23. PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. HON.

SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the GAB of 1994, was passed and approved by both houses of Congress.
As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant
to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval. President signed the bill into law,
and declared the same to have become RA NO. 7663 GAA of 1994. President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows: 1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme
cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA; 2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities
and Colleges (SUCs); 3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance; 4.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law
(R.A. No. 6675); 5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior
approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds; 6. Provision
authorizing Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds; 7. Conditions
on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

ISSUES:
1. WON the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 are constitutional
2. WON the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

HELD:
Veto of the Provisions
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed
provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in
Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it
is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy. The veto of the second paragraph of
Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question
is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for
road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.

Special Provision in the Appropriation for Debt Service
The appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there
are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the
President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional
commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President
has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the
ones to be embodied in the guidelines.


24 GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. No. 2085666 November 19, 2013

FACTS: Petitioners filed the present petitions for certiorari and prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers
and Filipino citizens, challenging the constitutionality of the PDAF provisions in the 2013 GAA and
certain provisions in Presidential Decree Nos. 910 and 1869. "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated
with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent
controversies on the matter has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund PD 910, issued
by then President Marcos. Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development
of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. Presidential Social Fund was created under PD
1869, or the Charter of the PAGCOR. PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos. As it stands, the
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government
in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.



Petitioners filed for seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional and the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment before the SC, seeking the lifting, or
in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the
Courts TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
1. WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions;

2. WON the phrases relating to the Malampaya Funds, and to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations, the Court
hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL (a)entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past
and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether individually or collectively
organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment
stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification
and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of
congressional oversight.

Non-delegability of Legislative Powe; Checks and Balances
The Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation. That the power to appropriate
must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which states that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. The power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation a matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to
taking undue advantage of their own office.

Malampaya Fund
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is
sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative
guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a)
filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b)
ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making. There are
two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed
adequate. The first test is called the completeness test. Case law states that a law is complete when it sets
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. The second test is
called the sufficient standard test. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates
authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. The said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be
confined only to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government under the principle of ejusdem generis, general word or phrase is to be construed to include
or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned. Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is early deducible from its text, the phrase and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken
down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law.


25 MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, ET AL VS. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO, III
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

FACTS: During the official budget deliberation of the DBCC and DBM, Rep. Neri Colmenares of Bayan Muna
Party-list inquired from the DBM Secretary, Respondent Florencio Abad about the nature of the DBM
National Budget Circular No. 541 (NBC 541). Sec. Abad informed the Appropriations Committee that
NBC541 is intended to accelerate disbursement under a then unknown DAP by withdrawing unobligated
allotments from under-spending agencies. When asked by Rep. Colmenares whether NBC 541 is
constitutional considering that it authorizes withdrawal of funds midyear and realigns it to other projects,
Sec. Abad maintained that it is only intended to be realigned for existing projects anyway. He further
stated that if the withdrawn funds will be spent on projects not contained in the General Appropriations
Act then indeed it would be unconstitutional. Estrada said that after the conviction of Corona in May
2012, those who voted to convict him were allotted an additional P50 Million, as provided in a private
and confidential letter memorandum by the then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. In his
speech, Estrada dubbed the additional amount as incentive for Coronas ouster. Sec. Abad issued a
statement through the DBM website explaining the purpose of the additional fund releases to senators as
mentioned in the speech of Sen. Estrada and said that the same came from the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP). According to Sec. Abad these funds were not bribes, but were necessary to help
accelerate economic expansion. He funding for DAP, the respondents said came from pooled
savingsand the Unprogrammed Fund. The so-called savings, camefrom the centralization of unreleased
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations, unreleased appropriations of slow
moving projects and discontinued projects and the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, also for slow-
moving programs and projects, which have earlier been released to national government agencies. More
importantly, the transfer or realignment of funds did not only went border crossing, but it even included
funding for new projects. In his memorandum to the President, Sec. Abad said that the pooled savings
were also intended for new activities which have not been anticipated during the preparation of the
budget and to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds e.g. PDAF, Calamity
Fund and Contingent Fund.

ISSUES:
1. WON the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP
violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as they treat the unreleased appropriations
and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government agencies as savings; they authorize the
disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and they augment discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

2. WON the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances, and
(3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.

HELD:
DAP is unconstitutional.
No less than the Constitution mandates that public funds will not be paid out of the national treasury
exception through an appropriation law enacted by Congress. Congress alone can authorize the
expenditure of public funds through its power to appropriate. The power to appropriate carries with it the
power to specify not just the amount that may be spent but also the purpose for which it may be spent.
Tantamount to appropriating public funds, the NBC 541 authorizes the funding priority programs and
projects not considered in the 2012. While being peddled as a stimulus package, the DAP is actually an
appropriation law which seeks to set aside public funds for public use. Sec. 24 Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that all appropriation bills shall originate exclusively in the HR. The DAP, not being
initiated by the HR, is unconstitutional. Moreover, no appropriation law was enacted stating the amount
that may be spent for DAP, as well as the purpose for which the DAP may be spent. No appropriation law
was enacted by Congress creating DAP. The cited provisions by Respondents do not amount to an
appropriation law, but merely a futile and belated attempt to justify an illegal appropriation and
disbursement of public funds and usurpation of the legislatives power to appropriate public funds. NBC
541 is an appropriation of public funds by the Executive, which did not originate in the HR as mandated
by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing the increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

The rule on the use and transfer of funds is clear as it is meticulously laid down in Art. VI, Section 25 (5)
of our Constitution: No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prohibits transfer of
appropriations. This simply means that once Congress passes the General Appropriation Act (GAA) or
any appropriation law, with or without any veto from the President, the same remains unalterable and
must be executed to the letter. The appropriations law becomes the law of the land, a product of the
collective effort of the representatives of the people and the different government agencies. Those who
have participated in the yearly budget process would knowhow arduous, detailed, and lengthy such a
process is, with government agencies listing all their spending in the previous year and coming up with
new projects needing funding; preparing for the justifications for each and every line item budget in case
Congress would ask for the wisdom of such an expenditure; as well as preparing for both parochial and
national concerns that may be raised by Congress during the budget deliberation/interpellation which may
or may not be related to the agencies budget but has an effect on its overall performance as an agency.
Congress has to contend with poring over at least 5 budget books -the National Expenditure Program,
Budget of Expenditure and Sources of Financing, Staffing Summary and Details of the Budget 1and 2
and studying the spending history/backgrounds and budget requests of each and every agency; reviewing
the agencys previous claims and promises; and most importantly, the impact of the agencies past budget
and current proposal to a particular lawmakers district or constituency. This being the case, the resulting
appropriations law is not a simple feat that should easily be trifled with. Not even Congress who passed it
can alter the same, without under going the same tedious process of enacting or amending a law. Such
is the wisdom of our Constitution. As a limited grant nevertheless, the Constitution allows the President,
President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions, to transfer of appropriations ONLY in specific circumstances: (1) if there is
a law; (2) if there are savings; and (3) only to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. The creation and implementation of the DAP and the NBC 541 violate the above-
stated provision.


26 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK (Philippine Branch) vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
ON BANKS
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007

FACTS: Petition for Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction) filed by
petitioners. SCB is a bank instituted in England. Petitioners are Executive officers of said bank.
Respondent is one of the permanent committees of the Senate. Petition seeks the issuance of a TRO to
enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.) Resolution
No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of SCB-Philippines to attend and testify before any
further hearing to be conducted by respondent; and (3) enforcing any hold-departure order (HDO) and/or
putting the petitioners on the Watch List. It also prays that judgment be rendered (1) annulling the
subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum issued to petitioners, and (2) prohibiting the respondent
from compelling petitioners to appear and testify in the inquiry being conducted pursuant to P.S.
Resolution No. 166. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, delivered a privilege speech entitled Arrogance of
Wealth before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and
urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a
similar fraudulent activity in the future. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S.
Resolution No. 166, DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
CURRENCIES, TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, INTO THE ILLEGAL SALE
OF UNREGISTERED AND HIGH-RISK SECURITIES BY STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, WHICH
RESULTED IN BILLIONS OF PESOS OF LOSSES TO THE INVESTING PUBLIC. Acting on the
referral, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, set the initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation, the subject
matter of the speech and resolution filed by Senator Enrile. Respondent invited petitioners to attend the
hearing, requesting them to submit their written position paper. Senator Enrile inquired who among those
invited as resource persons were present and who were absent. Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be
issued to those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the DOJ, through the Bureau of
Immigration, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List. Senator
Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved. Respondent then proceeded with the
investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through counsel, made an Opening
Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from affected clients
for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents
mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases
regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.

ISSUE: WON SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by the
courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases, the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach
upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.

HELD: Contention is UNTENABLE. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the
inquiry to be conducted by the Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof. The
unmistakable objective of the investigation exposes the error in petitioners allegation that the inquiry, as
initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply to denounce the illegal
practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x. This fallacy is
made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged
the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence
of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. In Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt is based on the
principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the
sovereign character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of
government. In this case, petitioners imputation that the investigation was in aid of collection is a
direct challenge against the authority of the Senate Committee, as it ascribes ill motive to the latter. In
this light, we find the contempt citation against the petitioners reasonable and justified.


27 ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified on matters concerning the
National Broadband Project, a project awarded by the DOTC to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. Committees persisted in knowing
petitioners answers to these 3 questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with
petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The senate thereafter issued a show cause
order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony. Petition for certiorari and Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) granted by the SC court.

ISSUES:
(1) WON there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by executive privilege;
(3) WON Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.

HELD:
There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege
Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The
Court articulated in cases that, the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In this case, it was the
President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific
matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the
three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation. A
President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These
are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.

There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the Communications Elicited by the Three (3)
Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power. Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power, because the Constitution does not vest it in the President alone,
but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive. The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does
not make such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an
executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the
fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not
diminish the executive nature of the power. In the same way that certain legislative acts require action
from the President for their validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature.

B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. Committees also seek reconsideration of
the application of the doctrine of operational proximity for the reason that it maybe misconstrued to
expand the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President but who may have no direct communications with her. It
must be stressed that the doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope of
the presidential communications privilege. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege to a
large swath of the executive branch is absent because the official involved here is a member of the
Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of
her official family.

C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in
balancing respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the
1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent
in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. With respect
to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people to
information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to
support respondent Committees case. There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right
of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency.
These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. In the case at
bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any
way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency.

Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in I ssuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(the Rules) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain from
reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress compliance therewith. We
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.


28 VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, et al
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

FACTS: Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the COMELEC surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as
the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings
were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress. In one of the Senates plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator
Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 if the
body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a
privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use,
possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public
officials. Petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of CA, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the
main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is sufficient compliance of the publication requirement prior to the effectivity of
laws and other issuances.

HELD: SC dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 170338 but granted the petition in G.R. No. 179275. A writ
of prohibition was issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes. The
Court held that the Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
it or after it. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page. The
Court did not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure."


29 SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions surfaced, this prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP.
The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to
speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department
heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of
Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they
were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. GMA issued EO 464 which took
effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the AFP and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege; PNP officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in
such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military
personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying
before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: WON EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. The
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who do possess it. Section 22 provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and
if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested,
hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour
is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads
in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory.