi cal
operati on uni ts provi de, i n addi ti on to advi ce, support i n the form
of l oudspeaker teams, l eafl ets, and vari ous other audi ovi sual
medi a.
H-11. Operations.
a. Properl y i ntegrated and empl oyed i n the pl anni ng and conduct of
operati ons and acti vi ti es, psychol ogi cal operati ons can faci l i tate
the accompl i shment of the bri gades mi ssi on. Counterguerri l l a
forces must consi der the empl oyment of psychol ogi cal operati ons
i n al l mi ssi ons. Commanders and staff offi cers must real i ze that
al l mi l i tary operati ons have psychol ogi cal i mpl i cati ons. PSYOP
offi cers must be i ncl uded i n pl anni ng al l acti vi ti es.
b.
The establ i shment of support bases and operati onal support
bases necessi tates gai ni ng the support of the popul ace i n the
vi ci ni ty. Propaganda themes stress the purpose of US support
and the mi l i tary ci vi c acti on program; the need for l aborers; the
effects of pi l ferage on the counterguerri l l a effort; and that peopl e
do not di scuss US and host country mi l i tary acti vi ti es.
c. Wi thi n an i nsurgency context, PSYOP has fi ve major objecti ves:
(1)
Assi st the government i n gai ni ng the support of i ts popu-
l ati on.
(2)
Assi st the government i n defeati ng the i nsurgent movement.
(3)
Assi st the government i n provi di ng psychol ogi cal rehabi l i -
tati on for returnees from the subversi ve i nsurgent move-
ment.
(4)
Establ i sh and mai ntai n a favorabl e i mage i n the host
countr y.
(5)
I nfl uence neutral groups and the worl d communi ty.
d .
The major tasks of US PSYOP i n an i nsurgency (when US combat
forces are not yet commi tted) are to:
(1)
Advi se host country PSYOP personnel on how to best expl oi t
government programs.
(2)
Recommend techni ques for mai ntai ni ng moral e of host
country forces.
(3) Assi st host country and US i nformati on agenci es and
acti vi ti es i n coordi nati ng thei r efforts.
(4)
Assi st host country personnel regardi ng PSYOP programs
whi ch wi l l moti vate the peopl e to acti vel y support thei r
government.
H- 8
FM 90- 8
(5)
Recommend programs whi ch wi l l adversel y affect the i n-
sur gent.
e. The major tasks of US PSYOP personnel i n an i nsurgency (when
US combat forces have been commi tted) are to:
(1)
Coordi nate PSYOP acti vi ti es wi th host country uni ts.
(2)
Advi se US and host country commanders regardi ng
i nsurgent acti vi ti es and effects.
(3)
Advi se US commanders regardi ng the psychol ogi cal effects
of mi l i tary acti ons.
(4)
Assi st i n devel opi ng a PSYOP capabi l i ty wi thi n host
country mi l i tary forces.
f.
There are fi ve major target groups for PSYOP: the i nsurgent, the
popul ati on supporti ng the i nsurgent, the uncommi tted popul ati on,
government personnel , and forei gn audi ences. Themes are
tai l ored to each of these groups to gai n maxi mum effecti ve
support for the government.
g.
When targeti ng the i nsurgent:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The major PSYOP objecti ve i s to di scredi t the i nsurgent and
to i sol ate hi m from the popul ati on.
The most i mportant di recti on of attack i s agai nst i nsurgent
uni t moral e.
Themes shoul d publ i ci ze and expl oi t di fferences between
cadre, recrui ts, supporters, and the l ocal popul ati on. Other
themes mi ght stress l ack of support, i sol ati on, homesi ckness,
and hardshi ps.
Amnesty programs often prove useful i n neutral i zi ng
i nsurgences. Amnesty programs are most effecti ve when
they are si ncere, credi bl e, wel l publ i ci zed, di rected agai nst
l ower ranki ng members of the i nsurgency, and offer
suffi ci ent reason and benefi ts for qui tti ng the i nsurgent
thr eat.
Amnesty programs do, however, have several di sadvantages:
they recogni ze the i nsurgents as quasi -l egi ti mate; they forgo
puni shment of anyone accepti ng amnesty; and they i ncrease
the i mage of the i nsurgent threat.
h.
When targeti ng the popul ati on supporti ng the i nsurgent:
(1)
The PSYOP objecti ve i s to achi eve wi thdrawal of support for
the i nsurgent and defecti on i n pl ace or person to the
l egi ti mate government.
(2)
Themes shoul d hi ghl i ght i nsurgent shortcomi ngs, ul ti mate
governmental vi ctory, government successes, and the
H- 9
160-739 O - 94 - 9
FM 90- 8
practi cal advantages of surrenderi ng or of accepti ng
amnesty.
i . When targeti ng the uncommi tted popul ati on:
(1)
The major PSYOP mi ssi on i s to bui l d nati onal moral e, uni ty,
and confi dence i n the government.
(2)
There shoul d al so be a major effort to wi n popul ar acceptance
of the government force, and convi nce the peopl e that
government programs serve thei r i nterests, government
forces can protect them, ul ti mate government vi ctory i s
assured, and the peopl e have major i ntel l i gence and
counteri ntel l i gence rol es to pl ay.
j.
When targeti ng government personnel :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Seek to mai ntai n l oyal ti es and devel op pol i ci es and atti tudes
whi ch wi l l resul t i n group members who wi l l real i ze the
i mportance of popul ar support, promote publ i c wel fare and
justi ce, take acti on to el i mi nate the basi c causes of the
subversi ve i nsurgency, and protect the popul ati on from the
subversi ve i nsurgent.
I ndoctri nate host country securi ty and mi l i tary forces
regardi ng the i mportance of the ci vi l i an popul ati on i n I DAD
operati ons. Each sol di er must understand that hi s acti ons
toward the peopl e may spel l the di fference between success
and fai l ure.
When government personnel i nteract wi th neutral and
nonhosti l e el ements of the popul ati on, the emphasi s shoul d
be posi ti ve and constructi ve. PSYOP efforts shoul d publ i ci ze
the tangi bl e and vi si bl e accompl i shments of the l egi ti mate
government.
PSYOP shoul d di scourage publ i c apathy and acti vi ty that
hel ps the i nsurgent.
The peopl e shoul d not be asked to undertake any acti vi ty
whi ch i s contrary to thei r own best i nterests.
k.
When targeti ng forei gn audi ences, there are two major groups to
be addressed: neutral nati ons and hosti l e nati ons. For neutral
nati ons, the purpose of PSYOP i s to achi eve fri endl y neutral i ty or
acti ve support for the l egi ti mate government. For hosti l e powers,
the major PSYOP objecti ve i s to i nfl uence publ i c opi ni on agai nst
i nvol vement i n supporti ng the i nsurgency.
l . US PSYOP attempts to establ i sh and mai ntai n a favorabl e US
i mage. The themes most useful i n establ i shi ng an i mage are that
the US presence i s requested by host country government, i t i s
l egal and necessary, i t i s temporary, and i t i s advi sory.
H- 10
FM 90- 8
m.
n.
o.
I n combat acti ons, every effort i s made to provi de for the safety of
the ci vi l i an popul ati on and, i f possi bl e, to separate them from the
guerri l l a forces so that maxi mum avai l abl e fi repower can be
empl oyed agai nst the guerri l l a. The deci si on to empl oy psychol ogi cal
operati on medi a to accompl i sh thi s task i s careful l y wei ghed
agai nst compromi si ng surpri se and securi ty.
I ntel l i gence operati ons are faci l i tated by empl oyi ng psychol ogi cal
operati on medi a to i nform the peopl e that they shoul d report to the
proper authori ty i nformati on pertai ni ng to strangers, suspi ci ous
persons, unusual acti vi ti es by nei ghbors, and guerri l l a acti vi ti es.
Posters and l eafl ets provi de defi ni ti ve i nstructi on as to persons
and pl aces that are avai l abl e to recei ve thi s i nformati on. The
message i ndi cates what rewards, i f any, are avai l abl e.
Captured or defected l eaders of the guerri l l a force are expl oi ted.
Wri tten and broadcast messages prepared by these i ndi vi dual s
and revi ewed by trai ned psychol ogi cal operati on personnel are
used i n communi ti es suspected of supporti ng guerri l l a forces, and
i n tacti cal operati ons agai nst guerri l l a forces.
Section IV. Civil Affairs
H-12. Gover nment-bui l di ng.
a. The ci vi l affai rs (CA) rol e i n FI D takes the form of ci vi c assi stance
and ci vi c acti on.
b.
Ci vi c assi stance i s defi ned as provi di ng advi ce and assi stance to
i ndi genous ci vi l and mi l i tary authori ti es i n the soci ol ogi cal ,
economi c, and pol i ti cal aspects of a ci vi l emergency, di sorder, or
I DAD. I t i s commonl y referred to as government-bui l di ng si nce
i t i s di rected toward the structures of government. Mi l i tary ci vi c
acti on i s defi ned as the parti ci pati on fi ndi genous mi l i tary forces
i n short-term projects whi ch are useful to the l ocal popul ati on and
whi ch contri bute to soci al and economi c devel opment.
c. Ci vi c acti on programs are di vi ded i nto l ong-range and short-range
programs. The former deal s wi th the resol uti on of soci al and
economi c probl ems; the l atter i s desi gned to gai n and retai n the
l oyal ty of the popul ati on.
d. CA operati ons are a responsi bi l i ty of mi l i tary commanders at
every echel on. They i ncl ude any acti vi ty of mi l i tary forces
concerned wi th rel ati onshi ps between the mi l i tary forces and the
ci vi l authori ti es and peopl e i n the area. Acti vi ti es may range from
mi l i tary ci vi c acti on projects to the exerci se of certai n authori ty
that normal l y i s the responsi bi l i ty of the l ocal government.
H-11
FM 90- 8
H-13. Operational scope.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
The scope of CA operati ons vari es wi th the type of l ocal
government and i s i nfl uenced by the economi c, soci al , and
pol i ti cal background of the country and peopl e. Some major CA
acti vi ti es i ncl ude:
(1)
Preventi on of ci vi l i an i nterference wi th mi l i tary operati ons.
(2)
Support of government functi ons.
(3)
Communi ty rel ati ons.
(4)
Mi l i tary ci vi c acti on.
(5)
Assi stance for popul ace and resources control .
(6)
Ci vi l defense.
The overal l objecti ve of CA i n FI D i s to mobi l i ze and moti vate
ci vi l i ans to assi st the government and mi l i tary forces. The
operati ons are di rected at el i mi nati ng or reduci ng mi l i tary,
pol i ti cal , economi c, and soci ol ogi cal probl ems. Cl ose and
conti nuous PSYOP support i s needed to maxi mi ze the effect of
CA.
Al l mi l i tary uni ts have a capabi l i ty to conduct CA, parti cul arl y
mi l i tary ci vi c acti on. Major rol es i n mi l i tary ci vi c acti on are
frequentl y undertaken by engi neer, transportati on, medi cal , and
other uni ts havi ng assets sui ted to support mi l i tary ci vi c acti on
pr ojects.
There are several judgmental factors that shoul d be consi dered
before a mi l i tary uni t undertakes a ci vi c acti on project:
(1)
I s the project needed and wanted?
(2)
Wi l l mi l i tary parti ci pati on compromi se ci vi l i an authori ty
and responsi bi l i ty?
(3)
Does the project support the uni ts pol i ti cal -mi l i tary
mi ssi on?
(4)
Does the project compl y wi th the host country FI D pl an?
(5)
Wi l l the project dupl i cate other efforts?
(6)
Wi l l the peopl e be i nvol ved i n the project?
(7)
Wi l l there be conti nui ty of effort?
Both ci vi c assi stance and ci vi c acti on are geared to the phase of
i nsurgency they are faci ng.
H- 12
FM 90- 8
H-14. US role.
a. The normal rol e of the US mi l i tary i n ci vi c assi stance and ci vi c
acti on i s to advi se and assi st host nati on mi l i tary forces. Under
some rare condi ti ons, US mi l i tary uni ts may enter i nto di rect ci vi c
acti on programs.
b.
Uni ts as smal l as a battal i on task force may be assi gned CA
el ements to assi st i n carryi ng out CA pl ans. A ci vi l -mi l i tary
operati ons staff offi cer may al so be assi gned to such a task force.
c. CA l i ai son and coordi nati on shoul d be establ i shed between
mi l i tary forces and government agenci es. Thi s can be accompl i shed
through organi zati ons speci fi cal l y desi gned for thi s purpose or
through CA staff el ements.
d. CA operati ons requi re good rel ati onshi ps wi th the popul ati on. To
establ i sh a good rel ati onshi p, troop di sci pl i ne, courtesy, and
honesty i n deal i ngs wi th the peopl e are emphasi zed. Where
rapport has been establ i shed between host country forces and the
popul ati on, properl y admi ni stered CA operati ons contri bute to
the attai nment of FI D objecti ves.
H-15. Planning five phases.
a.
CA pl anni ng i ncl udes pol i ti cal , economi c, soci al , psychol ogi cal ,
and mi l i tary consi derati ons. These consi derati ons i ncl ude:
(1)
A nati onal devel opment pl an that i nvol ves projects whi ch
support devel opment programs that meet the needs and
desi res of the peopl e. Ci vi c acti ons projects conducted si mpl y
for the want of somethi ng to do may be counterproducti ve.
(2)
Mi l i tary ci vi c acti on projects conducted by mi l i tary forces.
(3)
CA personnel and uni ts requi red to support host country
agenci es at subnati onal l evel s.
(4)
CA mobi l e trai ni ng team requi rements and resources.
(5)
CA trai ni ng program requi rements for host country and
al l i ed forces.
(6)
CA requi rements to provi de (where needed) government
admi ni strati on i n areas of the country.
b.
CA responsi bi l i ti es assi gned to a tacti cal uni t commander may
requi re the empl oyment of speci al i zed ci vi l affai rs personnel or
uni ts. Host country CA pl ans shoul d i ncl ude provi si ons for CA
support to tacti cal uni t commanders. (For further i nformati on on
CA organi zati on, see FM 41-10.)
c. Emphasi s on mi l i tary ci vi c acti on vari es wi th the i ntensi ty of
i nsurgent acti vi ti es. Whatever the l evel of mi l i tary ci vi c acti on,
H- 13
FM 90- 8
d.
e.
projects are pl anned and coordi nated wi th i nternal devel opment
programs. Duri ng Phase I of an i nsurgency, mi l i tary ci vi c acti on
concentrates on the devel opment of the soci o-economi c envi ronment.
I n the absence of tacti cal operati ons, many mi l i tary resources
may be devoted to mi l i tary ci vi c acti on projects provi di ng both
l ong-range and short-range benefi ts.
Duri ng Phases I I and I I I , mi l i tary ci vi c acti on i s concentrated on
projects desi gned to prevent i ntensi fi cati on of the i nsurgency.
These projects produce noti ceabl e i mprovements i n a rel ati vel y
short ti me. Exampl es of such projects are farm-to-market roads,
bri dges, short-range educati onal programs, basi c hygi ene,
medi cal i mmuni zati on programs, and si mpl e i rri gati on projects.
Advi ce i s sought on projects to ensure they are needed, wanted,
and coi nci de wi th devel opment pl ans for the area. I n the
advanced stages of i nsurgency, pri ori ti es on mi l i tary operati ons
may reduce mi l i tary ci vi c acti on to such i mmedi ate tasks as
provi di ng medi cal ai d to ci vi l i ans and procuri ng and di stri buti ng
food and shel ter for di spl aced persons.
Section V. Populace and Resources Control
H-16. Population protection.
a. Popul ati on and resources control (P&RC) operati ons are general l y
cl assi fi ed as nontacti cal , pol i ce-type operati ons.
b. Popul ace and resources control i s government acti on to protect
the popul ace and i ts materi el resources and to deny those resources
whi ch woul d further hosti l e objecti ves agai nst the government.
c. The objecti ve of popul ace and resources control operati ons i s to
assi st i n preservi ng or reestabl i shi ng a state of l aw and order
wi thi n a nati on or area. There are three mai n tasks i nvol ved i n
reachi ng thi s objecti ve:
(1)
Provi di ng securi ty for the popul ace.
(2)
Detecti ng and neutral i zi ng the i nsurgent apparatus.
(3)
Severi ng any rel ati onshi p between the i nsurgent and the
popul ace.
H-17. Forces avai l abl e.
a. There are three forces avai l abl e to conduct popul ace and resources
control operati ons:
(1)
The ci vi l pol i ce are the fi rst l i ne of defense i n the battl e
agai nst an i nsurgency.
H- 14
FM 90- 8
(2)
Parami l i tary forces may augment or assi st the ci vi l pol i ce.
(3) The nati on's mi l i tary forces shoul d reempl oyed onl y when
ci vi l pol i ce and parami l i tary uni ts cannot cope wi th the
i nsurgent acti vi ty. Even then, pri ori ty shoul d be gi ven to
empl oyi ng mi l i tary pol i ce uni ts rather than combat forces.
b.
Control of the popul ace and resources shoul d be performed by host
country agenci es. Thi s i s a matter of practi cal i ty, but there are
al so l egal and psychol ogi cal i mpl i cati ons. US mi l i tary shoul d be
used as a l ast resort and onl y as augmentati on to host country
uni ts. Mi l i tary pol i ce shoul d be uti l i zed before combat troops.
c. Popul ace and resources control measures can be cl assi fi ed i nto
three categori es:
(1)
Survei l l ance of i ndi vi dual s, groups, acti vi ti es, or l ocati ons
by overt or covert means.
(2)
Restri cti ons such as curfews, travel permi ts, regi strati on of
fi rearms, nati onal regi strati on and i denti fi cati on of al l
persons, and control of sel ected foodstuffs, medi cal suppl i es,
and equi pment.
(3) Enforcement through the use of roadbl ocks, checkpoi nts,
rewards, amnesty programs, and sel ecti ve i nspecti ons of
homes at ni ght.
d.
These control measures shoul d be wel l -pl anned and coordi nated
to ensure rapi d and effi ci ent operati ons, wi th a mi ni mum of del ay
and i nconveni ence to the peopl e.
e. Popul ace and resources control i s desi gned to compl ement and
support other counterguerri l l a operati ons and envi ronmental
i mprovements bei ng conducted by the mi l i tary forces, and to
contri bute to the overal l stabi l i ty of the country or the operati onal
ar ea.
H-18. Central theme.
a. The central theme of popul ace and resources control i s popul ati on
protecti on and resource management. PSYOP shoul d convey thi s
theme and be desi gned to accompl i sh the fol l owi ng:
(1)
Persuade the peopl e to accept the necessary measures,
pri ori ty to thei r i mpl ementati on.
(2)
Convi nce the peopl e that thei r ful l support wi l l mi ni mi ze the
i nconveni ence of the measures.
(3)
Pl ace the bl ame for any i nconveni ences or di scomfort
squarel y upon the i nsurgents.
b.
Border operati ons are taken (as part of popul ace and resources
control ) to i sol ate the i nsurgent from hi s outsi de support. Outsi de
H- 15
FM 90- 8
support covers a vari ety of acti vi ti es. I t may range from provi si on
of funds and trai ni ng of i ndi vi dual i nsurgents by an outsi de
power to provi di ng an acti ve sanctuary for combat forces.
c. The most frequent popul ace and resources control operati ons US
uni ts may parti ci pate i n are:
(1) Border operati ons.
(2) Cordon and search.
(3) Augmentati on of enforcement operati ons (roadbl ocks,
checkpoi nts).
Section VI. Advisory Assistance
H-19. Tactical backup.
a. Advi sory assi stance i s advi ce and assi stance provi ded by US
personnel to host country regul ar, parami l i tary, and i rregul ar
forces and to ci vi l i an agenci es to hel p them become effecti ve i n the
performance of thei r mi ssi ons.
b.
These acti vi ti es support and, i n turn, are supported by tacti cal
operati ons, i ntel l i gence operati ons, psychol ogi cal operati ons,
popul ace and resources control operati ons, and mi l i tary ci vi c
acti on. Such assi stance i s desi gned to:
(1)
Provi de mi l i tary assi stance i n conjuncti on wi th the Navy
and Ai r Force to the host country.
(2)
Parti ci pate wi th other servi ces i n joi nt i nternal defense
trai ni ng and exerci ses as mutual l y agreed upon by the
servi ces concerned.
(3)
Provi de mobi l e trai ni ng teams, combat servi ce support, and
combat support to advi se, trai n, assi st, and support host
country forces.
H-20. Army assistance.
a. The pri mary purpose of US Army assi stance i s to i ncrease the
capabi l i ti es of host country armed forces.
b. The bri gade may be requi red to organi ze, trai n, equi p, and advi se
host country ci vi l and mi l i tary personnel and uni ts to perform
counterguerri l l a mi ssi ons. Tasks i ncl ude:
(1)
Organi zi ng, equi ppi ng, trai ni ng, and advi si ng parami l i tary
and i rregul ar forces (l ocal l y recrui ted) to assume l ocal
defense mi ssi ons from the bri gade.
(2)
Equi ppi ng, trai ni ng, and advi si ng host country regul ar
armed forces on new equi pment provi ded by mi l i tary
H- 16
FM 90- 8
assi stance programs (MAP) and forei gn mi l i tary sal es
(FMS).
(3) Organi zi ng, equi ppi ng, trai ni ng, and advi si ng host country
pol i ce organi zati ons.
(4)
Advi si ng host country regul ar armed forces, parami l i tary
forces, and l ocal governments i n al l aspects of i nternal
defense and devel opment.
c. Bri gade advi sory assi stance to host country personnel and
organi zati ons, as di fferenti ated from mi l i tary ci vi c acti on,
usual l y i s performed to extend securi ty assi stance acti vi ti es. Such
acti vi ti es as organi zi ng, equi ppi ng, trai ni ng, and advi si ng host
country forces may be accompl i shed whi l e i n base areas or duri ng
the defensi ve phase of consol i dati on operati ons of counterguerri l l a
tacti cal operati ons.
d.
I f US mi l i tary assi stance organi zati ons are operati onal , advi sors
usual l y are provi ded for thi s purpose. However, i n cases where US
advi sors or mobi l e trai ni ng teams are not avai l abl e, bri gades may
be requi red to assume thi s functi on. Advi sory assi stance i s
coordi nated cl osel y wi th both the i nternal defense and the
i nternal devel opment programs through the l ocal area control
center .
H-21. Brigade organization.
a. Al l bri gade organi zati ons shoul d be prepared to provi de
i ndi vi dual s or teams capabl e of performi ng advi sory assi stance
wi thi n thei r areas of speci al i zati on, i f the need ari ses. Organi zati on
for advi sory assi stance operati ons may requi re the tai l ori ng of
speci fi c teams to accompl i sh speci fi c mi ssi ons:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Mi l i tary pol i ce, augmented by bri gade el ements, may be
requi red to trai n host country mi l i tary pol i ce organi zati ons
i n the area, whi l e combi ned arms teams may be requi red to
trai n l ocal host country arti l l ery and armor uni ts i n arti l l ery
and armor tacti cs and techni ques.
Trai ni ng centers may be requi red i f the trai ni ng l oad i s
suffi ci ent to warrant them.
Teams from bri gade uni ts may be organi zed for on-duty
trai ni ng of host country speci al i sts. These speci al i sts are
trai ned i n the use of speci al i zed equi pment whi ch i s organi c
to bri gades but whi ch wi l l be suppl i ed to host country forces
at some future date.
Mobi l e trai ni ng teams formed by the bri gade may be
di spatched to l ocal host country forces to conduct trai ni ng at
host country uni t bases or trai ni ng centers.
H- 17
FM 90- 8
b.
Advi sory assi stance operati ons i nherentl y i nvol ve the requi rement
to use advi sory techni ques. Consequentl y, tact, di screti on,
l anguage qual i fi cati on, expertness i n the subject, and other
qual i fi cati ons normal l y associ ated wi th US advi sors and
advi sory operati ons must be stressed. (For further i nformati on on
pol i cy governi ng advi sory assi stance acti vi ti es, see FM 100-5 and
FM 100-20.)
H- 18
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX I
Staff Functions
I-1. General.
Thi s appendi x descri bes some of the major functi ons and duti es of staff
personnel that are i nherent i n counterguerri l l a operati ons.
I -2. Executi ve offi cer (XO).
a.
The duti es and responsi bi l i ti es of the XO are tai l ored to the desi res
and wi shes of the commander.
b.
These duti es and responsi bi l i ti es encompass four major tasks:
(1)
Coordi nate al l staff functi ons.
(2)
Assume command i n the absence of the commander.
(3)
Prepare for future operati ons.
(4)
Ensure that l i ai son and coordi nati on are conducted wi th
hi gher headquarters by the appropri ate staff secti ons, as
needed.
I-3. Adjutant (S1).
a. The S1 i s responsi bl e for prepari ng the personnel esti mate and
provi di ng i nput on the effects of personnel status on operati ons.
b. I n addi ti on to thi s vi tal functi on, there are several other tasks that
the S1 must accompl i sh:
(1)
Mai ntai n uni t strength reports.
(2)
Process wounded i n acti on.
(3)
Process ki l l ed i n acti on.
(4)
Process pri soners of war (PW).
(5)
Mai ntai n uni t moral e.
(6)
Mai ntai n di sci pl i ne, l aw, and order.
I-4. Intelligence officer (S2).
a. I n counterguerri l l a operati ons, the S2 i s the dri vi ng force for al l
operati ons. Wi thout ti mel y, accurate i ntel l i gence and current
esti mates of enemy courses of acti on and l ocati ons, the S3 cannot
pl an for tacti cal operati ons wi th any degree of success.
I-1
FM 90- 8
b.
To ful fi l l thi s vi tal rol e, the S2 must:
(1)
Mai ntai n current i ntel l i gence i nformati on.
(2)
Devel op and i nterpret i ntel l i gence i nformati on.
(3)
Gather i ntel l i gence i nformati on.
(4)
Determi ne l i kel y and suspected enemy targets.
(5)
Prepare for future operati ons.
c. Some of the i tems the S2 accompl i shes, to compl ete hi s tasks,
i ncl ude:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Updati ng si tuati on map based upon current i ntel l i gence
r epor ts.
Col l ecti ng, i nterpreti ng, and di ssemi nati ng i nformati on
concerni ng the effects of weather, terrai n, and the guerri l l a
force on the battal i on mi ssi on.
Supervi si ng the i ntel l i gence acti vi ti es of attached and
supporti ng el ements.
Moni tori ng command and i ntel l i gence communi cati ons nets
at al l ti mes.
Requesti ng i ntel l i gence reports from vari ous sources (hi gher
uni ts, attachments) and l oggi ng reports i n the S2 journal .
Ensuri ng that the S2 secti on recei ves si tuati on reports from
the S3 secti on, tacti cal fi re di recti on system (TACFI RE), and
attachments accordi ng to the i nternal tacti cal operati ons
center communi cati ons SOP.
Eval uati ng and i nterpreti ng i ntel l i gence i nformati on and
determi ni ng enemy probabl e course(s) of acti on.
Di ssemi nati ng i ntel l i gence i nformati on to hi s commander,
staff, hi gher headquarters, uni ts or attachments, and
adjacent uni ts accordi ng to SOP.
Supervi si ng and control l i ng reconnai ssance and survei l l ance
pl ans (i n coordi nati on wi th the battal i on S3).
Bri efi ng and debri efi ng patrol s operati ng i n accordance wi th
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance pl ans.
Determi ni ng reconnai ssance patrol pl ans, reports, and the
use of scouts (recommends use of same to S3).
Supervi si ng the i nterrogati on of PWs, to i ncl ude ci vi l i ans
who may have i nformati on of i mmedi ate tacti cal val ue.
Exami ni ng captured enemy documents and expedi ti ng
evacuati on of PWs and captured materi el to hi gher head-
quarters after coordi nati ng wi th the S4. Unl ess the S2 i s
I-2
FM 90- 8
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
l anguage-qual i fi ed, or has an i nterpreter attached and
avai l abl e, documents and materi al s shoul d be forwarded
i mmedi atel y to hi gher headquarters where qual i fi ed personnel
can conduct i nterrogati ons and/or exami nati ons.
Pl anni ng, supervi si ng, and coordi nati ng wi th the S3 to
ensure al l reconnai ssance, survei l l ance, target acqui si ti on
(RSTA) devi ces mai ntai n as compl ete coverage of the area of
operati on as possi bl e.
Coordi nati ng wi th the S3 to ensure the reconnai ssance and
survei l l ance pl an and the l i mi ted vi si bi l i ty pl an are adjusted
as needed by the tacti cal si tuati on.
Supervi si ng and control l i ng the operati on of the scout
pl atoon i n the executi on of i ntel l i gence mi ssi ons.
Ori gi nati ng requests and screeni ng requests from staff
el ements and subordi nate uni ts for ai r reconnai ssance.
Anal yzi ng ai r photos and i magery-anal ysi s reports recei ved
from bri gade.
Supervi si ng the destructi on of cl assi fi ed materi al s i n
accordance wi th the uni ts cl assi fi ed document destructi on
pl an.
I-5. Operations and training officer (S3).
a.
The S3 prepares the operati ons esti mate and recommends to the
commander acti ons to be taken. The esti mates, predi cti ons, and
i nformati on suppl i ed by the S2 dri ve the tacti cal pl an.
b.
The S3 and the S2 work i n cl ose coordi nati on i f they are to
successful l y support the mi ssi on. More speci fi cal l y, the S3
accompl i shes the fol l owi ng major tasks:
(1 )
Recei ves and sends i ni ti al uni t or attachment di sposi ti ons.
(2)
Moni tors the tacti cal si tuati on.
(3) Anal yzes, i nterprets, and recommends courses of acti on.
(4)
I nteracts and coordi nates wi th other staffs.
(5)
Mai ntai ns communi cati ons.
(6)
Prepares for future operati ons.
(7)
Supervi ses trai ni ng.
I-6. Logistics officer (S4).
a. The S4 i s responsi bl e for advi si ng the commander on al l l ogi sti cal
matters. He determi nes suppl y and other servi ce support
requi rements. The S4 prepares the l ogi sti cal esti mate and
l ogi sti cal admi ni strati ve pl ans.
I-3
FM 90- 8
b.
The S4 accompl i shes the fol l owi ng tasks:
(1)
Mai ntai ns equi pment readi ness reports.
(2)
Moni tors support of uni ts or attachments.
(3)
Moni tors the tacti cal si tuati on.
(4) Supervi ses use of transportati on assets.
(5) Prepares for future operati ons.
c. Suppl y operati ons i n support of counterguerri l l a forces i nvol ve
much use of pre-posi ti oned caches and the urgency to resuppl y
uni ts i n acti on.
I-7. Civil-military operations officer (S5).
a. The rol e of the S5 i s a major one i n the i nevi tabl e i nteracti on
between counterguerri l l a forces and the ci vi l i an popul ati on. The
S5 prepares ci vi l affai rs esti mates and porti ons of the operati on
orders. Al l operati ons have ci vi l affai rs val ue, and the S5 ensures
that thi s val ue supports the overal l COI N goal s.
b.
To do thi s, the S5:
(1)
Advi ses, assi sts, and makes recommendati ons that rel ate to
ci vi l affai rs.
(2)
Makes recommendati ons to ensure operati ons are consi stent
wi th overal l COI N goal s.
(3)
Coordi nates and i mpl ements the ci vi l affai rs tasks of the
uni t.
I-8. Fire support officer (FSO).
a. The FSO i s responsi bl e for the pl anni ng, coordi nati on, and
request of fi re support for the battal i on. He ensures that fi re
support i s i n consonance wi th any fi repower restri cti ons and
adheres to the pri nci pl e of mi ni mum essenti al force.
b.
To accompl i sh thi s, the FSO:
(1)
Establ i shes and mai ntai ns communi cati on.
(2)
Manages fi re support coordi nati on reports and i nformati on.
(3)
Pl ans and coordi nates empl oyment of battal i on fi re support
assets.
(4)
Coordi nates al l fi re support on surface targets.
(5)
Processes pl anned fi re support requests.
(6)
Moni tors i mmedi ate fi re support requests.
(7)
Performs target anal ysi s.
I-4
FM 90- 8
APPENDIX J
Combined Operations
J -1. General.
I f and when US forces are depl oyed to a host country to assi st i n a
counteri nsurgency confl i ct, tacti cal operati ons wi l l probabl y be joi nt
i n nature, and i t i s l i kel y that US forces wi l l be worki ng wi th, or i n
support of, the mi l i tary and parami l i tary forces of the host country.
J -2. Nature of Combined Operations.
a. Combi ned operati ons requi re pri or wri tten agreement as to
authori ty, juri sdi cti on, and procedural and organi zati onal
matters. The l egal basi s for combi ned operati ons i s usual l y a
treaty or operati onal agreement between the US and the host
countr y.
b. US forces must pl an to coordi nate and work wi th the mi l i tary or
parami l i tary forces. Commanders and staffs must be prepared to
establ i sh workabl e arrangements rapi dl y, once i ntroduced i nto a
host country, i f not done pri or to depl oyment. Every si tuati on wi l l
be uni que and wi l l depend upon the extent of i nvol vement of
US forces and the nature of the operati ons.
c. Pl anni ng for factors that must be taken i nto consi derati on wi l l
benefi t combi ned operati ons. Chi ef consi derati ons are:
(1)
Command and control .
(2)
I ntel l i gence.
(3)
Operati onal procedures.
(4)
Combat servi ce support.
J -3. Command and Control.
Establ i sh:
a. Organi zati on of the combi ned force.
b. Overal l command of the force.
c. Rol es and/or mi ssi ons of the combi ned force.
d. Procedure for exchange of l i ai son offi cers wi th l anguage
capabi l i ty or i nterpreter support, and determi ne the l evel of
exchange.
e. Understandi ng of di fferences, capabi l i ti es, and personal charac-
teri sti cs of host country mi l i tary l eaders.
J-1
FM 90- 8
J -4. Intelligence.
Establ i sh procedures for:
a. Di ssemi nati on of mi l i tary i ntel l i gence and use of i ntel l i gence
assets by partners.
b. Coordi nati on of i ntel l i gence operati ons.
c. Shari ng of hi gh-tech i ntel l i gence capabi l i ti es.
J -5. Operational Procedures.
Establ i sh pl ans and procedures for:
a. SOPs that ensure effecti ve cooperati on.
b. Assi gnment of responsi bi l i ty for certai n operati ons based on
speci al capabi l i ti es of the force.
c. Determi ni ng di fference i n tacti cs, techni ques, and procedures.
d. Determi ni ng di fference i n equi pment, radi os, and maps.
e. Detai l ed pl anni ng and rehearsal s.
f . Determi ni ng al l i ed uni t recogni ti on.
g.
Rear operati ons coordi nati on, pl anni ng, and responsi bi l i ti es.
h. Use of combat support assets.
J -6. Combat Service Support.
Establ i sh pl ans for:
a. Exchange of l i ai son offi cers.
b. Coordi nati ng support from l ocal resources and faci l i ti es.
c. Determi ni ng equi pment and ammuni ti on compati bi l i ty.
d. Support i n a tacti cal emergency.
J-2
FM 90- 8
Glossary
Acronyms, Abbreviations
ACC
ADA
AI
AO
bde
BDF
bn
BSA
C
3
CM
CA
CAS
cdr
CEOI
CEWI
co
COIN
COMINT
COMSEC
CP
CS
DCA
div
DS
A
area control center
ai r defense arti l l ery
ai r i nterdi cti on
area of operati ons
B
bri gade
base defense force
battal i on
bri gade support area
C
Command, Control , Communi cati ons countermeasures
ci vi l affai rs
cl ose ai r support
commander
communi cati ons-el ectroni cs operati on i nstructi ons
combat el ectroni c warfare i ntel l i gence
company
counteri nsurgency
communi cati ons i ntercept
communi cati ons securi ty
command post
chemi cal gas
D
defensi ve counter ai r
di vi si on
di rect support
Glossary-1
FM 90- 8
EC
ELINT
EW
FA
FAC
FDC
FID
FIST
FM
FMS
FPF
FSO
GS
HAHO
HALO
HC
HHC
HQ
HUMINT
IDAD
IMINT
indiv
info
ldr
E
el ectroni c combat
el ectroni c i ntel l i gence
el ectroni c warfare
F
fi el d arti l l ery
forward ai r control l er
fi re di recti on center
forei gn i nternal defense
fi re support team
frequency modul ati on (radi o)
forei gn mi l i tary sal es
fi nal protecti ve fi re
fi re support offi cer
G
general support
H
hi gh al ti tude, hi gh openi ng
hi gh al ti tude, l ow openi ng
chemi cal smoke
headquarters and headquarters company
headquar ter s
human i ntel l i gence
I
i nternal defense and devel opment
i magery i ntel l i gence
i ndi vi dual
i nformati on
L
l eader
Glossary-2
mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), troops (available), and time (available)
FM 90- 8
LOC
log
LP
LRSU
LUP
MAP
METT-T
MI
mi l i tary i ntel l i gence
NBC
obj
OCA
OCOKA
OP
op
OPSEC
ORP
OSB
l i nes of communi cati on
l ogi sti cs
l i steni ng post
l ong-range survei l l ance uni t
l i nkup poi nt
M
mi l i tary assi stance program
N
nucl ear, bi ol ogi cal , chemi cal
O
objecti ve
offensi ve counter ai r
Observati on and fi el ds of fi re, Conceal ment and cover,
Obstacl es, Key terrai n, Avenues of approach and
escape
observati on post
operati on
operati ons securi ty
objecti ve ral l y poi nt
operati onal support base
P
pers per sonnel
plt pl atoon
POL petrol eum, oi l s, l ubri cants
P&RC popul ati on and resources control
PSG pl atoon sergeant
PSYOP psychol ogi cal operati ons
PW pri soners of war
Glossary-3
FM 90- 8
R
RCA
recon
RON
R&S
RSTA
SAO
SEAD
SIGINT
S1
SOP
SP
sqd
STANO
TACFIRE
tm
TOC
TOE
TOW
US
USAF
WP
XO
ri ot control agent
r econnai ssance
remai n overni ght
reconnai ssance and/or survei l l ance
reconnai ssance, survei l l ance, target acqui si ti on
S
securi ty assi stance organi zati on
suppressi on of enemy ai r defense
si gnal i ntel l i gence
adjutant
standi ng operati ng procedure
start poi nt
squad
survei l l ance, target acqui si ti on, and ni ght observati on
T
tacti cal fi re di recti on system
team
tacti cal operati ons center
tabl e(s) of organi zati on and equi pment
Tube-l aunched, Opti cal l y-tracked, Wi re-gui ded mi ssi l e
U
Uni ted States
Uni ted States Ai r Force
W
whi te phosphorus
X
executi ve offi cer
Glossary-4
FM 90-8
I ndex
advi sory assi stance, H-16
Army assi stance, H-16
tacti cal assi stance, H-16
aer i al sear ch oper ati ons, 3-20
aerospace reconnai ssance and
sur vei l l ance, 6-13
ai r assaul t forces, 3-20, 3-22, 5-3
ai r bor ne for ces, 5-3
ai r caval r y, 5-7
ai rcraft support, 3-38
ai r transportati on, 7-5
Ai r-Land Battl e, 1-7
doctr i ne, 1-8, 1-9
ai r movement, 3-44
ambushes, 3-32
ar ea, see ar ea ambush
attack fundamental s, C-2
base defense, 3-33
del i berate, C-1
executi on of, C-5
fi re di sci pl i ne, C-6
force si ze and depl oyment, C-3, C-7
formati ons, see for mati ons, ambush
hasty, C-1
ni ght, 3-24
objecti ve ral l yi ng poi nt, C-6
pl anni ng of, C-3
poi nt, C-1
purpose of, C-1, C-22
techni ques, C-6, C-21, see also spi der hol e
ambush, demol i ti on ambush, and speci al
ambush
anti tank pl atoons and compani es, 6-8
area ambush, C-1, C-18
bai ted trap, C-20
mul ti pl e poi nt, C-18
armor, 5-6
armor and caval ry movement, 3-41
armored caval ry, 5-6
Army assi stance, H-16
arti l l ery and mortar support, 3-38
attack
del i berate, 3-27
hasty, 3-27
hel i copters, 5-7
base commander, 3-30
responsi bi l i ti es of, 3-30
base defense
ambushes, 3-33
constructi on of, E-18
forces (BDF), 3-32, E-18
fundamental s of, 3-31, E-15
i n depth, 3-32
offensi ve acti on, 3-33
passi ve, 3-31
preparati ons, 3-33, E-17, E-19, E-20, E-22
securi ty, 3-32
use of host and thi rd country forces, 3-35
bases
bri gade or di vi si on support, see bri gade support
base
operati onal support, see operati onal support
bases
patrol , see patrol bases
tacti cal uses of, E-1
battl e-i n-depth, 1-8
border operati ons, 3-44
control methods, 3-46
sanctuari es, 3-47
water l i ne, 3-47
bri gade support base
base commander, E-16
base defense force, E-18
defense of, E-15, E-17
defense posi ti ons, E-19
defensi ve constructi on, E-18
operati onal concepts, E-14
organi zati on of, E-13
permanent, E-12
trai ni ng exerci ses, E-22
bui l t-up ar ea sear ches, 3-19, G-9, G-11
checkpoi nts, 3-18
ci vi l affai rs
ci vi c acti on programs, H-11
Index-1
FM 90-8
ci vi c assi stance, H-11
operati onal scope, H-12
pl anni ng, H-13
US rol e i n, H-13
ci vi l pol i ce, H-14
ci vi l i an popul ati on protecti on
by ci vi l pol i ce, H-14
by host nati ons mi l i tary
forces, H-15
by parami l i tary forces, H-15
ci vi l i ans, rel ocati on of, 3-45
cl ose ai r support, 6-12
combat
operati ons, 3-10
patr ol s, 3-34, D-1, D-8, D-15
servi ce support, 7-1
support, 6-1
combat avi ati on compani es, 5-8
combat el ectroni c warfare i ntel l i gence (CEWI ),
6-16
combat forces
ai r assaul t, 3-20, 3-22, 5-3
ai r bor ne, 5-3
ai r caval r y, 5-7
armor, 5-6
armored caval ry, 5-6
attack hel i copter, 5-7
avi ati on compani es, 5-8
composi ti on of, 5-1
mechani zed i nfantry, 5-5
US, i n COI N operati ons, 1-6
use of, 5-2
combi ned operati ons
combat servi ce support, J-2
command and control , J-1
i ntel l i gence, J-2
nature of, J-1
operati onal procedures, J-2
communi cati ons
duri ng movements, 3-38
l i nes of, 3-35
patrol bases, E-8
securi ty (COMSEC), 1-10
communi cati ons i ntercept (COMI NT), 6-17
communi cati ons securi ty (COMSEC), 1-10
Index-2
confl i cts
conventi onal , 1-1, 5-8
counteri nsurgency, 1-1
consol i dati on campai gns
control of, 3-14
devel opment and compl eti on phases, 3-14
offensi ve phase, 3-14
preparatory phase, 3-14
convoy securi ty, G-13
strong, G-13
weak, G-14
cordon and search operati ons, see sear ches,
bui l t-up areas
counter guer r i l l a for ces
fl exi bi l i ty of, 3-8
mobi l i ty of, 3-8
pati ence, 3-9
reserves, 3-9
counterguerri l l a operati ons, 1-5, 1-6, 3-1, 3-4
economi c factors, 4-4
effects of weather and terrai n on, 3-4, 4-3, 4-6
i n conventi onal confl i cts, 4-1
i n r ear ar eas, 4-1
i n ur ban ar eas, B-2
pol i ti cal consi derati ons, 3-5, 4-3
pri nci pl es of, 3-6
psychol ogi cal factors, 4-4
purpose of, 3-2
soci ol ogi cal factors, 4-3
tacti cal , see tacti cal counter guer r i l l a
oper ati ons
ti me avai l abl e for, 4-7
troops avai l abl e for, 4-7
counteri nsurgency
mi ssi on, 1-4
operati ons, 1-5
operati ng pri nci pl es, 3-6
strategy, 1-5
target groups, 1-4
counteri ntel l i gence, H-15
defensi ve operati ons, 3-29
agai nst guerri l l a offensi ve, 3-36
base, see base defense
del i ber ate
ambush, C-1
attack, 3-27
demol i ti on ambush, C-22
FM 90-8
di smounted patrol s
basi c movements, D-14
l i near movement, D-15
di vi si on support base, see bri gade support base
el ectroni c combat (EC), 6-14
C
3
CM, 6-14
EW, 6-14
SEAD, 6-14
engi neers, 6-7
expl oi tati on, 3-28
for ce, 3-28
fi el d arti l l ery
uni ts, 6-9
use of i n convoy securi ty, G-13
fi re support uni ts, 6-7
fl ame expedi ents
fl ame mi ne, F-2
fougasse, F-2
fuel , F-2
M202 r ocket, F-2
for ce
expl oi tati on, 3-28
mi ni mum essenti al , 3-48, B-3
use of, 3-8
for ces
ai r assaul t, 3-20, 3-22, 5-3
ai r bor ne, 5-3
base defense, 3-32, E-18
ci vi l pol i ce, H-14
host nati on, H-15
parami l i tary, H-15, see al so combat forces,
counter guer r i l l a for ces, and guer i l l as
formati ons, ambush
ar ea, see ar ea ambush
box, C-17
L-formati on, C-7
l i ne, C-9
T-formati on, C-11
tri angl e, C-14
V-formati on, C-13
Z-formati on, C-10
forei gn i nternal defense (FI D)
US acti vi ti es i n, 1-6
US assi stance i n, 1-6
US rol e i n, 3-1
Geneva Conventi ons, 3-45
ground transportati on, 7-5
guer r i l l a tacti cs i n ur ban ar eas, B-2
guer r i l l as
base camps, 2-8
capabi l i ti es, 3-3, 4-5
l i mi tati ons, 3-3
l ogi sti cal support, 2-7, 4-5
objecti ves, 4-2
popul ar support, 2-6, 4-2
strengths, 2-4
thr eats, 4-1
type of forces, 4-7
weaknesses, 2-5
guer r i l l a war far e, 1-4, 2-1, 3-31
envi ronmental consi derati ons, 2-2
pol i ti cal , soci ol ogi cal and economi c consi dera-
ti ons, 2-3
pri nci pl es, 2-10
tacti cs, 2-8
hasty
ambush, C-1
attack, 3-27
hel i copters, 5-7
herbi ci des, F-2
hi di ng hol es
ai r hol e, A-3
bamboo hol e, A-2
water entrance hol e, A-3
host nati on forces, H-15
house searches, G-11
human i ntel l i gence (HUMI NT), 4-6, 6-6, 6-16
i magery i ntel l i gence (I MI NT), 4-6, 6-16
i nternal defense and devel opment (I DAD), H-1
i nsurgency
acti vi ti es, 3-16
ai ms and goal s, 2-1
devel opment of, 1-3
organi zati on, 1-3
prerequi si tes, 1-2
i ntel l i gence offi cer, duti es of, H-2, I -1
i ntel l i gence sour ces
combat el ectroni c warfare i ntel l i gence (CEWI ),
6-16
Index-3
FM 90-8
communi cati ons i ntercept (COMI NT), 6-17
host country i ntel l i gence organi zati ons, H-1
human i ntel l i gence (HUMI NT), 4-6, 6-6, 6-16
i magery i ntel l i gence (I MI NT), 4-6, 6-16
l ocal popul ati on, H-1, H-3
mi l i tary i ntel l i gence (MI ), 6-7, 6-16
si gnal i ntel l i gence (SI GI NT), 4-6, 6-16
i nternati onal l aw, 4-4
l arge-uni t operati ons, 3-25
l aw of l and warfare, 4-4
Mao Tse-Tung, 2-10
mechani zed i nfantry, 5-5
METT-T, 1-9
pl anni ng consi derati ons, 3-2
mi l i tary i ntel l i gence, 6-7, 6-16
mi l i tary operati ons
al ong borders, 3-46
purpose of, 1-8
mi l i tary pol i ce, 6-18
mortar pl atoons, 6-8
motor movement, 3-39
motori zed patrol s, D-9
acti ons of at danger areas, D-12
movement of, D-10
movement
by ai r, 3-44
by foot, 3-43
by motor, 3-39
by rai l , 3-41
of armor and caval ry, 3-41
over water and ri vers, 3-42
securi ty duri ng, 3-37, 3-40
movement to contact, 3-26
naval gunfi re support
i n conventi onal confl i cts, 6-10
i n counter i nsur gency, 6-10
ni ght ambush, 3-24
nontacti cal transportati on, 7-4
objecti ve ral l yi ng poi nt, C-6
offensi ve operati ons, 3-16
operati onal support bases, 7-1
commander, E-10
defense of, E-9
i nfi l trati on of, E-10
l ocati on, 7-2
purpose of, E-9
reserves, E-11
work pri ori ti es, E-11
oper ati ons
aer i al sear ch, 3-20
combat, 3-10
combi ned, see combi ned operati ons
counter guer r i l l a, see counter guer r i l l a
oper ati ons
counteri nsurgency, 1-5
l arge-uni t, 3-25
mi l i tary, see mi l i tary operati ons
offensi ve, 3-16
pol i ce-type, 3-16
psychol ogi cal , see psychol ogi cal operati ons
r eacti on for ce, 3-34
securi ty (OPSEC), 1-10
smal l -uni t, 3-22
speci al ai r, see speci al ai r operati ons
stri ke campai gns, 3-11
subsurface, see subsurface operati ons
tacti cal countergueri l l a, see tacti cal counter
guer r i l l a oper ati ons
tacti cal , see tacti cal operati ons
ur ban, see ur ban oper ati ons
parami l i tary forces, H-15
patrol bases
communi cati ons, E-8
defense of, see base defense
departure, E-9
occupati on and operati on of, E-3
pl anni ng, E-1, E-9
securi ty measures, E-3, E-7
si te sel ecti on, E-2
patrol l i ng
defensi ve, 3-29
offensi ve, 3-29
saturati on, 3-23
patrol s, 3-22, 3-23
combat, 3-34, D-1, D-8, D-15
di smounted see di smounted patrol s
motori zed, see motori zed patrol s
operati on order, D-5
pl anni ng, D-2
Index-4
reconnai ssance and survei l l ance, 3-34, D-1,
D-7, D-15
ti me schedul e, D-4
warni ng order, D-3
poke-type operati ons, 3-16
poi nt ambush, C-1
property searches, 3-17
psychol ogi cal operati ons, 3-1, 6-5, 6-15, H-8
concept, H-7
organi zati on, H-7
pursui t, 3-28
purpose of, 3-28
rai l movement, 3-41
r ear battl e
defensi ve techni ques, 4-9
offensi ve techni ques, 4-9
reacti on force operati ons, 3-34
r econnai ssance and sur vei l l ance, 3-45
aerospace, 6-13
i n force, 3-26
LRSU mi ssi on, 6-6
patr ol s, 3-34, D-1, D-7, D-15
uni ts, 6-2
techni ques, 6-2
reserves, 3-39
rel ocati on of ci vi l i ans, 3-45
r i ot contr ol , 3-21
agents, F-2
roadbl ocks, 3-18
saturati on patrol l i ng, 3-23
search teams, G-10
search techni ques, G-5
sear ches
aeri al , 3-20
of bui l t-up ar eas, 3-19, G-9, G-11
of houses, G-11
of i ndi vi dual s, 3-18, G-7
of property, 3-17
of tunnel s, A-10, G-12
of vehi cl es, 3-18
securi ty, 3-9
base, 3-32, E-3, E-7
FM 90-8
communi cati on (COMSEC), 1-10
convoy, G-13
duri ng movements, 3-37, 3-40
operati ons (OPSEC), 1-10
servi ce support, combat, 7-1
medi cal , 7-3
mai ntenance, 7-5
personnel and admi ni strati on, 7-6
suppl y, 7-4
transportati on, see transportati on
uni t messes, 7-4, see al so operati onal support
bases
si gnal i ntel l i gence (SI GI NT), 4-6, 6-16
si gnal uni ts, 6-19
smal l -uni t operati ons, 3-22
smoke
sources, F-1
use of, F-1
speci al ai r operati ons,
aerospace survei l l ance and reconnai ssance,
6-13
ai rl i ft, 6-13
el ectroni c combat (EC), 6-14
psychol ogi cal operati ons, 6-15
weather operati ons, 6-15
speci al ambush, C-22
spi der hol e ambush, C-21
staff functi ons
adjutant (S1), I -1
ci vi l -mi l i tary operati ons offi cer, I -4
executi ve offi cer (XO), I -1
fi re support offi cer (FSO), I -4
i ntel l i gence offi cer (S2), I -1
l ogi sti cs offi cer (S4), I -3
operati ons and trai ni ng offi cer, I -3
stri ke campai gns
concepts, 3-11
mi ssi ons, 3-11
operati ons, 3-11
organi zati on, 3-10
targets, 3-10
subsurface operati ons
base areas, A-5
base camps, A-5
bunkers, A-6
hi di ng hol es, see hi di ng hol es
tunnel s, see tunnel systems
Index-5
FM 90-8
suppor t
ai rcraft, 3-38
arti l l ery and mortar, 3-38
cl ose ai r , 6-12
support bases, see bri gade support base
support uni ts
engi neers, 6-7
fi re support, 6-7
mi l i tary i ntel l i gence, 6-7, 6-16
mi l i tary pol i ce, 6-18
r econnai ssance and sur vei l l ance, 6-2
si gnal , 6-19
tacti cal
assi stance, H-16
i ntel l i gence, 3-6
si tuati on, 3-7
tacti cal counterguerri l l a operati ons, 3-1, 3-2, 3-5
contracti on, G-3
enci rcl ement, G-1
hammer and anvi l , G-4
wedge, G-4
tacti cal operati ons
ai r, 6-11
counterguerri l l a, see tacti cal counterguernl l a
oper ati ons
i n ur ban ar eas, 3-49
tacti cal transportati on, 7-4
tacti cs
conventi onal warfare, 1-4, 3-25
guer r i l l a war far e, 2-8
trai ni ng, 1-8, E-22
tr anspor tati on
ai r , 7-5
ground, 7-5
nontacti cal , 7-4
tacti cal , 7-4
tunnel systems
access and escape routes, A-4
constructi on methods, A-8
destructi on of, A-12
detecti on of, A-9
search of, A-10
speci al equi pment, A-11
Uni form Code of Mi l i tary Justi ce, 4-4
ur ban oper ati ons
counterguerri l l a, B-2
government acti vi ti es, 3-49
guerri l l a tacti cs, B-2
i n ci ti es and towns, B-1
subversi ve acti vi ti es, 3-49
vehi cl e sear ches, 3-18
water and ri ver movement, 3-42
Index-6
FM 90- 8
References
Required Publications
Requi red publ i cati ons are sources whi ch users must read i n order to
understand and use FM 90-8.
Field manual (FM)
100-20 Low I ntensi ty Confl i ct
Related Publications
Rel ated publ i cati ons are sources of addi ti onal i nformati on. Users do
not have to read them to understand FM 90-8.
Army regulation (AR)
310-25 Di cti onary of Uni ted States Army Terms
310-50 Catal og of Abbrevi ati ons and Brevi ty Codes
Field manual (FM)
1-100 Combat Avi ati on Operati ons
3-10 Empl oyment of Chemi cal Agents
3-12 Operati onal Aspects of Radi ol ogi cal Defense
3-50 Del i berate Smoke Operati ons
5-100 Engi neer Combat Operati ons
6-20 Fi re Support i n Combi ned Arms Operati ons
7-8 The I nfantry Pl atoon and Squad (I nfantry, Ai rborne,
Ai r Assaul t, Ranger)
7-10 The I nfantry Ri fl e Company (I nfantry, Ai rborne, Ai r
Assaul t, Ranger)
7-20 The I nfantr y Battal i on (I nfantr y, Ai r bor ne, Ai r
Assaul t )
7-30 I nfantry, Ai rborne, and Ai r Assaul t Bri gade Opera-
ti ons
17-47 Ai r Caval ry Combat Bri gade (ACCB)
17-50 Attack Hel i copter Operati ons
17-95 Caval r y
References-1
FM 90- 8
19-1
19-4
19-15
19-40
21-75
24-1
29-2
29-23
29-30-1
29-51
30-5
31-11
31-12
33-1
34-1
34-10
41-10
44-1
44-3
44-18
55-2
71-1
71-2
71-3
90-4
90-10
90-10-1
Mi l i tary Pol i ce Support for the Ai rLand Battl e
Mi l i tary Pol i ce Team, Squad, Pl atoon Combat Operati ons
Ci vi l Di sturbances
Enemy Pri soners of War, Ci vi l i an I nternees, and
Detai ned Persons
Combat Ski l l s of the Sol di er
Combat Communi cati ons
Organi zati onal Mai ntenance Operati ons
Di r ect Suppor t Mai ntenance Oper ati ons (Non-
di vi si onal )
Di vi si on Mai ntenance Battal i on
Di vi si on Suppl y and Fi el d Servi ce Operati ons
Combat I ntel l i gence
Doctri ne for Amphi bi ous Operati ons
Army Forces i n Amphi bi ous Operati ons
Psychol ogi cal Operati ons: US Army Doctri ne, Combat
El ectroni c Warfare and I ntel l i gence
I ntel l i gence and El ectroni c Warfare Operati ons
Mi l i tary I ntel l i gence Battal i on (Combat El ectroni c
Warfare I ntel l i gence Di vi si on)
Ci vi l Affai rs Operati on
US Army Ai r Defense Arti l l ery Empl oyment
Ai r Defense Arti l l ery Empl oyment: Chaparral /Vul can
Ai r Defense Arti l l ery Empl oyment: Sti nger
Di vi si on Transportati on Operati ons
Tank and Mechani zed I nfantry Company Team
The Tank and Mechani zed I nfantry Battal i on Task
For ce
Armored and Mechani zed Bri gade Operati ons
Ai rmobi l e Operati ons
Mi l i tary Operati ons on Urbani zed Terrai n (MOUT)
An I nfantrymans Gui de to Urban Combat
References-2
FM 90- 8
90-14 Rear Battl e
100-5 Operati ons
101-40 Armed Forces Doctri ne for Chemi cal and Bi ol ogi cal
Weapon Defense
J oint chiefs of staff publication (J CS Pub)
Pub 1 Di cti onary of Mi l i tary and Associ ated Terms
Pub 2 Uni fi ed Acti on Armed Forces
References-3
FM 9 0 - 8
29 AUGUST 1986
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
R. L. DILWORTH
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11A,
Requirements for Counterguerrilla Operations (Qty rqr block no. 1231).
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 160-739
PIN: 060559-000