CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR: MISCN,CULATION OR PROVOCATION?

h thesis presented to the Faculty o f the U. S . Aimy

Command and General Staff College In partial fulfillment of the requirements f o r the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

AUGUST W. BREMER, JR., MAJ, USA B.S., United States Military Academy, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1987

Approved f o r public release; distribution

1s

unlimited.

87-3624

YA\STER . jF M L L i T A R Y A R T

AND 5CIENCX

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candldate: Title of Thesis: August W. Bremer, Jr.

Chinese Communist Interventlon in the Korean War: Miscalculation or Provocation?

Approved by:

, Thesis Committee Chairman

, Hember, , Member,
Major Andrew N. Morris, M.A.

Graduate Faculty

Graduate Faculty

Accepted this 5th day of June 1987 by: .

,
Phllip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The Opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author ard do nst necessarily represent the views of the U. S. Army Command a'nd General Staff College o r any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foreqoinq statement.)

CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION I N THE KOREAN WAR: MISCALCULATION OR PROVOCATION? A study of the failure to

predict the Chinese Communist intervention In the Korean War, November 1950, by Major August W. Bremer, Jr., 9 0 pages. USA,

Thls study is an historical analysis of the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean War from the perspective of the intelligence available to General Douglas MacArthur p r i o r to the Chinese Communist counteroffensive. It answers whether MacArthur should

have known hls drlve toward the Yalu Rlver would provoke
the Chinese Communists' overt mllltary lntervention in the Korean War on 25 November 1950.

Thls thesis considers the signiflcant, credlble intelligence available to the varlous levels of the US military and national intelligence hlerarchies. The

interpretations of the lntelllgence and the resulting estlmates o f Chinese Communist lntent slgnlflcantly affected the natlonal and military policy makers.

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I deeply appreciate the expertise o f the staff .am;

faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College whose assistance in all aspects of the preparation of this thesis was significant.

I would like to thank my wife, Debbie, and my

daughter, Lorl, whose endless love, encouragement, and patience endured throughout.thls project.

I am, also,

indebted to my father who is the inspiration f o r all I d o .

T A B L E OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Chapter 1

Chapter

............................. Notes .................................... 2 . Background ...............................

.
Introduction Notes

1
0

...................................
...................................

21

Chapter 3

. .

The UNC Crosses the 38th Parallel Notes

....... 2 4
36

Chapter 4

Victory.Turns into Defeat Notes

............... 39
62
67

...................................
.............................

Chapter 5 .

Conclusions Notes

................................... Bibliography ........................................ Initial Distribution List ...........................

83
85

90

CHAPTER 1

I
INTRODUCTION

In late September 1950, Generai Douglas MacArthur's United Nations Command (UNC) reversed the tide in the Korean War. An impending disaster, the loss of the

Republic of Korea, turned into a decisive victory through imaginative leadership, audacity, and brave fighting by thousands of American, South Korean, and other United Nations forces. UNC forces broke out of defensive

positions around the port of Pusan on the southeast coast and landed forces at Inchon, the port of the South Korean capital of Seoul, halfway up the country on the west coast. The two halves of this giant pincer squeezed the

life out of the previously victorious North Korean People's Army (NKPA). UNC forces were in posltion along a

line running west to east from Seoul to the Sea of Japan. They planned to continue the counteroffensive across the 38th Parallel, the "border" between the People's Republic of Korea (PRK) (ROK)

North Korea

and the Republic of Korea

South Korea.

The UNC objectives were to Capture

the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, complete the destruction of the NKPA, and secure a peaceful and united

.-

Korean peninsula.

O n 9 October 1950, the UNC crossed the 38th

e . l r a l l e l s n d e n t e r e d North

KOLC-3

w l t h t h e elssii~t-I of

destroying the N o r t h Korean Armed Forces, disarming remaining NKPA units, and enforcing the terms of a surrender

.'

However, between 9 October and

28 November 1950, when General HacArthur stated he faced

"an entirely new war,nL something went terribly wrong. Rather than completing the destruction of the remnants of the virtually lneffective NKPA, the UNC entered into the hardest fight of its short life

--

a fight against the

competent, well-trained, "seasoned", and professional army of the People's Republic of China (PRC)-Communist China. When the full weight of this new enemy struck, the UNC conducted what the military historian 5 . L. A. Marshall called
'I

the longest retreat in US military history.*t3 In

the process, the UNC lost the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, the South Korean capital o Seoul, and 50,000 combat soldiers. UNC lines were finally stabilized in

mid-January 1951, more than 40 miles south of Seoul. Renewed UNC offensive operations recaptured the city and advanced northward but ground to a halt in a painfully stagnant war of attrition. The UNC positions became the

border between Nozth and South Korea in the armistice signed on 27 July 1953. What caused this catastrophic reversal? Were

General Douglas MacArthur and the UNC caught unaware b y the Chinese intervention in what the United States hoped
L

t3

keep a "localized war" without Chinese o r Soviet Was t h e Chinese deception s o complete t h a t

intervention?

t h e r e were no warnings o r indications o f their larqe.scslr

intervention and the resultant escalation of the war?

It

is the intent of this paper to analyze the Communist

Chinese intervention within the framework of intelligence and warning indicators available to General MacArthur, the United Nations Command, and US national-level decision makers. Did General MacArthur know that the UNC's drive across the 38th Parallel t o the Yalu River i n Korea in t h e fall of 1950 would provoke the Communist Chinese Government's direct military intervention i n the Korean War? Should he have known? The purpose of this paper is to answer these questions. levels? What intelligence was available, and at what

How was intelligence Interpreted, and were the

interpretat ons accepted and believed by the various responsible officials? To use these questions as stepping

stones over whlch this paper arrives at an answer to the basic quest on presented above, i t is necessary to consider the several types and levels of intelligence indicators and warnings and determlne what agencies were responsible f o r analysis and evaluation. An initial historical background chapter will cover events from the end of World War 11, when the Korean peninsula was artlficlally divided at the 38th Parallel,
3

through 27 September 1950 when J C S message 92801, told General NacArthur ( s i c ) operations
'I.

..

you are authorlzed t o conduct mil

including amphibious and airborne

landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel

in Korea

....

The chapter will begin with a "broad

..

brush" of selected slgnlficant events until the invasion by the NKPA on 25 June 1950, and will set the stage for the Korean War by presenting the overall situation in the Far East. It is not presented to explain causative

factors for the war; zather, it serves only as background for further study. The war is highlighted and summarized

through the invasion, initial US and U N reactions, early UNC defeats, the consolidation and defense of the Pusan Perimeter, offensive operations northward to the recapture of Seoul, MacArthur's authorization t o Cross the 38th Parallel, and the attacks across the 38th Parallol from
30 September t o 9 October 1950.

Subsequent chapters will chronologically address intelligence indicators and warnings available on three basic levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

Strategic intelligence is identified a s that emanating from international or diplomatic sources.

For example,

Western newspapers reported several public statements by Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist Party Chairman, and Chou En-lai, the Premier and Foreign Minister. These and

other statements announced Communist Chinese sentiments

and were, perhaps, warnings that they would not "stand b y idlyaQ5as U N f o r c e s crossed the 3 8 t h Parallel an< advanced into North Korea. Additionally, Premier C h o u warned t h e

Indian Ambassador to the PRC, K. M. Panikkar, that in crossing the 38th Parallel, the Americans would encounter Chineae It was the responsibility of the

State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other national-level intelligence agencies to collect, analyze, evaluate, and provide this intelligence to responsible decision makers. It was the responsibility o f

the decision makers to judge whether these and similar statements were true warnings of Chinese Communist lntentions or were "diplomatlc blackmail," as General MacArthur claimed
I

The perceptions of US national-level

policy makers and the degree of credibility they afforded these statements at that time are significant i n evaluating MacArthur's analysis. Operational intelligence is defined a s that intelligence obtained in the Far East, but not within the boundaries of North or South Korea, that could relate to the military operations being pursued by the UNC. An

-*

example is the relocation t o Manchuria in mid-1950 of several CCF Armies, two of which spearheaded the CCF counteroffensive across the Yalu in November 1950.
8

Perhaps restrictions imposed upon General MacArthur by President Truman dlsrupted the joint efforts of

national-level intelligence agencies and the UNC operational lntell!gence staff.

Finally, tactical or battlefield intelligence i:: also discussed. While a necessity for the tactical

commander, this level of intelligence is, to the

operational commander, more confirmation or verification of analyses derived from strategic and operational Intelligence. There were reports prior to

28 November 1950 of ethnic Korean "volunteers" from China

fighting with the NKPA; there were, likewise, reports of apparently isolated CCF actions in North Korea. The
UNC

had occasion to interrogate captured enemy prisoners who spoke neither Korean nor Japanese, only Chinese. collection, analysis, and dissemination of this intelligence was obviously within the responsibilities and capabilities of the UNC. All three levels of intelligence The

combine to create a picture which, when viewed in its entirety, with the luxury of 37 years of hindsight, seems clearly to show that General MacArthur could and should have anticipated Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean War. That the CCF counteroffensive in November 1950 surprised the UN forces in Korea, General MacArthur, and the US go-.ernment is clear from the results. A concluding

chapter evaluates all previously presented intelligence data from MacArthur's standpoint. It details what he knew

and what he should have known, what he did and what he

6

should have done.

Ultimately,

what G e n e m l MacArthur

s h o u l d h a v e d o n e is based u p o n the a u c h o r ' s s u b j e c ! : i v f : d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h a t a n y o b j e c t i v e , r a t i o n a l t h e a c e r

commander should have done in light of a l l the evidence

presented.

NOTES
'Message, U S JCS to CINCFE, Number J C S 92801, September 1 9 5 0 . :Unclassified), p p . 1-3, i n Declassified D o c u m e n t s Quarterly Cataloq-1975, v c l . 1. n o . 1, Jan-Mar 75 (microfiche; Washington, DC: CarrOlltOn Press, 19751, 14A, hereafter cited as JCS 92801.
2:

'Douglas MacArthur, "Communique #14, 28 November 1950," in Soldier SDeaks: Public PaDers and SDeeches of. v Douqlas ,-M ed; Vorin E. Whan, Jr. W e r a l of the ( N e w York: F r e e i c k Praeger, 1965), p . 229. 3S. L. A. Marshall quoted in John F. O'Shaughnessy, Jr., "The Chinese Intervention in Korea: An Analysis of Warning,'* Master of S c i e n c e of Strategic Intelligence Thesis, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 1985, p. 2. 4JCS 92801. S ~ ~ C h oSays u China Won't Stand Aside," New York Times, 2 October 1950, sec. 1, p . 3; and **China'sReds Again Warn U S on Korea," N e w York Times, 12 October 1950, sec. 1, p . 5.
-

6D. Clayton , James, T 45- 964 (Boston: co., 1985), p. 489.

T

vol. 3, Houqhton Mifflin

'Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, M 4 1 ( N e w York: McGraw-Hlll, 1954), p. 403; and T. R. Fehrenbach, U i b d of War: A Study i n UnDreDaredness ( N e w York: MacMillan, 1963), p. 282. 'Courtney Whitney, M zvous with H i s t o r Y ( N e w York: Alfred A. Knogf, 1956), p. 370.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

Korea occupies a peninsula on the 'eastern coast of

Asia.

The northern boundary is the Yalu River, bordering In the far northeast, the Tumen River forms To the west of Korea

Manchuria.

the border with the Soviet Union.

lies the Shantung Peninsula of China; to the south lies Japan: Throughout its history, Korea has been the point

where the ambltions of China, Russia, and Japan have conflicted. 1 Late in the 7th Century, a Chinese-controlled, native dynasty unifled the Korean peninsula. Korea

survived nearly one hundred years of ravage and destruction by Mongol armies: du-ing the 13th Century. Chinese, strengthened and revitalized, returned in the mid-14th Century, and-drove out the Mongols. In 1592, the The

Japanese invaded and subjected Korea to seven years of harsh, tyrannical rule. In 1894, Chinese troops entered

Korea to quell an anti-Chinese revolt; Japanese troops also invaded. The resultant Sino-Japanere War of 1894-

1895, compelled the Chinese t o relinquish their claims to Korea.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, ended with On 29 July 1905, US Secretary o f

Japan dominant In Korea.

War, William H. Taft, signed a pact with the Japanese

9

recognlzing Japan's suzerainty over Korea in return f o r a

J a p a n e s e p l e d g e Hot t o lnterferr w i t h AII1Crlr.3n
t h e Philippines.
,?iCtlOti?

irl

During the years 1905-1910, Japanese

control increased until 1910, when Japan formally annexed Korea. In July 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the fate of Korea was a topic or discusslon. The US needed a line

to separate US and Soviet forces in Korea after the defeat of Japan. On the map, the 38th Parallel appeared to

provide an acceptable line dividing the peninsula about In half. The line gave the Soviets enough of the country to

be acceptable as an occupation zone while retaining f o r the US as much of the territory as possible. gave the US two major sea ports The division

--

Pusan, on the southeast

tip of the penlnsula, and Inchon, near the capltal of Seoul, on the west coast.
US planners had to satisfy the

Soviets, since they'could invade and occupy all of Korea before the US could put any forces ashore. The 38th Parallel was a temporary, expedient measure to facilitate the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese occupation forces. It possessed no qualities

to recommend it a s either a national or political boundary. The southern half of Korea was primarily an The

agricultural region with rice being the primary crop.

extant heavy manufacturing industries were in the north.

10

Subsequent t o the Japanese suit for peace, the Soviets entered the country on 11-12 August and reached the 38th Parallel by 20 August. American occupation

forces landed at Inchon and accepted the Japanese surrender in Seoul on 9 September. After initial efforts

to astabllsh a viable public administration in the southern sector, the American occupatlon government turned its attention to reuniting the two sectors into a single nation. The Soviet Union was uncooperative.
On 10 May 1948, the UN supervised electlons In the

southern sector.

By 15 August, a government had been

established, and Syngman Rhee had been inaugurated the first President of the Republic of Korea. The United

Nations recognized the Republic of Korea on 12 December 1948.

On 8 September, the Communist Supreme People's

Assembly of Korea (SPAK) adopted a constitution for the

I

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The next

day the DPRK claimed governmental jurisdiction over all Korea. By mid-September there were two hostlle

governments, both claiming jurisdiction over all of Korea. American troop withdrawals concluded on 30 June

1949.

The US left the United States Korean Military

Assistance Group ( U S KMAG) to advise and assist the ROK Government in the task of developing a "security force." The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was actlvated on

11

February 1948.

Korean veterans of the Chlnese COmmUnlSt

B X p C : T i r l . r l ~ r ? 11.1

Forces ( C C F ) , W t i o had gained ValKiGlE: c!i>lnbac

the recent civil war with t h e Chinese Nationalists, returned to Korea to form the cadre. the NKPA. The Soviets armed
US

Tralning was in hlgh gear by January 1950.

Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, reported that during May and early June 1950, the NKPA crossed the border In

force weekly (every Sunday) to conduct maneuvers and

training

exercise^.^

Although the US KMAG did not believe

an attack from the North was imminent, should one come, the advisors felt the South could defeat the attackers with little effort. However, by late 1949, the Far Eastern Command seemed to accept the '8inevltability" of a North Korean 4 invasion and victory a s early as the summer of 1950. MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo consistently warned

offlclals in Washlngton that North Korea had the capability t o invade and that such a n attack was a posslbllity. There were more than 1,500 such warnings Intelligence agencies I n

from June 1949 to June 1950.5

Washington received these warnlngs, and others, prior t o the Invasion. MacArthur's Intelllgence Offlcer ( G Z ) ,

MG Charles A. Wllloughby, said that officlals in Washington should not have been surprised to learn of the attack, as his previous intelligence reports had clearly indicated it was a n opportune time for the Soviets to attempt to subjugate the South. 6

12

On 27 June, t h e New Y o r k Time% published an article

t h a t quoted a 1 0 June a r t i c l e in the S o v i e t Communist P a r t y newspaper, Izvestia.

The a r t i c l e s cited N o r t h

Korean plans for abrogatlon of the 38th Parallel as a dlvlsion of Korea and a reunlflcatlon of the country under

a "supreme Parliament" to be seated ln'seoul on 1 5 August

1950. Although there was no mentlon of mllltary force,

the manifesto laid out such a n ambltlous plan with an extremely short timetable that, short of either a n lmmedlate capltulatlon by the ROK Government or an. invasion, there was no way the North Korean Communists could be in Seoul by the deadline. I Was thls a valid, albeit unheeded, warning of things to come? Did US national-level agencies and

Mackthur's Far Eastern Command have accurate intelligence to forecast or predlct the lnvaslon of 25 June 19501 there a lack of cooperation and coordinatlon between MacArthur's theater lntelllgence staff and national-level intelligence agencles that could have caused them to mlslnterpret North Korean intentions? Although these aze Was

not questions to be answered by thls thesis, they may be lndlcators of a situation that had a far more devastating lmpact in November 1950, when the massive CCF counteroffenslve and intervention in the conflict caught the same lntelllgence agencles unaware.

13

The North Korean attack came about 0400, Sunday,

;5 J u n e 1 9 5 0 .
De.311 A C h r : S O t 1 ,

t h e Secretary o t

SC.At.?,

called President Truman, on a holiday i n Independenc?, Missouri, and informed him of the attack. Later that same

day, President Truman authorized MacArthur to send ammunltlon and equlpment t o Korea to prevent the loss o f the Seoul-Klmpo area; t o use US aircraft and ships t o evacuate Amerlcans from the country; and to send someone to Korea to assess the situation.
On

26 June, the

President expanded the guldance to authorize the use o f air and naval forces to support the ROK Army against military targets south o f the 38th Parallel. The United Nations reacted quickly to the North Korean invasion.
On 25 June, with the 3ovlet Union absent

In protest of the

U N ' s refusal to seat the Chlnese

Communist representative a s the offlcial Chinese delegate, the Unlted Nations Securlty Council passed a resolution calling for an lmmedlate cessation of hostilities, North Korea to withdraw north of the 38th Parallel, and all member nations to refrain from alding North Korea.
2 1 June
On

a second Security council Resolutlon, again with

the Soviet Unlon absent in protest, called upon member nations to render necessary assistance to the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack and restore the international peace and security. invasion, MacArthur had been given By the third day of the
US

authority to fight

the North Koreans with air and naval forces, the UN had
14

called f o r member nations to help repel t h e attack, and the N K P A was i n Seoul.
B y 30 June, President Truman had approved

MacArthur's request to lntroduce a regimental combat team into Korea, with the intent of building t o a two-division

force, and had dlrected a naval blockade of the North

Korean coast.

The tactical situatlon deteriorated as the

NKPA drove south with its main effort directed towards Taejon. On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution authorlzlng the formation of a unified command in Korea to combat the invasion. In response to the

resolution, President Truman appolnted MacArthur the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC).'
On

14 July, President Rhee placed all ROK armed forces under

MacArthur's command.

In addltlon to being CINCUNC,

MacArthur was the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the agent for 13 nations of the Faz Eastern Commission directing the occupation of Japan; Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), the commander of all
US

forces

in the Far East Command; and Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East, his own Army component. Machrthur's initial assessment of the situatlon, based upon a n assumption that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China would reinforce North Korea, was that he needed the equivalent of 4 to 4 1/2 full-strength lnfantry divisions, an airborne regimental combat team with Its 1s

lift assets, and an armored group of three medium tank

battalions, all wlth t k e l r n r c e s ~ a r ya r t l l l e r y .and z c r v l c e

elements. 9 As early as 7 July, MacArthur had announced to the JCS his plan for the prosecution of the war:

f i x the

enemy armies, exploit air and naval dominance, and conduct amphibious maneuvers to strike behind the attacking
I armies.

An intelligence estimate presented to the US

Joint Chiefs of Staff ( J C S ) on 10 July concluded that, Voluntary or forced withdrawal of US forces from Korea would be a calamity, seriously handicapping efforts to maintain US alliances and build political influence amonq the nations upon whose strength and energetic cooperation the policy of containment of Soviet-Communist expansion depends. It would discredit US foreign policy and UnderqIpe confidence in US military capabilities

....

By 5 August, the UNC established defenslve

positions covering the critical port of Pusan.

These

positions ran along the general line of the Naktong River.

x

In this area, the Pusan Perimeter, the US had a By the end of August, during

,kTrcombat strength of 65,000.

, & ? ? &J

ha xfl,Y;.&

q,

the NKPAs most concentrated offenslve against the Perimeter, the NKPA concentrated 14 dlvisions t o oppose the UN forces. strength. US intelligence grossly overestimated NKPA

HacArthurs intelligence staff estimated these

divisions comprised 100,000 combat troops with about 75% of authorized equipment. Actually, the NKPA numbered

about 70,000 combat troops, of whom less than 30% were

16

veterans o Manchurla, and the 2 5 June invasion.

The rest

were recent conscripts Erom South Korea, with no m o r e than

50% supplied with weapons and equipment. 1 2

Although still being pressed heavily, MacArthur held to his initial plan of seizlng the initiative through amphibious landings t o the rear of the' attacking NKPA

forces.

After considerable debate with his staff and with

the JCS, MacArthur decided t o land at Inchon and capture Seoul. The operation was the UNC's only hope for seizing

the initiative and creating a decisive opportunity f o r victory. Otherwise, the prospect was "...a war of

indeflnite duration, of attrition, and of doubtful results.... The JCS approved MacArthur's plan. He

activated the X US Corps in Japan on 26 August, and appointed his Chief of Staff, MG Edward A. Almond, to command the corps. The operation began at dawn on 15 September. NKPA fought a determined defense. However, by The

28 September, UNC forces controlled Seoul and were

eliminating remaining NKPA resistance throughout South Korea.
On 29 September, President Rhee reestablished the

Government of the Republic O E Korea in Seoul.

The natlon

had essentially returned to the pre-war status quo. MacArthur conveyed to Washington his desire to destroy the NKPA, rather than just drive it out of the south. l 4 On 11 September, prior to the Inchon landings,

President Truman approved a revised National Security

17

Council Memorandum ( N S C G l / 1 ) whlch authorized IJNC forces

LO

advance tiorth o f Ehe 30th P a r a l l e l I n order to d e f e a t

However,

the N K P A or o r c e i t s withdrawal from the R O K .

MacArthur was prohibited from conducting ground operations

in North Korea, i f either the

USSR

or the People's

Republic of China (PRC) intervened prior to UNC forces crossing the Parallel. The decision also grohiblted air,

naval, or ground operations across the North Korean borders into either Manchuria or the soviet Union.
It was

"not the policy" for the UNC to use non-ROK forces in the northern border provinces of North Korea. The policy

allowed MacArthur to develop contingency plans for the occupation of North Korea upon the cessation of hostilities, but he could execute these plans only upon Presidential authorizatlon. 15 The orlginal NSC memorandum (NSC 81) envisaged a halt to military operations along the 38th Parallel. Based, at least in part, upon the JCS's and MecArthur's insistence that such a halt was ''unrealistic," the President approved N8C 81/1. l6 The JCS wired the

authorization to conduct Operations north of the 38th Parallel, with the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces a s the primary military objective, in JCS message
92801 on 27 September.

This message, based upon NSC 81/1,

contained several caveats or limitations.

18

MacArthur was to lmmedlately assume the defensive

and d e f e r to Washington for . I p o l i c y decision iE.he :oi;nd

major Soviet Eorces employed either north or s o u t h o f ?.he 38th Parallel. Should he discover major CCF unlts

employed north or south of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur could continue the actlon as long as, in his opinion, the action offered a "reasonable chance of success.'I Should

the Soviets or Chinese Communists declare in advance their intentions to occupy North Korea and give warning that their forces should not be attacked, MacArthur was to, .again, refer the matter to Washington. 1 7 Within a matter of days the JCS had approved, "from the milltary point of view," MacArthur's plan for further prosecution of the war. The new Secretary of

Defense, George C. Marshall, obtained the approvals of the President and the Secretary of State on 29 September. 18 The JCS wlred the approval to MacArthur for Secretary Marshall and told MacArthur, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north
of the 38th parallel (sic).q*19 On 6 October, MacArthur

received word that the UN also supported operations north of the 38th. Although advanced UNC elements crossed the 38th Parallel a s early a s 30 September, the attack by the US 1st Cavalry Division on 9 October slgnalled the UNC decision to proceed northward. The stage was set for what

was supposed to have been the final destruction of the

19

N K P A a n d t h e s p e e d y cessation of hostilities.
Ylttilti
war
t'&S

However,

iiujtittis, L!iC

CCF 'di>l.lld opeti "dti

e r i ~ l r ~I~ -I?' ' ~/

I'

20

NOTES

(Hamden, C T : 'Edgar O ' B a l l a n c e , K o r e a 1950-1953 Archon Books, 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 16. T h i s c h a p t e r is a 3ynOpSiS Of t h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f Korea a n d t h e Korean War t h r o u g h e a r l y O c t o b e r 1 9 5 0 . The b a c k g r o u n d i n t o r m a t i o n i n t h i s T h e s e sources C h a D t e r came from a number of s o u r c e s . i n c i u d e Roy E. Appleman, s o u t h to t h e w n a . N o r t h t o $ h e Yalu (June-NovQmPer 1 9 5 0 ) U. S . Army i n t h e Korean W a r ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , D e p a r t m e n t of t h e Army, 1 9 6 1 ) ; a n d James F.S c h n a b e l , p o l i c v a n d D i r e c t i o n . The F i r s t Year U . S . Army i n t h e K o r e a n War ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: O f f i c e o f t h e C h i e f o f M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y , U . S . Army, 1 9 7 2 ) . U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e c i t e d , t h e h i s t o r i c a l background i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be found i n these references. 20'Ballance, p. 16.

3 S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e on Armed S e r v i c e s a n d S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Hearincis on t h e M i l i t a r v S i t u a t i o n i n t h e F a r E a s t a n d t h e R e l i e f o f General MacArthlll;, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 9 5 1 , p p . 1992-1993, a s c i t e d i n S c h n a b e l , p . 35. 4 S c h n a b e l . D. 63. c i t i n q b r i e f i n a t h e a u t h o r r e c e i v e d i n T o k y o - i ; November 1 9 4 9 when a s s i g n e d t o G 2 , GHO, FEC.

History

5 C o u r t n e y W h i t n e y , m t h u r : Hi s R e n d e zv o u s w i t h ( N e w York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1 9 5 6 ) , p . 320.

6 C h a r l e s A. W i l l o u q v and John Chamberlain. - h bMacArthur. 19 4 1 - 1 9 5 1 ( N e w York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p p . 350-354; and D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r , Reminiscences ( N e w York: McGraw-Hill, 1 9 6 4 ) , pp. 323-324.

w, 27

7nNorth Korea P l a n Bared 17 Days Ago," New York J u n e 1 9 5 0 , sec. 1, p. 3 .

'Messaaa. US JCS t o CINCFE. Number 85370, 1 0 J u l y 1 9 5 0 , i u n c l a s s i f i e d ) , p. 1, i n Declasslfled ments Q u a r t e r l y C a t a l o a - 1 9 7 5 , v o l . 1, n o . 1, Jan-Mar75 C a r r o l l t o n Press, 1 9 7 5 ) i S r o f i c h e ; W a s h i n g t o n , DC: 12B.
"'Record o f t h e A c t i o n s T a k e n by t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f R e l a t i v e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o p e r a t i o n s i n 1 A p r i l 1 9 5 1 , P r e p a r e d by Them Korea f r o m 25 J u n e 1 9 5 0 t o 1 f o r t h e S e n a t e Armed F o r c e s a n d F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s 21

Committees," 30 Aprll 1951, (Unclasslfied), p . 19, i n neclasslfled Documents Quarterly Cataloq-1975, v o l . 1, n u . 1, J a n - i l a r 75 (mlcruiiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975), 17B, hereafter c i t e 2 a s JCS R e p o r c to Senate, 3 0 A p r i l 1 3 5 1 . l0Intelligence Memorandum No. -304, "Effects of a Voluntary Wlthdrawal or Elimination of US Forces from Korea," 10 July 1950, a n enclosure to j'Estlmate by the Joint Intelllqence Committee on Estlmate of the Situation In Korea," 12 July 1950, (Unclassified), pp. 348-350, in Documents Quarterlv Catq;Lpa 1 9 7 5, vol. 1, @classified no. 1, J (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975), 2518.

"JCS

Report to Senate, 30 April 1951, pp. 19-31.

12Far Eastern Command, General Staff, Military Intelligence Section, "History o f the North Korean Army," (Unclassified), Tokyo, 1952, p. 29. 131bid., p. 38. 14Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of ( N e w York: Oxford MacArthur: A Precis in Limite d W University Press, 19601, p. 51; a% Schnabel, pp. 105-107.
v o l . 3:

"D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, w p h and Disaster. 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985), pp. 487-488.

16Memorandum, US Joint Chiefs of Staff t o the Secretary of Defense. "US Courses of Action with ReSDeC'C t o Korea;" 7 September 1950, (Unclassified), p. 1, i n Declassif led Doc umpnts m a r terlv Cataloa-1975, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan-Has 75 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 19751, 13B. 17Message, US JCS to CINCFE, Number JCS 92801, 27 September 1950, (unclassified), pp. 1-3, In sified D ocuments Quar terlv Catalos -1975, V O ~ . 1, no. 1, Jan-Mar 7 5 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975), 14A. "Hand written note on Memorandum, US JCS to the Secretary of Defense, '8Future Korean ODerations." 29 September 1950, (Unclassified), p. i, in peciassified Documents Quarterly Cataloq-1975, v o l . 1, no. 1, Jan-Mar 75 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 19751, 14B.

22

1 9 M e s s a g e , US JCS t o CINCFE, Number JCS 9 2 9 8 5 , 2 9 S e p t e m b e r 1750, ( U n c l a s s i f i e d ) , p . 1, i n D e c l a s s i f i e d Documents Q u a r t e r l y C a t a l o q - 1 9 7 5 , v o l . 1, n o . 1, Jan-Mar 7 5 ( m i c r o f i c h e ; W a s h i n g t o n , DC: C a r r o l l t o n Pre?~::, 1 3 7 5 1 , 14C.

23

CHAPTER 3

THE UNC CROSSES THE 38TH PARALLEL CASUS BELL1

I n addltion to attalning the mllltary objective of

the destruction of the NKPA, the JCS directed MacArthur to determine whether the Chinese Communists or the Soviets posed a threat to his mission. Although the JCS later

amplified these instructions, the amplifications appear reactive rather than proactive. The instructions told

MacArthur how to react under a litany of possible intervention situations, but restricted his ability to predict Chinese Communist or Sovlet lnterventlon capabilities and intentions.' MacArthur was to stay clear

of the Sovlet and Manchurian borders, while predicting

whether these governments were making plans to go to war. MacArthur would state later that such evaluations and predictions were not within the capabilities o r responsibilities of his theater intelligence section.

Who or what agency should have been given this

onerous task?

According to Rear Admlral Roscoe H.

Hillenkoetter, the C I A Director, It was not the function

of the CIA to evaluate reports or make predictidns about

enemy o r foreign nation intentions.3
I f this sort o f

evaluation was beyond the purview of the mllltary theater24

level intelligence, it was the responsibility o f some

ma t i o na 1 - 1e v e 1 c i v i 1 i a n i n t e 11 i qe n c e ,aqe n c y .

Tt i e f ,a i 1 u::

t o adequately assign t h e responslbility f o r detcrrninlnL1

Chinese Communlst national objectives plagued MacArthur and contributed to a gzoss inadequacy.of predictive Intelligence at all levels.

The US and' UN actlons In late

September and early October, thus, presented MacArthur with a great problem, as they Immediately raised the possibility oE Chinese intervent1on.l However,

MacArthur's initial assessment on 2 1 September was that there were no indications o f Soviet or Chlnese intervention.
5

On 1 October, as ROK Army units were crossing the 38th Parallel, MacArthur broadcast an ultimatum ordering the Pyongyang Government to surrender.
The demand

received no direct response from the North Kozeans, but US policy makers received indirect responses through diplomatic channels. Early on the morning of 3 October,

Chinese Communist Premier, Chou En-lai, summoned the Indian Ambassador, K. M . Panikkar, and told him that, i f any UN troops other than South Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea, Chlna would enter the war in support of North Korea. Panlkkar forwarded the message

through British diplomatic channels in the P R C to US policy makers.6 Over the next several days, intelligence

agencies of several allled and neutral nations and American embassies around the world forwarded
25

confirmations o t the warning.

These confirmations

s u p p o r t e d t h e I d e a t h a t Chinese t h r e a t s (of lntt?rverif,i~jti I

were not bluffs.

The CIA had earlier reported that, while Chinese Communist accusations and charges may be "almed at provldlng an excuse'* or "stage-settlnq for an imminent overt move," it was more likely that their particlpation in the war would be more lndlrect in llght o f the potential repercussions.8 A 6 October CIA Situation

Summary, though, reported contacts between Chou and the Burmese Ambassador to the PRC. The summary indicated that

China expected and was ready for war; China would lntervene when UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. report agreed with the Panikkar warning. The CIA This

qualified the report by saying there was no verificatlon that the Burmese Ambassador had presented a true picture of Chlnese Communist

intention^.^

Apparently little

credence was given to these warnings, although they were forwarded to HacArthur. Several days before the 3 October warning, Panikkar had responded to US diplomatic efforts to determine Chinese lntentlons by saying that China had no lntentlons of entering K o r e a ' ' , and even earlier, in a

15 July New York T i m e s artlcle, he had stated that Mao

Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist leader, viewed Korea as a "distant matter."ll

A frequent spokesman for the PRC,

Panikkar had reported on 25 September that the Chief of

26

StaEf of the CCF had told him that China would not "...sit back with f o l d e d hands and l e t the Americans come t o the
b o r d e r . I*''

These varying stories and Panikkar's perceived

pro-Communist and anti-American leanings gave hls reports little credibility in the eyes of American intelligence analysts.

I n a 6 October message to the UN Secretary

General, Chou protested that the UN resolution to unify Korea was illegal, and the advance of American soldiers threatened Chinese security. The message contained the

comment that the PRC would never be afraid to oppose an aggressive enemy. l 3 A determination that these diplomatic ventures were valid warnings and not just propagandistlc rhetoric is relatively simple in retrospect. However,

since the Chinese had not entered the war in August and ellmlnated the UNC from the Pusan beachhead, why should they enter the war in October when the U N forces were in control of half the peninsula and In much greater strength? Thus went the most common rationale used to It

discount the diplomatic reports of Chinese intentions. was consistent with the Department of the Army Intelligence Section's assessment of Chinese intentions. Publicly released and reported statements supported the prlvate, diplomatic warnings.

14

On 1 July Mao

charged that American interference in Korea was "unjustiEied," and American aggression would arouse reslstance throughout A s l a .
21

By 13 August, following

initial UN successes and the reinforcement o f UN force.

ehr Pi.isati ? e r i : n e t c r , a r:thlncse
Coiiiiii?in:st:

111

P::irty

iii:,gfizltit?

r e p o r t e d t h e war was e n t e r i n g a new stsqe.

The

27 August New York Times published a Chinese Communist

threat to intervene i f there was no diplomatic settlement.

2

The reports contlnued. ' C h o u said that

cr:r

SzI

d.X.TtMffi

--------- China would not "stand aside" i f its nelghbor, North

Korea, was invaded by the Americans. l a This litany continued on 12 October with the claim that the situation was "more serious," since American troops had ignored previous warnings and crossed the 38th Parallel.
19

Chinese radio broadcasts on 10 October and an 11 October Foreign Ministry public statement again reported Chou's warnings that the Chinese people would not idly accept US crossings of the 38th Parallel. The Foreign Ministry

statement called American actions a serious threat t o Chlnese security.

20

Significant among the public statements was a n August article in the Chinese Communist Party magazine, World Culture, that inextricably tied Chinese national interests to Korean national interests. It spoke clearly It

of the Chinese Communist "responsibilities" in Korea.

was the first public statement that specifically labelled

American actions a threat to Chinese security.
also:

It said

"North Korea's enemy is our enemy.

North Korea's

defense is our defense.

North Korea's victory is our

28

victory."

I t seemed t o imply also that North K o r e a ' s

defeat would b e China's deeat.L L

I n a 1960 report, Allen S . Wilting claimed thl? ::ev

harshness in statements intended for international consumption, coupled with an increase in coverage intended for domestic audlences, signalled the evolution of Chinese Communist policy. At the outbreak of the war there had

been no prior mention of Korea in the internal press; initial reports about the war were usually belated and often relegated to secondary positions within the papers. Throughout July and August, the Chinese domestic propaganda was not couched in terms of imminent Chinese Communist action or involvement in Korea. However, the unqualified confidence of June soon gave way to comments of a prolonged war of attrltlon. Rarely was the war depicted in terms of China's immediate

or vital interests, though.

Not until October was the war

specif lcally labelled a threat to the national security o f the People's Republlc of China. The press become more

critical of the US, called for support of North Korea, and demanded resistance to American aggression. The internal

press was a tool by which the Chinese Communist leadership prepared the Chinese population for military moves. The

press became increasingly militant as it mobilized public oplnion in support of possible intervention in the Korean War. 2 2

29

Had the Chinese dellvered, albelt lndlrectly, a n

!.l1clm.t!.liii

o f their own:'

Wa5 t h ?

Ari!cricati

cross!tlg

0:

;h::

3 8 t h P a r a l l e l :he

casus belli?

American in:.:l;iqcnc-

agencies chose to interpret the information as the CIA had done earlier In September. In s p i t e . o f the military

preparations and the stepped-up internal and external propaganda campaigns, direct Chinese Communist military 23 intervention was not considered probable in 1950. General Willoughby labelled the Chinese Communist diplomatic messages and propaganda program as "diplomatic blackmail" and deprecated the warnings i n his own intelligence reports. He reported the CCF possessed

sufflcient strength and capability to enter Korea from their advantageous positions in Manchuria and slgnlficantly affect UNC operations. Willoughby quallfled

the possible disparity within his report by stating the decision whether the PRC would intervene militarily was "...beyond the purview of collective intelligence: it is

a decision for war on the highest level.... ,824 By the beginning of October, the consensus within the intelligence community seemed to be that Chinese Communist intervention was improbable in 1950 and that claims to the contrary were manipulative attempts by the Chinese Communists. There were, however, a few State

Department o f ficlals who reported that China was prepared

Plr:nn. PdHt!
.//'
, /

to take considerable risks and the Chinese comments should not be regarded as mere bluffs. 2 5
30

Ic y \ ~ c A l n M ~

MacArthur and

Wllloughby would not be dlsabused of the conviction that the warnings constituted nothing more than blackmail.
I n discounting t h e Chinese warnings, MacArthur
'd*:i.j

also disparaging the threat posed by a steady flow of CCF

forces into the Manchurian provinces above North Korea.
P r i o r to the Korean War, a significant portion of the CCF

deployed to south and south-central Chlna in preparation

for an anticipated conflict with the Chinese Nationalists

on Formosa.

When President Truman ordered the US Seventh

Fleet to neutralize the Formosa strait, he eliminated the requirement for the Chinese Communists to malntain a large force opposite Nationalist China.
As a result, two CCF

armies were redeployed toward Manchuria. 2 6 Since early April, US national-level intelligence agencies had been aware of CCF troop movements from south China toward Manchuria. By mid-July, the estimates rose

sharply, as the CCF strength reported in Manchuria grew to about 180,000 regulars. Included were two CCF field

armies (each about the size of a US corps) and support forces. Washington sources viewed the shifts a s
I t was during this time that

precautionary and defensive.

the Chinese Communist internal press began stepping-up its anti-American propaganda campaign. 2 1
US intelligence agencies explained the movement of

CCF troops to Manchuria in a variety of ways.

One

explanatlon was that, with the neutralization of Formosa, the units were returning to their normal garrlson
31
w

locations.

Another was that Communist agrarian r e f o r m s

,3(1(:1

reilcd u p i ~ the army t o .$ssisf: w i t h r e g i o n a l h a r v e s t s ,

the deployments toward Manchuria were consistent w i t h agricultural needs. Whatever the justlfication for the movement of

large numbers of CCF unlts toward Manchuria, lntelllgence analysts were sensitive t o the potential for their employment in Korea. As early as July, Willoughby

prepared a detailed study of the capacity of the North Korean rail network to transfer major CCF units south from the Manchurian-Korean border to the battle front. 2 0 Chinese Nationalist sources also reported during July that the Chinese Communist troop movements were preparatory to their employment in Korea. 2 9 Extracts from the Far East Command's Daily Intelligence Summaries palnt a rather accurate picture of the build-up in Manchuria:
8 July:

Willoughby estimated 116,000 CCF regulars

in Manchuria; many in Antung (on the Yalu).

8

August:

Willoughby estimated 217,000 CCF

regulars in Manchuria.

31 August:

Willoughby estimated 246,000 CCF

regulars and 374,000 militia forces i n Manchuria and said that the movement may be preliminary t o their entering the Korean theater.
21 September:

The estimate had nearly doubled; a

total 450,000 CCF troops were reported in Manchuria.

32

1 4 October:

The evldence of massing o f CCF t z o o i ? : ~

T h e CCF
.~I?c?

a t Yalu R i v a r crosrjinq sites seemed conclusive.

order o f battie showed

. 3

total strength o f nine ariiii%

38 divisions in Manchuria, of which 24 divisions were

massed in the vicinity of crossing sites.

However,

Wllloughby said, "Recent declarations by CCF leaders, threatening to enter NK i f American forces were to cross the 38th Parallel, are probably in a category of diplomatic b l a ~ k m a l l . " ~ ~
C+,tm.u.
rllL

aOsm

f%:J;^uLu

'

.7

Some of Willoughby's other intelligence summaries could.lead a reader to believe that he was convinced o f a Chinese Communist intent to intervene in the war through active military participation. On 3 October, he reported

positive evidence that as many as 20 CCF divisions could have crossed the Yalu and been in North Korea since
10 September. 31

This would have been p r i o r to the Inchon

landing and almost a month ahead of Chou's warning that the Chinese would enter into the combat should the Americans cross the 38th Parallel.
I f this intelligence

report is accurate, rather than being a case of diplomatic blackmail, the Chinese assertions that an American crossing of the 38th Parallel would bring them into the war were valid warnings. On 4 Octobez, Willoughby reported evidence of the entry of another nine CCF divisions.

'*

Although he

continued to report CCF troops moving to Manchuria, massing at the Yalu River crossing sites, and entering
33

North Korea, Willoughby seemed to diJCOUnt the aCtua1

'~?tl:.iityi)f ~ h e lntelllgence.

There 1s no l t ~ ~ : l i c a t ! ~ ~ i ti- , . i t :
tiid

h e tried : o ciis:suacie Ms.cXrthur f r o m C r o S : j i n f 3

33th.

Although Willoughby stated on 14 October that intelligence reports began to take on a "sinister .connotation, there

is no evidence he ever cautioned against a drive northward

--

a drive that would undoubtedly run into the sizeable

CCF force he reported in North Korea. These forces comprised the bulk of the CCF Fourth Field Army, commanded by the veteran, Lin Piao. The US

2, M

5-0

Department of the Army G2 cautioned that reports o f L!n Piao and his army moving into Manchuria seemed "blown out

o f proportion by the press."

The G 2 warned against "blind

acceptance" of public statements on the army's location. Previous intelligence reports had indlcated the army was somewhere in north China. The 0 2 felt that, when

definitely determined, the location would provide valuable clues to Chinese Communist future military intentions. 3 4 Willoughby and the Department of the Army G 2 were not alone in their assessments of Chinese Communist intentions.
,.
i k.

The C I A stated,"

...there

are no convincing

indications of a n actual Chinese Communist intention to

1%

CLI .. . ' i 3 ,

resort to full-scale lntervention in Korea."

Although

intervention was a continuing possibility, it was not probable in 1950. The CIA reasoned that the Chinese

Communists feared the consequences of a war with the US, as such an action would jeopardize Chinese Communist
34

c h a n c e s f o r m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e UN and a s e a t on t h e
Security Council. T h e C I A b e l i e v e d t h e most f a v o r s b l e

time o r i n t e r v e n t i o n h a d p,assed. 3 5

rZDC7*

Armed w l t h t h e s e s l m l l a r i n t e l l i g e n c e a s s e s s m e n t s , t h e commander M a c A r t h u r ) and t h e P r e s i d e n t ( T r u m a n ) f l e w

t o Wake I s l a n d t o meet on 1 5 O c t o b e r a n d d i s c u s s t h e

conduct o f t h e war.

A f t e r t h i s a b b r e v i a t e d meeting, a n d

a s a r e s u l t of t h e m a s s i v e C h i n e s e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n November, c r i t cs a c c u s e d MacArthur o f i n t e n t i o n a l l y
m i s l e a d i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t when h e r e p o r t e d t h e c h a n c e s o f C h i n e s e o r s o v e t i n t e r v e n t i o n were v e r y l i t t l e . , , 3 6

35

NOTES l " ~ e c o r d of t h e Actions Taken by t h e Joint o f Staff Relative to the United Nations Operatlons Korea f r o m 25 June 1 9 5 0 t o 11 A p r i l 1951, Prepared f o r t h e Senate Armed Forces and Foreign Relations Committees," 30 April 1951, (Unclassified), p. 29, Chiefirj in
by '?hen

in a, vol. 1,

no. 1, Jan-Mar 75 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 19751, 17B, hereafter cited as JCS Report to Senate, 30 April 1951); and Bruce W. Bidwell, "History Of the War Department Intelligence Division," Part I, Chapter 5, as clted in James F. Schnabel, Policv and Dlr ectlon, The Flrst Year U. S. Army In the Korean War (washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U. S. Army, 1972), pp. 197-199.
2U. S. Army Far Eastern Command, Military Intelligence Section, Daily Intelligence Summary, Number 2957, 14 October 1950, p . le, (Unclassified), hereafter cited as FEC DIS.
3t*War N o Surprise," New York Times, 27 June 1950, sec. 1, p . 3. 4Charles A. Willoushbv and John Chamberlain, . . MacArthur. 1941-1951 ( N e w qoric: McGraw-Hill, 1954); p. 378. 'Message, USCINCFE to JCS, Number C-64805, 28 September 1950, p. 7, in Declassifie d Documen ts Reference Svstem. Re trospective collection, part I, Catalos of Abstracts, vol. 1 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1976), 253D. 6K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 109-111. Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Precis in Llmited War ( N e w York: oxford Unlversitv Press. 1960). . D. _ 70; and Allen 5. Whiting, -. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter t h e Kor ean (Santa Monica, CA: Rand c o r p . , [19601), pp. 108-109.
I

'Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum Number 324, 'Probability of Direct Chinese Intervention in Korea." 8 Seotember 1950, . DD. - _ 1-4. in Declassif led Docume-its Referince System. RelrosDective Collection, part 1, Cataloq of Abstracts, vol. 1 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1976), 34B, hereafter cited a s - C I A Intel Memo 324.

36

6 October 1 9 5 0 ,

Intelligence Agency, Situation Summary, in CIA Research R e ~ o r t s : J a p . 1 ~ Korea, and the Security of A s i a , 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 7 6 (microfilm; Frederick, M D : University Publications o f America, 1 3 8 3 3 , reel 1, frame 80.
p p . 2-3,

'Central

"Schnabel,

p. 197; and Higgins, pp. 54-55, 70.

'ln*Dfstant Matter, 15 J u l y 1950, sec. 1, p . 3.

Mao Says,!' Hew York TlmeaI

"Rosemary Foot, The Wr on4 War: Ame rlcan P o 1 I C Y and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 19851, p . 79; and eanlkkar, p. 1 0 8 . 13William Manchester, American Caesar: Douulas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), pp. 586-587.

Times

S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, "U. "Weekly Intelligence Report (U)," Number 85, 6 October 1950, p. 1, (Unclassified), hereafter cited as DA 0 2 WIR.

14ttAggressionby US: Mao Tse-tung's Charge," ondon), 1 July 1950, sec. 1, p. 3.

16Whiting, p. 71. 17ttPeiping Again Asks UN Chinese Seat: Role in War Hinted," Ne w York T l m e a, 27 August 1950, sec. 1, p . 10.

w ,2

180tChouSays Peiping Won"t stand Aside," New York October 1950, sec. 1, p . 3. 19v1Chlna'sReds Again Warn US on Korea," New York p. 5. "Schnabel, p. 233; and Higgins, p . 56.

Times, 1 2 October 1950, sec. 1,

21Whiting, pp. 70, 84-85. 221bid., pp. 35-81. 23CIA Intel Memo 324; and D. Clayton James', The years of MacArthur, vol. 3: -TrlumDh and-Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19851, p. 491. 24FEC DIS 2957, 14 October 1950, p. le. 37

:10 ri "The Ch 1ne 5 e I n t e r ve n I I n Kore.3: A n A n a l y S l 3 o f Y a r n l n g " ( M A J t e K 0: S C l e n C c C f Strategic Intelligence Thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 1 9 8 5 1 , p . 65; and Memorandum by t h e Director ot the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), "Chinese Communist Threat of Intervention in Korea," 4 October 1950, in U. S. Department of State, Foreicrn Rebations of the united Sta tes. 19 0, vol. 7, ,-K D e p a a ( Washing ton, DC: U. 9 . Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 864-866, hereafter cited as DSP 8859.
J o hn F

. 0 ' S ha u cj h ne s 3y ,

26Willoughby, p. 378. 27James, pp. 490-491. 28FEC DIS 2855, 4 July 1950, p. le. 291tPeipingTroop Moves Reported," New York Times, 2 July 1950, sec. 1, p . 20; and "Koo Bids Nations Join.to Meet Red 'Tests,"' New York Times, 11 July 1950, sec. 1, p. 20; and Harry Rositzke, The CIA'S Secret ODerations ( N e w York: Reader's Digest Press, 19771, p. 53. 30Willoughby, p p , 385-386, 400; and FEC DIS 2957, 14 October 1950, p p . le-lf.
JI

FEC DIS 2976, 2 November 1950, pp. If-19.

J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The Historv a (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 173-174. 33FEC DIS 2957, 14 October 1950, p. le. 34DA G2 WIR 85, 6 October 1950, p . 27. 35Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, "Threat of Full Chinese Communist Interventlon in K o r e a , " 12 October 1950, DSP 8859, pp. 933-934. 36t*Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on 15 October, Compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Notes Kept by the Conferees from 'lashingcon," DSP 8859, p. 953.

JL

CHAPTER 4

VICTORY TURNS INTO DEFEAT

The first time the Presldent and the General ever

met each other was at Wake Island on 15 October 1950. was also the first time in at least six years that HacArthur found himself seated at a conference table with a superior.' about a n hour. HacArthur and Truman conferred privately for After this meeting, they jolned the rest The other It

of the conferees for general dlscusslons.

conferees lncluded Ambassador John Huccio; Ambassador at Large Phlllp C. Jessup; Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Chairman of the Joint Chlefs of Staff, General of the Army

O m a r N. Bradley; Commander-ln-Chlef of the Paciflc Fleet,

Admiral Arthur W. Radford; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Hr. Averell Harrlman; Brigadier General Courtney Whltney, the Chief of the Far East Command Political Section; and Colonel A. L. Hemblen. After dlscussons on the rehabllltatlon of post-war Korea and the cost of such a n endeavor, the talk turned to the future of the confllct. The Presldent asked HacArthur

about the chances of Soviet or Chinese interference. MacArthur's response was, "Very little." The Soviets were

strong enough to have an impact should they intervene, but their closest unlts would take six weeks to reach combat
39

positions i n North Korea.

M.acArthur went on to explain

t h a t t h e C h i n e s e had 300,000 s o l d i e r s in Manchurld, c f

xhic!i p r o b a b i y n o inore than 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 1 2 5 , 0 0 ! 1

wer.2

?tcLl.baiL!

massed at Yalu River crossing sites.

Of these, no more

than 50,000-60,000 could actually be.moved across the

L lver

.2
The State Department had received a 13 October

report from the Netherlands' Ambassador in Peking that reliable, unidentified sources had reported four CCF divisions had crossed the Manchurian border into North Korea. Unfortunately, the message arrived in Washington

after the President and his party departed for Wake Island. It is doubtful whether the message would have had

an impact on the President and his advisors or the General

and his advisors. The conferees seemed predisposed to

believe there would be no intervention In Korea. The conversation drifted on to, among other topics, the continued occupation of Japan and the situation between the French and the Vietnamese in IndoChina.
As the conversation drifted back to the war

in

Korea, MacArthur said no "non-ROKs" would be used north of a line that ran from a point about 20 miles north of Pyongyang t o Hamhung. He was confident enough of the

military situation to state, also, that all non-Korean soldiers should be out of Korea as soon as possible. The

President, then, abruptly ended the dlscussion, l e s s than

40

two hours after it convened, commentlng favorably on t h e success o f t h e conference.

4

I n a discussion t h a t followed the p r i n c i p a l meeting, MacArthur was reported to say that he had no idea why the Chlnese had "gone out on such a limb" as to declare they would Intervene in the war i f the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel. He added that they must have 5 been embarassed by their disadvantageous positions.

Apparently there was nothing in recent intelligence reports that concerned either the President or MacArthur. It also appears that no one chose to question MacArthur's assessment that there was very llttle chance of CCF or Sovlet lnterventlon in the war. MacArthur later stated that he had clearly quallfled hls statements when he told the President the chances of Chlnese lnterventlon were small.
BG Whitney,

at the conference table with MacArthur, wrote that MacArthur preceded his answer to the President by explaining that the answer was speculative only speak from the military viewpoint.

--

he could

MacArthur claimed

the Defense Department, State Department, and the CIA had all advanced the opinion that the Chlncse Communlsts had no intentlon of intervening. He explained his field

intelligence was hampered by the Presldentlally-lmposed restrlctions protecting Sovlet and Manchurian borders and air space. Consequently, the Far East Command's aerial

reconnaissance could provide no reliable clues. 41

MacArthur's explanation a l s o included t h e :statement t h d t . s u c h .an analysis (whether a :~overeignZ

x o u l d e n t e r a war) was a pol.iticai issue ~ a t h t ?thcin ~
3

h k e

military i s s u e .

I t dealt with Chinese and Soviet natlonai

objectives and intentions and was, therefore, not the realm of his military intelligence staff. 6 MacArthur's response appears based upon his impressions of Chinese capabilities and not their intentions. He felt the Chinese had lost their chance f o r
X better

declsive intervention.

time would have been when

the NKPA had the UN forces contained within the Pusan Perimeter. Now, however, with the UNC successfully

"mopping up" the remaining NKPA resistance, the PRC stood very little chance of decisive intervention.
As,

perhaps, tacit proof of even General Bradley's

belief in MacArthur's assessment, one need look only to Bradley's question about how soon MacArthur could spare a division for redeployment to Europe.'l Had Bradley not

accepted MacArthur's assurances as fact, he certainly would not have asked for one of MacArthur's combat divislons. Either Bradley believed MacArthur's

intelligence reports over all others, or Bradley's other intelligence sources agreed with MacArthur. explanation is factually supported. On 20 October, five days after the conference, the JCS advised MacArthur that worldwide requirements called The latter

for the redeployment from Korea to Europe, as soon as

42

practlcable, of either the 2d o r 3d Infantry Division.

T!I e

.J: < 2

6 a v I ) r r 1-1 t: h e

r e !:I c p 1

) : I

YNile 1_1 r 0 f

t: h e ? t d I 11 f ,?I ti t L y
0 . :

Division.

MacArthur's response was that the c c s s a t i , , n

hostilities (between Thanksgiving and Christmas) would allow the Eighth Army t o withdraw to.Japan with the 2d Dlvlslon. He would need the 3d Divislon for occupation

duties i n Korea for about six months beyond the cessation of hostilities. At the end of this period, the

3d Division would leave for Japan, and he could make the 2d Division available for redeployment.
8

Clearly, MacArthur and the JCS would not have considered these moves i f their intelligence had given them reason to believe Chinese Communist intervention in the war was a fait accompll. For whatever reasons, the

lntelllgence analyses of Chlnese Communist intentions prior to and immediately following the Wake Island meeting were flawed and sadly inadequate. Although, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Willouqhby's intelligence reports on 3 and 4 October alleged the entry of as many as 29 CCF divisions into Korea,' his subsequent reports mentioned only the illtv of CCF troops crossing into North Korea from their concentration sites in Manchuria. When the reports

dlscussed posslb1.e CCF lnterventlon, Willoughby couched the discussions in terms of the CCF "capability" to cross the Yalu.
I t seems, without retracting
OK

qualifying any

43

previous reports, Wllloughby changed his tone regard 1ng actual versus possible CCP intervention. There were plenty o f reports, o f f i c i a unofficial, that the relocation of CCF units
a ntl

o Manchuria

was a prelude to their employment in,Korea. On

18 October, the London Times reported that CCF regulars

were moving north to be part of a force to ald the North Koreans. lo Even whlle MacArthur was at Wake Island

assuring the President that there was little chance of Chinese Communist interventlon, the CCF was crossing the Yalu in force. Contrary t o Willoughby's intelligence

estimates of approximately 162,000 CCF soldiers in Korea

( 1 8 divisions with 8,000-9,000 soldiers per division), b y

late October, the total CCF strength in Korea had reached

250,000. 11

On 16 October, Willoughby reported the possibility that the Chinese might occupy a narrow portion of North Korea from east t o west and establish a buffer zone to

.,",
i [ ,

, &,wlC- <Id. I b d b r u @ d . . ~ , ~ , . L . t

protect the Chinese mainland.

On i 7 October, MacArthur

lssued his order for the continuation of the pursuit and the final destruction of the NKPA. The Eighth Army was to

push forward t o a line, generally between Sonchon and Sonjin, and be prepared to push to the border. MacArthur

unilaterally lifted the restrictions on non-ROKs in the provinces bordering Manchuria and the Soviet Union; a restrictlon imposed by the President and the JCS on

44

2 7 September.
'Wrt>&e th.3t:
hi:

General Collins, Army chief of Staff, l a t e r

had
!lo

rei:i?llec:triati

wiieteher t h e .7CS eveii

made n o t e o f MacArthur's decision to ignore t h e restriction; i f the JCS noted the action, it certainly offered no objection. 12 There were signs of the trouble ahead. Wllloughby received, analyzed, evaluated, and disseminated. On 19 October, he reported elements of s i x Signs that

CCF armies in Manchuria

all s i x had recently been

reported i n locations other than Manchuria.

He also
. -

reported 46,000 Mongolian troops relocated t o Manchuria. Willoughby also cited reports that elements of three CCF armies had moved into Korea and reorganized/redesignated as NKPA divisions. The next day Willoughby reported as
(/?&T5?) . . . ... -

a falt accompll the potential that CCF units deployed I n the Manchurian border area would reinforce the NKPA. also
He

reported 75 fighter aircraft across the border in In his book, Korea: The Untold Story

Antung, Manchuria. of the

w, Joseph

C. Goulden claims Willoughby later

explained these as either routine, training aircraft or more of Chou En-lai's "sabre-rattling. ,el4
UNC aerial

reconnaissance of the roads leadlng south from the Yalu revealed "intermittent, though large-scale, truck convoys.81 Reliable sources reported increased CCF operational activities during several days prior to the
19 October intelligence summary.

45

The 20 October intelligence summary further stated

t h e CCF had t h e unquestlonable capacity to cross t h e Yall:

at o r north of Antunq.

This summary contained the caved::

that a Chinese decision to cross the Yalu was not wlthin the purview of military intelligence. The decision, a

polltical one, would be based upon the high level readiness of the Kremlin t o go t o war through her proxies

in China and Korea.

However, somewhat inconspicuous and

farther down in the report was the line, "The speculative date of intervention is set f o r 20th of October, probably following some sort of official announcement. , , I 5 Apparently someone in the FEC intelligence community had reason to believe CCF intervention was becoming more o f a probability and not just a potential capability. On

21 October, Willoughby cited a "reliable report" of

400,000 CCF troops in Manchurian border crossing areas

alerted to cross t : i e

border.

As a precaution, FEC

increased its aerial reconnaissance of the border areas. 16 On 24 October, MacArthur issued further instructions abolishing any remaining restraint on the use
of non-ROKs and telling his subordinate commanders to

"drive forward with all speed and full utilization of their forces." They were "...authorized to use any and When

all ground forces to secure all of North Korea.

the JCS questioned this action, MacArthur responded that it was a matter o f milltary necesslty. He said Marshall's

46

earlier directive t e l l l n g h l m t o f e e l t.3ctlcally .and

3 1; r .a t c g 1c ; a

11y

1 . 1.1liljiiipr i ' ei:i

'qa vc h i ti1 t he r i t t11.1 1: ;I t c

authority.

He added that h e had covered a l l his iiitericjed

actions with the President while at Wake Island.

The JCS

must have, at least tacltly, approved this explanation as they made no move to countermand MacArthur's orders to his subordinates..

* '

MacArthur's orders to his subordinates

were contrary to official US policy and also ignored most intelligence indicators.
. .. .. ,

.*

I n an order of battle dlstrlbuted on(24 .

. -

October-,)

Willouqhby reported confirmation o.f 3 1 6 , 0 0 0 ~ Chinese Communist Regular Ground Forces in Manchuria comprising a total of 12 armles and 44 dlvlslons.
He also reported

another unconfirmed six armies and 18 divisions, a n addltlonal 172,000 CCF soldlers I n Manchurla. Even though

later lntelllgence showed even these figures to be 'woefully short, Wllloughby's reports of close to 500,000

CCF soldiers along the border "alerted t o crosst* should

have caused him to warn MacArthur of the ever-increasing danger facing the new offensive. 19 Recalllng Chou En-lal's
3 October comments

threatenlng lnterventlon should the Amerlcans cross the 38th Parallel, It seems that Wllloughby should have begun to palnt for MacArthur a plcture of lmmlnent Intervention. Wllloughby's reports often spoke of the possibility of Chinese intervention but never the probability.
He

was not one to get caught I n a prediction

o f future enemy operations that h e could not, ensure.

:<ince Wi1:ouqhhy

b e ? i e v e d there Wa:j n o positive,

uncontrovertible evidence that the C C F h a d crossed t h e border and was in Korea,20 his reports never cautioned The UN appeared to be drawing near to the successful conclusion of the campaign. 21 restraint. On 2 5 October, the 3d ROK Division met a CCF unit of undetermined size, supported by armor, at Sudong south of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. 2 2 That same day a

regiment of the- 6th ROK Division engaged a CCF unit near Onjong, 40 miles north of. Anju, on the west, and was virtually annihilated in two days' heavy fighting. The

1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 6th ROK Division was the first UN force to reach the Yalu, arriving near Chosan late on 26 October. That night an attack by Chinese The 1st

Communist "Volunteers" decimated the battalion. 2 3

and 8th ROK Divisions were also hit hard causing the disintegration of the ROK I 1 Corps and exposed the Eighth Army's right flank. 2 4 CCF prisoners captured during the fight with the 1st ROK Division reported they were from a unit of Koreans

++'

+ r Z\W W+

.Aw

and Chinese that had crossed the Yalu at sinuiju some time
(lb ar2y!-d)

earlier.

One soldier reported that, from where he was

captured, there were 20,000 more CCF soldiers in the hills to the north and the east

48

On t h e afternoon of 26 October, t h e Commandcr o f

tilt:

L:jt ROK r J ! V l s i < : t l e::c.31\\lnc<:l rhf? ?:lt:iiiy dr,id fr<j!i:r i i :

He r e p o r t + d t o t h e I C o r p : j

previous night's f i g h t .

Commander that the dead were not a mixed group - they were all Chinese. Eighth Army intelligence officers, though,

discounted the prisoner reports and the possibility of a CCF intervention in strength. 2 6 The CIA, likewise,

reported prisoner interrogations but sounded no alarm, assigning the reports a low degree of credibility f o r content and source. 27 The 28 October Far East Command

Daily Intelligence Summary still maintained

the auspicious time for such intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe that such a move, i f planned, would have been postponed t o a time when remnant NK forces have2$een reduced to a low polnt o f effectiveness. Whether the auspicious time for lntervention had long passed or not, by 31 October prisoner of war interrogations had identified at least five CCF divisions.
29

...

Perhaps one of the most significant events in the

war was the capture of CCF soldiers in late October I n the

vicinity of Unsong, near the west coast, and at Sudong, about 40 miles north of Hamhung on the east coast. The

UNC identified elements of the 124th CCF Division near Koto-ri, a E e w miles south of the Chosin Reservolr. Within ten days, interrogation of CCF prisoners identified
11 more divisions in forward combat areas i n Korea.
49

At

the same time, IJNC a e r i a l reconnaissance Confirmed heavy troop rnovcmenLs. within M i ? n c h u r i a , a c r o s s t h e
b o r d e r , and within K o r e a .
.3 c
Korcd?.

Theater lntelllgence officers estimated that a bo u t :

40,000 CCF soldiers were in Korea, and another 200,000

were in Manchuria withln two nights' marching distance of the front. Actually at least 180,000 CCF soldiers were

already in Korea, and another 90,000 were scheduled to arrive within three weeks. 31 Again
US

intelligence While the

agencies had missed the mark by.a large margin.

UNC was fighting for its life in the Pusan Perimeter,

theater intelligence analysts had grossly over-estimated the size, strength, and equipment of the NKPA. the error was a gross under-estimation. This time

The possible

repercussions in the latter circumstance would be for more serious than those in the former. In a memorandum dated 1 November, Walter B. (Beetle) Smith, the Director of the CIA, told President Truman that Chinese Communist troops were opposing UN forces. Although he could not dismiss the possibility of

a full-scale intervention, Smith felt the Chinese intended instead to establish a c o r d o n sanltaire south of the Yalu. Such a buffer zone could protect the Chinese border

from UN forces arid ensure the uninterrupted flow into China of electricity from the Yalu River hydroelectric facilitie~.~ Such ~ a move would then be defensive and designed to not Drovoke the
US.

CIA Director Smith

50

believed the Chinese Communists were genuinely afraid of

I : , i-1

Aiiic r 1c.3 t I 1nva 3 1( J ~ I (3f :la tic hl.1 z 1: i 11 1 3 p 1t.i n E a I ,:! i r t: !):I I . : !

t o the contrary.

Although most intelligence estimates agreed with the CIA Director's estlmate that the.Ch1nese involvement
was only limited, the increase in enemy air activity

should have provided a clue to the expanding nature of the war. The UNC had air superlorlty.

For all intents and

purposes there was no North Korean Air Force; however, o n

1 November Russian MlG-15 jet fighter aircraft appeared

over the Yalu and challenged UNC air superiority.

The

first aerial combat between jet alrcraft made history on

8 November

when a

US

F-80 downed a MlG-15 with a Chlnese

pilot. 3 3 Wllloughby's 2 November lntelllgence report was the first of several that indicated a growing conviction that the Chinese Communists were in the war for good, regardless of the qualifiers written into each report.
2 November, Willoughby reported that the recent flow of

On

events had "remored (sic) Iremovedl the problem of Chinese lnterventlon from the realm of the academic and turns (slc) it lnto a serious proximate threat." It clted

earlier dally lntelllgence summaries that reported CCF unlts ( 2 4 divislons total) crosslnq the Yalu between 1 and
10 Seotember.

The 2 November intelligence summary

reported recent actions may "...presage the future appearance of some o r all of the other CCF units from 51

north o f the Manchurian border.''

Willoughby concluded
treat% an,d

China could logically be expected t o w a n t to control some sort of b u f E c r

i ~ ~ e south d

of the Y a l u ,

although some reports indicated IXF divisions were moviny forward from the Yalu to the active battle lines rather than staying in the area of the Yalu. ' 3 A In this report Willoughby seemed to be using the "perfect vision" of hindsight and attaching greater significance to "unconfirmed reports" he chose not to support in earlier reports. In three days of vicious fighting around Unsan,
2-4

November, the US 8th Cavalry Regiment was surrounded The fighting

and severely beaten by a major CCF force. wa3

so

stiff that the 8th Cavalry's parent unit, the

1st Cavalry Division, was unable to fight through and rescue the unit. In the section for conclusions on enemy capabilities, the 3 November intelligence summary said that, although there was still no "...concrete evidence" of full-scale CCF intervention, the possibility was considered an "active capability." There was no "concrete

evldence" in spite of the fact that the US 1st Cavalry Division claimed it did not have sufficient combat strength to fight through and rescue the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The I Corps Commander accepted this assessment

when he accepted that the 8th Cavalry Regiment would have to be abandoned.

52

The 3 November report lndlcated two-thlrds o f t h e

4 1 divlsions

(1% CCF arlnlesl sh~.)wn i n ManChluri;i weiOK

e i t h e r o n t h e border and capable o f crossing

actually

in North Korea.

The same report gave several accounts o f

heavy vehlcular trafflc from Manchuria, across the Yalu, and southward out of major North Korean towns along the

river.
gear.

The CCF resupply actlvitles must have been I n high The report concluded that there were more than

enough CCF troops in Manchuria for most normal purposes.

I t was unlikely the Chinese would need the additional

relnforcements

--

i f CCF actions I n Korea were actually

35

defensive in nature or limited in scope.

On 4 November, in response to a JCS request, MacArthur responded that it was impossible "...to authoritatively appraise the actuallties of Chinese Communlst lnterventlon In Korea."

He llsted four posslble

first, full-scale

courses of action the CCF might pursue:

intervention; second, covert military assistance to North Korea; third, assistance by Chinese "volunteers"; and fourth, do nothing

--

believing only ROKs would be

committed to the northern regions, and the ROKs would be too weak to affect the Chinese. MacArthur stated that the

first posslblllty was not as likely as some comblnation of the other three. MacArthur counselled agalnst making

hasty conclusions based upon a less than f u l l accounting of the facts. 36

53

In the 4 November intelligence summary, the

?!iscellaiieon?,
S e c t - i o n di..jc:issecl

recent P e k i n q

rGi;iu

br:]adcast and a s k e d the hypothrt i c a l qi:e.sti:)n broadcast signalled a declaration o f war.

s i h ? : ! i ? r

th.?

The Peking
US

broadcast detailed China's fear of invasion by the the

US'S

and

disregard f o r all previous warnings about Chinese The broadcast committed

Communist intentions in Korea.

Peking "to assist the Korean people," because "resistance alone has the possibility of teaching the imperialists a lesson." The broadcast also called f o r a formal

mobllization of all official political parties in the P R C

to resist the American invasion, assist Korea, and protect

China.

Willoughby's comments were that this broadcast,

indicative of an overt declaration of war, could be identified as official Chinese Communist policy. Willoughby claimed that, while previous broadcasts sounded like bombast and boasting, this one did not.

To him it

seemed a declaration of war that spoke clearly of overt resistance to the anticipated invasion of the PRC by the

us. 3 1
The 4 November Daily Intelligence Summary listed enemy capabilities as:
( 1 ) Conduct guerilla operations. ( 2 ) Reinforcement by Manchurian Communist

forces.
( 3 ) Retreat to adjacent border areas. ( 4 ) Troop capacity for defense. ( 5 ) Conduct air operations. 38 ( 6 ) Conduct limited offensive operations.

54

These reflected Willoughby's estimate of t h e enemy capablllties in the order of their greatest pr~bability.~ ~ view of the state o f t h e NKPA, stii: In the primary enemy, and the success of UNC exploitation and pursuit operatlons, such a ranking of enemy capabllltles docs not seem out of order. However, there was a dramatlc change on
5 November.

The capablllties (again in order of

probablllty) changed to:

( 1 ) Conduct offenslve operations. ( 2 ) Reinforce wlth Manchurian Communist orces. ( 3 ) Conduct guerilla operations. (4) Defend in present positions. ( 5 ) Conduct offensive air operations. 4 0

The enemy offensive capablllty was no longer

"limited."

I t also moved from the least probable course

Gone was any

of action to the most probable.

consideration of "retreat" as an enemy course of actlon. "...the entrance of the CCF into the Korean

war (sic)" markedly strengthened the potential for the enemy to conduct offenslve operations. The Chinese

Communists had demonstrated lntentions to deny the Yalu area t o UN forces. They had become a s much the enemy as

was the NKPA.

The CCF had sufflclent forces and had them

i n advantageous posltlons that allowed thelr introduction

in Korea, without warning, at any time.

Their employment
41

would present a serious threat to the UNC.

55

By 7 November, t h e report s a i d t h e r e were

5(j CC7
I::

divisizns, :)rqanl:ze*.i lind(?r 1.5 a r m i e s , in Hanchuriii.

these forces, 2 9 divisions were iinmedlately . ~ v a i l a b i ?t : i z employment in any major counteroffensive. This enemy present

relnforcement capability, if exercised, "...could a serlous threat t o UN forces....''

I t ' w a s entirely

possible for the deployment to be by back roads and under the cover of darkness to preclude UN detection. 4 2 There

were no comments i n this section that dealt with the actions o f CCF units already in Korea. On thls same day

the PRC admitted that, in addition to ethnic Koreans, Chinese "volunteers" had been fighting alongside the NKPA since 25 October. 4 3 The CCF units, absent in the 7 November intelligence summary, reappeared on 12 November. This

particular report listed 75,700 CCF in Korea opposing the Eighth Army. The report compared the 4 November total

estimated enemy strength (NKPA and CCF) ( 4 0 , 1 0 0 ) to that of 1 2 November (98,400) and stated that the most significant increase was in CCF units. It concluded the

dramatically lower 4 November figures must have represented "...only N.K. w44 As Willoughby's intelligence reports were often contradictory and unhelpful, so were those of the C I A . The Far East Command and the CIA seemed uncertain whether the CCF was actually In Korea and, i f in, what it's
56

the vanguard of the CCF forces in

strength really was.

1)

National Intelligence Estlmate i

111 iiiat\;/

; i

y,:,v.=(,ll:,~r,.:!qt-i.e,i
i

rcsp'f'cts w i
.3

I:):

ti:,.

" o p i n ions I t i n W i L' 1 iii:qhby"

r D p o r ts ,

1 thouqh i t ,:I i f e r ?<!

in the strength of the CCF reported in Korea and Manchurla.

700,000

NIE 2 estimated 30,000-40,000 CCF In Korea and

In Manchurla, of whlch 200,000'were regular combat

The CIA posltlon was, rather than drlvlng the UN

forces.

forces completely off the peninsula, the CCF objective was merely to halt the UNC advance. The report concluded that

the Chinese Communists had been committing forces to Korea since mid-October and would enter Korea in Eorce if the UNC attacked Chinese territory. 4 5 The CIA Director,

Smith, again advanced what seems to have been the officlal CIA position. On 9 November he told the President that

the Chinese Communist lntent was probably to establlsh a cordon sanitalre to protect the Yalu Rlver hydroelectrlc facillties. 4 6 Following the b l o o d y engagements between the UNC and the CCF in late October and e a r l y November, the enemy seemed to disappear. After about I November contact was

scarce., Thls could explaln some of the conuslon ln the

lntelllgence estimates. Had the UNC beaten the CCF badly Not

enough that they were leavlng the field of battle?

likely, In view of the overwhelmlng potential in manpower poised across the Yalu in Manchuria. Was this a probe
a

designed to find and fix UNC weak points for

later

51

attack? events.

This question seems borne out by subsequent

Joseph GouLden, a u t h o r of u r e a : The IJntold

Stor;!

of the War, and others feel the CCF's October o f f e n s i v e

operations were another warning to the UNC. The US had

ignored the previous verbal warnings and forced the Chinese to demonstrate their resolve. This could also The Chinese

explain the subsequent lull in the combat.

Communist leadership could have been allowing the US to assess the situation and make appropriate declsions that would lessen the threat to Chinese national security. Additionally, the Chinese Communist leadership could have been evaluating US responses and reactions to better prepare for the next step in the conflict. 4 1 Perhaps, like two fighters sparring in the opening rounds of a prize fight, the PRC and the US were eyeing each other to determine their next moves and to set up the "knock out punch." The Far East Command's 19 November

Daily Intelligence Summary gave a hint of the coming blow. Added as a new enemy capability, number s i x on the

list of probabilities, was "Psychological Preparation for War." The discussion of enemy capabilities in this

particular report was devoted entirely to recent Chinese Communist propaganda efforts aimed at convincing the Chinese people o f the necessity for "defensive intervention" in Korea. 4 8 The Chinese internal press'

anti-American campaign had become particularly virulent

58

during the l u l l that Eollowed the "tap" by the Chlnese. The 19 Noveinher t X + l l y I n t ? l l l q e r i c ? Summary cotntalned t h e closest t h i n q to a warninq seen i n Willoughby's r+por:3 when it said, "...it would appear logical to conclude that the Chinese Communist leaders are preparing their people psychologically f o r war. 1149 By the end of November, the US was not certain if it had provoked China. US national-level intelligence

estimates were inconclusive concernlng whether the Chinese were involved in a full-scale o r a limited offensive. 5 0 The State Department estimated (from sources other than the Far East Command) that in excess of 50,000 CCF troops had entered North Korea. The State Department, however,
'J,h
"2.~ 1 l . l

would neither evaluate the evidence nor offer suggestions about probable Chinese courses of action

--

it only
51

recounted all the options available to the Chinese.

The CIA stated that, while the CCF did not have the military capability to drive the UNC from the peninsula, it had the capability to drive the UNC back into defensive positions and into a protracted and lnconclusive war. The CIA reported the CCF had sufficlent

troops to conduct and support major military operations, and the Chinese had given no indication that any of their objectives were limited to buffer zones, protecting Yalu River hydroelectrlc facilities, o r holding UN forces along the 38th Parallel. The indications were that the Chinese However, the CIA

were fully committed to the war.

59

rJIi;

4'

concluded there was a lack of evidence to indicate whether

I::I,~ l:hi.ne:3ts

were c : ) i n m i k t e d trj a E : ~ ? l - s c a : e < : f f , ? n : ~ ; v s

e ' f f c r t .5 :

In this uncertaln atmosphere MacArthur planned his final offensive. The UNC was to drive forward to the Yalu The lack of evidence to the

and secure the flnal victory.

contrary seemed to lmply that total and inal victory was within the grasp of the UNC. MacArthur planned to have

many American troops home by Christmas. JCS message 92801, based upon the conditions established i n NSC 81/1, required MacArthur to forward f o r JCS approval all plans for operations north of the 38th Parallel. 5 3 However, on 24 November, without prior
JCS

approval54 and after the UN had voiced concern that just such a move could provoke total, open Chinese intervention,55 MacAzthur announced his final offensive and prematurely proclaimed victory. devastating for the UNC. On 2 5 November, six CCF divisions launched a holding attack in the center of the Eighth Army while eight CCF divisions struck the ROK I1 Corps on the right flank. "...the lrresistible force of the Chinese The results were

Communist Army hit the thoroughly movable object of the

Republic of Korea's I 1 Corps. Wlth its flank

dangerously exposed, Eighth Army withdrew under heavy enemy pressure.

60

Despite the evldence, MacArthur .and many O E h i s

>.<: y

e 1.1 i:, (1, r d 1I-,

, ;e

r. 1: I i t 1, : , 1.1 y

r r f 1.13 . . i( I b

3 i:c

cp t :

. : I; f . j.

I:

:.,P

wholesale CCF intervention.

W i 11 o u g hb y s t eiid f a s t 1 y

refused to believe the dead bodies and captured soldiers

a n y more than another Marine Corps l i e . e 5 8

in CCF uniforms and t h e Chinese-speaking prisoners were ; & :J t , ..

However, on 20 November, MacArtkur wired the JCS: T h e Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under t h e gulse of volunteerism or other subterfuge now has . . .-_. .. n e w , the slightest validity. We face a n entirely war .,...The resulting situation presents a n entire new picture which broadens the potentialities to world embracing considerations beyond the sphere of decision by the Theater Commander. This. command has done everything hu_ma_n>y.possible within. l k _ c a ~ & ~ t _ l.but & s Is. ngu faced. with

...

H o w could the confidence of a f e w days earller have become this depressing pronouncement from MacArthur? Was this part of HacArthurs plan

--

t o d r a w t h e Chinese

into the war so he could defeat them?

61

NOTE3

' J o s e p h C . G c u l d c n , Korea: ThSd!;,3.t?, S t o r y , 7 i ; t h t ? W 3 C (New Y O r k : M c G L 3 W - H i l 1 , 1'3821, p . 2 6 5 .

2 " S u b s t a n c e o f S t a t e m e n t s Made a t Wake I s l a n d C o n f e r e n c e o n 1 5 O c t o b e r , C o m p i l e d b y General o f t h e Army Omr N . Bradley, C h a i r m a n o f t h e J o i n t , C h i e f s o f S t a f f , from Notes Kept by t h e C o n f e r e e s from Washington," I n U. S . D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e , F o r e i a n R e l a t i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 1 9 50, v o l . 7, w, D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e U . 9. Government P u b l i c a t i o n 8859 ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 7 6 ) , p . 9 5 3 , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Wake I s l a n d N o t e s . T h i s c o l l e c t i o n of S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t d o c u m e n t s is h e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s DSP 8 8 5 9 . 3Message, The Ambassador i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s ( C h a p i n ) t o t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , 1 3 O c t o b e r 1 9 5 0 , DSP 8 8 5 9 , p. 9 4 2 .
4Wake I s l a n d N o t e s ,
p. 9 6 0 .

5Memorandurn b y t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e f o r F a r E a s t e r n A f f a i r s ( R u s k ) , "Addendum t o N o t e s on W a k e I s l a n d C o n f e r e n c e , O c t o b e r 1 4 , " u n d a t e d , DSP 8 8 5 9 , p . 9 6 2 . 6 C h a r l e s A. W i l l o u g h b y a n d J o h n C h a m b e r l a i n , M a c A r t h u r . 19 4 1 - 1 9 5 1 ( N e w York: M c G r a w - H i l l , 1 9 5 4 1 , p p . 382-383; C o u r t n e y W h i t n e y , M a c A r t h u r : H i s Rendezvous w i t h H i s t o r y ( N e w York: A l f r e d A . Knopf, 1 9 5 6 1 , p . 392; a n d D . C l a y t o n James, The Years of M a c A r t h u r , v o l . 3 , 945-1964 ( B o s t o n : Houghton TriumDh and Disaster. 1 M i f f l i n , 1 9 8 5 ) , p p . 507-508. 'Whitney, p. 395; a n d Wake I s l a n d N o t e s , p . 955.

8 t 1 R e c o r d of t h e A c t i o n s T a k e n b y t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f R e l a t i v e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s O p e r a t i o n s in K o r e a f r o m 25 J u n e 1 9 5 0 t o 11 A p r i l 1 9 5 1 , P r e p a r e d b y Them f o r t h e S e n a t e Armed F o r c e s a n d F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e s , " 30 A p r i l 1 9 5 1 , ( U n c l a s s i f i e d ) , p . 5 4 , i n D e c l a s s i f i e d Documents Q u a r t e r l y C a t a l o q - 1 9 7 5 , v o l . 1, n o . 1, Jan-Mar 7 5 ( m i c r o f i c h e ; W a s h i n g t o n , DC: Carrollton P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 7 8 , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s JCS R e p o r t t o S e n a t e , 30 A p r i l 1 9 5 1 .

'u. S. Army Far E a s t e r n Command, M i l i t a r y I n t e l l i g e n c e S e c t i o n , D a i l y I n t e l l i g e n c e Summary, Number 2976, 2 November 1 9 5 0 , p . I f , h e r e a f t e r c i t e d a s

FEC D I S .

62

ti)

P'

A l d N. K . , " 5.

lonchinese T r o o p s Move t o North: Reports o f F o r c e (Lotidon), 18 October 1'350, 3 e C . j.,

1 1 U . S. Army F a r Eastern Command, M i i i t ~ r y ;ntelliqence Section, " H i s t o r y of t h e N o r t h K o r e a n A r m y ,

'I

(Unclassified), Tokyo, 1952, p. 34, hereafter cited a s History Of NKA; and T. R . Fehrenbach, m l s Kind of War: n D r ( N e w York: MacMlllan, 19631, Study in U p. 278; and James, p. 491.
" 5 . Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Less ons of K O red (Boston: Houghton Hlfflin, 19691, pp. 176-177.

I3FEC DIS 2962, 19 October 1950, p. 5. I4Goulden, p. 273. I5FEC DIS 2963, 20 October 1959, p. Id. 16FEC DIS 2964, 21 October 1950, as cited i n James F. Schnabel, Pollcv and Direction, The First Year U . S . Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Mllltary History, U. S. Army, 1972), p. 222. 17JCS Report to Senate, 30 April 1951, pp. 57-58. "Collins, "FEC pp. 179-181.

DIS 2965, 22 October 1950, p . Id. p. 234.

"Schnabel, "JCS

Report to Senate, 30 April 1951, pp. 58-59.

"Whether the flrst combat between CCF and UNC troops was a s at Sudong or Unsang and whether I t was on 25 or 26 October is not significant to this thesis. The signlficance lies in the fact that the CCF had materialized "out of nowhere" and was fighting heavy battles with the UNC. All this was in the face of the J C S statement on the morning of 26 October, that there was no indication of Chinese Communist intervention (JCS Report t o Senate, 3 0 . A p r 1 1 1951, p. 58). 23FEC D I S 2970, 27 October 1959, p. lb; Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Carp., [19601), pp. 130-131; and James, p. 495. 24James, pp. 518-519. 63

FEC DIS 2371, 2 8 October 1350, p . I f . Gn 3 1 October, M a c A K t h l l r re!,OKt%d t o t h e JCS that h e hm?d confirmed the identity of prisoners taken at Sudonq 011 2 6 October as CCF. Th11 p r i s o n t ? ~indicated ~ t h r : r i ? . n i Z h.i crossed t h e Y a l u o n 16 October (JCS Report t o Senate, 30 Aprll 1951, p. 6 0 1 - the day after MacArthUr assured the President on Wake Island that there was very little

25

chance for Chlnese Communist intervention in Korea. 26C0111ns, pp. 184-185. 21James, p. 519. 28FEC DIS 2971, 28 October 1950, p. If. 29Schnabel, p. 234. 3 0 ~ i s t o r yof NKA, pp. 33-34. 31Whiting, p p . 131-132. 32Memorandum for the President from Walter 8 . Smith, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, "Chinese Communist Interventlon in Korea," 1 November 1950, pp. 1-2, in CIA Research Reports: Zapan. Korea, and the Securitv of Asia. 1946-1976 (microfilm; Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 19831, reel 4, frame 153. j3Edgar O'Ballance, Korea 1950-1953 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 19691, p. 70. 34FEC DIS 2976, 2 November 1950, pp. lf-lg. 35FEC DIS 2977, 3 November 1950, pp. If-lg. 3 6 M e s s a-~ e . ,MacArthur to JCS, Number C-41425, 4 November 1950, p. 1, in Declassified Documents Reference SYS part 1, Catalos of A b s t r a c t s, vol. 1 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 19761, 254A; and JCS Report to Senate, 30 April 1951, pp. 61-62. 31FEC D I S 2978, 4 November 1950, Miscellaneous Section, as cited in John F. O'shaughnessy, "The Chinese Intervention in Korea: An Analysis of Warning" (Master o f Science or Strateqic Intelligence Thesis, Defense Intelligence College, 19851, pp. 88-89. 38FEC DIS 2978, 4 November 1950, p. le. 390'Shaughnessy, pp. 85-86.
64

a ,

40FEC DIS 2979, 5 November 1950, p. le.

411 b i d .
42FEC DIS 2'301, 7 November 1 9 5 0 ,
p. Lq.

43Whiting, p. 130.

44FEC DIS 2986, 1 2 November 1950, un-numbered page following p. Id.

45National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 2, 8 November 1950, "Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea," pp.. 1-2, in CIA Research Reoorts: JaoaP. Korea, and the Security of Asia, 1946-1976 (microfilm; Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), reel 4, frame 178. 460'Shaughnessy, p. 93. 47Goulden, p. 276. 4 8 F E C DIS 2993, 19 November 1950, pp. 19-lh.
4 9 1 bid.

50Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policv and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p . 99. 51q*ChineseCommunist Intervention in KoZea," State peDartment Weekly Review, 22 November 1950, (Unclassified), DD. _ _ 1-5, in Declassified Documents Quarter lv Cataloq -1975, vol. 1, no. 3, Jul-SeD 75 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975), 1908.
~~

52National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 2/1, 2 4 November 1950, "Chlnese Communist Intervention in Korea," pp. 1-2, in C I A Research ReDorts: Jaoan. Korea, and the Security of A s i a . 1946 -1976 (microfilm; Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983), reel 4, frame 212. 53Message, US JCS to CINCFE, Number 92801, 27 September 1950, (Unclassified), p. 2, in Declassified Documents Quarterly Cataloq-1975, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan-Mar 75 (microflche; Washington, DC: Carrollton PLBSS, 1975), 14A. 54Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur: A Precis in Limited War ( N e w Y o r k : Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 75-79.
65

!55Message, Chief o f s t a f f U. s . Army t o C I N C UNC, 1950, i n Dec1a:jsifieij. D o c u r i ? i ? n t 5 Q u a r t e r l y Cataloq - 1375, v o l . 1, 110. 1, .Jan-Mar 7 5 !iiiicroEic!~e; W a s h i n g t o n , D C : C a r r o l l t o n Press, 1 9 7 5 ) ,
WAR '3720'7, 2 4 November

15F.

5601HOWOur V i c t o r y Turned t o D e f e a t , " Newsweek, 11 December 1950, p. 28.

"James,

p. 519.

58William B. Hopkins, One Busle No Drums: The M a r l n e s a t C h o s' Ln R e serv oLr ( C h a p e l Hl11, NC: Algonquin Books, 19861, p . 125.
59Messaqe, CINCFE t o J C S , C - 6 9 9 5 3 , 28 November 1950, p p . 1-2, i n D e c l a s s i f i e d Documents Reference System, R e t r o s o e c t i v e C o l l e c t i o n , part 1 , Cataloq of A b s t r a c t s , vol. 1 (microfiche; Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1976), 2543.

66

CONCLUSIONS

The war the Chinese Communists'entered in November was a different war from the one that had begun in June.

I n the intervening five months, the NKPA had rolled south

to the Naktong River before being halted by the UNC and pushed back the entire length of the Korean peninsula to the Yalu River. The "unstoppable" NKPA had been reduced

to a beaten and demoralized force escaping northward t o avoid decisive engagement and ultimate defeat. The UNC

had been transformed from an ad hoc force, fighting for its life from within the Pusan Perimeter, to a coordlnated military machine that was sweeping northward in a near brilliant combination of amphlbious landings, alrborne assaults, and gzound advances. The Chinese faced an enemy

that had gained in numerical strength, weapons, combat experience, and confidence. Although the reason for the Chinese intervention

is not a topic of this paper, it has bearing on the

warnings transmitted, intentionally or unintentionally, by the Chinese Communists prior to their intervention. There

are three possible explanations why the Chinese entered the war. One contention is that Chinese intervention was

a part of the overall plan for the prosecution of the war

67

against the Republic O E Korea.

tha war
W X : ~

This theory a r g u e s that

F : i ? l know12dqe

initiated w i t h

the

.and

s:~ppor.

o f the Chinese Communists, and the PRC had cOmmi:t:e<

itself to the full

U Y ~ of

its resources to ensure the

success of the venture. In its most extreme eppllcation, this theory could lndlcate the Chinese antlcipated
US

intervention and

assistance to the Republic of Korea.

t could also
US

indicate the Chinese expected the comb ned ROK and forces to gain the upper hand over the NKPA, thus requiring the CCF, or allowing the CCF and gain a military victory.

to enter the war

In a less extreme application, this theory could indicate that the Chinese Communists pledged full support and aid to North Korea and realized, after American involvement, that the support and aid had to include overt, large-scale military operations against the UNC. The rational approach would indlcate that the Chinese Communists pledged to give the North Koreans only as much support as demanded by the situation.

If overt Chinese Communist military assistance was

pre-arranged and a part of the overall concept for the conduct of the war against South Korea, Douglas MacArthur and Charles Wllloughby cannot be blamed for elther inclting or for failing to predict the actual Intervention. Perhaps, in this scenario, they could be

faulted o r falling to predict the time, place, and nature

68

of the lnturventlon b u t n o t the lnterventinn Itself.

t h e s i s f o r thi- n c f r n s ~?tl%r11igr!Ic't. 1::.31l?gt:,
0 ' S ha u q h n e s s y c La i rns

I :

,1

.John 7 .
Da i 1 :/

W i l l o iuq h b y ' 5 3 0

Se p t e ;nber

Intelligence Summary alludes that Mao Tse-tung and

V. Molotov, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, decided

upon China's ultimate milltary intervention during a n August 1950 Sino-Soviet conference in Moscow.' Such a

decision would have pre-ordained UNC actions to meet the

CCF on the field of battle in Korea.

Willoughby cited comments MacArthur made in reference to the 27 August intelllqence summary b u t apparently after the November CCF counteroffensive. quotes MacArthur as saying, It is now plainly evident that the intervention by Communist Chlna'was responslve t o baslc decisions reached evqn before the North Korean attack last June.... MacArthur seems t o be saying that, regardless of what he did as CINCUNC, the PRC was committed to entering the war. What MacArthur does not say, but implies, is He

that he should not be blamed for the effect o z impact of the CCF counteroffensive, as his actions did not provoke the intervention. He implies that, since the decislon to

lntervene was a f a i t accompli, there was little he could have done to predict, and nothing he could have done to prevent, the Chinese Communlst Intervention.

69

Similar to this theory is one that claims, :ni:epenJent Soviet

: E
.i!r.+ct:on
Zao

from,

13r

,:t

d,?ri.~icb ny ,

bht:

Union,

seized kht? opportunity to r e t u r n to

Chinese control territory taken by Japan during the S i n o Japanese War of 1894-1895.3 Korea was a Chinese

"dependent state" when Japan siezed it as a prize. Regaining Korea would bolster Chinese national pride by returning territory and defeating the US protector o f the ancient enemy, Japan. This reasoning, that Chinese intervention was "part o f the plan," is Elawed when used as the primary reason for Chinese Communist actions and UNC defeats in November.

--

the new

I t attempts to absolve all US/UNC personalities

and intelligence gathering agencies of any and all failures to predict Chinese intervention.
A

second theory is that the 38th Parallel was a

true casus belli, and China was forced into the war by US insistence upon crossing the parallel.
As

respected a

foreign affairs analyst as the State Department's George Kennan has held that such was the case.4 The Chinese

announced it, the US crossed it, and the Chinese were then compelled to act.

In a report written for the US Air

Force, Allen S . Whiting supported this thesis and stated that the intervention was a belated, reluctant last resort in direct response to American actions. He rejected the

hypothesis o f any carefully premeditated intervention.5

70

MacArthur refused t o accept that .a US c r o J s i n q o f

tht?

3Rth P?rallel

W~\Y

tht . 3 c t l o n that p u l l e d t h e c ! ~ rietz:..: !

Communists into the war.

Maintaining that t h e Chinese

intervention was a premeditated act, MacArthur said,

or had remained south thereof, the Chinese forces

would have been utilized.... It would be naive indeed t o believe that such an imaginary line would hfve influenced the Chinese in the slightest degree. It was, however, Maclrthur's success at Inchon, his continued attack northward, and the concomitant disintegration of the NKPA that spurred the Chinese Communists into the war. When the UNC crossed the 38th

...whether

our troops crossed the 38th Parallel

Parallel, i t sent a clear and distinct signal to the PRC. That signal indicated an aggressive desire to eliminate the threat to the Republic of Korea. In spite of US

assurances that UNC military operations were defensive in nature and not a prelude to the lnvaslon of Manchuria, the Chinese Communists viewed them as a threat to their national security.'l With its national securlty thus

threatened, the PRC was compelled to intervene in the conflict to ensure its survival. Indlcations are that, just as North Korea and the People's Republic of China had not expected the US to intervene after the June invasion, they had not also expected the US/UNC to continue the offensive across the 38th Parallel. MacArthur's drive presented the Chinese

Communists with a very real threat to their national security interests. Just a s the US could not stand by and

71

allow a Eriendly nation to be invaded and defeatel?, China

c o u l d not permit the: forced seperation of North Korea frsrn

her sphere o f influence.I3

A thlrd theory is that, regardless o f any

premeditated intent or desire and regardless of the perceived threat to Chinese national security, the Chinese Communists became active combatants In the war only after learning that MacArthur could not strike at their Manchurian bases and could not effectively interdict the flow of men and equipment from the PRC into Korea.
The

restrictions imposed by President Truman disallowed such deep strikes against the Chinese lines of communications. MacArthur malntalned that his plans had been predicated upon the ability to support his operations with reconnaissance overflights of Manchuria and deep strikes against appropriate Chinese Communist targets. They were

his only means of halting the Chinese Communist resupply

of the NKPA and the "last minute" Chinese intervention.

MacArthur maintained that the flnal Chinese declsion to mass for and launch the counteroffensive was based upon their realization that they would not be detected and there was no reason to fear American retallatlon against Manchuria

--

there would be no threat to Chinese

territorial ~ e c u r i t y . ~ MacArthur claimed someone must have told the Chinese Communists they would be secure in their Manchurian sanctuaries.

72

L a t e r investigations Jupported MacArthur's

c? IIZ

>: 1C 10 I12 .

T! I r 15 e B Z 1t, 19 h F O r ? la311 5 e r V 1<C!e

I? E

E 1':I

t?

L7

~ c c e s st o ,311 m e s s a g e s bekweer. H a c A r t h u r a n d t!ie U S J C S ,

were spying f o r the Chlnese Communists.

Guy Burgess,

Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby ensured the Chinese communists were aware of all political, strategic, and operational guidance and directives between MacArthur and the JCS. Armed with such valuable information, the

Chinese Communists were able to accurately assess the threat to the PRC and choose the most advantageous time and place f o r all their actions in North Korea. The

prlvileged information provided by Burgess, MacLean, and Philby demonstrated that the threat was not the UNC intentions or capabilities. The Chinese Communists

realized the threat was the loss of North Korea, a friendly state, protecting a potentially exposed flank with the US and Japan. Rather than being a situation where intervention was either premeditated or forced upon the Chinese Communists, or the fortuitous result of absolutely perfect knowledge of the decisions of the highest level of the American political and military policy makers, the reasons for Chinese Communist overt milltary intervention in the Korean War are a combination of all three. The Chinese Communist Government certalnly had some advanced knowledge of the planned invasion of the Republic of Korea. Early tacit support gave way to
73

:oqistical assistance.

T h e U S decision t o i n t e r v e n e d n d

d e f e n d t h e R O K wa:; a n u n a n t i c i p o t P c 1 t u r n of evcJnt3 e a r l - (

in t h e

w d : .

I t must h a v e caused discus:jions ir. ';ha

PRC

and the USSR on posslble overt Chinese Communist mllltary action in Korea. There was no immediate need, though, for

the Chinese to become directly involved, since the NKPA

was successfully drlving the ROK, US, and allied forces

toward the beaches on the southern tip o f the Korean peninsula. The fortunes of the NKPA faded and the potential need for direct military assistance grew as the UNC landed at Inchon and destroyed remnants of the NKPA south of the 38th Parallel.
As the UNC drove north across the

parallel, the PRC become genuinely concerned f o r its own security. The loss of a friendly neighbor and its

replacement by a hostile power caused the PRC t o warn of and follow through with its own intervention. Undoubtedly, the Chinese Communist leadership had confidence and comfort in the knowledge that MacArthur would be prohibited from striking targets within the sanctuary of Manchuria. Secure in this knowledge, Ma0

seized the opportunity to eliminate the threat, regain "lost" Chinese territory, and defeat the "American aggressors." There were clear indicators of the Chinese

Communist intent.

14

Although U:; p o l l c y makers and intelligence

. : I

q t ? I-K i :t c: : uc, p t x t.wl K

Y , p.:l ti i ;< k .I, z

r; I

I F ~ L (: .:I r~ A:I~I.!,.~

5 :. .I ! : r

t ; .

t h e PRC,

o f b e i n q sympathetic to the (hmmiunisk c~u.:~:,

so

they should not have

readily dismissed his warnings.

Both Ma0 and the Chief of Staff of the CCF told Panlkkar that the US advance northward would bring the PRC into the

war.

While the Chlef of Staff had said the Chinese the Americans come to the

Communists would not "...let

border, ''lo Mao clearly identlfled a US crossing of the 38th Parallel as the trigger for Chinese Communist intervention. The Burmese Ambassador to the PRC and
US

embassies and diplomatic missions around the world reported they had received similar warnings of Chinese Communist intentions. Most of the warnings cited the 38th

Parallel as the Chinese Communlst trigger. In the space of two weeks, Panikkar received and reported two seperate, terse warnings (the CCF Chief of Staff's warning on 2 5 September and Mao's warning on
3

October).

A similar warning from the Burmese Ambassador

and confirmations from numerous American embassies should have convinced the
US

lntelllgence analysts that the

Chlnese threats were not mere bluffs. In the midst of the bombast and rhetoric from the Chinese Communist leaders, two extremely slgniflcant events occurred In the Chlnese Communist press.
As

detailed in Chapter 3, an August article in the Chinese Communist magazine, World Culture, identified US actions 15

as

a threat to Chinese security.

By 11 October the

Chinese Communist Foreign M i n i s t e r h a d declarer! IJS iict. ic!!z

J

"s:?rioi?.: t h r m t " t o : ! ~ i n c : j e security. L .;

..

T h e 9 I?

statements seemed to slgnal a hardenlng of the P R C ' Y attitude toward the US and the UNC. 'These two statements

were neither bluffs nor diplomatic blackmail.

The Chinese

Communists felt compelled to take appropriate steps to

protect their territorial integrity and the security of the border with North Korea. There was also credible evidence at the operational level that, when viewed in its entirety, should have caused someone to comment o n the increasing likelihood that the CCF would actively intervene in the war. Among this evidence was: the build-up in Manchuria

of forces that far outnumbered any logical, purely defensive requirement; Willloughby's early and continuing reports of major CCF units deploying across the Yalu River; and the initial, savage combat between the UNC and
CCF in late October and early November.

The relocation of a sizeable CCF element from south-central China to Manchuria, while cause for attention, was not singularly indicative of a CCF build up
o r an intent to intervene in the war.

The redeploying CCF

units had earlier deployed to so*.th-central China from Manchuria In response t o a percelved threat involviny the Chinese Natlonallsts on Formosa. The US Seventh Fleet

76

effectively eliminated t h e threat, and the CCF elements

r e t 1.1 r r ~ * + d ? IJ t t i r I i
I>

1'3 I tim7 1 7 . 3 r r 1 4 (:in 1oc.3 t 1r:i 1-13

Even as t h e number o f CCF s o l d i e r s a n d u n i t s ::> Manchuria grew, the US viewed the relocation and subsequent increase as naturally precautionary and defensive against the perceived threat'of a possible Us invasion.

As the CCF strength and order of battle

continued to grow, US intelligence agencies failed to appreciate the significance of the CCF build-up. Shortly

after the Wake Island conference, Willoughby was report i n q at least 400,000-650,000 CCF in Manchuria and surmising a

limited Chinese intervention to create a buffer zone south of the Yalu River. Yet, he failed to paint a picture of In spite of his comments on a

imminent intervention.

limited intervention, Willoughby never indicated in hls reports that MacArthur's decision to drive to the Yalu would cause the UNC to run headlong into the CCF units in the "buffer zone." Throughout his intelligence reports, Willoughby had been citing purported crossings of the Yalu by CCF divisions. His initial reports were prior to the UNC These CCF divisions,

crossing of the 38th Parallel.

coupled with the sizeable force reported in Manchuria prepared to cross the Y a l u , represented a significantly growing threat to the UNC. However, the UNC made no

contact with these CCF units during the two to t h r e e w e e k s between 9 October, when the UNC attacked across the 38th
I1

e a r a l l e l , and 25 October, when elements o f the 5th R O K

3 i v i s i o n ra.3checl the Y a : ) l .
T h e .absence o f c a n h c t 5 e c ' d / r 2 ? ! :
ZZAsOn

t h e UNC a n d the CCF was likely the

that,

in

:I;):-:'' Wa5

of his reports o f CCF units in North Korea, Willouyhby

unwilling to commit himself and predict overt CCF intervention.

He must have doubted the rellabillty of his

earlier reports. The picture changed dramatically, though, when the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 6th ROK Division was decimated the day after it reached the Yalu. Almost

simultaneously, three other ROK divisions met and were engaged in heavy combat with confirmed CCF units along the front of the ROK I 1 Corps. By the end of the first week of November, both the ROK I Corps and the ROK I1 Corps had engaged large CCF units, the US 8th Cavalry Regiment had been nearly annihilated, and the UNC had identified 12-17 CCF divisions engaged in combat within North Korea. At this

time there should have been no question that the Chinese Communist Government had committed its forces to engage the UNC and halt its push to the Yalu. This not s o gentle

' ' t a p l l was the final warning to MacArthur that the Chinese Communists were not bluffing and he should take seriously their threats of intervention in the war. MacArthur misinterpreted the subsequent CCF withdrawal as a UNC victory, rather than an opportunity t o evaluate his operational plans and take the apppropriate
10

actions.
P~I,AI~(:*

He apparently felt h e stlll had a "reasonable

~ I . I C : C ' C R ~ ."

qf

Howelit2rI

sh01.11dt ~ h c ~uvit:!::; <.ir

advance their intent io n ;;

Chint?:;e

Cominunist:i d e c h ~ ein

tc;

occupy North Korea and give warning that their forces should not be attacked, JCS 92801 had told MacArthur to

assume the defense and refer the matter to Washlngton f o r

a decision. 1 4 MacArthur's key mistake was the failure to defer

to Washington for guldance after the Chinese Communist

warnings. The oral warnings were clear and concise. The

Chinese Communist intent was manifested in the resolute and vicious attacks on the UNC forces in late October and early November. It was at this point that MacArthur, the

theater commander, failed to comply with his instructions from the JCS and the National Command Authorlty. The "debrls" of the atap*f- captured CCF equipment and dead and captured CCF soldiers - proved the Chinese Communist involvement. MacArthur and his subordinates

refused to believe, though, that the Chinese Communists would be

so

audacious as to enter the war after the UNC Willoughby said

had so successfully defeated the NKPA.

later they had "gambled" that the Chinese would stay north

of the Yalu. l5

It was a bad gamble.

It was a gamble that

would be paid for over the next year and a half with the lives of thousands more US, ROK, and allied soldiers.

79

MacArthur was poorly served by his G2.

~ e : j ~ l t , 3 rint:?ll ?t i'3en::c
f:t i

The
riio!:~:
'i

Lure

.x:j t h e

: j

inq!.'?

important f a c t o r i n t h e Korea.
AS

IJPIC's

operational f s i l : ~ r i ?i:i

:r!:::

the operational intelligence oEflcer,

Willoughby was the point where national and tactical intelligence collection and analysis converged.
His

was

the key responsibility to gather intelligence from above and below, correlate it to the weather and terrain, and disseminate it to the responsible commanders. Willoughby

was responsible for determining enemy capabilities and intentions.16 The CIA and State Department intelligence analyses were also flawed.
No

intelligence agency concluded a Most

definite opening of hositilites with the PRC.

reports from these agencies generally indicated that the Chinese effort, if one came, would be limited to, perhaps, only guerilla action. However, due to the relatively

primitive state of international intelligence at that time, particularly regarding Communist China, most of the intelligence available to the national-level decision makers came from MacArthur's Far East Command Willoughby. 18

--

Regardless of other intelligence collection and evaluation deficiencies, the ultimate responsibility rested squarely upon MacArthur's shoulders. November, the Chinese intent was clear. By early

The Chinese

Communist Government had threatened large-scale

80

lntervention and had identified an Amerlcan crossing of

the 3 8 t h P . 3 r a l l e l

,3s

the

c.wli.2:

lie1 1 : .

i7ri

iiuire

C h i r i o!.;+

occasion t h e C h i n e s e p o s i t i v e l y stated they wo11:d

cntcr

the war i f US soldiers crossed the 38th Parallel.

They

openly described the security of North Korea in terms of the vital interest of the People's Republic of China. They clearly identified the American advance as a threat to their national security. Lastly, the Chinese

demonstrated their resolve in late October and early November when, with at least 11 divisions, the CCF drove the U N C from the vicinlty of the Yalu. The heavy fightlng

and the casualties suffered by both sides was the final, convincing demonstration that previous Chlnese Communist warnings were not bluffs. Contrary to MacArthur's later assertions, he had sufficient evidence prior to the end of November to raise doubts about the wisdom of his new offensive. He knew of

key national intelligence indicators O E a hardening o f Chinese resolve.

He hqd fairly accurate information about

the movement of the CCF to Manchuria and into North Korea. Although many in the national intelllgence

community regarded the indicators as vague, MacArthur and Willoughby were still at fault. They had the tactical

intelligence that reduced the degree of uncertainty or ambigu i ty 19

81

The p o i n t a t which M a c A r t h u r c o u l d and s h o u l d h a v e knovn t h a t t h e C h i n e s e Communists were g o i n g t o o p e n l y i n t e r v e n e i n t h e K o r e a n War was n o t i n e a r l y O c t o i x r x h e n t h e UNC c r o s s e d t h e 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l .

He c o u l d h a v e known,

s h o u l d h a v e known ( a n d p e r h a p s d i d know) t h a t t h e UNC would meet a l a r g e a n d d e t e r m i n e d C h i n e s e Communist a r m y

by the time h e l a u n c h e d h i s "end t h e war", "home by

C h r i s t m a s " o f f e n s i v e on 2 4 November

He s h o u l d h a v e

deferred t o W a s h i n q t o n f o r a h i g h l e v e l p o l i c y d e c i s i o n .

For whatever r e a s o n , MacArthur l a u n c h e d t h e o f f e n s l v e i n

t h e f a c e o f i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t he was a l r e a d y f a c i n g " a n e n t i r e l y new war"

--

a war o f h i s own m a k i n g .

82

NOTES

'John F. O'Shaughnessy, "The Chinese Intervention in Korea: An Analysis of Warning" (Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence Thesls, Defense Intelllgence College, 19851, p . 55. 'Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-195L ( N e w York: McGraw-Hill, 19541, p. 380. 3Robert C. North, Moscow and Chlnese Commmunists, 2d ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 19631, pp. 259-260.

War ( N e w York:

4Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the HcCraw-Hill, 1982), p . 234, as cited in O'Shaughnessy, p. 54. 'Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: Corp., [19601), pp. 109, 126. 6Wllloughby, p. 380. 'North,
'

Rand

p. 260; and Wllloughby, p. 380.

' T . R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in UnDreDaredneSS ( N e w York: MacMillan, 1963), pp. 276-280. 'Courtney Whitney, MacArth ur: His Rendezvous with History ( N e w York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19561, p. 394. "James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction. The First Year U. S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chlef of Military History, U. S. Army, 1972), p. 197; and Trurnbull Hiqgins, Korea and the Fall o f MacArthur: A Precis In Limit ed War ( N e w Yorkr Oxford University Press, 19601, pp. 54-55, 70.

"K. M. Panikkar, I n Two Chinas: Memoirs of a PiDlomat (London: Allen and Unwin, 19551, pp. 109-111.
l2Whiting, pp. 70, 84-85. 13Schnabel, p. 233; and Higgins, p. 56.

83

14Mecisage, US J C S t o C I N C F E , Number J C S 9 2 8 0 1 , 2 7 S e p t e m b e r 1950, ( U n c l a s s i f i e d ) , p p . 1 - 3 , i n D e c l a s s i f i e d 5ocument;s Q u a r t e r l y C a t a l o q - 1 9 7 5 , v o l . 1, n o . 1, J a n - M a r I 5 ( m i c r o f i c h e ; W , ~ s l i i n g t . o n , 3 1 : : :hc~:~Lit.jn P r e s s , 1 9 7 5 ) , 14A.

1 5 ~ t H 0 w Our V i c t o r y T u r n e d t o D e f e a t , " Newsweek, 11 December 1 9 5 0 , p . 2 9 .

1 6 S t a n l i s D. M i l k o w s k i , f l M a c A r t h u r " S 1 9 5 0 Campaign i n K o r e a : O p e r a t i o n a l A r t o n t h e S t r a t e g i c Margin" ( S t r a t e g i c S t u d y , N a t i o n a l War C o l l e g e , N a t i o n a l D e f e n s e U n i v o r s i t y , 19861, p p . 19, 29-30. 1 7 S c h n a b e l , p . 6 4 , c i t i n g Memo, Gen B o l l i n g , DA G 2 , f o r ACofS, Admin, DA, 1 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 5 0 , i n G3 DA f i l e C o f S 0 9 1 , Case 28.
"J. Lawton C o l l i n s , War i n P e a c e t i m e : The H i s t o r y a n d L e s s o n s of K o r e a ( B o s t o n : H o u g h t o n M l f f l l n , 1969), P . . 1 7 3 ; a n d H . A. De'nleerd, T h e T r i u m o h o f t h e L i m i t e r s : -K ( S a n t a M o n i c a , C A : Rand C o r p . , I19681), p . 6 .

19Milkowski,

p p . 29-30.

84

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N e w York T ,-

27 June-12

Octoher 1 9 5 0

-T

(London), 1 July-18 October 1950. MAGAZINES

"HOW Our Victory Turned to Defeat," 11 December 1950, pp. 28-31.

BOOKS

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktonq, N orth to the Y a l u IJune-November 1950). U. S. Army In the Korean War. Washington, DC : Office of the Chief o f Military Hlstory, Department of the Army, 1961. Archer, Jules. Front-Line General, Messner, 1963. Collins, J. Lawton. Lessons of Korea. Fehrenbach, ' T. ' R.
.qU

New York:

Julian

Boston: New York:

Houghton Mlfflin, 1969. MacMlllan, 1963.

3
T

Foot, Rosemary. D Ithaca, NY:

fli t 950-1953. D Cornell University Press, 1985.

Goulden, Joseph C . Korea: The Untold Storv of the War. New York: McGraw-Hl11, 1982. Gunther, John. T and the Far East.
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New York:

Z Harper and Bros., 1950.

Higqins, Trumbull. P Press, 1960. Hopkins, Wllliam B. . - C

1986.

K New York:

I Oxford University

Chapel Hlll, NC:

Algonquin Books,

Hunt, Frazler. The Untold Storv of Douqlas MacArthur. New York: Devln-Adalr, 1 3 5 4 .

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.I,?me.s, D . C l a y t o n . Thc Y m r S O E MacArtthar. V O 1 . 3 . T r l u m u h .4:id D L z a o t e r , 1 9 4 5 - 1 3 . B o y t o i i : t;!>i.iqtitcn M i f E l i n C o . , 1'385. L o w i t t , R i c h a r d , e d . T h e Truman - MarArthur C o n t r o v c r s v . C h i c a g o : Rand McNally, 1967. M a c A r t h u r , D ougl as. So l d l e r S v e a k s : P u b l i c P a v e r s a n d w h e s of General of t h e Armv Douala s MacArthuy. E d i t e d b y V o r i n E. Whan, J r . New York: F r e d e r i c k Praeger, 1965.

Reminls cences.

N e w York:

McGraw-Hl11,

1964.

Manchester, W l l l l a m . Ame r l c a n Caesar: Douqlas MacArthur, 1880-1964. B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, a n d C o . , 1978. North, Robert C. Moscow a n d C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s . 2d e d . S t a n f o r d , CA: S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963.

O'Ballance, Edgar. Books, 1969.

Korea 1950-1953.

Hamden, CT: Archon

P a n l k k a r , K. M . I n Two C h i n a s : Memoirs o f a D l D l O m d t . London: A l l e n a n d Unwin L t d . , 1955 R o s l t z k e , H a r r y A. The C I A ' S Secret O D e r a t l o n s . York: Reader's Digest P r e s s , 1971.

New

Rovere. R l c h a r d H . ; a n d S c h l e s l n g e r , A r t h u r M . , J r . General a n d t h e P r e s i d e n t . F a r r a r , S t r a u s , and

Young, 1951.

The

S c h n a b e l , James F. P o l i c v a nd Direc t l o n : The F i r s t w . U . S. Army i n t h e K o r e a n War. W a s h i n g t o n , DC: O f f i c e of t h e C h i e f of M l l l t a r y H i s t o r y , U . S . Army, 1972. S p a n l e r , John W. The T r u m a n - MacArthur C o n t r o v e r s v a n d Ghe Kor ean War. New York: W. W . N o r t o n , 1965.
U.

S. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e . F o r e l m R e l a t l o n s o f t h e Unlted S t a t e s , 1 9 5 0 . V o l . 7. ( D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e P u b l i c a t i o n 8 8 5 9 ) . W a s h i n g t o n , DC: U . S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1976.

w.

u. s .

M l l l t a r y Academy, west P o l n t . Department o f M i l l t a r y A r t and Engineering. The West P o l n t A t l a s A m e r i c a n Wars. Vol. 2. 1900-1953. N e w York: F r e d e r i c k P r a e q e r , 1959.

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Whitney, Courtney.
History.

MacArthur:

His Rendezvous wit&

Knopf,
1956.

N e v York:

AlEred A.

Willouqhby, Ch,lrles A , ; .and Chamberlain, John. 1941-1951. New Y o r k : McGraw-Hill, 1951. PUBLISHED REPORTS DeWeerd, H. A. The TriumDh of the Limiters: Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., r 1 9 6 8 1 . Whiting, Allen S. C to Enter the Korean War. Corp., t19601.

fl.scArthI:r,

Korea.

e
Santa Monica, CA: Rand

UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS, THESES, AND PAPERS "MacArthur's 1950 Campaign I n Mllkowski, Stanlis D . Korea: Operational Art o n the Strategic Margin." Strategic Study, National War College, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1986. O'shaughnessy, John F. "The Chinese Intervention i n Korea: An Analysis of Warning." Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence Thesis, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, DC, 1985. Pittman, P. et al. "The Battle of Sukchon-Sunchon: Defensive, Encircled Forces." Battle Analysis, Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1984. UNPUBLISHED REPORTS, DOCUMENTS, AND MESSAGES United Nations Command. General Staff. Military Intelligence Section, "One Year in Korea: A Summary, 25 June 1950-25 June 1951," (Restricted). U. S. Army. Assistant Chief of Staff, 0 2 (Intelligence). "Weekly Intelligence Report (U)," 17 March1 December 1950, (Secret). U. S. Army Far Eastern Command. General Staff. Military Intelligence Section. "Daily Intelligence Summary (U)," 4 J u l y 1 9 November 1950, (Confidential).

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IJ. S.

Army Far E a s t e r n Command.

I n ttt 11I gt?nr? !;e c t 1o n " H l s % o r y o f t h e N o r t h K,;t'e.:in Army," 3 1 J u l y 1952, (Unclassified).

G e n e r a i Staff.

M!llK?try

FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS

war History Compilation Commlttee. u l t e d Natlons Forces In the KQrean way.

Seoul, Korea: Defense, 1973.

he VOl. 2 . Republic of Korea Ministry of National -

MICROFORM Kesaris, Paul, ed. A Guide to Records of the Joint C h i e s of Staff. Part 2. 1946-1953, The Far East. Washington, DC: University - Publlcatlons of America, 1976. Microfilm. CIA Research ReDOrtS: JaDan. Korea, and the Security of Asia. 1946-1976. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1983. Microfilm. Wile, Anadel, ed. The Declassified Documents Quarterlv Cataloa-1975. Part 1. m. Vol. 1. No. 1. Jan-Mar 75. Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975. Microfiche. The Declassifled D ocuments Quarterly Ca ta 1 oqPart 1. Abstracts. Vol. 1. No. 2. ADr-JUn 75. Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975. Microfiche.

1 9 7 5 .

DC: Microfiche.

Vol. 1. No. 3. Carrollton Press, 1975.

1 9 7 5 .

The Declasslfled Documents Quarterlv cataloqPart 1. Abstracts. Vol. 1. No. 4. Oct-Dec 75. Washington, DC: Carrollton Press, 1975 Microflche.

The DeCl assifled Documents Refere nce system RetrosDective Collection. Part 1. Catalos of Abstr-acts. V o l . 1. Washinqton, DC: Carrollton Press, 1976. Microfiche.

89

I N I T I A I , DI STRI BUT1 ON LIST

1.
C o m b i n e d Arms R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y

U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

2.

Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3.

Jack J . Glfford, Ph.D. Combat Studles Institute US ACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Major Gary 8 . Griffin Combat Studies Institute USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

66027-6900

4.

66027-6900

5.

Major Andrew N . Morris Combat Studies Institute USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

66027-6900

90