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  • Strategies and Payoffs in Finite Games

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    Phuong Tran
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    This document discusses finite games and mixed strategies. It begins by focusing on finite games where the set of strategies for each player is finite. These finite two-player games are often depicted using matrices like the one in Figure 1.1. The document then defines a mixed strategy as a probability distribution over pure strategies. It notes that each player's randomization is independent and the payoffs to a mixed strategy profile are the expected values of the corresponding pure strategy payoffs. Lastly, it provides an example of a mixed strategy for player 1 in the game in Figure 1.1 as a probability vector over their three pure strategies.

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    This document discusses finite games and mixed strategies. It begins by focusing on finite games where the set of strategies for each player is finite. These finite two-player games are often depicted using matrices like the one in Figure 1.1. The document then defines a mixed strategy as a probability distribution over pure strategies. It notes that each player's randomization is independent and the payoffs to a mixed strategy profile are the expected values of the corresponding pure strategy payoffs. Lastly, it provides an example of a mixed strategy for player 1 in the game in Figure 1.1 as a probability vector over their three pure strategies.

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    3 views1 page

    Strategies and Payoffs in Finite Games

    Uploaded by

    Phuong Tran
    This document discusses finite games and mixed strategies. It begins by focusing on finite games where the set of strategies for each player is finite. These finite two-player games are often depicted using matrices like the one in Figure 1.1. The document then defines a mixed strategy as a probability distribution over pure strategies. It notes that each player's randomization is independent and the payoffs to a mixed strategy profile are the expected values of the corresponding pure strategy payoffs. Lastly, it provides an example of a mixed strategy for player 1 in the game in Figure 1.1 as a probability vector over their three pure strategies.

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    Page5

    Figure1.1
    particular,forsomejustificationsitsufficesthattheplayerssimplyknowtheirownpayoffs.
    Wefocusourattentiononfinitegames,thatis,gameswhereS=x
    i
    S
    i
    isfinitefinitenessshouldbeassumedwhereverwedonotexplicitlynoteotherwise.Strategic
    formsforfinitetwoplayergamesareoftendepictedasmatrices,asinfigure1.1.Inthismatrix,players1and2havethreepurestrategieseach:U,M,D(up,middle,
    anddown)andL,M,R(left,middle,andright),respectively.Thefirstentryineachboxisplayer1'spayoffforthecorrespondingstrategyprofilethesecondisplayer
    2's.
    Amixedstrategy
    i
    isaprobabilitydistributionoverpurestrategies.(Wepostponethemotivationformixedstrategiesuntillaterinthischapter.)Eachplayer's
    randomizationisstatisticallyindependentofthoseofhisopponents,andthepayoffstoaprofileofmixedstrategiesaretheexpectedvaluesofthecorrespondingpure
    strategypayoffs.(Onereasonweassumethatthespaceofpurestrategiesisfiniteistoavoidmeasuretheoreticcomplications.)Wewilldenotethespaceofplayeri's
    mixedstrategiesby
    i
    ,where
    i
    (s
    i
    )istheprobabilitythat
    i
    assignstos
    i
    .Thespaceofmixedstrategyprofilesisdenoted =x
    i i
    ,withelement .Thesupportofa
    mixedstrategy
    i
    isthesetofpurestrategiestowhich
    i
    assignspositiveprobability.Playeri'spayofftoprofile is
    whichwedenoteu
    i
    ( )inaslightabuseofnotation.Notethatplayeri'spayofftoamixedstrategyprofileisalinearfunctionofplayeri'smixingprobability
    i
    ,afact
    whichhasmanyimportantimplications.Notealsothatplayeri'spayoffisapolynomialfunctionofthestrategyprofile,andsoinparticulariscontinuous.Last,notethat
    thesetofmixedstrategiescontainsthepurestrategies,asdegenerateprobabilitydistributionsareincluded.(Wewillspeakofnondegeneratemixedstrategieswhenwe
    wanttoexcludepurestrategiesfromconsideration.)
    Forinstance,infigure1.1amixedstrategyforplayer1isavector(
    1
    (U),
    1
    (M),
    1
    (D))suchthat
    1
    (U),
    1
    (M),and
    1
    (D)arenonnegativeand
    1
    (U)+
    1
    (M)+
    1
    (D)
    =1.Thepayoffstoprofiles are

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