CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.

, Petitioner, versus PHILBANKING

CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 150731 | 2007-09-14

D E C I S I O N


VELASCO, JR., J.:

On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the March 29, 2001 Decision[1] and
November 7, 2001 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63979 entitled
Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty Development Corporation. The CA reversed the May 12,
1999 Order[3] of the Makati City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 93-2612,
which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed by respondent.

The Facts

The facts according to the appellate court are as follows:

In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory notes in favor
of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) involving the amounts of PhP 300,000 (PN No. 84-04) and
PhP 681,500 (PN No. 84-05). It was agreed in PN No. 84-04 that the loan it covered would earn an
interest of 36% per annum and a penalty of 12% in case of non-payment by June 27, 1985, while the
loan covered by PN No. 84-05 would earn an interest of 18% per annum and 12% penalty if not paid
by June 25, 1985.[4] On August 8, 1986, these promissory notes were assigned to respondent
Philbanking Corporation through a Deed of Assignment.[5]

Respondent alleged that despite demands, petitioner failed to pay the promissory notes upon
maturity such that its obligation already amounted to PhP 5,673,303.90 as of July 15, 1993.
Respondent filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City RTC for the collection of said
amount. In its Answer,[6] petitioner raised the following as special/affirmative defenses:

1. The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was barred by estoppel,
statute of frauds,statute of limitations, laches, prescription, payment, and/or release;

2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago[7] (Dacion) which ceded and
conveyed petitioner's property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the intention of totally extinguishing
petitioner's outstanding accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a Confirmation Statement[8]
dated April 3, 1989 issued by respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of
December 31, 1988.

3. Petitioner complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property since
the obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation statements in the latter months of 1989,
which showed that petitioner had no more outstanding loan; and

4. Assuming that petitioner still owed respondent, the latter was already estopped since in October
1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of PhP 41,265,325.12.[9]

Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim, alleged that it made an overpayment of
approximately PhP 4 million inclusive of interest based on Central Bank Reference Lending
Rates on dates of overpayment. Petitioner further claimed moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fee, amounting to PhP 4.5 million plus the costs of suit as a consequence of respondent's
insistence on collecting.[10]

The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial conference. Thereafter,
respondent presented its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,[11] pointing out that the plaintiff's failure to file a Reply to
the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the
genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion obliterated petitioner's
obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank had no right to collect anymore.

Respondent subsequently filed an Opposition[12] which alleged that: (1) the grounds relied upon by
petitioner in its demurrer involved its defense and not insufficiency of evidence; (2) the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement had yet to be offered in evidence and evaluated; and (3) since respondent
failed to file a Reply, then all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed controverted.[13]

The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint through the May 12, 1999
Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] finding defendant's Motion For Judgment On Demurrer To
The Evidence to be meritorious[,] the same is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, considering that the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff having been extinguish[ed] by a Dacion en Pago duly
executed by said parties, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice. Without
Cost.[14]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, respondent alleged that the trial court gravely erred because the promissory notes were
not covered by the Dacion, and that respondent was able to prove its causes of action and right to
relief by overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It explained that at the time of execution of the
Dacion, the subject of the promissory notes was the indebtedness of petitioner to Rare Realty and
not to the "Bank"--the party to the Dacion. It was only in 1989 after Rare Realty defaulted in its
obligation to respondent when the latter enforced the security provided under the Deed of
Assignment by trying to collect from petitioner, because it was only then that petitioner became
directly liable to respondent. It was also for this reason that the April 3, 1989 Confirmation Statement
stated that petitioner had no obligations to repondent as of December 31, 1988. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that the Deed of Assignment provided that Rare Realty lost its rights, title, and
interest to directly proceed against petitioner on the promissory notes since these were transferred
to respondent. Petitioner reiterated that the Dacion covered all conceivable amounts including the
promissory notes.[15]

The appellate court ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved in a
demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the facts presented and the law.
Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which alleged the Dacion, and
that its genuineness and due execution were not at issue. It added that the court a quo should have
resolved whether the two promissory notes were covered by the Dacion, and that since petitioner's
demurrer was granted, it had already lost its right to present its evidence.[16]

The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, respondent clearly had the right to proceed
against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty. Thus, the CA ruled, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated May 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 145, Makati City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Judgment is hereby entered ORDERING [petitioner] Casent Realty [Development] Corporation to:

1. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P300,000.00 with an interest of 36% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June 27, 1985 as
stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-04;

2. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation the amount of P681,500.00 with an interest of 18% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay the same on its maturity date, June 25, 1985 as
stipulated in Promissory Note No. 84-05; and

3. pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation, the amount representing 25% of total amount due as
attorney's fee as stipulated in the promissory notes.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] which was denied by the CA in its November 7,
2001 Resolution.[19]

The Issues

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE PETITIONER'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; AND

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE RESPONDENT

In other words, the questions posed by this case are:

1. Does respondent's failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
oath constitute a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents?

2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? If yes, are the
judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the complaint?

Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the promissory notes was already extinguished as
evidenced by the Dacion and Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits that when it presented
these documents in its Answer, respondent should have denied the same under oath. Since
respondent failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of said documents were
deemed admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was already paid. On the other hand, respondent
states that while it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters were deemed controverted pursuant to
Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to
another loan of petitioner amounting to PhP 3,921,750 which was obtained directly from the
respondent as of August 1986.[20] Furthermore, petitioner argued that assuming respondent
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement, said
admission was not all-encompassing as to include the allegations and defenses pleaded in
petitioner's Answer.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence.--After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence,
the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we defined a demurrer to evidence as "an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."[21]

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule
on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as
capacity to sue.[22] However, the plaintiff's evidence should not be the only basis in resolving a
demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by
the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions,
matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant's evidence.

Petitioner points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted
in the Answer, should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with
Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:

Section 8. How to contest such documents.--When an action or defense is founded upon a written
instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section,
the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse
party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due
execution of said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate
court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions.--An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

On appeal to the CA, respondent claimed that even though it failed to file a Reply, all the new
matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:

Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in
denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or
make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in
the answer are deemed controverted.

We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon
a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section
10 which merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer
is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.[23] Since
respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed
admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the
instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted
fact."[24]

In any case, the CA found that:

From the facts of the case, the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion en Pago were never
put to issue. Genuineness merely refers to the fact that the signatures were not falsified and/or
whether there was no substantial alteration to the document. While due execution refers to whether
the document was signed by one with authority.[25]

The more important issue now is whether the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove
that petitioner's liability was extinguished. Respondent asserts that the admission of the genuineness
and due execution of the documents in question is not all encompassing as to include admission of
the allegations and defenses pleaded in petitioner's Answer. In executing the Dacion, the intention of
the parties was to settle only the loans of petitioner with respondent, not the obligation of petitioner
arising from the promissory notes that were assigned by Rare Realty to respondent.

We AGREE.

Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement does
not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes.
Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the
promissory notes.

The promissory notes matured in June 1985, and Rare Realty assigned these promissory notes to
respondent through a Deed of Assignment dated August 8, 1986. The Deed of Assignment provides,
thus:

Rare Realty Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with law, with
office at 8th Floor Philbanking Building, Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein called Assignor) in
consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND & 00/100
pesos [PhP 3,790,000.00] and as security fee or in the payment of the sum, obtained or to be
obtained as loan or credit accommodation of whatever form or nature from the [PHILBANKING]
CORPORATION, with office at Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila (herein called Assignee), including
renewals or extensions of such loan or credit accommodation, now existing or hereinafter incurred,
due or to become due, whether absolute or contingent, direct or indirect, and whether incurred by
the Assignor as principal, guarantor, surety, co-maker, or in any other capacity, including interest,
charges, penalties, fees, liquidated damage, collection expenses and attorney's fee, the Assignor
hereby assigns, transfers and conveys to Assignee all its rights, title and interest in and to: (a)
contracts under which monies are or will be due to Assignor, (b) moneys due or to be due
thereunder, or (c) letters of credit and/or proceeds or moneys arising from negotiations under such
credits, all which are herein called moneys or receivables assigned or assigned moneys or
receivables, and are attached, or listed and described in the Attached Annex A (for contracts) or
Annex B (for letters of credit).[26]

It is clear from the foregoing deed that the promissory notes were given as security for the loan
granted by respondent to Rare Realty. Through the Deed of Assignment, respondent stepped into
the shoes of Rare Realty as petitioner's creditor.

Respondent alleged that petitioner obtained a separate loan of PhP 3,921,750. Thus, when
petitioner and respondent executed the Dacion on August 27, 1986, what was then covered was
petitioner's loan from the bank. The Dacion provides, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DEBTOR hereby transfers and
conveys in favor of the BANK by way of Dacion en Pago, the above-described property in full
satisfaction of its outstanding indebtedness in the amount of P3,921,750.00 to the BANK, subject to
x x x terms and conditions.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of the Dacion is unequivocal--the property serves in full satisfaction of petitioner's own
indebtedness to respondent, referring to the loan of PhP 3,921,750. For this reason, the bank issued
a Confirmation Statement saying that petitioner has no unpaid obligations with the bank as of
December 31, 1988.

In 1989, however, Rare Realty defaulted in its payment to respondent. Thus, respondent proceeded
against the security assigned to it, that is, the promissory notes issued by the petitioner. Under these
promissory notes, petitioner is liable for the amount of PhP 300,000 with an interest of 36% per
annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on the maturity date, June 27, 1985; and for the
amount of PhP 681,500 with an interest of 18% per annum and a penalty of 12% for failure to pay on
the maturity date, June 25, 1985.

WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of the CA are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
[SEPARATE OPINION, J. PUNO]
G.R. No. 161434 | 2004-03-03

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

Why bastard? Wherefore
When my dimensions are well compact,
My mind as generous, and my shape as true
As honest madam's issue?
Why brand they us
With base? With baseness
Bastardy? Base, base?
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature take
More composition and fierce quality
Than doth, within a dull stale, tired bed,
Got 'tween sleep and wake?
- well then,
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land:
Our father's love is to the bastard Edmund.
As to the legitimate: fine word - legitimate!
Well my legitimate, if this letter speed,
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base
Shall top the legitimate. I grow; I prosper -
Now, gods, stand up for bastards!

(Edmund, Bastard Son to Gloster, King Lear, Act I, Scene II)

I.

PROLOGUE

The petitions at bar seek the disqualification of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. from running for the
Presidency in the May 2004 national elections. But the issues posed by the petitions at bar
transcend the person of respondent Poe. These issues affect some of our most deeply held values
in democracy - - - the protection of the exercise of political rights, such as the right to run for public
office against irrelevant impediments, the levelling of the political playing field, the disapprobation of
political loyalty in our temples of justice, elimination of all invidious discrimination against non-marital
children, and the continued enthronement of the sovereignty of the people in the election of our
leaders. The petitions at bar concern all these democratic values. It is the people on the line. It is us.

II.

THE FACTS AND THE PROCEEDINGS

Let us first look at the facts for they are staring at us. On December 31, 2003, respondent Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. filed with the Commission on Elections his
Certificate of Candidacy for President in the May 10, 2004 elections. He made the following
declarations under oath in his certificate of candidacy:

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY

FOR PRESIDENT

I hereby announce my candidacy for the position of PRESIDENT, Republic of the Philippines, in the
May 10, 2004 elections; and after having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby state the
following:

1. FULL NAME: POE, FERNANDO, JR./RONALD ALLAN KELLEY

2. ONE NICKNAME OR STAGE NAME (by which I am generally or popularly known): FPJ

3. OFFICIALLY NOMINATED BY: KNP

4. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 August 1939 PLACE OF BIRTH: MANILA SEX: MALE

5. CIVIL STATUS: M IF MARRIED, FULL NAME OF SPOUSE: JESUSA SONORA

6. I AM A NATURAL BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: MOVIE PRODUCER/ACTOR

8. RESIDENCE: 23 LINCOLN ST., GREENHILLS, SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA

9. RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 10, 2004: 64 Years and 8 Months

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 227 A, BARANGAY GREENHILLS
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, PROVINCE OF METRO MANILA

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR MIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines, and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the
Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge.

31 December 2003

(thumbmarked) (sgd) RONALD ALLAN K. POE

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of Dec. 2003 at Manila, affiant exhibiting to
me his/her CommunityTax Certificate No. 11835585 issued on 8 Jan. 2003 at San Juan, M. Mla.

Doc. No. 92 (sgd) ATTY. KEVIN NARCE B. VIVERO
Page No. 20 NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. III until December 31, 2003
Series of 2003 PTR NO. 881104, JAN. 09, 2003, MANILA

On January 9, 2004, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, Victorino X. Fornier, filed with the COMELEC a
"Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr." Fornier alleged that respondent Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines, much less
a natural-born citizen, and as such, lacks one of the essential qualifications for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines. Fornier presented a photocopy of the marriage contract
of Allan Fernando Poe, respondent Poe's father, and a certain Paulita Gomez which appears to have
been executed on July 5, 1936.[1] Said marriage contract indicates that Allan Fernando Poe's
nationality was "Espaol", and that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes, were both Spanish
citizens. The copy presented by Fornier was certified by Ricardo Manapat, Chief of the Records
Management and Archives Office.[2] Based on said document, Fornier alleged that respondent Poe
could not have acquired Filipino citizenship from his father. Fornier added that even if respondent
Poe's father were a Filipino citizen, he still could not have validly acquired Filipino citizenship from
the former because the prior marriage of Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez renders the
marriage of his parents, Allan Fernando Poe and Bessie Kelley, void, thus making him an illegitimate
child. He contended that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of the legally known parent which
is the mother. Respondent Poe's mother, Bessie Kelley, was admittedly an American citizen.[3] In
addition to the copy of the marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez,
petitioner Fornier also presented a photocopy of the affidavit of Paulita Gomez stating that she filed
a bigamy case against Allan Fernando Poe.[4] Petitioner prayed that respondent Poe be disqualified
from running for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be denied due course or cancelled.

In his Answer, respondent Poe asserted that he is a Filipino citizen and denied Fornier's allegation
that his father and his grandparents were Spanish subjects. He likewise denied the alleged prior
marriage between Allan Fernando Poe and one Paulita Gomez. He maintained that his father, Allan
Fernando Poe, and grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, were Filipino citizens. He alleged that since the
Constitution provides that "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" are Filipinos, he is
therefore a Filipino citizen. Respondent presented a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of San CarlosCity, Pangasinan stating the contents of page 32 of Book 4 of the Register of Death of
San Carlos City which show, among others, that Lorenzo Pou died a Filipino citizen.[5] Respondent
alleged that Lorenzo Pou was born a Spanish subject; he was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands
when Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris on
December 10, 1898; and he became a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law. Respondent further averred that in his lifetime, Lorenzo
Pou comported himself a Philippine citizen - - - he voted in elections; he did not register as an alien;
and he owned real properties.[6] Respondent Poe also presented the death certificate of his father,
Allan Fernando Poe, which states that he died as Filipino.[7] Respondent further alleged that his
father was born in the Philippines in 1916, before the 1935 Constitution took effect, hence, a Filipino
by reason of his birthplace. He stated that Allan Fernando Poe acted as a Filipino during his lifetime.
He was called to active duty to serve in the Philippine Army; he was inducted into the USAFFE; he
fought in Bulacan and was in the "Death March"; and after the war, he reverted to inactive status
with the rank of Captain;[8] he was awarded the Gold Cross[9] and served the guerilla movement
during the Japanese occupation. Respondent Poe also presented his own Certificate of Birth[10]
which indicates that he is a Filipino citizen and that his father, Allan F. Poe, was Filipino. Like his
father and grandfather, respondent Poe represented and conducted himself as Filipino from birth. He
is a registered voter and has voted in every election; he holds a Philippine passport;[11] he owns
real properties which only citizens of this country may do;[12] he represented himself as a citizen of
the Philippines in all contracts or transactions. Respondent dismissed as a "worthless piece of
paper" the alleged marriage contract between Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez for the
following reasons: (1) it is only a xerox copy which is not even represented to be a xerox copy of an
original document; (2) no averment is made whether an original exists and where it is located; (3)
assuming an original exists, its genuineness and due execution may not be assumed and no proof is
offered; and (4) it is not evidence, much less persuasive evidence of the citizenship of the parties.
Respondent further presented the sworn statement of Ms. Ruby Kelley Mangahas, a surviving sister
of Bessie Kelley belying, among others, petitioner's claim of the prior marriage between Allan
Fenando Poe and Paulita Gomez.[13]

Meanwhile, Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., as well as Zoilo Antonio Velez,
filed their separate petitions with this Court, also seeking the disqualification of respondent Poe from
the presidential elections on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Petitioners Tecson and Desiderio[14] contended that respondent Poe is an illegitimate child and
therefore follows the citizenship of his mother. Petitioners cite the marriage certificate of Poe's
parents which shows that they were married in 1940, while Poe was born in 1939. They contend that
it does not appear that Poe has been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents as he
had not been acknowledged by his father. The same arguments were advanced by petitioner
Velez.[15]

The Senate also conducted two public hearings on January 21, 2004 and February 2, 2004 on the
authenticity of the following documents submitted by petitioner Fornier to the COMELEC: (1) the
alleged birth certificate of Allan Fernando Poe; (2) the alleged marriage certificate between Allan
Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez; and (3) the alleged bigamy charge filed by Paulita Gomez
against Allan Fernando Poe. The Senate issued subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to
compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents, equipment and other
materials relevant to the investigation. Witnesses from the Records Management and Archives
Office came forward and testified that they have been unwitting instruments in the fabrication of the
documents in question. The Senate Committee Report No. 517, signed by Senators Edgardo
Angara, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, Rodolfo Biazon, Loren Legarda, Aquilino Pimentel, Sergio Osmea,
Juan Flavier and Vicente C. Sotto III, recommended the criminal prosecution of Director Ricardo
Manapat for falsification of public documents, perjury, incriminatory machination, theft, infidelity in
the custody of document, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and obstruction of
justice. The Report was submitted by the respondent to the COMELEC en banc.

After hearing the parties, the First Division of the COMELEC, on January 23, 2004, issued a
Resolution dismissing Fornier's petition for disqualification for lack of merit. The First Division stated
that its jurisdiction is limited to all contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials. It, however, has authority to pass upon the issue of
citizenship of national officials in actions under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, in
Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that any material
representation contained therein is false. Thus, the First Division of the COMELEC proceeded to
assess the evidence presented by the parties to resolve the issue of whether respondent Poe is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. The COMELEC First Division concluded: "(c)onsidering that the
evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent did not
commit any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen."

Petitioner Fornier moved to reconsider the Resolution of the First Division.

On February 6, 2004, the Commission En Banc affirmed the Resolution of the First Division.

Thus, petitioner Fornier filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court assailing the Resolution of the
Commission En Banc. He cited the following grounds for the petition:

1. Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law and even acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it arbitrarily and whimsically
ruled, in violation of the Constitution, existing laws, jurisprudence and its own rules and issuance,
that it had no jurisdiction over the disqualification case below grounded on the lack of essential
qualification of respondent FPJ and on his disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines.

2. Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that under the law
Lorenzo Pou became a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

3. Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that, under law and
Constitution, Allan F. Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Pou became a citizen of
the Philippine Islands or of the Philippines.

4. Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that, under the 1935
Constitution, respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen despite his illegitimacy.

5. Assuming arguendo that respondent Comelec's jurisdiction is limited to denying due course or
cancelling certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation, respondent Comelec
committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that respondent FPJ's certificate of
candidacy does not contain a material misrepresentation or falsity as to his being a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

6. Respondent Comelec committed grave and reversible error of law, and even acted with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in concluding that respondent FPJ
should not be declared as disqualified to run for President in the May 2004 elections, and in
consequently dismissing the petition of petitioner Fornier.

7. In any event, regardless of whether or not respondent Comelec has jurisdiction to rule on the
disqualification case below which is grounded on the fact that respondent FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen and thus lacks an essential qualification, the Honorable Court can take cognizance of
said issue and rule on the qualifications of respondent FPJ to run for the position of President for the
Republic of the Philippines.

III.

THE ISSUES

On February 23, 2004, the Court held a session to discuss the cases at bar. The issues discussed
were the following: (1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the Tecson and Valdez petitions and
the Fornier petition; (2) Assuming the Court has jurisdiction, whether the COMELEC en banc gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the Fornier petition on the ground that Fornier failed to prove that
respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino; (3) Assuming there is
no grave abuse of discretion, whether the issue of the citizenship of respondent Poe should now be
resolved; and (4) Assuming the issue will now be resolved, whether the Court should resolve it on
the basis of the evidence on record or whether it should be remanded to the COMELEC to enable
the parties to adduce further evidence on the acknowledgment made by Allan F. Poe of respondent
Poe as his son.

These issues shall be discussed in seriatim.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A.

JURISDICTION

The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez
petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.

The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after
the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a
winner is proclaimed.

On the other hand, the Court is also unanimous in its view that it has jurisdiction over the Fornier
petition. The COMELEC treated the Fornier petition as a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides:

B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Article IX (C), Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The Fornier petition is before this Court on review under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The jurisdiction of this Court is therefore unassailable.

B.

THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THE CHARGE THAT
RESPONDENT POE DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTED THAT HE IS A NATURAL- BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY.

CERTIORARI POWER OF THIS COURT TO REVIEW COMELEC DECISIONS
IS A LIMITED POWER.

We start with the elementary proposition that the certiorari power of this Court to review decisions of
the COMELEC is a limited one. This Court can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision on
the ground that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion has
a well defined meaning in our jurisprudence. It means despotic, arbitrary or capricious. A decision
supported by substantial evidence is not despotic, arbitrary or capricious. Neither is a decision
interpreting a novel or difficult question of law with logical reasons. A mere disagreement with
COMELEC on the weight it gave to certain evidence or on its interpretation of some difficult
provisions of law is no basis to strike down the COMELEC decision as despotic, arbitrary or
whimsical. More so when the case involves election law where the expertise of COMELEC ought to
be conceded.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC DENYING THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT
POE IS
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, HENCE IS NOT DESPOTIC, WHIMSICAL OR
CAPRICIOUS.

To stress again, the petition of Fornier was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due
course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of respondent Poe on the ground of material
misrepresentation under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. Allegedly, respondent Poe misrepresented
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[16] we held that the
misrepresentation must not only be material but also deliberate and willfull.

Petitioner, therefore, has the burden to prove by substantial evidence the following facts: (1) that
respondent Poe made a misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy; (2) that the
misrepresentation is material to the position of which he is a candidate; and (3) that the material
misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully. Let us now examine the evidence presented
by petitioner Fornier to determine whether he was able to discharge the burden of evidence.

Analysis of Petitioner's Evidence

The first evidence of petitioner is Exhibit "A" which is the Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe. This
evidence proved the date of birth of respondent Poe, i.e., August 20, 1939. It is no proof that he is
not a natural-born citizen. Nor is it proof that respondent Poe knew that he was not a natural-born
citizen and deliberately represented himself as such in his Certificate of Candidacy.

The second evidence of petitioner are Exhibits "B", "B-1" and "B-2". Exhibits "B" and "B-1" is the
Sworn Statement of Paulita Gomez charging Allan F. Poe with bigamy. Exhibit "B-2" is the alleged
marriage contract between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez. Exhibits "B", "B-1" and "B-2" were
presented thru Director Manapat. These exhibits do not prove anything. They are out and out
fabrications. The sworn statements of Mr. Remmel G. Talabis, Mr. Emman A. Llamora, Ms. Vicelyn
G. Tarin, all employees of the Records Management and Archives Office, as well as the sworn
statements of Mr. William Duff and Mr. Victorino Floro III of Florofoto proved the fabrications of
Director Manapat.

The sworn statement of Remmel Talabis states:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)

SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA ) s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako Si Remmel G. Talabis, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 149 P. Gomez St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1. Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang Store Keeper I sa Supplies
Section. Inilipat ako ni Dir. Ricardo Manapat sa aming Computer Section dahil sa ako ay nagtapos
ng Computer Technology.

2. Noong magkakatapusan ng buwan ng Nobyembre 2003 ay ipinatawag ako ni Dir. Manapat sa
kanyang tanggapan at ako ay inutusang mag-scan ng mga birth record sa Archives, Paco.
Nakahanda na raw ang mga ito at ii-scan na lang. Ang mga birth record na ito ay mula sa mga taong
1936 hanggang 1941.

Matapos kong i-scan ang mga birth record at makabalik sa opisina ay inutusan naman niya ako na
linisin ang mga ito at alisin ang mga datos na nakalagay dito at pagkatapos ay gawan ko raw ito ng
black and white copy. Ginawa ko ito sa Adobe Photoshop. Nagpa-print din siya ng mga kopya nito.

3. Muli na naman akong ipinatawag ni Dir. Manapat noong kaagahan ng buwan ng Disyembre 2003
at ako ay inutusan na naman niya na mag-scan ng birth record sa Archives, Paco. Ayon sa kanya
ang kailangan niya raw na record ay para sa taon ng 1915 o 1916 pero ang pinakamaagang kopya
lang ng birth record na nasa Archives, Paco ay para sa taon ng 1928 lang. Kaya yun na lang ang
ipina-scan niya sa akin.

3.1 Nang matapos kong i-scan ang birth record ay inutusan niya ako uli na linisin ang birth record,
alisin ang mga datos nito at gawing black and white copy. Inutusan din niya ako na dagdagan ng
entrada ang black and white na kopya ng 1928 birth record ng in-scan ko, para sa "province" at
"municipality." Pina-alis din niya ang numero "2" sa lahat ng "192_" na entrada. Nagpa-print siya ng
kopya nito.

3.2 Pinahanap din ako ni Dir. Manapat ng katulad na font na ginamit sa 1928 birth record na in-scan
ko pero hindi ako makakita kaya "nag-cut and paste" na lang ako ng mga letra mula din sa nasabing
dokumento at ipinagdugtong-dugtong ko na lang para mabuo ang mga salitang isisingit.

4. Bago mag-pasko ay ipinatawag niya akong muli sa kanyang tanggapan. Inutusan niya ako na
kopyahin ang isang faxed copy ng marriage certificate at gawan ito ng "form." Naumpisahan kong
gawin ang porma ngunit hindi ko natapos dahil sumapit na ang takdang araw ng aking forced leave
na na-file. Nang mga panahon ding iyon ay inuutusan na rin niya ako na mag scan ng mga pirma
mula sa iba't-ibang documento at linisin ang nga iyon.

4.1 Tinawagan ko si Emman Llamera upang pakiusapan na siya na lang ang tumapos duon sa
iniuutos sa akin ni Dir. Manapat. Pumayag naman siya dahil wala ng ibang gagawa noon.

5. Nakaraan ang ilang araw ay nakatanggap naman ako ng tawag mula kay Dir. Manapat na
nagtatanong kung paano lilinisin ang pirma na ilalagay sa MS Word document. Sinabi ko na sa
Adobe Photoshop ang gamitin para malinis ang mga dumi.

6. Matapos iyon ay wala na kaming komunikasyon hanggang sa ako'y pumasok ng Enero 5, 2004.
Ipinatawag niya ako muli sa kanyang tanggapan at inutusan na i-print ang isang Marriage Contract.
Ito yung "form" ng Marriage Contract na pinagawa niya sa akin noong Disyembre.

6.1 Nang aking suriin ang documento, nakita ko na meron nang mga entrada tulad ng pangalan,
pirma, selyo, atbp. Pero gusto ni Dir. Manapat na paliitin ito. Sinabi ko sa kanya na mahirap gawin
yun sa isang Word Document.

6.2 Iminungkahi ko sa kanya na kung gusto nyang paliitin ang marriage contract ay mas maigi na i-
print ito ng actual size at pagkatapos ay i-scan muli at pagkatapos ay i-paste sa MS Word para
madali tong i-resize. Pumayag naman siya at ito nga ang aming ginawa. Ayon sa kanya ay gawin
namin itong katulad lamang ng laki ng isang lumang litrato sa ArchivesLibrary.

6.3 Pinalagyan din niya ng parang wavy line na border ang ipina-print nyang marriage contract sa
akin. Pagkatapos ay pinadagdagan na naman niya ito ng isa pang border para raw magmukhang
naka ipit. Pina-print niya ito ulit sa akin gamit ang isang newsprint na papel.

7. Ang sumunod naman nyang ipinagawa sa akin ay ang paglalagay naman ng pirma ng isang
Paulita Gomez sa gilid ng isang dokumento at pirma ng isang nagngangalang Cordero sa ikalawang
pahina ng pareho ring dokumento na nakasaad sa wikang espanyol. Dati ng may nakalagay na
pirma ni Paulita Gomez sa ibabaw ng pangalan nito sa ikalawang pahina ng documento. Nang
matapos ko ang pinagagawa niya, ipina-print niya sa akin ang nasabing dokumento gamit ang isang
newsprint na papel.

8. Makaraan pa ng ilang araw, pinatawag akong muli ni Dir. Manapat upang ipa-scan naman ang
isang birth record na may pangalan ng isang Allan Fernando Poe. Inutusan po ako na mag-print ng
isang negative copy at isang positive copy.

8.1 Nang makita ko ang Xerox copy ng minarkahang "Exhibit C" sa kasong disqualification sa
COMELEC ay katulad ito ng ipina scan at ipinalinis na birth record sa akin ni Dir. Manapat noong
Disyembre 2003.

9. Nito nga pong nakaraang lingo ay inutusan na naman ako ni Dir. Manapat na i-scan uli yung mga
dokumento na ipina print nya sa akin noon (marriage contract at dokumento ni Paulita Gomez).
Napansin ko na sinunog ang mga gilid ng dokumento. Nagpa print po siya uli ng isang negative copy
at isang positive copy ng mga nabanggit na dokumento.

10. Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya ni minsan
binanggit kung ano at para saan gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa akin.

(sgd) Remmel Talabis

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me, at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting
to me his Community Tax No. 15325884, issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela City.

NOTARY PUBLIC

(sgd) ATTY. KENNETH S. TAMPAL
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2005
PTR No. 50648646
Quezon City

Doc. No. 673;
Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Emman A. Llamera states:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si Emman A. Llamera, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 825 Rosarito
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1. Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang contractual, na may
alam sa lahat ng gawain pang computer, at direktang nagrereport sa opisina ni Dir. Ricardo
Manapat. Ako po nagtatapos ng computer science at isinabay ang kursong computer technician, at
nagpatuloy sa pag-aral bilang computer engineer hanggang sa ikaapat na taon.

2. Noong bago magkatapusan ng Disyembre ng taong nagdaan, may ipinasa si Remmel Talabis sa
akin na trabaho na ipinapagawa sa kanya ni Dir. Manapat. Nakisuyo si Remmel sa akin na
ipagpatuloy ko yong naumpisahan niyang trabaho at ibigay na lang kay Mr. Manapat pag natapos
ko.

3. Nang humarap ako sa computer ni Dir. Manapat, nakita ko sa unang pagkakataon ang isang
blankong porma ng Marriage Contract. Pagkaraan ng ilang minuto ay kinausap ako ni Dir. Manapat
at may pinakita at ibinigay sa akin na kopya ng Marriage Contract na may lamang datos at entrada
na gawa sa sulat kamay niya. Ang sabi niya, kopyahin ko daw ang mga datos at entrada at ilipat ang
mga ito sa blankong porma ng Marriage Certificate na nakasalang sa computer.

3.1 Inumpisahan ko na ipinil-up sa blankong porma ng Marriage Contract na nasa computer ang
mga pangalan nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez at iba pang impormasyon na nakalagay
sa papel na binigay ni Dir. Manapat.

3.2 Nang matapos na naming makompleto ang mga datos at entrada sa Marriage Contract ay
dahan-dahan ko namang in-insert ang tatlong pirma na ang natatandaan ko po lamang ay ang pirma
ng isang nagngangalang Mata, na nakalagay sa gitna sa bandang baba ng dokumento. Nang
matapos kong mailagay lahat ang tatlong pirma ay ipinapaprint na ni Dir. Mata. Di nagtagal, pinauwi
na niya ako dakong mag-aalas singko na.

3.3 Wala pang nakalagay na pirma sa pangalan nina Allan Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez.

3.4 Nakabantay sa tabi ko si Dir. Manapat habang nagtratrabaho ako, mula umpisa hanggang
matapos ko ang pinagawa niya.

4. Sa lahat po ng mga iniutos at pinagawa ni Dir. Manapat sa akin ay hindi po niya ni minsan
binanggit kung ano at para saan gagamitin ang mga ipinagagawa niya sa akin.

(sgd) Emman A. Llamera

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting
to me his Community Tax No. 01477379, issued on April 10, 2003 at City of Manila.

NOTARY PUBLIC

(sgd) KENNETH S. TAMPAL

Notary Public

Doc. No. 672;
Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Vicelyn G. Tarin states:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si Vicelyn G. Tarin, nasa wastong gulang, walang asawa, naninirahan sa 3150 Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela City, pagkatapos manumpa ay nagsasabing:

1. Ako ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan sa Pambansang Sinupan bilang isang Records Management
Analyst I. Bahagi ng aking katungkulan ay ang wastong paggamit at pagsusuri ng mga iba't-ibang
anyo ng mga dokumento at kasulatan. Ako ay pansamantalang inilipat noong Agosto, 2002 sa
computer section ng aming tanggapan. Naging bahagi ng aking panibagong tungkulin ang humawak
ng anumang gawain hinggil sa computer.

2. Noong Disyembre 30, 2003 ng gawing hapon, inutusan ako ni G. Ricardo L. Manapat na mag-
scan ng mga dokumento.

2.1 Iniabot ni G. Manapat sa akin ang dalawang piraso ng papel para i-scan. Iyung isang papel ay
naglalaman ng maraming pirmang "Allan Poe"; at iyung isa naman ay naglalaman ng maraming
pirmang "Paulita Gomez". Iniutos ni G. Manapat na mamili kami ni Leizl Punongbayan ng
pinakamaayos na pirma.

2.2 Pagkatapos kong i-scan ang buong papel, krinap (crop) ko iyong pinakamaayos na pirma nina
"Allan Poe" at "Paulita Gomez", at nilinis sa pamamagitan ng software na Adobe Photoshop.
Pagkatapos noon, "Ininsert" ko yung dalawang napili kong lagda sa MS Word at I-save sa diskette.

2.3 Nang matapos kong I-save sa diskette ang lahat ng aking mga nagawa ay iniwan ko na lang ito
kay Leizl para ibigay kay G. Manapat sa kadahilanang may kausap si G. Manapat sa kaniyang
opisina noong mga oras na iyon.

3. Matapos ang ilang araw, pinatawag ako muli ni G. Manapat para baguhin ang pirma ni Paulita
Gomez dahil masyado daw malaki ang tipo at sukat. Nang pumunta ako sa computer niya, doon ko
na muling nakita na iyong ini-scan kong mga pirma ay nakapaloob na sa isang file o "softcopy" ng
isang dokumento na may titulo na "Marriage Contract".

3.1 Inedit ko yung pirma ni Paulita Gomez sa pamamagitan ng Adobe Photoshop. Nang matapos
kong baguhin ito ayon sa kagustuhan ni G. Manapat, I-ninsert ko muli sa MS Word at si-nave ko ito
sa isang diskette. Binigay ko ang diskette na naglalaman ng edited version ng pirma ni Paulita
Gomez kay G. Manapat mismo.

4. Makaraan ang isang linggo nakita ko muli sa ikalawang pagkakataon yung dokumento na may
titulong "Marriage Contract" kung saan nakapaloob na ang mga pirma nina Allan Fernando Poe at
Paulita Gomez na ini-scan at trinabaho ko sa mismong loob ng kuwarto namin ni Remmel Talabis.
Napagalaman ko kay Remmel na inutusan siya ni G. Manapat na I-print na yung kopya ng "Marriage
Contract".

5. Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong kusa at laya upang patotohanan ang lahat ng
mga nakasaad dito.

(sgd) VICELYN G. TARIN

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 21st day of January, 2004, Affiant exhibiting
to me his Community Tax No. 15325883 , issued on January 21, 2004 at Valenzuela City.

NOTARY PUBLIC

(Sgd.) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2005
PTR No. 50648641

Doc. No. 674;
Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.

This is not all. Equally damaging to the credibility of Director Manapat are the sworn statements of
Mr. William Duff and Mr. Victorino A. Floro III of Florofoto. The sworn statement of Mr. Duff states:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA )s.s.

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

Ako si William Bautista Duff, may sapat na gulang, may asawa, kasalukuyang namamasukan sa
Florofoto na may address sa No. 502, C. Palanca St., Quiapo, Manila, pagkatapos manumpa ay
nagsasabing:

1. Ako po ay kasalukuyang naninilbihan bilang isang service supervisor sa naturang tanggapan.

2. Noong ika-sampu ng Enero ngayong taong kasalukuyan, sabado ng umaga, sinabihan ako ni Mr.
Floro na i-setup ang aming kamera dahil may ipapamicrofilm si Director Manapat na "confidential in
nature".

3. Dumating si Director Manapat mga dakong alas-onse ng umaga. Mahigit mga 30 to 50
dokumento ang iniwan niya na minicrofilm ko. Mga deed of sale na nakasaad sa espanyol ang mga
naturang documento.

3.1 Tinanong ako ni Mr. Manapat kung ilang oras ko magagawa ito? Ang sabi ko, sandali lang mga
30 minutes to 1 hour. Iiwanan ko na lang kay Emy, sekretarya ni Mr. Floro ang mga dokumento para
doon na lang niya kunin.

3.2 Kinuha ni Director Manapat ang mga naturang documento bandang hapon kay Emy.

4. Noong ika-labindalawa ng Enero, tinawagan ako ng processor ng film at sinabihan na hindi daw
malinaw at mabasa ang microfilm na ginawa ko.

4.1 Agad-agad kong tinawag si Director Manapat sa kanyang opisina at pinakiusapang ibalik ang
mga dokumento na minicrofilm ko dahil hindi ito mabasa at kukunan ko ulit.

4.2 Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na hintayin ako noong oras ding iyon. Dumating siya mga
dakong alas-onse na ng umaga at may dalang dalawang bundle ng mga dokumento. Ang tantiya ko,
iyong isang bundle naglalaman ng humigit kumulang tatlong daang dokumento, at iyong isa naman
ay may humigit kumulang limang daang dokumento.

4.3 Sinabihan ko si Direktor Manapat na gagawin ko agad at balikan na lang niya. Napagalaman ko
na mga birth certificate ang laman ng isang folder at mga deed of sale naman ang laman noong
isang folder.

5. Bumalik si Director Manapat mga dakong 12:30 ng hapon habang kasalukuyang akong nag-
mimicrofilm ako ng mga deed of sale. Nang tinanong ako ang kalagayan ng trabaho, sinabi ko na
tapos na yong mga birth certificates at pwede na niyang kunin. Iyong mga deed of sale, balikan na
lang niya at matatagalan pa. Iwanan ko na lang uli sa sekretarya ni Mr. Floro at doon niya kunin ang
mga dokumento.

5.1 Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na magdagdag ng isa pang kopya para sa mga deed of sale.

6. Pagkatapos ko pong magawa ang mga microfilm, pinadala ko sa planta namin para sa
developing. Sinabihan ko ang supervisor ng aming planta na kabilin-bilinan ni Director Manapat kay
Mr. Floro na "highly confidential" ang laman ng microfilms.

7. Noon ika-labingpito ng Enero, bumalik si Director Manapat para kunin ang mga rolyo ng
developed film. Sinabihan ako ni Director Manapat na mag-print ng mga kopya ng microfilms.

7.1 Sinita ako dahil nag-iisa ang kopya ng microfilm na naglalaman ng mga deed of sale.

7.2 Agad akong tumawag sa planta namin para magpakopya pa ng isa. Sinabi ni Director Manapat
na siya lang ang magdadala ng film sa isang planta. Ito ay pinaalam ko kay Mr. Floro.

8. Gusto ni Director Manapat ng print copies kaya pina-basa ko sa makina ang rolyo ng birth
certificate. Habang ginagawa ko ito, pinatigil ako sa isang image. Nakita ko ang birth certificate ng
isang Allan Fernando Poe. Nag-print ako ng kopya sa utos ni Director Manapat. Malabo po ang
lumabas na printout. Lahat na ng paraan ginawa namin para gumanda ang printout ngunit di namin
magawa.

8.1 Iyong isang rolyo na naglalaman ng mga deed of sale naman ang isinunud naming ipabasa sa
makina. Pinatigil ako ni Director Manapat sa isang image. Nakita ko ang marriage contract ni Allan
Fernando Poe at Paulita Gomez. Nakita ko rin ang isang image na nakasulat sa espanyol na may
pangalang Paulita Gomez. Sa utos niya, nag-print ako ng isang kopya ngunit katulad ng dati malabo
ang printout.

9. Para luminaw ang mga printout, pinalaki ko ang mga microfilms gamit ang isang enlarger. Doon
lumabas ng maganda ang mga imahen sa loob ng dalawang microfilm. Nagprint ako ng kopya ng
marriage contract, birth certificate at ang dalawang pahinang documento na nakasulat sa espanyol
na may pangalang Paulita Gomez. Natapos ko lahat ng mga ito dakong alas-4 na ng hapon. Kinuha
mismo ni Director Manapat ang mga microfilms at mga printouts sa akin.

10. Gusto akong ihatid ni Director Manapat sa bahay ko ngunit sinabihan kong madami pa akong
gagawin.

11. Ang lahat po ng mga iniutos at ipinagawa ni Director Manapat sa akin ay bahagi lamang ng
aking katungkulan. Ni minsan po ay hindi nabanggit kung ano at para saan gagamitin ang mga
trabahong ipinagagawa sa akin.

12. Ginawa ko ang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng buong kusa at laya upang patotohanan ang lahat ng
mga nakasaad dito.

(sgd) WILLIAM B. DUFF

Nagsalaysay

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2nd day of February, 2004, Affiant exhibiting
to me his Information Tax No. 109-998-007, issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

NOTARY PUBLIC

(sgd) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2005
PTR No. 50648641

Doc. No. 696;
Page No. 135;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.

The sworn statement of Mr. Floro is as follows:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS)
SIYUDAD NG MAYNILA )s.s.

A F F I D A V I T

I, VICTORINO A. FLORO III, of legal age, married, with business address at No. 502 Carlos Palanca
St., Quiapo, Manila, under oath, states:

1. I am the Vice-President of Florofoto;
2. Floro International, a sister company of Florofoto has a standing business agreement with the
Records and Management and Archives Office (RMAO) for the supply of microfilms;
3. Sometime in the first week of January, 2004, Mr. Ricardo L. Manapat, Director of the RMAO,
called me up, asking if Florofoto could microfilm some confidential documents;
4. On January 10, 2004, Mr. Manapat brought to my office a set of documents, numbering about 20
to 30 pages, and requested that the same be microfilmed;
5. On January 12, 2004, our technician, Mr. William Duff informed me that the microfilm was
unreadable;
6. On January 17, 2004, Mr. Manapat came to pick up the microfilm rolls;
7. Mr. Duff, with whom Mr. Manapat communicated directly on the matter of the production of the
microfilms will be most willing to give details in the transactions he had with Mr. Manapat;
8. Florofoto had absolutely no knowledge of the intention of Mr. Manapat on what he intended to do
with the microfilms he asked our company to produce;
9. I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of the Senate hearing.

Affiant further sayeth naught.

(sgd) VICTORINO A. FLORO III

Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Quezon City this 2nd day of February, 2004, Affiant exhibiting
to me his Community Tax No. 12356783, issued on January 6, 2004 at Manila.

NOTARY PUBLIC
(sgd) KENNETH S. TAMPAL
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2005
PTR No. 50648641

Doc. No. 695;
Page No. 140;
Book No. XIII;
Series of 2004.

These sworn statements were submitted to the COMELEC en banc by the respondent Poe. Instead
of traversing them, petitioner merely contended that they should not be considered on the technical
grounds that they were not formally offered in evidence before the COMELEC and that they cannot
be the subject of judicial notice. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial
body and hence is not bound by the technical rules of evidence. It can accept evidence which cannot
be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the rules of court on evidence are strictly observed. It can
accord weight to such evidence depending on its trustworthiness. In any event, petitioner cannot
complain they are hearsay for he was given an opportunity to challenge the credibility of the
witnesses who executed the foregoing sworn statements.

The third evidence of petitioner is Exhibit "C" which is the birth certificate of Allan F. Poe. This is part
of the Manapat fabricated evidence with a zero value. But even assuming it has a value, it merely
proves the fact of birth of Allan F. Poe as all birth certificates merely do. It does not prove that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen. Neither does it prove that respondent Poe deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen.

The fourth evidence of petitioner is Exhibit "D", the certification of Director Manapat that the National
Archives has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before 1907. Again,
this is part of the Manapat manufactured evidence which can only be given the value of a cypher.
But even if it is admissible, it has little weight for there is no evidence that the National Archives has
a complete record of all persons who lived in the Philippines during the Spanish and American
occupation of our country. Needless to state, petitioner again failed to prove that Lorenzo Pou,
grandfather of respondent Poe, was a Spanish subject.

The fifth and last evidence of the petitioner is Exhibit "E" (also Exhibit "1" of respondent Poe). It is a
certification of Estrella M. Domingo, OIC, Archives Division that the Register of Births for the
municipality of San Carlos, Pangasinan in the year 1916 is not on file with the National Archives,
hence, there is no available information about the birth of Allan Poe to the spouses Lorenzo Pou and
Marta Reyes in San Carlos Pangasinan. This lack of information is not proof that respondent Poe
deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born citizen. Law and logic bar that non sequitur
conclusion.

These are all the evidence presented by the petitioner. Even a sweep eye contact both with these
evidence will show that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondent Poe is
not a natural-born citizen. Petitioner was more dismal in trying to prove that respondent Poe willfully
and deliberately misrepresented himself as a natural-born citizen. For one, the Manapat evidence
appears to have been manufactured evidence. For another, these and the other evidence are
irrelevant evidence and there is no proof that they ever crossed the attention of respondent Poe. On
the other hand, the evidence unerringly show that respondent Poe, from the time of his involuntary
birth here, has always conducted himself as a Filipino. He is a registered voter, he owns land, he is
married to a Filipina, he carries a Filipino passport - - - he has always lived the life of a Filipino
(Exhibits "16", "17" to "19"). Thus, there is no iota of doubt that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge his burden of proving that respondent Poe deliberately misrepresented that he is a
natural-born citizen. For failure of petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, respondent Poe is
entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Respondent Poe need not present any
contrary evidence for the burden of proof has not shifted to him. Prescinding from these premises,
this Court cannot hold that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that no
substantial evidence was offered by petitioner to disqualify respondent Poe.

C.

ASSUMING THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS JURISDICTION AND THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER RESPONDENT POE IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO SHOULD NOW BE RESOLVED,
THE FORNIER PETITION NEED NOT BE REMANDED TO THE COMELEC FOR FURTHER
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE.

Remand to the COMELEC to give
the petitioner a second opportunity
to prove his case is a palpable error.

As aforediscussed, petitioner has the following burden of proof in the COMELEC: (1) prove that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born citizen, and (2) prove that knowing he is not a natural-born
citizen, he willfully and deliberately misrepresented that fact in his Certificate of Candidacy.

The COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition of Fornier for failure to prove these operative facts by
substantial evidence. After the 12-hour marathon hearing of the case at bar before this Court, the
hope of petitioner to disqualify respondent Poe became dimmer. Petitioner's principal thesis that
respondent Poe is an illegitimate child and therefore follows the American citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, was completely smothered by the learned opinions of the amici curiae. They opined
that respondent Poe's illegitimacy is immaterial in resolving the issue of whether he is a natural-born
citizen and whether he has a political right to run for President. They further submitted the view that
all that is required is clear proof of his filiation - - - i.e., that his father is Allan F. Poe, a Filipino
citizen. Mr. Justice Mendoza left it to the Court to determine the standard of proof that should be
imposed to prove this filiation.

In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curiae, it is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not
only wrong with his facts but also wrong with his law. Considering that petitioner is wrong both with
his facts and the law, the Court has no option but to dismiss the petition at bar which espouses
nothing but errors. This Court will be compounding the wrongs committed by petitioner Fornier with
another wrong if it remands the petition at bar to the COMELEC. A remand means a new round of
litigation in the COMELEC when its proceedings have long been closed and terminated. Remand
means the petitioner will be gifted with another chance to prove facts which he has failed to prove
before. Remand means the petitioner will be given the extra-ordinary privilege of correcting his
erroneous understanding of the law on who are natural-born Filipino citizens. These are favors which
cannot be extended to a litigant without shattering the Court's stance of political neutrality. The Court
must be above politics for in the temples of justice, we do not follow any political god.

Remand will change the nature of a
Section 78 proceeding by judicial
legislation, hence, unconstitutional.

The Fornier petition was treated by the COMELEC as a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy under B.P. Blg. 881, Section 78. The principal issue on a Section 78 petition
is whether the respondent deliberately made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of
Candidacy. In the particular petition at bar, the issue is whether respondent Poe deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue of whether respondent Poe is in
truth a natural-born citizen is considered only because it is necessary to determine the
deliberateness and the willfulness of the material misrepresentation. The proceedings are summary
in character for the central issue to be resolved is the deliberateness of the material
misrepresentation, as the issue of natural-born citizenship is a mere incident. In fine, the complex
issue of natural-born citizenship may not be finally litigated and can still be raised in an appropriate
proceeding such as a quo warranto proceeding after election. The citizenship issue in a quo
warranto proceeding will be determined in full length proceedings.

The remand of the case to the COMELEC will change the character of a Section 78 proceeding. The
citizenship of respondent Poe will no longer be inquired into as a mere incident necessary to
determine whether he deliberately made a material misrepresentation that he is a natural-born
citizen. It will now be determined as if it is the main issue in a Section 78 proceeding. This Court
cannot change the nature of a Section 78 proceeding without usurping legislative power. It is
Congress by law that defined the nature of a Section 78 proceeding and it is only Congress that can
change it by another law. We cannot engage in judicial legislation.

Remand will violate respondent
Poe's right to due process, hence,
unconstitutional.

There is a more compelling reason why the petition at bar should not be remanded to the COMELEC
for re-litigation. The COMELEC that will resolve the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-
born Filipino has ceased to be an impartial tribunal. Three of its members, Commissioners Tuazon,
Barcelona and Garcellano, submitted separate Comments to this Court expressing the firm view that
respondent Poe is not a natural-born Filipino. Their views are contrary to the decision of the
COMELEC under review by this Court. It is improper enough for individual commissioners to assail
the decision of the COMELEC of which they are members. It is worse in the case of Commissioners
Barcelona and Garcellano, who are not even sitting commissioners when the COMELEC
promulgated its decision under review. This is plain and simple prejudgment and it is not even
disguised prejudgment that needs to be unmasked. The COMELEC is composed of seven
commissioners all of whom must be independent and unbiased. The right to due process of
respondent Poe is the right to be heard by seven unbiased COMELEC commissioners - - - not 1, not
2, not 3, not 4, but by 7 unbiased members. We do not have such a COMELEC.

Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of
whether respondent Poe is qualified.
Delay will also prejudice his candidacy and
will favor his political opponents.

Remand of the petition at bar to the COMELEC will inevitably delay the resolution of the issue of
whether respondent Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The issue will not be finally resolved by the
COMELEC. The decision of the COMELEC can still be appealed to this Court. Given the
temperature of the present presidential contest, such an appeal can be assumed.

It cannot be gainsaid that any doubt on the qualification of respondent Poe to run as President is
prejudicial to his presidential bid and favorable to his political opponents. The right to run for a public
office includes the right to equal chance to compete. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is
diminished or denied a candidate. This chance to win may amount to a mere chimera if the
disqualification of respondent Poe will be left hanging in the air for a long time. It is the solemn duty
of this Court to equalize the chances of winning of all candidates to a public office. Any failure to
equalize the chances of all candidates is to insure the defeat of the disfavored.

D.

TO AVOID DELAY, THE COURT SHOULD ITSELF DECIDE THE ISSUE AND DECLARE
RESPONDENT POE AS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BEFORE THE COMELEC.

WHETHER RESPONDENT POE IS ILLEGITIMATE IS IRRELEVANT
IN DETERMINING HIS STATUS AS NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN - - - THAT IS THE LAW.

Petitioner has always submitted the legal thesis that: (1) respondent Poe is an illegitimate child as he
was born out of wedlock, i.e., he was born before the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly; (2)
as an illegitimate child, he follows the American citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly; therefore, (3)
he is not a natural-born citizen. Petitioner contends that evidence of respondent Poe himself,
Exhibits "3" and "21", prove these facts.

This interpretation of the law by the petitioner is erroneous. The amici curiae have opined that the
illegitimacy of respondent Poe is immaterial in determining his status as natural-born citizen. I quote
the learned opinion of Father Joaquin Bernas:

AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF A FILIPINO FATHER IS BORN A FILIPINO,
AND IS THEREFORE A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN.
PUT DIFFERENTLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF JUS SANGUINIS
APPLIES EVEN TO ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

I now come to the question whether jus sanguinis applies to illegitimate children. We have many
decisions which say that jus sanguinis applies to the illegitimate children of Filipino mothers because
the mother is the only known or acknowledged parent. But does the law make a distinction and say
that jus sanguinis does not apply to the illegitimate children of Filipino fathers even if paternity is
clearly established?

No law or constitutional provision supports this distinction. On the contrary, the Constitution clearly
says without distinction that among those who are citizens of the Philippines are those whose father
is a Filipino citizen. Hence, what is needed for the application of jus sanguinis according to the clear
letter of the law is not legitimacy of the child but proof of paternity.

Having said that, however, we must contend with four cases promulgated by the Supreme Court
which contain the statement that illegitimate children do not follow the Filipino citizenship of the
father. These cases are: Morano v. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562 (1967), which in turn cites Chiongbian v. De
Leon, 46 O.G. 3652 and Serra v. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, and finally Paa v. Chan, 21 SCRA
753 (1967).

We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement
of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision
constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish
doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

First, Morano v. Vivo. This case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a
stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The
issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian v. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It
was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the
1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.

Third, Serra v. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was
an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was
already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there
about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa v. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin
Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the
illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that
Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said
obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because
Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. Quintin was already on the floor and the Court still kicked him.
It was obiter dictum pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano v. Vivo. I submit
that the petitioners in this case as well as three Comelec Commissioners including the two new ones
and also the Solicitor General have merely been repeating without any semblance of analysis the
obiter dicta in these four cases.

The clear conclusion from all these four cases is that their statements to the effect that jus sanguinis
applies only to legitimate children were all obiter dicta which decided nothing. The Court had
purported to offer a solution to a non-existent problem. Obiter dicta do not establish constitutional
doctrine even if repeated endlessly. Obiter dicta are not decisions and therefore they do not
constitute stare decisis. They therefore cannot be used to resolve constitutional issues today.

Now to Fernando Poe, Jr. If indeed he is an illegitimate son of a Filipino father, should the Court now
pronounce a new doctrine that an illegitimate son of a Filipino father is not born a Filipino citizen
even if paternity is established? There is compelling constitutional reason why the Court should not
do so. Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice.
First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and
second it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and
the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People v. Cayat. I
would grant that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children rests on real differences
even if the differences are not as pleasurable as the differences between male and female. But real
differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one
purpose but not for another purpose.

Among the four requirements of allowable distinction is that the distinction must be germane to the
purpose of the law. Thus, the distinction between male and female is real, and we thank God for
that. But such distinction would not be relevant for purposes of, for instance, improving the standards
of the legal profession. Such distinction cannot be made the basis for disqualifying women from the
practice of law or sitting in the Supreme Court.

It is the same thing with respect to the exercise of political rights. What is the relevance of legitimacy
or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying
an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents
had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To
disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the
indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice
nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated.

The delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention, honorable men that they were, must have
been aware of the injustice of punishing the child politically for the indiscretion of his or her parents. I
invite the honorable Court to peruse the debates of the 1935 Constitutional Convention. When the
delegates were debating jus sanguinis, there was not the slightest suggestion to make a distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate children. For them sanguis, or blood, whether injected
legitimately or illegimately was the same blood and had the same political effect - citizenship of the
offspring.

The only time the Convention distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children was in
relation to the right of children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching majority. But it was an unnecessary distinction. When Delegate Rafols
raised the question whether the right to elect belonged to both legitimate and illegitimate children,
Delegate Cuaderno answered that only legitimate children could elect because only legitimate
children needed to elect. Illegitimate children already had the Filipino citizenship of their mother
flowing in their veins.

What then should be done with the obiter dicta in the four cases cited by the petitioners? I answer
this question with what the Court said when it declared in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor that Roa
v. Collector of Customs was wrong in holding that jus soli was put in effect in the Philippines. The
Court said: "The duty of this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in
violation of the law in force." Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil. 249 (1947).

The four cases cited by petitioners are not even decisions. They do not come under stare decisis.
They are obiter dicta more easily repudiated and should be repudiated.

In conclusion, therefore, when the Constitution says: "The following are citizens of the Philippines ...
'Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines'", the Constitution means just that without
invidious distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction
has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice
on an innocent child. What flow from legitimacy are civil rights; citizenship is a political right which
flows not from legitimacy but from paternity. And paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized nine
months before birth and not upon marriage or legitimation.

As to Fernando Poe, Jr., therefore, if it is established by competent proof that he is the son of a
Filipino father, legitimate or illegitimate, he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The former Dean of the UP College of Law Merlin Magallona espoused the same scholarly view. I
quote him:

4. Transmissive Essence of Citizenship

4.1 It is an essential feature of citizenship that it is transmissible. The key issue is: What principle
governs its transmissibility? The Philippine Bill of 1902 as well the Jones Law defines the conditions
by which persons similarly situated as Lorenzo Pou as a Spanish subject "shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." Over and above that, these laws provide for the means by
which Lorenzo Pou's Philippine citizenship would be transmitted when they declare that their or his
"children born subsequent" to the date of exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Paris as "citizens
of the Philippine Islands" as well.

4.2 While the text of the law speaks of children of Spanish subjects who are deemed to be "citizens
of the Philippine Islands," it is at that same time an embodiment of a core principle of blood
relationship or jus sanguinis. The word children becomes merely a reflection of the transmissive
essence of citizenship which lies in blood relationship. In this sense, the transmissibility of
citizenship, such as that of Lorenzo Pou, is not limited to the immediate generation to which Allan R.
Pou belonged; it continues to run through all children across generations, barring naturalization and
other methods of extradition.

4.3 The operation of the core principle of transmissibility in blood relation finds affirmation and, more
significantly, continuity in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions in which blood relationship
becomes a principal derivation and transmissibility of citizenship. All Constitutions embody this
transmissive essence of citizenship in blood relationship. In the determination as to who are citizens
of the Philippines, they have a common provision that those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines are citizens.

4.4 The interconnection between the Philippine citizenship of children born to Spanish subjects
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law and the said provision common to the three
Philippine Constitutions becomes a long line of generations that illustrates the transmissive essence
of citizenship.

4.5 Under the circumstances defined by the Treaty of Paris in correlation with the Philippine Bill of
1902 and the Jones Law, the Philippine citizenship of Lorenzo Pou and his son Allan R. Pou were
further affirmed by the application of subsection (1), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, by
which citizenship is defined on the part of:

Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

4.6 On his own account, having become citizen of the Philippine Islands as a child of Lorenzo Pou
born subsequent to the date of exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Paris under Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Section 2 of the Jones Law, Allan R. Pou has the benefit of subsection
(1), Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, quoted above.

4.7 As thus defined, Philippine citizenship on the part of Allan R. Pou is not limited to his person; his
citizenship is transmissible by its nature. The principle governing the transmissibility of his citizenship
to his children is provided by subsection 3, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which
declares as citizens of the Philippines -

Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4.8 The transmissive essence of citizenship here is clearly the core principle of blood relationship or
jus sanguinis. On this account, the derivation of citizenship from a person or the transmission of
citizenship to his child, springs from a person or the transmission of citizenship to his child, springs
from the fact that he is the father. Thus, paternity as manifestation of blood relationship is all that is
needed to be established. To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the status
of the child vis- -vis the derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the transmissive
essence of citizenship in blood relationship. The text of the law which reads "Those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines" becomes an embodiment of the kernel principle of blood relationship,
which provides no room for the notion of citizenship by legitimacy or legitimation.

4.9 The transmissive essence of citizenship as outlined above may receive further clarification in the
1987 Constitution, in which it is provided in subsection 2, Section 1 of Article IV that Philippine
citizenship is derived as follows:

Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis added.)

A woman becomes a derivation of citizenship not because of the illegitimate status of her child but
for the reason that she is a mother and as mother she is the medium of blood relationship. In this
provision of law, the father and the mother stand in equality. Both are derivative of citizenship on the
same principle of blood relationship.

4.10 The approach to the problem of citizenship from the angle of transmissive essence of
citizenship receives authoritative support from Chief Justice Manuel Moran speaking for this
Honorable Court in Chiongbian v. De Leon (82 Phil. 771 [1949]). In question was the interpretation of
the provision in the 1935 Constitution declaring that "Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office." (Art. IV,
Section 1, subsection 2). It was contended that citizenship thus acquired is personal and cannot be
transmitted to the children. In response, Chief Justice Moran emphasized the "transmissive essence
of citizenship," saying that this provision does not stand alone and requires its application together
with the provision that "Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines", thus bringing in the
transmissibility of citizenship on the principle of blood relationship.

Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a former member of this Court and an expert in
Constitutional Law, similarly opined:

The cases, in interpreting Art. IV, Section 1 (3), do not exclude illegitimate children of Filipino fathers
from this class of citizens of the Philippines. They do not say that only legitimate children or natural
children, who are legitimated as a result of the subsequent marriage of their parents and their
acknowledgment before or after the marriage, belong to this class of citizens of the Philippines
("those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines"). Nor, on the other hand, by holding that
illegitimate children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers as the "only legally recognized
parents," do some of the cases exclude instances in which an illegitimate child may have been
acknowledged by his Filipino father.

Indeed, cases holding that illegitimate children follow the citizenship of their Filipino mothers involve
situations in which the fathers are not Filipinos. (United States v. Ong Tianse, supra; Serra v.
Republic, supra; Santos Co v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 52 Phil. 543 [1928]; Ratunil Sy
Quimsuan v. Republic, 92 Phil. 675 [1953]). To hold that the illegitimate child follows the citizenship
of his Filipino mother but that an illegitimate child does not follow the citizenship of his Filipino father
would be to make an invidious discrimination. To be sure this Court has not ruled thus.

What is only needed is that the illegitimate child must be acknowledged by the father to establish his
filiation to the latter. The acknowledgment and establishment of filiation of such child may not be
sufficient to entitle him to support, successional rights, and other benefits under Civil Law, but, for
purposes of determining his political status as a citizen of the Philippines, such proof of
acknowledgment and filiation is all that is required.

A ruling by this Court that the constitutional provision (that those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines are citizens of the Philippines themselves) will require no overruling of prior decisions.
After all, none of the prior decisions of this Court deal with a situation in which the Filipino parent of
the illegitimate child is the father.

If this Court interprets the constitutional provision as including in the class of citizens illegitimate
children whose filiation to their Filipino fathers is established, the Court will simply be adding a third
category of citizens. In 1949, Chiongbian v. De Leon, supra, this Court held that "a legitimate minor
child follows the citizenship of his Filipino father." This is the first category. In 1967, in Paa v. Chan,
supra, it was held that a legitimated natural child, whose father is a Filipino, is also Filipino. This is
the second category of citizens whose fathers are Filipinos.

By holding that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his Filipino father provided he is
acknowledged or his filiation to him is duly proven, this Court will be creating a third category of
Filipino citizens "whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." For there is really no difference in
principle between, on the one hand, the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien father,
and, on the other hand, the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother. As long as the
child's filiation to his supposed father is established, it does not matter whether he is a legitimate or
an illegitimate child.

These opinions of the amici curiae support the ruling of the First Division of the COMELEC that:

x x x

Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not have a qualifying term "legitimate"
after the words "those whose fathers" and before the phrase "are citizens of the Philippines."
Legitimacy therefore is beside the point. As long as the father is a Filipino, the child will always be a
Filipino. As we have discussed early on, since Allan Fernando Poe is a Filipino, his son Ronald Allan
Poe, the respondent herein, is a natural-born Filipino.

This ruling was unanimously affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.

If petitioner Fornier is wrong in his understanding of the law on who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, how can he+ be right in assailing the status of respondent Poe?

TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT POE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN,
ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS PROOF OF HIS FILIATION TO HIS FATHER ALLAN R. POE,
A FILIPINO CITIZEN - - - THAT IS THE CRITICAL FACT.

The critical fact in the determination of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen is his
filiation with Allan F. Poe, a citizen of the Philippines. The fact that respondent Poe is the son of
Allan F. Poe is not disputed. It is an admitted fact. Petitioner Fornier from Day 1 proceeded from the
premise that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe.

The records of the case at bar speak for themselves. Let us first examine the Petition filed by Fornier
in SPA No. 04-003 before the First Division of the COMELEC. The Petition never questioned the fact
that Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. What it questioned is the alleged
Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe. I quote the Petition in extenso:

x x x

3. Under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the qualifications of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines are enumerated as follows:

Section 2. No person may be elected president unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

4. Respondent Poe, however, is not even a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural-born
citizen, and as such lacks the essential qualifications for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines since both of his parents are not Filipino citizens.

5. Based on respondent Poe's alleged Certificate of Birth, he was born on 20 August 1939. A copy of
the said Certificate of Birth is attached and made integral part hereof as Annex "B".

5.1. Respondent Poe's alleged Certificate of Birth indicated that his parents are Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley.

5.2. Respondent Poe's alleged Certificate of Birth indicated that his mother, Bessie Kelley, is
an American citizen.

5.3. However, the alleged Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe falsely or incorrectly indicated the
real citizenship of his father Allan F. Poe, since he is legally not a Filipino citizen, as shown below.

6. Contrary to what was falsely indicated in the alleged Certificate of Birth of respondent Poe, the
latter's father, Allan F. Poe, is not a Filipino, but an alien, specifically, a citizen of Spain.

6.1. On 05 July 1936, Allan F. Poe expressly and categorically declared in a public instrument that
he was a Spanish citizen. A copy of the Marriage Contract executed by Allan F. Poe, and one
Paulita Gomez at the Convento de Santo Domingo at Intramuros, Manila is attached and made an
integral part hereof as Annex "C".

6.2. Moreover, in said Marriage Contract, Allan F. Poe likewise categorically and expressly admitted
that both of his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes are also citizens of Spain.

6.3. Clearly respondent Poe's father is a Spanish citizen whose parents are both Spanish citizens.

7. Thus, respondent Poe could not have possibly acquired Filipino citizenship from his father, Allan
F. Poe since the latter is a Spanish citizen.

8. But even assuming arguendo that respondent Poe's father, Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, as
indicated in respondent Poe's Certificate of Birth (Annex "B" hereof), still respondent Poe could not
have validly acquired Filipino citizenship from his father due to the fact that the purported marriage of
his parents, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, is void.

8.1. Under Philippine jurisprudence, an illegitimate child, i.e., a child conceived and born outside a
valid marriage, follows the citizenship of his mother. (United States vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332
[1915])

8.2. As previously stated, respondent Poe's father, Allan F. Poe, married Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936, which marriage was subsisting at the time of the purported marriage of respondent Poe's
father to his mother, Bessie Kelley. (cf. Annex "C" hereof)


8.3. Moreover, it appears that Allan F. Poe's first wife, Paulita Gomez, even filed a case of bigamy
and concubinage against him after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley. A copy
of the Affidavit dated 13 July 1939 executed by Paulita Gomez in Spanish attesting to the foregoing
facts, together with an English translation thereof, are attached and made an integral parts hereof as
Annexes "D" and "D-1", respectively.

9. Verily, having been born out of void marriage, respondent Poe is an illegitimate child of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley. Consequently, the citizenship of respondent Poe follows that of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, who is undeniably an American citizen.

10. Under the 1935 Constitution, which was then applicable at the time of respondent Poe's birth,
only the following are considered Filipino citizens:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines Islands;

3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship; and

5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

11. Clearly, respondent Poe is not a citizen of the Philippines, much more a natural-born Filipino
citizen, considering that both of his parents are aliens. Also, even assuming arguendo that
respondent Poe's father, Allan F. Poe, is a Filipino citizen, as indicated in his Certificate of Birth
(Annex "B" hereof), since respondent Poe is an illegitimate child of his father with Bessie Kelley, an
American, he acquired the citizenship of the latter. (United States vs. Ong Tianse, supra)

12. Hence, respondent Poe, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, lacks an essential
qualification and corollarily possesses a disqualification to be elected President of the Republic of
the Philippines, as expressly required under the 1987 Constitution.

13. In view of the foregoing, respondent Poe should be disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the coming 10 May 2004 elections.

The Answer of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. did not touch on the fact that his father is Allan F. Poe
as that is a non-issue. Rather, it discussed the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, the grandfather of
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., the citizenship of Allan F. Poe, the father of respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr., and the Philippine citizenship of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. himself.

After the evidence of the parties were received by the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner
offered the following evidence as narrated in his Memorandum, viz:

x x x

1.8. In support of the petition, the petitioner presented and offered in evidence the following
documentary evidence showing that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and is, therefore,
disqualified to run for President of the Republic of the Philippines, and that he made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy as to his true and real citizenship.

1.8.1. As Exhibit "A" - A copy of FPJ's Certificate of Birth, indicating that respondent Poe was born
on 20 August 1939 and that his parents are Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan F. Poe,
allegedly a Filipino citizen.

1.8.2. As Exhibits "B" and "B-1" - A certified photocopy of an Affidavit executed on 13 July 1939 by
Paulita Poe y Gomez in Spanish, attesting to the fact that she filed a case of bigamy and
concubinage against respondent's father, Allan F. Poe, after discovering the latter's bigamous
relationship with respondent's mother, Bessie Kelley.

1.8.3. As Exhibit "B-2" - A certified photocopy of the Marriage Contract entered into on 5 July 1936
by and between respondent's father, Allan Fernando Poe and Paulita Gomez, showing that
respondent's father is "Espaol;" and that his parents, Lorenzo Poe and Marta Reyes, were
"Espaol" and "Mestiza Espaola," respectively.

1.8.4. As Exhibit "B-3" - An English translation of the Affidavit dated 13 July 1939 executed by
Paulita Poe y Gomez.

1.8.5. As Exhibit "C" - A certified photocopy of the Certificate of Birth of Allan Fernando Poe showing
that he was born on May 17, 1915, and that his father, Lorenzo Poe, is "Espaol" and his mother,
Marta Reyes, is "Mestiza Espaola,"

1.8.6. As Exhibit "D" - A certification dated 16 January 2004 issued by Ricardo L. Manapat, Director
of the Records Management and Archives Office, certifying that the National Archives does not
possess any record of a certain Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou residing or entering the Philippines
before 1907.

1.8.7. As Exhibit "E" (also respondent's Exhibit "1") - Certification dated 12 January 2004 issued by
Estrella M. Domingo, OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives, certifying that there is no
available information in the files of the National Archives, regarding the birth of "Allan R. Pou",
alleged to have been born on November 27, 1916.

Again, it is plain to see that petitioner offered no evidence to impugn the fact that Allan F. Poe is the
father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. Indeed, petitioner's Exhibits "A", "B", "B-1" and "B-2"
recognized that Allan F. Poe is the father of the respondent.

Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC in its Resolution of January 23, 2004 treated the
fact that Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Poe as an admitted fact. Page 7 of the Resolution
states:

x x x

To assail respondent's claim of eligibility, petitioner asserts that respondent is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen. According to him, Exhibit "B-2" (alleged Marriage Contract between Allan Fernando
Poe and Paulita Gomez) shows that the nationality of the father of Allan Fernando Poe, Lorenzo Poe
is Espaol. Allan Fernando Poe is admittedly the father of the respondent. In the same Exhibit "B-2"
appears an entry that the nationality of Allan Fernando Poe is also Espaol. Petitioner's line of
argument is that respondent could not have acquired Filipino citizenship from his father since the
latter is Espaol.

Page 8 of the Resolution reiterated:

x x x

Parenthetically, petitioner and respondent agreed on the fact that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of
Ronald Allan Poe. Hence, if Allan Fernando Poe is Filipino, necessarily, Ronald Allan Poe, his son is
likewise a Filipino.

Page 11 of the Resolution is similarly emphatic that respondent Poe, is the son of Allan F. Poe, viz:

x x x

Note that Section 3 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not have a qualifying term "legitimate"
after the words "those whose fathers" and before the phrase "are citizens of the Philippines."
Legitimacy therefore is beside the point. As long as the father is a Filipino, the child will always be a
Filipino. As we have discussed early on, since Allan Fernando Poe is a Filipino, his son Ronald Allan
Poe, the respondent herein, is a natural-born Filipino.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 2004. In this Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner always conceded that respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., is the son of Allan
F. Poe.[17] Petitioner simply continued to allege that the evidence does not show that the citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou (grandfather of respondent Poe) and Allan F. Poe (father of respondent Poe) is
Filipino. Petitioner insisted in the conclusion that respondent Poe is not a Filipino, let alone a natural-
born Filipino. Again, this is evident from the grounds invoked by petitioner in his Motion for
Reconsideration, viz:

x x x

Grounds

I.

The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that it is not the
proper forum to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

II.

The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in not appreciating all the
evidence presented by the parties in determining whether or not respondent made a material
misrepresentation or false material representation regarding his real citizenship in his certificate of
candidacy.

III.

The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that the evidence
presented do not controvert the declaration of the respondent in his certificate of candidacy that he is
a natural-born Filipino citizen.

IV.

The Honorable First Division committed a serious and reversible error in holding that legitimacy is
beside the point in determining the citizenship of the respondent.

On February 4, 2004, petitioner filed his Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner's Motion For
Reconsideration. As to be expected, petitioner did not again assail the fact that respondent Poe is
the son of Allan F. Poe.[18]

In its February 6, 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC en banc affirmed in toto, the resolution of its First
Division that respondent Poe, "x x x did not commit any material misrepresentation when he stated
in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen." Significantly, it did not waste
any word on whether Allan F. Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. The paternity of
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr., is conceded, a non-issue.

In the Petition for Certiorari dated February 9, 2004 and filed with this Court, petitioner again
proceeded from the premise that Allan Poe is the father of respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. The
pertinent portion of the Petition states:

x x x

The Relevant Facts

8. Briefly stated, the pertinent facts concern the circumstances of Lorenzo Pou - respondent FPJ's
grandfather, of Allan F. Poe/Allan Fernando Poe/Allan R. Pou/Fernando R. Poe - respondent FPJ's
father, of Bessie Kelley - respondent FPJ's mother, and accordingly of respondent FPJ himself.

The fact that respondent Poe is the son of Allan F. Poe is a judicial admission. It does not require
proof.[19]

Aside from these admissions, the filiation of respondent Poe is also proved by the declaration of Mrs.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas, Exhibit "20" of the respondent. Mrs. Mangahas is the sister of Bessie Kelly,
mother of the respondent. Her sworn statement states:

DECLARATION OF RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS

I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California,
U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law, do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late BESSIE KELLEY POE.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of FERNANDO POE, SR.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by name of RONALD ALLAN POE, more popularly known in
the Philippines as "Fernando Poe, Jr.", or "FPJ".

4. Ronald Allan Poe "FPJ" was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena St.,
Manila.

5. At the time of Ronald Allan Poe's birth, his father, Fernando Poe, Sr., was a Filipino citizen and his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American citizen.

6. Considering the existing citizenship law at that time, Ronald Allan Poe automatically assumed the
citizenship of his father, a Filipino, and has always identified himself as such.

7. Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at
the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr. by my sister
that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie, and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald Allan, and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr. and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald
Allan Poe.

11. From the very first time I met Fernando Poe, Sr., in 1936, until his death in 1951, I never heard
my sister mention anything about her husband having had a marital relationship prior to their
marriage.

12. During the entire life of Fernando Poe, Sr., as my brother-in-law, I never heard of a case filed
against him by a woman purporting to be his wife.

13. Considering the status of Fernando Poe, Sr., as a leading movie personality during that time, a
case of this nature could not have escaped publicity.

14. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the case was never published in any newspaper or
magazine, but was in fact filed in court, I would have known about it because my sister would have
been an indispensable party to the case, and she could not have kept an emotionally serious matter
from me.

15. This is the first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard Fernando Poe, Sr., being
maliciously accused of being a married man prior to his marriage to my sister.

16. This is the first time, after almost 68 years, that I have heard the name Paulita Poe y Gomez as
being the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

17. There was no Paulita Poe y Gomez, or any complainant for that matter, in or out of court, when
my sister gave birth to six (6) children, all fathered by Fernando Poe, Sr.

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural-born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in the City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

(Sgd.) RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS

Declarant

The allegation of Mrs. Mangahas that respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is the son of Allan F. Poe
stands unchallenged.

We follow the principle of jus sanguinis, the rule of blood relationship. Proof that Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino citizen, is the father of respondent Poe is proof that the blood of Allan F. Poe flows in the
veins of respondent Poe. No other proof is required for the principle of jus sanguinis to apply. There
is no need for other proofs such as proofs of acknowledgment, for such proofs are only used in civil
law for the purpose of establishing the legitimation of illegitimate children. Our Constitutions from
1935 merely state - "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." The ineluctable conclusion
is that the only proof required for the principle of jus sanguinis to operate is filiation, i.e., that one's
father is a citizen of the Philippines. No other kind of proof is required. In fine, the quantity and
quality of proof or the standard of proof is provided by the Constitution itself. We cannot alter this
standard by suggesting either a strict or liberal approach.

In any event, if further poof of acknowledgment is required, Exhibit "8-a" of the respondent Poe,
should be considered. It is entitled "Affidavit for Philippine Army Personnel," executed by Allan F.
Poe. In this Affidavit, Allan F. Poe declared and acknowledged his children to be Elizabeth, 6 years
old, Ronnie, 5 years old and Fernando II, 3 years old. This Affidavit is not refuted.

FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP OF ALLAN F. POE, RESPONDENT'S FATHER IS WELL ESTABLISHED.

The Filipino citizenship of respondent Poe's father, Allan F. Poe, is well established by evidence.
Allan F. Poe's father is Lorenzo Pou. Lorenzo Pou was a Spanish subject. He was an inhabitant of
the Philippines on December 10, 1898 when Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris. Said Treaty pertinently provides:

x x x

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present
treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom,
retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce,
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners.
In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality to the territory in which they
may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the
United States shall be determined by the Congress.

In relation to this Treaty, the Philippine Bill of 1902, provided as follows:

SEC. 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April eighteen hundred ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

while the Jones Law provided as follows:

SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of
the Untied States residing therein.

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, Exhibit "S" shows he died at age 84 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. By the Treaty of Paris, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Lorenzo Pou was
a citizen of the Philippines. Allan F. Poe followed the citizenship of his father (Lorenzo) as a Filipino.
Allan F. Poe can also be considered as a Filipino by birth. He was born in the Philippines on
November 27, 1916, before the 1935 Constitution. He studied, worked, lived and died in the
Philippines.[20] His Filipino citizenship is transmitted to his son, respondent Poe. The attempt of
petitioner to cast doubt on the Filipino citizenship of Allan F. Poe is an exercise in futility.

E.

TO DISQUALIFY RESPONDENT POE BECAUSE HE IS ILLEGITIMATE
WILL VIOLATE OUR TREATY OBLIGATION.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on November 20, 1989. The Philippines was the 31st state to ratify the Convention in July
1990 by virtue of Senate Resolution 109. The Convention entered into force on September 2, 1990.
A milestone treaty, it abolished all discriminations against children including discriminations on
account of "birth or other status." Part 1, Article 2 (1) of the Convention explicitly provides:

Article 2

1. State Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her
parent's or legal guardian's race colour, sex, language religion, political or other opinion, national,
ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.

The Convention protects in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights, civil
rights, social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. It adopted the principle of interdependence
and indivisibility of children's rights. A violation of one right is considered a violation of the other
rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should consider the
"best interests" of the child.

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, this Convention on the Rights of the child
became valid and effective on us in July 1990 upon concurrence by the Senate. We shall be
violating the Convention if we disqualify respondent Poe just because he happened to be an
illegitimate child. It is our bounden duty to comply with our treaty obligation pursuant to the principle
of pacta sunct servanda. As we held in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez,[21] viz:

x x x

For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be enforced or not at the whims of an
incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates a legally binding obligation on the parties founded on the
generally accepted principle of international law of pacta sunct servanda which has been adopted as
part of the law of our land. (Constitution, Article II, Section 3)

Indeed there is no reason to refuse compliance with the Convention for it is in perfect accord with
our Constitution and with our laws.

Moreover to disqualify respondent Poe due to his illegitimacy is against the trend in civil law towards
equalizing the civil rights of an illegitimate child with that of a legitimate child. Called originally as
nullius filius or no one's child, an illegitimate child started without any birthright of significance. The
passage of time, however, brought about the enlightenment that an illegitimate should not be
punished for the illicit liaison of his parents of which he played no part. No less than our Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a Commissioner of the Constitutional Commission, proposed the
adoption of the following radical provision in the 1987 Constitution, viz: "All children regardless of
filiations shall enjoy the same social protection." In an exchange with Commissioner Nolledo, he
explained its rationale as follows: [22]

x x x

Mr. Nolledo. Would it be appropriate to say that social protection is earned and should not be
imposed by legal mandate?

Mr. Davide: Mr. Presiding Officer, it is not, it may not be imposed but we are framing a Constitution
to provide for a directive policy or directive principles of state policy, there is no harm in making it as
a directive principle or a state policy especially if it would affect the lives of citizens who, I would like
to state again, are not responsible for a misfortune in life.

Following the undeniable injustice committed to illegitimate children due alone to the accident of their
birth, the universal trend of laws today is to abolish all invidious discriminations against their rights.
Slowly, they were granted more rights until their civil rights are now equal to the rights of legitimate
children. The Philippines has joined the civilized treatment of illegitimate children. Hence, under
Article 178 of our New Family Code, a child born out of wedlock of parents without any impediment
to marry (like the parents of respondent Poe) can be legitimated. If legitimated, Article 179 of the
same Code provides that the child shall enjoy the same civil rights as a legitimate child. In Ilano vs.
Court of Appeals,[23] this Court expressed the enlightened policy that illegitimate children "were
born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing
them through the misdeeds of their parents." The march towards equality of rights between
legitimate and illegitimate children is irreversible. We will be medieval in our outlook if we refuse to
be in cadence with this world wide movement.

V.

EPILOGUE

Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for President involves a constitutional
issue but its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship
of respondent Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national and
international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of this Court, the better
policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the next President. For on political questions,
this Court may err but the sovereign people will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the
unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO,
RUFINO L. SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN,
Petitioners, versus BF CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 145842 | 2008-06-27

D E C I S I O N


VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 to nullify certain
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc.
(ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen assail
the Decision[1] dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming the
Decision[2] dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in Pasig City
in Civil Case No. 63435 that ordered them to pay jointly and severally respondent BF Corporation
(BF) a sum of money with interests and damages. They also assail the CA Resolution dated October
25, 2000 which, apart from setting aside an earlier Resolution[3] of August 13, 1999 granting
ESHRI's application for restitution and damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid September 23,
1996 RTC Decision.

In the second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo also
assails the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her jointly and
severally liable with ESHRI, et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC Decision.

Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of
Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project[4] that ESHRI and BF executed for the
construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract
stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described
in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing
to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment
Certificate for that month's progress billing.[5]

In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure BF
was to follow, to wit:

(1) submission of the progress billing to ESHRI's Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the
preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity
Surveying Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San
Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991
to June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the monthly
progress billings, including an evaluation of the work in accordance with the Project Manager's
Instructions (PMIs) and the detailed valuations contained in the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for
final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of the WVOs were contained in the
progress billings under the section "Change Orders."[6]

From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the
procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF PhP
86,501,834.05.[7] According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-
measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment
for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working
continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment
Certificates already being processed. After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF
filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.

In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of
counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also
charged BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.

The RTC found for BF

On September 23, 1996, the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the
payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money
corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment for
BF. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, defendants [EHSRI], Ru[f]o B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Cynthia del Castillo,
Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen, are jointly and severally hereby ordered to:

1. Pay plaintiff the sum of P24,780,490.00 representing unpaid construction work accomplishments
under plaintiff's Progress Billings Nos. 14-19;

2. Return to plaintiff the retention sum of P5,810,000.00;

3. Pay legal interest on the amount of P24,780,490.80 representing the construction work
accomplishments under Progress Billings Nos. 14-19 and on the amount of P5,810,000.00
representing the retention sum from date of demand until their full Payment;

4. Pay plaintiff P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P1,000,000.00 as attorney's fees, and cost of the suit.[8]

According to the RTC, ESHRI's refusal to pay BF's valid claims constituted evident bad faith entitling
BF to moral damages and attorney's fees.

ESHRI subsequently moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC, prompting
ESHRI to appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399.

Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the following events and/or incidents transpired:

(1) The trial court, by Order dated January 21, 1997, granted BF's motion for execution pending
appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 43187.[9] Meanwhile, the branch sheriff garnished from ESHRI's bank account in the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of PhP 35 million.

(2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21, 1997 Order upon ESHRI's posting of a PhP
1 million bond. In a supplemental resolution issued on the same day, the CA issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge and/or his branch sheriff acting under
him (a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the enjoined order of execution pending
appeal; (b) to immediately return the garnished deposits to PNB instead of delivering the same to
ESHRI; and (c) if the garnished deposits have been delivered to BF, the latter shall return the same
to ESHRI's deposit account.

(3) By a Decision dated June 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA set aside the trial court's
January 21, 1997 Order.

The CA would later deny BF's motion for reconsideration.

(4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA Decision, docketed as G.R.
No. 132655.[10] On August 11, 1998, the Court affirmed the assailed decision of the CA with the
modification that the recovery of ESHRI's garnished deposits shall be against BF's bond.[11]

We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.

(5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999 granted, an application for
restitution or damages against BF's bond. Consequently, BF and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the
bonding company, filed separate motions for reconsideration.

On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA rendered a Decision resolving (1) the
aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2) herein petitioners' appeal from the trial court's
Decision dated September 23, 1996. This November 12, 1999 Decision, finding for BF and now
assailed in these separate recourses, dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. This Court's
Resolution dated 13 August 1999 is reconsidered and set aside, and defendants-appellants'
application for restitution is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the issues the parties raised
in their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no reason to
disturb the case disposition of the RTC, inclusive of its award of damages and attorney's fees and
the reasons underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently established its case by
preponderance of evidence. Part of what it had sufficiently proven relates to ESHRI being remiss in
its obligation to re-measure BF's later work accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand,
ESHRI had failed to prove the basis of its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the
defective work accomplished by BF.

Apropos ESHRI's entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising from the execution of
the RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy may peremptorily be allowed only
if the executed judgment is reversed, a situation not obtaining in this case.

Following the denial by the CA, per its Resolution[13] dated October 25, 2000, of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner del Castillo opting, however, to file a
separate recourse.

G.R. No. 145842

In G.R. No. 145842, petitioners ESHRI, et al. raise the following issues for our consideration:

I. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law raised
by petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing
Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs].

II. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding respondent guilty of
delay in the performance of its obligations and, hence, liable for liquidated damages [in view that
respondent is guilty of delay and that its works were defective].

III. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners guilty of malice
and evidence bad faith, and in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to
respondent.

IV. Whether or not the [CA] erred in setting aside its Resolution dated August 13, 2000.[14]

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered relate to the correctness
of the CA's factual determinations, specifically on whether or not BF was in delay and had come up
with defective works, and whether or not petitioners were guilty of malice and bad faith. It is basic
that in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be presented by the parties
and reviewed by the Court.[15] Just as basic is the rule that factual findings of the CA, affirmatory of
that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on the Court and may not be reviewed on appeal,
except for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both parties; and (7) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant evidence and undisputed facts,
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[16]

In our review of this case, we find that none of the above exceptions obtains. Accordingly, the factual
findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that there was delay on the part of ESHRI, that
there was no proof that BF's work was defective, and that petitioners were guilty of malice and bad
faith, ought to be affirmed.

Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs Petitioners fault the
CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners,
BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to the best
evidence rule.

Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis requirement.
Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the
documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the documents
since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite
requests.

We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced[17] and secondary evidence
of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the
custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after
such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other
than the original instrument or document itself.[18] A party may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody
or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be
given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.

In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for
presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be
dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty.
Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:

ATTY. ANDRES:

During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain
exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these
documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these
are internal documents and I am referring specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We
requested your Honor, that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that
opposing counsel first be given opportunity to present the originals which are in their possession.
May we know if they have brought the originals and whether they will present the originals in court,
Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)

ATTY. AUTEA:

We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by
plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured that, they will try to
check.

Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of
the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to
produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI
was not inclined to produce them.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule
130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is
proof of the original document's execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original
document's unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.[19] While perhaps not on all fours
because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt, thus:

x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must
be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror
offers satisfactory proof of its existence.

x x x x

The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it
is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in
open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the
party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the
original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence may be admitted.[20] (Emphasis supplied.)

On the Restitution of the Garnished Funds

We now come to the propriety of the restitution of the garnished funds. As petitioners maintain, the
CA effectively, but erroneously, prevented restitution of ESHRI's improperly garnished funds when it
nullified its own August 13, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187. In this regard, petitioners
invite attention to the fact that the restitution of the funds was in accordance with this Court's final
and already executory decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying that ESHRI should be restored to its
own funds without awaiting the final outcome of the main case. For ease of reference, we reproduce
what the appellate court pertinently wrote in its Resolution of August 13, 1999:

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Application (for Restitution/Damages against Bond for Execution
Pending Appeal) dated May 12, 1999 filed by [ESHRI] is GRANTED. Accordingly, the surety of [BF],
STRONGHOLD Insurance Co., Inc., is ORDERED to PAY the sum of [PhP 35 million] to [ESHRI]
under its SICI Bond. x x x In the event that the bond shall turn out to be insufficient or the surety
(STRONGHOLD) cannot be made liable under its bond, [BF], being jointly and severally liable under
the bond is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of [PhP 35 million] representing the garnished
deposits of the bank account maintained by [ESHRI] with the [PNB] Shangri-la Plaza Branch,
Mandaluyong City. Otherwise, this Court shall cause the implementation of the Writ of Execution
dated April 24, 1998 issued in Civil Case No. 63435 against both [BF], and/or its surety,
STRONGHOLD, in case they should fail to comply with these directives.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Petitioners' contention on the restitution angle has no merit, for, as may be recalled, the CA,
simultaneously with the nullification and setting aside of its August 13, 1999 Resolution, affirmed, via
its assailed November 12, 1999 Decision, the RTC Decision of September 23, 1996, the execution
pending appeal of which spawned another dispute between the parties.

And as may be recalled further, the appellate court nullified its August 13, 1999 Resolution on the
basis of Sec. 5, Rule 39, which provides:

Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. - Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or
partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

On the strength of the aforequoted provision, the appellate court correctly dismissed ESHRI's claim
for restitution of its garnished deposits, the executed appealed RTC Decision in Civil Case No.
63435 having in fact been upheld in toto.

It is true that the Court's Decision of August 11, 1998 in G.R. No. 132655 recognized the validity of
the issuance of the desired restitution order. It bears to emphasize, however, that the CA had since
then decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the main case, on the merits when it affirmed the underlying
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435. This CA Decision on the original and main case effectively
rendered our decision on the incidental procedural matter on restitution moot and academic.

Allowing restitution at this point would not serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted
litigation.

G.R. No. 145873

Petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, in her separate petition, excepts from the CA Decision affirming, in its
entirety, the RTC Decision holding her, with the other individual petitioners in G.R. No. 145842, who
were members of the Board of Directors of ESHRI, jointly and severally liable with ESHRI for the
judgment award. She presently contends:

I. The [CA] erred in not declaring that the decision of the trial court adjudging petitioner personally
liable to respondent void for not stating the factual and legal basis for such award.

II. The [CA] erred in not ruling that as former Director, Petitioner cannot be held personally liable for
any alleged breach of a contract entered into by the corporation.

III. The [cA] erred in not ruling that respondent is not entitled to an award of moral damages.

IV. The [CA] erred in holding petitioner personally liable to respondent for exemplary damages.

V. The [CA] erred in not ruling that respondent is not entitled to any award of attorney's fees.[22]

First off, Roxas-del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in question violated the requirements of
due process and of Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution that states, "No decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based."

Roxas-del Castillo's threshold posture is correct. Indeed, the RTC decision in question, as couched,
does not provide the factual or legal basis for holding her personally liable under the premises. In
fact, only in the dispositive portion of the decision did her solidary liability crop up. And save for her
inclusion as party defendant in the underlying complaint, no reference is made in other pleadings
thus filed as to her liability.

The Court notes that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively recognized the
applicability of the doctrine on piercing the veil of the separate corporate identity. Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot allow such application. A corporation, upon coming to
existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital stock
of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of separate corporate
personality.[23]

Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate agents, are not theirs but direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Solidary liability on the part of corporate officers
may at times attach, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as when they act with malice or
in bad faith.[24] Also, in appropriate cases, the veil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the
separate juridical personality of a corporation is abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a
social injustice, or used as a vehicle to evade obligations.[25] In this case, no act of malice or like
dishonest purpose is ascribed on petitioner Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the
corporate veil.

The above conclusion would still hold even if petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the time ESHRI
defaulted in paying BF's monthly progress bill, was still a director, for, before she could be held
personally liable as corporate director, it must be shown that she acted in a manner and under the
circumstances contemplated in Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads:

Section 31. Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts of the corporation or acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors
or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons. (Emphasis ours.)

We do not find anything in the testimony of one Crispin Balingit to indicate that Roxas-del Castillo
made any misrepresentation respecting the payment of the bills in question. Balingit, in fact, testified
that the submitted but unpaid billings were still being evaluated. Further, in the said testimony, in no
instance was bad faith imputed on Roxas-del Castillo.

Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the controversy between the principal
parties started in July 1992 when Roxas-del Castillo no longer sat in the ESHRI Board, a reality BF
does not appear to dispute. In fine, she no longer had any participation in ESHRI's corporate affairs
when what basically is the ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that
contracts are binding only among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311 of the Civil Code is clear on this
point:

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases
where the rights and obligations are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.

In the instant case, Roxas-del Castillo could not plausibly be held liable for breaches of contract
committed by ESHRI nor for the alleged wrongdoings of its governing board or corporate officers
occurring after she severed official ties with the hotel management. Given the foregoing perspective,
the other issues raised by Roxas-del Castillo as to her liability for moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees are now moot and academic. And her other arguments insofar they indirectly
impact on the liability of ESHRI need not detain us any longer for we have sufficiently passed upon
those concerns in our review of G.R. No. 145842.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 145842 is DISMISSED, while the petition in G.R. No. 145873
is GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57399 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioner in G.R. No. 145873, Cynthia
Roxas-del Castillo, is absolved from any liability decreed in the RTC Decision dated September 23,
1996 in Civil Case No. 63435, as affirmed by the CA.

SO ORDERED

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 107383 | 1996-02-20

MENDOZA, J.:


This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother,
a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any
person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and
consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court
ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso
Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr.,
this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with
merit:" 2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

. . . .

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to
this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which
order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's
order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject
annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the
truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against
him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order
of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the
documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or
whenpublic safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for
each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RODRIGO DOMOGOY,
ALLAN CUIZON and ELMER FRAGA, defendants. / RODRIGO DOMOGOY,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 116738 | 1999-03-22

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bislig, Surigao del Sur,[1] the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, accused Rodrigo Domogoy is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the private complaint, Angeles Adorable the amount
of P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the cost.

He shall serve sentence in the National Penitentiary of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

Accused Allan Cuizon and Elmer Fraga, for lack of evidence, are hereby acquitted.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Rodrigo Domogoy, Allan Cuizon and Elmer Fraga were charged with the rape of Angeles Adorable
in an information stating:

That on or about 10:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening, September 25, 1992, in Poblacion Bislig,
municipality of Bislig, province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other in their common design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and felonously [sic] have carnal knowledge of the offended party, ANGELES ADORABLE,
in the following manner: accused Rodrigo Domogoy while having carnal knowledge with the said
Angeles Adorable against her will, the accused Allan Cuizon and Elmer Fraga stood and acted as
guards, which acts and deeds caused damage and prejudice of the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW: In violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Bislig, Surigao del Sur, May 26, 1993.[3]

On July 30, 1993, Atty. Maximo N. Llanto,[4] counsel for the three accused, filed a Motion to quash
alleging that the criminal action, or the criminal liability of accused Rodrigo Domogoy, had been
extinguished by the pardon extended to him by private complainant. The alleged pardon was
contained in a letter[5] supposedly written by private complainant to Domogoy.

The prosecution opposed the motion to quash, claiming that pardon is a matter of defense and
therefore an improper ground for such motion. The prosecution likewise argued that while the private
complainant admitted having written said letter, she denied having pardoned or forgiven the accused
Rodrigo Domogoy as shown by the Affidavit[6] she executed on 11 August 1993.

After hearing, the trial court issued an Order[7] denying the Motion to Quash.

Upon arraignment, all the three (3) accused entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. The
parties then agreed on the following facts:[8]

1. That there was sexual intercourse but not that of rape between the accused and the private
complainant;

2. That the incident happened on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of September 25, 1992, at
the Bislig MunicipalHigh School building, Poblacion, Bislig, Surigao del Sur;

3. The medical certificate dated February 3, 1993;[9]

4. That before the incident happened the private complainant and accused, Rodrigo Domogoy came
from the Lily's Pharmacy at Sto. Tomas St., Poblacion, Bislig, Surigao del Sur;

5. That from Liliy's Pharmacy along Sto. Tomas St., Poblacion, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, the two (2)
co-accused, Allan Cuizon and Elmer Fraga were following behind the private complainant and the
accused.[10]

Trial proceeded thereafter.

As its sole witness, the prosecution presented the alleged victim, Angeles Adorable, twenty-one (21)
years of age and ahouse helper of the Yu spouses, owners of Lily's Pharmacy.[11]

On the evening of September 25, 1992, at around 10:00, Angeles and Monaliza Llenares, also a
house helper in the Yu household, were outside Lily's Pharmacy when the three (3) accused --
Rodrigo Domogoy, Allan Cuizon (Quizon) and Elmer Fraga -- arrived. Monaliza or Monmon, who
used to be Rodrigo's classmate, introduced the three to Angeles. The latter acknowledged the
introduction by nodding. At around 10:15 p.m., Monmon excused herself and went upstairs to take a
shower.

Rodrigo then approached Angeles and asked her to go with him. Angeles refused, making Rodrigo
angry. Rodrigo placed his right hand over Angeles' shoulder and, with his left, pointed a hunting
knife approximately eight (8) inches long on the left part of her waist. Behind them were Elmer and
Allan.

Rodrigo told Angeles she was hardheaded. "I am not a bad girl to be abused with," she replied.
Rodrigo then directed her to the Bislig Municipal High School some 200 meters away. Rodrigo held
Angeles' right shoulder strongly as he guided her through the dark portion of the street leading to
the school building, the knife still pointed at the left side of her body.

Although she was not able to turn her head to look back, Angeles knew that Rodrigo's co-accused,
Elmer Fraga and Allan Cuizon, were following them "because they were [already] around when we
reached the school building."

Rodrigo led Angeles to the darkest part of the school and took off her clothes. He then took off his
shirt, pulled his trousers to his knees, and made Angeles lean against the wall. He kissed Angeles all
over her body, fondled her breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rodrigo then ordered her to
kneel and suck his penis. When Angeles refused, he pushed her down. Angeles fell to the ground.
Rodrigo placed her in a supine position, put himself on top of her and kissed her all over her body.
As Rodrigo started the sexual intercourse, Angeles tried to push him away, to no avail.

While all these were taking place, Elmer and Allan were about a meter away from the couple,
looking and laughing.

Angeles soon felt hot liquid oozing on her lap. Satisfied, Rodrigo stood up, threw Angeles her dress
and told her to gohome. Angeles however could hardly move from the pain and exhaustion, and did
not immediately put on her clothes. Rodrigo became angry and ordered Elmer and Allan to get a
sack to put in Angeles. Afraid, Angeles forced herself to stand and dress up. She felt sore and found
blood on her thigh.

Angeles then walked home to Lily's Pharmacy as Rodrigo, Elmer and Allan followed her from a
distance, watching where she would go.

Angeles finally reached Lily's Pharmacy at around 11:00 p.m. Monmon opened the door for her.
Seeing the blood on her legs, Monmon asked her what happened. Angeles thus recounted her
ordeal to Monmon but did not report the incident to her employers who were already asleep.

Angeles did not see Rodrigo until a month after the incident. She nevertheless felt frightened so
Monmon supposedly suggested that she send him the letter that later became the basis for the
accused's motion to quash. The letter reads:

Oct. 25, 1992

Dearest Igoy,

Warmest regards in the magnificent name of our Lord Jesus Christ.

How's your life going on? Still fine? I hope so. . . Well if you ask me naman I'm fine, although it's
hard for me to forget, hard to accept and not easy to recover the pain in my heart; But I'm trying
myself to forget the past moments when I have been failured. Yes I can't deny myself that I'm broken
hearted and I realized at all that its not easy to full in love. Kaya nga bigla nalang ako sumama sa iyo
dahil na crush ako sa iyo for the first time when I saw you. But I did not expect na hahantong tayo sa
hindi magandang pangyayari. [p]ero tapos na yon, lets forget the past moments that we have; and
lets go on to the new world of friendship. In francly speaking inlove ako sa iyo pero ayaw kong
sundin ang puso ko dahil alam kong na tripingon mo lang ako. At and sabi pa nga ni Monmon
papuntapunta ka lang daw dito dahil natakot ka lang daw sa kanya, ngunit hindi mo naman talagang
tipong (ka) makipag usap sa akin. But don't worry because you're already forgiven. The bible said
you must do first to forgive your brother/sister before you ask the forgiveness your sin to the
heavenly father. If God can forgive the sinners, how much more we are?. . . Romans 2:6 God will
give to each person according to what he has done.

Your friend N Christ

Angel

God Bless you! ...

The letter itself was enclosed in a greeting card allegedly bought by Monmon. On the face of the
greeting card were printed in script the words:

I wonder if you've noticed

the change?

When we first met,

there were "no strings,"

no promises.

But now, I feel differently ...

The inside of the cover was blank. On the page opposite, Angeles wrote:

Isaiah 55:6

Seeks [sic] the Lord while he may be

found;

call on Him while he is near.

Open rebuke is

better than

secret

Love...

Angeles also wrote these words on the succeeding page:

In Jesus alone

I found the

real

Love

its [sic]

never

fails

Jesus is the melody

of the broken

heart...

Again, upon Monmon's suggestion, Angeles took a photograph[12] from her album and pasted it in
the space beside the second and seventh lines.

On the page opposite, the card's message continued:

October 25, 1992

Dear Igoy,

Now I realize

that there's no one else

I need,

there's no one else

I want,

there's no one else for me

...but you

Your friend N-Christ

Angel

Finally, at the lower part of the back cover were printed the words:

I Love You

Angeles attributed most of the words in the letter to Monmon who allegedly dictated the same to
Angeles. The Biblical quotes found in both the letter and the greeting card, as well as that part of the
letter relating to forgiveness, were however Angeles' own.

Angeles nonetheless denied forgiving Rodrigo. She likewise denied that she had a crush on Rodrigo
or that she was in love with him. According to Angeles her purpose in writing Rodrigo the letter was
"(s)o that he will believe and he could not defend whatever action I may take."[13]

Upon Angeles' request, Rowema Bagaan, another of the Yu's house helpers, delivered the card and
the letter to Rodrigo.

Angeles happened to see the three (3) accused viewing a "beta show" at Lily's Pharmacy after she
sent Rodrigo her letter. The three (3) mocked and laughed at her. Rodrigo even approached her and
puffed cigarette smoke on her face. Angeles felt afraid and left them.

In his defense, Rodrigo claimed that he and Angeles were sweethearts and the sexual intercourse
between them consensual. The twenty-one (21) year old student testified that he first met Angeles
on the first week of September 1992 at the Bislig market Site. Monmon, his former classmate,
introduced him to Angeles. The second time they met, he courted her and she readily accepted his
offered affection.

On the evening of September 25, 1992, he went to Lily's Pharmacy and invited Angeles to take a
walk with him. Angeles told him to "go ahead," and she would just follow him. Rodrigo did not agree
so they walked together to the Bislig Municipal High School instead. They talked along the way.

Q What was the nature of your conversation?

A I told her that, "because you went with me, that means, you will agree what will happen to us
now."

Q Then, what happen [sic]?

A Then, she answered, "I won't be afraid, what will happen to us. What I am afraid of is afterwards
you will neglect me."

Q What was your answer too?

A I said, "I cannot do it to you, if you really love me."[14]

Upon reaching the school building, Rodrigo told Angeles that "if you really love me, that means, you
will agree what will happen to us." Rodrigo then attempted to take off Angeles' dress but because he
had some trouble with the buttons, Angeles volunteered to take it off herself. As Angeles undressed,
Rodrigo removed his pants and brief. Rodrigo then proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
Angeles.

After consummating the intercourse, Rodrigo handed Angeles her clothes and put on his pants. With
his hand over her shoulder, Rodrigo walked her back to Lily's Pharmacy.

Rodrigo and Angeles next met sometime on the first week of October 1992. On said date, he and
Angeles again engaged in sexual congress at the Bislig National High School.

For their part, Rodrigo's co-accused, Elmer Fraga and Allan Cuizon, denied any participation in the
alleged rape, claiming they were merely peeping toms.

At around 10:30 p.m. of the date in question, Elmer and Allan were at the "betamax place" near Lily's
Pharmacy. Standing on the street about ten (10) meters away was Rodrigo who was talking to
Angeles. When the couple left for the school building minutes later, Elmer and Allan followed them.
The two believed that Rodrigo and Angeles were going to have "a date."

Elmer and Allan reached the school ahead of the couple and hid themselves. From their hiding place
seven (7) meters away, Allan saw Rodrigo take off Angeles' panty. Angeles shed the rest of her
clothes as Rodrigo took off his pants. Elmer and Allan masturbated as they watched Rodrigo and
Angeles perform the sex act.

As stated at the outset, the trial court acquitted Elmer Fraga and Allan Cuizon, but convicted Rodrigo
Domogoy of rape. The latter thus appeals to this Court questioning his conviction.

We acquit appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt.

A perusal of the appealed decision reveals that appellant's conviction by the trial court was grounded
largely upon the uncorroborated testimony of private complainant. This is not at all unusual in
rape cases, as the participants are usually the only ones who can testify as to the truth or falsehood
of the allegations.[15] When the conviction, however, depends at any vital point upon the victim's
uncorroborated testimony, it should not be accepted unless her sincerity is free from suspicion.[16]
The testimony of the complainant in crimes against chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity,[17] but regarded with utmost caution.[18] While the findings of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are generally accorded the highest respect, appellate courts are not
precluded from carefully scrutinizing the evidence to ascertain whether a fact or circumstance has
been overlooked or was misinterpreted by the trial court.[19] In the case at bar, several
circumstances impair complainant's credibility.

First. The tone and the contents of the letter and the card indicate a greater degree of familiarity than
complainant claimed to have existed between her and appellant, belying complainant's claims that
she was introduced to appellant on the evening of the alleged rape. (Even this claim is inconsistent.
Complainant testified that she was introduced by Monmon to the three (3) accused on the night of
September 25, 1992.[20] But in her affidavit executed before SPO4 Cristeta dela Cruz, complainant
stated that she "came to knowthier [sic] names only after the incident when she asked thier [sic]
identities from [her] house co-occupants."[21]) In her letter, complainant did not attempt to disguise
her feelings towards appellant. She candidly admitted having had a crush on appellant the first time
she saw him. "Fran[k]ly speaking," she unabashedly declared, "inlove [sic] ako sa iyo." This
statement virtually confirms the fact that complainant and appellant were lovers, thereby giving
credence to the latter's defense.

We disagree with the trial court when it observed that:

Relative to the letter which contains some love expressions, the Court is of the belief that it has
nothing [sic] to show that Angeles Adorable had given herself up voluntarily on her own free will. The
letter is dated October 25, 1992, exactly one month after the commission of the crime of rape on
September 25, 1992[.] [F]or a woman who has been deflowered, [it] is but natural to pretend to hide
her ill feelings. This expression of love in the letter are [sic] the aftermath of that harrowing
experience in the hands of the accused. The letter is mixed with some biblical verses or quotations,
the purpose of which as explained by Angeles Adorable, is to try to put in the mind of the accused
fear of God and to disuade [sic] him from committing carnal knowledge for the second time. xxx.[22]

On the contrary, it is highly unusual and inconsistent with human experience for a woman who has
been ravished to feign love for her persecutor, especially when, according to her, she hardly knew
the latter. Moreover, we have serious doubts whether said letter would "put in the mind of the
accused fear of God." Complainant's words are not exactly fire-and-brimstone exhortations that
would send appellant praying for divine mercy. Nor do we think that her use of saccharine words
would the least bit dissuade her purported rapist from molesting her again. Complainant's picture
which was pasted on the card would probably produce just the opposite effect.

Complainant's claims that the card was bought, and that the letter was dictated by, Monmon, if true,
would not work against appellant's acquittal. Complainant had every opportunity to read the card.
She admits that the handwriting thereon is hers. It is highly unlikely that she wrote on it without
reading and approving of its contents. If the card was not to her liking, she could have easily
discarded it but she did not. Likewise, complainant could have rejected the words supposedly
dictated by Monmon if she felt that these did not express her true sentiments. Complainant is not
illiterate. She is a high school graduate and was already of legal age at the time the letter was
written. It cannot be said that she was unduly influenced by Monmon, a house helper like her and
approximately the same age.

Second. This Court has found in some cases that some supposed victims (or their relatives) resort to
filing unfounded complaints for rape in an attempt to redeem the lost honor of complainant, the latter
having been caught in flagrante in pre-marital,[23] if not extra-marital,[24] intercourse with their
alleged rapists.

Here, private complainant was seen having sexual intercourse with appellant by the latter's co-
accused, Elmer Fraga and Allan Cuizon. It is thus not farfetched for complainant to have instituted
the complaint for rape against the three to avoid being bruited around as a woman of loose morals.

In People vs. Subido,[25] we declared that this Court will not hesitate to reverse a judgment of
conviction and acquit the accused where there are strong indications pointing to the possibility that
the rape charge was motivated by some factors other than the truth as to its commission.

Third. Considering the above circumstances, the fact that it took complainant almost (5) months to
report the alleged rape should be weighed in appellant's favor. Where the evidence gives rise to two
possibilities, one consistent with the acused's innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that
which favors the accused would be properly considered. Thus, in People vs. Relorcasa,[26] the long
delay of complainant in reporting the incident created doubts in the Court's mind that she was raped
by appellant therein.

The Solicitor General nevertheless argues that:

x x x it is hard to believe that an unmarried woman, like complainant, would tell a story of defloration,
allow the examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of public
trial, unless she was not motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished (People vs. Francisquiste, 56 SCRA 764).

Complainant belonged to the poor, was a mere household helper but still possessed the traditional
and proverbial modesty of the Filipina, especially the provinciana. Complainant would not have filed
a complaint for rape and suffered the torment, if not the ignominy of having to testify in a court of
justice about the wrong done to her if in truth she was not really raped (People vs. Sacabin, 57
SCRA 707).[27]

We are not persuaded. The presumption invoked by the Solicitor General cannot prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

Thus, in People vs. Godoy,[28] this Court, stated:

The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will
not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more
paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes
the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine
what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt does not itself destroy the
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence,
or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt until the defendant is shown in this manner,
the presumption of innocence continues.

The rationale for the presumption of guilt in rape cases has been explained in this wise:

"In rape cases especially, much credence is accorded the testimony of the complaining witness, on
the theory that she will not choose to accuse her attacker at all and subject herself to the stigma and
indignities her accusation will entail unless she is telling the truth. The rape victim who decides to
speak up exposes herself as a woman whose virtue has been not only violated but also irreparably
sullied. In the eyes of a narrow-minded society, she becomes a cheapened woman, never mind that
she did not submit to her humiliation and has in fact denounced her assailant. At the trial, she will be
the object of lascivious curiosity. People will want to be titillated by the intimate details of her
violation. She will squirm through her testimony as she described how her honor was defiled, elating
every embarassing movement of the intrusion upon the most private parts of her body. Most
frequently, the defense will argue that she was not forced to submit but freely conjoined in the sexual
act. Her motives will be impugned. Her chastity will be challenged and maligned. Whatever the
outcome of the case, she will remain a tainted woman, a pariah because her purity has been lost,
albeit through no fault of hers. This is why many a rape victim chooses instead to keep quiet,
suppressing her helpless indignation rather than denouncing her attacker. This is also the reason
why, if a woman decides instead to come out openly and point to her assailant, courts are prone to
believe that she is telling the truth regardless of its consequences. x x x."

The presumption of innocence, on the other hand, is founded upon the first principles of justice, and
is not a mere form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or
conjecture; a probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the
opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their
command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution. The
accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt.
This is in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of
innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.

On the basis of the forgoing doctrinal tenets and principles, and in conjunction with the
overwhelming evidence in favor of herein appellant, we do not encounter any difficulty in concluding
that the constitutional presumption on the innocence of an accused must prevail in this particular
indictment.

Likewise, in People vs. Sandagon,[29] this Court held that:

It is not enough to say that a girl would not expose herself to the humiliation of a rape complaint
unless the charge is true. That is putting things too simply. For the prosecution to succeed, it is also
necessary to find that the complainant's story is by itself believable independently of the
presumption. Otherwise, if all that mattered was that presumption, every accusation of rape would
inevitably result, without need of further evidence, in the conviction of the accused. This would
militate against the rule that in every criminal prosecution, including rape cases, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. Appellant Rodrigo
Domogoy is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1266-B of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao del Sur, Branch 29. The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith
cause the release of accused-appellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and
to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO DURANAN,
a.k.a. "Kalbo," accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 134074-75 | 2001-01-16


A discussion citing this case is available.
Opinion of ordinary witnesses
D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision1 Per Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 220,Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. "Kalbo," guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape and to indemnify private complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara in
the amount of P50,000.00.

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711 alleged -

That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, said accused with lewd designs
and by means of force and intimidation, to wit, by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
taking advantage of undersigned complainant, Maria Nympha Lozada y de Lara's feeblemindedness
and thereafter have carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.

Contrary to law.2 Rollo, pp. 2-3.

The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712 averred -

That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused with lewd
designs and by means of force and intimidation, to wit, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking (sic) advantage of the undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness, and thereafter have
carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent.

Contrary to law.3 Id., pp. 4-5.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each charge of rape against him,
whereupon he was tried.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara,
complainant's mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp
Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.

Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is
considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply
does household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainant's family in the
same apartment in K-6 No. 28 Kamuning St., Quezon City where he rented a room that he shared
with several other people.

The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994.4 TSN, p. 8, Jan. 30, 1995. Nympha was
standing by the door of her grandfather's house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on
her neck and dragged her inside the common bathroom.5 Id., p. 14. Complainant said that accused-
appellant kissed her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his
other hand. She did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get
angry if she did.6 TSN, pp. 11-12, Jan. 30, 1995. She claimed that accused-appellant was able to
rape her while standing up despite her resistance.7 TSN, pp. 9-10, Sept. 21, 1994. After the incident,
complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly home.8 Id., p. 12.

The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994,9 TSN, p. 3, Oct. 5, 1994.
according to complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when
accused-appellant pulled her from her house and took her to his room. According to complainant,
accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his
brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her.10 Id., pp. 6-7. Complainant
said she was forced to submit to accused-appellant's lust because of his threats.11 TSN, p. 18, Feb.
22, 1995. After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love for her and telling her
how beautiful she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them. 12 TSN, p. 9-10,
Oct. 5, 1994

In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her
inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them.
He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.13 Id., pp. 10-13.

Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-
appellant. Virginia noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her
daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. Virginia went to
Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other children, Teresa and Fernando, where they
filed affidavits and two informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for examination.14
TSN, pp. 22-25, Aug. 3, 1994. Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant, submitted a
report which contained the following findings:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with
pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and
soft. There is injury noted at the head;

Contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3 cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior midline.

GENITAL

There is an abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia minora are full, convex and gaping with the pinkish
brown and congested labia minor presenting in between. On separating, the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 5
o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining
index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugosities.

CONCLUSION

Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.

Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.

Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injury will resolve in 7 to 9 days

REMARKS

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.15
Exhibit A; Records, p. 66.

Dr. Cosidon explained that the term "congested" used in reference to the labia minora meant that
there was some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to intercourse.16 TSN, p.
9. Aug. 3, 1994. Taken together with the presence of a shallow hymenal laceration, this finding
indicates the possibility of intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity within the last five
days.17 Id., pp. 14-15.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but the trial court denied it in its November 17,
1995 order.18 Records, p. 80. The defense thereafter presented its witnesses, namely, accused-
appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-appellant's alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito
Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.

With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in the afternoon of March 7,
1994, it is contended that accused-appellant could not have committed such, because his daily
schedule was such that he was not at home at that time. He said that because of his work, he used
to leave the house at 3 a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again at 3 p.m. and arrive
home at 6:30 p.m.19 TSN, pp. 9 -13, Feb. 28, 1996. He also alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left
and was with Rico Bariquit throughout the day.20 Id., p. 10. As to the second incident of rape,
accused-appellant contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his room because there
were at least six other people there at the time (i.e., morning of March 8, 1994) of the alleged
rape.21 Id., pp. 13-15. He charged that the complaints were filed against him because complainant's
family wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house.22 Id., p. 18.

Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellant's schedule.23 TSN (Rico Bariquit),
pp. 13-14, March 11, 1996; TSN (Carlito Catubig), p. 6, June 5, 1996. Bariquit claimed that he was
always with accused-appellant and knew where he was all the time. Both witnesses said rape could
not have been committed in a room where at least five other people were sleeping.24 Id., p. 16; id.,
p. 8.

Virginia Lozada and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig before the two
testified in court.25 TSN (Virginia Lozada), p. 5, Jan. 29, 1997; TSN (Maria Nympha Lozada), p. 22,
Jan. 29, 1997.

Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on April 22, 1998, finding
the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:26
RTC Decision, p. 10; Records, p. 183.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal for two (2) counts of rape punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to
indemnify the private complainant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50, 000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal.

Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY
IS "DEPRIVED OF REASON" DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF TESTIMONY BY A COMPETENT
MEDICAL EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT AND DESPITE STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD
TO THE CONTRARY.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ALTERNATIVELY HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED
IS GUILTY OF RAPING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED WOMAN THROUGH "FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION".

First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim's mental age
was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element
for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant's
mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve.27 Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-7. He further
claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

The contention has no merit.

Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be
received in evidence regarding ---

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise:

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what
her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

. . . .

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a
person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits,
and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors
and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme
Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of
another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon
his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness' own
knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or
other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.28 7 V. J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court of
the Philippines 735-736 (1997).

In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter, thus:

Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)

A: When she was still a child while walking she accidentally bumped her head and then on she acted
quite not normal from then on we noticed changes because she acted like a child.

Q: How old is (sic) Nympha Lozada when this happened?

A: 3 to 4 years old.

Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)

A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her declaration are
(sic) true or believable.

Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.

A: Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can say she is quite intelligent.

Q: So she can somewhat understand what is happening around us?

A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as she would be provided some basis and some
reference inorder (sic) to establish time, places and incident (sic).

Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household chores(?)

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?

A: Yes ma'am.29 TSN, pp. 18 - 19. Aug. 3, 1995.

To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mother's statement that complainant is "quite
intelligent." The statement that complainant is "quite intelligent" must be read in the context of
Virginia Lozada's previous statement that complainant "thinks like a child but from her narration or
statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable." Thus, what complainant's
mother meant was that complainant, although she thought like a child, nevertheless could tell others
what happened to her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished the defense counsel not to use
inculpatory questions because complainant might give inculpatory answers.30 TSN, p. 8. Feb. 22,
1995. At another stage of the trial, the trial court reminded counsel, "The witness [complainant] is not
very intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish dates."31 Id., p. 10.

Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with complainant that she was mentally deficient. The rule
that findings of fact of the trial court should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position
to determine the findings of fact32 People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998). cannot be more apt than
in this case.

Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as "coherent" and
contends that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainant. This contention is totally
without basis. The medico-legal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical
examination is limited to determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused.33 Exhibit
A; Records, p. 66. In other words, the purpose of the examination was to determine her physical, not
her mental, state.

Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed, complainant could not be a
competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any person who can perceive and
make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is a
retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her and to
answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is clear from her
testimony, thus:

Q: Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano Duranan. Where did this happen?

A: In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.

Q: Where is this bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?

A: This bathroom is located at an alley, a "pasillo" towards our house.

Q: Where is your house, Miss Witness?

A: Our house is located at No. 28, K-6, Kamuning, Quezon City.

Q: You said that you were raped inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng. How were you able to get
inside that bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?

A: I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng because Emiliano Duranan pulled me inside.

Q: How did Emiliano Duranan pulled you? (sic)

A: He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm against my neck, pulling me towards the
bathroom.

. . . .

Q: When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the bathroom, what happened after that?

A: He kissed me.

(Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck)

And he had my panty removed.

Q: Now, you said that when you were inside the bathroom of your Tiya Ineng, Emiliano Duranan
kissed you in (sic) your lips?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?

A: Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he removed my underwear, my panty and he
inserted his sex organ into my sex organ.

Q: When "Kalbo" inserted his sex organ in your sex organ, what position were you then?

A: We were standing.

Q: Inside the bathroom?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Nympha, do you know how to tell the days of the week?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: How about the dates?

A: No, ma'am.

Q: Do you know what day is today?

A: Wednesday.

Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?

A: Tuesday.

Q: Do you know what date is today?

COURT:

She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesn't know the exact date.34 TSN, pp. 6-11, Sept.
21, 1994.

. . . .

Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo twice, is that correct?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: When was the second time?

A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.

Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the bathroom?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

. . . .

Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor and then Kalbo kissed you, where did
Kalbo kiss you?

A: From (sic) my lips.

Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?

A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his organ to mine.35 TSN, pp. 2-7, Oct. 5,
1994.

At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised by
the defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held:

A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify.... [I]f, after
such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge
of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of
mental capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken during the trial, a
new trial will be refused and the objection will not be available on writ of error.36 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence 1149, p.1988, cited in People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 706 (1947). See also People
v. Cruz, 208 SCRA 326 (1992).

Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by complainant negates the
presence of any force and intimidation. This contention is likewise without merit. The presence or
absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that sexual intercourse
with a woman was accomplished without her consent. In this case, the absence of consent is shown
by the fact that complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation by accused-appellant.

Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is relative, and must
be viewed in the light of the complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the offense.37 People v. Corea, 336 Phil 72 (1997); People v. Edualino, 337 Phil. 639 (1997). What
is vital is that such force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that accused-
appellant had in mind.38 People vs. Antonio, 233 SCRA 283 (1994) In this case, due to the
complainant's mental retardation, the force or intimidation required is not very great since it does not
take much to force a child into submission. Indeed, complainant said she submitted to accused-
appellant's demands because she was afraid he would get angry at her if she refused them. In
People v. Rosare,39 332 Phil 435 (1996). it was held that, in the instances where the victim is so
weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent, the force applied may be constructive.

In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother,40 TSN,
p. 19, Aug. 3, 1994. the trial court's observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her
intelligence,41 TSN, p. 8, Feb. 22, 1995. while the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the
medico-legal certificate.42 Exhibit A; Records. p. 66. In addition, the prosecution proved the
presence of force and intimidation, and the court appreciated such.43 RTC Decision p. 10, Records,
p. 183. The intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the threats that accused-appellant made to
the complainant,44 TSN, p. 11, Sept. 21, 1994; TSN, p. 15, Feb. 22, 1995. not to mention the force
employed by accused-appellant in placing his arm on the complainant's neck45 TSN, p. 14, Jan. 30,
1995. and holding her hands while undressing her.46 TSN, p. 6, Oct. 5, 1994.

However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled because there are two
counts of rape. In addition, complainant should also be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape, or a total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our rulings.47 E.g., People v.
Ramos, G. R. No. 136398, November 23, 2000; People v. Napiot 311 SCRA 772 (1999); People v.
Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in addition,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara the further sum of
P100,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODERICK LEGASPI,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 137283 | 2003-02-17

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch
65, in Criminal Case No. 9643 convicting accused-appellant Roderick Legaspi of rape.

The Information dated August 18, 1997 charged accused-appellant as follows:

x x x

That on or about the July 3, 1997 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province of Tarlac and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force and violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of complainant Cristina Castaneda, a child below seven (7) years old.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

x x x[2] (Emphasis supplied.)

Accused-appellant was arraigned on October 28, 1997. Duly assisted by his counsel de oficio, he
entered a plea of not guilty.[3]

The following facts are not disputed.

On July 3, 1997, at around 6:00 p.m., accused-appellant, together with his father Rogelio and two
others, had a drinking spree at their family house in Panumpunan, Tarlac, Tarlac. At around 8:00
p.m., he asked the more than 6-year old Cristina Castaneda, the niece of his father's common law
wife Brigida Pagsibagan, to go out with him for a few minutes. Cristina, who was wearing a pair
of short pants and a shirt, obliged and the two left the house.[4]

As two hours had elapsed and accused-appellant and Cristina had not yet returned, Brigida started
looking for them. She later went to the barangay hall to report the matter.[5]

About past 11:00 p.m. also of July 3, 1997, accused-appellant and Cristina returned home.[6]
Cristina, who was silent, with her arms placed "across her breast,"[7] was already garbed in
accused-appellant's t-shirt, without panty and slippers, and with her head and back full of sand.[8]
Accused-appellant on the other hand was only wearing a pair of wet pants.[9] When Brigida asked
them where they came from, Cristina replied that they came from the river,[10] about a kilometer
away from their house. And when she was asked what accused-appellant did to her, Cristina said
that he kissed her, boxed the left portion of her stomach, and let her drink dirty water.[11] While
Cristina did not say that she was sexually abused, given her appearance, Brigida brought her and
accused-appellant, who tried to flee but was overtaken, to the barangay hall.[12]

At the barangay hall, Kagawad Edilberto Villanueva asked Cristina what happened, to which she
replied that accused-appellant brought her to the river and "went on top of her."[13] Villanueva,
Brigida, Cristina and accused-appellant thereupon proceeded to the municipal hall to report the
matter to the police who directed that Cristina be brought to the provincial hospital for
examination.[14] Cristina was thus immediately brought to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital[15] where
she was examined by Dr. Susan Rhea Maniquis.

From Dr. Maniquis' examination of Cristina, the following findings[16] were noted:

EXT. GENITALIA: absent pubic hair, labia majora completely hiding labia minora, vestibule is
erythematous; (+) complete laceration 6'oclock position, (+) incomplete laceration, 2' oclock position,
(+) abrasion 9-10 'oclock positions; post-fourchette V-shaped, (-) bleeding, (-) hematomas.
(Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the filing of a complaint for rape against accused-appellant at the Tarlac, Tarlac Municipal
Trial Court which conducted a preliminary investigation at which accused-appellant failed to file a
Counter-Affidavit.[17] The Provincial Prosecutor accordingly filed the Information against accused-
appellant.

Villanueva declared that accused-appellant "admitted that he was raping Cristina but he was not
able to insert his penis."[18]

When Dr. Maniquis was interrogated on her findings, she gave the following testimony, quoted
verbatim:[19]

x x x

Q: By this finding of yours "vestibule is erythematous", what do you mean by this?

A: The vestibule I am referring to is that diamond shape area of the perineum where the urine comes
out, and "erythematous" I mean the reddish color in the vestibule.

Q: And what could have caused that reddish color in the vestibule?

A: It could have been caused by an object that could have insinuated into that opening.

Q: And by your finding "complete laceration 6:00 o'clock position", what do you mean, doctor?

A: By that, I mean that supposed to be the hymen is intact and there are no lacerations. There are
angulations along the hymenal wall. And by complete, I mean that the laceration reaches from the
surface of the hymen up to the base of the hymen. That is complete. And by incomplete, I mean that
it did not reach one-half of the hymen. The depth of the laceration did not reach up to the base of the
hymen.

Q: About the "abrasion, 9-10 o'clock position," what do you mean by that?

A: By that I mean that I saw linear abrasion, it was just a scratch mark.

Q: And what could have caused those complete laceration 6:00 o'clock position, incomplete
laceration, 2:00 o'clock position and abrasion 9-10 o'clock positions"?

A: Those could have been caused by trauma, sir.

Q: Would a sexual intercourse cause these injuries or lacerations?

A: Possibly, sir.

x x x

Q: And in this case you did not find any sperm cells in the genitalia area. If there was alleged sexual
abuse on the patient and found that there were no sperm cells in the said genitalia road, then it may
rule out the possibility that he lacerations that you found in the hymen were not made by male
organ?

A: It is possible that the victim or patient was raped even if there were no sperm cells found in the
genitalia area.

Q: But the finding that there were no sperm cells found in the genitalia area is a deep indication that
the lacerations were made or could have been made by blunt instrument?

A: It's possible.

x x x

COURT:

Q: What could have caused the abrasion, doctor?

A: That abrasion that I saw on the vestibule could have been caused by a fingernail or any sharp
object.

x x x

Q: What is the significance of the 6:00 o'clock position . . .

A: I just want to impart that there was trauma to that area.

Q: Has there been penetration?

A: Not necessarily.

Q: When you say "trauma", what could have caused this trauma?

A: It may have been caused by any object or human finger or penis of a male organ.

x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Accused-appellant insisted that he and Cristina just took a bath in the river.

Cristina, who refused to testify during the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence in chief,
finally took the witness stand on rebuttal. Through her following testimony,[20] the prosecution
sought to further prove that she was raped.

x x x

FISCAL:

Q: Cristina do you know the accused in this case Roderick Legaspi?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And could you tell us if he is inside the court now?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Will you please point at him if he is inside the courtroom?

INTERPRETER:

Witness is pointing to a person or man inside the courtroom wearing a stripe blue and green T-shirt.

Q: Cristina on July 3, 1997 you were at home is that correct?

A: Yes sir

Q: And Roderick Legaspi was drinking with somebody on that date is that correct?

ATTY. MARCOS:

Objection your Honor, leading.

COURT:

Witness may answer considering the age of the witness . . .

A: Yes sir.

Q: On July 3, 1997, Roderick Legaspi asked you to go with him is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Could you tell us where did Roderick bring you?

A: At the river sir.

Q: Were you able to reach the river?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And what did you do at the river, did you take a bath?

A: No sir.

Q: Did Roderick Legaspi do anything to you when you reached the river?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What did Roderick Legaspi do to you?

A: He removed my clothes sir.

Q: How about your panty did he also remove it?

A: Yes sir.

Q: How about Roderick Legaspi did he also remove his pants?

A: Yes sir.

Q: After Roderick Legaspi removed your panty and also after he removed his pants what did he do?

A: He kissed me sir.

Q: Aside from kissing you, what else did he do, did he touch your private part?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Aside from touching your private part did he do anything else to you?

A: Yes sir he boxed me.

Q: On what part of your body did he boxed [sic] you?

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing on her left breast.

Q: And he went on top of you?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When he was on top of you what was he doing then, did he do the push and pull motion?

A: Yes sir.

Q: While he was doing the push and pull motion were you hurt then?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And after that you already went home together with Roderick?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did you not tell or reported [sic] to your sister about what Roderick did to you?

A: No sir.

Q: Did you report it to your Auntie Bidang?

A: No sir.

Q: Why did you not report this incident to your auntie Bidang are you afraid?

A: Yes sir.

FISCAL:

That will be all your Honor.

COURT:

Any cross-examination counsel?

ATTY. MARCOS:

Yes your Honor. With the kind permission of this Hon. Court.

COURT:

Proceed.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY ATTY. MARCOS:

x x x

Q: Do you still remember that you testify (sic) a while ago that Roderick Legaspi made a push and
pull motion, can you identify to this court push and pull motion?

A: No reaction.

Q: Does this means [sic] that you do not know that push and pull motion?

A: No answer.

Q: So you are not telling the truth when you said that Roderick Legaspi made that push and pull
motion?

A: No answer.

COURT:

Q: Have you ever seen a penis?

A: No sir.

Q: Have you seen the penis of Roderick Legaspi?

A: No sir.

Q: When he went on top of you did you see his penis? Did he put it inside your private part?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Where did he put it inside your sex organ?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did you feel it if it is hard or soft?

A: No sir.

Q: It was soft?

A: No sir.

Q: Did he hold it and put it inside your sex organ?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What did you feel?

A: No answer.

Q: What did you feel, was it painful?

A: Yes sir.

ATTY. MARCOS:

Q: You said that you have not seen the penis of Roderick, how come or how do you know that what
was put inside your organ was the penis of Roderick Legaspi [sic]?

A: No answer.

Q: Does this mean you are not sure whether Roderick inside his penis inside your sex organ?

A: No answer.

COURT:

Q: You felt that the penis of Roderick did not enter the hole but you feel that it was in your sex
organ?

A: Yes sir.

ATTY. MARCOS:

Q: But you did not see the penis of Roderick?

A: No mam.

Q: What you feel that was inserted in your sex organ but you are not sure that that was the penis of
Roderick or other object?

A: No answer.

x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted accused-appellant by the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion[21] of which reads:

"Now therefore, this court finds you, Roderick Legaspi, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
heinous crime of rape pursuant to Article 335 in relation to RA 7610 and RA 7659 in relation to
Article 14, Pars. 3, 6, 14 & 15 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore sentences you to die by
lethal injection and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P150,000.00 as consequential,
exemplary and moral damages.

MAY GOD HAVE MERCY ON YOUR SOUL.

SO ORERED.

Tarlac City, Dec. 15, 1998."

In his Brief, accused-appellant assigns to the trial court the following errors, quoted verbatim:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY THE BIAS IT HAD SHOWN AGAINST HIM AND IN ITS UNDUE
HASTE IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
QUALIFIED RAPE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT INDEPENDENT
PROOF OF THE ACTUAL AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO PROVE HER AGE.[22]

Accused-appellant cites the promulgation of the judgment on the day following the testimony of
Cristina as indicative of bias. For, so accused-appellant submits, it is doubtful if the trial court
meticulously considered all the evidence presented.[23]

Accused-appellant's submission does not convince. A judge has in his favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty.[24] Mere suspicion or bare allegation that the judge
is biased or partial to a party is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the
charge.[25] That the judgment was promulgated on the day following the testimony of Cristina as
rebuttal witness cannot be considered as adequate evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption, especially given the fact that her testimony was simple - that accused-appellant
removed her clothes, boxed her, kissed her, went on top of her, touched her private part and held his
penis and put it inside her sex organ although it did not enter the "hole."

Accused-appellant adds that the predisposition of the trial court to convict him was shown by the fact
that it asked and allowed the prosecution to ask the victim leading questions without first showing
that there was difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from her because of tender age.[26]

It is, however, often expedient or even necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for
the judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a witness in order that his judgment may
rest upon a full and clear understanding of the facts, even if the testimony drawn out tends to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party.[27]

In the case at bar, the questions of the trial judge, as shown in the above-quoted testimony of
Cristina, were evidently clarificatory. Propounded when the responses she gave were vague and
imprecise, they cannot be considered proof of pre-judgment or bias.

As for the trial court's allowing the prosecution to ask Cristina leading questions, no prior proof of
difficulty in eliciting intelligible answers from the child witness is required in order to allow leading
questions. It is sufficient that the witness is shown to be a child of tender years[28] as in Cristina's
case.

On the main issue of whether the prosecution had proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant contends that it had not as Cristina never categorically stated that her private part
was penetrated by his.[29]

The alleged rape having been committed on July 3, 1997, the applicable law is Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, the pertinent provision of which, in light of
the allegations in the information, reads:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force and intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

x x x

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. (Emphasis supplied).

x x x

Accused-appellant argues that with Cristina's admission that she had not seen a penis, much less
that of accused-appellant,[30] it is not certain that what was put in her vagina was accused-
appellant's penis. The argument fails. Even if Cristina did not see what object was actually placed on
her vagina, given (1) her testimony that accused-appellant went on top of her, held what she felt to
be his penis and put it in her vagina although it did not enter the "hole;" and (2) Dr. Maniquis' finding
of lacerations and abrasions in Cristina's vagina and her testimony quoted earlier, it is improbable
that it was not accused-appellant's penis that he held and put in her vagina. With the luxury of time
afforded him, not to mention the venue of the incident where being seen and heard by anyone was
remote, why would accused-appellant introduce anything but his penis to her vagina?

Villanueva's testimony that accused-appellant "admitted that he was raping Cristina but he was not
able to insert his penis" thus assumes importance.

The penis may not have been inserted in Cristina's vagina but it was held, then put in, and therefore
it penetrated, the labia minora of Cristina's vagina. Cristina's following testimony bears reiterating,
quoted verbatim:

x x x

COURT

Q: You felt that the penis of [accused-appellant] did not enter the hole but you feel that it was in your
sex organ?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did [accused-appellant] hold his [penis] and put it inside your sex organ?

A: Yes sir."[31]

x x x (Underscoring supplied.)

There is then no doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of Cristina. A determination of
the circumstances under which the crime was committed is thus in order to arrive at the proper
penalty to be imposed on him.

The information alleges that Cristina was 6 years old when the crime was committed. No birth
certificate or any other authentic document was presented, however, to show when she was born in
order to determine her age at the time. While Brigida declared that she was born on October 22,
1990 and undertook to submit a copy of her birth certificate, no such certificate was presented.[32]

In People v. Pruna,[33] this Court set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall no be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)

Based on the foregoing guidelines, the unavailability of the birth certificate of Cristina
notwithstanding, the testimony of her aunt Brigida suffices to prove that she was below 12 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense.

The trial court, in imposing the penalty, appreciated the presence of aggravating circumstances that
fall under the following paragraphs of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

x x x

4. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party
on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the
latter has not given provocation.

x x x

6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever
such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.

x x x

14. craft, fraud, or disguise be employed.

15.advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.

x x x

These circumstances, however, may not be appreciated to modify the penalty for the rape
committed - reclusion perpetua - in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

x x x (Underscoring supplied.)

But even assuming that the penalty is not single indivisible, such circumstances still can not be
appreciated in the determination of the proper penalty since the Information dated August 18, 1997,
failed to allege them as required by the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which is given
retroactive effect.[34]

The failure to allege the aggravating circumstances notwithstanding, the proven presence thereof is
still material in the determination of exemplary damages to be awarded to private complainant under
Article 2230 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

As held in People v. Catubig,38 the retroactive application of procedural rules cannot adversely
affect the rights of the private offended party that have become vested prior to the effectivity thereof.

This Court, however, finds that, contrary to the finding of the trial court, not one of above-mentioned
aggravating circumstances can be appreciated for the purpose of awarding Cristina exemplary
damages. It bears recalling that two hours after accused-appellant started drinking liquor at 6:00 p.
m. together with his father and the latter's two compadres, or at 8:00 p. m., he asked Cristina to go
out. There is no showing that the circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place were deliberately
sought by accused-appellant to ensure the commission of rape. As to the circumstance of age, the
same was already considered to qualify it to statutory rape. Neither can craft or fraud be
appreciated, there being nothing deceitful with the way accused-appellant asked Cristina to go out
with him, to wit: "Ty,[35] we will go out for a few minutes."[36] As to the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, the same can be considered inherent in the crime of statutory rape, taking into
account the disparity of age and size between accused-appellant and Cristina.

A word on the civil liability of accused-appellant.

Instead of specifying the amount for each kind of damage due Cristina, the trial court awarded the
lump sum amount of P150,000.00 "as consequential, exemplary and moral damages." The award of
"consequential damages" is more precisely termed as civil indemnity.35

The penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant being reclusion perpetua, in conformity with
prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity due should be P50,000.00,36 and moral damages
should be P50,000.00.37

WHEREFORE, the judgment on review is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified,
accused-appellant RODERICK LEGASPI is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and is
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant Cristina Castaneda civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00.

Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.