Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A.

De Leon 201078170

Gador v. COMELEC

Facts:
1. Current petition is to enjoin COMELEC to include Gador's name
(petitioner) in the list of candidates for Mayor of the City of
Ozamiz which shall be printed and distributed soon to all voting
centers in the City of Ozamis.
2. Gador is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of
Ozamiz as Independent in the January 30, 1980 local election;
3. He filed his certificate of candidacy on January 7, 1980.
Thereafter, he tried several times to communicate with the
COMELEC chairman in order to find out about the status of his
application.
4. He filed this petition in view of the announcement made by the
President that the COMELEC resolution extending the period for
filing of the certificate of candidacy from January 4-10 had been
denied and that because of the great possibility that he may not be
included in the list of candidates to be voted for which is to be
printed soon and distributed in Ozamiz City.

Issue: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was
filed on January 7, 1980 is valid? NO.

Ratio:
1. B.P. 52: "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in
triplicate not later than January 4, 1980."
2. Petitioner admits that the President had not extended the period
for the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
3. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the
petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

Coquilla v. COMELEC, Alvarez

Doctrine: You cannot acquire legal residence in the Philippines while
still a citizen of another country such as the U.S which requires
residence in order to be naturalized as a citizen (presumes that the legal
residence is in the US)

Facts:
1. Petition to set aside a COMELEC resolution ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo
M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar.
2. Coquilla was born in 1938 of Filipino parents in Eastern Samar.
He grew up, stayed and resided there until 1965 when he joined
the U.S. Navy. Subsequently he was naturalized as a US citizen.
3. Coquilla retired from the US Navy in 1985 and he remained in
the US since then.
4. In 1998. he returned to the Philippines to take out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and
lasted until August 5, 2000.
5. Later on, he was able to be repatriated under the law and in 2000,
he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines on November 10,
2000.
6. November 2000 - petitioner applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. -> Granted.
7. February 2001 - he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two (2) years.
8. Incumbent mayor of Oras (Alvarez) sought the cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter
had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two
years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.
9. In the elections, Coquilla was able to get the highest number of
votes. Thereafter, he was proclaimed as Mayor and then he took
his oath of office.
10. COMELEC granted Alvarez's petition and cancelled the COC of
Coquilla.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

a. All things considered, the number of years he claimed to
have resided or stayed in Oras, Eastern Samar since 1985
as an American citizen and permanent resident of the
U.S.A. before November 10, 2000 . cannot be added to
his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until
May 14, 2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and
year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective
office in the Philippines. respondent is short of the one-
year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001
elections.

Issue:
1. (Procedural) WON the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide
this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner? YES.
2. (Substantive) WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on
May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy?
NO.
3. If yes, WON the COMELEC was justified in cancelling
Coquilla's COC for this reason? YES.
4. WON Coquilla was denied due process because the COMELEC
failed to act on his motion to be allowed to present evidence?

Ratio:
1. COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide the case. The rules are:
a. The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by
final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and
the votes cast for them shall not be counted.
b. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and
proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the
COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the
grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their
certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the
proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the
cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which
have been begun before the elections, should continue even
after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
c. *From R.A. No. 6646, Sec 6: Effect of Disqualification
Case
2. Coquilla was not a resident for the period required by the law.
a. 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160)
provides:
i. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Emphasis added)
b. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation,"
21
but
rather to "domicile" or legal residence,
22
that is, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain (animus manendi)."
c. A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
is usually the place where the childs parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice).
d. In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10,
2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have
allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
e. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized
abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his
residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner
did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

f. It is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished
residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to
prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly
declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek
repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections. Such acts are insufficient.
i. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be
waived:
1. either separately, when one acquires the status
of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine
citizenship, or
a. As an alien, an individual may obtain an
immigrant visa under 13
28
of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and
an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR)
29
and thus waive his status as a
non-resident.
2. at the same time when one acquires Philippine
citizenship.
ii. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners
status when he entered the country (on October 15,
1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and
June 23, 2000) is the statement "Philippine
Immigration [] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S.
passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the
stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year
stay."
31

iii. It would appear then that when petitioner entered the
country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-
free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid
for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held
to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No.
8171.
32
He lacked the requisite residency to qualify
him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
g. Conquilla's contention: his registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is conclusive
of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding the election.
i. As held in Nuval v. Guray,
35
however, registration
as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent
case questioning a candidates lack of residency.
3. SC holds that COMELEC was justified in cancelling COC.
a. OEC, SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The
certificate of candidacy shall state:
i. that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office;
ii. if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent;
iii. the political party to which he belongs;
iv. civil status;
v. his date of birth;
vi. residence;
vii. his post office address for all election purposes;
viii. his profession or occupation;
ix. that he will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto;
x. that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
xi. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country;
xii. that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion;
xiii. and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

b. OEC, SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material
representation is false.
c. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidates qualification for an office for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this
case is thus fully justified.
4. No.
a. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de
rigeur.
b. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to
be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum
and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the
COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by
him in this petition, which, contrary to petitioners claim,
are complete and intact in the records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001,
and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections
en banc are AFFIRMED.

Go v. COMELEC, Montejo, Antoni

Facts:
1. This seeks to nullify the resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc which disqualified to run for the
office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because
she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the
withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed
late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.
2. Go is the incumbent representative of the 5th District, province of
Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
3. Feb 27 2001 - Go filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
4. Feb 28 2001 at 11:47 PM- Go filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another
certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte.
a. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the
provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of
her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she
should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for
mayor.
5. The deadline for filing/withdrawal of COC was midnight of that
same day and there were a few minutes left and so she decided to
fax a copy of the affidavit of withdrawal to her father. The fax
copy was received by the Baybay office on March 1 2001 at
12:28 a.m. The original copy thereof was received at 1:15 p.m. on
the same day.
6. Montejo and Antoni filed with the provincial election supervisor
of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to
cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner on the ground
that petitioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions,
namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of
Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both.
7. Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena,
made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an
opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings.
a. Report and recommendation by the Law Dept:
i. Found that Go falsely represented in her certificate of
candidacy for Provincial Governor, and under oath,
that she is ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in
certificates of candidacy.
ii. Likewise, Go falsely represented in her certificates of
candidacy, under oath, that she will OBEY THE
LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS
AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND
ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to
be sworn to and contained in certificates of
candidacy.
iii. Citing Sec. 73 of OEC: 'No person shall be eligible
for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy
for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for
any of them.'
iv. Clearly, both her certificates of candidacy for
Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and Governor of Leyte were
still subsisting and effective making her liable for
filing two certificates of candidacy on different
elective positions, thus, rendering her ineligible for
both positions
8. COMELEC approved the recommendation.

Issue:
1. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte? YES.
a. Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election
officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was
filed? YES.
2. Was Go deprived of due course? YES.

Ratio:
1. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer
of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial
compliance with the requirement of the law.[14] We hold that
petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in
full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.
a. OEC, Sec. 73:
i. "A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy
may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written
declaration under oath.
ii. "No person shall be eligible for more than one office
to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he
shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed
more than one certificate of candidacy may
declare under oath the office for which he desires
to be eligible and cancel the certificate of
candidacy for the other office or offices."
b. There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the
affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office
where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was
filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of
the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director
concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor
of the province to which the municipality involved belongs,
or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.
c. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000,
requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election
officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was
filed,[16] such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not
contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a
deficiency in the law. (Me: But since the law does not say
isn't the administrative law free to fill in where the law is
silent?)
d. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for both
positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
2. In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELEC
conducted an ex-parte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner
an opportunity to be heard. Petitioner was not required to submit
a comment or opposition to the petitions for cancellation of her
certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification.
a. Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly
provides: "Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition
shall be heard summarily after due notice. (emphasis
supplied)
b. Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report
and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the
petitioner of procedural due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition.

De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, Lucero

Facts:

1. Petition is for the SC to issue a writ of mandamus addressed to
the provincial board of canvassers of the Province of La Union:
a. to meet and reject and annul all the votes adjudicated to the
respondent Juan T. Lucero, and
b. to proclaim and certify the petitioner elected for the office
of provincial governor of La Union after correcting the
election return
c. Ground:
i. While the canvassers had found that Lucero garnered
more votes compared to De Guzman, Lucero's COC
was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner Tomas de
Guzman, was prepared and filed in accordance with
the requirements of the law;
ii. that in view of these facts the respondent Juan T.
Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal
candidate for the office in question, and could not
have been certified elected for the office of provincial
governor.
d. Lucero filed a demurrer:
i. That the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter in litigation;
ii. court had no jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendant members of the extinguished provincial
board of canvassers of La Union;
iii. that the facts alleged in the complaint did not
constitute a cause of action.

Issue:
1. WON Lucero has filed a certificate of candidacy in accordance
with the law,
2. And in case he has not, whether the writ applied for should be
issued?

Ratio:
1. Section 41 of Act No. 3030, amending section 471 of the Election
Law, provides that the provincial board of canvassers or the
Governor-General, as the case may be, shall certify elected for
the offices of senator or member of the House of Representatives
and for provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the
highest number of votes, and filed their certificates of candidacy
in accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law.
2. Section 404, as amended by section 3 of the same Act No. 3030,
provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of senator,
representative or any provincial office, unless within the time
fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly
verified.
a. Two constructions of duly verified:
i. ". . . only when the corresponding receipt has been
issued and the certificate filed can it be presumed that
it has been duly verified and filed." -> This was met
by Lucero.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

ii. That the COC should be sworn to -> Not met
however
1. SC: In the case before us the certificate of the
respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective,
lacking the formality of the oath. This
irregularity might have justified the elimination
of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal
candidate for the office of provincial governor,
if an objection on the part of the petitioner
Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time.
2. Yet we are of the opinion that this irregularity
does not invalidate the election for the
fundamental reason that after it was proven by
the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the
will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality consisting in that his certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to.
3. Constructions of Election Law:
a. If Election law provides that an
irregularity is fatal to the validity of the
ballot or of the returns, or when the
purpose and spirit of the law would be
plainly defeated by a substantial
departure from the prescribed method ->
mandatory
b. If Election law does not provide that a
departure from a prescribed form will be
fatal and such departure has been due to
an honest mistake or misinterpretation of
the Election Law on the part of him who
was obligated to observe it, and such
departure has not been used as a means
for fraudulent practices or for the
intimidation of voters and it is clear that
there has been a free and honest
expression of the popular will ->
directory and harmless irregularity
c. Lio Luna v. Rodriguez: It has been
announced in many decisions that the
rules and regulations, for the conduct of
elections, are mandatory before the
election, but when it is sought to enforce
them after the election, they are held to
be directory only, if that is possible,
especially where, if they are held to be
mandatory, innocent voters will be
deprived of their votes without any fault
on their part. When the voters have
honestly cast their ballots, the same
should not be nullified simply because
the officers appointed under the law to
direct the election and guard the purity of
the ballot have not done their duty.
4. We hold that the legal provision here in
question is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would have
been fatal to the recognition of the status of
Juan T. Lucero as candidate. BUT after the
people have expressed their will honestly, the
result of the election cannot be defeated by the
fact that the respondent who was certified by
the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate
for the office of provincial governor, has not
sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
5. The situation is somewhat like that of a voter
placing his ballot in the box. There are certain
requirements of the law, affecting the vote,
which have been considered by this court as of
a mandatory character until the ballot is placed
in the ballot box; but we have held that the
validity of the count cannot be questioned, nor
the vote stricken out after the ballots had been
placed in the ballot boxes, simply for non-
compliance with such provisions.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

6. After the termination of the election, public
interest must be made to prevail over that of
the defeated candidate, and we cannot declare
that the election of the respondent Juan T.
Lucero was illegal, and that he should quit the
office for which he was elected, simply by
reason of a defect in his certificate of
candidacy, which defect could have been
corrected before the election, but which cannot
be cured after its termination, and after the
result of the election was published by the
provincial board of canvassers, respondents
herein.

Demurrer is SUSTAINED and mandamus is DENIED.

Villarosa v. COMELEC, Atty. Restor, Ricardo Quintos (opponent
candidate)

Facts:
1. Petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the COMELEC
disallowing the use by petitioner of the nickname JTV for the
purpose of her candidacy in the May 11, 1998 elections.
2. Villarosa was a candidate as representative for the lone district of
Occ. Mindoro in the May 11 1998 elections. She was proclaimed
duly elected thereto on May 27, 1998.
3. March 27, 1998 - She filed her COC in which she stated her
nickname as JTV.
4. Restor filed a letter-petition with COMELEC asking for the
invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official nickname of
petitioner as declared in her certificate of candidacy, and the
nullification of all votes cast in the said nickname, on the ground
that petitioner is not publicly known by that name. She was more
known as Girlie.
5. COMELEC en banc, in a resolution, granted Restor's letter-
petition. Villarosa received a fax copy of this Resolution at 5:32
in the afternoon of May 11, 1998, at which time voting has ceased
and canvassing of votes in some precincts has already gone
underway.
6. Villarosa filed MR -> Denied.

Issue:
1. WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it:
a. ruled on private respondent Restors letter-petition without
according notice and hearing to petitioner? YES.
b. took cognizance of the letter-petition which was not filed
by a real party in interest? YES.
c. resolving the letter-petition en banc, instead of first
referring it to one of its Divisions? YES.
d. disallowing petitioners use of the nickname JTV and
ordering the election officers of Occidental Mindoro to
consider invalid all votes cast in that appellation?

Ratio:
1. No due process accorded to Villarosa - It is clear that
COMELEC passed upon the letter-petition without affording
petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the
allegations of private respondent Restors letter-petition. Due
process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered
in a case, the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be
observed.[6] Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in the
assailed Resolution was drawn purely from the allegations of
the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.
a. What about COMELEC ruling that deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration?
i. SC: Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said
resolution by invoking due process, it does not
purport to embody petitioners grounds and
arguments for reconsideration In filing this
Urgent Manifestation and Motion on the second
day of canvassing of votes, and immediately after
receipt of the contested resolution, it is obvious that
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

petitioners immediate concern for doing so was not
mainly to exercise her right to be heard, but to have
the Commission seasonably reconsider the May 11,
1998 Resolution while canvassing was still at the
precinct or municipal level.
ii. While the filing of a supplemental motion for
reconsideration is not a matter of right, it is believed
that the judicious thing for the Commission to have
done, considering the obvious due process issues
brought about by the May 11, 1998 Resolution, was
to afford petitioner a chance to explain why she
should be allowed to use the nickname JTV, such
as by requiring her to submit a supplemental motion
for reconsideration. Thus, we find that respondent
COMELEC acted imprudently and in excess of its
jurisdiction in treating the Urgent Manifestation and
Motion as petitioners motion for reconsideration
and in summarily dismissing the same.
2. Defective because not a real party-in-interest - The
COMELEC Rules of Procedure require that all actions filed with
the Commission be prosecuted and defended in the name of the
real party in interest.[9]
a. The letter-petition does not allege that the protestant, herein
private respondent Restor, is a candidate for any position in
the May 11, 1998 elections, or a representative of a
registered political party or coalition, or at the very least, a
registered voter in the lone district of Occidental Mindoro -
-- as to stand to sustain any form of injury by petitioners
use of the nickname JTV.
b. Absent such essential allegation, the letter-petition stood
defective and should have been dismissed outright for
failure to state a cause of action.
3. Petition should have first been referred to division before
being decided upon by the en banc
a. Sarmiento v. COMELEC: Section 3, Article IX(C) of the
Constitution[11] required all election cases to be first heard
and decided by a division of the Commission, before being
brought to the Commission en banc on reconsideration.
b. Contention: Petition raised administrative issues and not
quasi-judicial ones.
i. Administrative connotes, or pertains, to:
1. administration, especially management, as by
managing or conducting, directing or
superintending, the execution, application, or
conduct of persons or things.
2. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard,
the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon. (University of
Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez: )
ii. Quasi-judicial: applies to the action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
iii. A directive by the Commission to disallow
petitioners use of the nickname JTV for purposes
of her candidacy, on the basis of Resolution No. 2977
clearly necessitates a determination of whether
petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known
as such in the locality of Occidental
Mindoro. Indubitably, since it involved the
application of law or rules to an ascertained set of
facts, it called for the Commissions exercise of its
adjudicatory powers and falls within the concept
of an election contest in the sense contemplated
by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution.
4. In view of the fact that the election protest of private respondent
Quintos is presently pending in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, we resolve to leave this matter to the
resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests
respecting the election, returns and qualifications of its members.

PETITION is GRANTED.

Sanciangco v. Rono (Minister of Local Government)
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170


Subject provisions:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Integrated National Police, as well as officials and employees of
government-owned and government-controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, however, that the Prime
Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet, and
the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they presently hold
notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy be
considered on forced leave of absence from office. (Emphasis supplied)

Facts:
Petition for certiorari.
May 17, 1982 Barangay elections - Sanciango was elected
barangay captain of Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City.
Later on, he was elected President of the Association of Brgy.
Councils of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of said
association.
As the president, he was also later on appointed (by the Pres. of
the Phil) as a member of the city's Sangguniang Panglungsod.
March 27, 1984 - Sanciangco filed his COC for the May 14, 1984
Batasan Pambansa (Legislative) elections for Misamis Occidental
under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance -> He did not win.
Later on, invoking Art. 5, Sec. 13(2) of BP 697, he informed the
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod that he was
resuming his duties as member of that body. -> Elevated to the
Minister of Local Govt who ruled that since he is an appointive
official he is deemed to have resigned from the filing of his COC.
Sanciangco contention: Sec. 13(2) does not distinguish between
elective and appointive officials and so the legislative intent is
clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also
covered by the said provision.

Issue:
(Matter of construction of provision) WON Sanciangco has
ceased to hold his office by virtue of his filing of his COC? YES.

Ratio:
Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have
ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
a. With regard to the contention of the provision not
distinguishing:
i. taking into consideration the nature of the
positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely,
governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in
section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive positions in
section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause
reading "any person holding public appointive office
or position," is clear.
Court goes to the legislative intent as can be gleaned from the
BP proceedings
a. The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in
subsection (1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2)
which should be construed to refer to local elective
officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the
Batasan Pambansa
b. Manner by which he came upon the office is the basis for
determining whether appointive or elective.
No violation of the equal protection clause - Nor do we
perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as petitioner
contends, since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all
persons subject to such legislation under like circumstances and
conditions. Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that he was
removed from office without due process of law since it was of
his own choice that he ran for a seat in the Batasan Pambansa.
The consequence that followed his unsuccessful attempt at the
elections arose from law.
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his
certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso
facto, to be an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay Captain from
which position he may be considered as having been on
"forced leave of absence." He also continues as President of
the Association of Barangay Councils but will need a
reappointment by the President, as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of "members who
may be appointed by the President."

WRITS prayed for are DENIED.

PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, Marcelino Tongco v. NLRC,
Pineda

Facts:
1. From September 17, 1981 to January 26, 1989, Manuel S. Pineda
was employed with the PNOC-EDC as a clerk when his
employment was terminated.
2. 1987 - While holding the position of Geothermal Construction
secretary in the PNOC-EDC, Pineda decided to run for councilor
of the Municipality of Kananga in Leyte in the local elections
scheduled in January 1988 and filed his COC for the position.
3. Pineda was elected for such position however he exhibited a bit
of hesitation in taking up the position
4. Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office in June, 1988 as
councilor-elect of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte and
thereon assumed his duties as such. He however also continued
working as secretary in the PNOC-EDC.
5. In response to an inquiry, the legal department of PNOC-
EDCrendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda
should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
6. Pineda made several inquiries, one even to the DLG secretary and
such secretary said that he can continue occupying the 2 positions
and receiving some form of compensation for them.
7. PNOC-EDC informed Pineda that his employment was being
terminated pursuant to Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,
effective upon receipt of notice, and (2) that he was entitled to
"proper compensation" for the services rendered by him from the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy until his actual
separation from the service.
8. Pineda filed an illegal dismissal case with the NLRC against
PNOC-EDC. Arbiter & NLRC ruled in his favor.

Issue:
1. WON an employee in a government-owned or controlled
corporations without an original charter (and therefore not
covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope
of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code? YES.

Ratio:
1. When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus
Election Code of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on
and subsequent enactment of related and repealing legislation it
was no doubt awarethat in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled
corporations were of two (2) categories (original charter &
organized under general law).
2. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two
classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their
employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related
statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.


3. Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a
government-owned or controlled corporation does not lose its
character as such because not possessed of an original charter but
organized under the general law.
4. Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
5. What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, even those organized under the general
laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or
legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil
Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words, Section
66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in
addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.

PETITION is GRANTED.

Quinto, Tolentino v. COMELEC

Dec 1, 2009 decision

Facts:
1. Petition assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the
COMELEC.
2. Controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES).
3. Dec 1997 - Congress enacted RA 8436


Issue:
1. WON the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9369, a reproduction of Section 66 of the OEC, which,
as shown above, was based on provisions dating back to the
American occupation, is violative of the equal protection clause?
YES.

Ratio:
1. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto
resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not
considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those
who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective
posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
2. In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
a. It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
b. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. It must apply equally to all members of the class.
3. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds
that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane
to the purposes of the law.
a. Reasons for previous discrimination of appointive officials:
i. Prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate.
ii. Promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated by
political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public.[34]
iii. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that
the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while
still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency
in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
4. (Influence) If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the
law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued
on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes
of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an
elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of
the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the
Pub Off Digest Vanessa Arrha A. De Leon 201078170

Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet
post
5. (Danger of neglect in current work) As to the danger of neglect,
inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of
his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and
compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of
candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent
performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
6. (Final note with regard to EQPC) There is thus no valid
justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC
violates the equal protection clause.
7. (Overbroad) First, the provision pertains to all civil servants
holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility
worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010 elections. This
scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use
his position in the government to wield influence in the political
world.