Society for American Archaeology

Behavioral Archaeology: Some Clarifications

Author(s): Michael Brian Schiffer
Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Antiquity, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 166-168
Published by: Society for American Archaeology
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2694352 .
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BEHAVIORAL ARCHAEOLOGY: SOME CLARIFICATIONS
Michael Brian Schiffer
In their comment on Schiffer (1996), Broughton and O'Connell perpetuate several commion misconceptions about behavioral
archaeology. This brief reply clarifies the character and goals of behavioral archaeology and indicates that this vigorous pro-
gram is now beginning to produce "social" theory beyond the explanation of variability in artifact designs.
En sit commentario sobre Schiffer (1996) Broughton y O'Connel (1998) perpettian varios malentendidos comnunes sobre la arqule-
ologia conductal e indica que sit vigoroso programa estd empezando a producir teoria "social" que va mids alld de la explicaci6n
de variabilidad en el disenio de artefactos.
J am delighted that Broughton and O'Connell
have reacted so constructively to my experi-
ment in archaeological communication. Adding
evolutionary ecology to the programs under discus-
sion should have a salutory effect by bringing in
other voices and views. In response to Broughton
and O'Connell's piece, my points are few but not
unimportant.
I agree with virtually the entirety of Broughton
and O'Connell's comments about selectionist
archaeology, but I must take issue with some of
their statements about the behavioral program.
Broughton and O'Connell perpetuate several mis-
conceptions about behavioral archaeology that are
regrettably prevalent in the discipline.
Perhaps most seriously, they misconstrue behav-
ioral archaeology's character and goals. They claim
that the program's goals are "to reconstruct and
explain variation in past human behavior" (empha-
sis in original). In fact, none of the five publications
they cite for this statement supports it. The first
(Schiffer 1972) makes no mention of "behavioral
archaeology," much less its goals. The second
(Schiffer 1976) does not speak of goals per se, but
offers behavioral archaeology as "the particular
configuration of principles, activities, and interests
that we offer to reintegrate the discipline" (Schiffer
1995a:69, orig. 1976). We also made clear behav-
ioral archaeology's unique conception of the disci-
pline's subject matter, which is not confined to the
past but encompasses "the relationships between
human behavior and material culture in all times
and all places (Schiffer 1995a:69, orig. 1976;
emphasis added). This crucial phrase captures the
core of behavioral archaeology. Citations three and
four (Schiffer 1983, 1987) are about formation
processes and do not deal explicitly with behavioral
archaeology. However, Schiffer (1987:4) does reit-
erate that archaeology's subject matter-"human
behavior and material culture"-has no spatial or
temporal boundaries. Fifth, and finally, Schiffer
(1995a:23) again states that behavioral archaeology
is about people-artifact relationships in all times
and places, and emphasizes the behavioralists' con-
ceptualization of archaeology as a unique scientific
enterprise having "ambitious goals."
Ironically, in the paper that stimulated
Broughton and O'Connell's comment (Schiffer
1996) lies this succinct statement: "Behavioralists
seek to explain variability and change in human
behavior by emphasizing the study of relationships
between people and their artifacts" (Schiffer
1996:644). Thus, behavioral archaeology's goals
are the broad goals of the social and behavioral sci-
ences, but they entail a unique focus on people-arti-
fact interactions regardless of time or space.
Broughton and O'Connell recognize that the
behavioralists' first task, as archaeologists, was to
provide a firm foundation for establishing infer-
ences from the archaeological record. Thus, we
Michael Brian Schiffer * Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona, Tucson AZ 85721
American Antiquity, 64(1), 1999, pp. 166-168
Copyright ? 1999 by the Society for American Archaeology
166
COEMENTSN1 7
have supplied conceptual tools for creating a
behavioral past: new models of inference (e.g.,
Dean 1978; Schiffer 1976, Chapter 2; Sullivan
1978) along with innumerable principles (produced
by experimental archaeologists and ethnoarchaeol-
ogists), many of which are employed for coping
with variability that formation processes intro-
duced into the archaeological and historical
records. Arguably, the improvement of inference
has been behavioral archaeology's major contribu-
tion to the discipline thus far.
Broughton and O'Connell also acknowledge
that behavioral archaeologists recently have begun
to address explanatory questions, focusing on "arti-
fact design," claiming that "The basic expectation
is that design will be 'optimal' with respect to func-
tion." Although the word optimal does appear in
Schiffer and Skibo (1987), we renounced its use in
the same issue of Current Anthropology when
replying to the commentators, and I have not used
"optimal" as a technical term since. Moreover, in
our most recent paper (Schiffer and Skibo 1997),
which is a fully general theory of artifact design,
we have framed the problem in a way that obviates
any preconceptions about optimality. In that effort,
we urge investigators to attend to the diverse behav-
ioral and social factors that affect the artisan's
weighting of performance characteristics-
mechanical, thermal, visual, acoustic, etc.-in any
specific artifact's design. Whether a given artifact
design "optimizes" a given performance character-
istic or characteristics is always an empirical ques-
tion. We also advocate abandoning the terms style
and function because they are too imprecise for sci-
entific work. Apparently, Broughton and
O'Connell have adopted McGuire's (1995) carica-
ture of our approach to explaining artifact design
rather than closely reading our recent theoretical
statements and case studies (e.g., Schiffer 1991;
Schiffer et al. 1994).
Like others before them, Broughton and
O'Connell fault behavioral archaeology for lack-
ing "a general body of theory, applicable to any
hominid, that produces testable hypotheses about
the relationship between relevant ecological vari-
ables and specific forms of behavior and morphol-
ogy." They believe that evolutionary ecology
uniquely provides such theory. Before clarifying
the behavioralists' approach to building "general,"
"explanatory," or "social" theory, I briefly examine
Broughton and O'Connell's claim that evolution-
ary ecology is the answer to all of our theoretical
questions.
Evolutionary ecology has valuable formulations
to contribute to the mix of models and theories
needed for explaining the entire range of behavioral
variability and change that interests archaeologists.
But evolutionary ecology, like selectionism, post-
processualism, and behavioral archaeology, lacks
the theories required to answer our every question.
Given the wide range of current questions, we must
acknowledge that theories from diverse programs
are needed to help answer them. For example, if I
wanted to explain variability in institutional ideolo-
gies in complex societies, I would first turn for
insights to Marxist theorists. Similarly, if I were
interested in explaining the sources of variability in
a specific technology, I would draw upon behav-
ioral theory and models. And, if I suddenly had a
yen to explain hunting behaviors in a foraging soci-
ety, I would immediately bone up on evolutionary
ecology. No theoretical program in archaeology-
or elsewhere in the sciences-is comprehensive
when it comes to explaining variability and change
in human behavior. It strikes me as little more than
wishful thinking to believe that any program now
possesses theories that can explain more than a tiny
fraction of the totality of human behavioral vari-
ability.
Preoccupied for more than two decades with
putting archaeological inference on a scientific
footing, some behavioral archaeologists, including
this author, have acknowledged in the past few
years the need to devote more effort to building
"social" theories (sensu Schiffer 1988). Behavioral
archaeologists assert that our focus-the archaeo-
logical focus-on people-artifact interactions
establishes a new and unique perspective for build-
ing social theory (Schiffer 1995b:23).
Neither in the social sciences, nor in the life sci-
ences, nor in the physical sciences have investiga-
tors erected theory upon an ontology that
recognizes the reality of human existence: our
incessant and diverse interactions with myriad
things (Schiffer 1995b, 1999a; Walker et al. 1995).
Behavioralists merely claim that this ontology,
along with countless behavioral models (such as
life-history models pertaining to people, artifacts,
places, behavioral components, etc.-e.g.,
LaMotta and Schiffer 1999; Rathje and Schiffer
168 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY [Vol.
64,
No.
1, 1999]
1982; Schiffer 1976, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Walker
1995, 1998; Zedefio 1997), provides a springboard
for constructing new social theory. Broughton and
O'Connell imply that behavioral archaeology has a
reduced potential to generate social theory in com-
parision to evolutionary ecology and, presumably,
other programs. However, as the above citations
indicate, our theory-building efforts now go well
beyond the explanation of artifact design (see also
Schiffer 1992, Chapters 4-7). And, more recently,
behavioralists have offered a theory of meaning
(Schiffer and Miller 1999b) and a general theory of
communication (Schiffer and Miller 1999a).
Moreover, many archaeologists who do not self-
identify as behavioralists, including some post-
processualists and evolutionary ecologists, are
contributing to the development of diverse theories
compatible with the behavioral program (e.g.,
Hayden 1998; Thomas 1996). It is precisely this
broadening front of theory-building efforts, not
abstract pronouncements from advocates of other
programs, that will define the boundaries of behav-
ioral archaeology's applicability.
Unlike evolutionary ecologists, selectionists,
and many postprocessualists, behavioralists do not
believe that off-the-shelf theories from other disci-
plines furnish answers to every explanatory ques-
tion. Behavioralists advocate a new ontology for
constructing social theory that privileges the inves-
tigation of people-artifact relationships in all times
and places. Upon the diligent study of these rela-
tionships behavioral archaeologists-and many
others-are quietly constructing new theories of
human behavior, bringing to fruition my early
vision of archaeology as a rather special behavioral
science having extraordinary potential (Schiffer
1975).
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