Sense and Intersensoriality

Franois Delalande
The relationship between sound and other
senses interests two categories of scholars: the rst group from
the elds of music and the human sciences, the second group
composed of specialists in the pure sciences, notably in neu-
rophysiology. The role of the rst group, to which I belong, is
to pose problems; that of the second group is to solve them.
This division of labor suits me perfectly, for the problems in-
volved strike me as particularly complex.
Indeed, in the eld of music, we often have to describe cer-
tain facts that have to do with the senses but that summon up
various forms of synesthesia, taken in a broad sense. However,
I hasten to state that for me, the question of various forms of
synesthesia and intersensoriality is only a part of the more
general problem of musical meaning. This is why I nd it nec-
essary to situate the various elds in relationship to one an-
other before bringing certain points to light in a more precise
manner.
MEANING
The problem of meaning in music has long divided theoreti-
cians into two opposing groups: rst, as in the current case of
semiotics, those for whom meaning within the world of sound
relates to something outside of the world of sounda sort of
external referentand, second, those who have searched for
musical meaning within music itselfan internal referent.
The latter position was frequently defended up to the work
of Jakobson, that is to say, until a relatively recent date. Jakob-
son considered music a language which signies itself [1].
The main supporters of this conception in the history of music
were Edouard Hanslick [2] and Leonard Meyer [3]. Hanslicks
contentions were relayed by a brilliant spokesman, Igor
Stravinsky, who stated, perhaps a bit peremptorily, I consider
that music, in its essence, is powerless to express anything else:
a feeling, an attitude, a psychological state, a phenomenon in
Nature, etc. [4]. For Leonard Meyer, the existence of both
types of referent was obvious. The referent that concerns in-
ternal organization may intervene in the pleasure of recep-
tion; it makes it possible, through interacting resonance, to
anticipate, to create an expectation that ends in a resolution
capable of causing an emotion. But this is not exactly mean-
ing. Meyer species that there also exists an external referent.
If positions like that of Stravinsky are outdated, it is due to
the work of psychologists such as Robert Francs [5], who have
experimented with sound reception by maliciously having au-
ditors listen to Stravinsky and have
obtained convergent verbal re-
sponses. Additional development
was carried out by Michel Imberty
[6], who took Francss work in mu-
sical semantics further, using more
modern statistical methods of fac-
torial analysis of correspondences.
Convergences of meaning that go
beyond the eld of pure sound can
be systematically observed. For ex-
ample, Imbertys rst postulate
links sound to movement. This is
fairly close to intersensoriality. But
isnt the word movement in the
responses collected by Imberty a
mere metaphor? This difculty will
be encountered time and time
again: Are we induced to describe meaning with the help of
metaphors, for want of anything better, or are these metaphors
supported by some basis or other? If the latter, is this basis
physiological or does it appear during childhood? This is one
of the questions that must obviously be addressed.
This discussion will be divided in two parts, one that deals
with sound forms and one that deals with sound matter.
For the statement of this dichotomy, I am indebted to Pierre
Schaeffer, who set the concepts of form and matter in oppo-
sition to each other in order to describe the morphology of
sound elements [7]. Form describes outline, that is to say, tem-
poral evolution, whereas matter includes more immediate cri-
teria such as tone or texture. Qualities that pertain to form
refer to movement and are probably based on a kinesthetic
type of experience. Synesthetic associations between sound
matter and other sensorial elds, such as sight or touch, prob-
ably fall within the province of physiologists. I will nonethe-
less try to present the information in my possession for
collective analysis.
THE SENSORIMOTOR BASES OF THE
REPRESENTATION OF MOVEMENT
Just as symbolism among children rests essentially on sensori-
motor experience, as has been explained by Piaget [8], so for
the musician, and notably the performer, the symbolism of
movement is based on gestural experience. There is a con-
tinuous transition between sensorimotor experience and sym-
bolism and this may be one of the keys to the explanation of
musical meaning. In music, and especially in the music of the
Western world, the representation of movement has been con-
sidered one of the bases of meaning. Francs points out that
emotion in music is linked to sounds through the represen-
tation of movement. A sound form can be related to what he
calls a kinetic form of behavior, which is itself linked to emo-
2003 ISAST LEONARDO, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 313316, 2003 313
A B S T R A C T
Intersensoriality is part of the
more general problem of
musical meaning: How does
sound relate to something
outside of the world of sound? If
we distinguish the form of
sound from its matter, the
discussion can then be divided
into two parts. First, how can
sound forms (shapes, proles)
suggest other temporal forms,
such as movement? The hypoth-
esis developed here is that
sensorimotor experience is
generalized to furnish a base, in
successive layers, for identifying
suggested movements that are
more and more abstract.
Secondly, how can a sound be
said to be hot or cold, dark
or clear? Metaphors concern-
ing the matter of sound deal
with a common level of synes-
thesia; a few stages of the
historical study of this phenome-
non are recalled here.
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Franois Delalande (researcher), Groupe de Recherches Musicales, Institut National de
lAudiovisuel, 116 avenue du Prsident Kennedy, 75520 Paris Cedex 16, France. E-mail:
fdelalande@ina.fr. Web: http://www.ina.fr/grm.
Translated by Yves and Barbara Lemeunier.
Originally presented at the colloquium Intersens et Nouvelles Tecnologies (Intersenses
and New Technologies), 28 November2 December 2000, at Cit de la Musique, Marseille,
France.
Leonardo_36-4_255_344 7/17/03 12:05 PM Page 313
tional states. To give a simple example,
Francs uses this postulate to explain that
a rapid movement (allegro) is generally
more joyous than a slow movement. A
person who is depressed has lower mus-
cular tone, so to speak, compatible with
slow body movements. Consequently, a
slow form in music, associated, thanks to
another explicative link, with a certain
type of movement (a kinetic pattern of
behavior) can evoke an emotional state.
In this case, the representation of move-
ment serves as a relay.
The link between movement in sound
and motor movement remains to be es-
tablished (as I intend to do here). Of
course, meaning in music is based on
many other codes. Gino Stefani has sug-
gested a hierarchy of codes on ve levels,
which go from codes that are general or
anthropological (meaning common to
all people) to those that are more spe-
cic and technical [9]. As will be the case
throughout this study, we are obviously
dealing with general codes, not with
transmitted culture. We are searching for
explanations on a general level (physio-
logical, ontogenetic, etc.) that are clearly
supra-cultural.
SENSORIMOTOR EXPERIENCE:
ACCOMMODATION AND
ASSIMILATION
A parallel can be established between the
sensorimotor experience of a small child
and that of a musician; it should proba-
bly be interpreted as a continuation of
what the musician experienced in in-
fancy. During the sensorimotor period,
there is no clear gap between act and feel-
ing; a gesture is both an impetus and a
recipient, that is to say that a child expe-
riences the world by shaking, pushing,
twisting, etc., and this kinesthetic expe-
rience is closely linked to the making of
sounds. When a child pushes a chair over
the oor, he hears the noise he is mak-
ing at the same time as he becomes aware
of resistance and of his own effort. Thus
a relationship between kinesthesia and
sound is created in the sensorimotor ex-
perience. By listening to a tape of the
sound produced, one can easily decode
it as the indication of an effort, a gesture
that pushes, scrapes and suddenly be-
comes easier. And indeed, this happens
constantly in music. When listening to a
violinist play, one can easily perceive the
bow bearing down, letting up and accel-
erating. The rst meaning attached to
the sound of an instrument is the gesture
that produces it. But the gesture for an
instrument includes a whole series of lev-
els, which go as far as what I will call the
suggested gesture. If a sound of the
same contour were produced by a syn-
thesizer, it would also suggest a move-
ment, but an imaginary movement that
could have produced such a sound.
The instrumentalists experience is of
a sensorimotor type. The performer uses
body and gestures not only to produce
sounds but also to receive them. The per-
former perceives with the hands, mouth,
breath, ribcage and so forth. Between
production and reception, a tight imbri-
cation is established, quite comparable
to what can be observed during infancy.
For Pierre-Yves Artaud, a utist,
Interpretation, for a musician, must go
through a distinct sensual contact with
his instrument. Through the sensations
that he experiences when he plays the
ute, in the tips of his ngers, close to
his lips, and also through the feeling of
his breath going into the mouthpiece.
The musical control of the phrasing, and
everything else, goes through that con-
tact, that very physical contact with the
instrument. The contact with the stream
of air that is obtained by the ngers is as
important as the contact one has with the
lips. If I play a Boehm ute, which rules
out any direct contact between ngers
and air, I have the impression Im fum-
bling in the dark, that something is miss-
ing in the sensations that I need to
achieve the proper tone [10].
Thus we realize to what extent the n-
gers, lips, and so on play a role as recep-
tors in instrumental music. This alone
justies the use of the term sensorimo-
tor. As Pierre-Yves Artaud has stated,
there is indeed an adjustment process; it
springs from the reception and rests on
an extremely short feedback loop. The
sensorimotor reception plays a role in the
adjustment of the gesture, primarily in
the search for tone.
It might be thought that things would
be different for a pianist. But the term
used by the pianist Jean-Claude Pen-
netier is worthy of note. Like Artaud, he
considers that he constantly accommo-
dates his gestures. (The word accom-
modation is Piagets.) He never says: To
obtain such and such a sound, to play
such and such a passage better, I must
do thus and so. By no means. He adjusts
his gesture empirically. I think that one
must listen to what one feels is the
proper gesture and progressively be-
come conscious of it so that little by lit-
tle, in short, it becomes memorized
[11]. This is indeed a description of the
sensorimotor process of accommodation
and assimilation. Piaget has a phrase,
which he uses for children, that is per-
fectly fitting to describe playing an in-
strument: The hand adapts to the shape
of the object [12].
MEANING LINKED TO
GESTURE
We have just seen how the creative ges-
ture adjusts in sensorimotor fashion and
how we are progressively led towards the
suggested gesture. As we shall see, this
takes place in a type of continuous move-
ment and not by going through distinct
stages. The rst degree on the contin-
uum is that of the meanings linked to the
producing gesture. The voice is a good
example of this. Listening to a singer, one
can actually perceive an effort overcome
by skill. The aria of the Queen of the
Night in Mozarts Magic Flute goes up to
a high F, which is very hard to produce.
When the singer reaches it, we feel she
cannot go higher, that she must not be
asked to go up to an F sharp. However,
the Institut de Recherche et Coordi-
nation Acoustique/Musique (IRCAM)
has recently created a computerized
singing program, and one of its rst
projects was to program the Queen of the
Nights aria. This proved to be a magnif-
icent counter-example. Naturally, the
computer synthesized the high F with
such ease that no hint of an effort can be
heard. The absence of effort makes us re-
alize that an extremely high note sung by
a singer is perceived as being fraught with
tension and even risk of failure.
GENERALIZING ASSIMILATION
We can go a step further towards the sug-
gested gesture by examining how a cer-
tain gesture made by an interpreter can
be assimilated to a more general ensem-
ble of other gestures. This is what Piaget
calls generalizing assimilation [13].
This pattern is extremely important be-
cause it represents one of the registers of
expression. As was evidenced in the ex-
ample of a child pushing a chair, whether
a performer plays vigorously or lightly,
the audience is perfectly capable of imag-
ining a vigorous or light touch. Insofar as
a musician is concerned, a vigorous ges-
ture will be related to all the vigorous ges-
tures he or she may make in a lifetime,
and even to vigorousness itself as a moral
category. Through the sound-producing
gesture, a much broader category is sug-
gested. This is how concepts are formed
during childhood. The Piagetian termi-
nology of generalizing assimilation is per-
fectly apt to describe what is being
produced in the case under study. A child
who caresses a stuffed toy experiences a
feeling similar to that of caressing other
soft objects. The child will then equate
these sensations, and many other similar
ones, so that the word soft will come to
evoke a precise experience. The word
314 Delalande, Sense and Intersensoriality
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would have no meaning if the child had
not felt and equated an aggregate of feel-
ings, thus leading to the creation of a cat-
egory of equivalence called softness.
Through a comparable mechanism of
generalizing assimilation, feelings can be-
come more inclusive and softness can
refer to affective relationships or intona-
tions of the voice. The concept of soft-
ness gradually expands.
This is exactly what happens in music.
I hear the gesture of a pianist who plays
lightly or strikes the keys with force; I sur-
mise what the gesture is because, through-
out the whole of my sensorimotor
education, I have been able to translate a
sound into a gesture. Moreover, these ges-
tures can be extended to much more in-
clusive categories. Pianist Glenn Gould
progressively reduced the range of ges-
tures he used to a certain number of types
corresponding to what musical terminol-
ogy would call expressive traits [14].
What is meant by an expressive trait?
Merely a type of productive gesture that
has become generalized. When Glenn
Gould struck the keyboard either vigor-
ously or lightly, the sound produced was
not the only indicatorin addition, body
position, facial expressionincluding
movements of the eyebrowsexpressed
vigor or lightness. In a vigorous body
position, his shoulders would contract
and his head pull in. A contraction of the
whole upper body could be observed. On
the other hand, to play light, successive
notes, Goulds head would no longer be
drawn back into his shoulders, and he
adopted another typical posture, leaning
over the keyboard, and wrinkling his
forehead. Thus his whole body was in-
volved.
THE ACCOMPANYING
GESTURE
This leads us to yet another level of in-
terpretation, which can be called the ac-
companying gesture. The important
question is: What is the purpose of these
gestures, which seem useless? Let us
watch Glenn Gould playing a very
smooth legato; he tends to move his
upper body, either swaying from side to
side or rocking back and forth. There is
a range of movements that obviously are
not used to produce sound. How can
they be interpreted? Using our analyses
and cross-checking with Goulds remarks
[15], we can see that gestural coherence
has to do with expression. To create u-
idity, thanks to a sustained legato (no-
tably in the left hand), he tends to make
the type of movement described above.
That is to say in the imaginary concep-
tion, a relationship is established between
uid sonorousness and an also uid type
of movement of the upper body. Like-
wise, breathing, for a pianist, unlike a
woodwind player, obviously plays no role
in the production of sound. However, on
a certain level, pianists are conscious of
the fact that they must fully control their
breathing. The pianist Jean-Claude Pen-
netier has stated,
Theres one thing that obsesses me,
which is breathing. To play such or such
a piece, I know how Im going to breathe.
For certain attacks, I like to breathe
deeply, whereas for others, my lungs be-
come empty as I breathe out, and that
corresponds to certain sounds, to a cer-
tain expressive volition.
And if I suggest, Do you really think
its expressive? Or isnt it simply linked
to a force? Is the contraction . . . ? Not
at all, its expressive! replies Pennetier.
A certain type of breathing seems to be
linked to a certain expressive content.
Take a very short breath, ll your lungs
half full, like a plant in water which opens
and closes very gently, is the advice Pen-
netier gives to one of his pupils. In this
instance, the piece to be played is
Chopins Second Ballade, which is, ac-
cording to Pennetier, very delicate, a sort
of inner paradise. You feel more at ease
physically to play that piece and that in-
uences your imagination. What is imag-
ined modies our breathing, but I think
that the opposite movement also exists,
that if you modify your breathing, you
can modify your own mental image.
Thus it appears that part of an inter-
preters motivity is not directly functional
but plays a role through the intermedi-
ary of an image.
THE SUGGESTED GESTURE
The last stage towards abstraction is what
we have called the suggested gesture, or
movement, the sound that soars and
becomes lighter. We have already noted
that it can be obtained by a stroking
movement that in actual fact becomes
lighter, but also by a synthesizer, in which
case the reference to a suggested gesture
is then the product of an illusion. Jean-
Pierre Drouet, a percussionist, explains
that now and then the lightening is ob-
tained by pressure. This is the case for a
hand-played percussion instrument with
a membrane, like the zarb. What is pe-
culiar is that sometimes, to give an im-
pression of lightness, I have paradoxically
to strike harder [16]. In this case we
note that the performing gesture and the
suggested movement are completely dis-
sociated, even if genetically the meaning
of lightening is based on the sensori-
motor experience of lightness.
TEMPORAL SEMIOTIC UNITS
The representations of movement can
thus be studied irrespective of all real ges-
tural or physical origins. The MIM team
(with which I was associated for that
study) tried to do so by making an in-
ventory of the type of sonorous gures
named Temporal Semiotic Units [17].
First the team observed that the repre-
sentation of movement can be dissoci-
ated from a precise trajectory. Thus, a
fall is characterized morphologically by
a steady acceleration of any one param-
eter after a period of stability, but it is pos-
sible, by simulation, to produce falls that
rise, or that neither rise nor fall (e.g. an
acceleration of the frequency of itera-
tion). For example, in the Temporal
Semiotic Unit called inexorable trajec-
tory, in spite of its name, the idea of a
trajectory is not the major element (as
simulations have shown, it can either rise,
fall or do neither), but rather the feeling
of the inexorable, which can be para-
phrased by the expression that never
stops . . . whatever action it is applied
to. This is why we chose the term Tem-
poral Semiotic Units (rather than rep-
resentation of movement or dynamic
gures), to stress the fact that we have
departed from particular dynamics in
order to describe an experiment in tem-
porality in the broadest sense possible.
This exploration had no other ambi-
tion than to stress the fact that the mean-
ings of movement related to sound
shapeseven if they are based on the
sensorimotor experience of early child-
hood and prolonged by the experience
of the instrumentalistactually comprise
combined series of meanings. Those
meanings range continuously from the
simple representation of a sound-
producing gesture to a generalization of
experiences in temporality separate from
all causal connection.
SOUND AND SYNESTHESIA
I will deal more rapidly with the questions
about the matter of soundin opposi-
tion to its formand with the metaphors
associated with it, probably linked to var-
ious forms of synesthesia, simply because
this subject, which is also standard in
music, is less well described.
Rather than the word matter, bor-
rowed from Schaeffer (and which already
calls to mind intersensoriality), I will use
the word sound, in the sense currently
generally accepted in all musical genres.
Delalande, Sense and Intersensoriality 315
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Matter, tone, sonorousness and
sound are near synonyms; they desig-
nate qualities that come to mind imme-
diately, independently of evolution and
development. Most of those who produce
musicperformers, conductors, techni-
cians, radio programmersspeak of
sound in this sense, whatever musical
universe they belong to [18]. Listeners
most often qualify the word sound by
using metaphors of synesthetic order. It
is in this eld that we can best study synes-
thesia in music. For example: the rst
movement of Winter in The Four
Seasons, by Vivaldi, played by the ensem-
ble Il Giardino Armonico. It is program
music illustrating a text. The text de-
voted to Winter is concerned with cold
and ice; how can one render cold and ice
through music and, more precisely,
through sound? Vivaldi found his so-
lution and his interpreters theirs. Why is
it that a given sound seems colder than
another? Is the sound obtained by play-
ing al ponticellovery close to the bridge,
and therefore a bit raspinga cold
sound? In what conditions is it cold? It is
clear that there must be cold and warm
sounds, just as we speak of light and dark
tones. We constantly use synesthetic
metaphors to describe sound, and this
is the very eld that we are exploring.
There is a history of synesthesia in psy-
chology. At the end of the 19th and be-
ginning of the 20th century, there was an
interest in pathological cases, notably in
color-hearing. This phenomenon is of
no particular interest to us, even if it
sometimes helps us understand more
general mechanisms. Research has gone
beyond this stage and, from the Gestalt
school on, has tried to examine forms of
synesthesia in a more general way. Werner
[19], for example, was led to formulate
hypotheses of a physiological nature to
explain associations between colors and
sounds. Merleau-Ponty also stated,
These are not exceptional phenomena.
Synesthetic perception is the rule, and
if we do not perceive it, it is because sci-
entic knowledge displaces the experi-
ence. . . . we have forgotten how to see,
to hear and, in general, to feel, and we
infer that the organization of our bodies
and the world as the physicist perceives
it is what we ought to see, hear and feel
[20].
Thus, perception seems to be guided
by knowledge, but on a certain level,
there must exist what Werner calls a
synesthetic layer [21], which is more
general than the differentiation made
through the channels of the senses.
There are thus strong, exceptional
cases of synesthesia and weak, ordinary
forms, experienced by all of us, which
crop up in metaphorical language. But a
lack of metaphor does not mean that
there is no synesthesia. Surely an expla-
nation must be given for metaphoric con-
vergences. If I ask a group of subjects to
classify a set of tones from light to dark,
their answers will be quite similar. On the
other hand, it is not at all apparent that
people listening to music will want to clas-
sify tones on such a scale.
When we listen to music, we constantly
use metaphors, putting sounds in rela-
tionship to non-sonorous elements,
which our other senses can normally per-
ceive, but not necessarily in the same way.
One listener will be aware of a scale going
from light to dark, another will notice a
near and far relationship, and yet an-
other will distinguish rising and falling.
The result will be diverging forms of
metaphorization, linked to different
methods of listening. However, if a lis-
tener is given precise directions that
focus the semantic eld on a particular
dimension, such as high/low or shrill/
deep, sufcient convergence can be ob-
served so as to construct scales delineated
by such correspondences. Schaeffer did
this in speaking of rough and smooth
sounds [22]. It is not necessary to classify
sounds on a rough/smooth axis, but if it
is done, the same sounds will be rough
or smooth for all listeners. We thus ap-
proach an area that undeniably possesses
a certain generality.
Gino Stefani [23], an Italian semioti-
cian, has tried to link the dimensions of
music to a common musical experience,
that is, to the way that music is received.
He calls this experience sound record-
ing. Stefanis play on words underlines
the fact that the listener appropriates
sound and music and that there are dif-
ferent ways of doing so. Motor experi-
ence corresponds to rhythm; the
experience of what is singable corre-
sponds to melody. As for sound, in the
modern meaning mentioned above, Ste-
fanis contention is that it belongs typi-
cally to the register of synesthesia:
Soundestesia is a global recording of a
musical object-event; but it is also another
way of being seized by sound, by music
which takes hold of us in all senses, that
is, synesthetically. We can thus say . . . that
sound is what creates synesthesia in music
or, symmetrically, that it is a synesthetic
appropriation of music [24].
We can thus nd forms and contours
that are probably of a kinesthetic na-
turewhether melodic or rhythmical
and soundthat is, an instantaneous
dimension that may more correctly be
linked to a classical conception of synes-
thesia.
References
1. Roman Jakobson, Essais de linguistique gnrale II
(Paris: Minuit, 1973) p. 99.
2. Edouard Hanslick, Du Beau dans la musique (Paris:
Christian Bourgois, 1986; originally published 1854).
3. Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
4. Igor Stravinsky, Chroniques de ma vie (Paris: Denol,
1962) p. 63.
5. Robert Francs, La Perception de la Musique (Paris:
Vrin, 1958).
6. Michel Imberty, Entendre la Musique (Paris: Dunod,
1979) and Les Ecritures du Temps (Paris: Dunod, 1981).
7. Pierre Schaeffer, Trait des objets musicaux (Paris:
Seuil, 1966).
8. Jean Piaget, La Formation du symbole chez lenfant
(Neuchtel-Paris: Delacchaux et Niestl, 1945).
9. Gino Stefani, La Competenza musicale (Bologna,
Italy: CLUEB, 1982).
10. The quotations by the instrumentalists Pierre-
Yves Artaud, Jean-Claude Pennetier and Jean-Pierre
Drouet are part of an inquiry prepared for a radio
series entitled Music and the Hand on France Cul-
ture, 1980. For more complete excerpts, see Franois
Delalande, Il gesto musicale, dal sensomotorio al
simbolico; aspetti ontogenetici, in F. Delalande, Le
condotte musicali (Bologna, Italy: CLUEB, 1993).
11. See Ref. [10].
12. Jean Piaget, La Naissance de lintelligence chez len-
fant (Neuchtel, Switzerland, and Paris: Delachaux
et Niestl, 1977) p. 93.
13. Jean Piaget [12] p. 164.
14. Franois Delalande, La gestique de Gould; l-
ments pour une smiologie du geste musical, in G.
Guertin, ed., Glenn Gould pluriel (Montral: Louise
Courteau ditrice, 1988).
15. Delalande [14].
16. See Ref. [10].
17. Laboratoire Musique et Informatique de Mar-
seille, Les Units smiotiques temporelles (Marseille,
France: MIM, 1996).
18. Franois Delalande, Le Son des musiques, entre tech-
nologie et esthtique (Paris: Ina/Buchet-Chastel, 2001).
19. H. Werner, Lunit de sens, Journal de psycholo-
gie normale et pathologique 31 (1934) pp. 190205.
20. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phnomnologie de la per-
ception (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).
21. Werner [19] p. 200.
22. Schaeffer [7].
23. Gino Stefani, Musica: dallesperienza alla teoria
(Milan, Italy: Ricordi, 1998).
24. Stefani [23] p. 50.
Franois Delalande is research director of the
Musical Reseach Group at the Institut Na-
tional de lAudiovisuel in Paris. He leads work
in two elds of music sciences: (1) electro-
acoustic music analysis and beyond: theory of
analysis, music reception and musical behav-
ior; and (2) ontogenesis of musical behavior
and its application to music pedagogy.
316 Delalande, Sense and Intersensoriality
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