THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003

INTERVIEW
The Grammar of Goodness
An Interview with Philippa Foot
Philippa Foot is Griffin Professor, Emerita, at UCLA and an Honorary Fellow
of Somerville College at Oxford. Foot describes her career as one of slow progress
in developing a distinctive line of thought on the nature of moral judgment and
the rationality of acting morally. Asked to characterize herself as a philosopher,
she says, Im not clever at all. Im a dreadfully slow thinker, really. But I do
have a good nose for what is important. And though the best philosophers com-
bine cleverness and depth, I prefer a good nose over cleverness any day. She is
also known for her writing on medical ethics. Her articles on these topics are
collected in Vi rtues and Vi ces and Moral Di l emmas. The recently published
Natural Goodness is her first book. This interview was conducted at Oxford by
Alex Voorhoeve of University College London in September 2002. Alex
Voorhoeves work was supported by the Mind Association Research Studentship
2002-2003.
HRP: AT THE BEGI NNI NG OF NATURAL
Goodness, you recall an intervention of
Wittgensteins at a seminar at which a
speaker realized that what he was about
to say was, though seductive, clearly
ridiculous. The speaker was trying to
hit on something more sensible, and
Wittgenstein said: No. Say what you
want to say! Be crude, and then we shall
get on. Why do you think this is good
advice for philosophers?
Foot: I begi n Natural Goodness wi th thi s
remark, si nce I have found i t excel l ent
advi ce. Whenever I fi nd mysel f tempted
to pass over a wei rd thought, I try to do
the opposi te, and gi ve thi s thought i ts
day i n court. So I advi se peopl e to sti ck
wi th thei r seducti ve but real l y ri di cul ous
thoughts, because one may wel l stri ke gol d just there.
HRP: How do you mean strike gold?
Foot: I thi nk an anal ogy may hel p, though one must al ways be careful wi th
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
33
Intervi ew
anal ogi es. I f one i s tal ki ng wi th a therapi st, and one fi nds onesel f about to
say somethi ng di sreputabl e, the l ast thi ng one shoul d do i s to say somethi ng
respectabl e i nstead. I t i s the same i n a way wi th our phi l osophi cal thi nki ng:
the phi l osophi cal i nterest i s where the trouble i s. And that i s why we shoul d
focus on the odd or crude thought that we actual l y had. At the begi nni ng of
Natural Goodness, I gi ve the exampl e of bei ng puzzl ed by the expressi on i f I
were you. I remember when I was a chi l d someone sayi ng I d take my
medi ci ne i f I were you!, and thi nki ng no you woul dnt, for I m not goi ng
to take i t! I l ater real i zed that my puzzl ement at thi s expressi on was due to
a phi l osophi cal entangl ement.
Perhaps i t i s because of thi s pecul i ar nature of phi l osophi cal ques-
ti ons that phi l osophy i s very di ffi cul t to explain to non-phi l osophers. You
know, Wi ttgenstei n sai d that one l esson i n phi l osophy i s as useful as one
l esson i n pi ano pl ayi ng, and I thi nk thats ri ght!
HRP: How did you become interested in philosophy, and how did you come
to study it?
Foot: I had no formal educati on as a chi l d. I l i ved i n the sort of mi l i eu where
there was a l ot of hunti ng, shooti ng, and fi shi ng, and where the gi rl s si mpl y
di d not go to col l ege. But one of my governesses, who hersel f actual l y had a
degree, sai d, you coul d go to uni versi ty, you know. And so I deci ded to
work for i t. I was extremel y i gnorant, whi ch i s not surpri si ng because most
governesses werent themsel ves hi ghl y educated, and they were supposed to
be abl e to teach you everythi ng! Anyway, I took some correspondence courses
and to my surpri se was accepted by Somervi l l e. I had put i n for Somervi l l e
because I had heard that i t was a col l ege that was i ntel l ectual l y but not so-
ci al l y snobby, and I was worki ng my way out of thi s soci al l y snobby back-
ground. I deci ded to do the course i n Pol i ti cs, Phi l osophy, and Economi cs
because I wanted to do somethi ng theoreti cal . I coul dnt do mathemati cs, by
l ack of educati on and tal ent. So I thought economi cs and phi l osophy woul d
be the theoreti cal subjects I coul d do.
HRP: What brought you to focus on moral philosophy?
Foot: I was al ways i nterested i n phi l osophy. But i t was si gni fi cant that when
I came back to Oxford i n 1945, that was the ti me when the news of the con-
centrati on camps was comi ng out. Thi s news was shatteri ng i n a fashi on that
no one now can easi l y understand. We had thought that somethi ng l i ke thi s
coul d not happen. Thi s i s what got me i nterested i n moral phi l osophy i n
parti cul ar. I n a way, I was al ways more i nterested i n the phi l osophy of mi nd,
and sti l l am. But i n the face of the news of the concentrati on camps, I thought
i t just cant be the way Stevenson, Ayer, and Hare say i t i s, that moral i ty i n
the end i s just the expressi on of an atti tude, and the subject haunted me.
HRP: What is it in the idea that morality is simply the expression of an
attitude that seemed to you so wrong in the face of the Holocaust?
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Philippa Foot
Foot: What these theori sts tri ed to do was construe the condi ti ons of use of
sentences l i ke i t i s moral l y wrong to ki l l i nnocent peopl e i n terms of a
speaker s feel i ngs or atti tudes, or of hi s or her commi tment to acti ng i n a
certai n way. And thi s meant that, accordi ng to these theori es, there i s a gap
between the facts, or grounds, for a moral judgement and that judgement
i tsel f. For whatever reasons mi ght be gi ven for a moral judgement, peopl e
mi ght wi thout error refuse to assent to i t, not fi ndi ng the rel evant feel i ngs or
atti tudes i n themsel ves. And thi s i s what I thought was wrong. For, funda-
mental l y, there i s no way, i f one takes thi s l i ne, that one coul d i magi ne one-
sel f sayi ng to a Nazi , but we are right, and you are wrong wi th there bei ng
any substance to the statement. Faced wi th the Nazi s, who fel t they had been
justi fi ed i n doi ng what they di d, there coul d si mpl y be a stand-off. And I
thought: Moral i ty just cannot be subjecti ve i n the way that di fferent atti -
tudes, l i ke some aestheti c ones, or l i kes and di sl i kes, are subjecti ve. The
separati on of descri pti ons from atti tudes, or facts from val ues, that charac-
teri zed the current moral phi l osophy had to be bad phi l osophy.
HRP: Before we turn to your response to subjectivism, Id like to dwell a
bit longer on your early influences in moral philosophy. When one reads
your work, one clearly sees the influence of Anscombe and Wittgenstein.
How would you say they have influenced your work?
Foot: Anscombe, above al l , i nfl uenced me. My excel l ent tutor, Donal d
MacKi nnon, was more of a theol ogi an than a phi l osopher, real l y. He taught
me about Hegel i an phi l osophy. And about Kant, whi ch was wonderful . But
MacKi nnon di dnt real l y bel i eve i n modern, anal yti c phi l osophy. So i t took
Anscombe to bri ng me to see the good i n that. She hersel f was a di ffi cul t
character, not qui te the person to be a col l ege tutor and hel p al l the under-
graduates through thei r exams. So she was hard to fi t i nto the Oxford setup.
But Somervi l l e happi l y saw her meri ts. They thought she was marvel ous,
and found one research fel l owshi p after another for her, not wanti ng to l et
her go. Thi s was marvel ous for me because i t was natural for us to tal k to-
gether day after day. After l unch i n col l ege, wed si t down and tal k phi l oso-
phy. Shed propound some topi c, and, and though she hardl y ever agreed
wi th what I sai d, she was al ways wi l l i ng to consi der my objecti on, and to
wonder why I had made i t. At one cruci al moment, I remember sayi ng of
some sentence that i t must have a mi x of descri pti ve and eval uati ve mean-
i ng. And she sai d, Of what? what? And I thought, my God, so one doesnt
have to accept that di sti ncti on! One can say what?!
So you see my posi ti on was i ncredi bl y pri vi l eged because Anscombe
i s one of the very best phi l osophers of our ti me. And moreover, she must
have been putti ng to me the probl ems that Wi ttgenstei n had put to her; she
must have had di scussi ons wi th Wi ttgenstei n on topi cs l i ke the ones that I
was di scussi ng wi th her. She di dnt tal k about Wi ttgenstei n, but she was teach-
i ng me somethi ng of hi s way of thi nki ng. I m sure she di dnt thi nk of hersel f
as teachi ng me, but that was what was goi ng on. She woul d often come to
my semi nars, and I woul d al ways attend hers, where I usual l y opposed nearl y
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
35
Intervi ew
everythi ng she sai d. Natural l y, I was regul arl y defeated. But I woul d be there,
objecti ng away, the next week. I t was l i ke i n those ol d chi l drens comi cs where
a steamrol l er runs over a character who becomes fl attened an outl i ne on
the groundbut i s there al l ri ght i n the next epi sode. I was l i ke one of those
characters.
Thi s went on for about fi ve years, I thi nk. Then Norman Mal col m
came over and gave a tal k whi ch got me i nterested i n the Philosophical Inves-
tigations. So I started readi ng i t, I mean really readi ng i t, and I sai d to
Anscombe, Why di dnt you tel l me? And she sai d, Because i t i s very i m-
portant to have ones resi stances. She thought that i t was very i mportant
not to accept what Wi ttgenstei n wrote, but rather to try everythi ng agai nst
i t. She woul d not have l i ked i t i f I had too easi l y agreed wi th anythi ng that
she sai d. On a personal l evel , we were fri ends of course. She was, as you
know, more ri gorousl y Cathol i c than the Pope, whi l e I am a card-carryi ng
athei st, so we di dnt agree on i deol ogi cal grounds at al l . But we had these
marvel ous di scussi ons, and her chi l dren used to come and see me qui te a l ot.
HRP: You approach moral philosophy by focusing on the virtues. What
attracted and attracts you to this way of doing moral philosophy?
Foot: I bel i eve i t was readi ng Aqui nas that got me started. I was on l eave,
and El i sabeth Anscombe had sai d, I thi nk you ought to read Aqui nas. I
got i nterested i n the second part of the Summa Theologica, whi ch i s about
parti cul ar vi rtues and vi ces. And i t struck me that there were al ways good
reasons for sayi ng of somethi ng that i t was a vi rtue or a vi ce. I recal l readi ng
the bi t where Augusti ne cal l s l oquaci ousness a vi ce, and thi nki ng what an
extraordi nary i dea! But i f you take seri ousl y a parti cul ar questi on about a
parti cul ar vi rtue, you see that i t i snt just subjecti ve, that you cant say any-
thi ng you l i ke. There must be a reason why thi s i s a vi ce, i f i ndeed i t i s a vi ce.
I put thi s questi on to a pupi l of mi ne: Why on earth shoul d l oquaci ty be a
vi ce? And she sai d, wel l i f one i s al ways tal ki ng, one doesnt have ti me to
thi nk. I was very i nterested i n thi s, whi ch wasnt Aqui nass reason but
seemed to me to be ri ght. I repeated what she had sai d i n a l ecture; and some
young man caught me on the way out and sai d (thi s was a l ong ti me ago you
know) but perhaps my girlfriend doesnt need to thi nk. And I sai d, strai ght
out, everybody needs to thi nk!
That ki nd of approach i s the key to al l my work ri ght down to the
wri ti ng of Natural Goodness. One doesnt just have to say, There must be
grounds for moral judgements. For i t was obvi ous i n the case of i ndi vi dual
vi rtues and vi ces, that one coul d ask what grounds there were. One coul d
ask, for i nstance, I s there a vi rtue of chasti ty, and i f so what mi ght the
grounds for i t be? And wi th thi s, the whol e subject of moral phi l osophy
thi ckened up i n my mi nd. Before that, I had si mpl y thought there must be
objecti ve grounds for moral judgement, wi thout bei ng abl e to say much
except that they woul d have to be connected to human wel fare or somethi ng
l i ke that. But l ooki ng i n detai l , as Aqui nas made me do, made me see that a
vi rtue-vi ce poi nt of vi ew provi ded an excel l ent way to make an i dea of ob-
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
36
Philippa Foot
jecti vi ty i n moral judgement concrete. I f one onl y consi dered a proposi ti on
such as thi s act i s wrong, i t di dnt l ead one on to parti cul ar reasons or
judgements i n the way l oquaci ty i s a vi ce di d.
However, after thi s di scovery, I sti l l di dnt have the general concep-
ti on of goodness as pertai ni ng to the capaci ti es, di sposi ti ons, and acti ons
that are necessary for a parti cul ar way of l i fe, whi ch forms such an i mpor-
tant part of my arguments about the grounds of moral requi rements i n Natu-
ral Goodness. For a l ong ti me, I coul dnt fi nd such a general basi s for moral -
i ty, and I was too l azy to wri te more than a few arti cl es wi th my i nconcl usi ve
thoughts. So I went on to medi cal ethi cs, whi ch was very much i n demand. I
di dnt despi se the subject, but I l eft i t as soon as I coul d see how to approach
the foundati onal questi ons that I address i n Natural Goodness. That wasnt
unti l the mi d 1980s. And i t took me a l ong ti me after that to get around to
publ i shi ng the book. At the l aunch of Natural Goodness, the Oxford Uni ver-
si ty Press edi tor pi cked up on the l i ne from Wi ttgenstei n wi th whi ch I open
the bookthe one that says that i t i s di ffi cul t to do phi l osophy as sl owl y as i t
shoul d be doneand he sai d, Wel l , that i s a probl em that Phi l i ppa seems to
have sol ved.
So that was the progressi on of my thought: from thi nki ng subjecti v-
i sm must be wrong to thi nki ng that when we l ook at the i ndi vi dual vi rtues
and vi ces we can actual l y begi n to see an objecti ve basi s for parti cul ar moral
judgements, and on from there.
HRP: You didnt see this basis for morality in other foundational concepts
used in contemporary moral philosophy, like the ideas of good states of
affairs or rights and obligations?
Foot: Exactl y. You see, al l I coul d do at fi rst was to reject subjecti vi sm and
i nsi st that somehow there was objecti vi ty i n moral judgement, and that i t
had somethi ng to do wi th human wel fare, wi thout si nki ng i nto uti l i tari an-
i sm. But I coul dnt get my feet on the ground wi th concepts l i ke the best
state of affai rs or good i n the abstract, whereas concepts l i ke vi rtues and
vi ces had made sense to me. I real i zed, however, that to real l y answer those
who had a di fferent theory of moral i ty, I needed a whol e al ternati ve theory
of moral judgement.
HRP: So where did you find this alternative?
Foot: I t was onl y i n the 1980s when I found a new begi nni ng by thi nki ng
about pl ants and ani mal s. Not that I thought that you coul d argue from such-
and-such i s i mportant to ani mal s to the concl usi on that such and such i s
i mportant. Rather, I was sayi ng l ook, there i s a parti cul ar l ogi cal category
here. I had an absol utel y excel l ent graduate student at UCLA, Mi chael
Thompson, who i s now i n the Pi ttsburgh department. Hed been i nfl uenced
by El i sabeth Anscombe, even at a di stance, because he had very good taste
i n phi l osophy. He had thi s super i dea that he had pi cked up from her wri t-
i ng, where she had tal ked about the proposi ti on humans have 32 teeth.
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
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Intervi ew
Very few humans actual l y have 32 teeth. So what i s the l ogi cal status of thi s
proposi ti on? I t i s not that i t says al l peopl e have 32 teeth. I t doesnt even
state that most peopl e have 32 teeth. Nor does i t mean merel y some peopl e
have 32 teeth. So i f you thi nk of quanti fi cati on, you see that i t si mpl y doesnt
fi t the l ogi cal categori es that we have. I t i s of a di fferent l ogi cal status from
proposi ti ons l i ke gardens have rai l i ngs. Mi chael Thompson real i zed that
there i s a l ogi cal pecul i ari ty of the way we tal k about l i vi ng thi ngs, and we
both started thi nki ng about thi s speci al way i n whi ch we can tal k about them.
Thats what got my l atest work goi ng.
HRP: You write that this special way of talking reveals itself in our judge-
ments about plants and non-human animals when we think about the way
we judge particular members of a species to be defective or to be, on the
contrary, as they should be. To make such judgements about plants and
non-human animals, you argue that we need two things. Firstly, a set of
propositions describing the lifecycle of the species, with particular focus
in the case of plants and animals on growth, self-maintenance, and repro-
duction; and secondly, a set of propositions saying how, for the species
under consideration, these things are achieved: how nourishment is ob-
tained, how it defends itself, how development takes place and how re-
production is secured. From these two kinds of propositions we can de-
rive norms for individual members of the species. These norms state that
the key functions should be carried out by the means specified. Id like to
question a few elements of this grammar of natural normativity, starting
with the idea of certain capacities or characteristics being necessary for
the way of life of a certain species. What kind of necessity do you have in
mind here? For in the case of teeth, for example, it is not necessary for our
way of life, not even of any great consequence, if we do not have a full set
of teeth. And yet, this was Anscombes original example.
Foot: Wel l , i t i s an i mperfecti on i f you have fewer than 32 teeth, si nce i t i s
typi cal l y when the tooth gets knocked out, or gets rotten, that one l oses i t, so
there i s sti l l a ti e-i n wi th heal th and di sease and acci dent, even though i t
i snt al ways a probl em, si nce one can chew ones food wi th fewer teeth. I
admi t the ori gi nal exampl e of teeth i s not the best one. But I have a di fferent
exampl e. Compare the col or i n the tai l of a peacock wi th that of a bi rd I have
i n my garden, the bl ue ti t. Now, the col or i n the tai l of the mal e peacock i s
necessary: i t needs i t to get i ts mate. On the other hand, as far as I know, the
l i ttl e patch of bl ue i n the bl ue ti t has no such rol e i n the l i fe of that bi rd. So i f
i t l acked i t, i t woul d be an oddi ty, a rari ty, but not a defect.
HRP: Does the concept of necessity you are using depend on the particu-
lar circumstances in which the species in question finds itself? Would one
say that in humans a lack of natural teeth used to be a defect, but that it
has ceased to be one since the availability of false teeth?
Foot: I thi nk there i s a certai n amount of pl ay here. I t i snt easy to draw the
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Philippa Foot
l i ne, for one occasi on doesnt change what counts as a defect i n a member of
a speci es. Certai nl y, thi ngs change al l the ti me. Now that foxes are becomi ng
urban creatures, they need di fferent thi ngs, speed bei ng, for exampl e, l ess
i mportant because food can be obtai ned wi thout i t.
But thi s doesnt mean that you can narrow down the reference si tu-
ati on for an attri buti on of natural goodness as much as you l i ke. For ex-
ampl e, the characteri sti cs ani mal s need i n a zoo may actual l y be defects. For
i t mi ght be useful for a predatory ani mal kept i n a zoo to l ack fi erceness. So
one must real i ze that the condi ti ons one can use must not be too l i mi ted.
And after al l , i t i s onl y a very smal l proporti on of the human race that has
fal se teeth and a very smal l proporti on of predatory ani mal s that l i ve i n zoos,
whi ch are not thei r natural habi tat.
HRP: Why should we only look at the way of life of a species? Why not of
a group or troupe or herd, a society, a family, or an individual? What privi-
leges the species in the account of natural normativity?
Foot: I n the case of urban foxes, one mi ght come up wi th di fferent necessi -
ti es than one woul d for thei r non-urban counterparts. But i t doesnt real l y
matter where preci sel y thi s ki nd of grammar begi ns to l ose i ts gri p, as l ong
as i t i s recogni zed as a general category of judgements about goodness.
HRP: Still, focusing on the species for the derivation of natural norms
seems particularly odd in the case of human beings. For you derive natu-
ral norms from the fact that certain things are necessary for a way of life.
But in humans, the phrase way of life is often used not to refer to the
species as a whole, but rather to refer to a society or group with a shared
set of institutions, practices, and outlook.
Foot: Agai n, perhaps there are no stri ct boundari es here. Thi s i s not of very
great i mportance. Some thi ngs are speci es-wi de i n our way of l i fe. Al l hu-
man bei ngs, for exampl e, need courage to face danger, chal l enges, and l oss.
There are many thi ngs that al l humans need, though some amount of rel a-
ti vi ty does emerge from di fferent ways of l i fe i n di fferent ti mes and pl aces
and di fferent soci al , economi c, and cul tural ci rcumstances. I thi nk i t i s one
of the advantages of thi s approach that i t doesnt have to cl ai m that al l moral
norms are the same for al l human bei ngs. But we mustnt l ose si ght of the
fact that there are many thi ngs that are absol utel y basi c human needs.
HRP: You mentioned moral norms. How is this kind of natural goodness
related to moral goodness?
Foot: Starti ng agai n from pl ants and ani mal s, we see that al l ki nds of thi ngs
are necessary for them i n thei r normal way of l i fe, such as certai n ki nds of
roots for certai n ki nds of trees or good ni ght vi si on for an owl . Now, humans
have a whol e new range of acti vi ti es and capaci ti es that are part of thei r way
of l i fe. A correspondi ng new set of defects i s possi bl e, most obvi ousl y those
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
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Intervi ew
defects rel ati ng to speci fi c human capaci ti es such as l anguage, i magi nati on,
and the wi l l . Then we can say, l et us l ook more cl osel y at these speci fi c
human defects. Human bei ngs can know, for exampl e, that certai n thi ngs
are bad for them. And whi l e ani mal s that l i ked al cohol as most of us do and
who were suppl i ed wi th enough of i t woul d probabl y dri nk themsel ves to
death, humans, on the other hand, can real i ze the effects of al cohol , and may
control thei r urge for i t. Thus, they need and can have the virtue of temper-
ance as an ani mal cannot. But where have I moved on to somethi ng gram-
mati cal l y di fferent i n thi s progressi on? Why make that ki nd of di sti ncti on
between the way temperance i s needed by a human bei ng and swi ftness i s
needed by a deer?
HRP: So you would say that moral goodness and badness, the virtues and
vices, are a subclass of the general class of ascriptions of natural goodness
and badness?
Foot: Exactl y. The move from pl ants to ani mal s and the move from ani mal s
and human bei ngs are si mi l ar. You have di fferent possi bi l i ti es, di fferent ways
of managi ng, di fferent needs, and there i s not the sl i ghtest ground for say-
i ng: Oh moral goodness, now that must be somethi ng that we judge qui te
di fferentl y. I t i s very i mportant, of course, that the subset of the cl ass of
ascri pti ons of natural goodness i n human bei ngs that we cal l moral has to
do wi th the goodness of the wi l l and wi th practi cal rati onal i ty, vi rtues bei ng
i ntel l i gent di sposi ti ons to take certai n thi ngs as reasons for acti on. Corre-
spondi ngl y, I woul d cal l a vi ce a defect of the wi l l . Note, however, that I am
not too keen on the word moral to mark out thi s subcl ass, si nce i t has a
certai n associ ati on wi th concern for others that separates out thi ngs that I
shoul d l i ke to bri ng together. For exampl e, the defect of not l ooki ng after
onesel f, whi ch usual l y i snt thought of as a moral defect, i s equal l y a defect
of the wi l l .
HRP: How does this way of thinking help us to determine what morality
and justice require of us? The virtue of justice requires that we respect
others rights. But it is a disputed question just what these rights are.
Foot: I must admi t that I have never thought as much as I shoul d about i s-
sues i n pol i ti cal phi l osophy. But I suppose that I woul d proceed i n a way
si mi l ar to El i sabeth Anscombes i n her work on promi ses, when she stresses
how i mportant a practi ce of keepi ng promi ses i s for us to be abl e to bi nd one
another s wi l l . I dont see any reason why a ri ght, whi ch i s a very strong
cl ai ma stronger cl ai m than you shoul d hel p me shoul d not be argued
for i n the same way, that i s, wi th reference to the good that hangs on i t. I
mean, soci ety si mpl y depends on certai n requi rements bei ng stri ct requi re-
ments, l i ke not ki l l i ng someone and taki ng thei r tool s. By contrast one coul dnt
say, You dont have the ri ght to annoy me! and be taken seri ousl y. Not
bei ng annoyed i s si mpl y not that i mportant i n human l i fe.
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
40
Philippa Foot
HRP: So in determining which rights we have, you would appeal to the
kinds of necessities that exist either for individuals or for society?
Foot: Exactl y. I have no doubt that thi s i s the basi s of moral requi rements.
HRP: Now, these necessities have changed throughout human history, and
they are set to change even more as our ability to affect not only the envi-
ronment but also our genetic makeup increases. What does this mean for
the category of natural goodness?
Foot: I thi nk I woul d be very permi ssi ve here. Where human bei ngs have
changed thei r envi ronment so that thi ngs that were once a defect are now
useful , di fferent standards mi ght appl y. Of course, a change i n what counts
as a vi rtue i s onl y natural when peopl es way of l i fe changes. I t i s a good
thi ng to be rel ati vi sti c on thi s poi nt. But I stress that the approach taken as a
whol e i s radi cal l y non-rel ati vi sti c because there i s so much that human be-
i ngs qui te general l y need, l i ke courage, temperance and wi sdom.
Of course, there are great technol ogi cal di fferences between tri bal
cul tures of the worl d and the modern cul ture of the devel oped nati ons.
Yet there i s sti l l so much i n common between human bei ngs i n di fferent cul -
tures, and i t i s because of thi s that the i dea that there i s a uni versal need for
certai n character trai ts and certai n rul es of conduct i s a strong one.
HRP: Id like to turn to the topic of practical rationality
Foot: Oh good! Can I tel l you why I had to deal wi th the topi c of rati onal i ty
i n Natural Goodness? I t was part of my attack on the subjecti vi sm that i denti -
fi ed moral proposi ti ons as expressi ng some subjecti ve state of mi nd. I , by
contrast, argue that they are about the natural goodness of a human wi l l . And
I was open to attack on the ground that I coul dnt gi ve a proper account of
why anyone shoul d have reason to fol l ow moral i ty. Why? Because subjecti v-
i sts had the i dea that onl y i f you had parti cul ar feel i ngs or desi res coul d you
have reasons for acti ng. I mysel f used to have thi s vi ew of reasons, and i n a
notori ous arti cl e cal l ed I s Moral i ty a System of Hypotheti cal I mperati ves?
1
I was brash enough to say that reasons just were desi re-dependent. So I had
to expl ai n how one coul d have reason to do good acti ons and avoi d bad ones,
whatever ones ai ms or desi res.
So I needed a better account of what i t i s to have reasons, and at thi s
poi nt i n ti me I was l ucky enough to work wi th my fri end, the l ate Warren
Qui nn. He made what I thi nk was an absol utel y bri l l i ant suggesti on, though
perhaps nei ther he nor others at the ti me saw the force of i t. Hi s move was to
ask: What woul d be so important about practi cal rati onal i ty i f i t coul d be
rati onal to do despi cabl e acti ons? Now, thi s thought was extraordi nari l y
ori gi nal . For i t has been more or l ess taken for granted i n modern moral
phi l osophy that one must fi rst devel op a theory of practi cal rati onal i ty, i n
terms, say, of the maxi mum sati sfacti on of desi res, and then somehow show
that even the greatest sel f-sacri fi ce coul d be rati onal . And no one, not even
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
41
Intervi ew
the cl everest, coul d do i t. But Qui nns remark suggested that one shoul dnt
tackl e i t l i ke that at al l . One shoul dnt thi nk that moral i ty must pass the test
of rati onal i ty, but rather that rati onal i ty must pass the test of moral i ty.
HRP: The answer to Quinns question would seem to be that a more lim-
ited conception of rationality relating to the consistent pursuit of interests
or things someone cares about can easily be shown to be important to that
person, since it involves the pursuit of ends that are his or hers, or that are
in his or her interest.
Foot: Why woul d you thi nk that the onl y way of justi fyi ng the cl ai m that i t
woul d be rati onal for a person to do somethi ng shoul d make reference to hi s
or her own desi res or i nterests? I f you l ook cl osel y at the theory of rati onal -
i ty as the maxi mum sati sfacti on of your most i mportant desi res, you i mme-
di atel y get i nto a whol e seri es of probl ems. I s i t onl y present desi res that we
are concerned wi th? What of somethi ng that you dont want now, but you
know you wi l l want i n twenty years ti me? I s i t i rrati onal to di scount the
future?
HRP: But all these things still have some connection to the interests or
projects of the person concerned, whereas the pursuit of goodness may
not. In your own earlier work, you mention the case of the cool calculat-
ing man, who cares nothing for morality, neither now nor in the future.
What good does it do to call this man irrational?
Foot: Now, you are ri ght that i rrati onal may not be exactl y the word one
woul d choose to descri be hi m. Neverthel ess, he is defecti ve. For he i s fai l i ng
to recogni ze and act on somethi ng that i s a reason. I am curi ous, though,
about your own posi ti on. I wonder what you woul d say about the young
person who says: I dont care about the chance of getti ng l ung cancer due to
smoki ng i n 20 years ti me. Fi rst, do you cal l thi s contrary to practi cal rati o-
nal i ty?
HRP: Well, I would have it depend on what this persons attitudes towards
the future in general were, and whether his actions generally expressed
this not-caring about his future.
Foot: What i f thi s young person does care, for exampl e, about bei ng wel l -
dressed at 40, but not about hi s heal th at 40?
HRP: I understand that although he is being consistent, I might want to
say that he is not recognizing something that he should recognize.
Foot: Ah. And where do you get that shoul d from?
HRP: (pause) Well, I guess from some idea of normalcy, that it would be
normal to care about this...
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
42
Philippa Foot
Foot: Normal cy?
HRP: Perhaps youre right that normalcy isnt the right concept here, since
it may be uncommon to want to live only if one can live stylishly, but still
something someone can rationally pursue...
Foot: So I take i t you are confl i cted about whether such atti tudes and behav-
i or are i ndeed i rrati onal ?
HRP: Yes.
Foot: The probl em i sand thi s i s real l y cruci al i n thi s argumentthat i t i s
very di ffi cul t for someone to deny that i t i s contrary to rati onal i ty not to care
about your future heal th to the degree that many peopl e dont when they
start to smoke. For i t i s di ffi cul t to deny that prudence i s part of rati onal i ty.
But then i t i s very hard to fi nd a basi s for our concept of practi cal rati onal i ty
that makes prudence a part of rati onal i ty and doesnt make justi ce or chari ty
a part of rati onal i ty. That i s what someone i n your posi ti on has got to do.
Youve ei ther got to say: I t i snt contrary to rati onal i ty to i gnore compl etel y
your future wel l -bei ng, and then gi ve up sayi ng that thi s ki nd of i mpru-
dence i s contrary to rati onal i ty, or accept some concepti on of practi cal rati o-
nal i ty that makes reference to thi ngs other than that whi ch someone cares
about. And of the young smoker, I thi nk one defi ni tel y wants to say that he
i s defecti ve wi th regard to the standards of practi cal rati onal i ty. After al l , he
i s bei ng si l l y!
HRP: And silly is a word that points to a defect...
Foot: Absol utel y. So thi s i s my chal l enge: i t i s goi ng to be di ffi cul t for you to
fi nd a ground for sayi ng that i mprudence i s a vi ce, a defect, but that l ack of
chari ty or i njusti ce i snt. Here I thi nk there i s somethi ng useful i n Natural
Goodness. Because i f you treat a defect i n the way that i t i s treated there, they
come together. They are di fferent parts of what human bei ngs need.
HRP: Still, one would say different kinds of things to someone who is not
acting on reasons for action that they themselves accept than to someone
who isnt recognizing something as a reason that you believe she should
recognize as such. In the first case we are concerned with a defect in the
way she pursues means to her given ends, while in the second case we are
concerned with her ends themselves. What is the conception of practical
rationality that brings together these disparate notions?
Foot: I argue that thi nki ng i n terms of natural goodness, as I defi ne i t, pro-
vi des thi s uni ty. Both the taki ng of means to ends i n an effi ci ent way and the
recogni ti on of rel evant reasons are thi ngs needed i n human l i fe, and a defect
i n ei ther of these i s a defect i n practi cal rati onal i ty.
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
43
Intervi ew
HRP: In Virtues and Vices you write that wise men know the means to
ends and know what these ends are worth.
2
Are practical rationality and
wisdom the same?
Foot: Yes. They are absol utel y the same. Take someone who says, the most
i mportant thi ng i n l i fe i s to be fashi onabl e. I f you thi nk of the way someone
woul d spend hi s or her l i fe bel i evi ng thi s, of the sort of fri ends theyd have
and the cel ebri ti es theyd try to emul ate, wel l one woul d l ook i nto that. I
havent been abl e to go i nto thi s very far, but I thi nk that the questi on of
what i s deep and superfi ci al has to come i n here. I certai nl y dont cl ai m to
have deal t adequatel y wi th thi s noti on of depth of happi ness, but i t does
seem to me that one understands when someone on hi s deathbed says, I ve
wasted so much of my l i fe on thi ngs that di dnt matter! And the i dea of
bei ng defecti ve i n recogni zi ng the wei ght of reasons seems appropri ate here.
HRP: The resistance I feel to this way of thinking about practical rational-
ity is that it seems so like preaching, saying to people such and such is
really important, and if you dont see this then you are defective.
Foot: I t is preachi ng! There i s good preachi ng and there i s bad preachi ng. I
thi nk a preacher who i s worth hi s sal t woul d be ri ght to say to a fashi onabl e
congregati on that they are l i vi ng a very superfi ci al l i fe (though hed better
not say i t i n an offensi ve way and hed probabl y better not say i t at al l !) But
he mi ght thi nk of them that they were ol d enough to know better, bei ng
grownups, not teenagers.
HRP: Still, before you can preach, you must have an idea of the good life
for human beings. Aquinas and Aristotle had their own fully developed
accounts of what a complete and fulfilled human life was like, and could
derive from these accounts the reason for human beings to live in a cer-
tain way and cultivate the virtues. In Aristotles and Aquinass accounts,
the virtues would be conducive to a persons well-being, even if he did
not see it this way. But we generally do not share their views of the one
correct goal in life. Do you have a similar account of how a person should
live?
Foot: The i dea of the good for humans i s i ndeed a di ffi cul t one. Though I
thi nk that we can get some handl e on the probl em by l ooki ng at human dep-
ri vati on. One seri ous chal l enge to my vi ew l i es, I thi nk, i n the i dea that hap-
pi ness i s mans good, and that happi ness may be achi eved i n the pursui t of
evi l . Now, happi ness i s a protean concept. But what I want to suggest i s that
we have a concepti on of happi ness (among di fferent possi bl e concepti ons) i n
whi ch i t i s the enjoyment of good things, wi th good thi ngs defi ned as objects
of a good (an i nnocent) wi l l ; and that we have to understand i t i n that way
when we say that happi ness i s Mans good. I thi nk we can approach thi s
concept of happi ness i ndi rectl y vi a our i dea of what i t i s to benefi t someone.
Consi der the murderous chi l d abusers Frederi ck and Rosemary West, and
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
44
Philippa Foot
ask what we shoul d say of someone who had made i t possi bl e for them to go
on for l onger getti ng thei r horri bl e pl easures. Shoul d we say that thi s person
had benefited the Wests? Surel y not!
HRP: How can you use the notion of benefit as a way into an idea of hap-
piness?
Foot: Benefi ti ng someone means doi ng somethi ng that i s for thei r good. And
i f I m ri ght, the concept of benefi ti ng someone reveal s a way of thi nki ng
about human good that excl udes the pursui t of evi l thi ngs, as i s shown by
my observati on of what we shoul d say about prol ongi ng the pl easures of the
Wests. But then the concept of happi ness that one fi nds i n the expressi on,
happi ness i s Mans good must al so excl ude the pursui t of evi l . So consi d-
eri ng the noti on of benefi ti ng someone offers us a gl i mpse of a way that we
have of thi nki ng about happi nessthi nki ng of happi ness as Mans good
that i nvol ves goodness.
HRP: On the final page of Natural Goodness, you consider what your ar-
guments mean for moral philosophy. Echoing Wittgenstein, you conclude
that your philosophy leaves everything as it is. Wittgenstein, however,
was referring to philosophical analysis leaving our everyday activities as
they are and wouldnt have thought that our philosophizing could go on
as before. So as an answer to the question where your approach leaves
moral philosophy, this seems a bit disingenuous.
Foot: I was onl y tal ki ng about certai n parts of moral phi l osophy, such as
medi cal ethi cs, when I sai d that I woul d not expect di sturbance. Perhaps
rashl y, I do hope that my approach mi ghtjust mi ghtaffect the way moral
phi l osophy i s done. For my approach i s di fferent from that of most contem-
porary moral phi l osophers. I do not start wi th moral judgement, aski ng di -
rectl y What i s moral i ty? or What i s moral goodness? Rather, drawi ng
on the work of El i zabeth Anscombe and Mi chael Thompson, I make a gen-
eral grammati cal poi nt about the eval uati on of l i vi ng thi ngs and thei r parts
and features i n terms of what I cal l natural goodness and defect, and then
suggest that moral judgment i s just one case of this kind of evaluation. Thi s i s
what I thi nk i s new, at l east to contemporary moral phi l osophy, and I hope
that thi nki ng about moral goodness and badness i n thi s way offers the po-
tenti al for a change i n moral phi l osophy.
Notes
1
The Philosophical Review, Vol . 81, No. 3, Jul y 1972. Later repri nted i n Virtues and Vices, 1978,
Oxford: Basi l Bl ackwel l , pp. 157-173.
2
Virtues and Vices, 1978, Oxford: Basi l Bl ackwel l , p. 5.