T 1220127686 5344688 Complaint Deprivation of Property Interest SDPS

James Alan Bush
1211 East Santa Clara Avenue #4

San Jose, CA 95116
(408) 217-8282
theodore _ knock@mac.com
Plaintiff in pro per
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
CIVIL DIVISION
James Alan Bush, ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND

) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR DEPRIVATION
Plaintiff, ) OF PROPERTY UNDER COLOR OF LAW
)
v. ) [Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1983;
) U.S. Const., amend. XIV, � 1, cl. 1.;
) Cal. Const., art. I, � 7(a)]
Jonathan Harrington, Joshua )
Koppenhaver, Daniel Cortez, )
Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford )
(aka �Malnburg, Jr.�), Paul )
Casey, Julie Hoene, and DOES ONE )
to TWENTY, inclusive, )
)
- and )
)
Kathy Bickel, Kandis Malefyt, )
Richard Schreiber, Jack Bush, )
Jarrod Bush, Jason Fisher, )
Jenipher Fisher, Kim Fisher, )
Jennifer Fisher, James Schmedel, )
Opal Schmedel, and DOES )
TWENTY-ONE to FIFTY, inclusive, ) Judge Jeremy Fogel
)
- and )
(continued on next page)
COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 1

(continued)
Fran Hirsch, Connie Ferguson, )

Adobe Wells, Margaret Ecker )
Nanda (CA Bar No. 92616), Origen )
Financial, Sylvana Healy, Steve )
DOE, Advantage Homes, Todd Su, )
Golden State Realty (Realty )
World), Huong Doan, Em Doan, )
David Brotman, Alpert & Barr, )
Suzie DOE, California Department )
of Housing and Community )
Development, )
)
- and )
)
Devon Klein, Robin Smith, Anthony )
Sult, James Anton, Benjamin Holt, )
Jeffery Schlesinger, Sean Werner, )
Theodore Zitney, Stuart Glasgow, )
Kirk Kim, Erik Golembriewski, )
Anthony Sult, PSO Whitaker, Joel )
Whitmer, Carl Rushmeyer, Michael )
Rose, Shannon Griffiths, )
Michael (aka �Mick�) Fontaine, )
Jon Crouch, Detective Moscowitz, )
Detective Lawrence, Sunnyvale )
Department of Public Safety, )
OFFICER DOES ONE through FIVE, )
inclusive, )
)
Defendants. )
)

CONTENTS
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF............................................... #

Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF.............................................. #

Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of Property
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................ #

Interference with Contractual Relationship
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................... #

Constructive Fraud and Negligent Breach of Fiduciary Duty
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................ #

Negligent Breach of Fiduciary Duty
COUNT I ..................................................... #
Promise Without Intent To Perform
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................... #

Abuse of Process
COUNT I ..................................................... #
Inducement of Breach of Contract
COUNT II .................................................... #
Defamation
COUNT III.................................................... #
Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (RESERVED) ................................. #

Unlawful Foreclosure

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1983,

and seeks damages and injunctive relief against Defendants, Sunnyvale
Department of Public Safety, and officers and employees, and against
private individuals, acting in concert with them, and under color of
law, for deprivation of plaintiff�s civil rights, and, in particular, for
conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of a constitutionally protected property
interest, i.e., his home and the expected economic proceeds from its
sale, in violation of � 1 of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court under Title 28 U.S.C.A.

� 1343, and Title 28 U.S.C.A. � 1331, which authorizes original
jurisdiction on the district court of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Plaintiff
further invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court to hear and
decide claims arising under California state law.
Jurisdiction is also conferred upon this court pursuant to Title 28
U.S.C.A. � 1343(c)(4), which grants jurisdiction to the district court

of any action to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights.
Jurisdiction also exists pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. � 1367(a),
which authorizes jurisdiction over state law claims that one so related
to the other claims in this lawsuit that they form part of the same
case and controversy.

VENUE
Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C.A. � 1391(e),
because the majority of defendant�s reside in this district, and a
substantial amount of the acts and omissions giving rise to this
lawsuit occurred in this district.
PARTIES
#. At all times referred to herein, Defendants, Devon Klein,

Robin Smith, Anthony Sult, James Anton, Benjamin Holt, Jeffery
Schlesinger, Sean Werner, Theodore Zitney, Stuart Glasgow,
Kirk Kim, Erik Golembriewski, Anthony Sult, PSO Whitaker,
Joel Whitmer, Carl Rushmeyer, Michael Rose, Shannon Griffiths,
Michael (aka �Mick�) Fontaine, Jon Crouch, Detective Moscowitz,
Detective Lawrence, and DOE OFFICERS ONE to FIVE, inclusive, were
police officers of the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, and
were acting in such capacity as officers and employees of the City
of Sunnyvale and its Police Department.
#. Plaintiff sues these defendants in their individual and official
capacities.
#. At all times referred to herein, these defendants acted under
color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies,
customs, and usages of the State of California, City of Sunnyvale,
and Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, and pursuant to their
authority as police officers of said Department and City.
#. D.M.F., at all times described herein, was the common name of

a criminal street gang, as it is defined in Section 186.22(f) of
the California Penal Code, with at least thirty (30) members,
including Defendants, Jonathan Harrington, Joshua Williams (aka
�Koppenhaver�), Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford
(aka �Malnburg, Jr.�), Paul Casey, Julie Hoene, and DOES ONE through
TWENTY, inclusive, who individually or collectively engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity.
#.
This systematic pattern of criminal gang activity consisted of the
commission of (or attempted commission of), or the conspiracy to
commit, and the solicitation of the following predicate acts:
�
Robbery [Pen. Code � 211]
�
Sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer
for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances
[Health & Safety Code �� 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, 11058]
�
Intimidation of witnesses and victims [Pen. Code � 136.1]
�
Grand theft [Pen. Code � 487(a),(c)]
�
Burglary [Pen. Code � 459]
�
Mayhem [Pen. Code � 203]
�
Aggravated mayhem [Pen. Code � 205]
�
Torture [Pen. Code � 206]
�
Felony extortion [Pen. Code �� 518, 520]
�
Felony vandalism [Pen. Code � 594(1)(b)]
�
The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm [Pen. Code � 12072]
�
Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person [Pen. Code � 12101(1)(a)]
�
Threats to commit crimes resulting in death or great bodily
injury [Pen. Code � 422]
�
Theft and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle [Pen. Code
� 10851]
�
Felony theft of an access card or account information [Pen.
Code � 484e]
�
Counterfeiting, designing, using, attempting to use an access
card [Pen. Code � 484f]
�
Felony fraudulent use of an access card or account information
[Pen. Code � 484g]
�
Unlawful use of personal identifying information to obtain
credit, goods, services, or medical information [Pen. Code
� 530.5]
�
Wrongfully obtaining Department of Motor Vehicles documentation
[Pen. Code � 529.7]
#.
Defendant, Jonathan Paul Harrington, was an active member of
a criminal street gang, as defined by Section 186.22(a) of the
California Penal Code, and was the self-described leader of D.M.F.,
who willfully promoted, furthered, and assisted in the felonious
criminal conduct by members of DMF against the plaintiff; Defendant
Harrington sustained a juvenile petition for the criminal acts
described herein, and, in particular, Defendant, Josh Williams.
#.
Defendants, Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Paul Casey, Robert
Bradford (aka �Malnburg, Jr.�), and DOES TWENTY-ONE through FIFTY,
were convicted felons and/or active members of D.M.F., or other
affiliations, as defined by Section 186.22(d) of the California Penal
Code, and commited criminal acts against the plaintiff for the

benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with, D.M.F. and,
in particular, Defendant, Jonathan Harrington.
#.
Defendants, Julie Hoene, Joshua Williams (aka �Koppenhaver�), and
DOES ONE through TWENTY, inclusive, actively participated in the
acts described herein, with the specific intent to promote, further,
and assist the criminal conduct visited upon plaintiff by other
members of D.M.F.
#.
Defendant, Josh Koppenhaver, a juvenile, was petitioned by Defendant
Harrington and officers of the Sunnyvale Department Public Safety to
participate in the criminal acts described herein.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(For Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of Property in violation of

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, � 1, cl. 1. and Cal. Const., art. I, � 7(a)
cognizable under Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1983)
#.
Between February 14th, 2006, and until August 15th, 2006, Defendant,
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, and its officers and
employees, together with Defendants, Jonathan Harrington, Daniel
Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford, Joshua Williams, Paul
Casey, and Julie Hoene, and the remaining DOE defendants, acting
under color of law, intentionally agreed with and conspired with
one and each other, and, on information and belief, entered into
an agreement to commit wrongful acts upon Plaintiff to deprive
him of a constitutionally protected property interest, and, in
particular, his home, on account of plaintiff�s sexual orientation
and disabilities, e.g., plaintiff�s HIV-positive status, and other

pretenses. Per Defendant Williams, on July 22nd, 2006:
WILLIAMS: God ... gave you this disease because, apparently,
you deserve it or what not.
#. The agreement between the defendants was clearly implied by the
conduct of all parties.
#.
In furtherance of the conspiracy, Defendants, Jonathan Harrington,
Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford, Joshua Williams,
Paul Casey, and Julie Hoene, and DOES ONE to TWENTY, inclusive,
knowingly entered into a conspiracy of annoyance and vexation
designed to interfere with plaintiff�s quiet and peaceable
possession and enjoyment of his home and to force plaintiff to
vacate the premises; specifically, the defendants committed the
following unlawful and/or overt acts, including, but not limited
to, mail theft, wiretapping, burglary, assault and battery, false
imprisonment, identity theft, vandalism, and interfering with the
plaintiff�s ability to seek and maintain employment.
Interference with income, obstruction of mail, interception of
communications (where intent is to prevent or hinder ability to
pay bills) actionable under � 1983 per case law. The right of a
party not to have a state impair its obligations of contract is
protected by U.S. Const., art. I, � 10, cl. 1 [So. Cal. Gas Co. v.
City of Santa Ana (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 885, 887].
#.
On information and belief, Defendants, Kathy Bickel, Richard
Schreiber, Opal Schmedel, Long Cao, Connie Ferguson, Fran Hirsch,
Sylvana Healy, Steve DOE, and Todd Su, the remaining DOE defendants,
and other persons, whose names are presently unknown to plaintiff,

intentionally participated in the above-described wrongful conduct,
for the purpose of assisting the remaining defendants to commit
such wrongful acts, knew of their role in the performance of such
wrongful and unlawful acts at the time they rendered assistance,
and knowingly and substantially assisted the performance of such
wrongful and unlawful acts.
#.
On information and belief, Defendant, Sunnyvale Department of
Public Safety, and its officers and employees, aided and abetted
in the performance of the above-described unlawful acts, and did
conspire and agree between themselves and with the remaining
defendants, for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or
defeating the due course of justice in the State of California, and
with the intent to deny to plaintiff the equal protection of the
laws because of his sexual orientation and perceived disabilities,
and to injure plaintiff for lawfully attempting to obtain his right
under the Constitution and laws of the United States to equal
protection of the laws.
#.
In furtherance of the object of said conspiracy, Defendant,
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, and its officers and
employees, and each of them, in violation of Title 42 U.S.C.S.
� 1985(2), did conspire and agree between themselves and with
others, for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or
defeating the due course of justice in the State of California,
and with intent to deny to plaintiff the equal protection of the
laws, and to injure plaintiff for lawfully attempting to obtain his
right under the Constitution and laws of the United States to equal

protection of the laws.
#.
Defendant, Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, carried out the
agreement within the actual or ostensible authority of its agent
and their actions were carried out in and during the course of the
employment by its� officers and employees.
The trustee�s or beneficiary�s fraudulent conduct during foreclosure
proceedings can give rise to tort damages. [South Bay Bldg.
Enterprises, Inc. v. Riviera Lend-Lease, Inc., supra, 72 CA4th at
1121-1122, 85 CR2d at 652�trustee and senior creditor fraudulently
conspired to prevent others from bidding in order to buy property
at low price, thereby causing junior lienholder to lose its security
interest; see also CC � 2924h(g)�criminalizing acts operating as
fraud or deceit on any beneficiary or junior lienholder]
#. All defendants did the acts and things herein alleged pursuant
to and in furtherance of the conspiracy and above-alleged
agreement, by interfering with Plaintiff�s economic and contractual
relationships, and his ability to acquire employment, and his
ability to pursue judicial and civil remedy for the tortious acts
of the defendants.
Per Defendant, Jonathan Harrington, in a phone conversation with
Plaintiff, on May 17th, 2006, at 11:54 PM, regarding the conduct of
the other defendants:
HARRINGTON: They�re actively making it so you [Plaintiff] cannot
sell your home, and [are] driving you into the ground
even...even further.
#.
All defendants acted in a manner, positively and tacitly, and

reached a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and
unlawful plan to deprive the plaintiff of economic proceeds to
which he is entitled and convert his property for their own use
[de Vries v. Brumback (1960) 53 Cal. 2d 643, 647, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764,
349 P.2d 532 (concerted acts evidencing a continuity of purpose)].
#.
Defendants� conduct was intentional, and each defendant knew that
their conduct would result in loss to the Plaintiff. [Hawkins v.
Hawkins, 101 N.C. App. 529, 532, 400 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1999)]
#.
Furthermore, the loss of Plaintiff�s home and the expected economic
proceeds from its sale was proximately caused by the acts of the
defendants, and, consequently, the defendants are liable. [Buckaloo
v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 827]

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy)
#.
Defendant, Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, and its
individual members, Defendants, Devon Klein, Robin Smith, Anthony
Sult, James Anton, Benjamin Holt, Jeffery Schlesinger, Sean Werner,
Theodore Zitney, Stuart Glasgow, Kirk Kim, Erik Golembriewski,
Anthony Sult, PSO Whitaker, Joel Whitmer, Carl Rushmeyer, Michael
Rose, Shannon Griffiths, Michael (aka �Mick�) Fontaine, Jon Crouch,
Detective Moscowitz, and Detective Lawrence, who are officers
and employees of the aforementioned respondent agency, together
with Defendants, Jonathan Harrington, Joshua Williams (aka
�Koppenhaver�), Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford
(aka �Malnburg, Jr.�), Paul Casey, Julie Hoene, Kathy Bickel, Kandis

Malefyt, Richard Schreiber, Jack Bush, Jarrod Bush, Jason Fisher,
Jenipher Fisher, Kim Fisher, Jennifer Fisher, James Schmedel,
Opal Schmedel, and persons unknown to plaintiff, acting under color
of law, have subjected plaintiff to a campaign of defamation, on
account of his sexual orientation and perceived disabilities, and
other pretenses, in denial of rights, privileges, and immunities
guaranteed plaintiff by the Constitution of the United States and
the State of California.
#.
Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of
defendants sued herein as DOE OFFICERS ONE through FIVE, and DOES
ONE through FIFTY, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants
by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to
allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. (Plaintiff
is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the
fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the
occurrences herein alleged, and that plaintiff�s damages as herein
alleged were proximately caused by their conduct.)
#.
At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants, Devon Klein,
Robin Smith, Anthony Sult, James Anton, Benjamin Holt, Jeffery
Schlesinger, Sean Werner, Theodore Zitney, Stuart Glasgow,
Kirk Kim, Erik Golembriewski, Anthony Sult, PSO Whitaker,
Joel Whitmer, Carl Rushmeyer, Michael Rose, Shannon Griffiths,
Michael (aka �Mick�) Fontaine, Jon Crouch, Detective Moscowitz, and
Detective Lawrence were law enforcement officers in the Sunnyvale
Department of Public Safety, and in doing all of the things
hereinafter mentioned, acted under color of their authority as such,

and under color of the statues, regulations, customs, and usages of
the State of California, County of Santa Clara, City of Sunnyvale,
and the aforementioned law enforcement agency.
#. This campaign of defamation had no justification or excuse in law,
and was instead gratuitous, illegal, improper, and unrelated to
any activity in which law enforcement officers may appropriately and
legally engage in the course of protecting persons or property, and
was clearly intended to humiliate and degrade the petitioner.
#. Each of the individual respondents, separately and in concert, acted
outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization
of law and each of the individual respondents, separately and
in concert, acted wilfully, knowingly, and purposefully with the
specific intent to deprive plaintiff of his right to pursue and
obtain privacy.
#. The right to privacy and to not be deprived of it without due
process is guaranteed plaintiff by the First Amendment to the and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
#. At all times herein mentioned, plaintiff was, and now is, a
resident of the County of Santa Clara, State of California.
Plaintiff has resided in Santa Clara County for ten years and at
all times has enjoyed an exemplary reputation in his occupation,
in that he was compensated above the normal range for his chosen
profession, and had obtained several widely-regarded certifications
related to his field of work from Sun, Adobe, and Novell. While
primarily employed as a technical publications manager and

writer, Plaintiff also was employed as a software engineer, marcom
strategist, graphics designer, and web developer/designer. He
performed work for such large companies as Apple and Microsoft, and
produced ads for nationally distributed industry trade magazines.
His work was commended by reviewers at PC Magazine and the Wall
Street Journal. Prior to the circumstances and events described
herein, plaintiff enjoyed excellent physical and mental health.
Plaintiff was fiscally solvent, with a near-perfect credit score.
Plaintiff had never been investigated for, or suspected of any
crime, nor was he ever arrested or detained. Plaintiff�s driving
record was clear of tickets and accidents for the past seven years.
#.
Upon information and belief, between February 23rd, 2006, and
until August 15th, 2006, Defendants made defamatory and slanderous
statements regarding the plaintiff�s conduct and deeds.
#.
Among the numerous reckless, malicious, and unsubstantiated
falsehoods and unprivileged publication of information contained
therein were that plaintiff:
�
trafficked controlled substances and narcotics from his residence,
and was considered a source of nuisance within his neighborhood
[Civ. Code � 46(1)].
Per Defendant, Joshua Williams, on July 12th, 2006:
WILLIAMS: He [Defendant Stuart Glasgow] said you were a
well-known drug dealer, who�s been causing a lot of
problems up in Adobe Wells.
�
was addicted to the excessive use of drugs;
�
was arrested multiple times for being under the influence of a
controlled substance;
Per Defendant, James Anton, on May 18th, 2006:
CSI ANTON: I had knowledge that James Bush has been arrested
several times for being under the influence of a

controlled substance after calling the Police to
report intruders and other activity that had been
the result of paranoia. I had personally responded
to the residence on several previous occasions for
controlled substance-related events.
�
was either a negligent contributor to the criminal conduct by which
he was victimized, or was a party or witness to, and not a victim
of, the crimes committed;
� intended to engage, was likely to engage, or had engaged, in sexual
misconduct with a minor;
Per Defendant, Jonathan Harrington, on May 18th, 2006:
HARRINGTON: Two police officers that were...that have been at
your home consistently on the graveyard shift went
to day shift�er, I�m sorry, uh...worked an early...
early swing--like, two-hour earlier shift than they
normally worked...
PLAINTIFF: Right.
HARRINGTON:
...a couple of weeks ago. Now, as soon as they saw
me walking in downtown Sunnyvale near my friend�s
house, they stopped me and they approached me and
then, you know, Joshua [Defendant Joshua Williams]
came through to that same house later on while we

were speaking--you know, it�s happenstance�and, he
said, �Hey, I know you!�--you know, the guy who
pulled me out at gunpoint recognized us, finally-�
That�s Josh.� The other one said, �You�re the one
I found in Jon Bush�s bed--or, James Bush�s bed...�
Like, he had to restate himself...
PLAINTIFF:
What?!
HARRINGTON:
�...the one that looked too fucking young.� He stated
that in front of me and, like, he pushed that. And,
I was like, �You know what? You guys are fucking
way off track...�
Per Karen Williams, mother of Defendant, Joshua Williams, on

March 24th, 2006:
WILLIAMS: The first or second day Josh [Defendant Joshua
WILLIAMS: Williams] was staying with you, he came over...
he goes, �Mom, c�mon! I want you to meet James.�

I didn�t even feel good that day; but, I got up
and got dressed up to go and Jonathan [Jonathan
Harrington] was like, �No, James is crazy!�--this
and that... [laughs] He said [that] you�re crazy;
and, then, he told me, �I gotta get Josh outta
there �cuz...� he told me that �...Josh gets the
car because he�s [Plaintiff] getting hummers from
your son [Joshua Williams].� I�m like, �Hm, yeah!�
[laughs]
� viewed pornographic material, in which minors are depicted;

HARRINGTON:
I was worried about it because your laptop is still
in custody [and] is being... [laughs] The only, the
only things that I ever [unintelligible] off is
viewing of certain web pages and there�s...they�re
doing evidence gathering on...on a whole different
subject.
� was infected with HIV;

Per Defendant, Devon Klein, on March 31st, 2006, in a public record:
PSO KLEIN: Bush stated he was under the care of a doctor and
ingests numerous medications to combat his HIV
infection.
On or about Mid-October, 2005, paramedics from Sunnyvale Department
of Public Safety answered an emergency call from Plaintiff at his
residence; while treating the plaintiff, the paramedics openly
discussed his confidential medical information with plaintiff�s
neighbors [Civ. Code �� 56-56.37 (Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act); Francies v. Kapla (2005) 127 CA4th 1381, 26 CR3d
501 (medical malpractice); Pettus v. Cole (1996) 49 CA4th 402,
57, CR2d 46; Susan S. v. Israels (1997) 55 CA4th 1290, 67 CR2d 42
(negligent infliction of emotional distress and other damages)].
The paramedics were the same police officers that waged a campaign
of defamation against plaintiff, and violated his right to privacy
by publicizing private facts about him, beginning on February 23rd ,
2006.
� suffered from psychosis and other severe mental illnesses,

resulting in paranoia, violence, and suicidal tendencies, which was
either hereditary or drug-induced.
Per Kenneth Pinto, on October 24th, 2006:
2nd
PINTO:
During this same time period [June , 2006,
to August 30th , 2006], Mr. PINTO also received
telephone calls and visits from Plaintiff�s mother,
expressing concern that Plaintiff was a danger to
himself and others. Plaintiff�s mother confirmed a
history of schizophrenia in Plaintiff�s family and
that Plaintiff had a history of significant mental
illness.
#.
Defendant, Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, through its
officers, agents, employees, and representatives, acting within
the scope of their employment and authority, without plaintiff�s
consent, express or implied, violated plaintiff�s right to privacy
and invaded his seclusion, solitude, and private affairs by, but not
limited to, the following means, instrumentalities, and methods:
�
By interviewing under false pretenses persons who knew the
plaintiff, questioning them about, and casting aspersions on,
his political, social, economic, racial, and religious views,
tendencies, and possible prejudices, integrity, sexual proclivities
and inclinations, and personal habits, such as use of intoxicants,
narcotics, and other stimulants.
�
By conducting a continuing investigation of plaintiff in a manner
that with reasonable foreseeability would, and did, violate
plaintiff�s right to privacy, subject plaintiff to harassment and
intimidation, and invade plaintiff�s seclusion, solitude, and
private affairs; and,
�
By trailing and shadowing the plaintiff on streets, in buildings,
and other places, including his property; such actions were
accomplished by unreasonable means for an unreasonable length of
time and without legitimate or justifiable purpose.
Per Josh Williams, on June 8th, 2006:
PLAINTIFF: Officer Klein was standing behind some bush all by
himself...
WILLIAMS: Yes!
PLAINTIFF: ...waiting. Why was he standing outside? Officer
Klein has been spying around my and house and shit,
right?
WILLIAMS: Not really spying. Like, he parks fucking a couple of
WILLIAMS: houses down the road and then just walks up...[cups
his
hand around his ear]...and that�s fine. He�s
quiet, you understand?

PLAINTIFF: Does he step onto my property at all or whatever?
WILLIAMS: Right. He was on your property when we pulled up
because I seen [sic] it as I drove by.
PLAINTIFF:
They brought me back here with groceries and, then,
they started to leave; and, then, Officer Klein was
standing outside waiting for, uh, um, someone. I
mean, so, as soon as Shane came out, he [Defendant
Devon Klein] just jumped out...
#. The statements were publicized to plaintiff�s business associates

(including, plaintiff�s landlord, mortgagor, realtor, and doctors),
family members, friends, and neighbors, and Defendants maliciously
and recklessly made the aforementioned statements, suggestions,
misstatements, innuendos, insinuations, and inferences with such
outrageous and reckless disregard and carelessness as to their
truth or falsity as to indicate an utter disregard of the rights of
plaintiff [Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 301, 307, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 855, 461 P.2d 39].
#.
Defendants� aforementioned statements, suggestions, misstatements,
innuendos, insinuations, and the inferences therefrom are
defamatory and slanderous, per se, in that they falsely attribute
criminal, unethical, immoral, dangerous, and improper conduct
to the plaintiff without justification or privilege, and in the
absence of supporting facts; and, they were made by Defendants with
knowledge of their falsity and/or with reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity [Civ. Code � 46].
#. Furthermore, Defendants conspired to defame plaintiff to extort him

for money and property, and for his acquiescence and complicity in
civil rights violations, and for his silence on crimes committed
against him, and to counter or mitigate damages arising from claims
by Plaintiff against them, by threatening to injure plaintiff and
his property, and, in particular, impute to him any of the crimes
described herein [Pen. Code � 519].
Per Defendant, Jonathan Harrington, on June 9th, 2006:
HARRINGTON: ...censor my name out of it or, um, like...you
know what? [If] you get your car back because of

something I do�like, I...I find it in the middle of
the night at 12:30... [stutters] I call you... I tell
you, �Man, I made...I made some of the things I do
happen, [or] whatever, and I pulled every possible
fucking string, �That�s where you car is.�� If I
go out on a limb... I�m not saying I can even do
it; but, I will. Because, I can�t hurt anybody to
do it, right? But, uh, if I do that shit, break
your LG phone; and, then, break all your copies
of what you have taped on other people, or, at
least, on me and Karen--don�t...don�t fuck with real
people, like, real people, as far as that goes;
because, I didn�t fuck with your shit, [and] I�m
not going to. But, I�m gonna go out on a limb one
more time and make sure that a 16-year old, whose
getting fucking told that, �Hey! You can have all
the money in the world and all the things in the
world: just care about me.� Like, um, like, as far
as I�m hearing, [it�s] like...Josh is [being told],
like, �Hey! That�s [my] car.� He�s being told that
that�s his car. And, I don�t know why...why, like,
what the game is; but, we all know his age, we all
know what...what the deal is . . . I hope you�re
fucking hearing, listening to this: I don�t want
to fucking deal with, uh...I don�t want to deal
with him fucking thinking that, �Hm! All I have to

do is pretend that I fucking care about this guy,
[and] maybe that, on the off-chance, I�ll fucking
force him to suck my dick like a Bobby [Defendant
Robert Bradford (aka �Malnburg, Jr.�), and I�ll get
anything I want in the world; because, at 16, he
shouldn�t be thinking about [that]: like, �Ooh!
If I just pretend that I love him, I can steal
everything from him.� Or, actually, you�ve given him
absolutely everything, systematically, one-by-one,
like a sheep that shears itself. It�s ridiculous!
Okay? Every time I�ve ever heard anything from it,
it�s, �He�s been given...� And, I know, I mean, you
don�t drive the car when you two drive together.
I don�t understand that shit; and, because I don�t
understand that shit, I�m only saying [that], if
I go out on a limb, make...make some of it--like,
the things you were thinking about keeping the
information on that you just shouldn�t have--make
those go away, and I�ll see if I can get [your car]
locked in a garage somewhere so it doesn�t move.
#.
By defaming plaintiff, and portraying him in a false light to
neighbors, family, and business associates, Defendants irreparably
injured his reputation and standing in the community, and
maliciously, negligently, and inexcusably exposed plaintiff to
contempt, ridicule, aversion and ostracism, and deprived him of
the confidence and free intercourse of society, and impeached his

honesty, integrity, virtue, and reputation [Wemple v. Delano (1946)
187 Misc 710, 65 NYS2d 322].
Per Defendant, Joshua Williams, on July 22nd, 2006:
WILLIAMS: Well, God take his word; because, he gave you this
disease because, apparently, you deserve it or what

not.
#.
Defendants� campaign of defamation against the plaintiff impaired
and/or destroyed his business and contractual relationships, which
resulted in the loss of plaintiff�s home, and the expectancy of
economic gain from its sale.
#.
Defendants� defamatory statements prejudiced opinion against the
plaintiff among other police officers and agencies, and caused
unfair and unwarranted bias in the exercise of their discretion in
the performance of their duties.
#.
Defendants have performed this character assassination of Plaintiff
to:
�
impair or destroy Plaintiff�s business and contractual
relationships;
�
eliminate Plaintiff�s expectancy of economic gain;
�
counter or mitigate damages arising from claims by Plaintiff
against them;
�
deprive Plaintiff of gainful employment and of future earning
capacity;
#.
Defendants� statements were made with knowledge that such
statements were false and/or with reckless disregard for the truth
of the same, and defendants acted with malice and wanton disregard

of the rights of the plaintiff.
#. Defendants knew at all relevant times that all of the false and
defamatory statements, suggestions, misstatements, innuendos,
insinuations, and inferences were false.
#. Defendants maliciously and recklessly made the aforementioned
statements, suggestions, misstatements, innuendos, insinuations, and
inferences with outrageous and reckless disregard for the truth.
#. Defendants falsely imputed to Plaintiff a course of criminal
and/or other misconduct and injured Plaintiff in his profession and
otherwise.
#. Plaintiff�s reputation was damaged by the false light with which the
defendants� words portrayed him.
#. Defendants have performed this character assassination of Plaintiff
to deprive him of his property by impairing or destroying the
plaintiff�s economic and contractual relationships.
#. Defendants� false statements and the implications of those
statements concerning Plaintiff are slanderous per se.
#. Slander is not a protected speech under the First Amendment.
#. There was no justification or privilege to disseminate malicious
falsehoods about Plaintiff.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Interference with a Contractual Relationship
in violation of Restatement Second, Torts � 767
against Daniel Cortez and Laurene Weber)
#. On or about mid-March, 2006, Plaintiff commenced a contractual
relationship with Advantage Homes, which contemplated the sale
of Plaintiff�s home, situated at 1220 Tasman Drive SPC 379, City
of Sunnyvale, County of Santa Clara, State of California, whereby
Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of the timely sale of his
home, and of an economic gain of at least $40,000.00.
#. Defendants, Daniel Cortez and Laurene Weber, had full knowledge
of the existence of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants,
Steve DOE and Advantage Homes.
#. On or about May 18th, 2006, Defendants, Daniel Cortez and Laurene
Weber, stated to Defendant, Steve DOE, that the Plaintiff no longer
intended to sell his home, in the absence of consent or knowledge
of Plaintiff.
#. Defendants, Daniel Cortez and Laurene Weber, made the false
statement with the intention of severing the existing contract
and disrupting the business relationship between Plaintiff and
Defendants, Steve DOE and Advantage Homes, thereby destroying
Plaintiff�s expectancy of economic gain. Defendant engaged in the
interfering conduct with malice toward Plaintiff and a desire to
injure Plaintiff economically, and with wantonness and disregard for
Plaintiff�s rights. Defendants� conduct was improper, unlawful and
unfair, in that it terminated the plaintiff�s business relationship

prematurely, and impaired his ability to sell his home.
#.
The conduct engaged in by Defendants and described herein was the
proximate cause of the loss or impairment of Plaintiff�s business
relationship with Defendant, Advantage Homes, which resulted in the
plaintiff�s loss of the expectancy of economic gain by causing the
sale of his home not to occur.
#.
As a result of the impairment or loss of Plaintiff�s business
relationship with Defendant, Advantage Homes, Plaintiff suffered
a loss of the economic expectancy arising from the relationship,
including damages in the form of lost equity and the proceeds from
the sale of Plaintiff�s home, amounting to at least $40,000.
#.
Defendant was not justified or privileged to induce the termination
of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, Advantage Homes.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Tortious Interference with Economic Expectancy)
#. ...against Defendants, Jonathan Harrington, Joshua Koppenhaver,

Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford (aka �Malnburg,
Jr.�), Paul Casey, Julie Hoene, and DOES ONE to TWENTY, inclusive;
and, Defendants,
�
On April 9th, 2007, at 9:18 AM, Defendant, Opal Schmedel, admitted
to taking correspondence from Plaintiff�s home, between August 13th ,
2006, and August 22nd, 2006, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. � 1701
(obstruction of mail):
PLAINTIFF:
Did you...did you ever talk to, um, mom about,
uh, er, about my situation, as far as like, uh,

what happened with the house? I mean: what is her
version of events? ... What happened? What did you
see?
DEFENDANT:
Well, I sent you a piece of paper they put on
the front door ... because Kathy, Kathy would not
accept it. And, that was when it said that they...we
had to be out in three days ... and, that�s what we
did. That�s all we could do. We had no legal right
to do anything. The best I remember, that�s how
it...how it...I know that the...they put the...I know
that they put the, uh, notice on the front door,
after Kathy wouldn�t accept it; but, anyhow, that�s
all I know about it. I sent you the thing that
they put on the front door.
�
On June 8th, 2006, per Defendant, Joshua Koppenhaver:
PLAINTIFF: Were they stealing my mail? I know they were
because Bobby...
DEFENDANT: [mumbles] And, Danny was, like, �Yeah, bro, I put
his mailbox by his door.� [mumbles]
PLAINTIFF: So, Danny was stealing from me?
DEFENDANT: [nods]
�
Between April, 2006, and July, 2006, Defendant, Daniel
Napolitan, unlawfully intercepted phone communications between
Plaintiff and Defendants, Adobe Wells, Advantage Homes, Golden
State Realty, and Origen Financial, in violation of Title 18
U.S.C. � 2511(1)(a) (unlawful interception, disclosure, or use of
communication by a nongovernmental defendant).
NAPOLITAN: I listen to their phone calls; I listen to
everything...
�
Between February, 2006, and August, 2006, Defendants, Jonathan
Harrington, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford, and [list],
wrongfully entered upon Plaintiff�s land, with the intent
of dispossessing him of ownership of his home and depriving
him of proceeds from its sale by diminishing its value and/
or preventing its sale altogether by removing the For Sale
sign in front of Plaintiff�s house and turning away realtors
and potential buyers from his home, constituting trespass to
chattels, as defined by The Restatement (Second) of Torts � 217.
�
Defendants, Robert Bradford and Daniel Napolitan, obstructed
the delivery of U.S. mail intended for the plaintiff, in
violation of Title 18 U.S.C. � 1701 (obstruction of mail).
#.
Between February, 2006, and August, 2006, Defendants,
Jonathan Harrington, Josh Williams, Daniel Napolitan, and
Robert Bradford, vandalized Plaintiff�s home, as defined by
The Restatement (Second) of Torts � 218(b), to diminish its
quality and condition, impairing its value, thereby1 [insert
cost repair estimate from Allstate as exhibit]. State v.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 722, 46 A.L.R.3d 1414 (Me. 1970); Henderson v.
City of Greenwood, 172 S.C. 16, 172, S.E.689 (1934); Bountiful
City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R.657 (1930);
Inman v. Sandvig, 170 Wash. 112, 15 P.2d 696 (1932).
Interference with income, obstruction of mail, interception of

communications (where intent is to prevent or hinder ability to
pay bills) actionable under � 1983 per case law [So. Cal. Gas
Co. v. City of Santa Ana (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3d 885, 887].
�
Defendant, Todd Su and Realty World (Golden State Realty),
stated that Defendant, Fran Hirsch, breached a contractual
obligation between Plaintiff and Defendant, Adobe Wells, by
refusing to accept applications from prospective home-buyers,
[and, according to Todd, there were two].
�
Defendants, Connie Ferguson, Fran Hirsch, and Adobe Wells
refused to review the applications of the prospective
homeowners, in violation of Civ. Code � 798.4. Plaintiff had a
signed agreement with two prospective purchasers of his home
and had a reasonable expectancy of economic gain. The only
impediment to the execution of the agreement was Defendants
refusal to review the applications of the purchasers;
�
Jonathan Harrington, Josh Williams, Daniel Napolitan,
Daniel Cortez, Laurene Reber, and Robert Bradford,
vandalized Plaintiff�s home to diminish its quality,
condition and value, constituting vandalism, as defined by
The Restatement (Second) of Torts � 218(b), and ... removed
the For Sale sign in front of Plaintiff�s house, and turned
away realtors and potential buyers from his home, constituting
trespass to chattels, as defined by The Restatement (Second) of
Torts � 217.
6.
In engaging in the conduct described in Paragraph IV, Defendants
intended to impair or destroy Plaintiff�s business relationship with
the third parties, Advantage Homes and Golden State Realty (Realty
World), thereby destroying Plaintiff�s expectancy of economic gain.
Defendant engaged in the interfering conduct with malice toward
Plaintiff and a desire to injure Plaintiff economically, and with
wantonness and disregard for Plaintiff�s rights. Defendants� conduct
was improper, unlawful and unfair, in that it [describe how conduct
was improper, e.g., that it involved a restraint of trade, was
defamatory, etc.].
7. The conduct engaged in by Defendants and described in Paragraph IV

was the proximate cause of the loss or impairment of Plaintiff�s
business relationship with the third parties, Advantage Homes and
Golden State Realty (Realty World), which resulted in the Plaintiff�s
loss of the expectancy of economic gain.
8.
As a result of the impairment or loss of Plaintiff�s business
relationship with third parties, Advantage Homes and Golden State
Realty (Realty World), Plaintiff suffered a loss of the economic
expectancy arising from the relationship, including damages in the
form of lost equity and the proceeds from the sale of Plaintiff�s
home, and amounting to at least $40,000.
9.
Defendant was not justified or privileged to engage in the conduct
described in Paragraph IV, which resulted in the impairment or
loss of Plaintiff�s business relationship with the third parties,
Advantage Homes and Golden State Realty (Realty World).
COUNT I. TRESPASSING
#.
Between February 23rd, 2006, and August 15th, 2006, Defendants,
Jonathan Harrington, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford, and [list],
and, DOES ONE through TWENTY, inclusive, wrongfully entered upon
Plaintiff�s land, constituting trespass to chattels, as defined by The
Restatement (Second) of Torts � 217, with the intent of dispossessing
him of ownership of his home, and depriving him of proceeds from its
sale, by diminishing its value and/or preventing its sale altogether
through acts of vandalism, obstruction of mail, interception of
phone communications, and other tortious conduct.
#.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of that
information and belief alleges, that each of those defendants was in
some manner intentionally, negligently, recklessly, or as the result
of an extrahazardous activity, proximately responsible for the
events and happenings alleged in this complaint and for plaintiff�s
injuries and damages.
#.
Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of this
information and belief alleges, that at all times mentioned in
this complaint, defendants were the agents and employees of their
codefendants, and in doing the things alleged in this complaint
were acting within the course and scope of such agency and
employment.
##. On or about November 23rd, 2005, Plaintiff was in possession

of certain real property, situated at 1220 Tasman Drive #379,
Sunnyvale, Santa Clara County, California.
##. Between February 23rd, 2006, and August 15th, 2006, Plaintiff was

using the property described above as his primary residence.
##. At various times between February 23rd, 2006, and August 15th, 2006,
Defendants, without the consent or authority and against the will
of Plaintiff, entered onto the above-described property as follows:
�
Per Defendant, Joshua Williams, on June 8th, 2006:
himself...
WILLIAMS: Yes!
PLAINTIFF: ...waiting. Why was he standing outside? Officer Klein
has been spying around my house and shit, right?
WILLIAMS:
Not really spying. Like, he parks, fucking, a couple
of houses down the road and then just walks up [cups
hand around ear]...and that�s fine. He�s quiet, you
understand?

WILLIAMS: Right. He was on your property when we pulled up
because I see [sic] it as I drove by.

[omitted]
PLAINTIFF: They brought me back to here [to my house] with
groceries and then they started to leave and then

Officer Klein was standing outside waiting for, uh, um,
someone. I mean, so, as soon as Shane came out, he
[Klein] just jumped out.
�
HARRINGTON:
Hey, this is you-know-who! I had the weirdest
fucking dream last night that you were having

[omitted]
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
trouble eradicating the problem in your home.

It was almost worse than--shit--me! [laughs]
It was uncomfortable, and you needed help (in
a very calm and civil way, of course).
The firework incident, like, that thing was

immediately misconstrued by, um, my...my people
or my, you know, anybody that was I just, I
just slightly...people that were standing next
to me: what they felt was, if it wasn�t you,
was it somebody that could get that close?
And that, and...
Oh!
...that made me worry. Now, that set off a
whole chain of events and then I find the
fireworks in the bathroom and you go, �Ha ha
ha!� Well, yeah...
I can�t believe I did that.
Nobody could breach the security that close;
because, of the ten people that were on the
property at that time, it would have to be
one of them.
Where were they at on the property, by the way?
How could you fit ten people on my property?
It�s so small.
No, there was six of us standing in the, in

PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
the, in the carport...

Oh, okay.
...and there was [sic] a few in the house and,
and, I�m just...
Okay.
...and, you know, they...they...
Couldn�t have gotten that close without one of
the ten people seeing it.
And, the issue was behind ... was empty at that
time and they said, �Well, Jon, maybe they�re
trying to prove a point that they could get
that close,� because the Paul Casey thing had
already been set into motion before...
Oh!
...and, so, they thought that that was, uh,
uh, like, a, a...when they said, when they
said, �Well, it�s James. It doesn�t make any
sense.�
Uh-huh...
They said, �Well, then, maybe somebody is
trying to, like, uh, in essence, send you a
bullet and say, �We can get close to one of
you,�� meaning, me, Magic, Bill [Defendant,
Billy Romeo aka Billy Rome (CA License Plate
5ARY006)]�a couple other people that were
talking outside at the time� like, made us all

PLAINTIFF:
HARRINGTON:
PLAINTIFF:
go, �Hm. Now, we need to tighten up things.�

And, that�s why...
That was the wrong group of people to play
that joke around, huh?
Yeah, but, at the same time, if it had been
immediately, like, �Ha ha ha!� Then, it would
have been okay. Our security lines weren�t
breached and everybody went into a fucking
havoc, where everybody�s pulled out and then
Paul Casey was allowed to come in and just
ridiculously, I mean...
Oh, you know what? That�s what I was trying
to do. I remember that now. I didn�t want you
to catch me and I remember going, �Ha ha ha!�
once you found the firecrackers and saying
to myself inside, �Oh, fuck! Why didn�t I
hide those?!� Because I remember that I had
literally, I mean, I...I�d probably already
had I don�t know how many, you know, freaking
nervous breakdowns; but, I was just so upset
because the people...those people, it made
life too tense for me because�one�I�m kind
of a loner, sometimes. I need my, you know,
I�m like a cat�I need my space, and I was
never getting it. And, then, they would come
in and I would just feel like I was trapped,

you know? It was so scary. I felt like I
couldn�t breathe without checking in, you
know, checking on that in my brain for a
little while before [laughs] to, uh, you know,
figure out whether or not that�s a good idea to
do and, um... So, I remember just, kinda out
of exasperation, dropping a firecracker or two
out the window in the bathroom. You know, I
knew it would sound like a gun with all the
metal trailers and stuff around and just kind
of like scaring people off and it worked; but,
I don�t think they appreciated it, uh, once
they found out what it really was.
##. The effect of Defendants� conduct, described above, was to deprive

Plaintiff of home ownership, prevent its sale, and, consequently,
deny him the proceeds from its sale.
##. Plaintiff advised defendants on multiple occassions, verbally,

that defendants were trespassing on Plaintiff�s land without any
right or authority to do so, and without Plaintiff�s consent.
Plaintiff further demanded that Defendants leave Plaintiff�s
property immediately and refrain from any further entry on the
property. Furthermore, on or about March 8th, 2006, Defendant, Robin
Smith, acting in her capacity as a law enforcement officer for the
Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, admonished Defendants,
Jonathan Harrington and Joshua Williams, to stay away from
Plaintiff�s residence

##. Defendants Harrington and Williams continued to enter Plaintiff�s
land against Plaintiff�s will and without Plaintiff�s consent, and
Defendant, Robin Smith, and other Sunnyvale police officers, either
failed or refused to enforce the stay-away order.
##. The intrusion was offensive to the Plaintiff and to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities in that it consisted of a physical

trespass of Plaintiff�s home by unsavory persons using lewd and
abusive language to solicit immoral and criminal acts.
#. The intrusion violated Plaintiff�s reasonable expectation of privacy
in that the Plaintiff expected to be free of uninvited intrusions
into his home.
#. The invasion of privacy committed by the respondent was committed
for [reason].
##. The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and
entitled to be private in that it involved an unconsented invasion
into Plaintiff�s home.
##. Defendants threatened and asserted that they would continue to

trespass, and therefore continued to deprive Plaintiff of his right
to exclusive possession of the property.
##. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of that

information and belief alleges, that unless restrained by this
court, defendants will continue to trespass against plaintiff�s
property.
##. Such trespassory conduct by defendants resulted in irreparable harm

to Plaintiff, in that [describe irreparable nature of injury, such
as it will not only deprive plaintiff of access to the land, but

if left unrestrained, will result in the imposition of a servient
easement in favor of defendants across the land, thereby posing a
threat to plaintiff�s good and marketable title to the property.].
##. As a result of defendants� conduct, as alleged in this complaint,

plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the property for a
period of [specify period of time], to plaintiff�s damage in the
approximate sum of $[amount].
##. [If appropriate, allege facts indicating fraud, malice, or

oppression to provide basis for recovery of punitive damages.]
##. [If appropriate, allege basis for recovery of damages for emotional
distress.]
COUNT II. VANDALISM
#.
Jonathan Harrington, Josh Williams, Daniel Napolitan, and
Robert Bradford, vandalized Plaintiff�s home, as defined by
The Restatement (Second) of Torts � 218(b), to diminish its quality
and condition, impairing its value, thereby1 [insert cost repair
estimate from Allstate as exhibit]. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 722,
46 A.L.R.3d 1414 (Me. 1970); Henderson v. City of Greenwood, 172 S.C.
16, 172, S.E.689 (1934); Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P.
194, 72 A.L.R.657 (1930); Inman v. Sandvig, 170 Wash. 112, 15 P.2d 696
(1932).
#.
Defendants, Officer Devon Klein, [officers], stalked, eavesdropped
and harassed Plaintiff, and is liable for injuries suffered by

Plaintiff under California Government Code � 820.4(a), (e.g.,
negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Per Defendant, Joshua Williams, on June 8th, 2006:
himself...
DEFENDANT: Yes!
PLAINTIFF: ...waiting. Why was he standing outside? Officer Klein
has been spying around my house and shit, right?
DEFENDANT:
Not really spying. Like, he parks, fucking, a couple
of houses down the road and then just walks up [cups
hand around ear]...and that�s fine. He�s quiet, you
understand?

DEFENDANT: Right. He was on your property when we pulled up
because I see [sic] it as I drove by.

[omitted]
PLAINTIFF: They brought me back to here [to my house] with
groceries and then they started to leave and then

Officer Klein was standing outside waiting for, uh, um,
someone. I mean, so, as soon as Shane came out, he
[Klein] just jumped out.
#.
The aforementioned Defendants willfully, repeatedly and continually
harassed Plaintiff to intentionally cause him to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened and harassed, which actually
caused him to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened
and harassed.

#.
The aforementioned defendants willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
followed and harassed the plaintiff with the intent to place him in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.
#.
The aforementioned defendants knowingly and willfully directed
their course of conduct towards the plaintiff in such a way as to
seriously alarm, annoy, and harass the plaintiff, which served no
legitimate purpose.
#.
Defendants� conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial
emotional distress.
#.
Defendants� pattern of conduct began in February 2006, and is
composed of a series of acts of unlawful violence, including,
stalking, assault and battery, false imprisonment, making of
harassing telephone calls, and sending of harassing correspondence,
including, but not limited to, the use of public mails and computer
e-mail, and continues to this day, evidencing a continuity in
purpose.
#.
Defendant�s conduct was intentional, as was their ability to carry
out threats of violence were apparent and credible, resulting in
Plaintiff�s reasonable fear for his safety.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Constructive Fraud1 and Negligent Breach of Fiduciary Duty
against Defendants Steve DOE and Advantage Homes)
#. On or about [date], Plaintiff commenced a business relationship
with Defendants, Steve DOE and Advantage Homes, which contemplated
the sale of Plaintiff�s home, situated at 1220 Tasman Drive SPC 379,
City of Sunnyvale, County of Santa Clara, State of California,
whereby Plaintiff had a reasonable economic expectancy arising from
the relationship, including proceeds from the sale of Plaintiff�s
home, and from its equity, amounting to at least $40,000.
#.
By virtue of the broker-client relationship that existed between the
defendant and plaintiff, the defendant owed to plaintiff a fiduciary
duty2, and by virtue of plaintiff�s having placed confidence in the
fidelity and integrity of defendant and in entrusting defendant with
the timely sale of his home, a confidential relationship existed at
all times herein mentioned between plaintiff and defendant.
#.
Despite having voluntarily accepted the trust and confidence of
plaintiff with regard the timely sale of his home, defendant abused
the trust and confidence of plaintiff on or about May 18th, 2006, by
delisting Plaintiff�s home in the absence of consent or knowledge of
Plaintiff4,5.
#. Plaintiff, in fact, placed confidence and reliance in defendant

until August 3rd, 2006, when plaintiff discovered that the defendant
severed the contract between them on May 18th, 2006, based on
misrepresentations made by Defendants, Daniel Cortez and Laurene
Reber, in violation of this relationship of trust and confidence6.
Per Defendant, Steve DOE, in a phone conversation with plaintiff, on
August 3rd, 2006, at 3:47 PM:
STEVE DOE: I mean, I knocked on the door--I had a client in the
car--um, [I] knocked on the door and waited a couple
of minutes. Somebody opened the door--I couldn�t
tell you what he looked like. I think, if memory

serves, [and], I mean, again, there�s no reason for
me to even remember this information; [but], um...
but, uh, I think he had facial hair; but, I, I can�t
tell you for sure--I couldn�t tell you. Uh, I know
there was a gal sitting on the couch, as well. Um,
anyway, they answered the door, and, I said, �Hi!�
And, I...I said, �Uh, I�m hoping to show the home.�
And, uh, that person said that, uh...I think�and,
I, again, don�t quote me, because I don�t remember
exactly-but, something to the effect of, um, �The
home is no longer for sale.� I think I asked because
there was no sign in front. And, I said...I asked
if it was still available, and, he said, �No, I
don�t think it�s for sale anymore��something to that
effect. And, uh, and, that was it. I mean, [it was]
a very simple, brief conversation that took all [of]
ten seconds. Then, I got back in the car and drove
off.
Between March 18th, 2006, and August 3rd, 2006, Plaintiff reasonably
relied on the broker-client relationship7.
#.
Prior to commencing a broker-client relationship with the defendant,
Plaintiff was experiencing serious personal and legal difficulties,
of which the defendant had full knowledge, and that required him to
sale his home within three months.
#.
In spite of such knowledge, the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care, skill and diligence in that he failed to disclose

to the plaintiff the fact that he was no longer actively marketing
plaintiff�s home.
#. The suppression of the information that plaintiff�s home was
delisted from the buyer�s market was likely to mislead plaintiff and
did in fact mislead plaintiff.
#. During the time the defendant failed to disclose this fact
to plaintiff, he knew that this fact existed and deliberately
concealed this from plaintiff and further knew that this fact was
not known to plaintiff.
#. Plaintiff, during the time the defendant failed to disclose and the
suppression of fact occurred, was ignorant of the existence of the
fact that defendant suppressed and failed to disclose. If plaintiff
had been aware of the existence of the facts not timely disclosed
by defendant, and if defendant had exercised reasonable care,
skill, and diligence by immediately informing the plaintiff that he
discontinued his services, plaintiff could have hired another real
estate broker, and thereon alleges that he could have sold the home
prior to the three-month deadline.
#. Defendant suppressed the aforesaid fact with the intention of
thereby depriving the plaintiff of property, and the plaintiff
suffered the loss of the economic expectancy arising from the sale
of his home, including damages in the form of lost equity and
proceeds, amounting to at least $40,0008 .
#. As a proximate result of defendant�s aforementioned negligent breach
of fiduciary duties to plaintiff, plaintiff was, in fact, unable to
sell his home prior to the deadline, and an action for unlawful

detainer was commenced against him, and his home was repossessed.
#. In doing the acts herein alleged, defendant acted with fraud11, and
plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages.
#. Defendant, Advantage Homes, is also liable to plaintiff for
damages12, for failure to exercise reasonable supervision over the
activities of its employee, Defendant, Steve DOE.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Negligent Breach of Fiduciary Duty
against Todd Su and Golden State Realty)
#.
On or about [date], Plaintiff commenced a business relationship
with Defendants, Todd Su and Golden State Realty, which contemplated
the sale of Plaintiff�s home, situated at 1220 Tasman Drive SPC 379,
City of Sunnyvale, County of Santa Clara, State of California,
whereby Plaintiff had a reasonable economic expectancy arising from
the relationship, including proceeds from the sale of Plaintiff�s
home, and from its equity, amounting to at least $40,000.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Abuse of Process against Connie Ferguson, Fran Hirsch,
Adobe Wells, Margaret Ecker Nanda, and Brandenburg, Staedler & Moore)
#.
On or about May 8th, 2006, Defendants began the process of unlawful
detainer against Plaintiff by filing a Proof of Personal Service for
a �Combined Three (3) Day Notice to Pay or Have Tenancy Terminated
and Sixty (60) Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy� at the
Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, Civil Division.

A copy of this document is attached hereto as Exhibit � _�, and
made a part hereof.

#. Defendants misused the unlawful detainer process by:
�
failing to properly serve plaintiff with a copy of the above-
described document on the date listed thereon, and executing a
false declaration of service thereby [Kappel v. Bartlett (1988)
200 Cal. App. 3d 1457, 1463-1467, 246 Cal. Rptr. 815]; in August,
2006, Defendants, Brandenburg, Staedler & Moore, provided
plaintiff with a copy of a 60-day Notice of Termination of
Tenancy, which was dated June 2nd, 2006;
�
refusing to accept plaintiff�s lease payment for the month of
July 2006. Defendant, Connie Ferguson, promised to extend the
due date of Plaintiff�s monthly lease payment. Plaintiff paid
the lease payment on the revised due date, as agreed upon by
the two parties; however, Defendant, Adobe Wells, attached a
notice of late payment letter as an exhibit in an unlawful
detainer complaint.
�
taking action pursuant to judicial authority, i.e., an action
for unlawful detainer, and attaching property that had a value
greatly in excess of the amount of the defendant�s claim [White
Lighting Co. v. Wolfson (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 336, 347, 66 Cal. Rptr.
697, 438 P.2d 345].
#.
The ulterior purpose and motivation of defendants in so misusing
the process in the above-described manner was to obtain the
following collateral advantage over the plaintiff: to force a
default on plaintiff�s mortgage and obtain a default judgment

pursuant to which plaintiff would be required to pay money disputed
by plaintiff to be due defendant.
#.
By assisting Defendant, Adobe Wells, in prosecuting the unlawful
detainer case against the plaintiff, Defendant, Margaret Ecker
Nanda, is liable for the misuse of legal process, and is likewise a
co-conspirator in the deprivation of plaintiff�s property.
#.
As a proximate result of the actions of defendants, plaintiff has
been damaged generally.
COUNT I. BREACH OF CONTRACT

#. For his cause of action against Defendant, Fran Hirsch, Plaintiff
incorporates each and every allegation and averment set forth in
this complaint as though fully set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 17.
#. Plaintiff leased the space on which his mobilehome is installed
[Civ. Code � 799.1] from, Defendant, Adobe Wells, a subdivision for
mobilehomes [Civ. Code � 799(c)].
#. Plaintiff�s mobilehome is subject to California Mobilehome Residency
Law [Civ. Code � 798.4].
#. On [date], Plaintiff and Defendant, Adobe Wells, entered into an
agreement [Civ. Code � 798.75], which, among other conditions,
required prior approval of a purchaser of the plaintiff�s
mobilehome. A copy of the agreement is attached hereto as
Exhibit � _ � and made a part hereof. In relevant part:
[T]he prospective buyer must meet with the Community
Administrator and fill out an Application for Tenancy in
his presence. ... Before your sale may be completed, your

prospective purchaser must be approved for residency and must
execute a lease with us. PLEASE BE AWARE THAT A NEW LOT LEASE
MUST BE FULLY EXECUTED PRIOR TO CLOSE OF SALE AND THAT THE
PURCHASER HAS NO RIGHTS OF TENANCY IF A LEASE IS NOT PROPERLY
EXECUTED.
Plaintiff fully complied with all requirements set forth in the
agreement.
#.
On [date], Plaintiff notified Defendant, Adobe Wells, of his
intention to sell his mobilehome through a real estate agent, and,
in particular, Defendant, Todd Su.
#. On July 11th, 2006, Defendant, Todd Su, agent for the plaintiff,
notified Defendant, Adobe Wells, that two prospective homeowners
proposed to purchase the plaintiff�s home; however, Defendant, Fran
Hirsch, notified Defendant, Todd Su, that any applications from
prospective buyers of plaintiff�s home would be refused.
Per Defendant, Todd Su, in a phone conversation with Plaintiff, on
July 12th, 2006, at 8:22 PM:
SU: Yesterday, I called her. I said [that] I wanted to make an
appointment for an application; and, uh, she said, �Let me
talk to Fran and make sure it�s okay� (Fran, which is her
boss).
SU: �Ooh, I�ll give you a call back, Todd.� I didn�t get a call
back; but...so, I followed up today to see what happened,
�How come I didn�t get a call?� And...and, she replied to
me, �I cannot discuss the situation with you any further.
Please...if...we...it�s been referred over to our lawyers;

so,
have, uh, James contact the lawyers or [have] his
lawyers contact [our] lawyers.�

SU: Mm-hm. And, then, that�s it.
SU: Huh?!
SU: I, I, I...[unintelligible] doesn�t know anything. He just
knows that I�m trying to get an appointment. [laughs]

SU: I don�t want to tell him anything like that; then, he�ll
get all scared! [laughs]
SU: Uh, they have two buyers, by the way. We have two buyers.
That�s two buyers, by the way.
#.
By refusing to review the applications of the prospective
homeowners, Defendants, Fran Hirsch and Adobe Wells, violated
Mobilehome Residency Law [Civ. Code � 798.4], in that, approval of
either prospective homeowner was withheld for a reason other than:
�
their inability to pay the rent and charges of the park, and
their failure to secure approval for their respective home
loans; and,
�
their inability to comply with the rules and regulations of
the park, based on their prior tenancies, as determined by
management.
#.
Defendants are liable for all damages proximately resulting
therefrom.

COUNT II. INDUCEMENT OF BREACH OF CONTRACT
#. [Plaintiff and Origen Financial made payment arrangments, which

were intended to allow Plaintiff to keep his home; Origen Financial
rescinded their agreement after Defendant, Connie Ferguson, called
them and disparaged Plaintiff].
#. Defendants, Origen Financial, agreed to lower or temporarily
eliminate Plaintiff�s monthly mortgage payment to accommodate
Plaintiff�s financial burden; but, later rescinded the offer based on
defamatory statements made by Defendant, Connie Ferguson.
� Inducement of breach of contract is merely one type of broader tort
of interference with prospective economic advantage [Environmental
Planning & Info. Council v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 188,
193, 203 Cal. Rptr. 127, 680 P.2d 1086; Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14
Cal. 3d 815, 823, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865].
� Supreme Court held that the tort of intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage applies when the defendant
interferes with a business or economic relationship not subject to
a legally binding agreement; but, nonetheless, containing a probable
future economic benefit to the plaintiff [Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975)
14 Cal. 3d 815, 822-823, 827, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865].
#.
Defendant, Connie Ferguson, cited the defamatory statements made
by various officers of Defendant, Sunnyvale Department of Public
Safety, as the reason for rescinding the agreement after the fact.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Attorney Malpractice and Professional Negligence

against Alpert & Barr and Steve Brotman)
#.
Plaintiff brings his cause of action1 for attorney malpractice
and professional negligence against Defendants, Steve Blackman,
Alpert & Barr, Steve Brotman, and Origen Financial, ...
#. ... and to set aside the nonjudicial foreclosure2, on the grounds of

violations of statutory notice requirements3,4,5.
#.
An attorney-client relationship is created if a person reasonably
relies on an attorney to provide services and the attorney, aware
of the reliance, does nothing to negate that reliance. The client�s
reliance on ther attorney�s anticipated action created an attorney-
client relationship regardless of whether the action was brought in
contract or tort.17
#.
In their representation of the legal interests of the plaintiff,
defendants assumed a duty to exercise the degree of care,
diligence, and skill that is ordinarily exercised by attorneys,
and to take only that action that served the best interests of the
plaintiff.
#.
Notwithstanding the duties imposed on the defendants by the
standards of practice established by the State of California, the
defendants breached their duty to the plaintiff by failing to
comply with the statutory notice requirements set forth in Civ. Code
� 2924, prior to commencing nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, in
that:
�
they failed to notify the plaintiff of his right to avoid
foreclosure by paying all overdue amounts, plus permitted costs
and expenses, within the time allowed by law for reinstatement
[Civ. Code � 2924c(b)(1)];
�
they failed to record the Notice of Default and Notice of Sale
with the county recorder; and,
�
they failed to post (and publish) the Notice of Sale in the
manner required by Civ. Code � 2924f(b)(1).
#.
That as a direct and proximate result of the negligence,
misfeasance, malfeasance, misconduct, and intentional acts of
defendants as already set forth, plaintiff has suffered damage to
his property and reputation, including, but not limited to:
�
loss of the plaintiff�s security and ownership interest in his home,
and its use incident to possession;
�
loss of reputation, including credit rating; and,
� extreme mental anguish.
#. [damages]
#. [absence of defense]
#. As a result of Defendants� failure to provide Plaintiff the Notice
of Sale, Plaintiff was denied his statutory right of reinstatement
under Civ. Code � 2924c(e).
#.
Liability of attorney to party from whom he receives no
compensation. The fact that attorney is receiving all his
compensation from one party to a transaction does not prevent the
relationship of attorney and client from existing with respect to
the other; an attorney who voluntarily undertakes to record for the

mortgagee a mortgage executed by the attorney�s client is acting
for the mortgagee as well, and would be liable to the latter if he
negligently delayed the recording and another encumbrance slipped
in ahead of it [Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa 532, 37 A 98].
#. Necessity of proof of mortgagor�s default. A mortgagee probably need
not prove that the mortgagor defaulted in his payments in order to
recover against an attorney whose negligence caused the mortgage
to be subordinated to another lien, thereby reducing the value of
the mortgagee�s security; however, proof of the mortgagor�s default
should be offered for its strategic value in indicating to the jury
that the mortgagee�s loss is an actual, and not merely a legal one
[Gardner v. Wood, 37 Misc 93, 74 NYS 750; Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa
532, 37 A 98; Miller v. Wilson (1854) 24 Pa 114].
#. Time as of which value of security is determined. It is the value
of the security at the time it was acquired that is material in
determining the fact and amount of the plaintiff�s loss, since
the right of action against the attorney accrues immediately; the
plaintiff need not foreclose his security to establish his loss [Fay
v. McGuire, 20 App. Div. 569, 47 NYS 286, aff�d 162 NY 644, 57 NE
1109; Gardner v. Wood, 37 Misc 93, 74 NYS 750].
#. [The transcript of my conversation with Steve Brotman serves to
discredit the defendant, in that the patently unreasonable answers
he gave to my questions were to avoid virtually admitting that he
was negligent].
#. Some courts have permitted the jury to infer negligence on his part
despite the absence of expert testimony [Suritz v. Kelner (Fla App)

155 So 2d 831].
#.
That the client-mortgagee, Origen Financial, had not foreclosed
the plaintiff�s mortgage, and that the mortgagor was not insolvent
and had not defaulted in payment of the debt, invalidates any
defense to malpractice and/or negligence on behalf of the defendant
[Gardner v. Wood, 37 Misc 93, 74 NYS 750; Lawall v. Groman, 180 Pa
532, 37 A 98; Miller v. Wilson (1854) 24 Pa 114].
In addition to the trustee, other persons authorized to record a notice

of default include an agent for the trustee or beneficiary, as well
as a person designated in an executed substitution of trustee or
his or her agent. [CC � 2924b(b)(4)]
Mailing, publication and delivery of the notice of default pursuant to

CC � 2924 constitutes a privileged publication under CC � 47 (i.e.,
no tort liability can be predicated thereon). [CC � 2924(d)(1)]
1. Preliminary �declaration of default� from lender: Most

trustees require, as a condition of their filing a notice of
default, that the beneficiary (lender) first execute and delivery to
the trustee a �declaration of default.� The declaration of default
describes the loan documents and the nature of the default. The
trustee will also require delivery of the original note (or other
evidence of the secured obligation), as well as the original deed
of trust.
2. Content of notice: The notice of default must contain
certain basic information: trustor�s name; book and page, or
instrument number (if applicable), where deed of trust is recorded
or a description of the secured real property; statement that the
secured obligation is in default and nature of each default, and
election of foreclosure remedy to satisfy the defaulted obligation.
[CC � 2924(a)(1)]
In addition, where the default is �curable� (see CC � 2924c(a)(1)),

the notice must contain the statement prescribed by CC � 2924c(b)(1)
(basically advising trustor of the right to avoid foreclosure by
paying all overdue amounts plus permitted costs/expenses within the
time allowed by law for reinstatement). [CC � 2924c(b)(1)]
a. Statement of default. To be valid, a notice of default must

contain �a correct statement of some breach or breaches sufficiently
substantial in their nature to authorize the trustee or beneficiary
to declare a default and proceed with a foreclosure.� [Knapp v.
Doherty, supra, 123 CA4th at 99, 20 CR3d at 18 (emphasis added)]
By the same token, so long as the above requirements are met,
erroneous statements in the notice about other breaches may be
treated as immaterial and will not invalidate the notice. [Knapp
v. Doherty, supra, 123 CA4th at 98-99, 20 CR3d at 18-19�incorrect

statement in notice of date of breach immaterial]
Injunctions against private foreclosure sale on grounds of irregularity
in notice, i.e., (motion to set aside or enjoin) for violation of
statutory notice requirements
Set aside foreclosure on ground of late payment accepted without

objection or notice of requirement for timely payment, e.g., failed
to satisfy statutory requirements for notice of default

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(For Breach of Contract and Unlawful Foreclosure
against Origen Financial)
#. ...
#.
On [date], defendant notified plaintiff that defendant intended
to sell plaintiffs� automobile at private sale on _ [date] unless
plaintiffs� paid the entire alleged balance due on the installment
sales contract

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(For Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice

under Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1985(2) and (3))
#.
COUNT III. CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD
#.
For his cause of action against Defendant, Kathy Bickel, Plaintiff
incorporates each and every allegation and averment set forth in
this complaint as though fully set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 17.
�
Constructive fraud arises when one party in a transaction is seen
to have a special duty to the other because of his superiority
of knowledge, position, or fiduciary relationship, and he exploits
or abuses this position. A special duty may be inferred from the
disproportionate power and knowledge a large institutional bank or
broker wields in relation to ordinary individuals; the willingness
of a seller to provide financing for a buyer as an indication of
trust and confidence; blood relations; a partnership relationship.
In a constructive fraud situation, a negligent representation that a
plaintiff believed and relied on to his detriment may be sufficient
to allow a remedy.
�Kathy Bickel
� There also are constructive fraud type exceptions. For
example, where one party has special knowledge not apparent to
the other, and is aware that the other party is acting under a
misapprehension as to the facts that would affect his decision. In
other words, when the fraud-feasor is in a special position relative to
the victim, i.e. he has a duty to disclose and there is an obligation
to act in good faith. Even if a party owes no duty to disclose facts,
should he voluntarily assume such a duty, then any �suppression
or disguise of, or distraction from the truth� renders the matter
actionable and the common law requires full disclosure.
If one undertakes to answer inquiries respecting facts related to

the transaction, then he must disclose the truth.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(For Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws

against Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety
cognizable under Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1983)
#.
Between February 14th, 2006, and until August 15th, 2006, Defendant,
Devon Klein, Robin Smith, Stuart Glasgow, Eric Grolembiewski,
[officers], who are agents and employees of the Sunnyvale Department
of Public Safety, together with Defendants, Jonathan Harrington,
Daniel Cortez, Daniel Napolitan, Robert Bradford, Joshua Williams,
Paul Casey, and Julie Hoene, and persons unknown to plaintiff,
acting under color of law, subjected plaintiff to a pattern of
conduct consisting of gang activity, as defined by Section 186.22(e)
of the California Penal Code, on account of plaintiff�s sexual
orientation and perceived disabilities, and other pretenses, in
denial of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and by the
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.
#.
This systematic pattern of criminal gang activity consisted of the
commission of (or attempted commission of), or the conspiracy to
commit, and the solicitation of the following predicate acts:
�
Robbery [Pen. Code � 211]
�
Sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, offer
for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances
[Health & Safety Code �� 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, 11058]
�
Intimidation of witnesses and victims [Pen. Code � 136.1]
�
Grand theft [Pen. Code � 487(a),(c)]
�
Burglary [Pen. Code � 459]
�
Mayhem [Pen. Code � 203]
�
Aggravated mayhem [Pen. Code � 205]
�
Torture [Pen. Code � 206]
�
Felony extortion [Pen. Code �� 518, 520]
�
Felony vandalism [Pen. Code � 594(1)(b)]
�
The sale, delivery, or transfer of a firearm [Pen. Code � 12072]
�
Possession of a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person [Pen. Code � 12101(1)(a)]
�
Threats to commit crimes resulting in death or great bodily
injury [Pen. Code � 422]
�
Theft and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle [Pen. Code
� 10851]
�
Felony theft of an access card or account information [Pen.
Code � 484e]
�
Counterfeiting, designing, using, attempting to use an access
card [Pen. Code � 484f]
�
Felony fraudulent use of an access card or account information
[Pen. Code � 484g]
�
Unlawful use of personal identifying information to obtain
credit, goods, services, or medical information [Pen. Code
� 530.5]
�
Wrongfully obtaining Department of Motor Vehicles documentation
[Pen. Code � 529.7]
#. Defendants, [officers], conspired to deprive plaintiff of his
right to personal security and to be protected from harm caused

by the activities of Defendants, [criminals], which is otherwise
guaranteed him by California Penal Code � 182.20 and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
#.
By and through their acts and/or omissions, Defendants, [officers],
placed plaintiff in a more dependent and vulnerable position than
would have otherwise occurred. These affirmative acts include, but
are not limited to, ignoring pleas from plaintiff to intervene, and
abandoning the plaintiff to private violence by failing to restrain
persons exhibiting criminal conduct or propensities. Moreover, by
adopting a policy of restraint towards the criminals, the police
emboldened participants in the violence and increased the danger
to the plaintiff, which entitled him to the broader right to be
protected from harm [United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 (9th
Cir. 1994); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L.
Ed. 2d 28 (1982)].
#.
Defendants, [officers], owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, in
that the defendants were advised, or knew, that an inherent danger
existed, in view of the propensity of criminal defendants to
violence and revenge, and could have reasonably been expected to
have foreseen that a breach of that duty would result in harm to
the plaintiff.
#.
The harm suffered by Plaintiff was proximately caused by
Defendants� willful disregard and deliberate indifference for his
safety, in that the failure to exercise reasonable care due the
plaintiff increased the risk of danger that specifically affected
the plaintiff, and not the community-at-large.

#.
Furthermore, each of the [officer] defendants, separately and in
concert, acted outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without
authorization of law and each of the individual defendants,
separately and in concert, acted wilfully, knowingly, and
purposefully with the specific intent to deprive plaintiff of his
right to:
�
Freedom from invasion of privacy and defamation;
�
Petition the government for redress of grievances;
�
Freedom from illegal seizure of his person, papers, and
effects;
�
Freedom from unlawful arrest and conviction without evidence in
support thereof (i.e., a fair trial);
�
Freedom from illegal detention and/or imprisonment; and,
�
Freedom from physical abuse, coercion, or intimidation;
#.
All of these rights are secured to plaintiff by the provisions of
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and by Title 42
United States Code Section 1983 and Section 1985; and, by Title 18
United States Code � 245 [(1968) Pub Law 90�284, 90th Cong, HR 2516,
82 Stat 73].
#.
Despite the fact that they knew or should have known of the fact
that this pattern of conduct was being carried out by their agents
and employees, Defendants, Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety
and City of Sunnyvale, took no steps or made any effort to order a
halt to this course of conduct, to make redress to the plaintiff,
or to take any disciplinary action whatsoever against any of their

employees or agents.
Cause of action is Negligent/Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Disturbance (posttraumatic anxiety neurosis caused by either
negligence, i.e., breach of duty of care, or intentionallly wrongful
act or omission)
38 Am Jur 2d, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance � 1
23 POF, Intentionally Caused Emotional Distress p. 185
Right to recover for emotional disturbance or its physical consequences,

in the absence of physical impact or other actionable wrong [64
ALR2d 100, � 9(b)].
Proof that mentla or neurological condition resulted from incident in

suit [2 ALR3d 487, � 2 (anxiety neurosis)].
Allegational Requirements:
1.
Duty owed by defendant to plaintiff to exercise due care to protect
the plaintiff from harm (e.g., admonishment of suspects creates
�duty of care� and �special relationship�; a liability exists where
the suspects ignore the admonishment, and the defendants fail to
respond appropriately)
2.
Breach of such duty by defendant
3.
Psychological trauma (i.e., emotional stress) sustained by plaintiff
as proximate result of defendant�s breach of duty
-fright
-shock
-other forms of emotional stress
4.
Posttraumatic anxiety neurosis sustained by plaintiff as proximate
result of such psychological trauma
-acute phase of plaintiff�s anxiety (the traumatic syndrome)
-chronic phase of plaintiff�s anxiety (the actual neurosis)
5.
Physical examination of plaintiff showing no physiological reason
for his anxiety symptoms
6.
Psychiatric examination of plaintiff indicating presence of
posttraumatic anxiety neurosis
7.
Symptoms of acute anxiety phase
- fear
- palpitation
- intense perspiration
- �startle� reaction
- repetitive nightmares in which accident trauma is reexperienced
- headaches
- dizziness
- excessive fatigue
- decrease in appetite
- decrease in sexual drive
- irritability
- excitability
- increased sensitivity to noise
- various other manifestations of fear and incapacitation
- Symptoms of chronic anxiety phase
- nervousness
- restlessness
- irritability
- excitability
- headaches
- excessive fatigue
- insomnia
- periodic appearance and disappearance of the above symptoms
- varying degrees of severity of the above symptoms
- Normal predisposition of plaintiff towards developing posttraumatic
neurosis
- fact that plaintiff�s preexisting susceptibility was shared by
substantial number of other persons
[The following proof presents evidence to show the development by the
plaintiff of posttraumatic anxiety neurosis as a proximate result
of psychological trauma - that is, emotional stress - experienced
by the plaintiff in an automobile accident negligently caused by
the defendant. Although in any posttraumatic neurosis the clinical
picture is generally mixed,� it is assumed for the purposes of
this proof that the plaintiff�s neurotic symptoms are only those
of posttraumatic anxiety neurosis. This proof is intended only as
an illustrative method of proving the development of posttraumatic
anxiety]
NOTE: Allege incidents of hyperventilation, characterized by excessive

respiration, causing breathlessness, rapid heart action, excessive
perspiration, and dizziness, and was induced by being confined in a
small, enclosed area (transport vehicle) on April 22nd, 2006.


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James Alan Bush

1211 East Santa Clara Avenue #4

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

James Alan Bush, ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND

(continued on next page)

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 1

Fran Hirsch, Connie Ferguson, )

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 2

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF............................................... #

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF.............................................. #

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................ #

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................... #

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................ #

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION ........................................... #

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (RESERVED) ................................. #

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 3

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.S. � 1983,

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court under Title 28 U.S.C.A.

Jurisdiction is also conferred upon this court pursuant to Title 28

U.S.C.A. � 1343(c)(4), which grants jurisdiction to the district court

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 4

Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the

#. At all times referred to herein, Defendants, Devon Klein,

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 5

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 7

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(For Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiff of Property in violation of

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 8

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 9

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 10

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 11

v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 827]

(For Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy)

COMPLAINT FOR DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW PAGE 12

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several times for being under the influence of a

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Per Karen Williams, mother of Defendant, Joshua Williams, on

he goes, �Mom, c�mon! I want you to meet James.�

� viewed pornographic material, in which minors are depicted;

� was infected with HIV;

� suffered from psychosis and other severe mental illnesses,

Klein has been spying around my and house and shit,

quiet, you understand?

because I seen [sic] it as I drove by.

#. The statements were publicized to plaintiff�s business associates

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#. Furthermore, Defendants conspired to defame plaintiff to extort him

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disease because, apparently, you deserve it or what

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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(For Tortious Interference with Economic Expectancy)

#. ...against Defendants, Jonathan Harrington, Joshua Koppenhaver,

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Interference with income, obstruction of mail, interception of

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