Vasquez Comparing Paths To War

Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths
to War Author(s): John A. Vasquez Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 531-558 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600890 . Accessed: 17/02/2014 13:12
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(1996) 40, 531-558 Quarterly Studies International
DistinguishingRivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A QuantitativeComparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War
JOHN
A. VASQUEZ
University Vanderbilt
enduring rivalriesexperience wars, some do not. This Many interstate and howrivals why, analysispresentsand testsan explanationofwhether, betweenequal statesthatdo not go to go to war. It is argued thatrivalries issues are not at stake. Rivalriesin the war are those in whichterritorial issues tend to go to war onlyby being embroiledin absence of territorial withemphasison rivalries A seriesoftests an ongoingwarbya third party. during1816-1986 supportsthe territorial betweenmajor statesoccurring explanation. Two distinctpaths to war are empiricallyidentified-one dispute(s)and a second path a territorial leading to a dyadicwarinvolving a territorial disputejoin an ongoing war because bywhichrivalswithout of contagionfactors.
Enduring rivalries is a topic that has received increased attention in the last few years (see Wayman, 1983, 1996; Huth and Russett, 1991; Geller, 1993; Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Thompson, 1995; Bennett, 1996; Hensel, 1996). Most rivalries result in war, but a few do not. Is it possible to distinguish the few that do not go to war fromthe many that do? This article presents a theoretical answer to this query based on the territorialexplanation of war and tests this explanation on rivalries between major states from 1816 to 1986. The theoretical analysis suggests that rivalries differ markedly in how they go to war, so much so that it is possible to distinguish two differentpaths to war. The identification of these paths provides a more complete understanding of why and how rivalries between equal states lead to war. This article begins with a discussion of some of the conceptual issues involved in defining rivalry.It then develops a theoretical explanation of why and how rivalries go to war, presenting two propositions that can be tested empirically. The next section outlines the research design, and the fourthpresents the findings.
Paul F. Diehl, Douglas M. Gibler,Marie T. Henehan, A. BikashRoy,Tom note:Mythanksto ScottBennett, Autthor's forthe articleremains and editorsof ISQ forvaluable comments.The finalresponsibility Walker,and the reviewers mine alone, however.
C 1996 InteirnationalStudies Association. by Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street,Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK PuLblished
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Rivals Distinguishing The Concept of Rivalry
on international Commentators history, whetherpolitical scientists or historians, have oftenfeltthe need to use the termrivalry to characterize a special,competitive relationship thatemergesbetweentwopartiesthatdistinguishes it fromthe typical relationship thatgovernspoliticalactors.Thus, we have theFranco-German rivalry ofthe late nineteenth and earlytwentieth therivalry betweenPrussiaand centuries, Austriaover Germany,and the recentSoviet-American rivalry. No one questions deservethe label "rivalry," butwhatmakes themconceptuthattheserelationships or competitive one mightfindin fromotherconflictive ally distinct relationships history thatare not usuallyconsideredrivalries? of rivalry Operational definitions emphasize repeated disputes (i.e., the use or Goertzand Diehl (1993) review threat offorce)as themajorcharacteristic ofrivalry. in use and the effect the variousoperationaldefinitions different currently dispute includedin a definition. While thresholds have on the numberofwarsand rivalries theseoperationaldefinitions have been usefulforanalyzingdata, theydo notreally providea conceptualization ofthedynamics ofrivalry thatgiveriseto therecurrent thatwill disputesin thefirst place. Whatis needed is a better, conceptualdefinition be able to predictthe onset of disputes(see also Thompson, 1995:195-7). is defined here as: a relationship and Rivalry characterized byextreme competition, cal hostility, inwhich the contenders usually psychologi issue positions of aregoverned primarily eachother rather at hand. Competitionis the bytheir attitude toward thanbythestakes engine that drivesthe rivalry and, in political interactions (as opposed to purely commercialtransactions), produces hostility at some level.As conflict recurs,contenders become moreconcernedwithhurting or denying their thanwith competitor theirown immediatevalue satisfaction, and withthis,hostility deepens and goes I beyondthatassociatedwithnormalconflict. While competition and the hostility oftenassociatedwithit are the mostobvious the foundation characteristics of rivalry, on whichrivalry restslies withthe issue(s) under contention whenissuesare approached and (cf.Bennett,1996). Technically, defined in termsof what theymean for the other actor, this is called an actor as opposed to a stakedimension, which defines issues in termsof the dimension; intrinsic value the stakehas to oneself(see Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981:60). The hallmarkof a rivalry is the adoption of an actor dimension,which is drivenby ratherthan a stake dimension,whichis drivenby a negativeaffect (i.e., hostility), cost-benefit analysis of the stake under contention.Normal conflictis guided because of the persistenceof ultimatelyby a selfishconcern, whereas rivalry, and negativeactsthatfrom hostility, can getout ofhand and make fordisagreement a strict cost-benefit When an actordimensionis adopted, analysisare notnecessary. thereis also a tendency forall issues (and the specific stakesthatcompose them)to become linkedintoone grand issue-us versusthem. Thus, as I have noted elsewhere(Vasquez, 1993:82):
A rivalry intoissueson the is a competitive relationship amongequals thatlinksstakes a persistent basis of an actordimension. The actordimensionresults fi-om disagreement and the use of negativeacts which build up negativeaffect (psychological reinforces the actordimension whichgradually reducesall issues hostility). Hostility
I The level of hostility a politicalactoris involvedin and can be expected to var-y depending on how manyrivalries theremay be, as Deutsch and Singer how it ranksrivalsby the threatstheypose. When thereare multiplerivalries, Whereas when there is only one rivali-y (1964) argue, cross-cutting of certain issues which will moderate affect. cross-cutting is less likely, especiallyifall the issuesare reduced to one of"us vs. them"or "good vs. evil"(see Mansbach suchas theU.S. and USSR and Vasquez, 1981:ch. 7 forelaboration).Hence, politicalactorsinvolvedin onlyone rivalry, than political from1947 to 1964,willhave a higherlevel of hostility and willbe more guided by theirmutualhostility actorsinvolvedin multiplerivalries, forexample, the U.K.-Italyrivali-y priorto WorldWar II.
JOHN A. VASQUEZ to a singleoverarching issue. Simultaneously, concretestakesare transformed into symbolic and transcendent ones, and proposalsforthedisposition ofstakesand the resolutionof an issue distribute costsand benefits on an unequal basis. This makes for more disagreement,greater use of negative acts, and an intensification of hostility, whichin turnreinforces the actordimension.An escalatingconflict spiral results, whichcreatesan atmospherein whichcrisesare likelyto be born. Rivalry becomes a wayoflife.The relationship is difficult to changebecause each side is involvedin a vicious circle in whichhostility makes actorsdefineissues in in part,because waysthatare intractable and threatening, and actors become hostile, of the waytheyhave definedthe issuesthatdivide them.
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Issues become intractablenot simplybecause theyare intrinsically difficult to resolve,but also because one side cannotjust seize thestakesat hand through sheer force.Relativecapabilityplaces the actors in a situationfromwhich neithercan is make a decision withoutthe agreement of the other. The result, typically, whichfuelsboth hostility stalemate, and recurring disputes.The advantageof such a conceptualization is thatit getsat the dynamics the "enduringdispuunderlying tation"(Wayman,1983:18, note 6) of rivalsand hence is able to predictwhen two politicalactorscan be expected to engage in recurring disputes. The inabilityof either side to impose its issue position leads me to assume, to Waymanand Jones (1991) and Goertz and Diehl (1993), thatrelative contrary equality is a prerequisite of rivalry.Without equality there cannot be a real competition, because one side would be capable of dominating the other. Anotherway of puttingthis is that interactions between equals are bound to be different frominteractionsbetween unequals, because the logic of equality of different fromthe logic of inequality.This can power or statusis fundamentally be seen by looking at some of the major-minordyads Waymanand Jones (1991) and Goertz and Diehl (1995) identifyas rivals, such as Russia-Turkey (pre 1816-1918) and U.S.-Mexico (1896-1921) (Waymanand Jones, 1991) or U.S.Haiti and India-Nepal (Goertz, 1994:221-2; Goertz and Diehl, 1995). The relationships and behavior of these dyads, I would submit,are fundamentally different from the Anglo-German rivalry,the Soviet-Americanrivalry,or the rivalrybetween France and Germany,Prussia and Austria,or Russia and Austria-Hungary(cf. Thompson, 1995:197-200). Relations between unequals is better discussed based on an imperialist or asymmetricperspective than the perspectiveof rivalry. betweenrelative Froma psychological therelationship perspective, equals should be different fromthatbetweenunequals. In an unequal relationship, onlytheweak tendto takean actordimensionand are guided byextremehostility (and a hostility based primarily on seethingresentment ratherthan on the otheraspectsof hostility).Likewise,the stronghave no need to feartheirweaker opponent,and hence are more motivated The absence ofmutual bypredationthansecurity. fear,insecurity, and hostility suggeststhat the fundamentalpsychologicalunderpinningsof are different from thoseofequal relationships. unequal relationships Nevertheless, whetherrivalries are betterconceptualizedby controlling forequalityis a question that should be decided ultimately on the basis of empiricalresearchratherthan solelyconceptual analysis.By examiningonly rivalsbetweenequals, this analysis conflict withthebehaviorofprotracted providesa basisfora subsequentcomparison betweenunequals. This definition ofrivalry, theissue(s) then,emphasizesthreecharacteristics: First, whichis thefoundation oftherivalry. overthisissue(s),which Second, thecontention between equals gives rise to persistentdisagreementin the form of an actor dimension.Third, psychologicalhostility, which arises naturallyfrompersistent and is typical of the mostenduringrivalries. disagreement
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Rivals Distinguishing
because dyads rivalrieshave attractedinterest Withinthe empirical literature, of going to war than disputeshave a much higherprobability thathave recurrent other dyads (see Diehl, 1985; Goertz and Diehl, 1992a; Wayman,1996), withthe dyads(Bremer,1992). No one has asked,however, possibleexceptionofcontiguous thatgo to war fromthe fewthatdo not. the manyrivalries distinguish whatfactors This is an importantquestion for both theoreticaland methodologicalreasons. would add to our knowledge being able to explain the difference Theoretically, the question provides a challenge and about the onset of war. Methodologically, powerand empiricalaccuracyofvarious hence a testforappraisingtheexplanatory explanationsofwar. interstate rivalries thatgo to war fromthose thatdo not Clearly,distinguishing easier ifone has an explanation of war in general. It is is a task made immensely maintained here that the most importantthingsabout understandingwhether rivalriesresult in war are: (1) the issues under contention-some issues, like territorial issues, are much more prone to war than others,for example, purely ideological issues; and (2) the patternof interaction-thatis, how the issues are handled. thathave a war and betweenrivalries From thisperspective, the main difference issues.Rivalstates to avoid crisesinvolving territorial thosethatdo not is theability a major war disputeswitheach othertend not to fight thatdo not have territorial with each other unless they are brought in by third parties. The next section forthem elaboratesthe meaning of thesepropositionsand providesa justification whichtheyare derived. explanationfrom fromthe general theoretical Explaining the Onset and Expansion of War War is a verycomplex subject,in part because war does not resultfroma singleset ofcauses. There are manypathsto war. In anotheranalysis(Vasquez, 1993), I have equal stateshave become embroiled path bywhichrelatively delineatedthe typical hoped thata I had initially in warswithone anotherin the modern statesystem. Instead, I have could be constructed. single explanationof war over all of history typesofwar and thateach typecan come to the conclusionthatthereare different the be preceded bydifferent causal sequences. To explain war requiresidentifying variouspaths thatlead to war. In trying to identify the causal sequences thatprecede wars,I have distinguished between underlyingand proximate causes. Underlyingcauses are fundamental a trainofevents(the proximatecauses) thatend in war.Of all the causes thatsetoff disputesbetween various issues over whichwars can arise, I argue thatterritorial thatcan giverise to a sequence of actions neighborsare the main source ofconflict that ends in war (see also Kocs, 1995). Since all neighborsusuallymust,at some contendwiththisissue,and because thisissue is an issue over pointin theirhistory, I see territorial disputesas an underlying which most neighborsare apt to fight, willdepend on how willgiverise to war,however, or not they cause ofwar.Whether the issue is treated(the proximatecauses). Since how statestreateach othervaries the proximatecauses of war are much according to a number of characteristics, causes. more varied than the underlying I identify policypracticesthatlead to proximatecauses bylookingat the foreign war is likelyamong equals if the war. I argue that,in the modern global system, disputes. Power practicesof power politics are used to tryto resolve territorial that increasestheprobability war,actually politicsbehavior,ratherthanpreventing it will break out. This is because the main practicesof power politics-alliances, and hostility, tactics-increaseinsecurity buildups,and theuse ofrealpolitik military each side to take a harderline. Coercion failsto produce complianceor motivating because thenatureoftheissue at stakeis suchthatgivingin (especially compromise
JOHN A. VASQUEZ
535
to an equal) is unthinkable.Under such conditions,the use of power politics thatmake war and domesticpoliticalenvironments produces a set of interactions increasingly likely.Between equals, war is broughtabout by each side's takinga and make the issue at hand more intractable. seriesof steps thatincreasehostility This involvesthe disputantsin a series of crises,one of which escalates to war. of ofwarand whichcharacteristics Evidence on whichstepsincreasetheprobability crisesmake themprone to escalationcan be foundin existingempiricalresearch (see Vasquez, 1993:ch. 5). The use of the foreignpolicy practices of power politics to handle certain willincreasethe probability ofwar,butwhether territorial disputes,it is predicted, power politicswill be used depends, in part,on the nature of the global political context,in particular,whetherit systemin operation. The global institutional issues,has a major impacton providesnormsand "rulesof the game" forresolving war and creatingpeace whetherstateswill resort to power politics. Preventing that provide mechanismsforresolving involveslearning how to build structures issues throughdiplomacyratherthanarmed force. thatbring one of the main factors To summarize:In the modern state system, between disputes,particularly about war between equals is the rise of territorial to resolve network ofa global institutional neighbors, that,in theabsence or failure make actorsresort providedbypower theissuepolitically, to theunilateralsolutions politics. disputesare much From the above itfollows thatrivalries thatinvolveterritorial disputes. more apt to result in war than rivalriesthat do not involveterritorial source especiallyborders,is an important Attempts to demarkand defineterritory, in thevery In fact, thisterritorial oftheterm etymology ofrivalry. aspectis reflected which means "one using the same rival,which is derived fromthe Latin rivalis, 2nd college ed.). Thus, in stream(rivus)as another" (American Dictionary, Heritage the first use of the term,rivalswere thosewho both soughtto use a life-sustaining thatoftenhad to be shared. piece of territory on territorial In themodernglobal system, ended up contending manyneighbors to controlthe originatedin attempts stakes,and one suspectsthatmanyrivalries are space betweenthem. Hence, it should come as no surprisethatmostrivalries between neighborsand appear related to territorial disputes. Less frequentare andJones(1991) sample, states. UsingtheWayman rivalries between noncontiguous between1816 and 1986, ithas been whichidentifies interstate rivalries twenty-eight whereasonlyfour werenot ofthemwerebetweenneighbors, foundthattwenty-four (Vasquez, 1993:134-5). thatrivalsinvolvedin territorial theproposition One oftheproblemswithtesting therewillbe rivals disputesare more apt to go towaris thatsincewar is multicausal, thatgo to war without dispute.A valid testof the proposition havinga territorial will therefore but to do so requires have to incorporatethis added complexity, identifying at least some of the additionalconditionsunder whichrivalsgo to war. are territorial without One ofthemajorwaysstates disputesgo towar is thatthey thatis, a complex war drawninto a dyadicwar thatspreads to become multilateral; (see Vasquez, 1993:71-4). Putanotherway,therivalsare broughtintoa warbythird then,become relevantfordetermining parties.Models ofcontagionand diffusion, focusedon territorial who willbe at war and when. If havinga rivalry questionsis a territorial one path to war,a second path to war is forrivalswithout disputeto be drawn into a war. Furthermore, one would expect, on the basis of the above theoreticalanalysis,that this complex war would begin witha territorial dispute betweenthe initialbelligerents. offer some clues as to the path by whichinterstate Existingempiricalfindings warsexpand (see Bueno de Mesquita,1978; Organskiand Kugler,1980; Yamamoto and Bremer,1980; Wayman,1984; Sabrosky, 1985; Siversonand Starr,1991). Once
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or a war breaks out, other statesare broughtin because of alliance commitments contiguity (see Siversonand Starr,1991), diffusion processes involving territorial ongoing rivalries,the breakdown of political order, economic dependence, or simplythe dynamicof the ongoing war itself(see Vasquez, 1993:ch. 7 for a full discussion). path towar,thefollowing wouldbe predicted: Taken in conjunction withthefirst 1. The main factor thatdistinguishes rivalsthatgo to war,at some point in their fromthose that do not is the presence of an ongoing territorial dispute. history, Because thereare otherpathstowar,this Territorial disputesmakewarmorelikely. in fordyadicwarsand initialbelligerents path would be expected to hold primarily a multilateral war. 2. The main path bywhichrivalsthatdo not have territorial disputesgo to war This means is to be broughtinto an ongoingwar by one of the initialbelligerents. thatrivals without territorial tobe involvedin complexwars disputesare morelikely ratherthandyadicwarswitheach other.In addition,itwouldbe expectedthatthere be some tendencyforrivalsdrawn into a war to join thatwar aftersome decent the easier it would be intervalfollowing initialhostilities. The longer the interval, to justify the inference that thatit was the ongoingwar and processesof diffusion drewin the rivalsor providedan incentive fortheserivalsto fight. of a rivalinto an ongoingwar should not be Nevertheless, the immediateentry taken as evidence against the second path to war. Alliances or commitments to defenda thirdparty soon, as in WorldWar I and World could bringin a statefairly WarII, whena majorstate(s)comes to theaid ofa minorstatethatis beingpressured by one's rival.Russia did thiswithSerbia in 1914, and Britainand France did this forPoland in 1939. This theoretical some of the dynamics and complexitiesofwhy analysisclarifies paths to war,it is difficult forrivalsthat rivalsgo to war. Since thereare twodistinct are equal to avoid war. Nevertheless, the presence of distinct paths helps explain whywar is more probable in some rivalriesthan others.Thus, the analysiscan explain whywarwas more probable betweenGermanyand France-Russiain 1914 itclearly thanbetweenGermany and Britain. Also,unlikeotherhypotheses, specifies the processbywhichrivalswillcome to war and the typeofwar itwillbe (dyadicvs. complex). theexplanationsuggests whysome rivalries do notresultin warand what Finally, the U.S. and of theserivalries the characteristics should be. From thisperspective, USSR did not fighta direct (dyadic) war with each other because therewas no territorial disputebetweenthem.A complex warwas avoided by each side's taking care to manage theirrivalry so as to avoid theescalationand spread ofwarsinwhich theywere a party.2 the analysisseems plausible and has a certainamountof explanaTheoretically, testing. tory power.Whatneeds to be seen is whetherit can pass systematic
2 One ofthe r-easons and especially inter vention theU.S. and USSR wereso concernedabout managingtheiirivalh-y dispute into ongoing warswas the danger of escalationto nuclearwar (see Kahn, 1968). The absence of a territorial whichwereprimarily ideological,werenotworth betweentheU.S. and theUSSR meantthattheissuesdividingthetwo, did notprevent byitself war,whichmeans r-isking all-outwar.The implication ofthisanalysisis thatnucleardeterrence would have a much higherprobability of failing(see thatin rivalries thathave a salientterritor-ial dispute,deterrence Vasquez, 1991; see also Thompson, 1995:209).
A. VASQUEZ JOHN Research Design
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Because the analysis delineates two distinctpaths to war, it is importantthat We can begin by derivedto testthe explanationbe properlyspecified. hypotheses rivalsthatgo to what distinguishes analysis, asking,on the basis of the theoretical thathave never itwould be expected thatrivalries war fromthosethatdo not. First, disputes.Second, itwould been at war would be those thatdo not have territorial wouldgo to disputes somerivals thatdo nothave territorial be expectedthatalthough than warsrather incomplexmultilateral war,they would(1) be moreapt tobe involved dyadic wars, and theywould (2) have more of a tendencythan rivals involving disputestojoin an ongoingwar ratherthanbe involvedat thebeginning territorial are derived: thefollowing twogeneralpropositions ofthewar.Based on thisanalysis, are more apt togo towar disputes 1: Rivals that haveterritorial Proposition territorial at some eachother thanthose without history with pointin their directly territorial without Hence,rivalsthatdo notgo to war shouldbe those disputes. disputes. should ofterritorial disputes absence 2: Rivalsthat go towarin the Proposition rivalsthat go to multilateral wars.Likewise, be involved in more warsthandyadic shouldbe more likely togetinvolved in war in theabsence ofterritorial disputes warsthanat thebeginning ongoing ofwars. whichthesepropositions are derivedpositsdifferent Since the explanationfrom equal or unequal, dyads paths to war depending on whetherstatesare relatively dyads) will not be examined. Even consistingof unequal states(i.e., major-minor pathstowar,especially are thought tobe governedbysimilar thoughwarsofequality behave in thepresenceofrivalry, thereis some evidenceto suggestthatminorstates and at othertimesmore more cautiously frommajor states-sometimes differently (see Vasquez, 1993:127, 168, 191,230-1, 316, 318, 339, note 17). For this aggressively betweenmajor states.Such a will be confinedonlyto rivalries reason, thisanalysis 1972; and Stuckey, procedureis not unusual in peace research(see Singer,Bremer, is on cases aboutwhichthere 1996). This also has theadvantageoffocusing Wayman, The standard Correlates ofWarlistformajorpowers historical knowledge. widespread minorstates.3 majorfrom willbe takenas an operational fordistinguishing definition approach requiresthatnew data be collected,and thiscan Anynew theoretical the testing we are onlybeginningto get process.As a field, slowdownconsiderably on exactly and the efforts to date have produced disagreements data on rivalries, a rivalry and howitshouldbe operationalized.It is no conceptually whatconstitutes in definition listsofrivalries (see should produce different surprisethatdifferences in the listsare not as severeas one might Goertzand Diehl, 1993). The differences on how many disputes to use as a suspect,however,since theycenter primarily whatis or is not a "true"rivalry. An obvious solutionto thresholdfordetermining thisdefinitional (Wayman, problemis to treattheamountof"enduringdisputation" disputesin a dyad) 1983:18, note 6) (i.e., thevariationin thenumberofmilitarized Goertz and Diehl dimension to measure the degree of rivalry. as an underlying (1995) move in this directionby establishingthresholdsfor sporadic or isolated rivalries and enduring (butsee also Goertzand Diehl, 1994). conflict, proto-rivalries, To date most quantitative analyses have employed the number of militarized rivalry (see Goertz disputes(MIDs) as the basic indicatorof an interstate interstate
3 Major powersare identified (1816-1918), Prussia(1816-1870) bySmall and Singer(1982:45) as: Austria-Hungar-y and its successorGermany(1871-1918, 1925-1945), Russia/USSR(1816-1917, 1922-present),France (1816-1940, 1945-present),England/U.K.(1816-present),Italy(1860-1943), Japan (1895-1945), U.S. (1898-present),and China
(1 950-pr-esent).
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Distinguishing Rivals
and Diehl, 1993). This analysiswill do the same; all three major listsof rivalries based on Correlates of War militarizedinterstatedispute (MID) data will be employed. These lists can be ordered by the degree to which their operational criteria reduce the potentialset of interstate rivalries. This is accomplishedby two setsofrules,one defining thenumberofdisputesrequiredand thesecond thelength of timeexamined. The most restricted listis thatof Waymanand Jones (1991:5), who operationallydefinean enduringrivalry as having at least fivereciprocated militarized disputesduringa twenty-five-year period,each ofwhichmustlast fora reciprocateddispute minimumof thirty days. Rivalriesend if thereis no further over a twenty-five-year span. These criteriaproduce only seven dyadic rivalries betweenmajor statesfrom1816 to 1984. The main reason forthisis that,unlike other operational definitions, Waymanand Jones's (1991) criteriarequire that a whereasotherslook at the disputebe reciprocated in orderto countas an indicator, totalnumberof disputesregardlessofwhether Waymanand theyare reciprocated. Jones(1991) adopt thisrulein partbecauseJones(1988) showsthatabout40 percent of the militarizeddisputesnever receive a response fromthe targetand because makinga dyadappear sometimes militarized disputesinvolving minorstates cluster, as an enduringrivalry when in factit maynot be. The second mostrestrictive listis thatof Goertzand Diehl's "enduring"rivalries whichuses six militarized On the basis disputeswithin twenty yearsas a threshold. of an extensiveanalysisof disputesbetweena variety of states,Goertz and Diehl ifmore than six rivalries (1993:167) finda clear drop in the numberof interstate disputes are used as a threshold.This operational definitionresultsin eleven rivalries betweenmajor statesfrom1816 to 1976. a rivalry The least restrictive listis thatofWayman(1983, 1996) who identifies existingbetween two major states if theyhave at leasttwo militarizedinterstate is said to end ten disputeswitheach other over the course of a decade. A rivalry years afterthe last militarizeddispute. One of the advantages of his approach is This permits thatit identifies more specifictimeperiods when a dyad is a rivalry. an examination of each period to see which path to war it follows. Such a whichcan be quitesevere specification helps alleviatethenumber-of-cases problem, when identifying Wayman's (1996) criteria only rivalsand not periodsof rivalry. periods of rivalry. produce twenty-three rivalsbetweenmajor statesand forty-four It is assumed that as the numberof militarizeddisputesincreases,the kind of relationship depicted in the theoretical portionof the articleis likelyto exist; that is going to indicate ofmilitarized confrontations is, itis assumed thattherepetition a highlycompetitive and relationshipcharacterizedby negativeaffect(hostility) governedbyan actordimension. or the actor Of course, the repetitionof disputesdoes not directly tap hostility dimension,and no claim is made here thatit does. Rather,the repeated MIDs are ofthesefactors, seen as an indirect indicator whichis notan implausible assumption, the characterized especiallyfortherivalries bya large numberofdisputes.Whether researchthat assumptionis accurateis an empiricalquestionthatwillneed further is beyond the scope of thisarticle.4Suffice it to say here thatthe main purpose of thisarticleis not to establishthe empiricalsuperiority of the particular conception in thefirst ofrivalry offered but the superiority ofthe explanationofpeace section, and war in whichthatconceptionof rivalry happens to be embedded. For such a ifit is assumed thatthesebear some test,it is betterto use standardlistsof rivalry,
4 It is certainly stipulated in thedefinition ofrivalry employed characterized thecase thatrivals bythekindofhostility What conditionforrepeatedconfrontations. ofthissortis positedas a sufficient herewillhave repeatedMIDs. Hostility thatlack hostility and are not governedby an is not clear is whetherthereexist dyads withrepeated confrontations would make the use of the MID indicatormore complicated. actordimension.The presenceof the latter
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reasonablecorrelation to themorecomplicatedunmeasuredaspectsoftheconcept. The variousrivalries thatwillbe used in the data analysisare reportedin Table 1 along withotherrelevantmeasures. to finddata on territorial disputes.Verylittle The real problemoccursin trying systematic workhas been done on thisquestion,althoughthereare some data on (Day, territorial changes (Goertz and Diehl, 1992b) and listsof border conflicts betweenterritorial issuesand war 1987). One ofthebestanalysesoftherelationship is Holsti (1991), but his analysisis not based on precise operationalizedmeasures. Eventually, data on territorial issues and disputeswill need to be collected to test willbe taken the propositions.In the presentcircumstances, territorial contiguity as an indirectmeasure. It is argued in Vasquez (1993) thatat some point in their equal will tend to establish their borders history, neighbors that are relatively throughthe use of force.If thisis the case, it can be expected thatstatesthatare issues.Of to be disputing over territorial contiguousand are rivalsare in factlikely in each case and documented course, this will need to be checked historically coded in a scientifically reliablemanner, butsucha projectwould extensively and/or requirea separateanalysis. reviewto historical For now,each case can be examined on the basis ofa cursory rivalswill be see whetherrivalsare fighting issues. In thisreview, over territorial consideredas havinga territorial disputeif:(1) theymake directclaims to a piece of territory held or occupied byone oftherivals, or (2) theyhave competingclaims each The small numberof cases permits regardingterritory held by a thirdparty. Thelisting to be checkedto see whether itfits the logic of the hypothesis. dyads ofthe partofthe data analysis and can beseenas a set in the contingency tables is thus an integral is an efficient Sucha procedure wayofdeterminofquantitative comparative casestudies. iswarranted. and costly, datacollection ingwhether morerigorous, buttime-consuming indicator, because fromthe theoretical Lastly, contiguity can serveas an indirect rivalsdid perspective being presentedhere,itwould be expected thatifcontiguous The theexplanationwouldbe falsified. notexperiencewarin themannerpredicted, use of contiguity therefore the conditionof falsifiability.5 satisfies willbe tested: theaboveoperational indicators, thefollowing hypotheses Employing 1. Rivaldyads that aremore apttogo towarat some point arecontiguous in their that are notcontiguous. history thanrivaldyads war 2. Rivalries states aremore apttoendin dyadic involving contiguous thanrivalries states noncontiguous (tobetested by removing involving casesofmultilateral war). more 3. Noncontiguous rivalsthat apttobeinvolved go towarare much in multilateral rivalsthat go towar. warsthancontiguous 4. Noncontiguous rivalsthatgo to war are muchmoreapt tojoin an warthancontiguous that dyads go towar. ongoing rivals,noncontiguous rivalswilleither 5. In comparison to contiguous haveno warorbeinvolved in multilateral warswith rivals. only
may be Conversely, it is a limitedindicatorbecause it may not be acceptable to thosewho hold thatcontiguity associated withwar not because territorial issues are more prone to violence, but because contiguity provides an of thesepositionls are presented interactions. Theoreticalrefutations opportunity forwar due to proximity or frequent in Vasquez (1993:ch. 4). In order to resolve the debate over why neighborsfight-whetherbecause of proximity, interactions, or territoriality-both sides of thedebate mustcome up witha setofcrucialtests(see Vasquez, 1995). The in thisarticleis notintendedtoprovidesucha test, and howrivalries butto assessa territorial explanationofwhy analysis to do. nor the interaction go to war,something thatneithertheproximity explanationi has attempted
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TABLE
1. Comparisonof Major State Rivalry Dataa Wayman andJones Goertz and DiehlC Dyadicl Multi
Dyad FR-GER
Contig.b Y
Wayman 1830-1842 1850-1880 1905-1933 1936-1945 1860-1876 1888-1903 1925-1950 1830-1864 1917-1928 1948-1971 1848-1869 1914-1918 1938-1950 1865-1876 1838-1860 1912-1918 1895-1913 1917-1930 1933-1955 1914-1939 1966-1984 1825-1850 1888-1908 1849-1871 1877-1914 1917-1933 1946-1971 1900-1931 1938-1945 1932-1950 1934-1950 1843-1887 1904-1918 1934-1945 1893-1905 1917-1928 1937-1951 1902-1913 1915-1927 1932-1950 1917-1928 1946-1983 1900-1915 1949-1984 23 dyads
WaTd
1850-1945 1905-1939
FR-IT FR-RUS FR-AH FR-JN PRUS-AH GER-RUS RUS-AH RUS/USSR-JN
Y N N N Y Y Y Y
Franco-Prussian WWI WWII
M M M
WWII Crimean Ital Unification WWI No wars Seven Weeks [WWI,WWII]* WWI Russo-Japanese Changkufeng Nomohan WWII Sino-Soviet Fr.Rev/Nap Crimean
M M M M M M D D M M D M
1895-1945
1895-1976
RUS/USSR-CH+ Y UK-FR Y
1898-1986 pre-1816-1840
1898-1929
UK-RUS
1877-1923 1900-1939 1932-1954 1911-1940 1843-1915
UK-GER UK-JN UK-IT IT-AH
N N N Y
1843-1918
IT-GER IT-RUS US-UK US-GER US-JN US-USSR US-CH
N N N N N N N
WWI WWII WWII WWII Aust-Sardinian Ital Unification Seven Weeks WWI [WWI]* [Crimean]* WWII No wars WWI WWII No wars Boxer Rebellion Korean
M M M M M M M M
1837-1861
1946-1986 1949-1974 7 dyads
1946-1973 1949-1974 11 dyads
M M
Number ofcases:
JOHN A. VASQUEZ
TABLE 1.
541
Continued
(a)Based on Wayman(1996), WaymanandJones (1991), and Goertzand Diehl (1995:Table 1). (b) Contiguity definedas an adjacent land borderor a separation (Y = yes,N = no) is operationally Palmer(1961) and Langer (1972). Under thisstandard ofless than 150 milesofwater.Data derivedfrom the US-USSR is contiguousafter1959 whenAlaska is Correlatesof War projectoperationaldefinition nations because boththeU.S. and theUSSR are continental grantedstatehood.However,in thisanalysis frompopulation centerstheyare treatedas not contiguousfor thatare proximateonlyin areas distant the entireperiod. (c) Goertzand Diehl omit 12 rivaldyadsofWayman:FR-IT, PRUS-AH, RUS-AH, UK-FR, GER-RUS, IT-GER, IT-RUS, FR-AH, US-JN,US-GER. Last disputedate is used, nottermination FR-RUS, FR-JN, date. (d) War data includingparticipants and date of entry are takenfromSmall and Singer (1982:Table is not treatedas an interstate warbySmall and Singer(1982:80, 202, 4.2). The 1917 allied intervention Gaddis' (1987:4-5, and international civilwar. This is consistentwith 227), butlistedas an extrasystemic a war. thatthe U.S. and USSR have neverfought 223) interpretation (*) Warsfought outsiderivalry period. (?) Because USSR-China have a rivalry of whenboth are major states,1966-1984, the earlierrivalry the 1914-1939 is retained in the sample even though China was not then a major state.Conversely, "rivalry" ofJapan and China, 1914-1947, whichproduces threewars,is not includedbecause therewas when bothwere major states. nevera period of rivalry
these The finalmeasurement problemthatneeds to be discussedbeforetesting The various is howto operationalize"warat some pointin theirhistory." hypotheses wars occur identified make thisproblematicbecause sometimes periods of rivalry The generalrule adopted is to include beforeor after a particular period ofrivalry. ifitoccurredduringor after at some pointin therivalry's history a waras occurring but not ifit occurredbefore.Since mostwarsoccurredduringa a period of rivalry, rivalryperiod, this is not a major problem; however,some specificcases were the U.K.-Russia rivalryas affected.Thus, for Goertz and Diehl, who identify 1877-1923, the earlierCrimeanWar is not included,althoughit is included in the Similarly, the 1849-1871 period as one ofrivalry. Waymansample,whichidentified in the Italy-Germany which is identifiedas a rivalryby Wayman for rivalry, 1934-1945, World War I where Italyand Germanywere on opposite sides is not Lastly,the U.K.-France included because it occurredbeforethe period of rivalry. by Wayman and Jones as predating 1816, whereas is identifiedcorrectly rivalry (1825-1850 and 1888-1908). Since most periodsofrivalry Waymanhas twospecific as one thatwentto war,the French observers would regardthe U.K.-Francerivalry Wars are included in the analysis, withEngland seen as Revolutionary/Napoleonic a joiner. Findings a briefreviewof the Before beginninga reporton the testsof these hypotheses, as reportedin Table 1 is in order.Using differences among thethreelistsofrivalries seven fordetermining a high threshold rivalry, Waymanand Jones (1991) identify Goertzand Diehl, Basically, elevenrivals. rivalsand Goertzand Diehl (1995) identify all therivals Wayman to includean MID, identify who do notrequirereciprocation is withone exception-U.K.-France (pre 1816-1840). The latter and Jonesidentify of its where therewould be no questionhistorically a legacyof the earliercentury, In addition to the six rivalries Waymanand Jones (1991) statusas a major rivalry. also identify, Goertz and Diehl include: U.K.-Russia, U.K.-U.S., U.K.-Germany, U.K.-Italy, and U.K.-Japan. The change in operational criteriabrings in five
542
historically; theoretically the U.K. All these cases are important rivalries involving because theyinvolvenoncontiguousstatesand a leading (and theyare of interest oftentheleading) naval power. lists are not as major as those between the two restricted These differences (Waymanand Jones (1991) and Goertzand Diehl (1995)) on the one hand and the broader listof Wayman(1983, 1996), whichincludesany twostatesthathave two cases thanthe latter(7 fewer have considerably MIDs withintenyears.The former Two important and 11 vs. 23), as would be expected giventheiroperationalcriteria. included byWayman's (1) Are the rivalries questionsare raised by thisdifference: the findings? (2) Will the sample affect broader inclusioncriteria really"rivalries"? thatGoertzand Withone exception,Waymanincludesall the periods of rivalry betweentheU.K. identify 1837-1861 as a period ofrivalry Diehl include-the latter Both, only1902-1913 as a period ofrivalry. and theU.S. whereasWaymanidentifies however, include the dyad. is whatWaymanincludesand Goertzand Diehl's definition Of more significance rivaldyads(see Table omittwelve ofWayman's leavesout. Goertzand Diehl's criteria of omitted thought dyadsare typically almostall ofthesetwelve 1,notec). Historically, forexample,fortheWorld importance; as "rivalries," and some are ofmajorhistorical thewholething starts War I period,Goertzand Diehl's criteria omit:RUS-AH (which and US-JNare FR-AH,and US-GER. For theWorldWarII period,FR-IT,FR-JN, off), of IT-GER and IT-RUS. omitted. Also not includedare the inter-war periodrivalries themostsignificant is that ofPRUSSIA-AUSIn thenineteenth rivalry missing century, mentioned U.K.-France. TRIA, as wellas FR-RUS and thepreviously a numberof rivalry On the positive eliminates side, Goertzand Diehl's definition also does notsee themore periodsthatnevergo towar.Goertzand Diehl's definition subtle rivalries ofFR-RUS (twentieth century) and USSR-CH (intheCold (or marginal) thefact, the onlyafter Giventheseoutcomes, whichare known War)as true"rivalries." and that are moreintense morerestrictive criteria thoserivals appear tobe identifying forwhatever reasonare notable to avoid repeatedconfrontations and war.Since itis withtheonsetofwar(Wallensteen, known thatrepeatedconfrontations are associated of results samplesmayallow usingthe twodifferent 1981; Leng, 1983), comparisons and presumably inferences ofthenumberofrepeatedconfrontations abouttheeffect lastassumption theintensity tobe made.Ifthis hostility) oftherivalry (and itsunderlying a setof is granted, themorerestricted sampleofGoertzand Diehl maybe considered is higher, made on thisbasismustbe althoughanyinferences rivalries wherehostility because there is no directmeasure of hostility being considered only suggestive employed.The real question,of course, is whetherthe high and low operational in thestatistical thresholds make anydifference analysis.
HYPOTHESES 1 & 2. Rivalriesprone to war
to geta sense ofhow Table 2 providesa preliminary look at all threelistsofrivalries they might differin their impact on Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicts that contiguous states are more apt to go to war than noncontiguousstates. This is fineas a preliminary test,but it mustbe rememberedthatit ignores hypothesis the second which is intended to describe how the two paths to war, particularly noncontiguousstates come to war. Keeping this caveat in mind, it is clear that Yule's Q's of .67, .50, Hypothesis1 is supportedin all threesampleswithrespective and .57 (and Phi's of .65, .46, and .37), althoughthese do not alwaysreach the .05 level of statistical significance.6
is not the devices to aid interpretation. What is important 5 The Yule's Q's and Phi's should be seen as heuristic specific value of the statistic, but how it changes fromthe earlytablesto the lateras controlsare added. Yule's Q and Phi are appropriatefor2X2 tables using nominal data. Yule's Q is simplygamma calculated fora 2X2 table. Phi is
JOHN A. VASQUEZ
TABLE 2. Rivalsand War
543
a. Wayman andJones Sample (1991) (5 MID threshold) No War Noncontiguous US-USSR Some War US-CH
1 0 Contiguous
1 5 UK-FR FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH
Likelihood ratio, p = .08a CorrectedYule's Q = .67b Phi=.65 p=.O9
b. Goertz and Diehl(1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample No War Some War
Noncontiguous
US-USSR US-UK UK-RUS+ 3 4 4
US-CH UK-IT UK-GER UK-JN
O
Contiguous
FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH
Likelihood ratio, p = .068a CorrectedYule's Q = .50b Phi=.46 p=.12
544
TABLE
2. Continued
c. Wayman 1996 (2 MID threshold) Sample No War Some War US-CH UK-IT UK-GER UK-JN UK-RUS FR-AH 4 0 Contiguous 10 9 FR-GER FR-IT GER-AH IT-AH GER-RUS... RUS-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH UK-FR FR-RUS IT-RUS/USSR US-JN US-GER
Noncontiguous
US-RUS US-UK FR-JN IT-GER+
Likelihood ratio, p = .03a CorrectedYule's Q = .57b Phi=.37 p=.08 (a) Chi-squareprobability. (b) Since Yule's Q alwaysmathematically when thereis a zero injust produces a perfect relationship one cell, it can be correctedby placing a 1 in thatcell (fordiscussionof the procedureused to correct Yule's Q, see Vasquez and Henehan (1992:411-4)). In all instancesthat thiswas done, the 1 worked againstthe hypothesis. (*) See notesb and d in Table 1. (+) UK-RUS foughtin the earlier Crimean War withEngland,joining the war on March 31, 1854. This war is priorto Goertzand Diehl's rivalry period of 1877-1923 and so is not included accordingto the operationalrules.Wayman(2 MID), however, has a UK-RUS rivalry period 1849-1871 so thewar is included in part c ofTable 2. (+ +) IT-GER fought earlier in WorldWar I withItaly joining the war on April 23, 1915. Since this war is priorto Wayman'speriod ofrivalry of 1934-1945, it is not included. (+ + +) Note the GER-RUS dyad is the only one in which a war is foughtafterthe rivalry period. foronly each otherin both WorldWar I and WorldWar II, butWaymanlistsa rivalry GER-RUS fight a rivalry 1838-1860. Accordingto the operationalrules,all warsfought after period are includedin the analysis.
These positiveassociationsmean thatcontiguousrivalsare more frequently apt than are noncontiguousrivals.Anotherway of to have some war in theirhistory than rivalsare more likely to avoid war altogether sayingthisis thatnoncontiguous are contiguousrivals.Whatis also evidentin the tables,when the Phi scoresare the is thatthe more restrictive listsofWaymanand Jones (1991) focusof examination,
based on chi-squaredivided by the sample size. It tends to be lowerthan Yule's Q when dealing withsmall samples, hence it is less appropriatehere, except when Q needs to be corrected.Yule's Q has the disadvantageof being vei-y levelsare sensitive to zeros and mustbe corrected when a zero appears in one cell (see note b to Table 2). Significance reportedfor each table as well as for individualPhi scores. A discussionof these statistics can be found in Norusis (1993:210, 217).
JOHNA. VASQUEZ
545
do betterthan respectively) and of Goertz and Diehl (1995) (5-6 MID threshold, whichwill the broader (2 MID threshold)sample ofWayman(1996). This pattern, become more pronounced and consistentin later tables, implies that the more rivalsbetterfitthe explanationofwar being testedin thisanalysis. disputatious An examination of the contiguous cases that go to war (in Table 2, a and and RUS/USSR-China)-seems to b)-France-GER, Italy-AH,RUS\USSR-Japan, overterritorial are actually fighting supportthenotionthatrivalsthatare contiguous disputesin thewarsthey issues.All ofthesedyadshave had ratherseriousterritorial have fought, as will be discussed below. The only exception to thisis the UK-FR disputebetweenthese twopartiesgave rise to the case, where no directterritorial Wars,whichEnglandjoined onlylater.7 FrenchRevolutionary In theWaymanand Jones (1991) sample (Table 2, a), thereare onlytworivalries weakeningthe association, states,and thesesplit,thereby involving noncontiguous The U.S.-Soanalysis. but each case does providesupportforthe largertheoretical ifone does not accept,as I and severalothers vietcase, of course,is veryintriguing explanationthattheCold War did notbecome hotbecause do not,theconventional of nuclear deterrence (see Kugler, 1984; Mueller, 1989; Vasquez, 1991). It is disputes, consistent withProposition2 and impliesthatin theabsence of territorial adds althoughan exception, rivalsmaybe able to avoidwar.The U.S.-China rivalry, period (1949-1974) support to this notion,because the only war for the rivalry is the Korean War,whichis a war neitherthe Waymanand Jones (1991) identify got too U.S. nor China reallywanted. China was drawnin because the battlefield and got carriedawaywith somewhat close to itsborder,and the U.S. miscalculated (see George objectivesit did not have initially itsmilitary successadding territorial had apparently and Smoke, 1974). To thiswas added the problemthatMacArthur even more territorial objectives than Truman. To the extent that China took and otherAmericanhard-liners thenthe U.S. and China had MacArthur seriously, a perceived territorial dispute, making this rivalrymore dangerous. All in all, did not place any directclaimson Chinese however,the U.S., despite MacArthur, so the Korean War is a betterillustration of howan ongoingwar drawsin territory, The slightly these broader Goertz and Diehl sample (Table 2, b) strengthens statesthatdo notfight, but ofnoncontiguous findings byadding twomoreinstances rivalries the U.K. thatdo have some involving theyalso add threenoncontiguous the overallstrength of association. lowering war,thereby slightly
7 An examinationof the minor-minor rivalsin theWaymanand Jones (1991) sample also supportsthe conclusion states: thannoncontiguous over territor-y thatcontiguousrivalsare much more likelyto have war-s No War War-
noncontiguous rivals.
Noncontiguous Contiguous
0 4
1 9
identified byWaymanand withtheexceptionofUS-Spain (I1850-1898),ar-e minor-minor rivals, No noncontiguous dyad). Of the thirteen Jones (1991) (and this is not reallyan exception because in 1898 it is reallya major-minor minor-minor contiguousrivals,nine have some war and four do not. A perusal of the nine cases that go to war (GRK-TUR, IND-PAK, ISR-EGY, ISR-SYR, N.KOR-S.KOR, BOL-CHILE, BOL-PARA, PERU-CHILE, IRAN-IRAQ) (see Levyand Froelich,1985), thepossibleexceptionbeing Ir-an-Iraq warsover territory, suggeststhatmostare in fact in 1972:131 1). Of equal interest aspects (see the relevantdiscussionin Langer-, territorial and even thathas important terms of futureresearch are the four rivalriesinvolvingcontiguous states that do not go to war (CHILE-ARG, explanationdoes not anomalies since the territorial ECUD-PERU, AFG-PAK,THAI-CAM). These are not necessarily handled. These cases are ofinter-est is at stake;the keyis how the issuesar-e even ifterr-itol-y claim thatwar is inevitable in ter-ms of finding out exactly whytheydid not go to war.
546
Table 2, c turnsto Wayman's(1996) largerlistof rivalriesbased on a ten-year signifiduration.Here the relationshipis statistically ratherthan twenty-five-year cant with a solid Yule's Q of .57, but a weaker Phi of .37. Nevertheless,the cases showsthat ofthenine contiguous An inspection rivalsfit perfectly.8 contiguous disputesthatlead to war. almostall have territorial held by disputes are of two distincttypes:claims to territory These territorial held by a thirdparty.The either one of the rivals or claims involvingterritory rivalryof France-Germanyis a notorious example of the firsttype. Italy and France and Italy have Austria, of course, are fightingover Italian irredenta. claims going back to the Italian Wars begun in 1495, and competing territorial similar territorialissues still play a role in the Italian Wars of Unification. Territorial claims against France are later resurrectedby Mussolini. Germany in the area of Poland and the rivalry and Russia have a long-standingterritorial aggravatedbyGerman ambitions(beginning whichbecomes greatly Baltic states, plan) to create duringWorld War I and greatlyextended in Hitler's Lebensraum a Mitteleuropa incorporatingmuch of the Ukraine (see Bell, 1986:260, 284-5, 288; Kaiser, 1990:370-4, 377-84). It is the latterobjective that makes the 1941 attack fundamentally territorial(see Vasquez, 1996a). Russia-Austria/Hungary fromthe declining Ottoman Embecome entangled over controllingterritory claims on the Ottoman Empire, however, pire. The nature of their territorial were such that the rivalsprobablycould have avoided war, ifit were not forthe claims thatAustria-Hungary presence of otherSlavic statesthatmade territorial begins as struggleforhegemfound threatening.The rivalry of Prussia-Austria ony in Germany,but moves to warfareover specificpieces of land and eventually unificationof Germanyunder Prussia withoutAustrian ends withthe territorial influence (see Carr, 1991). Finally, Russia and Japan, and Russia and China, in the Far East (see Carr, 1985:56-7, 65). skirmishover borders and territory This suggeststhatat the heart of these rivalriesand the reasons theyend up in war are territorial disputes. cell) goingtowarin Table 2, c (northeast rivalries The tencases ofnoncontiguous association.A comparisonof the three samples in Table 2, depress the statistical samples and the broader Waymansample, especiallybetweenthe two restrictive will include more rivalry suggests that reducing the threshold for identifying "deviant"noncontiguous cases thathave somewar,butwillnotincludeany"deviant" withsome states cases ofcontiguous war.The "deviant"noncontiguous rivals without explanation of war, if thereexistsa war, however,do not undercutthe territorial separate path thatbringsthese statesintowar. Tables 3-7 attemptto assess thismore complicatedexplanationby introducing various controlsincrementally. This provides a way of testingto what extentthe process.Since the cases in thenortheast cell are being broughtto warbya different samples both produce similarresultsin Table 2, the remaininganalyses restricted
8 Unlike Waymanand Jones (1991), whichhas the UK-FR as a r-ivalr-y this 1816 and is used to identify pr-edating ofwhich,1825-1850, can be ofrivalry, thefirst rivalry as havingsome war,theWayman(1996) sample has twoper-iods included in the some-war cell. The second period, seen as a legacyfromthe Napoleonic Wa-s and thusis legitimately This case suggeststhat interest. an exception and forthatreason is of theoretical is more truly 1888-1902, however, consistent withMostand as otherterritorial disputes(a finding not as war-prone disputesare simply colonial territorial propositions:Rivals disputingwitheach otherover Starr (1980)). From thisanalysisone mightderive the following are more apt to go to war thanrivalsdisputingover peripheral(includingcolonial) territory. core territol-y respective more intensely thanr-ivals fighting are apt to fight over core territol-y that:Rivalsfighting follows Fi-omthisit further overperipheralterritory.
JOHN
A. VASQUEZ
547
willcompare onlytheGoertzand Diehl (6 MID threshold) samplewiththeWayman (2 MID threshold).9 explanationbyremoving Table 3 begins thisassessmentof the two-paths-to-war war. It providesa testof Hypothesis2, whichpredictsthat the cases of multilateral rivalries of contiguousstatesare much more apt to end in dyadicwar thanrivalries states.The resultsof thistestare quite stark;it turnsout involving noncontiguous that all the cases of noncontiguousrivalsgoing to war (in Table 2, b and c) are wars. For both samples the relationshipis perfect.For each of the multilateral Yule's Q's both go up to 1.00 as do the Phi's (see Table 3, a samples,the respective and b). Justhow much weightcan be placed on this findingis the focus of the remaining three hypotheses,which are crucial for assessing the accuracy of a territorial explanationofwhyand how rivalsgo to war. rivalries producea solid tests on major-major For now,it is clear thatthebivariate rivals the claim thatcontiguous supports association(Table 2), and closerinspection rivalsare the claim that noncontiguous Furthermore, are fighting over territory. inTable results further bythedramatic towarbya separatepathis confirmed brought with cases provideevidenceconsistent of specific 3. Both the testsand examination thatrivalries disputesare more thathave territorial Proposition1, whichmaintains disagreements. thatare notfocusedon territorial prone to direct warsthanrivalries
HYPOTHESES
pathstowar 3-5. Thetwo
Hypotheses 3-5 assume that some states go to war because they have serious grievances withone anotherthattheyexpectto be settledonlybywarand thatthere are otherstatesthatgo to war but eitherdo not wantto or are embroiledin a war because ofsomeone else's rivalry. Another wayoflookingat thesetwopaths started betweengoing to war because of a directbilateraldispute to war is to distinguish causal and going to war as a result of supportinga third party.The different sequences associatedwiththe onset ofwar on the one hand, and the spreadingof war on the other, need to be betterincorporatedinto how we conceive of our and construct our researchdesigns. hypotheses states are moreprone There are basically theclaimthatcertain twowaysof testing whereone party initiates war. intoa war,rather thanbeingin a rivalry tobeingbrought statesare more likelyto be involvedin The first is to see whethernoncontiguous 3 teststhisclaim.The second is to see multilateral than in dyadicwars.Hypothesis rivalsare more apt to be war joiners in an ongoing war. whethernoncontiguous 4 tests thisclaim.This hypothesis providesa purertestof thenotionthat Hypothesis intoan ongoingwar rivalsare less prone to war and mustbe brought noncontiguous wars where several in multilateral startedforotherpurposes. Unlike participation in a warafter a decentinterval sharethesame grievances, participation partiesmight from thoseoftheinitial are brought to thewarforreasonsdifferent thatstates suggests are premised on the and mostlikely process.Boththesetests bya different belligerents ofwar. are proneto different kindsofrivalries thatdifferent types assumption Table 4 presents a test of Hypothesis 3 by predictingthat if the territorial explanation of war is correct,then noncontiguousrivals should fightprimarily either. warsand not dyadicwars;whereascontiguousrivalscould fight multilateral itshould produce format does notprovidethemostprecisetest, Whilethebivariate
9 The Goertz and Diehl sample is the source of manyanalyseson rivalry; ifonly one restricted listis therefore, selected,thisone shouldbe it.It also has theadvantageofhavingfourmorecases thanWaymanandJonesand dropping censoreddata (pre-1816),is pi-oneto miscodingon the dependentvariable.As can be a case which, because it involves anidJones seen in Table 2, the Goertz-Diehlsample is not being picked because it will do betterthan the Waynmatn
sample.
548
TABLE
3. Rivalsand AnyDyadic War (Multilateral Wars Removed) a. Goertz and Dieehl (1995) (6 MID thlreshlold) Sample
No War Noncontiguous US-USSR US-UK 2 0 Contiguous Likelihood ratio, p = .018a Yule's Q = 1.00 Phi = 1.00 p = .045 0 2
AnyDyadicWar
RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH
b. Wayman (1996) (2 MID threshold) Sample No War AnyDyadic War
Noncontiguous
US-USSR US-UK FR-JN IT-GER+ 4 0 0 2 N RUS/USSR-J RUS/USSR-CH
Contiguous
Likelihood ratio, p = .006a Yule's Q = 1.00 Phi= 1.00 p=.Ol
(a) See Table 2. (+ +) See Table 2.
some association ifthehypothesis is accurate.'0A fairly that testis to predict stringent hasatleastone dyadic warinthepost-Napoleonic that anynoncontiguous rivalry period thehypothesis. This means thatonly (1816-1980) wouldbe takenas a case falsifying
I() This testunderestimates of the propositionbecause it coun-ts the strength contiguousdyads havinig dyadicwars in favor ofthehypothesis, butcountscontiguousdyadshavingonlymultilater al warsas evidenceagainstthehypothesis, when in factthe territorial explanationdoes not denythe latterpossibility.
JOHN
A. VASQUEZ
549
TABLE 4. Contiguity and Large Wars
a. Goertz and Diehl(6 MID threshold) Samplle
At Least One Dyadic War Noncontiguous 0 2 RUS/USSR-CH RUS/USSR-JN Contiguous 4 2
Only Multilateral Wars UK-GER UK-IT UK-JN US-CH
FR-GER IT-AH
Likelihood ratio, p = .06a CorrectedYule's Q = -.60 Phi=-.58 p=.10
b. Wayman (1996) (2 MID threshold) Sample
At Least One DyadicWar
Only Multilateral Wars
Noncontiguous
UK-GER UK-IT UK-RUS UK-JN FR-AH 0 2 RUS/USSR-CH RUS/USSR-JN 10 7 FR-GER IT-FR IT-AH UK-FR
FR-RUS IT-RUS US-CH US-JN US-GER
Contiguous
PRUS-AH RUS-AH GER-RUS...
Likelihood ratio, p = .07a CorrectedYule's Q = -.48b Phi=-.36 p =.12
550
TABLE
4. Continued
(*) The Wayman(2 MID) sample has 23 cases; the 4 not included here have no warsforthe relevant periods (FR-JPN,US-UK, US-USSR, UK-FR). Three "no wars" are excluded in the Goertz and Diehl sample. (a)See Table 2. (b) See Table 2. (++ + ) See Table 2.
noncontiguous rivalsthatfight exclusively multilateral warswillbe takenas evidence in favorof the proposition.The resultsin Table 4 bear out thisprediction.Not a single noncontiguousrivalry(in either sample) foughteach other directlyand exclusively by fighting a dyadicwar. While the contiguousdyads reflect a similar itis less pronounced.The relationship tendency, is not quite statistically significant, butthecorrected Yule's Q's are fairly -.60 and a moderate-.48 (thePhi's impressive: are -.58 and -.36).11 Justhow manyexceptionsthe contiguousrivalstruly embody can be assessed by determining whetherthe multilateral war was an outcome of a rivalry drivenby a territorial disputeor some otherrivalry. Hypothesis4 providesone wayof getting at thatquestion.It recognizesthe fact that in a multilateral war, those statesthat are involvedfromthe beginningare different fromthosewhojoin lateron. This second group comes to thewarbecause of contagionfactors or because thewar diffuses. This is a distinct path to war that can be differentiated fromthe factors thatbroughtabout the initialonset of war. Table 5 triesto get at thispath by comparingthose rivalsthatare presentat the beginningof thewarwiththose that join in. 4 predicts thatnoncontiguous rivalsare muchmoreapt thancontiguHypothesis ous rivalstojoin an ongoingwar.This is a better testofProposition 2, because unlike Hypothesis3 it makes a clear distinction betweenthe behavior of noncontiguous and contiguousrivals. To be a warjoiner,an actormustenterthewarbydeclaration or troop commitment at least threemonthsafterthe initialdeclaration.Dates of are givenin Table 5. entry To testthishypothesis, and warshad to be examined. specificperiods of rivalry Wayman's (1995) shorterperiods lend themselvesbetterto such a test,and the resultsof thissample are reportedin Table 5. One of the problemswithshorter periods,however, is thattheycould potentially bias the testifone or tworivalshad and dominated the data. This, however,is not the many shortperiods of rivalry case as can be seen fromthe table. The resultsin Table 5 are consistent withthe hypothesis, showinga statistically at the .058 levelwitha Yule's Q of -.61,but a weakerPhi of significant relationship -.34. Thus, as contiguity goes up (i.e., fromnoncontiguousto contiguous),the tendencyto join an ongoing war goes down. Only five of eighteen contiguous rivalries go to war byjoining an alreadyongoingwar. Conversely, eightof thirteen rivalriesgo to war byjoining an ongoingwar. Five cases go to war noncontiguous wars. Of the fivecases, twoare fromthe beginning,but these are all multilateral authenticexamples of noncontiguous rivalries thatgo to war,even in the absence in 1939 and to a lesserextentthe ofdirectterritorial disputes.The UK-GER rivalry in 1859 are of thisilk. The otherthreecases, however,mayreflect FR-AH rivalry measurement errorin thatat leastone sidejoined an ongoingwar,albeitfairly early.
II The negativesign in thisand subsequenttablessimply reflects the orderof thevariablesin thecontingency table and is not substantively relevantto the hypothesis. The negativesign means that as contiguity goes up (i.e., from noncontiguous to contiguLous), fighting in onlymultilater al warsgoes down.
JOHN A. VASQUEZ
TABLE 5. Contiguity and Diffusion ofWars
551
Wayman (1996) (2 MID threshold) Sample (basedonperiods and warpairs) Foughtfrom Beginning UK-GER 1914 UK-GER 1939 FR-AH 1859 FR-AH 1914 US-CH 1900 WarJoinerin an Ongoing War UK-IT 1940 a UK-RUS 1854 b UK-JN 1941 c FR-RUS 1854b IT-RUS/USSR 1941c US-JN 1941 c US-GER 1917 US-CH 1950 d 5 13 FR-GER 1870 FR-GER 1914 FR-GER 1939 PRUS-AH 1866 IT-AH 1849 IT-AH 1859 IT-AH 1866 RUS-AH 1914 RUS-JN 1904 RUS/USSR-JN1938 RUS/USSR-JN1939 RUS/USSR-CH 1929 GER-RUS 1914 Likelihood ratio, p = .058+ Yule's Q = -.61 Phi=-.34 p=.06 (a) Italydeclared war on FR and UK 6/10/1940; WWII startedon 9/1/1939. (b) The CrimeanWar startedon 10/23/1853; FR and UK entered 3/31/1854. (c) In WWII GER and IT attackedUSSR on 6/22/1941; Japan attackedUS and UK on 12/7/1941; WWII started9/1/1939. (d) China intervened againstthe U.S. in the KoreanWar on 10/27/1950, about 4 monthsafter thewar This is the shortest began on 6/24/1950. timespan in thiscolumn. (e) The USSR declared war on Japan and attacked Japanese forcesin Manchuriaon 8/8/1945. (f) ItalyenteredWWI on 5/23/1915; WWI began 7/29/1914. (g) The FrenchRevolutionary Warsbegan on April20, 1792 and France declaredwaron England on Feb. 1, 1793. (+) See note a to Table 2. 8 5
Noncontiguous
Contiguous
FR-IT 1940 a RUS/USSR-JN1945'C IT-AH 1915 f GER-RUS/USSR 1941 UK-FR 1793 g
For example, the FR-AH rivalry preceding 1914 reallyonlycame to war because of entangling alliances. A strong historicalargument can also be made that the Anglo-Germanrivalrypreceding World War I did not produce the war, that Germanywanted to avoid war with the U.K., and that the U.K. was dragged in because ofBelgium(see Vasquez, 1993:95-6). Finally, the US-CH case reflects U.S.
552
in the Boxer Rebellion,an intervention intervention whichit is inconceivablethat theU.S. wouldhaveundertaken on itsown.The rather solidYule's Q, then,probably is underestimating the relationship. The cases in thewarjoiner (northeast) cell ofTable 5 are all fairly standard.They all involvestatesthatare broughtinto an ongoingwar afterit started. The Second WorldWar in the Pacificis treatedas an extensionofthe European war,but even if theU.K. and U.S. can still one objectsto thisinterpretation, be seen as beingbrought into an ongoing Sino-Japanesewar because theirpolicies conflict withJapanese objectivesin China and the region (Iriye,1987:118, 148, 150, 156, 162, 171; see also Vasquez (1996b) formore detail). Table 6 testsHypothesis4 in the Goertz and Diehl sample. The longer time periods in the Goertzand Diehl sample mean thatmultiple warsoftenoccurin the same timeperiod. Ratherthandrop thissample,itwas decided to code a dyadbased on the typical thebeginningor later).Onlythree (modal) wayit enteredwars(from ofthe eightcases were subjectto thisrule (IT-AH, RUS-JN,and US-CH-see Table 1 forthe wars),and IT-AH and RUS-JNwere easilyclassifiedon the basis of the modal rule.12For cases thatlacked a modal path, a second rule was followed:the war withinor closest to the period of rivalry identified by Goertz and Diehl was takenas thebasis ofthecoding.OnlytheUS-CH case was determined bythisrule.13 On thebasis oftheserules,thedyadsin theGoertzand Diehl samplewereclassified into the categoriespresentedin Table 6. The resultsare similarto those in Table The corrected Yule's Q is -.85 and Phi is -.77; as states 5, butconsiderably stronger. become more contiguous,the tendencytojoin wars (as opposed to fighting from the beginning)goes down dramatically. in thenumber This is an interesting increasein theQ and Phi,giventhereduction in thatitwas broughtabout because of a of cases. It is also a serendipitous finding in thewaythe twosamples measure durationof rivalry. A comparison discrepancy of the twosamplespermits an examinationof the typical path a rivalry traverses on itswaytowar (without thenoise ofatypicalcases). Table 6 providesstrong evidence thatthetypical path towarfornoncontiguous rivalsis to enteran ongoingwar,while the typical path to war for contiguous rivals is to fightfrom the beginning. Identifying the typical path to wara rivalry follows makes therelationship depicted in Hypothesis 4 much clearer. The finaltable combinesthe effects of the twopaths to war to testProposition2. Table 7 testsHypothesis5, whichpredictsthateithernoncontiguous rivalswillnot in multilateral wars. go to war or iftheygo to war theywill do so by participating rivals Contiguousrivalsare expected to be much more likelythan noncontiguous to fight dyadicwars.As can be seen in Table 7, theresults are statistically significant in the predicteddirectionforboth samples,withrespective(corrected)Yule's Q's
12 IT-AH fought in thebeginningin 1849, 1859, and 1866, and onlyonce enteredwaras ajoiner (in 1915). Of these wars,theformer all relateto the ItalianWarsof Unification, and theseseem to capturebetterthe major reasonsforthe IT-AH rivalry. RUS-JNfought fromthe beginningin 1904, 1938 (Changkufeng), and 1939 (Nomohan), and entered as a joiner dyad in Wor-ld War II in 1945. Again, the former wars seem more criticalforthe purposes of the dyadic rivalry. 3I'The U.S. and China, as can be seen in Table 5, fough-t twowars in the post-Napoleonicperiod-the Boxer Rebellion and the Korean War. While both fallwithin Wayman'speriods,Goertz and Diehl identify only 1949-1974 as a period of rivalry, in an ongoing so the Korean War is used as a basis of the coding. China is seen as inter-vening war. In case thisrulewas notsufficient, a thirdr-ule was developed (butneverused): a dyadwouldbe classified as ajoiner ifitseemed to have inter-vened in an ongoingwarbeing fought or bytwootherparties(regardlessof the timeofentry) ifitwas one of the main participants to have fought fromthebeginning, briinging about thewar. Under thisrule,both the Boxer Rebellion(forthe U.S.) and Korea (forChinese inter-vention) would be classifiedin thejoiner cell.
JOHN A. VASQUEZ
553
TABLE 6. Contiguity and Diffusion ofWars
anid Goertz Diehl(1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample

(based on modal patli to war) +
Foughtfrom Beginning
WarJoinerin an Ongoing War
Noncontiguous
UK-GER 1 4 FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH 3 0
UK-IT UK-JN US-CH
Contiguous
Likelihood ratio, p =.01a CorrectedYule's Q = -.85 Phi=-.77 p =.03 (+) The Goertz and Diehl sample consistsof 11 cases; the 3 not included here have no warsforthe relevantrivalry period (UK-RUS, US-UK, US-USSR). (a) See Table 2. (b) See Table 2.
of -.75 and -.60 (and Phi's of -.62 and -.38).14Rivalsthatare noncontiguous(have a lowerscoreon contiguity) are morelikely eitherto avoidwaror to fight each other onlyin multilateral wars. These findings (in Table 7 as wellas Table 6) are also consistent with Thompson's (1995) recentclaimsthatspatialrivalries, contention overterritorial involving issues, and positionalrivalries, contention over global politico-economic involving issues, evincedistinct behavioralpatterns. The latter, whichalmostalwaysinvolvenoncontiguousstates,are, according to Thompson (1995:208-9), mostly pacificand less likelyto fightdirectly the farther apart theyare geographically. Conversely, the spatialrivalries, whichofteninvolvedcontiguousstatesfighting overterritory, fight each otherfairly frequently. Thompson focuseson the principalrivalries fromthe fifteenth through the twentieth centuries,so that four of his six centuriesare independentfromthe data used here, yet his conclusionsare verysimilarto the delineated in thisanalysis. patterns
14 The second Phi,aswould be expectedgivenitsmagnitude, does notquitemake the.05 significan-ce level,although itcomes close withp = .06. Note here,however, as in Table 4, thatcontiguousdyads tend to become involvedin more multilateral wars than dyadic wars. This has th-e effect of weakening the association even thoughthe th-eoretical explanationdoes not say contiguousstateswillnot fight multilateral wars. In thisway,the testis underestimating the strength of the hypoth-esis.
554
TABLE 7. Contiguity and the Two Paths to War
a. Goertz and Diehl (1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample

Rivalry-Producing Wars; At Least One Dyadic War No War or Multilateral War
Noncontiguous
US-USSR US-UK
UK-RUS UK-GER UK-IT UK-JN US-CH
7 2
FR-GER IT-AH
2
Contiguous RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-JN
Likelihood Ratio, p =027a Corrected Yule's Q = .75b Phi=-.62 p =.038
b. Wayman Sample (1996) (2 MID threshold)

Rivalry-Producing Wars; At Least One Dyadic War* No War or Multilateral War+
Noncontiguous Contiguous
0 2
14c
7d
Likelihood Ratio, p = .04a Corrected Yule's Q = .60b Phi=-.38 p =.06
(*) (+) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Cases from Table 4, part b. Cases from Tables 3, part b, and 4, part b. See Table 2. See Table 2. Four dyads never fightwars and 10 fight multilateral wars. Seven fight multilateral wars.
JOHN
A. VASQUEZ
555
Conclusion They showthatone ofthemainfactors encouraging. The tests in thisarticleare very thatdistinguish rivalries thatgo to war fromthosethatdo not is whetherthe rivals are contiguous or noncontiguous.In addition, there is a strong tendencyfor byjoining ongoingwars.This process rivalsto go to war primarily noncontiguous usuallyoccursthrougha rival'sbeing broughtinto an ongoingwar,but it can also itis initiated. in a multilateral warfairly soon after occurthrough states'participating provide clear empiricalevidence thatthe existenceof twodistinct These findings thatneeds to but a behavioralregularity paths to war is notjust a logical possibility, have of testdesigns.Otheranalysesofcontiguity be recognizedin the construction neithertestednor shownthis. restricted of rivalry-one fairly operationaldefinitions The use of twodifferent broad (2 MID threshold)-also produced (6 MID threshold)and the other fairly based passed tests althoughall thehypotheses interesting and unexpectedfindings, Goertz and Diehl sample generally on the two samples. Still,the more restricted This fit thanthe2 MID sample ofWayman. findings and a better produced stronger rivals thatwerenotreallyknownbeforethe analysis.First, makesclear twofindings depictthetwopathstowar.The majorreason in theGoertzand Diehl samplebetter in the analysispresentedin Table 6. When forthiswas uncoveredserendipitously (modal) formeasurement reasons,to code rivalson thebasis oftheirtypical forced, fight dyadicwarswhereas path to war,itwas foundthatcontiguousstatesgenerally wars,and often fight multilateral generally states, when theyfight, noncontiguous Without lookingat the modal path join the latterlate ratherthanin thebeginning. muted.The althoughstillpresent,is somewhat to war rivalstake,thisrelationship, reason is thatcontiguousstatesare also oftenbroughtintolargewars,even though it is rare formajor stateswhose thatis not theirtypicalpath to war. Nevertheless, warsone on one, eventhoughfornaval states core territory to fight is noncontiguous or colonial competitors thereare fewbarriersagainstdoing so. Second, given the results,it is clear thatrivalsin the Goertz and Diehl sample betterfitthe territorial explanation being tested in this analysis. For whatever bythebroader2 MID threshold, as opposed to thesetidentified reason,theserivals, withthatpredictedby the more consistent tend to go to war in a manner slightly the twosamples. territorial explanation.This leads us to ask whatdistinguishes and more of the Goertzand Diehl rivalshave more confrontations By definition, are more a persistent This suggeststhatless intenserivalries patternof disputing. but not so much as to make the predictedrelationsubjectto anomalous patterns, the real difference is thatin the less intenserivalries, ships disappear. Specifically, than are the wars more frequently contiguousstatesare broughtinto multilateral contiguousstateswho have intenserivalries(cf.Table 4, a and b). The latterfight explanamore dyadicwarsand warsoverterritory, as is predictedbythe territorial tion. Less intense and short-term rivalriesappear to go to war with each other byGoertzand because ofthewarsofothers.A numberoftherivalsthatare omitted Diehl seem to be of thisilk-FR-IT, FR-RUS, IT-RUS, FR-AH, RUS-AH, US-JN, If this researchcan make thisconclusiondefinite. US-GER-although onlyfurther lack thelevelofhostility is foundto be thecase, thenitmaybe because suchrivalries discussed in the first sectionof thisarticle.At any rate,it is the case thatthe more better restricted sample, whichis presumed to contain the more hostilerivalries, fits the propositions being tested. with are consistent Of moreimmediatetheoretical is thatthefindings importance the territorial and war, which states that rivals that have explanation of rivalry territorial disputesare much more apt to go to war than rivalsthatdo not. These a processofwardiffusion. otherrivalsthatgo towarprobablydo so through Despite analysiscan the preliminary natureofthesetests, theydo showthatthistheoretical
556
rivals resultin war and thatit is able to distinguish accurately explain how rivalries thatdo not go to war fromthose thatdo. Those who would object to thisconclusionwould replythattheuse of contiguity to fight will as a measureindicatesonlythatthosethathave more ofan opportunity rivals ofthe contiguous thanthosethatdo not.An inspection fight morefrequently thatgo to war, however,showsthatall these dyads-FR-GER, IT-AH, PRUS-AH, have because they RUS/USSR-CH-go towarnotsimply GER-RUS, RUS/USSR-JN, the opportunity to do so, but because they all have very serious issues under these issues are not of a random nature; all involve dispute.'5 Furthermore, explanationof rivalry territorial disputes.The testsshowthatworkon a territorial further and should not be dismisseda prioriby a proximity is worthinvestigating interalternative explanation is a legitimate explanation,althoughthe proximity of the in the absence of precise measurement pretationforsome of thesefindings issue contentof rivalries. as an indirect The most severe limitationof the testsis the use of contiguity disputes. Getting data on the latterwould be a way of measure of territorial and the proximity-interaction explanations. discriminating betweenthe territorial rivalsare brought In addition,morein-depth case studiesofwhether noncontiguous disputes of their allies would provide an into wars because of the territorial elucidation on whetherand how additional test of the explanation and further and war (see Vasquez, 1996a, 1996b). territorial issuesare behind rivalry the uncovering of twopaths to war,are particularly The findings of thisanalysis, (and wars) are also consistent withThompson's (1995) analysisthatsome rivalries issues,while otherrivalries(and major global basicallyspatial and over territorial wars) are over positionalissues.AlthoughI argue thateven global wars oftenstart as dyadic wars over specificterritorial questions, the alternativeexplanation is plausible. Futureresearchwill need to determinethe extentto which positional are (includingthe linkingofongoingrivalries) issuesratherthancontagionfactors factors bringingnoncontiguousstatesinto war witheach the primary motivating other.The existenceofthisalternative underlinestheneed for explanationfurther high-quality data on the issues overwhichrivalsare contending. Giventhecomplicatedand multicausal war,itis illusory processesassociatedwith willeverbe definitive. thewaytoproceed is through to think thatanyone test Rather, a numberof different whichtogether can correct forthe gaps in anyone test. tests, one wayofdoing thatbycontrolling forpossiblepaths The tests hereindemonstrate the territorial to war throughsampling.Together,theycould have falsified explathe presence of nation,but theydo not. For the teststo become more definitive, measured.The testspresentedhere territorial issueswillneed to be more precisely would be justified.An inspectionof the specificcases show that such an effort issuesare behindwhether and howrivalsgo towar,implying thatterritorial suggests thatmore precise measurement will showthatrivalsgo to war not simplybecause butbecause territorial thereis an opportunity, disputessupplyrivalswitha willingness to fight thatfewof themhave been able to resist. References
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Vasquez Comparing Paths To War

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Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths

(1996) 40, 531-558 Quarterly Studies International

Rivals Distinguishing The Concept of Rivalry

A. VASQUEZ JOHN Research Design

FR-IT FR-RUS FR-AH FR-JN PRUS-AH GER-RUS RUS-AH RUS/USSR-JN

Franco-Prussian WWI WWII

1877-1923 1900-1939 1932-1954 1911-1940 1843-1915

UK-GER UK-JN UK-IT IT-AH

IT-GER IT-RUS US-UK US-GER US-JN US-USSR US-CH

1946-1986 1949-1974 7 dyads

1946-1973 1949-1974 11 dyads

1 5 UK-FR FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .08a CorrectedYule's Q = .67b Phi=.65 p=.O9

b. Goertz and Diehl(1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample No War Some War

US-USSR US-UK UK-RUS+ 3 4 4

US-CH UK-IT UK-GER UK-JN

FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .068a CorrectedYule's Q = .50b Phi=.46 p=.12

US-RUS US-UK FR-JN IT-GER+

pathstowar 3-5. Thetwo

b. Wayman (1996) (2 MID threshold) Sample No War AnyDyadic War

US-USSR US-UK FR-JN IT-GER+ 4 0 0 2 N RUS/USSR-J RUS/USSR-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .006a Yule's Q = 1.00 Phi= 1.00 p=.Ol

(a) See Table 2. (+ +) See Table 2.

TABLE 4. Contiguity and Large Wars

a. Goertz and Diehl(6 MID threshold) Samplle

At Least One Dyadic War Noncontiguous 0 2 RUS/USSR-CH RUS/USSR-JN Contiguous 4 2

Only Multilateral Wars UK-GER UK-IT UK-JN US-CH

Likelihood ratio, p = .06a CorrectedYule's Q = -.60 Phi=-.58 p=.10

b. Wayman (1996) (2 MID threshold) Sample

At Least One DyadicWar

Only Multilateral Wars

FR-RUS IT-RUS US-CH US-JN US-GER

PRUS-AH RUS-AH GER-RUS...

Likelihood ratio, p = .07a CorrectedYule's Q = -.48b Phi=-.36 p =.12

FR-IT 1940 a RUS/USSR-JN1945'C IT-AH 1915 f GER-RUS/USSR 1941 UK-FR 1793 g

TABLE 6. Contiguity and Diffusion ofWars

anid Goertz Diehl(1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample

WarJoinerin an Ongoing War

UK-GER 1 4 FR-GER IT-AH RUS/USSR-JN RUS/USSR-CH 3 0

UK-IT UK-JN US-CH

a. Goertz and Diehl (1995) (6 MID threshold) Sample

UK-RUS UK-GER UK-IT UK-JN US-CH

Likelihood Ratio, p =027a Corrected Yule's Q = .75b Phi=-.62 p =.038

b. Wayman Sample (1996) (2 MID threshold)

Likelihood Ratio, p = .04a Corrected Yule's Q = .60b Phi=-.38 p =.06

(*) (+) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Studies Bargaining,and the End of InterstateRivalry.International D. S. (1996) Security, 40:157-183. Quarterly

Journal 36:309-341. ofConflict Resolution ofConflict Resolution 22:241-267.

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