Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No.

127255, August 14, 1997

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions
of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved
to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the
conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared
by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.

558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous
Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement

SEMA vs COMELEC

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of
Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a
plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create
provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional
Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised
of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only
made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo
should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration
from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She
contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that
province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes
Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S.
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that
a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that
in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On
the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating
a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative
districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities
and provinces.

Another suggested answer:

No. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the grant to the Regional Assembly of the
ARMM of the power to create provinces and cities by Congress under RA 9054. “Only Congress
can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes
the creation of legislative districts” and that “Congress exercises these powers through a law
that the Congress itself enacts and not through a law that a regional or local legislative bodies
enact.” An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.”(GR Nos. 177597 and 178628, Sema v. Comelec
and Marquez v. Comelec, July 16, 2008)

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271

May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify
and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list
groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May
14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition
to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in
the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the
Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknowns
then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date
April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the
party list nominees away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report
appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941
that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must
not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.

In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-
list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees
possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3,
2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of
the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees
do not appear to be qualified.

2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution; and

3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or
publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would
require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of
judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is
not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts
on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the
evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an election

3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where
the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official
records are not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern"
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or
like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups
in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the
legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject
of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

Delegation of Powers

Department Secretary alter ego of Congress.

Congress delegated the power of ascertainment of facts upon which the enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent to the Secretary of Finance. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006 contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the
President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the
event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary becomes the means or tool
by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress.
Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or
modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary the authority to
ascertain the existence of a fact. If it is exists, the Secretary, by legislative mandate, must
submit such information to the President who must impose the 12% VAT rate. There is no
undue delegation of legislation power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.
This is constitutionally permissible. (Abakada Guro Party List, etc., et al. vs. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 168056, and other cases, September 1, 2005).

Q — Section 34 of RA 9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
200_” (EPIRA) imposes Universal Charge upon end-users of electricity (a charge imposed for the
recovery of stranded cost; stranded debts refer to any unpaid financial obligations of the NPC
which has not been liquidated by the proceeds from the sales and privatization of NPC Assets;
stranded contract costs of NPC or distribution utility refer to the excess of the contract cost of
electricity under eligible contracts over the actual selling price of the contracted energy output
of such contracts in the market.

ERC issued its Implementing Rules and Regulations defining Universal Charge refers to
the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery of Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC
and Stranded Contract Costs of Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes
pursuant to Section 34 of the EPIRA. (Rule 4 (rrr, IRR).

National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with

Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of
its share for Missionary Electrification.

The ERC decided the NPC’s petition authorizing it to draw up to P70, 000, 000.00 from
PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the
Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged
Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their
respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.

Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to
implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:

1. The universal charge provided for under Section 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be
implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative
function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency
like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision
clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC,
hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

2. The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected
should be used.

3. The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory
and amounts to taxation without representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
be heard and represented.

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to
fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886,
March 31, 1993, 220 SCRA 703; Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-79601-03,
June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 521; and Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, L-77194, March 15, 1988,
158 SCRA 626, invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges
imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds were
created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to
counteract the changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which
cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to
delegate powers to administrative bodies. They posited that the Universal Charge is imposed
not for a similar purpose.

The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

1. Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the
ERC.

Decide.

ANS: 1. As to the first issue.

No, the Universal Charge is not a tax. In exacting the said charge through Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA, the State’s police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be
deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is
imposed, and which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character.

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement
of police power. (Osmeña v. Orbos, Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, Tio v. Videogram
Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, 151 SCRA 208, 216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955)). In
Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al. and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, it was held
that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were
exactions made in exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v.
Orbos, with respect to the OPSF.

With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also created under the administration
of PSALM.

As aptly pointed out by the OSG, evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special
Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is well within the pervasive
and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and
economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority
we designate as the police power of the State.

This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction
imposed primarily in the pursuit of the State’s police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and
assures attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed,
i.e., to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of
Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, Nachura, J).

2. As to the second issue.

No ,there is no undue delegation of powers to the ERC. The EPIRA, read and appreciated
in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions,
and it contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, shall
be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be
paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
parameters provided by the law itself when it provided for the promulgation and enforcement
of a National Grid Code, and a Distribution Code.

This is also the case when the EPIRA law authorized the PSALM to compute the stranded
debts and stranded costs of the NPC which is to form the basis of the ERC in determining its
universal charge.

As to the second test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: “interest of law and order;” “adequate and efficient instruction;” “public interest;”
“justice and equity;” “public convenience and welfare;” “simplicity, economy and efficiency;”
“standardization and regulation of medical education;” and “fair and equitable employment
practices.” Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure the total electrification of
the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power”, and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are
sufficient standards. (Gerochi, et al. v. Dept. of Energy, et al., G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007,
Nachura, J).

Note:

It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC’s conferred powers were
challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 161113,
June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157, it has been held

“In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions
of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in its entirely,
because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its
meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration
of the statute as a whole. Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading
the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the
regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to
be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the
ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers already conferred upon ERC’s
predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possess only the powers and functions listed
under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to the
delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public
utility, to wit;

Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the
preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary social interests
in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to “assume an affirmative duty to
eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial
economy.” Police power is not exerted “to further the public welfare – a concept as vast as the
good of society itself.” When the police power is delegated to administrative bodies with
regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even
broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more
active role in balancing the many conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was
issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power. We should
have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the
field of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a
traditional instrument of economic growth that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is
an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of
progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of
pesos would be lost as a result of power outrages or unreliable electric power services. The
State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great flexibility, when the
need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v.

Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, where it was
held that the ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes
wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we there fore hold there is no undue delegation of
legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that
the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory, and
amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned per Resolution of August 3, 2004. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a
tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves questions of
fact, and thus, the Court is precluded from reviewing the same.

Note

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the
EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal structure and regulatory framework for the electric
power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and improvement of
the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the
industry itself have long been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To
attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of the industry had to be
addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic,
the distribution side was fragmented with over 10 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The
pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of existing generation capacity; extremely high
and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to forgettable
performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a
clear strategy for overcoming these shortcomings.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a
competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the
private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors,
namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating
plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.
(Freedom from Debt Coalition v. ERC, G.R. No. 161113, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 157).