SP 1. Tridib Chakraborti

India and the Asia Pacific Region: Dilemma of a
Changing APEC Mindset

Tridib Chakraborti and Mohor Chakraborty
Abstract
If the 20
th
Century was the American Century, it is indeed veracity today that the 21
st
Century is the Asian Century, with India an important actor of the Asia Pacific region.
India became an inseparable part of the Southeast and East Asian regions by consoli-
dating its stature as a Summit-level partner of ASEAN and East Asia Summit partner in
2002 and 2005 respectively. Although, India has not been able to become a member of
APEC, a pivotal economic organization in the region, yet, given the present circum-
stances and international milieu of an interdependent world economic order, it may be
contended that Indias essentiality will be a part and parcel for others economic mo-
mentum. In 1990s, India was yearning to be a part of the international economic system.
But that scenario has presently reversed in its entirety when other countries feel Indias
indispensability in global politics.
Keywords: India, Asia-Pacific, APEC, ASEAN, East Asia Summit
Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Sciences
Special Issue No.1, December 2010
ISSN 2229 5801 (Print) / ISSN 0975 5942 (Electronic)
International Society for Asia-Pacific Society
Introduction
If the 20
th
Century was the American Cen-
tury, as the founder of the magazines, Time,
Life and Fortune, Henry R. Luce so modestly
christened it, then it is true that the 21
st
Century
belongs to the countries of the Asia Pacific re-
gion. The emergence of Asia Pacific as a region
in International Relations is a modern phenom-
enon. This region is a product of several devel-
opments associated with the modernization and
globalization of economic, political and social
life that has involved the spread of industrialism
and statehood throughout the world. Geo-
graphically speaking, this region includes all the
littoral and island states of South Pacific, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Northeast, Southeast and
South Asia. In other words, the Asia Pacific re-
gion has been defined somewhat narrowly to
include the two Super Powers, the United States
and the former Soviet Union (which demised in
1991), two regional Great Powers China and
Japan, few emerging economically strong sub-
continental powers like South Korea, Singapore
and India and other vibrant economies and
smaller countries of the region.
The regional identity of the Asia Pacific may
be said to derive from geographical and geo-
econometric considerations rather than from
any indigenous sense of homogeneity or com-
monality of purpose. Unlike Europe, this region
does not call upon shared cultural origins or
proclaim attachment to common political val-
ues as a basis for regional identity, which in other
words, means it is essentially multifarious in
character. But, this region in the cold war years
had not become as prominent as it is today. The
major rationale behind the importance of this
region is the presence of some countries, which
are emerging as economically vibrant ones in
the current global politics as well as the strate-
Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Sciences, Special Issue No.1, Dec 2010, pp 1-11 1
gic dimension owing to the importance of gas,
energy and natural resource endowment. Since
the fall of the former Soviet Union and the emer-
gence of the processes of globalization and lib-
eralization, the ideological competition of the
cold war era lost its momentum and economics
became the sole determining factor of the life
sketch of this region. This new dynamics was
accompanied by dramatic economic growth,
along with a rapid increase in regional economic
ties, which naturally created a favourable con-
dition for the countries of this region to establish
an economic forum. Against this backdrop, the
Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) was
formed when Ministers of Trade and Foreign
Affairs from twelve nations of the Pacific Rim
gathered in Canberra in November 1989 to dis-
cuss trade liberalization and closer regional
cooperation in specific areas as investment,
technology transfer, manpower training and
ageed to plan a new regional economic organi-
zation that they believed would shape the fu-
ture of the worlds most dynamic economic re-
gion, embracing 1.9 billion people whose com-
bined economies accounted for 24% of world
output. The APEC forum, conceived and pro-
posed by Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke,
was an important step for the open multilateral
economic trading systems of the world. Hawke
pointed out in his Inaugural Remarks at the
Canberra meeting
1
that, the regional states were
being threatened by an emerging European
Union and the advent of a US-Canada Free
Trade Area (later known as the North American
Free Trade Area, NAFTA). The key role APEC
could play in this context would be to strengthen
the fight against the global protectionism evi-
dent in the negotiations then being carried out
within the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT/later WTO). Hawke was emphatic
on this point: Let it be clearly understood that
we do not meet here today with any hidden
agenda to create some sort of Pacific trading
bloc.
2
Thus, the APEC was formulated on the
basis of 3 important goals: it sought to resist
protectionist pressures which would jeopardize
Pacific growth by maintaining the momentum of
liberalization in the face of uncertainty about
the global trading system; it aimed to counter
inward-looking regionalism, especially in Eu-
rope and North America; and it sought to pro-
vide better ways to deal with economic con-
flicts that pervade the area and agreed that it
should not discuss security issues in the forum.
Therefore, APEC provided an unprecedented in-
stitutional framework for engaging China and
Japan in the region (accounting for nearly half
of the worlds production and including all the
major economies in the fastest growing region
of the world), where instability and hostility had
dominated the past Century. Moreover, it was
believed that by maintaining American involve-
ment in the economic life of East Asia, the same
framework could sustain American security in-
volvement as well. In fact, it essentially consid-
ered a wholly new model of regional economic
cooperation and a steady development of trade
liberalization between the regional and global
levels that would conform its dedication to open
regionalism in the Asia Pacific region.
Presently, APEC has crossed nearly two
decades of its existence and its membership
extended to 21, but its viability as a regional
economic organization in the Asia Pacific has
not at all been formidable in nature. During this
long period, APEC has conducted several Sum-
mit meetings, among which, the Vancouver
Summit held in November 1997 was very sig-
nificant. In this meeting, three new members
were included, namely Vietnam, Russia and Peru
and it froze its membership for ten years. India,
which in the context of its liberalized New Eco-
nomic Policy, expressed its willingness to be-
come an APEC partner, unfortunately was not
granted membership due to its lack of political
clout, the then instability of governments as well
as absence of strong supporters within the APEC
group. This rejection of Indias membership of
APEC was, no doubt, a severe blow to the
mindset of the Indian policy makers in spite of
its process of economic liberalization. The pur-
pose of this paper is to highlight the degree of
relevance of APEC to the policy makers of India
in the context of the New World Order.
The Birth of APEC and the Mindset of the
ASEAN Leaders
After the formation of APEC in the
perspecive of the New Global Order, its utility
and relevance appeared to some countries of
Southeast Asia as a manifestation of the identity
crisis of their own regional organization that is
ASEAN, which was established in 1967 and its
performance since then. Some ASEAN mem-
bers expressed deep concerns about a new
body that they apprehended would usurp its
role in regional economic cooperation or felt that
ASEAN would be eclipsed with the establish-
ment of APEC. Besides, it was also apprehen-
sive of an APEC dominated by Tokyo and Wash-
ington. However, it was only after Japan and the
United States assured ASEAN leaders that nei-
ther Tokyo nor Washington would seek to domi-
nate the organization and that it would move
slowly with all decisions made by consensus,
were the fears of ASEAN substantially allayed.
Furthermore, it was decided that the APEC
would operate on the basis of non-binding com-
mitments, open dialogue and equal respect for
the views of all participants, thereby forming an
arrangement with no treaty obligations required
of its members. Decisions within APEC were
supposed to be reached by consensus and com-
mitments made on a voluntary basis. However,
this assurance failed to win over the suspicious
mindset of the ASEAN leaders. As a result, in
1991, Malaysias Prime Minister, Mahathir Bin
Mohammad proposed the East Asian Economic
Caucus (EAEC) which would function as an in-
formal forum within APEC involving all its Asian
members only. Malaysia wanted ASEAN to en-
dorse Mahathirs call for the EAEC, a modified
version of its original idea of East Asian Eco-
nomic Grouping (EAEG) as a counter to the
APEC concept. Actually, Mahathir, while
honouring the visiting Chinese Premier, Li Peng,
in Kuala Lumpur in December 1990, had ex-
pressed his deep concern about what he called
an unhealthy trend of Euro-American econo-
mies forming into a bloc which would be an
impediment to just and fair trade.
3
Mahathir
was convinced that it was imperative for Asian
nations to organize their own economic bloc in
response to APEC and being disappointed over
the failure of Uruguay Round negotiations at
Brussels to reach agreement on agricultural
products, he was motivated to propose the
EAEG initiative the very next year in the APEC
forum. He believed that a country like Malaysia,
which lacked infrastructure, trained manpower,
and technology, being dependant upon export
trade, was very vulnerable to the formation of
an economic bloc entailing protectionism. His
apprehensions were shared by ASEAN, China,
and even Mexico at the Eighth Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference held in Singapore in
May 1991 as well as from ASEANs enlarged
Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Bangkok
in July 1991. In his view, EAEC sought Asia-Pa-
cific cooperation to serve the interests of Asias
developing economies. While explaining this
initiative in a Keynote Address at the 10th Gen-
eral Assembly of the Pacific Economic Coop-
eration Conference in March 1994, Mahathir
said, What we must build is a Pacific
gemeinschaft. The Pacific must be built upon a
group relationship in which villages, families, and
friends are united together.
4
Summarily then,
Mahathirs brainchild was engineered to be as
much a group of East Asian nations to discuss
issues informally as it would be a forum for shar-
India and the Asia Pacific Region : Dilemma of a Changing APEC Mindset
ing a common culture, to talk and arrive at con-
clusions by consensus, that was identified as
the Asian Way.
Prior to the Canberra meeting of APEC,
the ASEAN-6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand,
the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei) was
united in the position that they should be the
principal actors in the regional cooperation ef-
fort; otherwise they would not participate in
APEC. Subsequently, the ASEAN nations ulti-
mately attended the Inaugural APEC Confer-
ence after an assurance from the developed
nations that they would not dominate APEC.
However, ASEAN states did not repose their un-
conditional trust on their developed counter-
parts and thus, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
prepared an ASEAN Paper, which spelled out
their determination to maintain the indepen-
dence of APEC. Unfortunately, much to the cha-
grin of the ASEAN, the Australian Foreign Minis-
ter, Gareth Evans ignored their wishes in a sum-
mary draft of the meeting initially. It was only
after an indignant protest by the Indonesian For-
eign Minister, Ali Alatas, his Australian counter-
part agreed to revise the text to read that a rep-
resentative of the ASEAN Secretariat would be
invited as a coordinator to APECs Senior Minis-
terial Conference. Ali Alatas argued that the util-
ity of the existing ASEAN as the basis for an
expanded regional organization would be the
best way to explore more effective means of
economic cooperation.
5
He further emphasized
APEC should not be made into a permanent in-
stitution to enunciate a vision for trade in the
Asia Pacific region and highlighted identifica-
tion of constraints and issues which should be
considered by APEC in that context.
6
Subsequently, American and Australian of-
ficials vented their annoyance regarding the
views expressed by the ASEAN Foreign Minis-
ters and their arrogant demands. Eventually,
though the six ASEAN nations attended the suc-
ceeding APEC Conferences because APEC
appeared to have accommodated their wishes
and it seemed advantageous to be part of APEC
itself, Mahathir regarded the conciliatory ges-
tures of US and Australia as a temporary strate-
gic retreat to hold the glue of APECs unity.
Mahathir, in fact, maintained vigilance against
domination by power.
The idea of the EAEC was staunchly op-
posed by United States as APEC itself had
started as a regional organization with the goals
of strengthening and expanding the regions
multilateral free trade against the emerging EU
bloc. The conception of EAEC was all the more
vexing since Mahathir on the one hand, opposed
the protectionist principles of the EU bloc, and
wanted to keep out the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand from the fold of his
proposed Caucus, and on the other, pragmati-
cally realized the importance of China and Ja-
pan as strong potential economic power houses
in accelerating the dynamism of EAEC. The Ma-
laysian Premier was convinced that the time had
come for Asia to keep out of big-power politics
and chart its own destiny within its compass and
the EAEC was his answer to this challenge in its
entirety. The Malaysian proposal of establishing
the EAEC thus split APEC members and paved
the way for heated verbal exchanges between
its proponents and those opposed to it, notably
the United States, so much so that US Secretary
of State, James Baker reiterated his criticism,
charging that EAEC was a dangerous idea that
would draw a line in the Pacific Ocean and
lead to a split between the United States and
Japan. Besides, Michael Armacost, the US
Ambassador to Japan, vehemently opposed
EAEC because it would encourage Myanmar,
Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea to join
ASEAN in linking upbut not creating a free
trade zonewith other East Asian economies.
7
Thus, the US critics of the idea of EAEC com-
plained that it was designed to be an exclusivist,
closed grouping and a counterweight to West-
ern economies.
In spite of these strong voices of confron-
tation and condemnation of EAEC, the ASEAN
Summit in Singapore held in January 1992
adopted EAEC and issued a declaration stat-
ing that, ASEAN recognizes the importance of
strengthening and/or establishing cooperation
with other countries, regional/multilateral eco-
nomic organizations, as well as Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation and an East Asian Eco-
nomic Caucus. With regard to APEC, ASEAN
attaches importance to APECs fundamental
objective of sustaining growth and dynamism
in the Asia-Pacific region. With respect to the
EAEC, ASEAN recognizes that consultations on
issues of common concern among East Asian
economies, and when the need arises, could
contribute to the expanding cooperation among
the regions economies and the promotion of an
open and free global training system.
8
At the Seattle meeting of APEC that took
place in November 1993, the Chinese Foreign
Minister, Qian Qichen declared anew Chinas
endorsement of EAEC and this declaration was
aimed at checking what Beijing regarded as
Washingtons unilateral usurpation of the lead-
ership role in APEC.
9
Unlike China, Japan was
weary of coming out in favour of EAEC and
Prime Minister, Kiichiro Miyazawa viewed it as
an interim organization to becoming an eco-
nomic bloc. He was probably waiting for ASEAN
to spell out the role of EAEC before deciding its
stand on the issue or taking an individual
stance.
10
This fence-sitting diplomacy under-
taken by Tokyo was regretted by Malaysia and it
created an unfavourable image that Japan
would usually tow an American line.
The attention of the APEC members was
further diverted on a plethora of pressing glo-
bal issues ranging from efforts to promote trade
liberalization, ratification and implementation of
the Uruguay Round agreements, transformation
of GATT into the World Trade Organization
(WTO), encouraging unilateral liberalization by
individual governments and implementing trade
liberalization among the APEC members. More-
over, while recognizing the diversity of Asia Pa-
cific economies, the member states outlined
several principles for APEC, including mutual
benefit, mutual respect and egalitarianism,
pragmatism, decision-making through consen-
sus but implementation with flexibility, and open
regionalism. Subsequently, at the 1994 Bogor
Meeting of APEC, the Ministers adopted rules
regulating investment and trade liberalization,
which threatened to cause a serious rift between
the industrialized North and the developing
South, based on the following contradictions
between the developed and developing APEC
members - macroeconomic goals such as trade
liberalization on the one hand and the coopera-
tive development approach, on the other. Thus,
devoid of support from either US or Japan, EAEC
died its natural death before it could take off the
ground.
On the whole, it may be contended that,
despite tensions that stemmed not only from the
diversity of cultural backgrounds, formation of
EAEC and stages in economic development
among the APEC members, but also from the
perceived domination of Japan and the US that
the ASEAN states harboured, APECs First
meeting was fairly successful. It concluded by
issuing a joint statement supporting the role of
ASEAN in strengthening economic cooperation
in the Pacific region and the role of the Uruguay
Round in opening a multilateral trade system, in
addition to endorsing the proposal that
Singapore and South Korea host APEC meet-
ings in 1990 and 1991 respectively. Subse-
quently, APEC Ministerial Conferences held in
Singapore, Seoul, and Bangkok (in 1992) re-
solved to support the early conclusion of the
Uruguay Round and invite China, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong to the forum.
11
In fact, the holding of
APEC Ministerial Conferences was an implicit
indication that ASEAN wanted to retain its lead-
ership and voice in the management of the na-
scent organization.
The Formation of ASEAN plus Three: Con-
sequences for India
The situation in the Asia Pacific region
changed drastically when the Economic Crisis
befell the region in 1997-1998. The Crisis pushed
the regional countries to a precipice and stimu-
lated greater cooperation between the ASEAN
members and East Asian countries (particularly
China, Japan and South Korea), to tide over the
problem. The situation was compounded by
measures dictated by International Monetary
Fund (IMF), with the US Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve exerting influence behind the
scenes. Although the IMF programmes were
meant to restore confidence and generate in-
crease in foreign exchange reserves to enable
countries under its programmes to eventually
recover from their conditions of liquidation, yet
the nature of the conditions imposed by the Fund
was rather controversial and unsuitable for the
Asia Pacific victims of the Crisis. As an immedi-
ate logical conclusion of these trepidations, the
members of ASEAN took a coordinated stance
and thereby formed the ASEAN Plus Three
Framework (constituting ASEAN states plus
China, Japan and South Korea), and the first
meeting of which took place in December 1997
on the sidelines of the Second Informal ASEAN
Summit in Kuala Lumpur. It may be mentioned
in this context that, the first proposal for post-
Crisis regional financial cooperation was actu-
ally put forward by Japan at the IMF Meeting in
Hong Kong, held in September 1997 for estab-
lishing an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). Unfor-
tunately, this idea not did not receive much sup-
port within the region and was strongly opposed
by the IMF and the US. Consequently, the AMF
proposal was put on the backburner.
However, it was at a meeting of Asian Fi-
nance and Central Bank Deputies in Manila, held
on 18-19 November 1997, that the so-called
Manila Framework,
12
also christened as A
New Framework for Enhanced Asian Regional
Cooperation to Promote Financial Stability was
developed. This framework recognized the cen-
tral role of the IMF in the international monetary
system and included initiatives for setting up a
mechanism for regional surveillance to comple-
ment global surveillance by the IMF as well as a
cooperative financing arrangement that would
supplement IMF resources. The Manila Frame-
work was endorsed at a meeting of Finance
Ministers from ASEAN, US, Australia, China, Ja-
pan, South Korea and Hong Kong, that is, a ma-
jority of APEC members, on 2 December 1997
at Kuala Lumpur. Furthermore, as a means of
strengthening regional cooperative financing
arrangements within the Manila Framework,
the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting in
Chiang Mai, held in May 2000,
13
expressed a
need to establish a regional financing arrange-
ment to supplement the existing international
facilities, thereby forming the Chiang Mai Ini-
tiative (CMI), in addition to including a plethora
of agreements on economic scrutiny and bond
market development (Asian Bond Market Ini-
tiatives, ABMI, together with the Asian Bond
Funds) aimed at bailing the region out of the
financial doldrums.
It deserves mention at this juncture that,
though New Delhi was enthusiastic about be-
coming part of the APT phenomenon, the ASEAN
countries did not respond positively to this ges-
ture. Several factors may be identified for the
refusal of the ASEAN to embrace New Delhi as
an APT member in 1997 and they are as follows:
First, the fluctuating nature of the Indian politi-
cal milieu in the aftermath of the 11
th
Lok Sabha
Elections in 1996 resulting in a hung Parliament
and two years of political instability, during
which India witnessed frequent change in gov-
ernments at the Centre. Secondly, the volatile
complexion of Indian politics during 1996-1998
raised serious doubts in the psyche of the
ASEAN leaders regarding the direct and indi-
rect consequences of politics on the Indian eco-
nomic mosaic. Thus, the countries of ASEAN
were seriously worried as to whether New Delhi
would be able to sustain the pace of its eco-
nomic reforms and liberalized economic sys-
tem, unveiled by the Prime Minister, Narasimha
Rao in 1991 within the framework of the New
Economic Policy (NEP). Thirdly, the outbreak of
the Asian Financial Ccrisis in 1997, gave birth
to an East Asian Consciousness, in the con-
text of which, geographic configuration played
an important part and boosted cooperation
among the countries of Southeast and East Asia,
particularly China, Japan and South Korea. As a
matter of fact, China opposed the inclusion of
India vehemently, citing the argument that In-
dia did not figure in the geographical sweep of
ASEAN plus Three members. Chinese policy-
makers had a mindset that Indias presence
should be confined within South Asia rather than
allowing it to expand its wings outside its geo-
graphical boundary. Therefore, in tune with its
strict Asia-Pacific geographical structure, the
membership of APT evolved into a channel for
promoting East Asian cooperation, in the
scheme of which, the membership of a South
Asian country like India within the APT network
could not figure. Fourthly, Beijing and Tokyo,
unlike New Delhi, had extended their arms of
economic support to the suffering countries of
Southeast Asia reeling under the negative ef-
fects of the financial maelstrom. For instance, at
the peak of this crisis, Japan contributed the larg-
est sum to the IMF package ($4 billion) for bail-
ing out the victims, despite its economic diffi-
culties and falling levels of trade and invest-
ment at the national level.
14
Thus, China and
Japan successfully gained ASEANs trust dur-
ing the phase of its worst financial upheaval,
while India, which was under enormous politi-
cal and economic strains itself, remained a sym-
pathetic spectator. Fifthly, though the New Eco-
nomic Policy was initiated by New Delhi in 1991,
its export and import figures with the countries
of Southeast Asia did not imprint its image as an
economic power, unlike the countries of East
Asia. New Delhis political instability naturally
had a spillover effect on its economic perfor-
mance, which determined at that point of time
to what extent the Indian economy could open
its door to outside markets, considering its na-
tional interest. It was also felt by many senior
members of ASEAN that Indias economic per-
formance at that point was essentially appren-
tice in nature. Sixthly, Indias entry as a Full Dia-
logue Partner of ASEAN in 1995 more or less
coincided with the East Asian countries also
gaining Full Dialogue status. In spite of having
received Full Dialogue status almost simulta-
neously, China, Japan and South Korea could
surpass India in receiving Plus Three stature.
Finally, the ASEAN countries believed that New
Delhi needed to considerably enhance eco-
nomic and technological sophistication of its
policymaking and bureaucratic system, in or-
der to address poverty and issues of social in-
equities at the domestic level.
In keeping with the actions and rhetorical
position of its proponents, East Asian regional-
ism had taken a concrete shape in the after-
math of the East Asian Economic Crisis. Conse-
quently, when the Third Summit of ASEAN Plus
Three was held in November 1999 in Manila, the
then ASEAN Secretary General, Rudolfo
Severino described it as part of a general con-
vergence of purpose in East Asia, a process that
has been building up.
15
Thus, the APT process
acted as a positive catalyst in signaling a novel
era of broader and incisive East Asian collabo-
ration in economic, political, security and social
issues. India unfortunately was excluded from
this scheme of systemic cooperation.
India: An Alien in APEC Orbit
India was not included as a member of
APEC in 1997 and this came as a major blow to
Indian foreign policy makers. The importance
of Indias membership of APEC today is not as
vital as it would have been in 1997, because
during that time, India wanted to legitimize its
self-declared Look East Policy and New Eco-
nomic Policy by gaining APECs membership.
India, at that juncture, had failed to obtain
APECs membership mainly as pointed out ear-
lier, because of the fluctuation of permanent
governments at the Centre, due to coalition poli-
tics at the domestic level, on the one hand and
the non-convincing performance of New Delhis
economy, which was unable to imprint a posi-
tive image the mindset of APEC leaders, on the
other. However, within a decade, India had over-
come the blemishes, which obstructed the gain-
ing of APEC membership, and its growth rate in
the economic sphere and political stability of
the government since 1998 clearly exhibited its
burgeoning strength, legitimizing its potential-
ity as a budding economic powerhouse in the
Asian region. Although India was swiftly tread-
ing on the path of liberalization of markets for
foreign investments, and it believed that it would
soon be considered for membership of this fo-
rum, this optimism eluded New Delhi and until
now, it has not been able to establish even its
toehold in the APEC ambit.
At the conclusion of the Third Ministerial
Meeting of APEC in Seoul in November 1991, a
Joint Statement was issued, which, included the
following provision on participation, and men-
tioned clearly that: Participation in APEC will
be open, in principle, to those economies in the
Asia-Pacific region which: (a) have strong eco-
nomic linkages in the Asia-Pacific region; and
(b) accept the objectives and principles of
APEC as embodied in this Declaration. Besides,
the APEC Guidebook provided the following
guidelines for admitting new members, which
includes that the applicant economy should be
located in the Asia-Pacific region; have substan-
tial and broad-based economic linkages with
existing APEC members and in particular, the
value of the applicants trade with APEC mem-
bers, as a percentage of its international trade,
should be relatively high; be pursuing externally
oriented, market-driven economic policies; and
accept the basic objectives and principles set
out in the various APEC declarations. Decisions
regarding future participation in APEC would
be made on the basis of a consensus of all exist-
ing members of this organization.
16
Despite
such declarations, at the Seattle Ministerial Meet-
ing of November 1993, after admitting Mexico
and Papua New Guinea and deciding to admit
Chile in 1994, ... Ministers agreed to defer con-
sideration of additional members for three
years. The Manila Ministerial held in 1996 fur-
ther decided not to extend the moratorium with
the view to admitting a limited number of new
members, reiterating that APEC is an open and
evolving process, and agreed that in Vancouver
in 1997, when the set of criteria for evaluating
applications would be adopted in Kuala Lumpur
in 1998, new members would be announced
based on the adopted criteria, to be admitted
in Auckland in 1999.
Evidently then, APEC imposed a fresh
moratorium at the Vancouver Summit in Novem-
ber 1997, and described the move, as a 10-
year period of consolidation, following which
membership issue will be considered further. In
2007, additional members will have the oppor-
tunity to apply for membership. Yet, such pro-
visions did not deter Peru, Russia and Vietnam
from being listed as members since 1998. Thus,
it may be conceded that under the present cir-
cumstances, India is highly qualified for inclu-
sion within APEC, in keeping with the provisions
on participation, issued at the Third Ministerial
Meeting of APEC (1991), and the following fac-
tors vindicate this stance:
First, India is an important investment des-
tination, with many sectors open for foreign in-
vestment. Secondly, its trade with many of the
countries of the Asia Pacific region has in-
creased manifold, encompassing both goods
and services, as a positive outfit of New Delhis
effective Look East and Move East policies.
Thirdly, Indias signing of Free Trade Agreements
with ASEAN (on goods) on the one hand and
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agree-
ments with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Ja-
pan and South Korea on a bilateral basis on the
other, has accelerated the pace of reaching its
economic destination in New Delhis extended
neighbouring vicinity. Fourthly, as testimony to
its economic importance, at the 2007 East Asia
Summit at Cebu, the Philippines, Japan pro-
posed a pan-Asian free-trade zone that would
include India, Australia and New Zealand along
with China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN
members and this was viewed as a pertinent
step in further integrating India within the Asia
Pacific orbit. Fifthly, the strength of the emerg-
ing more than 350 million Indian middle class
and its increasing economic clout offers the
APEC members a better market to cultivate and
develop their economic mobility. Sixthly, Indias
relations with Australia, China, Japan, South Ko-
rea, Russia, and the US have never been as
strong and multi-faceted as now, particularly
after the Civil-Nuclear Deal was signed with
Washington in 2006. Finally, while the 2008 glo-
bal economic meltdown had severely affected
many countries of the world, including Europe
and US, India was affected nominally due to its
strong economic base. This growing and sound
economic base as well as its huge emerging
middle class appears to many countries all over
the world that India could become a future des-
tination of economic market. The recent con-
secutive visits of US President Obama and
French President Sarkozy in November 2010 and
Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao and the visit of the
Russian President in 2010 are examples of New
Delhis growing economic prowess in global
economic scenario.
Conclusion
New Delhi is a strong contender for the
portfolio of APEC membership and it is just a
matter of time and judicious consideration be-
fore the present members induct India within
the realm of this exclusive regional forum. In
other words, India has sufficiently created the
space for its membership in APEC, which was
asserted a decade ago by missing the APEC
train. Although New Delhi has not been ac-
corded APECs membership even after the
moratorium on new induction ended in 2007,
India has strengthened its foothold in Southeast
and East Asia steadily since the beginning of
the new millennium. With its enhanced status as
a Summit-level partner of ASEAN in 2002, India
is presently a member of the East Asia Summit
(EAS), which was launched in 2005, and in-
cludes all ASEAN members, APT members,
Australia and New Zealand. Evidently, EAS has
emerged as a counterweight to APEC, particu-
larly with the granting of Observer Status to the
US and Russia, which was decided at the re-
cently concluded EAS Meeting in Hanoi, in Oc-
tober 2010. It has been aired in the new millen-
nium that the 21
st
Century is the Asian Century,
in which India and China are the two emerging
powerhouses. This enhanced status is chiefly
due to New Delhis spectacular achievements,
premised on the New Economic Policy. How-
ever, if one can compare Chinas development
process in the new global order, India has a long
way to go, for which, it needs more time to com-
pete with China in the Asian region. The devel-
opment and prosperity of India, which it has dis-
played so far, is a combination of Nehruvian
model and the phenomenon of liberalization.
Obviously, New Delhi has exhibited its potential
as an emerging economic power house to be
reckoned with and other leading powers, start-
ing from the US and Europe to the Asia Pacific
region have expressed their willingness to de-
velop better linkages with India, not only at the
economic level, but also in other areas which
are political and strategic in nature. Now it is
time for others to think of India and they can no
longer ignore its emergence as a power with
huge potentiality for their own political and stra-
tegic reasons, considering their national and
economic interests. India, is thus in demand not
for its own sake, but also for the sake of others.
The fact that India had become a principal re-
gional player particularly in the follow up to be-
coming a Summit-level partner of ASEAN was
clearly exemplified by the then Indian Prime
Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee in the 21st
Singapore Lecture on Indias Perspectives on
ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region, which he
delivered in April 2002. In this momentous Lec-
ture, Vajpayee said: Indias belonging to the
Asia-Pacific community was a geographical fact
and a political reality, which did not require for-
mal membership of any regional organization
for its recognition or sustenance.
17
Thus, India believed that it was already an
integral part of the region by virtue of its histori-
cal legacy and geographical proximity and its
inclusion as ASEANs Summit-level Partner
would further consolidate its regional stature by
extending its footprints into the East Asian re-
gion, as envisaged in Phase II of its Look East
Policy. Therefore, everybody is reckoning Indias
stature in global politics and whether India will
be a member of APEC or UN Security Council is
not a matter of concern for India, but rather a
matter of essential concern for others. For the
essentiality of preserving peace and tranquility
of the Asia Pacific region, many of the APEC
countries have changed their mindset of the
1990s and are considering the option of includ-
ing India as a member of the APEC, owing to the
transformed global circumstances as well as the
importance of Indias presence to counter China
in the region. India today, truly, seems to be a
beautiful radiant bride, with many bride-
grooms
18
ready to tie the knot by deepening
the areas of cooperation and collaboration with
it.
References
1. http://www.wn.com/APEC_Australia_1989, accessed on 1 September 2010
2. Ibid.
3. http://www.mfa.gov.cn, accessed on 3 September 2010
4. Mahathir Mohamad, Building Equalitarian Pacific Community, Institute of Strategic and
International Studies (ISIS) Focus, (Singapore, April 1994): 43
5. Japan Times, 16 November 1989
6. Shojiro Imanishi, Current State of Activities in APEC, Awashima Forum II on Asia-Pacific Coop-
eration after the GATT Uruguay Round (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1994):
48.
7. Asia Week, 22 March 1991.
8. http://www.aseansec.org, accessed on 1 April, 2009
9. The Hindu, 20 November 1993
10. Japan Times, 1 December 1993
11. http://www.apec.org, accessed on 3 September 2010
12. http://www.adbi.org/workingpaper/2010/07/13/
3938.chiang.mai.initiative.multilateralization/origin/accessed on 1 August 2010
13. Ibid.
14. John Funston, Thai Foreign Policy: Seeking Influence, Southeast Asian Affairs: 1999, (Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999): 304
15. Far Eastern Economic Review, (23 December, 1999) : 27
16. http://www.apec.org, accessed on 14 August 2010
17. The Hindu, 9 April, 2002
18. Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakins Interview to The Telegraph, 18 December,
2010
Prof. Tridib Chakraborti, Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata
Mohor Chakraborty, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, South Calcutta Girls
College, Calcutta University, Kolkata
Corresponding author: tridibchakraborti2001@yahoo.com

SP 1. Tridib Chakraborti

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India and the Asia Pacific Region: Dilemma of a

Changing APEC Mindset

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