Vocational Choice: A Decision Making Perspective: Henry Sauermann

Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303 www.elsevier.
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Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

Henry Sauermann
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Box 90120, Durham, NC 27708, USA Received 7 June 2004 Available online 15 December 2004
Abstract We propose a model of vocational choice that can be used for analyzing and guiding the decision processes underlying career and job choices. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (BDM), in particular the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998). The basic model involves two major processes. First, the selection of a decision strategy according to four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive eVort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justiWability of the decision. Second, the construction of situation-speciWc preferences, which can reXect irrelevant task and context factors such as the evaluation mode. This basic model is extended to account for social inXuences and the long decision time typical of most career and job decisions. We review research on vocational choice in light of this model, discuss normative implications for counseling, and outline a research agenda for studying vocational choice from a behavioral decision making perspective. 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Vocational choice; Decision making processes; Choice goals; Constructed preferences; Decision strategies; Behavioral decision making; Person-environment Wt models; Social inXuences in vocational choice; Decision time
We thank John Payne, Rick Larrick, Gerry DeSanctis, and two anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. E-mail address: henry.sauermann@duke.edu.
0001-8791/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2004.10.001
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H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303
1. Introduction The vast literature on career decision making, counseling, recruiting, and search in labor markets reXects the high importance of vocational choice for individuals and for society. The dominant approach in studying vocational choice focuses on the characteristics of the individual and of the occupations from which the individual has to choose, whether vocational choice results in some sort of Wt, and what the eVects of Wt are (person-environment Wt paradigm). Hollands theory of vocational choice (Holland, 1997) is probably the most inXuential theory in this tradition and has spurred a wealth of interesting insights (Kristof, 1996; Spokane, Meir, & Catalano, 2000). Although there remain questions at the level of speciWc constructs, measurement, and moderating factors (Tinsley, 2000), there seems to be considerable support for the idea that individuals tend to match personal and organizational or task characteristics and that Wt has beneWcial eVects at the individual and organizational level (Holland, 1997; Kristof, 1996). The person-environment Wt approach to vocational choice is therefore particularly useful from a predictive perspective. But how exactly is Wt created? Why do we sometimes observe a lack of Wt? How can the quality of a decision, with respect to Wt or some other measure, be improved? To answer these questions, a process-focused analysis of vocational choice is necessary. In developing such a process-focused perspective, we can draw on research in the Weld of behavioral decision making (BDM), which has conducted a large amount of basic research on decision processes. Insights from BDM have been successfully applied in a variety of areas such as consumer research and managerial decision making. Findings and concepts from BDM have also been used to develop and test descriptive models of vocational choice and to develop recommendations for counseling (Brooks & Betz, 1990; Gati & Asher, 2001; Gati, Fassa, & Houminer, 1995; Lichtenberg, ShaVer, & Arachtingi, 1993). However, while decision processes have gained considerable attention in the vocational choice literature, most applications of decision making research in this Weld involve rather abstract model comparisons or focus on selected issues. An integrated behavioral perspective on vocational decision making is still lacking. Since scholars in BDM have developed signiWcant insights over the past 30 years, we are convinced that such a perspective could beneWt the Weld considerably by providing a useful basis for studying the processes involved in making vocational choices. In this paper, we develop a model of the motivational and cognitive processes that are involved in vocational choice. Vocational choice (we deWne it broadly as involving careers as well as jobs) is a very complex process that can extend over a relatively long period of time. One could argue that Wrst aspects of career decision making emerge when a child dreams of becoming an astronaut, teacher, or just like Mom. However, we will consider vocational choice more narrowly. The strength of a BDM perspective lies in focusing on the motivational and cognitive issues that arise in the phase where the decision maker has a set of alternatives (occupations or jobs) from which a choice has to be made. Not always will such a phase be clearly identiWable; for some people vocational choice is of a more emergent nature. However, we suggest that in many cases it is possible and useful to distinguish such an explicit decision phase and
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to study it in more detail. Such a decision phase is of course even more pronounced when professional career counselors get involved who explicitly structure the counseling process as involving the choice between alternatives, sometimes directly building on BDM research (e.g., Gati & Asher, 2001; Gati et al., 1995). Our model is applicable to vocational decisions where more controlled, analytical, and deliberative processes dominate. We have chosen not to incorporate the emerging research on intuitive and emotion-driven decision making (e.g., Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; ShaWr & LeBoeuf, 2002) since our knowledge about these processes is still very limited, especially with respect to their interactions with analytical and conscious processes. The model presented in this paper is based on research in BDM as well as in career and job decision making and is primarily descriptive. However, some of its elements have only been studied by BDM researchers and not in the career choice context; more research is needed to Wll these gaps, and our paper therefore also represents a research agenda for scholars interested in studying vocational choice from a BDM perspective. Throughout the paper, we will illustrate our discussion using the Wctitious case of a college senior (lets call him Robert). Robert is a successful college senior with a business major who is confronted with the decision whether to go into business consulting, management in a private Wrm, or whether to become a business professor. We will see how BDM research can help us understand how he deals with limited information, conXicting preferences, the demands of his social environment, and his own cognitive limitations. And we will see how a counselor could help him make a good decision. Of course, the applicability of our model is not restricted to college seniors with a business major; this mini case is simply meant to make our discussion more tangible. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present a model overview. In Section 3, we describe a typical decision task in vocational choice using the terminology of behavioral decision making research. In Section 4, we discuss various decision strategies and how they relate to the choice goals of decision makers. In Section 5, we discuss the impact of decision strategies as well as of task and context factors on the construction of preferences in vocational choice. In Section 6, we brieXy discuss the implications of social factors and of the long decision time in vocational choice for our model. In Section 7, we derive normative implications of our model for counseling. A summary and directions for future research follow in Section 8.
2. Model overview Our model is primarily based on the choice goals framework developed by Bettman, Luce, and Payne (1998), which integrates major Wndings in behavioral decision making research over the last decades. We extend that framework in various ways and pay particular attention to research that has been conducted on decision processes in vocational choice. The model entails two major processes, the selection of a decision strategy in light of certain choice goals of the decision maker and the construction of preferences given certain characteristics of the decision task and context.
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In the following, we provide a brief overview of these two processes; a detailed discussion follows in the subsequent sections. When making a decision, a decision maker pursues certain choice goals (Fig. 1). We distinguish four choice goals: maximizing the decision accuracy, minimizing the
Fig. 1. Model overview.
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cognitive eVort required to make the decision, minimizing the negative emotions experienced during the decision process, and maximizing the justiWability of the decision to signiWcant others. These four goals motivate certain cognitive processes that ultimately lead to the choice outcome. In particular, the choice goals determine which decision strategy the decision maker selects to combine and evaluate information on the alternatives in order to determine the best alternative. DiVerent strategies require diVerent amounts of information and strategy selection may therefore be constrained by informational limitations. To some extent, the decision maker can acquire additional information in the course of the decision process; how much and which information is acquired depends on the choice goals the decision maker pursues. The social context plays an important role in the decision process in that signiWcant others may try to inXuence choice goals and often provide informational inputs to the decision. The second major process in our model is preference construction. Preferences are used in the decision process to evaluate the attributes of options and to assess their relative importance. However, the preferences people express in their choices are not always stable and well-deWned. Research has shown that they are often inXuenced by situational variables, in particular the evaluation mode (joint vs. separate evaluation of the options) and its interactions with characteristics of the attributes (context factors). The evaluation mode, in turn, is partially determined by the representation of information and by the decision strategy. In addition to these situational determinants of preferences, preferences are often shaped by the social context. The choice outcome is ultimately a function of the informational inputs the decision maker has, the preferences that are partly constructed in the decision process, and the decision strategy, i.e., the way in which information and preferences are combined to select an alternative.
3. Decision tasks in vocational choice 3.1. Alternatives, attributes, and information The choice options (alternatives) considered in this paper are occupations such as business consultant or industrial engineer and jobs in particular organizations. In addition to the characteristics of the occupation itself, job options also entail characteristics of the organization such as organizational culture, reputation, or economic viability. Although choices involving these options diVer in a variety of ways, they share a number of characteristics that make them similar from a decision making point of view. We assume some initial set of alternatives from which the decision maker chooses. Which concrete alternatives and how many of them are in the initial choice set depends, among others, on the breadth of interests of the individual, the decision makers physical and mental skills, considerations of self-eYcacy (i.e., the individuals expectations about his or her ability to perform well in an occupation), and market constraints (e.g., availability of jobs in that occupation). These factors have been
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discussed extensively in the literature and will not be the focus of our paper (cf. Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Hartung & Blustein, 2002; Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994; Morrow, Gore, & Campbell, 1996). Theories on the process that governs the admission of alternatives to the choice set usually rely on some form of pre-choice screening (e.g., Beach, 1993). For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the options that are in the initial choice set are not completely irrelevant or impossible. Returning to our example of the college senior majoring in business, it is reasonable to assume that his choice set does not include the career of a concert pianist or of a garbageman; instead he chooses between becoming a business consultant, a manager, or a business professor. Each alternative in the choice set is characterized by a set of attributes. Attributes include, for instance, pay, social status of the occupation, degree of autonomy, amount of social interaction, importance of creativity, and anticipated positive and negative emotions on the job.1 Occupations have a virtually unlimited number of attributes and many of these might be important to the decision maker. This makes vocational decisions potentially complex. Extensive research has been conducted on the types of attributes individuals consider in vocational decisions and has revealed the diversity of these attributes (e.g., Cable & Judge, 1996; Holland, 1997). The literature on work values has also contributed considerably to our understanding of what these attributes are (e.g., Elizur, Borg, Hunt, & Beck, 1991; Judge & Bretz, 1992; Sagie, Elizur, & Koslowsky, 1996). This research shows that the relevant attributes are not only numerous but also very heterogeneous. The heterogeneity of attributes in vocational choice is exempliWed by the variety of rewards an occupation can entail. One important distinction is that between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, which emphasizes the source of rewards (Ryan & Deci, 2000). A second dimension in which rewards can be distinguished is what Elizur et al. call modality in the context of work values (Elizur et al., 1991). The three modi they distinguish are instrumental (e.g., pay), aVective (e.g., peer recognition), and cognitive (e.g., job interest, feeling of self-achievement). Modality reXects diVerent ways in which rewards are of value to the recipient. The heterogeneity of attributes such as rewards has important implications for the decision process, as we will discuss below. The information on the attributes of occupations and jobs is often provided in diVerent forms, such as personal communication with relatives and acquaintances, printed materials, or through television. In addition, individuals who have made prior vocational choices may draw on their work experience. Information on alternatives can be incomplete and the amount of information available for each of the alternatives may diVer.
1 Note that relevant capabilities of the decision maker and certain external constraints can be framed as attributes of the alternative. For instance, required mathematical skills could be considered an attribute of occupations and an individual with limited mathematical skills would have a strong preference for a low level of this attribute. Similarly, the general job prospects in a given occupation may be considered an attribute of that occupation and decision makers will generally prefer high values of that attribute.
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Finally, vocational choice usually involves uncertainty about attributes. For example, our college senior might have information on the current average income of a business consultant. However, this information is only a very crude proxy for his potential future income as a consultant; a variety of individual and environmental factors can lead to a higher or lower actual income should he choose to become a consultant. The estimation problem is even greater when attributes such as anticipated emotions are concerned (cf. Kidd, 2004). The estimated amount of emotion will diVer from individual to individual and the same individual may estimate diVerent amounts depending on situational factors at the time of decision making (e.g., general mood) (Anderson, 2003). While we acknowledge the importance of uncertainty about future outcomes, we do not incorporate it into our model in order to keep the discussion manageable. 3.2. Preferences Preferences are used by the decision maker to assess the attributes and alternatives. We will consider two functions of preferences. First, preferences describe the transformation of the level of an attribute into some measure of value (evaluation). For example, how good or bad is a salary of X dollars? Second, if the evaluations of attributes are aggregated in the decision process, preferences are used in weighting the values according to the relative importance of the attributes (weighting). For instance, pay might receive a larger weight than the expected amount of coVee provided free of charge by the employer. If an attribute is considered irrelevant for the decision, its implicit weight is zero and it is excluded from further analysis. Preferences are reXected in concepts such as personality types (e.g., Holland, 1997), interests (Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, & Tellegen, 1993), and work values (Sagie et al., 1996). Both the structure of preferences and the development of preferences over time have received a great amount of attention in the psychological and vocational literature. With respect to changes of preferences over time, several researchers emphasize the importance of social inXuences (e.g., Demo, 1992; Holland, 1997). When making a decision, his or her preferences are not always known to the decision maker; in fact, a lack of preference information has been identiWed as a major cause of career indecision in vocational choice (Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996). Research on exploration and feedback from prior choices, identity diVusion, and self-concept crystallization investigates the concrete causes and eVects of a lack of preference information, and helping individuals to obtain such information is an important element of career counseling (Mitchell, Levin, & Krumboltz, 1999; Osipow, 1999). However, this task is challenging since research suggests that actual or hypothetical decisions people make do not simply reXect stable, well-deWned and coherent preferences. Instead, preferences are to some extent constructed and context-dependent; they may be formed during the decision process or when they are elicited by means such as preference inventories (Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1999). The result of these preference construction processes and thus the decision outcome may depend on the particular decision strategy used and on the characteristics of the choice situation (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Slovic, 1995). Accordingly,
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Fig. 2. Components of expressed preferences and their determinants.
it is useful to conceptualize the preferences people express in choices as consisting of three components (cf. Payne et al., 1999). One component, which we call core preferences, reXects relatively stable values associated with attributes, e.g., that more pay is preferred to less pay or that autonomy is a more important attribute than social relations on the job. These core preferences may have genetic origins (Lykken et al., 1993), are shaped by the social environment (Demo, 1992; Holland, 1997), and can be thought of as attitudes that are stored in the long-term memory (cf. Hastie, 2001; Payne et al., 1999). A second, situational component results from systematic eVects that certain task and context factors in the speciWc decision situation can have on expressed preferences (preference construction, to be discussed in more detail below). Finally, expressed preferences may reXect random error that will not be considered further (see Fig. 2). Most research on preferences in vocational choice focuses on the core preferences, implicitly assuming that the situational component can be neglected (e.g., Holland, 1997; Lent et al., 1994). In contrast, we will show in Section 5 that preference construction may play a signiWcant role in vocational choice. For the following discussion of decision strategies and their determinants, however, preference construction plays no direct role and we will ignore it for simplicity.
4. Decision strategy selection based on choice goals Decision strategies describe how information on attributes and preferences is combined in order to select an alternative. For example, one strategy is to carefully evaluate and weight all the attributes of the various options, to form an overall score for each option, and to select the option with the highest score. An alternative, much
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simpler strategy would be to select the option that is best on the most important attribute. Decision makers have been shown to select diVerent decision strategies, depending on their individual goals as well as situational factors (Bettman et al., 1998; Slaughter & Highhouse, 2003). DiVerent strategies, however, can lead to diVerent choice outcomes. 4.1. General characteristics of decision strategies In characterizing decision strategies, Payne et al. (1993) consider four general characteristics: the total amount of information processing, the selectivity of information processing, whether the information is processed by alternative or by attribute (across alternatives), and whether the strategy is compensatory or noncompensatory. First, the total amount of information processing depends on the breadth and depth of analysis. Little information processing is required if the decision maker considers the alternatives only on a broad level and then makes a decision. In contrast, a detailed analysis of each attribute and a sophisticated weighting scheme result in more intensive processing. Second, processing can be consistent or selective. Attributes can receive diVerent amounts of attention; a decision maker can consider all available information (consistent processing) or selectively process information on a subset of attributes and ignore information on other attributes. Our college senior could, for instance, focus only on the expected monetary payoVs in an occupation and ignore the amount of social interaction or autonomy at work (selective processing). Third, information can be processed by alternative or by attribute. In alternativebased processing, the attributes of a single option are processed and some aggregate evaluation of the option is made before the decision maker proceeds to the next option. For example, our college senior would evaluate the attributes of the consulting occupation, arrive at an overall evaluation for consulting and then proceed to the next occupation (e.g., manager in a private Wrm). In attribute-based processing, in contrast, the same attribute is Wrst evaluated across all options before the next attribute is evaluated. The college senior might Wrst compare the expected pay across all occupations and then compare the expected autonomy for each occupation. Unlike alternative-based processing, attribute-based processing can involve an evaluation on a relative basis. Finally, processing can be compensatory or noncompensatory. In a compensatory strategy, a desirable level of one attribute compensates for a less desirable level on another attribute. For instance, the working hours of one job may be evaluated negatively, but this disadvantage is partially or completely oVset by larger pay. A compensatory strategy thus involves trade-oVs between attributes; the decision maker has to decide how much of one attribute he is willing to give up for another attribute. In noncompensatory strategies, there is no such compensation across attributes; for instance, the decision maker would reject an option if it does not meet certain minimum standards on important attributes, regardless of the values of other attributes.
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4.2. SpeciWc decision strategies A large number of decision strategies have been proposed in the literature and have been studied in areas as diverse as consumer behavior, strategic decision making, and vocational choice. In the following, we provide an overview of selected decision strategies and their speciWc characteristics (for more details, see Payne et al., 1993). We do not claim that decision makers use these strategies exactly as described and in their pure form; the strategies we describe are abstractions or ideal-types of more complex decision strategies people may use. The primary purpose of this overview is to illustrate how decision strategies may diVer in fundamental ways, to discuss how diVerent strategies can aVect choice outcomes, and to provide a vocabulary that can be used in the later discussion. On that basis, we will discuss in subsequent sections under which circumstances people are likely to use decision processes that resemble one ideal-type strategy versus another. In the weighted additive strategy, the decision maker evaluates each attribute and weights its value according to his preferences. The weighted values are summed up for each alternative and the alternative with the highest overall value is chosen. This strategy requires a large amount of information processing and uses information consistently for each attribute. It is alternative-based because the attributes of one option are evaluated independently of the attributes of the other options. Due to the summation for each option, undesirable levels of an attribute can be compensated for by desirable levels of other attributes; the weighted additive strategy is compensatory.2 The weighted additive strategy is generally considered the standard for rational decision making because it uses all available information and involves making tradeoVs, ideally resulting in the best balance of attributes in the chosen option. Algebraically, it can be represented as Vi D wkvk(xk), where Vi is the value of option i, wk is the weight for attribute k, vk is the evaluation (value) of attribute k and is a function of the score or level xk of attribute k. The equal weight strategy diVers from the weighted additive strategy only in that the values of the attributes are weighted equally. The decision maker does not give diVerent weights to the attributes, and therefore, he does not need information about their relative importance.3 Processing is consistent, alternative-based and compensatory. Compared to the weighted additive strategy, this strategy involves less information processing and requires less information on preferences. The equal weight strategy can be represented algebraically as Vi D vk (xk).
2 Note that compensatory strategies do not necessarily require trading oV attributes against each other explicitly (e.g., I am willing to accept X more working time in exchange for Y more money). Rather, trade-oVs can be made implicitly in the choice process. For instance, the weighted additive strategy only requires the separate evaluation of each attribute and the summation of the weighted scores. The process of summation results in compensation across attributes, but it does not require the explicit trading-oV of attributes against each other. However, from a less mechanistic perspective, the decision maker will be aware of the trade-oVs implicit in his choice. Trade-oVs and compromises are an important aspect of vocational choice and will be discussed in more detail below. 3 Weights play an indirect role, however, by determining which of the attributes are considered at all by the decision maker. As discussed above, attributes thought to be irrelevant receive a weight of zero.
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Simon (1955) suggested that people often use a strategy called satisWcing, because their cognitive resources are limited (bounded rationality) and extensive information processing such as in the weighted additive strategy is therefore unrealistic. SatisWcing is not based on the maximization of value; instead the alternatives are examined sequentially until the decision maker Wnds an option that exceeds minimum standards on all relevant attributes. For instance, our college senior might Wrst look at the consulting occupation and determine if it exceeds his aspirations with respect to pay, social recognition, and other relevant attributes. If it does, the search stops and consulting is chosen. If it does not, the decision maker examines the next alternative in the same way. In satisWcing, the order in which options are examined can thus have an inXuence on the outcome of the choice. This strategy is non-compensatory, since a minimum standard has to be met for each attribute, independent of the values of other attributes. It is alternative-based because alternatives are evaluated sequentially and no comparison of attributes across alternatives takes place. Information processing in satisWcing is selective in that an option is discarded as soon as it does not meet the standard for one attribute; the remaining attributes of that option are then not considered at all. The amount of information processing varies depending on the number of alternatives considered, but will always be smaller than in the weighted additive strategy. When using a lexicographic strategy, the decision maker simply selects the option that is best with respect to the most important attribute. For instance, if our college senior feels that a high income is the single most important career goal, he might simply select the occupation that promises the highest monetary payoVs. This strategy is noncompensatory, attribute-based, and involves very little information processing. Elimination by aspects (EBA) combines elements of the lexicographic strategy and satisWcing (Tversky, 1972). In essence, the decision maker Wrst looks at the most important attribute (e.g., pay) and eliminates all options that do not meet a minimum standard for this attribute. If more than one option remains, the process is repeated with the second most important attribute (e.g., autonomy). The process stops when only one option remains. Elimination by aspects is attribute-based, noncompensatory, and can involve diVerent amounts of information processing, depending on the number of cycles needed to reduce the number of options to one. Note that elimination by aspects (and other strategies that evaluate attributes in the order of importance) requires more information on the preferences of the decision maker than strategies that put equal weights on all attributes. Finally, a strategy based on counts of the number of good and bad features has been described by Alba and Marmorstein (1987). On the basis of some cut-oV value for each attribute, the decision maker rates each alternatives attributes as either good or bad. For example, if an income of x is the cut-oV value, then all jobs with an income >x have a good income, jobs with an income <x have a bad income. The option with the largest number of positive attribute evaluations is chosen. Note that this strategy does not require information on the relative importance of attributes since it implies equal weights for all attributes that are considered. This strategy is compensatory, consistent, and alternative-based.
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Table 1 Characteristics of selected decision strategies (adapted from Bettman et al., 1998, p. 191) Strategy Cognitive eVort required High Medium Variable Low Variable Medium Consistent vs. Alternative vs. Compensatory Need for Order of selective attribute-based vs. nonpreference alternatives processing compensatory information matters Consistent Consistent Selective Selective Selective Consistent AL AL AL AT AT AL C C N N N C High Medium Low Low Medium Medium No No Yes No No No
Weighted additive Equal weight SatisWcing Lexicographic Elimination by aspects Counts of good/ bad features
The ideal-type decision strategies discussed and their key characteristics are summarized in Table 1. In a given decision situation, the decision maker may use more than one of these strategies, resulting in a mixed strategy. In particular, a decision maker might pre-screen options on the basis of a less cognitively demanding noncompensatory strategy (e.g., lexicographic or elimination by aspects) and then make a Wnal choice on the basis of more thorough processing involving weights and trade-oVs. 4.3. Choice goals and informational constraints Since there are many possible decision strategies, the decision maker has to make a second-order choice: he or she has to select a strategy how to decide. Strategies are selected so as to satisfy four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive eVort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing the justiWability of the decision (Bettman et al., 1998). This metacognitive process of strategy selection can be conscious and explicit (e.g., the decision maker thinks There are so many attributes for each occupation that considering all information gets too complicated I should focus on the most important attributes) or relatively unconscious and automatic (Payne et al., 1993).4 In the following, we discuss the four goals, potential determinants of their relative importance, and how they guide strategy selection. The goal of decision accuracy is achieved if the option that is chosen maximizes the value or utility for the decision maker. A larger amount of information processing will generally result in more accurate decisions. Similarly, consistent processing will lead to higher accuracy because more information is used. Decision accuracy is generally considered to be largest for the weighted additive strategy. The accuracy goal will be more important in decisions that involve high stakes and are hard to reverse. Vocational choice usually has a fundamental impact on the future life of the
4 Some readers will have discovered the problem of inWnite regress, i.e., how exactly do people choose how to choose ( how to choose)? Although we have evidence that people do select decision strategies consistent with speciWc choice goals (e.g., Bettman et al., 1998; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), there is no systematic research on the exact process of strategy selection (i.e., on the second-order choice). Given the complexities involved, it seems unlikely that people engage in conscious third- or higher-order choices.
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individual and decisions are costly to reverse (e.g., due to human capital investments). Certain opportunities may not even exist at later points in time. For most people, decision accuracy will therefore be an important goal in vocational decisions. Cognitive eVort is a function of the amount of information that has to be processed and of the intensity of processing. In his classic paper on bounded rationality, Simon (1955) pointed out that the cognitive capacity of humans is limited and generally prohibits rational, accuracy-maximizing decision making. As outlined previously, decision strategies diVer in the amount of information processing required: required cognitive eVort is highest for the weighted additive strategy and lowest for the lexicographic strategy. The goal of minimizing cognitive eVort will play a more important role in decisions that stretch the cognitive limits of the decision maker, i.e., in more complex decisions or when the representation of information makes processing diYcult. As discussed above, the number of potentially relevant attributes in vocational choice is very large and information often has to be integrated from a variety of sources; the goal of reducing cognitive eVort will be important. In addition to requiring cognitive eVort, decisions can also induce negative emotions, in particular when diYcult trade-oVs between attributes have to be considered. Avoiding negative emotions can then be an important goal in the selection of a decision strategy. Trade-oVs are present in almost all types of decisions, but the trade-oV diYculty has been found to depend on the objects or attributes involved. Trade-oVs that involve non-commodities such as objects of sentimental value or that involve protected values such as health or honesty have a larger emotional potential than trade-oVs involving commodities such as money or rebate coupons (Beattie & Barlas, 2001; Luce, 1998). A high level of emotional strain can also be expected when individuals have to consider accepting attributes that are inconsistent with their self-concept (cf. Festinger, 1957; Sirgy, 1982). For example, a decision maker who considers herself a trustworthy person might experience great discomfort when thinking about the possibility to take on a job as sales representative for a company known for highpressure sales methods. Similarly, a law student considering himself very socially responsible may experience negative emotions when having to decide between private law with higher expected pay and public interest law with lower expected pay (cf. Erlanger & Epp, 1996). One way to reduce negative emotion is to choose a decision strategy that does not require explicit trade-oVs or that frames trade-oVs in a way that makes them less emotionally stressful. For instance, Luce, Bettman, and Payne (1997) found that decision makers used more attribute-based decision strategies in more emotion-laden decisions, consistent with an attempt to reduce explicit tradeoVs in emotionally stressful situations. A more extreme way to cope with potential negative emotion during a decision is to avoid the decision (Anderson, 2003; Luce, 1998). Decision avoidance as a way to cope with negative emotions elicited by a particular set of attributes could be an interesting issue for research on indecision in vocational choice; thus far, this research has focused primarily on informational limitations, indecisiveness as an individual trait, or general choice anxiety (e.g., Chartrand, Robbins, Morrill, & Boggs, 1990; Osipow, 1999). In sum, vocational choice has a high potential for emotional strain, particularly when it involves trade-oVs between protected values or values that are relevant for the self-concept. Decision makers can
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try to cope with emotional strain by selecting a decision strategy that does not require explicit trade-oVs or by avoiding the decision. The fourth choice goal is justiWability of the decision process or outcome to the self or to signiWcant others (cf. Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). JustiWcation of the decision process may involve the decision strategy used, the weights used, the information used, or the trade-oVs made, while outcome justiWability can also be achieved by choosing the alternative that conforms with the expectations or preferences of signiWcant others. Importantly, justiWability is not a Wxed property of the decision process or outcome; it depends on the standards of the audience (Brown, 1999). Strategies that involve extensive and consistent information processing will usually be considered more accurate and justiWable (e.g., weighted additive strategy); however, the selection of weights and the resolution of trade-oVs in more complex strategies can be hard to justify because of their highly subjective nature (Bettman et al., 1998). A simple lexicographic strategy based on an attribute that is socially accepted as most important may therefore be preferred. The need for justiWability will increase with the importance of the decision and with the impact the decision has on the social environment of the decision maker. Accountability is therefore partly a function of the decision outcome. For instance, the decision to pursue a career in the arts may put higher demands on parental support than the decision to pursue a career in business consulting, so that the former might need more justiWcation. In addition, the pressure for justiWcation will depend on the extent to which a decision violates expectations or social norms. An individual who chooses an occupation that does not meet the expectations of the social environment or conXicts with certain norms (e.g., with respect to gender stereotypes) will feel a particularly high pressure for justiWcation. Although the decision maker generally does not know the particular decision outcome when selecting the decision strategy, he or she may anticipate a higher need for justiWcation if the choice set involves such controversial options. The relative importance of these four choice goals in making a strategy selection can depend on several determinants, including individual, social, and situational factors. For example, some persons have a higher need for approval than others, potentially leading them to emphasize the goal of justiWability more. Similarly, some (collectivist) cultures value cohesion and conformity highly, potentially leading their members to emphasize justiWability (cf. Eby & Dobbins, 1997). Finally, an important situational determinant of the relative importance of choice goals is the availability of timely and unambiguous feedback on goal achievement (Bettman et al., 1998). In vocational decisions, the availability of feedback is likely to diVer substantially for the four goals. The decision maker notices the eVort necessary to process information immediately and experiences emotions resulting from trade-oV diYculty at the time of making the decision. The accuracy of the decision, however, can only be assessed after it is implemented, which will be much later. The justiWability of a decision will become apparent either during the decision process (e.g., if the decision process is followed by the family or professional counselors) or shortly after the decision is made and publicly announced. The usual pattern of feedback on choice goal achievement in vocational choice may therefore increase the perceived importance of saving cognitive eVort, reduc-
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ing emotional strain, and increasing justiWability while reducing the perceived importance of decision accuracy. The selection of a decision strategy does not only depend on the four choice goals, but also on informational constraints. With respect to information, our focus thus far has been on the reduction of cognitive eVort through mechanisms such as the selective use of information or the simpliWcation of information processing. However, the literature on indecision in vocational choice suggests that a perceived lack of information rather than information overload is characteristic of many decision situations (Chartrand et al., 1990; Gati et al., 1996). In such cases, the availability of information is an important constraint on strategy choice; a particular strategy can only be used if the decision maker has the necessary information on attributes and preferences. For instance, the weighted additive strategy requires complete information on all attributes and preferences. If the decision maker lacks preference information with respect to the relative importance of attributes, strategies that require the weighting or ordering of attributes cannot be used. To some extent, the decision maker can try to infer missing information on attributes on the basis of available information on other attributes; however, such inferences will be less reliable than explicit information and may even be misleading (Huber & McCann, 1982). Overall, informational constraints in a particular choice task limit the feasibility of decision strategies, whereas the four choice goals determine the relative attractiveness of the feasible strategies to the decision maker. 4.4. Research on decision strategies in vocational choice In the previous sections, we provided an overview of decision strategies that can be used in vocational choice and brieXy discussed their key characteristics. We then suggested that decision makers will choose a strategy based on the available information and on the relative importance of four choice goals: maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive eVort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing the justiWability of the decision. We will now review additional research on decision processes in vocational choice in light of our discussion. Scholars generally agree that vocational choice does not follow the ideal of a weighted additive strategy (Phillips, 1997). However, there is only a limited amount of research on how individuals deviate from this ideal and under what conditions alternative strategies are used. Soelberg (1967) developed a model of unprogrammed decision making on the basis of interviews with job candidates. He found that decision makers did not use weighted additive models, even though some stated their intention to do so. According to his model, a job searcher identiWes primary and secondary attributes (based on attribute importance), and considers these attributes to make implicit choices between known alternatives already during the search for more alternatives. In a socalled conWrmation phase, the decision maker then rationalizes the selection of his implicit favorite, which can entail the ex post construction of a seemingly rational decision rule (Soelberg, 1967). Soelbergs model emphasizes informational constraints (the decision is made before all alternatives are identiWed) as well as the goal of justiWability to self and others (post hoc creation of seemingly rational decision rules).
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The impact of the social context on career decisions is an important aspect of research on exploration and nontraditional career choices (e.g., Felsman & Blustein, 1999; Morrow et al., 1996; Phillips & ImhoV, 1997). Most of these studies focus on social inXuences via the formation of preferences or via feelings of self-eYcacy. However, we argue that many of the Wndings are also consistent with social inXuences during the actual decision making process. For example, a person who does not choose a gender-inconsistent occupation could have truly internalized genderrelated stereotypes and therefore prefer other occupations; alternatively, however, the person might actually like that occupation, but give much weight to the justiWability of the decision. In the latter case, the individual may select a decision strategy that leads to the rejection of the gender-inconsistent occupation in order to maximize the justiWability of the decision outcome. For instance, the individual could ignore the attributes he or she likes but should not like according to social stereotypes. More recent research has begun to investigate social inXuences during the decision making process in more detail (e.g., Phillips, Christopher-Sisk, & Gravino, 2001), and we will return to this important issue in Section 6.1. In their normative decision model for vocational choice, Gati and his colleagues advocate the sequential use of diVerent decision strategies, resulting in a mixed strategy (Gati & Asher, 2001; Gati et al., 1995). In their model, the number of alternatives is Wrst reduced in a screening phase using elimination by aspects. Once the number of alternatives is manageable, the remaining options are ranked using strategies that require more intensive information processing. Gottfredsons (1981) theory of compromise explains vocational choice from a developmental perspective, but is structurally similar to a mixed strategy such as that proposed by Gati et al. (1995). In a so-called circumscription phase, which can extend over several years, individuals eliminate unacceptable occupations from the range of career possibilities and create a zone of acceptable alternatives. When selecting from the acceptable options, individuals become aware of barriers that may inhibit them from achieving their goals in certain occupations, and they choose by making tradeoVs between the desirability and the feasibility of options.
5. Preference construction In the preceding section, we assumed that the decision maker has predetermined preferences and that the situational component of preferences is negligible. On this basis, we discussed diVerent strategies to integrate information on preferences and attributes and how decision makers may select a strategy. We now turn to the situational component and consider the strong evidence that the preferences that are expressed in actual or hypothetical choice situations are often constructed at the time of the decision. They can thus be partly determined by characteristics of the speciWc decision situation that ideally should not aVect the choice outcome (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Slovic, 1995; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). Payne et al. (1993) distinguish between two types of situational factors that can lead to preference construction. Task factors are associated with the general structure
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of the decision problem, including the number of alternatives, the representation of information, time pressure, and the evaluation mode. Context factors refer to the particular values of the attributes in the speciWc choice set, including the similarity of the alternatives and attributes and the overall attractiveness of the alternatives. Because of diVerent constellations of task and context factors, a decision maker may prefer alternative A to alternative B in one decision situation, but alternative B to alternative A in another (Payne et al., 1993). The possibility of such preference reversals is especially problematic in high stakes decisions such as vocational choice; it just does not seem right that the decision to become a business manager as opposed to a scholar may depend on factors such as the number and types of other occupations considered, how the information on the occupations is presented, or how the counselor elicits the clients preferences. In the following, we discuss a particularly important task factor, the evaluation mode, and how it interacts with other task and context factors in inXuencing the construction of preferences. 5.1. Joint vs. separate evaluation Two evaluation modes are generally distinguished in the decision making literature (cf. Hsee et al., 1999). In joint evaluation, decision makers are asked to choose one of the simultaneously presented options. In separate evaluation, individuals are asked to evaluate each alternative separately, e.g., by asking them to rate the alternatives successively on an absolute scale. Separate evaluation involves alternative-based processing of information, whereas joint evaluation may be either alternative-based or attribute-based. The interesting general Wnding is that choice outcomes may depend on the evaluation mode; for instance, options that receive a higher overall rating in a separate evaluation may be rejected in a direct choice situation. Preference reversals in joint vs. separate evaluation are contingent on context factors such as the heterogeneity of attributes, the evaluability of attributes, and the comparability of options. In the following, we review research on the interactions between the evaluation mode and these context factors and how they aVect preference construction. In doing so, we focus on eVects that may be particularly relevant to vocational choice. 5.2. Importance and salience of attributes The attributes of the alternatives in an occupational choice situation are highly heterogeneous. Rewards, for instance, can range from instrumental (e.g., pay) to cognitive (e.g., interesting task) to aVective (e.g., peer recognition). Some of the attributes are more salient or more important to the decision maker than others (Elizur et al., 1991). If such diVerences in the importance or salience of attributes are present, the preferences that are constructed in a joint evaluation may diVer from those in a separate evaluation of the options. More speciWcally, research indicates that the weights assigned to heterogeneous attributes depend on the evaluation mode; more important and non-commodity attributes tend to receive more weight in joint evaluation than in separate evaluation (Beattie & Barlas, 2001; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). This eVect has been conWrmed in a variety of studies and has been captured in the
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so-called prominence hypothesis (Tversky et al., 1988). For vocational choice, this would imply that decision makers tend to prefer occupations or jobs that are superior on very important dimensions (e.g., attributes that are relevant to the self-concept) more when asked to evaluate the options jointly, but prefer such options less when evaluating the options separately. 5.3. Evaluability People often cannot evaluate levels of attributes in isolation because well-deWned preferences with respect to these attributes do not exist in their memory (Hsee et al., 1999). Instead, evaluations of attributes as well as weights assigned to attributes are based on a variety of cues. For instance, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003) showed that the monetary value people put on goods and feelings was substantially higher when people had previously been primed to think of a large number and smaller when they had been primed to think of a small number. The numbers apparently served as anchors for the evaluation, even though they did not convey any substantive information. Highhouse, Brooks-Laber, Lin, and Spitzmueller (2003) found that people evaluated salary levels based on what is normal and used diVerent cues to estimate the normal pay level. As a result, the same absolute salary was evaluated positively when it was at the high end of the range of options but negatively when it was at the low end. With respect to relative weights, Hsee et al. (1999) found that people gave less weight to attributes that are hard to evaluate when they were asked to evaluate options separately. However, more weight was given to these attributes when the options were evaluated jointly. Underlying these eVects is the concept of evaluability, the ease of evaluating an attribute. If an attribute is hard to assess, considering the alternatives jointly as opposed to separately can signiWcantly increase the evaluability of that attribute because the decision maker can establish a relative preference based on the distribution of that attribute in the choice set (Hsee et al., 1999). Such an attribute may then also receive more weight in the overall assessment of the alternatives because its evaluation seems more reliable and informative. The evaluability of an attribute in isolation will be high (and joint and separate evaluation will be similar) if the decision maker has suYcient information about the distribution of the attribute without knowing the particular choice set. For example, knowing the average salary or the range of salaries in a certain occupation will be very helpful to evaluate the salary for a given job option. The appropriate information is often obtained from career centers, industry surveys, or acquaintances (cf. Tenbrunsel & Diekmann, 2002). In addition, distributional information may reside in the individuals memory, but may be more readily available for some attributes (e.g., pay) than for others (e.g., degree of autonomy). In either case, the better the individual is informed prior to the decision, the smaller will the impact of the evaluation mode be. The concept of evaluability not only suggests that joint evaluations may diVer from separate evaluations, but also that the structure of the choice set may play a role in the evaluation (cf. Tversky & Simonson, 1993). For example, our college senior may reevaluate the relative merits of the options consultant and business
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manager when the third option professor is introduced that conveys additional evaluation information. Supporting this idea, Highhouse et al. (2003) found that the frequency of alternatives involving salaries above a certain target level in the choice set aVected the salary expectations and salary evaluations of decision makers. Merely introducing new job options can thus change the evaluation and importance of salary as an attribute, which in turn can result in a change in the relative attractiveness of diVerent options. 5.4. Comparability and feature matching A third situation in which joint and separate evaluations may diVer is when the alternatives are not directly comparable because information is available on a certain set of attributes for one alternative, but on a diVerent set of attributes for another alternative. For example, our college senior might have information on the salary, degree of autonomy, and working conditions in business consulting. For managers, he has information on the salary, social relationships, and working conditions. When evaluating the two occupations separately, he will give certain weights to the three attributes on which he has information. However, these weights will diVer from those he would use in joined evaluation. The reason is that people tend to engage in feature matching when evaluating alternatives jointly: they give more weight to attributes that are shared by the alternatives (e.g., salary and working conditions) and less weight to unique attributes (e.g., autonomy and social relationships). As a result, alternatives that have an advantage in shared attributes are evaluated more positively in joint evaluation than in a separate evaluation (Houston, Sherril-Mittleman, & Weeks, 2001). Research has established two important boundary conditions for the feature matching eVect. First, Johnson (1984) suggested that as alternatives become less comparable, decision makers represent attributes at more abstract levels in order to allow comparisons. For instance, a decision maker may aggregate the job attributes salary, bonus, and stock options into the more abstract attribute compensation that is more comparable across the alternatives. To the extent that unique attributes are reXected in the weight of the more general attribute, joint evaluation does not result in a loss of weight for unique attributes. Second, the degree of feature matching may depend on the complexity of the choice task and on the way in which information is represented. Slaughter and Highhouse (2003) conducted an experiment involving the choice between jobs and found that participants engaged in feature matching when information was presented in a simple way that facilitated attribute-based comparison (e.g., a matrix) but did not engage in feature matching when information was presented in more complex ways (e.g., in recruitment brochures and site visit summaries). Apparently, the more complex representation of information led to more alternativebased processing, in which feature matching does not occur. 5.5. When are preferences constructed? The strength of task and context eVects depends on the nature of the decision. For some decisions, the relevant core preferences will be clearly deWned in the decision
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makers memory; in such cases, preference construction may only play a minor role for the choice outcome. However, even if clear core preferences are stored in memory, they will only be used when they are perceived as relevant to the new situation and when they are easily accessible (Payne et al., 1999). Slaughter and Highhouse (2003) demonstrated the role of accessibility; in their experiment, feature matching did not occur when subjects had rated the importance of job attributes prior to the choice task (increasing accessibility), but feature matching did occur when participants had not rated the attributes prior to making the choice. Core preferences will be well-deWned for choices that are familiar and that are directly experienced, because experience with a choice situation and with the choice outcome gives individuals the opportunity to receive feedback that helps to form core preferences (Hsee et al., 1999; Payne et al., 1999). For instance, choices involving certain consumer products (e.g., washing detergent, soft drinks) will often involve relatively stable preferences. Vocational choice, however, seems to Wt the opposite picture. Vocational decisions and even job choices are extremely infrequent for an individual and there is a long time lag between the decision and the experience of the decision outcome. Preference construction may therefore play a particularly important role in vocational choice.
6. Extensions of the model In the preceding sections, we presented a basic model of vocational choice that focused on individual decision making and did not explicitly consider the duration of the decision. In the following sections, we discuss how two important characteristics of vocational decisionssocial inXuences and a long decision timecan be incorporated into our model. While this discussion can only scratch the surface of a number of interesting issues we still think that it is useful to outline some connections, and as we will see, promising areas of future research. 6.1. Social dimensions of decision making Phillips et al. (2001) conducted a study on the social dimensions of career choice in a sample of young adults, and we will discuss two of the inXuences they found to be particularly important. First, many respondents indicated that a very important action of others was the provision of information as well as of concrete alternatives (e.g., job oVers). In terms of our model, both the alternatives that are potentially included in the initial choice set and the information on the alternatives are to a considerable extent provided by others. While these contributions of others will in most cases improve the decision makers informational position and enlarge the initial choice set, the implicit Wltering process may reinforce the impact the social environment has via the formation of preferences and interests, possibly contributing to phenomena such as the reproduction of socio-economic status. Note that we do not refer to deliberate inXuence attempts of signiWcant others by providing biased information (see below), but to what could be called non-random sampling of jobs and
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information. To return to our example of the college senior, if his social environment consists to a large degree of people who work in business related occupations (e.g., peers, faculty, and internship contacts) and who will think that these are good options (many of them have already self-selected into these occupations at an earlier point in time), he will be exposed to particularly rich information on certain business related occupations and this information will tend emphasize the advantages of such occupations. Similarly, when looking for concrete job oVers, his social contacts are most likely to have knowledge of or access to opportunities that are related to what they do. According to the research of Phillips et al. (2001), a second major activity of the social environment is to push/nudge the decision maker in career choices (52% of the respondents reported such activities). Relevant individuals such as friends and family try to steer the decision maker towards a certain course of action they think is best. The extensive research on social inXuence and attitude change (cf. Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Wood, 2000) suggests that many people are receptive to such social inXuences. How does our model capture such inXuences?5 It is useful to distinguish three forms of inXuence attempts: inXuence via the provision of biased or selective information (e.g., Consultants have to work 80 h a week and are much more likely to get heart attacks than average people!), inXuence attempts via preferences (e.g., I dont think you should pay so much attention to money, what ultimately matters is that you love what you do.), and inXuence by establishing explicit or subtle norms (e.g., Our business has always been under family leadership, and you should continue that tradition.). Social inXuence via the provision of information aVects the information the decision maker uses, at least to the extent that the decision maker is unable to verify, de-bias, or ignore the information. Research on mental contamination has shown how diYcult it can be to correct or ignore Xawed or irrelevant information (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). To the extent that inXuence attempts are targeted at preferences, they are reXected in the core preferences; they would not aVect preference construction, which, by deWnition, results from the speciWc characteristics of the alternatives and attributes (see Section 3.2). Finally, inXuence via norms is best accounted for by considering choice goals and strategy selection. Strong social inXuence via norms may aVect the choice goal of high justiWability and therefore indirectly inXuence strategy selection and the Wnal choice outcome (see Section 4). Finally, social inXuences operate not only with respect to preferences, but also with respect to the relative importance of choice goals. Instead of trying to steer the decision maker towards a speciWc choice outcome, signiWcant others may try to raise the importance of certain choice goals such as decision accuracy. In fact, we will suggest below that the key to improving vocational decisions in a counseling situation is to understand and change choice goals.
5 In the extreme case, where the decision is eVectively made by someone else (e.g., the parents), it may be necessary to redeWne the locus of decision making. Instead of studying the decision processes of the aVected individual, one might ask questions such as: How do parents decide what they tell their child to do? What are the parents goals in such a decision, where do they get the information on available options, what biases might occur in processing the information?
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6.2. The role of decision time The vocational choice processes that are captured in our model can easily extend over several weeks or even months and we will now brieXy discuss two mechanisms through which this long decision time may aVect the decision processes and the choice outcome. First, a long decision time may change the relative importance of choice goals. Second, it allows the acquisition of additional information on the alternatives as well as on individual preferences, a process that may be directed by choice goals. When discussing the impact of time on choice goals, the BDM literature primarily focuses on decisions with time constraints rather than decisions with a particularly long decision time. When time constraints reduce the processing capacity of individuals and make the choice goal of reducing cognitive eVort more important, decision makers tend to adopt simpler strategies such as the lexicographic strategy or elimination by aspects (Gilliland & Schmitt, 1993; Payne et al., 1993). A long decision time will increase the cognitive capacity of decision makers, but saving cognitive eVort will still be an important goal due to the high complexity of vocational choice problems as well as the cost of eVort. We can only speculate how a longer decision time aVects the relative importance of choice goals since research on this issue is lacking. One interesting possibility concerns the choice goal of reducing negative emotion resulting from decision diYculty and diYcult trade-oVs. The importance of this goal might increase with decision time because the negative emotion is experienced or expected over a longer period of time. In other words, repeatedly contemplating a diYcult trade-oV and every time experiencing emotional discomfort may lead the decision maker to switch to a decision strategy that does not involve the trade-oV, e.g., by focusing on one important attribute that clearly discriminates the options (lexicographic strategy). In addition to these potential eVects on choice goals, a longer decision time allows the decision maker to engage in the acquisition of additional information about the alternatives. Of particular interest is the question if and when this information acquisition is biased. A large body of research investigates motivated reasoning, where biases in cognitive processes result from certain underlying motivations of individuals (Brownstein, 2003; Kunda, 1990). For example, decision makers often have an early favorite among the alternatives and want to choose that alternative. However, this choice needs to be justiWable. Decision makers therefore selectively search for information that further boosts the favorite alternative relative to the other alternatives or they Wlter out negative information about the favorite (Kuhl, 1984; Soelberg, 1967). Building on this research, Lundgren and Prislin (1998) studied how diVerent underlying motivations may elicit diVerent kinds of biases. In their experiment (a simulated debate about university politics), Lundgren and Prislin distinguished three types of motivation. Accuracy motivation is the motivation to hold attitudes congruent with relevant information, directional motivation is the motivation to protect existing attitudes, and impression motivation is aroused when attitudes are an important element in social relationships and agreement with others is sought. Lundgren and Prislin found that individuals in the accuracy motivation condition engaged in objective and unbiased information acquisition, whereas individuals with directional motivation avoided disconWrming information and focused on information that supported their
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existing attitude. In addition, these individuals creatively self-generated arguments and combined external information in new ways to further bolster their position. Finally, individuals with impression motivation engaged in extensive information search but processed information selectively so as to arrive at some compromise between their initial position and that of their relevant social environment. Lundgren and Prislins study shows that information acquisition can be directed by diVerent goals concerning the use of the information. Their Wndings resonate extremely well with our model of vocational choice, which considers the choice goals of high accuracy, low cognitive eVort, low negative emotion, and high justiWability (the latter is similar to Lundgren and Prislins impression motivation) as determinants of the decision strategy. Synthesizing these two bodies of work, we propose that choice goals inXuence decisions via the acquisition of information as well as via the selection of a decision strategy. Selective information acquisition has also been observed with respect to information about personality traits and preferences. If individuals are motivated to maintain their self-concept, information that disconWrms valued self-beliefs is often discredited, rejected as inaccurate, or reinterpreted in such a way as to conWrm self-conceptions (Swann & Hill, 1982). Individuals also try to obtain feedback that supports rather than threatens self-conceptions (Swann & Read, 1981). White, Brockett, and Overstreet (1993) found that people judged feedback from personality tests as less accurate when it was inconsistent with their self-perception. Finally, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) showed that subjects who were made to believe that certain traits (e.g., extroversion) were conducive to academic success rated themselves higher on that trait than other subjects, potentially by selectively accessing their memory in search of conWrming anecdotal evidence. The implications of this research on information acquisition (with respect to both attributes and preferences) for our model of vocational choice are very interesting. If the acquisition of information is directed by choice goals, then the eVects of choice goals on the decision outcome we have discussed in the previous sections may be reinforced. Consider our college senior as an example. If accuracy is his primary choice goal, then the senior will not only select an accuracy maximizing decision strategy, but will also try to obtain a large amount of accurate information about the three options as well as about himself. In contrast, if justiWability is the primary concern (e.g., his parents want him to become a consultant and he is motivated to conform), he might not only use an appropriate decision strategy (e.g., EBA starting with salary) but could also try to boost the consulting alternative by selectively acquiring information about the alternatives (e.g., obtain information about bonus sizes in boom years, interview successful consultants) and about himself (e.g., recall how much he likes traveling, explore how enjoyable a luxurious life-style can be, etc.).
7. Implications for counseling Our model of decision processes in vocational choice allows us to derive normative implications for counseling practice. In the following discussion of selected
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recommendations, we emphasize the role of career counselors as decision counselors, whose aim it is to facilitate an active decision making process (cf. Gati & Asher, 2001). While some of our recommendations will be most eVective when the underlying rationale is shared with the client, others may be eVective even if the client does not understand the underlying cognitive processes. More speciWcally, we expect that interventions that address motivational processes (i.e., choice goals and strategy selection) beneWt from a certain degree of insight on the part of the client because they require active participation and commitment. In contrast, most recommendations addressing preference construction processes may be implemented without a detailed explanation to the client since they operate via more automatic cognitive processes. 7.1. Understanding and inXuencing strategy selection and information acquisition We have discussed how choice goals may direct the selection of a decision strategy and the acquisition of information on alternatives and preferences. Because of this important role of choice goals, the Wrst step in a counseling situation should be to understand the relative importance of the choice goals to the client. In a next step, it should be identiWed how these goals may lead the client to prefer a certain decision strategy and to selectively acquire information, and how this might aVect the choice outcome. For instance, does the client tend to avoid diYcult trade-oVs? Which alternatives would beneWt from the use of a trade-oV avoiding decision strategy? Does the client have an objective picture of the options, where is more information needed? If potential problems become apparent, reconsidering choice goals may seem desirable. In particular, to the extent that the client overemphasizes short-term goals (e.g., reduction of cognitive eVort and negative emotion) and underestimates the role of decision accuracy that is experienced only in the longer term, it might be in the clients interest to increase the weight of decision accuracy. We consider understanding and inXuencing choice goals an integral part of the counseling process, but one may argue that it is easier and less time-consuming to override or ignore seemingly inadequate choice goals. For example, when a client fails to acknowledge the importance of the decision and of decision accuracy, prescribing an accuracy-maximizing strategy may be in his or her long-term interest. If the client selectively acquires information, the counselor might just confront him with additional information. While such interventions may be necessary and successful in some cases, we believe that choice goals should be consistent with the overall decision process. If they are not, the participation of the client in the counseling process as well as his or her commitment to the choice outcome may be reduced. Choice goals can be changed by encouraging a more conscious consideration of their implications and trade-oVs. Alternatively, the underlying objective and subjective drivers of particular choice goals may be addressed in many situations. For example, if justiWability is perceived as very important, the counselor might investigate with the client how realistic a perceived need for justiWcation really is; perhaps a joint session with parents or peers may dispel this concern. Similarly, if an individual is obsessed with (and perhaps paralyzed by) trying to make the perfect decision,
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it may help to discuss how irreversible and narrow the choice to be made really is. Finally, the importance of saving cognitive eVort can be reduced by making information easier to process or by increasing the cognitive capacity of the decision maker (e.g., through training in systematic decision making or through the use of decision aids). On the basis of the original or revised set of goals, an appropriate decision strategy can be selected. In doing so, the availability of information on attributes and preferences has to be considered as a constraining factor. Additional information on alternatives and preferences can be acquired during the counseling process, but information acquisition is costly in terms of time and eVort. Accordingly, the following iterative process seems most adequate: As choice goals and suitable decision strategies become clearer, it is determined if the necessary information can be obtained. The availability of the information, in turn, guides the further speciWcation of the decision process. The goal is that the optimal decision process is selected given the obtainable information and the choice goals; at the same time, only necessary information should be obtained. Throughout the process, the potential for biases in information acquisition should be kept in mind and measures should be taken to obtain information that is as accurate as possible. In addition to guiding decision makers and their advisors, our model can also be applied to analyze and evaluate decisions that have already been made. In particular, the explicit analysis of choice goals, decision strategies, and information acquisition patterns can help to disentangle several inXuences that may have led to a particular choice outcome. Based on ones idea of a good decision process, such an analysis may suggest that the decision be reconsidered. 7.2. Understanding and inXuencing preference construction The evaluation mode (joint vs. separate evaluation) can have a signiWcant impact on the evaluation of attributes and their relative weights in a choice. Unfortunately, when expressed preferences partly reXect the evaluation mode or other task and context factors (situational component), we do not know which the true (core) preferences are on which the decision should ideally be based. However, if counselors are aware of the eVects task and context factors can have, they can design and steer the decision process in a way that may lead to a better achievement of the objectives of their clients. One general method to identify and reduce the inXuence of task and context factors is triangulation (Payne et al., 1999). Choices should be made in diVerent ways (e.g., joint and separate evaluation, diVerent order of options) and the client should be confronted with inconsistencies in the choices made. Decision makers are often able to resolve such inconsistencies (Baron, 2001). A triangulation approach appears particularly suitable for decisions that are made over a longer period of time, since several aspects of the decision (e.g., available information, framing, etc.) will either vary naturally or can be deliberately manipulated and the individual has enough time to reXect on hypothetical choices. It is important, however, that counselors facilitate a systematic learning and discovery process; in the same way that a successful psychological experiment requires a careful setup and analysis of the
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experimental conditions, triangulation needs to be systematically conducted in order to be enlightening and not confusing. A second recommendation is derived from the fact that the alternatives in vocational choice are future occupations or jobs. When decisions involve the prediction of future preferences or when the decision outcome will be experienced in the future, context-matching increases decision accuracy (Hsee et al., 1999; Payne et al., 1999). In context matching, the choice situation is designed to match the context in which the decision maker will eventually experience the outcome. In vocational choice, individuals will generally experience the attributes of only the chosen alternative (e.g., receive the salary, have the social contacts and autonomy in their actual future job); ongoing comparisons with rejected alternatives are rarely the case (cf. PfeVer, 1990). Accordingly, context matching in vocational choice implies a separate evaluation of options. A third recommendation reXects the important role of hard-to-evaluate attributes in occupational choice: measures should be taken to ensure a high degree of evaluability for all relevant attributes. Evaluability is usually higher in joint evaluation. However, separate evaluation also has several advantages (e.g., consideration of trade-oVs, no feature-matching eVects, and context-matching beneWts). To combine the informational beneWt of joint evaluation and the beneWts of separate evaluation, we suggest the following simple two-step procedure. In a Wrst step, distributional information on the attributes is constructed from the complete choice set. In the second step, this information is then used to facilitate a separate evaluation of the alternatives. Fourth, a simpliWed representation of information is often advocated but can have more subtle eVects than just making information processing easier. In particular, matrix representations of alternatives encourage attribute-based processing. This not only eliminates explicit trade-oVs, but can also lead to a change in the evaluations and weights of attributes as compared to a more complex representation of the information (Slaughter & Highhouse, 2003). Therefore, when there are advantages of alternative-based processing for a given set of choice goals, the beneWts of a simple representation of information and its potential negative eVects via attribute-based processing should be carefully balanced. Finally, our model may also be helpful to evaluate normative decision strategies that have been proposed in the literature. The relative advantages of strategies such as the ideal weighted additive strategy (Broscio & Scherer, 2003), sequential elimination (Gati et al., 1995), or more intuitive approaches (cf. Singh & Greenhaus, 2004) may vary considerably depending on the goals of the decision maker and depending on the nature of task and context factors.
8. Summary and directions for future research We presented a model of the motivational and cognitive processes that are involved in vocational choice. Our model is based on research in behavioral decision making (e.g., Bettman et al., 1998; Payne et al., 1993; Tversky et al., 1988) and involves two major processes:
299
(1) Decision strategies are selected depending on the relative importance of four choice goals (maximizing decision accuracy, minimizing cognitive eVort, minimizing negative emotion, and maximizing justiWability of the decision). This strategy selection is constrained by the availability of information on attributes and preferences. (2) The evaluation mode (joint vs. separate evaluation of alternatives) and certain characteristics of the attributes can lead to preference construction processes and thereby aVect the choice outcome. The evaluation mode is determined in part by the decision strategy, but can also be inXuenced by the representation of information. This basic model was extended to account for the role of the social context and for a long decision time, both of which can potentially aVect the decision process and the decision outcome. The social context can aVect decisions via the provision of information and alternatives, as well as via changes in preferences. A long decision time allows the acquisition of additional information on alternatives as well as on preferences, and this information acquisition is directed by the choice goals of the decision maker. Several elements of the model have already been investigated in the particular context of vocational decisions; for example, considerable research has been conducted on the characteristics of alternatives in vocational choice, on the accuracy of diVerent decision strategies, and on selected task and context eVects. However, there are many opportunities to Wll remaining gaps and to replicate Wndings made in behavioral decision making research in the context of vocational choice. In particular, there is little descriptive research on decision strategies and how they are aVected by choice goals. Also, more research is needed on the size of task and context eVects in more realistic, complex vocational decisions. A decision making perspective on vocational choice can provide useful recommendations for counseling. Our model suggests that the counselor should analyze the choice goals of the client and their potential eVects on the selection of decision strategies and on information acquisition patterns. It may be in the clients interest to reconsider choice goals if they motivate cognitive processes that are detrimental to decision quality. In addition, task and context eVects should be taken into account. Using approaches such as triangulation and context matching, the counselor can try to control these situational eVects and to design a decision process that allows the most relevant preferences to emerge. Our model also oVers an interesting perspective for researchers interested in career transitions. As an individuals career progresses, several key constructs in our model will undergo systematic changes. For example, the relative importance of choice goals is likely to change over the course of peoples lives. We also expect that preference construction will be less pronounced for decision makers that have had the opportunity to form clearer core preferences by actually experiencing job attributes. Finally, work experience will provide people with valuable information on alternatives such that informational constraints might be less relevant. Our discussion has revealed many exciting opportunities for research on vocational choice processes and only some elements of such a research agenda can be highlighted here. First, an interesting question is if people learn to implement better decision processes after experiencing the outcomes from prior vocational choices.
300
There is some evidence of learning in tasks such as stock trading or inventory planning (e.g., Gibson, 2000; Subbotin, 1996), but we suspect that learning is particularly diYcult in vocational choice due to the particular nature of the decision problem and of the alternatives. Hopefully, research on this question will point us towards useful tools to improve career and job decisions over time. Second, the determinants of the relative importance of choice goals are an interesting area for future research, especially given the central role of choice goals for strategy selection and information acquisition. If these determinants are primarily situational (e.g., time pressure, cognitive load, and salience of social inXuences), counselors may be better able to guide the decision process than if they reside on the individual or cultural level. Individual-level studies could investigate the relationships between choice goal importance and certain personality traits; cross-cultural studies could investigate if there are systematic diVerences in the importance of choice goals in collectivist vs. individualist cultures. Third, and on a more conceptual level, future work could extend this model to account for uncertainty about attributes and alternatives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Research on decision making under risk and uncertainty has advanced considerably over the last decades and might provide important additional insights into vocational decisions (for an excellent review and integration of that literature, see Fox & See, 2003). Finally, the current model may be of little use for understanding decisions that are primarily based on intuition and emotional processes. We have a long way to go in understanding these processes on a more fundamental level, and we know even less about the interaction of emotional and systematic deliberative processes (ShaWr & LeBoeuf, 2002). Studying these issues is an important task not only for researchers interested in career decision making but for the Weld of behavioral decision making more generally. We hope that this paper will contribute to the literature on vocational choice by exposing the Weld to recent research in behavioral decision making and by stimulating further research on decision making processes in the context of vocational choice. To the extent that certain decision processes lead to better outcomes than others, a process perspective may help to achieve a signiWcant improvement of vocational decisions, be it with respect to person-environment Wt or some other measure of decision quality. Given the high importance of vocational choice for individuals and for society, this opportunity should not be neglected.
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Vocational Choice: A Decision Making Perspective: Henry Sauermann

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Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303 www.elsevier.

Vocational choice: A decision making perspective

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

Fig. 1. Model overview.

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

Fig. 2. Components of expressed preferences and their determinants.

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

H. Sauermann / Journal of Vocational Behavior 66 (2005) 273303

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