Pilar Vda. de Manalo v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129242; January 16, 2001

Facts:
Troado Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his 11 children. Troadio left several real properties located in
Manila and Tarlac including Manalo's Machine Shop in Quezon City.
Respondents (8 of the surviving children) filed a petition in RTC of
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate and for the appointment of
Romeo(son) as the administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and
directed the publication thereof. It also directed the service of the said order
upon the heirs. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an order
"declaring the whole world in default, except the government." However, such
order was set aside upon motion of petitioners.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by the petitioners:
1. set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which
denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; 2. to set for
preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the
case; 3. to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the oppositors; 4. for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
TC denied the motions. MR was also denied. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the orders of the TC which
denied the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate.


Ruling:
* Petitioners claim that petition is an ordinary civil action because the petition
contains averments which are indicative of its adversarial nature.

No. The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition,
shall be controlling. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest.
The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of the legal heirs
including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased.

















Angela Rodriguez v. Hon. Juan de Borja
L-21993; June 21, 1966

Facts:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan delivered the purported will to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan.
Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave to allow them to
examine the alleged will. However, such petition was withdrawn.
The aforementioned petitioners then filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate in the CFI of Rizal. Pangilinan and Jacalan also filed a petition for
the probate of the will in the CFI of Bulacan on the same date.
The petitioners (Angela and Maria) contend that since the intestate proceeding
was filed at 8 am on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed at
11 am, the CFI of Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Pangilinan takes the stand that the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction upon
delivery by them of the will to the clerk on March 4, 1963. The CFI of Bulacan
denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did
not entitle one proceeding over the other; and that the movants were aware of
the existence of the will since they filed a petition to examine the same. MR was
also denied. Thus, the petitioners filed a pet. for a writ of certiorari and
prohibition.

Issues:
1. WON the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings.
2. Venue

Ruling:
1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of
the will of Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon being deposited the court could,
motu propio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issue corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by Rule 76
(section 3).
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the
deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12,
eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontestable.
2. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the
delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently
done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by
the Rules.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez is pending.


Cresencia Hernandez v. Zacarias Andal
March 29, 1947; G.R. No. L-273

Facts:
Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria & Aquilina; and Pedro and
Basilia(not parties herein) are brothers and sisters. They acquired in common
by descent from their father a parcel of land. An oral partition of the land was
allegedly made by the siblings. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of the
parcel to Zacarias Andal in consideration of P860. After the sale, the plaintiff
attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her complaint,
dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchaser P150 as price of repurchase.
Such amount was the supposed price paid for Aquilina and Marias shares. But
Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property in favor of Cresencia.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint wherein the she
alleged that when the cause was called for trial, she announced in open court
that she was willing to repurchase the lot from Andal and reimburse Andal for
his expenses. Meanwhile, respondent Andal resold the land fictitiously to the
vendors for the amount of 970 pesos.
In their answer, the intervenors alleged that a partition was made after
which everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his/her
portion in the partition. They charged the plaintiff with bad faith for allegedly
delaying the sale in favor of Andal. The court handed down its decision
declaring that the resale of the land in favor of Maria and Aquilina was illegal
and in bad faith. The court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court as well as Article 1248 of the Civil Code, parole evidence of partition was
inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition is admissible.
Ruling:
Yes.
-ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED.
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or
partly performed.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a
means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by
the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan
vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of
acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or
contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or
contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the
document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernandez, 45 Phil., 746.)
-SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF
PARTITION.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the
public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition
or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this
Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a
partition as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors
and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means
notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there
are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors
being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those
provided by law.

Ricardo Marquez et al v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125715; December 29, 1998

Facts:
Rafael Marquez Sr. and Felicidad begot twelve children, namely: Natividad,
Aurea, Herminigildo; Filomena; Exequel; Salvador; Gaudencio; Rafael Jr.; Belen;
Alfredo; Ricardo; and Antonio. In 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte Rizal, wherein they
constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad died intestate. Thirty years later, Marquez Sr. executed an
Affidavit of Adjudiction of the lot in his favor. On December 29, 1983, Marquez
Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" over the said lot as well as the
house constructed thereon to petitioner Rafael Jr. and respondents Alfredo and
Belen.
From 1983 to 1991, respondents were in actual possession of the land.
However, when the petitioners learned about the certificate of title in the name
of the donees, they immediately demanded their respective share over the land
in question. Private respondents ignored petitioners demands.
Rafael Jr., joined by the petitioners filed a complaint for "Reconveyance and
Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the "Affidavit of
Adjudication" and The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent because
the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father
when the said documents were executed.
Private respondents argued that petitioners' action was already barred by the
statute of limitations. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the
petitioners.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's findings. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration also proved unavailing.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners' action has already prescribed.

Ruling:
No. Under Article 887 of the present Civil Code, Felicidad's compulsory heirs are
her legitimate children and her spouse. When Marquez Sr. decided to adjudicate
the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication", a constructive
trust under Art. 1456 was established. In this regard, it is settled that an action
for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years. Thus, considering that the action was filed nine years after a Torrens title
was issued to Marquez Sr. over the property, it is evident that prescription had
not yet barred the action.
Moreover, Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, cannot validly donate this
portion to the respondents in accordance with Art. 736 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to
them.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
















Eusebio Godoy v. Guillermo Orellano et al.
G.R. No. L-16584; November 17, 1921

Facts:
On January 13, 1919, a document was executed by appellant Felisa Pangilinan,
in the amount of P1,000, for an option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000.
The dredge was the common property of the vendor and the brothers Demetrio,
Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; The condition was that
Godoy was to pay the whole price within twenty days; and that said option was
in accordance with the power of attorney executed by Pangilinan's co-owners
who reserved the right to ratify the option contract. The co-owners did not
ratify the option contract. When the appellee was ready to pay the price, the
appellant failed to deliver the dredge. The appellee then brought a suit in the
Court of First Instance against the vendor as well as the co-owners, praying that
they be ordered to deliver the dredge.
The defendants set up as a special defense that the dredge in question was the
property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, with pending administration
proceedings in the Court of Instance of Manila. It was under the administration
of Felisa Pangilinan and that the petitioner knew that the dredge was under
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority. The
court rendered judgment, ordering the defendants to pay Godoy the sum of
P2,000 with legal interest.

Issue:
Whether or not the administratrix has the authority to sell, or contract to sell,
any property belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Ruling:
No. In the sale of a property belonging to an intestate estate, it is necessary to
comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, 722 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an
administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real property
and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to
an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is
had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the
administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void.
Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of
properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed
by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of
court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are
under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the
aforesaid power of attorney.



















Teopista Castro, et al. v. Antonio Martinez Gallegos, et al.
G.R. No. L-3880; March 9, 1908

Facts:
Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on
Calle Cadiz, city of Cebu, valued at 200 pesos. She executed a nuncupative will
before a notary under which she died and wherein she disposed of the house in
which she lived. In one of the will's clauses, she bequeathed 10 pesos to each
once of her nephews, the children of her brother Valentin, named Godofredo,
Mateo, Quitin, Romana, Salud, and Constancia.
Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and a certain Ignacio and Teopista Castro
challenged the will, after Mateo and Quintin received their legacies.
Under the will, Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed as
executors. In compliance with clause 4 of the same, they sold the house and lot
for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut. Afterwards, Ferragut sold the same
to Tomas Osmena; he later on sold it to Martinez Gallegos. The latter finally sold
it to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2, 500 pesos.
The plaintiffs in their complaint that they we declared as the owners of the
property of the deceased; that it be placed in their property; and in case that the
same could not be found, for the sum of 4,000 pesos as indemnity. It is alleged in
their complaint: (1) That Marcelina Cuico was not of sound mind, nor in control
of her mental faculties, nor was she capable of disposing of her property at the
time and place of its execution; (2) that the signature of Jose A. Casals which
appears as the signature of the will is not in law sufficient as the legal signature
of said Marcelina Cuico, nor by anyone in her name, or at her request.
The court declared that the will was not only null and illegal but was also
fraudulent. Naturally, it results that all the transfers made by Martinez Gallegos
were and are null and illegal, and that the title thereto has always remained
with the heirs of the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in granting the petition to transfer ownership of
the property to the plaintiffs.

Ruling:
Yes. It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of
justice of Spain, that "wills executed with the formalities of law are presumed
valid."
It is also a legal doctrine established among others, that "the normal condition
of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law."
And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions, "that is not
proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to
the testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that
according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of
sound mind."
Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of
Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of
law .
Nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining,
or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity; and the
plaintiffs have limited themselves to asking that they be declared the owners of
the property of the late Marcelina Cuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning
at the same time for a declaration of nullity of the will whereby Marcelina
transmitted said property to others.
In the event that will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would
be open the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure
established by law; in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico
could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts
by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to
third persons.

Estate of the deceased Basilia Tantoco, Vicente Fernandez v. Domingo
Tantoco
G.R. No. 25489; September 8, 1926

Facts:
On September 9, 1925, Basilia Tantoco, aged 62 years, executed an instrument
purporting to be her will. She was a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital at
the time. She died a few days after the will was executed. An application for the
probate of the will was filed by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of
Malolos. The three brothers and a nephew of the deceased opposed the probate.
The proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument. The
instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial
judge refused to allow the probate, for the reason that the three witnesses are
not in harmony whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the
time and place when they affixed their signatures.
In 1910, Vecente Platon, an attorney of Malolos wrote a will for the deceased for
the disposition of a building and lot in favor of the parish priest for certain
religious uses.
When her final illness came upon her, the testatrix executed the September 9
will.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred for not allowing the probate of the will.

Ruling:
Yes. In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally
bound to introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are
therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not
bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the
testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the
proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the instrument,
even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of
them.
With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment
of the document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was
properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic.
These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the
will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some
fatal irregularity occurred. And such irregularity must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence before probate can be denied.