Caudal vs.

Court of Appeals,
175 SCRA 798, G.R. No. 83414
Ponente: Judge Fernan
July 31, 1989

Doctrine:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute.
Clauses and phrases of the statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts.

Facts:
1. This case is a petitioner for review seeking the reversal of the Regional Trial Courts
decision and affirmed by Court of Appeals which grants the respondent Dionisio Cu
to take possession of the herein disputed property.
2. The respondent after years of leasing has finally bought a permanent abode for his
family. The property had an existing improvement, a six door apartment, in one of the
apartment is occupied by the herein petitioner.
3. The petitioner was notified of the termination of the lease and was ordered to
vacate in 3 months, since the respondent is also in need of the property. Yet, after due
notice the occupant did not vacate the property. The respondent brought the matter to
the respective Barangay Captain then he was issued a certification to bring the matter
to the court.
4. The MTC decided in favor of the petitioner, then it was reversed by the RTC on the
ground that the ejectment was due to the legitimate need of the owner/lessor which
the CA affirmed.
5. The petitioner alleged that he has a verbal contract with the previous owner on a
month to month basis, the payment is duly deposited in the bank. And that the use of
the subject apartment door as “stockroom, office, and quarters for maids drivers” is
not a valid ground for judicial ejectment under Section 5 or B.P. 877 or Rental Law.

Issue:
Whether the use of the intention of the new owner to use the subject apartment door
for stockroom, office and maids’ quarters and drivers is included in the ground for
judicial ejectment under Section 5 or B.P. 877 or Rental Law

Ruling:
Yes, the Rental Law did not confine the “residence” to mere habitation purposes.

Section 2 (b) of Rental Law states that: “Residential Unit—refers to an apartment,

house and/or land on which another’s dwelling is located used for residential purposes
and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling
places, except . . . but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other
business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, that in the case of a retail store, home
industry or business, the initial capitalization thereof shall not exceed five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) and Provided, further, that in the operation of the store, home
industry or business, the owner thereof shall not require the services of any person
other than the members of his household. On the other hand Section 5 of the same
statute provides that, “ “(N)o lessor or his successor-in-interest shall be entitled to
eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises has been sold or mortgaged
to a third person regardless of whether the lease or mortgage is registered or not.”
While 5(c) provides a grounds for judicial ejectment, which is the legitimate need of
the lessor provided that it gives the lessee three months notice,

To appreciate the term “residential unit” we must refer to the Rental Law as a
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts. In this case, the law explicitly define a residential unit not by mere habitation
purposes, the respondent admits on his purpose to remodel the entire property which
would consider the entire conjugal property as one which includes the subject door
apartment, thus with that intention by Cu, the entire property is considered a
“residential unit”, which gives the respondent the right to eject Caudal. While the law
also provides protection for the lessee, the owner of the property were also provided
with preferential rights, thus when respondent gave the petitioner a notice of three
months and with the intention of possessing the property for his own use, the owner
has the ground for judicial ejectment against the petitioner.

Wherefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
Relationship to our subject:
In this case the Supreme Court in aid of statutory construction referred to the
provisions of the Rental Law to fix the contention on whether the stockroom, office
and maids’ quarters and drivers are included in the definition of “residential unit”, it
also which paved the clarification on the grounds for judicial ejectment.