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html The Art of !ar "y Sun Tzu Translated by #ionel $iles I. #aying Plans %. Sun Tzu said: The art of ar is of vital importance to the State. &. It is a matter of life and death' a road either to safety or to ruin. (ence it is a sub)ect of in*uiry hich can on no account be neglected. +. The art of ar' then' is governed by five constant factors' to be ta,en into account in one-s deliberations' hen see,ing to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. .. These are: /%0 The 1oral #a 2 /&0 (eaven2 /+0 3arth2 /.0 The Commander2 /40 1ethod and discipline. 4'5. The 1oral #a causes the people to be in complete accord ith their ruler' so that they ill follo him regardless of their lives' undismayed by any danger. 6. (eaven signifies night and day' cold and heat' times and seasons. 7. 3arth comprises distances' great and small2 danger and security2 open ground and narro passes2 the chances of life and death. 8. The Commander stands for the virtues of isdom' sincerely' benevolence' courage and strictness. %9. "y method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions' the graduations of ran, among the officers' the maintenance of roads by hich supplies may reach the army' and the control of military e:penditure. %%. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he ho ,no s them ill be victorious2 he ho ,no s them not ill fail. %&. Therefore' in your deliberations' hen see,ing to determine the military conditions' let them be made the basis of a comparison' in this ise:;; %+. /%0 !hich of the t o sovereigns is imbued ith the 1oral la <

/&0 !hich of the t o generals has most ability< /+0 !ith hom lie the advantages derived from (eaven and 3arth< /.0 =n hich side is discipline most rigorously enforced< /40 !hich army is stronger< /50 =n hich side are officers and men more highly trained< /60 In hich army is there the greater constancy both in re ard and punishment< %.. "y means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. %4. The general that hear,ens to my counsel and acts upon it' ill con*uer: let such a one be retained in command> The general that hear,ens not to my counsel nor acts upon it' ill suffer defeat:;;let such a one be dismissed> %5. !hile heading the profit of my counsel' avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. %6. According as circumstances are favorable' one should modify one-s plans. %7. All arfare is based on deception. %8. (ence' hen able to attac,' e must seem unable2 hen using our forces' e must seem inactive2 hen e are near' e must ma,e the enemy believe e are far a ay2 hen far a ay' e must ma,e him believe e are near. &9. (old out baits to entice the enemy. ?eign disorder' and crush him. &%. If he is secure at all points' be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength' evade him. &&. If your opponent is of choleric temper' see, to irritate him. Pretend to be ea,' that he may gro arrogant. &+. If he is ta,ing his ease' give him no rest. If his forces are united' separate them. &.. Attac, him here he is unprepared' appear here you are not e:pected. &4. These military devices' leading to victory' must not be divulged beforehand. &5. @o the general ho ins a battle ma,es many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general ho loses a battle ma,es but fe calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory' and fe calculations to defeat: ho much more no calculation at all> It is by attention to this point that I can foresee ho is li,ely to in or lose.

II. !aging !ar %. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of ar' here there are in the field a thousand s ift chariots' as many heavy chariots' and a hundred thousand mail;clad soldiers' ith provisions enough to carry them a thousand li' the e:penditure at home and at the front' including entertainment of guests' small items such as glue and paint' and sums spent on chariots and armor' ill reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of %99'999 men. &. !hen you engage in actual fighting' if victory is long in coming' then men-s eapons ill gro dull and their ardor ill be damped. If you lay siege to a to n' you ill e:haust your strength. +. Again' if the campaign is protracted' the resources of the State ill not be e*ual to the strain. .. @o ' hen your eapons are dulled' your ardor damped' your strength e:hausted and your treasure spent' other chieftains ill spring up to ta,e advantage of your e:tremity. Then no man' ho ever ise' ill be able to avert the conse*uences that must ensue. 4. Thus' though e have heard of stupid haste in ar' cleverness has never been seen associated ith long delays. 5. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged arfare. 6. It is only one ho is thoroughly ac*uainted ith the evils of ar that can thoroughly understand the profitable ay of carrying it on. 7. The s,illful soldier does not raise a second levy' neither are his supply; agons loaded more than t ice. 8. "ring ar material ith you from home' but forage on the enemy. Thus the army ill have food enough for its needs. %9. Poverty of the State e:che*uer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. %%. =n the other hand' the pro:imity of an army causes prices to go up2 and high prices cause the people-s substance to be drained a ay. %&. !hen their substance is drained a ay' the peasantry ill be afflicted by heavy e:actions. %+'%.. !ith this loss of substance and e:haustion of strength' the

homes of the people ill be stripped bare' and three;tenths of their income ill be dissipated2 hile government e:penses for bro,en chariots' orn;out horses' breast;plates and helmets' bo s and arro s' spears and shields' protective mantles' draught;o:en and heavy agons' ill amount to four;tenths of its total revenue. %4. (ence a ise general ma,es a point of foraging on the enemy. =ne cartload of the enemy-s provisions is e*uivalent to t enty of one-s o n' and li,e ise a single picul of his provender is e*uivalent to t enty from one-s o n store. %5. @o in order to ,ill the enemy' our men must be roused to anger2 that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy' they must have their re ards. %6. Therefore in chariot fighting' hen ten or more chariots have been ta,en' those should be re arded ho too, the first. =ur o n flags should be substituted for those of the enemy' and the chariots mingled and used in con)unction ith ours. The captured soldiers should be ,indly treated and ,ept. %7. This is called' using the con*uered foe to augment one-s o n strength. %8. In ar' then' let your great ob)ect be victory' not lengthy campaigns. &9. Thus it may be ,no n that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people-s fate' the man on hom it depends hether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. III. Attac, by Stratagem %. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of ar' the best thing of all is to ta,e the enemy-s country hole and intact2 to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So' too' it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it' to capture a regiment' a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. &. (ence to fight and con*uer in all your battles is not supreme e:cellence2 supreme e:cellence consists in brea,ing the enemy-s resistance ithout fighting. +. Thus the highest form of generalship is to bal, the enemy-s plans2 the ne:t best is to prevent the )unction of the enemy-s forces2 the ne:t in order is to attac, the enemy-s army in the field2 and the orst policy of all is to besiege alled cities. .. The rule is' not to besiege alled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets' movable shelters' and various implements of ar' ill ta,e up three hole months2 and the piling up of mounds over against the alls ill ta,e three months more.

4. The general' unable to control his irritation' ill launch his men to the assault li,e s arming ants' ith the result that one;third of his men are slain' hile the to n still remains unta,en. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. 5. Therefore the s,illful leader subdues the enemy-s troops ithout any fighting2 he captures their cities ithout laying siege to them2 he overthro s their ,ingdom ithout lengthy operations in the field. 6. !ith his forces intact he ill dispute the mastery of the 3mpire' and thus' ithout losing a man' his triumph ill be complete. This is the method of attac,ing by stratagem. 7. It is the rule in ar' if our forces are ten to the enemy-s one' to surround him2 if five to one' to attac, him2 if t ice as numerous' to divide our army into t o. 8. If e*ually matched' e can offer battle2 if slightly inferior in numbers' e can avoid the enemy2 if *uite une*ual in every ay' e can flee from him. %9. (ence' though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force' in the end it must be captured by the larger force. %%. @o the general is the bul ar, of the State2 if the bul ar, is complete at all points2 the State ill be strong2 if the bul ar, is defective' the State ill be ea,. %&. There are three ays in hich a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:;; %+. /%0 "y commanding the army to advance or to retreat' being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. %.. /&0 "y attempting to govern an army in the same ay as he administers a ,ingdom' being ignorant of the conditions hich obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier-s minds. %4. /+0 "y employing the officers of his army ithout discrimination' through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This sha,es the confidence of the soldiers. %5. "ut hen the army is restless and distrustful' trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army' and flinging victory a ay. %6. Thus e may ,no that there are five essentials for victory: /%0 (e ill in ho ,no s hen to fight and hen not to fight. /&0 (e ill in ho ,no s ho to handle both superior and inferior forces.

/+0 (e ill in hose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ran,s. /.0 (e ill in ho' prepared himself' aits to ta,e the enemy unprepared. /40 (e ill in ho has military capacity and is not interfered ith by the sovereign. %7. (ence the saying: If you ,no the enemy and ,no yourself' you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you ,no yourself but not the enemy' for every victory gained you ill also suffer a defeat. If you ,no neither the enemy nor yourself' you ill succumb in every battle. IA. Tactical Bispositions %. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat' and then aited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. &. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our o n hands' but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. +. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat' but cannot ma,e certain of defeating the enemy. .. (ence the saying: =ne may ,no ho to con*uer ithout being able to do it. 4. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics2 ability to defeat the enemy means ta,ing the offensive. 5. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength2 attac,ing' a superabundance of strength. 6. The general ho is s,illed in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth2 he ho is s,illed in attac, flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand e have ability to protect ourselves2 on the other' a victory that is complete. 7. To see victory only hen it is ithin the ,en of the common herd is not the acme of e:cellence. 8. @either is it the acme of e:cellence if you fight and con*uer and the hole 3mpire says' C!ell done>C %9. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength2 to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight2 to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a *uic, ear. %%. !hat the ancients called a clever fighter is one ho not only ins' but e:cels in inning ith ease.

%&. (ence his victories bring him neither reputation for isdom nor credit for courage. %+. (e ins his battles by ma,ing no mista,es. 1a,ing no mista,es is hat establishes the certainty of victory' for it means con*uering an enemy that is already defeated. %.. (ence the s,illful fighter puts himself into a position hich ma,es defeat impossible' and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. %4. Thus it is that in ar the victorious strategist only see,s battle after the victory has been on' hereas he ho is destined to defeat first fights and after ards loo,s for victory. %5. The consummate leader cultivates the moral la ' and strictly adheres to method and discipline2 thus it is in his po er to control success. %6. In respect of military method' e have' firstly' 1easurement2 secondly' 3stimation of *uantity2 thirdly' Calculation2 fourthly' "alancing of chances2 fifthly' Aictory. %7. 1easurement o es its e:istence to 3arth2 3stimation of *uantity to 1easurement2 Calculation to 3stimation of *uantity2 "alancing of chances to Calculation2 and Aictory to "alancing of chances. %8. A victorious army opposed to a routed one' is as a pound-s eight placed in the scale against a single grain. &9. The onrush of a con*uering force is li,e the bursting of pent;up aters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. A. 3nergy %. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a fe men: it is merely a *uestion of dividing up their numbers. &. ?ighting ith a large army under your command is no ise different from fighting ith a small one: it is merely a *uestion of instituting signs and signals. +. To ensure that your hole host may ithstand the brunt of the enemy-s attac, and remain unsha,en;; this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. .. That the impact of your army may be li,e a grindstone dashed against an egg;;this is effected by the science of ea, points and strong. 4. In all fighting' the direct method may be used for )oining battle'

but indirect methods ill be needed in order to secure victory. 5. Indirect tactics' efficiently applied' are ine:haustible as (eaven and 3arth' unending as the flo of rivers and streams2 li,e the sun and moon' they end but to begin ane 2 li,e the four seasons' they pass a ay to return once more. 6. There are not more than five musical notes' yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. 7. There are not more than five primary colors /blue' yello ' red' hite' and blac,0' yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. 8. There are not more than five cardinal tastes /sour' acrid' salt' s eet' bitter0' yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. %9. In battle' there are not more than t o methods of attac,;;the direct and the indirect2 yet these t o in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. %%. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is li,e moving in a circle;;you never come to an end. !ho can e:haust the possibilities of their combination< %&. The onset of troops is li,e the rush of a torrent hich ill even roll stones along in its course. %+. The *uality of decision is li,e the ell;timed s oop of a falcon hich enables it to stri,e and destroy its victim. %.. Therefore the good fighter ill be terrible in his onset' and prompt in his decision. %4. 3nergy may be li,ened to the bending of a crossbo 2 decision' to the releasing of a trigger. %5. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle' there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all2 amid confusion and chaos' your array may be ithout head or tail' yet it ill be proof against defeat. %6. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline' simulated fear postulates courage2 simulated ea,ness postulates strength. %7. (iding order beneath the cloa, of disorder is simply a *uestion of subdivision2 concealing courage under a sho of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy2 mas,ing strength ith ea,ness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

%8. Thus one ho is s,illful at ,eeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances' according to hich the enemy ill act. (e sacrifices something' that the enemy may snatch at it. &9. "y holding out baits' he ,eeps him on the march2 then ith a body of pic,ed men he lies in ait for him. &%. The clever combatant loo,s to the effect of combined energy' and does not re*uire too much from individuals. (ence his ability to pic, out the right men and utilize combined energy. &&. !hen he utilizes combined energy' his fighting men become as it ere li,e unto rolling logs or stones. ?or it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground' and to move hen on a slope2 if four;cornered' to come to a standstill' but if round;shaped' to go rolling do n. &+. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled do n a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the sub)ect of energy. AI. !ea, Points and Strong %. Sun Tzu said: !hoever is first in the field and a aits the coming of the enemy' ill be fresh for the fight2 hoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle ill arrive e:hausted. &. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his ill on the enemy' but does not allo the enemy-s ill to be imposed on him. +. "y holding out advantages to him' he can cause the enemy to approach of his o n accord2 or' by inflicting damage' he can ma,e it impossible for the enemy to dra near. .. If the enemy is ta,ing his ease' he can harass him2 if ell supplied ith food' he can starve him out2 if *uietly encamped' he can force him to move. 4. Appear at points hich the enemy must hasten to defend2 march s iftly to places here you are not e:pected. 5. An army may march great distances ithout distress' if it marches through country here the enemy is not. 6. Dou can be sure of succeeding in your attac,s if you only attac, places hich are undefended.Dou can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attac,ed. 7. (ence that general is s,illful in attac, hose opponent does not ,no hat to defend2 and he is s,illful in defense hose opponent

does not ,no

hat to attac,.

8. = divine art of subtlety and secrecy> Through you e learn to be invisible' through you inaudible2 and hence e can hold the enemy-s fate in our hands. %9. Dou may advance and be absolutely irresistible' if you ma,e for the enemy-s ea, points2 you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. %%. If e ish to fight' the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All e need do is attac, some other place that he ill be obliged to relieve. %&. If e do not ish to fight' e can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All e need do is to thro something odd and unaccountable in his ay. %+. "y discovering the enemy-s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves' e can ,eep our forces concentrated' hile the enemy-s must be divided. %.. !e can form a single united body' hile the enemy must split up into fractions. (ence there ill be a hole pitted against separate parts of a hole' hich means that e shall be many to the enemy-s fe . %4. And if e are able thus to attac, an inferior force ith a superior one' our opponents ill be in dire straits. %5. The spot here e intend to fight must not be made ,no n2 for then the enemy ill have to prepare against a possible attac, at several different points2 and his forces being thus distributed in many directions' the numbers e shall have to face at any given point ill be proportionately fe . %6. ?or should the enemy strengthen his van' he ill ea,en his rear2 should he strengthen his rear' he ill ea,en his van2 should he strengthen his left' he ill ea,en his right2 should he strengthen his right' he ill ea,en his left. If he sends reinforcements every here' he ill every here be ea,. %7. @umerical ea,ness comes from having to prepare against possible attac,s2 numerical strength' from compelling our adversary to ma,e these preparations against us. %8. Eno ing the place and the time of the coming battle' e may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

&9. "ut if neither time nor place be ,no n' then the left ing ill be impotent to succor the right' the right e*ually impotent to succor the left' the van unable to relieve the rear' or the rear to support the van. (o much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred #I apart' and even the nearest are separated by several #I> &%. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Dueh e:ceed our o n in number' that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved. &&. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers' e may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the li,elihood of their success. &+. Fouse him' and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. ?orce him to reveal himself' so as to find out his vulnerable spots. &.. Carefully compare the opposing army ith your o n' so that you may ,no here strength is superabundant and here it is deficient. &4. In ma,ing tactical dispositions' the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them2 conceal your dispositions' and you ill be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies' from the machinations of the isest brains. &5. (o victory may be produced for them out of the enemy-s o n tactics;;that is hat the multitude cannot comprehend. &6. All men can see the tactics hereby I con*uer' but hat none can see is the strategy out of hich victory is evolved. &7. Bo not repeat the tactics hich have gained you one victory' but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. &8. 1ilitary tactics are li,e unto ater2 for ater in its natural course runs a ay from high places and hastens do n ards. +9. So in ar' the ay is to avoid hat is strong and to stri,e at hat is ea,. +%. !ater shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over hich it flo s2 the soldier or,s out his victory in relation to the foe hom he is facing. +&. Therefore' )ust as ater retains no constant shape' so in arfare there are no constant conditions. ++. (e ho can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and

thereby succeed in inning' may be called a heaven;born captain. +.. The five elements / ater' fire' ood' metal' earth0 are not al ays e*ually predominant2 the four seasons ma,e ay for each other in turn. There are short days and long2 the moon has its periods of aning and a:ing. AII. 1aneuvering %. Sun Tzu said: In ar' the general receives his commands from the sovereign. &. (aving collected an army and concentrated his forces' he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. +. After that' comes tactical maneuvering' than hich there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct' and misfortune into gain. .. Thus' to ta,e a long and circuitous route' after enticing the enemy out of the ay' and though starting after him' to contrive to reach the goal before him' sho s ,no ledge of the artifice of deviation. 4. 1aneuvering ith an army is advantageous2 ith an undisciplined multitude' most dangerous. 5. If you set a fully e*uipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage' the chances are that you ill be too late. =n the other hand' to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. 6. Thus' if you order your men to roll up their buff;coats' and ma,e forced marches ithout halting day or night' covering double the usual distance at a stretch' doing a hundred #I in order to rest an advantage' the leaders of all your three divisions ill fall into the hands of the enemy. 7. The stronger men ill be in front' the )aded ones ill fall behind' and on this plan only one;tenth of your army ill reach its destination. 8. If you march fifty #I in order to outmaneuver the enemy' you ill lose the leader of your first division' and only half your force ill reach the goal. %9. If you march thirty #I ith the same ob)ect' t o;thirds of your army ill arrive. %%. !e may ta,e it then that an army ithout its baggage;train is lost2 ithout provisions it is lost2 ithout bases of supply it is lost.

%&. !e cannot enter into alliances until e are ac*uainted ith the designs of our neighbors. %+. !e are not fit to lead an army on the march unless e are familiar ith the face of the country;;its mountains and forests' its pitfalls and precipices' its marshes and s amps. %.. !e shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless e ma,e use of local guides. %4. In ar' practice dissimulation' and you ill succeed. %5. !hether to concentrate or to divide your troops' must be decided by circumstances. %6. #et your rapidity be that of the ind' your compactness that of the forest. %7. In raiding and plundering be li,e fire' is immovability li,e a mountain. %8. #et your plans be dar, and impenetrable as night' and hen you move' fall li,e a thunderbolt. &9. !hen you plunder a countryside' let the spoil be divided amongst your men2 hen you capture ne territory' cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. &%. Ponder and deliberate before you ma,e a move. &&. (e ill con*uer ho has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering. &+. The "oo, of Army 1anagement says: =n the field of battle' the spo,en ord does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. @or can ordinary ob)ects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. &.. $ongs and drums' banners and flags' are means hereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. &4. The host thus forming a single united body' is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone' or for the co ardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men. &5. In night;fighting' then' ma,e much use of signal;fires and drums' and in fighting by day' of flags and banners' as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

&6. A hole army may be robbed of its spirit2 a commander;in;chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. &7. @o a soldier-s spirit is ,eenest in the morning2 by noonday it has begun to flag2 and in the evening' his mind is bent only on returning to camp. &8. A clever general' therefore' avoids an army hen its spirit is ,een' but attac,s it hen it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods. +9. Bisciplined and calm' to a ait the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:;;this is the art of retaining self;possession. +%. To be near the goal hile the enemy is still far from it' to ait at ease hile the enemy is toiling and struggling' to be ell;fed hile the enemy is famished:;;this is the art of husbanding one-s strength. +&. To refrain from intercepting an enemy hose banners are in perfect order' to refrain from attac,ing an army dra n up in calm and confident array:;;this is the art of studying circumstances. ++. It is a military a:iom not to advance uphill against the enemy' nor to oppose him hen he comes do nhill. +.. Bo not pursue an enemy ho simulates flight2 do not attac, soldiers hose temper is ,een. +4. Bo not s allo bait offered by the enemy. Bo not interfere ith an army that is returning home. +5. !hen you surround an army' leave an outlet free. Bo not press a desperate foe too hard. +6. Such is the art of arfare. AIII. Aariation in Tactics %. Sun Tzu said: In ar' the general receives his commands from the sovereign' collects his army and concentrates his forces &. !hen in difficult country' do not encamp. In country here high roads intersect' )oin hands ith your allies. Bo not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed;in situations' you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position' you must fight. +. There are roads hich must not be follo ed' armies hich must be not attac,ed' to ns hich must be besieged' positions hich must not be contested' commands of the sovereign hich must not be obeyed.

.. The general ho thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics ,no s ho to handle his troops. 4. The general ho does not understand these' may be ell ac*uainted ith the configuration of the country' yet he ill not be able to turn his ,no ledge to practical account. 5. So' the student of ar ho is unversed in the art of ar of varying his plans' even though he be ac*uainted ith the ?ive Advantages' ill fail to ma,e the best use of his men. 6. (ence in the ise leader-s plans' considerations of advantage and of disadvantage ill be blended together. 7. If our e:pectation of advantage be tempered in this ay' e may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. 8. If' on the other hand' in the midst of difficulties e are al ays ready to seize an advantage' e may e:tricate ourselves from misfortune. %9. Feduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them2 and ma,e trouble for them' and ,eep them constantly engaged2 hold out specious allurements' and ma,e them rush to any given point. %%. The art of ar teaches us to rely not on the li,elihood of the enemy-s not coming' but on our o n readiness to receive him2 not on the chance of his not attac,ing' but rather on the fact that e have made our position unassailable. %&. There are five dangerous faults hich may affect a general: /%0 Fec,lessness' hich leads to destruction2 /&0 co ardice' hich leads to capture2 /+0 a hasty temper' hich can be provo,ed by insults2 /.0 a delicacy of honor hich is sensitive to shame2 /40 over;solicitude for his men' hich e:poses him to orry and trouble. %+. These are the five besetting sins of a general' ruinous to the conduct of ar. %.. !hen an army is overthro n and its leader slain' the cause ill surely be found among these five dangerous faults. #et them be a sub)ect of meditation. IG. The Army on the 1arch %. Sun Tzu said: !e come no to the *uestion of encamping the army' and observing signs of the enemy. Pass *uic,ly over mountains' and ,eep in the neighborhood of valleys. &. Camp in high places' facing the sun. Bo not climb heights in order

to fight. So much for mountain arfare. +. After crossing a river' you should get far a ay from it. .. !hen an invading force crosses a river in its on ard march' do not advance to meet it in mid;stream. It ill be best to let half the army get across' and then deliver your attac,. 4. If you are an:ious to fight' you should not go to meet the invader near a river hich he has to cross. 5. 1oor your craft higher up than the enemy' and facing the sun. Bo not move up;stream to meet the enemy. So much for river arfare. 6. In crossing salt;marshes' your sole concern should be to get over them *uic,ly' ithout any delay. 7. If forced to fight in a salt;marsh' you should have ater and grass near you' and get your bac, to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt;marches. 8. In dry' level country' ta,e up an easily accessible position ith rising ground to your right and on your rear' so that the danger may be in front' and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country. %9. These are the four useful branches of military ,no ledge hich enabled the Dello 3mperor to van*uish four several sovereigns. %%. All armies prefer high ground to lo and sunny places to dar,. %&. If you are careful of your men' and camp on hard ground' the army ill be free from disease of every ,ind' and this ill spell victory. %+. !hen you come to a hill or a ban,' occupy the sunny side' ith the slope on your right rear. Thus you ill at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. %.. !hen' in conse*uence of heavy rains up;country' a river hich you ish to ford is s ollen and flec,ed ith foam' you must ait until it subsides. %4. Country in hich there are precipitous cliffs ith torrents running bet een' deep natural hollo s' confined places' tangled thic,ets' *uagmires and crevasses' should be left ith all possible speed and not approached. %5. !hile e ,eep a ay from such places' e should get the enemy to approach them2 hile e face them' e should let the enemy have them on his rear.

%6. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country' ponds surrounded by a*uatic grass' hollo basins filled ith reeds' or oods ith thic, undergro th' they must be carefully routed out and searched2 for these are places here men in ambush or insidious spies are li,ely to be lur,ing. %7. !hen the enemy is close at hand and remains *uiet' he is relying on the natural strength of his position. %8. !hen he ,eeps aloof and tries to provo,e a battle' he is an:ious for the other side to advance. &9. If his place of encampment is easy of access' he is tendering a bait. &%. 1ovement amongst the trees of a forest sho s that the enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thic, grass means that the enemy ants to ma,e us suspicious. &&. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attac, is coming. &+. !hen there is dust rising in a high column' it is the sign of chariots advancing2 hen the dust is lo ' but spread over a ide area' it beto,ens the approach of infantry. !hen it branches out in different directions' it sho s that parties have been sent to collect fire ood. A fe clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. &.. (umble ords and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. Aiolent language and driving for ard as if to the attac, are signs that he ill retreat. &4. !hen the light chariots come out first and ta,e up a position on the ings' it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. &5. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a s orn covenant indicate a plot. &6. !hen there is much running about and the soldiers fall into ran,' it means that the critical moment has come. &7. !hen some are seen advancing and some retreating' it is a lure. &8. !hen the soldiers stand leaning on their spears' they are faint from ant of food. +9. If those ho are sent to dra the army is suffering from thirst. ater begin by drin,ing themselves'

+%. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and ma,es no effort

to secure it' the soldiers are e:hausted. +&. If birds gather on any spot' it is unoccupied. Clamor by night beto,ens nervousness. ++. If there is disturbance in the camp' the general-s authority is ea,. If the banners and flags are shifted about' sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry' it means that the men are eary. +.. !hen an army feeds its horses ith grain and ,ills its cattle for food' and hen the men do not hang their coo,ing;pots over the camp;fires' sho ing that they ill not return to their tents' you may ,no that they are determined to fight to the death. +4. The sight of men hispering together in small ,nots or spea,ing in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the ran, and file. +5. Too fre*uent re ards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources2 too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. +6. To begin by bluster' but after ards to ta,e fright at the enemy-s numbers' sho s a supreme lac, of intelligence. +7. !hen envoys are sent ith compliments in their mouths' it is a sign that the enemy ishes for a truce. +8. If the enemy-s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time ithout either )oining battle or ta,ing themselves off again' the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. .9. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy' that is amply sufficient2 it only means that no direct attac, can be made. !hat e can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength' ,eep a close atch on the enemy' and obtain reinforcements. .%. (e ho e:ercises no forethought but ma,es light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. .&. If soldiers are punished before they have gro n attached to you' they ill not prove submissive2 and' unless submissive' then ill be practically useless. If' hen the soldiers have become attached to you' punishments are not enforced' they ill still be unless. .+. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance ith humanity' but ,ept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory. ... If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced' the army ill be ell;disciplined2 if not' its discipline ill be bad.

.4. If a general sho s confidence in his men but al ays insists on his orders being obeyed' the gain ill be mutual. G. Terrain %. Sun Tzu said: !e may distinguish si: ,inds of terrain' to it: /%0 Accessible ground2 /&0 entangling ground2 /+0 temporizing ground2 /.0 narro passes2 /40 precipitous heights2 /50 positions at a great distance from the enemy. &. $round hich can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. +. !ith regard to ground of this nature' be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots' and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you ill be able to fight ith advantage. .. $round hich can be abandoned but is hard to re;occupy is called entangling. 4. ?rom a position of this sort' if the enemy is unprepared' you may sally forth and defeat him. "ut if the enemy is prepared for your coming' and you fail to defeat him' then' return being impossible' disaster ill ensue. 5. !hen the position is such that neither side ill gain by ma,ing the first move' it is called temporizing ground. 6. In a position of this sort' even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait' it ill be advisable not to stir forth' but rather to retreat' thus enticing the enemy in his turn2 then' hen part of his army has come out' e may deliver our attac, ith advantage. 7. !ith regard to narro passes' if you can occupy them first' let them be strongly garrisoned and a ait the advent of the enemy. 8. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass' do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned' but only if it is ea,ly garrisoned. %9. !ith regard to precipitous heights' if you are beforehand ith your adversary' you should occupy the raised and sunny spots' and there ait for him to come up. %%. If the enemy has occupied them before you' do not follo him' but retreat and try to entice him a ay. %&. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy' and the strength of the t o armies is e*ual' it is not easy to provo,e a battle' and fighting ill be to your disadvantage. %+. These si: are the principles connected ith 3arth. The general

ho has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. %.. @o an army is e:posed to si: several calamities' not arising from natural causes' but from faults for hich the general is responsible. These are: /%0 ?light2 /&0 insubordination2 /+0 collapse2 /.0 ruin2 /40 disorganization2 /50 rout. %4. =ther conditions being e*ual' if one force is hurled against another ten times its size' the result ill be the flight of the former. %5. !hen the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too ea,' the result is insubordination. !hen the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too ea,' the result is collapse. %6. !hen the higher officers are angry and insubordinate' and on meeting the enemy give battle on their o n account from a feeling of resentment' before the commander;in;chief can tell hether or no he is in a position to fight' the result is ruin. %7. !hen the general is ea, and ithout authority2 hen his orders are not clear and distinct2 hen there are no fi:es duties assigned to officers and men' and the ran,s are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner' the result is utter disorganization. %8. !hen a general' unable to estimate the enemy-s strength' allo s an inferior force to engage a larger one' or hurls a ea, detachment against a po erful one' and neglects to place pic,ed soldiers in the front ran,' the result must be rout. &9. These are si: ays of courting defeat' hich must be carefully noted by the general ho has attained a responsible post. &%. The natural formation of the country is the soldier-s best ally2 but a po er of estimating the adversary' of controlling the forces of victory' and of shre dly calculating difficulties' dangers and distances' constitutes the test of a great general. &&. (e ho ,no s these things' and in fighting puts his ,no ledge into practice' ill in his battles. (e ho ,no s them not' nor practices them' ill surely be defeated. &+. If fighting is sure to result in victory' then you must fight' even though the ruler forbid it2 if fighting ill not result in victory' then you must not fight even at the ruler-s bidding. &.. The general ho advances ithout coveting fame and retreats ithout fearing disgrace' hose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign' is the )e el of the ,ingdom. &4. Fegard your soldiers as your children' and they ill follo you

into the deepest valleys2 loo, upon them as your o n beloved sons' and they ill stand by you even unto death. &5. If' ho ever' you are indulgent' but unable to ma,e your authority felt2 ,ind;hearted' but unable to enforce your commands2 and incapable' moreover' of *uelling disorder: then your soldiers must be li,ened to spoilt children2 they are useless for any practical purpose. &6. If e ,no that our o n men are in a condition to attac,' but are una are that the enemy is not open to attac,' e have gone only half ay to ards victory. &7. If e ,no that the enemy is open to attac,' but are una are that our o n men are not in a condition to attac,' e have gone only half ay to ards victory. &8. If e ,no that the enemy is open to attac,' and also ,no that our men are in a condition to attac,' but are una are that the nature of the ground ma,es fighting impracticable' e have still gone only half ay to ards victory. +9. (ence the e:perienced soldier' once in motion' is never be ildered2 once he has bro,en camp' he is never at a loss. +%. (ence the saying: If you ,no the enemy and ,no yourself' your victory ill not stand in doubt2 if you ,no (eaven and ,no 3arth' you may ma,e your victory complete. GI. The @ine Situations %. Sun Tzu said: The art of ar recognizes nine varieties of ground: /%0 Bispersive ground2 /&0 facile ground2 /+0 contentious ground2 /.0 open ground2 /40 ground of intersecting high ays2 /50 serious ground2 /60 difficult ground2 /70 hemmed;in ground2 /80 desperate ground. &. !hen a chieftain is fighting in his o n territory' it is dispersive ground. +. !hen he has penetrated into hostile territory' but to no great distance' it is facile ground. .. $round the possession of hich imports great advantage to either side' is contentious ground. 4. $round on hich each side has liberty of movement is open ground. 5. $round hich forms the ,ey to three contiguous states' so that he ho occupies it first has most of the 3mpire at his command' is a ground of intersecting high ays.

6. !hen an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country' leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear' it is serious ground. 7. 1ountain forests' rugged steeps' marshes and fens;;all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. 8. $round hich is reached through narro gorges' and from hich e can only retire by tortuous paths' so that a small number of the enemy ould suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. %9. $round on hich e can only be saved from destruction by fighting ithout delay' is desperate ground. %%. =n dispersive ground' therefore' fight not. =n facile ground' halt not. =n contentious ground' attac, not. %&. =n open ground' do not try to bloc, the enemy-s ay. =n the ground of intersecting high ays' )oin hands ith your allies. %+. =n serious ground' gather in plunder. In difficult ground' ,eep steadily on the march. %.. =n hemmed;in ground' resort to stratagem. =n desperate ground' fight. %4. Those ho ere called s,illful leaders of old ,ne ho to drive a edge bet een the enemy-s front and rear2 to prevent co;operation bet een his large and small divisions2 to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad' the officers from rallying their men. %5. !hen the enemy-s men ere united' they managed to ,eep them in disorder. %6. !hen it as to their advantage' they made a for ard move2 hen other ise' they stopped still. %7. If as,ed ho to cope ith a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attac,' I should say: C"egin by seizing something hich your opponent holds dear2 then he ill be amenable to your ill.C %8. Fapidity is the essence of ar: ta,e advantage of the enemy-s unreadiness' ma,e your ay by une:pected routes' and attac, unguarded spots. &9. The follo ing are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country' the greater ill be the solidarity of your troops' and thus the defenders ill not

prevail against you. &%. 1a,e forays in fertile country in order to supply your army ith food. &&. Carefully study the ell;being of your men' and do not overta: them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Eeep your army continually on the move' and devise unfathomable plans. &+. Thro your soldiers into positions hence there is no escape' and they ill prefer death to flight. If they ill face death' there is nothing they may not achieve. =fficers and men ali,e ill put forth their uttermost strength. &.. Soldiers hen in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge' they ill stand firm. If they are in hostile country' they ill sho a stubborn front. If there is no help for it' they ill fight hard. &4. Thus' ithout aiting to be marshaled' the soldiers ill be constantly on the *ui vive2 ithout aiting to be as,ed' they ill do your ill2 ithout restrictions' they ill be faithful2 ithout giving orders' they can be trusted. &5. Prohibit the ta,ing of omens' and do a ay ith superstitious doubts. Then' until death itself comes' no calamity need be feared. &6. If our soldiers are not overburdened ith money' it is not because they have a distaste for riches2 if their lives are not unduly long' it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. &7. =n the day they are ordered out to battle' your soldiers may eep' those sitting up bede ing their garments' and those lying do n letting the tears run do n their chee,s. "ut let them once be brought to bay' and they ill display the courage of a Chu or a Euei. &8. The s,illful tactician may be li,ened to the shuai;)an. @o the shuai;)an is a sna,e that is found in the ChHng mountains. Stri,e at its head' and you ill be attac,ed by its tail2 stri,e at its tail' and you ill be attac,ed by its head2 stri,e at its middle' and you ill be attac,ed by head and tail both. +9. As,ed if an army can be made to imitate the shuai;)an' I should ans er' Des. ?or the men of !u and the men of Dueh are enemies2 yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm' they ill come to each other-s assistance )ust as the left hand helps the right. +%. (ence it is not enough to put one-s trust in the tethering of horses' and the burying of chariot heels in the ground

+&. The principle on hich to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage hich all must reach. ++. (o to ma,e the best of both strong and ea,;;that is a *uestion involving the proper use of ground. +.. Thus the s,illful general conducts his army )ust as though he ere leading a single man' illy;nilly' by the hand. +4. It is the business of a general to be *uiet and thus ensure secrecy2 upright and )ust' and thus maintain order. +5. (e must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances' and thus ,eep them in total ignorance. +6. "y altering his arrangements and changing his plans' he ,eeps the enemy ithout definite ,no ledge. "y shifting his camp and ta,ing circuitous routes' he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. +7. At the critical moment' the leader of an army acts li,e one ho has climbed up a height and then ,ic,s a ay the ladder behind him. (e carries his men deep into hostile territory before he sho s his hand. +8. (e burns his boats and brea,s his coo,ing;pots2 li,e a shepherd driving a floc, of sheep' he drives his men this ay and that' and nothing ,no s hither he is going. .9. To muster his host and bring it into danger:;;this may be termed the business of the general. .%. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground2 the e:pediency of aggressive or defensive tactics2 and the fundamental la s of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. .&. !hen invading hostile territory' the general principle is' that penetrating deeply brings cohesion2 penetrating but a short ay means dispersion. .+. !hen you leave your o n country behind' and ta,e your army across neighborhood territory' you find yourself on critical ground. !hen there are means of communication on all four sides' the ground is one of intersecting high ays. ... !hen you penetrate deeply into a country' it is serious ground. !hen you penetrate but a little ay' it is facile ground. .4. !hen you have the enemy-s strongholds on your rear' and narro

passes in front' it is hemmed;in ground. !hen there is no place of refuge at all' it is desperate ground. .5. Therefore' on dispersive ground' I ould inspire my men ith unity of purpose. =n facile ground' I ould see that there is close connection bet een all parts of my army. .6. =n contentious ground' I ould hurry up my rear. .7. =n open ground' I ould ,eep a vigilant eye on my defenses. =n ground of intersecting high ays' I ould consolidate my alliances. .8. =n serious ground' I ould try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. =n difficult ground' I ould ,eep pushing on along the road. 49. =n hemmed;in ground' I ould bloc, any ay of retreat. =n desperate ground' I ould proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. 4%. ?or it is the soldier-s disposition to offer an obstinate resistance hen surrounded' to fight hard hen he cannot help himself' and to obey promptly hen he has fallen into danger. 4&. !e cannot enter into alliance ith neighboring princes until e are ac*uainted ith their designs. !e are not fit to lead an army on the march unless e are familiar ith the face of the country;;its mountains and forests' its pitfalls and precipices' its marshes and s amps. !e shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless e ma,e use of local guides. 4+. To be ignored of any one of the follo ing four or five principles does not befit a arli,e prince. 4.. !hen a arli,e prince attac,s a po erful state' his generalship sho s itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy-s forces. (e overa es his opponents' and their allies are prevented from )oining against him. 44. (ence he does not strive to ally himself ith all and sundry' nor does he foster the po er of other states. (e carries out his o n secret designs' ,eeping his antagonists in a e. Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthro their ,ingdoms. 45. "esto re ards ithout regard to rule' issue orders ithout regard to previous arrangements2 and you ill be able to handle a hole army as though you had to do ith but a single man. 46. Confront your soldiers ith the deed itself2 never let them ,no your design. !hen the outloo, is bright' bring it before their eyes2 but tell them nothing hen the situation is gloomy.

47. Place your army in deadly peril' and it ill survive2 plunge it into desperate straits' and it ill come off in safety. 48. ?or it is precisely hen a force has fallen into harm-s ay that is capable of stri,ing a blo for victory. 59. Success in arfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy-s purpose. 5%. "y persistently hanging on the enemy-s flan,' e shall succeed in the long run in ,illing the commander;in;chief. 5&. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. 5+. =n the day that you ta,e up your command' bloc, the frontier passes' destroy the official tallies' and stop the passage of all emissaries. 5.. "e stern in the council;chamber' so that you may control the situation. 54. If the enemy leaves a door open' you must rush in. 55. ?orestall your opponent by seizing hat he holds dear' and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. 56. !al, in the path defined by rule' and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. 57. At first' then' e:hibit the coyness of a maiden' until the enemy gives you an opening2 after ards emulate the rapidity of a running hare' and it ill be too late for the enemy to oppose you. GII. The Attac, by ?ire %. Sun Tzu said: There are five ays of attac,ing ith fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp2 the second is to burn stores2 the third is to burn baggage trains2 the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines2 the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. &. In order to carry out an attac,' e must have means available. The material for raising fire should al ays be ,ept in readiness. +. There is a proper season for ma,ing attac,s ith fire' and special days for starting a conflagration. .. The proper season is hen the eather is very dry2 the special days are those hen the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve' the !all' the !ing or the Cross;bar2 for these four are all days of rising ind.

4. In attac,ing ith fire' one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: 5. /%0 !hen fire brea,s out inside to enemy-s camp' respond at once ith an attac, from ithout. 6. /&0 If there is an outbrea, of fire' but the enemy-s soldiers remain *uiet' bide your time and do not attac,. 7. /+0 !hen the force of the flames has reached its height' follo it up ith an attac,' if that is practicable2 if not' stay here you are. 8. /.0 If it is possible to ma,e an assault ith fire from ithout' do not ait for it to brea, out ithin' but deliver your attac, at a favorable moment. %9. /40 !hen you start a fire' be to ind ard of it. Bo not attac, from the lee ard. %%. A ind that rises in the daytime lasts long' but a night breeze soon falls. %&. In every army' the five developments connected ith fire must be ,no n' the movements of the stars calculated' and a atch ,ept for the proper days. %+. (ence those ho use fire as an aid to the attac, sho intelligence2 those ho use ater as an aid to the attac, gain an accession of strength. %.. "y means of ater' an enemy may be intercepted' but not robbed of all his belongings. %4. Hnhappy is the fate of one ho tries to in his battles and succeed in his attac,s ithout cultivating the spirit of enterprise2 for the result is aste of time and general stagnation. %5. (ence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans ell ahead2 the good general cultivates his resources. %6. 1ove not unless you see an advantage2 use not your troops unless there is something to be gained2 fight not unless the position is critical. %7. @o ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his o n spleen2 no general should fight a battle simply out of pi*ue. %8. If it is to your advantage' ma,e a for ard move2 if not' stay here you are.

&9. Anger may in time change to gladness2 ve:ation may be succeeded by content. &%. "ut a ,ingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being2 nor can the dead ever be brought bac, to life. &&. (ence the enlightened ruler is heedful' and the good general full of caution. This is the ay to ,eep a country at peace and an army intact. GIII. The Hse of Spies %. Sun Tzu said: Faising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily e:penditure ill amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There ill be commotion at home and abroad' and men ill drop do n e:hausted on the high ays. As many as seven hundred thousand families ill be impeded in their labor. &. (ostile armies may face each other for years' striving for the victory hich is decided in a single day. This being so' to remain in ignorance of the enemy-s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments' is the height of inhumanity. +. =ne ho acts thus is no leader of men' no present help to his sovereign' no master of victory. .. Thus' hat enables the ise sovereign and the good general to stri,e and con*uer' and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men' is fore,no ledge. 4. @o this fore,no ledge cannot be elicited from spirits2 it cannot be obtained inductively from e:perience' nor by any deductive calculation. 5. Eno ledge of the enemy-s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. 6. (ence the use of spies' of hom there are five classes: /%0 #ocal spies2 /&0 in ard spies2 /+0 converted spies2 /.0 doomed spies2 /40 surviving spies. 7. !hen these five ,inds of spy are all at or,' none can discover the secret system. This is called Cdivine manipulation of the threads.C It is the sovereign-s most precious faculty. 8. (aving local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. %9. (aving in ard spies' ma,ing use of officials of the enemy.

%%. (aving converted spies' getting hold of the enemy-s spies and using them for our o n purposes. %&. (aving doomed spies' doing certain things openly for purposes of deception' and allo ing our spies to ,no of them and report them to the enemy. %+. Surviving spies' finally' are those ho bring bac, ne s from the enemy-s camp. %.. (ence it is that hich none in the hole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than ith spies. @one should be more liberally re arded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. %4. Spies cannot be usefully employed ithout a certain intuitive sagacity. %5. They cannot be properly managed ithout benevolence and straightfor ardness. %6. !ithout subtle ingenuity of mind' one cannot ma,e certain of the truth of their reports. %7. "e subtle> be subtle> and use your spies for every ,ind of business. %8. If a secret piece of ne s is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe' he must be put to death together ith the man to hom the secret as told. &9. !hether the ob)ect be to crush an army' to storm a city' or to assassinate an individual' it is al ays necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants' the aides;de;camp' and door;,eepers and sentries of the general in command. =ur spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. &%. The enemy-s spies ho have come to spy on us must be sought out' tempted ith bribes' led a ay and comfortably housed. Thus they ill become converted spies and available for our service. &&. It is through the information brought by the converted spy that e are able to ac*uire and employ local and in ard spies. &+. It is o ing to his information' again' that e can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. &.. #astly' it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. &4. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is ,no ledge of the enemy2 and this ,no ledge can only be derived' in the first

instance' from the converted spy. (ence it is essential that the converted spy be treated ith the utmost liberality. &5. =f old' the rise of the Din dynasty as due to I Chih ho had served under the (sia. #i,e ise' the rise of the Chou dynasty as due to #u Da ho had served under the Din. &6. (ence it is only the enlightened ruler and the ise general ho ill use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in ater' because on them depends an army-s ability to move. T(3 3@B ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; Copyright statement: The Internet Classics Archive by Baniel C. Stevenson' !eb Atomics. !orld !ide !eb presentation is copyright /C0 %88.;&999' Baniel C. Stevenson' !eb Atomics. All rights reserved under international and pan;American copyright conventions' including the right of reproduction in hole or in part in any form. Birect permission re*uests to classicsIclassics.mit.edu. Translation of CThe Beeds of the Bivine AugustusC by Augustus is copyright /C0 Thomas "ushnell' "S$.