STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION...............................................................1
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................2
I. STATUTES..........................................................................................4
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.............................................................4
Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez............................................4
Lidasan vs. Commision on Elections..........................................................4
People vs. Ferrer........................................................................................5
Tobias vs. Abalos........................................................................................5
Tañada vs. Tuvera......................................................................................6
II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION.........................................7
*Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals...................................7
People vs. Nazario......................................................................................7
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa vs. Manila Railroad Company.....................7
Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicholas...........................................7
Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc..............................................................8
Lapid vs. Court of Appeals.........................................................................8
People vs. Jabinal......................................................................................8
Co vs. Court of Appeals..............................................................................9
Benzonan vs. CA.........................................................................................9
III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION.............................................................11
City of Baguio vs. Marcos........................................................................11
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito..................................................................................11
People vs. Purisima..................................................................................11
U.S. vs. Hart.............................................................................................12
Matabuena vs. Cervantes.........................................................................12
People vs. Manantan................................................................................12
Director of Lands vs. Abaya.....................................................................13
Salaysay vs. Castro..................................................................................13
Commissioner of Customs vs. CTA..........................................................14
Gloria vs. CA............................................................................................15
Buenaseda vs. Flavier..............................................................................15
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals...........................................16
Philippine Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs.................................16
IV. ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM LANGUAGE..................18

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 National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC..................................................18
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, et al..........................................................18
Santiago vs. Comelec...............................................................................19
Casela vs. Court of Appeals.....................................................................19
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.................................................20
King vs. Hernandez..................................................................................20
U.S. vs. Toribio.........................................................................................21
Commendador vs. De Villa......................................................................21
Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. CTA..........................................................22
People vs. Yu Hai.....................................................................................22
Amatan vs. Aujero....................................................................................23
People vs. Purisima..................................................................................23
Salvacion vs. Central Bank......................................................................23
Demafiles vs. Comelec.............................................................................24
Chua vs. Civil Service Commission..........................................................24
V. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES................................26
Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. NTC.............................................26
Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.............................................26
Manila Herald vs. Ramos.........................................................................26
Claudio vs. COMELEC............................................................................27
Garcia vs. COMELEC..............................................................................27
Liggett & Myers Tobacco vs. Collector of Internal Revenue...................28
Garvida vs. Sales......................................................................................28
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos.................................................................29
Carandang vs. Santiago...........................................................................29
People vs. Santiago..................................................................................30
Caltex Phils., Inc. vs. Palomar.................................................................30
Mutuc vs. Comelec...................................................................................31
Vera vs. Cuevas........................................................................................31
Republic vs. Migrino................................................................................32
U.S. vs. Santo Nino...................................................................................32
Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. SSC.......................................................32
Lerum vs. Cruz.........................................................................................33
Vera vs. Fernandez...................................................................................33
Manabat vs. De Aquino............................................................................34
Escribano vs. Avila...................................................................................34
People vs. Tamani....................................................................................35
Fores vs. Miranda....................................................................................35
Manila Electric Company vs. Public Utilities Employees.......................36

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VI. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE...........................................37
National Tobacco Adm. vs. Commission on Audit...................................37
People vs. Garcia.....................................................................................37
Republic vs. Court of Appeals..................................................................38
Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals....................................................................38
Paras vs. COMELEC...............................................................................39
Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. Court of Appeals............................................39
C&C Commercial Corp. vs. NAWASA.....................................................40
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. vs. City of Butuan...................................................40
Bagatsing vs. Ramirez..............................................................................41
City of Manila vs. Teotico........................................................................42
VII. STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION.......................................43
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan.....................................................................43
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals.........................43
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals.........................44
Cena vs. Civil Service Commission..........................................................44
Abella vs. NLRC.......................................................................................45
VIII. MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES..................................46
Chartered Bank vs. National Government Auditing Office......................46
McGee vs. Republic..................................................................................46
Fule vs. Court of Appeals.........................................................................47
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC..........................................................47
Marcelino vs. Cruz...................................................................................47
Bersabal vs. Salvador...............................................................................48
IX. PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES................................49
Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue................49
Nilo vs. Court of Appeals.........................................................................49
People vs. Zeta.........................................................................................50
Buyco vs. PNB..........................................................................................50
Subido, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan.................................................................51
Billones vs. CIR........................................................................................51
Corales vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission...............................52
Development Bank of the Phils. vs. CA....................................................52
X. AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL...............54
Case Name................................................................................................54
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION.............................................55
Case Name................................................................................................55

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PAGE 5 OF 56
 I. STATUTES
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630, G.R. NO. 115873 & 115931
25 AUGUST 1994
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or
exchange of services. R.A. No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716.
ISSUES: Whether or not this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced
in the title of R.A. No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No.
1590 as among those which the statute amends.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that since the title states that
the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing
this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before.
To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to §
103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that
the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional
requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if
they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did
not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any
defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although
published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their
existence. Indeed, the title of R.A. No. 7716 is not any more general than the
title of PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made
of its tax exemption.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a
manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary
legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject
of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus
expressed.
CASCO PHILS. CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS. GIMENEZ
7 SCRA 347, G.R. NO. L-17931
28 FEBRUARY 1963
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Phils. Chemical Co., Inc.
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 2609, the Central Bank issued
Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. As a result of which, petitioner paid the margin fees amounting to
P33,765.42 and another P6,345.72.
Prior to the second payment of margin fees, petitioner sought the refund of
its earlier payment relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of
said bank, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is
exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the bank refused to pass and approve said
vouchers on the ground that urea and formaldehyde is not covered within the
exemptions provided for in Republic Act No. 2609.
ISSUES: Whether or not “urea formaldehyde” which appears in the provision
should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde” and therefore exempting the
petitioner from payment of margin fees.
RULING: When petitioners contended that the bill approved in Congress was
intended to exempt the individual items “urea” and “formaldehyde” citing the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, the Supreme Court ruled that these
“statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the indent of the House of Representatives.”
In construing the law, the Court ruled that the enrolled bill which uses the
term “urea formaldehyde” rather than “urea and formaldehyde” is conclusive
upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President.
LIDASAN VS. COMMISION ON ELECTIONS
21 SCRA 496, G.R. NO. L-28089
25 OCTOBER 1967
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS: Republic Act. No. 4790 which is entitled “An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” was enacted into
law. However, its constitutionality is being questioned as it also includes barrios
located in another province: Cotabato.
In creation of the Municipality of Dianaton, twelve barrios in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to Lanao del Sur which brings about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 4790 is constitutional on the ground that it
does not conform to the mandate that “No bill may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”.
Whether or not R.A. No 4790 may be salvaged by creating Dianaton through
the barrios already included within the province of Lanao del Sur by merely
nullifying those portions of the law which are repugnant to the Constitution and
saving those “not affected” by the infirmity.
RULING: In ruling upon the unconstitutionality of this law, the Supreme Court
said that “the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such prevision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.”
Thus, the title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur” is defective in that it projects the impression that
solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected in the creation of Dianaton when
it does, in fact, dismember two municipalities from the province of Cotabato.
Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law and did not inform the people in Cotabato that part of their territory was
already being taken away.
Anent the second issue, the rule that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld, the Supreme Court stated that the exemption to
this rule should apply. This exemption states that “where parts of the statute are
so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then all the
provisions which are dependent on the unconstitutional part must fall with it.”
This is buttressed by the fact that the bill was presented in Congress with the
totality of the twenty-one barrios, not nine and that the seat of government will
be in a municipality in Cotabato.
PEOPLE VS. FERRER
48 SCRA 382, G.R. NO. L-32613-14
27 DECEMBER 1972
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: A complaint for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act against Feliciano
Co was filed. Judge Jose de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and,
finding a prima facie case against Co, directed prosecutors to file the
corresponding information alleging that Co had become an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Co moved to quash
the information on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder and thus
void for being unconstitutional.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court upheld the Anti-Subversion Act by
saying that when the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it
does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be
an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the government for the purposes of
the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed
organization. The term “Communist Party of the Philippines” is used solely for
definition purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of
the Philippines but also to “any other organization having the same purpose as
their successors.” Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
As to the claim that under the statute, organizational guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party,
suffice it to say that that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been
referred to as a “dragnet device” whereby all who participate in the criminal
covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were
construed as punishing membership devoid of any specific intent to further the
unlawful goals of the Party. But the statute specifically requires that membership
must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the legal objectives of
the Party.
TOBIAS VS. ABALOS
239 SCRA 106, G.R. NO. 114783
8 DECEMBER 1994
BIDIN, J.
FACTS: Before the enactment of R.A. No. 7675, “an Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the
City of Mandaluyong”, San Juan and Mandaluyong belonged to a single
legislative district. The act was signed into law on February 9, 1994.
Subsequently, a plebiscite was held wherein the people of Mandaluyong ratified
the law pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioners now question the constitutionality of said law as taxpayers
and residents of Mandaluyong.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 is constitutional for contravening the
“one subject-one bill” rule. Petitioners contend that the division of the
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate districts is
violative of this rule.
RULING: R.A. 7675 is constitutional. The Supreme Court held that the creation
of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is
a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
treaty and is thus contemplated in the title.
A liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been adopted by
the Court so as not to cripple or impede legislation, that such should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446, G.R. NO. L-63915
29 DECEMBER 1986
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: The petitioners move for a clarification on the Court’s previous decision
(Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27). They have sought to clarify the meaning of
the clause, “unless it is otherwise provided” and the word “law” as they were
used in Article 2 of the Civil Code. In line with this, petitioners also asked the
court to shed light on the requirements of publication.
ISSUES: Whether or not the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
variability of the date of effectivity or to the requirement of publication.
RULING: The clause refers to the variability of the date of effectivity and not the
requirement of publication. This is evidenced by the sentence “This code shall
take effect one year after publication.” Thus, publication is mandatory for a
law’s effectivity.
II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
*FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
107 SCRA 352, G.R. NO. L-44161, 41222, 43153 & 43369
10 SEPTEMBER 1981
BARREDO, J.
FACTS: blah
blah
ISSUES: blah
blah
RULING: blah
blah
PEOPLE VS. NAZARIO
165 SCRA 186, G.R. NO. L-44143
31 AUGUST 1988
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS: Accused Nazario was charged with the violation of a Municipal
Ordinance by failing to pay municipal taxes incurred as the owner fishpond
business. Accused thus questions the constitutionality of the ordinance and,
assuming its constitutionality, its non-application to him.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance is vague and therefore
unconstitutional.
Whether or not accused is under the purview of the law, Nazario claiming
that he is the owner, and not the “manager” which the law has identified.
RULING: The ordinances in question are not vague. He is clearly, as the actual
operator of the fishponds, within the term “manager” which is among those
people sanctioned by the law.
The Supreme Court had occasion to define vagueness as when a law “lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.” It went on to say that a
law “must be utterly vague on its face and cannot be clarified by a saving clause
or construction.”
The Court also differentiated vague statues from those which are merely
ambiguous, the latter remaining constitutional and subject merely to
interpretation whereas in the former, one is totally devoid of any means to
ascertain the meaning of the law and what acts it seeks to enforce or prevent.
KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA VS. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
88 SCRA 616, G.R. NO. L-25316
28 FEBRUARY 1979
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: This is a mandamus petition wherein the petitioner-appellant would
seek a reversal of a lower court’s dismissal based on R.A. No. 2023 § 62. This
stems from the petitioner’s contention that under R.A. No. 2023, the loans
granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll
collection from the respondent’s employees’ wages and salaries.
ISSUES: What power does the judiciary have in terms of interpretation of the law
when there is absence of doubt as to the scope of operation of the law.
RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision which, in turn,
said that there is nothing in the provision of the said law that provides that
obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy first
priority in the deduction from the employees’ wages and salaries. The only
effect of R.A. No. 2023 is to compel the employer to make deduction of the
employees’ debt from the latter’s salary and turn this over to the employees’
credit union but this mandatory character does not convert the credit union’s
credit into a first priority credit.
Where the law is clear and there is absence of doubt as to its application, the
courts have no other recourse but to enforce them as they are worded. Dura lex
sed lex.
DAOANG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICHOLAS
159 SCRA 369, G.R. NO. L-34568
28 MARCH 1988
PADILLA, J.
FACTS: The spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition to adopt the
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. A hearing was set and notices were
served to the public. The petitioners, however, filed an opposition to said
adoption claiming that the spouses Agonoy had a legitimate daughter,
oppositors’ mother, and were therefore disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of
the Civil Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not the spouses Agonoy are disqualified to adopt based on
Art. 335 of the Civil Code, the opposition basing their claim that it would
produce a foreign element into the family unit and result in the reduction of their
legitimes.
RULING: The spouses are not disqualified to adopt their grandchildren, the law
being clear and unambiguous as regards the persons who may not adopt. The
statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted and must thus
be applied. Only those statutes that are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may
be the subject of construction.
Also, it must be said that the enumeration is exclusive, and therefore
excludes those items not included. In this case, the rule expression unius est
exclusio alterius applies in that “grandchildren” has not been among those
prohibited by the law to be susceptible of adoption.
ENDENCIA AND JUGO VS. DAVID, ETC.
93 SCRA 696, G.R. NO. L-6355-56
31 AUGUST 1953
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: R.A. No. 590 was enacted and directed the respondent Collector of
Internal Revenue to collect income tax on the salary of judicial officers,
specifically petitioner Endencia.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 590 is unconstitutional, the petitioner basing
its argument on the fact that such a collection of income tax is a diminution of
compensation fixed by law and thus repugnant to Art VIII, Section 9 of the
Constitution.
RULING: Following the Court’s decision in Perfecto vs. Meer, the Supreme
Court reiterated that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax
on their salaries because the collection thereof would be tantamount to a
decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The law being repugnant to the Constitution, its validity must fail and thus
be declared unconstitutional, as it has exceeded its legislative authority.
LAPID VS. COURT OF APPEALS
334 SCRA 738, G.R. NO. 142261
29 JUNE 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
FACTS: A complaint was filed charging Gov. Manuel Lapid of “Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service”.
The Ombudsman subsequently issued an order suspending Lapid for 6 months
pursuant to R.A. 6770.
 On November 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the case
finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and thus suspending
him from office. The petitioner then filed for a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals and prayed for a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which
impose penalties that are not enumerated in R.A. 6770 § 27 are final,
unappealable, and immediately executory.
Whether or not the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the
Local Government Code should be applied suppletorily to the Ombudsman Act
(R.A. 6770).
RULING: The rule inclusion unius est exclusio alterius applies in this case since
suspension without pay for one month is not among those listed as final and
unappealable, hence immediately executory. Since express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included, all those decisions which impose
penalties found in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 are not final, unappealable, and
immediately executory, it will stay the immediate execution of the
Ombudsman’s decision.
Anent the second issue, the lack of any provision providing for the
suppletory application of the Administrative Code and the Local Government
Code to the Ombudsman Act, the two former laws cannot be applied
suppletorily to the latter for that will enlarge the scope of the law beyond that
contemplated by the legislature when the latter law was enacted.
PEOPLE VS. JABINAL
55 SCRA 607, G.R. NO. L-30061
27 FEBRUARY 1974
ANTONIO, J.
FACTS: Accused Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. During the time he was caught, the prevailing
doctrine was that on Macarandang and Lucero.
The accused, on trial, admitted that he was in possession of the revolver and
the ammunition described without license or permit. However, he claims that
though he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander and said appointments expressly carried
with them the authority to possess the firearm in question.
ISSUES: Whether or not Jabinal is to be found guilty owing to his reliance on the
doctrines set forth in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero.
RULING: In deciding, the Court brought up the case of People vs. Macarandang
wherein the accused in the case was acquitted because of his appointment as a
Secret Agent. In said case, unlicensed firearms were allowed by the Revised
Administrative Code by exempting “peace officers” from said requirement. It
further provided that Macarandang’s appointment as a Secret Agent was
contemplated in the category of a “peace officer”.
In People vs. Lucero, the Court held that under the circumstances of the case,
the granting of temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary
means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be
deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said
military commander.
However, in People vs. Mapa, the Court abandoned the doctrine in
Macarandang and sustained conviction that Secret Agents are not contemplated
within the exemptions that law has provided for.
In this case, the accused was acquitted on the basis that considering his
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent pursuant to the prevailing
doctrines in Macarandang and Lucero, he may not be punished for an act which
at the time it was done was held to be punishable.
CO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
227 SCRA 444, G.R. NO. 100776
28 OCTOBER 1993
NARVASA, C.J.
FACTS: In an agreement to salvage and refloat a sunken vessel, petitioner
Albino Co paid a salvaging firm a check on September 1, 1983. The check was
dishonoured and a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner based on P.D.
22, of which he was found guilty.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals where he contended that because the
RTC erroneously based his conviction on the case of Que vs. People (which
penalized the mere issuance of a bouncing check) which was dated September
21, 1987 whereas he issued the dishonored check on September 1, 1983.
Petitioner’s contention was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are to be
applied retroactively.
RULING: The Court ruled that Court decisions must be given prospective agricultural purposes. He was not the kind of poor farmer for whom homesteads
application. It can be made to retroact only so far as it is favorable to the and free patents were intended by the law.
accused. Respondent cannot therefore repurchase the land he had lost due to
BENZONAN VS. CA nonpayment of debts since such a repurchase of property does not fall within the
205 SCRA 515, G.R. NO. 97998 purpose, spirit, and meaning of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which is to give the
homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the
27 JANUARY 1992
land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
cleaning and cultivating it.
FACTS: Respondent Benito Salvani Pe is a businessman based in General Santos
City who acquired through free patents and miscellaneous sales from the Bureau
of Lands a 26,064 m2 parcel of land. Barely three months after he acquired said
land, Mr. Pe mortgaged it together with another lot and some chattels to secure a
commercial loan from the DBP. The lot was developed into a commercial-
industrial complex with rice mill and warehouse facilities, a solar drier, an office
and residential building, roadway, garden, depository, and dumping grounds for
various materials.
Mr. Pe, however, failed to pay his loan after more than seven years and DBP
foreclosed the mortgage. After the foreclosure, respondent Pe leased the lot and
its improvements from DBP. When respondent, in turn failed to redeem the
property within the one year period, DBMP sold the lot to petitioners for
P1,650,000.00 payable in quarterly amortizations over a five year period. The
petitioners occupied the purchased lot and introduced further improvements
worth P970,000.00.
Claiming that he was acting within the legal period given to him to
repurchase, respondent Pe offered in writing to repurchase the lot for
P327,995.00. DBP countered saying that over P3 million has already been
incurred in the preservation, maintenance, and introduction of improvements.
Respondent filed a complaint for repurchase under Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 with the RTC of General Santos City. Said RTC
ruled in favor of respondent and ordered the DBP to reimburse petitioners, and
give preference to respondent’s ability to repurchase the said lots.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with modification. A motion for
reconsideration with the same court was denied and the case was thus appealed
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent’s use of the land was in keeping with
Commonwealth Act. No. 141 § 119.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that respondent has never shown the
intention of utilizing the land given to him for free by the Government for
 III. AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
CITY OF BAGUIO VS. MARCOS
27 SCRA 342, G.R. NO. 26100
28 FEBURARY 1969
SANCHEZ, J.
FACTS: The Director of Lands, seeking to reopen cadastral proceedings,
instituted a Civil Reservation case. It is not disputed that the lands involved were
amongst those declared public lands by final decision in the case decided on
November 13, 1922.
On July 25, 1961, respondent Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen
said Civil Reservation case as to the parcel of land he owns. Private petitioners
and the City of Baguio registered opposition to the reopening, the former basing
their claim on the premise that they are tree farm lessees of the said lands.
On August 5, 1963, the cadastral court dismissed private petitioners’
opposition to the reopening. A motion for reconsideration was also rejected
thereafter. All the petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
ruled that the petitioners were not bound by the declaratory relief heretofore
stated. Nevertheless, the private petitioners as lessees had no right to oppose the
cadastral case.
Petitioners now seek redress from this Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not he forty-year period to file a petition for reopening
cadastral proceedings hsoudl be counted from the date the proceeding was
originally filed in court or when the decision became final.
RULING: The Court held that since the title of R.A. No. 931 is “An Act to
authorize the filing in the proper court under certain conditions of certain claims
of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of the
judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act,” there is an apparent inconsistency between the body and title of R.A.
No. 931. The Court ruled that the forty-year period starts from the date the final
decision was rendered by enunciating that the Act’s title belongs to that type of
title which should be regarded as part of the rules or provisions expressly stated
in the body.
EBARLE VS. SUCALDITO
156 SCRA 803, G.R. NO. L-33628
29 DECEMBER 1987
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS: The petitioner seeks injunctive relief to enjoin further proceedings in
three criminal cases all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and provisions on the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the preliminary investigations but was denied. He
went to the respondent court on prohibition and mandamus praying that a writ of
preliminary injunction and to have the restraining order lifted. Two challenged
orders were handed and a series of criminal prosecutions were filed.
Petitioner now challenges these prosecutions for failure to comply with E.O.
264.
ISSUES: Whether or not E.O. No. 264 applies to criminal actions to the end that
no preliminary investigations thereof can be undertaken or information filed in
court unless there is compliance with said Executive Order.
RULING: The Court held that E.O. No. 264 applies only to administrative and
not criminal complaints since its title, “Outlining the procedure by which
complaints charging government officials and employees with commission of
irregularities should be guided,” speaks only of “irregularities” rather than
“offenses” or “crimes”
PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA
86 SCRA 542, G.R. NO. L-42050-66
20 NOVEMBER 1978
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J.
FACTS: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or “illegal
possession of a deadly weapon,” specifically carrying outside one’s residence
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement
for livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be
carrying such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a
deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above
in order that the accused be convicted.
RULING: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit
and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble
as an indispensable element of the crime. Where, as in this case, there exists
ambiguity in the scope of the law, its preamble may be referred to in order to
determine legislative intent.
U.S. VS. HART
26 PHIL 149, G.R. NO. 8848
21 NOVEMBER 1913
TRENT, J.
FACTS: Appellants Hart, Miller, and Natividad were arraigned and found guilty
of vagrancy under Act No. 519. Prosecution based its argument on the evidences
presented showing that Hart pleaded guilty and was convicted of gambling two
or three weeks before his arrest on the vagrancy charge.
Defense showed that Hart and Dunn operated a hotel and saloon in Angeles
which did business of P96,000 during its 19 months before the trial. Hart was
also the proprietor of a saloon in Tacondo, raised imported hogs which he sold
to the Army garrison, and had other businesses.
Act 519 divides section 1 into seven clauses separated by semi-colons, each
clause enumerating a certain class of persons who, within the meaning of the
statue can be considered as vagrants.
ISSUES: Whether or not the legislative intended to limit the crime of vagrancy to
those having “no visible means of support”
RULING: The prosecution relies on the argument that “visible means of support”
does not apply to “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses”. In order for the clause “without visible means of support to
qualify the fist clause, either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else the comma after country would have been inserted.
The Court held that if the punctuation gives the statue a meaning which is
reasonable and in apparent accord with the legislative will, it may be used as an
additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of a statute as
thus punctuated. However, an argument based on punctuation alone is not
conclusive on the court by itself and the court will not hesitate to change the
punctuation as necessary. To say that there are two classes of vagrants defined in
par. 2, sec. 1 of Act 519 implies a lack of logical classification which the Court
is not inclined to uphold. The accused are thus acquitted, they having shown that
they have “visible means of support”.
MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES
38 SCRA 284, G.R. NO. L-28771
31 MARCH 1971
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: Cornelia Matabuena assails the validity of a donation made by her
brother, the deceased Felix Matabuena to the latter’s common-law wife,
Petronilla Cervantes.
The facts show that Felix Matabuena owned the property in question,
donated it to the defendant on Feb. 20, 1956, and was accepted by the latter, and
that this donation took place during the common-law relationship of the
deceased and defendant.
ISSUES: Whether or not he donation between Felix Matabuena and Petronilla
Cervantes is valid owing to the construction of Art. 133 of the Civil Code.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the assailed donation is void. In ruling
thus, the Court overruled the lower court’s decision basing donations void
between spouses but that between Matabuena and Cervantes as valid because
theirs was not a valid marriage but a common-law one.
The Court based its own decision by applying the spirit of the law, its policy
rather than mere words. It stated that the policy behind Art. 133 is to prevent
donations in favor of the other consort because of ear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor. Moreover, it was said by the Court that
the law’s policy of what is just and right would be nullified if such an irregular
relationship were to be visited with benefits instead of disabilities.
PEOPLE VS. MANANTAN
115 PHIL 657, G.R. NO. L-14129
31 JULY 1962
REGALA, J.
FACTS: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code which provides that “no justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer,
or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence
in any manner in any election or to take part therein, except to vote x x x”.
Manantan argues that he, a justice of the peace, is not comprehended among
the officers enumerated in the law. He further contends that a perusal of the
history of the Revised Election Code will show that since Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code which governed such an infraction included
“justice of the peace” in its enumeration while omitted in the Revised Election
Code shows the intention of the Legislature to exclude “justice of the peace
from its operation.
ISSUES: Whether a “justice of the peace” is included in the prohibition contained
in Section 54 of the old Revised Election Code.
RULING: The Court ruled that Manantan’s argument is untenable in that it
overlooks the fundamental fact that under the Revised Administrative Code
qualifies the word “judge” by the phrase “of First Instance” while the Revised
Election Code does not. Justices of the peace were expressly included in the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified
whereas the Revised Election Code makes no such distinction. Also, an
examination of the history of these laws show that whenever the word “judge”
was qualified by the phrase “of the first instance,” the word “justice of the
peace” would follow. However, if the law simply said “judge,” the words
“justice of the peace” were omitted.
The defendant likewise invokes the statutory construction rule of casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est or that a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, was declared
by the Supreme Court as inapplicable to the case at bar. The rule can only be
made to apply where the omission has been clearly establish, the fact of which is
belied by the fact that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the
peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan
political activities but rather merely called it by another name.
Its is for these reasons that the dismissal by the trial court is set aside and
remanded for trial on the merits.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. ABAYA
63 SCRA 559, G.R. NO. 42134
21 OCTOBER 1936
LAUREL, J.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance denying the motion of
the appellants to set aside the motion of the appellants to set aside the decision
of that court declaring a certain piece of land as public and to reopen the case in
accordance with Act No. 4043.
On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance praying that the titles with respect to a tract of land be
settled and adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2259,
otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. Such tract of land was subsequently
declared public land because no one appeared to claim it.
On January 25, 1934, a motion was filed by Ramon de Arruza and Mario
Luzuriaga praying that this aforementioned decision of the lower court be set
aside and that they be allowed to present their claim in a new trial in accordance
with Act. No. 4043.
The Fiscal of Negros Occidental contended that the Court of First Instance
had no jurisdiction to reopen the case because the motion was not filed within
the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043. Said Act involved allowed the filing,
within ten years, of a claim to lands that “have been, or are about to be, declared
lands of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted” in
cadastral cases.
The judge of the said court denied the motion of the appellants. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the ten-year period as contemplated in Act No. 2259 or
the Cadastral Act is to be counted from the date the decision was rendered or
from the date judicial proceedings were instituted in the cadastral case.
RULING: The Supreme Court perused the history of the prior laws on the subject
and noted that of the four laws on the subject, two refer in their titles to “lands
that have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered”
while the other two fail to make any such allusion.
However, the text of all four laws speak of lands that “have been or about to
be declared land of public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted.”
The explanatory note likewise showed that the intention was to authorize filing
of the claim to lots that have been declared public lands “by virtue of judicial
decisions” but such was not adopted when the legislature made no alteration in
the language of the statute to reflect such intention.
The legislative intent, therefore, is to start counting ten years from the date
of the institution of the judicial proceeding and not from the date of judgment
therein as rendered.
SALAYSAY VS. CASTRO
98 PHIL 264, G.R. NO. L-9669
31 JANUARY 1956
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: Engracio Santos is the duly-elected Municipal Mayor and petitioner
Nicanor Salaysay is the duly-elected Vice Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal.
On September 1955, Santos was held under suspension due to administrative
charges. Salaysay then had to act as mayor in accordance with Section 2195 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Shortly thereafter, he filed his certificate of
candidacy as mayor.
 In view of filing for candidacy, the Office of the President designated Sto.
Domingo acting municipal vice mayor to replace petitioner pursuant to Section
27 of the Revised Election Code which provides that any elective provincial,
municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one he is currently
holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner refused to turn over the office to Sto. Domingo and brought the
instant action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against Castro, Pascual,
and Sto. Domingo to declare invalid, illegal and unauthorized the designation of
Sto. Domingo as acting Vice-Mayor.
ISSUES: Whether a vice mayor who temporarily took over the functions of the
mayor following the latter’s suspension from office, be deemed automatically
resigned as acting mayor upon filing his certificate of candidacy for mayor.
RULING: In interpreting the phrase “actually holding” in a provision which sates
that “any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office,
other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned
from his office from the moment of filing his certificate of candidacy”, the Court
examined the legislative history of the provision in order to ascertain the
legislative intent. It noted that it was Commonwealth Act No. 666 which
originally provided for virtually the same provision. Since the rule of hold-over
was not in force when said law was still effective, President Roxas appointed
many local officials to continue in office even after filing their certificates of
candidacy.
To enable many local officials to continue in office, the legislature amended
Commonwealth Act No. 666 by replacing the phrase “for which he has been
lastly elected” with the phrase “which he is actually holding”.
It cannot thus be said that a vice mayor merely acting as mayor because of
the disability of the latter comes under the provision and exception as he acts as
mayor only in a temporary, provisional capacity.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. CTA
224 SCRA 665, G.R. NOS. 48886-88
21 JULY 1993
MELO, J.
FACTS: The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan
were constructed and improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at
the expense of Iligan Express Corporation, a private corporation.
On various dates, the berthing facilities of the said company were used by
the vessels of the Litonjua Shipping Company and were assessed berthing fees
by the Collector of Customs. Private respondent, Litonjua Shipping Company
filed a case before the Bureau of Customs claiming for a refund of said berthing
fees on the premise that the latter’s ships berthed at a privately owned wharf or
pier and is thus not liable to the payment of the berthing charges under Section
2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code as amended by P.D. No. 34.
The Commissioner of Customs, on the other hand, contends that the
government has the authority to impose and collect berthing fees whether a
vessel berths at a private pier or at a national port or that the port in Kiwalan is a
national port, it being under the jurisdiction of the collection district and
territorial limits of the national port of Iligan City. Private petitioner opposes
this contention saying that the Kiwalan port is absent from the list of national
ports mentioned in Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936.
ISSUES: Whether nor not a vessel which berths at a privately owned wharf or
pier, is liable for the payment of the berthing charge under Sec. 2901 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by P.D. No. 34 states that a vessel
berthing “at any national port” shall pay berthing fees.
RULING: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court looked into the history of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Prior to its amendment, the said law provided that
berthing fees were to be collected from any vessel berthing “at any port.”
The Court noted that the word “national” before the word “port” was
inserted in the amendment. Such a change in the phraseology by the amendment
of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had and held that such an insertion is an
indication to change the meaning of Section 2901 from its original meaning.
Thus, only vessels berthing at national ports are liable for berthing fees. The
petitioner must refund the berthing fees paid by the private respondent.
GLORIA VS. CA
306 SCRA 287, G.R. NO. 131012
21 APRIL 1999
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Private respondents are public school teachers who, on various dates in
September and October 1990, did not report for work. For this reason, they were
administratively charged and placed under preventive suspension.
An investigation was conducted and private respondents were found guilty
as charged. On appeal to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), they
were also found guilty. They appealed to the Civil Service Commission which
only affirmed the decision of the MSPB as to private respondent Margallo but
found the other three private respondents guilty only of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming the decision of the CSC as to the three private respondents
while Margallo’s suspension was lifted. They filed for a reconsideration of the
case. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision but ruled that the
respondents were entitled to their salary during the suspension. Petitioner
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, Ricardo Gloria, moved for a
reconsideration of the ordered payment of back salaries to the private
respondents.
ISSUES: Whether or not a public officer or employee, who has been preventively
suspended pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, is
entitled to his salary and other benefits during such preventive suspension.
RULING: The Supreme Court, ruling in the negative, held that the private
respondent teachers are thus not entitled to their respective salary and other
benefits “beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension” or, in other words,
no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending
investigation but only for the period of preventive suspending pending appeal in
the event the employee is exonerated.
The Civil Service act of 1959 provided for salaries in case of exoneration.
However, when it was revised in 1975, the provision on the payment of salaries
was deleted. Likewise, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that preventive
suspension shall be “without pay.”
The rule applicable is that when an amendment by deletion of certain words
or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to change the
meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have
made the deletion had the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. In
the case at bar, the purpose is that the amendment is to disallow the payment of
salaries for the period of suspension.
BUENASEDA VS. FLAVIER
226 SCRA 645, G.R. NO. 106719
21 SEPTEMBER 1993
QUIASON, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer
for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the
order of the ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of the petitioners in
connection to the administrative complaint filed by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
petitioners, respondents invoke Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770 which provides in part
that the “ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation.” Respondents contend
that the “authority” extends not only to those within the Ombudsman’s office
but also those in other departments or offices of the government.
It is claimed by the petitioners, however, that under this provision, the
Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in administrative cases
who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other
departments or offices of the government, in view of the phrase “any officer or
employee under his authority.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman’s power “to recommend the
suspension” of a public official or employee refers to penalties in administrative
cases.
Whether or not the ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents
in administrative cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are
employees in other departments or offices of the government.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
word “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words with
which it is associated, that where a particular word is equally susceptible of
various meanings, the correct one may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated. Thus,
“suspension” bears the meaning of a punitive measure since the words
association with it refer to penalties in administrative cases.
Anent the second issue, the Court, in determining the legislative intent,
traced the history of Sec. 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code authorized the chief of a
bureau or office to “suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under
his authority pending an investigation.”
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which superseded the above
provision authorized the chief of a bureau or office to “suspend any subordinate
officer or employee, in his bureau or under his authority”
In the Civil Service Law of 1975, however, the phrase “subordinate officer
and employee in his bureau” was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase
“under his authority.” Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the
proper disciplining authority may suspend “any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation.x x x”
 The Ombudsman law deleted the words “subordinate” and “in his bureau”
leaving the phrase to read “suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation x x x” The conclusion thus stands that Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and
employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of whether they are
employed “in his office” or in other offices of the government.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
203 SCRA 504, G.R. NO. 86738
13 NOVEMBER 1991
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS: Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of Nestle Phils.
Inc., was increased. Nestle underwent the necessary procedures and filings to
secure the approval of the Board, stockholders, and the SEC, the latter
approving the increase. In accordance with the Schedule of Fees and Charges
implemented by the SEC, Nestle paid the amount of P50,000.
On December 16, 1983, the board of directors and stockholders of Nestle
approved resolutions authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares of the
previously authorized but unissued capital stock of Nestle to San Miguel
Corporation and to Nestle S.A.
On March 25, 1985, the petitioners filed a letter to the SEC seeking
exemption of its proposed issuances of additional shares to its existing principal
shareholders from the registration requirements of Section 4 of the Revised
Security Act and from payment of fee referred to in Section 6 (c) of the same
Act on the basis of the provisions of Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Security
Act which uses the terms “issuance of additional stock” and “increased capital
stock” as a criteria for the non-application of exemption but was denied. An
appeal to the Court of Appeals failed, the CA having affirmed the SEC’s ruling
and interpretation on the matter.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not Section 6 (a) (4) of the Revised Securities Act exempts
company from the requirement of registration and payment of fees based on the
premise that the term “increased capital stock” should be interpreted to refer to
“additional capital stock” or equity participation of the existing stockholders as a
consequence of either an increase of the authorized capital stock or the issuance
of unissued capital stock.
RULING: In upholding the construction of the SEC and CA, the Supreme Court
had reason to accord great respect to the interpretation given by the former
administrative agency for it would permit greater opportunity for the SEC to
implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring
proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial
conditions and prospects of the corporation.
In giving greater credence to the interpretation of the SEC, the court had
reason to state that: “[i]t is a principle too well established to require extensive
documentation that the construction given to a statute by an administrative
agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled
to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such
construction is clearly to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the
Constitution and other laws.”
PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRAL VS. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
51 PHIL 143, G.R. NO. 27761
6 DECEMBER 1927
DEL ROSARIO, J.
FACTS: On May 1926, when plaintiff loaded the steamship Hannover at
Palupandan with over 5 million kilos of sugar, a collector of customs assessed
and collected P10,248.84 as wharfage dues.
The plaintiff now protests that it is not liable to pay such wharfage dues
since the wharf used by the plaintiff for shipping said goods did not belong to
the Government as required by the current customs laws.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Government can legally collect duties “as a charge
for wharfage” upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves.
RULING: In ruling upon the issue, the Supreme Court had occasion to look upon
older legislative enactments in order to determine legislative intent as regards
the phrase “as a charge for wharfage”. The Court determined that in order to
determine such, the history, relative situation and the conditions existing at the
time the law was enacted must be taken into consideration.
When original Customs Tariff of 1901 was enacted by the Philippine
Commission, the government did not own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere
within the Philippine Islands. It must also be considered that the tax in question
has been paid without any protest or objection since the time of its enactment
except when its constitutionality was assailed in Compañia General Tobacos vs.
Collector of Customs and its validity was subsequently sustained.
The Supreme Court resolved that the tax in question has at all times for
twenty-six years been levied and collected by the government before it owned or
operated any wharf, and that it has spent millions in the construction of wharves
in its principal ports of entries and that the determination of the issue in this case
would have far reaching effects on the government’s finances.
 The Court cites the case of Kelley vs. Multnomah County which stated that:
“where those whose duty it is to execute a law have uniformly given it a
particular construction, and that construction has been acquiesced in and acted
upon for a long time, it is a contemporary exposition of the statute, which
always commands the attention of the courts, and will be followed unless it
clearly and manifestly appears to be wrong.”
Taking all these into consideration, the Supreme Court ruled that the purpose
of the law was to authorize the Government of the Philippine Islands to levy a
duty of $1 per gross ton “as a charge for wharfage.” The long and continuous
construction which has been placed upon it by government officials tasked with
the execution of the laws are not to be easily overruled, and the very fact that
Congress has not seen fit to repeal or change the law is a very potent argument
in favor of sustaining such a construction.
 IV. ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM
LANGUAGE
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR VS. NLRC
327 SCRA 158, G.R. NO. 127718
2 MARCH 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the National Federation of Labor, a
legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. The petitioners were employed by Charlie Reith and Susie Galle
Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the Patalon Coconut Estate
in Zamboanga, a business engaged in growing agricultural products and in
raising livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which mandated the compulsory
acquisition of all covered agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer
beneficiaries. Pursuant to said law, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to
the Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform Association, of which petitioners are
members and co-owners.
As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation
of the Patalon Coconut Estate and the employment of the petitioners were
terminated. Petitioners did not receive any separation pay. Being beneficiaries of
the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners became part-owners of the land.
Petitioners then filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in
Zamboanga praying for reinstatement with full backwages on the ground of
illegal dismissal but such was dismissed. Appeal to the NLRC was also
dismissed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation
because of the compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for
purposes of agrarian reform, is liable to pay separation pay to its affected
employees.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that even if the situation was the closure of
business of the Patalon Coconut Estate, the petitioners are still not entitled to
such separation pay. Art. 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of
establishment and reduction of personnel. However, the case at bar involves
neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel. The Estate
was closed because it was acquired by DAR pursuant to R.A. 6657. Hence, it is
not applicable to the case at bar.
The closure contemplated under Art. 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral
and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment
as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that “the
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to…” the
use of the word “may” in a statute, denotes that it is directory in nature and
generally permissive only.
The statutory construction rule of verba legis finds application in this case. It
states that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Art. 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the
closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately
for the benefit of the employees.
PASCUAL VS. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ET AL.
207 SCRA 561, G.R. NO. 84240
25 MARCH 1992
PARAS, J.
FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973, without any
issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children, and was
survived, among others by acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual,
brother of the full blood of the deceased: Oliva Pascual and Hermes Pascual.
Adela Pascual, spouse of the deceased, filed a Special Proceeding for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Later, she filed a
Supplemental Petition where she expressly stated that Olivia and Hermes
Pascual are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual. Again, she filed an affidavit
to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood
brother of her late husband, to belie the statement made by the oppositors.
The above-mentioned heirs entered into a compromise agreement on
October 16, 1985 despite the manifestation/motion of the petitioners stating their
hereditary rights in the estate of their uncle.
On September 30, 1987, they filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary
Rights and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights
which was thereafter denied. The Court of appeals also denied and dismissed
their petition and motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners contend that they do not fall within the purview of Art. 992
because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception.
Otherwise, they say that the term “illegitimate” must be strictly construed to
refer only to spurious children.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the petitioners are
within the prohibition of Art. 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down
in Diaz v. IAC.
ISSUES: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code can be interpreted as to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased and
therefore bar petitioners from inheriting from the deceased.
RULING: The Court, in citing Diaz v. IAC, said that “Art. 992 of the civil code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992.” Clearly, the term
“illegitimate” refers to both natural and spurious children.
The Court furthermore elucidated that though Eligio Pascual is, indeed, a
legitimate child, petitioners are illegitimate children of Eligio and thus cannot
represent their father Eligio in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate
of the decedent Andres Pascual.
When the law is clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what
it says. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law
may be harsh or onerous. Dura lex sed lex.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 107, G.R. NO. 127325
19 MARCH 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: On December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with
public respondent Commission on Elections a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative Sen.
Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
initiatory petition properly cognizable the COMELEC.
On December 18, 1996 petitioners Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for
prohibition raising an argument that R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution. This deliberate omission indicates that the
matter of people’s initiative to amend the constitution was left to some future
law.
On January 2, 1997, private respondents, through Atty. Quadra, filed their
comment on the petition arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law
implementing the power of people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
constitution. On that same day, private respondent Delfin also filed in his own
behalf a comment arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is the law that governs the
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and the absence of subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws. Also on that same day COMELEC filed a comment
contending that R.A. No. 6735 deals with people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution. Its Sec. 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes,
and guarantees that power and its Sec. 3 includes initiative on the Constitution
and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
On January 17, 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitutsyon and
the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc.
filed a motion for intervention arguing that R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and
inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the people’s
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Art
XVII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. It further said that
such law cannot be used as a basis to implement the right of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution.
The majority of the Court adopted and strict and literal rather than a liberal
construction of the law, which is not in keeping with the maxim, interpretatio
fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat or that interpretation as will give the
thing efficacy is to be adopted, as well as the rule that provisions on initiative
should be liberal construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not to
hamper the exercise by voters of the rights granted thereby.
CASELA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
35 SCRA 279, G.R. NO. 26754
16 OCTOBER 1970
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: The Court of Agrarian Relations ordered defendant Mateo Casela
ejected in a case against him by Exequiel Magsaysay. However, he refused to
vacate and the court issued two more writs.
 Instead of obeying, Casela instituted a civil case asking the respondent to
pay him the value of his house, improvements and damages thereto. Against
this, Magsaysay filed for a writ of execution pending the final outcome of the
civil case. Casela filed a countermotion to declare defendant and the sheriff in
contempt of court. The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Magsaysay and
said that the issue should have been brought before the Agrarian Court instead
of the Court of First Instance.
Magsaysay then filed a motion of an alias writ of execution to the Agrarian
Court but was denied holding that the first decision as to ejecting Casela was
beyond the five year reglamentary period. He moved for reconsideration which
was granted. Hence, this appeal by Casela.
ISSUES: Whether or not Magsaysay’s motion for execution of December 11,
1963 was filed beyond the five-year reglamentary period and thus prescribed.
RULING: From the date when the decision in question became final and
executory (December 17, 1956) until December 11, 1963 when Magsaysay’s
motion for execution was filed, a period of six years, eleven months, and
twenty-four days had elapsed. From this period must be subtracted the time
during which the writs of execution could not be served due to reasons of acts or
causes not of Magsaysay’s own making or a period of three years, nine months
and twenty five days. Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty
nine days can be charged against the five year reglamentary period.
Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of
statutes. The courts are not hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of
the statute; the spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This
rule will especially be applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute
would result in absurdity and injustice.
ALONZO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
150 SCRA 259, G.R. NO. L-72873
28 MAY 1987
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel
of land registered in the name of their deceased parents under the Registry of
Deeds of Tarlac. On March 15, 1963, Celestino Padua transferred his undivided
share by way of absolute sale. On April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister,
sold her own share to the same vendees.
Petitioners occupied two fifths of the said lot and subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with the Paduas’ consent, they built a semi-concrete
house on part of the enclosed area.
Mariano Padua sought to redeem the area but his case was dismissed. Tecla
Padua, another co-heir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption by her brother. The trial court dismissed the complaint saying that it
was dropped for not being filed within thirty days from notice of the sales in
1963.
ISSUES: Whether or not the interpretation and application of Article 1088 is
invoked correctly.
RULING: It is a cardinal rule in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the law maker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice. Thus, we interpret the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice re inseparable and keep them so. For what is within
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that
which is within the letter but a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker
is as much as within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within
the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.
KING VS. HERNANDEZ
114 PHIL 731, G.R. NO. L-14859
31 MARCH 1962
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS: On January 1, 1957, Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen,
became the owner of the business establishment known as “Import Meat and
Produce” a grocery wholesale and retail business, previously owned by the
Philippine Cold Stores, Inc. In the business were 12 Filipinos and 3 Chinese, the
latter being employees of the old owner, Philippine Cold Stores, Inc.
Three weeks after King had acquired the business as aforesaid, he sought
permission from the President of the Philippines to retain the services of the
three Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108,
coursing his letter through the Secretary of Commerce and Industry.
This official recommended the disapproval of King’s request on the ground
that aliens may not be appointed to operate or administer a retail business under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1180 which requires capital to be wholly owned by
Filipino citizens with the exception to the technical personnel which may be
allowed by the authorization from the President. The president approved the
recommendation and stated that purchasers and salesmen are not technical
positions within the meaning of Section 2-A of C.A. 108 as amended by R.A.
No. 134.
It is contended by the petitioner that this provision does not prohibit
employment of aliens in non-control positions because they do not, as such,
intervene in the management, operation, administration or control of the retail
establishment.
ISSUES: Whether or not a Chinese may be employed in a non-control position in
a retail establishment, a wholly nationalized business under R.A. No. 1180,
otherwise known as the Retail Trade law.
RULING: In rejecting the petitioner’s argument, the Supreme Court ruled that
“when the law says that you cannot employ an alien in any position pertaining to
the management, operation, administration and control whether as an officer,
employee, or laborer therein, it only means one thing: the employment of a
person who is not a Filipino citizen even in a minor or clerical or non-control
position. The reason is obvious: to plug any loophole or close any avenue that an
unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one
can deny that while one may be employed in a non-control position who
apparently is harmless he may turn out to be a mere tool to further the evil
designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law be interpreted in a manner
that would stave off any attempt at circumvention of the legislative purpose.”
U.S. VS. TORIBIO
15 PHIL 85, G.R. NO. 5060
25 JANUARY 1910
CARSON, J.
FACTS: The appellant was charged for slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered
for human consumption, carabaos without a permit from the municipal treasurer
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of Section 30 and 33 of
Act No. 1147.
It appears that in the town where the animal was slaughtered, there is no
municipal slaughterhouse and appellant thus contends that under such
circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 cannot apply.
ISSUES: Whether or not the slaughter of large cattle outside of the municipal
slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited under
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147 which provides that “no large cattle shall be
slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasurer” and “any person slaughtering or
causing to be slaughtered for human consumption any large cattle except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished x x x.”
RULING: The Court said that the language of these sections fairly admits of two
constructions: one whereby the phrase, “at the municipal slaughterhouse” may
be taken as limiting and restricting both the word “slaughtered” and the words
“killed for food” in section 30, and the words “slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption” and the words “killing for food” in section
33; and the other whereby the phrase “at the municipal slaughterhouse” may be
taken as limiting and restricting merely the words “killed for food” and “killing
for food”
The Court ruled that considering the whole act and keeping in mind the
manifest purpose and object of the enactment—to protect large cattle against
theft and to make easy recovery and return of such cattle to their owners, when
lost, strayed or stolen—the latter construction should be adopted. It concluded
that to adopt the first interpretation would abort the provisions for registry and
record of brands and marks of identification of large cattle, since thieves in
possession of such cattle could evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering
them outside the municipal slaughterhouse and thus enjoy the fruits of their
wrongdoing. Such construction should be avoided which would bring such
result and defeat the object of the law.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted. Literal import must yield to intent.
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA
200 SCRA 81, G.R. NO. 93177
2 AUGUST 1991
CRUZ, J.
FACTS: Petitioners are officers of the AFP facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. Charges against them are in violation of
the Articles of War: mutiny, conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman,
various crimes and Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder. Petitioner
challenged the proceedings on various grounds through a motion for summary
dismissal but was denied by the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. The Petitioners
then manifested their right to raise peremptory challenges and invoked Art. 18
of CA No. 408. However, the Court Martial ruled that C.A. No. 408 was already
terminated due to P.D. No. 39
ISSUES: Whether P.D. No. 39, which withdrew the right to peremptorily
challenge members of a military tribunal, had been rendered inoperative by
Proclamation No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law.
RULING: In answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled, applying the principle
of cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex, that with the termination of martial
law and the dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for
the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC. VS. CTA
100 PHIL 851, G.R. NO. L-9274
1 FEBRUARY 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: Lopez and Sons imported hexagonal wire from Germany. The Manila
Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties in the
importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoice. The collector,
however, reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting
and as a result, additional customs duties were levied upon petitioners.
They appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals but such was dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125.
Said law, creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides in Section 7 thereof
that the Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal “decisions of the commission or customs x x x.” However,
Section 11 of said law states that persons “adversely affected by a decision or
ruling of the x x x collector of customs x x x may file an appeal in the Court of
Tax Appeals within thirty days after receipt of such decision or ruling.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
owing to the discrepancy in Sections 7 and 11 of R.A. No. 1125.
RULING: There is a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11. Taken literally,
Section 7 would be empty, meaningless and unenforceable because, while it
grants the Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction to review decisions of the
commissioner of customs, under Section 11, no person affected by the
commissioner of customs may appeal to the tax court.
The Court changed the phrase “collector of customs” to “commissioner of
customs” to correct an obvious mistake in the law. It is more reasonable and
logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the legislature meant and intended
to say, commissioner of customs, instead of collector of customs in the first
paragraph of said Section.
It further said that “the Courts are not indulging in judicial legislation. They
are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clerical error in the wording of a
statute in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the
legislature.
PEOPLE VS. YU HAI
99 PHIL 725, G.R. NO. L-9598
15 AUGUST 1956
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Respondent Yu Hai was accused of violating Article 195 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code for having allegedly permitted the game of Panching or
Paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused
moved to quash on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the
criminal action or liability had already been extinguished.
On December 24, 1954, the court sustained respondent’s motion to quash on
the theory that the offense charged was a light offense under Article 90 of the
RPC which prescribes in two months. However, it is argued by the petitioner
that the crime prescribes in ten years because the crime may be punished by a
maximum fine of 200 peso, which is correctional under Art. 26 and therefore
prescribes in ten years in accordance with Art. 90. The provincial appealed to
the CFI of Caloocan which order the dismissal of the information.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: When does a crime punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos prescribe?
RULING: Article 90 provides that crimes “punishable by a correctional penalty
shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto
mayor; which shall prescribe in five years;” libel prescribes in one year; and
light offenses prescribe in two months.” Article 9 defines light offenses as those
“for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided.” Fine, on the other hand, is classified
under Art. 26 into afflictive, correctional and light; and a fine not exceeding
6,000 pesos but not less than 200 pesos is correctional; light if it be less than 200
pesos.
In rejecting such argument, the Court said: “Article 90 could not have
intended that light offenses as defined by Art. 9 would have two prescriptive
periods—two months if they are penalized by arresto menor and/or a fine of less
than P200. The difference of only one peso in the imposable fine would mean
the difference of nine years and ten months in the prescriptive period of the
offense. And what is worse, the proper prescriptive period could not be
ascertained until and unless the court decided which of the alternative penalties
should be imposed, which the court could not properly do if the offense had
prescribed, for then it could no longer be prosecuted.
These absurd results the lawmaker could not have wittingly intended
especially since more serious offenses as those punishable by arresto mayor
prescribe also under Article 90 in five years while other “less grave” offenses
like libel and oral defamation and slander prescribe in even shorter periods of
time: one year and six months, respectively.
AMATAN VS. AUJERO
248 SCRA 511, A.M. NO. RTJ-93-956
27 SEPTEMBER 1995
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: A criminal complaint for murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code was filed against Rodrigo Umpad for shooting Genaro Tagsip, causing the
latter’s death. The crime of homicide was filed by the provincial fiscal after
preliminary investigation. Upon arraignment, the offended party and the public
prosecutor entered into a plea bargain agreement with the approval of the judge
and thus the information was amended to attempted homicide to which the
accused pleaded guilty thereto. The agreement was entered into and approved by
the judge pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which allows the accused to plead guilty to a lesser felony.
The deceased’s brother-in-law, herein complainant, wrote a letter-complaint
to the Chief Justice for respondent judge Aujero’s gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law. In reply, Aujero based his reliance on the aforementioned
rule and that the plea bargain was pursuant to that rule and with the consent of
the deceased’s wife.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law because of his interpretation of Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULING: In holding the judge administratively liable for gross ignorance, the
Court ruled that “the fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo
Umpad was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense
be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lesser offence of attempted homicide.
The crime of homicide necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does
not.”
It further went on to say that where literal application of a provision of law
would lead to injustice for to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates
of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code
admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of
doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justicia, ruat coelum.
PEOPLE VS. PURISIMA
86 SCRA 542, G.R. NO. L-42050-66
20 NOVEMBER 1978
MUÑOZ-PALMA, J.
FACTS: The accused were charged with violation of P.D. No. 9 or “illegal
possession of a deadly weapon,” specifically carrying outside one’s residence
any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement
for livelihood. The defense bases its contention that the accused should be
carrying such weapons for the furtherance or in relation to subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law requires the elements that the possession of a
deadly firearm be for the purposes or the furtherance of those aims stated above
in order that the accused be convicted.
RULING: The Court ruled that pursuant to the preamble of P.D. No. 9, the spirit
and intent of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble
as an indispensable element of the crim.
Where, as in this case, there exists ambiguity in the scope of the law, tis
preamble may be referred to in order to determine legislative intent
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
278 SCRA 27, G.R. NO. 94723
21 AUGUST 1997
TORRES, JR., J.
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, American tourist, lured and detained petitioner Karen
Salvacion and was able to rape the latter several times. Bartelli was eventually
arrested and criminal cases for serious illegal detention and four counts of rape
were filed against him. A civil case for damages with preliminary attachments
were also filed.
On the day for Bartelli’s petition for bail hearing, the latter escaped from jail.
Hence, the criminal cases were archived but the civil proceedings continued and
later granted moral and exemplary damages to the petitioner through a writ of
attachment on Bartelli’s dollar deposits.
The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused to honor the writ of
attachment, invoking Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426, as amended, which provides in
part that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the dollar bank deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign
tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the
latter’s 12-year-old rape victim.
RULING: In rejecting the contention of the banks and holding that the peculiar
circumstances obtaining make the law not applicable to the case of the 12-year
old rape victim and that the banks should comply with the writ of execution and
release the dollar deposit in favor of the victim, the Court applied the principles
of right and justice to prevail over the strict and literal words of the statute.
The questioned law would, therefore, make the favorable judgment futile.
The intention of the questioned law may have been good when it was enacted
which is a time when the economy was in shambles. However, the law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case before us.
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con daño de otro. When the
statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
DEMAFILES VS. COMELEC
21 SCRA 1463, G.R. NO. L-28396
29 DECEMBER 1967
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: The new municipality of Sebaste held its first election of officers with
the petitioners Agripino Demafiles and respondent Benito Galida vying for the
mayoralty. Galide questioned the provincial board to disregard, as “obviously
manufactured,” the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that said return
shows that 195 voters were registered, 188 voted, when according to a certificate
of the municipal election registrar, only 182 had registered.
Galido won over Demafiles and was proclaimed mayor-elect. Demafiles
protested to the COMELEC on the board’s rejection of the election returns from
precinct 7, the subsequent proclamation of Galide, and challenging the right of
two board members who were reelectionists. The COMELEC annulled the
canvas and proclamation. Upon the motion of Galido, the COMELEC
reconsidered its previous decision and held that the canvas and proclamation
made stands.
ISSUES: Whether or not a pre-proclamation election case has become moot
because the proclaimed winner had immediately taken his oath pursuant to
Section 2 of R.A. No. 4870 which provides that the “first mayor, vice-mayor
and councillors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next
general elections for local officials and shall have qualified.”
RULING: The court, rejecting the argument, ruled: “In our view, the last portion
of the provision—‘and shall have qualified’—is devoid of any meaning, is
unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does not warrant the respondent’s
reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins
immediately after their proclamation.
It is quite probable that this is what the legislature meant. Here is a clear case
of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty
forbids the court from assuming and, consequently, from supplying.
The term of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January
following their election, and so the assumption of office by the respondent
Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case.
CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
206 SCRA 65, G.R. NO. 88979
7 FEBRUARY 1992
PADILLA, J.
FACTS: R.A. No. 6683 provides benefits to government employees for early
retirement and voluntary separation from government service as well as
involuntary and separation pay due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua as
an employee of the National Irrigation Authority for fifteen years with a status
of “co-terminus”. The petitioner believing that she is qualified of availing the
benefits of the program, filed an application with the respondent NIA which,
however, denied the same and instead offered separation benefits equivalent to
one-half month pay for every year of service commencing from 1980.
Recourse by the petitioner to the CSC stating that she is qualified for the
benefits of the program was again denied because her status as “co-terminus”
employee is excluded in the coverage of R.A. No. 6683, which only covers
regulars, temporary, emergency, and casual employees with the further requisite
of at least two years of consecutive service.
ISSUES: Whether or not a coterminous employee, or one whose appointment is
co-existent with the duration of a government project, who has been employed
as such for more than two years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6683, which provides in part that the “benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation.”
RULING: Answering in the affirmative, the Court ruled that a coterminous
employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary
implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of government employees
entitled to benefits of the law necessarily implies that the former should also be
entitled to such benefits.
 V. INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION VS. NTC
131 SCRA 200, G.R. NO. L-63318
18 AUGUST 1984
MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS: After the petitioner, the private respondent, and the Solicitor General
filed their respective comments and memoranda, the decision sought to be
reconsidered was promulgated, annulling and setting aside the challenged
decision and order.
The decision promulgated on November 25, 1983 interprets the rule-making
authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 to the then Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communication as mandatory, which
construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said section, which
reads”
ISSUES: Whether or not the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D.
No. 217 is mandatory
RULING: The basic canon of statutory construction is that the word used in the
law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest
from the law itself. Hence, the phrase “may be promulgated” should not be
construed to mean “shall” or “must”. It shall be interpreted in its ordinary sense
as permissive or discretionary on the part of the delegate-department or the
Board of Communications then, now the NTC. There is nothing in P.D. No. 217
which commands that the phrase “may be promulgated” should be construed as
“shall be promulgated.”
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
257 SCRA 430, G.R. NO. 104988
18 JUNE 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts,
and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner, the SAID organized
a team of foresters and policemen to conduct a surveillance of the lumberyard.
They saw petitioner’s truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions. The team seized the truck with its cargo and impounded
them
The team then secured a search warrant which enabled them to seize from
the petitioner’s lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs;
a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of
lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa.
Respondent Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint against petitioner’s
president and general manager for violation of section 68 of P.D. No. 705
penalizes the cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without a license. The DOJ handed down a resolution for the filing of an
information against the petitioner.
In quashing the information charging a person with violation of said
provision, the trial court held that the subject matter of the charge sheet is
“lumber,” which is neither “timber” nor “other forest products.”
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit. As to the claim that possession of lumber
under the said provisions it held that since wood is included in the definitions of
forest products, lumber is necessarily included.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether or not the word “lumber” is included in the word “timber” as
the latter is used in Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705.
RULING: In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the Supreme Court held that
the trial court gravely erred in quashing the information because lumber is
included in the term timber. The court explained that lumber is a processed log
or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and
phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 as amended makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus.
MANILA HERALD VS. RAMOS
88 PHIL 94, G.R. NO. L-4268
18 JANUARY 1951
TUASON, J.
FACTS: Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against Aproniano Borres,
Pedro Padilla, and Loreto Pastor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of
the Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in Manila, asking for damages.
Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon certain office and
printing equipment at the Daily Record.
 Thereafter, the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc., filed
separate third-party claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property
previously attached by the plaintiffs. Unsuccessful in their attachment, the latter
commenced a joint suit against the sheriff to enjoin the defendants from the
proceedings with the attachment of the properties and prayed for damages.
Whereas case No. 11531 was being handled by Judge Sanchez, case No.
12263 fell in the branch of Judge Pecson. The latter then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to the sheriff directing him to desist from proceeding
with the attachment of the said properties. After the issuance of which, Antonio
Quirino filed an ex parte petition for its dissolution but was denied by Judge
Ramos, to whom the case had been transferred, saying that it was “unnecessary,
superfluous, and illegal.”
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Ramos has authority to dismiss case No. 122263
at the stage it was thrown out of court.
RULING: Section 14 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the steps
to be taken when property attached is claimed by a person other than the
defendant or his agent, contains a proviso that “nothing herein shall prevent such
third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.” To
the argument that the phrase “proper action” limits the third party’s remedy to
intervene in the action in which the writ of attachment was issued, the Court said
that the word “action” has acquired a well-defined, technical meaning as an
“ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong,”
while Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court states that a “civil action may be
commenced by filing a complaint with the proper court.” In employing the word
“commencement”, the rule clearly indicates an action which originates an entire
proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of the court calling for summons,
answers, etc. and not any intermediary step taken in the course of proceeding
whether the parties themselves or by a stranger.
The Court further elucidated that it would be strange indeed if the framers of
the Rules of Court should have employed the term “proper action” instead of
intervention or equivalent expression if the intention had been just that. It was
all the easier, simpler, and the more natural thing to say intervention if that had
been the purpose, since the assisted right of the third party claimant necessarily
flows out of the pending suit.
CLAUDIO VS. COMELEC
331 SCRA 388, G.R. NO. 140560
4 MAY 2000
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jovito O. Claudio was the duly-elected mayor of Pasay City.
Sometime after his election, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City
gathered to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence. A resolution was adopted to initiate the recall of
Claudio for loss of confidence. The petition was then filed in the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and
Roberto Angeles alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition.
In its resolution, the COMELEC held that the petition for recall be granted
and its oppositions dismissed. It maintains that the process of recall starts with
the filing of the petition for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall
election. Thus, the recall was validly initiated outside of the one-year period.
Petitioner contends that the term “recall” in Sec. 74 (b) refers to a process, in
contrast to the term “recall election” found in Sec. 74 (a) which obviously refers
to an election.
ISSUES: Whether or not the first limitation regarding the one year period in Sec.
74 of the Local Government Code embraces the entire proceedings or only the
recall election.
RULING: In answering the issue that “recall” refers only to the recall election
and not those proceedings prior thereto, which may take some time, the Court
construed the word “recall” in relation to Sec. 69 of the Code to the effect that
“the power of recall… shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs.”
The Court stated that “since the power vested on the electorate is not the
power to initiate recall proceedings” but the power to elect an official into
office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings.
GARCIA VS. COMELEC
237 SCRA 279, G.R. NO. 111230
30 SEPTEMBER 1994
PUNO, J.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Marong, Bataan agreed, through its
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, to the inclusion of the municipality of Marong
to the Subic Special Economic Zone. Petitioners, headed by Garcia, filed a
petition to the Sangguniang Bayan to change the said resolution which decrees
that Marong shall form part of said zone on certain conditions.
Since the Sangguniang Bayan did not act upon the petition, petitioners used
their power on initiative and solicited the number of signatures required. The
COMELEC denied the petition of the petitioners through referendum since the
subject was only a resolution and not an ordinance.
It is claimed that since a resolution is not included in this definition, then the
same cannot be the subject of an initiative.
ISSUES: Whether or not a local resolution of a municipal council can be the
subject of an initiative and referendum.
RULING: In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court ruled that such a narrow and
literal reading of the provision will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in
enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and
referendum.
The Constitution requires that the legislative shall provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, whereby the people can directly approve or reject any
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body.
Congress thereafter enacted R.A. No. 6735 which includes resolutions as among
the subjects of initiative. However, the Local Government Code, a later law,
defines local initiative as “the process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.”
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Contrary to the submission of the
respondents, the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code did not
change the scope of its coverage. It merely defines the concept of local initiative
as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal
with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative.
The word or provision should not be given a meaning that will restrict or
defeat, but should instead be construed to effectuate, what has been intended in
an enacting law.
LIGGETT & MYERS TOBACCO VS. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
101 PHIL 106, G.R. NO.
22 APRIL 1957
FACTS: On or about September 28, 1954, the petitioners received a shipment of
several cartons of King Size L&M Filter Cigarettes. The Collector of Customs
required the petitioners to pay specific tax on said cigarettes. This was paid by
petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners, through counsel, filed a formal claim for
a partial refund which was denied by the Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue.
The case revolves around the construction of Sec. 137 of the National
Internal Revenue Code. The provision stated that “if the length exceeds seventy-
one millimeters or if the weight per thousand exceeds one and one-fourth kilos,
the tax shall be increased by one hundred per centum.”
The petitioner contends that the term “cigarettes as used in this section will
mean only the part containing the tobacco and not the filters. The CTA,
however, rendered an adverse decision stating that the law did not distinguish
between cigarettes with filters and those without.
ISSUES: Whether or not the law distinguishes between filter and non-filter
cigarettes for purposes of taxation.
RULING: The Court ruled that the law not having distinguished between filter
cigarettes and non-filter cigarettes, neither the executive department nor the
court may distinguish one form the other, hence, the tax should be paid as fixed
under the provision.
As long, however, as the law does not distinguish between filter cigarettes
and non-filter cigarettes, and said Sec. 137 does not do so, neither the executive
department nor the courts may distinguish one from the other for purposes of
taxation. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
GARVIDA VS. SALES
271 SCRA 767, G.R. NO. 124893
18 APRIL 1997
PUNO, J.
FACTS: The SK elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996.
On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and voter of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers denied her
application because petitioner was already 21 years and 10 months old saying
that she had exceeded the age limit set forth by the COMELEC in a resolution.
However, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered a decision in petitioner’s
favour.
On May 2, 1996, The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the
Board of Election Telelrs and Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to
suspend the proclamation of petitioner I n the even she own in the election
which she did win. She was not proclaimed the winner by said order of the
COMELEC. Thereafter, the Board proclaimed petitioner’s adversary as the
winner to which the petitioner seeks to annul the order of the COMELEC
disqualifying her.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner who was over 21 but below 22 years of age
was qualified to be an elective SK member.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner is ineligible for being over
21 years of age.
Sec. 424 of the Local Government Code provides that a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan must not be more than 21 years. Sec. 428 of the same
Code provides that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not
be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election, adding the phrase “on
the day of his election” as an additional qualification.
The Court clarified that there is a distinction between the maximum age of a
member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK
official. For the former, Sec. 424 sets the maximum age at 21 years only. There
is no further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age.
On the other hand, Sec. 428 qualifies that the member may be more than 21
years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than
21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable
considering that the Code itself provides more qualification for an elective SK
official than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The courts may
distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing the legislature
intended a distinction or qualification.
Of things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar. Dissimilum Dissimilis est ratio.
CENTENO VS. VILLALON-PORNILLOS
236 SCRA 197, G.R. NO. 113092
1 SEPTEMBER 1994
REGALADO, J.
FACTS: The officers of the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay had a fund
drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malalas,
Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno with Vicento Yeo solicited from Judge
Angeles a contribution of P1,500. The solicitation was made without a permit
from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Due to the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against
petitioners with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yeo for the violation of P.D. No.
1564. Petition filed a motion to quash claiming that P.D. No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made
for a religious purpose.
On December 29, 1992 the trial court convicted the petitioners and sentenced
them to each pay a fine of P200. Accused Centeno appealed to the RTC of
Malolos. However, Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower
court but changed the penalty to imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1000
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the same court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not solicitations for religious purposes are within the ambit
of P.D. No. 1564.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that used the statutory
construction rule of expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention
of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction be extended to others. The rule proceeds
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out “charitable” and
“religious” in an enumeration, whereas P.D. No. 1564 merely stated “charitable
or public welfare purposes,” only goes to show that the framers of the law in
question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its
coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have stated so
expressly.
CARANDANG VS. SANTIAGO
97 PHIL 94, G.R. NO. L-8238
25 MAY 1955
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari against Vicente Santiago, Judge of the
CFI of Manila to annul his case entitled Carandang vs. Valenton wherein the
latter was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the
person of the former.
Petitioner filed a complaint to receive damages. After defendants submitted
their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case,
pending the termination of the criminal case. The judge ruled that the trial on the
civil action must await the result of the criminal case on appeal. A motion for
reconsideration was submitted but the court denied the same.
The offended party predicates his action on Article 33 of the Civil Code
which provides that “[i]n cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.”
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that the term “physical injuries” does
not include frustrated homicide because the term refers to the specific crime of
physical injuries as defined in the RPC and should be understood in its technical
or legal sense, and not in its ordinary or generic sense of bodily injury.
ISSUES: Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent
civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of
the criminal action for frustrated homicide.
RULING: The Court ruled that the term “physical injuries” should be understood
to mean bodily harm or injury, such as physical injuries, frustrated homicide, or
even death. Said the court: “The article in question uses the words ‘defamation,’
‘fraud’ and ‘physical injuries.’ Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary
sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using
these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms must
have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning.
It is evident that the term ‘physical injuries’ could not have been used in its
specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code for it is difficult to
believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article—
some in their generic and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
‘physical injuries’ should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of
physical injuries, because the term used with the latter are generic terms.
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO
5 SCRA 231, G.R. NO. L-17663
30 MAY 1962
CONCEPCION, J.
FACTS: On October 5, 1959, the accused alleged Mayor Arsenio Lacson of
raping two women in the course of a political speech delivered to a crowd of
around a hundred persons through an amplifier system. A motion was filed
against him for libel but the defendant moved to quash the information filed
against him on the ground that the crime he committed is oral defamation which
had already prescribed. The CFI of Manila granted this motion. Hence, this
appeal by the prosecution.
ISSUES: Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier
system constitutes oral defamation or libel.
RULING: In rejecting the argument, the court ruled that the word “radio” should
be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated—writing,
printing, etc.—all of which, unlike an amplifier system, have a common
characteristic, namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication which is
not present in utterances through an amplifier.
CALTEX PHILS., INC. VS. PALOMAR
18 SCRA 247, G.R. NO. L-19650
29 SEPTEMBER 1966
CASTRO, J.
FACTS: In 1960, Caltex conceived a groundwork promotional scheme to drum
up patronage for its oil products denominated “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest”.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for transmission of communications thereto,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to
be cleared in advance for mailing. The then Acting Postmaster General opined
that the scheme falls within the purview of the Postal law and declined to grant
the requested clearance. The Postmaster General maintained his view that the
contest involves consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a “gift
enterprise” which is equally banned in the postal law.
ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violates
the Postal Law.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court established that where the word
“lottery” is defined as a game of chance, one of the elements of which is
consideration, the term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the
Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element.
Under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries,
they involve the element of consideration. Because there is none in the contest
herein in question, the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
The Court also had occasion to define Construction as “the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.”
 MUTUC VS. COMELEC
36 SCRA 228, G.R. NO. L-32717
26 NOVEMBER 1970
FERNANDO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Pampanga and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged
that respondent Commission of Elections informed him that his certificate of
candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his
mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which
petitioner says is violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court adopted a resolution which required respondent to file
an answer. Respondent does not deny the allegations of the petitioner but
justifies the prohibition on the Constitutional Convention Act which proscribes
candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.”
It is the respondent’s contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It is prayed
that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
ISSUES: Whether or not the jingles of petitioner are embraced within the phrase
“and the like” and thus articles prohibited from being distributed.
RULING: In answering in the negative, the Court applied the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, where general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to.
It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Constitution
Convention Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for
its distribution. Where an act makes unlawful the distribution of electoral
propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or material
“and the like,” the term “and the like” does not embrace taped jingles for
campaign purposes, the said term being restricted only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically enumerated.
VERA VS. CUEVAS
90 SCRA 379, G.R. NOS. L-33693-94
31 MAY 1979
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought private
respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which
do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within
fifteen days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of
private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the
necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order.
The lower court held that the products in question were correctly labeled and
restrained the CIR from requiring the private respondents to print on the labels
of their filled milk products the words, “This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age” or words of similar import as
required by the Tax Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not filled milk is synonymous with skimmed milk and thus
subject to the application and prohibitions found in the Tax Code on proper
labelling.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It cannot then be readily or
safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.
The term “skimmed milk” in a statute which requires that “all condensed
skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form” “shall be clearly and legibly
marked on its immediate containers” “with the words: ‘This milk is not suitable
for nourishment for infants less than one year of age,’” restricts the phrase “all
milk in whatever form” and excludes with its scope, filled milk.
Since skimmed milk and filled milk are different from each other due to the
presence of fatty part in the former while absence of such in the latter. Section
169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk but to skimmed milk because
of the use of the words “skimmed milk” in the headnote and text of said section
which would restrict the scope of the general clause thereof referring to “all
milk, in whatever form”, applying the rule of ejusdem generis.
REPUBLIC VS. MIGRINO
189 SCRA 289, G.R. NO. 89483
30 AUGUST 1990
CORTES, J.
FACTS: Chairman Jovito Salonga created the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines Anti-Graft Boardin order to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in service.
 Lt. Col Troadio Tecson was required by the board to submit his
explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence based on an
information received by the Board alleging the acquisition of wealth beyond his
lawful income.
Private respondent failed to produce evidence of his innocence and the board
proceeded with its investigation. It thereafter recommended that private
respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of The Anti-Graft Act in
relation to Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 authorizing the PCGG to recover ill-
gotten wealth of the former President’s “subordinates and close associates”
“during his administration.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate the former
military officer for being in the service during the administration of the former
President and was therefore his subordinate.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that the term “subordinate”
refers only to one who enjoys close association or relation with the former
President and/or his wife, and not to any government officer during the former
President’s administration, the term “close associates” having restricted the
meaning of “subordinates.”
U.S. VS. SANTO NINO
13 PHIL 141, G.R. NO. 5000
11 MARCH 1909
WILLARD, J.
FACTS: On August 16, 1908, defendant Victor Santos was seen to have carried a
deadly weapon. It is one iron bar, 15 inches in length with an iron ball at one
end and a string on the other to tie to the wrist. This is designed and made for
fighting.
Due to this, he was charged for violation of Act No. 1786, which provides
that “It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie, knife, direck, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this
prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of person who have
secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the
provisions of this act.”
It is argued that following the rule of ejusdem generis, the phrase “other
deadly weapon” does not include an unlicensed revolver.
ISSUES: Whether or not the carrying of an unlicensed revolver concealed in the
person comes under the phrase “other deadly weapon” thus constituting a
violation of Act No. 1786.
RULING: In rejecting this argument, the Court said that the rule of ejusdem
generis “is resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the intent of the
legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears from the other
parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result
which would be reached by the application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the
latter must give way. In this case, the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in
the view of the legislature, the carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a
violation of the Act. By the proviso, it manifested its intention to include in the
prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein specified.”
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP VS. SSC
1 SCRA 10, G.R. NO. L-15045
20 JANUARY 1961
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
FACTS: On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila filed
with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a request that “catholic Charities,
and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are
directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila,” be exempt from compulsory coverage of R.A. No. 1161
otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1954.
The SSC denied the petitioner’s request. After a request for reconsideration,
the Commission again denied the exemption. In invoking the rule of ejusdem
generis, the petitioner claims that it is not included in the term “employer” as
statutorily defined as “any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carried in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity
of any kind and sued the services of another person who is under his order as
regard the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or
controlled by the government.”
It is contended that the term “employer” should be limited to those who
carry an “undertaking or activity which has the element of profit or gain”
because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the
words “any trade, business, industry, undertaking.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the term “employer” should be limited to activities for
profit or gain only, thus exempting the petitioner from compliance with R.A.
No. 1161.
RULING: In rejecting the petitioner’s contention, the Court held that the “rule of
ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling
where the plain purpose and intent of the legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated.” The definition is “sufficiently comprehensive to include religious
and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit,” and “this is made
more evident by the fact that it contains exceptions in which said institutions or
entities are not included.”
LERUM VS. CRUZ
87 SCRA 652, G.R. NO. L-2783
29 NOVEMBER 1950
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
FACTS: A case for bigamy was filed against Nello Roa. In the course of the trial,
respondent former judge Roman Cruz was placed on the witness stand by the
defendant to prove that his wife Elena Muñoz had already secured a divorce
decree against him.
The prosecution moved for the striking out of some portions of the testimony
of the Judge Cruz but was denied. The prosecution again brought the case to the
Supreme Court through certiorari and again the petition was denied on the
ground that the respondent judge had power and authority to rule on the question
raised therein. After the steps taken by the prosecution to foil the attempt to
prove the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence proved futile, the private
prosecution filed the present petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner have the necessary personality and interest
to file the petition under question.
RULING: In answering in the affirmative, the Court said that pursuant to the rule
that a person who is interested “under a deed, will, contract, or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute
and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder,” the subject matter of
such action must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to
a statute or ordinance, and not to other matters, in order to warrant declaratory
relief, such other matters not being mentioned therein being deemed excluded.
This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
VERA VS. FERNANDEZ
89 SCRA 199, G.R. NO. L-31364
30 MARCH 1979
DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS: A motion representing the indebtedness to the Government of the late
Luis Tongoy for deficient payment of income taxes to which was attached a
Proof of Claim was filed. The Administrator opposed the motion solely on the
ground that the claim was barred under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
Finding the opposition well-founded, the respondent Judge dismissed the motion
for allowance of claim filed by the petitioner Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. A motion for reconsideration was filed but later on denied.
Hence this appeal on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the statute of nonclaims bars claim of the government
for unpaid taxes still within the period of limitation of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the court said that the National Internal
Revenue Code as well as the Rules of Court makes no mention of claims for
monetary obligations of the decedent created by law, such as taxes which is
entirely of different character from the claims for monetary obligations of the
decedent created by law, such as taxes which is entirely of different character
from the claims expressly enumerated therein. Under the familiar rule of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Thus, if a statute enumerates the
things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily, and by
implication be excluded from its operation and effect.
Taxes due the government, not being mentioned in the rule that “all claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses
and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money
against the decedent, must be filed within the time limit in the notice, otherwise
they are barred forever,” are deemed excluded from the operation of the rule,
and such taxes can still be recovered even though the same are not presented as
claims against the estate within the prescribed period in the notice, so long as
they have not prescribed under the Tax Code.
MANABAT VS. DE AQUINO
92 PHIL 1025, G.R. NO. L-5558
29 APRIL 1953
BENGZON, J.
FACTS: Sued on a promissory note, Enrique Manabat and his wife denied
liability and alleged usury. Having failed to appear and present evidence at the
hearing, they were ordered to pay the amount plus interest to the plaintiffs.
Notified of the decision, the Manabats sent their notice of appeal by
registered mail together with a postal money order payable to the justice of the
peace. However, the Roxas couple submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal of
the Manabats on the ground that the appeal documents had been received by the
inferior court two days after the expiration of the time prescribed by law for
appeals from that court and that the appeal was frivolous, interposed obviously
for delay.
It is the contention of the petitioners that Section 1 Rule 27 should be applied
and thus the appeal has been reasonably perfected. The respondents, on the other
hand, contend that Rule 27 is not applicable because it is not mentioned in
Section 19 Rule 4 and thus, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius applies.
ISSUES: Whether or not the appeal has been perfected within fifteen days as
required by Section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative. It said that where the rule
enumerates the provisions which are applicable to proceedings in municipal trial
courts in cases falling within their jurisdictions, the fact that the provision
making the date of mailing a pleading as shown by the post office registry
receipt as the date of filing in court is not one of those enumerated does not
mean that it is not applicable to proceedings in municipal trial courts.
The reason for this is that there are circumstances indicating that the
enumeration is not intended to be exclusive, as shown by the fact that to exclude
the provision and others not mentioned therein would be productive of
undesirable consequences not intended by its framers, and disruptive of the
principle that uniformity of rules is designed to simplify procedures in all courts.
The appeal has thus been filed well within the prescriptive period.
ESCRIBANO VS. AVILA
85 SCRA 245, G.R. NO. L-30375
12 SEPTEMBER 1978
AQUINO, J.
FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun, governor-elect of Cotabato, filed
directly with the CFI of that province a complaint for libel against Mayor
Escribano of Cotabato sworn before Judge Avila and supported by Acting
Governor Datumanong. Escribano was charged of having said in a broadcasted
spiel by a radio station, that “Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever lived in
this province.”
Petitioner now questions Avila’s authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation since the latter said that he has power to do such. Escribano filed
the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying Avila’s
decision to be set aside. No restraining order was issued. He then filed a
supplemental petition to annul that order. Judge Avila ordered the arrest of
Escribano and a warrant was issued and the city fiscal filed an information for
libel. This Court then issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from
proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CFI of Cotabato is invested with authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court said that the maxim inclusio unius
est exclusio alterious does not apply where the omission of something which is
otherwise within the statute has nothing to do with the purpose of the
amendment. The maxim cannot be applied in this case because as shown, the
CFI is not mentioned in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a
preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with
the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the
court must look in to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief
sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law
a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than
one which will defeat it. It is reasonable to surmise that the CFI was not
mentioned due to inadvertence. That oversight is not unusual since preliminary
investigations are usually conducted by municipal courts and fiscals. In practice,
a preliminary investigation by the CFI is the exception, not the general rule.
Where the legislative intent shows that the enumeration is not exclusive, the
maxim does not apply.
PEOPLE VS. TAMANI
55 SCRA 153, G.R. NOS. L-22160 & L-22161
21 JANUARY 1974
AQUINO, J.
FACTS: This is an appeal of defendant Teodoro Tamani from the decision of the
CFI sentencing him to life imprisonment for the murder of Jose Siyang.
The Solicitor General filed a petition to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
it was 47 days late. A decision was promulgated convicting Tamani and his
motion for reconsideration was denied. The wife received the order on July 13
and was never brought to the attention of defendant’s counsel only on
September 7 averring that the wife must have lost the envelope containing the
order.
The trial court opined that the tardy appeal be given due course. After
considering the gravity of the two penalties imposed, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal without prejudice of the Solicitor General to “raise the
question of jurisdiction on the ground of a very much belated appeal.”
 Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from.”
ISSUES: Whether the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgment of
conviction in a criminal action is to be counted from the date of promulgation of
judgment or from the receipt of the notice of judgment.
RULING: In holding that the 15-day period should be counted from the
promulgation and not from receipt of copy of the judgment, the court used a
variation of the doctrine of last antecedent: the rule of reddendo singula
singulis. The maxim means referring each to each; referring each phrase or
expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is,
the words should be taken distributively. It further said that the word
“promulgation” in Section 6 should be construed as referring to “judgment;”
while the word “notice” should be construed as referring to “order.” Such a
construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis.”
FORES VS. MIRANDA
105 PHIL 266, G.R. NO. L-12163
4 MARCH 1959
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney. While the vehicle
was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver
lost control, causing the vehicle to swerve and hit the bridge wall. Five
passengers were injured including the respondent. The driver was charged with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty and
was sentenced accordingly.
It is the contention of the petitioner that a day before the accident happened,
she allegedly sold the passenger jeep to a Carmen Sackerman. This is attacked
by the respondent, saying that such requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission (PSC).
This is based on the fact that approval by the PSC of the sale of a public
service vehicle was not necessary because of the proviso in Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146 was rejected, said Section 20 reading in part that
“it shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or for the owner, lessee or
operator thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission
previously had x x x to sell, alienate, x x x its property, franchise, certificate,
privilege, or right, or any part therof; x x x Provided, however, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being
negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary course of
business.”
ISSUES: Whether or not the approval of the PSC is necessary for the sale of a
public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate
the same.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that “the proviso x x x means only that the
sale without the required approval is still valid and binding between the parties”
and the “phrase in the ordinary course of business x x x could not have been
intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to
such property that may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary
course of its business, like junked equipment.”
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. PUBLIC UTILITIES EMPLOYEES
79 PHIL 409, G.R. NO. L-1206
30 OCTOBER 1947
FERIA, J.
FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari by the petitioner of the Manila Electric
Company on the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations holding that they
are liable for additional compensation though the former grants a one day
vacation leave with pay to every workingman, Sundays and holidays must be
observed for purposes of religion and rest.
The appellant contends that the said decision is against the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
ISSUES: Whether or not Manila Electric Co., which is a public utility company
supplying electricity, is liable to pay an additional compensation of twenty-five
per centum of the regular remuneration in favour of those employees required to
work during Sundays and legal holidays.
RULING: In resolving the case in the negative, the court held that “said Section 4
consists of two parts: the first, which is the enactment clause, prohibits a person,
firm or corporation, business establishment or place or center of labor from
compelling an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays,
unless the former pays the latter an additional sum of at least twenty-five per
centum of his regular remuneration; and the second part, which is an exception
exempts public utilities performing some public service x x x from the
prohibition established in the enactment clause.
As appellant is a public utility that supplies electricity and provides means of
transportation to the public, it is evident that the appellant is exempt from the
qualified prohibition established in the enactment clause, and may compel its
employees or laborers to work during Sundays and legal holidays without
paying them said extra compensation.
The second portion of Section 4 is in reality an exception, and not a proviso
although it is introduced by the word ‘provided,’ and it is elemental that an
exception takes out of an enactment, something which would otherwise be a part
of it.
 VI. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADM. VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
311 SCRA 755, G.R. NO. 119385
5 AUGUST 1999
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS: Officials and employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year
Social Amelioration Benefit to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue graduate
studies and to finance the schooling of their children even before Congress
passed R.A. No. 6758 and its implementing rule CCC No. 10.
The auditor of the NTA issued a notice of Disallowance of payment of the
benefit which was in turn affirmed by the Commission on Audit stating that the
NTA had no statutory authority to grant such an incentive. Sec. 12 of said law
provides: “Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation—All allowances
except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign
service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not
otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional
compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as
of July 1, 1989, not integrated into the standardized rates shall continue to be
authorized.”
Petitioner now contends that by virtue of the second sentence, they are
entitled to receive the benefit. The COA contends that the entirety of Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 6758 in relation to subparagraphs 5.4 to 5.6 of CCC No. 10 shows that
there is no legal basis for such because the benefit is included in the catch-all
phrase of the first sentence of Sec. 12.
Proper interpretation of the first sentence of Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 6758, which
states that “such other compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary
rates herein prescribed,” and the second sentence of said Sec. 12, which
provides that “Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standard salary rates shall continue to be authorized.”
ISSUES: Whether or not educational assistance benefit given to individuals prior
to enactment of R.A. No. 6758 should continue to be received by them.
RULING: The Court ruled that the first sentence is a “catch-all provision” that
refers to allowances, while the second sentence refers to benefits in the nature of
financial assistance and not allowance.
Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that the particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A
statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions
whenever possible. And the rule—that statute must be construed as a whole—
requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized, if at all possible. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory
construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of the subject statute.
With these rules and the foregoing distinction elaborated upon, it is evident
that the two seemingly irreconcilable propositions are susceptible to perfect
harmony. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the aforesaid “catch-all
provision,” the legislative intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in
the nature of allowances and since the benefit under controversy is not in the
same category, it is safe to hold that subject educational assistance is not one of
the fringe benefits within the contemplation of the first sentence of Section 12
but rather, of the second sentence of Section 12, in relation to Section 17 of R.A.
No. 6758.
PEOPLE VS. GARCIA
85 PHIL 651, G.R. NO. L-2873
28 FEBRUARY 1950
TUASON, J.
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Supreme
Court where the main theme as averred by the Solicitor General is that articles
12(20 and 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code “complement each other”; that the
application of article 68 takes place only when the court has to render judgment
and impose a penalty upon a minor who has been proceeded against in
accordance with article 80 and who has misbehaved or is found incorrigible, and
that article 80 must be applied first before article 68 can come into operation,
and the Court can not apply the latter article in total disregard of the former. In
short, what article 80 does not touch, article 68 can not touch as well.
ISSUES: Whether or not the appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
contemplated in article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that Article 68 is not
dependent on article 80, nor do these articles complement each other if by
complement is meant that they are two mutually completing parts so that article
68 could not stand without article 80. It is more appropriate to say that article 68
merely adjusts itself to article 80 but is, in all other respects, self-sufficient and
independent of the latter. Parts of one system of penology and working in
coordination with each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be noticed that
article 79 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled “Application of Penalties,”
while article 80 comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled “Execution and
Service of Penalties.” Two different subjects are these.
All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may
be given to each and every part thereof, and conflicting intentions in the same
statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by
an unambiguous language.
In amending article 80 of the RPC by R.A. No. 47, there is no clear intention
on the part of Congress to amend article 68. Indeed, the rational presumption in
that if there had been such an intention, the lawmakers should have said so
expressly, instead of leaving the change to influence.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
263 SCRA 758, G.R. NO. 122256
30 OCTOBER 1996
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in
Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent
rejected the government’s offer arguing that the nearby lands planted the same
crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just
Compensation in the RTC of Davao del Norte. The RTC dimissed the petition
on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Private respondent moved for
a reconsideration but it was denied. A petition for certiorari was filed in the
Court of Appeals by private respondent contending that a petition for just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 § 56-57 falls under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC. The Court of Appeals set aside the order of
dismissal of the RTC.
ISSUES: Whether or not in cases involving claims for just compensation under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, an appeal from the decision of the
provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can
resort to the Regional Trial Court Under Sec. 57.
RULING: In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court held that it
is true that § 50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
“agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture and Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) “all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners” and (2) “the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657”. The provision of §50
must be construed in harmony of just compensation and criminal cases for
violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred
on the DAR.
SAJONAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
258 SCRA 79, G.R. NO. 102377
5 JULY 1996
TORRES, JR., J.
FACTS: The case is for the cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on
Execution from a Certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The
inscription was caused to be made by the private respondent on TCT No. N-
79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses
Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin and was later carried over to and annotated
on TCT No. N-109417 of the same registry issued in the name of the spouses
Alfredo and Conchita Sajones who purchased the parcel of land from the
Uychocdes and are now the petitioners in this case.
Petitioners argue that the lower court erred in holding that the rule on the 30-
day period for adverse claim under section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 is absolute
inasmuch as it failed to read or construe the provision in its entirety and to
reconcile the apparent inconsistency within the provision in order to give effect
ot it as a whole.
Private respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse claim was
annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effective only up to September
26, 1984, after which it will no longer have any binding force and effect
pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.
ISSUES: What period an adverse claim annotated at the back of transfer
certificate of title is effective, which in turn depends upon the interpretation of
Sec. 70 of P.D. No. 1529.
RULING: The Court held that in construing the law, care should be taken that ISSUES: Whether or not the phrase “regular local election” includes the SK
every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could render a election which is set by R.A. No. 7808.
provision inoperative should be avoided and inconsistent provisions should be
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that to construe the phrase
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a harmonious whole. For taken in
“regular local election” as including SK elections, no recall election can be
solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with
It would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
those with which it is associated. In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its entirety.
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
Construing the provisions as a whole would reconcile the apparent filled by the electorate.
inconsistency between the portions of the law such that the provisions on
This construction is in accordance with the rule that in the interpretation of a
cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the
statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended
provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simple means that
to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,
thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
upon the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
upon the lapse of said period, its cancellation is no longer necessary and the
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.
process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
MANILA LODGE NO. 761 VS. COURT OF APPEALS
PARAS VS. COMELEC
73 SCRA 162, G.R. NO. L-41001
264 SCRA 49, G.R. NO. 123169
30 SEPTEMBER 1976
4 NOVEMBER 1996
CASTRO, C.J.
FRANCISCO, J.
FACTS: The CA affirmed the decision of the CFI of Manila which declared the
FACTS: Petitioner Danila E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension as part of the public park or
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangays election in 1994. A
plaza and, therefore, part of the public domain. Consequently, the lower court
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
declared that sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila Lodge No.
the barangays. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission
761, BPOE, was null and void.
on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the
25% required by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in ISSUES: Whether or no the reclaimed land is patrimonial land or of public
view of petitioner’s opposition. The COMELEC set anew the recall election. To dominion intended for public use.
prevent such, the petition filed before the RTC a petition for injunction and latter
RULING: The Court held if the land is patrimonial, it can be disposed of without
issued a TRO.
statutory authorization. The act uses the phrase “is hereby authorized.” To
After conducting a summary hearing, the RTC lifted the TRO, dismissed the authorize means to empower, to give a right to act, and “hereby” means “by
petition and required petitioner to explain why he should not be cited for means of this statute or action.” To hold that the reclaimed land is patrimonial
contempt for misrepresentation. In a resolution, the COMELEC rescheduled the property, which can be disposed of without statutory authorization, is to render
recall election for a third time. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari with the provision of the law to the effect that the City of Manila “is hereby
prayer for injunction. authorized to lease or sell” a portion thereof superfluous. And to so construe the
Petitioner insists that the recall election scheduled for January 13, 1996 is statute as to render the phrase superfluous would violate the elementary rule of
now barred as the SK election on the first Monday of May 1996 is a regular legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence
election under Sec. 74(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
of the statute and that a statute must be so interpreted that no part thereof
becomes inoperative.
C&C COMMERCIAL CORP. VS. NAWASA
21 SCRA 984, G.R. NO. L-27275
18 NOVEMBER 1967
ANGELES, J.
FACTS: On July 19, 1965, a complaint was filed alleging that NAWASA had
started to negotiate for direct purchase of centrifugally cast iron pipes for the
improvement of the San Pablo Waterworks section in violation of the provisions
of R.A. No. 912 which provides that “in construction or repair work undertaken
by the Government, whether done directly or through contract awards,
Philippine-made materials and products, whenever available, practicable, and
usable and will serve the purpose as equally well as foreign-made products or
materials, shall be used in said construction or repair work.”
The plaintiff C&C alleges also that it violates the bidding law because it
excludes the said corporation from the bidding which can supply instead
asbestos cement pressure pipes which are available, practicable, and usable and
serve the purpose of the aid of project at a much lower cost. The trial court
rendered a partial decision which dismissed the complaint and dissolved the
preliminary injunction issued. The partial decision became final.
On several occasion, NAWASA called for bids. For the improvements of
Davao Metropolitan Waterworks, Iloilo Waterworks System and Manila and
Suburbs Waterworks System. Plaintiff filed supplemental complaints seeking to
restrain NAWASA from continuing the projects on the ground that these
projects violate R.A. No. 912. The trial court rendered a decision pending and
conducting that the act of NAWASA constituted violations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 912
ISSUES: Whether or not NAWASA Should be included with the term
“government” as sued in R.A. No. 912
Whether or not R.A. No. 912 and C.A. No. 138 requires that preponderance
be made in the purchase and use of Filing made in the purpose and use of
Philippine-made materials and products.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that Sec. 2 of the RAC
defining the term “government” which is heavily relied upon by the appellant to
cognize an exception: “when a different meaning for the word or phrase is given
a particular statute or is plainly to be collected from the context of connection
where the term is used.” In this be construed in its implied sense and not in the
strict signification of the bar “Government of the Philippines” as the political
entity through which other political authority is exercised.
The Court further said that they being statutes in pari material, they should
be construed to attain the same objective—to give preference to locally
produced materials in purchases, works or projects of the Government—the
accomplishment of which will be defeated if government-owned or controlled
corporations are excluded from the operation of R.A. No. 912.
BUTUAN SAWMILL, INC. VS. CITY OF BUTUAN
16 SCRA 755, G.R. NO. L-21516
29 APRIL 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Butuan Sawmill, Inc., petitioner-appellee, was granted a legislative
franchise by virtue of R.A. No. 399, for an electric light, heat and power system
at Butuan, Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and conditions established
in Act 3636, as amended by C.A. No. 132 and the Constitution. It was also
issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service
Commission on March 18, 1954
Ordinance No. 7, which took effect on October 1, 1950, imposes a tax of 2%
on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city, payable
monthly within the first 20 days of the following month, and provides penalties
thereof. This ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 11 by enumerating the
kinds of business required to pay the tax, and further amended by Ordinance No.
131 by modifying the penal provision, and still further amended by Ordinance
No. 148 by including within the coverage of taxable businesses “Those engaged
in the business of electric light, heat and power”.
Herein respondent-appellant, City of Butuan, maintains the stand that the
franchise of petitioner-appellee is subject to an “amendment, alteration or repeal
by the National Assembly” as per Section 12 of Act 3636, as amended; that the
city is empowered under its charter to “provide for the levy and collection of
taxes for general and special purposes”; and that its taxing power was enlarged
and extended by the Local Autonomy Law, R.A. No. 2264 and that said
statutory enactments gave the city the authority to impose 2% tax on the gross
sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat, and power of herein
petitioner appellee.
ISSUES: Whether or not herein respondent-appellant is empowered under its
charter to provide for the levy and collection of taxes against Butuan Sawmill,
Inc.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that the inclusion of the
franchised business of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. within the coverage of the
questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city
under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be taken as an authority
delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise, since its charter did not
expressly nor specifically provide any such power. Be it noted that the franchise
was granted by act of the legislature on June 18, 1949 while the city’s charter
was approved on June 15, 1950.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general—the
terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special—the fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption
that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one
as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, is therefore applicable in
this case since a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception
to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
BAGATSING VS. RAMIREZ
74 SCRA 306, G.R. NO. L-41631
17 DECEMBER 1976
MARTIN, J.
FACTS: On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 7522 which regulates the operation of public markets and prescribing the
fees for the rentals of stalls and other penalties for the violation thereof.
Subsequently, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. filed a
civil case before the CFI of Manila presided by respondent Judge Pedro
Ramirez, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 primarily
because the publication requirement under Section 17 of the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila has not been complied with. Under the said Charter, each
proposed ordinance shall be published in 2 daily newspapers of general
circulation in the city within 10 days after its approval.
After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision
declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the non-compliance with the
requirement of publication. Petitioners moved for reconsideration alleging that
only post-publication is required under Section 43 of the Local Tax Code, to wit:
“within ten days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city,
municipality, and barrio ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees, or other
charges shall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper x x x.”
However, the respondent Judge denied the motion. Hence, the petitioner filed
this instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Local Tax Code is controlling over the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila as in the instant case, hence, post-publication is
already sufficient to hold the validity of a taxing ordinance.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that Ordinance No. 7522
was validly enacted. There is no question that the said Charter is a special act
while the Local Tax Code is a general law, and that the rule commonly said is
that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law.
The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the
special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as
general law of the land and the other as the law of a particular case.
However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers
to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. In the
instant case, Section 17 of the Charter speaks of “ordinance” in the general,
irrespective of the nature and scope thereof whereas Section 43 of the Local Tax
Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in
particular. In regard therefore to ordinances in general, the Charter is dominant
but that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of
“ordinance levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular.
There, the Local Tax Code controls. This is especially true where the law
containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the
general provision.
Here, as always, the general provision must give way to a particular
provision. The Charter prescribes a rule of the publication of “ordinance” in
general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of
“ordinance levying or imposing taxes, fees, or other charges” in particular. In
fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special
or specific act by a general or broad one. A subsequent general law similarly
applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the
reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the constitution, general laws,
and public policy of the state.
CITY OF MANILA VS. TEOTICO
22 SCRA 267, G.R. NO. L-23052
29 JANUARY 1968
CONCEPCION, C.J.
FACTS: Genaro Teotico was waiting for a jeepney under the loading and
unloading zone one night. As a jeepney stopped and he approached it, he fell
into a manhole resulting in the shattering of his glass and wounding of his left
eyelid. He also received several contusions in the process.
He was taken to the Philippine General Hospital but further treatment for
anti-tetanus was required with a private doctor. This cost him P1,400 plus P50
for his absence from work for twenty days, along with the ridicule of his co-
members in circles of which he is a part, and was worried for the support of his
minor children.
The City of Manila cited section 4 of R.A. No. 409 removing the liability of
the city and mayor for their negligence. It was countered by Article 2189 of the
Civil code which substantially provides that it is the responsibility of the cities
and mayors whenever damage or even death is caused by poor roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings and other public works under their supervision. The
City further contends that it is not liable because there was no negligence on its
part to ensure safety (the cover was claimed to have been stolen) and the
incident happened on a national highway. The Court of Appeals held that the
City of Manila is liable and should pay Teotico P6,750.
ISSUES: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for the damages based on
Article 2189 of the Civil Code or not liable under R.A. No. 409.
RULING: In ruling that the City is liable, the Court held that while the Civil
Code is a general and R.A. No. 409 is a special one, both speak of liabilities.
While the former speaks of liabilities arising form the poor condition of the
infrastructures that the cities are responsible, the latter of liabilities arising from
negligence in general.
Due to the specificity of the Civil Code provisions, it shall prevail. Though
the usual rule is that the general law gives way to a specific law, this case is an
exception because the special speaks of a more general aspect while the general
law speaks of a more specific aspect of liability.
 VII. STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
268 SCRA 747, G.R. NO. 116033
26 FEBRUARY 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving
business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were contracted by the Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao
del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former’s premises. From this set of
circumstances arose the present controversy.
It appears that a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the
main office of the BIR addressed to the Regional Director or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to
distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.
Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the “Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue along with his co-
accused Jaime Ancla were charged before the Sandiganbayan of the crime of
malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article
222 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES: Whether or not a private person can be considered a public officer
venue as a depository of distrained property, so as to make the conversion
thereof the crime of malversation falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that there is no provision in
the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as a
depository cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public
officer.
Article 222 of the RPC reads: “Officers included in the preceding provisions.
—The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any
capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial, or municipal funds,
revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of funds or property
attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs
to a private individual.
The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who
has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and
commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title
Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to
erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a
private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
303 SCRA 508, G.R. NO. 107135
23 FEBRUARY 1999
PURISIMA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner (private respondent CENVOCO) is a manufacturer of edible
and coconut/coprameal cake and such other coconut oil related or subject to the
millers tax of 3%. In 1986, herein petitioner purchased a specified number of
containers and packaging materials for its edible oil from its suppliers and paid
the sales tax due thereon.
An investigation conducted by the respondent Revenue Examiner found out
that there was deficiency in the assessment of the petitioner’s miller tax
amounting to P1,575,514.70. Thus respondent was sent an Assessment Notice
informing and requesting the petitioner to pay the assessment tax deficiency,
notwithstanding the letter filed by the petitioner contending that the final
provision of Section 168 of the Tax Code does not apply to sales tax paid on
containers and packaging materials, hence, the amount paid therefor should have
been credited against the miller’s tax assessed against it.
Dissatisfied with the adverse action taken by the BIR, CENVOCO filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of
CENVOCO. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari from the judgment of
the Court of Apepals.
The BIR claims that there should be no tax credit pursuant to the proviso of
Sec. 168 of the Tax Code which reads: “Provided, finally, That credit for any
sales, miller’s or excise taxes and raw materials or supplies used in the milling
process shall not be allowed against the miller’s tax due, except in the case of a
proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder.”
ISSUES: Whether or not containers and packaging materials can be credited
against the miller’s deficiency tax.
RULING: The Court ruled that the proviso should be strictly construed to apply
only to raw materials and not to containers and packaging materials which are
not raw materials; hence, the miller is entitled to a tax credit.
 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established
by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the
latter by implication.
The exception provided for in Section 168 of the old Tax Code should be
strictly construed. Conformably, the sales, miller’s and excise taxes paid on all
other materials (except on raw materials used in the milling process), such as the
sales taxes paid on containers and packaging materials of the milled products
under consideration, may be credited against the miller’s tax due therefor.
It bears stressing that tax burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be
imposed beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes
being construed strictissimi juris against the government.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
271 SCRA 605, G.R. NO. 115349
18 APRIL 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various
programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young
people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80
from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants
and canteen operators, and P44,259 from parking fees collected from non-
members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to private respondent
in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for
deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on wages. Private
respondent formally protested the assessment and, as supplement to its basic
protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims
of YMCA. Contesting the denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for
review at the CTA. In due course, the CTA ruled in favor of the YMCA.
Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case t o the Court of
Appeals. The CA initially decided in favor of the CIR and disposed of the
appeal. Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA, the
CA reversed its earlier decision, thus affirming the CTA’s.
The internal revenue commissioner’s own Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent court. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned
by the YMCA is subject to income tax under the NIRC and the Constitution.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court agreed with the argument of the
CIR in that the income received by the organizations enumerated in Section 27
(now Section 26) of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax
“in respect to income received by them as such,” the exemption does not apply
to the income derived “…from any of their properties, real or personal, or from
any of their activities conducted for profit; regardless of the disposition made of
such income…”
Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied
the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax exemptions. Furthermore, a
claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable
from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption
“must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be
mistaken.”
CENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
211 SCRA 179, G.R. NO. 97419
3 JULY 1992
MEDIALDEA, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena’s government service started on
November 16, 1978 at the Law Department of Caloocan City. His last
appointment was on July 16, 1987 with the Register of Deeds of Malabon, and
stayed there until he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on
January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service
of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. He requested for an extension of service
before his 65th birthday so as to complete the 15-year service requirement to
enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par.
(b) of P.D. No. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). His
request, as well as his subsequent motions for reconsideration, was denied by
respondent CSC, and was only given an extension of 1 year, pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990.
ISSUES: Whether or not a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months
and 6 days of government service, may be allowed to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
benefits of an old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court held that the rule on limiting the
extension of service under CSC MC No. 27 to only 1 year for an employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less than 15 the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the
years of service, cannot be accorded validity. It cannot be extended to embrace State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
matters not covered by P.D. No. 1146 which, with its par. (b) Section 11, does The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious—the protection of the
not limit nor specify the maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of
complete the 15 years of service. establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like
The Court, applying a liberal approach in interpreting P.D. No. 1146, held private respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the
that the completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) thirty-three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case
partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years but has less than 15 years of service. Mr. hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the letter has assumed the
Cena’s agency, the Land Registration Authority, was thereby provided the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new
discretion to allow the petitioner to complete the 15 years of government employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
service.
ABELLA VS. NLRC
152 SCRA 140, G.R. NO. L-71813
20 JULY 1987
PARAS, J.
FACTS: On June 27, 1960, herein petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm
land in Ponteverde, Negros Occidental, known as Hacienda Danao-Ramona, for
a period of ten years, renewable, at her option for another ten years.
On August 13, 1970, she opted to extend the lease contract for another ten
years. During the existence of the lease, she employed the herein private
respondents, Ricardo Dionele Sr., and Romeo Quieto. Upon the expiration of
her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private respondents and turned over
the hacienda to the owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the
management, cultivation, and operation of the farm.
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint against the
petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal
dismissal, and reinstatement with back wages.
ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that it is well-settled in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial
consideration. It is the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance
to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of
the New Labor Code which states that “all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.” The policy is to extend the
applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of
 VIII. MANDATORY & DIRECTORY STATUTES
CHARTERED BANK VS. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDITING
OFFICE
149 SCRA 58, G.R. NO. L-38513
31 MARCH 1987
PARAS, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Chartered Bank was accepting postal money orders from the
general public since 1946. The accepted postal money orders were then
presented to the Iloilo City Post Office for payment. During the occasions when
the available cash in the Post Office was less than the value of the postal money
orders, the Iloilo Post Office issued receipts acknowledging the remaining
balance.
However, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular and
memorandum involving the installation of a new postal money order system
which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must clear all
postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at
Manila.
All these notwithstanding, petitioner continued its transactions with the Post
Office under the old practice until the bank noticed that they had not received
payment for some money orders. They wrote the Post Office again, replied to by
the Acting Postmaster informing petitioner that the latter is not aware that said
amount is still carried as an obligation of the Iloilo Post Office supported by the
Bureau of Posts Circular which states that no commercial bank could present
postal money orders to post offices for payment.
ISSUES: Whether or not the bank can collect the balance of the postal money
order it endorsed to the Iloilo City Post Office.
RULING: There is no absolute formal test for determining whether a statutory
direction is to be considered mandatory or directory. As with any question of
statutory construction the decisive factor is the meaning and intention of the
legislature, to be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its
object and the consequences that would follow their construing it one way or the
other.
Nowhere in the provisions of said circular and memorandum can it be
gleaned that exceptions to the general rule have been given, much less has it
been shown that options may be exercised by the commercial banks, as claimed
by the petitioner, to follow or not to follow the new system and revert to the old
one depending on their convenience. On the contrary, the memorandum itself is
emphatic that no old style money orders will be issued after September 30, 1968
and that all uncashed old style money orders will be referred to the Money Order
Division for validation. Neither is there any provision granting authority to any
official or employee of the Bureau of Posts to maintain the old procedure at his
discretion. In contrast, the circular is emphatic in requiring that postmasters and
inspectors shall attend training sessions to insure a thorough knowledge and
understanding of the new procedures for effective implementation.
MCGEE VS. REPUBLIC
94 PHIL 820, G.R. NO. L-5387
29 APRIL 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.
FACTS: Appellee Clyde McGee, an American citizen, is married to Leonarda S.
Crisostomo by whom he has one child. The minors Maria and Amada, both
surnamed Magpayo, are Leonarda’s children by her first husband Ernesto
Magpayo who was killed by the Japanese during the occupation. McGee filed a
petition in the CFI of Manila to adopt his two minor step-children Maria and
Amada.
The Government opposes this, saying that petitioner has a legitimate child
and thus disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 paragraph 1 of the new Civil Code.
The Trial Court overruled the opposition and granted the petition, applying the
provisions of Art. 338 paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.
The Government is appealing from that decision, contending that although
the provisions of Art. 338 permits the adoption of a step-child by the step-father
or step-mother, nevertheless, because of the negative provisions of Art. 335, said
permission is confined to those step-fathers and step-mothers who have no
children of their own.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner can adopt his two step-children.
RULING: In answering in the negative, the Court held that art. 338 of the new
Civil Code should be subordinated and made subject to the provisions of art. 335
so as to limit the permission to adopt granted in art. 338, to parents who have no
children of their own, is that the terms of art. 335 are phrased in a negative
manner—the following cannot be adopted, while the phraseology of art. 338 is
only affirmative—the following may be adopted. Under the rule of statutory
construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while
those in the affirmative are merely directory.
 Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but
one way to obey the command, “thou shall not,” and that is to completely refrain
from doing the forbidden act.
Petitioner McGee is thus disqualified from adopting his step-children.
FULE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
162 SCRA 446, G.R. NO. L-79094
22 JUNE 1988
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS: This is a petitioner for review on certiorari of the decision of the
respondent appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lucena
City convicting petitioner of violating B.P. 22 on the basis of the stipulation of
facts entered into between the prosecution and defense during the pre-trial
conference in the trial court.
At the hearing, only the prosecution presented evidence. At the subsequent
hearing, petitioner waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof,
submitted a Memorandum confirming the stipulation of facts. Thus, the trial
court convicted petitioner-appellant.
Hence, this recourse with petitioner appellant contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in convicting the former on the basis solely of the stipulation of
facts made during the pre-trial which was not signed by the petitioner nor his
counsel.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted on the basis solely of a
stipulation of facts not signed by him or his counsel.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that since Rule 118 Sec. 4 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that an agreement or admission
must be in writing and signed by the accused and counsel before it is admitted as
evidence.
The Court further said that by its very language, the rule is mandatory. The
use of the term “shall” further emphasizes the mandatory character of the rule
and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
Omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily
required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.
The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the
accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence
independent of his admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300, G.R. NO. 119976
18 SEPTEMBER 1995
KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already
lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which reads:
“Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
ISSUES: Whether or not the period provided by the Omnibus Election Code is
directory or mandatory.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, so that
non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if
the statute had intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it. The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law and that judges would
otherwise abstain from rendering a decision after the period to render them had
lapsed because they lacked jurisdiction to do so.
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to
the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
MARCELINO VS. CRUZ
121 SCRA 51, G.R. NO. L-42428
18 MARCH 1983
ESCOLIN, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape. Trial was conducted and
the same was concluded when the accused rested his case on August 4, 1975. On
the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for time within
which to submit their respective memoranda. Counsel for petitioner submitted
his memorandum in due time but none was filed by the People. Hence, notices BERSABAL VS. SALVADOR
of the date for promulgation of the decision were sent and received by the 84 SCRA 176, G.R. NO. L-35910
parties. 21 JULY 1978
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved MAKASIAR, J.
for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the
FACTS: Petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the three orders of respondent
trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof
judge and to compel said respondent judge to decide petitioner’s perfected
for decision. Acceding to counsel’s request, the respondent judge reset the
appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City
promulgation. Counsel for petitioner then moved anew for the resetting of
Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the
promulgation which was also granted.
petitioner and respondents.
Meanwhile, counsel for accused filed before the Court the present petition,
praying for a temporary restraining order on respondent judge from ISSUES: Whether or not it is mandatory upon the CFI to proceed to decide the
promulgating the aforementioned decision contending that the three-month appealed case on the basis of evidence and records transmitted to it, the failure
period prescribed in Section 11[1] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a of the appellant to submit a memorandum on time notwithstanding.
constitutional directive, is mandatory in character and that non-observance RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that the second paragraph of
thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction. Section 45 of R.A. No. 296 is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be
ISSUES: Whether or not the Constitution alters the general rule and render time interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the
provisions to decide mandatory. part of the parties. Being optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so
choose to waive the submission of the memoranda. The Court cannot thus
Whether or not a decision rendered beyond the period prescribed in the
dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum.
Constitution is null and void.
The CFI is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the
RULING: In answering in the negative to both issues, the Court said that that the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts.
phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the Generally speaking, the use of the word “may” in a statute denotes that it is
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase “unless reduced by the directory in nature. The word “may” is generally permissive only and operates
Supreme Court,” it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to to confer discretion.
modification by this Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5(5)
of Article X of the New Constitution to “promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts x x x.” And there can be no doubt that said
provision having been incorporated for reasons of expediency, relates merely to
matters of procedure.
Considering the nature of a directory statute, the nonperformance of what it
prescribes, though constituting in some instances an irregularity or subjecting
the official concerned to disciplinary or administrative sanction, will not vitiate
the proceedings therein taken. Nor will a statute by interpreted as mandatory if it
will lead to absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences. The statute will
instead be construed as directory, so as to avoid such results, without prejudice
to subjecting the officer concerned to administrative sanction for his failure to
do what the law requires.
 IX. PROSPECTIVE & RETROACTIVE STATUTES
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO. VS. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
25 SCRA 789, G.R. NO. 20563
29 OCTOBER 1968
ANGELES, J.
FACTS: Petitioner herein claims for a refund of sales tax and ad valorem tax
from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by the same.
After the approval of R.A. No. 1299 which became effective upon its
approval on June 16, 1955, amending Section 246 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), petitioner stopped paying sales tax on its gross sales and
instead paid ad valorem taxes for the purpose.
Petitioner contends that since the purpose of R.A. No. 1299, which amended
Section 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code, was merely to clarify the
meaning of “minerals” and “mineral products” in said section, the section should
be construed as if it had been originally passed in its amended form, so that
cement should be considered as “mineral product” even before the enactment of
R.A. 1299 and therefore exempt from the sales or percentage tax.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 1299 which amends Section 246 of the NIRC
should be given retroactive effect.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that it is a settled rule in
statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively only and never
retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either
by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. In every case of
doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. There is
nothing in the provision that would manifest the Legislature’s intention to make
it retroactive. On the other hand, the word “shall” in a statute implies that the
lawmakers intend the enactment to be effective only in futuro.
Like other statutes, tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact,
amend or repeal, unless, as aforesaid, the purpose of the Legislature is to give
retrospective effect is expressly declared or may clearly be implied from the
language used. It thus results that before the enactment of the amendment to
section 246 of the Tax Code, when cement was not yet placed under the
category of either “minerals” or “mineral products” it was not exempt from the
percentage tax imposed by section 186 of said Code, and was, therefore, taxable
as a “manufactured product.”
NILO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
128 SCRA 519, G.R. NOS. L-34586 & L-36625
2 APRIL 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: These are two cases of ejectment seeking relief from the Supreme Court
through certiorari from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the first case, petitioner Hospicio Nilo, an agricultural share-tenant of
respondent Almario Gatchalian was ejected by the latter in an ejectment suit
filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations under R.A. No. 3844 § 36(1) which
provides that the lessor-owner may repossess the landholding should he elect to
personally cultivate the same. The CAR ruled in favor of Gatchalian. The CA
affirmed. Petitioner Nilo filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that
“personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an agricultural lessee has been
eliminated under R.A. No. 6389,” which took effect on September 10, 1971. The
CA denied the motion resolving that R.A. No. 6389 has no retroactive
application.
In the second case, petitioner Fortuanto Castro filed a complaint for
ejectment of his tenant, respondent Juan Castro in the land owned by him in
Pulilan, Bulacan before the CAR on the same ground of personal cultivation.
After the enactment of R.A. 6389, respondent Castro moved for the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint in view of the elimination of personal cultivation by the
landowner as a ground for the ejectment of an agricultural tenant. CAR
dismissed the complaint and was subsequently denied an appeal before the CA.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 6389 § 7, which amended R.A. No. 3844 §
36(1) should be given retroactive effect.
RULING: In ruling in the negative, the Court held that R.A. No. 6389 which
removed “personal cultivation” as a ground for ejectment of a tenant cannot be
given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity.
The reason for the general rule, as embodied in Article 4 of the Civil Code,
is that a law is a rule established to guide actions with no binding effect until it
is enacted; hence, it has no application to past but only to future times. This is
why it is said that the law looks to the future only, and has no retroactive effect
unless the legislature may have formally given that effect to the law.
A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates
prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implication.
 PEOPLE VS. ZETA
98 PHIL 143, G.R. NO. L-7140
22 DECEMBER 1955
LABRADOR, J.
FACTS: Esteban Zeta was found guilty of violating R.A. No 145 for having
solicited, charged, demanded, and collected a fee or compensation of P300 for
assisting one Eugenio Albiza in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of
his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States.
Pursuant to the then existing law authorizing a lawyer to charge not more
than 5% of the amount involved as attorney’s fees in the prosecution of certain
veteran’s claim, Zeta entered into a contract for professional services on
contingent basis and actually rendered service to its successful conclusion.
Before the claim was collected, a statute was enacted prohibiting the
collection of attorney’s fees for services rendered in prosecuting veteran’s
claims. For collecting his fees pursuant to the contract for professional services,
the lawyer was prosecuted for violation of the statute.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 145 should be given retroactive application so
as to affect contracts entered into under the sanction of the previous law (C.A.
No. 675)
RULING: In exonerating the lawyer, the Court said that the statute prohibiting
the collection of attorney’s fees cannot be applied retroactively so as to
adversely affect the contract for professional services and the fees themselves.
The court added the fact that the 5% fee was contingent and did not become
absolute and unconditional until the veteran’s claim had been collected by the
claimant when the statute was already in force did not alter the situation. For the
“distinction between vested and absolute rights is not helpful and that a better
view to handle the problem is to declare those statutes attempting to affect rights
which the courts find to be unalterable, invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable,
thus lacking in due process.”
The Court concluded that the 5% fee allowed by the old law is “not
unreasonable. Services were rendered thereunder to claimant’s benefits. The
right to the fees accrued upon such rendition. Only the payment of the fee was
contingent upon the approval of the claim;’ therefore, the right was not
contingent. The subsequent law enacted after the rendition of the services should
not as a matter of simple justice affect the agreement, which was entered into
voluntarily by the parties as expressly directed in the previous law. To apply the
new law to the case of defendant-appellant so as to deprive him of the agreed fee
would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructive of the inviolability of
contracts, and therefore invalid as lacking in due process; to penalize him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of justice.
BUYCO VS. PNB
112 PHIL 588, G.R. NO. L-14406
30 JUNE 1961
PAREDES, J.
FACTS: Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the amount of
P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner’s deficit on his
1952-53 crop loan with respondent bank which was secured by a mortgage of
real property. Petitioner is a holder of a Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate
under R.A. No. 897 payable in 30 years.
Petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the
above mentioned crop year with his backpay acknowledgment certificate but
respondent denied such, basing its contending that respondent’s motion for
reconsideration in the case of Florentino vs. PNB was still under consideration
by the Supreme Court.
After the Court had denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration in said
case, petitioner reiterated his request to pay the obligation with said certificate.
Respondent answered that in view of the amendment of its charter by R.A. No.
1576, it could not accept petitioner’s certificate.
At the time he offered to pay with his backpay certificate, R.A. No. 897 gave
him the right to have said certificate applied in payment of his obligation.
Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 1576 was enacted on June 16, 1956 amending
the charter of the PNB and providing that the bank shall have no authority to
accept backpay certificate in payment of indebtedness to the bank. For this
reason, the bank refused to accept petitioner Buyco’s backpay certificate.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner Buyco can compel the Philippine National
Bank to accept his backpay certificate in payment of his indebtedness to the
bank.
RULING: In holding that petitioner Buyco acquired a vested right to have his
certificate applied in payment of his obligation to the bank, the Court said that
laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. It is said
that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislature may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; that all
statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the
purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retroactive effect is
expressly decreed or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that
every case of doubt must be resolved against retroactive effect. These principles
also apply to amendments or statues.
R.A. No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive effect
nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon
approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present
case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made.
The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be
in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior t such amendment.
A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in
property that has become fixed or established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy.
SUBIDO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
266 SCRA 379, G.R. NO. 122641
20 JANUARY 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with Arbitrary Detention, defined and
penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. Bayani Subido Jr., being a
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and accused Rene
Parina, then being a BID Special agent, while in the performance of their official
functions caused the issuance and implementation of an arrest warrant against
James Maksimuk, knowing full well that the BID decision requiring
Maksimuk’s deportation has not yet become final and executory considering the
pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the latter
for a period of forty-three days and thus causing him undue injury.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash contending that in view of the enactment
of R.A. No. 7975 which amended P.D. No. 1606 § 4, the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused. They
argue that R.A. No. 7975 should be given prospective application and at the time
the case was filed, petitioner Subido was already a private person since he was
separated from the service while Parina did not hold a position corresponding to
a salary grade “27” and three penal laws must be strictly construed against the
state.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 7975, in further amending P.D. No. 1696 as
regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, and other procedural matters, is a
procedural law and can thus be given retroactive effect.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court said that R.A. No. 7975, in
further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction,
mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e.,
one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
Moreover, the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise curative or remedial
statute: one which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. x x x All told, as a procedural and curative statue, R.A. No. 7975
may validly be given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual
or vested rights.
Curative remedial statues are healing acts. They are remedial by curing
defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in
regard to curative statues is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and
which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is
something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous
statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
BILLONES VS. CIR
14 SCRA 674, G.R. NO. L-17566
30 JULY 1965
PAREDES, J.
FACTS: The petitioners were employees of the respondent Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them
additional compensation. Petitioners then formed the Universal Marine Labor
union with the crew members of respondent’s tugboats and barges.
As a Union, they presented with the Wage Administration Service,
Department of Labor, a claim for accrued overtime compensation covering the
period from 1948 to 1954. The claim was dropped by the WAS, it appearing that
before the hearing could be terminated, the Union entered into an amicable
settlement with respondent Luzon Stevedoring.
Disclaiming any knowledge of the petition to dismiss the claim, that if there
was any, they did not authorize the filing of the same in their behalf, or
consented thereto, petitioners presented to the Department of Labor complaints
for overtime compensation. These cases were dismissed on the ground that such
complaint is without basis and foundation.
Respondent moves to dismiss such petition, contending that the action had
prescribed on the basis of C.A. No. 444 as amended by R.A. No. 1993 which
states that “any action to enforce any clause under this Act shall be commenced
within three years after such cause of action accrued; otherwise, such action
shall be forever barred: Provided, however, That actions already commenced
before the effective date of this Act shall not be affected by the period herein
prescribed.”
ISSUES: Whether or not C.A. No. 144 § 7-A, as amended by R.A. No. 1993,
should be given retroactive effect on existing causes.
RULING: In ruling in the affirmative, the Court said that because the statute
shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate
the Constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims
were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year
from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims.
A statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach
thereto nor arise therefrom. It said that when the legislature provided that
“actions already commenced before the effective date of this Act shall not be
affected by the period herein prescribed,” it intended to apply the statue to all
the existing actions filed after the effectivity of the law.
CORALES VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
88 SCRA 547, G.R. NO. L-44063
27 FEBRUARY 1979
MAKASIAR, J.
FACTS: The petitioner contracted an illness as early as September 1965 which
remained uncured up to the time of retirement from the Government at the age
of 65 on March 27, 1975. As of March 17, 1975, his chest x-ray disclosed broad
linear densities in the right upper lung fields and ill-defined densities in the root
of the lung field which are indicative of the fact that he is still suffering from
PTB moderately advanced.
Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action existed as early as he contracted it
in September 1965, clearly before the effectivity of the New Labor Code,
although it can be advanced that his cause of action transcended the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, because his illness continued even after the new
Labor Code was already effective and operative.
ISSUES: Whether or not a claim for workmen’s compensation which accrued
under the old Workmen’s Compensation Act but filed after March 31, 1975 is
barred by the provision of the New Labor Code which repealed the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.
RULING: The Court ruled that the provision does not apply to claims for
workmen’s compensation that accrued before the Labor Code took effect, even
if such claims were not filed not later than March 31, 1975, because the
“prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, is ten years” which “is a right founded on
statute” and “hence is a vested right” that cannot be impaired by the retroactive
application of the Labor Code.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILS. VS. CA
96 SCRA 342, G.R. NO. L-28774
28 FEBRUARY 1980
ANTONIO, J.
FACTS: The Board of Governors of petitioner-appellant DBP appropriated in a
resolution the sum of P1,204,000 to purchase land for a housing project for its
employees in which the Bank itself will build houses and will be sold to
employees who do not yet own homes, the latter paying for the houses in
monthly instalments for 20 years.
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots in West
Triangle, Q.C. of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) for
the price of P802,155.56 and paid P400,000 as downpayment.
Without the knowledge of DBP, a portion of the property covered by the
master title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC.
However, it was not annotated on the master title nor was it cancelled pro tanto
as to the 159 lots.
The Register of Deeds, unable to decide as to who should be issued
certificates of titles for the two lots referred the matter on consulta to the Land
Registration Commission which held that respondent spouses Honesto G.
Nicandro and Elisa F. Nicandro were better entitled to lots 2 and 4. After its
motion for reconsideration was denied, DBP promptly appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Respondent spouses filed the case at bar against the DBP and PHHC to
rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP, to cancel the transfer
certificate of title that may have been issued covering the two lots to DBP, and
to order DBP to pay damages to the plaintiffs. It was alleged that the DBP is not
only in excess of its corporate powers but also in violation of the express
prohibition of its charter, R.A. No. 85, as amended.
The CFI held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4 to the DBP is null and void. A
motion for reconsideration was filed and denied. The DBP then appealed to the
Court of Appeals which thereafter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not R.A. No. 3147, in amending R.A. No. 85 § 13 can be
given retroactive application.
RULING: It may be stated, as a general rule, that curative statues are forms of
“retrospective legislation which reach back on past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.” They are intended to
enable persons to carry into effect that which they have designed and intended,
but which has failed of expected legal consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or irregularity in their action. They thus make valid that which, before
enactment of the statute, was invalid.
There cannot be any doubt that one of the purposes of Congress when it
enacted R.A. No. 3147, by amending R.A. No. 85 § 13, was to erase any doubts
regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the
PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees
who did not yet have houses of their own. This is obvious from the fact that
R.A. No. 3147 at a time when the legality of the acquisition of the lots by the
DBP for its housing project was under question. It is, therefore a curative statute
to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots of the PHHC.
 X. AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND
REPEAL
CASE NAME
CITATION
FACTS: blah
blah
ISSUES: blah
blah
RULING: blah
blah
 XI. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CASE NAME
CITATION
FACTS: blah
blah
ISSUES: blah
blah
RULING: blah
blah