Tobias vs Abalos

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the R.A. 7675 which is entitled The Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city which will be called Mandaluyong City.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approve the conversion of the said municipality into province and the
result was in favor of the affirmative and the said republic act take effect.
As an effect, this will make the Province of San Juan and Mandaluyong be a separate legislative district, hence they will have
different representative who will be voted by the inhabitants of each province.
Petitioners argue that the enactment of this R.A will increase the number of members in the House of Representatives. They
object that this is a violation of Article VI section 5 (1) which provides that the House of Representatives shall compose of not
more than 250 members.
The Article Section 5 (1) shows that the limit of 250 members of the House of Representatives is not absolute, the constitution
clearly provides unless otherwise provided by law the clause means that the congress may increase the number of
representatives if Congress itself mandates through legistlative enactment. Hence the RA is not unconstitutional.
Mariano Vs Comele
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of certain provision of the Republic act 7854 entitled An act converting the
municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city known as Makati City. They assail that the provision of the said R.A the
Section 52 of the R.A because it will add another legislative district in Makati which is in violation of Article VI section 5 (3) for
as of the latest census, the population of Makati is 450,000.
SC ruled that petitioners cannot insist that the additional legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the Article VI section
5(3) based on the latest census where Makati has 450,000 population. Under such provision, it provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. This means that if a city achieved the minimum
requirement of population which is 250,000, it can have at least 1 representative. Since Makati had 450,000 population, it can
add additional district since it achieved the minimum requirement of 250,000. The provision didnt state that the every
250,000 population should have 1 representative.
Quintos-Deles vs comelec
This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission on
Appointments to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties as a member of the House of
Representatives representing the Women's Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner's appointment to the
confirmation process.
petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President1. Teresita Quintos-Deles -Women
2. Al Ignatius G. Lopez Youth
3. Bartolome Arteche -Peasant
4. Rey Magno Teves -Urban Poor
the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the
Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-
appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some
congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed
by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of
Representatives. the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of
the four sectoral representatives
On January 31, 1989, the Court after noting the reply filed by the petitioner and the rejoinder filed by respondents, resolved to
give due course to the petition and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 309). By way of
manifestation and motion dated March 9, 1989 (Rollo, p. 311), the Office of the Solicitor General adopted its statement of
position (in lieu of comment) and rejoinder as its memorandum. Petitioners and intervenor Civil Liberties Union submitted their
memoranda on March 22, 1989 and March 30, 1989, respectively. A supplemental statement of position (in lieu of
memorandum) dated March 31, 1989 was filed by respondent Commission.
The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative districts and those who as provided by law,
shall be elected thru a party-list system. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is reserved for
sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three consecutive terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,"
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (Sarm
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution,
require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to
appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution.
Sema vs. Comelec
It held that the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao does not have the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, the creation of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan was unconstitutional and that province no longer exists as a political entity in the
Philippines. These consolidated certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief petitions sought the annulment of Commission on
Elections "Resolution No. 7902" (10 May 2007), treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Bai Sandra S. A. Sema (Sema), asked the COMELEC "to exclude from the canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of
the legislative district in question in the Philippine general election, 2007." The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8municipalities. Maguindanao forms
part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanaos
first legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the
8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, 2 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not
part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29 October 2006 plebiscite.
On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No.
07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELECs Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).
Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district
during the Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato
district, Didagen Dilangalen.
[2]
The court annulled "Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201", which created Shariff Kabunsuan (carved out
of Maguindanao, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Justice Antonio Carpio opined: "We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid."
Carpio stressed that only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the
creation of legislative districts. Creation of province or a city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. The Constitution
mandates that a province or a city with at least 250,000 inhabitants is entitled to at least one representative."
The Court also declared unconstitutional the RLAs power to create provinces and cities in the region but it did not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of new municipalities and barangays. Under Republic Act No. 9140 or the Expanded ARMM Law, the RLA
has the power to create new LGUs and to set its own criteria in creating, dividing, merging, or abolishing LGUs.
[3]

Carpio further ruled that "in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House
of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50
party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district
representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the
allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces."
Bagong bayani vs comelec
two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
1
issued by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not
the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of
herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended."
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed.
4
On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
5

Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution, provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared
that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the
provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new
chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature."
35

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in
accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of
the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of
the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a
statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
38

League of cities vs comelec
Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,
Congress enacted into lawRepublic Act No. 9009 which took effect on June 30, 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirements
in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of
Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills
contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirements in RA
9009. On December 22, 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved
the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 7, 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to
declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for
violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether or not the
Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held: 1. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion ? mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress ? is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-
viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Banat vs comelec
a petition for certiorari and mandamus,
[1]
assails the Resolution
[2]
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En
Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution.
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of
COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the
COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using
the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least
four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list;
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of. The House of
Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to
party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate
from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14
th
Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in theConstitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
Aquino 3
rd
vs Comelec
petitioners seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative
to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur
was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,
2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts, the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. , concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by
the Constitution for such new district.
4

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.
6
The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5.(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. The use by the
subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
26
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition
to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes
this point.
40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an
additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
Romualdez-Marcos vs. comelec
Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the
Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
Ratio Decidendi:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of
petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only
7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost
only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife
does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile
after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second
District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate forcongressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a
period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by
Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution
Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate forRepresentative of the Second District of Makati City, he
must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At
that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. Hisbirth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
BANAT vs COMELEC. G.R. No. 203766 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party-List System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani andBANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must used the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-
list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-
defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANATcase, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized
sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It
is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941
includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se
economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.

Ligot vs Mathay
Political Law Salaries of Representatives Retirement
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-
year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office
(1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government
was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act
expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term
expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as
amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total
of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of
employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.
HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor
General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied
to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such
increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30,
1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of
increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots
claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation
within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as
provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary
beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-
General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.