Civil Law Notes

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2005 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS
MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED TOPCS N C!L LA"
Source: U.P. Law Center
Persons and Family Relations
TOPC# REQUREMENTS FOR T$E !ALDTY OF MARRA%E &1'(') 1''*) 1''+) 1''3) 1'',) 1''-)
1''.) 1''() 1''') +**+/
I
What is the status of the following marriages and why?
A. A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent.
B. A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental adice.
!. A marriage between two "ilipino first cousins in #pain where such marriage is alid.
$. A marriage between two "ilipinos in %ong &ong before a notary public.
'. A marriage solemni(ed by a town mayor three towns away from his )urisdiction. *1999+
ANS"ERS#
A. ,he marriage is oidable. ,he consent of the parties to the marriage was defectie. Being
below 21 years old- the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. ,he
consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its alidity.
B. Between 21-year olds- the marriage is alid despite the absence of parental adice-
because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal re.uisite /i.e.- the marriage
license0and does not affect the alidity of the marriage itself. ,his is without pre)udice to the
ciil- criminal- or administratie liability of the party responsible therefore.
!. By reason of public policy- the marriage between "ilipino first cousins is oid 1Art. 23- par.
*1+- "!4- and the fact that it is considered a alid marriage in a foreign country in this case- #pain0
does not alidate it- being an e5ception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said !ode which accords
alidity to all marriages solemni(ed outside the 7hilippines 5 5 5 and alid there as such.
$. It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is alid under %ong &ong law- the
marriage is alid in the 7hilippines. 8therwise- the marriage that is inalid in %ong &ong will be
inalid in the 7hilippines.
'. 9nder the :ocal ;oernment !ode- a town mayor may alidly solemni(e a marriage but said
law is silent as to the territorial limits for the e5ercise by a town mayor of such authority.
%oweer- by analogy- with the authority of members of the )udiciary to solemni(e a marriage- it
would seem that the mayor did not hae the re.uisite authority to solemni(e a marriage outside of
his territorial )urisdiction. %ence- the marriage is oid- unless it was contracted with either or both
parties belieing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemni(e this particular
marriage 1Art. 2<- par. *2+- "!4.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
!. ,he marriage is oid. 9nder Article 26 of the "amily !ode- a marriage alid where
celebrated is alid in the 7hilippines e5cept those marriages enumerated in said Article which
marriages will remain oid een though alid where solemni(ed. ,he marriage between first cousins
is one of those marriages enumerated therein- hence- it is oid een though alid in #pain where it
was celebrated.
$. If the two "ilipinos belieed in good faith that the =otary 7ublic is authori(ed to solemni(e
marriage- then the marriage is alid.
'. ,he marriage is alid. 9nder the :ocal ;oernment !ode- the authority of a mayor to
solemni(e marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority
een outside the territory thereof. %ence- the marriage he solemni(ed outside his municipality is
alid. And een assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality- such marriage will-

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neertheless- be alid because solemni(ing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere
irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro vs. Domagtoy- 2<9 #!>A 129. In this case- the
#upreme !ourt held that the celebration by a )udge of a marriage outside the )urisdiction of his
court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the alidity of the marriage notwithstanding Article
? of the "amily !ode which proides that an incumbent member of the )udiciary is authori(ed to
solemni(e marriages only within the court@s )urisdiction.
OT$ER ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
!. By reason of Article 1< in relation to Article 23 of the !iil !ode- which applies to "ilipinos
whereer they are- the marriage is oid.
'. ,he marriage is oid because the mayor has no authority to solemni(e marriage outside his
)urisdiction.
II
8n Aalentine@s $ay- 1996- 'lias and "ely- both single and 2< years of age- went to the city
hall where they sought out a fi5er to help them obtain a .uicBie marriage. "or a fee- the fi5er
produced an ante-dated marriage license for them- issued by the !iil >egistrar of a small remote
municipality. %e then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall- and
the latter solemni(ed their marriage right there and then.
A. Is their marriage alid- oid- or oidable?
B. Would your answer be the same if it should turn out that the marriage license was
spurious? '5plain. *1996+
ANS"ERS#
A. ,he marriage is alid. ,he irregularity in the issuance of a alid license does not adersely
affect the alidity of the marriage. ,he marriage license is alid because it was in fact issued by a
!iil >egistrar *Arts. 2 and C- "!+.
B. =o- the answer would not be the same. ,he marriage would be oid because of the absence
of a formal re.uisite. In such a case- there was actually no alid marriage license.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
A. It depends. If both or one of the parties was a member of the religious sect of the
solemni(ing officer- the marriage is alid. If none of the parties is a member of the sect and both of
them were aware of the fact- the marriage is oid. ,hey cannot claim good faith in belieing that
the solemni(ing officer was authori(ed because the scope of the authority of the solemni(ing
officer is a matter of law. If- howeer- one of the parties belieed in good faith that the other was
a member of the sect- then the marriage is alid under Article 2<*2+- "!. In that case- the party in
good faith is acting under a mistaBe of fact- not a mistaBe of law.
TOPC# PROPERTY RELATONS 0ET"EEN $US0AND AND "FE &1'(') 1''+) 1'',) 1''3) 1''()
+***/
I
In 19?2- Dauricio- a "ilipino pensioner of the 9.#. ;oernment- contracted a bigamous
marriage with 'rlinda- despite the fact that his first wife- !arol- was still liing. In 19?<- Dauricio
and 'rlinda )ointly bought a parcel of >iceland- with the title being placed )ointly in their names.
#hortly thereafter- they purchased another property *a house and lot+ which was placed in her
name alone as the buyer. In 1931- Dauricio died- and !arol promptly filed an action against 'rlinda
to recoer both the >iceland and the house and lot- claiming them to be con)ugal property of the
first marriage. 'rlinda contends that she and the late Dauricio were co-owners of the >icelandE and
with respect to the house and lot- she claims she is the e5clusie owner. Assuming she fails to
proe that she had actually used her own money in either purchase- how do you decide the case?
*1993+
ANS"ER#

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!arol@s action to recoer both the >iceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are
con)ugal property in iew of the failure of 'rlinda- the wife in a bigamous marriage- to proe that
her own money was used in the purchases made. ,he #upreme !ourt in a case applied Art. 1C3-
"amily !ode- despite the fact that the husband@s death tooB place prior to the effectiity of said
law. %oweer- een under Art. 1CC- !iil !ode- the same conclusion would hae been reached in
iew of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
ANOT$ER ANS"ER#
9nder Art. 1C3 of the "!- which applies to bigamous marriages- only the properties
ac.uired by both parties through their actual )oint contribution of money- property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respectie contributions. Doreoer- if one of
the parties is alidly married to another- his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
communityFcon)ugal partnership e5isting in such alid marriage.
,hus- in this case- since 'rlinda failed to proe that she used her own money to buy the
>iceland and house and lot- she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the >iceland nor the e5clusie
owner of the house and lot. #uch properties are Dauricio@s. And since his share accrues to the
con)ugal partnership with carol- !arol can alidly claim such properties to the e5clusion of 'rlinda
*Art. 1CC- !iil !ode+.
II
In 19?G- Bob and Issa got married without e5ecuting a marriage settlement. In 19?<- Bob
inherited from his father a residential lot upon which- in 1931- he constructed a two-room
bungalow with saings from his own earnings. At that time- the lot was worth 73GG-GGG while the
house- when finished cost 76GG-GGG. In 1939- Bob died- suried only by his wife- Issa and his
mother- #ofia. Assuming that the relatie alues of both assets remained at the same proportionH
A. #tate whether #ofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not con)ugal but
e5clusie property of her deceased son.
B. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 2- 1933? *1993+
ANS"ERS#
A. #ince Bob and Issa got married in 19?G- then the law that goerns is the =ew !iil !ode
*7ersons+- in which case- the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of
the spouses is the system of relatie community or con)ugal partnership of gains *Art. 119- !iil
!ode+. By con)ugal partnership of gains- the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their worB or industry *Article 1C2- !iil !ode+. In this
instance- the lot inherited by Bob in 19?< is his own separate property- he haing ac.uired the
same by lucratie title *Art. 1C3- par. 2- !iil !ode+. %oweer- the house constructed from his own
saings in 1931 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is con)ugal property and not
e5clusie property in accordance with the principle of Ireerse accessionJ proided for in Art. 1<3-
!iil !ode.
B. Kes- the answer would still be the same. #ince Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way
bacB in 19?G- then the property relations that will goern is still the relatie community or con)ugal
partnership of gains *Art. 119- !iil !ode+. It will not matter if Bob died before or after August 2-
1933 *effectiity of the "amily !ode+- what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted.
As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way bacB in 19?G- the property relation that goerns
them is still the con)ugal partnership of gains. *Art. 1<3- !iil !ode+
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
A. #ofia- being her deceased son@s legal heir concurring with his suriing spouse *Arts. 93<-
936- and 99?- !iil !ode+- may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not con)ugal but belong
to the hereditary estate of Bob- the alue of the land being more than the cost of the improement
*Art. 12G- "!+.
B. If Bob died before August 2- 1933- which is the date the "amily !ode tooB effect- the
answer will not be the same. Art. 1<3- !iil !ode- would then apply. ,he land would then be
deemed con)ugal- along with the house- since con)ugal funds were used in constructing it. ,he
husband@s estate would be entitled to reimbursement of the alue of the land from con)ugal
partnership funds.

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III
"or fie years since 1939- ,ony- a banB ice-president- and #usan- an entertainer- lie
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to
marry each other. #ince ,ony@s salary was more than enough for their needs- #usan stopped
worBing and merely IBept the houseJ. $uring that period- ,ony was able to buy a lot and house in a
plush subdiision. %oweer- after fie years- ,ony and #usan decided to separate.
A. Who will be entitled to the house and lot?
B. Would it maBe any difference if ,ony could not marry #usan because he was preiously
married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? *2GGG+
ANS"ERS#
A. ,ony and #usan are entitled to the house and lot as co-owners in e.ual shares. 9nder
Article 1C? of the "amily !ode- when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
lied e5clusiely with each other as husband and wife- the property ac.uired during their
cohabitation are presumed to hae been obtained by their )oint efforts - worB or industry and shall
be owned by then in e.ual shares. ,his is true een though the efforts of one of them consisted
merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
B. Kes- it would maBe a difference. 9nder Article 1C3 of the "amily !ode- when the parties to
the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment- only those properties
ac.uired by both of them through their actual )oint contribution of money- property- or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respectie contributions. ,he efforts of
one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered ade.uate
contribution in the ac.uisition of the properties.
#ince #usan did not contribute to the ac.uisition of the house and lot- she has no share
therein. If ,ony cohabited with #usan after his legal separation from Alice- the house and lot is his
e5clusie property. If he cohabited with #usan before his legal separation from Alice- the house and
lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
IA
:uis and >i((a- both 26 years of age and single- lie e5clusiely with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. :uis is gainfully employed. >i((a is not employed- stays
at home- and taBes charge of the household chores.
After liing together for a little oer twenty years- :uis was able to sae from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of 72GG-GGG presently deposited in a banB. A house and lot
worth 7<GG-GGG was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. 8f the 7<GG-GGG used
by the common-law spouses to purchase the property- 72GG-GGG had come from the sale of palay
harested from the hacienda owned by :uis and 72GG-GGG from the rentals of a building belonging
to >i((a. In fine- the sum of 7<GG-GGG had been part of the fruits receied during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth 71GG-GGG being used by the common-law
spouses- was donated )ust months ago to >i((a by her parents.
:uis and >i((a now decide to terminate their cohabitation- and they asB you to gie them
your legal adice on the followingH
A. %ow- under the law- should the banB deposit of 72GG-GGG- the house and lot alued at
7<GG-GGG and the car worth 71GG-GGG be allocated to them?
B. What would your answer be *to the aboe .uestion+ had :uis and >i((a been liing
together all the time- i.e.- since twenty years ago- under a alid marriage? *199?+
ANS"ERS#
A. Art. 1C? of the "! proides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other- lie e5clusiely with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a oid marriage- their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in e.ual shares
and the property ac.uired by both of them through their worB or industry shall be goerned by the
rules of co-ownership.

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In the absence of proof to the contrary- properties ac.uired while they lied together shall
be presumed to hae been obtained by their )oint efforts- worB or industry- and shall be owned by
them in e.ual shares. A party who did not participate in the ac.uisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to hae contributed )ointly in the ac.uisition thereof if the former@s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
,husH
1+ ,he wages and salaries of :uis in the amount of 72GG-GGG shall be diided e.ually
between :uis and >i((a.
2+ ,he house and lot alued at 7<GG-GGG haing been ac.uired by both of them through
worB or industry shall be diided between them in proportion to their respectie
contribution- in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. %ence- :uis gets 2F< while
>i((a gets 2F< of 7<GG-GGG.
2+ ,he car worth 71GG-GGG shall be e5clusiely owned by >i((a- the same haing been
donated to her by her parents.
B. ,he property relations between :uis and >i((a- their marriage haing been celebrated 2G
years ago *under the !iil !ode+ shall be goerned by the con)ugal partnership of gains- under
which the husband and wife place in common fund the proceeds- products- fruits and income from
their separate properties and those ac.uired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance- and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership- the net gains or benefits
obtained by either or both spouse shall be diided e.ually between them *Art. 1C2- !iil !ode+.
,husH
1+ ,he salary of :uis deposited in the banB in the amount of 72GG-GGG and the house and
lot alued at 7<GG-GGG shall be diided e.ually between :uis and >i((a.
2+ %oweer- the car worth 71GG-GGG donated to >i((a by her parents shall be considered
to her own paraphernal property- haing been ac.uired by lucratie title *par.2-
Art.1C3- !iil !ode+
TOPC# ADOPTON &1'(') 1''-) 1''() +***) +**1/
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#ometime in 199G- #arah- born a "ilipino but by then a naturali(ed American citi(en- and
her American husband ,om- filed a petition in the >,! of DaBati- for the adoption of the minor
child of her sister- a "ilipina. !an the petition be granted? *2GGG+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
It depends. If ,om and #arah hae been residing in the 7hilippines for at least 2 years prior
to the effectiity of >A 3<<2- the petition may be granted. 8therwise- the petition cannot be
granted because the American husband is not .ualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 199G- it was considered refiled upon the
effectiity of >A 3<<2- the $omestic Adoption Act of 1993. ,his is the law applicable- the petition
being still pending with the lower court.
9nder the Act- #arah and ,om must adopt )ointly because they do not fall in any of the
e5ceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt )ointly- the
#upreme !ourt has held in a line of cases that both of them must be .ualified to adopt. While
#arah- an alien- is .ualified to adopt under #ection ?*b+*i+ of the Act for being a former "ilipino
citi(en who seeBs to adopt a relatie within the C
th
degree of consanguinity or affinity- ,oman
alien is not .ualified because he is neither a former "ilipino citi(en nor married to a "ilipino. 8ne
of them not being .ualified to adopt- their petition has to be denied. %oweer- if they hae been
residents of the 7hilippines three years prior to the effectiity of the Act and continues to reside
here until the decree of adoption is entered- they are .ualified to adopt the nephew of #arah under
#ection ?*b+ thereof- and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
#ince the petition was filed before the effectiity of the $omestic Adoption Act of 1993-
the "amily !ode is the law applicable.
9nder the "!- #arah and ,om must adopt )ointly because they do not fall in any of the
e5ceptions where one may adopt alone. 9nder a long line of cases decided by the #upreme !ourt-
when husband and wife must adopt )ointly- both of them must be .ualified to adopt. While #arah is

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.ualified to adopt under Article 13C*2+*a+ for being a former "ilipino citi(en who seeBs to adopt a
relatie by consanguinity- ,om is not. %e is not a former "ilipino citi(en and neither is he married
to a "ilipino. 8ne of them not being .ualified to adopt- the petition must be denied.
TOPC# DECLARATON OF NULLTY
ANNULMENT &14o5nds) de6la4ations and e22e6ts/ &1''1) 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) +**+/
LE%AL SEPARATON &14o5nds and e22e6ts/ &1'(') 1'',) 1''-) 1''.) +**+/
I
Bert and Baby were married to each other on $ecember 22- 1933. #i5 months later- she
discoered that he was a drug addict. 'fforts to hae him rehabilitated were unsuccessful.
!an Baby asB for annulment of marriage- or legal separation? '5plain. *1996+
ANS"ER#
=o- Baby cannot asB for annulment of her marriage or for legal separation because both
these actions hae already prescribed.
While concealment of drug addiction e5isting at the time of marriage constitutes fraud
under Art. C6 of the "! which maBes the marriage oidable under Art. C< of the "!- the action
must- howeer- be brought within < years from the discoery thereof under Article C?*2+- "!. #ince
the drug addiction of Bert was discoered by Baby in Lune 1939- the action had already prescribed
in Lune of 199C.
Although drug addiction is a ground for legal separation under Art. <<*<+ and Art. <? of the
"! re.uires that the action must be brought within < years from the occurrence of the cause. #ince
Bert had been a drug addict from the time of the celebration of the marriage- the action for legal
separation must hae been brought not later than 22 $ecember 1992. %ence- Baby cannot- now-
bring action for legal separation.
II
A. ;ie a brief definition or e5planation of the term Mpsychological incapacityM as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage.
B. If e5isting at the inception of marriage- would the state of being of unsound mind or the
concealment of drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- homose5uality or lesbianism be considered
indicia of psychological incapacity? '5plain.
!. If drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality should occur only during
the marriage- would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal separation- or
would they render the marriage oidable? *2GG2+
ANS"ERS#
A. M7sychological incapacityM is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the
incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of loe-
respect- cohabitation- mutual help and support- trust and commitment. It must be characteri(ed by
)uridical antecedence- graity and incurability and its root causes must be clinically identified or
e5amined. *Santos v. CA- 2CG #!>A 2G 199<4+
B. ln the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals- 2CG #!>A 2G *199<+- the #upreme !ourt held that
being of unsound mind- drug addiction- habituaI alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality may be
indicia of psychological incapacity- depending on the degree of seerity of the disorder. %oweer-
the concealment of drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
!. ln accordance with law- if drug addiction- habitual alcoholism- lesbianism or homose5uality
should occur only during the marriage- theyH
1+ Will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity *Art 26- "amily !ode+E
2+ Will constitute as grounds for legal separation *Art. <<- "!+E and
2+ Will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage oidable *Art. C< and C6- "!+.

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III
!adio and !orona contracted marriage on Lune 1- 1932. A few days after the marriage- !orona
discoered that !adio was a homose5ual. As homose5uality was not a ground for legal separation
under the !iil !ode- there was nothing that !orona could do but bear with her problem. ,he
couple- howeer- started to lie separately. With the enactment of the "amily !ode- !orona
decided to be legally separated from !adio based on the new ground of homose5uality. !orona
brought her action for legal separation on #eptember 1<- 1933. Will the action prosper? ;ie your
reasons. *1939+
ANS"ER#
Kes- the action will prosper because the IcauseJ arose only on August 2- 1933- the
effectiity of the "amily !ode- and the action had not yet prescribed.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
,he action will prosper. ,he offense of homose5uality as a continuing offense can be a
ground for legal separation. ,he prescriptie period of fie years will apply only when the offense
has a fi5ed period of time and- therefore- the date of its occurrence can be computed.
Property
TOPC# USUFRUCT N %ENERAL) R%$TS AND O0L%ATONS OF T$E USUFRUCTUARY AND
E7TN%US$MENT OF T$E USUFRUCT &1'(') 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''(/
I
8n 1 Lanuary 193G- Dinera- the owner of a building- granted 7etronila a usufruct oer the
property until G1 Lune 1993 when Danuel- a son of 7etronila- would hae reached his 2G
th
birthday.
Danuel- howeer- died on 1 Lune 199G when he was only 26 years old.
Dinera notified 7etronila that the usufruct had been e5tinguished by the death of Danuel
and demanded that the latter acate the premises and delier the same to the former. 7etronila
refused to acate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her faor would e5pire only on 1
Lune 1993 when Danuel would hae reached his 2G
th
birthday and that the death of Danuel did not
e5tinguish the usufruct.
Whose contention should be accepted? *199?+
ANS"ER#
7etronila@s contention is correct. 9nder Article 6G6 of the !iil !ode- a usufruct granted for
the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall subsist for the number of
years specified een if the third person should die unless there is an e5press stipulation in the
contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar- there is no e5press stipulation that the
consideration for the usufruct is the e5istence of 7etronila@s son. ,hus- the general rule and not
the e5ception should apply in this case.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
,his is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Danuel until he reaches 2G
years of age- with 7etronila sering only as a conduit- holding the property in trust for his benefit.
,he death of Danuel at the age of 26- therefore- terminated the usufruct.
TOPC# R%$T OF ACCESSON &1'(') 1''+) +***) +**1/
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$emetrio Bnew that a piece of land bordering the beach belonged to 'rnesto. %oweer-
since the latter was studying in 'urope and no one was taBing care of the land- $emetrio occupied
the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with tables and benches which he rented out to
people who wanted to hae a picnic by the beach. When 'rnesto returned- he demanded the return
of the land. $emetrio agreed to do so after he has remoed the nipa sheds. 'rnesto refused to let

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$emetrio remoe the nipa sheds on the ground that these already belonged to him by right of
accession. Who is correct? *2GGG+
ANS"ER#
'rnesto is correct. $emetrio is a builder in bad faith because he Bnew beforehand that the
land belonged to $emetrio. 9nder Art. CC9 of the =!!- one who builds on the land of another loses
what is built without right to indemnity. 'rnesto becomes the owner of the nipa sheds by right of
accession. %ence- 'rnesto is well within his right in refusing to allow the remoal of the nipa sheds.
II
#ubse.uent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a rier- its area was
increased by accession. ,his additional area was not included in the technical description appearing
on the ,orrens !ertificate of ,itle haing been ac.uired subse.uent to the registration
proceedings. Day such additional area be ac.uired by third persons thru prescription? ;ie your
reasons. *1939+
ANS"ER#
,he :and >egistration :aw proides that no title in derogation of the registered owner may
be ac.uired by aderse possession or ac.uisitie prescription. #ince the law refers to registered
lands- the accession mentioned in this .uestion may be ac.uired by a third person through aderse
possession or ac.uisitie prescription.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
If the accession is man made- then it cannot be considered as priate property. It belongs
to the public domain- and- therefore- cannot be ac.uired by aderse possession or ac.uisitie
prescription.
TOPC# 0ULDER N %OOD FAT$ &1''+) 1''') +***) +**1/
I
Bartolome constructed a chapel on the land of 'ric. What are Bartolome@s rights if he wereH
A. A possessor of the land in good faith?
B. A possessor of the land in bad faith?
!. A usufructuary of the land?
$. A lessee of the land? *1996+
ANS"ERS#
A. A chapel is a useful improement. Bartolome may remoe the chapel if it can be remoed
without damage to the land- unless 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel. In the latter case-
Bartolome has the right to the reimbursement of the alue of the chapel with right of
retention until he is reimbursed. *Art. CC3 in relation to Art. <C6 and <C?- =!!+.
B. Bartolome- under Art. CC9 of the =!!- loses whateer he built- without any right to
indemnity.
!. Bartolome has the right to remoe the improement if it is possible to do so without
causing damage to the property *Art. <?9- =!!+. %e may also set off the improement
against any damages which the property held in usufruct suffered because of his act or the
acts of his assignee. *Art. <3G- =!!+
$. ,he owner of the land- as lessor- can ac.uire the improement by paying for one-half of its
alue. #hould the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount- the lessee may remoe the
improement- een though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby *Art. 16?3- =!!+.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
A. Assuming that 'ric acted in good faith- Bartolome@s rights will depend upon what option
'ric chooses. 'ric- the owner of the land- may choose to ac.uire the chapel- which is a
useful e5pense or to sell the land to the builder *Bartolome+.

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If 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel- he has the right to reimbursement for useful
e5penses- with a right of retention until paid.
If 'ric chooses to sell the land to Bartolome- Bartolome may refuse to buy the land
if the alue of the land is considerably more than the alue of the building- in which case-
there will be a forced lease between them.
B. It is the owner of the land who has the right to ac.uire the chapel without paying
indemnity- plus damages- or to re.uire Bartolome to remoe the chapel- plus damages or to
re.uire Bartolome to buy the land- without any option to refuse to buy it. *Arts. CC9 and
C<3- =!!+
If 'ric acted in bad faith- then his bad faith cancels the bad faith of Bartolome- and
both will be taBen to hae acted in good faith. *Art. C<2- =!!+
ADDTONAL ANS"ER#
A. If 'ric acted in good faith- then Bartolome has the right of absolute remoal of the chapel-
plus damages. %oweer- if 'ric chooses to ac.uire the chapel- then Bartolome has the right to
reimbursement- plus payment of damages- with right of retention *Art. C<C in relation to Art.
CC?- =!!+
II
DiBe built a house on his lot in 7asay !ity. ,wo years later- a surey disclosed that a
portion of the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Lose- to the e5tent of CG s.uare
meters. Lose claims that DiBe is a builder in bad faith because he should Bnow the boundaries of his
lot- and demands that the portion of the house which encroached on his land should be destroyed
or remoed. DiBe replies that he is a builder in good faith and offers to buy the land occupied by
the building instead.
A. Is DiBe a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why?
B. Whose preference should be followed? Why? *2GG1+
ANS"ERS#
A. Kes- DiBe is a builder in good faith. ,here is no showing that when he built his house- he
Bnew that a portion thereof encroached on Lose@s lot. 9nless one is ersed in the science of
sureying- he cannot determine the precise boundaries or location of his property by merely
e5amining is title. In the absence of contrary proof- the law presumes that the encroachment was
done in good faith 1Technogas Phils. vs. CA, 263 #!>A <- 1< *199?+4
B. =one of the preferences should be followed. ,he preference of DiBe cannot preail because
under Art. CC3 of the !!- it is the owner of the land who has the option or choice- not the builder.
8n the other hand- the option belongs to Lose- he cannot demand that the portion of the house
encroaching on his land be destroyed or remoed because this is not one of the options gien by
law to the owner of the land. ,he owner may choose between the appropriation of what was built
after payment of indemnity- or to compel the builder to pay for the land of the alue of the land is
not considerably more than that of the building. 8therwise- the builder shall pay rent for the
portion of the land encroached.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
A. DiBe cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he built his house without first
determining the corners and boundaries of his lot to maBe sure that his construction was within the
perimeter of his property. %e could hae done this with the help of a geodetic engineer as an
ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do under the circumstances.
B. Lose@ s preference should be followed. %e may hae the building remoed at the e5pense of
DiBe- appropriate the building as his own- oblige DiBe to buy the land and asB for damages in
addition to any of the three options. *Arts. CC9- C<G- C<1- !!+
TOPC# EASEMENT &CONCEPT) KNDS) AND EFFECTS/ & 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) +***) +**1) +**+/
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:auro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. %ernando owns an ad)acent
land deoted to his piggery business- which is two *2+ meters higher in eleation. Although
%ernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery- it is inade.uate to contain the

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waste water containing pig manure- and it often oerflows and inundates :auroNs plantation. ,his
has increased the acidity of the soil in the plantation- causing the trees to wither and die. :auro
sues for damages caused to his plantation. %ernando inoBes his right to the benefit of a natural
easement in faor of his higher estate- which imposes upon the lower estate of :auro the obligation
to receie the waters descending from the higher estate. Is %ernando correct? *2GG2+
ANS"ER#
%ernando is wrong. It is true that :auro@s land is burdened with the natural easement to
accept or receie the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends from a
higher estate to a lower estate. %oweer- %ernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his
piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to :auroNs land. %ernando has- thus
interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. 9nder Art. 69? of the
!!- abatement of a nuisance does not preclude recoery of damages by :auro een for the past
e5istence of a nuisance. ,he claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191 *C+ of the !!.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
%ernando is not correct. Article 62? of the =ew !iil !ode proides that the owner of the
higher estate cannot maBe worBs which will increase the burden on the serient estate. *Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA- 22G #!>A 1C< 12GGG4+. ,he owner of the higher estate may be compelled to
pay damages to the owner of the lower estate.
II
'mma bought a parcel of land from '.uitable-7!I BanB- which ac.uired the same from
"elisa- the original owner. ,hereafter- 'mma discoered that "elisa had granted a right of way oer
the land in faor of the land of ;eorgina- which had no outlet to a public highway- but the
easement was not annotated when the serient estate was registered under the ,orrens system.
'mma then filed a complaint for cancellation of the right of way- on the ground that it had been
e5tinguished by such failure to annotate. %ow would you decide the controersy? *2GG1+
ANS"ER#
,he complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way must fail. ,he failure to
annotate the easement upon the title of the serient estate is not among the grounds for
e5tinguishing an easement under Art. 621 of the !iil !ode. 9nder Art. 61?- easements are
inseparable from the estate to which they actiely or passiely belong. 8nce it attaches- it can only
be e5tinguished under Art. 621- and they e5ist een if they are not stated or annotated as an
encumbrance on the ,orrens title of the serient estate. *II ,olentino 226- 193? ed.+
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
9nder #ection CC- 7$ =o. 1<29- eery registered owner receiing a certificate of title
pursuant to a decree of registration- and eery subse.uent innocent purchaser for alue- shall hold
the same free from all encumbrances e5cept those noted on said certificate. ,his rule- howeer-
admits of e5ceptions.
9nder Act C96- as amended by Act =o. 2G11- and #ection C- Act 2621- an easement if not
registered shall remain and shall be held to pass with the land until cut-off or e5tinguished by the
registration of the serient estate. %oweer- this proision has been suppressed in #ection CC- 7$
=8. 1<29. In other words- the registration of the serient estate did not operate to cut-off or
e5tinguish the right of way. ,herefore- the complaint for the cancellation of the right of way
should be dismissed.
III
A. What is easement? $istinguish easement from usufruct.
B. !an there be *1+ an easement oer a usufruct? *2+ a usufruct oer an easement? *2+ an
easement oer another easement? '5plain. *199<+
ANS"ERS#
A. An easement or seritude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immoable for the benefit of
another immoable belonging to a different owner. *Art. 612- =!!+

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9sufruct gies a right to en)oy the property of another with the obligation of presering its
form and substance- unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise proides *Art. <62- =!!+.
An easement or seritude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immoable for the benefit of
another immoable belonging to a different owner *Art. 612- =!!+.
B.
*1+ ,here can be no easement oer a usufruct. #ince an easement may be constituted only on a
corporeal immoable property- no easement may be constituted on a usufruct which is not a
corporeal right.
*2+ ,here can be no usufruct oer an easement. While a usufruct may be created oer a right- such
right must hae an e5istence of its own independent of the property. A seritude cannot be the
ob)ect of a usufruct because it has no e5istence independent of the property to which it attaches.
*2+ ,here can be no easement oer another easement for the same reason as in *1+. An easement-
although it is a real right oer an immoable- is not a corporeal right. ,here is a >oman ma5im
which says thatH ,here can be no seritude oer another seritude.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
A. 'asement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immoable for the benefit of another
immoable belonging to a different owner in which case it is called real or predial easement- or for
the benefit of a community or group of persons in which case it is Bnown as a personal easement.
,he distinctions between usufruct and easement areH
a. 9sufruct includes all uses of the property and for all purposes- including us fruen!i.
'asement is limited to a specific use.
b. 9sufruct may be constituted on immoable or moable property. 'asement may be
constituted only on an immoable property.
c. 'asement is not e5tinguished by the death of the owner of the dominant estate while
usufruct is e5tinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention
appears.
d. An easement contemplates two *2+ estates belonging to two *2+ different ownersE a
usufruct contemplates only one property *real or personal+ whereby the usufructuary
uses and en)oys the property as well as its fruits- while another owns the naBed title
during the period of the usufruct.
e. A usufruct may be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches- while
an easement cannot be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches.
B. *2+ ,here cannot be a usufruct oer an easement since an easement presupposes two *2+
tenements belonging to different persons and the right attaches to the tenement and not to the
owner. While a usufruct gies the usufructuary a right to use- right to en)oy- right to the fruits- and
right to possess- an easement gies only a limited use of the serient estate.
%oweer- a usufruct can be constituted oer a property that has in its faor an easement or
one burdened with a seritude. ,he usufructuary will e5ercise the easement during the period of
the usufruct.
TOPC# DONATON &1''*) 1''1) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''() 1''') +***/
I
#pouses Dichael and :inda donated a 2-hectare residential land to the !ity of Baguio on the
condition that the city goernment would build thereon a public parB with a bo5ing arena- the
construction of which shall commence within si5 *6+ months from the date the parties ratify the
donation. ,he donee accepted the donation and the title to the property was transferred in its
name. "ie years elapsed but the public parB with the bo5ing arena was neer started. !onsidering
the failure of the donee to comply with the condition of the donation- the donor-spouses sold the
property to "erdinand who then sued to recoer the land from the city goernment.
Will the suit prosper? *1991+
ANS"ER#

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"erdinand has no right to recoer the land. It is true that the donation was reocable
because of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation is reoBed- it remained
alid. %ence- #pouses Dichael and :inda had no right to sell the land to "erdinand. 8ne cannot gie
what he does not hae. What the donors should hae done first was to hae the donation annulled
or reoBed. And after that was done- they could alidly hae disposed of the land in faor of
"erdinand.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
9ntil the contract of donation has been resoled or rescinded under Article 1191 of the !!
or reoBed under Article ?6C of the !!- the donation stands effectie and alid. Accordingly- the
sale made by the donor to "erdinand cannot be said to hae coneyed title to "erdinand- who-
thereby- has no cause of action for recoery of the land acting for and in his behalf.
ANOT$ER ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
,he donation is onerous. And being onerous- what applies is the law on contracts- and not
the law on donation *De "una vs. A#rigo, 31 #!>A 1<G+. Accordingly- the prescriptie period for the
filing of such an action would be the ordinary prescriptie period for contracts which may either be
si5 or ten depending upon whether it is erbal or written. ,he filing of the case fie years later is
within the prescriptie period and- therefore- the action can prosper.
,he law on donation lays down a special prescriptie period in the case of breach of
condition- which is four years from non-compliance thereof *Article ?6C !!+. #ince the action has
prescribed- the suit will not prosper.
II
8n Luly 2?- 199?- 7edro mailed in Danila a letter to his brother- Lose- a resident of Iloilo
!ity- offering to donate a intage sports car which the latter had long been wanting to buy from the
former. 8n August <- 199?- Lose called 7edro by cellular phone to thanB him for his generosity and
to inform him that he was sending by mail his letter of acceptance. 7edro neer receied that
letter because it was neer mailed. 8n August 1C- 199?- 7edro receied a telegram from Iloilo
informing him that Lose had been Billed in a road accident the day before *August 12- 199?+.
A. Is there a perfected donation?
B. Will your answer be the same if Lose did mail his acceptance letter but it was receied
by 7edro in Danila days after Lose@s death? *1993+
ANS"ERS#
A. =one. ,here is no perfected donation. 9nder Art. ?C3 of the !!- the donation of a moable
may be made orally or in writing. If the alue of the personal property donated e5ceeds 7<-GGG- the
donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Assuming that the alue of the thing
donated- a intage sports car- e5ceeds 7<-GGG- then the donation and the acceptance must be in
writing. In this instance- the acceptance of Lose was not in writing- therefore- the donation is oid.
9pon the other hand- assuming that the sports car costs less than 7<-GGG- then the donation may be
oral- but still- the simultaneous deliery of the car is needed and there being none- the donation
was neer perfected.
B. Kes- the answer is the same. If Lose@s mail containing his acceptance of the donation was
receied by 7edro after the former@s death- then the donation is still oid because under Article
?2C of the !!- the donation is perfected the moment the donor Bnows of the acceptance by the
donee. ,he death of Lose before 7edro could receie the acceptance indicates that the donation
was neer perfected. 9nder Article ?C6 acceptance must be made during the lifetime of both the
donor and the donee.
Wills and Succession
TOPC# "LLS N %ENERAL &1'(') 1''3) 1''3) 1''-) 1''() +***/

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Danuel- a "ilipino- and his American wife 'leanor- e5ecuted a Loint Will in Boston-
Dassachusetts when they were residing in said city. ,he law of Dassachusetts allows the e5ecution
of )oint wills. #hortly thereafter- 'leanor died. !an the said Will be probated in the 7hilippines for
the settlement of her estate? *2GGG+
ANS"ER#
Kes- the will may be probated in the 7hilippines insofar as the estate of 'leanor is
concerned. While the !iil !ode prohibits the e5ecution of )oint wills here and abroad- such
prohibition applies only to "ilipinos. %ence- the )oint will which is alid where e5ecuted is alid in
the 7hilippines but only with respect to 'leanor. 9nder Article 319- it is oid with respect to Danuel
whose )oint will remains oid in the 7hilippines despite being alid where e5ecuted.
TOPC# NTESTATE SUCCESSON &1''+) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''() 1''') +***) +**3/

I
A. :uis was suried by two legitimate children- two illegitimate children- his parents- and
two brothers. %e left an estate of 71 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of :uis- how much is
the legitime of each- and how much is the free portion of his estate if any?
B. #uppose :uis- in the preceding .uestion *a+- died intestate. Who are his intestate heirs- and
how much is the share of each in his estate? *2GG2+
ANS"ERS#
A. ,he compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two illegitimate children. ,he
parents are e5cluded by the legitimate children- while the brothers are not compulsory heirs at all.
,heir respectie legitimes areH
*1+ ,he legitime of the two *2+ legitimate children is one-half *1F2+ of the estate
*7<GG-GGG+ to be diided between them e.ually- or 72<G-GGG each .
*2+ ,he legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half *1F2+ the legitime of each legitimate
child or 712<-GGG.
#ince the total legitimes of the compulsory heirs is 7?<G-GGG- the balance of 72<G-GGG is the
free portion.
B. ,he intestate heirs are the two *2+ legitimate children and the two *2+ illegitimate
children. In intestacy the estate if the decedent is diided among the legitimate and illegitimate
children such that the share of each illegitimate child is one-half the share of each legitimate
child.
,heir shares areH
"or each legitimate child - 7222-222.22
"or each illegitimate child - 7166-666.66
*Art. 932- =!!E Art. 1?6- "!+
Obligations and Contracts
TOPC# CONTRACTS N %ENERAL &6on6e8t) 9inds) 4e:5i4e;ents 2o4 validit< and 4e;edies/
&1'(') 1''*) 1''1) 1''+) 1''3) 1''-) 1''() +**+/
I
>oland- a basBetball star- was under contract for one year to play-for-play e5clusiely for
:ady :oe- Inc. %oweer- een before the basBetball season could open- he was offered a more
attractie pay plus fringe benefits by #weet ,aste- Inc. >oland accepted the offer and transferred
to #weet ,aste. :ady :oe sues >oland and #weet ,aste for breach of contract. $efendants claim
that the restriction to play for :ady :oe alone is oid- hence- unenforceable- as it constitutes an

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undue interference with the right of >oland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his
freedom to play and en)oy basBetball.
!an >oland be bound by the contract he entered into with :ady :oe or can he disregard
the same? Is he liable at all? %ow about #weet ,aste? Is it liable to :ady :oe? *1991+
ANS"ER#
>oland is bound by the contract he entered into with :ady :oe and he cannot disregard
the same- under the principles of obligations and contracts. 8bligations arising from contracts hae
the force of law between the parties.
Kes- >oland is liable under the contract as far as :ady :oe is concerned.
%e is liable for damages under Article 11?G of the !! since he contraened the tenor of his
obligation. =ot being a contracting party- #weet ,aste is not bound by the contract but it can be
held liable under Art. 121C. ,he basis of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is founded on
.uasi-delict- assuming that #weet ,aste Bnew of the contract. Art. 121C of the !! proides that any
third person who induces another to iolate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
It is assumed that :ady :oe Bnew of the contract.
=either >oland nor #weet ,aste would be liable- because the restriction in the contract is
iolatie of Article 12G6 as being contrary to law- morals- good custom- public order- or public
policy.
II
7rintado is engaged in the printing business. #uplico supplies printing paper to 7rintado
pursuant to an order agreement under which #uplico binds himself to delier the same olume of
paper eery month for a period of 13 months- with 7rintado in turn agreeing to pay within 6G days
after each deliery. #uplico has been faithfully deliering under the order agreement for 1G months
but thereafter stopped doing so- because 7rintado has not made any payment at all. 7rintado has
also a standing contract with publisher 7ublico for the printing of 1G-GGG olumes of school
te5tbooBs. #uplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing 1-GGG olumes- 7rintado also
fails to perform under its printing contract with 7ublico- #uplico sues 7rintado for the alue of the
unpaid delieries under their order agreement. At the same time 7ublico sues 7rintado for damages
for breach of contract with respect to their own printing agreement. In the suit filed by #uplico-
7rintado counters thatH a+ #uplico cannot demand payment for delieries made under their order
agreement until #uplico has completed performance under said contactE b+ #uplico should pay
damages for breach of contractE and c+ #uplico should be liable for 7rintadoNs breach of his contract
with 7ublico because the order agreement between #uplico and 7rintado was for the benefit of
7ublico. Are the contentions of 7rintado tenable? '5plain your answer as to each contention. *2GG2+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
=o- the contentions of 7rintado are untenable.
a+ 7rintado haing failed to pay for the printing paper coered by the deliery inoices on
time- #uplico has the right to cease maBing further deliery. And the latter did not iolate the
order agreement *Integrate! Pac$aging Corp. v. Court of Appeals- *222 #!>A 1?G- ;.>. =o. 11<11?-
Lune 3- 2GGG.+
b+ #uplico cannot be held liable for damages- for breach of contract- as it was not he who
iolated the order agreement- but 7rintado.
c) #uplico cannot be held liable for 7rintadoNs breach of contract with 7ublico. %e is not a
party to the agreement entered into by and between 7rintado and 7ublico. ,heirs is not a
stipulation pour autrui. OAforesaid4 #uch contracts could not affect third persons liBe #uplico
because of the basic ciil law principle of relatiity of contracts which proides that contracts can
only bind the parties who entered into it- and it cannot faor or pre)udice a third person- een if he
is aware of such contract and has acted with Bnowledge thereof. %Integrate! Pac$aging Corp. v.
CA, supra.&

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TOPC# E7TN%US$MENT OF O0L%ATONS &1'(') 1''+) 1'',) 1''() +***) +**1) +**+/
I
In 19?3- Bobby borrowed 71-GGG-GGG from !hito payable in two years. ,he loan- which was
eidenced by a promissory note- was secured by a mortgage on real property. =o action was filed
by !hito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage. But in 1991- Bobby- without receiing any
amount from !hito- e5ecuted another promissory note which was worded e5actly as the 19?3
promissory note- e5cept for the date thereof- which was the date of its e5ecution.
!an !hito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 199C? *199C+
ANS"ER#
Kes- !hito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 199C. Although the 19?3
promissory note for 71 million payable two years or in 193G became a natural obligation after the
lapse of ten *1G+ years- such natural obligation can be a alid consideration of a noated promissory
note dated in 1991 and payable two years later or in 1992.
All the elements of an implied real noation are presentH
a+ an old alid obligationE
b+ a new alid obligationE
c+ capacity of the partiesE
d+ animus novan!i or intention to noateE and
e+ ,he old an new obligation should be incompatible with each other on all material points *Art.
1292+.
,he two promissory notes cannot stand together- hence- the period of prescription of ten
*1G+ years has not yet lapsed.
II
Arturo borrowed 7<GG-GGG from his father. After he had paid 72GG-GGG- his father died.
When the administrator of his father@s estate re.uested payment of the balance of 72GG-GGG-
Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father as eidenced by a notation at the
bacB of his checB payment for the 72GG-GGG readingH IIn full payment of the loanJ. Will this be a
alid defense in an action for collection? *2GGG+
ANS"ER#
It depends. If the notation Iin full payment of the loanJ was written by Arturo@s father-
there was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case- the
notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. ,he condonation being
implied- it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effectie. ,he defense of full
payment will- therefore- be alid.
When- howeer- the notation was written by Arturo himself- it merely proes his intention
in maBing that payment but in no way does it bind his father *'am vs. CA, ;> =o. 1GC?26- 11
"ebruary 1999+. In such case- the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation
may be inferred. ,here being no condonation at all- the defense of full payment will not be alid.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
If the notation was written by Arturo@s father- it amounted to an e5press condonation of
the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be alid under the 2
nd
par. 8f
Article 12?G of the =!!. #ince the amount of the balance is more than 7<-GGG- the acceptance by
Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article ?C3. ,here being no acceptance in
writing by Arturo- the condonation is oid and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. ,he
defense of full payment is- therefore- not alid. In case the notation was not written by Arturo@s
father- the answer is the same as the answers aboe.
Sales and Lease
TOPC# MACEDA LA" & 1'(') 1''') +***/

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What are the so-called IDacedaJ and I>ectoJ laws in connection with sales on
installments? ;ie the most important features of each law. *1999+
ANS"ER#
,he Daceda :aw *>.A. 6<<+ is applicable to sales of immoable property on installments. ,he most
important features are *Rillo vs. CA, 2C? #!>A C61+H
1. After haing paid installments for at least two years- the buyer is entitled to a mandatory
grace period of one month for eery year of installment payments made- to pay the unpaid
installments without interest.
If the contract is cancelled- the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender alue
e.uialent to <GP of the total payments made- and after fie years of installments- an additional
<P eery year but not to e5ceed 9GP of the total payments made.
2. In case the installments paid were less than 2 years- the seller shall gie the buyer a grace
period of not less than 6G days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the
e5piration of the grace period- the seller may cancel the contract after 2G days from
receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act.
,he >ecto :aw *Art- 1C3C+ refers to sale of moables payable in installments and limiting
the right of seller- in case of default by the buyer- to one of three remediesH
*a+ e5act fulfillmentE
*b+ cancel the sale if two or more installments hae not been paidE
*c+ foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold also in case of default of two or
more installments- with no further action against the purchaser.
II
7riscilla purchased a condominium unit in DaBati !ity from the !itiland !orporation for a
price of 71G million- payable 72 million down and the balance with interest thereon at 1CP per
annum payable in si5ty *6G+ e.ual monthly installments of 7193-222.22. ,hey e5ecuted a $eed of
!onditional #ale in which it is stipulated that should the endee fail to pay three *2+ successie
installments- the sale shall be deemed automatically rescinded without the necessity of )udicial
action and all payments made by the endee shall be forfeited in faor of the endor by way of
rental for the use and occupancy of the unit and as li.uidated damages. "or C6 months- 7riscilla
paid the monthly installments religiously- but on the C?
th
and C3
th
months- she failed to pay. 8n the
C9
th
month- she tried to pay the installments due but the endor refused to receie the payments
tendered by her. ,he following month- the endor sent her a notice that it was rescinding the $eed
of !onditional #ale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic rescission- and demanded that she
acate the premises. #he replied that the contract cannot be rescinded without )udicial demand or
notarial act pursuant to Article 1<92 of the !iil !ode.
A. Is Article 1<92 applicable?
B. !an the endor rescind the contract? *2GGG+
ANS"ERS#
A. Article 1<92 of the !iil !ode does not apply to a conditional sale. In (alarao vs. CA, 2GC #!>A
1<< the #upreme !ourt held that Article 1<92 applies only to a contract of sale and not to a
$eed of !onditional #ale where the seller has resered title to the property until full payment
of the purchase price. ,he law applicable is the Daceda :aw.
B. =o- the endor cannot rescind the contract under the circumstances. 9nder the Daceda :aw-
which is the law applicable- the seller on installment may not rescind the contract till after
the lapse of the mandatory grace period of 2G days for eery one year of installment
payments- and only after 2G days from notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by a
notarial act. In this case- the refusal of the seller to accept payment from the buyer on the
C9
th
month was not )ustified because the buyer was entitled to 6G days grace period and the
payment was tendered within that period. Doreoer- the notice of rescission sered by the
seller on the buyer was not effectie because the notice was not by a notarial act. Besides-
the seller may still pay within 2G days from such notarial notice before rescission may be

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effected. All these re.uirements for a alid rescission were not complied with by the seller.
%ence- the rescission is inalid.
TOPC# LEASE N %ENERAL AND T$E R%$TS AND O0L%ATONS OF T$E LESSOR AND LESSEE
&1''*) 1''3) 1''-) 1''.) 1''') +**1/
I
In a 2G-year lease contract oer a building- the lessee is e5pressly granted a right of first
refusal should the lessor decide to sell both the land and building. %oweer- the lessor sold the
property to a third person who Bnew about the lease and in fact agreed to respect it.
!onse.uently- the lessee brings an action against both the lessor-seller and the buyer *a+ to rescind
the sale and *b+ to compel specific performance of his right of first refusal in the sense that the
lessor should be ordered to e5ecute a deed of absolute sale in faor of the lessee at the same
price. ,he defendants contend that the plaintiff can neither seeB rescission of the sale nor compel
specific performance of a ImereJ right of first refusal. $ecide the case. *1993+
ANS"ER#
,he action filed by the lessee- for both rescission of the offending sale and specific
performance of the right of first refusal which was iolated- should prosper. ,he ruling in
E)uatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. *ayfair theater, Inc. *26C #!>A C32+- a case with similar
facts- sustains both rights of actions because the buyer in the subse.uent sale Bnew the e5istence
of right of first refusal- hence in bad faith.
ANOT$ER ANS"ER#
,he action to rescind the sale and to compel the right of first refusal will not prosper. *Ang
'u Asuncion vs. CA, 223 #!>A 6G2+. ,he !ourt ruled in a unanimous en #anc decision that the right
of first refusal is not founded upon contract but on a .uasi-delictual relationship coered by the
principles of human relations and un)ust enrichment *Art. 19- et se.. !iil !ode+. %ence the only
action that will prosper according to the #upreme !ourt is an Iaction for damages in a proper
forum for the purpose.J
TOPC# SU0 LEASE &6on6e8t and e22e6ts/ &1''*) 1'',) 1''') +***/
I
A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. ,he lease contract did not contain
any e5press prohibition against the assignment of the leasehold or the subleasing of the leased
premises. $uring the third year of the lease- B subleased the land to !. In turn- !- without A@s
consent- assigned the sublease to $. A then filed an action for the rescission of the contract of
lease on the ground that B has iolated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement. If you
were the )udge- how would you decide the case- particularly with respect to the alidity ofH
A. B@s sublease to !? and
B. !@s assignment of the sublease to $?
'5plain your answers. *199G+
ANS"ERS#
A. B@s sublease to ! is alid. Although the original period of two years for the lease contract
has e5pired- the lease continued with the ac.uiescence of the lessor during the third year. %ence-
there has been an implied renewal of the contract of lease. 9nder Art. 16<G of the !iil !ode- the
lessee may sublet the thing leased- in whole or in part- when the contract of lease does not contain
any e5press prohibition *Arts. 16<G- 16?G- !!+. A@s action for rescission should not prosper on this
ground.
B. !@s assignment of the sublease to $ is not alid. 9nder Art. 16C9 of the !!- the lessee
cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor- unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary. ,here is no such stipulation in the contract. If the law prohibits assignment of the lease
without the consent of the lessor- all the more would the assignment of a sublease be prohibited
without such consent. ,his is a iolation of the contract and is a alid ground for rescission by A.

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TOPC# CONTRACT TO SELL &NATURE AND EFFECTS/ &1''.) 1''') +**1/
I
Arturo gae >ichard a receipt which statesH
I>eceiptJ
>eceied from >ichard as down payment
"or my 199< ,oyota !orolla with
7late =o. QKR-122 --------------------------------------7<G-GGG.GG
Balance payableH 12F2GFG1 ----------------------------7<G-GGG.GG
#eptember 1<- 2GG1.
*#gd.+ Arturo
$oes this receipt eidence a contract to sell? Why? *2GG1+
ANS"ER#
It is a contract of sale because the seller did not resere ownership until he was fully paid.
II
#tate the basic difference *only in their legal effects+ /
A. Between a contract to sell- on the one hand- and a contract of sale- on the otherE
B. Between a conditional sale- on the one hand- and an absolute sale- on the other
hand. *199?+
ANS"ERS#
A. In a contract of sale- ownership is transferred to the buyer upon deliery of the ob)ect to him
while in a contract to sell- ownership is retained by the seller until the purchase price is fully
paid. In a contract to sell- deliery of the ob)ect does not confer ownership upon the buyer. In
a contract of sale- there is only one contract e5ecuted between the seller and the buyer-
while in a contract to sell- there are two contracts- first the contract to sell *which is
conditional or preparatory sale+ and a second- the final deed of sale or the principal contract
which is e5ecuted after full payment of the purchase price.
B. A conditional sale is one where the endor is granted the right to unilaterally rescind the
contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment- as the case may be- of the
prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title to the property is not resered to
the endor or if the endor is not granted the right to rescind the contract based on the
fulfillment or non-fulfillment- as the case may be- of the prescribed condition.
Partnership !gency and "rusts
TOPC# CONCEPT OF PARTNERS$P &1'(') 1''+) 1''.) +**1/
I
W- Q- K and R organi(ed a general partnership with W and Q as industrial partners and K and
R as capitalist partners. K contributed 7<G-GGG and R contributed 72G-GGG to the common fund. By a
unanimous ote of the partners- W and Q were appointed managing partners- without any
specification of their respectie powers and duties.
A applied for the position of #ecretary and B applied for the position of Accountant of the
partnership.

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,he hiring of A was decided upon by W and Q- but was opposed by K and R.
,he hiring of B was decided upon by W and R- but was opposed by Q and K.
Who of the applicants should be hired by the partnership? '5plain and gie your reasons.
*1992+
ANS"ER#
A should be hired as #ecretary. ,he decision for the hiring of A preails because it is an act
of administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners- W and Q.
B cannot be hired- because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partners- the
deadlocB must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case- the
opposition of Q and K preails because K owns the controlling interest *Art. 13G1- !!+.
II
Q used his saings from his salaries amounting to a little more than 72-GGG as capital in
establishing a restaurant. K gae the amount of 7C-GGG to Q as Ifinancial assistanceJ with the
understanding that K would be entitled to 22P annual profits deried from the operation of the
restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years- K filed a case demanding his share in the said profits. Q
denied that there was a partnership and raised the issue of prescription as y did not assert his
rights anytime within ten *1G+ years from the start of the operation of the restaurant. Is K a partner
of Q in the business? Why? What is the nature of the right to demand one@s share in the profits of a
partnership? $oes the right prescribe? *1939+
ANS"ER#
Kes- because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and an intent to diide
profits. It is founded upon an e5press trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
=o- K is not a partner because the amount is e5tended in the form of a financial assistance
and therefore it is a loan- and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a partnership. ,he
right is founded upon a contract of loan whereby the borrower is bound to pay principal and
interest liBe all ordinary obligations. Kes- his right prescribes in si5 or ten years depending upon
whether the contract is oral or written.
III
1. !an a husband and wife for a limited partnership to engage in real estate business- with the
wife being a limited partner?
2. !an two corporations organi(e a general partnership under the !iil !ode of the 7hilippines?
2. !an a corporation and an indiidual form a general partnership? *199C+
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
1. Kes- the !iil !ode prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a uniersal partnership.
#ince a limited partnership is not a uniersal partnership- a husband and wife may alidly form
one.
2. =o. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation were to become a
partner- co-partners would hae the power to maBe the corporation party to transactions in an
irregular manner since the partners are not agents sub)ect to the control of the Board of
$irectors. But a corporation may enter into a )oint enture with another corporation as long as
the nature of the enture is in line with the business authori(ed by its charter. *Tuason + Co.,
Inc. vs. ,olano, 9< 7hil 1G6+
2. =o- for the same reasons gien in the Answer to =umber 2 aboe.
OT$ER ALTERNAT!E ANS"ERS#
1. Kes. While spouses cannot enter into a uniersal partnership- they can enter into a limited
partnership pr be members thereof *CIR vs. Suter, et al., 2? #!>A 1<2+.
2. As a general rule a corporation may not form a general partnership with another corporation or
an indiidual because a corporation may not be bound by persons who are neither directors nor
officers of the corporation.

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%oweer- a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or an
indiidual proided the following conditions are metH
*a+ ,he Articles of Incorporation of the corporation e5pressly allows the corporation to enter
into partnershipsE
*b+ ,he Articles of 7artnership must proide that all partners will manage the partnership- and
they shall be )ointly and seerally liableE and
*c+ In case of foreign corporation- it must be licensed to do business in the 7hilippines.
2. =o. A corporation may not be a general partner because the principle of mutual agency in
general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the corporation will iolate the
corporation law principle that only the board of directors may bind the corporation.
TOPC# CONTRACT OF A%ENCY &1''+) 1'',) 1''.) 1''') +***) +**1/
I
7rime >ealty !orporation appointed =estor the e5clusie agent in the sale of lots of its
newly deeloped subdiision. 7rime >ealty told =estor that he could not collect or receie
payments from the buyers. =estor was able to sell ten lots to Lesus and to collect the down
payments for said lots. %e did not turn oer the collections to 7rime >ealty. Who shall bear the loss
for =estor@s defalcation- 7rime >ealty or Lesus? *199C+
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
,he general rule is that a person dealing with an agent must in.uire into the authority of
that agent. In the present case- if Lesus did not in.uire into that authority- he is liable for the loss
due to =estor@s defalcation unless Article 19GG- !! goerns- in which case the deeloper
corporation bears the loss.
Art. 19GG !! proidesH I#o far as third persons are concerned- an act is deemed to hae
been performed within the scope of the agent@s authority- if such act is within the terms of the
power of attorney- as written- een if the agent has in fact e5ceeded the limits of his authority
according to an understanding between the principal and the agent.
%oweer- if Lesus made due in.uiry and he was not informed by the principal 7rime >ealty
of the limits of =estor@s authority- 7rime >ealty shall bear the loss.
!onsidering that 7rime >ealty !orporation only ItoldJ =estor that he could not receie or
collect payments- it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written authority or power
of attorney. In this case- insofar as Lesus- who is a third person- is concerned- =estor@s acts of
collecting payments is deemed to hae been performed within the scope of his authority *Article
19GG- !!+. %ence- the principal is liable.
%oweer- if Lesus was aware of the limitation of =estor@s power as an agent- and prime
>ealty !orporation does not ratify the sale contract- then Lesus shall be liable *Art. 1393- !!+.
II
A. Q appoints K as his agent to sell his products in !ebu !ity. !an K appoint a sub-agent
and if he does- what are the effects of such appointment?
B. A granted B the e5clusie right to sell his brand of Daong pants in Isabela- the price for
his merchandise payable within 6G days from deliery- and promising B a commission of
2GP on all sales. After the deliery of the merchandise to B but before he could sell any
of them- B@s store in Isabela was completely burned without his fault- together with all
of A@s pants. Dust B pay A for his lost pants? Why? *1999+
ANS"ERS#
A. Kes- the agent may appoint a substitute or sub-agent if the principal has not prohibited him
from doing so- but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substituteH
*1+ when he was not gien the power to appoint oneE

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*2+ when he was gien such power- but without designating the person- and the person
appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolentE
B. ,he contract between A and B is a sale not an agency to sell because the price is payable
by B upon 6G days from deliery een if B is unable to resell it. If B were an agent- he is not bound
to pay the price if he is unable to resell it.
As a buyer- ownership passed to B upon deliery and- under Art. 1<GC of the !!- the things
perishes with the owner. %ence- B must still pay the price.
TOPC# TRUST &1''3) 1''3) 1''.) 1''(/
I
In 193G- Daureen purchased two lots in a plush subdiision registering :ot 1 in her name
and :ot 2 in the name of her brother Walter with the latter@s consent. ,he idea was to circument
a subdiision policy against the ac.uisition of more than one lot by one buyer. Daureen constructed
a house on :ot 1 with an e5tension on :ot 2 to sere as a guest house. In 193?- Walter who had
suffered serious business losses demanded that Daureen remoe the e5tension house since the lot
on which the e5tension was built was his property. In 1992- Daureen sued for the reconeyance to
her of :ot 2 asserting that a resulting trust was created when she had the lot registered in Walter@s
name een if she paid the purchase price. Walter opposed the suit arguing that assuming the
e5istence of a resulting trust the action of Daureen has already prescribed since ten years hae
already elapsed from the registration of the title in his name.
$ecide. $iscuss fully. *199<+
ANS"ER#
,his is a case of an implied resulting trust. If Walter claims to hae ac.uired ownership of
the land by prescription of if he anchors his defense on e5tinctie prescription- the ten year period
must be recBoned from 193? when he demanded that Daureen remoe the e5tension house on :ot 2
because such demand amounts to an e5press repudiation of the trust and it was made Bnown to
Daureen. ,he action for reconeyance filed in 1992 is not yet barred by prescription *Spouses
-uang vs. CA, #ept. 12- 199C+.
Credit "ransactions
TOPC# MORT%A%E &1''+) 1''') +**1/ = PLED%E &1'',) 1''-) 1'''/
I
,o secure a loan obtained from a rural banB- 7urita assigned her leasehold rights oer a stall in the
public marBet in faor of the banB. ,he deed of assignment proides that in case of default in the
payment of the loan- the banB shall hae the right to sell 7urita@s rights oer the marBet stall as
her attorney-in-fact- and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan.
A. Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a cession?
B. Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage- does the proision giing the banB the
power to sell 7urita@s rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why? *2GG1+
ANS"ERS#
A. ,he assignment was a mortgage- not a cession- of the leasehold rights. A cession would
hae transferred ownership to the banB. %oweer- the grant of authority to the banB to sell the
leasehold rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that a mere
encumbrance was constituted. ,here would hae been no need for such authority had there been a
cession.
B. =o- the clause in .uestion is not a pactum commissorium. It is pactum commissorium when
default in the payment of the loan automatically ests ownership of the encumbered property in
the banB. In the problem gien- the banB does not automatically become the owner of the property
upon default of the mortgagor. ,he banB has to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the
indebtedness.

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II
A. $istinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge.
B. Are the right of redemption and the e.uity of redemption gien by law to a mortgagor the
same? '5plain.
!. Q borrowed money from K and gae a piece of land as security by way of mortgage. It was
e5pressly agreed between the parties in the mortgage contract that upon non-payment of the
debt on time by Q- the mortgaged land would already belong to K. If Q defaulted in paying-
would K now become the owner of the mortgaged land? Why?
$. #uppose in the preceding .uestion- the agreement between Q and K was that if Q failed to pay
the mortgage debt on time- the debt shall be paid with the land mortgaged by Q to K. Would
your answer be the same as in the preceding .uestion? '5plain. *1999+
ANS"ERS#
A. In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor- while in a contract of
pledge possession belongs to the debtor.
A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract.
A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind third
persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing description of the
thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons.
B. ,he e.uity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. '.uity of redemption is
the right of the mortgagor after )udgment in a )udicial foreclosure to redeem the property by
paying to the court the amount of the )udgment debt before the sale or confirmation of the sale.
8n the other hand- right of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at
an e5tra-)udicial foreclosure by paying to the buyer in the foreclosure sale the amount paid by the
buyer within one year from such sale.
!. =o- K could not become the owner of the land. ,he stipulation is in the nature of pactum
commissorium which is prohibited by law. ,he property should be sold at public auction and the
proceeds thereof applied to the indebtedness. Any e5cess shall be gien to the mortgagor.
$. =o- the answer would not be the same. ,his is a alid stipulation and does not constitute
pactum commissorium. In pactum commissorium, the ac.uisition is automatic without need of any
further action. In the instant problem another act is re.uired to be performed- namely- the
coneyance of the property as payment *!acion en pago+.
III
In 1932- #tee borrowed 7CGG-GGG from $anny- collaterali(ed by a pledge of shares of stocB
of !oncepcion !orporation worth 73GG-GGG. In 1932- because of the economic crisis- the alue of
the shares pledged fell to only 71GG-GGG. !an $anny demand that #tee surrender the other shares
worth 7?GG-GGG?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
=o. Bilateral contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a subsidiary
contract- and #tee is still indebted to $anny for the amount of 7CGG-GGG despite the fall in the
alue of the stocBs pledged.
=o. $anny@s right as pledgee is to sell the pledged shares at a public sale and Beep the
proceeds as collateral for the loan. ,here is no showing that the fall in the alue of the pledged
property was attributable to the pledger@s fault or fraud. 8n the contrary- economic crisis was the
culprit. %ad the pledgee been deceied as to the substance or .uality of the pledged shares of
stocB- he would hae had the right to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate
payment of the obligation. ,his is not the case here.

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"orts and #amages
TOPC# QUAS>DELCT &1''*) 1''1) 1''-) 1''() +**+) +**3/
I
As a result of a collision between a ta5icab owned by A and another ta5icab owned by B- Q-
a passenger of the first ta5icab- was seriously in)ured. Q later filed a criminal action against both
driers.
A. Is it necessary for Q to resere his right to institute a ciil action for damages
against both ta5icab owners before he can file a ciil action for damages against
them? Why?
B. Day both ta5icab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and
superision of their driers to be absoled from liability for damages to Q? >eason.
*2GG2+
ANS"ERS#
A. It depends. If the separate ciil action is to recoer damages arising from the criminal act-
reseration is necessary. If the ciil action against the ta5icab owners is based on culpa
contractual- or on .uasi-delict- there is no need for reseration.
B. It depends. If the ciil action is based on .uasi-delict the ta5icab owners may raise the
defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and superision of the drierE if
the action against them is based on culpa contractual or ciil liability arising from a crime- they
cannot raise the defense.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
A. =o- such reseration is not necessary. 9nder #ection 1 of >ule 111 of the 2GGG >ules of
!riminal 7rocedure- what is Ideemed institutedJ with the criminal action is only the action to
recoer ciil liability arising from the crime or e5 delicto. All the other ciil actions under Articles
22- 22- 2C- and 21?6 of the =!! are no longer Ideemed institutedJ- and may be filed separately
and prosecuted independently een without any reseration in the criminal action *sec. 2 >ule 111-
Ibid.+. ,he failure to maBe a reseration in the criminal action is not a waier of the right to file a
separate and independent ciil action based on these articles of the =!! *!asupanan vs. "aroya .R
No. /0123/, August 45, 4664&.
TOPC# LA0LTY OF T$E EMPLOYER AND T$E DR!ER N CASE OF ACCDENT &1''+) +***)
+**1) +**+/
I
A an owned by 8rlando and drien by $iego- while negotiating a downhill slope of a city
road- suddenly gained speed- obiously beyond the authori(ed limit in the area- and bumped a car
in front of it- causing seere damage to the car and serious in)uries to its passengers. 8rlando was
not in the car al the time of the incident. ,he car owner and the in)ured passengers sued 8rlando
and $iego for damages caused by $iegoNs negligence. In their defenses- $iego claims that the
downhill slope caused the an to gain speed and that- as he stepped on the braBes to checB the
acceleration- the braBes locBed- causing the an to go een faster and eentually to hit the car in
front of it. 8rlando and $iego contend that the sudden malfunction of the anNs braBe system is a
fortuitous eent and that- therefore- they are e5empt from any liability.
A. Is this contention tenable? '5plain.
B. '5plain the concept of icarious liability in .uasi-delicts.
!. $oes the presence of the owner inside the ehicle causing damage to a third
party affect his liability for his drierNs negligence? '5plain. *2GG2+
ANS"ERS#

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A. =o. Dechanical defects of a motor ehicle do not constitute fortuitous eent- since the
presence of such defects would hae been ready detected by diligent maintenance checB. ,he
failure to maintain the ehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.
B. ,he doctrine of icarious liability is that which renders a person liable for the negligence of
others for whose acts or omission the law maBes him responsible on the theory that they are under
his control and superision.
!. ln motor ehicle mishaps- the owner is made solidarily liable with his drier if he *owner+
was in the ehicle and could hae- by the use of due diligence- preented the mishap. *Cae!o v. 'u
7he Thai, 26 #!>A C1G 119634+. %oweer- this .uestion has no factual basis in the problem gien- in
iew of the e5press gien fact that M8rlando was not in the car at the time of the time of the
incident.J
TOPC# DAMA%ES &1''+) 1''3) 1'',) +**+/
I
8n Lanuary <- 1992- =onoy obtained a loan of 71 million from his friend >affy. ,he promissory note
did not stipulate any payment for interest. ,he note was due on Lanuary <- 1992 but before this
date the two became political enemies. =onoy- out of spite- deliberately defaulted in paying the
note- thus forcing >affy to sue him.
A. What actual damages can >affy recoer?
B. !an >affy asB for moral damages from =onoy?
!. !an >affy asB for nominal damages?
$. !an >affy asB for temperate damages?
'. !an >affy asB for attorney@s fees? *199C+
ANS"ERS#
A. >affy may recoer the amount of the promissory note of 71 million- together with interest
at the legal rate from the date of )udicial and e5tra)udicial demand. In addition- howeer-
inasmuch as the debtor is in bad faith- he is liable for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation *Art. 22G1*2+- =!!+.
B. Kes- under Art. 222G- =!! moral damages are recoerable in case of breach of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
!. =ominal damages may not be recoerable in this case because >affy may already be
indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. =ominal damages
are ad)udicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff- which has been iolated or inaded by
the defendant may be indicated or recogni(ed- and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him *Art. 2221- !!+.
$. >affy may asB for- but would most liBely not be awarded temperate damages- for the
reason that his actual damages may already be compensated upon proof thereof with the
promissory note. ,emperate damages may be awarded only when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot- from the nature of the case- be proed
with certainty *Art. 222C- !!+.
'. Kes- under par. 2- Art. 22G3 of the !!- considering that =onoy@s act or omission has
compelled >affy to litigate to protect his interests. "urthermore- attorney@s fees may be awarded
by the court when it is )ust and e.uitable *Art. 22G3*11G+- !!+.

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Land "itles and #eeds
TOPC# PRESCRPTON AND LAC$ES &1''*) 1''() +***) +**+) +**3/
I
:ouie- before leaing the country to train as a chef in a fie-star hotel in =ew KorB- 9#A-
entrusted to his first-degree cousin $ewey an application for registration- under the :and
>egistration Act- of a parcel of land located in Bacolod !ity. A year later- :ouie returned to the
7hilippines and discoered that $ewey registered the land and obtained an 8riginal !ertificate of
,itle oer the property in his *$ewey@s+ name. !ompounding the matter- $ewey sold the land to
%uey- an innocent purchaser for alue. :ouie promptly filed an action for reconeyance of the
parcel of land against %uey.
A. Is the action pursued by :ouie the proper remedy?
B. Assuming that reconeyance is the proper remedy- will the action prosper if
the case was filed beyond one year- but within ten years- from the entry of
the decree of registration?
ANS"ERS#
A. An action for reconeyance against %uey is not the proper remedy- because %uey is an
innocent purchaser for alue. ,he proper recourse is for :ouie to go after $ewey for damages by
reason of the fraudulent registration and subse.uent sale of the land. If $ewey is insolent- :ouie
may file a claim against the Assurance "und *-eirs of Pe!ro "ope8 vs. De Castro 240 SCRA 13/
94666: citing Sps. E!uarte vs. CA, 242 Phil 054 9/335:&.
B. Kes- the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten *1G+ years- not within one
*1+ year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may be filed. ,he action for
reconeyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of registration %.rey Al#a vs. Dela
Cru8, /; Phil 03 9/3/6:&. ,here is no need to reopen the registration proceedings- but the property
should )ust be reconeyed to the real owner.
,he action for reconeyance is based on implied or constructie trust- which prescribes in
ten *1G+ years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. ,his rule assumes that
the defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the land-
the action for reconeyance would be in the nature of a suit for .uieting of title which action is
imprescriptible %Davi! vs. *alay, 2/< SCRA ;// 9/333:&.
II
In 196G- an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner 8 to D- a family friend- as
collateral for a loan. 8 acted through his attorney in fact- son- #- who was duly authori(ed by way
of a special power of attorney- wherein 8 declared that he was the absolute owner of the land-
that the ta5 declarationsFreceipts were all issued in his name- and that he has been in open-
continuous and aderse possession in the concept of owner.
As 8 was unable to pay bacB the loan plus interest for the past fie *<+ years- D had to
foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale- D was the highest bidder. 9pon issuance of the
sheriff@s final deed of sale and registration in Lanuary- 1966- the mortgage property was turned
oer to D@s possession and control. D has since then deeloped the said property. In 196?- 8 died-
suried by sons # and 7.
In 19??- after the tenth *1G
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+ death anniersary of his father 8- son 7 filed a suit to annul
the mortgage deed and subse.uent sale of the property- etc.- on the ground of fraud. %e asserted
that the property in .uestion was con)ugal in nature actually belonging- at the time of the
mortgage- to 8 and his wife- W- whose con)ugal share went to their sons *# and 7+ and to 8.
A. Is the suit filed by 7 barred by prescription? '5plain your answer.
B. After the issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale in 1966 in this case- assuming that
D applied for registration under the ,orrens #ystem and was issued a ,orrens ,itle to
the said property in .uestion- would that added fact hae any significant effect on your
conclusion? #tate your reason. *199G+
ANS"ERS#

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A. 9nder Art. 1?2- !!- the action is barred by prescription because the wife had only ten *1G+
years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of the mortgage
deed.
B. If D had secured a ,orrens ,itle to the land- all the more # and 7 could not recoer because
if at all their remedies would beH
1. A 7etition to >eiew the $ecree of registration. ,his can be aailed of within one *1+ year
from the entry thereof- but only upon the basis of Iactual fraud.J ,here is no showing that
D committed actual fraud in securing his title to the landE or
2. An action in personam against D for the reconeyance of the title in their faor. Again- this
remedy is aailable within four *C+ years from the date of the discoery of the fraud but not
later than ten *1G+ years from the date of registration of the title in the name of D.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
A. ,he mortgage contract e5ecuted by 8- if at all- is only a oidable contract since it inoles
a con)ugal partnership property. ,he action to annul the same instituted in 19??- or eleen years
after the e5ecution of the sheriff@s final sale- has obiously prescribed becauseH
1. An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four *C+ years
from the date of discoery of the fraud. #ince this is in essence an action to recoer
ownership- it must be recBoned from the date of e5ecution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessor@s office for the purpose
of transferring the ta5 declaration- this being unregistered land *,ael vs. IAC, ;> =o. :-
?CC22 Lanuary 2G- 1939- 169 #!>A 61?+.
2. If the action is to be treated as an action to recoer ownership of land- it would hae
prescribed )ust the same because more than ten *1G+ years hae already elapsed since the
date of the e5ecution of the sale.
A. ,he action to recoer has been barred by ac.uisitie prescription in faor of D considering
that D has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten *1G+ years with a )ust title.
TOPC# TORRENS SYSTEM &1''*) 1''1) 1'',) 1''() +**1/
I
#ection ?G of 7$ 1<29- concerning aderse claims on registered land- proides a 2G-day
period of effectiity of an aderse claim- counted from the date of its registration. #uppose a
notice of aderse claim based upon a contract to sell was registered on Darch 1- 199? at the
instance of the B9K'>- but on Lune 1- 199?- or after the lapse of the 2G-day period- a notice of
ley on e5ecution in faor of a L9$;D'=, !>'$I,8> was also registered to enforce a final
)udgment for money against the registered owner. ,hen- on Lune 1<- 199? there haing been no
formal cancellation of his notice of aderse claim- the B9K'> pays to the seller-owner the agreed
purchase price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the
notice of ley is carried oer to the new title in his name- the B9K'> brings an action against the
L9$;D'=, !>'$I,8> to cancel such annotation- but the latter claims that his lien is superior
because it was annotated after the aderse claim of the B9K'> had ipso facto ceased to be
effectie. Will the suit prosper? *1993+
ANS"ER#
,he suit will prosper. While an aderse claim duly annotated at the bacB of a title under
#ec. ?G of 7$ 1<29 is good only for 2G days- cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it
ineffectie- otherwise- the inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property.
While the life of aderse claim is 2G days under 7$ 1<29- it continuous to be effectie until it is
cancelled by formal petition filed with the >egister of $eeds.
,he cancellation of the notice of ley is )ustified under #ec. 1G3 of 7$ 1<29 considering
that the ley on e5ecution cannot be enforced against the buyer whose aderse claim against the
registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of ley on e5ecution.

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C I V I L L A W
II
In 196G- an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner 8 to D- a family friend- as
collateral for a loan. 8 acted through his attorney in fact- son- #- who was duly authori(ed by way
of a special power of attorney- wherein 8 declared that he was the absolute owner of the land-
that the ta5 declarationsFreceipts were all issued in his name- and that he has been in open-
continuous and aderse possession in the concept of owner.
As 8 was unable to pay bacB the loan plus interest for the past fie *<+ years- D had to
foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale- D was the highest bidder. 9pon issuance of the
sheriff@s final deed of sale and registration in Lanuary- 1966- the mortgage property was turned
oer to D@s possession and control. D has since then deeloped the said property. In 196?- 8 died-
suried by sons # and 7.
In 19??- after the tenth *1G
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+ death anniersary of his father 8- son 7 filed a suit to annul
the mortgage deed and subse.uent sale of the property- etc.- on the ground of fraud. %e asserted
that the property in .uestion was con)ugal in nature actually belonging- at the time of the
mortgage- to 8 and his wife- W- whose con)ugal share went to their sons *# and 7+ and to 8.
!. Is the suit filed by 7 barred by prescription? '5plain your answer.
$. After the issuance of the sheriff@s final deed of sale in 1966 in this case- assuming that
D applied for registration under the ,orrens #ystem and was issued a ,orrens ,itle to
the said property in .uestion- would that added fact hae any significant effect on your
conclusion? #tate your reason. *199G+
ANS"ERS#
A. 9nder Art. 1?2- !!- the action is barred by prescription because the wife had only ten *1G+
years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of the mortgage
deed.
B. If D had secured a ,orrens ,itle to the land- all the more # and 7 could not recoer because
if at all their remedies would beH
2. A 7etition to >eiew the $ecree of registration. ,his can be aailed of within one *1+ year
from the entry thereof- but only upon the basis of Iactual fraud.J ,here is no showing that
D committed actual fraud in securing his title to the landE or
4. An action in personam against D for the reconeyance of the title in their faor. Again- this
remedy is aailable within four *C+ years from the date of the discoery of the fraud but not
later than ten *1G+ years from the date of registration of the title in the name of D.
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
A. ,he mortgage contract e5ecuted by 8- if at all- is only a oidable contract since it inoles
a con)ugal partnership property. ,he action to annul the same instituted in 19??- or eleen years
after the e5ecution of the sheriff@s final sale- has obiously prescribed becauseH
3. An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four *C+ years
from the date of discoery of the fraud. #ince this is in essence an action to recoer
ownership- it must be recBoned from the date of e5ecution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessor@s office for the purpose
of transferring the ta5 declaration- this being unregistered land *,ael vs. IAC, ;> =o. :-
?CC22 Lanuary 2G- 1939- 169 #!>A 61?+.
C. If the action is to be treated as an action to recoer ownership of land- it would hae
prescribed )ust the same because more than ten *1G+ years hae already elapsed since the
date of the e5ecution of the sale.
A. ,he action to recoer has been barred by ac.uisitie prescription in faor of D considering
that D has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten *1G+ years with a )ust title.

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Con$licts o$ Law
TOPC# ARTCLE 1.) NCC &1''1) 1''3) +**+/ = DOCTRNE OF FORUM NON CON!ENENS
&DEFNTON/ &1'',) +**+/
I
"elipe is a "ilipino citi(en. When he went to #ydney for acation- he met a former business
associate- who proposed to him a transaction which tooB him to Doscow. "elipe broBered a
contract between #ydney !oals !orp. *!oals+- an Australian firm- and Doscow 'nergy !orp.
*'nergy+- a >ussian firm- for !oals to supply coal to 'nergy on a monthly basis for three years. Both
these firms were not doing- and still do not do- business in the 7hilippines. "elipe shuttled between
#ydney and Doscow to close the contract. %e also e5ecuted in #ydney a commission contract with
!oals and in Doscow with 'nergy- under which contracts he was guaranteed commissions by both
firms based on a percentage of delieries for the three-year period- payable in #ydney and in
Doscow- respectiely- through deposits in accounts that he opened in the two cities. Both firms
paid "elipe his commission for four months- after which they stopped paying him. "elipe learned
from his contacts- who are residents of #ydney and Doscow- that the two firms talBed to each other
and decided to cut him off. %e now files suit in Danila against both !oals and 'nergy for specific
performance.
A. $efine or e5plain the principle of Mle5 loci contractus.M
B. $efine or e5plain the rule of Mforum non coneniens.M
!. #hould the 7hilippine court assume )urisdiction oer the case? '5plain. *2GG2+
ANS"ERS#
A. :e5 loci contractus may be understood in two senses- as followsH
It is the law of the place where contracts- wills- and other public instruments are e5ecuted and
goerns their Iforms and solemnitiesJ- pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 1? of the !iil
!odeE or It is the proper law of the contractE i.e.- the system of law intended to goern the
entire contract- including its essential re.uisites- indicating the law of the place with which the
contract has its closest connection or where the main elements of the contract conerge. As
illustrated by =alamea v. Court of Appeals *223 #!>A 22 1I19924+- it is the law of the place
where the airline ticBet was issued- where the passengers are nationals and residents of- and
where the defendant airline company maintained its office.
B. "orum non coneniens means that a court has discretionary authority to decline )urisdiction
oer a cause of action when it is of the iew that the action may be )ustly and effectiely
ad)udicated elsewhere.
!. =o- the 7hilippine courts cannot ac.uire )urisdiction oer the case of "elipe.
"irstly- under the rule of forum non conveniens- a 7hilippine court or agency may assume
)urisdiction oer the case if it chooses to do so provi!e!H *1+ that the 7hilippine court is one to
which the parties may coneniently resort toE *2+ that the 7hilippine court is in a position to
maBe an intelligent decision as to the law and the factsE and *2+ that the 7hilippine court has or
is liBely to hae power to enforce its decision.
2?
,he conditions are unaailing in the case at
bar. ,he 7hilippine court is not a conenient forum as all the incidents of the case occurred
outside the 7hilippines. =either are both !oals and 'nergy doing business inside the
7hilippines.
#econdly- the contracts were not perfected in the 7hilippines. 9nder the principle of le5
loci contractus- the law of the place where the contract is made shall apply.
:astly- the 7hilippine court has no power to determine the facts surrounding the e5ecution
of said contracts. And een if a proper decision could be reached- such would hae no binding
effect on !oals and 'nergy as the court was not able to ac.uire )urisdiction oer the said
corporations. **anila -otel Corp. v. N"RC- 2C2 #!>A 1-12-1C 12GGG4+
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#

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A. 9nder the doctrine of le5 loci contractus- as a general rule- the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into goerns with respect to its nature and alidity- obligation and
interpretation. ,his has been said to be the rule een though the place where the contract was
made is different from the place where it is to be performed- and particularly so- if the place
of the maBing and the place of performance are the same *>nite! Airline v. CA- ;.>- =o.
12C11G- April 2G- 2GG1+.
0AR TYPE QUESTONS
QUESTON No?1# Fo54 e;8lo<ees o2 A6t T@eate4 n6? we4e a884e@ended A< t@e 8oli6e o22i6e4s
2o4 alle1edl< ta;8e4in1 a wate4 ;ete4? On t@e Aasis o2 t@e 2o4e1oin1) t@e Met4o8olitan
"ate4wo49s and Sewe4a1e S<ste; 65t t@e wate4 se4vi6e 6onne6tion o2 A6t T@eate4 a 2ew @o54s
a2te4 a noti6e to s56@ e22e6t was se4ved 58on t@e latte4?
Did M"SS 84o8e4l< eBe46ise its 84o84ieta4< 4i1@tsC
ANS"ER# NO? !oncededly- DW##- as the owner of the utility proiding water supply to certain
consumers including the respondent- had the right to e5clude any person from the en)oyment and
disposal thereof. %oweer- the e5ercise of rights is not without limitations. %aing the right
should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be e5ercised. Article 19 of the
=ew !iil !ode states that I'ery person must- in the e5ercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties- act with )ustice- gie eeryone his due- and obsere honesty and good faith. When a
right is e5ercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another- a legal
wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case- DW## failed to act with
)ustice and gae ,heater Act what is due to it when the former unceremoniously cut off the latter@s
water serice connection. %*etropolitan ?ater@or$s an! Se@erage System vs Act Theater Inc., .R
No. /0;6;5, Aune /;, 4660&
QUESTON No?+# T@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 oAtained a loan 24o; Met4oAan9? T@e said loan was
se654ed A< a 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e on a 8a46el o2 land owned A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1? Fo4
2ail54e o2 t@e latte4 to settle t@ei4 oAli1ation) Mat4oAan9 eBt4aD5di6iall< 2o4e6losed t@e 4eal
estate ;o4t1a1e and t@e ;o4t1a1ed 84o8e4t< was sold to Met4oAan9 as t@e @i1@est Aidde4?
0e2o4e t@e eB8i4ation o2 t@e one><ea4 4ede;8tion 8e4iod) t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 2iled a
6o;8laint 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 eBt4aD5di6ial sale alle1in1 t@at Met4oAan9 Aloated t@ei4 oAli1ation
to 245st4ate t@ei4 6@an6es o2 8a<in1 t@e loan?
A2te4 t@e eB8i4ation o2 t@e one><ea4 4ede;8tion 8e4iod) Met4oAan9 6onsolidated its
owne4s@i8 ove4 t@e 2o4e6losed 84o8e4t< and) t@e4ea2te4) 2iled a 8etition 2o4 "4it o2 Possession?
T@is was o88osed A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e 6o;8laint 2iled A< t@e; is a
84eD5di6ial :5estion w@i6@ wa44anted t@e s5s8ension o2 t@e 84o6eedin1s Ae2o4e t@e 6o54t?
s t@e 6o;8laint 2iled A< t@e s8o5ses Pa@an1 a 84eD5di6ial :5estion to Met4oAan9Es
8etition 2o4 t@e iss5an6e o2 a "4it o2 PossessionC
ANS"ER# NO? A pre)udicial .uestion is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue inoled therein- and the cogni(ance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a ciil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there e5ists in the former an issue that must be preemptiely resoled before
the criminal action may proceed because howsoeer the issue raised in the ciil action is resoled
would be determinatie )uris et de )ure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. ,he complaint of the petitioners for annulment of e5tra)udicial sale is a ciil action and the
respondent@s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is but an incident in the land
registration case and- therefore no pre)udicial .uestion can arise from the e5istence of the two
actions. %Spouses Pahang vs (estil, .R No. /0<131, Auly /4, 4660&
QUESTON No?3# Rodol2o and Ma4ietta we4e ;a44ied on Ma46@ 3) 1'3'? On De6e;Ae4 -) 1''+)
Rodol2o le2t t@e 6onD51al @o;e and aAandoned Ma4ietta and t@ei4 6@ild4en?

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n t@e ;eanti;e) Rodol2o) w@o was desi4o5s o2 6ont4a6tin1 anot@e4 ;a44ia1e) 2iled a
8etition 2o4 t@e de6la4ation o2 t@e n5llit< o2 @is ;a44ia1e wit@ Ma44ieta on t@e 14o5nd o2
8s<6@olo1i6al in6a8a6it<? F5ll< awa4e t@at Ma44ieta @ad al4ead< t4ans2e44ed to anot@e4
4esiden6e) Rodol2o still indi6ated in @is 8etition t@at s5;;ons 6an Ae se4ved 58on Ma44ieta in
@e4 84evio5s add4ess? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) Ma44ieta did not 4e6eive an< s5;;ons and
2ailed to 2ile an answe4? T@e 6o54t) 58on ;otion) de6la4ed Ma44ieta in de2a5lt and allowed
Rodol2o to add56e eviden6e eB 8a4te? T@e 85Ali6 84ose65to4 w@o a88ea4ed 2o4 t@e state
o22e4ed no oADe6tion to t@e ;otion o2 Rodol2o? T@e 6o54t 4ende4ed a de6ision de6la4in1 t@e
;a44ia1e o2 Rodol2o and Ma44ieta void aA initio?
"as t@e 14ant o2 ann5l;ent o2 ;a44ia1e A< de2a5lt 84o8e4C
ANS"ER# NO? ,he actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
C3 of the "amily !ode. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. %ence- in all cases for annulment- declaration of nullity of marriage
and legal separation- the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state
for the purpose of preenting any collusion between the parties and to taBe care that their
eidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint-
the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead- should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion e5ists between the parties. ,he prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
the application of legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own eidence- if
in his opinion- the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. %Ancheta vs Ancheta, .R No. /012;6,
*arch 0, 4660&
QUESTON No?,# Al24edo and En6a4na6ion we4e ;a44ied on Fan5a4< () 1'-*? D54in1 t@e
s5Asisten6e o2 t@ei4 ;a44ia1e) t@e< a6:5i4ed 1**)*** s@a4es o2 sto69 in Cit<6o48 and 4e1iste4ed
t@e sa;e in t@e na;e o2 Al24edo?
On Se8te;Ae4 +-) 1'.() t@e P@ili88ine 0loo;in1 Mills Co;8an<) n6 &P0MC/oAtained a
loan 24o; Allied 0an9? As added se654it< 2o4 t@e said loan) Al24edo) as t@e EBe65tive !i6e
P4esident o2 P0MC eBe65ted a 6ontin5in1 15a4antee wit@ Allied 0an9 Aindin1 @i;sel2 to Dointl<
and seve4all< 15a4antee t@e 8a<;ent o2 all t@e P0MC oAli1ations owin1 to Allied 0an9?
P0MC 2ailed to settle its oAli1ation wit@ Allied 0an9? Allied 0an9 2iled an a88li6ation 2o4
a w4it o2 84eli;ina4< atta6@;ent w@i6@ was 14anted A< t@e 6o54t? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@)
t@e s@e4i22 levied on atta6@;ent t@e 1**)*** s@a4es o2 Cit<6o; sto69s in t@e na;e o2 Al24edo?
En6a4na6ion) assisted A< Al24edo) t@e4ea2te4 2iled a Motion to Set Aside t@e lev< on
atta6@;ent?
S@o5ld t@e Motion to Set Aside t@e lev< on eBe65tion Ae 14antedC

ANS"ER# YES? Article 16G of the =ew !iil !ode proides that all the properties ac.uired during
the marriage are presumed to belong to the con)ugal partnership- unless it be proed that it
pertains e5clusiely to the husband- or to the wife. It is not een necessary to proe that the
properties were ac.uired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were ac.uired by
the parties during the marriage- they are presumed to be con)ugal in nature. In fact- een when
the manner in which the properties were ac.uired does not appear- the presumption will still
apply- and the properties will still be considered con)ugal.
In this case- the eidence adduced by 'ncarnacion is that the 1GG-GGG shares of stocBs in
!itycorp were issued and registered in its corporate booBs in the name of Alfredo when the said
corporation was incorporated on Day- 1C- 19?9. ,his was done during the subsistence of the
marriage of Alfredo and 'ncarnacion. ,he shares of stocB are thus presumed to be the con)ugal
partnership property of Alfredo and 'ncarnacion. ,he barefaced fact that the shares of stocBs
were registered in the corporate booBs of !itycorp solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute
proof that Alfredo- not the con)ugal partnership- owned the same. %Ching vs Court of Appeals, .R
No. /40504, Be#ruary 42, 4660&
Note# 9nder the "amily !ode- Article 92- the presumption is that property ac.uired during the
marriage belong to the community- unless it is proed that it is one of those e5clused therefrom.
,he presumption in Article 116 of the "amily !ode will only arise if the future spouses agree in
their marriage settlements that the regime of con)ugal partnership of gains shall goern their
property relations during the marriage pursuant to Article 1G< "!.

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Property
QUESTON No?1# T@e s8o5ses Pas65a eBe65ted a Deed o2 AAsol5te Sale ove4 t@ei4 84o8e4t< and
t@e i;84ove;ents t@e4eon in 2avo4 o2 t@e s8o5ses C@5a? On t@e Aasis o2 t@e said deed)
T4ans2e4 Ce4ti2i6ate o2 Title No? (.-1* ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< was iss5ed to t@e latte4?
T@e s8o5ses C@5a t@e4ea2te4 de;anded t@at t@e s8o5ses A8ostol va6ate t@e 84o8e4t<
A5t t@e latte4 st5AAo4nl< 4e25sed to do so 6lai;in1) a;on1 ot@e4s) t@at t@e< Ao51@t t@e said
84o8e4t< and @ave Aeen in 8ossession o2 t@e sa;e in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 t@o51@ t@e< we4e
not aAle to 4e1iste4 t@e deed o2 sale?
T@e s8o5ses C@5a 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 5nlaw25l detaine4 a1ainst t@e s8o5ses A8ostol?
T@e latte4) on t@e ot@e4@and) 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 t@e deed o2 sale and TCT and
2o4 4e6onve<an6e?
Can t@e s8o5ses A8ostol Ae dis8ossessed o2 t@e 84o8e4t< notwit@standin1 t@e 2a6t t@at
t@e< a4e 8ossesso4s in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4C
ANS"ER# YES? ,he sub)ect property is registered under the ,orrens #ystem in the names of the
spouses !hua whose title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be collaterally attacBed-
much less in an action for unlawful detainer. It is an accepted rule that a person who has a ,orrens
title oer the property is entitled to the possession thereof. In Laelosa s !A *26< #!>A C92+- the
#upreme !ourt declared that the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property
coered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their faor. Doreoer- the fact that
the respondents were neer in prior physical possession of the sub)ect land is of no moment- as
prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. %Spouses Apostol vs Court of
Appeals, .R No. /412;1. Aune /;, 4660&
QUESTON No?+# Fose is t@e owne4 o2 a 8a46el o2 land sit5ated in San A15stin) Das;a4inas)
Cavite? So;eti;e in t@e ;iddle o2 1'.*) Paolo) t@e A4ot@e4 o2 Fose w@o was t@en t@e
84esident o2 Cavite Ele6t4i6 Coo8e4ative) ve4Aall< 4e:5ested t@e latte4 to 14ant National Powe4
Co48o4ation t@e 4i1@t o2 wa< ove4 a 8o4tion o2 t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< and to allow it to install
wooden ele6t4i6al 8osts and t4ans;ission lines 2o4 t@e ele6t4i2i6ation o2 P5e4to AG5l? Fose
a66eded to t@e said 4e:5est A5t 58on t@e 6ondition t@at t@e said installations wo5ld onl< Ae
te;8o4a4< in nat54e?
So;eti;e in 1'', and t@e4ea2te4 in 1''3) a1ents o2 NPC ente4ed t@e 84o8e4t< o2 Fose
and 6ond56ted en1inee4in1 s54ve<s t@e4eon 2o4 t@e 8548ose o2 e4e6tin1 an all>steel
t4ans;ission line towe4?
Fose t@e4e58on 2iled an a6tion 2o4 a s5; o2 ;one< and da;a1es alle1in1 t@e4ein t@at
6ont4a4< to t@ei4 ve4Aal a14ee;ent) NPC 6ontin5ed to 5se @is 84o8e4t< 2o4 its wooden ele6t4i6al
8osts and t4ans;ission lines wit@o5t 6o;8ensatin1 @i; t@e4e2o4e?
nstead o2 2ilin1 an answe4) NPC 2iled a ;otion to dis;iss on t@e 14o5nd t@at it @ad
al4ead< a6:5i4ed A< 84es64i8tion t@e ease;ent o2 4i1@t>o2>wa< ove4 t@at 8o4tion o2 FoseEs
84o8e4t< w@e4e its 8osts and t4ans;issions we4e estaAlis@ed?
$as NPC a6:5i4ed A< 84es64i8tion t@e ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa<C
ANS"ER# NO? Article 62G of the !iil !ode readsH I!ontinuous and apparent easements are
ac.uired either by irtue of a title or by prescription of then years.J 7rescription as a mode of
ac.uisition re.uires the e5istence of the followingH *1+ capacity to ac.uire by prescriptionE *2+ a
thing capable of ac.uisition by prescriptionE *2+ possession of the thing under certain conditionsE
and *C+ lapse of time proided by law. Ac.uisitie prescription may either be ordinary- in which
case the possession must be in good faith and with )ust title- or e5traordinary- in which case there
is neither good faith nor )ust title. In either case- there has to be possession which must be in the
concept of an owner- public- peaceful- and uninterrupted. As a corollary- Article 1119 of the =!!
proides thatH IActs of possessory character e5ecuted in irtue of license or by mere tolerance of
the owner shall not be aailable for the purposes of possession.
In the present case- the facts reeal that =7!@s possession of that portion of Lose@s
property where it erected the wooden posts and transmission lines was merely upon the tolerance
of the latter. Accordingly- this permissie use by =7! of that portion of the sub)ect property- no
matter how long continued- will not create an easement of right of way by prescription. %NPC vs.
Spouses Campos Ar. .R no. /02502 Aune 4;, 4662&

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QUESTON No?3# Te4esa owned a 4esidential lot wit@ t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 title in @e4 na;e? n
1'-*) s@e allowed Rosendo to 6onst456t a @o5se on t@e said lot and sta< t@e4ein wit@o5t an<
4entals t@e4e2o4e? n 1'--) s@e leased t@e 84o8e4t< to 0ienvenido Santos and assi1ned @e4
lease@old 4i1@ts to t@e Se6ond Q5eGon Cit< Develo8;ent 0an9) to w@i6@ s@e @ad an o5tstandin1
loan?
Te4esa died in 1'.(? n de2e4en6e to @e4 wis@es) @e4 @ei4s allowed Rosendo to sta< in
t@e 84o8e4t<? Rosendo died in 1''3? T@e @ei4s o2 Te4esa t@e4ea2te4 2iled an eDe6t;ent s5it
a1ainst t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo a2te4 t@e late4 4e25sed to va6ate t@e 84o8e4t< des8ite 4e8eated
de;ands?
T@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo inte48osed t@e de2ense t@at Te4esa donated t@e 8a46el o2 land to
Rosendo in 1'.-? T@e< 84od56ed as eviden6e t@e 8@oto6o8< o2 t@e deed o2 donation? An
eBa;ination o2 t@e deed 4eveals t@at t@e sa;e is nota4iGed and a88ea4s to @ave 6o;8lied wit@
all t@e 4e:5isites o2 donation? $en6e) its validit<) a66o4din1 to t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo) ;5st Ae
84es5;ed?
t a88ea4s @oweve4) t@at t@e title to t@e 84o8e4t< 4e;ained wit@ Te4esaH t@at t@e Deed
o2 Donation was not 4e1iste4ed in t@e O22i6e o2 t@e Re1iste4 o2 DeedsH no4 was t@e deed
annotated in t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 title?
a/ Do t@e @ei4s o2 Rosendo @ave t@e Aette4 4i1@t o2 8ossessionC
A/ "@at a4e t@e essential ele;ents o2 a valid donationC
6/ s 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e Deed o2 Donation ne6essa4< 2o4 its validit<C
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? ,he fundamental principle is that a certificate of title seres as eidence of an
indefeasible and incontroertible title to the property in faor of the person whose name
appears therein as the registered owner. ,he registered owner has the right to posses-
en)oy and dispose of the property without any limitations other than those imposed by law.
"urthermore- the following facts and circumstances engender eritable doubts as
to whether they hae a better right of possessionH the fact that the title to the property
remained with ,eresa- and that no new title had been issued in the name of >osendo
because the deed was not registered in the 8ffice of the >egister of $eedsE the fact that
the deed was not annotated at the dorsal portion of the certificate of titleE and the fact
that it was only after eighteen years- after the heirs of >osendo were sued for e)ectment-
that this defense of donation came out for the first time.
b+ ,he essential elements of donation are as followsH *a+ the essential reduction of the
patrimony of the donorE *b+ the increase in the patrimony of the doneeE *c+ the intent to do
an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a donation of an immoable
property- the law further re.uires that the donation be made in the same deed or in a
separate public instrumentE in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument- it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form- to be
noted in both instruments.
c) NO? In order that the donation of an immoable property may be alid- it must be made in
a public document. >egistration of the deed in the 8ffice of the >egister of $eeds or in the
Assessor@s 8ffice is not necessary for it to be considered alid and official. >egistration
does not est titleE it is merely eidence of such title oer a particular parcel of land. ,he
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected.
QUESTON No? 1# Con6e86ion and @e4 siste4) Nieves we4e 6o>owne4s o2 a 8a46el o2 land? Nieves
and @e4 @5sAand An1el 6onst456ted on t@e said 84o8e4t< a two>sto4e< 6o;;e46ial A5ildin1?
Con6e86ion t@e4ea2te4 a6:5i4ed @e4 5ndivided s@a4e o2 t@e 84o8e4t< A< vi4t5e o2 a 6o54t o4de4
w@i6@ @ad Ae6o;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? S@e t@en 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 5nlaw25l detaine4
a1ainst Nieves and An1el w@i6@ was de6ided A< t@e MTC in @e4 2avo4?
Con6e86ion s5Ase:5entl< eBe65ted a deed o2 aAsol5te sale 6ove4in1 @e4 5ndivided
s@a4e to l5;inada w@o ;ade a 8a4tial 8a<;ent o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e and 84o;ised) 854s5ant

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to t@e 6ont4a6t) to 8a< t@e Aalan6e 58on delive4< A< Con6e86ion o2 t@e 6o44es8ondin1
6e4ti2i6ate o2 title?
A2te4 t@e deat@ o2 Con6e86ion) l5;inada 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 t@e 4evival and
eBe65tion o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e MTC in t@e 5nlaw25l detaine4 6ase? S@e alle1ed t@e4ein t@at
s@e is t@e s566esso4 in inte4est o2 Con6e86ion) and as s56@) s@e a6:5i4ed t@e 4i1@t o2 a6tion to
en2o46e t@e aAove;entioned de6ision o2 t@e MTC? Nieves and An1el) on t@e ot@e4@and)
;aintains t@at t@e 6o;8laint s@o5ld Ae dis;issed Ae6a5se Con6e86ion @ad not <et 8aid t@e
Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e o2 t@e 84o8e4t<) and as s56@) @ad not a6:5i4ed title ove4 t@e lot
and t@e 4i1@t to evi6t t@e;? T@is is so Ae6a5se t@e< ;aintained t@at t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale
eBe65ted A< Con6e86ion in 2avo4 o2 l5;inada was an eBe65to4<) and not an eBe65ted deedH
@en6e) t@e 2ail54e o2 l5;inada to 8a< t@e Aalan6e o2 8546@ase 84i6e d54in1 t@e li2eti;e o2
Con6e8tion 4ende4ed t@e sale n5ll and void?
l5;inada) t@e4ea2te4) 6onsi1ned Ae2o4e t@e 6o54t) a2te4 t@e la8se o2 +1 <ea4s 24o; t@e
eBe65tion o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale) t@e a;o5nt 4e84esentin1 t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase
84i6e and 2iled a ;otion 2o4 t@e eBe65tion o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e MTC in t@e 5nlaw25l detaine4
6ase?
a/ Did l5;inadaEs 2ail54e to 8a< t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e 4ende4 t@e sale
n5ll and voidC
A/ "@at is t@e e22e6t o2 l5;inadaEs a6t o2 6onsi1nin1 t@e Aalan6e o2 t@e 8546@ase
84i6e Ae2o4e t@e 6o54tC
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? In a perfected contract of sale of realty- the right to rescind the said contract
depends upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the prescribed condition. ,he #upreme
!ourt has held in a number of cases that the non-payment of the purchase price of
property is a resolutory condition for which the remedy is either rescission or specific
performance under Article 1191 of the =ew !iil !ode. ,his is true for reciprocal
obligations where the obligation is a resolutory condition of the other. ,he endee is
entitled to retain the purchase price or a part of the purchase price of realty if the endor
fails to perform any essential obligation of the contract. #uch right is premised on the
general principles of reciprocal obligations.
Iluminada paid the downpayment of the purchase price. By the terms of the contract-
the obligation of the endee to pay the balance of the purchase price ensued only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title by the >egister of $eeds oer the property sold to and
under the name of the endee- and deliery thereof by the endor !oncepcion to the
latter. !oncepcion failed to secure a certificate of title oer the property. When she
died- her obligation to delier the said title to the endee deoled upon her heirs-
including =iees. ,he said heirs- including =iees failed to do so- despite lapse of eighteen
years since !oncepcion@s death.
b+ ,he consignation by the endee of the purchase price of the property is sufficient to
defeat the right of the petitioners to demand for a rescission of the said deed of absolute
sale.
It bears stressing that when the endee consigned part of the purchase price with
he !ourt and secured title oer the property in her name- the heirs of !oncepcion-
including the petitioners- had not yet sent any notarial demand for the rescission of the
deed of absolute sale to the endee- or filed any action for the rescission of the said deed
with the appropriate court.
Although Iluminada consigned consigned with the court an amount short of the
purchase price- it cannot be claimed that !oncepcion was an unpaid seller because under
the deed of sale- she was still obligated to transfer the property in the name of the
endee- which she failed to do. According to Article 116? of the =!!H IIf a person obliged
to do something fails to do it- the same shall be e5ecuted at his cost. ,he same rule shall
be obsered if he does it in contraention of the tenor of the obligation. "urthermore- it
may be decreed that what has been poorly done be undone.J *.il vs Court of Appeals, .R
No./4;465. Septem#er /4, 4662&
QUESTON No?+# Al24ed) an A5st4alian 6itiGen) ;et Ede4lina) a Fili8ina w@o was wo49in1 in
A5st4alia as a ;asse5se? Ede4lina is ;a44ied to Kla5s) a %e4;an 6itiGen? "@en t@e two Ae6a;e
6lose) Al24ed 6onvin6ed Ede4lina to 4et54n to t@e P@ili88ines and estaAlis@ @e4 own A5siness

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t@e4e wit@ t@e 2o4;e4 84ovidin1 2o4 t@e 6a8ital? "@ile in t@e P@ili88ines) t@e two 8546@ased a
n5;Ae4 o2 4eal estate wit@ t@e 5se o2 Al24edEs ;one< t@o51@ t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale
desi1nated Ede4lina as t@e vendee? T@ei4 4elations@i8) @oweve4) did not wo49 o5t? As a
6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) Al24ed now de;ands t@at Ede4lina eBe65te t@e 6o44es8ondin1 deeds o2
t4ans2e4 ove4 t@e dis85ted 84o8e4ties in @is na;e so t@at @e 6an sell t@e sa;e at 85Ali6 a56tion
and 4e6ove4 t@e val5e o2 t@e sa;e? t is @is 6ontention t@at sin6e it was @is ;one< w@i6@ was
5sed in 8546@asin1 t@e 84o8e4ties) t@e sa;e Aelon1s to @i; as t@e 4eal vendee?
a/ "ill Al24ed Ae allowed to 4e6ove4 t@e 84o8e4ties on t@e Aasis o2 A4ti6le 1,1+ o2 t@e
Civil CodeC
A/ "ill @e Ae allowed to 4e6ove4 on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e a14ee;ent is not ille1al 8e4 se
854s5ant to A4ti6le 1,1-C
6/ "ill t@e denial o2 4elie2 to Al24ed not 45n 6o5nte4 to A4ti6le ++ o2 t@e New Civil
CodeC
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? A contract that iolates the !onstitution and the law- is null and oid and ests no
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. Alfred- being a party
to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and asB to hae his illegal ob)ectie
carried out. 8ne who looses his money or property by Bnowingly engaging in a contract or
transaction which inoles his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his
losses. ,he law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreementE it leaes the
parties where it finds them. 9nder Article 1C12 of the =ew !iil !ode- the petitioner
cannot hae the sub)ect properties deeded to him or allow him to recoer the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof. '.uity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit
that to be done indirectly- which- because of public policy- cannot be done directly.
Where the wrong of one party e.uals that of the other- the defendant is in the stronger
positionS it signifies that in such situation- neither a court of e.uity nor a court of law will
administer a remedy.
b) NO? Alfred cannot find solace in Article 1C16 =!! which readsH IWhen the agreement is
not illegal per se but is merely prohibited- and the prohibition by the law is designated for
the protection of the plaintiff- he may- if public policy is thereby enhanced - recoer what
he has paid or deliered.J ,he proision applies only to those contracts which are merely
prohibited- in order to benefit priate interests. It does not apply to contracts oid ab
initio. ,he sales of three parcels of land in faor of Alfred who is a foreigner is illegal per
se. ,he transactions are oid ab initio because they were entered into in iolation of the
!onstitution. ,o allow Alfred to recoer the properties or the money used in the purchase
of the same would be subersie of public policy.
c) NO? ,he said proision is e5pressed in the ma5imH IDemo cum alterius deter detremento
protestJ *=o person should un)ustly enrich himself at the e5pense of another+. An action
for recoery of what has been paid without )ust cause has been designated as an accion in
rem erso. ,he proision does not apply if- as in this case- the action is proscribed by the
!onstitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and un)ust
to bar Alfred from filing an accion in rem erso oer the sub)ect properties- or from
recoering the money he paid for the sid properties- but as :ord Dansfield stated in the
early case of %olman s LohnsonH Ithe ob)ection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant- sounds at all times ery ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his saBe that the ob)ection is eer allowedE but it is founded on
general principles of policy- which the defendant has the adantage of- contrary to the real
)ustice- as between him and the plaintiff. %Bren8el vs Catito, .R No./0231<, Auly //, 4662&
QUESTON No?3# An1eli6a and @e4 6@ild4en we4e t@e 4e1iste4ed owne4s o2 3 8a46els o2 land?
T@ese 84o8e4ties we4e tenanted and tilled A< 2a4;e4s? T@e said 2a4;e4s assi1ned t@ei4 4i1@ts to
t@e land in 2avo4 o2 $e4;inio in 6onside4ation o2 P3*= s:; to Ae 8a<aAle w@en t@e le1al
i;8edi;ents to t@e sale o2 t@e said land 6eased to eBist?
$e4;inio de;anded 2o4 t@e i;8le;entation o2 t@e 6ont4a6t? T@e latte4) @oweve4)
desisted and in2o4;ed $e4;inio t@at t@e< we4e 4es6indin1 t@e 6ont4a6t and t@e< will instead
sell t@ei4 4i1@ts to t@e La6sonEs w@o o22e4ed @i; Aette4 te4;s?
A4e t@e La6sonEs 15ilt< o2 inte42e4en6eC

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Answe4# No? 9nder Art. 121C of the =!! any third person who induces another to iolate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. It has been held that the
pleader has the burden of proingH 1+ the e5istence of a alid contractE 2+ Bnowledge by the third
person of the e5istence of the contractE and 2+ interference by the third person in the contractual
relation without legal )ustification.
8ne who is not a party to a contract and who interferes thereon is not necessarily an
officious or malicious intermeddler. Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract-
and the impulse behind one@s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
moties- a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested- and such interest motiates his conduct- it cannot be said that he is an officious or
malicious intermeddler. #uch is the case at bar. *Tayag vs. "acson.R C /203;/ *arch 41, 4660&
QUESTON No?1# On Se8te;Ae4 +*) 1'33) Pasto4 Li; ;a44ied R52ina L5<? D54in1 t@e ea4l< 8a4t
o2 t@ei4 ;a44ia1e) Pasto4 estaAlis@ed a n5;Ae4 o2 2a;il< 6o48o4ations 5sin1 t@ei4 6onD51al
25nds? A;on1 t@ese 6o48o4ations was S9<line nte4national Co48o4ation w@e4ein t@e s8o5ses
Li; we4e in6o48o4ato4s and e;8lo<ees? n 1'.1) R52ina 2iled a 8etition 2o4 le1al se8a4ation on
t@e 14o5nd o2 in2idelit< a1ainst Pasto4? T@e 6o54t 14anted t@e sa;e and 58on ;otion o4de4ed
t@e s@e4i22 to @ave t@e 84o8e4ties o2 S9<line levied to answe4 2o4 t@e awa4d o2 s588o4t 14anted
to R52ina?
On A515st +1) 1'(.) S8eed Dist4iA5tin1 Co48o4ation was 4e1iste4ed wit@ SEC wit@ Pasto4
as one o2 t@e in6o48o4ato4s? T@en on F5ne +1) 1''1) Lesli; Co48o4ation was also 4e1iste4ed
wit@ SEC wit@ Pasto4 as t@e ;aDo4it< s@a4e@olde4?
On F5ne 11) 1'',) Pasto4 died intestate and was s54vived A< @is wi2e w@o was
t@e4ea2te4 a88ointed as s8e6ial ad;inist4at4iB o2 Pasto4Es estate?
t a88ea4s t@at on two o66asions) Lesli; Co48o4ation sold to S8eed Dist4iA5tin1 Co48?
8a46els o2 land? U8on 9nowin1 t@is) R52ina 2iled a 6o;8laint a1ainst S8eed 2o4 t@e n5lli2i6ation
o2 t@e deed o2 sale eBe65ted A< Lesli; in its 2avo4? S@e alle1ed t@at t@e s5ADe6t 84o8e4ties)
alt@o51@ 4e1iste4ed in t@e na;e o2 t@ose entities) we4e a6:5i4ed A< Pasto4 d54in1 t@ei4
;a44ia1e? S@e 254t@e4 alle1ed t@at t@e sale was 5na5t@o4iGed sin6e at t@e ti;e o2 its
eBe65tion) @e4 @5sAand w@o was ;aDo4 sto69@olde4) was al4ead< dead and 6o5ld no lon1e4
;ani2est @is a884oval ove4 t@e sa;e?
Can R52ina le1all< :5estion t@e validit< o2 t@e saleC
Answe4# Yes. >ufina filed the complaint as one of the heirs of 7astor- who died intestate. #he was-
in fact- the suriing spouse of the deceased- a compulsory heir by operation of law. ,he general
rule under the law on succession is that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called upon to succeed by operation of law to the
inheritance without the need of further proceedings. 9nder Art. ??6- =!!- inheritance includes all
the properties- rights and obligations of a party- not e5tinguished by his death. Although >ufina was
appointed by the probate court as special administratri5 of the estate of 7astor- she had the right-
apart from her being a special administratri5- to file the complaint against #peed for the
nullification of the deed of absolute sale.
A prior settlement of the estate or een the appointment of >ufina as administratri5- is not
necessary for any of 7astor@s heirs to ac.uire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into
the shoes of their decedent upon his death- they can commence any action originally pertaining to
the decedent. "rom the moment of 7astor@s death- all his rights not e5tinguished by his death
were transmitted to his heirs. %Spee! Distri#uting Corp. vs. CA, .R No. /0321/, *arch /;, 4660&
Sales and Lease
QUESTON No?1# A14i6o; leased its 45AAe4 8lantation to Pionee4 Ente484ises? As a
6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) A14i6o; te4;inated its e;8lo<ees in t@e 8lantation and 1ave t@e; t@ei4
se8a4ation 8a<?

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"@ile Pionee4 was ;ana1in1 t@e 8lantation) so;e o2 A14i6o;Es seve4ed e;8lo<ees 2iled
a 6o;8laint 2o4 ille1al dis;issal a1ainst A14i6o; and Pionee4 w@i6@ was de6ided A< t@e laAo4
a4Aite4 in 2avo4 o2 t@e e;8lo<ees? So;e individ5als 2en6ed 6e4tain 8o4tions o2 t@e 8lantation)
went to t@e o22i6e o2 Pionee4 A4in1in1 taB de6la4ations and 6lai;ed t@at t@e< we4e t@e owne4s
o2 t@e sa;e?
Pionee4 de2a5lted in its 8a<;ent o2 t@e ;ont@l< 4ental? A14i6o; t@e4ea2te4 2iled a
6o;8laint 2o4 s5; o2 ;one< wit@ da;a1es? n its answe4) Pionee4 ;aintained t@at s@e @ad t@e
4i1@t to s5s8end 8a<;ent o2 t@e 4entals sin6e A14i6o; 2ailed to ;aintain @e4 in 8ea6e25l and
ade:5ate enDo<;ent o2 t@e leased 84o8e4t<?
a/ Does A14i6o; @ave t@e oAli1ation to ;aintain t@e lessee in 8ea6e25l and ade:5ate
enDo<;ent o2 t@e 84o8e4t<C
A/ %4antin1 t@at t@e aAove oAli1ation eBists) was A14i6o; aAle to 6o;8l< wit@ t@e
sa;eC
ANS"ERS#
a) YES? As lessor- the Agricom had the duty to maintain 7ioneer in the peaceful and ade.uate
en)oyment of the leased premises. #uch duty was made as part of the contract of lease
entered into by the parties. 'en if it had not been so- the lessor is still duty-bound under
Article 16<C*2+ of the !iil !ode.
b) YES? ,he duty to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and ade.uate en)oyment of the lease
for the duration of the contract mentioned in Article 16<C *2+ is merely a warranty that the
lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal- and not physical- possession. In the case at bar-
no action to .uiet title was filed by any of the said claimants against 7ioneer during the
time that it occupied the premises. When 7ioneer@s representatie saw that a portion of
the leased premises was being fenced by the claimants- it had all the right to sue the
intruders who had disturbed its physical possession as proided in Article 166C of the =ew
!iil !ode. %oweer- 7ioneer did not file any suit against the claimants. 7atently- then-
7ioneer had not been disturbed in its legal possession of the property in derogation of
Article 16<C of the =ew !iil !ode. %Chua Tee Dee vs Court of Appeals, .R No./21;4/. *ay
4;, 4660&
QUESTON No?+# O4lando oAtained a loan 24o; P@ili88ine Savin1s Aan9 8a<aAle wit@in a 8e4iod
o2 one <ea4 in :5a4te4l< install;ents o2 P+')1'*?+(? T@e said loan was se654ed A< a 4eal estate
;o4t1a1e 6ove4in1 O4landoEs 84o8e4t<?
On De6e;Ae4 +-) 1'(3) O4lando) as vendo4) and Ro1elio as vendee eBe65ted a Deed o2
Sale wit@ Ass5;8tion o2 Mo4t1a1e ove4 t@e said 84o8e4t<? A ;ont@ late4) O4lando eBe65ted a
Cont4a6t to Sell involvin1 t@e sa;e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2 Ro1elio 2o4 P+3*)***?**? n t@e said
do65;ent) @e oAli1ed @i;sel2 to eBe65te a deed o2 aAsol5te sale ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2
Ro1elio 58on t@e 25ll 8a<;ent o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e t@e4eo2? T@e 6ont4a6t 25t@e4 oAli1ed
Ro1elio to 8a< t@e said a;o5nt to PS0 as 8a4t o2 t@e 8546@ase 84i6e?
Ro1elio 8aid t@e 2i4st) se6ond and t@i4d :5a4te4l< install;ents in O4landoEs na;e wit@
PS0? $oweve4) on Nove;Ae4 +.) 1'(-) O4lando was noti2ied A< PS0 t@at @is loan wo5ld ;at54e
on De6e;Ae4 +, o2 t@at <ea4? Fea4in1 t@at Ro1elio wo5ld not Ae aAle to 8a< t@e last
install;ent) O4lando was 6o;8elled to 8a< t@e sa;e? O4lando sent a noti6e to Ro1elio t@at @e
was 4ead< to eBe65te t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale and t54n ove4 t@e title to t@e 84o8e4t< 58on
latte4Es 4e;ittan6e o2 t@e a;o5nt w@i6@ O4lando 8aid to PS0?
On De6e;Ae4 +,) 1'(-) Ro1elio went to PS0 to 8a< t@e last install;ent and in2o4;ed
t@e latte4 t@at O4lando @ad eBe65ted a deed o2 sale wit@ ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e in @is 2avo4?
PS0 @oweve4 4e25sed to a66e8t t@e 8a<;ent and in2o4;ed Ro1elio t@at it was not Ao5nd A< t@e
said deed?
Ro1elio t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 s8e6i2i6 8e42o4;an6e a1ainst O4lando?
a/ "@at is t@e nat54e o2 t@e 6ont4a6t ente4ed into Aetween O4lando and Ro1elioC
A/ "@at is t@e e22e6t o2 Ro1elioEs 2ail54e in 8a<in1 t@e last install;ent to PS0C
6/ "@at 4e;ed<) i2 an<) is availaAle to Ro1elioC
ANS"ERS#
a) CONTRACT TO SELL? It bears stressing that 8rlando and >ogelio e5ecuted two interrelated
contracts- isH the $eed of #ale with Assumption of Dortgage and the !ontract to #ell. ,o

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determine the intention of the parties- the two contracts must be read and interpreted
together. 9nder the two contracts- 8rlando bound and obliged himself to e5ecute a deed
of absolute sale oer the property and transfer title thereon to >ogelio after the payment
of the full purchase price of the property- inclusie of the .uarterly installments due on the
petitioner@s loan with 7#B.
!onstruing the contracts together- it is eident that the parties e5ecuted a contract to
sell and not a contract of sale. It is well established that where the seller promised to
e5ecute a deed of absolute sale upon completion of payment of the purchase price by the
buyer- the agreement is contract to sell.
b+ In contracts to sell- where ownership is retained by the seller until the payment of the
price in full- such payment is a positie suspensie condition - failure of which is not really
a breach but an eent that preents the obligation of the endor 8rlando to coney title in
accordance with Article 113C of the !iil !ode. ,he non-fulfillment by >ogelio of his
obligation to pay- which is a suspensie condition to the obligation of 8rlando to sell and
delier the title to the property- rendered the contract to sell ineffectie and without force
and effect. ,he parties stand as if the conditional obligation had neer e5isted. Article
1191 will not apply because it presupposes an obligation already e5tant. ,here can be no
rescission of an obligation that is still non-e5isting- the suspensie condition not haing
happened.
c) >ogelio may reinstate the contract to sell by paying the amount paid by 8rlando to 7#B
when the latter settled the last installment- and 8rlando may agree thereto and accept
>ogelio@s late payment. In this case- 8rlando had already decided before and after >ogelio
filed the complaint to accept the payment and to e5ecute the deed of absolute sale oer
the property and cause the transfer of the title of the sub)ect property to >ogelio. %Rayos
vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /2114<, Auly /0, 4660&

Partnership !gency and "rusts
QUESTON No?1# T@e @ei4s o2 Te6son and Eleosida a4e t@e owne4s o2 a 8a46el o2 land 6ove4ed
A< TCT Nos? T>3-.-- and T>3-.,3 4es8e6tivel<? T@e aAove;entioned owne4s a4e 4e84esented
A< Ma4<?
On one o66asion) Ma4< ;et Antonio and A54elio w@o o22e4ed to 8546@ase t@e 84o8e4t<)
o2 w@i6@ t@e 2o4;e4 a14eed? Antonio and A54elio t@e4ea2te4 de;anded t@at a deed o2 aAsol5te
sale Ae eBe65ted A< Ma4< 854s5ant to t@ei4 ve4Aal a14ee;ent? "@en t@e said de;and 4ea6@ed
Ma4<) s@e sent a lette4 to Antonio and A54elio in2o4;in1 t@e; t@at s@e is no lon1e4 sellin1 t@e
84o8e4t< as s@e was en6o5nte4in1 84oAle;s wit@ t@e tenants t@e4eon?
Antonio and A54elio s5Ase:5entl< 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 s8e6i2i6 8e42o4;an6e wit@
da;a1es a1ainst Ma4< and t@e 4e1iste4ed owne4s o2 t@e 8a46els o2 land 14o5nded on t@e alle1ed
8e42e6ted 6ont4a6t o2 sale as eviden6ed A< t@e lette4 sent to t@e; A< Ma4<?
a/ "as t@e4e a 8e42e6ted 6ont4a6t o2 saleC
A/ "as t@e lette4 sent A< %4a6e a s522i6ient note o4 ;e;o4and5; o2 t@e 8e42e6ted
6ont4a6t to 4e;ove t@e sa;e 24o; t@e 6ove4a1e o2 t@e stat5te o2 24a5dsC
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? ,here is no documentary eidence that the respondent-owners authori(ed respondent
Dary to sell their properties to another. Article 13?3 of the =ew !iil !ode proides that a
special power of attorney is necessary to enter into a contract by which the ownership of
an immoable is transmitted or ac.uired either gratuitously or for a aluable
consideration- or to create or coney real rights oer immoable property- or for any other
act of strict dominion. Any sale of real property by one purporting to be the agent of the
registered owner without any authority therefore in writing from the said owner is null and
oid. %e declarations of the agent alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or
e5tent of her authority.
b) NO? !ontrary to Antonio and Aurelio@s contention- the letter sent by ;race is not a note or
memorandum within the conte5t of Article 1CG2 *2+ of the =ew !iil !ode because it does
not contain the followingH *a+ all the essential terms and conditions of the sale of the
propertiesE *b+ an accurate description of the property sub)ect of the saleE and *c+ the
names of the respondents-owners of the properties. %"itonua vs Bernan!e8, .R No./0<//5.
April /0, 4660&

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Credit transactions
QUESTON No?1# T@e s8o5ses Se44ano oAtained a loan 24o; %SS se654ed A< a 4eal estate
;o4t1a1e 58on a @o5se and lot owned A< t@e 2o4;e4?
T@e s8o5ses Se44ano eBe65ted on F5ne 3) 1'-' a deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ 8a4tial
ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e ove4 t@e 84o8e4t< in 2avo4 o2 t@e s8o5ses %eli w@o i;;ediatel< too9
8ossession o2 t@e sa;e? T@e s8o5ses %eli 2ailed to settle t@ei4 oAli1ation? As a 6onse:5en6e o2
w@i6@) %SS 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4 t@e 4es6ission o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ 8a4tial
ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e? T@e 6o54t t@e4ea2te4 o4de4ed t@e 4es6ission o2 t@e said deed?
T@e s8o5ses %eli elevated t@e 6ase to t@e Co54t o2 A88eals? D54in1 t@e 8enden6< o2 t@e
a88eal) %SS 2o4e6losed t@e 4eal estate ;o4t1a1e ove4 t@e 84o8e4t<? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale)
t@e 84o8e4t< was awa4ded to %SS as t@e @i1@est Aidde4 and a 6e4ti2i6ate o2 sale was iss5ed to it
on A515st 3*) 1'(-? Un9nown to Aot@ t@e s8o5ses Se44ano and t@e Co54t o2 A88eals) t@e
s8o5ses %eli 8aid t@e 4ede;8tion 84i6e on O6toAe4 3*) 1'(. and a 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4ede;8tion
was eBe65ted A< %SS in t@ei4 2avo4? T@e Co54t o2 A88eals @oweve4 dis;issed t@e a88eal and
t@e sa;e Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<?
&o8tional/ T@e s8o5ses %eli t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 8etition 2o4 6e4tio4a4i 84a<in1 2o4 t@e
n5lli2i6ation o2 t@e o4de4 o2 t@e t4ial 6o54t? T@e< alle1ed t@at w@en t@e< 8aid t@e 4ede;8tion
84i6e to t@e %SS) t@ei4 a88eal o2 t@e de6ision o2 t@e lowe4 6o54t was still 8endin1 Ae2o4e t@e
CA? Conse:5entl<) 5nde4 t@e te4;s o2 t@e deed o2 aAsol5te sale wit@ ass5;8tion o2 ;o4t1a1e
w@i6@ was still standin1 at t@at ti;e) t@e< we4e i8so 2a6to s5A4o1ated to t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e
s8o5ses Se44ano as ;o4t1a1o4s o2 t@e 84o8e4t<H @en6e) t@e< Ae6a;e owne4s o2 t@e 84o8e4t<
and we4e entitled to t@e 8ossession t@e4eo2?
Did t@e a6t o2 t@e s8o5ses %eli in 4edee;in1 t@e 84o8e4t< and o2 %SS in eBe65tin1 t@e
6e4ti2i6ate o2 4ede;8tion in 2avo4 o2 t@e 2o4;e4 o8e4ated to vest in t@e; t@e owne4s@i8 ove4
t@e sa;eC
ANS"ER# NO? Before the lapse of the one year period- the mortgagor-debtor remains the owner
of the property. ,he right ac.uired by the purchaser at public auction is merely inchoate until the
period of redemption has e5pired without the right being e5ercised by the redemptioner. #uch
right becomes absolute only after the e5piration of the redemption period without the right of
redemption haing been e5ercised.
In this case- there is no showing that that the sheriff@s certificate of sale in faor of the
;#I# has been registered in the 8ffice of the register of $eed and if so- when it was in fact
registered in the said office. It cannot thus be argued that when the spouses ;eli paid the
redemption price in full payment of the account of the spouses #errano- the one year period to
redeem the property had by then lapsed. %ence- the spouses #errano remained the owners of the
property. ,he ;#I# neer ac.uired title oer the property and could not hae coneyed and
transferred ownership oer the same when it e5ecuted the certificate of redemption to and in the
name of the spouses #errano. %Serrano vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /22<<2, Decem#er /6, 4662&
QUESTON No?+# F4an9lin was as9ed A< @is 24iend An1eles to @el8 A4t54o in in6o48o4atin1 @is
A5siness A< de8ositin1 a 6e4tain a;o5nt o2 ;one< in t@e Aan9 a66o5nt o2 Ste4ela Ma49etin1?
An1eles ass54ed !ives t@at @e 6o5ld wit@d4aw t@e said a;o5nt 24o; t@e sa;e a66o5nt in a
;ont@s ti;e? Rel<in1 on t@e a2o4e;entioned ass54an6es and 4e84esentations) F4an9lin iss5ed a
6@e69 in t@e a;o5nt o2 P+**)***?** in 2avo4 o2 Ste4ela Ma49etin1?
F4an9lin t@e4ea2te4 went to P4od56e4Es 0an9 to ve4i2< i2 @is ;one< was still inta6t? $e
was @oweve4 in2o4;ed t@at 8a4t o2 t@e ;one< in t@e a66o5nt @ad Aeen wit@d4awn A< A4t54o
and t@at t@e 4e;ainin1 P'*)***?** 6o5ld not Ae wit@d4awn sin6e it @ad to answe4 2o4 so;e
8ostdated 6@e69s iss5ed A< A4t54o?
A4t54o iss5ed a 8ostdated 6@e69 in t@e a;o5nt o2 P+1+)***?** in 2avo4 o2 F4an9lin
w@i6@ was @oweve4 dis@ono4ed 58on 84esent;ent? As a 6onse:5en6e o2 w@i6@) F4an9lin 2iled
an a6tion 2o4 4e6ove4< o2 s5; o2 ;one<?
a/ "as t@e t4ansa6tion Aetween F4an9lin and A4t54o one o2 loan o4 6o;;odat5;C
A/ Can a 6ons5;aAle t@in1 Ae a s5ADe6t o2 6o;;odat5;C

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ANS"ER#
a) COMMODATUM? "ranBlin agreed to deposit his money in the saings account of #terela
specifically for the purpose of maBing it appear that the same had sufficient capitali(ation
for incorporation- with the promise that the amount shall be returned within thirty days.
"ranBlin merely accommodated Arturo by lending his money without consideration as faor
to his good friend Angeles. It was howeer clear to the parties that the money will not be
remoed from #terela@s saings accountand would be returned to "ranBlin after thirty days.
Arturo@s attemps to return to "ranBlin the amount of 72GG-GGG.GG together with an
additional 712-GGG.GG- allegedly representing interest on the mutuum- did not conert the
transaction from the commodatum into a mutuum because such was not the intent of the
parties and because the additional 712-GGG.GG corresponds to the fruits of the lending of
the 72GG-GGG.GG. Article 192< of the !iil !ode e5pressly states that Ithe bailee in
commodatum ac.uires the use if the thing loaned but not the fruits. As such- it was only
proper for Arturo to remit to "ranBlin the interest accruing to the latter@s money deposited
with 7roducer@s BanB.
b) YES? ,here are some instances where a commodatum may hae for its ob)ect a
consumable thing. Article 1926 of the =ew !iil !ode proides that I!onsummable goods
may be the sub)ect of commodatum if the purpose of the contract is not the consumption
of the ob)ect- as when it is merely for distribution.J ,hus- if consumable goods are loaned
only for purposes of e5hibition- or when the intention of the parties is to lend consumable
goods and to hae the ery same goods returned at the end of the period agreed upon- the
loan is a commodatum and not a mutuum. %Pro!ucers ,an$ of the Philippines vs CA, .R
No.//1240, Be#ruary /3, 4662&
QUESTON No?3# S58e4lines T4ans8o4tation Co? de6ided to a6:5i4e 2ive new A5ses 24o;
Dia;ond Moto4s? CC Leasin1 a14eed to 2inan6e t@e 8546@ase o2 t@e said A5ses in t@e a;o5nt o2
P13 Million via a loan 58on t@e 6ondition t@at t@e A5ses s@all Ae 5sed as se654it< 2o4 t@e loan?
S58e4lines @oweve4 de2a5lted in t@e 8a<;ent o2 its oAli1ation to CC? As a 6onse:5en6e o2
w@i6@) CC eBt4aD5di6iall< 2o4e6losed t@e 6@attel ;o4t1a1e? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale) CC
o22e4ed a Aid o2 P. Million 2o4 t@e ;oto4 ve@i6les and was de6la4ed t@e winnin1 Aidde4)
4es5ltin1 in t@e de2i6ien6< o2 P- Million 24o; t@e total a;o5nt o2 t@e loan?
a/ s A4ti6le 1,(, &3/ o2 t@e Civil Code a88li6aAle in t@e 84esent 6aseC
A/ s S58e4lines still liaAle 2o4 t@e P- Million de2i6ien6<C
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? Article 1C3C *2+ of the =ew !iil !ode is inapplicable to the instant transaction
between the parties. It was $iamond Dotors and not I!! which sold the sub)ect buses to
#uperlines. =o eidence had been presented by #uperlines to show that I!! bought the
said buses from $iamond Dotors !orporation under a special arrangement and that I!! sold
the buses to #uperlines. Article 1C3C *2+ is applicable only where there is endor-endee
relationship between the parties and since I!! did not sell the buses to #uperlines- the
latter cannot inoBe the said law.
b) YES? Applying the !hattel Dortgage :aw- it is settled that if in an e5tra-)udicial
foreclosure of a chattel mortgage a deficiency e5ists- an independent ciil action may be
instituted for the recoery of the said deficiency. ,o deny the mortgagee the right to
maintain an action to recoer the deficiency after foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
would be to oerlooB the fact that the chattel mortgage is only gien as security and not
as payment for the debt in case of failure of payment. Both the !hattel Dortgage :aw and
Act 212< goerning e5tra-)udicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage- do not contain any
proision- e5pressly or impliedly- precluding the mortgagee from recoering deficiency of
the principal obligation. %Superlines Transportation Company vs ICC "easing an! Binancing
Corporation, .R No. /165;2, Be#ruary 4<, 4662&

"orts and #amages
QUESTON No?1# E44ol was 2o5nd 15ilt< Ae<ond 4easonaAle do5At A< t@e RTC o2 Ro;Alon 2o4
t@e ;54de4) :5ali2ied A< aA5se o2 s58e4io4 st4en1t@) o2 AleDand4o? T@e 6o54t senten6ed @i; to
s522e4 t@e 8enalt< o2 4e6l5sion 8e48et5a and o4de4ed @i; to 8a< t@e @ei4s o2 AleDand4o t@e

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2ollowin1# a/ P3*)***?** as 6ivil inde;nit<H A/ a6t5al da;a1es Aased on t@e testi;on< t@at t@e
@ei4s in6544ed A54ial and ot@e4 eB8enses as a 6onse:5en6e o2 AleDand4oEs deat@H and 6/
P+3)***?** as eBe;8la4< da;a1es?
a/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 P3*)***?** as 6ivil inde;nit<C
A/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 a6t5al da;a1esC
6/ "as t@e 6o54t 6o44e6t in awa4din1 eBe;8la4< da;a1esC
ANS"ERS#
a) YES? !onformably to recent )urisprudence- the amount of 7<G-GGG.GG for ciil indemnity
should be sustained. Artcile 22G6 of the !iil !ode proides that when death occurs as a
result of a crime- the heirs of the deceased are entitled to be indemnified without need of
any proof thereof.
b) NO? While there was testimony that the heirs incurred burial and other e5penses resulting
from the death of Ale)andro- no competent eidence was presented to proe his claim.
9nder Artile 2199 of the !iil !ode- a party is entitled to compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proed. 8nly substantiated an proen
e5penses- or those that appear to hae been genuinely incurred in connection with the
death - waBe or burial of the ictim will be recogni(ed.
%oweer- under Article 222C of the same !ode- te;8e4ate da;a1es may be
recoered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot- from the nature of the case- be proed with certainty. In the present case- the
heirs of Ale)andro clearly incurred funeral and burial e5penses. %ence- the award of
temperate damages is )ustified.
c) YES? ;ien the attendance of the .ualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength-
the award of e5emplary damages in the amount of 72<-GGG.GG to the heirs of the ictim in
accordance with Article 222G of the !iil !ode- is in order. %People vs "achica, .R
No./2/3/1. Septem#er 2, 4662&
QUESTON No?+# Ia;Aoan1a Develo8;ent Co48o4ation &IDC/ oAtained 24o; United Co6on5t
Plante4s 0an9 &UCP0/ in w@i6@ t@e s8o5ses Teo2ilo Ra;os) S4? and A;elita Ra;os a6ted as
s54eties? Teo2ilo S4? was t@e EBe65tive O22i6e4 o2 t@e 1lesia ni C4isto? Fo4 2ail54e o2 IDC to
settle its oAli1ation) UCP0 2iled a 6o;8laint &Civil Case 1-,33/ 2o4 a s5; o2 ;one< a1ainst it and
t@e s54eties? F5d1;ent was 4ende4ed in 2avo4 o2 UCP0? A w4it o2 eBe65tion was t@e4ea2te4
iss5ed w@i6@ 6ontained t@e na;e Teo2ilo Ra;os?
n t@e 84o6ess o2 i;8le;entin1 t@e aAove w4it) UCP0 was in2o4;ed A< one o2 its
a884aise4s t@at t@e< @ave lo6ated a @o5se and lot 6ove4ed A< TCT +.31-. owned A< Teo2ilo C?
Ra;os) P4esident and C@ai4;an o2 t@e 0o4ad o2 Di4e6to4s o2 t@e Ra;d5st4ial Co48o4ation) and
;a44ied to ReAe66a Ra;os?
Meanw@ile) Ra;d5st4ial Co48? w@o was in need o2 ;one< to 8a4ti6i8ate in a Aiddin1
84oDe6t o2 San Mi15el Co48o4ation) a88lied 2o4 a loan wit@ UCP0 5sin1 t@e @o5se and lot owned
A< Teo2ilo C? Ra;os as 6ollate4al t@e4e2o4e? M56@ to t@ei4 s5484ise) t@e< we4e in2o4;ed A<
UCP0 t@at it @ad to @old in aAe<an6e an< a6tion on its loan a88li6ation Ae6a5se a noti6e o2 lev<
was annotated on t@e title o2 t@e 84o8e4t< Aelon1in1 to Teo2ilo C? Ra;os? As a 6onse:5en6e o2
w@i6@) Teo2ilo C? Ra;os @as to 45s@ to t@e @os8ital d5e to @<8e4tension 84oAle;s and
Ra;d5st4ial Co48o4ation 2o42eited its 6@an6es to 8a4ti6i8ate in t@e Aiddin1? Teo2ilo C? Ra;os
t@e4ea2te4 2iled a 6o;8laint 84a<in1 t@at D5d1;ent Ae 4ende4ed o4de4in1 UCP0 to 8a< ;o4al
and eBe;8la4< da;a1es on a66o5nt o2 its ne1li1en6e?
a/ "as UCP0 ne1li1entC
A/ s t@e awa4d o2 ;o4al da;a1es 84o8e4C
6/ s t@e awa4d o2 eBe;8la4< da;a1es 84o8e4C
ANS"ERS#
a) YES? In determining whether or not the petitioner acted negligently- the constant test isH
I$id the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary prudent person would hae used in the same situation? If not- then he is guilty
of negligence.J

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9!7B has access to more facilities in confirming the identity of their )udgment
debtors. It should hae acted more cautiously- especially since some uncertainty had been
reported by the appraiser whom it had tasBed to maBe erifications. It appears that 9!7B
treated the uncertainty as a flimsy matter. It placed more importance on the information
regarding the marBetability and marBet alue of the property- utterly disregarding the
identity of the registered owner thereof.
"urthermore- the name of the )udgment debtor in !iil !ase 16C<2 was ,eofilo
>amos- #r.. ,he name of the owner of the property coered by ,!, 2?<16? was ,eofilo !.
>amos. It behoed upon 9!7B to ascertain whether ,eofilo >amos #r. in !iil !ase 16C<2
was the same person who appeared as the owner of the property coered by the said title.
If the petitioner had done so- it should hae surely discoered that the respondent was not
the surety and the )udgment debtor in !iil !ase 16C<2. 9!7B failed to do so- and merely
assumed that the respondent and the )udgment debtor ,eofilo >amos #r. were one and the
same person.
b) YES? "or the award of moral damages to be granted- the following must e5istH *1+ there
must be an in)ury clearly sustained by the claimant- whether physical- mental- or
psychologicalE *2+ there must be a culpable act or omission factually establishedE *2+ the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the pro5imate cause of the in)ury sustained by
the claimantE and *C+ the award for damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the !iil !ode.
In the case at bar- all the four re.uisites are present. "irst- ,eofilo !. >amos
sustained in)uries in that his physical health and cardio-ascular ailment were aggraatedE
his fear that his one and only property would be foreclosed- hounded him endlesslyE and his
reputation as mortgagor has been tarnished. #econd- the annotation of the notice of ley
on the ,!, of ,eofilo !. >amos was wrongful- arising as it did from 9!7B@s negligent act of
allowing the ley without erifying the identity of its )udgment debtor. ,hird- such
wrongful ley was the pro5imate cause of ,eofilo@s misery. "ourth- the award for damages
is predicated on article 2219 of the !iil !ode- particularly =o. 1G thereof *Acts and actions
referred to in Article 21- 26- 2?- 23- 29- 2G- 22- 2C- and 2<+.
c) NO? ,eofilo !. >amos failed to show that 9!7B acted with malice and bad faith. It is a
re.uisite in the grant of e5emplary damages that the act of the offender must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton- fraudulent- or maleolent manner.
QUESTON No? 3# T@e RTC o2 Malolos) 05la6an) 6onvi6ted T4inidad) Sa;8a1a) and Co4ona o2
;54de4 and was senten6ed a66o4din1l<? As to t@e 6ivil liaAilit< o2 t@e a665sed) t@e t4ial 6o54t
awa4ded) a;on1 ot@e4s) t@e s5; o2 P3**)*** 2o4 loss o2 ea4nin1 6a8a6it< o2 t@e vi6ti; Aased
solel< on t@e testi;on< o2 Fose8@ine) t@e vi6ti;Es da51@te4?
"as t@e awa4d 84o8e4C
Answe4# No? ,he award of 7<GG-GGG to the heirs of the ictim for the latter@s unearned income is
barren of factual basis. ,he prosecution was mandated to adduce documentary eidence to proe
the same. ,he bare testimony of Losephine is not sufficient basis for the award.
!ompensation for lost income is in the nature of damages- and re.uires ade.uate proof
thereof. "or loss of income due to death- there must be unbiased proof of the deceased@s aerage
income as well as proof of aerage e5penses. ,he award for lost income refers to the net income of
the deceasedE that is the total income less aerage e5penses. =o proof of the ictim@s aerage
e5penses was adduced in eidenceE as such- there can be no reliable estimate of lost earnings.
Indeed- the award of the trial court was based merely on speculation and surmises. %People vs.
Sampaga, .R No. /23<42, *arch /4, 4660&

QUESTON No?1# An1el 2iled a 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation o2 a 8a46el o2 land on F5ne ++) 1'',
6lai;in1 t@at @e @as Aeen in a6t5al) o8en) 6ontin5o5s and noto4io5s 8ossession) in t@e 6on6e8t
o2 an owne4 ove4 t@e sa;e? t a88ea4s t@at @e li9ewise 2iled a 2o4es@o4e lease a88li6ation ove4
t@e sa;e land in 1'..? D54in1 t@e t4ial) t@e 6o54t o4de4ed t@e LRA and t@e CENRO to 2ile wit@

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it a 4e8o4t on t@e stat5s o2 t@e s5ADe6t land? T@e 6o54t t@e4ea2te4 4ende4ed a de6ision on Ma<
3 1''3 14antin1 t@e 8etition? T@e said de6ision Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<?
T@e O22i6e o2 t@e Soli6ito4 1ene4al s5Ase:5entl< 2iled a 8etition 2o4 ann5l;ent o2 t@e
aAove D5d1;ent on t@e 14o5nd t@at Aased on t@e 4e8o4t o2 t@e LRA w@i6@ was 4e6eived A< it on
F5ne ++) 1''3) t@e land a88lied 2o4 is 2o4es@o4e land?
a/ "@at is t@e nat54e and 6lassi2i6ation o2 2o4es@o4e landC
A/ "ill t@e a6tion o2 t@e Re85Ali6 t@4o51@ t@e OS% 84os8e4C
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? "oreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marBs
and is alternatiely wet and dry to the flow of the tide. It is that part of the land ad)acent
to the sea- which is alternatiely coered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is
part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and
not otherwise. "oreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the
commerce of man. It is not capable of priate appropriation.
b) YES? 'en if the decision of the >,! has become final and e5ecutory- the action for
annulment of )udgment should be sustained since it is impressed with public interest. ,he
#tate has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by- or estopped from- the mistaBes
or negligent acts of its officials or agents- mush more- non-suited as a result thereof.
"urthermore- Angel had in fact filed a foreshore lease application in 19?? and paid
the corresponding fees thereon. ,here is therefore doubt to Angel@s claim that he had
been in actual- open- notorious- and continuous possession in the concept of an owner.
%Repu#lic vs Court of Appeals, .R No. /452/5, Aune 41, 4660&
QUESTON No?+# On De6e;Ae4 +.) 1'.-) F4an6is6o 2iled a 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e t@4ee
8a46els o2 land? $e alle1ed t@e4ein t@at t@e4e we4e @a4dl< an< Ai1 t4ees in t@e s5ADe6t
84o8e4t< and t@at @e and @is 84ede6esso4s>in>inte4est even 8lanted Aananas) 6assava) 6o6on5t
t4ees and 6a;otes on t@e sa;e? $e 254t@e4 alle1ed t@at @e @ad Aeen in a6t5al) o8en) noto4io5s
and 6ontin5o5s 8ossession o2 t@e 84o8e4t< in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4?
T@e a88li6ation was o88osed A< t@e Di4e6to4 o2 Lands on t@e 14o5nd t@at t@e s5ADe6t
84o8e4t< was 2o4est land and was onl< 4e6lassi2ied as alienaAle and dis8osaAle onl< on A84il 1-)
1'.3?
a/ S@o5ld t@e 8etition 2o4 4e1ist4ation Ae 14antedC
A/ s t@e aAsen6e o2 Ai1 t4ees 6on6l5sive as 4e1a4ds to t@e 6lassi2i6ation o2 a 8a46el o2
land as not Aelon1in1 to 2o4est landC
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? 9nder #ection 6 of !ommonwealth Act =o.1C1- the classification and reclassification
of public lands into alienable or disposable- mineral or forest land is the prerogatie of the
'5ecutie $epartment. ,he rule on the confirmation of imperfect title does not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain. "rancisco failed to adduce in eidence any certification from the Bureau of
:ands or the Bureau of "orestry to the effect that the property is alienable or disposable.
"urthermore- since the property was reclassified as alienable and disposable only on April
16- 19?2 and "rancisco filed his application only on $ecember 2?- 19?6- he irrefragably
failed to proe his possession of the property for the re.uisite thirty *2G+-year period.
b) NO? A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may hae stripped it of its forest coer.
7arcels of land classified as forest land may actually be coered with grass or planted to
crops by 7aingin cultiators or other farmers. I"orest :andsJ do not hae to be in the
mountains or in out of the way places. #wampy areas coered by mangroe trees- nipa
palms and other trees growing in bracBish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. ,he classification is descriptie of its legal nature or status and does not hae to be
descriptie of what the land actually looBs liBe. %=arate vs Director of "an!s, .R No.
/2/16/, Auly /0, 4660&
QUESTON No?3# T@e s8o5ses I5l5eta oAtained 24o; %SS va4io5s loans se654ed A< 4eal estate
;o4t1a1es ove4 8a46els o2 land? T@e s8o5ses I5l5eta 2ailed to 8a< t@ei4 loans w@i6@ 84o;8ted

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%SS to 2o4e6lose t@e 4eal estate ;o4t1a1es? D54in1 t@e a56tion sale) so;e o2 t@e ;o4t1a1ed
84o8e4ties we4e awa4ded to %SS? $oweve4) so;e lots w@i6@ we4e 6ove4ed A< t@e ;o4t1a1ed
titles we4e eB84essl< eB6l5ded 24o; t@e a56tion sin6e t@ose t@at we4e sold we4e s522i6ient to
8a< 2o4 all t@e ;o4t1a1e deAts? T@is notwit@standin1) %SS in6l5ded t@e eB6l5ded lots w@en it
eBe65ted on Nove;Ae4 +3) 1'.3 an A22idavit o2 Consolidation o2 Owne4s@i8 on t@e Aasis o2
w@i6@) 6e4ti2i6ates o2 title ove4 t@e sa;e we4e iss5ed in t@e na;e o2 %SS?
I5l5eta t@e4ea2te4 t4ans2e44ed @is 4i1@ts ove4 t@e eB6l5ded lots to Ed5a4do in 1'(' w@o
6onse:5entl< de;anded 24o; %SS t@e 4et54n o2 t@e said eB6l5ded lots? Ed5a4do t@en 2iled on
Ma< .) 1''* a 6o;8laint 2o4 4e6onve<an6e o2 4eal estate a1ainst t@e %SS?
a/ Can %SS le1all< 6lai; owne4s@i8 ove4 t@e eB6l5ded 84o8e4ties on t@e Aasis o2 t@e
6e4ti2i6ates o2 title ove4 t@e sa;e w@i6@ we4e iss5ed in its na;eC
A/ $as t@e a6tion 2o4 4e6onve<an6e 84es64iAedC
ANS"ERS#
a) NO? 'en if titles oer the lots had been issued in the name of the ;#I#- still it could not
legally claim ownership and absolute dominion oer them because indefeasibility of title
under the ,orrens system does not attach to titles secured by fraud or misrepresentation.
,he fraud committed by ;#I# in the form of concealment of the e5istence of said lots and
failure to return the same to the real owners after their e5clusion from the foreclosure
sale made ;#I# holders in bad faith. It is well settled that a holder in bad faith of a
certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as
a shield for fraud.
b) NO? Article 1C<6 of the !iil !ode proidesH If the property is ac.uired through mistaBe or
fraud- the person obtaining it is- by force of law- considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. An action for reconeyance
based on implied or constructie trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title oer the property.
,he general rule that the discoery of fraud is deemed to hae taBen place upon
the registration of real property because it is Iconsidered a constructie notice to all
personsJ does not apply in this case. ,he case in point is Samonte vs Court of Appeals
where the #upreme !ourt recBoned the prescriptie period for the filing of the action based
on implied trust from the actual discoery of the fraud. #antiago came Bnow of ;#I#@
fraudulent acts only in 1939 and the complaint was filed in 199G. "ollowing the !ourt@s
pronouncement in Samonte- the institution of the action for reconeyance was thus well
within the prescriptie period. %.SIS vs Santiago, .R No. /11465, Dcto#er 4<, 4662&
QUESTON No? ,# n A515st 1'3*) t@e Re85Ali6 o2 t@e P@ili88ines 2iled an a88li6ation wit@ t@e
6adast4al 6o54t 6lai;in1 owne4s@i8 ove4 6e4tain 84o8e4ties w@i6@ 6ove4ed Lot ,3+'? %5ille4;o
2iled an answe4 6lai;in1 t@e4ein a 4i1@t ove4 Lot ,3+'? %5ille4;o died d54in1 t@e 8enden6< o2
t@e 6ase?
%4e1o4io) w@o 6lai;ed to Ae t@e onl< son o2 %5ille4;o) s5Astit5ted t@e latte4) and to
@i;) Lot ,3+' was adD5di6ated A< t@e 6o54t? T@e de6ision Ae6a;e 2inal and eBe65to4<? On
F5l< () 1'(3) OCT No? *>-)131 was iss5ed in t@e na;e o2 %4e1o4io?
So;eti;e t@e4ea2te4) t@e A4ot@e4s and siste4s o2 %5ille4;o 2iled a 6o;8laint 2o4
4e6ove4< o2 8ossession wit@ da;a1es a1ainst %4e1o4io) alle1in1 t@at %5ille4;o died sin1le and
wit@o5t iss5e and t@at %4e1o4io oAtained title to t@e 84o8e4t< t@4o51@ 24a5d de6eit and 14oss
;is4e84esentation? T@e< 84a<ed t@at %4e1o4ioEs title Ae 6an6elled and t@e 84o8e4t< Ae
4e6onve<ed to t@e;? A2te4 t@e t4ial) t@e 6o54t de6la4ed t@at %4e1o4io @as not s522i6ientl<
84oved t@at @e is t@e son o2 %5ille4;o A5t 45led t@at @e @as t@e 4i1@t o2 8ossession o2 t@e
dis85ted 84o8e4t<?
s %4e1o4io entitled to t@e 8ossession o2 t@e dis85ted 84o8e4t<C
ANS"ER# YES? ;regorio was able to obtain a title in his name oer the .uestioned property after
the cadastral proceedings instituted by the >epublic. ,his ,orrens title is now a conclusie
eidence of his ownership of the sub)ect land. After the e5piration of the one-year period from
the issuance of the decree of registration- the said certificate of title became incontroertible. In
fine- whether or not his title was obtained fraudulently is beyond the competence of the #upreme
!ourt to determine. ,he issue should hae been raised during the proceeding before the cadastral
court. A ,orrens title cannot be collaterally attacBed- the issue on the alidity of title- i.e.
whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be raised in an action e5pressly instituted for

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that purpose. ,he prayer for the cancellation of ;regorio@s title and the reconeyance of the
same to brothers and sisters of ;uillermo is legally impossible. ,o sustain the said action would be
inconsistent with the rule that the act of registration is the operatie act that coneys a parcel of
land to its registered owner under the ,orrens system.
What we are emphasi(ing is that- although ;regorio has not sufficiently proed his filiation
to the late ;uillermo- the fact that he has a legal title oer the sub)ect land entitles him to
possession thereof- pending the final determination of the alidity of the title issued to him in an
appropriate proceeding.
DOCTRNES OF SELECTED LANDMARK CASES N C!L LA"
"A!ER OF R%$TS
A sti85lation 4e:5i4in1 t@e 4e6i8ient o2 a s6@ola4s@i8 14ant to waive @is 4i1@t to t4ans2e4
to anot@e4 s6@ool) 5nless @e 4e25nds t@e e:5ivalent o2 @is s6@ola4s@i8 in 6as@ is n5ll and void?
T@e s6@ool 6on6e4ned oAvio5sl< 5nde4stands s6@ola4s@i8 awa4ds as a A5siness s6@e;e desi1ned
to in64ease t@e A5siness 8otential o2 an ed56ational instit5tion? T@5s) 6on6eived) it is not onl<
in6onsistent wit@ so5nd 8oli6<) A5t also wit@ 1ood ;o4als? %Cui &s. !rellano Uni&ersity'
ACTS CONTRA 0ONUS MORES
A88l<in1 A4t? +1) t@e S584e;e Co54t 45led t@at a ;a44ied ;an @ad sed56ed a 1i4l
t@4o51@ an in1enio5s and t4i69< s6@e;e) i?e? on t@e 84eteBt o2 tea6@in1 @e4 @ow to 84a< t@e
4osa4<) to t@e eBtent o2 ;a9in1 @e4 2all in love wit@ @i;? !e4il<) @e @as 6o;;itted an inD54< to
t@e 1i4lEs 2a;il< in a ;anne4 6ont4a4< to ;o4als) 1ood 65sto;s and 85Ali6 8oli6<? %Pe &s Pe'
$oweve4) t@e S584e;e Co54t denied t@e awa4d o2 ;o4al da;a1es Aased on t@e 2a6t t@at
2o4 one <ea4) 24o; 1'3(>1'3') t@e 8lainti22) a wo;an o2 ad5lt a1e) ;aintained inti;ate seB5al
4elations wit@ de2endant) wit@ 4e8eated a6ts o2 inte46o54se? S56@ 6ond56t is in6o;8atiAle wit@
t@e idea o2 sed56tion? Plainl<) t@e4e is @e4e vol5nta4iness and ;5t5al 8assionH 2o4 @ad t@e
8lainti22 Aeen de6eived) @ad s@e s544ende4ed eB6l5sivel< Ae6a5se o2 t@e de6eit) a4t25l
8e4s5asions and wiles o2 de2endant) s@e wo5ld not @ave a1ain <ielded to @is e;A4a6es) ;56@
less 2o4 one <ea4 wit@o5t eBa6tin1 ea4l< 25l2ill;ent o2 t@e alle1ed 84o;ises o2 ;a44ia1e and
wo5ld @ave 65t s@o4t all seB5al 4elations 58on 2indin1 t@at de2endant did not intend to 25l2ill @is
84o;ises? $en6e) no 6ase is ;ade 5nde4 A4t? +1 o2 Civil Code? %"an(anco &s C!'
"@ile a A4ea6@ o2 84o;ise to ;a44< is not a6tionaAle) it @as Aeen @eld t@at to 2o4;all< set a
weddin1 and 1o t@4o51@ and s8end 2o4 all t@e weddin1 84e8a4ation and 85Ali6it<) onl< to wal9
o5t o2 it w@en t@e ;at4i;on< was aAo5t to Ae sole;niGed is a di22e4ent ;atte4? T@is 8al8aAl<
and 5nD5sti2iaAl< 6ont4a4< to 1ood 65sto;s 2o4 w@i6@ t@e de2endant ;5st Ae @eld answe4aAle
2o4 da;a1es in a66o4dan6e wit@ A4t? +1 o2 t@e Civil Code? %Wassmer &s. )ele*'
T@e oAli1ation o2 6o@aAitation o2 @5sAand and wi2e is not en2o46eaAle A< 6onte;8t
84o6eedin1s? n 84ivate 4elations) 8@<si6al 6oe46ion is Aa44ed 5nde4 t@e t@e old ;aBi; J KNe;o
8otest 84e6iso 6o1i ad 2a6t5;?L $oweve4) t@e 4e25sal o2 t@e wi2e to 8e42o4; @e4 wi2el< d5ties)
@e4 denial o2 6onso4ti5; and @e4 dese4tion o2 @e4 @5sAand wo5ld 6e4tainl< 6onstit5te a will25l
in2li6tion o2 inD54< 58on @e4 @5sAandEs 2eelin1s in a ;anne4 w@i6@ is 6ont4a4< to ;o4als) 1ood
65sto;s and 85Ali6 8oli6< 2o4 w@i6@ A4ts? +1 and ++1* &1*/ o2 t@e CC a5t@o4iGe an awa4d 2o4
;o4al da;a1es? %"encha&e* &s. +scano'
NATONALTY

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It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 1< of the !iil !ode-
only 7hilippine nationals are coered by the policy against absolute diorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. %oweer- aliens may obtain
diorces abroad- which may be recogni(ed in the 7hilippines- proided they are alid according to
their national law.
%ence- an American =ational who had diorced a "ilipina wife cannot )ustifiably maintain
that under our laws- the "ilipina- despite the diorce- has to be considered still married to him and
still sub)ect to a wife@s obligation. A "ilipina should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of )ustice are to be sered. #he should not be obliged to lie with him- to
support him- or to obsered respect and fidelity to the e5-husband- and the latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible write to con)ugal properties. %(an Dorn vs. Romillo, "E
5<0;6, Dct. <, /3<1&
,he decree of diorce obtained by a ;erman national and its legal effects may be
recogni(ed in the 7hilippines insofar as the foreigner is concerned in iew of the nationality
principle in our ciil law on the matter of status of persons. ,he said ;erman national can no longer
be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal Bnowledge with
another- because in diorcing her- he already implicitly authori(ed the woman to hae se5ual
relations with others. %Pilapil vs. I#ayESomera, .RN <6//5, Aune 26, /3<6&
PREFUDCAL QUESTON
A pre)udicial .uestion is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue inoled therein. It must appear not only that the ciil case inoles facts
upon which the criminal action is based- but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the ciil
action would necessarily be determinatie of the criminal case. >ules of !ourt- >ule 111- #ec. <.
'lements of pre)udicial .uestion. - ,he two *2+ essential elements of a pre)udicial .uestion areH *a+
the ciil action inoles an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
actionE and *b+ the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
%e who contracts a second marriage before the )udicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risB of being prosecuted for bigamy- and in such a case the criminal case may
not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a ciil case for declaration of nullity.
8therwise- all that an adenturous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article CG of the "amily !ode-
contract a subse.uent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is oid and that the subse.uent marriage is e.ually oid for lacB of a prior )udicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may een enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a
re.uisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subse.uent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is oid. #uch
scenario would render nugatory the proisions on bigamy. %,o#is vs. ,o#is, .RN /2<163, Auly 2/,
4666&
FURDCAL PERSONALTY
T@e Ro;an Cat@oli6 C@546@ is a 6o48o4ation A< 84es64i8tion) wit@ a69nowled1ed
D54idi6al 8e4sonalit<) inas;56@ as it is an instit5tion w@i6@ antedated) A< al;ost a t@o5sand
<ea4s) an< ot@e4 8e4sonalit< in E54o8e) and w@i6@ eBisted w@en %4e6ian elo:5en6e still
2lo54is@ed in Antio6@ and w@en idols w@e4e still wo4s@i88ed in t@e te;8le o2 Me66a? %,arlin &s.
Ramire*'
T@e estate o2 a de6eased 8e4son s@o5ld Ae 6onside4ed an a4ti2i6ial o4 D54idi6al 8e4son
2o4 t@e 8548oses o2 t@e settle;ent and dist4iA5tion o2 @is estate w@i6@) o2 6o54se) in6l5de t@e
eBe46ise d54in1 t@e D5di6ial ad;inist4ation t@e4eo2 o2 t@ose 4i1@ts and t@e 25l2ill;ent o2 t@ose
oAli1ations o2 @is w@i6@ s54vived a2te4 @is deat@? %Lim(oco &s. -ntestate +state o$ Pedro
Fragrante'
7arents of an unborn fetus cannot sue damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who
oluntarily procured her abortion could not recoer damages from the physician who caused the
same. #ince an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal in)ury or death pertains
primarily to the in)ured- no such right of action could deriatiely accrue to the parents or heirs of

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an unborn child. In fact- een if the cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child- the
same was e5tinguished by its pre-natal death- since no transmission can taBe place from one that
lacBed )uridical personality. It is no answer to inoBe the proisional personality of a conceied
child under Article CG of the !iil !ode because the same Article e5pressly limits such proisional
personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subse.uently born alie.
,his is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them- as distinguished from the in)ury or iolation of
the rights of the deceased- his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not
e5pect either help- support or serices from an unborn child- they would normally be limited to
moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal deelopment of the spes hominis that was the
foetus- i.e.- on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss- and the disappointment of
their parental e5pectations *!iil !ode- Art. 221?+- as well as to e5emplary damages- if the
circumstances should warrant them *Art. 222G+. %.elu8 vs. Court of Appeals, 4 SCRA <6/&
C!L PERSONALTY
'en if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead- a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptie death is necessary in order to
contract a subse.uent marriage- a mandatory re.uirement which has been precisely incorporated
into the "amily !ode to discourage subse.uent marriages where it is not proen that the preious
marriage has been dissoled or a missing spouse is factually or presumptiely dead- in accordance
with pertinent proisions of law. %Navarro vs. Domagtoy, .RN *TAE35E/6<<, Auly /3, /335&
,he fact that the Ludge who solemni(ed the marriage did not sign the marriage contracts or
certificates of those marriages he solemni(ed without a marriage license- there were no dates
placed in the marriage contracts to show when they were solemni(edE the contracting parties were
not furnished their marriage contracts and the :ocal !iil >egistrar was not being sent any copy of
the marriage contract- will not absole him from liability. By solemni(ing alone a marriage without
a marriage license he as the solemni(ing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying with the formal re.uisites of marriage and under Article C*2+ of the "amily !ode of the
7hilippines- he shall be ciilly- criminally and administratiely liable. %Cosca vs. Au!ge Palaypayon,
11 SCAD ;13&
DOMCLE AND RESDENCE
$omicile In Article <G of the =!! was construed in 8ng s >epublic as an indiidual@s
Ipermanent homeJE a place to which wheneer absent for business or pleasure- one intends to
return and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. $omicile
includes the twin elements of the Ifact of residingJ and the animus manendi.
>esidence implies the factual relationship of an indiidual to a certain place. ,he essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that the former inoles the intent to leae
when the purpose for which the resident has taBen up his abode ends. 8ne may seeB a place for
purposes such as pleasure- business or health. If a person@s intent be to remain- it becomes his
domicile. It is thus normal for an indiidual to hae different residences in arious places. %oweer-
a person can only hae a single domicile unless he successfully abandons his domicile in faor of
another domicile of choice. *Romual!e8E*arcos vs. Commission on Elections, 40< SCRA 266&
REQUSTES OF MARRA%E
A marriage under a license is not inalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully or
fraudulently obtained without pre)udice to the prosecution of the parties and the solemni(ing
officer does not hae to inestigate whether or not the license has been properly issued. %People
vs. ,elen+
,he absence of any formal re.uisites of marriage shall generally render the marriage oid
ab initioE and while an irregularity in the formal re.uisites shall not affect the alidity of the
marriage- the party responsible for their irregularity shall be ciilly- criminally- administratiely
liable. %Cosca vs. Au!ge Palaypayon, 11 SCAD ;13&

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In order to classify a marriage in articulo mortis- the law does not re.uire that the party
who is at point of death must die immediately after the celebration of the marriage. All that is
necessary is that the parties- including the person solemni(ing the marriage must be coninced that
there was imminent danger of death %"oria vs. BeliF, .RN "E3661, Aune 46, /31<&
!OD AND !ODA0LE MARRA%ES

,he senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of se5ual cooperation for the
procreation of children is e.uialent to psychological incapacity. Absence of finding as to the one
who refused to hae se5 is immaterial because the action to declare a marriage oid may be filed
by either party- een the psychologically incapacitated one. %Chi *ing Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,
455 SCRA 240&
WorBing on the assumption that 7epito and =orma hae lied together as husband and wife
for fie years without the benefit of marriage- that fie-year period should be computed on the
basis of a cohabitation as Mhusband and wifeM where the only missing factor is the special contract
of marriage to alidate the union.
In other words- the fie-year common-law cohabitation period- which is counted bacB from
the date of celebration of marriage- should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. ,his <-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characteri(ed by e5clusiity / meaning no third
party was inoled at any time within the < years and continuity / that is unbroBen. 8therwise- if
that continuous <-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire fie years- then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to hae common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lied faithfully with their spouse. %Ninal vs. ,aya!og, .R No.
/22;;<, *arch /0, 4666&
"or Article 2C of the "amily !ode on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply- the
following re.uisites must concurH
1. ,he man and woman must hae been liing together as husband and wife for at least
fie years before the marriageE
2. ,he parties must hae no legal impediment to marry each otherE
2. ,he fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriageE
C. ,he parties must e5ecute an affidait stating that they hae lied together for at least
fie years 1and are without legal impediment to marry each other4E and
<. ,he solemni(ing officer must e5ecute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
.ualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage **an8ano vs. Sanche8 ..R. No. *TAE66E/243, *arch 6<, 466/+
9nder the "amily !ode- there must be a )udicial declaration of the nullity of a preious
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article CG of the "amily !ode is
applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectiity of the "amily !ode regardless of the
date of the first marriage. #aid Article is gien retroactie effect insofar as it does not pre)udice
ested or ac.uired rights in accordance with the =ew !iil !ode and other laws. %Atien8a vs.
,rillantes, 402 SCRA 24&

A distinction should be made between the case of a woman who was already 2 or C months
pregnant at the time of marriage and one who is already 6 or ? months pregnant. In the former-
concealment is possible and conse.uently- the marriage can be annulled by reason of fraud. In the
latter concealment is not possible. According to medical authorities- een on the <th month of
pregnancy- the enlargement of a womanNs abdomen is still below the umbilicus- that is to say- the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may- if
noticed- be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th
month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womanNs abdomen reaches a height aboe the
umbilicus- maBing the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If- as claimed by
plaintiff- defendant is Mnaturally plumpM- he could hardly be e5pected to Bnow- merely by looBing-

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whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage- more so because she must hae
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. %A)uino vs. Deli8o, ..R. No. "E/1<12, Auly 4;, /356&

LE%AL SEPARATON
An action for legal separation which inoles nothing more than the bed-and board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. Being personal in character- it follows that the death
of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. %"apu8 Sy vs. Eufemio, 02 SCRA
/;;&
,he mere circumstance that defendant told the "iscal that she MliBed alsoM to be legally
separated from her husband- is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action.
!onfession of )udgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses
the right of plaintiff to )udgment or files a pleading e5pressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand.
%ere there was only an e5tra)udicial admission and =8, a confession of )udgment. Ket- een
supposing that the aboe statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of )udgment-
inasmuch as there is eidence of the adultery independently of such statement- the decree may
and should be granted- since it would not be based on her confession- but upon eidence presented
by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a )udgment based e5clusiely or mainly on defendantNs
confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto- any defendant who opposes the separation
will immediately confess )udgment- purposely to preent the giing of the decree. %Dcampo vs.
Blorenciano, "E/2112, Be#ruary 42, /356&
FUDCAL OF DECLARATON OF NULLTY
Fo4 8548oses o2 4e;a44ia1e) t@e onl< le1all< a66e8taAle Aasis 2o4 de6la4in1 a 84evio5s
;a44ia1e an aAsol5te n5llit< is a 2inal D5d1;ent de6la4in1 s56@ 84evio5s ;a44ia1e void)
w@e4eas) 2o4 8548oses ot@e4 t@an 4e;a44ia1e) ot@e4 eviden6e is a66e8taAle? %#omingo &s. C!'
Pa4ties to t@e ;a44ia1e s@o5ld not Ae 8e4;itted to D5d1e 2o4 t@e;selves its n5llit<) 2o4
t@e sa;e ;5st Ae s5A;itted to t@e D5d1;ent o2 t@e 6o;8etent 6o54ts and onl< w@en t@e
n5llit< o2 t@e ;a44ia1e is so de6la4ed 6an it Ae @eld as void) and so lon1 as t@e4e is no s56@
de6la4ation) t@e 84es5;8tion is t@at t@e ;a44ia1e eBists 2o4 all intents and 8548oses?
T@e4e2o4e) @e w@o 6o@aAits wit@ a wo;an not @is wi2e) Ae2o4e t@e D5di6ial de6la4ation o2
n5llit< o2 t@e ;a44ia1e) ass5;es t@e 4is9 o2 Aein1 84ose65ted 2o4 6on65Aina1e? %,eltran &s.
People .une /0 /000'
CUSTODY OF MNOR C$LDREN
In all cases inoling the custody- care- education and property of children- the latterNs
welfare is paramount. ,he proision that no mother shall be separated from a child under seen *?+
years of age- will not apply where the !ourt finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 8ne
compelling reason to separate a child from the mother is when she has a common-law *or Ilie-inJ+
relationship with another man. #uch a scenario will not afford the minor child that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and deelop into an upright and moral-minded person. In all
controersies regarding the custody of minors- the foremost consideration is the moral- physical
and social welfare of the child concerned- taBing into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. *Cervantes vs. Baar!o, .RN ;3311, Aanuary 4;, /3<3&

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In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child- courts are mandated by the
"amily !ode to taBe into account all releant considerations. If a child is under seen years of age-
the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. ,he presumption is strong but it is not
conclusie. It can be oercome by Mcompelling reasons.M If a child is oer seen- his choice is
paramount but- again- the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion- the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent- or een to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances. %Espiritu vs. CA, .RN //1506, *arch /1, /331&
PROPERTY RELATONS
,he proisions of the "amily !ode highlight the underlying concern of the law for the
conseration of the con)ugal partnershipE for the husband@s duty is to protect and safeguard- if not
augment- not to dissipate it. ,his is the underlying reason why the "amily !ode clarifies that the
obligations entered into by one of the souses must be those that redound to the benefit of the
family and that the measure of the partnership@s liability is to Ithe e5tent that the family is
benefited.J In the case at bar- while the husband is solidarily liable with AI$!- such liability under
the "amily !ode is restricted by Article 122*1+ so that debts fro which the husband is liable may not
be charged against the con)ugal partnership. *Ayala Investment an! Development Corp. vs. CA, 4<5
SCRA 4;4&
In donations propter nuptias the marriage is really a consideration- but not in the sense of
being necessary to gie birth to the obligation- which maBes the fact that the marriage did not taBe
place a cause for the reocation of such donations- thus taBing it for granted that there may be a
alid donation propter nuptias een without marriage- since that which has not e5isted cannot be
reoBed. ,he marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which- as such
presupposes the e5istence of the obligation which may be resoled or reoBed- and not a condition
necessary for the birth of the obligation. %Solis vs. ,arroso, .RN 4;323, Dcto#er 26, /34<&
,he words in Article 161 of the =ew !iil !ode Mall debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the con)ugal partnership Mdo not re.uire that actual profit or benefit
must accrue to the con)ugal partnership from the husbandNs transaction-M but it suffices that the
transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership.M %.E
Tractors vs. CA, .RN 1;064, Be#ruary 4<, /3<1&
9nder Article 123 of the "amily !ode- the aggrieed spouse may petition for )udicial
separation of property either on the ground of abandonment without )ust cause or on the ground of
failure to comply with obligations to the family. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse
without the intent to return- followed by prolonged absence without )ust cause- and without- in
the meantime- proiding in the least for ones family although able to do so. ,here must be
absolute cessation of marital relations- duties and rights- with the intention of perpetual
separation. *PastoraEAo vs. CA, 4/5 SCRA 534&
PROPERTY RE%ME OF UNONS "T$OUT MARRA%E
,he donation made between parties guilty of adultery at the time of the donation is oid.
Article 3? of "! proides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons liing together husband and wife without a alid marriage- for
otherwise the condition of those who incurred guilt would run out to be better than those in the
legal union.
,he property relation cannot be considered to be goerned by the law on co-ownership for
failure of spouse to proe that she contributed money to the purchase price of the real property. It
should belong to con)ugal partnership.
9nder article 1C3 of "!- only the properties ac.uired by both of the parties through their
actual )oint contribution of money- property- or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respectie contributions. Actual contribution is re.uired in Article 1C3 of "!- in
contrast Art 1C? of "!- which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family are
regarded as contribution to the ac.uisition of common property by one who has no salary or income
or worB or industry. If actual contribution of the party is not proed- there will be no co ownership
and no presumption of e.ual shares. %Agapay vs Palang, <1 SCAD /01&

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9nder Article 1C3 of the "amily !ode- a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated
to marry each other- but who nonetheless lie together con)ugally- may be deemed co-owners of a
property ac.uired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution
to its ac.uisition. %ence- mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-
ownership. %Tumlos vs. Bernan!e8, .RN /2;516, April /4, 4666&
FAMLY $OME
9nder Article 162 of the "amily !ode- it is proided that Ithe proisions of this !hapter
shall also goern e5isting family residences insofar as said proisions are applicable.J It does not
mean that Articles 1<2 and 1<2 of the "amily !ode hae retroactie effect such that all e5isting
family residences are deemed to hae been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectiity of the "amily !ode and are e5empt from e5ecution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectiity of the "amily !ode. Article 162 simply means
that all e5isting family residences at the time of the effectiity of the "amily !ode- are considered
family homes and are prospectiely entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
"amily !ode. Article 162 does not state that proisions of chapter 2- ,itle A hae a retroactie
effect. %*anacop vs. Court of Appeals 4;; SCRA 50&
PATERNTY AND FLATON
%usband died on Lanuary 1- 19C3. ,he boy whose legitimacy is in .uestion was born on Lune
1?- 19C2. ,hat boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of said husband and his wife- he haing
been born within three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. ,hat presumption
can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to hae had access
to his wife during the first 12G days of the 2GG ne5t preceding the birth of the child. ,he fact that
the wife has committed adultery cannot oercome this presumption. ,he fact that the husband was
seriously sicB is not sufficient to oercome the presumption of legitimacy. Lust because tuberculosis
is adanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of se5ual intercourse. ,here
are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act een in the most crucial
stage of health because then they seemed to be more inclined to se5ual intercourse. %An!al vs.
*acaraig, <3 P-I" /51&
According to Article 16? of the "amily !ode- the child shall still be legitimate- although the
mother may hae declared against his legitimacy. ,his law liBewise applies to such instances where
the mother may hae been sentenced as an adulteress. ,here are three reasons for this proisionH
1. In a fit of anger- or to arouse )ealousy in the husband- the wife may hae made this
declarationE
2. ,he child should not be under the mercy of the passion of the parents. ,hus- the
husband whose honor has been offended- being aware of his wife@s adultery- may hae
obtained from the latter by means of coercion- a confession against the legitimacy of the child-
which- in reality- may only be a confession of guilt. 8r the wife out of engeance or spite- may
declare the child as not her husband@s although the statement is false.
2. Where the woman cohabits during the same period with two men- nobody can
determine who is really the father of the child
,he modern rule is that- in order to oerthrow the presumption of legitimacy- it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could hae enabled the husband to be
the father of the child. #e5ual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproed- unless such presumption is rebutted by eidence to the contraryE where se5ual
intercourse is presumed or proed- the husband must be taBen to be the father of the child.
%*aca!ang!ang vs. CA, /66 SCRA ;3&
Blood grouping test can establish conclusiely that the man is not the father of the child
but not necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child. It may hae some probatie alue
if the blood type and the combination in the child is rare. ,hus- it is now up to the discretion of the
)udge whether to admit the results. *Aao vs. CA, /14 SCRA 213&

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PROOF OF FLATON
,o be sufficient recognition- the birth certificate must be signed by the father and mother
)ointly- or by the mother alone if the father refuses- otherwise- she may be penali(ed. And if the
alleged father did nothing in the birth certificate- the placing of his name by the mother- or doctor
or registry is incompetent eidence of paternity of the child. If the birth certificate is not signed by
the alleged father- it cannot be taBen as record of birth to proe recognition of the child- nor can
said birth certificate be taBen as a recognition in a public instrument.
While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents- they are eidence only
to proe the administration of the sacraments on the dates specified- but not the eracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to the bapti(ed person@s BinsfolB. %Reyes vs.
CA, .RN 2312;, *arch /3, /3<1&
I!ontinuousJ does not mean that the concession of status shall continue foreer but only
that it shall not be of intermittent character while it continues. ,he possession of such status
means that the father has treated the child as his own- directly and not through others-
spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity. ,here must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own- by continuous and
clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. %*en!o8a vs. CA, 46/ SCRA 5;1&
T@e 8ate4nal a22e6tion and 6a4e ;5st not Ae att4iA5ted to 854e 6@a4it<? KS56@ a6ts ;5st
Ae o2 s56@ a nat54e t@at t@e< 4eveal not onl< t@e 6onvi6tion o2 8ate4nit<) A5t also t@e a88a4ent
desi4e to @ave and t4eat t@e 6@ild as s56@ in all 4elations in so6iet< and in li2e) not a66identall<)
A5t 6ontin5o5sl<?L %.ison &s. C!'
T@e SC in Lim &s. C!) 45led t@at 8etitione4 was t@e 2at@e4 o2 @is ille1iti;ate 6@ild4en
Ae6a5se t@e eviden6es 6onvin6in1l< s@ow t@is? $en6e) it was t@e 8etitione4 w@o 8aid t@e Aills
2o4 t@e @os8italiGation o2 t@e ;ot@e4 w@en s@e 1ave Ai4t@? $e was t@e one w@o 6a5sed t@e
4e1ist4ation o2 t@e na;e o2 t@e 6@ild 5sin1 @is s54na;e in t@e Ai4t@ 6e4ti2i6ate? $e also w4ote
@andw4itten lette4s to t@e ;ot@e4 and t@e 6@ild statin1 @is 84o;ise Kto Ae a lovin1 and 6a4in1
@5sAand and 2at@e4 to Aot@ o2 <o5?L T@e4e we4e also 8i6t54es o2 t@e 8etitione4 on va4io5s
o66asions 65ddlin1 t@e 6@ild?
LE%TMATON
=atural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimated. 9nder Article 269- =!!- only
natural children can be legitimated. !hildren born outside of wedlocB of parents who- at the time
of the conception of the former- were not dis.ualified by any impediment to marry each other- are
natural children. #ince the children were born when there was a alid subsisting marriage of their
father with another woman- they cannot be natural. :egitimation is a right granted by law only to
natural children who- because their parents could hae legally married at the time they were
conceied- cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate children once their parents do
marry after their birth. ,his is because said parents can marry any time- there being no legal
impediment preenting them from alidly contracting marriage. ,he situation obtaining respecting
legitimate children and legitimated natural children is certainly distinct from that respecting
adulterous children because the parents of adulterous children are admittedly incapacitated to
marry each other at the time said children were conceied. It may easily be said- thus- that to
interpret the law as allowing adulterous children to be put on e.ual footing with the legitimate
children- would be putting a premium on adulterous relationships- which is frowned upon by the
society itself. %De Santos vs. Au!ge Angeles, 55 SCAD 1/6&
ADOPTON
,he fact that a dual relationship will result *sister-brother- by natureE parent and child- by
fiction of law+ is immaterial. After all- such double relationship may occur in other cases- e.g.
persons who are already related by blood or affinity may still marry- as long as the relationship
does not fall under the cases where a marriage is prohibited by law. %Santos vs. Repu#lic, 4/ SCRA
2;3&

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If an alien adopts a "ilipino child- our !iil !ode cannot confer on the child the nationality
of the adopter. ,his would be a matter of foreign law. %Chin "eng vs. .alang, /60 P-I" /61<&
"@e4e t@e 8etition 2o4 ado8tion was 14anted a2te4 t@e 6@ild @ad s@ot and 9illed a 1i4l)
t@e SC did not 6onside4 t@e 4et4oa6tive e22e6t to t@e de64ee o2 ado8tion so as to i;8ose a
liaAilit< 58on t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents a6645in1 at t@e ti;e w@en t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents @ad no
a6t5al o4 8@<si6al 65stod< ove4 t@e ado8ted 6@ild? Ret4oa6tive e22e6t ;a< 8e4@a8s Ae 1iven to
t@e 14antin1 o2 t@e 8etition 2o4 ado8tion w@e4e s56@ is essential to 8e4;it t@e a6645al o2 so;e
Aene2it o4 advanta1e in 2avo4 o2 t@e ado8ted 6@ild? To @old t@at 8a4ental a5t@o4it< @ad Aeen
4et4oa6tivel< lod1ed in t@e ado8tin1 8a4ents so as to A54den t@e; wit@ liaAilit< 2o4 a to4tio5s
a6t t@at t@e< 6o5ld not @ave 2o4eseen and w@i6@ t@e< 6o5ld @ave 84evented wo5ld Ae 5n2ai4
and 5n6ons6ionaAle? %"amargo &s. C! /01 S 234'
t was ;ont@s a2te4 t@e e22e6tivit< o2 R?A? No? (33+ t@at @e4ein 8etitione4 2iled an
a6tion to 4evo9e t@e de64ee o2 ado8tion 14anted in 1'.3? 0< t@en) t@e new law) @ad al4ead<
aA4o1ated and 4e8ealed t@e 4i1@t o2 an ado8te4 5nde4 t@e Civil Code and t@e Fa;il< Code to
4es6ind a de64ee o2 ado8tion? Consistentl< wit@ its ea4lie4 84ono5n6e;ents) t@e Co54t s@o5ld
now @old t@at t@e a6tion 2o4 4es6ission o2 t@e ado8tion de64ee) @avin1 Aeen initiated A<
8etitione4 a2te4 R?A? No? (33+ @ad 6o;e into 2o46e) no lon1e4 6o5ld Ae 854s5ed?
t is still notewo4t@<) @oweve4) t@at an ado8te4) w@ile Aa44ed 24o; seve4in1 t@e le1al
ties o2 ado8tion) 6an alwa<s 2o4 valid 4easons 6a5se t@e 2o42eit54e o2 6e4tain Aene2its ot@e4wise
a6645in1 to an 5ndese4vin1 6@ild? Fo4 instan6e) 58on t@e 14o5nds 4e6o1niGed A< law) an ado8te4
;a< den< to an ado8ted 6@ild @is le1iti;e and) A< a will and testa;ent) ;a< 24eel< eB6l5de @i;
24o; @avin1 a s@a4e in t@e dis8osaAle 8o4tion o2 @is estate? %Lahom &. Sibulo 5.R. 6o. 378141
.uly 37 /008'
SUPPORT
,he wife- who is forced to leae the con)ugal abode by her husband without fault on her
part- may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no other
remedy notwithstanding the proisions of Article 1C9 of the !iil !ode giing the person who is
obliged to furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fi5ed pension or by receiing
and maintaining in his own home the one haing the right to the same. Article 1<2 of the !iil !ode
gies the instances when the obligation to gie support shall cease. ,he failure of the wife to lie
with her husband is not one of them. A husband cannot- by his own wrongful act- reliee himself
from the duty to support his wife imposed by lawE and where a husband by wrongful- illegal and
unbearable conduct- dries his wife from the domicile fi5ed by him- he cannot taBe adantage of
her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties
thereunder. %.oitia vs. Campos Rue!a&
If the wife commits adultery- she loses the right to be supported. #o if the wife claims
support and the husband sets up adultery as a defense- he should be allowed to introduce
preliminary eidence as to why support should not be granted. %*angoma vs. *aca!aeg an!
,autista, 36 P-I" 16<&
PARENTAL AUT$ORTY
7arental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced e5cept in cases authori(ed by law. ,he right attached to parental authority- being
purely personal- the law allows a waier of parental authority only in cases of adoption-
guardianship and surrender to a childrenNs home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another- such as a friend or godfather- een in a document- what is gien
is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 'en if
a definite renunciation of parental authority is manifest- the law still disallows the same. ,he
father and mother- being the natural guardians of unemancipated children- are duty-bound and
entitled to Beep them in their custody and company. %SagalaEEslao vs. CA, 455 SCRA 2/;&

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Property
CLASSFCATON OF PROPERTY
"urther analysis of Article 22C will show that in the case of immoables by destination- the
!ode re.uires that they be placed by the owner of the tenement- in order to ac.uire the same
nature or consideration of real propertyE but in cases of immoable by incorporation- such as
houses- trees- plants- etc.- the !ode nowhere re.uires that the attachment or incorporation be
made by the owner of the land. ,he only criterion is the union with the soil. It follows from the
foregoing that a true building is immoable or real property- whether it is erected by the owner of
the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. *"a!era vs -o!ges, 0< D. 12;0, Septem#er 42, /314&
Doable e.uipment to be immobili(ed in contemplation of the law must be first Iessential
and principal elementsJ of the industry or worBs without which such industry or worBs would be
Iunable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.J ,he tools and
e.uipments in .uestion- by their nature- are not essential and principal elements of petitioner@s
business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucBs. ,hey are merely incidentals /
ac.uired as moables and used only for e5pediency to facilitate andFr improe its serice. ,he
proision also re.uires that the industry or worBs be carried on in a building or on a piece of land.
,he e.uipment in .uestion are destined only to repair or serice the transportation business- which
is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land. %*in!anao ,us Company vs. City
Assessor an! Treasurer, .R No. "E/;<;6, Septem#er 43, /354&
PROPERTY N RELATON TO T$E PERSON "$ERE T 0ELON%S
As property of public dominion- the >oppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collectie ownership for general use and en)oyment-
an application to the satisfaction of collectie needs- and resides in the social group. ,he purpose
is not to sere the state as a )uridical person- but the citi(ens. ,he >oppongi property is correctly
classified under paragraph 2 of Article C2G of the =!! as property belonging to the state and
intended for some public serice. ,he fact that the >oppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual embassy serice does not automatically conert it to patrimonial property. A property
continues to be part of public domain- not aailable for priate appropriation or ownership until
there is a formal declaration on the part of the goernment to withdraw it from being such.
%"aurel vs. .arcia, /<; SCRA ;3;&
P4o8e4ties o2 t@e lo6al 1ove4n;ent w@i6@ a4e devoted to 85Ali6 se4vi6e a4e dee;ed
85Ali6 and a4e 5nde4 t@e aAsol5te 6ont4ol o2 Con14ess? $en6e) lo6al 1ove4n;ents @ave not t@e
a5t@o4it< w@atsoeve4 to 6ont4ol o4 4e15late t@e 5se o2 85Ali6 84o8e4ties 5nless s8e6i2i6
a5t@o4it< is vested 58on t@e; A< t@e Con14ess? A4ti6le ,+, o2 t@e Civil Code la<s down t@e
Aasi6 84in6i8le t@at 84o8e4ties o2 85Ali6 do;inion devoted to 85Ali6 5se and ;ade availaAle to
t@e 85Ali6 in 1ene4al a4e o5tside t@e 6o;;e46e o2 ;an and 6annot Ae dis8osed o2 o4 leased A<
t@e lo6al 1ove4n;ent 5nit to 84ivate 8e4sons? %9acasiano &s #io:no 5R6 1;;<7 !ugust 30
311/'
,he rights oer the land are indiisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. ,he classification must be categorical- the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case- the land which was originally classified as
forest land ceased to be so and became mineral once the mining claims were perfected. It would
not become agricultural- een if only partly so- )ust because it was enclosed with a fence and was
cultiated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. %Repu#lic vs. CA, .R No. "E0232<,
April /1, /3<<&.
O"NERS$P
"e st4ess a1ain t@at 8ossession and owne4s@i8 a4e distin6t le1al 6on6e8ts? Owne4s@i8
eBists w@en a t@in1 8e4tainin1 to one 8e4son is 6o;8letel< s5ADe6ted to @is will in a ;anne4 not
84o@iAited A< law and 6onsistent wit@ t@e 4i1@ts o2 ot@e4s? Owne4s@i8 6on2e4s 6e4tain 4i1@ts to

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t@e owne4) one o2 w@i6@ is t@e 4i1@t to dis8ose o2 t@in1 A< wa< o2 sale? Att<? Ped4o %a46ia and
@is wi2e Re;edios eBe46ised t@ei4 4i1@t to dis8ose o2 w@at t@e< owned w@en t@e< sold t@e
s5ADe6t 84o8e4t< to t@e Ma18a<o s8o5ses? On t@e ot@e4@and) 8ossession is de2ined as t@e
@oldin1 o2 a t@in1 o4 t@e enDo<;ent o2 a 4i1@t? Possession ;a< Ae @ad in one o2 two wa<s)
8ossession in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 and 8ossession o2 a @olde4? One w@o 8ossesses as a
;e4e @olde4 a69nowled1es in anot@e4 a s58e4io4 4i1@t w@i6@ @e Aelieves to Ae owne4s@i8)
w@et@e4 @is Aelie2 Ae 4i1@t o4 w4on1? T@e 4e6o4d s@ows t@at 8etitione4 o6658ied t@e 84o8e4t<
not in t@e 6on6e8t o2 an owne4 2o4 @is sta< was ;e4el< tole4ated A< @is 8a4ents? Conse:5entl<)
it is o2 no ;o;ent t@at @e was in 8ossession o2 t@e 84o8e4t< at t@e ti;e o2 t@e sale to t@e
Ma18a<oEs? t was not a @ind4an6e to a valid t4ans2e4 o2 owne4s@i8? %5arcia &s C! 5R6
388370 !ugust 30 3111'
,he principle that Ithe owner or lawful possessor of thing has the right to e5clude any
person from the en)oyment and disposal thereof for this purpose- he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or preent an actual or threatened unlawful physical inasion or
usurpation of his propertyJ is inapplicable to the case at bar. "or haing been gien 2G days within
which to acate the lot- complainant did not- within said period inade or usurp said lot. #he had
merely remained in possession thereof- een though the hacienda owner may hae become its co-
possessor. !aisip- et al did not Irepel or preent in actual or threatened physical inasion or
usurpationJ. ,hey e5pelled ;loria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession
een before the action for forcible entry was filed against them- despite the fact that the sheriff
had e5plicitly authori(ed them to stay in said property within the period and had e5pressed the
iew that he could not oust them therefrom within the period without )udicial order therefore.
%Caisip vs. People, .R No. "E4<;/5, Novem#er /<, /3;6&

,he doctrine of self-help enunciated by Art. C29 can only be e5ercised at the time of actual
or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been
lost- the owner must resort to )udicial process for the recoery of the property. %.erman
*anagement an! Services, Inc. vs. CA, .R No. ;54/5, Septem#er /0, /3<3&

,he law recogni(es in the owner the right to en)oy and dispose of a thing- without other
limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of an owner- to enclose on a fence
their property. Article C2G of the !iil !ode proides that Ieery owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls- ditches- lie or dead hedges or by any other means without
detriment to seritudes constituted thereonJ. A person has a right to the natural use and
en)oyment of his own property- according to his pleasure- for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule- therefore- there is no cause of action for acts done
by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner- although such acts incidentally
cause damage or an unaoidable loss to another- as such damage or loss is damnum abs.ue in)uria.
When the owner of property maBes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the
property is used- such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case- nobody can complain of
haing been in)ured- because the inconenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere
conse.uence of community life. %Custo!io vs. CA, .R No. //5/66, Be#ruary 3, /335&
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Ad)oining
landowners hae mutual and reciprocal duties which re.uire that each must use his land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recogni(e the right of an owner to build structures on his land- such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to ad)oining
landowners and can withstand the usual and e5pected forces of nature. If the structure causes
in)ury and damage to an ad)oining landowner- the latter can claim indemnification for the in)ury or
damage suffered. %An!amo vs IAC, /3/ SCRA /31&

ACCESSON CONTNUA
,he owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another- is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the alue of his building- under article C<2. ,he
owner of the land- upon the other hand- has the option- either to pay for the building or to sell his

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land to the owner of the building. But he cannot- as respondents here did- refuse both to pay for
the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remoe it from the land
where it is erected. %e is entitled to such remoal only when- after haing chosen to sell his land-
the other party fails to pay for the same. %Ignacio vs. -ilario, .R ND. "E/;1, April 26, /305&
9nder the terms of Articles CC3 and <C6 of the !iil !ode- it is true that the owner of the
land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the
alue thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. 'en this second right
cannot be e5ercised if the alue of the land is considerably more than that of the building. In
addition to the right of the builder to be paid the alue of his improement- Article <C6 gies him
the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the owner of the land.
,here is nothing in the language of these two articles which would )ustify the conclusion that- upon
failure of the builder to pay for the alue of the land- when such is demanded by the landowner-
the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improements.
When the builder in good faith fails to pay the alue of the land when such is demanded by
the landowner- the parties may resort to the following remediesH *1+ ,he parties may decide to
leae things as they are and assume the relation of lessor and lessee- and should they disagree as to
the amount of the rental- then they can go to court to fi5 that amountE *2+ #hould the parties not
agree to assume the relation of lessor and lessee- the owner of the land is entitled to hae the
improement remoedE and *2+ ,he land and the improement may be sold at public auction-
applying the proceeds first to the payment of the alue of the land and the e5cess- if any-
deliered to the owner of the improement in payment thereof. %Bilipinas Colleges, Inc. vs.
Tim#ang, .R No. "E/4</4, Septem#er 43, /313&

,he !iil !ode confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. 8ne of
these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property ac.uires not only that which it
produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially. Whateer is built- planted or
sown on the land of another- and the improements or repairs made thereon- belong to the owner
of the land. Where- howeer- the planter- builder- or sower has acted in good faith- a conflict of
rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improements without causing in)ustice to the owner of the land. In iew of the impracticability of
creating what Danresa calls state of Iforced co-ownershipJ- the law has proided a )ust and
e.uitable solution by giing the owner of the land the option to ac.uire the improements after
payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to e5ercise the option
because his right is older and because- by the principle of accession- he is entitled to the ownership
of the accessory thing. %,ernar!o vs. ,ataclan, .R No. 00565, Novem#er 4<, /32<&
When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an
erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was
howeer made in good faith- then the proisions of Article CC3 should apply to determine the
respectie rights of the parties.
When the court adopted the IworBable solutionJ and ordered the owner of the land to sell
to priate respondents- the part of the land they intended upon- it depried the petitioner of his
right to choose. #uch ruling contraened the e5plicit proisions of Article CC3 to the effect that
Ithe owner of the landSshall hae the right to appropriateSto oblige the one who builtSto pay the
price of the landSJ the law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the
landowner and not upon the builder and the courts. ,hus- the right to appropriate the worBs or
improements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner. %Ignao
vs. IAC, .R ND. ;4<;5, Aanuary /<, /33/&

Article CC3 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder- sower- or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. =eertheless- the proision
therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article CC3
is to aoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties in the main agree that Articles CC3
and <C6 of the !iil !ode are applicable and indemnity for the improements may be paid although
they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. %Pecson vs. CA, .R No. //1</0,*ay 45, /331&

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,he registered owner is not presumed to Bnow the metes and bounds of his own land- and
therefore is not in bad faith if he mistaBenly builds on an ad)oining land. ,here is no .uestion that
when petitioner purchased the land- the buildings and other structures were already in e5istence.
Article <2? of the !iil !ode presumes good faith by the builder of the encroaching structures- the
latter should be presumed to hae built them in good faith. It is presumed that possession
continues to be en)oyed in the same character in which it was ac.uired- until the contrary is
proed. ;ood faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his- and his
ignorance of any defect or flaw in title. ,he good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title
are made Bnown to the possessor- by e5traneous eidence or by suit for recoery of the property by
the true owner. %Technogas vs. CA, .R No. /6<<30, Be#ruary /6, /33;&

ACCESSON NATURAL
A664etion Aene2its a 4e8a4ian owne4 w@en t@e 2ollowin1 4e:5isites a4e 84esent# &1/
t@at t@e de8osit Ae 14ad5al and i;8e46e8tiAleH &+/ t@at it 4es5lted 24o; t@e e22e6ts o2 t@e
6544ent o2 t@e wate4H and &3/ t@at t@e land w@e4e a664etion ta9es 8la6e is adDa6ent to t@e Aan9
o2 a 4ive4? T@e a88ellate 6o54t 6on2i4;ed t@at t@e a664etion on t@e weste4n Aan9 o2 t@e
Ca1a<an Rive4 @ad Aeen 1oin1 on 24o; 1'1' 58 to 1'-( o4 2o4 a 8e4iod o2 ,' <ea4s addin1 3*
@e6ta4es o2 land to 84ivate 4es8ondentEs 84o8e4t<?
T@e 84ivate 4es8ondentsM owne4s@i8 o2 t@e a664etion to t@ei4 lands was not lost 58on
t@e s5dden and aA458t 6@an1e o2 t@e 6o54se o2 t@e Ca1a<an Rive4 in 1'-( o4 1'-' w@en it
4eve4ted to its old 1'1' Aed) and se8a4ated o4 t4ans2e44ed said a664etions to t@e ot@e4 side o2
t@e 4ive4? A4ti6les ,3' and ,-3 o2 t@e New Civil Code a88l< to t@is sit5ation? %!gustin &s. -!C
5R6 <<0;2=;< .uly 2 3110'
A664etion is t@e 84o6ess w@e4eA< t@e soil is de8osited w@ile all5vi5; is t@e soil
de8osited on t@e estate 24ontin1 t@e 4ive4Aan9? T@e owne4 o2 s56@ estate is 6alled t@e 4e8a4ian
owne4? T@e all5vi5;) A< ;andate o2 A4t? ,3. o2 t@e Civil Code is a5to;ati6all< owned A< t@e
4e8a4ian owne4 24o; t@e ;o;ent t@e soil de8osit 6an Ae seen A5t it is not a5to;ati6all<
4e1iste4ed 84o8e4t<? %6a&arro &s. -!C 5R6 <43<< February 3/ 311;'
QUETN% OF TTLE
7rescription cannot be inoBed for it is aphoristic that an action to .uiet title to property in
one@s possession is imprescriptible. ,he rationale for this rule is that the owner of a real property
who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession is inaded or his title is attacBed before
taBing steps to indicate his right. 7ossession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such
possession. #o it has been determined that an owner of real property in possession has a continuing
right to inoBe a court of e.uity to remoe a cloud that is a continuing menace to his title. %Pingol
vs. CA, .RN /64363, Septem#er 5, /332&

CO>O"NERS$P
P54s5ant to A4ti6le ,'3 o2 t@e Civil Code) it ;a< Ae ded56ed t@at sin6e a 6o>owne4 is
entitled to sell @is 5ndivided s@a4e) a sale o2 t@e enti4e 84o8e4t< A< one 6o>owne4 wit@o5t t@e
6onsent o2 t@e ot@e4 6o>owne4s is not n5ll and void? $oweve4) onl< t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e 6o>owne4>
selle4 a4e t4ans2e44ed) t@e4eA< ;a9in1 t@e A5<e4 a 6o>owne4 o2 t@e 84o8e4t<?
T@e 84o8e4 a6tion in 6ases li9e t@is is not 2o4 t@e n5lli2i6ation o2 t@e sale o4 2o4 t@e
4e6ove4< o2 t@e t@in1 owned in 6o;;on 24o; t@e t@i4d 8e4son w@o s5Astit5ted t@e 6o>owne4=s
w@o alienated t@ei4 s@a4esH A5t t@e D!SON o2 t@e 6o;;on 84o8e4t< as it 6ontin5ed to 4e;ain
in t@e 8ossession o2 t@e 6o>owne4s w@o 8ossessed and ad;iniste4ed it? Neit@e4 4e6ove4< o2
8ossession n4 4estit5tion 6an Ae 14anted sin6e t@e de2endant A5<e4s a4e le1iti;ate 84o84ieto4s
and 8ossesso4s in Doint owne4s@i8 o2 t@e 6o;;on 84o8e4t< 6lai;ed? %,ailon=Casilao &s C! 5R6
L=;43;4 !pril 32 3144'
=o prescription shall run in faor of a co-owner against his co-owner or co-heirs so long as
he e5pressly or impliedly recogni(es the co-ownership. !o-owners cannot ac.uire by prescription

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the share of the other co-owners- absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly
communicated to the other co-owners.
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article C9? proides that the assignees of the co-
owners may taBe part in the partition of the common property and Article C9C that each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property- a proision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. %Del ,anco vs. IAC, .R
No. ;4530, Decem#er /, /3<;&
,he fact is clear that the co-ownership of the parcels of land was terminated when the co-
owners drew up a subdiision plan and actually occupied their respectie portions in the plan- a
title issued accordingly. Where co-owned property had been subdiided already- a right of legal
redemption by a co-owner does not arise een though coneyance tooB place before partition
agreement and approal by he intestate court thereof as to the portion under intestate
proceedings. %Caro vs.Court of Appeals, .R No. "E0566/, *arch 41, /3<4&

An action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. "irst-
there is the issue whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned. #econd- assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue- there is the
secondary issue of how the property is to be diided between plaintiff and defendant*s+ / i.e.- what
portion should go to which co-owner. "unctionally an action for partition may be seen to be at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and of segragation and coneyance of a determinate
portion of the property inoled. ,his is sustained by public policy which abhors multiplicity of
actions. *Ro)ue vs. IAC, .R No. ;1<<5, August 26, /33<&

An< 6o>owne4 ;a< 2ile an a6tion 5nde4 A4ti6le ,(. not onl< a1ainst a t@i4d 8e4son) A5t
also a1ainst anot@e4 6o>owne4 w@o ta9es eB6l5sive 8ossession and asse4ts eB6l5sive owne4s@i8
o2 t@e 84o8e4t<? n t@e latte4 6ase) @oweve4) t@e onl< 8548ose o2 t@e a6tion is to oAtain
4e6o1nition o2 t@e 6o>owne4s@i8? T@e 8lainti22 6annot see9 eB6l5sion o2 t@e de2endant 24o; t@e
84o8e4t< Ae6a5se as 6o>owne4 @e @as a 4i1@t o2 8ossession? T@e 8lainti22 6annot 4e6ove4 an<
;ate4ial o4 dete4;inate 8a4t o2 t@e 84o8e4t<? %#+ 5U-! &s. COUR" OF !PP+!LS 5.R. 6o.
3/04<7 October 4 /008'
POSSESSON

In e)ectment cases- the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical and
material possession of the property inoled- independent of any claim of ownership. Anyone of the
litigants who can proe prior possession de facto may recoer such possession een from the owner
himself. ,his rule holds true regardless of the character of a party@s possession- proided that he
has in his faor priority in time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
e)ected by a person haing a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reinidicatoria.
7rior possession oer the property- howeer- is not synonymous with his right of ownership
oer the same. >esolution of issue of possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership.
"orcible entry is merely a .uieting process and neer determines the actual title to an
estate. %Somo!io vs. CA, ..R. No. <45<6, August /2, /330&

>espondent ;uearra- haing been unlawfully depried of the diamond ring in .uestion-
was entitled to recoer it from petitioner who was found in possession of the same *Article <<9 of
the !iil !ode+. ,he only e5ception the law allows is when there is ac.uisition in good faith of the
possessor at a public sale- in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price. ,he right of the owner cannot be defeated een by proof that there is good faith in the
ac.uisition by the possessor. ,he right of the owner to recoer personal property ac.uired in good
faith by another is based on his being dispossessed without his consent.
7ossession in good faith does not really amount to title- for the reason that Article 1122 of
the !ode proides for a period of ac.uisitie prescription for moables through Iuninterrupted
possession for four years in good faith. ,he title of the possessor in good faith is not that of
ownership- but is merely a presumptie title sufficient to sere as a basis for ac.uisitie
prescription.
Article <<9 assumes that where the possessor is as yet not the ownerE for it is obious that
where the possessor has come to ac.uire indefeasible title by- let us say- aderse possession for the

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necessary period- no proof of loss or illegal depriation could aail the former owner of the chattel.
%e would no longer be entitled to recoer it under any condition. %De .arcia vs. CA, ..R. ND. "E
46450, Aanuary 26, /3;/&
t is :5ite 6lea4 t@at a 8a4t< w@o @as lost a ;ovaAle o4 @as Aeen 5nlaw25ll< de84ived
t@e4eo2 6an 4e6ove4 t@e sa;e 24o; t@e 84esent 8ossesso4 even i2 t@e latte4 a6:5i4ed it in 1ood
2ait@ and @as) t@e4e2o4e) title t@e4eto 2o4 5nde4 t@e 2i4st senten6e o2 A4ti6le 33' o2 t@e Civil
Code) s56@ ;anne4 o2 a6:5isition is e:5ivalent to title? T@e4e a4e t@4ee 4e:5isites to ;a9e t@e
8ossession o2 ;ovaAle 84o8e4t< e:5ivalent to title) na;el<# a/ t@e 8ossession s@o5ld Ae in 1ood
2ait@H A/ t@e owne4 vol5nta4il< 8a4ted wit@ t@e 8ossession o2 t@e t@in1H and 6/ t@e 8ossession is
in t@e 6on6e8t o2 owne4?
Undo5Atedl<) one w@o @as lost a ;ovaAle o4 w@o @as Aeen 5nlaw25ll< de84ived o2 it
6annot Ae said to @ave vol5nta4il< 8a4ted wit@ t@e 8ossession t@e4eo2? n t@e 6ase at Aa4) t@e4e
was a 8e42e6ted 5n6onditional 6ont4a6t o2 sale Aetween 84ivate 4es8ondent and t@e o4i1inal
vendee? T@e 2o4;e4 vol5nta4il< 6a5sed t@e t4ans2e4 o2 t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2 4e1ist4ation o2 t@e
ve@i6le in t@e na;e o2 t@e 2i4st vendee> even i2 t@e said vendee was 4e84esented A< so;eone
w@o 5sed a 2i6titio5s na;e J and li9ewise vol5nta4il< delive4ed t@e 6a4s and t@e 6e4ti2i6ate o2
4e1ist4ation to t@e vendeeEs alle1ed 4e84esentativeH title t@e4eto was 2o4t@wit@ t4ans2e44ed to
t@e vendee? %Ledesma &s C! 5R6 4<023 September 3 311/'
,he respondents- by their own admission are in possession of the disputed land. ,here is no
eidence that they were possessors in bad faith. %oweer- their good faith ceased when they were
sered with summons to answer the complaint *Article <23- !iil !ode+. As possessors in bad faith
from the serice of the summons they Ishall reimburse the fruits receied and those which the
legitimate possessor could hae receied.J %Cor!ero vs. Ca#ral, "E25;<3, Auly 41, /3<2&

USUFRUCT

9sufruct gies a right to en)oy the property of another with the obligation of presering its
form and substance. 8nly the )us utendi and )us fruendi oer the property is transferred to the
usufructuary. ,he owner of the property maintains the )us disponendi or the power to alienate-
encumber- transform- and een destroy the same- although he cannot alter the property@s form or
substance- or do anything which is pre)udicial to the usufructuary. ,here is no doubt that the
owner may alidly mortgage the property in faor of a third person and the law proides that- in
such a case- the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the mortgagor- and should not
the immoable be attached or sold )udicially or the payment of the debt- the owner shall be liable
to the usufructuary for whateer the latter may lose by reason thereof. %-eme!es vs. CA, ..R. No.
/6;/24, Dcto#er <, /333&
EASEMENTS
An ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa< t@o51@ it ;a< Ae a88a4ent) is neve4t@eless) dis6ontin5o5s
o4 inte4;ittent and t@e4e2o4e 6annot Ae a6:5i4ed t@4o51@ 84es64i8tion) A5t onl< A< vi4t5e o2 a
title? %Ron>uillo &s Roco 5R6 L=30<31 February /4 3124'
,he owner of the dominant estate may alidly claim a compulsory right of way only after he
has established the e5istence of four re.uisites- to witH *1+ the *dominant+ estate is surrounded by
other immoables and is without ade.uate outlet to a public highwayE *2+ after payment of the
proper indemnityE *2+ the isolation was not due to the proprietor@s actsE and *C+ the right of way is
claimed at a point least pre)udicial to the serient estate. Additionally- the burden of proing the
e5istence of the foregoing prere.uisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.
9nder Article 6<G- it shall be established upon two criteriaH *1+ at the point least
pre)udicial to the serient estateE and *2+ where the distance to a public highway may be the
shortest. 'ach case must be weighed according to its indiidual merits- and )udged according to the
sound discretion of the court. %Consta#ella Corp. vs CA, ..R. No. <61//, Aanuary 41, /33/&

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Article 6<1 of the !iil !ode proides that the width of the easement of right of way shall
be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate- and may accordingly be changed
from time to time. ,his is taBen to mean that under the law- it is the needs of the dominant
property which ultimately determine the width of the passage. And these needs may ary from
time to time. #ince the easement to be established in faor of petitioner is of continuous and
permanent nature- the indemnity shall consist of the alue of the land occupied and the amount of
the damage caused to the serient estate.
;enerally- the right of way may be demandedE *1+ when there is absolutely no access to a
public highway- and *2+ when- een if there is one- it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly
insufficient. %Encarnacion vs. CA, ..R. No. ;;54<, *arch //, /33/&
Article 6<G of the !iil !ode e5plicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least pre)udicial to the serient estate and insofar as consistent with this
rule- where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. ,he
criterion of least pre)udice to the serient estate must preail oer the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of )udicial appreciation. Where the easement may be established
on any of seeral tenements surrounding the dominant estate- the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. %oweer- if these two circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement- the way which will cause the least damage should be used- een if it
will not be the shortest. %Guimen vs CA, .R No. //422/, *ay 43, /335&
T@e 2a6ts o2 t@e 6ase Aea4s s522i6ient ind5AitaAle 84oo2s t@at t@e 84o8e4ties 6on6e4ned
@ad intended and @ad indeed 6onstit5ted a vol5nta4< ease;ent o2 4i1@t o2 wa< ove4 Man1<an
Road) and li9e an< ot@e4 6ont4a6t) t@e sa;e 6o5ld Ae eBtin15is@ed onl< A< ;5t5al a14ee;ent
o4 A< 4en5n6iation o2 t@e owne4 o2 t@e do;inant estate? %La )ista !ssociation &s C! 5R6
12/2/ September 2 311;'
Article 63C of the !iil !ode is a new proision. A reading of Article 63C shows that the
duty of an ad)acent owner not to deprie the ad)acent land or building of sufficient lateral or
sub)acent support is an absolute one. It does not depend upon the degree of care and precaution
made by the proprietor in maBing the e5caation or building on this land. 'en if the ad)acent
owner had taBen the proper care and precaution- if the ad)acent land or building is depried of
sufficient lateral or sub)acent support- as a result of which it is damaged- we beliee that the
ad)acent owner shall be liable for the damage caused. %De Aesus vs -o@mart Corp. No. 00/3/ER,
August 4<, /3;0&
DONATON
A donation which purports to be one inter ios but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donee@s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a
donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alie. In the instant case- the donees did not get the possession of the property donated. ,hey did
not ac.uire the right to the fruits thereof- or any other right of dominion oer the property / this
would accrue to them only after 1G years from Dontinola@s death. ,hey were therefore simply
Ipaper ownersJ of the donated property. Indeed- the donation in .uestion was a donation mortis
causa- contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor@s demise. %Sica!
vs. CA, ..R. No. /41<<<, August /2, /33<&
Although the non-registration of a deed of donation shall not affect its alidity- the
necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third persons are affected- as in the
case at bar. It is actually the act of registration that operates to coney registered land or affect
title thereto. %.on8ales vs. CA, .R No. //6221, Aune /<, 466/&
,he stipulation in the contact proiding for the automatic reersion of the donated
property to the donor upon non-compliance is alid. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a
party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach without going to court. 9pon the
happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance with the condition of the contact- the
donation is automatically reoBed without need of a )udicial declaration to that effect. %De "una
vs. A#rigo, ..R. No. 1;011, Aanuary /<, /336&

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8nce a donation is accepted- the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation- the same must
not be contrary to law- morals- good customs- public order and public policy. ,he condition
imposed in the deed of donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and
undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated- which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. #uch a prohibition against alienation- in order to be alid-
must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time. %Roman Catholic Arch#ishop of
*anila vs. CA, ..R. No. ;;041, Aune /3, /33/&
As found in ,olentino@s !ommentaries and Lurisprudence on the !iil !ode- Iall crimes
which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for reocation.J 7etitioner@s attempt to
categori(e the offenses according to their classification under the >eised 7enal !ode is therefore
unwarranted considering that illegal detention- threats and coercion are considered as crimes
against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal
liberty and security under the >eised 7enal !ode. %E!uarte vs CA, .R No. /61300, Be#ruary 3,
/335&
CONCEPT OF SUCCESSON
,he right to a person@s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death- and do
not est in his heirs until such time. 7roperty which $oTa !atalina *decedent+ had transferred or
coneyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of
her death to which her heirs may lay claim. %ad she died intestate- only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death deoled to her legal heirsE and een if those
transfers were- one and all- treated as donations- the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or reocation of a decedent@s gifts inter ios does not inure to
the respondents *nephews and nieces of $oTa !atalina+ since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory or forced heirs. %*ariano "ocsin, et al. vs. CA, ..R. No. <3;<2, Be#ruary /3, /334&
FORMALTES OF "LLS
6O"!R-!L W-LL
"ailure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages would hae been fatal defect
were it not for the fact that- in this case- it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and
actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatri5 and her instrumental witnesses.
%Ta#oa!a vs. Rosal, //< SCRA /31&
T@e lan15a1e 5sed in t@e attestation 6la5se li9ewise need not e&en be :nown to the
attesting witnesses? A4t? (*3 ;e4el< 4e:5i4es t@at) in s56@ a 6ase) t@e attestation 6la5se s@all
Ae inte484eted to said witnesses? %Caneda &s. C! /// SCR! ;43'
Attestation clause which does not state that the testament Iwas signed by the witnesses in
the presence of one another and the testatorJ renders the will oid. 8mission which can be
supplied by an e5amination of the will itself- without the need of resorting to e5trinsic eidence-
will not be fatal and correspondingly- would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being
assailed. %oweer- those omissions which cannot be supplied e5cept by eidence aliun!e would
result in the inalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately- the will itself.
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and
at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses- it certainly cannot be conclusiely
inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affi5ed their respectie signatures in the presence of the
testator and of each other since- as petitioners correctly obsered- the presence of said signatures
only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed- but it does not proe that the attesting
witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. ,he e5ecution
of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on arious days

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or occasions and in arious combinations- the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of
effectiity.
"urthermore- the rule on substantial compliance in Article 3G9 cannot be inoBed or relied
on by respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or
supplied by the te5t of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would
proide the data not e5pressed in the attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be
gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted te5tual re.uirements were
actually complied with in the e5ecution of the will. In other words- the defects must be remedied
by intrinsic eidence supplied by the will itself. %Cane!a vs. CA, 444 SCRA ;</&
In our opinion- the attestation clause is fatally defectie for failing to state that Antero
Dercado caused Atty. "lorentino Laier to write the testatorNs name under his e5press direction- as
re.uired by section 613 of the !ode of !iil 7rocedure. ,he herein petitioner *who is appealing by
way of certiorari from the decision of the !ourt of Appeals+ argues- howeer- that there is no need
for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature
and the signature of Atty. "lorentino Laier is a surplusage. 7etitionerNs theory is that the cross is as
much a signature as a thumbmarB- the latter haing been held sufficient by this !ourt in seeral
cases.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero
Dercado or een one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection- we are not
prepared to liBen the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmarB- and the reason is obious. ,he cross
cannot and does not hae the trustworthiness of a thumbmarB. %.arcia vs. "acuesta&
In the case at bench- the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial eidence
produced by petitioner. ,he will and its codicil- upon inspection by the respondent court- show in
blacB and white or more accurately- in blacB and blue-that more than one pen was used by the
signatories thereto. ,hus- it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbeliee
petitionerNs claim that both testamentary documents in .uestion were subscribed to in accordance
with the proisions of Art. 3G< of the !iil !ode. %Cal!e vs. CA, 422 SCRA 2;5&
,he notary public before whom the will was acBnowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acBnowledge before himself his haing signed the will.
,o acBnowledge before means to aowE to own as genuine- to assent- to admit- and IbeforeJ
means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. !onse.uently- if the third witness were the
notary public himself- he would hae to aow- assent or admit his haing signed the will in front of
himself. ,his cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acBnowledge his participation in the maBing of the will.
,he function of a notary public is- among others- to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. ,hat function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting
witnesses. "or then he would be interested in sustaining the alidity of the will as it directly
inoles himself and alidity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the
ery purpose of the acBnowledgement. Which is to minimi(e fraud would be thwarted %Cru8 vs.
(illasor, 10 SCRA 2/&
Article 3G3 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who- for one reason or
another- are incapable of reading their wills. #ince Alarado *testator+ was incapable of reading the
final drafts of his will and codicil due to his Ipoor-J Idefectie-J or blurred ision- there can be no
other course but to conclude that he comes within the scope of the term IblindJ as it is used in
Article 3G3.
In the case at bar- as testified to by the three instrumental witnesses- the notary public
and by the lawyer who drafted the 3-paged will who were present in the e5ecution- the testator
did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead- the lawyer who drafted the will read the
same aloud in the presence of the testator- the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public.
,he latter four followed the reading with their own respectie copies preiously furnished them.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial re.uirements of the law in
order to insure the authenticity of the will- formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which- when taBen into account- may only defeat the testator@s
will. %Alvara!o vs. .aviola, ..R. No. ;0531, Septem#er /0, /332&

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?OLO5R!P?-C W-LL
A reading of Article 312 of the !iil !ode shows that its re.uirement affects the alidity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will- but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
and date some of the dispositions- the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. #uch
failure- howeer- does not render the whole testament oid.
:iBewise- a holographic will can still be admitted to probate- notwithstanding non-
compliance with the proisions of Article 31C. %Aero vs. Court of Appeals, 425 SCRA 0<<&
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is aailable- the will
cannot be probated because the best and only eidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. But a photostatic copy or Qero5 copy of the holographic will may
be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. %Ro!elas
vs. Aran8a, //3 SCRA /5&
8rdinarily- when a number of erasures- corrections- and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic will hae not been noted under his signature- the will is not thereby
inalidated as a whole- but at most only as respects the particular words erased- corrected or
interlined. %oweer- when the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial proision- which
was altered by substituting the original heir with another- but which did not carry the re.uisite of
full authentication by the full signature of the testator- the effect must be that the entire will is
oided or reoBed for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could
remain alid. %7ala@ vs. Relova, /24 SCRA 42;&
As a general rule- the IdateI in a holographic will should include the day- month and year
of its e5ecution. %oweer- when as in the case at bar- there is no appearance of fraud- bad faith-
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date I"'B.F61J appearing on the holographic will is a alid compliance with
Article 31G of the !iil !ode- probate of the will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance. %RoFas vs. De Aesus, /20 SCRA 401&
,he law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will.
,he only re.uirements are that the date be in the will itself and e5ecuted in the hand of the
testator. ,hese re.uirements are present in the sub)ect will. %"a#ra!or vs. CA, /<0 SCRA /;6&
We are coninced- based on the language used- that Article 311 of the !iil !ode is
mandatory. ,he word MshallM connotes a mandatory order. We hae ruled that MshallM in a statute
commonly denotes an imperatie obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
the presumption is that the word Mshall-M when used in a statute is mandatory.M
:aws are enacted to achiee a goal intended and to guide against an eil or mischief that
aims to preent. In the case at bar- the goal to achiee is to gie effect to the wishes of the
deceased and the eil to be preented is the possibility that unscrupulous indiiduals who for their
benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
#o- we beliee that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the
true intent of the deceased. An e5haustie and ob)ectie consideration of the eidence is
imperatie to establish the true intent of the testator. %Co!oy vs. Calugay, .RN /420<5, August /4,
/333&
PRO0ATE OF "LLS
In a proceeding for the probate of a will- the court@s area of in.uiry is limited to an
e5amination of- and resolution on- the e5trinsic alidity of the will- the due e5ecution thereof- the
testatri5@s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the re.uisites or solemnities prescribed
by law. ,he intrinsic alidity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the

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will has been duly authenticated. %oweer- where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic alidity of the will be passed upon- een before it is probated- the !ourt should meet the
issue. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will- nothing will be gained. 8n the
contrary- this litigation would be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record- in the
eent of probate or if the court re)ects the will- probability e5ists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic alidity or nullity of the will. >'#9:,H waste of
time- effort- e5pense- plus added an5iety. %Nugui! vs. Nugui!, /; SCRA 003&
n 6epomuceno &s C! %381 SCR! /0;' t@e Co54t 45led t@at Kt@e 6o54t 6an in:5i4e as to
t@e int4insi6 validit< o2 t@e will Ae6a5se t@e4e was an eB84ess state;ent t@at t@e Aene2i6ia4<
was a ;ist4ess?
T@e 2a6t t@at t@e will @as Aeen allowed wit@o5t o88osition and t@e o4de4 allowin1 t@e
sa;e @as Ae6o;e 2inal and eBe65to4< is not a Aa4 to t@e 84esentation o2 a 6odi6il) 84ovided it
6o;8lies wit@ all t@e 2o4;alities 2o4 eBe65tin1 a will? t is not ne6essa4< t@at t@e will and
6odi6il Ae 84oAated to1et@e4 as t@e 6odi6il ;a< Ae 6on6ealed A< an inte4ested 8a4t<? T@e< ;a<
Ae 84oAated one a2te4 t@e ot@e4? &9acam &s. 5atmaitan <0 Phil 824'
,he employment of un!ue influence by %eracio was not Imutually repugnantJ to fraud as
petitioner insists- for it was the means employed by %eracio to defraud his brothers and sisters of
their share in $on !ayetano@s estate.
,here was frau! because $on !ayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing
with !o- Barredo and :im was a second will reoBing the dispositions of property that he made in
his first will. %ad he been aware that it was a second will- and if it were prepared at his own
behest- he would not hae denied that he made it. %e would probably hae caused it to be
probated while he was still alie- as he did with his first will %Revilla vs. CA 4/; SCRA 1<2&
PRETERTON
7reterition consists in the omission on the testator@s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them either because they are not mentioned therein- or- though mentioned- they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are e5pressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned- Article 3<C of
the !iil !ode may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator- although she is
compulsory heir. #tated otherwise- een if the suriing spouse is a compulsory heir- there is no
preterition een if she is omitted from the inheritance- for she is not in the direct line. %oweer-
the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Airginia A. "ernande(- whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been .uestioned by the petitioner. 9nder Article 29 of 7.$. =o. 6G2- Bnown
as the !hild and Kouth Welfare !ode- adoption gies to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and maBes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were depried of at least their legitimate.
=either can it be denied that they were not e5pressly disinherited. %ence- this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child. %Acain vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /11 SCRA /66&
7reterition is the omission of the heir in the will- either by not naming him at all or- while
mentioning him asfather- son- etc.- by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
e5pressly- nor assigning to him some part of the testator@s estate. Whether the testator gae a
legacy to a person- whom he characteri(ed in the testamentary proision as not related to him- but
later this person was )udicially declared to be his acBnowledged natural child- the case is not a
case of preterition but a case of completion of legitime. ,he institution in the will would not be
annulled. ,here would be no intestacy. %A8nar vs. Duncan, /; SCRA 136&
SU0STTUTON OF $ERS
#caeola- Daura- and ,raiesas construe Udegree@ as designation- substitution- or
transmission. ,he #upreme !ourt of #pain has decidedly adopted this construction. "rom this point
of iew- there can be only one transmission or substitution- and the substitute need not be related
to the first heir. Danresa- Dorell- and #anche( >oman howeer- construe the word Udegree@ as
generation- and the present !ode proiding that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree

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Ufrom the heir originally instituted.@ ,he !ode thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be
related to and be one generation from the first heir. "rom this- it follows that the fideicommissary
can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir. ,hese are the only relaties who are one
generation or degree from the fiduciary. %Ramire8 vs. Ramire8, ..R. No. "E4;314 Be#ruary /1,/3<4&
Indeed- legally speaBing- Drs. %odges@ will proides neither for a simple or ulgar
substitution under Article 3<9 of the !iil !ode nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article
362 thereof. ,here is no ulgar substitution therein because there is no proision for either *1+
predecease of the testator by the designate heir or *2+ refusal or *2+ incapacity of the latter to
accept the inheritance- as re.uired by Article 3<9E and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because obligation is imposed thereby upon %odges to presere the estate or
any party thereof for anyone else. %PCI ,an$ vs. Escolin, .. R. Nos. "E4;<56E35 an! "E4;325E2;,
*arch 43, /3;0&
MODAL NSTTUTON
,he institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 332 is what is Bnown in the
law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution- the
testator states *1+ the ob)ect of institution- *2+ the purpose or application of the property left by
the testator or- *2+ the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A ImodeJ imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. 8n the other hand- in a conditional testamentary disposition- the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. ,he condition
suspends but does not obligateE and the mode obligates but does not suspend. ,o some e5tent- it is
similar to a resolutory condition.
,hen- too since testamentary disposition are generally acts of liberality- an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will
itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt- the institution should be
considered as modal and not conditional. %Ra#a!illa vs. CA, 220 SCRA 142&
NTESTATE SUCCESSON
Article 992 of the =ew !iil !ode is not applicable because inoled here is not a situation
where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father- which is
prohibited by the aforesaid proision of law. >ather- it is a scenario where an illegitimate child
inherits from his father- the latterNs share in or portion of- what the latter already inherited from
the deceased sister- 'arista.
As opined by the !ourt of Appeals- the law in point in the present case is Article ??? of the
=ew !iil !ode- which proides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.
#ince 'arista died ahead of her brother "rancisco- the latter inherited a portion of the
estate of the former as one of her heirs. #ubse.uently- when "rancisco died- his heirs- namelyH his
spouse- legitimate children- and the priate respondent- Loselito- an illegitimate child- inherited
his *"ranciscoNs+ share in the estate of 'arista. It bears stressing that Loselito does not claim to be
an heir of 'arista by right of representation but participates in his own right- as an heir of the late
"rancisco- in the latterNs share *or portion thereof+ in the estate of 'arista.
,he present case relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir to the share of his
late father in the estate of the decedent 'arista- ownership of which had been transmitted to his
father upon the death of 'arista. ,here is no legal obstacle for priate respondent Loselito-
admittedly the son of the late "rancisco- to inherit in his own right as an heir to his fatherNs estate-
which estate includes a one-third *1F2+ undiided share in the estate of 'arista. %Dela *erce! vs.
Dela *erce!&
COLLATON
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the aboe proisions e5pressly
prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the said court correctly obsered- the phrase
Msa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muliM merely described the donation as
MirreocableM and should not be construed as an e5press prohibition against collation. ,he fact that

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a donation is irreocable does not necessarily e5empt the sub)ect thereof from the collation
re.uired under Article 1G61.
We surmise from the use of such terms as MlegitimeM and Mfree portionM in the deed of
donation that it was prepared by a lawyer- and we may also presume he understood the legal
conse.uences of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose- gien the precise language
of the document- that he would hae included therein an e5press prohibition to collate if that had
been the donorNs intention.
Anything less than such e5press prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of
Article 1G62. ,he suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated
were imputable to the free portion of the decedentNs estate merits little consideration. Imputation
is not the .uestion here- nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious. ,he sole issue is
whether or not there was an e5press prohibition to collate- and we see none.
,he intention to e5empt from collation should be e5pressed plainly and une.uiocally as an
e5ception to the general rule announced in Article 1G62. Absent such a clear indication of that
intention- we apply not the e5ception but the rule- which is categorical enough. %De Roma vs. CA,
"E05362, Auly 42, /3<;&
PARTTON
Article 1G<6 of the !iil !ode of 1339 authori(es a testator to partition inter ios of his
property- and distribute them among his heirs- and that this partition is not necessarily either a
donation nor a testament- but an instrument of a special character- sui generis- which is
recoerable at any time by the causante during his lifetime- and does not operate as a coneyance
of title until his death. It deries its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of
the owner of the property- limited only by the creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs. ,hat such partition is not goerned by the rules of wills or donations inter ios is a
conse.uence of its special nature. %*angEoy vs. CA, /00 SCRA 22&
Article 1G3G of the =ew !iil !ode allows a person to maBe a partition of his estate either
by an act inter ios or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not pre)udice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance- the
partition by the parent- as proided in Art. 1G3G- is a case e5pressly authori(ed by law.
Art. 1G3G of the !iil !ode clearly gies a person two options in maBing a partition of his
estateE either by an act inter ios or by WI::. When a person maBes a partition by will- it is
imperatie that such partition must be e5ecuted in accordance with the proisions of the law on
willsE howeer- when the person maBes the partition of his estate by an act inter ios- such
partition may een be oral or written- and need not be in a form of will- proided that the partition
does not pre)udice the legitime of compulsory heirs. %Chave8 vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /3/
SCRA 4//&
SOURCES OF O0L%ATONS
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers- it should neertheless be
held to answer for the flaws of its e.uipment if such flaws were at all discoerable. In this
connection- the manufacturer of the defectie appliance is considered in law the agent of the
carrier- and the good repute of the manufacturer will not reliee the carrier from liability. ,he
rationale of the carrierNs liability is the fact that the passenger has no priity with the manufacturer
of the defectie e.uipmentE hence- he has no remedy against him- while the carrier usually has.
%Necesito vs. Paras, "E/6561, Aune 26, /31<&
NATURE AND EFFECT OF O0L%ATONS

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It is a5iomatic that in reciprocal obligations- neither party incurs in delay if the other does
not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. It will
not do- howeer- to dispose of the controersy by simply declaring that the contract between the
parties had not been alidly cancelled and was therefore still in force- and that Agcaoili could not
be compelled by the ;#I# to pay the stipulated price of the house and lot sub)ect of the contract
until and unless it had first completed construction of the house. In this case- the !ourt cannot
re.uire specific performance of the contract in .uestion according to its literal terms- as this would
result in ine.uity. ,he preailing rule is that in decreeing specific performance e.uity re.uires not
only that the contract be )ust and e.uitable in its proisions- but that the conse.uences of specific
performance liBewise be e.uitable and )ust. ,he general rule is that this e.uitable relief will not be
granted if- under the circumstances of the case- the result of the specific enforcement of the
contract would be harsh- ine.uitable- oppressie- or result in an unconscionable adantage to the
plaintiff. In the e5ercise of its e.uity )urisdiction- the !ourt may ad)ust the rights of parties in
accordance with the circumstances obtaining at the time of rendition of )udgment- when these are
significantly different from those e5isting at the time of generation of those rights. %Agcaoili vs.
.SIS, .. R. No. 26615, August 26, /3<<&
KNDS OF O0L%ATONS
A stipulation proiding for the term of lease as Ifor as long as the defendant needed the
premises and can meet and pay said increasesJ is inalid because it is a purely potestatie
condition and it leaes the effectiity and en)oyment of the leasehold rights to the sole and
e5clusie will of the lessee. Dutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no e.uality
e5ists between the lessor and lessee since the life of the contract is dictated solely by the lessee.
%"ao "im vs. CA, /3/ SCRA /16&
RESCSSON OF O0L%ATONS
7etitioner@s breach of the agreement does not warrant a resolution of the contract. While
it is true that in reciprocal obligations- such as the contract of purchase and sale in this case- the
power to rescind is implied and any of the contracting parties may- upon non-fulfillment by the
other party of his part of the obligation- resole the contract- rescission will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach of the contract. >escission may be had only for such breaches that are so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the ob)ect of the parties in maBing the agreement. ,he
two aforementioned conditions that were breached by petitioners are not essential for the
fulfillment of the obligations to sell on their part but merely an incidental undertaBing. ,he
rescission of the contract may not be allowed on this ground alone. %Ang vs. CA, /;6 SCRA 4<5&
A4ti6le 11'1 4e2e4s to D5di6ial 4es6ission? t does not a88l< i2 t@e4e is an eB84ess
sti85lation to 4es6ind) in w@i6@ 6ase s56@ sti85lation ;5st 84evail? T@e4e is not@in1 in t@e law
w@i6@ 84o@iAits t@e 8a4ties 24o; ente4in1 into an a14ee;ent t@at violation o2 t@e te4;s o2 t@e
6ont4a6t wo5ld 6a5se its 6an6ellation wit@o5t 6o54t inte4vention? Said sti85lation is in t@e
nat54e o2 2a65ltative 4esol5to4< 6ondition %!ngeles &s. Calasan* 382 SCR! 8/8'?
,he rule that the in)ured party- can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the
obligation- and cannot hae both. applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment. If- as in this
case- the fulfillment has become impossible- Article 1191 allows the in)ured party to seeB rescission
een after he has chosen fulfillment. %AysonESimon vs. A!amos, /2/ SCRA 023&
Well settled is the rule- as held in preious )urisprudence that )udicial action for the
rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract proides that it may be cancelled for
iolation of any of its terms and conditions. %oweer- een in the cited cases- there was at least a
written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. ,he act of a party in treating a
contract as cancelled should be made Bnown to the other. In other words- resolution of reciprocal
contracts may be made e5tra)udicially unless successfully impugned in !ourt. If the debtor impugns
the declaration it shall be sub)ect to )udicial determination. %Aison vs. Court Df Appeals, /50 SCRA
223&

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In reciprocal obligations- the obligation of one is a resolutory condition of the obligation of
the other- the non-fulfillment of which entitles the other party to rescind the contract. It does not
apply to a case where there are two separate and distinct obligations- each independent of the
other. %Songcuan v. IAC, /3/ SCRA 4<&
O0L%ATONS "T$ A PEROD
T@e onl< a6tion t@at 6an Ae ;aintained is an a6tion to as9 t@e 6o54t to 2iB t@e d54ation
o2 t@e te4; o4 8e4iod? T@e 25l2ill;ent o2 t@e oAli1ation itsel2 6annot Ae de;anded 5ntil a2te4
t@e 6o54t @as 2iBed t@e 8e4iod 2o4 6o;8lian6e t@e4ewit@) and s56@ 8e4iod @as a44ived?
$oweve4) s56@ te6@ni6alit< need not Ae ad@e4ed to w@en a 84io4 and se8a4ate a6tion wo5ld Ae
a ;e4e 2o4;alit< and wo5ld se4ve no ot@e4 8548ose t@an to dela< %,orromeo &s. C! 7; SCR!
<2'?
O0L%ATONS "T$ A PENAL CLAUSE
Where a contract of sale of real property imposes a Ispecial conditionJ upon the endee to
construct a house thereon and complete at least <GP of such construction within two years
otherwise the surety bond would be forfeited in faor of the endor- such special obligation is in
reality an obligation with a penal clause and the obligor@s liability may be mitigated pursuant to Art
1229 of the =!!- considering that the penalty is intended not to indemnify the endor for any
damage it might suffer as a result of a breach of contract- but rather to compel performance.
%*a$ati Development Corp vs. Empire Insurance Co., 46 SCRA 11;&
LE%AL TENDER
;ranting that petitioner had neer encashed the checB- his failure to do so for more than
ten *1G+ years undoubtedly resulted in the impairment of the checB through his unreasonable and
une5plained delay.
While it is true that the deliery of a checB produces the effect of payment only when it is
cashed- pursuant to Art. 12C9 of the !iil !ode- the rule is otherwise if the debtor is pre)udiced by
the creditorNs unreasonable delay in presentment. ,he acceptance of a checB implies an
undertaBing of due diligence in presenting it for payment- and if he from whom it is receied
sustains loss by want of such diligence- it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or
obligation for which it was gien. It has- liBewise- been held that if no presentment is made at all-
the drawer cannot be held liable irrespectie of loss or in)ury unless presentment is otherwise
e5cused. ,his is in harmony with Article 12C9 of the !iil !ode under which payment by way of
checB or other negotiable instrument is conditioned on its being cashed- e5cept when through the
fault of the creditor- the instrument is impaired. ,he payee of a checB would be a creditor under
this proision and if its non-payment is caused by his negligence- payment will be deemed effected
and the obligation for which the checB was gien as conditional payment will be discharged. %Papa
vs. A.>. (alencia an! Co., Inc., .RN /61/<<, Aanuary 42, /33<&
In the case at bar- the checB inoled is not an ordinary bill of e5change but a managerNs
checB. A managerNs checB is one drawn by the banBNs manager upon the banB itself. It is similar to a
cashierNs checB both as to effect and use. A cashierNs checB is a checB of the banBNs cashier on his
own or another checB. In effect- it is a bill of e5change drawn by the cashier of a banB upon the
banB itself- and accepted in adance by the act of its issuance. It is really the banBNs own checB
and may be treated as a promissory note with the banB as a maBer. ,he checB becomes the
primary obligation of the banB which issues it and constitutes its written promise to pay upon
demand. ,he mere issuance of it is considered an acceptance thereof. If treated as promissory
note- the drawer would be the maBer and in which case the holder need not proe presentment for
payment or present the bill to the drawee for acceptance.
'en assuming that presentment is needed- failure to present for payment within a
reasonable time will result to the discharge of the drawer only to the e5tent of the loss caused by
the delay. "ailure to present on time- thus- does not totally wipe out all liability. In fact- the legal
situation amounts to an acBnowledgment of liability in the sum stated in the checB. In this case-
the ;ueco spouses hae not alleged- much less shown that they or the banB which issued the
managerNs checB has suffered damage or loss caused by the delay or non-presentment. $efinitely-
the original obligation to pay certainly has not been erased. %The International Corporate ,an$

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%no@ >NIDN ,AN7 DB T-E P-I"IPPINES& vs. Sps. Brancis S. .ueco an! *a. "u8 .ueco, ..R. No.
/0/35<. Be#ruary /4, 466/&
8n the issue of prescription- 7!IBanB claims that the action of "ord had prescribed because
of its inability to seeB )udicial relief seasonably- considering that the alleged negligent act tooB
place prior to $ecember 19- 19?? but the relief was sought only in 1932- or seen years thereafter.
,he statute of limitations begins to run when the banB gies the depositor notice of the
payment- which is ordinarily when the checB is returned to the alleged drawer as a oucher with a
statement of his account- 29 and an action upon a checB is ordinarily goerned by the statutory
period applicable to instruments in writing.
8ur laws on the matter proide that the action upon a written contract must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. %ence- the recBoning time for the
prescriptie period begins when the instrument was issued and the corresponding checB was
returned by the banB to its depositor *normally a month thereafter+. Applying the same rule- the
cause of action for the recoery of the proceeds of !itibanB !hecB =o. #= GC36? would normally be
a month after $ecember 19- 19??- when !itibanB paid the face alue of the checB in the amount of
7C-?C6-11C.C1. #ince the original complaint for the cause of action was filed on Lanuary 2G- 1932-
barely si5 years had lapsed. ,hus- we conclude that "ordNs cause of action to recoer the amount of
!itibanB !hecB =o. #= GC36? was seasonably filed within the period proided by law %Philippine
Commercial International ,an$ %formerly INS>"AR ,AN7 DB ASIA AND A*ERICA& vs. Court of
Appeals an! Bor! Philippines, Inc. an! Citi#an$, N.A ..R. No. /4/0/2. Aanuary 43, 466/&
E7TN%US$MENT OF O0L%ATONS
Pa<;ent is a ;ode o2 eBtin15is@in1 an oAli1ation? A4ti6le 1+,* o2 t@e Civil Code
84ovides t@at 8a<;ent s@all Ae ;ade to t@e 8e4son in w@ose 2avo4 t@e oAli1ation @as Aeen n a
6ont4a6t involvin1 4e6i84o6al oAli1ations) t@e 45les on w@en a 8a4t< ;a< Ae de6la4ed in de2a5lt
a4e 2o5nd in A4ti6le 11-'# KA4t? 11-'? T@ose oAli1ed to delive4 o4 to do so;et@in1) in654 in
dela< 24o; t@e ti;e t@e oAli1ee D5di6iall< o4 eBt4aD5di6iall< de;ands 24o; t@e; t@e 25l2ill;ent
o2 t@ei4 oAli1ation?B B B n 4e6i84o6al oAli1ations) neit@e4 8a4t< in654s in dela< i2 t@e ot@e4 does
not 6o;8l< o4 is not 4ead< to 6o;8l< in a 84o8e4 ;anne4 wit@ w@at is in65;Aent 58on @i;?
F4o; t@e ;o;ent one o2 t@e 8a4ties 25l2ills @is oAli1ation) dela< A< t@e ot@e4 Ae1ins?
T@e 8a<;ents we4e 8548o4tedl< ;ade to a Ns58e4viso4N o2 t@e 84ivate 4es8ondent) w@o
was 6lad in an SMC 5ni2o4; and d4ove an SMC van? $e a88ea4ed to Ae a5t@o4iGed to a66e8t
8a<;ents as @e s@owed a list o2 65sto;e4sM a66o5ntaAilities and even iss5ed SMC li:5idation
4e6ei8ts w@i6@ loo9ed 1en5ine? Un2o4t5natel< 2o4 8etitione4 F4an6is6o C5laAa) @e did not
as6e4tain t@e identit< and a5t@o4it< o2 t@e said s58e4viso4) no4 did @e as9 to Ae s@own an<
identi2i6ation to 84ove t@at t@e latte4 was) indeed) an SMC s58e4viso4? T@e 8etitione4s 4elied
solel< on t@e ;anMs 4e84esentation t@at @e was 6olle6tin1 8a<;ents 2o4 SMC? T@5s) t@e
8a<;ents t@e 8etitione4s 6lai;ed t@e< ;ade we4e not t@e 8a<;ents t@at dis6@a41ed t@ei4
oAli1ation to t@e 84ivate 4es8ondent? %Culaba &s. C! 5.R. 6o. 3/24</ !pril 32 /007'
=oation of a contract cannot be presumed. In order that an obligation may be
e5tinguished by another which substitutes the same- it is imperatie that it be so declared in
une.uiocal terms or that the old and new obligation be on eery point incompatible with each
other. ,he legal doctrine is that an obligation to pay a sum of money is not noated in a new
instrument by changing the term of payment and adding other obligation not incompatible with the
old one. It is not proper to consider an obligation noated as in the case at bar by mere granting of
e5tension of payment which do not een alter its essence. %.arcia vs. CA, /3/ SCRA 032&
Novation in w@ateve4 2o4; it ;a< Ae) w@et@e4 s5ADe6tive o4 oADe6tive) ;5st @ave to Ae
wit@ t@e 6onsent o2 t@e 64edito4? T@e4e 6an Ae novation wit@o5t t@e 6onsent o2 t@e deAto4
&eB84o;ision/ A5t t@e4e 6an neve4 Ae novation wit@o5t t@e 6onsent o2 t@e 64edito4? T@e 4eason
is t@at a new 6ont4a6t is Aein1 64eated Aetween t@e new 64edito4 and t@e new deAto4?
An agreement is needed for the effect of an e5traordinary inflation to be taBen into
account to alter the alue of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which
as a rule- is always the determinatie element- to be aried by agreement that would find reason
only in the superention of e5traordinary inflation or deflation.

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Doreoer- in his concurring opinion in the same case- Lustice !laudio ,eehanBee statedH
MI concur in the result with the obseration that the statements in the main opinion re the
applicability or non-applicability of Article 12<G of the !iil !ode should be taBen as obiter dicta-
since said article may not be inoBed nor applied without a proper declaration of e5traordinary
inflation or deflation of currency by the competent authorities. %*o#il Dil Phils. vs. CA, /<6 SCRA
51/&
'5traordinary inflation e5ists when Nthere is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power
of the 7hilippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the alue of said
currency- and such decrease or increase could not hae been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.
While appellantNs oluminous records and statistics proed that there has been a decline in
the purchasing power of the 7hilippine peso- this downward fall of the currency cannot be
considered Me5traordinary.M It is simply a uniersal trend that has not spared our country. %Bilipino
Pipe an! Boun!ry vs. NA?ASA, "E02005, *ay 2, /3<<&
Where a timely and alid tender of payment is made pursuant to the e5ercise of a right it is
sufficient- without consignation- to presere such right. !onsignation referred to in Art 12<6 of the
!iil !ode is inapplicable to a lease with option to buy because said proision refers to consignation
as one of the means for the payment or discharge of a debt whereas the lessee was not indebted to
the lessor for the price of the leased premises. ,he lessee merely e5ercised a right of option and
had no obligation to pay said price until e5ecution of the deed of sale in his faor- which the lessor
referred to do. %Brancisco vs. ,autista, /34 SCRA 2<<&
An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with
consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price
within the prescribed period. It must be stressed howeer that in maBing a repurchase it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase. ,his
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment
which constitutes the legal use or e5ercise of the right to repurchase. %GuiHo vs. CA, 43/ SCRA 403&
,he deposit of the rentals with the banB is not the consignation contemplated by law. What
the law re.uires is the deposit of the thing due at the disposal of )udicial authority before whom
the tender of payment shall be proed in a proper case. %Ercillio vs. CA, /34 SCRA /52&
An indiidual who is not a forced heir- creditor or party to a contract of sale made during
the life of the grantor cannot bring an action to annul said oluntary deed of sale to the grantee
because under the law- an action to annul a contract entered into with all the re.uisites mentioned
in Art. 1261 wheneer they are tainted with the ice which alidate them in accordance with law
may be brought- not only by any person principally bound or who made them but also his heir to
whom the right and obligation arising from the contract are transmitted. %Concepcion vs. Sta. Ana,
"E44;, Decem#er 43, /316&
AUTONOMY OF CONTRACTS
!ontracting parties may establish such stipulations- clauses- terms and conditions as they
may deem conenient- proided they are not contrary to law- morals- good customs- public order-
or public policy.M %oweer- where one of the conditions stated in a contract is a prohibition to sell
to third parties- the same is contrary to public policy because it irtually amounts to a perpetual
restriction on the right of ownership- specifically the ownerNs right to freely dispose of his
properties. Any such prohibition- indefinite and unlimited as to time- so much so that it shall
continue to be applicable een beyond the lifetime of the original parties to the contract- is-
without doubt- a nullity. %"eal v. IAC, ..R. No. "E51041, Novem#er 1, /3<;&
Article 12<? of the !iil !ode is confined to the enforcement of stipulations in faor of
third persons. ,he history of the doctrine and the meaning of the word stipulation re.uire that the
benefit claimed by a third person must be one intended to be conferred upon him by the parties.
,he article does not lend its aid to an incidental benefit which a third person may hae in the
performance of the contract. ,he intent of the contracting parties to benefit a third person must
be clearly e5pressed. %>y Tam an! >y 'et vs. "eonar!, 26 Phil. 0;/&
CONSENT

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,he acceptance of an offer must therefor be un.ualified and absolute. In other words- it
must be identical in all respects with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the
minds. ,his was not the case herein considering that petitionerNs acceptance of the offer was
.ualified- which amounts to a re)ection of the original offer. %"im$et$ai Sons v. CA, 411 SCRA 545&
An o22e4 ;ade inter praesentes ;5st Ae a66e8ted MMEDATELY? 2 t@e 8a4ties intended
t@at t@e4e s@o5ld Ae an eB84ess a66e8tan6e) t@e 6ont4a6t will Ae 8e42e6ted onl< 58on
9nowled1e A< t@e o22e4o4 o2 t@e eB84ess a66e8tan6e A< t@e o22e4ee o2 t@e o22e4? An a66e8tan6e
w@i6@ is not ;ade in t@e ;anne4 84es64iAed A< t@e o22e4o4 is NOT EFFECT!E 0UT A COUNTER>
OFFER w@i6@ t@e o22e4o4 ;a< a66e8t o4 4eDe6t? %9albarosa &s. C! et al. 5.R. @ 3/2;<3 !pril
80 /008'
MUTUALTY OF CONTRACTS
,he binding effect of any agreement between parties to a contract is premised on two
settled principlesH*1+ that any obligation arising from contract has the force of law between the
partiesE and *2+ that there must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential e.uality.
Any contract which appears to be heaily weighed in faor of one of the parties so as to lead to an
unconscionable result is oid. Any stipulation regarding the alidity or compliance of the contract
which is left solely to the will of one of the parties- is liBewise- inalid. %Alme!a v. CA, 415 SCRA
434&
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
As 6o44e6tl< 2o5nd A< t@e a88ellate 6o54t) t@e o6658ation and 6onst456tion o2 t@e
i;84ove;ents ;ade A< 8etitione4s on t@e dis85ted 84o8e4t< a4e 6lea4 a6ts o2 4ati2i6ation and
en2o46e;ent? n ot@e4 wo4ds) t@e e4e6tion o2 t@ese st456t54es on t@e s5ADe6t lot indi6ates t@at
t@e lease 6ont4a6t was al4ead< in e22e6t? T@e Stat5te o2 F4a5ds a88lies onl< to eBe65to4< and
not 6o;8leted) eBe65ted o4 8a4tiall< eBe65ted 6ont4a6ts? T@5s) w@e4e as in t@is 6ase) one
8a4t< @as 8e42o4;ed @is oAli1ation) o4al eviden6e will Ae ad;itted to 84ove t@e a14ee;ent?
%Camara &s. 9alabao 5.R. 6o. 327<20. .uly 83 /008'
A contract need not be contained in a single writing. It may be collected from seeral
different writings which do not conflict with each other and which- when connected- show the
parties- sub)ect matter- terms and consideration- as in contracts entered into by correspondence. A
contract may be encompassed in seeral instruments een though eery instrument is not signed by
the parties- since it is sufficient if the unsigned instruments are clearly identified or referred to
and made part of the signed instrument or instruments. %,B Corporation v. CA, 4<< SCRA 45;&
An e5ception to the unenforceability of contracts pursuant to the #tatute of "rauds is the
e5istence of a written note or memorandum eidencing the contract. ,he memorandum may be
found in seeral writings- not necessarily in one document. %"im$et$ai Sons v. CA, 416 SCRA 142&
RESCSSON
n 6o5ntless ti;es t@e4e @as Aeen 6on25sion Aetween 4es6ission 5nde4 A4ti6les 13(1 and
11'1 o2 t@e Civil Code? T@4o51@ t@is 6ase we a1ain e;8@asiGe t@at 4es6ission o2 4e6i84o6al
oAli1ations 5nde4 A4ti6le 11'1 is di22e4ent 24o; 4es6issiAle 6ont4a6ts 5nde4 C@a8te4 - o2 t@e law
on 6ont4a6ts 5nde4 t@e Civil Code? "@ile A4ti6le 11'1 5ses t@e te4; 4es6ission) t@e o4i1inal
te4; 5sed in A4ti6le 11+, o2 t@e old Civil Code) 24o; w@i6@ A4ti6le 11'1 was Aased) was
4esol5tion? Resol5tion is a 84in6i8al a6tion t@at is Aased on A4ea6@ o2 a 8a4t<) w@ile 4es6ission
5nde4 A4ti6le 13(3 is a s5Asidia4< a6tion li;ited to 6ases o2 4es6ission 2o4 lesion 5nde4 A4ti6le
13(1 o2 t@e New Civil Code? %Ri&era &s. #el Rosario 5.R. 6o. 377187. .anuary 32 /007'

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Sales
A0SOLUTE AND CONDTONAL SALES
A deed of sale- een though denominated as a I$eed of !onditional #aleJ is absolute in
nature in the absence of stipulation that the title to the property sold is resered in the endor or
that the latter has the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon the non-payment within a
fi5ed period. %Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, /1< SCRA 2;1&
O0FECT OF A CONTRACT OF SALE
:ands ac.uired by free or homestead patent shall not only be incapable of being
encumbered or alienated e5cept in faor of the goernment- but shall not also be liable to the
satisfaction of debt within the prohibitie period of fie *<+ years. ,his prohibition is mandatory
and any sale made in iolation thereof is null and oid. ,his is true een if the sale inoled is not
oluntary- such as a )udicial sale. "or the purpose of compliance with the law- it is immaterial that
the satisfaction of debt by alienation or encumbrance was made oluntarily or not. %Artates vs.
>r#i, 2; SCRA 231&
A bilateral promise to buy and sell and the agency to sell- entered into within fie *<+ years
from the date of the issuance of the homestead patent is in iolation of the 7ublic :and :aw
although the e5ecution of the sale was deferred until after the e5piration of the fie-year
prohibitory period. ,o all intents and purposes- there was an actual sale perfected during the
period of prohibition e5cept that it was reciprocally demandable thereafter. ,he stipulation
deferring the effects of the sale was merely a deice to circument the prohibition. ,hereafter- a
compromise agreement wherein a grantee of a public land promised to sell the same and entered
into within the prohibitory period of fie years is null and oid ab initio. %-eirs of Enri)ue =am#ales
vs. CA, /46 SCRA <3;&
A 6ont4a6t o2 sale o4 8546@ase o2 1oods to Ae delive4ed at a 25t54e ti;e) i2 ente4ed into
wit@o5t t@e intention o2 @avin1 an< 1oods 8ass 24o; one 8a4t< to anot@e4) A5t wit@ an
5nde4standin1 t@at at t@e a88ointed ti;e) t@e 8546@ase4 is ;e4el< to 4e6eive o4 8a< t@e
di22e4en6e Aetween t@e 6ont4a6t and t@e ;a49et 84i6es) is ille1al? S56@ 6ont4a6t 2alls 5nde4 t@e
de2inition o2 K25t54esL in w@i6@ t@e 8a4ties ;e4el< 1a;Ale on t@e 4ise o4 2all in 84i6es and is
de6la4ed n5ll and void A< law? &A4t? +*1() NCC/ &Onapal Phil. Commodities -nc. &s. C! O1''3P/
CONTRACT OF SALE vs? A%ENCY TO SELL
When one undertaBes to delier a thing at a stipulated price to another who is to pay the
price in a moment agreed upon- such constitutes the essential features of a contract of sale and
e5cludes the legal conception of an agency or order to sell. ,he contract entered into by the
parties was that the plaintiff was to furnish the defendant with the beds which the latter might
order at a stipulated price and that the defendant was to pay the price in the manner agreed upon.
,his contract contains the essential features of a contract of sale unliBe in an agency whereby the
agent receies the thing to sell it and does not pay its price but deliers to the principal the price
he obtains from the sale of the thing to a third person and if he does not succeed in selling it-
returns it. %Guiroga vs. Parsons -ar!@are Company, 2< Phil 16/&
CONTRACT OF SALE vs? CONTRACT FOR A PECE OF "ORK
#elling or distribution is an essential ingredient of manufacturing. Danufacture- thereof- of
products for the general marBet inoles the sale and distribution thereof and cannot be regarded
as contract for a piece of worB- which the manufacturing of goods especially upon the special order
of customers- and not for the general marBet. A contract for the sale of an article which the endor
in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general marBet- whether
the same is on hand at the time or not is a contract for the sale of goods %Concrete Aggregates,
Inc. vs. Court Df TaF Appeals, /<1 SCRA 05/&.
PERFECTON OF CONTRACT OF SALE

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A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the
formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. ,his is so because the agreement as to the
manner of payment goes into the price such that a difference or disagreement in the manner of
payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. $efiniteness as to the price is an
essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal property. In the case- nothing on the
agreement mentioned about the full purchase price and the manner the installments were to be
paid. %Toyota Sha@, Inc. vs. Court Df Appeals, 400 SCRA 24/&
EQUTA0LE MORT%A%E
One w@i6@ la69s t@e 84o8e4 2o4;alities) 2o4; o2 wo4ds) o4 ot@e4 4e:5isites 84es64iAed
A< law 2o4 a ;o4t1a1e) A5t s@ows t@e intention o2 t@e 8a4ties to ;a9e t@e 84o8e4t< s5ADe6t o2
t@e 6ont4a6t as se654it< 2o4 a deAt and 6ontains not@in1 i;8ossiAle o4 6ont4a4< to law &Cachola
&s. C! /04 SCR! 71</
PROMSE TO 0UY AND SELL !S ACCEPTED UNLATERAL PROMSE TO 0UY OR TO SELL
While it is true that under Art. 122C of the !iil !ode- the general rule regarding offer and
acceptance is that- when the offeror gies to the offeree a certain period to accept- the offer may
be withdrawn at anytime before acceptance when the option is not founded upon consideration
distinct from price. ,his general rule must be interpreted as modified by the proision of Article
1C?9 which applies to a Ipromise to buy and sellJ specifically. ,his rule re.uires that a promise to
sell to be alid- must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price- which means that the
option can still be withdrawn- een if accepted- if the same is not supported by any consideration.
%South@estern Sugar an! *olasses Co. vs. Atlantic .ulf An! Pacific, Co., 3; SCRA 403&
,he acceptance of an offer to sell a determinate thing for a price certain creates a
bilateral contract to sell and to buy. ,he offer- upon acceptance- ipso facto assumes the
obligations of a purchaser. If an option is gien without consideration- it is a mere offer of contract
of sale- which is not binding until accepted. If- howeer- acceptance is made before a withdrawal-
it constitutes a binding contract of sale een though the option was not supported by a sufficient
consideration. %At$ins, 7roll an! Company vs, Cua -ian Te$, /64 SCRA 30<&
,here is no conflict between Articles 122C and 1C?9. An accepted unilateral promise to sell
partaBes the nature of an option- which- although not binding as contract in itself because of lacB
of separate consideration- generates a bilateral contract of purchase and sale upon acceptance.
Article 122C of the !iil !ode which presumes the e5istence of a consideration in eery contract
applies to contracts in general- whereas the second paragraph of Article 1C?9 thereof refers to
sales in particular and more specifically to an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell.
%Sanche8 vs. Rigos, 01 SCRA 25<&
An e5tension of the period to redeem the property after the redemption period granted by
the 7resident and Danager of a banB after the e5piration of the redemption period could only
relate to the matter of resale of the property- not redemption. 'en if it were to be understood as
an e5tension of the period of redemption- the banB is not bound by the promise not only because it
was not approed or ratified by the Board of $irectors but also because- and more distinctiely- it
was a promise not supported by a consideration distinct from the repurchase price. %Natino vs.
Interme!iate Appellate Court, /3; SCRA 242&
In a unilateral promise to sell- where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise before the
acceptance by the creditor- the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to buy because
upon the acceptance by the creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor- there is already a meeting
of the minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and the price which is certain. In
which case- the parties may reciprocally demand performance. An optional contract is a priilege
e5isting only in one party / the buyer. "or a separate consideration paid- he is gien the right to
purchase or not- a certain merchandise or property- at any time within the agreed period- at a
fi5ed price. It is the duty of the endor to remain open the offer until the agreed period e5pires.

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,he purchaser is then gien the option to decide to purchase or not and may not be compelled to
e5ercise the option to buy before the term e5pires. %Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 443 SCRA 56&
O0L%ATON OF T$E !ENDEE TO PAY T$E PRCE
A grace period granted the endee in case of failure to pay the amountFs due is a right not
an obligation. ,he grace period must not be liBened to an obligation- the non-payment of which-
under Article 1169 of the !iil !ode- would still generally re.uire )udicial or e5tra-)udicial demand
before IdefaultJ can be said to arise *,ric$to@n DevIt Corp vs. Amor Tierra DevIt Corp.
1;SCRA02;+
R%$T OF FRST REFUSAL
In the instant case- the right of first refusal is integrated in the contract of lease. ,hus- it is
incorrect to say that there is no consideration in an agreement of right of first refusal. ,he
contractual stipulation is part and parcel of the whole contract of lease. %ence- the consideration
for the lease includes the consideration for the right of first refusal. >escission is a relief allowed
for the protection of one of the contracting parties and een third persons from all in)ury and
damage the contract may cause or to protect some incompatible and preferred right by the
contract. %E)uatorial Realty Development vs. *ayfair Theater Inc., 450 SCRA 0<2&
,he basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller- or offer
to purchase of any prospectie buyer. 8nly after the optionee fails to e5ercise its right of first
priority under the same terms and within the period contemplated- could the owner alidly offer to
sell the property to a third person- again- under the same terms as offered to the optionee.
%Parana)ue 7ings Enterprises, Inc. v. CA .R No. ///12<, Be#ruary 45, /33;&
A right of first refusal means identity of terms and conditions to be offered to the lessee
and all other prospectie buyers and a contract of sale entered into in iolation of a right of first
refusal of another person- while alid- is rescissible. %Riviera Bilipina, Inc. v. CA .R No. //;211,
April 1, 4664&
"$O 0EARS T$E RSK OF LOSS
,he disappearance or loss of property which the owner intended or attempted to sell can
only interest the owner- who should suffer the loss- and not a third party who has ac.uired no
rights nor incurred any liability with respect thereto. In the case- the sale was not perfected for
failure of the owner to comply with the condition. It follows that the loss of the essel should be
borne by the owner. %Roman vs. .rimalt, 5 Phil 35&
,he issuance of sales inoice does not proe transfer of ownership of the thing sold either
actually or constructiely. In all forms of deliery- it is necessary that the act of deliering whether
constructie or actual be coupled with the intention to transfer ownership and to delier the thing.
Article 1C96 of the !iil !ode which proides that in the absence of an e5press assumption of risB
by the buyer- the things sold remain at the seller@s risB until the ownership thereof is transferred to
the buyer. %Nor$is Distri#utors, Inc. vs. CA, /32 SCRA 530&
RECTO LA"
In sales on installments- where the action instituted is for specific performance and the
mortgaged property is subse.uently attached and sold- the sale thereof does not amount to a
foreclosure of the mortgage- hence- the seller-creditor is entitled to deficiency )udgment. ,he
attachment and subse.uent sale on public auction of the property was merely an incident to an
ordinary ciil action and cannot be considered as e.uialent to the remedy of foreclosure.
%Southern *otors, Inc. vs. *oscoso, 4 SCRA /52&
If the guarantor should be compelled to pay the balance of the purchase price- the
guarantor will in turn be entitled to recoer what she has paid from the debtor-endee pursuant to
Article 2G66 of the !iil !ode- so that ultimately- it would be the endee who will be made to bear
the payment of the balance of the price- despite the earlier foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.

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,hus- the protection gien by Article 1C3C would be indirectly suberted- and public policy
oerturned. ,herefore- foreclosure of the chattel mortgage releases the guarantor. %Pascual vs.
>niversal *otors Corp., 5/ SCRA /4/&
DEL!ERY AS A MODE OF TRANSFERRN% O"NERS$P
,he e5ecution of a public instrument is e.uialent to the deliery of the thing which is the
ob)ect of the contract- but in order that this symbolic deliery may produce the effect of tradition-
it is necessary that the endor shall hae had such control oer the thing sold that- at the moment
of the sale- its material deliery could hae been made. %A!!ison vs. BeliF an! Tioco, 2< Phil 060&
8wnership is not transferred by perfection of the contract of sale but by deliery- either
actual or constructie. ,his is true een if the purchase has been made on credit or payment of the
purchase price is not essential to the transfer of ownership as long as the property sold has been
deliered. 8wnership is ac.uired from the moment the thing sold was deliered to the endee- as
when it is placed in his control and possession. %Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. vs. Aal@in!or
*anufacturers Inc., 02 SCRA 046&
ARTCLE 1,'1
,he prohibition mandated by paragraph 2 of Article 1C91 in relation to Article 1CG9 of the
!iil !ode does not apply where the sale of the property in dispute was made under a special power
inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to Act no. 212<- as amended. 9nder
#ection < of such Act- the title of the mortgagee-creditor oer the property cannot be impeached
or defeated on the ground that the mortgagee cannot be a purchaser of his own sale. %Biestan vs.
CA,, /<1 SCRA ;1;&
ARTCLES 13*- AND 33'
,he right of the owner to recoer personal property ac.uired in good faith by another is
based on his being dispossessed without his consent. ,he common law principle that where one of
the two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another- the law imposes upon the
party who by his misplaced confidence- has enabled the fraud to be committed cannot be applied
to a person unlawfully depried coered by an e5press proision of the !iil !ode specifically
Article <<9. Between a common law principle and a statutory proision- the latter must preail.
%Concurring opinion of Austice Teehan$ee&
9nlawful depriation is not merely contained in the specific sense of depriation by robbery
or theft but e5tends to all cases where there has been no alid transmission of ownership- including
depositary or lessee who sold the same. It e5tends to all cases where there has been no alid
transmission of ownership. %Di8on vs. Suntay, 0; SCRA /56&
7ossession of moable property ac.uired in good faith is e.uialent to a title. %ence- where
there was a perfected contract of sale- it cannot be said that there is unlawful depriation so as to
warrant recoery from a purchaser in good faith without reimbursement. %EDCA Pu#lishing An!
Distri#uting Corp. vs. Santos, /<0 SCRA 5/0&
DOU0LE SALE
,he first purchaser is necessarily a purchaser in goo! faith. #uch good faith subsists and
continues to e5ist een if the first purchaser subse.uently is informed of the e5istence of a second
sale. ,he goerning principle here is Jfirst in time, stronger in rightJ. ,he Bnowledge gained by the
first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer@s good faith and the right to register
first. But conersely- Bnowledge gained by the buyer of the first sale defeats his rights een if he
be the one to register first as he then acts in bad faith. It has to be noted that Bnowledge is
tantamount to registration. %Car#onell vs. Court Df Appeals, 53 SCRA 33&

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Where one of two conflicting sales of a piece of land was e5ecuted #efore the land was
registered- while the other was an eFecution sale ma!e after the land had been registered- what
should apply is #ection 2<- >ule 29 *not Article 1<CC+ which proides that purchaser of e5ecution
sale ac.uires only the rights of the )udgment debtor to the property as of the time of the ley.
,herefore- a prior sale- although unregistered cannot be deemed to be automatically cancelled
upon subse.uent issuance of the ,orrens title oer the land. %Dagupan Tra!ing Co. vs. *acam, /0
SCRA 33&
&nowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subse.uent purchaser maBes
him a purchaser in bad faith which itiates his title and creates no right as against the first
purchaser. ,he Bnowledge contemplated here must be continuing- from the time of ac.uisition
until the title is transferred to him by registration a failing registration by deliery of possession.
,he second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lacB of Bnowledge of the first
sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration as proided by law. %Cru8
vs. Ca#ana, /43 SCRA 515&
As between two purchasers- the one who registered the sale in his faor has a preferred
right oer the other who has not registered his title- een if the latter is in actual possession of the
immoable property. %Tane!o vs. Court Df Appeals, 414 SCRA <6&
Article 1<CC does not apply to land not registered under the ,orrens system. ,he proisions
in Act =o. 22CC should be made applicable- which states that registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is without pre)udice to a third party with a better right. ,his is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff@s e5ecution sale only steps into the shoes of the
)udgment debtor- and merely ac.uires the latter@s interest in the property sold as of the time the
property was leied upon. %Ra!io@ealth Binance Co. vs. Palileo, /3; SCRA 401&
Where a person claims to hae superior proprietary rights oer another on the ground that
he deried his title from a sheriffNs sale registered in the >egistry of 7roperty- Article 1<CC of the
!iil !ode will apply only if said e5ecution sale of real estate is registered under Act C96.
9nfortunately- the sub)ect property was still untitled when it was already ac.uired by banB
*first buyer+ by irtue of a final deed of coneyance. 8n the other hand- when the second buyer
purchased the same property- it was coered under the ,orrens #ystem. At the time of the
e5ecution and deliery of the sheriffNs deed of final coneyance the disputed property was already
coered by the :and >egistration Act and the 8riginal !ertificate of ,itle was liBewise already
entered in the registration booB of the >egister of $eeds as of April 1?- 193C.
,hus- from said date- the sub)ect property was already under the operation of the ,orrens
#ystem. 9nder the said system- registration is the operatie act that gies alidity to the transfer
or creates a lien upon the land. Doreoer- the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of
relieing the land of all claims e5cept those noted thereon. Accordingly- the second buyer in
dealing with the sub)ect registered land- were not re.uired by law to go beyond the register to
determine the legal condition of the property. ,hey were only charged with notice of such burdens
on the property as were noted on the register or the certificate of title. ,o hae re.uired them to
do more would hae been to defeat the primary ob)ect of the ,orrens #ystem which is to maBe the
,orrens ,itle indefeasible and alid against the whole world. %Naa@an Community Rural ,an$ v.
CA&
0REAC$ OF "ARRANTY
As a general rule- there is no implied warranty in a sale of second hand goods. %oweer-
this general rule is not without e5ceptions. Article 1<62 of the !iil !ode states that Iwhere the
buyer e5pressly or by implication maBes Bnown to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are ac.uired and it appears that the buyer relied on the seller@s sBill or )udgment- there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. In the certification that
the machine was in A1 condition must be considered an e5press warranty and their binding on the
seller. #uch condition or certification was a condition sine .ua non for the release of the
petitioner@s loan which was used for the payment of the purchase price. #eller must be bound by it.
%*oles vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /53 SCRA ;;;&

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While it is true that Article 1<?1 of the !iil !ode proides for a prescriptie period of si5
months for a rehibitory action- a cursory of the preceding ten articles will reeal that said rule may
be applied only in case of implied warranties. In case of e5press warranty- the prescriptie period
is the one specified in the warranty and in the absence of such period- the general rule on
rescission of contracts which is four *C+ years shall apply. %(illostas vs. Court Df Appeals, 4/6 SCRA
036&
R%$T OF REDEMPTON
Where the true intention of the parties show that the transaction shall secure the payment
of the debt- such a transaction shall be presumed to be an e.uitable mortgage under paragraph 6
of Article 16G2. #ettled is the rule that to create the presumption enunciated by Article 16G2- the
e5istence of one circumstance is enough. %Ramos vs. Court Df Appeals, /<6 SCRA 521&
While in ordinary sales for reason and e.uity a transaction may be inalidated on the
ground of inade.uacy of price or when such inade.uacy shocBs one@s conscience as to )ustify the
courts to interfere- such does not follow when the law gies to the owner the right to redeem as
when a sale is made at public auction- upon the theory that the lower the price- the easier it is for
the owner to effect the redemption. And so it was aptly said that when there is the right to
redeem- inade.uacy of the price should not be material because the )udgment debtor may redeem
the property. %De "eon vs. Salva!or, 25 SCRA 15;&
!o-heirs may redeem the shares sold by any of their co-heirs within 2G days from written
notice of the sale. %oweer- strict application of this legal mandate would amount to in)ustice
when there is an actual Bnowledge though no written notice is gien. In such case- mere
technicality should not defeat the purpose of the law- i.e. to notify the redemptioners whose
actual $no@le!ge is e)uivalent to notice. %Alon8o vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /16 SCRA 413&
A formal offer to redeem- accompanied by a bona fide tender of payment of redemption
price is not essential where the right to redeem is e5ercised through a )udicial action within the
redemption period and simultaneously depositing the redemption price. ,he filing of action itself
is e)uivalent to a formal offer to re!eem. ,here is actually no prescribed form for an offer to
redeem to be properly effected- what is paramount is the aailment of the right to legally redeem
within the fi5ed period. %"ee Chuy Realty Corp. vs. Court Df Appeals, 416 SCRA 135&
While it is true that written notice by the endor is re.uired by law under Article 1622- it is
e.ually true that the same Article 1622 does not prescribe any distinctie method for notifying the
redemptioner so long- therefore- as the latter is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof- the 2G days for redemption starts running and the redemptioner has no real cause to
complain. %Etcu#an vs. Court Df Appeals, /0< SCRA 1<;&
Lease
When rental is paid monthly and the term had not been e5pressly agreed upon- the lease is
understood under Article 163? to be terminated or terminable from month-to-month. An e5tension
by the contract of lease may only be sought by the tenant before- not after- the termination of the
lease. %'e$ Seng Co. vs. Court Df Appeals, 461 SCRA 261&
Although the lease is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated at the end of eery
month- in the absence of proper notice to acate- the lease continues to be in force and cannot be
deemed to hae e5pired as of the end of the month automatically. =either can the non-payment of
the rent be ground for termination without a demand to pay and to acate. %'ap vs. Cru8, 46<
SCRA 534&
An e5press agreement which gies the lessee the sole option to renew the lease is fre.uent
and- sub)ect to statutory restriction alid and- binding. ,his option which is proided in the same
lease agreement is fundamentally part of the consideration in the contract and is no different from

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any other proision of the lease carrying an undertaBing on the part of the lessor to act conditioned
on the performance by the lessee. It cannot be aoided on the ground that it lacBs mutuality. And
while the lessee has the right to choose to continue the lease or not- and the lessor accepts- both
parties are bound by the new lease contract. %Allie! ,an$ing Corporation vs. Court Df Appeals, 4<0
SCRA 21;&
B7 3?? erased the distinction between oral and written leases in so far as e5piration of the
lease period as a ground for )udicial e)ectment is concerned. ,herefore- the lease- although orally
e5ecuted- may be for a definite period if it paid on a monthly basisE therefore- the period is from
month to month. ,herefore- finally- any e5press e5ception of 7$ =o. 2G- )udicial e)ectment lies
when the lease is for a definite period or when the fi5ed or definite period agreed upon has
e5pired. %-eirs Df Bausta Dimaculangan vs. Interme!iate Appellate Court, /;6 SCRA 232&
B7 2< e5pressly sanctions banB deposits as a sufficient and alid alternatie to )udicial
consignation.
:ease on a month-to-month basis can be alidly terminated by the lessor at the end of any
gien month upon prior notice. ,he lessor is granted the right to e)ect the lessee- being an
e5cepted case under the >ental !ontrol :aw- after prior notice of such termination and demand to
acate the leased premises. %In!uctivo vs. Court Df Appeals, 443 SCRA 2<6&
#tipulations in a lease contract e5pressly warranting that the leased premises shall be used
e5clusiely by the lessee for a specific purpose and that the lessee shall not directly or indirectly
assign its right of lease oer the leased premises are consistent with Art. 16C9 of the !iil !ode
which proides that the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor- unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary. It has been held that the consent of the lessor is necessary
because the assignment of the lease would inole the transfer- not only of rights- but also of
obligations. It constitutes a noation by a substitution of the person of one of the parties.
%,angayan v. CA, 4;< SCRA 2;3&
Partnership
CONCEPT OF PARTNERS$P
While it has been held that as between themseles the rights of the stocBholders in a
defectiely incorporated association should be goerned by the supposed charter and the laws of
the state relating thereto and not by the rules goerning partners- it is ordinarily held that persons
who attempt- but fail- to form a corporation and who carry on business under the corporate name
occupy the position of partners inter se.
%oweer- such a relation does not necessarily e5ist- for ordinarily persons cannot be made
to assume the relation of partners- as between themseles- when their purpose is that no
partnership shall e5ist- and it should be implied only when necessary to do )ustice between the
partiesE thus- one who taBes no part e5cept to subscribe for stocB in a proposed corporation which
is neer legally formed does not become a partner with other subscribers who engage in business
under the name of the pretended corporation- so as to be liable as such in an action for settlement
of the alleged partnership and contribution. A partnership relation between certain stocBholders
and other stocBholders- who were also directors- will not be implied in the absence of an
agreement- so as to maBe the former liable to contribute for payment of debts illegally contracted
by the latter. %Pioneer Insurance vs. CA, .RN <0/3;, Auly 4<, /3<3&
It is true that the complaint also states that the plaintiff is Mrepresented herein by its
Danaging 7artner ;regorio Araneta- Inc.M- another corporation- but there is nothing against one
corporation being represented by another person- natural or )uridical- in a suit in court. ,he
contention that I;regorio Araneta- Inc.J can not act as managing partner for plaintiff on the theory
that it is illegal for two corporations to enter into a partnership is without merit- for the true rule
is that Mthough a corporation has no power to enter into a partnership- it may neertheless enter
into a )oint enture with another where the nature of that enture is in line with the business
authori(ed by its charter.M %A.*.T. ?ason an! Co., Inc. vs. ,olanos, "E0321, *ay 4<, /35<&

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,hey were co-owners pure and simple. ,o consider them as partners would obliterate the
distinction between a co-ownership and a partnership. ,he petitioners were not engaged in any
)oint enture by reason of that isolated transaction.
,heir original purpose was to diide the lots for residential purposes. If later on they found
it not feasible to build their residences on the lots because of the high cost of construction- then
they had no choice but to resell the same to dissole the co-ownership. ,he diision of the profit
was merely incidental to the dissolution of the co-ownership which was in the nature of things a
temporary state. It had to be terminated sooner or later. %D#illos vs CIR, "E5<//<, Dcto#er 43,
/3<1& ,he legal concept of a )oint enture is of common law origin. It has no precise legal
definition- but it has been generally understood to mean an organi(ation formed for some legal
purpose. It is in fact hardly distinguishable from the partnership- since their elements are similar /
community of interest in the business- sharing of profits and losses- and a mutual right of control.
,he main distinction cited by most common law )urisdictions is that the partnership contemplates a
general business with some degree of continuity- while the )oint enture is formed for the
e5ecution of a single transaction- and is thus of a temporary nature. ,his obseration is not entirely
accurate in this )urisdiction- since under the !iil !ode- a partnership may be particular or
uniersal- and a particular partnership may hae for its ob)ect a specific undertaBing. It would
seem therefore that under 7hilippine law- a )oint enture is a form of partnership and should thus
be goerned by the law of partnerships. ,he #upreme !ourt has howeer recogni(ed a distinction
between these two business forms- and has held that although a corporation cannot enter into a
partnership contract- it may howeer engage in a )oint enture with others. Doreoer- the usual
rules as regards the construction and operations of contracts generally apply to a contract of a )oint
enture. %Aur#ach v. Sanitary ?ares *anufacturing Corp., /<6 SCRA /26&
O0L%ATONS OF T$E PARTNERS
It is not disputed that the prohibition against an industrial partner engaging in business for
himself seeBs to preent any conflict of interest between the industrial partner and the
partnership- and to insure faithful compliance by said partner with his prestation. ,here is no
pretense- howeer- een on the part of appellants that appellee is engaged in any business
antagonistic to that of appellant company- since being a Ludge of one of the branches of the !ity
!ourt of Danila can hardly be characteri(ed as a business. %Evangelista + Co. vs. A#a! Santos, "E
2/5<0, Aune 4<, /3;2&
Aboe all other persons in business relations- partners are re.uired to e5hibit towards each
other the highest degree of good faith. In fact the relation between partners is essentially
fiduciary- each being considered in law- as he is in fact- the confidential agent of the other. It is
therefore accepted as fundamental in e.uity )urisprudence that one partner cannot- to the
detriment of another- apply e5clusiely to his own benefit the results of the Bnowledge and
information gained in the character of partner. And this rule has een been applied to a renewal
taBen in the name of one partner after the dissolution of the firm and pending its li.uidation. %Pang
"im vs. "o Seng, .RN /52/<, Dcto#er 4/, /34/ &
7arenthetically- the appelleesN statement that the beneficial right oer the fishpond in
.uestion is the Mspecific partnership propertyM contemplated by Art. 1311 of the !iil !ode- is
incorrect. A reading of the said proision will show that what is meant is tangible property- such as
a car- trucB or a piece of land- but not an intangible thing such as the beneficial right to a
fishpond. If what the appellees hae in mind is the fishpond itself- they are grossly in error. A
fishpond of the public domain can neer be considered a specific partnership property because only
its use and en)oyment-neer its title or ownership-is granted to specific priate persons. %Deluao vs
Casteel, "E4/365, Decem#er /<, /35<&
In short- while the liability of the partners are merely )oint in transactions entered into by
the partnership- a third person who transacted with said partnership can hold the partners
solidarily liable for the whole obligation if the case of the third person falls under Articles 1322 or
1322.
,he obligation is solidary because the law protects him who in good faith relied upon the
authority of a partner- whether such authority is real or apparent. ,hat is why under Article 132C of

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the !iil !ode all partners- whether innocent or guilty- as well as the legal entity which is the
partnership- are solidarily liable.
8ur construction of the article *Article 1?9?- =!!+ is that it relates e5clusiely to the
settlement of the partnership affairs- among the partners themseles and has nothing to do with
the liability of the partners to third personsE that each one of the industrial partners is liable to
third persons for the debts of the firmE that if he has paid such debt out of his priate property
during the life of the partnership- when its affairs are settled he is entitled to credit for the
amount so paid- and if it results that there is not enough property in the partnership to pay him-
then the capitalist partners must pay him. %"a Compania *aritima vs. *uHo8, 3 P-I" 245 &
*Article 1?9?- =!!+ is susceptible of two different interpretations of which that gien it in
the !ompaTia Daritima case- supra- i.e.- that it relates merely to the distribution of losses among
the partners themseles in the settlement of the partnership affairs and has no reference to
partnership obligations to third parties- appears to us to be the more logical.
,here is a marBed distinction between a liability and a loss- and the inability of a
partnership to pay a debt to a third party at a particular time does not necessarily mean that the
partnership business- as a whole- has been operated at a loss. ,he partnership may hae
outstanding credits which for the moment may be unaailable for the payment of debts- but which
eentually may be reali(ed upon and yield profits more than sufficient to coer all losses. Bearing
this in mind it will be found that there in reality is no conflict between the two articles .uotedE
one speaBs of liabilities- the other of losses. %Pacific Commercial Co. vs. A#oiti8 + *artine8, .RN
4166;, *arch 4, /345 &
I,he partnership has a )uridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the
partners.J #ince the capital was contributed to the partnership- not to petitioners- it is the
partnership that must refund the e.uity of the retiring partners.
#ince it is the partnership- as a separate and distinct entity- that must refund the shares of
the partners- the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other
words- it can only pay out what it has in its coffers- which consists of all its assets. %oweer-
before the partners can be paid their shares- the creditors of the partnership must first be
compensated. After all the creditors hae been paid- whateer is left of the partnership assets
becomes aailable for the payment of the partners@ shares. *AI::A>'A: s. >ADI>'R- ;.>. =o.
1CC21C- Luly 1C- 2GG2+
DSSOLUTON
,he heir ordinarily *and we did not say MnecessarilyM+ becomes a limited partner for his own
protection- because he would normally prefer to aoid any liability in e5cess of the alue of the
estate inherited so as not to )eopardi(e his personal assets. But this statutory limitation of
responsibility being designed to protect the heir- the latter may disregard it and instead elect to
become a collectie or general partner- with all the rights and priileges of one- and answering for
the debts of the firm not only with the inheritance but also with the heirNs personal fortune. ,his
choice pertains e5clusiely to the heir- and does not re.uire the assent of the suriing partner.
,he Articles did not proide that the heirs of the deceased would be merely limited
partnerE on the contrary- they e5pressly stipulated that in case of death of either partner Mthe co-
partnership . . . will hae to be continuedM with the heirs or assigns. It certainly could not be
continued if it were to be conerted from a general partnership into a limited partnership- since
the difference between the two Binds of associations is fundamentalE and specially because the
conersion into a limited association would leae the heirs of the deceased partner without a share
in the management. %ence- the contractual stipulation does actually contemplate that the heirs
would become general partners rather than limited ones.
8f course- the stipulation would not bind the heirs of the deceased partner should they
refuse to assume personal and unlimited responsibility for the obligations of the firm. ,he heirs- in
other words- cannot be compelled to become general partners against their wishes. But because
they are not so compellable- it does not legitimately follow that they may not oluntarily choose to
become general partners- waiing the protectie mantle of the general laws of succession. And in
the latter eent- it is pointless to discuss the legality of any conersion of a limited partner into a
general one. ,he heir neer was a limited partner- but chose to be- and became- a general partner
right at the start. %.o)uiolay vs. Sycip, "E//<06, Decem#er /6, /352&

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While an unregistered commercial partnership has no )uridical personality- neertheless-
where two or more persons attempt to create a partnership failing to comply with all the legal
formalities- the law considers them as partners and the association is a partnership in so far as it is
a faorable to third persons- by reason of the e.uitable principle of estoppel.
It results that if the law recogni(es a defectiely organi(ed partnership as de facto as far as
third persons are concerned- for purposes of its de facto e5istence it should hae such attribute of
a partnership as domicile *for purposes of the !hattel Dortgage :aw+. %*cDonal! vs. National City
,an$ of Ne@ 'or$&
What is important for present purposes is that- not only the retiring partners but also the
new partnership itself which continued the business of the old- dissoled- one- are liable for the
debts of the preceding partnership. In #ingson- et al. . Isabela #aw Dill- et al.- the !ourt held that
under facts ery similar to those in the case at bar- a withdrawing partner remains liable- to a third
party creditor of the old partnership. ,he liability of the new partnership- upon the other hand- in
the set of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar- is established in Article 13CG of the !iil
!ode. %'u vs. N"RC, .RN 3;4/4, Aune 26,/332&
,he birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on the mutual desire and consent of
the partners. ,he right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the ery
foundation and essence of that partnership. Its continued e5istence isin turn- dependent on the
constancy of that mutual resole- along with each partnerNs capability to gie it- and the absence of
a cause for dissolution proided by the law itself. Aerily- any one of the partners may- at his sole
pleasure- dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. %e must- howeer- act in good faith- not
that the attendance of bad faith can preent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can
result in a liability for damages.
In passing- neither would the presence of a period for its specific duration or the statement
of a particular purpose for its creation preent the dissolution of any partnership by an act or will
of a partner. Among partners- mutual agency arises and the doctrine of delectus personae allows
them to hae the power- although not necessarily the right- to dissole the partnership. An
un)ustified dissolution by the partner can sub)ect him to a possible action for damages. %Drtega vs
CA, .RN /6340<, Auly 2, /331&
LMTED PARTNERS$P
,o establish a limited partnership there must be- at least- one general partner and the
name of at least one of the general partners must appear in the firm name. But neither of these
re.uirements has been fulfilled. ,he general rule is that those who seeB to aail themseles of the
protection of laws permitting the creation of limited partnerships must show a substantially full
compliance with such laws. A limited partnership that has not complied with the law of its creation
is not considered a limited partnership at all- but a general partnership in which all the members
are liable %Tec$ Seing + Co. vs Ao Chung Cang, .RN /3<3, Septem#er 5, /342&
!gency
,he management contract was a contract of lease of serices. In both agency and lease of
serices- one of the parties binds himself to render some serice to the other party. Agency-
howeer- is distinguished from lease of worB or serices in that the basis of agency is
representation- while in the lease of worB or serices- the basis is employment.
Agency is a preparatory contract- as agency does not stop with the agency because the
purpose is to enter into other contracts. ,he most characteristic feature of an agency relationship
is the agent@s power to bring about business relations between his principal and third persons.
,he agent is destined to e5ecute )uridical acts. :ease of serices contemplate only material
acts. %Nielson + Co. vs. "epanto Consoli!ate! *ining Co., "E4/56/, Decem#er /;, /355 &
A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership
of an immoable is transmitted or ac.uired either gratuitously or for a aluable consideration. ,he

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e5press mandate re.uired by law to enable an appointee of an agency *couched+ in general terms
to sell must be one that e5pressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient
of the act mentioned. "or the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate- a
power of attorney must so e5press the powers of the agent in clear and unmistaBable language.
When there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used coneys such power- no such
construction shall be gien the document.
It is therefore clear that by selling to respondent 7ere( a portion of petitionerNs land
through a compromise agreement- Aillamil-'strada acted without or in obious authority. ,he sale
ipso )ure is conse.uently oid. #o is the compromise agreement. %Cosmic "um#er Corp. vs. CA, .RN
//02//, Novem#er 43, /335&
,he difficulty in distinguishing between contracts of sale and the creation of an agency to
sell has led to the establishment of rules by the application of which this difficulty may be soled.
,he decisions say the transfer of title or agreement to transfer it for a price paid or promised is the
essence of sale. If such transfer puts the transferee in the attitude or position of an owner and
maBes him liable to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price and not merely as an agent who
must account for the proceeds of a resale- the transaction is a saleE while the essence of an agency
to sell is the deliery to an agent- not as his property- but as the property of the principal- who
remains the owner and has the right to control sales- fi5 the price- and terms- demand and receie
the proceeds less the agentNs commission upon sales made. %7er + Co., "t!. vs. "inga!&
,he sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under Article 13?9 is a oluntary and
independent contract- and not an auction sale resulting from e5tra)udicial foreclosure- which is
precipitated by the default of a mortgagor. Absent that default- no foreclosure results. ,he
stipulation granting an authority to e5tra)udicially foreclose a mortgage is an ancillary stipulation
supported by the same cause or consideration for the mortgage and forms an essential or
inseparable part of that bilateral agreement.
,he power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates e5clusiely the
representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the
mortgagee for the latterNs own protection. ,hat power suries the death of the mortgagor.
It matters not that the authority to e5tra)udicially foreclose was granted by an attorney-in-
fact and not by the mortgagor personally. ,he stipulation in that regard- although ancillary- forms
an essential part of the mortgage contract and is inseparable therefrom. =o creditor will agree to
enter into a mortgage contract without that stipulation intended for its protection. %,icol Savings +
"oan Assoc. vs. CA, .RN <1264, *arch 2/, /3<3&
"rust
,he MmistaBeM or MfraudM that results in an implied trust being impressed upon the property
inoled- may be the mistaBe or fraud of a third person- and need not be a mistaBe or fraud
committed directly by the trustee himself under the implied trust. Accordingly- in the instant case-
an implied trust was established upon the land ac.uired by Atty. 7ascua een though the operatie
mistaBe was a mistaBe of respondent trial )udge.
A constructie trust- otherwise Bnown as a trust eF maleficio- a trust eF !elicto- a trust !e
son tort- an inoluntary trust- or an implied trust- is a trust by operation of law which arises
contrary to intention and in initum- against one who- by fraud- actual or constructie- by duress or
abuse of confidence- by commission of wrong- or by any form of unconscionable conduct- artifice-
concealment- or .uestionable means- or who in any way against e.uity and good conscience- either
has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not- in e.uity and good
conscience- hold and en)oy. It is raised by e.uity to satisfy the demands of )ustice. %oweer- a
constructie trust does not arise on eery moral wrong in ac.uiring or holding property or on eery
abuse of confidence in business or other affairsE ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared
only on wrongful ac.uisitions or retentions of property of which e.uity- in accordance with its
fundamental principles and the traditional e5ercise of its )urisdiction or in accordance with
statutory proision- taBes cogni(ance. It has been broadly ruled that a breach of confidence-
although in business or social relations- rendering an ac.uisition or retention of property by one
person unconscionable against another- raises a constructie trust.
And specifically applicable to the case at bar is the doctrine that a constructie trust is
substantially an appropriate remedy against un)ust enrichment. It is raised by e.uity in respect of

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property- which has been ac.uired by fraud- or where- although ac.uired originally without fraud-
it is against e.uity that it should be retained by the person holding it. %Sumaoang vs. RTC Au!ge,
.RN ;</;2, Dcto#er 45, /334&
Before a person can sue for the benefit of another under a trusteeship- he must be Itrustee
of an e5press trust.J *,he proision in the >ules of !ourt regarding representatie parties+ does not
apply in cases of implied trust- that is- a trust which may be inferred merely from the acts of the
parties or from other circumstances. %PA" vs. -eal! "um#er Co.&
As differentiated from constructie trusts- where the settled rule is that prescription may
superene- in resulting trust- the rule of imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has
not repudiated the trust. 8nce the resulting trust is repudiated- howeer- it is conerted into a
constructie trust and is sub)ect to prescription.
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following re.uisites concurH a+ the trustee has
performed une.uiocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui )ui trustE b+ such
positie acts of repudiation hae been made Bnown to the cestui )ui trustE and c+ the eidence
thereon is clear and conincing.
In ,ale . !ourt of Appeals- the !ourt categorically ruled that an action for reconeyance
based on an implied or constructie trust must perforce prescribe in ten *1G+ years- and not
otherwise- thereby modifying preious decisions holding that the prescriptie period was four *C+
years.
After all- so long as the trustee recogni(es the trust- the beneficiary may rely upon the
recognition- and ordinarily will not be in fault for omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights.
,here is no running of the prescriptie period if the trustee e5pressly recogni(es the resulting trust.
#ince the complaint for breach of trust was filed by respondent-spouses two *2+ months after
ac.uiring Bnowledge of the sale- the action therefore has not yet prescribed. %DI "aco vs. Co Cho
Chit, .RN 1<6/6, *arch 2/,/332&
A resulting trust is an Iintent-enforcingJ trust- based on a finding by the court that in iew
of the relationship of the parties their acts e5press an intent to hae a trust- een though they did
not use language to that effect. ,he trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties.
%oweer- if the purpose of the payor of the consideration in haing title placed in the name of
another was to eade some rule of the common or statute law- the courts will not assist the payor
in achieing his improper purpose by enforcing a resulting trust for him in accordance with the
Mclean handsM doctrine. ,he court generally refuses to gie aid to claims from rights arising out of
an illegal transaction- such as where the payer could not lawfully taBe title to land in his own name
and he used the grantee as a mere dummy to hold for him and enable him to eade the land laws-
e.g.- an alien who is ineligible to hold title to land- who pays for it and has the title put in the
name of a citi(en %Ramos vs. CA, 424 SCRA 20<&
An action for reconeyance of a parcel of land based on an implied or constructie trust
prescribes in ten years- the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
date of the issuance of the certificate of title oer the property- but this rule applies only when the
plaintiff- or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property- since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property- the right to seeB
reconeyance- which in effect seeBs to .uiet title to the property- does not prescribe. ,he reason
for this is that- one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof-
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacBed before taBing steps to indicate his
right- the reason for the rule being- that his undisturbed possession gies him a continuing right to
seeB the aid of a court of e.uity to ascertain and determine the nature of the aderse claim of a
third party and its effect on his own title- which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. %(!a !e Ca#rera v. CA, 45; SCRA 223&
Credit "ransactions
LOAN) MORT%A%E AND COMMODATUM

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,he chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant@s land simply stood as a security
for the fulfillment of appellant@s obligation coered by the fie promissory notes- and the loss of
the crops did not e5tinguish his obligation to pay- because the account could still be paid from
other sources aside from the mortgaged crops. %Repu#lic vs .rial!o, "E46406, Decem#er 2/, /351&
It was indeed a patent error on the part of the ,rial !ourt to hold the deeds of real estate
mortgage as contracts of guaranty- giing to the mortgagors the benefit of e5cussion. A mortgage is
clearly and completely different from a guaranty.
A real estate mortgage- on the other hand- is a contract embodied in a public instrument
recorded in the >egistry of 7roperty- by which the owner of an immoable *or an alienable real
right imposed upon immoables+ directly and immediately sub)ects it- whoeer the possessor may
be- to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. MIt is a contract in
which the debtor guarantees to the creditor the fulfillment of a principal obligation- sub)ecting for
the faithful compliance therewith a real property in case of nonfulfillment of said obligation at the
time stipulated.M
While both a contract of guaranty *or suretyship+ and one of mortgage hae as their ob)ect
the assurance or guarantee of the performance of a particular principal obligation- in a contract of
guaranty- no property is gien for this purpose at allE reliance is solely placed on the solency or
credit of the guarantor or surety. In a mortgage- howeer- it is property+ immoable or moable-
that is specifically encumbered and sub)ected to that function of assuring or guaranteeing the
satisfaction of that principal obligation. It is the property- rather than the indiidual financial
capacity of the guarantor or surety- that is chiefly relied upon to answer for or guarantee the
payment of the debt. Indeed- the rule is that a third party creating a mortgage oer his property to
guarantee the obligation of a principal debtor- may not be held personally liable for the obligation-
his liability being limited to the alue of the property mortgaged. It is of the essence of contracts
of mortgage that when the principal obligation becomes due- the things in which the pledge or
mortgage consists may be alienated for the payment to the creditor. ,he action or proceeding
against the guarantor or surety is a personal one- and in personam. ,hat against the mortgagor is a
real action- as well as .uasi in rem. %Distileria "imtuaco vs. IAC&
,he Dortgagor and Dortgagee hae no right to waie the posting and publication
re.uirements under Act. =o. 212<. =otices are gien to secure bidders and preent a sacrifice of
the property.

!learly- the statutory re.uirements of posting and publication are mandated- not for
the mortgagor@s benefit- but for the public or third persons.
:acB of republication of notice of foreclosure sale made subse.uently after the original
date renders such sale oid %PN, vs. Nepomuceno Pro!uctions Inc., ..R. No. /230;3 Decem#er 4;,
4664&.
n a 6ont4a6t o2 6o;;odat5;) one o2 t@e 8a4ties delive4s to anot@e4 so;et@in1 not
6ons5;aAle so t@at t@e latte4 ;a< 5se t@e sa;e 2o4 a 6e4tain ti;e and 4et54n it? An essential
2eat54e o2 6o;;odat5; is t@at it is 14at5ito5s? Anot@e4 2eat54e o2 6o;;odat5; is t@at t@e 5se
o2 t@e t@in1 Aelon1in1 to anot@e4 is 2o4 a 6e4tain 8e4iod? T@5s) t@e Aailo4 6annot de;and t@e
4et54n o2 t@e t@in1 loaned 5ntil a2te4 eB8i4ation o2 t@e 8e4iod sti85lated) o4 a2te4
a66o;8lis@;ent o2 t@e 5se 2o4 w@i6@ t@e 6o;;odat5; is 6onstit5ted? 2 t@e Aailo4 s@o5ld
@ave 541ent need o2 t@e t@in1) @e ;a< de;and its 4et54n 2o4 te;8o4a4< 5se? 2 t@e 5se o2 t@e
t@in1 is ;e4el< tole4ated A< t@e Aailo4) @e 6an de;and t@e 4et54n o2 t@e t@in1 at will) in w@i6@
6ase t@e 6ont4a6t5al 4elation is 6alled a 84e6a4i5;? Unde4 t@e Civil Code) 84e6a4i5; is a 9ind
o2 6o;;odat5;? %P!.UAO &s. COUR" OF !PP+!LS 5.R. 6o. 37<8<7 .une 8 /007'
REDEMPTON
After said foreclosure and sale- what remains is the right ested by law in faor of the
,olentinos to redeem the properties within the prescribed period. ,his right of redemption is an
absolute priilege- the e5ercise of which is entirely dependent upon the will and discretion of the
redemptioners. ,here is- thus- no legal obligation to e5ercise the right of redemption.
#hould they choose not to e5ercise it- nobody can compel them to do so nor will such
choice gie rise to a cause of action in faor of the purchaser at the auction sale. In fact- the
relationship between said purchaser and the redemptioners is not een that of creditor and debtor.

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8n the other hand- if the redemptioners choose to e5ercise their right of redemption- it is
the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat the right of redemption. It stands to reason
therefore- that redemptions should be looBed upon with faor and where no in)ury is to follow- a
liberal construction will be gien to our redemption laws as well as to the e5ercise of the right of
redemption.
We are not- by this decision- sanctioning the use of a checB for the payment of obligations
oer the ob)ection of the creditor. What we are saying is that a checB may be used for the e5ercise
of the right of redemption- the same being a right and not an obligation. ,he tender of a checB is
sufficient to compel redemption but is not in itself a payment that reliees the redemptioner from
his liability to pay the redemption price. In other words- while we hold that the priate
respondents properly e5ercised their right or redemption- they remain liable of course- for the
payment of the redemption price. %Bortuna!o vs. CA, .RN ;<11, April 41, /33/&
PLED%E
,he !ourt of Appeals found that the deeds of assignment were contracts of pledge- but- as
the collateral was also money or an e5change of Mpeso for peso-M the proision in Article 2112 of the
!iil !ode for the sale of the thing pledged at public auction to conert it into money to satisfy the
pledgorNs obligation- did not hae to be followed. All that had to be done to conert the pledgorNs
time deposit certificates into cash was to present them to the banB for encashment after due
notice to the debtor.
,he encashment of the deposit certificates was not a pacto commissorio which is prohibited
under Art. 2G33 of the !iil !ode. A pacto commissorio is a proision for the automatic
appropriation of the pledged or mortgaged property by the creditor in payment of the loan upon its
maturity. ,he prohibition against a pacto commissorio is intended to protect the obligor- pledgor-
or mortgagor against being oerreached by his creditor who holds a pledge or mortgage oer
property whose alue is much more than the debt. Where- as in this case- the security for the debt
is also money deposited in a banB- the amount of which is een less than the debt- it was not illegal
for the creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtorsN oerdue obligation- with
the latterNs consent. %'au Chu vs. CA, .RN ;<1/3, Septem#er 45, /3<3&
NTEREST
A mere offer to pay- not accompanied or promptly followed by consignation in court of the
amount tendered but refused by the creditor- is not sufficient to cause cessation of the running of
interest. ,hus- in :lamas s. Abaya- the #upreme !ourt stressed that a written tender of payment
alone- without consignation in court of the sum due- does not suspend the accruing of regular or
monetary interest. %*asantol Rural ,an$, Inc. vs. CA, .RN 3;/24, Decem#er /6, /33/&
When an obligation- not constituting a loan or forbearance of money- is breached- an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the !iscretion of the court at the
rate of 6P per annum. =o interest- howeer- shall be ad)udged on unli.uidated claims or damages
e5cept when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly- where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty- the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made )udicially *Art. 1169- !iil !ode+ but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made- or where the pleadings of the plaintiff in
the trial court did not spell such amounts with certitude- the interest shall begin to run only from
the date the )udgment of the court is made *at which time the .uantification of damages may be
deemed to hae been reasonably ascertained+. ,he actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall- in any case be- on the amount finally ad)udged.
When the )udgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and e5ecutory-
the rate of legal interest- whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2- aboe- shall be
12P per annum from such finality until its satisfaction- this interim period being deemed to be by
then an e.uialent to a forbearance of credit. %Eastern Shipping "ines Inc. v. CA, .RN 3;0/4, Auly
/4, /330&
USURY LA"

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We agree with petitioners that the stipulated rate of interest at <.<P per month on the
7<GG-GGG.GG loan is e5cessie- ini.uitous- unconscionable and e5orbitant. %oweer- we can not
consider the rate MusuriousM because this !ourt has consistently held that !ircular =o. 9G< of the
!entral BanB- adopted on $ecember 22- 1932- has e5pressly remoed the interest ceilings
prescribed by the 9sury :aw and that the 9sury :aw is now Mlegally ine5istentM.
=eertheless- we find the interest at <.<P per month- or 66P per annum- stipulated upon by
the parties in the promissory note ini.uitous or unconscionable- and- hence- contrary to morals
*Mcontra bonos mores-M+ if not against the law. ,he stipulation is oid. ,he courts shall reduce
e.uitably li.uidated damages- whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are ini.uitous
or unconscionable.
!onse.uently- the !A erred in upholding the stipulation of the parties. >ather- we agree
with the trial court that- under the circumstances- interest at 12P per annum- and an additional 1P
a month penalty charge as li.uidated damages may be more reasonable. %*e!el vs. CA, 433 SCRA
0</&
While the 9sury :aw ceiling on interest rates was lifted by !entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G<-
nothing in the said circular grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to leels
which will either enslae their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. %Solangon v.
Sala8ar, .RN 3;0/4, Auly /4, /330&
!entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G<- $ecember 1G- 1932 does not apply to all Binds of obligations
*e.g. from a contract of sale+ and all Binds of monetary )udgment. ,he )udgments
spoBen of and referred to are )udgments in litigation inoling loans or forbearance
of any money- goods or credits- or to cases where money is transferred from one
person to another and the obligation to return the same or a portion thereof is
ad)udged. Any other Bind of monetary )udgments which has nothing to do with nor
inoling loans or forbearance of any money- goods and credits does not fall within
the coerage of the 9sury :aw for it is not within the ambit of the authority
granted by the !entral BanB. ,hus- where the decision sought to be e5ecuted is one
rendered in an action for damages for in)ury to persons or loss of property- the law
applicable is Article 22G9 of the !iil !ode. %Boo! Terminal, Inc. v. CA, 454 SCRA
223&
!entral BanB !ircular =o. 9G< which tooB effect on Lanuary 1- 1932- and remoed the
ceiling on interest rates for secured and unsecured loans - regardless of maturity- cannot be made
to retroactiely apply to a contract e5ecuted earlier while the 9sury :aw was in full force and
effect. It is an elementary rule of contracts that the laws- in force at the time the contract was
made and entered into goern it. A !entral BanB !ircular cannot repeal a law. 8nly a law can
repeal another law. ,hus- retroactie application of a !entral BanB !ircular cannot- and should not-
be presumed. %Birst *etro Investment Corp. vs. Este Del Sol&
ESCALATON CLAUSES
It is now- clear that from Darch 1?- 193G- escalation clauses to be alid should specifically
proideH *I+ that there can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Donetary BoardE
and *2+ in order for such stipulation to be alid- it must include a proision for reduction of the
stipulated interest Uin the eent that the applicable ma5imum rate of interest is reduced by law or
by the Donetary Board.@
'scalation !lauses are not basically wrong or Nlegally ob)ectionable so long as they are not solely
potestatie but based on reasonable and alid grounds. %ere- as clearly demonstrated aboe- riot
only the increases of the interest rates on the basis of the escalation clause patently unreasonable
and unconscionable- but also there are no alid and reasonable standards upon which the increases
are anchored. %Spouses Alme!a vs CA, 415 SCRA 434&
DEPOST
A contract for the rent of safety deposit bo5es is not an ordinary contract of lease of things
but a special Bind of depositE hence- it is not to be strictly goerned by the proisions on deposit.
,he preailing rule in the 9nited #tates is that the relation between a banB renting out safe deposit
bo5es and its customer with respect to the contents of the bo5 is that of bailor and bailee. ,husH

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Where a safe-deposit company leases a safe-deposit bo5 or safe and places therein his securities or
other aluables- the relation of bailee and bailor is created between the parties to the transaction
as to such securities or other aluablesE the fact that the safe-deposit company does not Bnow- and
that it is not e5pected that it shall Bnow- the character or description of the property which is
deposited in such safe-deposit bo5 or safe does not change that relation. ,hat access to such safe-
deposit bo5 can be had only by the use of a Bey retained by the lessee *whether it is the sole Bey or
one to be used in connection with one retained by the lessor+ does not operate to alter the
foregoing rule. %CA AgroEIn!ustrial Devt Corp vs. CA, 4/3 SCRA 045&
%UARANTEE
A 15a4ant< ;a< Ae 1iven to se654e even 25t54e deAts) t@e a;o5nt o2 w@i6@ ;a< not Ae
9nown at t@e ti;e t@e 15a4ant< is eBe65ted? T@is is t@e Aasis 2o4 6ont4a6ts deno;inated as
6ontin5in1 15a4ant< o4 s54et<s@i8? A 6ontin5in1 15a4ant< is one w@i6@ is not li;ited to a sin1le
t4ansa6tion) A5t w@i6@ 6onte;8lates a 25t54e 6o54se o2 dealin1) 6ove4in1H a se4ies o2
t4ansa6tions) 1ene4all< 2o4 an inde2inite ti;e o4 5ntil 4evo9ed? t is 84os8e6tive in its o8e4ation
and is 1ene4all< intended to 84ovide se654it< wit@ 4es8e6t to 25t54e t4ansa6tions wit@in 6e4tain
li;its) and 6onte;8lates a s566ession o2 liaAilities) 2o4 w@i6@) as t@e< a6645e) t@e 15a4anto4
Ae6o;es liaAle? Ot@e4wise stated) a 6ontin5in1 15a4ant< is one w@i6@ 6ove4s all t4ansa6tions)
in6l5din1 t@ose a4isin1 in t@e 25t54e) w@i6@ a4e wit@in t@e des64i8tion o4 6onte;8lation o2 t@e
6ont4a6t o2 15a4ant<) 5ntil t@e eB8i4ation o4 te4;ination t@e4eo2? A 15a4ant< s@all Ae 6onst45ed
as 6ontin5in1 w@en A< t@e te4;s t@e4eo2 it is evident t@at t@e oADe6t is to 1ive a standin1 64edit
to t@e 84in6i8al deAto4 to Ae 5sed 24o; ti;e to ti;e eit@e4 inde2initel< o4 5ntil a 6e4tain
8e4iodH es8e6iall< i2 t@e 4i1@t to 4e6all t@e 15a4ant< is eB84essl< 4ese4ved? $en6e) w@e4e t@e
6ont4a6t states t@at t@e 15a4ant< is to se654e advan6es to Ae ;ade N24o; ti;e to ti;e)N it will
Ae 6onst45ed to Ae a 6ontin5in1 one? %P?-L-PP-6+ ,LOO9-65 9-LLS -6C. &s COUR" OF !PP+!LS
5R 6o. 37/843 OC"O,+R 32 /008'
CONCURRENCE AND PREFERENCE OF CREDTS
,hose proisions may be seen to classify credits against a particular insolent into three
general categories- namelyH
*a+ #pecial preferred credits listed in Articles 22C1 and 22C2-
*b+ 8rdinary preferred credits listed in Article 22CCE and
*c+ !ommon credits under Article 22C<.
,urning first to special preferred credits under Articles 22C1 and 22C2- it should be noted at
once that these credits constitute liens or encumbrances on the specific moable or immoable
property to which they relate. Article 22C2 maBes clear that these credits Mshall be considered as
mortgages or pledges of real or personal property- or liens within the puriew of legal proisions
goerning insolency.M It should be emphasi(ed in this connection that Mduties- ta5es and fees due
1on specific moable property of the insolent4 to the #tate or any subdiision thereofM *Article
22C1 114+ and Mta5es due upon the 1insolentNs4 land or building *22C2 114+M stand first in preference
in respect of the particular moable or immoable property to which the ta5 liens hae attached.
Article 22C2 is .uite e5plicitH M1,4a5es mentioned in number 1- Article 22C1 and number 1- Article
22C2 shall first be satisfiedM ,he claims listed in numbers 2 to 12 in Article 22C1 and in numbers 2 to
1G in Articles 22C2- all come after ta5es in order of precedenceE such claims en)oy their priileged
character as liens and may be paid only to the e5tent that ta5es hae been paid from the proceeds
of the specific property inoled *or from any other sources+ and only in respect of the remaining
balance of such proceeds. What is more- these other *non-ta5+ credits- although constituting liens
attaching to particular property- are not preferred one oer another inter se. 7roided ta5 liens
shall hae been satisfied- non-ta5 liens or special preferred credits which subsist in respect of
specific moable or immoable property are to be treated on an e.ual basis and to be satisfied
concurrently and proportionately. 7ut succinctly- Articles 22C1 and 22C2 )ointly with Articles 22C6
to 22C9 establish a two-tier order of preference. ,he first tier includes only ta5es- duties and fees
due on specific moable or immoable property. All other special preferred credits stand on the
same second tier to be satisfied- pari passu and pro rateE out of any residual alue of the specific
property to which such other credits relate.

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!redits which are specially preferred because they constitute liens *ta5 or non-ta5+ in turn-
taBe precedence oer ordinary preferred credits so far as concerns the property to which the liens
hae attached. ,he specially preferred credits must be discharged first out of the proceeds of the
property to which they relate- before ordinary preferred creditors may lay claim to any part of such
proceeds- the alue of the specific property inoled is greater than the sum total of the ta5 liens
and other specially preferred credits- the residual alue will form part of the Mfree propertyM of the
insolent-i.e.- property not impressed with liens by operation of Articles 22C1 and 22C2. if- on the
other hand- the alue of the specific moable or immoable is less than the aggregate of the ta5
liens and other specially preferred credits- the unsatisfied balance of the ta5 liens and other such
credits are to be treated as ordinary credits under Article 22CC and to be paid in the order of
preference there set up.
In contrast with Articles 22C1 and 22C2- Article 22CC creates no liens on determinate
property which follow such property. What Article 22CC creates are simply rights in faor of certain
creditors to hae the cash and other assets of the insolent applied in a certain se.uence or order
of priority.
8nly in respect of the insolentNs Mfree propertyM is an order of priority established by
Article 22CC. In this se.uence- certain ta5es and assessments also figure but these do not hae the
same Bind of oerriding preference that Articles 22C1 =o. 1 and 22C2 =o. 1 create for ta5es which
constitutes liens on the ta5payerNs property. %Repu#lic vs. Peralta, /16 SCRA 2;&
"orts and #amages
NE%L%ENCE
In order that there may be recoery for an in)ury- howeer- it must be shown that the
in)ury for which recoery is sought must be the legitimate conse.uence of the wrong doneE the
connection between the negligence and the in)ury must be a direct and natural se.uence of eents-
unbroBen by interening efficient causes. In other words- the negligence must be the pro5imate
cause of the in)ury. "or- negligence- no matter in what it consists- cannot create a right of action
unless fit is the pro5imate cause of the in)ury complained of. And the pro5imate cause of an in)ury
is that cause- which- in natural and continuous se.uence- unbroBen by any efficient interening
cause- produces the in)ury- and without which the result would not hae occurred. %St. *aryIs
Aca!emy vs. Carpitanos ..R. No. /02252&
ATTRACT!E NUSANCE
,he attractie nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water- artificial as
well as natural- in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other that the mere
water and its location.
,he reason why a swimming pool or pond or reseroir of water is not considered an
attractie nuisance is thatE I=ature has created streams- laBes and pools which attract children.
:urBing in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early
instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to Bnow the dangerE and if the owner of priate
property creates an artificial pool on his own property- merely duplicating the worB of nature
without adding any new danger- he is not liable because of haing created an attractie nuisance.J
%-i!algo Enterprises, Inc. vs. ,alan!an 3/ Phil 0<<&
EMER%ENCY RULE
9nder the Jemergency ruleK adopted by this court- an indiidual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is re.uired to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to aoid the impending danger- is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertaBe what subse.uently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution- unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
In this )urisdiction- contributory negligence of the plaintiff merely results in mitigation of
liability. 9nder this rule- contributory negligence is defined as conduct on the part oft the in)ured
party- contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered- which falls below the standard to
which he is re.uired to conform for his own protection.

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While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflectie thought or the
opportunity to ade.uately weigh a threatening situation is absent- the conduct which is re.uired of
an indiidual in such cases is dictated not e5clusiely by the suddenness of the eent which
absolutely negates throughful care- but by the oer-all nature of the circumstances %(alen8uela vs.
CA 412 SCRA 262&
SPECAL RULES
#ince negligence may be a felony and a .uasi delict and re.uired discernment as a
condition of liability- either criminal or ciil- a child under nine years of age is by analogy-
conclusiely presumed to be incapable of negligenceE and that the presumption of lacB of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child oer nine but under fifteen years of
age is rebuttable one- under our law. ,he rule therefore is that a child under nine years if age must
be conclusiely presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. *Larco DBtg !orp
et al s. !A- ;>= 129?92- $ecember 21- 1999+
,he law fi5ed no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to hae the necessary capacity
to understand and appreciate the nature and conse.uences of his own acts- so as to maBe it
negligence on his part to fail to e5ercise with due care and precaution in the commission of such
actsE and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do- for in the ery nature
of things the .uestion of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand
the character of his own acts and their conse.uencesE and the age at which a minor can be said to
hae such ability will necessarily ary in accordance with the arying nature of the infinite ariety
of acts which may be done by him. %Taylor vs. *anila Electric Railroa! an! "ight Co. /5 Phil <&
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things re.uiring professional
sBill- he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to e5hibit the care and sBill of one ordinarily
sBilled in the particular worB which he attempts to do. %Cullion Ice Bish An! Electric Co. vs. Phil
*otors Corp 11 Phil /43&
AFFRMAT!E DUTES AND MSCELLANEOUS ACT!TES
$octors are protected by a special rule of law. ,hey are not guarantors of care. ,hey do
not een warrant a good result. ,hey are not insurers against mishaps or unusual conse.uences.
"urthermore- they are not liable for honest mistaBes of )udgment.
Whether of not a physician has committed an Iine5cusable lacB o precautionJ in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care obsered by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
adanced state of the profession at the time of treatment of the present state of medical science.
%Dr. Ninevetch Cru8 vs. CA 4<4 SCRA /<<&
9nder the captain of the ship doctrine- the surgeon is liBed to a ship captain who must not
only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the essel. ,he head
surgeon is made responsible for eerything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating
room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are
under his physical control but also those wherein he has e5tension of control. %Ramos vs. CA ..R.
No. /40210, Decem#er 43, /333&
,here is no employer-employee relationship between $:#D! and $rs. ;utierre( and %osaBa
which would hold $:#D! solidarily liable for the in)ury suffered by petitioner 'rlinda under Article
213G of the !iil !ode because of the following reasonsH 1+ a hospital does not hire or engage the
serices of a consultant- but rather- accredits the latter and grants him or her the priilege of
maintaining a clinic andFor admitting patients in the hospital upon a showing by the consultant that
he or she possesses the necessary .ualifications- such as accreditation by the appropriate board-
eidence of fellowship and referencesE 2+ it is not the hospital but the patient who pays the
consultant@s fee for serices rendered by the latteE 2+ a hospital does not dismiss a consultant-
instead- the latter may lose his or her accreditation or priileges granted by the hospitalE and C+

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when a doctor refers a patient for admission in a hospital- it is the doctor who prescribes the
treatment to be gien to said patient.
,he contract between the consultant an! the patient is separate and distinct the contract
between the hospital an! the patient. ,he first has for its ob)ect the rendition of medical serices
by the consultant to the patient- while the secon! concerns the proision by the hospital of
facilities and serices by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper
treatment of the patient. *Ramos vs. CA .R No /40210, April //, 4664+
,he general principle is that the iolation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an in)ury by the interention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident- in
the manner in which it happened- was the ery thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to preent. ,o consider the iolation of the ordinance as the pro5imate cause of the in)ury does
not portray the situation in its true perspectieE it would be more accurate to say that the
oercrowding at the stairway was the pro5imate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to preent by re.uiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. %*erce!es *.
Teague vs. Elena Bernan!e8 1/ SCRA /</&
DOCTRNE OF RES PSA LOQUTUR
Where the thing which caused the in)ury complained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his serants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who hae its management or control use proper care- it affords
reasonable eidence- in absence of e5planation by defendant- accident arose from want of care
*$octrine of >es Ipsa :o.uitur+. %Africa vs. CalteF, "E/43<5, *arch 2/, /355&
,he defendant@s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the
re.uisites for the application of res ipsa lo.uitur. 8nce the plaintiff maBes out a prima facie case
of all the elements- the burden then shifts to defendant to e5plain. ,he presumption may be
rebutted or oercome by other eidence and- under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption- such as that of due care or innocence- may outweigh the inference. It is not for the
defendant to e5plain or proe its defense to preent the presumption or inference fro arising.
'idence by the defendant of say- due care- comes into play only after the circumstances for the
application of the doctrine has been established. %D.*. Consuni, Inc. vs. CA ..R. No. /2;<;2, April
46, 466/&
,he doctrine of res ipsa lo.uitur is not applicable if there is direct proof of absence or
presence of negligence. As early as 191G- the #upreme !ourt already e5plained that the doctrine
merely creates a prima facie case- and applies only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something inoBed in faor of the plaintiff
in the absence of proof. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstance under
which the in)ury occurred- the creatie reason for the doctrine disappears. %S.D. *artine8, et al.
vs. ?illiam (an ,us$ir$ ..R. No. "E153/&
DOCTRNE OF LAST CLEAR C$ANCE
,he doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude a recoery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter- by
e5ercising reasonable care and prudence- might hae aoided in)urious conse.uences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. ,he doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant- who had the last fair chance to aoid
the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the conse.uences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. %Pantranco North EFpress vs. ,aesa citing
Dng vs. *etropolitan ?ater District an! Picart vs. Smith&
!CAROUS LA0LTY
,he ciil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children liing with
them- may be seen to be based upon the parental authority ested by the !iil !ode upon such
parents. ,he ciil law assumes that when a minor liing with its parents commits a tortuous act-
the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to superise

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the child who is in their custody and control. 7arental liability is in other words- anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. ,he parental dereliction is- of course- only presumed and the
presumption can be oerturned under Article 213G of the !iil !ode by proof that the parents had
e5ercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to preent the damage. %*acario Tamargo
vs. CA 463 SCRA 1/<&
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student ob)ectie- in the e5ercise of a legitimate student right- and een in the
en)oyment of a legitimate student priilege- the responsibility of the school authorities oer the
student continues. Indeed- een if the student should be doing nothing more than rela5ing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and en)oying the ambience and atmosphere of
the school- he is still within the custody and sub)ect to the discipline of school authorities under
the proision of Article 213G. %Ama!ora vs. court of Appeals, /56 SCRA 4;0&
It had been stressed that Article 213G plainly proides that the damage should hae been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students or the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. %oweer- this material situation does not
e5ist in the present case for- as earlier indicated- the assailants of !arlitos were not students of the
7#BA- for whose acts the school could be made liable. %Philippine School of ,usiness
A!ministration vs. CA, 461 SCRA ;43&
DOCTRNE OF RESPONDEAT SUPEROR
,he case at bar is clearly within the coerage of Articles 21?6 and 21??- in relation to
Article 213G- of the !iil !ode proisions on .uasi-delicts.
,he responsibility imposed by this article arises by irtue of a presumption )uris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article- deried from their failure
to e5ercise due care and igilance oer the acts of subordinates to preent them from causing
damage. =egligence is imputed to them by law- unless they proe the contrary. ,hus- the last
paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if it is proed that the persons who
might be held responsible under it e5ercised the diligence of a good father of a family
*diligentissimi patris familias+ to preent damage. It is clear- therefore- that is it not
representation- nor interest- nor een the necessity of haing somebody else answer for the
damages caused by the persons deoid of personality- but it is the non-performance of certain
duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by ciil bond
uniting the actor to them- which forms the foundation of such responsibility.
,he aboe rule is- of course- applicable only where there is employer-employee
relationship- although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry- the employer under Article 213G is liable for
torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasBs. But- it is necessary first
to establish the employment relationship. 8nce this is done- the plaintiff must show- to hold the
employer liable that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned tasB when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant- as employer- may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and superision of employees.
,he diligence of a good father of a family re.uired to be obsered by employers to preent
damages under Article 213G refers to due diligence in the selection and superision of employees in
order to protect the public. %*etro *anila Transit Corp. vs. Court of Appeals .R. ND. //55/;,
Novem#er /5, /33<&
,he responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of
their duties is primary- that is- the in)ured party may recoer from the employers directly-
regardless of the solency of their employees.
'mployers may be relieed of responsibility of the negligent acts of their employees within
the scope of their assigned tasBs only if they can show that Ithey obsere all the diligence of a
good father of a family to preent damage.J "or this purpose- they hae the burden of proing
that they hae indeed e5ercised such diligence- both in the selection of the employee who
committed the .uasi-delict and in the superision of the performance of his duties. In the

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selection of prospectie employees- employers are re.uired to e5amine them as to their
.ualifications- e5perience- and serice records. 8n the other hand- with respect to the superision
of employees- employers should formulate standard operating procedures- monitor their
implementation- and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. %*etro *anila Transit
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals .R. ND. //55/;, Novem#er /5, /33<&
,he liability imposed by Art. 213G arises by irtue of a presumption )uris tantum of
nerligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder- deried from their failure to
e5ercise due care and igilance oer the acts of subordinates to preent them from causing
damage. Article 213G is hardly applicable in the case under consideration because the priate
respondent being engaged in rent-a-car business was only the o@ner of the car leased to its client.
As such- there was no iculum )uris between them as employer and employee. %B.> Insurance
Corporation vs. CA ..R. No. //<<<3, *arch 42, /33<&
In an action based on .uasi delict- the registered owner of a motor ehicle is solidarily liable
for the in)uries and damages caused by the negligence of the drier- in spite of the fact hat
the ehicle may hae already been the sub)ect of an unregistered $eed of #ale in faor the
another person. 9nless registered with the :and ,ransportation 8ffice- the sale / while alid
and binding between the parties / does not affect third parties- especially the ictims of
accidents inoling the said transport e.uipment? %E)uita#le "easing Corporation vs. Suyom
..R. No. /02256&
,he main aim of motor ehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens- or that any damage or in)ury is caused by the ehicle on the public highways-
responsibility therefore can be fi5ed on a definite indiidual- the registered owner.
,he registered owner is not allowed by law to proe the real owner of the ehicle. Were a
registered owner allowed to eade responsibility by proing who the supposed transferee or owner
is- it would be easy for him- by collusion with others or otherwise- to escape said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person- or to the one who possesses no property with which to
respond financially for the damage or in)ury done. %,A Binance Corporation vs. CA, ..R. No. 3<4;1,
Novem#er /2, /334&
#amages
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMA%ES
In computing the award for loss of income- only net earnings- not gross earnings- are to be
consideredE that is- the total of the earnings less e5penses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income- less liing and other incidental e5penses. When there is no showing that the
liing e5penses constituted a smaller percentage of the gross income- we fi5 the liing e5penses at
half of the gross income.
,he life e5pectancy should not be based on the retirement age of goernment employees-
which is pegged at 6<. In calculating the life e5pectancy of an indiidual for the purposes of
determining loss of earning capacity under Article 22G6*1+ of the !iil !ode- it is assumed that the
deceased would hae earned income een after retirement from a particular )ob. %Smith ,ell
Do!@ell Shipping Agency Corp. vs. ,ora, .RN /0266<, Aune /6, 4664&
LOSS OF PROFTS
When it is shown that a plaintiff@s business is a going concern with a fairly steady aerage
profit on the inestment- it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business through
defendant@s wrongful act not occurred- it would hae continued producing this aerage income Iso
long as is usual with the things of that nature.J When in addition to the preious aerage income of
the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of the business are immediately after
the cause of the interruption has been remoed- there can be no manner of doubt that a loss of
profit has resulted from the wrongful act of the defendant.
7rofits are not e5cluded from recoery because they are profitsE but when e5cluded- it is
on the ground that there are no criteria by which to estimate the amount with certainty on which

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the ad)udications of courts- and the findings of )uries should be based. %Algarra vs. San!eas, 4;
Phil. 4<0 citing ,righam vs. Carlisle&
NOMNAL DAMA%ES
=ominal damages cannot co-e5ist with actual or compensatory damages. %Armovit vs. Court
of Appeals, /<0 SCR 0;5&
TEMPERATE DAMA%ES
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are
those suffered by him as he has duly proed.
8ur rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation- the in)ury suffered as a conse.uence of an act of negligence has been completed and
that the cost can be li.uidated. %oweer- these proisions neglect to taBe into account those
situations- as in this case- where the resulting in)ury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the in)ury- while certain to occur- are difficult to predict.
In these cases- the amount of damages which should be awarded- if they are to ade.uately
and correctly respond to the in)ury caused- should be one which compensates for pecuniary loss
incurred and proed- up to the time of trialE and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be
suffered but which could not- from the nature of the case- be made with certainty. In other words-
temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the in)ury is chronic and continuing. And because of the uni.ue nature of such
cases- no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are proided for. ,he
reason is that these damages coer two distinct phases.
As it would not be e.uitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration
of )ustice - for the ictim in such cases to constantly come before the courts and inoBe their aid in
seeBing ad)ustments to the compensatory damages preiously awarded - temperate damages are
appropriate. ,he amount gien as temperate damages- though to a certain e5tent speculatie-
should taBe into account the cost of proper care %Ramos vs. CA, .R No. /40210 Decem#er 43,
/333&.
9CD*PI"ED ,'L ATT'. CIRIACD CR>=:
FRAUD
A title issued pursuant to a patent under administratie proceeding is as indefeasible as a
title secured in a )udicial proceeding. But een after the lapse of one year from the issuance of the
patent- the goernment may still initiate an action for reersion of the land to the public domain if
the land is titled through fraud or misrepresentation as when the applicant stated that the sub)ect
land is e5clusiely possessed by him when in truth it oerlaps the land of an ad)acent owner.
%Repu#lic of the Philippines vs. CA an! -eirs of ,ullongan, 411 SCRA 221&.
;enerally- a forged deed is oid but it can be the root of a alid title if registered in the
name of the forger then transferred to an innocent purchaser for alue absent any showing that the
buyer had any part in the anomaly. %ence- the rights of the innocent purchaser for alue must be
respected. ,he proper recourse of the true owner is to bring an action for damages against the
party who caused the fraud. %E!uarte vs. CA, 412 SCRA 23/&.
A party depried of his land by confirmation of title through actual fraud may seeB for
reopening of a decree of registration within one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. Before the e5piration of the one-year period from the entry of the decree- the court
retains control of the decision which- after hearing and actual fraud was proed to e5ist- may
ad)udicate the land to any party entitled thereto. %-eirs of *anuel RoFas an! Trini!a! De "eon vs.
CA, 4;6 SCRA 263&.

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Actual fraud or e5trinsic fraud proceeds from the intentional deception produced by means
of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. '5trinsic fraud preents the party from
presenting his entire case to the court. %-eirs of *anuel RoFas an! Trini!a! De "eon vs. CA, 4;6
SCRA 263&.
"raud is e5trinsic or collateral where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case
the effect of which preents a party from haing a trial- a real contest or from presenting his case
to the court- or where it operates upon matters pertaining- not to the )udgment itself- but to the
manner in which it was procured so that there is no fair submission of the controersy.
Accordingly- use of forged document or per)ured witness are not e5trinsic fraud as it does not
preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. %Strait Times, Inc. vs. CA, 430 SCRA
;/0&.
!onstructie trust is created in e.uity in order to preent un)ust enrichment. ,hus- one
who- by fraud- duress or abuse of confidence- obtains or holds the legal right to property which he
ought not- in e.uity and good conscience- so hold has no alid title to said property and therefore
cannot dispose of the same. %ence- a widower who ad)udicates the entire con)ugal property to
himself holds the childrenNs share in the property in trust. %*ar)ue8 vs. CA, 266 SCRA 512&.
A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud. Any false statement in
the application for a land patent shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the same een after
the lapse of one year from issuance of said patent pursuant to #ection 1G1 of the 7ublic :and Act
wherein an action may be undertaBen for the reersion of the land to the public domain.
%Brancisco ,aguio vs. Repu#lic, et al., 26/ SCRA 016&.
%OOD FAT$H NNOCENT PURC$ASER FOR !ALUE
8ne who deals with property coered by the ,orrens system of registration need not go
beyond the title to determine the condition of the property. %"egar!a vs. CA, 4<6 SCRA 504&.
A person dealing with registered land has the right to rely on the ,orrens certificate of title
without the need of in.uiring further. %ence- a purchaser who buys property without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full fair price for the
property is a buyer in good faith. %San!oval vs. CA, 456 SCRA 4<2&.
A person in good faith and for alue is defined as one who buys property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to- or interest in- such property and pays a full and fair
price of the time of the purchase or before he has notice that other person has a right to- or
interest in- the property. As a rule- he who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for
alue has the burden of proing said assertion. As is the common practice in the real estate
industry- an ocular inspection of the premises is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser
usually taBes and should he find out that the land is occupied by anybody else other than the seller
who is not in actual possession- it is incumbent upon the purchaser to erify the e5tent of the
occupantsN possessory rights. %Spouses Sonya *athay an! Ismael *athay, Ar. vs. CA, 431 SCRA 215&.
An >,! court sitting as a land registration court may determine the alidity of an aderse
claim. 7urchaser in good faith and for alue is one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for
the same on the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property. %.SIS vs. CA, 406 SCRA ;2;&.
O"NERS$P = POSSESSON
An action for reconeyance of a parcel of land based on constructie or implied trust
prescribes in 1G years recBoned from the issuance of title or date of registration. ,his rule applies
only when plaintiff or party enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property- but if he is in
possession thereof- the right to seeB reconeyance- which in effect is an action to .uiet title- does
not prescribe. %Ca#rera vs. CA an! Belicio, et al., 45; SCRA 223&.

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A partyNs failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to another partyNs possession
of a parcel of land in a span of 2G years is contrary to his claim of ownership. %-eirs of Teo!oro
Dela Cru8 vs. CA, et al., 43< SCRA /;4&.
,orrens system does not est title because it is not recogni(ed as a mode of ac.uiring
ownership. While registered land under the system maBes the title thereto imprescriptible- the
same may be lost by laches caused by a partyNs inaction or passiity in asserting his rights oer the
disputed property. %Santiago vs. CA, 4;< SCRA <62&.
,a5 declaration and ta5 receipts become strong eidence of ownership ac.uired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. %Dclarit vs. CA, 422 SCRA 23&.
PU0LC LANDS
A title may be confirmed under #ection C3 of the 7ublic :and Act *7:A+ only if it pertains to
alienable lands of the public domain but unless such assets are reclassified and considered
disposable and alienable- occupation thereof in the concept of owner- no matter how long- cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A was clarified by 7$ 1G?2
that said section applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. %De Dcampo
vs. Arlos, 202 SCRA ;/5&
#ales patents fraudulently obtained are inalid and the #tate should initiate the suit to
recoer the property thru the #olicitor ;eneral and not by a supposedly aggrieed party who has no
personality to initiate such litigation. %De Dcampo vs. Arlos, 202 SCRA ;/5&
,he >egalian $octrine which forms part of our land laws is a reered and long standing
principle. It must howeer be applied together with the constitutional proision on social )ustice
and land reform- and must be interpreted in a way as to aoid manifest unfairness and in)ustice.
But when the land of public domain is in danger of ruthless e5ploitation- fraudulent titling or other
.uestionable practice- a strict application of the law is warranted. %Director of "an!s vs. Buntilar,
/04 SCRA 1;&
>ules on confirmation of title do not apply unless the land classified as forest is released in
an official proclamation by the '5ecutie branch of the goernment. %ence- possession of forest
lands no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership. %-eirs of Amunategui vs. Director of
Borestry, /45 SCRA 53&
>A 32?1 Bnown as Indigenous 7eoples@ >ights Act *I7>A+ that grants to indigenous cultural
communities the ownership of ancestral lands and domains held by them under natie title are
undisputably presumed priate lands because they hae been held that way since before the
#panish con.uest or as far as memory reaches. ,he #tate by recogni(ing the right of tribal "ilipinos
to their ancestral lands and domains has effectiely upheld their right to lie in a culture distinctly
their own as enunciated in Article III of the !onstitution- hence- the I7>A :aw is in consonance with
and not iolatie of the !onstitution. %Cru8 vs. Sec. of DENR, et al., 20; SCRA /4<&
If public land was titled but turned out to be forest land instead of agricultural land- the
one year period to file a reiew of the decree does not apply. 8n the contrary- the land may reert
to the public domain upon petition of the #olicitor ;eneral. %Repu#lic vs. CA an! -eirs of Ri#aya,
41< SCRA 442&.
Absent any publication in any newspaper of general circulation- the land registration court
cannot alidly confirm and register the title of the applicant. 7ublication of the notice of initial
hearing in the 8fficial ;a(ette is not enough to confer )urisdiction to the court because the law
re.uires publication also in a newspaper. ,he word MshallM denotes an imperatie and thus
indicates the mandatory character of the statute that publication shall be in the 8fficial ;a(ette
and a newspaper of general circulation. %Director of "an!s vs. CA, 4;5 SCRA 4;5&.
Pe4iods 4e:5i4ed in 8ossession and o6658ation o2 85Ali6 land to :5ali2< as 6lai;ant#

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#ection C3*b+ of the 7:A - $ecember 1- 1926 - those who by themseles or through their
predecessors-in-interest hae been in open- continuous- e5clusie and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ac.uisition of
ownership e5cept as against the goernment since Luly 26- 139C.
>A 19C2 - Lune 22- 19<? - amended #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A by prescribing open-
continuous- e5clusie and notorious possession and occupation for at least 2G years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title.
7$ 1G?2 - Lanuary 22- 19?? - amended further #ection C3*b+ of the 7:A by stating that
these proisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which hae
been in open- continuous- e5clusie and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ac.uisition of ownership
since Lune 12- 19C<. *#ee also #ection 1C of 7$ 1<29+
Accordingly- the period of 2G years of open- continuous- e5clusie and notorious possession
and occupation would not suffice to confer title to a settler- particularly so when the 7resident
reseres said public land for a public purpose. %Repu#lic Dpol National Secon!ary Technical School
vs. Nicanor Dol!ol, 431 SCRA 213&.
"oreshore lands or submerged areas which may be reclaimed under >A 1399 by local
goernments are part of the public domain which could only be sub)ect of reclamation by the
national goernment under 7$ 2-A. ,he authority granted to local goernments to undertaBe
reclamation pro)ects was a mere grant by the soereign which- in the e5ercise of police power-
may be withdrawn as shown in 7$ 2-A. *>epublic s. !A and 7asay !ity- et al. *!ultural !enter+-
299 #!>A 199+.
9nder #ection 1G1 of the 7:A- an action for reersion to the public domain of land
fraudulently titled may be initiated een after the lapse of one year as said action is not barred by
prescription. %Brancisco ,aguio vs. Repu#lic, et al., 26/ SCRA 016&.
,he goernmentNs prolonged inaction for 2G years whereby it failed to correct and recoer
the increased area in the land of a priate party militates against its cause as it is tantamount to
laches which is the failure or neglect for unreasonable length of time to do that which by e5ercising
due diligence could hae been done earlier. While the general rule is that the #tate cannot be put
in estoppel by the mistaBes and errors of its officials and its agents- this is sub)ect to e5ception if it
would operate to defeat the effectie operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. ,he
goernment must not be allowed to deal dishonorably with its citi(ens and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing. %Repu#lic vs. CA an! St. Au!e Enterprises, 26/ SCRA 2&.
DECREE OF RE%STRATON
As long as a final decree has not been entered by the :>A and the period of one year has
not yet elapsed from the date of entry of such decree the title is not finally ad)udicated and the
decision of the court in the registration proceedings continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it. %Ramos vs Ro!rigue8, 400 SCRA 0/<&.
When the court decision has become final and the court directs the :>A to issue a decree of
registration- the :>A is not legally obligated to follow the courtNs order when the land sought to be
registered is discoered to hae been already decreed and titled in the name of another. %Ramos vs
Ro!rigue8, 400 SCRA 0/<&.
CERTFCATE OF TTLE
A title oer registered land cannot be defeated een by aderse- open and notorious
possession nor prescriptionE neither could ownership be proen thru ta5 payment receipts or ta5
declarations as they are not conclusie eidence of ownership. %Cervantes vs. CA an! Brancisco,
214 SCRA 0;&
Indefeasibility of title does not attach to a ,orrens title secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. %,aguio vs. Repu#lic, 26/ SCRA 016&

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,he issue of alidity of title- i.e. whether or not it was fraudulently issued can only be
raised in an action e5pressly initiated for that purpose. 8therwise stated- a collateral attacB
impugning the alidity of the title in a suit for recoery of ownership is an indirect challenge to the
final )udgment and decree of registration. %(illanueva vs. CA an! Santiago, 21/ SCRA /4&
,itle once registered under the ,orrens system should not thereafter be altered- changed-
modified or diminished e5cept in a direct proceeding permitted by law as proided in #ection C3 of
7$ 1<29 disallowing collateral attacB of a ,orrens title. %Seville vs. NatIl DevIt Co., 21/ SCRA //4&
,orrens title ac.uires the character of indefeasibility one year from the entry of the decree
of registration. %ence- een if the decision of the land registration court has reached finality- the
court still retains control and may alter or modify the same if the decree of registration has not
been issued by the :>A. %Divina vs. CA, et al., 214 SCRA 14;&
>eal purpose of ,orrens system of registration is to .uiet title to land and put a stop to any
.uestion of legality of title e5cept claims which hae been recorded in the certificate of title at the
time of registration. 'ery registered owner and eery subse.uent purchaser for alue in good
faith holds title to land free from all encumbrances- e5cept those proided by law. %ence- a
registered owner who e5ecuted a deed of sale in faor of another without any consideration
*e5cept their common-law relationship+ and caused the registration of said coneyance alidly
transmits the property which can be coneyed to an innocent purchaser for alue. %.loria Cru8 vs.
CA an! Romy Su8ara, 4</ SCRA 034&.
Where 2 certificates of title purport to coer the same land- the certificate bearing the
earlier date preails. %ence- in cases where two certificates coer the same land- a certificate of
title is not conclusie eidence of title if it is shown that the land had already been registered and
an earlier certificate is in e5istence. %*?SS vs. CA, 4/1 SCRA ;<2&.
!ertificate of title merely confirms or records the title already e5isting and ested. ,hey
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner nor can they be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud nor to permit one to enrich himself at the e5pense of another. %ence- one
who loses his property and reiew of decree is no longer aailable- the e.uitable remedy of
reconeyance may be resorted to. %Es)uivas vs. CA, 4;4 SCRA <62&.
A land registration proceeding is in rem and therefore a decree of registration issued
thereafter is binding upon and conclusie against all persons including the goernment. A decree of
registration that has become final shall be conclusie not only on .uestions actually contested and
determined but also upon all matters that ought to be litigated or decided in land registration
proceedings. %Teofilo Cacho vs. CA, 453 SCRA 213&.
A certificate of title is not conclusie eidence of title if it is shown that the same land had
already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in e5istence. Where two titles
hae been issued on different dates to two different persons for the same parcel of land- een if
both are presumed to be titleholders in good faith- it does not necessarily follow that he who holds
the earlier title should preail. Assuming that there was regularity in registration leading to the
issuance of title- the better approach is to trace the original certificate from which the certificates
of title in dispute were deried. #hould there be one common original title- the transfer certificate
issued on an earlier date along the line must preail absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the
process of registration. %Spouses Sonya *athay an! Ismael *athay, Ar. vs. CA, 431 SCRA 215&.
'ery person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. ,hus- all the property of the
marriage are presumed to belong to the con)ugal partnership unless it be proed that it pertains
e5clusiely to the husband or wife. %-eirs of the Spouses ,enito .anico vs. CA, 4</ SCRA 031&.
When the certificate of title is issued in the name of the original buyer on installment who
died before completion of payment- the heirs who continued the installment payments may inoBe
#ection 1G3 of 7$ 1<29 to correct the error and hae the land registered in their names. %Ernesto

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Da@son, et al., vs. Register of Dee!s of Gue8on City an! RTC, GC, 431 SCRA ;22, citing the case of
Cru8 vs. Tan, 32 Phil 20<&.
LAC$ES
:aches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and une5plained length of time to do
that which by e5ercising due diligence could or should hae been done earlier or negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time- warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or has declined to assert it. %*argolles vs. CA, 426
SCRA 3;&.
AD!ERSE CLAM
,he purpose of the annotation of aderse claim is to protect the interest of a person oer
real property where the registration of such right or interest is not otherwise proided under the
,orrens system. Dere registration of aderse interest does not maBe such claim alid nor is it
permanent in character because )udicial determination of the issue of ownership is still necessary.
%.ar#in vs. CA, 412 SCRA /<;&.
While the law states that the aderse claim is effectie within 2G days- the annotation
thereof remains and cancellation is necessary- otherwise the inscription will continue as a lien on
the title. ,o limit to 2G days the effectiity of an aderse claim will defeat the ery purpose for
which the law proides for the remedy of inscription of the aderse claim. %ence- a sheriffNs ley on
property already coered by an aderse claim is considered subserient to said claim. %Saonas vs.
CA, 416 SCRA ;2;&.
A court sitting as a land registration court may determine the alidity of an aderse claim
and- if found to be inalid- order the cancellation of said aderse claim. %.SIS vs. CA, 406 SCRA
;2;&.
A notice of aderse claim annotated on the title of a registered owner remains alid een
after the lapse of thirty *2G+ days. As long as no petition for its cancellation has been filed- the
notice of aderse claim remains. A hearing must first be conducted wherein the parties are gien
the opportunity to proe the propriety or impropriety of the aderse claim. %ence- the
cancellation automatically being done by the >egister of $eeds after the lapse of 2G days from
registration is improper. %Rogelio Duarte vs. CA, et al., 43< SCRA 2<<&.
LS PENDENS
8nce annotated upon the original copy of the title- the notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation sering as a
warning that one who ac.uires an interest oer said property does so at his own risB. %'u vs. CA,
41/ SCRA 163&.
,he notice of lis pendens is but an incident in an action. It does not affect the merits
thereof. It is intended merely to constructiely adice or warn all people who deal with the
property that they deal with it at their own risB and whateer rights they may ac.uire in the
property are sub)ect to the result of the action. %-eirs of *aria *arasigan vs. IAC, /14 SCRA 412&.
RECONSTTUTON
>econstitution of lost or destroyed certificates in the office of the >$ can be done only thru
)udicial proceedings. =otice of hearings shall be sent to the >$ and the :> !ommissioner.
When it is conceded that some deficiencies e5ist in the formal re.uisites for the issuance of
a transfer certificate of title coering a parcel of land with an increased or e5panded area- and
where the >egister of $eeds noting such facts has recommended the cancellation of the certificate
of title pursuant to :>! !ircular =o. 16?- there is a serious or substantial controersy as to the
ownership of the e5panded area. ,his Bind of controersy can only be heard in the e5ercise of the
courts@ general )urisdiction- the proper remedy would be a petition for declaratory relief under
#ection 6C of the >ules of !ourt. %Santos vs. A)uino, .R No. 24303, Nov. 4<, /3<6&.

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In reconstitution of allegedly lost certificate of title- greatest caution must be e5ercised in
acting on such petitions- especially when it is filed after an ine5plicable delay of 2< years. It is
mandatory thatH
Aside from publication- actual and personal notice be duly sered to indispensable parties-
i.e. the actual owners and possessors of the land inoledE
,he land has in fact been preiously registered under Act C96 but the corresponding
certificate of title has been lost or destroyed. In other words- the title is no longer subsisting.
,he reconstitution of a certificate of title literally and within the meaning of >A 26 denotes
the restoration of the instrument which is supposed to hae been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition.
!ourts must proceed with e5treme caution in proceedings for reconstitution of titles under
>A 26- and should not only re.uire strict compliance therewith but also establish the identity of
eery person who files the petition. If filed by some other person than the registered owner- no
effort should be spared to assure itself of the authenticity and due e5ecution of petitionerNs
authority to institute the proceedings. It should aoid itself being unwittingly used as a tool of
swindlers and impostors robbing someone of his title. %-eirs of Pe!ro Pinoto vs. -on. Au!e Dulay,
.R No. 1<530, Auly 4, /336&.
T@e essential 4e:5i4e;ents in t@e 4e6onstit5tion o2 title a4e t@e 2ollowin1#
1. =otice of petition should be published in the 8fficial ;a(ette and posted on the main entrance
of the proincial and municipal building where the land is situatedE
2. ,he notice should state the number of the lost or destroyed title- the name of the registered
owner- occupants or persons in possessionE the names of ad)oining owners and interested
partiesE the area and boundaries of the property and stating the date on which all interested
parties must appearE
2. !opy of the notice must also be sent by registered mail or otherwise to eery person named
therein or to the occupant or ad)oining owners whose addresses are Bnown- at least 2G days
prior to the hearingE and
4. At the date of the hearing of the petition- the petitioner must submit proof of publication-
posting and serice of notice as re.uired by the court. *Calalang vs. Registry of Dee!s of
Gue8on City, 42/ SCRA <<M Drtigas vs. (elasco, 420 SCRA 011+.
FURSDCTON
,he distinction between general )urisdiction ested in the >,! and the limited )urisdiction
when acting as a land registration court has been eliminated by #ection 2 of 7$ 1<29. %ence- the
>,!s now hae authority to act on .uestions after original registration with power to hear and
decide substantial and contentious issues to aoid multiplicity of suits. %Ignacio vs. CA, 405 SCRA
402&.
,he land registration court has no )urisdiction to ad)udicate the issue regarding the
e5istence or non-e5istence of tenancy relationship under >A 23CC *Agricultural >eform !ode- as
amended by >A 6239+ since e5clusie )urisdiction oer such relationship was ested by law in the
!ourt of Agrarian >elations- now the >egional ,rial !ourt pursuant to B7 129. %Duano vs. CA, 42;
SCRA /44&.
7$ 1<29 abolished the difference between the general )urisdiction of regular courts and the
limited )urisdiction of the land registration court such that pursuant to #ection 2 of 7$ 1<29- the
court may issue a writ of possession to effectuate the result of a ta5 sale- citing the leading case of
Aeria s. !aguioa- 1C6 #!>A- where it was declared that a land registration court has )urisdiction
to decide contentious and substantial issues after original registration. %Cloma vs. CA, 420 SCRA
551&.
=o oluntary instrument shall be registered by the >egister of $eeds unless the ownerNs
duplicate certificate is presented together with the instrument e5cept in some cases or upon order
of the court for cause shown.

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Any lien annotated on the preious certificate of title which subsist should be incorporated
in or carried oer to the new ,!,. %"eticia "igon vs. CA an! Iglesia ni 7risto, 400 SCRA 532&.
E7PROPRATON
9nder >A ?2?9- lands for sociali(ed housing are to be ac.uired by the goernment in the
following orderH
1. goernment lands
2. alienable lands
2. unregistered lands or idle lands
C. priately owned lands
When priately owned lands are to be e5propriated- two conditions must be complied with-
namelyH
1. resorted to only when other modes are e5hausted
2. lands owned by small property owners are e5empt from e5propriation for social housing.
%City of *an!aluyong vs. Aguilar, et al., 216 SCRA 0<;&
-6"+R !L-!
KA;on1 ot@e4 t@in1sL
RESTRCTON ON ACQUSTON OF REAL PROPERTY
1. #ale of lands to aliens is oid as it iolates the !onstitution- which disallows
aliens to ac.uire lands. Both endor and endee are in pari delicto and the !ourts will not
allow protection to either party. ,he goernment may annul the sale at anytime because
prescription does not run against the goernment *:ee s. >epublic of the 7hilippines- 266
#!>A+.
2. =atural-born "ilipino citi(ens who hae lost their "ilipino citi(enship may now
ac.uire not more than 2 hectares of land if it is rural and not more than <GGG s.uare
meters if residential. *>A 31?9+
EFFECT OF P?D? 13+' ON SPANS$ TTLES
1. !annot be used as eidence to proe title *'state of $on Dariano de #an 7edro- 26<
#!>A+
2. ,he same may be registered under the system of registration for unregistered land.
*Act 22CC+
2. ,hose not registered under the :>A are not considered registered at all.
EFFECT OF P?D? 13+' ON T$E SYSTEM OF RE%STRATON OF UNRE%STERED LAND
1. Inoluntary transaction liBe attachment and the liBe on unregistered land may now
be registered in the >egister of $eeds.
2. Any .uestion regarding registration in the >egister of $eeds may now be eleated
by way of consulta to the :and >egistration Administration.
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF RE%STRATON OF LAND UNDER T$E LRA
1. Purpose / the legislatie intent in proiding a system of registration is to afford a
mode of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may search records and
thereby ac.uire security against instruments- the e5ecution of which has not been
reealed. %ence- a permanent record of landholdings and transactions thereon is

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maintained in order to preent fraudulent claims to land by concealment of unregistered
transactions.
2. +$$ect / >ecording of coneyance constitute notice to all whereas- it is presumed
that the purchaser has e5amined eery document of record *;arcia s. !ourt of Appeals- 9<
#!>A 23G+.
3. Real Purpose o$ "orrens System / to .uiet title already e5isting and to stop
foreer any .uestion as to its legality. 8nce title is registered- the owner may rest secure
without waiting in the portals of the !ourt to aoid possibility of losing his land. *!hing s.
!ourt of Appeals- 131 #!>AE =ational ;rains Authority s. !ourt of Appeals- 1<? #!>A+
O0FECT OF RE%STRATON
D#ect of registration / 8nly real property is the ob)ect of registration. While land literally
means the bare soil of the earth- it includes whateer may be found on its surface and under it. But
forest land- een if it is stripped of trees and forest coer are not susceptible of priate ownership
much less of registration by priate persons unless reclassified or released from forest to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain by official proclamation *$irector of "orest Danagement
s. Aaleriano- 129 #!>A+.
T$E DFFERENT MODES OF ACQURN% LAND TTLES
1. 7ublic grant such as homestead patent- free patent or sales patent under !A 1C1.
2. 7riate grant liBe donation- sale- etc.
2. Aderse possession or prescription
C. Accretion / to the owners of the land ad)oining banBs of riers belong the accretion- which
they gradually receie from the effects of the current of the riers and not from the sea
*Ignacio s. $irector of :ands- 1G3 7hilE Binoloy s. Danalo- 19< #!>A+. #hould accretion
taBe place while application for registration is pending- there is a need for filing a new
application for registration of the additional land and not merely awarding the application
*!ureg s. IA!- 1?? #!>A+.
<. Inoluntary alienation / such as e5propriation proceedings- escheat- e5ecution sale- ta5
sale.
6. $escent or deice / testate and intestate succession.
?. >eclamation / under the 7hilippine :aw of Waters- only the goernment may initiate
reclamation pro)ects *;oernment s. !abangis- <2 7hil 112+. 9nder >A 1399- the national
goernment granted to municipalities and chartered cities the authority to undertaBe and
carry out reclamation pro)ects but was reoBed by 7.$. 2-A and only the national
goernment may undertaBe such pro)ects *>7 s. 7asay city- et al.- 299 #!>A 199 / !ultural
!enter+.
TTLE 0Y EMANCPATON PATENT OR %RANT UNDER P?D? +. AND RA --3.
>A 66<? did not repeal or supersede 7.$. 2?. While >A 66<? coers all public and priate
agricultural lands- 7.$. 2? coers rice and corn lands *#igre s. !ourt of Appeals+.
LANDS SU0FECT OF OR%NAL RE%STRATON
1. 7riate lands / lands segregated from general mass of the public domain by any form of
grant by the #tate and which are in possession of the original grantee or their successors in
interest.
2. 7ublic agricultural land to which claimants hae ac.uired incomplete title within the
contemplation of section C3 of the 7ublic :and Act.
!AROUS MET$ODS OF 0RN%N% LANDS UNDER T$E OPERATON OF T$E TORRENS SYSTEM
1. Ludicial / oluntary and compulsory
a. Aoluntary / #ec 1C-29 7.$. 1<29
b. !ompulsory / instituted in !ourt by the #tate under the !adastral Act

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*Act 22<9+
2. Administratie / where goernment grants- alienates- or coneys lands by way of
patent- said grant- deed- or instrument must be registered in the >egister of $eeds so
as to be coered by the :and >egistration Act. *#ec 1G2- 7.$. 1<29+
EFFECT OF FALURE TO RE%STER LAND UNDER T$E TORRENS SYSTEM OF RE%STRATON
>ecording is not indispensable to proe ownership- under Art. ?G9- =!!- property not
recorded in the >egister of $eeds will not pre)udice third persons proided it is not registered in
the name of third persons and that he has been in .uiet andpeaceful possession thereof. 7ossession
here is in accordance with Art. <2C- =!!- which contemplates not only material but also symbolic
possession *Vuimson s. >osete- 3? 7hil. 139+.
NATURE OF LAND RE%STRATON PROCEEDN%S
In rem- based on the generally accepted principle underlying the ,orrens system wherein
all the world are made parties defendants. >elatedly- a decree of registration that has become
final shall be deemed conclusie not only on .uestions actually contended and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated in the land registration proceedings *!acho s. !ourt of
Appeals- 269 #!>A+
NATURE OF FURSDCTON OF RTC O!ER RE%STRATON OF TTLE
1. >,! e5ercises plenary )urisdiction oer all applications for any registration including
improement and interest thereon and oer all petitions filed after original registration
*Ignacio s. !ourt of Appeals- 2C6 #!>AE Aeria s. !aguioa- 1C6 #!>AE 7=B s. International
!orporate BanB- 199 #!>A+
2. $elegated )urisdiction / >A ?691 allows inferior courts to hear and determine land
registration cases where there is no controersy or where the alue of the property does
not e5ceed 71GG- GGG.
FUNCTONS OF T$E RE%STER OF DEEDS
1. ;eneral function / $uty to register instrument presented for registration with all re.uisites
for registration being present.
2. Dinisterial functions / %e performs ministerial functions with reference to registration of
deeds- encumbrances- instruments and the liBe *Baranda s. ;ustilo- 16< #!>A+. %e cannot
e5ercise personal )udgment and discretion when confronted with the problems of whether
to register an instrument on the ground that it is inalid as this is a function of the court
*Almirol s. >egister of $eeds of Agusan- 22 #!>A+.
"$EN MAY RE%STER OF DEEDS DENY RE%STRATON OF !OLUNTARY NSTRUMENTS
1. Where there are more than one copy and owner@s duplicate and not all are presented.
2. When the document on its face bears infirmity.
2. When the alidity of the instrument sought to be registered is in issue pending in !ourt
*Balbon s. >egister of $eeds of Ilocos sur- 23 #!>A+.
9ay an applicant whose predecessor in interest was denied registration now apply $or the
registration o$ the same landB
Kes- proided that he has ac.uired an imperfect title thereto by open- continuous-
e5clusie- notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
*$irector of :ands s. 7astor- 1G6 #!>AE $: Danagement Bureau s. !ourt os Appeals- 2G< #!>A+
=ature of proceedings in land registration under 7.$. 1<29 and the 7ublic :and Act *!A 1C1+
=ature of proceedings in land registration under 7.$. 1<29 and the 7ublic :and Act *!A 1C1+
particularly #ection C3 thereof are the same in that both are against the whole world- both taBe
the nature of )udicial proceedings and the decree of registration issued under both laws are
conclusie and final- and the proceedings therein are goerned by the same court procedure and
laws of eidence.

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What is the re.uired period of possession and occupation necessary to be proed?
#ince Lune 12- 19C<- under #ection 1C- 7.$. 1<29 as interpreted by the #upreme !ourt in >7
s. $oldol- 29< #!>A.
"$AT S T$E PEROD "T$N "$C$ TO SECURE FUDCAL CONFRMATON OF TTLE OR
ADMNSTRAT!E LE%ALIATON OF TTLEC
9nder >A 91?6- the period within which to file petitions for )udicial confirmation or
administratie legali(ation of title had been e5tended to $ecember 21- 2G2G.
EBtent o2 84oo2 4e:5i4ed o2 an a88li6ant 2o4 4e1ist4ation
1. :and is alienable and disposable *$irector of :ands s. Buyco- 216 #!>A+.
2. 8pen- continuous- e5clusie- and notorious possession of the land since Lune 12-
19C< *#ec 1C- 7.$. 1<29 and >7 s. $oldol+ under a bona fide claim of ownership.
MAY PR!ATE CORPORATONS APPLY FOR RE%STRATON OF PU0LC LANDSC
7riate corporations or associations are not allowed by the 19?2 and 193? !onstitution but
the prohibition does not apply if at the time of registration proceedings- the land was already
priate lands *$irector of :ands s. IA! and A!D' 7lywood- 1C6 #!>AE =atiidad s. !ourt of
Appeals- 2G2 #!>A+.
$O" S POSSESSON PRO!EDC
1. 9nder #ec C3- 7:A possession must be accompanied by occupation since the two words are
separated by the con)unction A=$- hence possession must not be by mere fiction or
constructie possession.
2. =ature of possession / it is open when it is patent- isible- apparent- notorious and not
clandestine. !ontinuous when not interrupted or occasional. '5clusie when possessor had
e5clusie dominion oer the land and appropriate it to his own benefit *$irector of :ands
s. !A and Danlapa(- 2G9 #!>A+.
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF PU0LCATON
1. !onfers )urisdiction oer the land applied for upon the court.
2. ,o charge the whole world with Bnowledge of the application and inite them to taBe part
in the case and assert and proe their right to the property.
a. %oweer- publication is neer meant to dispense with the re.uirement of mailing
and posting which are mandatory and )urisdictional *>7 s. Darasigan- 193 #!>A
219+.
b. Also- publication once in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory and
)urisdictional *$irector of :ands s. !ourt of Appeals- 2?6 #!>A+.
c. A defectie publication depries the !ourt of )urisdiction and therefore lacBs
authority oer the whole case and all its aspects *7o s. >7- CG #!>AE >egister of
$eeds of Dalabon s. >,! Dalabon- 131 #!>A+.
d. Where actual publication of notice of initial hearing was after the hearing itself or
where the 8fficial ;a(ette containing the notice was released for publication only
after said hearing- the publication is defectie *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals- 226 #!>A+.
EFFECT OF ORDER OF DEFAULT
All persons and the whole world e5cept only those who had appeared and filed pleadings in
the case are bound by said default order *!achero s. Dar(an- 19G #!>A+.
"$EN S DEFAULT ORDER MPROPERC

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Where oppositor filed opposition but did not appear on date of initial hearing- it was
improper for the court to declare him in default and the remedy is not appeal but certiorari
*$irector of :ands s. #antiago- 16G #!>AE 8mico Dining s Aalle)os- 62 #!>A+.
0URDEN OF APPLCANT N LAND RE%STRATON PROCEEDN%S
%e must show that he is the real and absolute owner of the property in fee simple and
oercome the presumption that the land is a part of the public domain *>7 s. :ee- 19? #!>AE
$irector of :ands s. #ayo- 191 #!>A+.
In petitions for confirmation of imperfect title it is re.uired to show that the applicant is in
open- continuous- e5clusie and notorious possession and occupation of the land under bona fide
claim of ownership within the period re.uired by law *since Lune 12- 19C< or earlier+. 'en if there
is no opposition- applicant must proe his claim and submit his eidence and not rely on the
weaBness of the eidence of the opposition *$irector of ands s. Buyco- 216 #!>A+.
PROOF OF DENTTY OF LAND MAY CONSST OF J
1. #urey plan approed by $irector of :ands *>epublic !ement !orp. s. !ourt of
Appeals- 193 #!>A+.
2. ,racing cloth plan and the blue print copies thereof *$irector of :ands s. >eyes- 63
#!>AE %eirs of Isabel ,esalora- 226 #!>A+.
2. ,echnical description duly signed by ;eodectic 'ngineer *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals-
2G1 #!>A+.
C. ,a5 $eclaration / if there are discrepancies of area and boundary in ,a5 $eclaration
and technical description such differences are common as measurements in ,a5
$eclarations are based on more estimation rather than computation *$irector of :ands s.
"ontillas- CG2 #!>A+.
"$AT E!DENCE S NECESSARY TO PRO!E O"NERS$PC
1. $ocumentary eidence / must not only proe the identity of the land but also genuineness
of title *>epublic !ement !orp. s. !ourt of Appeals- 193 #!>A+.
a. ,a5 declaration and real ta5 payments / not conducie proof of ownership but
indicia of possession *8rdoTe( s. !ourt of Appeals- 133 #!>AE $irector of :ands s.
IA!- 19< #!>A+.
b. 7residential issuance and legislatie acts *>7 represented by Dindanao Dedical
!enter s. !ourt of Appeals- ?2 #!>AE International %ardwood W Aeneer !orp. s.
9niersity of the 7hilippines- 2GG #!>A+.
c. #panish title / already inapplicable and may not be used as eidence *Intestate
'state of $on Dariano de #an 7edro- 26< #!>A where 7.$. 392 was applied+.
2. ,estimonial eidence showing among others possession and occupation of the land in the
manner and period prescribed by law.
PROOFS NOT SUFFCENT TO ESTA0LS$ PR!ATE R%$TS OR O"NERS$P
1. !ompromise agreement among the parties where they agreed that they hae rights and
interest oer the land and allocated portions to each of them.
2. #urey plan approed by $irector of :ands *>7 s. !ourt of Appeals- 1<C #!>A+.
ORDER OF TRAL SAME AS ORDNARY C!L ACTON
8rder of trial inland registration cases is the same as ordinary ciil action *>ule 2G- 199?
>ules of !ourt+. #ec 2C 7.$. 1<29 e5pressly states that the >ules of !ourt are applicable to land
registration cases.
0asis o2 6o54t D5d1;ent
#ection 29 7.$. 1<29 proides that all conflicting claims of ownership in the land shall be
determined by the court. Ludgment< of the court shall be based on the eidence presented by the
parties A=$ reports of :>A and Bureau of :ands. ,he court is empowered to wield its )udicial power

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to compel :>A to speed up the inestigation and submission of is report and recommendation
*>amos s. >odrigue(- 2CC #!>A+.
PROPERTY SU0FECT OF ADFUDCATON 0Y T$E COURT
8nly property claimed by applicant can be ad)udicated by the !ourt- hence if he asserts
ownership and submits eidence only for a portion of a lot- the inclusion of a portion of a lot not
claimed is oid * Almar(a s. Arguelles- 1<6 #!>A+.
REPORT OF LRA AND LAND MANA%EMENT 0UREAU REQURED TO 0E CONSDERED TO%ET$ER
"T$ E!DENCE PRESENTED
If submitted later but not beyond one year after the issuance of decree- the !ourt may still
cause a change in the decision *;ome( s. !ourt of Appeals- 163 #!>AE >amos s. >odrigue(- 2CC
#!>A+.
"$EN MAY "RT OF POSSESSON "LL SSUE
A writ of possession in land registration cases is a mere part )udgment incident. ,he
)udgment carries with it deliery of possession which is inherent in ownership and it may issue een
if there is an appeal *Aencilao s. Aano+.
Writ of possession does not prescribe and >ule 29 of the >ules of !ourt regarding
enforcement of )udgment by motions in ciil cases has no application in land registration
proceedings *%eirs of !ristobal Darcos s. $e Banuuar- 2< #!>A+.
E22e6t o2 De64ee o2 Re1ist4ation
It binds the land- .uiets title thereto and it is conclusie upon all persons- including the
goernment and bars re-litigation after 1 year *Klarde s. :ichauco- C2 #!>A+.
MNSTERAL DUTY OF LRA
$uty of :>A to issue decree of registration is ministerial- hence :>A cannot e5ercise
discretion but is duty bound to refer matter to the court per #ec 6*2+ 7.$. 1<29. %oweer- :>
Administrator is not bound to issue decree if land had earlier been registered *>amos s. >odrigue(-
2CC #!>A+.
EB6e8tions to inde2easiAilit< o2 title a2te4 one <ea4 24o; date o2 ent4< o2 de64ee
1. When a alid title already coers the land *>eg. 8f $eeds s. 7=B- 12 #!>A+.
2. :and not capable of registration *Dartine( s. !ourt of Appeals- <6 #!>A+.
2. "raudelent registration where :>A could not be used to perpetuate fraud *Bonales s. IA!-
166 #!>A+.
DSTNCTON 0ET"EEN !OLUNTARY AND N!OLUNTARY RE%STRATON
1. Aoluntary / Innocent purchaser for alue becomes registered owner the moment he
presents and files a duly notari(ed document *deed of sale+ and the same is entered in the
primary entry booB and at the same time presents duplicate owner@s copy and pays
registration fees because what remains to be done lies not in his power to perform *;arcia
s. !ourt of Appeals- 9< #!>A+.
2. Inoluntary / mere entry in the primary entry booB sufficient notice to all een if owner@s
duplicate copy is not presented to >egister of $eeds.
EFFECT OF RE%STRATON N RD
>egistration of the document in the >egister of $eeds is the operatie act that transmits
title. Absent such registration coneyance does not bind the land *Aillalu( s =eme- ? #!>A+. ,his
rule also applies to sale on e5ecution or foreclosure *!empillo s. !ourt of Appeals- 129 #!>AE 7=B
s. !ourt of Appeals- 93 #!>A+.

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NDEFEAS0LTY OF T$E CERTFCATE OF TTLE
Buyers and mortgages not re.uired to go beyond certificate of title. ,hey are only charged
with notice of burden on property which are noted on the face of the register or certificate of title
*Ibarra s. Ibarra- 1<6 #!>AE Bel Air Aillage Association s. $ionisio- 1?C #!>A+.
When there is nothing on certificate of title to indicate any cloud or ice in ownership or
encumbrance thereon- the purchaser is not re.uired to e5plore further than what the certificate of
title indicates in .uest for any hidden defect *!enteno s. !ourt of Appeals- 129 #!>AE 7ino s.
!ourt of Appeals- 193 #!>A+.
E7CEPTON TO T$E RULE T$AT 0UYERS NEED NOT %O 0EYOND T$E FACE OF T$E TTLE
1. When purchaser neglects to maBe necessary in.uiries and closes his eyes to facts which
should hae put a reasonable man on his guard *'gao s. !ourt of Appeals- 1?C #!>A+.
2. ,ransactions with banBs and other financial institutions *=aarro s. #econd :aguna
$eelopment BanB- ;.>. =o. 129 C23- "ebruary 2GG2E $ela Derced s. ;#I#- 26< #!>AE
,omas s. ,omas- 93 #!>A+.
2. When buyer relied upon rights of endee based on annotated transaction *;uererro s.
!ourt of Appeals- 29 #!>AE #antiago s. !ourt of Appeals- 2C? #!>A+.
Con$licts o$ Law
Nationalit< Law T@eo4< / :aws relating to "amily rights and duties or to the status- condition-
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citi(ens of the 7hilippines een though liing
abroad *Art. 1<- !iil !ode+. By analogy then- the status- condition and legal capacity of a
foreigner so)ourning in the 7hilippines shall be goerned by his national law.
A4ti6le +1 o2 t@e Fa;il< Code re.uires that when either or both parties contracting marriage
are foreigners- they shall submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by
their diplomatic or consular offices before a marriage license can be obtained. If a license is
issued without the certificate of legal capacity- the subse.uent marriage will still be alid
without pre)udice to the appropriate ciil- criminal or administratie action against the party
responsible for the irregularity in the formal re.uisite.
As a rule- the alidity of aAsol5te divo46e is not recogni(ed in the 7hilippines because of public
policy considerations. But an American who consented to a diorce from a "ilipino wife- cannot
claim any interest in the property of his "ilipino spouse in the 7hilippines on the ground that
the diorce is not alid here. #ince under his national law the alidity of diorce is recogni(ed-
he ceased to become the spouse of the "ilipino. Also- a ;erman national who obtained a
diorce in his country- cannot file adultery charges against his "ilipino wife as he can no longer
be considered an offended spouse. In both instances- the status of a foreigner shall be
goerned by his national law.
A 2o4ei1ne4 ;a< ado8t in t@e P@ili88ines proided that- in addition to the .ualifications
re.uired of "ilipino adopters- the following re.uirements are presentH diplomatic relationsE 2
years continuous residence prior to application and until issuance of decreeE legal capacity to
adopt under his national lawE and his national law allows adoptee to enter his country.
nte4>6o5nt4< ado8tion is a socio legal process for the adoption of a "ilipino !hild by a
foreigner or a "ilipino permanently residing where the petition is filed- the superised trial
custody undertaBen- and the decree of adoption issued outside the 7hilippines.

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,he 2o4;al validit< o2 a 6ont4a6t of goerned by the law of the place of e5ecution *le5 loci
celebrationis or le5 contractus+E capacity to contract by the national law of the contracting
paryE intrinsic alidity by the law intended by the parties to goern *le5 intentionis+ proided
that said law must hae a substantie relationship or connection to the transaction- contract or
partiesE and the performance by the law intended or by the law of the place of performance
*le5 solutionis+.
Cont4a6ts 2o4 nte4national Ai4 T4ans8o4tation / When a passenger files 2 causes of action
arising from a.+ theftFslashing of his luggageE and b.+ shabby treatment or humiliation he
suffered from airline personnel- the rules and limits proide in the Warsaw !onention will
apply only to the first cause of action but not to the second. ,he Warsaw !onention is not
applicable to cases of malice- bad faith- bumping off- barbaric acts- humiliation- and other
tortsE it does not regulate or e5clude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier- or
misconduct of its employees- or for some other e5ceptional type of damages.
nt4insi6 validit< o2 will and 6a8a6it< to s566eed are goerned by the national law of the
decedentH "ormal or e5trinsic alidity of a will e5ecuted by a.+ "ilipino abroad / goerned by
law of place of e5ecution or 7hilippine lawE b.+ Alien abroad / goerned by his national law- law
of place of residence- or 7hilippine lawE c.+ Alien in the 7hilippines / goerned by his national
law or 7hilippine law.
SU%%ESTED ANS"ERS TO T$E +**, 0AR E7AMNATON
QUESTONS N C!L LA"
QUESTON NO?
A. Dr. RK lost 71GG-GGG in a card game called >ussian poBer- but he had no more cash to pay in
full the winner at the time the session ended. %e promised to pay 7Q- the winner- two weeBs
thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two months- so 7Q files in court a suit to
collect the amount of 7<G-GGG that he won but remained unpaid. Will the collection suit
against RK prosper? !ould Drs. RK file in turn a suit against 7Q to recoer the 71GG-GGG that her
husband lost? >eason. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? 1/ T@e s5it A< P7 to 6olle6t t@e Aalan6e o2 w@at @e won 24o; IY will not 84os8e4? Unde4
A4ti6le +*1, o2 t@e Civil Code) no a6tion 6an Ae ;aintained A< t@e winne4 2o4 t@e 6olle6tion
o2 w@at @e @as won in a 1a;e o2 6@an6e? Alt@o51@ 8o9e4 ;a< de8end in 8a4t on aAilit<) it
is 25nda;entall< a 1a;e o2 6@an6e?
+/ 2 t@e ;one< 8aid A< IY to P7 was 6onD51al o4 6o;;5nit< 84o8e4t<) t@e wi2e o2 IY 6o5ld
s5e to 4e6ove4 it Ae6a5se A4ti6le 11.&./ o2 t@e Fa;il< Code 84ovides t@at losses in 1a;Alin1
o4 Aettin1 a4e Ao4ne eB6l5sivel< A< t@e lose4>s8o5se? $en6e) 6onD51al o4 6o;;5nit< 25nds
;a< not Ae 5sed to 8a< 2o4 s56@ losses? 2 t@e ;one< we4e eB6l5sive 84o8e4t< o2 IY) @is
wi2e ;a< also s5e to 4e6ove4 it 5nde4 A4ti6le +*1- o2 t@e Civil Code i2 s@e and t@e 2a;il<
needed t@e ;one< 2o4 s588o4t?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER to QA &+/#

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A? +/ M4s? IY 6annot 2ile a s5it to 4e6ove4 w@at @e4 @5sAand lost? A4t?+*1, o2 t@e Civil Code
84ovides t@at an< loses in a 1a;e o2 6@an6e ;a< 4e6ove4 @is loss 24o; t@e winne4) wit@
le1al inte4est 24o; t@e ti;e @e 8aid t@e a;o5nt lost? T@is ;eans t@at onl< @e 6an 2ile t@e
s5it? M4s? IY 6annot 4e6ove4 as a s8o5se w@o @as inte4est in t@e aAsol5te 6o;;5nit<
84o8e4t< o4 6onD51al 8a4tne4s@i8 o2 1ains) Ae6a5se 5nde4 A4t 11.&./ o2 t@e Fa;il< Code)
losses a4e Ao4ne eB6l5sivel< A< t@e lose4>s8o5se? T@e4e2o4e) t@ese 6annot Ae 6@a41ed
a1ainst aAsol5te 6o;;5nit< 84o8e4t< o4 6onD51al 8a4tne4s@i8 o2 1ains? T@is Aein1 so) M4s?
IY @as no inte4est in law to 84ose65te and 4e6ove4 as s@e @as no le1al standin1 in 6o54t to
do so?
B. ,Q filed a suit for e)ectment against B$ for non-payment if condominium rentals amounting to
71<G-GGG. $uring the pendency of the case- B$ offered and ,Q accepted the full amount due as
rentals from B$- who then filed a motion to dismiss the e)ectment suit on the ground that the
action is already e5tinguished.
Is B$@s contention correct? Why or why not? >eason. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
B. 0DEs 6ontention is not 6o44e6t? T7 6an still ;aintain t@e s5it 2o4 eDe6t;ent? T@e
a66e8tan6e A< t@e lesso4 o2 t@e 8a<;ent A< t@e lessee o2 t@e 4entals in a44ea4s even d54in1
t@e 8enden6< o2 t@e eDe6t;ent 6ase does not 6onstit5te a waive4 o4 aAandon;ent o2 t@e
eDe6t;ent 6ase? &Spouses Clutario &. C! +1- SCRA 3,1 O1''+P/?
QUESTON NO?
A. $istinguish briefly by clearly betweenH
1. *utuum and commo!atum.
2. #ubstitute parental authority and special parental authority.
2. !iil obligation and natural obligation.
C. Ine5istent contracts and annullable contracts.
<. $omiciliary theory and nationality theory of personal law. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? T@e distin6tions a4e as 2ollows#
1. n mutuum) t@e oADe6t Ao44owed ;5st Ae a 6ons5;aAle t@in1) t@e owne4s@i8 o2 w@i6@ is
t4ans2e44ed to t@e Ao44owe4 w@o in654s t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e sa;e 6ons5;aAle
to t@e lende4 in an e:5al a;o5nt) and o2 t@e sa;e 9ind and :5alit<?
n commodatum) t@e oADe6t Ao44owed is 5s5all< anon>6ons5;aAle t@in1) t@e owne4s@i8
o2 w@i6@ is not t4ans2e44ed to t@e Ao44owe4 w@o in654s t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e ve4<
t@in1 to t@e lende4?
+? n s5Astit5te 8a4ental a5t@o4it<) t@e 8a4ents lose t@ei4 8a4ental a5t@o4it< in 2avo4 o2 t@e
s5Astit5te w@o a6:5i4es it to t@e eB6l5sion o2 t@e 8a4ents?
n s8e6ial 8a4ental a5t@o4it<) t@e 8a4ents o4 an<one eBe46isin1 8a4ental a5t@o4it< does
not lose 8a4ental a5t@o4it<? T@ose w@o a4e 6@a41ed wit@ s8e6ial 8a4ental a5t@o4it<
eBe46ise s56@ a5t@o4it< onl< d54in1 t@e ti;e t@at t@e 6@ild is in t@ei4 65stod< o4
s58e4vision?
S5Astit5te 8a4ental a5t@o4it< dis8la6es 8a4ental a5t@o4it< w@ile s8e6ial 8a4ental
a5t@o4it< 6on654s wit@ 8a4ental a5t@o4it<?
3? Civil oAli1ation is a D54idi6al ne6essit< to 1ive) to do and not to do? t 1ives t@e 64edito4
t@e le1al 4i1@t to 6o;8el A< an a6tion in 6o54t t@e 8e42o4;an6e o2 s56@ oAli1ation?

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A nat54al oAli1ation is Aased in e:5it< and nat54al law? T@e4e is no le1al 4i1@t to
6o;8el 8e42o4;an6e t@e4eo2 A5t i2 t@e deAto4 vol5nta4il< 8a<s it) @e 6annot 4e6ove4
w@at was 8aid?
4. neBistent 6ont4a6ts a4e 6onside4ed as not @avin1 Aeen ente4ed into and t@e4e2o4e) &oid
ab initio. T@e< do not 64eate an< oAli1ation and 6annot Ae 4ati2ied o4 validated) as
t@e4e is no a14ee;ent to 4ati2< o4 validate? On t@e ot@e4 @and) ann5llaAle o4 voidaAle
6ont4a6ts a4e valid 5ntil invalidated A< t@e 6o54t A5t ;a< Ae 4ati2ied?
n ineBistent 6ont4a6ts) one o4 ;o4e 4e:5isites o2 a valid 6ont4a6ts a4e aAsent? n
ann5llaAle 6ont4a6ts) all t@e ele;ents o2 a 6ont4a6t a4e 84esent eB6e8t t@e 6onsent o2
one o2 t@e 6ont4a6tin1 8a4ties was vitiated o4 one o2 t@e; @as no 6a8a6it< to 1ive
6onsent?
3? Do;i6ilia4< T@eo4< 8osits t@at t@e 8e4sonal stat5s and 4i1@ts o2 a 8e4son a4e 1ove4ned
A< t@e law o2 @is do;i6ile o4 t@e 8la6e o2 @is @aAit5al 4esiden6e? T@e Nationalit<
T@eo4<) on t@e ot@e4 @and) 8ost5lates t@at it is t@e law o2 t@e 8e4sonEs nationalit< t@at
1ove4ns s56@ stat5s and 4i1@ts?
B. $, and D, were prominent members of the fre.uent traelers@ club of "Q Airlines. In %ong
&ong- the couple were assigned seats in Business !lass for which they had bought ticBets. 8n
checBing in- howeer- they were told that they were upgraded by computer to "irst !lass for
the flight to Danila because the Business #ection was oerbooBed.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats- food- beerage and other serices in "irst !lass.
,hey said they had guests in Business !lass they should attend to. ,hey felt humiliated-
embarrassed and e5ed- howeer- when the stewardess allegedly threatened to offload them if
they did not aail of the upgrade. ,hus they gae in- but during the transfer of luggage- $,
suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrial in Danila- they demanded an apology from "Q@s
management as well as indemnity payment. When none was forthcoming- they sued the airline
for a million pesos in damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? '5plain briefly. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
B. F7 Ai4lines 6o;;itted A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t w@en it 5814ade DT and MT) ove4 t@ei4
oADe6tions) to Fi4st Class Ae6a5se t@e< @ad 6ont4a6ted 2o4 05siness Class 8assa1e?
$oweve4) alt@o51@ t@e4e is a A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t) DT and MT a4e entitled to a6t5al da;a1es
onl< 2o4 s56@ 8e65nia4< losses s522e4ed A< t@e; as a 4es5lt o2 s56@ A4ea6@? T@e4e see;s to
Ae no s@owin1 t@at t@e< in6544ed s56@ 8e65nia4< loss? T@e4e is no s@owin1 t@at t@e 8ain in
DTEs a4; and w4ist 4es5lted di4e6tl< 24o; t@e 6a44ie4Es a6ts 6o;8lained o2? $en6e) t@e< a4e
not entitled to a6t5al da;a1es? Mo4eove4) DT 6o5ld @ave avoided t@e alle1ed inD54< A<
4e:5estin1 t@e ai4line sta22 to do t@e l511a1e t4ans2e4 as a ;atte4 o2 d5t< on t@ei4 8a4t?
T@e4e is also no Aasis to awa4d ;o4al da;a1es 2o4 s56@ A4ea6@ o2 6ont4a6t Ae6a5se t@e 2a6ts
o2 t@e 84oAle; do not s@ow Aad 2ait@ o4 24a5d on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e ai4line? &Cathay Paci$ic &.
)as>ue*) 3'' SCRA +*. O+**3P/? $oweve4) t@e< ;a< 4e6ove4 ;o4al da;a1es i2 t@e 6a5se o2
a6tion is Aased on A4ti6le +1 o2 t@e Civil Code 2o4 t@e @5;iliation and e;Aa44ass;ent t@e<
2elt w@en t@e stewa4dess t@4eatened to o22load t@e; i2 t@e< did not avail o2 t@e 5814ade?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
2 it 6an Ae 84oved t@at DTEs 8ain in @is a4; and w4ist o66asioned A< t@e t4ans2e4 o2 l511a1e
was 6a5sed A< 2a5lt o4 ne1li1en6e on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e ai4lineEs stewa4dess) a6t5al da;a1es
;a< Ae 4e6ove4ed?
T@e ai4line ;a< Ae liaAle 2o4 ;o4al da;a1es 854s5ant to A4t? ++1' &1*/ i2 t@e 6a5se o2
a6tion is Aased o2 A4ti6le +1 o4 an a6t 6ont4a4< to ;o4als in view o2 t@e @5;iliation s522e4ed

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A< DT and MT w@en t@e< we4e se8a4ated 24o; t@ei4 15ests and we4e t@4eatened to Ae
o22loaded?
QUESTON NO?
A. >= and $D- without any impediment to marry each other had been liing together without
benefit of church blessings. ,heir common-law union resulted in the birth of RD=. ,wo years
later- they got married in a ciil ceremony. !ould RD= be legitimated? >eason *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? IMN was le1iti;ated A< t@e s5Ase:5ent ;a44ia1e o2 RN and DM Ae6a5se at t@e ti;e @e was
6on6eived) RN and DM 6o5ld @ave validl< ;a44ied ea6@ ot@e4? Unde4 t@e Fa;il< Code)
6@ild4en 6on6eived and Ao4n o5tside o2 wedlo69 o2 8a4ents w@o) at t@e ti;e o2 t@e 2o4;e4Es
6on6e8tion) we4e not dis:5ali2ied A< an< i;8edi;ent to ;a44< ea6@ ot@e4 a4e le1iti;ated
A< t@e s5Ase:5ent ;a44ia1e o2 t@e 8a4ents?
B. $r. A:Q is a scientist honored for worB related to the human genome pro)ect. Among his
pioneering efforts concern stem cell research for the cure of Al(heimer@s disease. 9nder
corporate sponsorship- he helped deelop a microbe that are and digested oil spills in the sea.
=ow he leads a college team for cancer research in D## #tate. ,he team has e5perimented on
a mouse whose body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor. !alled Ioncomouse-J it is a
life-form useful for medical research and it is a noel creation. Its body cells do not naturally
occur in nature but are the product of man@s intellect- industry and ingenuity. %oweer- there
is a doubt whether local property laws and ethics would allow rights of e5clusie ownership of
any life-form. $r. A:Q needs your adiceH *1+ whether the reciprocity principle in priate
international law could be applied in our )urisdictionE and *2+ whether there are legal and
ethical reasons that could frustrate his claim of e5clusie ownership oer the life-form called
IoncomouseJ in Danila? What will be your adice to him? *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
B. &1/ T@e 4e6i84o6it< 84in6i8le in 84ivate inte4national law ;a< Ae a88lied in o54 D54isdi6tion?
Se6tion 3 o2 R?A? (+'3) t@e ntelle6t5al P4o8e4t< Code) 84ovides 2o4 4e6i84o6it< as 2ollows#
K!ny person who is a national or who is domiciled or has a real and e$$ecti&e industrial
establishment in a country which is a party to any con&ention treaty or agreement
relating to intellectual property rights or the repression o$ un$air competition to which
the Philippines is also a party or eCtends reciprocal rights to nationals o$ the Philippines
by law shall be entitled to bene$its to the eCtent necessary to gi&e e$$ect to any
pro&ision o$ such con&ention treaty or reciprocal law in addition to the rights to which
any owner o$ an intellectual property right is otherwise entitled by this !ct. %n'D To
ill5st4ate# t@e P@ili88ines ;a< 4e24ain 24o; i;8osin1 a 4e:5i4e;ent o2 lo6al in6o48o4ation
o4 estaAlis@;ent o2 a lo6al do;i6ile 2o4 t@e 84ote6tion o2 ind5st4ial 84o8e4t< 4i1@ts o2
2o4ei1n nationals &6itiGens o2 Canada) SwitGe4land) U?S?/ i2 t@e 6o5nt4ies o2 said 2o4ei1n
nationals 4e24ain 24o; i;8osin1 said 4e:5i4e;ent on Fili8ino 6itiGens?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
Re6i84o6it< 84in6i8le 6annot Ae a88lied in o54 D54isdi6tion Ae6a5se t@e P@ili88ines is a 8a4t<
to t@e TRPS a14ee;ent and t@e "TO? T@e 84in6i8le involved is t@e ;ost>2avo4ed nation
6la5se w@i6@ is t@e 84in6i8le o2 non>dis64i;ination? T@e 84ote6tion a22o4ded to intelle6t5al
84o8e4t< 84ote6tion in t@e P@ili88ines also a88lies to ot@e4 ;e;Ae4s o2 t@e "TO? T@5s) it
is not 4eall< 4e6i84o6it< 84in6i8le in 84ivate inte4national law t@at a88lies) A5t t@e ;ost>
2avo4ed nation 6la5se 5nde4 85Ali6 inte4national law?
&+/ T@e4e is no le1al 4eason w@< Kon6o;o5seL 6annot Ae 84ote6ted 5nde4 t@e law? A;on1
t@ose eB6l5ded 24o; 8atent 84ote6tion a4e Kplant &arieties or animal breeds or

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essentially biological process $or the production o$ plants and animalsD &Se6tion ++?,
ntelle6t5al P4o8e4t< Code) R?A? No? (+'3/? T@e Kon6o;o5seL in t@e 84oAle; is not an
essentiall< Aiolo1i6al 84o6ess 2o4 t@e 84od56tion o2 ani;als? t is a 4eal invention Ae6a5se
its Aod< 6ells do not nat54all< o6654 in nat54e A5t a4e t@e 84od56t o2 ;anEs in1en5it<)
intelle6t and ind5st4<?
T@e A4eedin1 o2 on6o;o5se @as novelt<) inventive ste8 and ind5st4ial a88li6ation? T@ese
a4e t@e t@4ee 4e:5isites o2 8atentaAilit<? &Se6 +') PC/
T@e4e a4e no et@i6al 4easons w@< D4? AD7 and @is 6olle1e tea; 6annot Ae 1iven eB6l5sive
owne4s@i8 ove4 t@ei4 invention? T@e 5se o2 s56@ 1eneti6all< ;odi2ied ;o5se) 5se25l 2o4
6an6e4 4esea46@) o5twei1@s 6onside4ations 2o4 ani;al 4i1@ts?
T@e4e a4e no le1al and et@i6al 4easons t@at wo5ld 245st4ate D4? AL7Es 6lai; o2 eB6l5sive
owne4s@i8 ove4 Kon6o;o5se?L Ani;als a4e 84o8e4t< 6a8aAle o2 Aein1 a884o84iated and
owned? n 2a6t) one 6an own 8et do1s o4 6ats) o4 an< ot@e4 ani;al? 2 wild ani;als a4e
6a8aAle o2 Aein1 owned) wit@ ;o4e 4eason ani;als te6@nolo1i6all< en@an6ed o4 6o4458ted
A< ;anEs invention o4 ind5st4< a4e s5s6e8tiAle to eB6l5sive owne4s@i8 A< t@e invento4?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
T@e oncomouse is a @i1@e4 li2e 2o4; w@i6@ does not 2all wit@in t@e de2inition o2 t@e te4;
Kin&ention.D Neit@e4 ;a< it 2all wit@in t@e a;Ait o2 t@e te4; Kmanu$actureD w@i6@ 5s5all<
i;8lies a non>livin1 ;e6@anisti6 84od56t?
T@e oncomouse is a Aette4 4e1a4ded as Edisco&eryD w@i6@ is t@e 6o;;on 8at4i;on< o2
;an?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
T@e EoncomouseD is a non>8atentaAle invention? $en6e) 6annot Ae owned eB6l5sivel< A<
its invento4? t is a ;et@od 2o4 t@e t4eat;ent o2 t@e @5;an o4 ani;al Aod< A< s541e4< o4
t@e4a8< and dia1nosti6 ;et@ods 84a6ti6ed on said Aodies a4e not 8atentaAle 5nde4 Se6? ++
o2 t@e PC?
QUESTON NO? !
A. LA- owner of a parcel of land- sold it to 77. But the deed of sale was not registered. 8ne year
later- LA sold the parcel again to >>- who succeeded to register the deed and to obtain a
transfer certificate of title oer the property in his own name.
Who has the better right oer the parcel of land- >> of 77? Why? '5plain the legal basis for
your answer. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? t de8end on w@et@e4 o2 not RR is an inno6ent 8546@ase4 2o4 val5e?
Unde4 t@e To44ens S<ste;) a deed o4 inst45;ent o8e4ated onl< as a 6ont4a6t Aetween t@e
8a4ties as eviden6e o2 a5t@o4it< to t@e Re1iste4 o2 Deeds to ;a9e t@e 4e1ist4ation? t is t@e
4e1ist4ation o2 t@e deed o4 t@e inst45;ent t@at is t@e o8e4ative a6t t@at 6onve<s o4 a22e6ts
t@e land? &Se6? 31) P?D? 13+'/?
n 6ases o2 do5Ale sale o2 titled land) it is a well>settled 45le t@at t@e A5<e4 w@o 2i4st
4e1iste4s t@e sale in 1ood 2ait@ a6:5i4es a Aette4 4i1@t to t@e land? &A4t? 13,,) Civil Code/?

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Pe4sons dealin1 wit@ 84o8e4t< 6ove4ed A< To44ens title a4e not 4e:5i4ed to 1o Ae<ond w@at
a88ea4s on its 2a6e? &Or>uiola &. C! 3(-) SCRA 3*1) O+**+PH #omingo &. Roces ,*1 SCRA
1'.) O+**3P/? T@5s) aAsent an< s@owin1 t@at RR 9new aAo5t) o4 o51@t to @ave 9nown t@e
84io4 sale o2 t@e land to PP o4 t@at @e a6ted in Aad 2ait@) and Aein1 2i4st to 4e1iste4 t@e sale)
RR a6:5i4ed a 1ood and a 6lean title to t@e 84o8e4t< as a1ainst PP?
B. !Q e5ecuted a special power of attorney authori(ing $K to secure a loan from any banB and to
mortgage his property coered by the owner@s certificate of title. In securing a loan from
DbanB- $K did not specify that he was acting for !Q in the transaction with said banB.
Is !Q liable for the banB loan? Why or why not? Lustify your answer. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? C7 is liaAle 2o4 t@e Aan9 loan Ae6a5se @e a5t@o4iGed t@e ;o4t1a1e on @is 84o8e4t< to se654e
t@e loan 6ont4a6ted A< DY? 2 DY late4 de2a5lts and 2ails to 8a< t@e loan) C7 is liaAle to 8a<?
$oweve4) @is liaAilit< is li;ited to t@e eBtent o2 t@e val5e o2 t@e said 84o8e4t<?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
C7 is not 8e4sonall< liaAle to t@e Aan9 loan Ae6a5se it was 6ont4a6ted A< DY in @is 8e4sonal
6a8a6it<? Onl< t@e 84o8e4t< o2 C7 is liaAle? $en6e) w@ile C7 @as a5t@o4iGed t@e ;o4t1a1e
on @is 84o8e4t< to se654e t@e loan o2 DY) t@e Aan9 6annot s5e C7 to 6olle6t t@e loan in 6ase
DY de2a5lts t@e4eon? T@e Aan9 6an onl< 2o4e6lose a4e not s522i6ient to 8a< t@e loan in 25ll)
t@e Aan9 6annot 45n a2te4 C7 2o4 t@e de2i6ien6<?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
"@ile as a 1ene4al 45le t@e 84in6i8al is not liaAle 2o4 t@e 6ont4a6t ente4ed into A< @is a1ent
in 6ase t@e a1ent a6ted in @is own na;e wit@o5t dis6losin1 @is 84in6i8al) s56@ 45le does not
a88l< i2 t@e 6ont4a6t involves a t@in1 Aelon1in1 to t@e 84in6i8al? n s56@ 6ase) t@e 84in6i8al
is liaAle 5nde4 A4ti6le 1((3 o2 t@e Civil Code? T@e 6ont4a6t is dee;ed ;ade on @is Ae@al2
&Sy=(uco &. Sy=(uco ,* P@il? -3, O1'+*P/?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
C7 wo5ld not Ae liaAle 2o4 t@e Aan9 loan? C7Es 84o8e4t< wo5ld also not Ae liaAle on t@e
;o4t1a1e? Sin6e DY did not s8e6i2< t@at @e was a6tin1 2o4 C7 in t@e t4ansa6tion wit@ t@e
Aan9) DY in e22e6t a6ted in @is own na;e? n t@e 6ase o2 Rural ,an: o$ ,ombon &. C!) +1+
SCRA) &1''+/) t@e S584e;e Co54t) 5nde4 t@e sa;e 2a6ts) 45led t@at Ein order to bind the
principal by a mortgage on real property eCecuted by an agent it must upon its $ace
purport to be made signed and sealed in the name o$ the principal otherwise it will bind
the agent only. -t is not enough merely that the agent was in $act authori*ed to ma:e the
mortgage i$ he has not acted in the name o$ the principal. 6either is it ordinarily
su$$icient that in the mortgage the agent describes himsel$ as acting by &irtue o$ a power
o$ attorney it in $act the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand and
seal to the mortgage. "here is no principle o$ law by which a person can become liable on
a real estate mortgage which she ne&er eCecuted in person or by attorney in $act.D
QUESTON NO? !
A. $78 went to a store to buy a pacB of cigarettes worth 722<.GG only. %e gae the endor >>A- a
7<GG-peso bill. ,he endor gae him the pacB plus 72?<.GG change. Was there a discount- an
oersight- or an error in the amount gien? What would be $78@s duty- if any- in case of an
e5cess in the amount of change gien by the endor? %ow is this situational relationship
between $78 and >>A denominated? '5plain *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#

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A. T@e4e was e44o4 in t@e a;o5nt o2 6@an1e 1iven A< RRA? T@is is a 6ase o2 solutio indebiti in
t@at DPO 4e6eived so;et@in1 t@at is not d5e @i;? $e @as t@e oAli1ation to 4et54n t@e
P1**?**H ot@e4wise) @e will 5nD5stl< en4i6@ @i;sel2 at t@e eB8ense o2 RRA? &A4t? +13,) Civil
Code/
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
DPO @as t@e d5t< to 4et54n to RRA t@e eB6ess P1** as t45stee 5nde4 A4ti6le 1,3- o2 t@e
Civil Code w@i6@ 84ovides# -$ property is ac>uired through mista:e or $raud the person
obtaining it is by $orce o$ law considered a trustee o$ an implied trust $or the bene$it o$
the person $rom whom the property comes. T@e4e is) in t@is 6ase) an i;8lied o4
6onst456tive t45st in 2avo4 o2 RRA?
B. 8L was employed as professional drier of DD ,ransit bus ownd by Dr. B,. In the course of his
worB- 8L hit a pedestrian who was seriously in)ured and later died in the hospital as a result of
the accident. ,he ictim@s heirs sued the drier and the owner of the bus for damages.
Is there a presumption in this case that Dr. B,- the owner- had been negligent? If so- us the
presumption absolute or not? '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? Yes) t@e4e is a 84es5;8tion o2 ne1li1en6e on t@e 8a4t o2 t@e e;8lo<e4? $oweve4) s56@ is
4eA5ttaAle? T@e liaAilit< o2 t@e e;8lo<e4 s@all 6ease w@en t@e< 84ove t@at t@e< oAse4ved
t@e dili1en6e o2 a 1ood 2at@e4 o2 a 2a;il< to 84event da;a1e &A4ti6le +1(*) Civil Code/?
"@en t@e e;8lo<ee 6a5ses da;a1e d5e to @is own ne1li1en6e w@ile 8e42o4;in1 @is own
d5ties) t@e4e a4ises t@e (uris tantum 84es5;8tion t@at t@e e;8lo<e4 is ne1li1ent)
4eA5ttaAle onl< A< 84oo2 o2 oAse4van6e o2 t@e dili1ne6e o2 a 1ood 2at@e4 o2 a 2a;il< &9etro
9anila "ransit &. C! ++3 SCRA 3+1 O1''3PH #elsan "ransport Lines &. CF! Construction
,1+ SCRA 3+, O+**3P/?
Li9ewise) i2 t@e d4ive4 is 6@a41ed and 6onvi6ted in a 64i;inal 6ase 2o4 64i;inal ne1li1en6e)
0T is s5Asidia4il< liaAle 2o4 t@e da;a1es a4isin1 24o; t@e 64i;inal a6t?
QUESTON NO? !
A. AB! loaned to D=8 7CG-GGG for which the latter pledged CGG shares of stocB in QKR Inc. it was
agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with 1GP yearly interest within four years- the
pledgee is authori(ed to foreclose on the shares of stocB. As re.uired- D=8 deliered
possession of the shares to AB! with the understanding that the shares would be returned to
D=8 upon the payment of the loan. %oweer- the loan was not paid on time.
A month after C years- may the shares of stocB pledged be deemed owned by AB! or not?
>eason. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A. T@e s@a4es o2 sto69 6annot Ae dee;ed owned A< A0C 58on de2a5lt o2 MNO? T@e< @ave to
Ae 2o4e6losed? Unde4 A4ti6le +*(( o2 t@e Civil Code) t@e 64edito4 6annot a884o84iate t@e
t@in1s 1iven A< wa< o2 8led1e? And even i2 t@e 8a4ties @ave sti85lated t@at A0C Ae6o;es
t@e owne4 o2 t@e s@a4es in 6ase MNO de2a5lts on t@e loan) s56@ sti85lation is void 2o4 Aein1
a pactum commissorium.
B. As an agent- A: was gien a guarantee commission- in addition to his regular commission- after
he sold 2G units of refrigerators to a customer- %, %otel. ,he customer- howeer- failed to pay

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for the units sold. A:@s principal- $>BI- demanded from A: payment for the customer@s
accountability. A: ob)ected- on the ground that his )ob was only to sell and not to collect
payment for units bought by the customer.
Is A:@s ob)ection alid? !an $>BI collect from him or not? >eason. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? No) ALEs oADe6tion is not valid and DR0 6an 6olle6t 24o; AL? Sin6e AL a66e8ted a 15a4antee
6o;;ission) in addition to @is 4e15la4 6o;;ission) @e a14eed to Aea4 t@e 4is9 o2 6olle6tion
and to 8a< t@e 84in6i8al t@e 84o6eeds o2 t@e sale on t@e sa;e te4;s a14eed 58on wit@ t@e
8546@ase4 &A4ti6le 1'*.) Civil Code/
QUESTON NO? !
A. 7% and :A are %& !hinese. ,heir parents are now "ilipino citi(ens who lie in Danila. While
still students in D=# #tate- they got married although they are first cousins. It appears that
both in %& and in D=# #tate first cousins could marry legally.
,hey plan to reside and set up business in the 7hilippines. But they hae been informed-
howeer- that the marriage of first cousins here us considered oid from the beginning by
reason of public policy. ,hey are in a dilemma. ,hey don@t want to breaB 7hilippine law- much
less their marriage ow. ,hey seeB your adice on whether their ciil status will be adersely
affected by 7hilippine domestic law? What is your Adise? *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? M< advise is as 2ollows#
T@e 6ivil stat5s o2 P$ and L! will not Ae adve4sel< a22e6ted A< P@ili88ine law Ae6a5se t@e<
a4e nationals o2 $on1 Kon1 and not Fili8ino 6itiGens?
0ein1 2o4ei1ne4s) t@ei4 stat5s) 6onditions and le1al 6a8a6it< in t@e P@ili88ines a4e 1ove4ned
A< t@e law o2 $on1 Kon1) t@e 6o5nt4< o2 w@i6@ t@e< a4e 6itiGens? Sin6e t@ei4 ;a44ia1e is
valid 5nde4 $on1 Kon1 law) it s@all Ae valid and 4es8e6ted in t@e P@ili88ines?
B. In a class suit for damages- plaintiffs claimed they suffered in)uries from torture during the
martial law. ,he suit was filed upon 7resident 'D@s arrial on e5ile in %I- a 9.#. state. ,he
court in %I awarded plaintiffs the e.uialent of 71GG billion under the 9.#. law on alien tort
claims. 8n appeal- 'D@s 'state raised the issue of prescription. It argued that since said 9.#.
law is silent on the matter- the court should applyH *1+ %I@s law setting a two-year limitation on
tort claimsE or *2+ the 7hilippine law which appears to re.uire the claims for personal in)ury
arising from martial law be bought within one year.
7laintiffs countered that proisions of the most analogous federal stature- the ,orture Aictims
7rotection Act- should be applied. It sets ten years as the period of prescription. Doreoer-
they argued that e.uity could toll the statute of limitations. "or it appeared that 'D had
procured !onstitutional amendments granting himself and those acting under his direction
immunity from suit during the tenure.
In this case- has prescription set in or not? !onsidering the differences in the cited laws- which
prescriptie period should be appliedH one year under the 7hilippine law- two years under %I@s
law- ten years under 9.#. federal law- or none of the aboe. '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
B. T@e US Co54t will a88l< US law) t@e law o2 t@e $orum) in dete4;inin1 t@e a88li6aAle
84es64i8tive 8e4iod? "@ile US law is silent on t@is ;atte4) t@e US Co54t will not a88l<
P@ili88ine law in dete4;inin1 t@e 84es64i8tive 8e4iod? t is 1ene4all< a22i4;ed as a 84in6i8le

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in 84ivate inte4national law t@at 84o6ed54al law is one o2 t@e eB6e8tions to t@e a88li6ation
o2 2o4ei1n law A< t@e 2o45;? Sin6e 84es64i8tion is a ;atte4 o2 84o6ed54al law even in
P@ili88ine D54is845den6e) &Cadalin &. PO+!G6LRCG ,rown and Root -nternational +3( SCRA
.+1 O1'',P/) t@e US Co54t will a88l< eit@e4 $ o4 Fede4al law in dete4;inin1 t@e a88li6aAle
84es64i8tive 8e4iod and not P@ili88ine law? T@e Restatement o2 A;e4i6an law a22i4;s t@is
84in6i8le?
QUESTON NO? !
A. A "ilipino couple- Dr. and Drs. BD- Lr.- decided to adopt KA- and orphan from #t. !laire@s
orphanage in =ew KorB !ity. ,hey loed and treated her liBe a legitimate child for they hae
none of their ery own. %oweer- BD- Lr.- died in an accident at sea- followed to the grae a
year later by his sicB father- BD- #r. 'ach left a si(able estate consisting of banB deposits- lads
and buildings in Danila. Day the adopted child- KA- inherit from BD- Lr.? Day she also inherit
from BD- #r.? Is there a difference? Why? '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? Y! 6an in@e4it 24o; 0M) F4?
T@e s566ession to t@e estate o2 0M) F4? is 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine law Ae6a5se @e was a
Fili8ino w@en @e died &A4ti6le 1-) Civil Code/? Unde4 A4ti6le 1*3' o2 t@e Civil Code) t@e
6a8a6it< o2 t@e @ei4 to s566eed is 1ove4ned A< t@e national law o2 t@e de6edent and not A<
t@e national law o2 t@e @ei4? $en6e) w@et@e4 o4 not Y! 6an in@e4it 24o; 0M) F4? is
dete4;ined A< P@ili88ine law? Unde4 P@ili88ine law) t@e ado8ted in@e4its 2o4; t@e ado8te4
as a le1iti;ate 6@ild o2 t@e ado8te4?
Y!) @oweve4) 6annot in@e4it) in @is own 4i1@t) 24o; t@e 2at@e4 o2 t@e ado8te4) 0M) S4?)
Ae6a5se s@e is not a le1al @ei4 o2 0M) S4? T@e le1al 2i6tion o2 ado8tion eBists onl< Aetween
t@e ado8ted and t@e ado8te4? &"eotico &. #el )al 13 SCRA ,*- O1'-3P/? Neit@e4 ;a< @e
in@e4it 24o; 0M) S4? A< 4e84esentin1 0M) F4? Ae6a5se in 4e84esentation) t@e 4e84esentative
;5st Ae a le1al @ei4 not onl< o2 t@e 8e4son @e is 4e84esentin1 A5t also o2 t@e de6edent 24o;
w@o; t@e 4e84esented was s588osed to in@e4it &A4ti6le '.3) Civil Code/?
B. Dr. Q, and Drs. K, hae been married for 2G years. #uppose the wife- K,- died childless-
suried only by her husband- Q,. What would be the share of Q, from her estate as
inheritance? Why? '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? Unde4 t@e Civil Code) t@e widow o4 widowe4 is a le1al and 6o;85lso4< @ei4 o2 t@e de6eased
s8o5se? 2 t@e widow is t@e onl< s54vivin1 @ei4) t@e4e Aein1 no le1iti;ate as6endants)
des6endants) A4ot@e4s and siste4s) ne8@ews and nie6es) s@e 1ets t@e enti4e estate?
QUESTON NO? 7
A. ,he parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest is 12P and it can be
increased if there is a law that would authori(e the increase of interest rates. #uppose 8B- the
lender- would increase by <P the rate of interest to be paid by ,K- the borrower- without a law
authori(ing such increase- would 8B@s action be )ust and alid? Why? %as ,K a remedy against
the imposition of the rate increase? '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? O0Es a6tion is not valid?

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T@e deAto4 6annot Ae 4e:5i4ed to 8a< t@e in64ease in inte4est t@e4e Aein1 no law
a5t@o4iGin1 it) as sti85lated in t@e 6ont4a6t? n64easin1 t@e 4ate in t@e aAsen6e o2 s56@ law
violates t@e 84in6i8le o2 ;5t5alit< o2 6ont4a6ts?
ALTERNAT!E ANS"ER#
Even i2 t@e4e was a law a5t@o4iGin1 t@e in64ease in inte4est 4ate) t@e sti85lation is still void
Ae6a5se t@e4e is no 6o44es8ondin1 sti85lation to de64ease t@e inte4est d5e w@en t@e law
4ed56es t@e 4ate o2 inte4est?
B. $on- an American businessman- secured parental consent for the employment of fie minors to
play certain roles in two moies he was producing at home in DaBati. ,hey worBed at odd
hours of the day and night- but always accompanied by parents or other adults. ,he producer
paid the children talent fees at rates better that adult wages.
But the social worBer- $'B- reported to 8#W$ that these children often missed going to school.
,hey sometimes dranB wine- aside from being e5posed to drugs. In some scenes- they were
filmed naBed or in reealing costumes. In his defense- $8= contended all these were part of
artistic freedom and cultural creatiity. =one of the parents complained- said $8=. %e also
said they signed a contract containing a waier of their right to file any complaint in any office
or tribunal concerning the worBing conditions of their children acting in the moies.
Is the waier alid and binding? Why or why not? '5plain. *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? T@e waive4 is not valid? Alt@o51@ t@e 6ont4a6tin1 8a4ties ;a< estaAlis@ s56@ sti85lations)
6la5ses) te4;s and 6onditions as t@e< ;a< dee; 6onvenient) t@e< ;a< not do so i2 s56@ a4e
6ont4a4< to law) ;o4als) 1ood 65sto;s) 85Ali6 o4de4) o4 85Ali6 8oli6< &A4ti6le 13*-) Civil
Code/? T@e 8a4entsE waive4 to 2ile a 6o;8laint 6on6e4nin1 t@e wo49in1 6onditions
det4i;ental to t@e ;o4al well>Aein1 o2 t@ei4 6@ild4en a6tin1 in t@e ;ovies is in violation o2
t@e Fa;il< Code and LaAo4 laws? T@5s) t@e waive4 is invalid and not Aindin1?
T@e C@ild LaAo4 Law is a ;andato4< and 84o@iAito4< law and t@e 4i1@ts o2 t@e 6@ild 6annot
Ae waived as it is 6ont4a4< to law and 85Ali6 8oli6<?
QUESTON NO? 7
A. B8=I and A==' met while worBing oerseas. ,hey became sweethearts and got engaged to be
married in =ew Kear@s 'e aboard a cruise ship in the !aribbean. ,hey tooB the proper license
to marry in =ew KorB !ity- where there is a "ilipino consulate. But as planned- the wedding
ceremony was officiated by the captain of the =orwegian-registered essel in a priate suit
among selected friends.
BacB in Danila- A==' discoered that B8=I had been married in Bacolod !ity < years earlier but
diorced in 8slo only last year. %is first wife was also a "ilipina but now based in #wede. B8=I
himself is a resident of =orway where he and A==' plan to lie permanently.
A==' retains your serices to adise her on whether her marriage to B8=I is alid under
7hilippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances? *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
A? 2 0ON 5s still a Fili8ino 6itiGen) @is le1al 6a8a6it< is 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine Law &A4t? 13
Civil Code/? Unde4 P@ili88ine Law) @is ;a44ia1e to ANNE is void Ae6a5se o2 a 84io4 eBistin1
;a44ia1e w@i6@ was not dissolved A< t@e divo46e de64eed in Oslo? Divo46e oAtained aA4oad
A< a Fili8ino is not 4e6o1niGed?
2 0ON was no lon1e4 a Fili8ino 6itiGen) t@e divo46e is valid? $en6e) @is ;a44ia1e to ANNE is
valid i2 6eleA4ated in a66o4dan6e wit@ t@e law o2 t@e 8la6e w@e4e it was 6eleA4ated? Sin6e
t@e ;a44ia1e was 6eleA4ated aAoa4d a vessel o2 No4we1ian 4e1ist4<) No4we1ian law a88lies?

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2 t@e S@i8 Ca8tain @as a5t@o4it< to sole;niGe t@e ;a44ia1e aAoa4d @is s@i8) t@e ;a44ia1e is
valid and s@all Ae 4e6o1niGed in t@e P@ili88ines?
As to t@e se6ond :5estion) i2 0ON is still a Fili8ino) ANNE 6an 2ile an a6tion 2o4 de6la4ation
o2 n5llit< o2 ;a44ia1e to @i;?
B. In his lifetime- a 7aBistani citi(en- A$I:- married three times under 7aBistani law. When he
died an old widower- he left behind si5 children- two sisters- three homes- and an estate worth
at least 2G million pesos in the 7hilippines. %e was born in :ahore but last resided in !ebu
!ity- where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest children now lie and worB. ,wo
of his oldest children are farmers in #ulu- while two middle-aged children are employees in
Ramboanga !ity. "inding that the deceased left no will- the youngest son wanted to file
intestate proceedings before the >egional ,rial !ourt of !ebu !ity. two other siblings
ob)ected- arguing that it should be in Lolo before a #hari@a court since his lands are in #ulu.
But A$I:@s sisters in 7aBistan want the proceedings held in :ahore before a 7aBistani court.
Which court has )urisdiction and is the proper enue for the intestate proceedings? ,he law of
which country shall goern succession to his estate? *<P+
SU%%ESTED ANS"ER#
0? n so 2a4 as t@e 84o8e4ties o2 t@e de6edent lo6ated in t@e P@ili88ines a4e 6on6e4ned) t@e<
a4e 1ove4ned A< P@ili88ine law &A4ti6le 1-) Civil Code/? Unde4 P@ili88ine law) t@e 84o8e4
ven5e 2o4 t@e settle;ent o2 t@e estate is t@e do;i6ile o2 t@e de6edent at t@e ti;e o2 @is
deat@? Sin6e t@e de6edent last 4esided in CeA5 Cit<) t@at is t@e 84o8e4 ven5e 2o4 t@e
intestate settle;ent o2 @is estate?
$oweve4) t@e s566essional 4i1@ts to t@e estate o2 ADT a4e 1ove4ned A< Pa9istani law) @is
national law) 5nde4 A4ti6le 1- o2 t@e Civil Code?

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