Is Alvin Plantingas Free Will Defence a satisfying response to David

Humes formulation of The Epicurean Paradox

In 1779, David Hume questioned how it could be that an all-powerful and all-
loving God allows evil to eist in the world ! as this is surel" in some wa"
contradictor" to His nature# Hume concluded that as one cannot den" the
eistence of evil in the world, it logicall" follows that one must instead accept
that the traditional monotheistic concept of God is false# $hilst this argument
succeeded unscathed for centuries, the contempor" philosopher %lvin
&lantinga is seen b" man" to have successful solved the problem# &lantinga
argues that it can still be logical to ascribe infinitel" divine properties to God' if
one accepts that evil is the result of human freewill ! which we all possess as
a result of God(s benevolent creation# I will see) to outline the problem
formulated b" Hume, and &lantinga(s subsequent response' before anal"sing
the *reewill Defence in light of criticism b" +#,# -ac)ie and m"self, then I shall
ultimatel" conclude that the Defence is not a satisfactor" response to Hume(s
formulation of the .picurean parado#
In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume rearticulated a
problem first outlined b" .picurus circa /00 12.#
1
In a discussion regarding
the nature of evil, the character &hilo challenges his peer 2leanthes to eplain
how an omnipotent and omnibenevolent creator could allow the eistence of
evil in the world# &hilo as)s3 4Is he willing to prevent evil but not able5 6hen is
he impotent# Is he able but not willing5 6hen is he malevolent# Is he both able
and willing5 $hence then is the evil57
8
Hume uses his character &hilo to
outline what he sees as a logical contradiction in the theistic interpretation of
divine properties# -onotheistic theologians traditionall" characterise God as
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possessing such properties as omniscience, omnipotence and
omnibenevolence#
/
However, it seems that the latter two of these properties
form a contradiction when one considers the eistence of evil in the world# If
God is all-powerful, then He must hold dominion over all of creation, will all
events and be able to perform an" action# If God is all-loving, then He must
love all within creation, wish onl" good for them and care for them as much as
possible# However, for these two properties to logicall" coeist, the world
would have to be a place wherein God uses his infinite power to show infinite
love for humanit"# <et, this is clearl" not the case, as innumerable evils are
constantl" enacted upon the human race, causing us to suffer and eperience
pain# %s Demea colourfull" illustrates in the Dialogues3 4.ntrance into life
gives anguish to the newborn infant and its wretched parent# $ea)ness,
impotence and distress attend each stage of that life' and it is at last finished
in agon" and horror#7
9
Hume(s outlining of the .picurean parado poses a great problem for the
monotheist# How can one successfull" defend the idea of an omnipotent and
omnibenevolent God in the light of evil5 %s it is a certain a posteriori truth that
evil eists in the world, a monotheist must surel" therefore concede that God
is either indifferent to human suffering or incapable of preventing it# 6his
problem is made even more difficult when one considers the sheer scale of
evil that eists# $h" would an all-powerful and all-loving God allow the spread
of 6he 1lac) Death, and fail to intervene in 6he Holocaust5 6he character
2leanthes attempts to respond to &hilo(s assertions in the Dialogues, b"
arguing that the quantit" of good outweighs that of evil# He claims that3
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4=&hilo(s> representations are eaggerated? Health is more common than
sic)ness, pleasure more common than pain#7
@
$hilst &hilo outwardl" reAects
2leanthes claim, instead favouring the view that nature is a constant struggle
between predator and pre", he does entertain the possibilit" for a moment#
&hilo postulates3 4.ven allowing what will never be believed? $h" is there
an" miser" at all in the world, then5 Bot b" chance surel"# *rom some cause
then# Is it from the intention of the Deit"57
C
6hrough &hilo, Hume outlines here
the central question posed b" the .picurean parado in regard to evil# $hat is
the cause of suffering, if not God5
6he contempor" philosopher %lvin &lantinga sought to provide an alternative
answer to Hume(s question# In God, Freedom and Evil, &lantinga outlines how
God does not directl" cause the evil in the world, but that it is instead a result
of human freewill#
7
&lantinga attempts to eplain wh" evil eists in the world,
whilst still maintaining the traditional monotheistic concept of God, and thus
illustrates his position under the assumption that God is omnipotent and
omnibenevolent# He argues that a world created b" God in which people have
freewill is more loving than a world in which the" do not# &lantinga postulates
that in order for people to be free, God cannot casuall" determine them to
perform good actions ! as this would undermine their freedom# 6herefore, 4to
create creatures capable of moral good, He must create creatures capable of
moral evil' and He canDt give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and
at the same time prevent them from doing so#7
:
&lantinga eplains the moral
evil in the world as a result of where 4sadl" enough, some of the free
creatures God created went wrong in the eercise of their freedom#7
9
He thus
concludes that his eplanation of evil dodges the .picurean parado as3 4the
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fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong counts neither against GodDs
omnipotence nor against His goodness' for He could have forestalled the
occurrence of moral evil onl" b" removing the possibilit" of moral good#7
10
&lantinga(s *reewill Defence attempts to Austif" the eistence of evil b"
appealing to the consequences of the divine characteristics of
omnibenevolence and omnipotence# *irst, he argues that humans have the
freewill to choose to do evil as a result of God(s all-loving nature# $hilst it
would have been benevolent for God to create a perfect world in which no
person harms another, such a determined world would not be as virtuous as
the imperfect world we inhabit, in which people are free to choose between
committing good or evil# He therefore sees freewill as the ultimate good,
overriding an" evil that humans ma" choose to perform# Eecond, &lantinga
see)s to clarif" the definition of God(s omnipotence, in order to eplain wh"
the creation of a world in which people alwa"s choose to do good is
impossible# He argues that God is all-powerful in the sense that he can do
an"thing that is logicall" possible# However, there eists a logical contradiction
in the actualisation of a world in which people onl" freel" choose to do good#
*or if it was the case that God used His infinite power to create a world where
people alwa"s chose to do good, he would not be omnibenevolent ! as He
would be depriving them of the gift of freewill# 4God could not have
actualised? worlds containing moral good but no evil7
11

&lantinga therefore concludes that the eistence of evil in a world created b"
an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is possible' as God can onl" actualise
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logicall" possible worlds and it would be impossible for creatures in our world
not to have freewill, as this is the greatest good that his omnibenevolence
gives us# 6hus, evil is not directl" caused b" God - but is rather a b"-product
of the gift of human freewill#
%lthough man" philosophers consider &lantinga(s *reewill Defence a
successful response to the .picurean parado, I feel that the Defence is
unsatisfactor" due to its limited scope in addressing metaph"sical challenges,
as well as &lantinga(s preconceptions regarding the nature of divine
properties being ill thought out# *irstl" though, I would li)e to briefl" address a
problem regarding the *reewill Defence(s inabilit" to successfull" eplain
natural evil#
$hilst &lantinga posits a possible solution to the moral evil implied b" the
.picurean parado ! he fails to illustrate wh" an omnipotent and
omnibenevolent God would allow the sort of pain described b" Demea in
Dialogues, as mentioned above# How can human freewill be responsible for
the suffering caused b" disease, disabilit" and natural disasters5 .speciall"
considering that natural evils inflict most upon those without freewill# -ost
nonhuman animals will suffer grievous amounts of pain without the abilit" to
ma)e a free choice# 2ountless human infants have been born with disabilities,
illnesses or die in childbirth# How can &lantinga eplain such pain as the result
of free human action5 His onl" attempts to address such concerns are as
callous and uns"mpathetic as the" are philosophicall" dissatisfactor"# He first
implies that the suffering caused b" natural disasters is the fault of those living
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in danger Fones b" commenting3 4earthqua)es, tidal waves, and virulent
diseases are evils that result from human stupidit"#7
18
He then invo)es Et#
%ugustine to argue that3 4Eatan rebelled against God and has since been
wrea)ing whatever havoc he can### Eo the natural evil we find is due to free
actions of nonhuman spirits#7
1/
In attempting to quell the problem of natural
evil, &lantinga instead endorses a proposition that does not onl" support
Hume(s position, b" supposing the eistence of a wholl" malicious being that
God cannot subdue' but also raises several metaph"sical questions regarding
the nature of nonhuman, nonph"sical moral agents that &lantinga fails to
address#
% further metaph"sical concern with the *reewill Defence is its inherent
incompatibilism# %s mentioned above, &lantinga seems to assume an freewill
and determinism are necessaril" incompatible# $hilst it is possible that God
cannot determine us to freel" choose to do good, &lantinga fails to
convincingl" argue that compatibilism is necessaril" false# 6his causes a
problem for the *reewill Defence, as several philosophers, such as +#,#
-ac)ie, have argued for the possible compatibilit" of freewill and determinism#
-oreover, in Evil and Omnipotence, -ac)ie argues that if it is logicall"
possible for freewill and determinism to be compatible ! a claim that &lantinga
fails to refute ! then 4there cannot be a logical impossibilit" in =humans> freel"
choosing the good on ever" occasion, there was open to =God> the obviousl"
better possibilit" of ma)ing beings who would act freel" but alwa"s go right#7
19
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-ac)ie(s point here also raises an interesting question to do with &lantinga(s
conception of God(s omnipotence# In God, Freedom and Evil, &lantinga
argues that it would have been logicall" impossible for God to have created a
world wherein people onl" chose to do good# <et, this seems a somewhat
unsatisfactor" proposition considering that traditional monotheistic theolog"
teaches that God created the world ex nihilo# If one regards God(s
omnipotence as constrained b" logic, then b" whom was logic created5
Eurel", if God created the world from nothing, there must not have been
previous logical rules to obe"# &lantinga(s claim that it was logicall" impossible
for God to have created a world in which people chose to onl" do good
therefore seems to undermine God(s omnipotence ! and thus fails to solve
the .picurean parado# %s -ac)ie states3 4=God(s> failure to avail Himself of
this possibilit" is inconsistent with His being both omnipotent and wholl"
good#7
1@
-ac)ie develops this point further b" quer"ing that if &lantinga views the
concept of a world where people alwa"s choose to freel" do good as absurd,
and not a trul" free world, what is it then that constitutes freedom5 4If it is that
the ma)ing of some wrong choices is logicall" necessar" for freedom, it would
seem that? =human> choices and consequent actions can be Gfree( onl" if the"
are not determined b" their characters#7
1C
6o clarif" -ac)ie(s point, he is
as)ing us here to consider a world in which all people are created morall"
good, and so alwa"s freel" choose to help one another and not cause
suffering# -ac)ie argues that there is no logical contradiction implied b" such
a possible world, and if one believes that such a world would be devoid of
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freedom, then the" are classif"ing freedom merel" as the chance that
someone ma" go wrong# -ac)ie furthers this point b" as)ing3 4$hat value or
merit would there be in free choices if =the"> were random actions which were
not determined b" the nature of the agent57
17
However, I wish to develop this
argument in different wa"# *or if one defends &lantinga(s view, and the
consequence that evil actions are either a result of a person(s character or of
chance, then does this not la" the blame for evil with God5
6he classical monotheistic concept, which &lantinga see)s to defend, defines
God as an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being who created the
world ex nihilo# <et, if evil is a result of a person(s character, then was that
person not created b" an omniscient God who, at the point of creation,
alread" )new ever"thing that person would thin) and do5 I am not attempting
to form an argument for the compatibilism of freewill and determinism, but
merel" see) to question the consequences that belief in an omniscient creator
would have on the nature and origin of moral evil# If one assumes that God is
all-)nowing, then He must have )nown at the point of creation the consequent
repercussions of ever" action that ever" person would ever Gfreel"( choose to
do# &lantinga(s argument that freewill was God(s greatest gift, and one that
does not contradict an" of his other divine properties therefore seems flawed
! as does his preconception that incompatibilism is logicall" necessar"# %s if
God is trul" omniscient, He must necessaril" )now ever" action people will
perform before the" even ma)e a decision# Eimpl" put, for an" action P, a
person has the choice to P or to P# However, if God were omniscient, He
would )now before the person chose eactl" which option the" would pic)#
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Due to the nature of omniscience, it would not onl" be logicall" impossible for
God to )now a falsehood, as then he would not )now all truths, but it would
also be logicall" impossible for the moral agent to P, as such an action would
ma)e God(s )nowledge fallible# 6hus, returning to -ac)ie(s previous criticism,
one cannot coherentl" defend &lantinga(s claim that freewill entails the
possibilit" to choose between right and wrong ! as if one accepts God(s
omniscience one must also accept that it is logicall" impossible for an agent to
choose to perform an" action other than that which God has )nown the" will
perform since the point of creation#
6his obAection has even more salience when considered alongside the divine
properties of omnipotence and omnibenevolence# If it is logicall" necessar"
that we choose to do what an omniscient God )nows we will do, is it not also
the case that an omnipotent God would be willing us to carr" out such an
action5 *or if God were trul" omnipotent, and )new all we would do, He must
surel" also be willing us to carr" out what he )nows will occur ! otherwise he
would not be all-powerful# <et, surel" a God who wills evil cannot be
omnibenevolent5 2onversel", if God were omnibenevolent, and )new all the
evil that humans were going to choose to carr" out ! surel" he must not have
the power to prevent or change the actions his )nowledge necessaril"
determines we will perform5 He therefore cannot be omnipotent#
God(s )nowledge of human action must therefore either result in God )nowing
and willing the evils humans perform, and not caring about the suffering the"
will cause' or lovingl" )nowing the evils we will perform, and not being able to
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prevent them# I can therefore onl" conclude that &lantinga(s *reewill Defence
is an unsatisfactor" response to Hume(s formulation of the problem of evil#
$hilst it ma" seem to provide an alternative answer to the initial logical
problem, the repercussions of &lantinga(s position onl" lead to the creation of
another logical problem regarding God(s omniscience and its relation to an
person(s free choice to commit evil# 2onsidering his further inabilit" to account
for natural evil, his lac) of a convincing proof of the necessit" of
incompatibilism, and his lac)luster definition of freewill, &lantinga(s *reewill
Defence cannot be considered a satisf"ing response to Hume(s formulation of
the .picurean parado#
!eferences"
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1# +ohn Hospers, An ntroduction to Philosophical Anal!sis H,ondon, 1990I
p#/10
8# David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion HBew <or), 19:9I p#:9
/# Graham Jpp" and -ichael Ecott, Reading Philosoph! o" Religion HEusse,
8010I p#8/7
9# Hume, Dialogues, p#:0
@# Hume, Dialogues, p#:C
C# Hume, Dialogues, p#:7
7# %lvin &lantinga, God, Freedom and Evil HBew <or), 8008I pp#89-/9
:# &lantinga, God, p#/0
9# &lantinga, God, p#/0
10# &lantinga, God, p#/0
11# &lantinga, God, p#9@
18# &lantinga, God, p#:
1/# &lantinga, God, p#@:
19# +#,# -ac)ie, G.vil and Jmnipotence(, #ind 8@9 H19@@I, p#809
1@# -ac)ie, G.vil and Jmnipotence(, p#809
1C# -ac)ie, G.vil and Jmnipotence(, p#809
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17# -ac)ie, G.vil and Jmnipotence(, p#809
Word #ount3 8,CC9
$i%liography"
Hospers, +ohn# An ntroduction to Philosophical Anal!sis H,ondon, 1990I
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Hume, David# Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion HBew <or), 19:9I
-ac)ie, +#,# G.vil and Jmnipotence(, #ind 8@9 H19@@I pp#800-818
Jpp", Graham# Ecott, -ichael# Reading Philosoph! o" Religion HEusse,
8010I
&lantinga, %lvin# God, Freedom and Evil HBew <or), 8008I
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