GDI ‘04 MALUMPHY/PRIEUR CONSULT NATO C.P, BLOCKS AT: PERMUTATION ne SHELL as GENUINE CONSULTATION KEY * 2NC AT: CONSULT CP's LEGIT i VETO POWER KEY & NC AT: TWO PART FA 3 Leaks EXT BUREACRAGY a 2NG AT: NO REAL WORLD CORRALARY : LEAKS EXT-COMM MONITORING 3 Nc AT: DOUBLE CONDITIONALTTY ? 2NC AT: PERM— OTHER ISSUES 8 ‘AT:_NORMAL MEANS = CONSULTATION, ING AT: PERM UE baz BFFs MORONS te UNIQUENESS: AT: NATO 1g COLLAPSING NOW rsa RUSSIAWATO RELATIONS HIGH = o7.a9 NATO WILL COLLAPSE WITHOUT A NEWROLE {517 RUSSIA DOESN'T FeaR NATO cose UsINATO RELATIONS Low Now tee NOWMPACTTORUSSIANGACKLASH $04 AT: NO RISK OF COUNTER BALANCING a at-cuwa TURNS CONSULTATION GOOD — CHINA NOT A THREAT 8 CONSULT SOLVES ALLIANCE COHESION ~ 22.26 CONSULT: KEYTOALLIANGE SUnvVAL ZF eounes CONSULT. SOLVES COUNTER-BALANGING 28 CONGRESS OPPOSES NATOPKO'S 96-4 4.5 CONSULT. KEYTO ALLIANCE EFFECTIVENESS 29 ‘CONSULT. SOLVES OVERSTRETCH 30-31 TT CONSULT, TEMPERS BUSH DOCTRINE 2 Ske HEGRY CRONTENE o CONSULT, KEY TO WAR ON TERROR so Dac AT: LEAKS % CONSULT, SOLVES NORTH KOREA 3 ALUANCERELATIONS RESILIENT 35.100 CONSULT, SOLVES MIDDLE EAST 3 NATO NOT KEV TONEG 01 KRAUTHAMMERUNIEATERAUISM TURN. 102 aro wit. sav veg NATO FAILS = PEACEKEEPING 03 NATO WILL SAY YES (GENERAL) sr40 NATO DOESN'T SOLVE PROLIE ie ATS THEVLL SAY NO a" NATO SAYS NO ss NATO SOLVES PEACEKEEPING ou NATONOTKEYTOEU.SECURTY 186 NATO SOLVES MEDITERRANEAN « RUSSIA TURN tor-120 NATO SOLVES imag s NATO SOLVES ~ ISRAEL PALESTINE oa NATO SOLVES CYPRUS @ _ ‘NATO.GooD IMPACTS Moge EN WES CE NATO KEY TO US LEADERSHP so ——_—_—— NATO KEY TO WAR ON TERROR Sts TERRORISM IMPACTS sat Urck of Mada Chisian he NATO KEY TO SOLVE PROLIF 65-66 NATO KEY TO US-CU RELATIONS er70 tall cause Ni Coles. UE NATO KEY TO EUROPEAN SECURITY ne EUROPEAN WARS IMPACT 7 7 NATOKEYTOSOLVEBAIKANWAR . 7B BALKAN WAR IMPACT Teo . NATO EY TO DEMOCRACY PRONOTION ft NATO KEY TO US TURKEY RELATIONS @ U.S. WITHDRAWAL CAUSES WAR a JEREMY OLIVIER DID NOT 00 THIS INDEX, WHICH IS WHY THERE IS NO BAD JOKE AT THE BOTTOM\ GDI ‘04 a CONSULT NATO NC COUNTERPLAN SHELL TEXT: THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENTER INTO. PRIOR, BINDING CONSULTATION WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY. ORGANIZATION OVER WHETHER OR NOT TO. (INSERT THE MANDATES OF THE AFF PLAN] THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ADVOCATE THE PLAN THROUGHOUT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. OBSERVATION ONE: COMPETITION THE COUNTERPLAN SOLVES THE ENTIRETY OF THE CASE AND HAS THE ADDED BENEFIT OF BOOSTING NATO COHESION-—~ ANY PERMUTATION WOULD SEVER THE IMMEDIACY OR GUARANTEED NATURE. OF THE PLAN, WHICH IS A VOTING ISSUE FOR WASTING THE ENTIRE 1NC WHICH WAS ALL PREDICATED ON THE ORIGINAL MANDATES OF THE PLAN, AND, ANY PERMUTATION IS NOT TOPICAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE WORD ‘RESOLVED’ — WHICH MEANS ‘COMMITTED TO A SPECIFIC ACTION’ — NON-TOPICAL. PERMUTATIONS ARE BAD BECAUSE IT ALLOWS THE AFF TO GET OUT OF ALL DISADS TO TOPICAL ACTION, WRECKING THE ENTIRE 1NC STRATEGY. THE AFF SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE EXTRA-TOPICAL PERMUTATIONS IN ORDER TO TEST NON-TOPICAL COUNTERPLANS BUT EXPLICITLY NOT TOPICAL PERMS ARE DEVASTATING TO NEG GROUND. OBSERVATION TWO: THE NET BENEFIT NATO CONSULTATION IS KEY TO PRESERVE THE VITALITY AND COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE, PREVENTING ITS COLLAPSE. James Kitield, Correspondent forthe National Journal, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, October 12, 2002, PIN. But Americans, too, will have to make some hard decisions if’ NATO is to survive as a viable apcurity alliance. Weskiagton will soos have to decide whether i ail favors the consultation und coasensus- building tat lie atthe heart of a collective-security allan, ‘Washington will have to pull its European pariers into fori that consensus, and avoid the tendency toward ualateralir. "Especially ‘Eoropens a als on both tides ofthe Adlantc say that liey-making ealie if they are to chieve | = ‘tend to cause concera among our friends. And io an era when te threats to U.S. and European security ‘wall increasingly originate bayond NATO's borders alles that the United States will wantin on the crash lnnding will inereesingly expect to be in on the take.”‘GDI ‘04 CONSULT NATO 4NC COUNTERPLAN SHELL ENGAGEMENT WITH EUROPE THROUGH NATO IS KEY TO UNITED STATES GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. Michael Rille, Head of the Policy Planning and Speechwelting Section, NATO Political AGtirs Division, PARAMETERS, Summer 2003, P. 91-92, Despite the fundamental need for change, NATO could take on this reexamination ofits internal rolationships with considerable self-confidence, After all, 9/11 did aot change everything. Despite some ‘American claims that Europe eas “fading slowly in the US rearview mirror,” there is atransatantic ‘connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned. Firs, European stability remains a key US strategic interest, The consolidation of Europe a8 an usdivided, deméeratic, and market-orienled space reraina a major objective of US security policy. Only in NATO, the ‘central legitimizing framework far US power in Europe can the United States play an undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic objective. Ths, the United States is wot likely o murender this” role. Indeed, many US cries of Europe Rave yet to grasp the fect that bots NATO enlargement and the war“ ‘on terrorism have actully increased the United States’ immersion in European security affairs. ‘Consequeatly, there is no serious political fooe in the Unised States advocating a withdrawal from Evrope. ‘Second, Europeans remain the key strategic ais for the United States, This statement does not exchude 2 ‘ronger US focus on other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergeave of much wies “conlitions of the valling” along the model provided by the Afghanistan campaign. Europe's military capabilites lag behind the Usited States, et on. global scale, Europe rania No. 2 militarily. Moreover, although the debate preceding the wat agsinat req may have suggested therwie, it ig only in Burope where the United ‘States finds a railien of countries predisposed to working with the United States. In Avi, by contrast the ‘United States will have to continue to rely on bilateral elaionahips with politicelly and culturally very different countries. la shor, if the Uniled States wants to remain tbe world's predominant power, it will have to remain a “Buropean power" as well, U.S. LEADERSHIP IS KEY TO AVOID A GLOBAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. ‘Zalenay Kealizad, Special Bavey to Afphanisun and Iraq, Senior Analyst, RAND, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Spring 1995, P. LN. ‘Under the third option, the United States would sock to retain gla leadership and 1o preclude the rise of slobal rival ora recur to raulipolarity forthe indefinite future, On balance, this isthe best long-term {ding principle and vision, Such a vision is desirable aot as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises Ioadership would have tremendus edvanlages. First, to global environment ‘would be more open and more receplive to Ametican values ~ democracy, free markets, and the rule of Taw, Second, such a-world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world’s major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and iow-level Conflicts. Finally, US. leadership would belp preclude the rise of another bostile global sval, enabling the ‘United States and the world o avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendent dangers, including, ‘aglobal auclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar ora multipolar balance of power system. AND, THE COUNTERPLAN SOLVES. THE CASE - PRIOR CONSULTATION ENSURES NATO WILL SAY YES TO THE PLAN. ‘Kart M. Campbell, Senior Vice President, Crater for Stratogic and Intemational Sraies, and Celeste Johnson Ward, Follow in te Ineraational Security Program, CSIS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Septembex’October 2003, . IN. : Given the sensitivity ofthe issues involved, several stops should be taken before and during the rollout of any new naitary posture. The frst is ensuring thet everything about the move is vetted carefllyby all ‘major relevant actors. Attention to process will aot solve every problem, bot it wl cerinialy affect the receptivity of other countries to any changes. How allies such as South Korea and Japan cespond, for example, wil depend not just oa the substance of the modifications themselves, but also.on how well the ‘United States consult with their goveruments, ike their reservations into account, and allays their various snxeties, Ia fact, rather than being seen as routine obligation ors auisance, consultations over the posture ‘changes should be seen es an important opportunity to solidify, swengihen, end redefine those allimices for the future, In Europe, similarly, countries are likely to be more receptive to changes if they take place in the | ‘context ofa revitalized NATO and a reinvestment in the Atlantic alliace by the United States, ther than | being seeu as an expression of impatieace or uncancem with “old Europe." yr Z 7G01 ‘04 CONSULT NATO \ 2NC AT: CONSULT COUNTERPLAN'S ILLEGIT CONSULTATION IS LEGITIMATE — FIRST ~ OUR DEFENSE - -CONSULT COUNTERPLANS INCREASE PREDICTABLE AFF GROUND - THEY GET: POLITICS LINKS — BECAUSE MOST REPUBLICANS WOULD OPPOSE GIVING FRANCE VETO POWER ‘OVER ITS FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP LINKS ~ BECAUSE THERE ARE CONCRETE DISADS TO THE GLOBAL HEGEMON ‘CONSULTING LUXEMBORG ON MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. ALL OF THOSE LINKS GET BIGGER THE MORE OBSCURE THE CONSULTED COUNTRY GETS, PROVIDING GUARANTEED AFF GROUND AND CHECKING INFINITE REGRESSION INTO SMALL AND IRRELEVENT ACTORS. ‘GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR 3B fisros cOyiwt® tes rap TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE LOW AFTER THE IRAQ WAR Wifield, 02 (James, National Journal, October 12, 2974) ‘AS partof the well practiced protocol peculiar to a 19-member allanca of sovereign ond often hypersensitive’ natfons, beth Rumsfeld and Lord Robertson told reporters In Warsaw thet they had not given ary thought to ‘what part NATO might play in a U.S-led war with rag in rin, both men and their statis have thought long ‘and hard about the Issue, and their conclusions are nol exactly comforting to an alllance at the crossroads: NATO will not tkely have any formel, substantive rote in a war with Iraq beyond possibly deploying forces to NATO member Turkey to protect i rom any iraq reprisals. Disagreements between the United States and some European alias about whether to go to war wih iq are just to0 deep for Washington to ask that NATO be given a formal role in managing the war. Although many NATO members dont really want to.go to war in Iraq, they algo don't want to be marginatzed. And for the United States not to ask NATO to participate in an attack on fraq rafsea the question of the aliance's ‘relevance. What does it mean to the alliance that its pre-eminent member has decided to sideline NATO in two were In the space of litte more than a year? That question Is bound to come up in Prague. And ifthe sliance is not part of an treq war, European alles have made clear they cannot then be relied upon to help pick up the places in Iraq after a war they had iitie part in intatng. “Whe United States leeds 2 hand-alcked coaliton nto aq, they should be prepared to stay for a very long {ime and not expect oer nations to come in behind them and conduc te nation bulling,” Hans-Ulncn tose, chairman of tha German Bundestag's foreign policy commie, csld in an interview. “To do otherwlse ‘would be to repeat tha example of Algharistan, when | ink the United States mad a big mistake of ‘refusing NATO's offer to make tan eliance campaign.” {In truth, European feelings are sil brulsad by the events of last year. After the Seplember 11 altacks, NATO. for the first time in its history invoked the Article 5 "one-for-ll, allfor-one” clausa thal calls for a collective response to any altack on an alliance member. U.S. officials nevertheless deciined to assign NATO any formal role in the Afghanistan fighting, saying they wanted to avoid cosine that might complicate U.S. war ‘tategy. “The mission," Rumsfeld famously said, “wil define the coaion.” | ost = Soa w NSGDI 2004 CONSULTNATOCIP @_ MALUMPH' fh pac =z TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE LOW NOW; FOR MANY REASONS _2903 (Samuel F., an associate director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and is the a sso of 00 hooks. “Transatlantic Ils.” Wilson Quarterly, 03633276, Winter 2003, Vol. 27, Issue 1) Transatlantic relations will be improved only by the most judicious mix of pragmatism aud patience. The United States and Europe are separated today much less by a general gap in cultural vatues than hy particular belie#S about the role of goverument, the use of force, and the amount of time to be allowed for solving problems. The United States wants the minimum possible role for government at home and abroad. (There's even talk of privatizing parts of the foreigp-palicy apparatus such as the U.S. Agency for International Development.) It's allergic to multinational projects, and avoids using & United Nations whenever possible. It wants problems dealt with directly and resolved quickly. Americans are an impatient people. By contrast, the Europeans, from experience and conviction, favor a high level of political direction in all international activities, especially those involving the military; prefer multinational solutions and the use of the United Nations to achieve them; and are willing to accept half-measures to buy tine, in the hopes of an improved international environment, 3} TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ARE LOW FOLLOWING THE IRAQ WAR Kitfield, 02 lames, National Journal, October 12, 2974) V” Some undoring tensions, however, ued behind the pote toasts and caret werent cy ete Sencar ern e e, Sa ro emnaieteriren Pa a nae ad Sp atm enn tet ete eg Seay structures of the U.S. government and military fo confront the threat posed by the link between gtobel See a aan ie er nar AE a to keep in sync with the United States. the message strongly implied, the United States will go its own way. “Those Soptambor 11 atacks were more hen tragedy were a wake-up cal wating cera ig aud ua axed RAS Goon Tanstrs on he Warsaw sumo : se kd to recognize tha ho word weve Steanty entronnent nate sgcany aren fom repeat’ nS name WN onred now Although Rumsfeld stressed that the United States wanted NATO to transfor 1m itsel to better con! Ghaloroe hl nw scny ener teh he ot as he coneeaience ft ache, f wa fall do so, itil send harmful signal othe word about our allanca," Rumsfeld sald." NATO doesn't have a force that is quick and age, hat can deplay in days and weeks cather than months and years, thn iw not have much to ofe the word inthe 2¥et century, Rumsfeld was equally blunt about the emerging U.S. doctrine of ", 1," whic ! {oat okopslam arose Europe. “eveqone show on notes about re ties we face and Season Saat Ros mate clear our abjecive to sop another 9 or weapons-otmass-destruction attack before ! happe umsfeld said. “Throughout our history, many books have been written about threats that. . ‘appeared and the attacks that resulted, and why no one had anticipated or prevented those ‘tacks, Those Feet anite acs tn omens coe 9 ueenetts Sevenvont gisemmareatee teeter arian ao aie cacao, ee poeta aes soem soaks ania eae - a le,GDI 2004 vs/ BQ CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR _ caeqlteiegn (toto ys low ‘THE IRAQ WAR HAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED US-EU RELATIONS Wells Jr 2003 (Samuel Fan associate director of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and is the author/editor of 10 books. “Transatlantic Ills.” Wilson Quarterly, 03633276, Winter 2003, Vol. 27, Issue 1) In assessing this mix of friends and foes, how would American policymakers characterize Europe? Self-absorbed is perhaps the term most policymakers and analysts would use. The Europeans are preoccupied with the construction of the European Union (EU) and with domestic issues of economic reform, immigration, and social services. The individual member states of the EU pursue foreign policies that are often divergent and frequently ineffective, Though many European leaders say they want an independent international role for the EU, it lacks the resources, clarity of purpose, and political will to make that feasible. —_ _ Even on the fraught question of Iraq, there is no unanimity: Germany remains opposed to USS. policy, but France has moderated its position after extracting significant concessions from Washington, and other countries, notably ftaly and Spain, have been quietly supportive of the U.S. approach all along. And, of course, British prime minister Tony Blair has worked closely with the Americans. To make matters more uncertain, the EU is on the verge of adding as many as 10 new members, most of whom are even fess committed to a strong international role for their own countries and for the EU than the least enthusiastic of the current 15. No wonder maay officials in Washington betieve that Europe's policy preferences, weak military power, and even weaker will to use it are largely responsible for the current transatlantic discord. 7}Gpi2004 CONSULTNATOCIP | MALUMPHY-PRIEUR AT 3 No nsk of Counter-6 Laney THERE IS A LARGE RISK OF ALLIED COUNTER-BALANCING IN THE STATUS QUO Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard, 2001 (America Unrivaled, Comell University Press, pg. 141) thes agente the obvious quenion the danger ofan ans claed wo apport or oppowe US pulses ant eheee oe ne or dificult o coordinate joint opgosiion te US roto other sates wéiry about U.S. preponderance, the more likely they are to take stpr—howerer modest and cover dcdpead asl see ae finer US. efor: The United Sats bay tte beth eae ae Detter able to achieve its chosen ends if other states dé not se is prepon ‘This snould be'a funny quoteGDI 2004 CONSULTNATO CIP A MALUMPHY-PRIEUR S Consubtotion Good cance US consultation is key to rebuilding the broken down NATO, ‘Naumann, Former Chairman NATOs Miltary Conimitee, /1772003 (Klaus. "NATO atthe Crossroads, Key ‘note address at the SHAPE Commanders Conference on June 1, 2003.” httosavw ritynetwork.com Ishowarticle.cfin?article_id=8550) nee I IER nape erect NATO is indeed at the crosstoads, more than cver before. But the rift can be healed if there is the ical will on both sides of th tic, But ms it WORK, There is no ‘way back tothe Pestraq situation, To heal rebuil to adapt its consultati deci races: ui f an alliance which is determined to act where and when it wile essary and anor its itary it 21 eam Bghing foc. Such aNATO would be the choi th the 2. But both sides need to understand that there Tho ‘From useless and indeed damaging initiatives ofthe “chocolate “type. L also is 1ope that our American atic inderstand that they need more than allies, namely an alli F allies in the collectively and who are prepared to at side by side with th s i with them there where commor Unrest eat stake, Slightly modifying what President Bush had said t his fellow Americans the NATO nations should send a message to the bed guys in our world which reads: The. d to security in this w is is alli ‘ill act, CONSULTATION KEY TO. REINVIGORATE THE ALLIANCE simmpbell “03 (Kut M, Kurt M. Campbell is senor vice president, director ational ; of the inte Secunty Program, 2d folder ofthe Henry A Kissinger Chai in National Security at CSIS, ‘ternational textrism; the politics and foreign potioy ia an fener implicati Ee 4 problems of Asia; nuclear nonproliferation; ieplications of globalization for America and the woc, September Occbes 200% (Given the sensitity ofthe ives involved, several steps shuld be taken before and drng the rollout of any ‘new miltary posture, Thedirst is ensuring that everything about the move is vetted carefully By all major felevant actors. Attention to process wil aot salve every problem, but i will certainly affect the receptivity of other countries to any changes. How allies such as South Korea and Japan respond, for example, will depend not just an the substance of the modifications themselves, but also on how weil the United States consults with thelr governments, takes their reservations Into account, and allays their various anxieties. In fact, rather than being Seen as 8 routine obligation or a nuisance, consultations over the posture cranges should bbe seen as an Important opportunity to solly, strengthen, and redefine those alliances forthe future. In Europe, simiariy, countries are likely to be more receptive to changes i they take place in the context of a ‘revitalized NATO and a reinvestment in the Atlantic aliance by the United States, rather then being seen as fe expression of mpiencs er ncencer th ld Supe, ‘Gxring he consuratons, he Unted States should exln fe purpose and ravonle behind ts ston, faking it cleor that the changes are global and nat driven by any particular regional dynarnic. Becase ofthe Lering, international servers wil be prone to view the charges inthe content of recent events, particulary the tead-up to and conduct ofthe war n Treg, Without guldance trom the United States, eney wit put thet wn spin an what Is happening, when wil not necessarily be accurate and could edversly eect ster U.S. interests. - ‘This should be a funny quote —GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Consultation GOOD (plac FAILURE TO CONSULT NATO WILL HURT RELATIONS AND US HEG SLOAN 04 (Stanley Sioan is the senior specialist in international security policy with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, July 25, 1997. “Steering NATO — Nota one-Country Job" Christian Science Monitor) ‘Seifconfident US behavior has cubbed many Europeans the weong wey. When the Clinton administration revealed its choive of three candidates Polaad, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wove ‘of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even — France, which isa strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, ‘was not surprised that the United States and severt other allies would ‘only support a smaller group. But the fact thatthe United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice ‘lear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even our “This should be a funny quete L ceGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP A MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Consultahon GOOD Cranes CONSULTATION IS KEY TO SOLVE US- NATO RELATIONS NATO, May 1996 c-Hightighs of NATO Secretary Generals address tothe Russian Council on Foreign and Seeunty Policy, in Moscow, on 20 Mare.” p/w. nat.indocu/eview!1996/5603-4shtn) We im for a relationship in which there is acti lar consultat and in wrt Russa and NATO keep each other fully informed of our agenda and concems and have the tunity to discuss and influence them. This consultation should be full, timel e ress chal id con ich face arent 80 that we vent us. before they tum into crises. 1 thiek-such a celationship is achievable. Itis certainly on offer. CONSULTATION IS ESSENTIAL TO ALLIANCE COHESION LACK OF CONSULTATION ENSURES INEVITABLE COLLAPSE Bicerinski 2003 (Zbigniew, U.S. National Security Adviser, The National Interest Winter 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) i Imay Ack Be easy to achieve, given dvergant American and European perspectives, but tha benafes of Cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise, For the United States, a Joint approach would mean Fes reecom of unlstral stion; for the European Unio, Ie would mann ess oppertulty for st serng ection Sut acting together-wtn the threat of U.S. mitary gower reinforced bythe EUs pala, novell and (to some degree) lary suppert-the Euro-Alae community cold foster a enulvaly stable and possy even democrat pst Saddam regime, > Tooter, te Unted States nd European Union wou also be better Bonicned to des withthe roader: fealerolcrseauenes of be upheaval in tea. Seca progres nthe lrelelston peste poses ‘would reduce the Arab concer that U.S. actions directed at iraa's regime were Inspired by [srae''s desire. te wenken a nelgboring Arb states whe perpatinling Is onl overs Pasian, Nosovee ‘esa clnbrton btwn he uted Stead te EU wu ae ent trey mea Patt htc eeween ts yay 5 US. ands hopes fo Besse - Active stroteg oartnership between the United States and the European Union would also make it mare likely that Iran could eventuar'y be transformed from o regional ogre Into.a reglonat stabilizer, Currentty, Zon has 8 cooperative relationship with Russo, but otherwise elther wary or hostile relations with a of (es neighbors, Ithas maintained 8 relatively normal relationship with Europe, but Its antagonistic posture toward Amarica--eciprocated by restrictive U.S, trade legklation-thas mace i dificult for European Eranian and Irarion-Japanese economic relations to truly prosper. Is internal development has suffered {ccordinoly, whe Is sacoeconomic ditemmas have bean made more acute by a demographic explosion ‘that has increased its population te 7O-0dd milion. §, WY women ‘This should be a tunny quoteGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P Kw MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Consuttastion GOOD (ond > CONSULTING NATO IS CRITICAL TO IMPROVE ALLIANCE COHESION ~— Col Thomas J. Kennedy, USA Senior Fellow, 1984. (NATO. Politico-Military Consultation, National Defense University Press, pg. 3) "The way toward such allied solidarity is not through con- {entation or singlenation dominance, but persuasivenees in the poltical apd strategic councits of NATO and West. oo fem Europe. The process that has evolved to generate alliance consensus in the absence of any supranational body is politico-miltary consultation, 34k _In the NATO rubric, consultation Is much more than dis+ “Eussion; it implies an obligation tor each member to voluntarily Soma forward, before taking soma planned acilon, and consult with all other members on any Issue affecting thelr mutual se- curity: In effect, Ee has an obligation to both inform . and then listen ies. Because governments are as in Porfoct as the humans who operate them, this system af polltico-miltary consultation will break down on occasion, yot it has served NATO well for moro than thirty years, and as long ag tne NATO allanes remains necessary and operable, ‘consultation wil remain the basis of mutual planning and ‘décisionmaking. What lollows here wil not racommond struc tural changes in consultation, because, as Ambassador Bennett, former US representative to NATO, rocantly noted, NATO dogs not need mora consultative bodies, but concen tration on making the existing consultative tramework work More elfectively.? The place for Americans to start on that in ~_ eased efficiency is on our side of the Atlantic, rather than in - Brussels, I will argue that the United States must shape its In- puts to the coliico~miltary consultative process more care- | jconsidering where and-how and with whom they:are to: € argued, 2s well as thelr substantive cantent, | bollava this; ‘improvement can be achieved by an educational process" within. the US govemment—a process which must be ro- 7 poated with every major charge of participants, but which re- quires no significant reorganization or structural change, ¥ wall also argue thal thera are parailel consultative forums, outside ‘he formal NATO process, that also damand greater attention. "and consultative effort. ‘This snonld be =‘GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR. s Consultation GOOD Collar) < Consultation on foreign policy is key to greatly strengthening the solidarity of NATO, NATO. 2000 (“Text ofthe Report ofthe Commitee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO." hupu/www.nato.invdocwhasierxt/bS6 12! 13a.htm) ‘The essential role of consultation in fostering political cooperation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951: "... The achie it of a closer d Port was prepared by i Commitee of Tre inthe course ofits meetings and iner-goveramesal sence last September. ‘Subsequent events have reinforced the Committe's conviction that lantic nit og unity onl ing con: to achieve c cies and ti isultation on issu mon cone is done, me f Seperation in NATO, which hs consid sogealy othe cause of feedon, and ahh ne eos advancement in the future, (1) will be endangered, This shaun Ge 2 fiery anoteCONSULT NATO C/P \ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Corsult Verte Abawe Guniual =) + CONSULTATION IS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENTING NATO COLLAPSE - Col. Thomas J. Kennedy, USA Senict Fellow, 1984. (NATO Politico-Milit Consultation, National Defense University Press, pg. 73) Consultation, tke almost ail ether aspacts of the NATO System, is @ shared responsibility. i essential to the cont. Duly of an alliance et sixteen sovereign states that deliber. ately tacks a supranational directive body. yet consultations fot an absolute, religious vow. instead, t's a politcal proc. 9, open to interpretation and rationalization, As frustrating as this process can ba on both sides of the Atlantic, iL 18 an essential part of managing the common de oe fonse, and, wlth a ite gréBler atfort, can be accomplished ‘mare offectvely. Trying harder is nat enough, however: the ef fort must produce concrete results. Amaricans can conhbute to this improvement by acting with greater concern for allod views and: by recognizing both, the shortoomings and. the stangths of US institutional procedures. By befter analvsia, wa can choose better Issues, better methods of presentation and rdalstic objectives. es “There is no need for extensive structura or arganizaticinal ‘change, just etter managemont of our present resources. In sehleving such self-discipino, wa must be wary o sting init ative and innovation, however; and soma process to’ assure: the flow of fresh Ideas Into the conauitative forum would bea" valuable contribution to the NATO systam., Neither should wo forget the severai parallel consultative bodies available’ to ‘hase interested in Western’ socurily. Tho United States can. -proft from thase added opportunites for consultation, leamring fo deal with each individual body on @ complementary and not 8 competitive basis, sea In the noar-torm, these extra efforts at enhancing our con ‘suttation cannot hoip but Improve the qualily of doth the Amer- {can inputs and the resultant NATO coflective decisions; in the tong term, such efforts will support European defense afféts ‘as NATO nations undertake @ greater role in resouree-sharing fd decisionmaking. | Without consultation, NATO's existence will be in jeopardy. NATO. 2000 ("Non-Military Cooperation.” htpi/hvww.nato.in/docubasictxtt-23 htm) ‘These words were writen five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before, If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO.We must also ice of i not so in the NAT cil as to meet the lit fn . ‘The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation, ress quirement for all members to ation in NA the.GD! 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP ‘ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR TY Consultation Key sto rede allied Counter -nlansing CONSULTATION IS KEY TO REDUCE ALLIED COUNTER-BALANCING Gordon Phillip H.) Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Director of the Center of the United States and France atthe Brookings Institution. January and February 2003 Tere is much to be Said for assertive Arighan leadership. As developments over the post decade ~ roi” the Persian Gulf tothe Balkans to Central Asia — have shown, Washington's wilingness to lead often seems to be the only way to get the rest ofthe international community to act. Bt fis also clear that when taken /too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateraltsm, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States. Few have put this argument better than did candidate Bush when, in October 2000, he warned that potential alles arcund the worid would “welcome* a humble United States but “resent” an arrogant one. The Bush team's policies, however, thus far seem to have been based on the epposte premise, Telling alis tht if tey do not support Washington's approach to the war on tercorism, they are “eth the terrorists," sighting key NATO alles (and NATO itso) In AMgharistan, and refsing genuine consultatlons Before important declsions seem far more Ukely to foster ‘esentment than to muster support, Whatever the merits ofthe administration's opposition to the tong list of multiteral agreements it nas fought since coming ta office ~ and many of those agreements were genuinely flawed -- it should have been clear thet the United States could nat abruptly pronounce the Kyoto Protocol “dead,” seek to undermine the International Criminal Court, raise tarfs on steel and increase agricultur. subsidies, and oppose a range of arms control agreements Without such actions’ having a cumultive Impact ‘enue etitutes of Europeon leavers and publ tomars the United State. The September 2002 German lection, where fr the fist time inthe postwar peried a leading candidate concluded that major electoral falns could be had by running against the United States, sould be taken as a warning that. American tnilataralm could indeed come at a prige._) Us This should be a funny quoteGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP \ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Congensud ter to Mine Cae — Stress ( NATO's effectiveness requires consultation of normal parts of governmental activities. NATO, 2000 (“Non-Military Cooperation.” http://www.nato.int/docw/basictxt/bt-23 htm) ctive. structive international cooperation requires a resolve to work together for solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interest, which should make this task easier than it oxherwize would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own ici actions, take i it Alliance. This requires not only the aeceptance of the obligation of consultation and cooperation whenever necessary, but aso the development of practices by which the discheage of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity. International law and consensus with NATO is key to keeping the Allies effective. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 2003 (Gen. Wesly. “Inthe war on terrorism, alliances are not an obstacle to victory. They'te the key to it.” htp:/vww.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0209 clack. hemiWbyline) ‘What caused this outcome was not just the weapens of war. Foress fir beyond the bombs and bullets were at work: the weight of international diplomacy; the impact of intemational law: a sus-engine” of NATO, which kept all the Allies in the fight, The lesson of Kosovo is that international institutions and alliances are really another form of power. They have their limitations and can require @ lot of ‘maintenance. But used effectively, they can be strategically decisive. Consensus in NATO is key to its effectiveness. Clark, Supreine Allied Commander, Europe, 2003 (Gen, Wesly. “Inthe war on terrorism, ali an dasa towel They ee keyioit” ipso atingometlycomfesnsesaQ0iN08° a in) sus ehgine for its members. Becaus broad agreement, every decisions an opportunity for members to dissen--thersfore, every decision Generates pressure to agree. Greece, for example, never opposed a NATO action, though its electorate strongly opposed the war and the ‘Greek government tried in other ways to maintain an acceptable due from NATO. military actions, ok hi state others al Ofcourse, this wasn'ta pleasant experience for any of the participants. For U.S. leaders during the war, it meant continuing dialogue, frictions, and occasional hard. exchanges with some allies to get them on board. For some. European leaders, the experience must have been the reverse: a continuing pressure from the United States to approve actions~to strike targets-that would generate domestic criticism at home, There was no. ‘escaping the fact thet this was every government's war, that they were intrinsically par of the operation, and_each Was, ultimately, ble, eld accountable by its voters for it acts on the b © This stioaterbe a tunny quot: LAGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ ConS« lt Solve, NESS elves Overstrefey NATO CONSULTATION IS KEY TO SOLVE US MILITARY OVERSTRETCH The Baltimore Sun 2003 (Mark NATO to take over contol of hay oeeepann yom Boman uly 9%, US mi Traq occupation) ‘might ask "You would need a whole package” giving allies a major role in decisions on Iraq's, ~ reconstruction and how its future government is organized, said Robert Hunter, U.S, ~ ambassador to NATO under President Clinton. "It can't be just that the U.S. is still in charge of everything,” —~ a "Said Stanton Bamett, a former U.S. diplomat at NATO: "The allies would have to be ~ convinced that this administration is not trying to find a quick fix, and that this would set a {new pattem and a new understanding of what NATO consultation means.” Stich a sharing of authority could be "quite painful” for administration policymakers to swallow, Burnett said, particularly those who favor an assertive, unilaterelist American role in world affairs. But given the pressure on American forces, it might also be necessary. NATO reduces military forces and member's dependence on nuclear arms. Botticelli, writer at Sufolk Transnational Law Review, Winter 2002 (Andtea Devise, *THE PREMIER OF TH NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY'S ARTICLE V: IS ARTICLE V STILL A DETERRENT?” P, Vn) ‘After te thcat of Communisin disappeared in 1991, NATO convened to adopt se goals atthe Rome ‘Summit Meeting (Summit). 166 ‘These new intistives included: reducing members’ dependence on ume — the sii ‘of NATO's military forces: improving NATO's TO's mili and: ang developing conflict prevention, 98? The Summit lio developed « Dsiarones Pease Cooperation, fori ing with Easter ‘tis should be a funny quote - i zGDI 2004 . CONSULT NAT! MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Cons..!t Sus quecstichly ocr a Zz COOPERATION WITH NATO DECREASES US OVERSTRETCH ‘The Baltimore Sun 2003 (Mark Matthews and 7 ”, NATO to tke over control of frag occupation) om Bowman Joly, US might ate WASHINGTON -- With American costs and casualties mounting in “tag, the Bush administration is showing new interest in putting a NATO in charge of the military occupation as a way of Scaling back “ihe U.S. troop commitment, U.S. and NATO officials say. Such a change would discomfit some administration hard-liners, as it would foree the United States to share decision-making on Iriq with European leaders who opposed the U.S--ed invasion, analysts said. It might also require secking a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which the United States failed to get ‘before launching the war to topple Saddam Hussein. But is the single thost powerful nation ia NATO, the United States ‘would retain military command while spreading the burden and costs among 2 number of nations, thereby easing demands on overstretched American forces, diploraats said. "There is interest" in turning the mission over to NATO, although not right away, a senior Bush administration official said yesterday. "think the American public would be pleased to see NATO helping, “usin Iraq... Americans believe in NATO and would coxsider it a plus to have NATO secure Iraq." >. ‘This shoul be a funny qudie= 7 \GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR. Consuttetion Solves- Aernpers “Bus doctrine en ition Solves tempers “Bush doctrine CONSULTATION Is KEY TO TEMPERING THE BUSH DOCTRINE Giltin and Packer, 2003 (Todd and George, ’ » Issue 1: Page 33) To Serge, “America’s Age of Empire.” Jan/Feb2003, Vol. 28, HIE Bush had doubts about regime extension before September 11, he surely does no longer. The morals of a president with a mission has now fused wrk the parochiatism”*— ofa man whose well of world knowledge is filled with ol, He will maken battle to the remy. even if the enemy is far-flung, even if allies are frightened and skeptical, even if the political and economic costs of way are immense. (Since the economic costs wil Fall mainly on America’s poor and middle class and will have the effect ot forestatling any of small-group communion. It hasall the logic of the Republican ‘Supreme Court majority _ in Bush ¥ Gore, the logic that put Weis the White House, the logic that now leads the Shamed citele of Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld. Wolfowitz, and Rice to make enormous decisions behind closed doors without much consultation (except an decasional nod to Colin Powell). It has the bluster of an administration that presses the intelligence agencies sania alto its view of how things must be, agnins their better judgment. the the manifesto of a bully with a ferocious will who fumbles in search of econ to explain why he does what he feets like doing, 4 This should be a funny quote \ K BzGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR \ Coasultortion Fea Ro v WHHL ww Tentow No one is consulting NATO anymore; consultation is key to putting NATO in the war on terrorism, Hoyar, president of the ELDER party, 9/1/2002 (Werner. “Press Release.” http://www liberal- democrat.com/modulo/printnews.cfn/acticle.2338) In view of the Terrorist-Attack on the United States, NATO acknowledged that it as an attack in conformity with Ar. Sfthe Wahgen-Tea Ts een om Ober th apes bea ot NATO it repared yntribt ictures of NATO, which were initially Creed ape vith rely uch ee femme cefnc, af not being activated at all Equally unimpressive isthe contribution of the EU mi its Common Foreign and Security Policy. _ has i ild a coalition under their: h bilateral arrangements with individual NATO ue EU-embers, and nobody seems to be consulting NATO anymore. That he State, with both the highest risk and the biggest contribution at stake, should claim the leading role is most legitimate, To keep the Allies tofally out of the decision-making-process though, would be most unusual and also unwise in the long-run. Not taking advantage of the wel ished and most reliable political and above all military s of NATO i Opportunity for more efficiency, transparency and ultimately acceptance. ZZ ‘This sHiould be a funny cuete‘GDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR q Gonsultotions Ss = “Ai eae = Zk not too late to enlist NATO in the fight againet terrorism. Sadly Supreme alti Commander, Europe, 2005 (Gen Wesly “In he ene terrorism, alliances are not, ‘washingtonmonthly.cor/features/2001/0209 “ CONSULT NATO C/P Obstacle 10 joe Thee he key ot" hapten: increasingly chaotic Afghanistan, mu 1s ass. tion, and isto be a military operation against Ir 3 hen certainly NATO patina nd law-enforcement setivitigS If there more di m sgsinst rag, Hen estan TC ciation should be sought Involving wo ive ing the Europeans that che United States is seri conflict situations. That NA Tt can be expended ot nity it Postvar eq or ther pose ig lat do not bel ‘0, at ite el to CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND NATO IS KEY TO COUNTER TERRORISM Hunter, doctoral dissertation atthe London School of Economies, 2004 (Robert B. “ESDP and NATO: ‘Companions or Competitors?” htp//wavw-rand orginatsee_area/productyMR 1463.htm]) Cooperation on Terrorism. NATO and the EU need to create a common locus for counterterrorism planning and coordination. This should ena a permaneat coordinating staf and council involving both the EU and NATO, and including all the relevant parts of governments. Given the special need for U.S. leadership, direct engagement of the U.S. National Security Council process with this Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Council could pay major dividends, . Integrating diferent aspects of policy. An ongoing consultation between the European Union, NATO, and the United Stat ues ineludin; ical allGDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR CONSULT NATO C/P NATO CONSULTATION IS KEY TO STABALIZING NORTH KOREA [Nye Gong , Dean of Harvard's Keaney Shoolof Govemnet, US. Powerand Steg ater Ing Forign Aas, une 5, 2000, Yi) ‘What the Bush administration bas not yet sorted out s how to go about implementing its new approach, At frst lance, it appears thatthe Iraq war tetled the issue, But the war canbe interpreted asthe Tast chapter of Wh {Nwentiethycentury rather than the frat chapter of the twenty-irst Not only was itunfinished business i the minis of its planners, bt it also rested on more tbag.a decade of unfulfilled UN Security Council resoitions. A numberof loae observers -- such as British Ambassador tothe UN Sir Jeremy Gresnstock ~ believe that with a litle more palieuce and diplomacy, the administration could have obwained another resolution that would have focused on the ins of Saddam Hussein rather thaa allowing France and Russia to tum th problem into one of American power. If ‘that close call had corae out differently, the continuity with the past would be clearer today. Moreaver, the + dininisteation is carendy faced with another dangerous dictator who is ionths rather than years eway Som having, ‘gucloar weapons and thus Gta the criteria of the new strategy even more closely than req did. Nosth Korea any to implement the new eategy, Ths fr, the Bush sdministation as responded Elose consultation} lies. Deterrence seems to | although in this case it wasGDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR CONSULT NATO CIP Consurt Saves Middle East CONSULTING NATO IS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST STABALIZATION Brzezinski 2003 (Zbigniew, U.S. National Security Adviser, The National Interest Winter. 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) For ot least a generation, te major tas facing the Unites States In the effort to promote globe! secrty ‘nl be the pectcatlen and ten the coerativeargalzavon of a reion that contains the wora's greatest Concentration of pital injustes, soda depevaten,cemographlc congestan and potential or Nigh intensky violence. But the region aio contains mast ofthe work's oll and natural gas. In 2002, the arta destgitnd a8 tne Global Daleanseontaired 68 percent of the word's proven oll eserves end 4 prcent of the work's prove natural ges reserves; Secounted for 32 parent of word ol production and 15 perce of word natural ga produtton, 1h 2020, the are is prejected to produce roughly 42 millon barrels of ol per day~39 percent ofthe gle pracuclon total (207.8 milan bares per day, Three key ‘Fregions-Burope, the United States and the Far East--collectively are projected to consume 60 percent of that ofa! procueton (26 perent, 25 pareant and 19 percent, respective) ‘The combination of ol and volatilty ves the United States no cholce. America faces an awesome: challenge in helping to sustain some degree of stabilty among precaris states Inhablted by Increasingly politically restess, socially aroused and religiously inflamed peoples. It must undertake an even rare ‘daunting envrprise than it dd a Europe nore than hai w catury ago, glen keratin that Is culturally aien, poitcally turbulent and ettnicalty tomplex. Jn tha past, is remote regln could have been leh to fs own devices. Until the mide ofthe last ‘century, nest of ft wes dominated by Imperial and cofontat powers. Today, to tgnare its problems and ‘nderestimate Its potential for globa! disruption would be tantarmaunt to declaring an open season for Intensifying regional viclence, region-wide contamination by terrorist groups and the competitive Droleraton of weaponry of mass destruction, “The United States thus faces a task of monumental scope and complexity. There are no se-evicent |: answers to such baste questions as how and wth whom America snout be engaged In telping to sxabze the area, pacty It and eventuslly cooperatively orjarize it. Past remedies tested In Europe-“ke the Marshall Pon or NATO, both of which exploited an undertying tronsatlansic plitial-uiture slidarty--d0 rot auite fe» region sal rent by historical hatreds and cuktural diversity. Nationalism In the region i sl sean garter and more emotional stage than it was In wareweary Europe (exhausted by two massve | | European cv wars fought within Just tree decades), end is fueled by religious passions reminiscent of ‘urope’s Catholle-Protestant forty-year war of almost four centuries ago. Furthermore, the area contains no naturat alles bonded to America by history ahd culture, such a5 exlstec sn Europe with Great Britain, Fronce, Germany and, lately, even Poland. In essence, America Ras to ravigate in uncertain and badly charted waters, seting its own course, making diferentianed ‘2ccommodations while not leitng any ane recionsl power dictate fs direction and priorities.GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO. MALUMPHY-PRIEUR vier wis say Yee “ GENUINE CONSULTATION MEANS NATO WILL SAY YES Col. Thomas J. Kennedy, USA Senior Fellow, 1984, (NATO Politico-Milit Consultation, National Defense University Press, pg. 16) \ Desplte their common purpose as a dotense alliance, ATO membor nations have disparate national Intorests ‘they vary In population, size, and geography. ‘The larger:,, Yeuntres havo worldwide fesponaibiies in aaion 10 ther! aliance roles. Consequontly, It is not surprisiig that lifor. fences of opinion occasionally arco and thal tho process oF : 2 quick, effective vehicle for resolving!:* 13 Binding acceptable alternative solu- tions.*® Among other berets is the simple eillciancy ot | Jimparting certain information in a single mutilaieral forum, aher than Bilateral through embessies in sixtoen captala. ‘Aside trom this obvious efficiency, some banofts of consulta: ‘ton rolata more to the relative size of the country involved. Former Secretary General Manto Srosio has observed thet for “tna larger allies, consultation is “a way to tegttimize and rein- Morce their foreign policy initiatives, thus obtaning a dagree of involvement and support (rom the smalier alles; conversely), for the smaller countries it Is a way af participating, or bein soon to participate, logethor with the lager ale, I Important ddabetes and decisions." Former US Permanent Representative Harlan Cleveland soos some other advantages to be derived from consultation by smal nations Including a.dagree of access to current US, Bere, ‘and a.senge of greater froedom:in citi. | PigdsciSsions of a US proposal than they would havent big ontext where the clsparity in power and size bet | LUnited. States and themselves is mote pronounced. For iaiger nations, ne sees advantage lo gaining early undor-: 2 landing of a protiom that Is kely to escalate to criss propor dns because most “International arguments about Gnsultations stam from the sense of surprise, not from peli Fobjactions.” He:also notes that consultation: can. improve! quality of our own decisions by forciig us to think-harder j.about what we are doing and why we are doing it, Cleveland ‘©eums up that argument with the candid observation, “it is com+ “parativaly easy for any govemment to kid Itself; it is always: {ch hardor to ld forelgnara2 - a NATO often agrees with US policies leading to cohesion. Robertson, Secreury of NATO, 2003 (Lord. “Chasige and continuity” itp:/Avaw.nato in/docureview!2003/ issued/englistvart] hem!) nearly 2003, when the international communit yultilateral institution were split and paralysed over Iraq, NATO was able both to agree and to act. It did take us 11 difficult days to meet our ‘Washington Treaty commitments and reinforce Turkey. But we did so when others failed, Indeed, some people will recall tat it took NATO longer still to reach a similac decision in politically less difficult circumstances at the time ofthe first Gulf War. Moreover, in buildin; ent, we coi ities who said that this erisi ‘NATO's cohesion forever. Only weeks later, our supposedly erippled Alliance took two previously ‘unthinkable decisions: irs, to take over the Intemational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan's capital, Kabul; then to provide suppor to Poland in setting up a multinational stabilisation division in Iraq, 7 ; : aGDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR niaro wus Seu sles NSULTNATOCIP % CONSULTING NATO OVER THE PLAN - THIS Ii a MULTILATERAL ‘SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION CRUCIAL TO SOLVE AND GARNER Brzezinski 2003 (Zbigniew, U.S. National Security Adviser, The National Interest Winter 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) Cuttately, Amerea can look to only ane genuine partner In coping with the Global Balkans: Europe. ‘Although will need the help of leading East Asian states like Japan and China~and Japan will provide ‘some, thouigh limited, material assistance and some peacekeeping forces-neltner Is Ukely at this stage to “pecome heavily engaged. Only Europe, increasingly organized as the European Union and militarily integrated through NATO, has the potential capably In the politcal, itary end economic realms to ~ pursue Jointly with America the task of engaging the various Eurasian peoples--on a differentiated and ‘exible basis~in the premotion of regional stabitty and of progressively wldening trans-Eurasinn ‘cooperation. And 2 supranationat european Unon liked to America would be lass suspect inthe regiones ‘2 returning colonialist bent an consclidatng or regaining es special economic interests. “America and Europe together represent an aray of physical and experiential assets with the capabitty to snake the decisive diference tn shaping the polteal furure of the Global Balkans. The question Is whether urope~tnrgely precccupied with the shaping of its oun unity have the will and te generosity to ‘become truly engaged with America ina fint effort that wil dwarf in complexity end scala the eerie, ‘successful joint American-European effort to preserve peace in Europe and then end Europe's division. European engagement will not occur, however, fits expected to consist of simply following Amerca's lead, The war on terrorism con be the opening wedge for engagement In the Global Baans, but cannot ‘be the definition of that engagement. This the Europeans, less traumatizes by the September 11 attacks, understand better than the Americans. Tes also why any jmnt effort by the Attantic community wil have to.be bazad on a broad strategic consensus regarding the longeter nature ofthe task at hand. ‘Semertat the same considerations apply to Japan's potential role, Japan, too, can and should Become & ‘major somewhat less central player. For some tne to come, Japan wll eschew 2 majermiltary role ‘beyond that of direct national selfefense, But despite its recant stagnation, Janan remains the globe's “second-largest national economy. Ts fhancal suppor for efforts designed to enlarge the word's zone of peace would be crucial and ufimately [nits own interest. Hence Japan--n conjunction with Europe--has to be viewed as America's eventual partner inthe long-term struggle agalnst the many forces oF ehacs within ‘tha Global Balkans. > NATO agrees with US perspectives on situations and has lead to success in the field. no m Robertson, Secretary of NATO, 2003 (Lord. “Change and continuity.” hrtp://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/ iseues/englistvart html) - ‘The answer is that NATO will succeed because it has no alternative. All of its members understand and ‘Agree that if we do nat go to Afghanistan, and succeed in Afghanistan, A fghanistan and its problems will come to ts. Worse sil, we would have to deal with the terrorist, the rofugees andthe drug traffickers with a much weaker international security structure because NATO would have been severely damaged and the concept of multinational security cooperation, whether in NATO, the European Union, the United Nations or coalitions, would have been dealt an equally heavy blow. am, however, optimistic, firstly because NATO has an unbroken record of success, Second, because nations have woken uy mi le and more deployable i this kind, and are beginning to do something about it. My efforts in the autumn of 2003 to provide helicopters and intelligence teams for [SAF were well reported in the newspapers. There were fewer reports of our success in December in meeting the requirement — exceeding it in some respects. The mood has changed. { hope that - Fie gbhe ts shot mv successor, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, can spend less UyGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P % MALUMPHY-PRIEURN mts win say YES “w PRIOR CONSULTATION WILL SMOOTH OVER ALLIANCE OPPOSITION Asmuns, Program Director for the Atlantic Partnership Program, Deputy Assistant ‘Secretary of State for Europe (1997-2000); Senior Analyst at RAND (1988-87); Research Assoclate, Free University-Berlin (1986-87); and Senior Analyst at Radio Free Europe (1981-86) September/ October 2003, (Ronald, Foreign affairs, p.20) fa, 2004 Book el no doubt be writen on tha reasons fcr the U.S-Eurapean clash over lag, Aloady Fe Gawets blo competing explanations, each with vary dierent policy implications. The fret atitbeaes Fro spit to 8 growing asymmetry in powar hat has been pushing the United Stales and Gurspe ford a Sper o.a hest of issues and has mad Brategie cooperation across the Atlantic Increasingly tenuore, $3This thesis has been seized on by many in the Bush somineevaiey to justify its go-i-slone or, failing that, ‘Roe cosiion approach, Afterall if Americans and Europeans no longer reside an the sane pleat in forms of strategic outlook, wh in their right mind would attempt ta sustain a strategic allonios Detecee Barny Aecording to his view, Washington shoule welcome Europe’ remarkable succass n haaing all but not expect Ito be a major strategie partner inthe future, ga alternative view is that although some real dferences do exist, this crisis targely tho result of trooped manlqess on one or bolt sides ofthe Allen. I could have Been avoided cf. at a minimum, recisely in this realm that the Bush administration has falled ~ tough its inabidly to define Its pr Washington's purpose in ways that its closest ales could support. instead, itrellad on tho mistaken ‘assumption that might makes right and that its alles would fe complained weer ‘about the paucity of consuttation and the ineffectiveness of the administration's iplomacy.GDI 2004 MALUMPHYPRIEUR NATO will Say Yes CONSULT NATO CIP 4 A GENUINE CONSULTATION ENSURES NATO WILL SAY YES. Col. Thomas J. Kennedy, USA Senior Fellow, 1984. (NATO Politico-Military Consultation, National Defense University Press, pg. 16) * Desplta their common purpose as a datense alliance,! {NATO member nations have disparate national Interests just i they vary in population, size, and geography. The larger, “Countries have worldwide responsibilities In addition to ther}! alliance roles. Consequently, it Is not surprisiig that dite. fences of opinion occasionally arise and thal the process of, ‘vonullation provides a quick-effective vehicle for resolving! most differences and finding acceptable altemative solu tions.2® Among other benefits is the simple eiticiency of, imparting certain information in a singlo multilateral forum, rathor than bilaterally through embassies in sixteen capitals. sige from this obvious efficlency, some banafts of consulla- ‘on relate more to the relative size of the country Involved. Former Secretary General Menilo Broilo has observed that for ‘ape lrg ales, consuttion is “a way to ogiimiza and rin (force their foreign policy initiatives, thus obtaining a degree ot involvement and support from the smaller alios; conversely, tor the smaller counties It Is a way of participating, or belng seen to partilpate, together with tho larger alles, in important dabetes and dactsions."2* Former US Permanent Raprosentative Harlan Clavatand ‘9908 some other advantages to be derived from consultation by smallan nations including a degree of access to current US Peccentomes tnd w corsa of rater redo ct | : ons ofa US propose than they would havasin's BES ‘eral context where the disparily In powsr and size betweest {Untled Statos and themseivas is more pronounced. For | i laiger nations, he soos advantage to gaining early under-; {fManding of a problem that Is likely o escalate to crisis propor: fons. because most “International arguments about it stom from the sense of surprise, nat from polloy isetbns." He.also notes that consultation; an. Improve’ the” ‘quality of our own decisions by forcing us to think harder’ about what we are doing and why. wo aro doing it. Cleveland - uns up that argument with the eardid observation, “tls com- “paratively easy for any gavernment to kid itself; It fs always - . {snueh harder ta ed fortgners."2)\ GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P _\_ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR A T+ . oO { CONSULTATION OVERCOMES DIFFERENCES IN OPINION - PRODUCING DECISIONS IN LINE WITH AMERICAN INTERESTS Asmus, Program Oirector for the Atlantic Partnership Program, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe (1997-2000); Senior Analyst at RAND (1988-97); Research Associate, Free University-Berlin (1986-87); and Senior Analyst at Radio Free Europe (1981-86) September/ October 2003. (Ronald, Foreign Affairs, p.20) Mary a geod book wl no doubt te wien on the reasons fr the U.S-Eurcpean cash over i’, Aeady one detects two competing oxptanalions,each with very diferent policy impleatone, The fet stotocaee {he spl to 2 growing aaymmeby in power that nas been pushing the United States and Europe tad apart on s hos of issues and has made strategic cooperation across the Alan increasingly (enous, iis heals hoe been sezed on by many inthe Bush administration fo Jaoly ta go“tatone ot fal tal, hoe coallon approach. After a Americans ano Europeans no longer reside onthe seme planet n= leems of sratege outlook who in ther right mind would alterptto austin a strategie ellance between them? According to iis view, Washington snould welcome Europe's remarkable success in aang taal but not expectitto be a major strategie partner inthe future. The alternative view is that although some real differences do exist, this crisis is langely the result of NATO is far more effective in protecting national security than any UN peace enforcement. Bereuter, Chairman ofthe Subcomminet on Europe ofthe House international Relations Commitee and president ofthe NATO Parliamentary Assembly / senior policy adviser for transatlantic relations for the committee and former director of the assembly's Defense and Security Committzc in Brussels, 2004 (Doug. The Washington. Quarterly. “Broadening the transatlantic relationship.” 147-148. Winter 2003-2004) |e Few fallacies are more absurd than the erroneous assertions that NATO is dying and that the United States no longer cares about NATO and Europe. Last spring, as coalition forces moved to oust the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein, experienced policy observers on each side ofthe Atlantic rushed to pronounce NATO dead. The French analyst Guillaume Parmentier claimed "NATO is finished” while the US scholar Charles Kupchan proclaimed that “the Atlantic Alliance now lies in the rubble of Baghdad.” Their conclusions, however, simply are not validated by the examination of the facts. NAT e organization that ¢: ffectivel ions of Eur ica against threats to their secur European members of NATO still regard the Atlantic Alliance as their best guarantee of the security. NATO is also demonstrably far more effective in peace enfi in which the BU is only beginning to gain experience, NATO IS AN EFFECTIVE PEACE KEEPING ORGANIZATION/ MULTIPLE COUNTRIES PROVE Bennet, Transitions, 2004 (Christopher, The Making of the Magnificent Seven, available online) & For the seven new members, the challenge was to become contributors to as well as have beats OF security. Here, they have risen to the occasion, For, a the same time as they MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Vays sover _(? => aaa cP = NATO JS AN IDEAL PEACEKEEPER ‘TERTRAIS 04 (Bruno Terteais is a senior research fellow at the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique and an associate researcher at the Centie d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales “The changing Nature of Military Alliances” The Washington Quarterly in Spring 2004) TF Milicatly, the main fonction of the Atlantic Alliance progressively trans- formed in the 1990s from waging war to enforcing peace. Europe no longer faces 2 majot milicary threat, The experience of Kosovo, in which NATO. oo procedures were seen as a liability by Washington, and the precedent of AF- ghanistan, in which the United States declined to use NATO as an umbrella organization despite European offers, will make resorting to NATO to con- duct major military operations an exception rather chan the rule, In con- trast, NATO has proven exceptionally useful in organizing and conducting ~ peace support operations. The Internacional Security Assistance Force's as- sumption of command in Afghanistan has excended chis role far beyond che alliance's borders. The United States and its coalition partners may also yet call on NATO to play a role in the stabilization of Iraq. This should be a funny quote .GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP 1 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR W109 Saves~ Heavterranesc NATO IS KEY TO SOLVING TENSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ‘Sensitor Hagel (Chick, ator fom Neb, meer of he Senate Comite on Fovpn Reload andthe elt Commitee ‘uelgen,Seior Hapa ca NATO' Role in Mie Ea Searty flor, US, Det of So, ane 2004, pie ie coi/3259¢ta) Fourth, NATO shoul expand and deepen its parmership withthe countries ofthe Mediterranean, There havo been some significant achievements in this ares, however, we should consider a modified version of the Pariersip for Peace program for tis regioa. Over the coming years the Mediterranean will take on even greater sategic, importance for NATO. It should be considered asa ertically important geo-political region with ita own djmamics. ‘Tercocisin legal trafficking in mrcotics and persons, and other threats in this region are niajorsecunty concerns for Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, The Mediterranean draws together Europe, North Africa, and the Middle Bast and is, therefore, influenced by political developments in each aren. There is enaexdous potential for expanded security, ‘ooperntion, especially intelligence gathering and sharing, and esonomic and trade development in Aigerta, Tunisia, 32d Morocco. Theso countries are taking important steps toward politcal and economic reform. They need tb do ‘more, but al tree countries are moving inthe right direction. This progress can be undermined by insiabilitwia ‘West Aftca and by radial Islamic groups and terorsts based inthis region. These areas requice more attention om the Adlantc Alliance, AS. ‘This shoutd be a funny quote TeGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NIKTO Solves, ~ Loa Mideile Fa NATO INVOLVEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO PEACE IN IRAQ Senator Hagel (Char, sao Nebrasa, neater of he Sanat Commie on Foriga Ran snd the Stet Comeiceson Totelige, Sesto gs on NATOS Role in Mil Eau Seurty Efe, US, Da of lat, one 200, ine negli A ‘NATO has assumed leadership ofthe United Nations-rasudated Intemational Security Assistance Force ISA), the “Alliance's frst mission beyond the Buro-Adaatic region, And NATO Secretary General Jap de Floop Sebelfer has said moce than ouee that * Afghanistan is the eumber one priority for the Alliance.” NATO's goal slould be to ‘eventually assume responsibility for al military and reconstruction operations in Afghanistan, including Operation ‘Enduring Freedom. The expansion of IS AF beyoad Kabul, and of NATO-led provincial reconstruction teams throughout the county, wil streagthen efforts to manage the tramsition to stability and democracy im Afghanistan. It ‘i also critical that NATO assets promised for Afghanistan be there ~ on the ground and operational, Third, NATO “wil néed to play a significant role in helping bring security end stability to Iraq, Last year, NATO eonnmitted to ‘providing support for Polish forces infaaq, However, NATO should initiate discussions to take over the duiewof the Polish sector in central Iraq or possibly assume responsibility fora division in northera Iraq. ‘This should be a funny quoteGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CiP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR niato _souver \erman PrussTine EUROPEAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION IS KEY TO SOLVING THE FOR, « PALESTINE AND ISREAL BRZEZINSKI, former national security advisor to the president, 2004 (Zoigniew Brzezinski “Hegemonic Quicksand,” National Interest, 08849382, Winter 2003/2004 Issue 74 database: Academic Search Premier p. online) FRevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic community's ene ing, cleavage over the Middle East is reversible. There is remarkable international consensus regarding the substance of an eventual Israeli-Palestinian pence treaty. There ate even drafts of the likely peace treaty that go considerably beyond the vague "roadmap" that the Bush Administration reluctantly endorsed in the spring of 2003. The real issue, how to get the Israelis and the Palestinians to cross the t's and dot the i's, will be a challenge despite the actuat support for a compromise peace amongthe Israeli anc Palestinian peoples. Left to themsel veS> + they have proven inable to bridge their lingering differences or transcend their embittered suspicions, Only the United States and the European Union together can decisively accelerate the process. To clo so, they will increasingly have to spell out in substance, and not just in procedural terms, the outlines of an Israelt-Palestinian peace. Broadly speaking, there is international consensus that its basic framework will include two states, territorially defined by the 1967 lines but with reciprocal adjustments to permit incorporation into Israet of the suburban settlements of Jerusalem; two capitals in Jerusalem itself; only a nominal or symbolic right of return for the Palestinian refugees, with the butk of returnees settling in Palestine, perhaps in vacated Isracli settlements; a demilitarized Palestine, perhaps with NATO or other internationat peacekeepers; and a comprehensive, unequivocal recognition of Israel by its Arab neighbors.{ PRSTVE NATO INVOLVEMENT IS KEY TO SOLVING THE ISRAEL BEEN CRISIS ‘Senator Hagel (Ca sear rom Neb, member of the Seats Commute on Foriga Relations nde Sent Comiten oo, " matigsee, Soator Hagel on NATO's Rola Mile it Senuty tint, US. Dept of Sot, ne 2004, ll ie gow 8EP6 hi) Fifth, NATO should begin to plan for» role in the Israsi-Palestiian conflict. Ubelieve a NATO peacekeeping ‘mission may eventually be called upod to belp secure ax leraeli-Palestnian peace. The day may come whea NATO ‘woops monitor he birth of a Palestinian state: NATO is the only institution with the credibility zad capability undertake such a ortical mission. The time is not yet right for this evelopment, but [believe we must begin to ‘ove our thinking, policies, and planaing in that diection. The esofution ofthe Iraeli-Pelestnian conflict canmot be Separated from our efforts in imq and Afghanistan. NATO INVOLVEMENT KEY TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE ‘Senator Hagel (Cc, senor om Nema, menber of he Sate Conmite an Foeen Rees andthe Slt Commit on ‘ixeligence, Sear Hagel on NATO' Rete in Middle at Scorty Biot, US. Dept of Ste, Fone 2008, ioc ce aoe hia) | ‘Adapting to this new strategic environment will 2ot come easily oF cheaply and will require a new NATO strategic doctrine. As tho Alliance adjusts to both an expanded membership and a new global stztegic cavironment, NATO. ‘must address the gapa in military expenditures and capabilites ofits members. The tough decisions cannot continue tw be deferred. It is essential that NATO members ao allow themselves to def into adversarial relationships over Gsagreerents. The challenges and differences that wil always exist mong members must be resolved inside — not outside ~ of NATO. NATO can only be undermined by its own internal distractions. President Bush hos offered a plan forthe Greater Middle East that is potentially historic in scope, and convoys the etrategio importance of this. teyion do: US. foeig :oiizy, Amieica's suppor for heedom in the Greater Middle Bast mast be matched with - ‘operational program of garinersip with the peoples and governments ofthe region to promote more democrats “ politics and more open economies. NATO is critical to this succes.GDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR justo soves [pet ‘Amaia Fattecrine NATO INVOLVEMENT IS KEY TO SOLVING THE ISRAEL S08 CRISIS Brzezinski 2003 (Zbigniew, U.S. National Seeurity Adviser, The National Interest Winter ~ 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) - or 3 oniy tne United States and the European Union togiher can decshvely accelerate the process. Ta co, they wil ncrensngly rave to spel on subanee, and no Jt procedural ters, the otnes of an Isreal pace. Breadyspeking, there international consensus tats bas trarewar wil ve D ee CLOSER TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE G. John Ikenberry, professor of geopolitics at Georgetown University, 2001 ‘unable to bridge thelr lingering tMtarences or transcend their embittered suspicions. Include two states, terorially defined by the 1967 lines but wit reclorocal adjustments to permit Incorporation Into fsrae ofthe suburban settlements of Jerusalec; two capitals In Jerusaiem itself; only @ _Ellevertheless, the Euro-atientic community's emerging cleavage over the Middle East Is reversible, There {is remariabie Intrnationsl consensus regarding the substance of an eventual Isae!-Palestinian peace treaty, There are even drafts ofthe key peace treaty thet go consiterably Beyond the vague “reacmap” thatthe Busn Administration reluctanty endorsed Inthe spring of 2003. The real lscue, How te get the Talis and the Palestinians to cross the t's and dot the I's, wil be a challenge desaite the actual support for a compromise peace arrong the leaell and Palestinian peoples. Left to thamiselves they have proven ‘nominal or symbole right of return for the Palestinian refugees, withthe bulk of retumees setting in Palestine, perhaps In vacated Israel settiernents; 9 demiltarized Palestine, pecheps éth NATO or other Intemational pescekeepers; and a comprehensive, unequivocal recognition of Israei by its Arab neighbors. “The Internationally sponsored adoption ofa viable formula forthe coexistence of Israel and Palestine ‘would not resolve the whder region's manifold confit, -but It would neve @ triple Benett: It would * somewhat reduce the focus of Middle Easter terrorists on America; It would disarm the most Ukely trigger ‘or & regional explosion; and t would permit a mare concerted effort by the United States and the [European Union to address tne region's secunty problems without seeming to ernbark on an anti-stamic crusade. The resolution ofthe Arab-Larali conflict would also faclitate American efforts tO promote the progressive democratization of the adjining Arab states without appearing, In Arab eyes, to explok the democratization Issue as yet another pretext for delaying a comprehensive Israell-Peiestioin (America Unrigaled, Comell University Press, pg. 230) T7the recent revision ofthe US.—Japan secuiy weary in May 1996 isan vier ualcaton dat both-countries se virtues in aintaining a tight 6 oes eionabip regardless ofthe end of the Cold War or de ve and ir cr spedine sequsty threats in che region." Eien though the threats in the region have become les angibl or immediate, the allance has been wethined and eooperadon and joint planning have expanded. Part of “ee tuovon ig dat the lance fel yeea by many Japanese and American, Sie ia as away w render the bilateral relationship more stable by bind- ip each vo da cer.® The cabinding aspects ofNATO have also partly cect expansion, Tht view of NATO as “srehitecrare” tat wou ae ea ner cal hea er oad in serene of Baters Bens po : Soe ee og NATO expansion seco an surance POUT Sa af fuer esrgenan reson Rosa BOC Fre ee clnton admnieaon, the vos of era Sbaimore a vena of ie EE oot ~ tome from NATO as an instration.*_}, FacestnGONSULT NATO CIP Zz 2D NGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ ATS Suvec CyPpus COOPERATION WITH NATO OVER CYPRUS WOULD IMPROVE ALLIENCE COHESION THEODOULOU, Christian Science Monitor comespondent, 2004 (Michael Theodoulou “Cyprus Will Still Split over Split,” Christian Science Monitor Vol. 96 issue 104 p, online) Give plans strongly backed othe EU and the US, A settlement would save the EW from taking ina divided country. {t would also bolster relations between NATO members. Greece and Turkey and smooth Turkey's own EU accession course. Mediators insist that, most of all. it will benefit the people of Cyprus. The plan addresses the key concerns on both sides and is the "best and fairest chance for peace, prosperity, and stability that is ever likely to be on offer," said Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general _ ‘The plan envisages reuniting Cyprus under a lose, Swiss-style federation of two largely autonomous areas. The amountof the island's teritory held by the Turkish side woutd be reduced from nearly 37 percent to 29 percent, enabling more than half the Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their ancestral homes under their own administration, Many others could gradually return to live in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, while those who do ot get all their property back would be compensated This should-be a funriy quote \GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO ‘ely TO ug wer sur, NATO IS KEY TO U.S. LEADERSHIP AND INFLUENCE Duffield, 94-95 Goha S., Political Science Quarterly, Winter, 763) | Continued strong American backing for the aliance is further assured by the fect that NATO remains the principal insitutensl vehice trough which the United States can infuence West European polos [21] Aulance membership entilles the United States to playa direct role in shaping a Varely of European security Issues. And active American engagement, including the presence of U.S. forces on the continent, ondowa 2 United States with considerable Isverage. Indead, the influence provided by is NATO invoWVernent (nay {even extond fo other bilateral and.mmatttaloralfasues, including those in the economia eld, One Ammorco> lplomat reportedly stated that by exerting its military weight in Europe through NATO, the United States te aR Gse Tetne Europeans wnat we wanton a whole ft of saves ~ bade agrcuture, the gu, you name 162), CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES IMPROVES AMERICAN SOFT POWER . [Nye (Jospeh 8. Dean of Harvart's Keandy School of Government, OS, Power an Ste ate ing Foreign Ase, Zane 6,203, Va) ss ee smectic mediate nan ee ‘toniancasis, on denocrey and human ight ean lp male US ple atractv 9 a wc = become sats bxitizaton ores att rier, the Bush administration jae ss comes jor post hoc: logitimis of the war. 88 earlier, nh cpus ete Oc rgetciaiatgamana ‘Seoplgnapuins HIVIAIDS. ut llough they share Woodrow Wilkos dsc fo spread democrcy, ad eae att at keegan cesses pea Pes nce peal impoton of aus asl ote oe or procs so owe “his should be a funny quote. ye. osGDI 2004 CONSULT NATOC/P =) MALUMPHY-PRIEUR KATO Zz oO} _ os NATO IS A CRUCIAL MEMBER IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM NYT 03 Gune 13°, 2003, The New York Times East Coast Late Edition. Pg A3 “NATO Agrees to U.S. Proposals to Revamp alliance) a ne ears oF analring the tolevance of alliances in the unprecedented gam the Hantcance ofthe events of September [1 i Stiack against a member state of NATO. Because NATO £58 collective defensive mechanism, an attack against any single member Automatically constitutes an ateack against all member stares ant requires a response from all members in the form of collective action. In fact, Article 5 ~ of the North Atlanctc Treaty emphasizes thot the “enduring” cote mission of NATO is the collective defense of its membets.? Some NATO members, in- cluding the United Kingdom and Germany, asisted the United States in the military action ¢o remove thé Taliban regime from Afghanistan and con- tinue co assist in removing latent Taliban and Al Qaeda forces from the country. NATO has since taken over command and coordination of the In- ternational Securicy Assiscance Force (ISAF) there. NATO, ori to meet Cold War threats, has thus, in this case at least, proven effective in the face of che new cheat posed by terri} yey _| NATO has prove combating the NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO THE WAR ON TERROR ‘Senator Hagel (Chast, sewer fom Neha, ‘oe, Seater Hage on NATO's Rele arabe fh Sema Commis on Foreign Rehtions and he Set Commo on nile Eat Ser irs, 5, Dep. of Sate, June 200, elf ate eo! am) ‘This show be a funny quese oN oaGDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ NATO CONSULT NATO CIP ~ NATO PROVIDES ESSENTIAL COMBAT SUPPORT TO WIN THE WAR ON g& TERROR “_Asmus, Program Director for the Atlantic Partnership Program, Deputy Assistant ‘Secretary of State for Europe (1997-2000); Senior Analyst at RAND (1988-97); Research Associate, Free University Berlin (1986-87); and Senior Analyst at Ragio Free Europe (1981-86) September/ October 2003. (Ronald, Foreign Affairs, p.20) 7 Ksimtar approach is needed today. in an age when the greatest threats come from terorsts of rogue sates armed with WMO, the new front line of defense must be tansatanuc homeland secutlly. There aro few aroas In which the need for ransaliantic cooperation is more selt-avident or America's ovnintarastm ne EU's becoming a strong and coherent actor more obvious In fact, Is precisely inthis area that U.S.- European cooperation has continued lrgoly undisturbed by the rag csi. But mush more needs to be done. The EU, for Itstanco, needs 15 create its own Office of Homeland Securtty to expend ecoperatrin ‘his area. Miliary capeblity Is the other indispensable component of defense. Afghanistan and rag heve \demonsttatad thatthe United Slates and Europe need the capacity to intervene rlltaly beyond thelr borders both to deter new threats and to respond to them. They also need competence in long-term Deacekeping to ald n the democratic reconstruction ofthese counnes. Tackling these bs Beyond Burope should be a core now mission ct NATO. The Bush administration missed a historic opportunity to Toad the allance into this new era in Afghenistan. Belatedly itis corracting its mistake by NATO-zing the Intemational Secuitly Assistance Force. Neto should also assume 2 lead role In providing secur in iraq, ‘And it should look for ways to reach out to other Arab states in the region, drawing on the experience of the Parinership or Peace. Finaly both parties agree and condlions warrant, NATO should be prepared tw help enforce an leraelPalestnian peace accord. ‘The gap in miltary capabillies across the Allantc must clearly be narrowed. Butt need not be the: showstopper some ertics calm, Nato requires modest expecitionary capabilltes, but Europe doss not hhave to replicate America's miltary prowass, It requires the capacity to Intervene, together with the United ‘States, in fulure coalition operations; to sustain long-term peacekeeping missfons; and to act onits own in ‘smaller crises. But the Achilles’ heel ofthe West Is not miltary in nature. Ata time when Washington ‘spends more on dafense then the rest of the world combined, the West as a whole doos not suffer from a lack of miltary capacity. Instead, the weak link s the lack of an affective transformation strategy that cag help create a democratic pollical alternative in the Arab world. Europe potentially hes as much to offer ss the United States when It oomas to meeting this challengo. The allance needs a modern-day equlvalent _af the Harmel Rezor forthe groater Middle East that combines an effeclve defense against terronsm and "WMD wih & poilcal strategy to help transform and demecratizo the Isomic and Arab works. THE NATO ALLIANCE IS KEY TO SOLVING THE WARONTERROR | TERTRAIS 04 *_ (Bruno Tertras isa senior esearch fellow a the Foundation pou re aherehe Stratégique and an associate researcher at the Centred” Etdes 6 de Recherches Internationales. “The changing Nature of Military Alliances” The sterly in Spring 2004) Feng ee eon Fit, blatrl alliances forged in che ight against communism have found a new purpose; Thailand and che Phlip- pines, for example, have become key US. partners in Asia, a main theater of terrorist operations. Second, ad hoc coalitions set up and led by the United _ States, not peemantene alliances, have conducted the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq waged since then. Third, these coalitions have revolved around an ‘Anglo-Saxon core. The two key U.S. tary partners inthe war aginst ter rortsm have been countries trith strong testo the United States, politically and culcurally, which were US. allies long before the Cold War: the United Kingdom and Australia These trends confirm the growing primacy of ad hoe and bilateral alliances over permanent and multiaceral alliances. in fate, the post-September !1 era increasinyly appeats to be the culmination . cof a hiscorical trend inthis regard.) .GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO KZ WO on Terrorism NATO IS A KEY PARTNER IN THE WOT, PROLIFERATION AND RELATIONS TERTRAIS 04 (Bruno Tertrais is a senior research Feltow at the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique and an associate researcher at the Centre d’Btucdes et de Recherches Internationales “The changing Nature of Military Alliances” The ‘Washington Quarterly in Spring 2004) Permanent alliances will survive, but only as long as they demonstrably serve common strategic and political interests. Some alliances created to ‘combat communism have proven useful for other purposes. For example, the US.-Japanese alliance helps counter the North Korean threat, while the Uniced States alliances with Australis and the Philippines are useful in che fight against terrorism. More generally, as the Al Queda network extends across several dozen countries, international cooperation has become a vital US. incerest. The need for rear bases during Operation Enduring Freedom. in Afghanistan even compelled Washington to set up @ new alliance to en- sure cooperation with Usbekistan. Additionally, despite eechnological geps, alliances can scill be helpful as “training grounds” for common operations and can ensure that armed forces shate a minitaum of technical inceroperability and common military procedures. Also, permanent alliances can provide common assets to support peacekeeping operations, as NATO has done since 1993, Finally, alliances remain a powerful nonproliferation tool, par- ticularly under the Bush administration, which has been less inhibited than its predecessor about nuclear matters, strongly reafficming the extension of its nuclear umbrella over its allies. The positive secusity guarantees provided by Washingzon help decrease the chances that countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or Turkey will be tempted to “go nucleat”} Zz ¥ NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO THE WAR ON TERROR; IT IS EMPIRICALLY PROVEN NYT 03 (une 13", 2003. The New York Times East Coast Late Edition, Pg A3 “NATO Agrees to U.S. Proposals to Revamp alliance) ("In che military operation to defeat the ter rorist threat in Afghanistan, che United Seates also had access to international institutions, such as the United Nations and was able to ‘secure greater participation from states that fare not part of various, eradiciorial US. alli- ances by building a coalition of willing, sup- Pottive nations. The UN has passed various resolutions concerning Afghanistan, and many UN member states (some of ‘which are not parties to U:S. alliances) have provided financial support to the reconstruction of thac country. Despite these alternatives, however, NATO remains che most appropriate multilateral insticution—one that Washington has buile up for a half cencury and whose counceraggression capabilities can be ed immediately. Even though the US. goveramenc will seek international cooperation from all available avenues to meet this particular new threat, Washington must consider NAG the most reliable strategic asset to tespond eftectively, not. ‘only based. on its record in responding to terrorist threats so far (as they have been limited in number if noc in gravity) but on its record in re-GDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO AZ a@doy7on Serre —_— Unilateralism doesn’t solve terrorism. Giltin and Packer, 2003 (Todd and George, “America’s Age of Empire.” Jan/Feb2003, Vol. 28, Issue 1; Page 35.) = ROBERT JERVIS. a professor of international polities at Columbia University and a [eading foreign-affairs realist in the academy, calls the document’ rhetoric “ineredibly ambitious and incredibly activist.” Asa declaration of American strategy vis-A-vis the world, itis, Jervis believes, "the boldest public statement since 1947," when containment became policy and the Truman Doctrine committed the United States to intervene against communist insurgencies around the world, Like the Bush doctrine, containment was open-ended: alike the new doctrine. it was predicated on a network of alliances and multinational organizations, of which NATO was the most formidable. aio Bush now trades in alliances for acl hoc "coalitions." He makes a pass at disguising unilateralism as "a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the anion of our values and our national interests.” Interestingly, the doctrine retroactively downgrades the old threat, characterizing Soviet communism as "a generally status quo, risk-averse adversary." (If only Ronald Reagan had grasped that before he committed the country to the massive deficits of the 1980s.) Bush and his allies want their challenge to surpass afl previous challenges, their terain to extend beyond all previous terrains, The whole world is their turf. Now. some things are true everi if George W. Bush says them. Itis tre and important that Al Qaeda and its brethren arc: uncontainable and undeterrable. American power does sometimes serve a larger good--as it would in the Middle East, were Bush wise enough to ‘exert it on behalf of a two-state Israel/Palestine solution, But Al Qaeda is not the Bush doctrine's principal target, nor does it have more than a few words to spare about the Middle East. Terrorism is the occasion for what is really a doctrinal update. The National Security Strategy proclaims the virtue of a power extension--call it regime extension-that its authors have sought for years.\ __ This ehoutd bo a funny auote - o aGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO cP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NAW (Z War on Teryorism NATO involvement would give a key position against terrorist networks, Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 2003 (Gen, Wesly. “In the war on terorism, alliances ae not an ‘bstacle to vietory. Theyre the key toi. hiipi/iwwn rashingtonmonthly com eatures/200 1/0209 stark htmifbyline) NATO involvement would probably not have hastened ou sto in Ahan But had the Afghan camp wi Tbelie ave been in a ion to stay course in A\ estat the co rat, ‘As the president himself has warned, against far more than exclusiv. military actions. Indeed, as time goes on, the most important aspect of the war may be in Jaw enforcement ore judicial activities. Much of the t iraws support and r 1m within cou ‘Giiendly or allied with us. Terrorists residing in Westem Europe planned te September 11 attack, and the greatest concentration of their “sleeper cells” What ee ‘Middle East is probably in Europe, ‘Yet stag isa threat that the American military ean do litle to combat. ser alignment {udicial activities with our Sends and alliss ee ‘Breater cooperation in joint police ves sharing of evidence, harmonious evidentiary standards and procedures, as well as common definitions of crimes associated with terrorism. met ‘greater oe judicial, a re gecanaton, we. need to make the tional environment m wan it is fo terrorists . NATO support is key to fighting the war on terrorism, ; Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 2003 (Gen. Wesly. “In the war on terrorism, alliances are not an ‘batacle to vitory. They're the key toi. hi /wwor-washingtonmonthly.convfeatures/2001/0209 clark. html#byline) ghanistan campaign against the Taliban went well-an outcome that didn't surprise anyone Xv has al hone: oes conan ovr ties magni ous Bute cay sca ees have reinforced the conviction of some within the U.S. government that the continuing war against terrorism is best ‘waged outside the structures of international wnsttutions—that American leedership must be "unfettered" This is a fundamental misudement ‘The longer this war goes on-and by all accoums, it will go on for years-the more ill on the. willing cooperati ive Toot out teroistcells in Euope md ia-e-cut off funding and support of teroriss and to deal with Saddam Hussein and other threats. We are far more likely to gain the support we need by working through ternational institutions than outside of them. We've got a problem ere: Because the Bush ised to our allies through NATO, we are fighting the war ‘on terrorism with one hand tied behind our back. “Ge u ‘coh should be a funny quote 7 o .‘GD! 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NTO KZ WO" on Terrorivm Empirically proven, NATO is a vital role in counter terrorism, Bormann, Department of Politics, University of Neweastle Upon Tyne, 12/11/2001 (Natalie. “NATO Notes Interim Report.” hapl/www cosd.org/natonotes/notes39a htm) ‘Other issues were touched upon in the discussions, though closely linked to the main agenda points and witha lesser degree of significance, The Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council incorporated long-term adjustments to ‘more traditional NATO concems, in the context of a generally-accepted ‘new security environment’. Those issues included the importance of maintaining regional stability in the Balkans, whece NATO forces had ‘smashed” terrorist cells. In this context, the success of NATO-EU co-operation in the Balkans was viewed as vita, highlighting the accomplishments particularly in Macedonia, where joint action had led to the i ion of the peace 1 Last but not least, the issue of enlargement was again brought LUD. ‘The next round of enlargement, which was characterised by the General Secretary as an ‘ambitious agenda’, will be launched at the Prague Summit in Novertber 2002. But even this matter was viewed through the lens of (T~ September, and included remarks that many of the applicants, especialy in the Caucasus, might play a vita ‘tole in countering terrorism. NATO is the strongest form of solidarity against terrorism. Bormann, Department of Politics, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 12/11/2001 (Natalie. “NATO Notes Interim Report.” hip:/hvww.cesd.org/natonotes/notes39a,himm) Initially, Secretary General George Robertson predictably recalled NATO’s historic decision to inygke Article V, and added it was through this mechanism that the Allies pledged their strongest form of solidarity against terrorism.2 He gave the examples of deploying NATO's AWACS planes over US cities, ‘and making available logistical support such as ports, bases, and airspace 3 In response to criticism of the relatively lying political st s questions regarding Article V, especially in terms of how Jong exactly it would be applicable, Robertson dodged a direct reply by declaring it would be binding “until the 19 countries decide otherwise’. This follows Germany’s Mc Fischer who cardonically ‘pronounced that Article V would remain active as long as necessary. As tothe arguably vitel detail of what exactly ‘was deemed ‘necessary’, he expressed that it had not been discussed at that point in time, NATO has provided the largest practical contribution on the global campaign against terrorism. . Bormann, Department of Politics, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 12/11/2001 (Naialie, “NATO Notes Interim Report.” hnp://www.cesd, org/natonotes/notes39a.him) ‘Two issues took centre stage in NAC discussions; terrorism and the evolving NATO-Russia relationship, In his ‘opening statement, NATO Secretary General George Robertson highlighted NATO’s vital participation in it e attacks of The invocati cle V for the first time in th described as i ractical contribution i inst terror ation of an international c ‘especially ground-breaking co-operation with Russia, Wa’ Hliance’s % & be.‘GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P 7 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO KZ. dor on Tercorign —_ NATO provides intelligence that is key to preventing terrorism. :7 Bormann, Department of Politics, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 12/11/2001 (Natalie. “NATO Notes Interim Report.” hetpi/worw.cesd.onginatonotes/aotes39a, him) A recurring theme in the discussions was the long-term challenges for NATO in the global campaign prevention. Ministers instructed NATO international staff to begin elaborating on that theme for the Prague summit in Noveraber 2002, as Mr Robertson put it ‘new thinking needs to go along with new threats. There was & clear understanding that capabilities needed to be adapted, which does not imply just military hardware. Basie structures, such as different training for troops, also need to be modified. It was. agreed that it would be a Jong and complex task, in which AlJies would be ‘contribute and work on adet measures’. Yet, the nature of those measugs was not specified in great detail. Intelligence was statedaag the key, followed by tackling weapon of mass destruction and their proliferation, Preventing terrorism was scrutinised, while consolidating co-operation was considered to be the other side of the same coin, In particular co-operation with non-NATO members, the EU, as well as other Agencies was stressed, Frequent references were made to the successful NATO-EU collaboration in the Balkans, seemed to nera} consensus that of terrorism was real and " capabilities had \ced quickly and thoror NATO is key to solving the War on Terror and the WMD conflict. Bush, the president of the United States, 02 (George W., “The U.S. and NATO", Press conference.) {So as the President has said, it should be no surprise that so many NATO nations -- all the NATO nations -- are at the forefront of this war on terror. NATO is the kind oF alliance that you need, because when facing a fong-term strategic challenge, there's no Substitute for long-term strategic partners, partners that you can trust, and who trust you Its also the kind of alliance that works because when the going gets tough, the sheer «training, standards and structures are what welds different nations into an effective home. {Ws also the kind of alliance that lasts because it adapts and modernizes, as it will indeed do at our summit meeting in Prague, in November of this year ~- taking in new members, rising to new challenges, creating new capabilities to defeat new enemies and new threats, So, today, the President and dFScussed the common threats that we face, both in Europe and in North America, including from weapons of mass destruction. And NATO allies will work together to overcome these threats. And | say this t0 you, that we will sueceed because the record shows that NATO is an alliance that has served its members well in the past, is serving us well in the present, and as we continue to transform, will serve us well into the future \ = This should *29 farcry ateGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO AZ Wor Tercoriem 5 & NATO IS KEY TO A MULTILATERAL WAR ON TERROR Powell, 2004 (Colin L, the Secretary of State, “A Strategy of Partnerships.” Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb 2004, Vol. 83, Issue 1) ‘The common interest of all major powers in defeating terrorism is one source of a rue and remarkable opportunity: the United States’ chance to enjoy excellent relations with al the world's major powers simulcnieously, OF enuese, we hive a heud start in this, because we are blessed with many enduring friendships. None is more important than those enshrined in NATO. Some observers predicted that NATO would wither away after the Cold War, others that the United States and the European Union would even end up on a collision course, Neither prediction has, or will, come true. Not only has NATO survived, but both its membership and its mission have expanded. As for our relations with the EU, never has our common agenda been so large and mutually significant ~ from advancing free trade to joint efforts in counterproliferation. Itis true that we have had differences with some of our oldest and most valued NATO allies. But these are differences among friends. The transatlantic partnership is based so firmly on common interests and values that neither feuding personalities not occasional divergent perceptions can derail it. We have new friends and old friends alike in Europe. They are all, in the end, best friends, which is why the president continues to talk about Partnerships, not polarities, when he speaks about Europe. Some authorities say that we Must move to a multipolar world. We do not agree -- not because we do not value competition and diversity, but because there need be no poles among a farnily.of nations that shares basic values. We believe that itis wiser to work at overcoming differences than to polarize them further. a NATO COOPERATION IS ESSENTIAL TO-THE WAR ON TERRORISM Bush, the president of the United States. 02 (George W., “The U.S. and NATO”, Press conference.) - Since September the | Ith, NATO has been a bulwark in the fight against terror. On September the 12th, for the first time in history NATO invoked Article V, declaring an attack on one of its members is an attack on ail, NATO did so to show its strong support for the United States. And NATO nations are backing up those words with action. More than a dozen of our NATO allies are contributing forces to the war against terror in Afghanistan. NATO aircraft have been deployed to patrol our skies in support of America’s security. ‘And the airspace of NATO members has been critical to coalition air operations. The United States is deeply, deeply grateful for this support. > © This should bé'a twuny quotc. 5 y\ CONSULT NATO C/P GDI 2004 ~ — MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Texcorism [py Terrorists will acquire nuclear weapons if left unchecked, Hokshin and Alison, vrusrs for National Airs, 2002 (Grin and Andree New Containment.” National Affairs. Fall 2002. p. Un) nucle 10N from insiders or criminals, Nuclear ist in eight states: the United States, Russia, Great Brtsin, France, China, Israel, lia and Pakistan. Security measures, such as "perm designed to prevent unautherized use, are France and the United Kingdom. These safe; a8 well as, 5-India and Pakisten. ium and 26.6 metric tons of Hi ls by theft, illicit purchse or voluntary transfer from state steal or sell Just last fl, theo Jen ial ut were caught trying to do so. In one highly publicized case, i steal 18.5 kg (40.7 Ibs.) of HEL sites in Russia and a group of insiders ata , which would have been ¢ is “absolutely confident” struction of Soviet or Russian origin. considering the issue of "lost nukes." {s i possible thatthe United States or Soviet Union lost assembled Daten, Nespons? Atleast on the American side the evidence is clear 981, the U.S, Department of Defense published alist of32 accidents involving nuclear weapons, ‘many of which resulted in lost bombs, One caGDI 2004 ” CONSULT NATO CiP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR & ccrontsmM oy Nuclear terrorism will lead to a global nuclear conflict involving every nuclear state, and this will ultimately lead to planetary extinction. Beres, professor of political science at Purdue, 1987 (Louis Rene, professor also of int'l law, Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, p. 42-43) zw — Like Camas Caligula, who kills because "there's only one way of geting even with the gods . to be as cruel as they,” a number of terrorist groups could turn to nuclear weaponry as a promising new instrument of vengeance, Faced with such threats, governments would find it necessary to choreograph their ‘own macabre dances of death, mecting savagery with savagery in aquest for security that might reveal only ‘impotence, inthe wake of auch widespread dislocation, madness would be celebrated by al sides as the liberating ‘core of survival and sanity would dissolve into insignificance. tis not a pretty picture, The record of human history reveals not only the most extreme manifestations of deliberate evil, buFtso the most bizarre and inexplicable attraction to that evil, Living, as ‘we must, with both the memory and the expectation of holocaust, the "pornography of death” tht lies latentin the ‘prospect of nuclear terrorism carries not only the dark vision of cosmic disorder, but also the irit through successive ions of excessive Vi ‘Nuclear Terrorism and Nucleat War could even spark full-scale war betw . ld involve ent nflict possibilities rangin: lear a nuclear state to system wide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terorit nuclear assault against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example, consider the following example: Early in the 1990s, Israel and its Arab-state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral ‘Peace settlement. With the interests of Palestinians - as defined by the PLO - seem to have been left out, On the even Of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half'a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one-kiloton range ‘detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousands dead and maimed is matched only. dy the outery for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebation, whereupon Lebanese Shiite forces and Syria retaliate agains Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countri ‘the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, enario is draught with the maki ct How would the United States react to the situations in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is i i hain reaction of interstate nuct iet could ld involve the ven ev lear weapons state on the planet. ‘What exactly would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death, Only such a paradigm would allow us @ proper framework for absorbing the vision of scar-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible SONSequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, such a war would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations. ‘This stiould be a funny quoteGDI 2004 . CONSULT NATO C/P- MALUMPHY-PRIEUR T@rrorism Mpx Tv Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons - it is only a matter of time before we face nuclear terrorism. ‘Kokshin and Allison, writers for National Adis, 2002 (Grahan and Andrei, “The New Containment” National Affairs. Fall 2002. p. Vo) ‘There is no doubt that Osama bin Laden and his associates have serious nuclear ambitions. For ost a ey have bi ively seeking nucl: and, #s President Bush has noted, they would use against ited States or its allies "in a heartbeat in 2000, the CIA intercepted a message in which @ member of Al-Qaeda boasted of plans for a"Hiroshima” against America ‘According tothe Justice Department indfetment fr the L998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, “At various times from atleast as early as 1993, Osama bin Laden and others, known an unknown, made “oan tammy anarast‘CONSULT NATO Ci/P GDI 2004 “o MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO Ky fo futopean security NATO IS KEY TO EUROPEAN SECURITY Duffield, 94-95 (John S., Political Science Quarterly, Winter, 763) Above ail, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable inra-allance functions that the alliance has always ‘erformed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped stabltze Westem Europe, whose slates had often been bitter rvals in the past. By damping the security dilemma and providing an insttutonal mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO has. contributed to making the use of foros in retains among the countries of the region virally incon able, Inall those ways, NATO dlearly serves the interests of ts European members, But even the United States hae a slgnifcant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addillon to strong transatlantic lstoncal and cultural tes, American economic interests in Eurape-as a leading markel for U.S. products, as , 8 source of valuable Imports, and 2s the host for considerabla direct foreign invesiment by American, Hl ‘companies remain substantial, If history is any guide, moreover. the United Statas could easily be drawn into 2 future major war in Europe, the consequences of which would Ikely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons] In sum, athough NATO now lacks a single competting raison d'etre, as ithad ia the past the alliance Continues to parform a number of valuable security functions for Its members. As a result, all of the alles have found itn thelr interest to preserve NATO, notwithstanding differences in the importance they may attach to each of these purposes. The most significant ofthe allance's extemal and internal functions are described in the next Iwo sections.) NATO KEY TO EUROPEAN SECURITY Binnendijk and Kugler, 2004 (Hans and Richard. “Can NATO Survive Burope?” National Interest, 08849382, Spring 2004, Issue 75) “The first premise is that NATO continues to be of high value in serving the interests of both the United States and Enrope on the continent itself. By helping make the continent secure, NATO enables the-United States to address other dangerous regions without constantly looking over its shoulder in fear that Europe may unravel because itis preoccupied elsewhere. Meanwhile, Eucoje benefits fram NATO because Ameri defense commitments allow the continent to protect its security at a vastly lower expense than otherwise would be the case, Indeed, the amount of money that Europe saves each year roughly equals the EU's annual budget. The result is a long-standing, healthy transatlantic bargain that remains profitable for both sides. J ‘This should be x Sunny quote “ } “T.GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR _NA70_Key to Loropean Seeuei A A—E TO eto eon Secveity _— lo NATO IS KEY TO A SECURE AND STABLE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ‘Hunter, Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, U.S, Permanent Representative on the Noth Adlantic Council (1993-1998), principal architect of the “New NATO”, key leader on the North, Atlantic Council, Vice President for Intemational Politics, and Directot of Europeaa Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; 2002, {Robert E,, The European Securitv-and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?) . Tistou 138, nner rund one ga in nae th wo abl decopeante wuoiaed oti nae eS ‘ined a purpose following the end of the cold war—to paraphrase Volaie on God itNat0 dia matcu swosldoenmeentein, <= venti and te Europes Sua sana oe intont eres, ou ntaibing eset tember and win abs ee ee mang drove emerged fom crenata Bho NATO's case te ws already becoming clear that retaining te al liance and its apparatus was necessary lo achieve important post- cold war purposes—ensuring that the United States would remain engaged strategically on the European continent; preserving the best of the alliance’s past, including its integrated imilitary command structure; reaching out to the newly sovereign states of Central Europe: and helping to shape Russia's future, potentially the most consequential, long-term imponderable on the continent. To fulfil its varius purposes, during the 1890s, NATO embarked on a series of Interlocking efforts, each designed to pravide some aspect of an overall concept of security, devoted, at heart, to pursuit of the Historically unprecedented chance of creating-in the words of President George H.W. Bush—a Europe “whole and free." Thus in a series of eight inidatives, NATO began taking in new members and kept the door open to others; invented the Partnership lor Peace and created the-Buro-Atlantic Partnership Council signed a Founding ‘Act with Russia and a Charter with Ukraine: revamped its command arrangements; and, at the same time, saw wisdom in developing 2 ‘ew relationship with the key manifestation of the old "European pillar"—the Western European Union (WEU)? } NATO IS KEY TO PREVENTING CONFLICTS IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE Duffield, 94-95 (John S., Political ‘Science Quarterly, Winter, 763) roa teeny a memento qr a oe ME sr era mo, crane neta a ae enna Sting nthe rt lace by coving to he proves fostering sy nh farmer Seve ae, os This should be a fanny ete 1 \‘GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P matuwpy-pricur NATO Key to Evtoreen Security NATO IS KEY TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND STABILITY i itative on the -, Senior Advisor at the. RAND Corporation, U.S. Permanest ‘Represent h Hane, fentfe Connell (1993-1958), principal acter of te "New: NATO", key caer on the North Atlantic: ‘Council, Vice President for’ Intemational Politics, o reine of nre'Stadies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Winter 2000, (Robert B,, Washington Quarterly, p- 115) “This common Central European perspective ~ which rapidly came to include a number of countries that ‘of the Soviet Union — immediately introduced the factor of Russia. in had emerged from the wreck rations the 1290s ware not abstractions in the post-Cold Warworld but Central Europe, security cons rallies derived from historic experience, Even though, as ine decade progressed, became apparent patron Europe was ale much ss wl, io pose rou aval foto any Gaal rapean state, Russia remained a loorning presence, a geopolitical realy, and the perceived “successor state" fo the Soviet Union, in terms of size, position, and potential ambition as much as in intornationsl Jegal form, For most Central European states, therefore, jlning the West, and mors particulary NATO, was nat ust a means af bringing to an end the recurring uncertainties that had produced so much soffering a Russian future, Likewise, becoming associated with NATO, and theraby gaining the mostdesired U.S. ‘connection, was net just about a community of values but aiso abaut tangible guaranlees against @ ‘possi reemergence of Russian Impertalisrn, however Uniikety or far inthe future. ) NATO IS KEY TO BALKANS Rizzo, 2001 Aion TABILIZATION tragedy In the twentieth cantury, but also of gaining assurances against the vagaries of the 95 To a the Deputy : Good News Story.” Depiity Secretary General of NATO. “The State of the Alliance — A +So, throughout the NATO has been inst Bosnia te Alliance nt only played a crucial rol wih al noes ze eng oe Bie vital role in topping and then reversing hectic. ° ite, de emstnal om ee {oven so ja to win, And while NATO has, conan vs ecsnt ‘any ilosevie egime, ics now working ver more close new democratic government in Belgrade - ‘Opment completely unimaginable even half a year 2507 This saowld ‘ov a funny quev:GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MacumPHy-PRIEUR NAfo Key fo Luro reas Security G NATO IS KEY TO BALKAN STABILIZATION Rizzo, 2001, (Minuto, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. “The State of the Alliance — A Good News Story.” http://www ato. int/docu/speech/2001/s010330a htm) “There are reasons for hope. Governments throughout the Balkans region believe in the same basic principles: democracy; peaceful resolution of disputes; and cooperation to address common challenges. Cooperative regional initiatives, are now in place, and delivering Tesults: better trust and oe confidence, and practical problem solving. And iraportantly, the international community is fully engaged in the region, with NATO making a real difference. So, all in all, not only the current situation in the Balkans, but also the prospects for further positive change, are much better than they seem at first sight] NATO IS KEY TO BALKAN STABILIZATION Rizzo, 2001. (Minuto, the i Rizzo, 2001 Qin ute. the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. “The State of the Alliance — A NATO's second priority in the Balkans is to continue our efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to the Presevo Valley. We must build on the cease-fire that exists there, and consolidate it into lasting peace. For this to happen, the insurgents in the area must continue to refrain from using force - to carry out their goals. Equally, the Yugoslav forces in the area must continue to show the restraint they have displayed over the last several weeks. 7] St ‘Pils should be a funny quatefoes Sal Wwe tS Console ete Ete patd Wares [Meact —_~ Cucerer! ews Velo Wae i However, although the Glaser '93 (Charles, intemational Security, Summer, p. 8:9) bo Suclea — CaacwnsGDI 2004 MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ NATO) + 1s $0! _ CONSULT NATO C/P \ vio “Bal whe) T TRANS-ATLANTIC COOPERATION IS KEY TO PREVENTING A BALKAN WAR BRZEZINSKI, former national security advisor to the president, 2004 (Zbigniew Brzezinski “Hegernonic Quicksand,” National Interest, 08649382, Winter 2003/2004 Isue 74 database: Academic Search Premier p. online) [Citimately. America can look to only one genuine pariner in coping with the Global Mafkane: Europe. Although it will need the heip of leading East Asian states like Japan and China--and Japan will provide some, though limited, material assistance and some peacekeeping forces--neither is likely at this stage t0 become heavily engaged. Only Brrope, increasingly organized as the European Union and etary integrated through NATO" has the potential capability inthe political, military and economic realms co pursue Jointly with America the fask of engaging the various Eurasian peoples--o dn Uifferentiated and flexible basis~in the promotion of regional stability and of » progressively widening trns-Eurasian cooperation. And a supranation®) European Union linked to America would ‘be less suspect in the region as a returning colonialist bent on consolidating o regaining its special economic interests [America and Burape together represent an array of physical and experiential assets Wi'h the capability to make the decisive difference in shaping the pofitical future of the Global ethane. ‘The question is whether Europe-largely preoccupied withthe shaping oF is avn unity-vll ave the will and the generosity to become truly engaged with “America iia joint effort that will dwart in complexity and seale the entier, successtyt oi aac eBuropean effort o preserve peace in Europe and then end Europe's division TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE KEY TO SOLVE BALKAN WAR Brvevinsll 2003 (Zoigniew, US. National Security Adviser, Tae National Interest Wistet 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) . “ome EFFORT to stabilize the Global Bekans wit lst severat decades, At best, regress wil be incremental, Tresnatstont, and wsnerable to major riversas. Il be sustalned ony Wthe.two mest success] sectors trove gbe-the pomally moblized America andthe eccnemially wnfying Euope-treat kt Increasingly se shored responsibly nthe face ef a common sécury threat. One should not force that strugaiog lone makes the qulcksand only more dangerous."? ~ ‘This shouie be a tunny (07GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP { MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Ballon War Dapachs —_— L ESCALATING BALKAN VIOLENCE ENSURES WORLD WAR Ill COLLAPSING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, INCREASING THE RISK OF ROGUE PROLIFERATION, AND PUTTING AMERICA ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE WORLD OF ISLAM BRZEZINSKI, former national security advisor to president Clinton, 2004 [Zbigniew, “Hegemonie Quicksand’, National interest, Winter 2003/2004, iss 74] Fi next several decades ul ion of the, areca Te erosive potential to once the world into chaos. be the. 4 Grucial swat ‘urasia between Europe and the Far East. Heavily inhabited by Muslims, we migi im this crucial subregion of Eurasia the new “Global Balkans."( ‘8D Tis here At the outset, il is essential to recognize that the ferment within the Muslim world must be viewed lobal nerspective, and thro gical prism. The world of ited, both politically . politically unstable and militarily weak, and likely to remain so for some time. lity. foward the United States, while pervasive in some Muslim countries, originates more trom specific poTTCal_ ‘ShevanCES=SUCH AS Tranian nationalist resentment over the U.S. backing of the Shah, Arab animus ‘Simulated by U.S. support for Israel or Pakistani feelings that the United States has been partial to India-~ than from a generalized religious bias. Europe, A strategically critical frontfine o ‘maximum danger, with the dally possibility that a clash in Berlin could unleash a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the United States recognized the stakes involved and committed itself to the defense. pacification, reconstruction and revitalization of a viable European community. In doing $0, ‘America gained natural allies with shared values. Following the end of the Cold War, the United Stales led the transformation of NATO from a defense alliance into an enlarging security alliance-gaining an enthusiastic new ally, Poland~and it has supported the expansion of the European Union (EU). For at least a generation, the major task facing to promote global security will be the pacification and then HeTo afr concent fensity violence. But the regio also coMmams most of the world’s off and natural gas. In 2002, the area gr ‘contained 68 percent of the proven oil 8 and 41 percent of ‘si gaint fra rit BEECD Be 5009 IORATCACA Heng ig VEAAD rant Te me ‘This showd be @ funny quote |. 74 3MALUMP CONSULT NATO ¢. MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Batken War Tm pad LT NATO CIP -Z_ —_ vw the world's proven natural gas reserves; it accounted for 32 percent of world oil production and 15 percent of ‘world natural gas production. In 2020, the area is projected to produce roughly 42 milion barrels of oll per day--39 percent of the global production total (107.8 million barrels per day). Three key regions~Europe, the United States and the Far East-collectively are projected to consume 60 percent of that global production (16 percent, 25 percent and 19 percent, respectively). ‘The combination of oil and volatility gives the United States no choice. America faces an awesome challenge in helping to sustain some degree of stability among precarious states inhabited by Increasingly politically restless, socially aroused and religiously inflamed peoples. It must undertake an even more daunting enterprise than it did In Europe more than half a century ago, given a terrain that is culturally alien, politically turbulent and ethnically complex. oo In the past, this remote region could have been left to its own devices. Until the middle of the tury, Most of twas cornmnated by Imperial and colonial powers. Today, to ignore its problems and underestimat its 7a fuption would be tantarma wing a open season for intensifying regional violence, Soe COraPaTSn oy eons UTE ATT he CATPSMIVE FTONSSTET Ore SOUS AAT Te Cor prolTeralion of weaponry Tass destruction. ‘The United States thus faces a task of monumental scope and complexity. There are no self-evident ~ answers to such basic questions as how and with whom America should be engaged ir in helping to stabilize the area, pacify it and eventually cooperatively organize it. Past remedies tested in Europe~like the Marshall Plan or NATO, bath of which exploited an underlying transatlantic political-cultura! solidarity—do not quite fit a region still rent by historical hatreds and cultural diversity, Nationalism in the region is still at ~ an earlier and more emotional stage than it was in warwe3ty Europe (exhausted by two massive European Givil wars fought within just Three us passions reminiscent of Europe's Catholic-Protestant forty-year war of alm reenturies ag0- ————E—=~—F—T_—__ ec — evr oS go ‘Fluis should be a funny quote aanIn discussions of the democratic peace, tao litte is made of the fact that stable democracies do nat fall apart, GDI 2004 : CONSULT NATO C/P \ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO, Key fo Demarracy Drenn 4 - — NATO IS KEY TO INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Reiter, 01-02 (Dan, Prof of Political Science at Emory, International “ Security, Winter, 221) NATO enlargement may not spread democracy, but itis perfectly plausible that membership woutd ~ strengthen it. Beyond that, enlargement can promote reform (especialy inthe mailtary), contribute to regional poftical order, and co-opt younger generations into Western norms and perspectives. Enlargement ‘ll ental costs, inctuding added burdens to struggling economies and governing and oneratiag headaches for NATO. But some things are worth paying for. Reiter is correct to fecus on the larger Issue of NATO's contribution to democratic stability and order in the region, but he focuses too much on craating democracy and too little on maintaining It and establishing a zone of peace. He is right to be conceM@d about Russia but wrong in falling to see that a zone of peste ts Just what is needed to avoid issues that pit Russia and the West against each other, In discussions of the democratic peace, tno little s made of the fact that stable democracies do not falt apart, and therefore do not create the occasions for iocal contilcts that broaden to involve others In war. That is the prize that NATQ enlargement may win. Finally, NATO itself has evolved. Always to some degree a “security management Institution *n$ It has become almost wholly that, with litte left ofits collective defense mission. Even earty on, that security management function served to assist and control one ofits own members (West Germany). Bringing ppotentiat problem countries in is likely to be more successful (and less costly) than going “out of area,” as NATO has lately felt compelled to dd in Bosnia and Kosovo, Enlargement is the logical next step in managing security and the fogical commitment to make to keep the United States trom abandoning its security interests In the region. What once seemed distant wil aapear ever closer, Perhaps in tts future interventions, NATO. wll show up on time. A STRONG NATO IS CRITICAL TO THE STABILITY OF FLEDGLING DEMOCRACIES Reiter, 01-02 (Dan, Prof of Political Science at Emory, International: Security, Winter, 221) NATO enlargement may oot spread democracy, but itis prec plus tha members ; ould szregthen Beyond that, enlargement ean promats [fern aspecaly ite ikon) cocoa to ‘ ‘rin pls ogre era Yasoe ateratans no Wes oe nd payee, Erceene inang ade buen to srg ng bd operatg reaches : wiles con nding aes bres tosewagng ecnemtes and govern on oe henche er fcr correc to focus onthe ager sue of NATO's contrbutlon to democrat sabiy and ade nthe reson, bu ne Tosses too much an rating democragy and tesla ou mananiee raed leh ~ zane of peace Hes right to be concerned about Russia aut wrong infllng to ace tt na 4st whats neeced vo avol issues tat pt Russia andthe West apmnt aacn etna oT" Peao® 8 and therefore do not create the occasions for ve Kee are argon crete te ects oneal os tat broaden inv Dter war Tat BE i Finally, NATO itself has evolved. Aways to some degre a “tecurty ma Instaton 8 nas Become aioat wholly that, with itl let o is collective defense sim, Svan cary ont tat secur ‘management function served to assist and control one of its own members (West Germany). Bringing. Botonta problem enuntis ins fey to be more success (and less Coa) thn going “ot of ee” 28 NATO nas inely fet competed to don Soria and Kesov. alargerent fhe open ext step nonegia secure and te togcl commitment to make to Keep the United Stas fart sbaraoning ts secur heroes inte regen. wnat once ceemed stant wil appear ever ser Perhaps mts huture nrerventions, MATO a ee will show up on time, |GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P \ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR NATO Keu tn 0 S —Tuvrey Relanans —_— \ NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO US-TURKEY RELATIONS Brzezinski 2003 (Zbigniew, U.S, National Security Adviser, The National Interest Winter 2003, Hegemonic Quicksand) : “Zinkey has been America's aly for haifa century. It eamaa America's trust and gratitude by Rs direct ‘Barvctpation in the Korean War. It has proven'te be NATO's solid and reliable southern anchor. With the fall of tne Soviet Union, it became actve in helping both Georgia and Azerbalian consolidate thelr new Independence, ard it energetcally promoted itself as a relevant model of poltical development and soc ‘modernization for those Central Aslan states whose people largely fll within the radius oF the Turkic uttural and tngustc traditlons, tn that respect, Turkey's slgnifcant strategie rol has been complementary to America's poley of relnforcing te new Independence ef the region's ast-Sovlet states. >GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ L).9, (oid Arsh J CES wal) U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE CAUSES SECURITY COMPETITION AND WAR ‘Mearsheimer 2001 (John J., Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, Foreign Affairs September/October, The Future of the America Pacifier) Without the American pacifier, Europe is not quaranteed to remain peaceful. Indeed, intense security “competition among the great powers would likely ensue because, upon American withdrawal, Europe would from benign bipolarity to unbalanced multipolanty, the most dangerous kind of power structure. The nited Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany would have to buld up their own military forces and provide for heir own secunty, In effect, they would all become great powers, making Europe multipolar and raising the ‘ever-present possibility that they might fight among themselves. And Germany would probably become ‘potential hegemon and thus the main source of warry. Looking at Europe today, such a forecast might appear far-fetched, but that Is because few are prepared to consider how radically the European security environment will be transformed by the witndrawal of U.S. ‘troops. Once the major European powers are forced to provide for thelr own defense, suspicions among them are certain to grow, thereby triggering the familar dynamics of great-power compatition. "The kind of trouble that might le ahead for Europe can be illustrated by considering how particular German -meosures aimed 2t enhancing its security might nevertheless lead to instability. Ifthe Unlted States removed Its security umbretia from over western Europe, Germany would likely move to acquire its own nuclear ‘arsenal. This would be the case both because nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent, as Germany's governing elites recognized during the Cold War, but also because ft would be the best way fo escape otential coercion by its three nuclear-armed neighbors. During the proliferation procass, however, these neighbors would probably contemplate using force to prevent Germany from going nuclear, and the cesult ‘ould be & major crisis. e ‘Without the American miltory on its territory, furthermore, Germany would probably increase the size ofits army and certainly would a2 more inclined to try to dominate-central Europe, Why? Because Germany would feer Russian control ofthat cntically important buffer zone between them. Of course, Russia would have the same fear in reverse, which would likely lead to a serous security compatition between them for control of Central Europe. France, meanwhile, would undoubtedly view such behavior by Germany with alarm and take Measures to protect itself ~- for example, by Increasing its defense spending and establishing closer relations with Russia. Germany, of course, would perceive these actions as hostile and respond with measures ofits! own. > . U.S. WITHDRAWAL GUARANTEES GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT | Mearsheimer 2001 ohn J., Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, Foreign Affairs September/October, The Future of the America Pacifier) FIVE EUROPEAN STATES now have sulficent wealth and population to qualify as potenti grat powers: the | United Kingdom, France, Germany, tay, and Masse. Of tnese, Rowers amy Germany as the sonar oF g Potentslhegeinon. t's the weakest European sate, has be second-largest populton (ater Russ), “End has the most powerfil army in the region. Neverthaless, Germany 15 not a great power today, much tess {potential hageron, because has no muclar weapons of Rs on aa because lt heey depeaent the Untea States forts security. American troope were pulled ou of Europe, however, end Germany Became responsibie for is own defense, R youl probebly acnure hs own ncesr arsenal and ncoare the (TU) shee of ks army, tansterming tse inte something mutans trmsie. ¢GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_Cenu ine Consultation \c@y GENUINE CONSUL’ SHE ALLS NSULTATION IS THE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE THE NATURE OF Sloan ‘97 (Stanley R, The Christian Science Monitor Boston MA, us ladusti SL Sine 1 Manager of Venus Industries ‘ut the administration's approach to pre-summit consultations created some serious frictions in the alllance, ‘and troubled even those allies who strongly supported the administration's goals. Now, as NATO enters the ‘ertical process af negotiating and ratifying the enlargement decislons taken in Madd, the Clinton administration hasan opportunity to reflect on the leadership eye most Hk to achieve R& policy gals in the months ahead. : ‘The issues facing the United States and Its allies are not trivial. Allied leaders in Madrid rallied together to ‘produce @ "successful" outcome, lnvieMig the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland ta join NATO, leaving the doar open for other qualified candidates, and noting their continuing efforts to build a “new NATO.” ‘But the real success of Madrid will be measured by subsequent events. The debate in the United States ‘Senate on the candidates nominated for NATO membership will ikely be an intense discussion of the ‘American rola In Europe and in the post-cold-war world. President Clinton apparently sees the outcome as ‘eritical to his place in history. The stakes are high. Tt ls not surprising that administration officials are focused ‘on ensuring that i all comes out right. On the other side of the Atlantic, challenging economic circumstances and weakened political consensus In many continental nations are making fife difcult, The US economlc model is admired but not seen 2s universally applicable to European circumstances, This fact was made clear by several European leaders following the "G-B* economic summit in Denver, at which the president had clear bragging rights based on, ‘current US economic success. In spite of tough times, European Union (EU) leaders would like to move ahead with deepening the Union through the formation of a European Monetary Union. They claim to support enlarging the EU to bring In new democracies from Eastern end Central Europe. Sut doing both in the next several years will be dificult at a time when economic margins are so stim and domestic political support notably fraglle. The summit of EU leaders In Amsterdam last month clearly put Eurapean weaknesses on display. {t's not easy Belng No. 1 Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton administration revealed its cholce of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a strong propanent of Including Romania and Stovenia, was not sur 1 Uni a Incuing Roman ana surprised thatthe United States and several other alles woul only But the fact tht the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations makin fs choice cer, and then sad its deciion was non-negotlable, troubled even our loses alles: r=? strengthened the hand of those in Europe who calm thatthe United States fe acing lea "hegemonic® Bower, using ts impressive position of strength to have ls way with weaker Evrepeen alles, One aida of 2 pro-American northern European country that suppor the package of three told me, “We liked the present 0 but were troubled by the way it was wrapped.” ‘US oma say that they wanted to kee the l6Sue within Silanes Consultations but tht thelr postion w being lead tothe press by other alles. They desided to put an en to “lobbying” for other outcomes, Their ‘hole tog strong ang fo ge pubic ay be undertandble and sven defensible, However, te femocratc states probably needs to set th example consultative process if it wants other soverelgn states | 0 follow eF the very bast inthe roms ut ions 1 ol oe te eae "xn ne Zeenat tc se tes Ud earn OIat cath het sec Pots mg ft tn cena ay races But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. ° npsee ve een, Upon ae wl haven ee seedy 25 Sera 2 ern, rns i me ee ha sey 25 spatGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP mS MALUMPHY-PRIEUR — a PRIOR NATO CONSULTATION IS ESSENTIAL TO SOLVING TERRORISM Hloyar, president of the ELDER party 9/1/2002 (Werner. “Press Release.” hit lbeal -democrat.com/module/printnews.cim/article.2338) In view of the Terrorist-Attack on the United States, NATO acknowledged that jt was an att in conformity with Art. 5 of the ‘Washington-Treaty, This declaration from October 4th, appears to be all that NATO is prepared to contribute to the great struggle against Terrorism, The structures of NATO, hich were iniily created to cope with prestely such cases of cornmon defence, ae not being activated at all, Equally unimpressive isthe contibtfOW ofthe EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy. ‘What the US has instead done, is to build a coalition under their command through bilateral arrangements with individual NATO and U-members, and nobody seems to be consulting NATO ‘ANyMore. That the State, with both the highest risk and the biggest contribution at stake, should claim the Jeading role is most estimate. To keep the Alles totally out of the decision-makine-process though, ‘would be most unusual and also unwise in the long-run, Not taking advantage of the well established and ‘most reliable political and above all military structures of NATO is a missed opportunity for more efficiency, transparency and ultimately acceptance. ext of the Report of the Committee of three on Non-military Cooperation in NATO, Brussels, December 13, 1956, HYPERLINK “http://www nato int/docu/basictxt/b561213a.htm" C. Preparation for Political Consultation 55. Effective consultation also requires careful lanning and preparation of Political questions coming up for-discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed: so that representatives may Nave background information on the: thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion, Additional preparatory work will also be require the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding se. ion.GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR \Jefo over key Binding agreements ensure economic and political stability. , \ G. John Ikenberry, professor of geopolitics at Georgetown University, 2001 (America Untivaled, Comell University Press, pg. 228) Fane pence or bal constrain aly mates sen anPRaonal Sons tenes an ave au indepevden orceing pact on het) Sous efoate: The smmpsonis hac nsenatonrare eX eat they can {akc ona ie and lgie of their ow, shaping and consocning even he sas that crete them, When saize employ instcatonal binding 2s Seutegy, they re esendaly agreeing totaly conse tewseece “ection pecy what tS ton sates ae expected foo a make ditt and easy for nats to do merwice® Biting mecha nla include weades, interlocking rgmncaiona joe managencnt re Sponsblice, agreed opon seayards and prince of rlons, and oo. iBeah Theve mechanism rise he "cons Se exe sid cess oles op portnizes” thereby providing mechanisms to mlgte ar resolve oe een “The Bretton Woods economie and monetary accords exhibit he lg ofinaitstona lock, These were the eet accents to eal spon, nent intecradonalinsiestonal and legal Bnmework to enaire cece ceoperaion bemen stirs, They wee conuted ty caberte oles trues and obigadone with quasijucical procedures for najueatng Ghopoes In aoc the Western goveramen erated an ray Of fane tonallyergaized wansnatonal poltca antmn, Moreove Ue demo. Grade characte ofthe United aes an theater Western counueree ‘Sted the consouston of thee’ denve itewate connections, The permeabity of domes insraions provided congenial grounds for te posal and purl -puling and Moving” aos the anced indo gawon, VETO POWER KEY BINDING AGREEMENTS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE ALLIED SUPPORT G. John Ikenberry, professor of geopolit ° “ ‘> ‘geopolitics at Georgetown Universit , 2001 America Unrivaled, Comell University Press, pg. 230) = . “Lhis scould he 9 funny cucteEye ZN — Lebts Syereneies THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IS A LEAKY FAUCET - POURING OUT KEY NATIONAL ‘SECURITY INFORMATION LIKE IT WAS CANDY SALON.COM _2004 (Mark Folman, “A spook speaks out’, July 13, p. lexis) ‘Uke Thoms Powers, Jamea Samiord Seymour Harsh and many the expat, Schauer charges tat ion hi oliticized intelligence to an unpreceder -- and done inealcul: He points to the flood of I io the public: "I can. ‘confidence that the most damaging leaks about al Qaeda come from the FBI, the Department of Defense and the White House. A reliable rule of thumb is that the federal agencies who have done least to protect America from al Qaeda leak the most to take credit for others’ work and disquise their years of AGDI 2004 of CON: MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Risk of leaks high Commaaicnti Newnan cr \ COMMUNICATION MONITORING ENSURES LEAKS WILL GET OUT National Post, 2000 + (Goodspeed, “The New Space Invaders” C1 HYPERLINK “http: vw converge. org.nfpmalsismor wv ‘A former employee of Canada's security agency has charged that Canadian spies oats thanaged to overhear the American ambassador to ‘Canada discussing @ pending trade deal with China on a mobitexelephone and used ‘that information to undercut the ‘Americans in landing a $2.5-billion Chinese grain safe, oo For decades they were guardians -- mysterious warriors who straddled the globe searching for secrets that would prevent a nucTear holocaust, But now she neve rechnolozy of the post-Cold War world has suddenly transformed the West's leading spymasters into sinister shadows manipulating a massive surveillance system that can capture and study every telephone call, fax al e-mail message sent anywhere in the world.) THE RISK OF LEAKS |S HIGH, DIPLOMATS ABU J Tee OGY SE SURVEILLANCE National Post, 2000 (Goodspeed, “The New Space Livaders” 0 HYPERLINK "pttp://ww converge.org.niz/pma/sismore btm" LE “It should hardly be surprising that Echelon ends up being used by elected and bureaucratic officials to their political advantage or by the intelligence agencies themselves for the purpose of sustaining their privileged powers and bloated budgets,” says Mr. Poole. "The availability of such invasive echnology practically begs for abuse Ontawa burenucrat Claude Hisson, the commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment, is charged with investigating any complaints into CSE operations. In his most recent annual report, he admits that, on occasion, our spies intercept private Tanversations, But he insists there is nothing to worry about. "The sophistication of CSb's technology has led to speculation about the organization's capability to intercept thie communications of Canadians,” Mr. Hisson says. “7 : |, CTPThis shonld be a funny suote “5GDI 2004 CONSULT NA’ MALUMPHY-PRIEUR, TO GIP AT: Normal seans = consuttetion Consultation is not normal means, it has not been as developed to meet the political changes and world trends. NATO, 2000 ("Non-Military Cooperation.” http://www nato.invdocu/basictxt/bt-a3.htm) ‘These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO We Must also, i e practic i developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends, The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. ‘There is 2 pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part ‘of the making of national policy, Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be ini ‘The US has abandoned NATO consultation. Sloan, Senior Specialist im Intemational Security Policy, 1997 (Stanly. “Transatlantic relations: Stormy weather (on the way to enlargement?” httpi/ww.nato.invdocu/review/1997/9705-05.htm) But the fact thet the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations to make its choice clear, and then said its decision was non-negotiable, troubled even the closest allies of : Unit It strengthened nd, in Europe who claim 1 Unit is q i ition of si using its to have its wayGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ Russia NATO relodoas Hiah, —_— ern z RUSSIA AND NATO ARE WORKING. TOGETHER ON MANY FRONTS NOW fogov, and Oli RAND Group Rapporteur) N, Russia: Bridge Buildin, 1 Cen "As part of evolving cooperation, it is also important to take into account actions. of a bilateral or multinational aature undertaken by NATO, by NATO countries, or by the Russian Federation thatcould have an impact on the interests and concerns of otliet pasties. For example, in the recent past, both NATO and Russia have carried out military + exereises based on notional scenarios that seemed to suggest that the two were adversaries, rather than partners if not also ftiends. One approach would be to arrange for 8 larger Russian role in NATO exercise planaing (rather than only being invited to observe NATO exercises), and vice versa. In general, an improved and more effective NATO-Russia relationship is crucial not just to accomy in regard to threats emanating from Enrope, but also to freeing Russia from the remains of a Cold War mentality. ‘Whether this is ac ‘through structural changes in NATO or simply through increased cooperation, the further diminishing of Russian perceptions of NATO asa military threat will enable Russian planners to ‘from worst-case scenarios SaaS a Se eae na Het and anges pases & ict with NATO states to more of conflicts that Russia amy;fa tact, fice in the future, |» NATO-Russian relations are now high. Lord Robertson, 200 (Secretary General Lord Robertson. “Promoting Peace through Partnership.” http-//ww inews/press/010324nato hi a We had hoped that the special relationship that had existed between NATO and Russi since 1997 would have at lest allowed Russia to remain on speaking terms. ‘Instead, Russia froze its relations with the Alliance Luckily this episode is behind us now. Tuc NATO-Russia relationship is once again back on track. Russian forces work together effectively with NATO forces in the Balkans, Our Joint Couneilis again meeting regularly to dacuss common security concems and to steer practical cooperation on a wide array of issues. And ‘here is a general feeling on both sides that we should deepen our relations furtherGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR_ Russia- NATO celetions Aiah ———EEOeee Toons NGS NATO-Russian relations are good. ah — — Grossman, 2002 (Mac, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, NATO. April 15, 2002. btp://nato usmission gov/ambassador%5Cs150402,html) C A- Let me see if I can explain this as clearly as I can. First, on Friday, in the United States, our White House Spokesman said that the United States would support a summit in May between NATO and Russia. There is of course a NATO decision to be made, and in fact right now the Council is discussing this. So I would have to leave announcements of that to NATO. On the other part of your question, which is where do we stand in the negotiations between NATO and Russia, I think we are making good Progress, and I believe the NATO Foreign Ministers will be able to meet the promise they made to themselves to be able to announce some kind of new relationship between Russia and NATO at the summit meeting in May in Reykjavik. 3GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR s RUSSIA “NAW felekions Digic > NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ARE HIGH—RUSSIA WILL NOT FEEL ENCIRCLED Rizzo, 2001, (Minuto, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO. “The State of the Alliance ~ A. Good News Story.” ht i i Also, much better than one is led to believe is NATO's relationship with Russia. True, in the almost four years since the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the NATO-Russia relationship has seen many twists and turns, with Kosovo as the most obvious low point. I do not need to remind you that NATO-and Russia had serious oo disagreements over Kosovo, up to the point where Russia suspended its formal cooperation with the Alliance. But Russia was of course never completely out of the picture. It was ultimately instrumental in achieving a settlement, And it is crucial now in NATO's and other international efforts to restore peace and stability in the region, So the Kosovo ‘experience has demonstrated that, if there is to be true and lasting security in Europe, Russia and NATO must work together, and build a solid relationship. 4 RUSSIAN-NATO COOPERATION IS HIGH IN THE STATUS QUO Hates, Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, U.S, Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (1993-1998), principal architect of the ‘New NATO" key leader thin seats ee eta Seige lense be Sed weer sehen oa Peasy fib orm reson ey ae one ais er cats ere | The Founding Act was written more from the NATO then the Russian : 58 nal Ruslan concoct came le aro mons tre Wastes Maen ea NATO decided to take In three new members from Central Europe and also dectared an “open doar” for | ! both cases of concession, the alles merely restated, without negotiation, policies already In effect to ‘keep nuciear weapons out of new alied states and to rafaln, In general, nem deploying major 2 Sopventonal foveas there. The fact that hes ware ‘unaterst NATO statement was Imporiantto many upgrie “ogists” in new alia states, tus making possible the reception of NATO forces Ina cela, But i h Sion one " appear to Congress tobe sh, |GDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P XN MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Russia does not fear SATO _ 3 RUSSIA AND NATO WILL INEVITABLY COOPERATE DUE TO SIMILAR GEO- STRATEGIC CONCERNS Hun ov, and ‘(Robert E. is a Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (1993-1998); Sergey, Director, Russian’ Academy of Sciences; Olga, RAND Group Rapporteur) NATO and Russia: Bridge Bullding for the 21" Century, t, and, specifically, ‘opened way a and NATO, Our common task is... ionship right this time: to devise and implement new mechanisms for ‘consultation, joint decisions, and coordinated action, his similar challenges to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as continued dangers posed by {instability in regions of concer to them both, NATO must continue to adaptto niect | these threats. In doing so, if recognizes that its efforts to deal effectively with 2Ist- | century threats will be far more successful if they are accorapanied by closer cooperation | with Russia. NATO and Pussiatoday share similar perceptions of both threats and_ ‘opportunities on several levels, and there are a number of areas in which they can work effectively together, Therefore, it is in their mutual i that NATO and. adn nae relationship based on a genuine partnership that can help to provide | Tasting seourit forall nations in Eurasia and tat en asin Russo's TERUG Ge 1 ‘iaily of democratic, market-oriented nations. NATO-Russian relations should be guided | ‘by the need To oppose comune threats in pret ceiending the values of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. NATO EXPANSION IS NOT SEEN AS A THREAT IN RUSSIA Deutsche Presse- Agentur ‘(April 8, 2004) cote “NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer met Russian President Viadimir Putin in the Kremlin ‘Thufsday to discuss Moscow's concerns at the eastward expansion of thé miltary-aliance. "We hope that the enlargement of the alliance wil help bulld trust in Europe and in the world, and will be an element and lnstrument for reinforcing international security," Putin said at the start ofthe meeting. The talks were _#xpected to focus on Russia's relations with NATO after It Incorporated seven former Sovlet bloc countrles a ‘new members last week. De Hoop Scheffer was on his first visit to Russia since becoming head of the afllance inJanuary. His predecessor, George Robertson came six times as NATO and Russia sought to overcome “disagreements over the Kosovo conflict and improve overall cooperation In the post-Cold War era. gaie miley er aia Hautes raced NATO eleaement a enroadid ous secur, Pato st Task week that ft Not elation of NATO anc ia in recent years, id up miltary areas in ree Balic ing Russia,” de Hoop Scheffer cave after his arrival. Estonia, Latvia and Uthuania are exscted to duly “Gign the Tresey‘on Conventional Armaments in Europe (CFE) which limits miltary deployments, te sald, The BIO oral wes nso mee: wth Defence Minister Serge Ivanov before leaving ler on Thursday pe na ¥ = ‘ ‘Vhis chante ben & aeGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Russia does aot fear NATO NATO-Russian relations are good. Lord Robertson, 2001 (Secretary General Lord Robertson. “Promoting Peace through hutp://www brama,com/news/press/010324nato html) Partnership.” hetp:// www. 24a [ And that same emphasis on shaping tomorrow's peace is clear in our relations with Russia. In a few moments Foreign Minister Ivanov will join us in the NATO/Russia Permanent Joint Council. I'm glad that the NATO/Russia relationship is getting back on track, Of course we're not going to agree on everything, and some of the talking will be toygh. But we are talking. ee We recognise, and President Putin made this clear when he met me, that we have too many common interests not to work together. We share a common responsibility to tackle common threats. That's why I know the NATO/Russia relationship will develop. And there's no more important time to do this that when a new Russian president and government are taking over and looking afresh to the future. NATO IS EVOLVING AND READY TO CO-OPERATE WITH RUSSIA TERTRAIS 04 (Bruno Tertiais is a senior research fellow at the Foundation pour la Recherche Stratégique and an associate researcher at the Centre d”Btades et de Recherches Internationales “The changing Nature of Military Alliances” The Washington Quarterly in Spring 2004) ~ The Atlantic Alliance itself is also undergoi found Iehas discarded che geographical command stiecture Inhented Genes Cold War, geared toward fighting wars at is periphery, i favor of a mult - Purpose functional command structure. NATO's second enlargement cart, ward will bring most of Europe-into ics fold. Most US. forces stationed ry Germany will redeploy further east and south, into countries such as Polond, Romania, and Bulgaria.’ Cooperation wich non-NATO members is extend Ge.and deepening, NATO and Russia have established a NATO-Russia NATL ich wll help foster cooperation between former adversaries. set up a rapid reaction force to enable ic to be more responsive tema se In fun walk oder muliational alliances, NATO wes 0 evolve after the threat i ee eae he creat agit which tas created “angement on the continent, | H disappeared, '§ position as che dominant security ar- za 3GDI 2004 CONSULTNATO CIP MALUMPHY-PRIEUR Riu tsia dees not fear NATO _ 4 NATO IS KEY TO DETERRING A RUSSIA / CHINA ALLIANCE Russett and Stam, 1997 (Bruce and Allan, Professors of Political Science at Yale. “Russia, NATO, and the Future of US-China Relations.”) (Fn its curent limited incamation, however, itis an ill-considered and potentially regressive move, By limiting NATO expansion to small Pastem European states, NATO leaders prectude the alliance from developing the capabilities it will need to confront the coming _ security challenges of the 21st century. ‘Current plans for limited NATO expansion ignore the biggest future security problem for the West, which is not Russia itself, but the Jong-run possibility of a global power transition with China sometime in the next century. In this geostrategic scenario, Russia ‘matters because of the potential power of a Russian-Chinese alliance. ‘The need to prevent any such alignment should be central to all thinking about the future of NATO. In the short run, the problem of securing Russian respect for the boundaries of its neighbors in Eastern Europe is best managed within the context of NATO's Proven capacity for reducing and resolving contlicts among its ‘members, of whom Russia should be one} ~ | '?his shoutd ne a thenGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO C/P { MALUMPHY-PRIEUR No impact to Russian backlash —_— L NO IMPACT TO RUSSIAN BACKLASH / RUSSIA'S MILITARY IS NOT A THREAT Russet and Stam, 1997 (Bruce and Allan, Profe i “] Narcan roy Bae and Alan, P of fessors of Political Science at Yale. “Russia, China, not Russia, presents the only remaining long-term credible Potential threat to western (and global) peace and security. This is not said to impute particular intentions or malice to China's people or to its current leadership. Nor does it imply that the Chinese government's intentions are fundamentally more than defensive, to secure a territorial integrity that includes but does not exceed historie> — “*— Chinese regional claims. Rather, it is stated simply to recognize what diplomats and scholars have long understood. The period of transition from one great power system leader to another is marked by tremendous potential for instability and cataclysmic conflict, as a potential challenger catches up to and ultimately surpasses the power base of the previously dominant state. If the rising power is dissatisfied with its place in the intemational system, war between the system leader and the challenger may well result 22 7} DEPENDENCE ON THE WEST MAKES NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS RESILIENT senior policy analyst in Russian and Eurasian Affairs et the Heritage foundation, 98 COPTEN src Eaagenens no eto US fu any” Hecuve meresen ‘510 svar. heritage.org/Research/IntemationalOrganizations/emS10.cfm p. online) “Fears that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will disrupt ties between the United States and Russia are unfounded. Russia needs Western investment, technology, and cooperation to integrate into the global economy. In addition, the Western media overemphasize anti- NATO sentiment among Russians. Polls show that Russians worry more about payments of chronically delayed wages, low _ living standards, crime, and corruption. Russia's real security _ ‘concems, moreover, are with its Islamic neighbors and the People’s Republic of China, not with the democratic West. Finally, even the Yeltsin administration, which vehemently opposes NATO enlargement, admits that the major threats to Russia are domestic, and that no foreign country currently endangers Russia's security. KyGDI 2004 CONSULT NATO CG) Lu MALUMPHY-PRIEUR No impact to Russian backlash ° a 7% RUSSIA WILL INEVITABLY COOPERATE WITH THE US AND NATO / THEY ARE ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT AND SO WILL NOT BE AGGRESSIVE COHIEN, senior policy analyst in Russian and Eurasian Affairs atthe Heritage foundation, 98 (Dr. Ariel Cohen “NATO Enlargement is no threat to US-Russian Relations,” Executive memorandum # 510 www heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/em510.cfm p. online) “Russia needs Western investment and technology to modemize its economy and society. A vitriolic anti-American ‘campaign and an offensive military posture hinting at a new Cold War will scare off foreign investors and might jeopardize multilateral economic gssistance. Russia will not risk access to _ the benefits the West can offer just to derail Polish, Czech, and Hungarian membership in NATO. Russian reformers understand that enhanced stability and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe are in Russia's interests. Russian reformers also understand that Russia can benefit from cooperation with NATO on such issues as civil-miltary relations, fighting crime and corruption in the military, protecting the rights of enlisted personnel, and cutting the military budget and manpower. NATO has expertise in these areas that it will share willingly with Russia. EVEN IF RUSSIA EXPRESSES DISAPPROVAL = THEY WON’T OVERREACT TO STRENGTHENING NATO itis casting Corporation, 2004 {BBC Worldwide Monitoring, April 3) negative” postion 00 NATO's eastward expansion, Russian Deputy Foreign Maar ladinir Chizhov has sald Invan interview with a news agency, Negotstions to resolve Russian anesrys verte European Union's enlargement are proceeding wal Wr gUnreraTe2 OF SUGLES, 16 sd Tecent oulbret Te our coping with tts peacekeeping duties. The following is the text of Chizhov' March, with subheadings inserted editorially: _ view to Interfax news agency published bn 30 his interview Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Viadimir Chizhov tells correspondent Kseniva Ba tee tthe poapects of relations bebween Russia end the expanded NATO and the European unter ‘Question A ceremony of seven new countris joining NATO was held in Washington yesterday «Daas Moscow. stl have 2 *calm-negative” attitude to the expansion of the sllance? *calm-negative” stance on NATO expansion, Tealmenegative” stance on NATO expanen. have putt correcty, our atihude to NATO-exepanslon camains calm and negative: would sa ee a a ape at tage of HATO expanlon. NATO wae oFeorized In 1949, i ey ave of is expanslon took place in 1952 when Greece and Turkey joined the allience. The next Toe Ge Sa asin 2956, when the Federal Repvbil of Germany joined t.Thethird wave heppaned much eee on vain becarre a NATO member efter the Frenco regime collapsed, Then East Germany In fact tate we member ofthe North atlantic alfance (after Germany's reunion), And, at ast four years 290, Potand, the Czech Republic and Hungary also joined NATO. ‘ AY