2.

The Relationship between Language, Thought and Reality

Long before linguistics existed as a discipline, thinkers were speculating about the nature
of meaning. For thousands of years, the question what is meaning!" has been considered central
to philosophy. #ore recently it has come to be important in linguistics, as well.
2.$ Extension and Intension
The impossibility of equating a word%s meaning with its referents has led to a distinction
between extension and intension or &erin and 'edeutung. The extension of a term corresponds to
the set of entities that it picks out in the real world. The term extension" is often used
synonymously with denotation". &ometimes, denotation is understood not only in its narrower
sense which co(ers the relation between nouns or noun phrases and groups of indi(iduals or
ob)ects, but also the relation between words belonging to other word classes and extra*linguistic
phenomena they relate to. Thus, (erbs denote situations, ad)ecti(es denote properties of
indi(iduals and ob)ects and ad(erbs denote properties of situations.+,ortmann, 2--./ $012
The extension of 3tiger3 is the set of tigers in the real world. Intension corresponds to the
inherent sense of a term, to the concept that is associated with it. For instance, the intension of
woman in(ol(es notions like 3female3 or 3human3.
Two terms can ha(e the same extension and yet differ in intension +meaning2. For
example, the compound terms 3creature with a heart3 and 3creature with a kidney3 ha(e the same
extension because +we assume that2 e(ery creature with a heart possesses a kidney and (ice (ersa.
4e(ertheless the re(erse is impossible/ two terms cannot differ in extension and ha(e the same
intension.
5utnam +$01./ $6.2 claims that this impossibility reflects the tradition of the ancient and
medie(al philosophers who assumed that the concept corresponding to a term was )ust a
con)unction of terms, and hence that the concept corresponding to a term must always pro(ide a
necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term.
The term whose analysis caused all the discussions in medie(al philosophy was 789,
thought to be defined through the con)unctions of the terms 37ood3, 35owerful3, 38mniscient3.
The philosopher 5utnam supports Frege%s (iew:stand against psychologism according to
which the psychological state of the speaker determines the intension of a term and hence, its
extension. ;e argues that extension is not determined by psychological state.
<xtension is determined socially +is a problem of sociolinguistics2 and indexically and in
its turn determines intension.
=f concepts +intensions2 were more important than extensions +then we would expect that
when concepts associated with a term no longer applied to the members of its extension2 , then
that term would be replaced by another to refer to the extension. ,nowing the meaning of a word
is to acquire a word, i.e. to associate it with the right concept.
2.2 Sign-sense-reference (referent)
>ontributions to semantics ha(e come from a di(erse group of scholars, ranging from
5lato to ?ristotle in ancient 7reece to 5utnam and Frege in the twentieth century.
?ccording to Frege +$01-/ .12 a sign is any designation representing a +proper2 name
which has as its reference a definite ob)ect +the word ob)ect is taken in the widest sense2, not a
concept or a relation.
The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its reference is of such a kind that to
the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference while to a gi(en
reference +an ob)ect2 there does not belong only a single sign. For example, Aristotle +the referent2
can be denoted by these signs/ the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great.
The same sense has different lexicali@ations in different languages or e(en in the same
language +pass aay - die - !ic! the "uc!et2.
To the sense does not always correspond a reference, i.e. in grasping a sense one is not
certainly assured of a reference +e.g. sign words such as unicorn, dragon# elf# fairy, $orld $ar
III, ha(e no referents in the real world e(en though they are far from being meaningless2
Frege maintains that the reference and sense of a sign must be distinguished from the
associated idea +concept2 which is sub)ecti(e/ 3if the reference of a sign is an ob)ect percei(able
by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image arising from memories of sense impressions
which = ha(e had ABC . &uch an idea is often saturated with feelingD the clarity of its separate
parts (aries and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, e(en in the same man with
the same idea3.
8gden and Richards +$02$2 argue that the symbol corresponds to the &aussurian 3signifiant3
+signifier2. They use the term reference for the concept that mediates between the symbol:
word:expression and the referent. The triadic concept of meaning was represented by 8gden and
Richards in the form of a triangle.
#ost linguists agree that a sign +ord or expression2 expresses its sense, stands for and
designates its reference. 'y means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.
sense
sign referent/reference
=dentical linguistic expressions may ha(e different referents in different contexts and at
different times +e.g. the 5ope, my neighbour, =, you, here, there, now, tomorrow2. +#eyer, 2--2/
$-E2. These expressions are called expressions with variable reference.
To identify who is being referred to by pronouns like FsheG, F=G, FyouG, etc., we certainly
need to know a lot about the context in which these word were uttered. These words whose
denotational capability needs : requires contextual support are called deictic ords. +The term
deixis comes from 7reek and means roughly pointing").
The sense of a linguistic expression is its content without reference, those features and
properties which define it. For example, the sense of FgirlG is a bundle of semantic features/ :
Hhuman:, :*adult:, :Hfemale:.
The referent of a sign may differ from the sense. For instance, the referent of Fe(ening starG is
the same as that of morning star, but not the sense. Therefore the designation of a single ob)ect can also
consist of se(eral words or signs. 8ther instances of references denoted by se(eral signs are 3the
pupil of 5lato3, 3the teacher of ?lexander the 7reat3 referring to ?ristotle or 3The 5rime #inister
of 7reat 'ritain3 and 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3, both referring +in $0I0 at least2 to
#argaret Thatcher. ?lthough the last two expressions may ha(e the same referent we would not
say that they ha(e the same sense. 4o one would maintain that the phrase 3 The 5rime #inister
of 7reat 'ritain3 could be defined as 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3 or (ice (ersa.
'esides expressions with (ariable reference, there are expressions with constant
reference +e.g. the Eiffel Toer and the Pacific %cean2 and non-referring items, that is, they do
not identify entities in the world, such as so# &ery# may"e# if# not# all.
The same sense has different lexicali@ations in different languages +<. ta"le, Fr. ta"le, 7.
Tisch, =t. ta&ola2 or e(en in the same language +pass aay# die# 'ic! the "uc!et2.
The association of two or more forms with the same meanings +synonymy2 and the association
of two or more meanings with one form +homonymy and polysemy2 show that one can hardly find an
ideal language in which words are defined by a one*to*one relation between signified and signifier.
2.6. Types of signs
The relationship between a sign and what it represents +or, in &aussurian terminology between
a signifier and its signified2 can be of three types/ +$2 a relationship of similarity +e.g. between a
portrait and its real life ob)ect or a diagram of an engine and its real life engine2, +22 a relationship of
close association, not infrequently causal association +e.g. the smoke as an indication of fire2 and +62 a
con(entional link, an arbitrary relation.
&tarting from these types of relationship that may hold between a sign and the ob)ect it
represents, >. &. 5eirce makes a distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic signs. ?n iconic
sign or icon +from 7reek ei!on %replika%2 resembles the referent and pro(ides a perceptual +e.g. (isual,
auditory, etc.2 image of what it stands for. This type of sign is a highly moti(ated one.
?n indexical sign or index +from Latin index %pointing finger%2 stands for what it points to +e.g.
spots indexical of a disease like measles, fe(er indexical of flu, etc.2. ?n index is partially moti(ated to
the extent that there is a connection, usually of causality, between sign and referent.
? sym"ol +from 7reek sym"olon %a token of recognition%2 or sym"olic sign does not ha(e a
natural link between the form and the thing represented, but a con(entional link. 5eirce%s symbol is the
most arbitrary kind of sign/ the word in language, the formula in mathematics and chemistry, a
military emblem, the dollar sign, a flag, red circles in tele(ision, etc.
?s the etymology of the word suggests, the term used in linguistics is understood in the sense
that, by general consent, people ha(e agreed upon the pairing of a particular form with a particular
meaning. =n language, the notion of arbitrariness holds true for most of the simple wordsD howe(er,
new words +compounds, deri(ati(es2 built on already existing linguistic material and therefore are
partially moti(ated. The notion of moti(ation refers to non*arbitrary links between a form and the
meaning of linguistic expressions.
=n terms of their degree of abstraction, the three types of signs can be ordered from the most
%primiti(e% to the most abstract. =ndexical signs, which are said to be the most %primiti(e% +9ir(en and
Jerspoor, $00I/ 62 are restricted to the %here% and %now% and are based on a relation of contiguity
between form and meaning. 'ody language +e.g. smiling2, traffic +e.g. 2 and ad(ertising +e.g. 2 are
areas pro(iding examples of such signs.
=conic signs are more complex in that their understanding requires the recognition of similarity
between form and meaning. Road signs picturing children, animals or (arious (ehicles or scarecrows
in the fields which birds take for real enemies are some instances of iconic signs.
&ymbolic signs, based on a relation of con(ention between sign and meaning, are the exclusi(e
prerogati(e of humans. ?s it has been acknowledged, people ha(e more communicati(e needs than
pointing to things and replicating thingsD we also want to talk about thinks which are more abstract in
nature such as e(ents in the past or future, ob)ects that are distant from us, hopes about peace, etc. This
can only be achie(ed by means of symbols which humans all o(er the world ha(e created for the
purpose of communicating all possible thoughts +9ir(en and Jerspoor, $00I/ E2.
The three types of signs presented so far underlie the structuring of language, i.e. within
language, we may recogni@e principles that are similar to these types of signsD the principle of
indexicality +occurring when we use %pointing% or deictic words2, the principle of iconicity +showing up
in similarities between the order of e(ents and the word order in the sentences we use to describe
them2 and the principle of symbolicity accounting for the purely con(entional relation between the
form and the meaning of signs.
2.E (odels of meaning
The famous triangle of meaning of 8gden and Richards +$06K/ $$2 stands for a model of an
analytical and referential definition of meaningD it has been referred to in hundreds of subsequent
works and has had a powerful influence on semantic thinking.
4e(ertheless, Lllmann +$0K2/ .K2 contends that 3for a linguistic study of meaning the basic
triangle offers too little or too much3. ?s a diachronic semanticist, he obser(es that the meaning of
words may change as new knowledge is generated without a corresponding change in the referent or
real world entity +for example, atoms remain unchanged while our knowledge of their structure has
increased considerably in the present century2.
Lllmann indirectly ad(ises linguists to confine their attention to the left*hand side of the
triangle, i.e. on what he calls name and sense, corresponding to the set %lexeme-concept%
+#agnusson and 5ersson, $0IK/ 2.12 or %form - content% +Marren, $002/ 1K2. The implication is to
neglect the right*hand element, i.e. the thing +Lllmann, $0K2/ .K2, entity +#agnusson and 5ersson,
$0IK/ 2.12 or referent +Marren, $0I1/ 1K2, lea(ing us with a simplified model.
This model corresponds to an intra*linguistic attitude to the study of meaning where there is
no room for extension, i.e. the relation between the symbol and the real world entities to which it
refers. #ore recently, cogniti(e linguists ha(e shown that the (arious beliefs that people may ha(e
about real world entities are crucial to their understanding of word meaning.
Following the cogniti(e line and, at the same time, trying to reconcile componential analysis
+>?2 with the notions of prototypic categories and fu@@y meaning, 5ersson +$00-2 interestingly
combines a core model, often associated with >? +Figure $a2 and a prototypical model +Figure $b2
in what he calls %a complementary% model. Mhat 5ersson notes is that the seemingly unimportant
connotations of the core*meaning model may become significant attributes in his complementary
model.
Figure $ a. Figure $ b.
woman women

The main disad(antage with the model in fig. $a is that it wrongly suggests that the connotati(e
concepts placed in the outer box are somehow less important than the ones in the central box. =n the
can bear
children"

has a has
high* feminine
pitched features"
(oice"
has breasts
and a womb"
h u m a n
f e m a l e
a d u l t "
human female adults
who can bear
children ha(e
feminine features,
breasts and high *
pitched (oices
prototypical model in fig. $b it is precisely these concepts that gi(e salience to the meaning of the
lexeme and pro(ides it with the attributes that are typical of the category it denotes.
5ersson%s complementary model +Figure $ c2 is based on two different types of concept/ +a2
>> N Fcategorial concept+s2G originally corresponding to the core concept and +b2 T? N Ftypical
attributesG standing for the set of attributes that are considered characteristic of the best examples of
the category/
Figure $c woman
=n Fig.$c oman is seen as a Fsense containerG
$
with two boxes in it. The smaller box contains the
>>, i.e. categorial concepts which ser(es to separate women from boys and men, etc. The larger of
the boxes contains the T?, consisting of attributes )udged to be generally held characteristic of
women. These attributes may single out typical women from untypical ones. The dotted box
enclosing the T? suggests that the set of attributes is open * ended and (ariable.
The ad(antage of using a complementary model based on a combination of categorial
concepts and typical attributes can further be pro(ed by an example, which shows the semantic
de(elopment of a word in time.
For instance, spinster originally denoted Fa woman engaged in spinningG. &ince these female
workers were often unmarried, the word came to connote Gunmarried womanG. This connotation
gradually de(eloped into the main sense of spinster# which in the $1
th
century became the legal
designation of an unmarried adult female.
This could stand for the current categorial meaning of the noun spinster and is located in the upper
smaller box +fig.22. The lower larger box contains the (arious beliefs and pre)udices that are usually
associated with spinsters and which in traditional semantics were labelled FconnotationsG/
1
The idea that linguistic expressions, e.g. Mords as well as larger linguistic structures +phrases, clauses,
sentences2 are containers for meanings comes from Reddy +$010/2IE*62E2 and Lakoff and Oohnson +$0I-/$-*$62.
?ccording to Reddy"s (iew of the Fconduit metaphorG, ideas +or meanings2 are regarded as ob)ects, which can be
stored in containers and sent between language users.
?n instance of linguistic e(idence supporting this (iew is the sentence F=t is (ery difficult to put this concept into
words.G
>>
T?

human female
adult"
has breasts and
a womb, can bear
children, has a high *
pitched (oice, has
feminine features"
Fig. 6. spinster

?s can be noticed, most of the T? are pe)orati(e. The fact that nowadays, unmarried career women
firmly dissociate themsel(es from such a pe)orati(e label may explain why the word is becoming
obsolete. Therefore another perspecti(al shift of the prototypical centre is unlikely to occur due to
the FstatusG of the referent itself.
The analysis of a complementary model is also useful for a better understanding of a model
of meaning. Thus, an impro(ed model of meaning would place L<P<#< and >84><5T at the
same hori@ontal le(el. This representation implies that both the speaker"s and the hearer"s points of
(iew are taken into account.
2.. Study )uestions and exercises
$. ?nswer these questions/
$. Mhat is the distinction between extension and intension!
2. >an two terms ha(e the same extension and differ in intension! 7i(e examples.
6. >an two terms ha(e the same intension and differ in extension!
E. >an intension determine extension!
.. >an extension be influenced by the speaker QQs psychological state!
K. ;ow can extension be determined socially!
1. Mhat is Frege QQs definition of sign !
I. 9oes a reference: referent always belong to a single sign!
2. Mhat are the referents of the following expressions!
a2 the teacher of this course
b2 the person who is answering this question
c2 where you ate lunch last
d2 a child of your parents
unmarried
woman"
prudish, frumpish,
unable to catch a
husband and too
old to marry