Combat Lancer

The F-111 goes to war

While the troubled early development of the F-111 saw the advanced attack aircraft battling controversy, its first combat deployment in Vietnam also suffered its fair share of setbacks. Nevertheless, the swing-wing striker did enough to prove its value to the US Air Force, securing its service for many years to come. Here, crewmen recall that initial combat deployment: Combat Lancer
report: Warren E. Thompson

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HE COLD WAR was heating up rapidly in the 1960s, and the race was on to decide which of the two superpowers could stockpile the greatest number of nuclear weapons, and the state-of-the-art delivery systems they required. On both sides, an emphasis was placed on developing faster jets employing ever more advanced capabilities, and the General Dynamics F-111 stood out above all the rest on account of its ability to strike with deadly accuracy by day or night. Its terrain-following radar (TFR) ranked it at the top of the list in terms of fear factor. The F-111 was rst own on December 21, 1964, at a time when the Vietnam War was fast escalating. However, the aircraft had rst to undergo much rigorous testing before it could be sent into a hostile environment. It would not be operationally ready until July 1967. The original request sent out to aircraft manufacturers by the US Air Force stated that it needed an attack aircraft able to achieve at least Mach 2.5 airspeed, and y at heights ranging from tree-top level all the

way up to 60,000ft. At lower altitudes an airspeed of at least Mach 1 was stipulated. The design was far from the norm, since it was required to carry out missions that no previous aircraft had been capable of, while carrying a host of specialized equipment. At rst, the two biggest obstacles it faced had nothing to do with the variable-sweep wings or TFR: rather, the aircraft came in grossly overweight and over the predicted cost. It was these two problems that forced the Senate Armed Services Committee to remove $460 million from appropriations, which all but eliminated funding for a US Navy F-111B interceptor version to be operated from aircraft carriers. This initially left the USAF as the only customer for the new machine. Nearly two years were spent solving all the technical difculties, but the production line was nally cranked up in early 1967. The rst 18 F-111As were destined for the test and evaluation squadrons based at Edwards AFB in California and Eglin AFB in Florida. Initially, these efforts, known as Project Bullseye I, were successful and the project on track. One major factor impressed all

ofcials engaged in monitoring progress: the outstanding bombing accuracy. The timing could not have been better, and the positive results encouraged the Pentagon to move forward the date on which the new F-111As would be sent to South-east Asia for combat duty in Vietnam. Considerable pressure was put on the test schedulers to nish up, because the Air Force wanted to accelerate production and integrate the F-111A into its front-line squadrons as quickly as possible. However, there was a negative side to all the good news: the original unit cost of the aircraft was about $4.5 million, but by the time General Dynamics was ready to get the production lines running the cost had risen to $6 million. Media coverage was plentiful, and hit a sour note with the American public. The rst outt equipped with the F-111A was Detachment 1 of the 4481st Tactical Fighter Squadron

This photo: An F-111A from Detachment 1 pulls in close after a practice day mission over South Vietnam. Tom Germscheid via author Inset: The original patch worn by the aircrews from Detachment 1 of the 428th TFS when they took the F-111A into the Vietnam War. Warren E. Thompson

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This photo: An image that demonstrates the rugged terrain with which the F-111s had to contend on their night missions. Crews depended on the aircrafts new terrain-following radar to get them to the target and back. This image was taken on a daytime training mission during Combat Lancer. USAF via author Right: The six F-111As that arrived at Takhli AB in Thailand received a big welcome. If the new swingwing, all-weather bomber was successful, it would help in cutting down the high losses experienced by the F-105s. Joe Snoy via author

The new F-111As were impressive, but very demanding. The airframe, as a weapons system, let you deliver a lethal bomb load with very good accuracy under conditions that didnt give the bad guys much of a chance to shoot you down
Maj Charlie Arnet, 428th TFS

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(TFS), eventually re-designated as the 428th TFS. Beginning with the 31st airframe to come out of the factory, the aircraft would go straight into operational squadrons. The commander of the 4481st, Col Ivan Dethman, picked up the 31st aircraft at the General Dynamics plant and took off for Nellis AFB in Nevada, a distance of about 1,000 miles. The ight went smoothly, and the Colonel reported that using the TFR he never touched the controls except on take-off and landing. The Air Force made sure that this event received maximum publicity. Six F-111A models were delivered to Nellis at the rate of one a week, making up the complement that would be sent to Vietnam for the Combat Lancer operation. Seven instructor pilots were initially assigned to train the new pilots bound for South-east Asia. They put in long days ying and developing tactics that would be put to use in Vietnam. Oblivious to the negative press, almost all the pilots became rm believers in the potential of the new variablegeometry attack aircraft and were anxious to take it into action. However, the learning process in training was not without problems. Capt Joe Hodges describes one of the rst training ights that he ew in the right-hand seat during that period, and which did little to endear the aircraft to him. My rst ight in the Aardvark was not a great one. My pilot was Maj J. D. Phillips, and when he took the active and ran the engines up to mil power, both compressors stalled and blew reballs out of both ends of the airplane. I asked J. D. what was going on and he responded that it was normal for that to happen. I had 500 hours in the F-4 and had never seen a compressor stall. He ran the engines up again and it stalled again. I suggested that we taxi back to maintenance and let them have it, but he lit them up again, this time without the bang. We went up to the Nellis Bombing Range, and as he was showing me the area we heard a loud noise and both windscreens crazed! We could hardly see anything dead ahead and we ew back to base with full aps at about 230kt. We ew the approach in a full crab, so J. D. could see out of the left hatch. When we got back on the ground we found that we had been hit with hail from a storm that we didnt even see. The hail had

also punched holes in the leading edge slats as big as your thumb! The intensity of the negative press in early 1968 forced some quick decisions, and the biggest one was to take the six new F-111As to Vietnam. Early on the morning of March 15, 1968, all six aircraft launched from Nellis and set a course due west with a nal destination of Takhli RTAFB, located 80 miles north of Bangkok, Thailand. All of the support personnel and necessary equipment had earlier been loaded on to a C-141 and were already en route. The experimental deployment had two objectives: rst, to prove that the new attack bomber was a viable low-level weapon that could carry out its mission at tree-top level in any weather conditions, thus providing much-needed relief for the F-105s and F-4s that were suffering heavy losses over Route Packs V and VI. The other aim was to demonstrate that the F-111 should be produced in signicant numbers. The initial deployment was carried out only a week after training had been completed at Nellis.

Pacific crossing

The transit across the Pacic met with heavy headwinds, increasing to 20 hours the ight time for the 7,000-mile trip that ended at Takhli. Each F-111 had to hook up with the tanker four times between Nellis AFB and Guam. All six aircraft landed at their destination without incident on March 17. Maintenance crews were already in place and now began preparing the aircraft for their rst missions, a process that would take several days. Due to the bombing halt called by President Johnson, the rst sorties would only cover targets in Route Packs I and II. The major targets close to Hanoi and Haiphong were temporarily off limits. One of the Combat Lancer pilots, Capt Charlie Arnet, comments on the bombing capabilities of the F-111A. A typical bomb load was 12 750lb M117 general-purpose (GP) bombs. At full military power, we could achieve a ground speed of about 600kt. I always selected 200ft/hard ride on the terrain-following system. On the back side of a Karst mountain, at night in the clouds at about 350ft above the ground (the ight path would balloon a little), we would often

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see the vertical velocity indicator pegged at 12,000fpm descent. I always thought it was remarkable to be in IMC conditions (instrument meteorological conditions) with such a rate of descent so close to the ground. We trusted the system, and without distractions combined with malfunctions, it was safe enough. In theory, the Combat Lancer missions would be own at night at very low level. This would afford the element of surprise, especially as each aircraft would be carrying out its sortie as a single ship. Finally, on the night of March 25, the new swing-wing attackers went into combat. Only four would y that rst night. The squadron commander Col Ike Dethman was the rst to take off his mission was a night strike against an ammunition dump on Tiger Island off the east coast of Vietnam. It was a textbook execution as they came in on the dump from the west and egressed out over the water. By the time the AAA picked them up, they had already hit the target dead-center and were out of range, still ying at a very low altitude. Since all of the rst strikes were executed at night, it was impossible to get any accurate damage reports except for the secondary explosions that Col Dethmans bombs had caused. Maj Jack Funke was one of the more experienced aircrew members to y the F-111A on Combat Lancer. Offering insight into the missions they ew using the TFR, he says: Night low-level navigation at 500ft was almost totally reliant on the inertial system for the accuracy required. It had to be frequently updated from the attack radar in order to provide the accuracy. The attack radars effective range at such a low altitude in rough terrain was three to eight miles, which amounted to about one minute at 480kt IAS (indicated airspeed). Even a slight route deviation therefore changed the radar appearance of turn points or update points from their predicted appearance and made the right-seat job a hundred times more difcult. Often, then, he could not distinguish one mountain peak from another in the time available and the turn had to be made on time, or with inertial distance countdown, which in effect is dead reckoning. Therefore, the planning sessions were of inestimable value, especially for

the right-seater! It was paramount that he study every inch of the route using radar predictions and radar-scope lm. It was equally important for the aircraft commander to know terrain, obstructions and minimum en-route altitudes for terrain clearance. Initially, most if not all the crews would descend to TFR altitude, generally 1,000ft above the ground, at the Thailand-Laotian border, then y the entire distance across Laos and North Vietnam, then descend to 500ft as the Radar Homing and Warning Device (RHAWS) detected enemy early warning or SAM radar then descend down to 200-400ft in the foothills approaching the Delta. 300ft was probably the most common clearance plane setting for the bomb run as it afforded enough altitude for the high-drag bombs arming time and therefore didnt require a change in clearance plane setting during the bomb run.

Changing fortunes

The successful bombing missions by the newly-arrived Combat Lancer aircraft were to be cut short after the rst three nights. On the night of March 28, F-111A serial 66-0022 went down without a single clue or trace. The pilot was Maj Henry McCann and his right-seater Capt Dennis Graham. They were lost over North Vietnam and were listed as KIA. Enemy-controlled radio stations picked up on the loss and claimed credit for shooting down the F-111, but this was highly unlikely due to the fact that it disappeared off the radar screen in an area that had no valuable targets and would not have been home to effective defensive weapons. This tragedy whipped the American media into a frenzy because it had only been the fourth night of F-111A operations. However, the bad news did not end there. Two days later, a second Combat Lancer F-111A, 66-0017, went down. This had a more pleasant ending in that the crew pilot Maj Sandy Marquardt and his rightseater Capt Joe Hodges was able to eject safely in the escape capsule. Again, some type of malfunction rather than enemy re was to blame. In the debrief, the crew stated that they had just entered Laos en route to a target in North Vietnam and, while descending from 10,000ft, experienced a violent pitch-up maneuver quickly followed

Capts Tom Germscheid (left) and Rick Matteis with their F-111 after a practice mission over Thailand. Tom Germscheid via author

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Above left to right: Maj Charlie Arnet and his F-111A, loaded with bombs for the next night mission over North Vietnam. Maj Arnet was on the investigation team that examined the possible causes of the downed aircraft crewed by LCDR Spade Cooley, USN and Lt Col Ed Palmgren, both of whom were listed as killed in action. Charlie Arnet via author The escape capsule from serial 66-0017 was recovered from where it went down in Thailand and brought to Nakhom Phanom. The aircrew climbed back in for a photo before it was taken back to Takhli. In the left-hand seat is pilot Maj Sandy Marquardt, while the right-seater is Capt Joe Hodges. Harry Winberg via author This photo: A Combat Lancer F-111 is prepared for engine start. Note the standard arrowhead emblem that was painted on the rudders of all six F-111As involved in Detachment 1s deployment. Tom Germscheid via author

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by an uncontrolled roll. At that time, the wings were at 50-degree sweep. Unable to gain control, the crew chose to eject in the capsule. They were temporarily unsure whether they were in enemy-held territory, so they kept a very low prole, but after being on the run for a mile or so a Jolly Green rescue helicopter located them and picked them up. Maj Marquardt stated, Soon after our rescue, the capsule was located and retrieved and brought to the closest friendly base which was Nakhom Phanom (NKP). The Air Force conducted a thorough investigation at that point and it was originally determined that a solidied tube of unused sealant (the type used to repair the aircrafts honeycomb skin) found at the crash site probably caused the accident. Somehow, the tube had become wedged in the ight controls while we were en route to the target. As a side note, in a further investigation of the incident, it was determined that the sealant had been used at the Grumman facility on Long Island where the F-1 fuel tank located on the underside of the aircrafts nose had been manufactured. A later report put out by General Dynamics after much investigation stated that the cause was structural failure of an actuating valve in the stabilator system, which controlled both the pitch and roll axes of the aircraft. Despite all the negative coverage, the early foray into Vietnam during Combat Lancer proved that the aircrafts potential was almost unlimited. Maj Charlie Arnett was one of the original pilots that went over with the 428th Squadrons Detachment 1, and relates what they accomplished during that deployment. The new F-111As were impressive, but very demanding. The airframe, as a weapons system, let you deliver a lethal bomb load with very good accuracy under conditions that didnt give the bad guys much of a chance to shoot you down. It was the best all-weather and night delivery system that was set up to deliver non-nuclear weapons. But, any aircraft that was that sophisticated was never perfect that soon off the assembly line. One problem that showed up early on was noise on the intercom system. Another was the demand, mentally and physically, that ying such a complex piece of equipment made on a two-man crew. A three-hour mission, at low levels, left you pretty washed out. You y most of the time at about three inches off your seat! There is never an idle moment. It was very

gratifying to pop up out over our target and know we had caught the enemy by surprise, which meant we could drop our ordnance accurately and have a chance to exit the area unscathed. Our capabilities at night or during bad weather gave us the advantage over the enemy on just about all the missions we ew under these conditions. The third and nal F-111 lost in Combat Lancer fell on the night of April 22, 1968. To have three losses in such a short period almost terminated the project. Serial 66-0024 was one of two replacement aircraft rushed over after the second loss. The pilot was a seasoned veteran, Lt Col Ed Palmgren. He had own F-84s in the Korean War and had a leadership role with the Thunderbirds. Both crew members were listed as KIA. There had been radar contact until they began their bomb run. Capt Charlie Arnet was part of the investigation team that delved into the loss, and states: The aircraft disappeared in a rain shower at an altitude of 8,000ft at 195 degrees and 15nm from Invert Site at NKP. The wreckage was never located. When they disappeared off the radar they had evidently dropped down to a very low altitude before hitting their target. At that point, the crew depended totally on their TFR. Whatever the cause, they probably had no opportunity to eject. If the enemy located the wreckage, there was never enough intel to conrm it. The Combat Lancer projects losses, thanks to negative media coverage, overshadowed its achievements. After the third and nal accident, the remaining ve aircraft stayed on at Takhli and ew sporadic missions with reasonable success. Records show that, before they departed SEA, they had logged close to 60 low-level missions that received high marks for bombing accuracy and the element of surprise. Finally, on November 22, 1968, all ve jets returned to Nellis AFB. The press corps was there in force to greet the aircraft. In an interview, the commanding ofcer of that cadre, Col Ben Murph, made very clear his opinion of Combat Lancer: This is a hell of a ne airplane and I hope to see something positive in print about it! The concept of a single-ship attack aircraft capable of accurately hitting any target it went after in any type of weather, day or night, had made its mark and was here to stay. Future designs such as the B-1 and F-15E incorporated these same traits, and the future of aerial warfare was changed. The F-111 would meanwhile go on to prove itself beyond any doubt in the Linebacker operations a few years later.

An F-111A flying close to its base at Takhli in Thailand. The first mission flown by the Combat Lancers was a night strike against an ammo dump on Tiger Island right off the east coast of North Vietnam on March 25, 1968. Charlie Arnet via author

Below: F-111As head back to Nellis AFB from their base at Takhli as their deployment ended. Tom Germscheid via author Left: A Detachment 1 Aardvark makes a cartridge start in its revetment at Takhli AB. Harry Winberg via author

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