Physical Security - FM 3-19.30

Headquarters, Department of the Army
(Formerly FM 19-30)
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
i
Fi el d Manual
No. 3-19.30
*FM 3-19.30
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washi ngton, DC, 8 January 2001
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 19-30, 1 March 1979.
PHYSICAL SECURITY
Contents
Page
PREFACE................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1 PHYSICAL-SECURITY CHALLENGES ..................................................................1-1
Overview...................................................................................................................1-1
Automated Information Systems.............................................................................. 1-1
OPSEC and the Threat ........................................................................................... 1-3
Chapter 2 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH.................................................................................. 2-1
Protective Systems.................................................................................................. 2-1
Systems Development............................................................................................. 2-2
The Integrated Protective System ............................................................................2-5
Security Threats....................................................................................................... 2-6
Chapter 3 DESIGN APPROACH ............................................................................................. 3-1
Design Strategies .................................................................................................... 3-1
Protective Measures................................................................................................ 3-1
Vehicle Bombs..........................................................................................................3-2
Exterior Attack ....................................................................................................... 3-10
Standoff Weapons ................................................................................................. 3-13
Ballistics................................................................................................................. 3-16
Forced Entry ...........................................................................................................3-17
Covert Entry and Insider Compromise....................................................................3-19
Surveillance and Eavesdropping ............................................................................3-20
Mail and Supply Bombs..........................................................................................3-22
Chemical and Biological Contamination .................................................................3-24
Chapter 4 PROTECTIVE BARRIERS...................................................................................... 4-1
Overview...................................................................................................................4-1
Fencing ................................................................................................................... 4-2
Utility Openings........................................................................................................ 4-5
Other Perimeter Barriers.......................................................................................... 4-5
Security Towers........................................................................................................4-5
Installation Entrances ...............................................................................................4-6
Warning Signs ..........................................................................................................4-8
Other Signs...............................................................................................................4-8
Installation Perimeter Roads and Clear Zones.........................................................4-8
Arms-Facility Structural Standards ...........................................................................4-9
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FM 3-19.30
Chapter 5 PHYSICAL-SECURITY LIGHTING ......................................................................... 5-1
Overview.................................................................................................................. 5-1
Commanders Responsibility.................................................................................... 5-1
Planning Considerations .......................................................................................... 5-2
Principles of Security Lighting.................................................................................. 5-3
Types of Lighting...................................................................................................... 5-4
Wiring Systems ........................................................................................................ 5-5
Maintenance............................................................................................................. 5-6
Chapter 6 ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS .................................................................... 6-1
Overview.................................................................................................................. 6-1
ESS Design Considerations..................................................................................... 6-2
Interior ESS Considerations..................................................................................... 6-7
Exterior ESS Considerations.................................................................................... 6-8
ESS Alarm-Annunciation System........................................................................... 6-12
ESS Software......................................................................................................... 6-17
Interior Intrusion-Detection Sensors....................................................................... 6-18
Exterior Intrusion-Detection Sensors ..................................................................... 6-29
Electronic Entry Control ......................................................................................... 6-39
Application Guidelines............................................................................................ 6-42
Performance Criteria.............................................................................................. 6-43
Data Transmission ................................................................................................. 6-44
CCTV for Alarm Assessment and Surveillance...................................................... 6-45
Chapter 7 ACCESS CONTROL ............................................................................................... 7-1
Designated Restricted Areas ................................................................................... 7-1
Employee Screening................................................................................................ 7-4
Identification System................................................................................................ 7-4
Duress Code .......................................................................................................... 7-10
Access-Control Rosters ......................................................................................... 7-10
Methods of Control ................................................................................................. 7-10
Security Controls of Packages, Personal Property, and Vehicles.......................... 7-11
Tactical-Environment Considerations .................................................................... 7-12
Chapter 8 LOCK AND KEY SYSTEMS.................................................................................... 8-1
Installation and Maintenance ................................................................................... 8-1
Types of Locking Devices ........................................................................................ 8-1
Chapter 9 SECURITY FORCES............................................................................................... 9-1
Types of Security Forces ......................................................................................... 9-1
Authority and Jurisdiction......................................................................................... 9-2
Personnel Selection ................................................................................................. 9-3
Security Clearance................................................................................................... 9-3
Organization and Employment of Forces................................................................. 9-4
Headquarters and Shelters ...................................................................................... 9-4
Execution of Security Activities ................................................................................ 9-5
Training Requirements............................................................................................. 9-6
Supervision .............................................................................................................. 9-7
Uniforms................................................................................................................... 9-8
Vehicles.................................................................................................................... 9-9
Firearms ................................................................................................................... 9-9
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FM 3-19.30
Communications ...................................................................................................... 9-9
Miscellaneous Equipment ........................................................................................ 9-9
Military Working Dogs ............................................................................................ 9-10
Summary................................................................................................................ 9-10
Chapter 10 IN-TRANSIT SECURITY........................................................................................ 10-1
In-Port Cargo.......................................................................................................... 10-1
Rail Cargo .............................................................................................................. 10-4
Pipeline Cargo........................................................................................................ 10-6
Convoy Movement ................................................................................................. 10-7
Chapter 11 INSPECTIONS AND SURVEYS............................................................................ 11-1
Inspections ............................................................................................................. 11-1
Surveys .................................................................................................................. 11-2
Appendix A METRIC CONVERSION CHART ........................................................................... A-1
Appendix B SAMPLE INSTALLATION CRIME-PREVENTION HANDBOOK........................... B-1
Section I Installation Crime-Prevention Programs.........................................B-1
Crime-Prevention Working Groups ......................................................................... B-1
Crime-Prevention Officers ...................................................................................... B-2
Crime-Prevention Program Development ................................................................B-2
Training ....................................................................................................................B-5
Civilian Crime-Prevention Organizations..................................................................B-5
Section II Criminal Analysis .............................................................................B-5
Sources of Information .............................................................................................B-6
Individual Criminal Analysis .................................................................................... B-9
Criminal-Analysis Procedures ............................................................................... B-15
Criminal-Analysis Summary .................................................................................. B-17
Section III Command and Law-Enforcement Countermeasures................ B-17
Crime Hot Lines .................................................................................................... B-17
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design................................................ B-18
Specialized Patrol Tactics and Surveillance ..........................................................B-25
Publicity Campaigns...............................................................................................B-30
Residential-Security Surveys .................................................................................B-31
Juvenile Crime Prevention .....................................................................................B-34
Fraud......................................................................................................................B-47
Internal Theft ..........................................................................................................B-52
Pilferage .................................................................................................................B-53
Section IV Army Property at the Local Level ................................................B-61
Motor Vehicles .......................................................................................................B-61
Consumer Outlets ..................................................................................................B-63
Arson......................................................................................................................B-66
Section V Community Crime-Prevention Programs.....................................B-67
Neighborhood Watch Program...............................................................................B-67
Operation ID...........................................................................................................B-71
Neighborhood Walks..............................................................................................B-74
Vigilantism..............................................................................................................B-75
Mobile Patrols ........................................................................................................B-76
Project Lock ...........................................................................................................B-76
Section VI Evaluation......................................................................................B-79
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FM 3-19.30
Crime-Prevention Programs...................................................................................B-79
Crime Rates ...........................................................................................................B-83
Measures of Effectiveness .....................................................................................B-84
Internal Measures ..................................................................................................B-85
Appendix C INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND THREAT ANALYSIS............C-1
Information Sources .................................................................................................C-1
Responsibilities of US Government Lead Agencies.................................................C-2
Information Requirements........................................................................................C-4
Threat Analysis and Assessment .............................................................................C-5
Determination of the Threat Level ............................................................................C-6
Appendix D CRISIS-MANAGEMENT PLAN...............................................................................D-1
Appendix E OFFICE SECURITY MEASURES ...........................................................................E-1
Physical-Security Survey .........................................................................................E-1
Security-Engineering Assessment ...........................................................................E-1
Technical Assessment of Responses ......................................................................E-2
Physical-Security Enhancement Measures..............................................................E-2
Appendix F PHYSICAL-SECURITY PLAN................................................................................ F-1
Annexes .................................................................................................................. F-6
Tactical-Environment Considerations ...................................................................... F-7
Appendix G PERSONAL-PROTECTION MEASURES............................................................. G-1
Personal Protection................................................................................................. G-1
Working Environment .............................................................................................. G-2
Home Environment ................................................................................................. G-4
Appendix H BOMBS....................................................................................................................H-1
General ....................................................................................................................H-1
Concealing Bombs...................................................................................................H-1
Damage and Casualty Mechanisms ........................................................................H-1
Telephonic Threats ..................................................................................................H-3
Evacuation Drills ......................................................................................................H-3
Searching for a Suspected IED................................................................................H-6
Appendix I EXECUTIVE PROTECTION ..................................................................................... I-1
Supplemental Security Measures ............................................................................. I-1
Executive Protection Goals....................................................................................... I-1
Residential Security Measures.................................................................................. I-2
Transportation Measures .......................................................................................... I-4
Individual Protective Measures ................................................................................. I-7
Combating-Terrorism Training for Executives......................................................... I-10
Travel to Potential Physical-Threat Risk Areas....................................................... I-10
Protective Security Details ...................................................................................... I-10
Executive-Protection System Integration ................................................................ I-12
Appendix J RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.................................................................................. J-1
Funding Programs.................................................................................................... J-1
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FM 3-19.30
Projected Requirements........................................................................................... J-1
Obligation Plan......................................................................................................... J-1
Types of Appropriations ........................................................................................... J-2
Appendix K VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT...........................................................................K-1
Assessment Considerations.....................................................................................K-1
THREATCON Levels ...............................................................................................K-2
Assessing Vulnerability ............................................................................................K-3
GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................ Glossary-1
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... Bibliography-1
INDEX...................................................................................................................................... Index-1
vi
Preface
Thi s fi el d manual (FM) sets forth gui dance for al l personnel responsi bl e for physi cal securi ty. I t i s
the basi c r efer ence for tr ai ni ng secur i ty per sonnel . I t i s i ntended to be a one-stop physi cal -
secur i ty sour ce for the Depar tment of Defense (DOD), the Depar tment of the Ar my (DA), and
other proponents and agenci es of physi cal securi ty.
Pr eventi on and pr otecti on ar e the two pr i mar y concer ns of physi cal secur i ty. Both ser ve the
secur i ty i nter ests of peopl e, equi pment, and pr oper ty. These i nter ests must be suppor ted at al l
staff and command l evel s; and thi s suppor t must be uni fi ed i n j oi nt, mu l ti nati onal , and
i nteragency operati ons.
Support to joi nt, mul ti nati onal , and i nteragency operati ons r el i es on the fact that the Army wi l l
not conduct operati ons al one. Addi ti onal l y, for ce-projecti on operati ons conducted by the mi l i tary
wi l l i nvol ve the i ntegr ati on of war -fi ghti ng capabi l i ti es wi th stabi l i ty and suppor t oper ati ons.
Thi s manual s pri mary focus i s the ar ti cul ati on of a bal anced understandi ng of physi cal securi ty
for joi nt, mul ti nati onal , and i nter agency oper ati ons thr oughout the envi r onments of peaceti me,
confl i ct, and war (whether i n the conti nental Uni ted States [CONUS] or outsi de the conti nental
Uni ted States [OCONUS]).
Physi cal securi ty must i ntegrate the vari ous capabi l i ti es of joi nt, mul ti nati onal , and i nteragency
oper ati ons i n pur sui t of a seaml ess connecti on between the str ategi c, oper ati onal , and tacti cal
l evel s of war. Physi cal securi ty must al so address an expanded range of threats that embraces not
onl y tr adi ti onal thr eat components of war , but al so nontr adi ti onal thr eats gener ated by
guer r i l l as, ter r or i sts, cr i mi nal s, and natur al or man-made di saster s. I n addi ti on, physi cal
securi ty must address the concept of Homel and Defense due to the aforementi oned threats.
Homel and Defense i s the mi l i tarys rol e i n the Uni ted States (US) governments pri nci pal task of
pr otecti n g i ts ter r i tor y an d ci ti zen s . Th i s i s accompl i s h ed by j oi n t, i n ter agen cy , an d
mul ti juri sdi cti onal organi zati ons. Homel and Defense i ncl udes
Supporti ng domesti c authori ti es for cri si s and consequence management wi th regard
to weapons of mass destructi on (WMD).
Protecti ng nati onal -securi ty assets (such as i nstal l ati ons) and depl oyi ng forces and
ensuri ng the avai l abi l i ty, i ntegri ty, and adequacy of other cri ti cal assets.
Deterri ng and defendi ng agai nst strategi c attacks whi l e mai ntai ni ng freedom of
acti on through anti terrori sm and force-protecti on operati ons.
Wi th thi s i n mi nd, i t i s essenti al to addr ess the fi ve pi l l ar s of for ce pr otecti oncombati ng
ter r or i sm, physi cal secur i ty, per sonal secur i ty, l aw enfor cement, and oper ati ons secur i ty
(OPSEC). Physi cal securi ty i s a central component of force protecti on and provi des an i ntegrated
venue to expr ess suppor t for oper ati ons. Physi cal secur i ty i s a pr i mar y-l eader task and an
i nherent part of al l operati ons to protect sol di ers, fami l y members, ci vi l i ans, and resources. Thi s
functi on di rectl y supports the Armys uni versal task l i st.
Whi l e the effects of these changes (when vi ewed i ndi vi dual l y) appear r evol uti onar y, the basi c
acti vi ti es r emai n r el ati vel y unchanged, though executed under di ffer ent condi ti ons and
standards. Another component that remai ns unchanged i s our rel i ance upon qual i ty sol di ers and
l eaders wel l versed i n physi cal -securi ty fundamental s. Leaders wi l l be chal l enged to ensure that
they ar e functi onal l y pr ofi ci ent; possess an under standi ng of physi cal -secur i ty oper ati ons; ar e
vii
FM 3-19.30
educated i n joi nt, mul ti nati onal , and i nter agency oper ati ons; and have the abi l i ty to per for m
physi cal -securi ty functi ons i n support of ful l -di mensi on operati ons.
Appendi x A contai ns an Engl i sh-to-metr i c measur ement conver si on char t. Appendi x B i s a
sampl e i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on handbook. Thi s handbook i s desi gned to assi st commanders
i n devel opi ng cri me-preventi on programs for thei r i nstal l ati on and uni ts.
The proponent of thi s publ i cati on i s HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendati ons on DA
For m 2028 di rectl y to Commandant, US Ar my Mi l i tar y Pol i ce School (USAMPS), ATTN: ATSJ-
MP-TD, Di r ector ate of Tr ai ni ng, 401 Engi neer Loop, Sui te 2060, For t Leonar d Wood, Mi ssour i
65473-8926.
Unl ess thi s publ i cati on states otherwi se, mascul i ne nouns and pr onouns do not refer excl usi vel y
to men.
Physical-Security Challenges 1-1
Chapter 1
Physical-Security Challenges
Physi cal secur i ty i s defi ned as that par t of secur i ty concer ned wi th
ph y s i ca l mea s u r es des i gn ed to s a f egu a r d per s on n el ; to pr ev en t
unauthori zed access to equi pment, i nstal l ati ons, materi al , and documents;
and to safeguard agai nst espi onage, sabotage, damage, and theft. As such,
al l mi l i tary operati ons face new and compl ex physi cal -securi ty chal l enges
acr oss the ful l spectr um of oper ati ons. Chal l enges r el ati ve to physi cal
secur i ty i ncl ude the contr ol of popul ati ons, i nfor mati on domi nance,
mul ti nati onal and i nteragency connecti vi ty, anti terrori sm, and the use of
physi cal -securi ty assets as a versati l e force mul ti pl i er.
OVERVIEW
1-1. Reducti ons i n manpower and fundi ng are cri ti cal chal l enges to physi cal
securi ty. Manpower for supporti ng physi cal -securi ty acti vi ti es i s reduced
through depl oyments and cutbacks. The rapi d evol uti on of physi cal -securi ty-
equi pment technol ogy al so l ends to physi cal -securi ty chal l enges, whi ch are
exponenti al l y mul ti pl i ed by the i ntroducti on of the i nformati on age.
1-2. Physi cal -securi ty chal l enges must be understood, and measures must be
taken to mi ni mi ze them to enhance force protecti on. Leaders must create
order when comi ng upon a si tuati on; and when they depart, some sembl ance
of that order must remai n. They must be aware of the human-di mensi on
factors and ensure that thei r sol di ers do not become compl acent. I t was
human error rather than modern technol ogy that took l i ves i n the bombi ngs of
the Afri can embassy. Warni ng was gi ven, but not heeded. Compl acency
became a physi cal -securi ty chal l enge.
AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1-3. Success on past battl efi el ds has resul ted not so much from technol ogi cal
advances, but from i nnovati ve ways of consi deri ng and combi ni ng avai l abl e
and new technol ogi es as they appl y to war fi ghti ng. Some of these technol ogi es
deal t wi th di ssemi nati ng and processi ng i nformati on. For exampl e, the
tel egraph, the tel ephone, the r adi o, and now the computer have redefi ned the
fi re-support paradi gm.
1-4. As the armed forces move i nto the technol ogi cal age, a greater need for
physi cal -securi ty measures i s requi red. The ri sks associ ated wi th automated
i nformati on systems (AI Ss) are wi despread because computers are used for
everythi ng. Army Regul ati on (AR) 380-19 outl i nes the requi rements that
commanders and managers need for processi ng uncl assi fi ed and cl assi fi ed
i nformati on and for securi ng medi a, software, hardware, and di fferent
systems.
FM 3-19.30
1-2 Physical-Security Challenges
1-5. The threat to AI Ss and i nformati on systems securi ty (I SS) i nvol ves
del i berate, overt, and covert acts. Thi s i ncl udes the physi cal threat to tangi bl e
property, such as the theft or destructi on of computer hardware. Al so i ncl uded
i s the threat of el ectroni c, el ectromagneti c-pul se, radi o-frequency (RF), or
computer-based attacks on the i nformati on or communi cati ons components
that control or make up cri ti cal Army command and control (C
2
)
i nfrastructures. I n most cases, the threats target i s the i nformati on i tsel f
rather than the system that transmi ts i t. The threat comes from a range of
sources, i ncl udi ng the fol l owi ng:
Unauthori zed users (such as hackers) are the mai n source of todays
attacks, pri mari l y agai nst computer-based systems. The threat they
pose to AI S networks and mai nframe computers i s growi ng.
I nsi ders are those i ndi vi dual s wi th l egi ti mate access to an AI S. They
pose the most di ffi cul t threat to defend agai nst. Whether recrui ted or
sel f-moti vated, the AI S i nsi der has access to systems normal l y
protected by I SS agai nst an attack.
Terrori sts once had to operate i n the i mmedi ate vi ci ni ty of a target to
gai n access to or col l ect i ntel l i gence on that target. The proxi mi ty to
the target ri sked exposure and detecti on. Today, a terrori st can
accompl i sh most target sel ecti on, i ntel l i gence col l ecti on, and
preoperati onal pl anni ng by gai ni ng access through a computer
network. He can i ncrease hi s probabi l i ty of success by usi ng computer
systems to reduce hi s ti me on target. Terrori st access to an AI S al so
i ncreases the threat of cri ti cal -data destructi on or mani pul ati on.
Al though hi s presence woul d be vi rtual , the potenti al for damage to
Army C
2
systems coul d be equal to or gr eater than that achi eved by
physi cal i ntrusi on, especi al l y when used as a force mul ti pl i er i n
conjuncti on wi th a tradi ti onal terrori st attack. Therefore, whi l e
tradi ti onal preventi ve measures are sti l l needed to protect unwanted
access to i nformati on, the i nformati on age has added addi ti onal
concerns for the commander and new opportuni ti es for those wi th
hosti l e i ntent.
Non-state- and state-sponsored groups provi de addi ti onal chal l enges.
I n many cases, i t i s di ffi cul t to confi rm state sponsorshi p of threat
acti vi ty agai nst an AI S, no matter how apparent the affi l i ati on mi ght
seem. Acti vi sts of al l persuasi ons are i ncreasi ngl y taki ng advantage of
i nformati on-age technol ogy. Nei ther AI Ss nor I SS are i mmune from an
adversarys i nterest i n expl oi ti ng US mi l i tary i nformati on systems or
di srupti ng communi cati on i nfrastructures. The avai l abi l i ty of l ow-cost
technol ogy and the prol i ferati on of an AI S i ncrease the ri sk to the
Army by potenti al adversari es.
Forei gn-i ntel l i gence servi ces (FI S), both ci vi l and mi l i tary, are
conti nual l y acti ve and are another source of contenti on concerni ng
i nformati on systems. I n peaceti me, they are i ncreasi ngl y targeted
agai nst US commerci al and sci enti fi c i nterests, rather than mi l i tary
i nformati on. Wi th l i ttl e effort, thi s peaceti me i ntrusi veness coul d
easi l y be refocused on AI Ss and I SS usi ng a wi de range of i nformati on
operati ons tacti cs.
FM 3-19.30
Physical-Security Challenges 1-3
Pol i ti cal and rel i gi ous groups are other potenti al adversari es to AI Ss
and I SS. The worl ds pol i ti cal cl i mate i s di verse and compl i cated. I t
embraces tradi ti onal mai nstream pol i ti cal val ues, as wel l as radi cal
rel i gi ous fundamental i sm and pol i ti cal extremi sm. When pol i ti cal or
rel i gi ous vi ewpoi nts al so i ncorporate anti -US senti ment, US
i nformati on i nfrastructures (i ncl udi ng AI Ss) are i ncreasi ngl y at ri sk of
penetrati on or expl oi tati on by these potenti al adversari es.
1-6. When consi deri ng an AI S, physi cal securi ty i s more than just
safeguardi ng the equi pment. I t i ncl udes the fol l owi ng el ements:
Software i s marked for each system and secured when not i n use.
I ni ti al l ogon i s password-protected (at a mi ni mum).
Passwords are a mi ni mum of ei ght characters, usi ng a mi xture of
l etters and numeral s.
Access to an AI S i s al l owed onl y to authori zed and cl eared personnel
(per AR 380-19).
1-7. Cl assi fi ed materi al i s entered and transmi tted onl y on approved devi ces
wi th the fol l owi ng consi derati ons:
Approved cl assi fi ed devi ces are operated i n a secured envi ronment.
Cl assi fi ed devi ces are secured i n appropri ate contai ners when not i n
use.
Secure tel ephone uni tI I I (STU-I I I ) keys are secured i n an appropri ate
safe when not i n use (as outl i ned i n AR 380-19).
1-8. Addi ti onal i nformati on regardi ng AI Ss can be found i n ARs 380-5 and
380-19. Requi red trai ni ng of personnel worki ng wi th an AI S i s l ocated i n AR
380-19.
OPSEC AND THE THREAT
1-9. OPSEC i s a process of i denti fyi ng cri ti cal i nformati on and subsequentl y
anal yzi ng fri endl y acti ons attendant to mi l i tary operati ons and other
acti vi ti es. The threat i s i denti fi ed usi ng the factors of mi ssi on, enemy, terrai n,
troops, ti me avai l abl e, and ci vi l i an consi derati ons (METT-TC). The threat
defi nes the physi cal -securi ty chal l enges. I mpl ementi ng physi cal -securi ty
measures supports OPSEC. Provi di ng soundproof rooms for conducti ng
bri efi ngs i s a si mpl e but i nval uabl e measure.
1-10. Another i ssue to consi der when eval uati ng physi cal -securi ty chal l enges
i s what acti ons to take i n case of pol i ti cal i mpl i cati ons i nterferi ng wi th
physi cal -securi ty measures. I n the devastati ng event at Khobar Towers, a
warni ng was gi ven but not everyone recei ved i t. I t took too l ong to evacuate
the bui l di ng after the warni ng was i ssued because a cohesi ve pl an was not i n
pl ace.
1-11. Commanders can mi ni mi ze the chal l enges to physi cal securi ty through
proacti ve measures. They shoul d peri odi cal l y change the physi cal -securi ty
posture of thei r area of responsi bi l i ty to throw off perpetrators.
The Systems Approach 2-1
Chapter 2
The Systems Approach
Commanders must ensure that appropri ate physi cal -securi ty measures are
taken to mi ni mi ze the l oss of per sonnel , suppl i es, equi pment, and materi al
through both human and natural threats. Commanders commonl y exerci se
those protecti ve r esponsi bi l i ti es through the provost mar shal (PM) and/or
physi cal -securi ty offi cer and the force-protecti on offi cer. The force-protecti on
offi cer must coor di nate wi th sever al di ffer ent agenci es to compl ete hi s
mi ssi on. For exampl e, the Ar mys I ntel l i gence and Counter i ntel l i gence
Pr ogr am (see Appendi x C) pr ovi des i nfor mati on that wi l l be used to
compl ete the uni ts cri si s-management pl an (see Appendi x D).
PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
2-1. The approach to devel opi ng protecti ve measures for assets shoul d be
based on a systemati c process resul ti ng i n an i ntegrated protecti ve system.
The protecti ve system focuses on protecti ng speci fi c assets agai nst wel l -
defi ned threats to acceptabl e l evel s of protecti on. The system i s organi zed i n-
depth and contai ns mutual l y supporti ng el ements coordi nated to prevent gaps
or overl aps i n responsi bi l i ti es and performance.
2-2. Effecti ve protecti ve systems i ntegrate the fol l owi ng mutual l y supporti ng
el ements:
Physi cal protecti ve measures, i ncl udi ng barri ers, l i ghti ng, and
el ectroni c securi ty systems (ESSs).
Procedural securi ty measures, i ncl udi ng procedures i n pl ace before an
i nci dent and those empl oyed i n response to an i nci dent. (These i ncl ude
procedures empl oyed by asset owners and those appl i ed by and
governi ng the acti ons of guards.)
Terrori sm counteracti on measures that protect assets agai nst terrori st
attacks.
2-3. The fol l owi ng determi nati ons are made when consi deri ng system-
devel opment procedures:
The resources avai l abl e.
The assets to be protected.
The threat to those assets.
The ri sk l evel s appl i cabl e to those assets.
The appl i cabl e regul atory requi rements for protecti ng the assets.
The appl i cabl e l evel of protecti on for those assets agai nst the threat.
Addi ti onal vul nerabi l i ti es to the assets (based on the threat).
FM 3-19.30
2-2 The Systems Approach
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
2-4. AR 190-51, DA Pamphl et (Pam) 190-51, and Techni cal Manual (TM)
5-853-1 are useful tool s for devel opi ng protecti ve systems usi ng the systems
approach. The key to appl yi ng these tool s successful l y i s to use a team
approach. A team may i ncl ude physi cal -securi ty, i ntel l i gence, and operati ons
personnel ; the i nstal l ati on engi neers; and the user of the assets. I t may al so
i ncl ude representati ves from the mul ti nati onal , host-nati on (HN), and l ocal
pol i ce as wel l as the regi onal securi ty offi ce from the embassy.
ASSETS
2-5. Protecti ve systems shoul d al ways be devel oped for speci fi c assets. The
goal of securi ty i s to protect faci l i ti es and bui l di ngs and the assets contai ned
i nsi de. The ri sk-anal ysi s procedure i n DA Pam 190-51 i s used to i denti fy
assets. Thi s procedure i s appl i ed to al l mi ssi on-essenti al or vul nerabl e areas
(MEVAs) accordi ng to AR 190-13. I t represents the majori ty of assets wi th
whi ch DOD i s commonl y concerned. These assets i ncl ude
Ai rcraft and components at avi ati on faci l i ti es.
Vehi cl e and carri age-mounted or -towed weapons systems and
components at motor pool s.
Petrol eum, oi l , and l ubri cants (POL).
Contr ol l ed medi cal substances and other medi cal l y sensi ti ve i tems.
Communi cati on and el ectroni cs equi pment; test, measurement, and
di agnosti c equi pment (TMDE); ni ght-vi si on devi ces (NVDs); and other
hi gh-val ue preci si on equi pment and tool ki ts.
Organi zati onal cl othi ng and i ndi vi dual equi pment stored at central -
i ssue faci l i ti es.
Subsi stence i tems at commi ssari es, commi ssary warehouses, and
troop-i ssue faci l i ti es.
Repai r parts at i nstal l ati on-l evel suppl y acti vi ti es and di rect-support
(DS) uni ts wi th authori zed stockage l i sts.
Faci l i ti es-engi neeri ng suppl i es and constructi on materi al s.
Audi ovi sual equi pment, trai ni ng devi ces, and subcal i ber devi ces.
Mi scel l aneous pi l ferabl e assets (not i ncl uded above) and money.
Mi ssi on-cri ti cal or hi gh-ri sk personnel .
General mi l i tary and ci vi l i an popul ati ons.
I ndustri al and uti l i ty equi pment.
Control l ed cryptographi c i tems.
Sensi ti ve i nformati on (i ncl uded i n TM 5-853-1, but not i ncl uded i n DA
Pam 190-51).
Arms, ammuni ti on, and expl osi ves (AA&E).
I nstal l ati on banks and fi nance offi ces.
RISK LEVELS
2-6. DA Pam 190-51 provi des a procedure for determi ni ng ri sk l evel s
assessi ng the val ue of the assets to thei r users and the l i kel i hood of
FM 3-19.30
compromi se. These factors are assessed by answeri ng a seri es of questi ons
l eadi ng to val ue and l i kel i hood rati ngs.
2-7. Asset val ue i s determi ned by consi deri ng the fol l owi ng three el ements:
The cri ti cal i ty of the asset for i ts user and the Army as a whol e.
How easi l y the asset can be repl aced.
Some measur e of the assets r el ati ve val ue.
2-8. The rel ati ve val ue di ffers for each asset. For some assets, the rel ati ve
val ue i s measured i n terms of monetary cost.
2-9. The l i kel i hood of the threat i s assessed for each appl i cabl e aggressor
category by consi deri ng the assets val ue to the aggressor, the hi story of or
potenti al for aggressors attempti ng to compromi se the asset, and the
vul nerabi l i ty of the asset based on exi sti ng or pl anned protecti ve measures.
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
2-10. The ri sk l evel i s the basi s for determi ni ng the requi red protecti ve
measures for assets covered i n AR 190-51. For each asset type, there may be
physi cal protecti ve measures, procedural securi ty measures, and terrori sm
counteracti on measures. These measures are speci fi ed by ri sk l evel . The
measures i denti fi ed i n AR 190-51 are the mi ni mum regul atory measures that
must be appl i ed for the i denti fi ed threat l evel . The mi ni mum regul atory
measures for AA&E are based on the ri sk category establ i shed i n AR 190-11.
ANTITERRORISM/FORCE-PROTECTION CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS
2-11. I n accordance wi th DOD I nstructi on 2000.16, the commanders i n chi ef
(CI NCs) have devel oped standards for new constructi on and exi sti ng faci l i ti es
to counter terrori sm threat capabi l i ti es wi thi n the area of responsi bi l i ty.
These constructi on standards have speci fi c requi rements for such measures as
standoff di stance, peri meter barri ers, bui l di ng constructi on, and parki ng. The
DOD constructi on standard provi des for mi ni mum standards that must be
i ncorporated i nto al l i nhabi ted DOD structures regardl ess of the i denti fi ed
threat. These standards provi de a degree of protecti on that wi l l not precl ude
the di rect effects of bl ast but wi l l mi ni mi ze col l ateral damage for bui l di ngs
and peopl e and wi l l l i mi t the progressi ve col l apse of structures. These
standards add rel ati vel y l i ttl e cost, may faci l i tate future upgrades, and may
deter acts of aggressi on. (Al l servi ces have adopted common cri teri a and
mi ni mum standards to counter anti terrori sm/force-protecti on [AT/FP]
vul nerabi l i ti es and terrori sm threats.) Protecti on to i denti fi ed threat l evel s i s
descri bed i n the fol l owi ng paragraphs. Physi cal -securi ty personnel must be
fami l i ar wi th the CI NC and DOD AT/FP constructi on standards because these
standards may affect el ements of physi cal -securi ty pl ans and how i ndi vi dual
faci l i ti es are secured.
THREAT IDENTIFICATION
2-12. The threat must be descri bed i n speci fi c terms to hel p determi ne the
assets vul nerabi l i ti es or to establ i sh protecti ve measures. Thi s descri pti on
shoul d i ncl ude the tacti cs that aggressors wi l l use to compromi se the asset
(weapons, tool s, and expl osi ves ar e l i kel y to be used i n an attempt). For
FM 3-19.30
exampl e, the threat mi ght be descri bed as a movi ng vehi cl e bomb consi sti ng of
a 4,000-pound vehi cl e contai ni ng a 500-pound expl osi ve. Another exampl e
woul d be a forced-entry threat usi ng speci fi c hand, power, or thermal tool s.
These types of threat descri pti ons (cal l ed the desi gn-basi s threat) can be used
to desi gn detai l ed protecti ve systems to mi ti gate the attacks. TM 5-853-1 and
DA Pam 190-51 contai n procedures for establ i shi ng desi gn-basi s threat
descri pti ons i n the format descri bed above. These procedures can be used
together or separatel y. Threats l i sted i n the TM wi l l be summari zed l ater i n
thi s chapter. When usi ng the TM as a l one source or i n conjuncti on wi th DA
Pam 190-51, the fol l owi ng acti ons occur:
When the TM process i s used al one, the user goes through an i denti cal
process to that i n DA Pam 190-51 up to the poi nt where the ri sk l evel
woul d be determi ned. I n TM 5-853-1, the val ue and l i kel i hood rati ngs
are used di fferentl y than i n DA Pam 190-51. The l i kel i hood rati ng i s
used to deter mi ne the weapons, tool s, and expl osi ves that wi l l be used
by a parti cul ar aggressor i n carryi ng out a speci fi c tacti c. I n thi s
procedure, hi gher l i kel i hood rati ngs resul t i n more severe mi xes of
weapons, tool s, and expl osi ves. The assumpti on i s that the more l i kel y
the attack, the more resources the aggressor i s l i kel y to use i n carryi ng
out the attack.
When the procedure i n TM 5-853-1 i s used i n conjuncti on wi th the
resul ts of the DA Pam 190-51 ri sk anal ysi s, the l i kel i hood rati ng i s
taken di rectl y from the ri sk anal ysi s and appl i ed as descri bed above.
LEVEL OF PROTECTION
2-13. The l evel of pr otecti on appl i es to the desi gn of a pr otecti ve system
agai nst a speci fi ed threat (for exampl e, a bomb, breaki ng and enteri ng,
pi l feri ng, and so forth). The l evel of protecti on i s based on the assets val ue
rati ng from ei ther DA Pam 190-51 or TM 5-853-1. The l evel i ncreases as the
assets val ue rati ng i ncreases. There are separate l evel s of protecti on for each
tacti c. TM 5-853-1 provi des detai l ed gui dance on how to achi eve the l evel s of
protecti on, and Chapter 3 of thi s manual provi des a summary of the l evel s of
protecti on as they appl y to vari ous tacti cs.
VULNERABILITIES
2-14. Vul nerabi l i ti es are gaps i n the assets protecti on. They are i denti fi ed by
consi deri ng the tacti cs associ ated wi th the threat and the l evel s of protecti on
that are associ ated wi th those tacti cs. Some vul nerabi l i ti es can be i denti fi ed
by consi deri ng the general desi gn strategi es for each tacti c descri bed i n TM
5-853-1 and as summari zed i n Chapter 3 of thi s manual . The general desi gn
strategi es i denti fy the basi c approach to protecti ng assets agai nst speci fi c
tacti cs. For exampl e, the general desi gn strategy for forced entry i s to provi de
a way to detect attempted i ntrusi on and to provi de barri ers to del ay the
aggressors unti l a response force arri ves. Vul nerabi l i ti es may i nvol ve
i nadequaci es i n i ntrusi on-detecti on systems (I DSs) and barri ers. Si mi l arl y,
the general desi gn strategy for a movi ng vehi cl e bomb i s to keep the vehi cl e as
far from the faci l i ty as possi bl e and to harden the faci l i ty to resi st the
expl osi ve at that di stance. Vul nerabi l i ti es may i nvol ve l i mi ted standoff
FM 3-19.30
di stances, i nadequate barri ers, and bui l di ng constructi on that cannot resi st
expl osi ve effects at the appl i cabl e standoff di stance.
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
2-15. Where vul nerabi l i ti es have been i denti fi ed, protecti ve measures must
be i denti fi ed to mi ti gate them. AR 190-13, AR 190-51, DA Pam 190-51, and
TM 5-853-1 are effecti ve tool s for devel opi ng protecti ve measures. The key to
effecti ve devel opment of protecti ve systems i s a partnershi p between physi cal -
securi ty personnel and the i nstal l ati on engi neers. Appendi x E of thi s manual
di scusses i nformati on for offi ce securi ty, whi ch shoul d be l i sted i n the
physi cal -securi ty pl an (see Appendi x F). Appendi x G di scusses personal -
protecti on measures.
THE INTEGRATED PROTECTIVE SYSTEM
2-16. Protecti ve systems i ntegrate physi cal protecti ve measures and securi ty
procedures to protect assets agai nst a desi gn-basi s threat. The characteri sti cs
of i ntegrated systems i ncl ude deterrence, detecti on, defense, and defeat.
DETERRENCE
2-17. A potenti al aggressor who percei ves a ri sk of bei ng caught may be
deterred from attacki ng an asset. The effecti veness of deterrence vari es wi th
the aggressors sophi sti cati on, the assets attracti veness, and the aggressors
objecti ve. Al though deterrence i s not consi dered a di rect desi gn objecti ve, i t
may be a resul t of the desi gn.
DETECTION
2-18. A detecti on measure senses an act of aggressi on, assesses the val i di ty of
the detecti on, and communi cates the appropri ate i nformati on to a response
force. A detecti on system must provi de al l three of these capabi l i ti es to be
effecti ve.
2-19. Detecti on measures may detect an aggressors movement vi a an I DS, or
they may detect weapons and tool s vi a X-ray machi nes or metal and expl osi ve
detectors. Detecti on measur es may al so i ncl ude access-control el ements that
assess the val i di ty of i denti fi cati on (I D) credenti al s. These control el ements
may provi de a programmed response (admi ssi on or deni al ), or they may rel ay
i nformati on to a response force. Guards serve as detecti on el ements, detecti ng
i ntrusi ons and control l i ng access.
2-20. Nucl ear, bi ol ogi cal , and chemi cal (NBC) detecti on systems must be used
to measure and val i date acts of aggressi on i nvol vi ng WMD. NBC detecti on
systems shoul d al so be used to communi cate a warni ng.
DEFENSE
2-21. Defensi ve measures protect an asset from aggressi on by del ayi ng or
preventi ng an aggressors movement toward the asset or by shi el di ng the
asset from weapons and expl osi ves. Defensi ve measures
FM 3-19.30
Del ay aggressors from gai ni ng access by usi ng tool s i n a forced entry.
These measures i ncl ude barri ers al ong wi th a response force.
Prevent an aggressors movement toward an asset. These measures
provi de barri ers to movement and obscure l i nes of si ght (LOSs) to
assets.
Protect the asset from the effects of tool s, weapons, and expl osi ves.
2-22. Defensi ve measures may be acti ve or passi ve. Acti ve defensi ve
measures are manual l y or automati cal l y acti vated i n response to acts of
aggressi on. Passi ve defensi ve measures do not depend on detecti on or a
response. They i ncl ude such measures as bl ast-resi stant bui l di ng components
and fences. Guards may al so be consi dered as a defensi ve measure.
DEFEAT
2-23. Most protecti ve systems depend on response personnel to defeat an
aggressor. Al though defeat i s not a desi gn objecti ve, defensi ve and detecti on
systems must be desi gned to accommodate (or at l east not i nterfere wi th)
response-force acti vi ti es.
SECURITY THREATS
2-24. Securi ty threats are acts or condi ti ons that may resul t i n the
compromi se of sensi ti ve i nformati on; l oss of l i fe; damage, l oss, or destructi on
of property; or di srupti on of mi ssi on. Physi cal -securi ty personnel and desi gn
teams must understand the threat to the assets they are to protect i n order to
devel op effecti ve securi ty programs or desi gn securi ty systems. Hi stori cal
patterns and trends i n aggressor acti vi ty i ndi cate general categori es of
aggressors and the common tacti cs they use agai nst mi l i tary assets. Aggressor
tacti cs and thei r associ ated tool s, weapons, and expl osi ves are the basi s for the
threat to assets.
THREAT SOURCES
2-25. There are many potenti al sources of threat i nformati on. Threat
assessment i s normal l y a mi l i tary-i ntel l i gence (MI ) responsi bi l i ty. MI
personnel commonl y focus on such securi ty threats as terrori sts and mi l i tary
forces. Wi thi n the US and i ts terri tori es, the Federal Bureau of I nvesti gati on
(FBI ) has pri mary responsi bi l i ty for both forei gn and domesti c terrori sts. The
FBI , the US Army Cri mi nal I nvesti gati on Command (USACI DC [CI D]), and
l ocal l aw-enforcement agenci es are good sources for physi cal -securi ty
personnel to obtai n cri mi nal threat i nformati on. Coordi nati ng wi th these
el ements on a regul ar basi s i s essenti al to mai ntai ni ng an effecti ve securi ty
program.
THREAT CATEGORIES
2-26. Securi ty threats are cl assi fi ed as ei ther human or natural . Human
threats are carri ed out by a wi de range of aggressors who may have one or
more objecti ves toward assets such as equi pment, personnel , and operati ons.
Aggressors can be categori zed and thei r objecti ves can be general i zed as
descri bed bel ow. (See DA Pam 190-51 and TM 5-853-1 for more i nformati on.)
FM 3-19.30
Aggressor Objectives
2-27. Four major objecti ves descri be an aggressors behavi or. Any one of the
fi rst three objecti ves can be used to real i ze the fourth. These objecti ves
i ncl ude
I nfl i cti ng i njury or death on peopl e.
Destroyi ng or damagi ng faci l i ti es, property, equi pment, or resources.
Steal i ng equi pment, materi el , or i nformati on.
Creati ng adverse publ i ci ty.
Aggressor Categories
2-28. Aggressors are grouped i nto fi ve broad categori escri mi nal s, vandal s
and acti vi sts, extremi sts, protest groups, and terrori sts. Hosti l e acts
performed by these aggressors range from cri mes (such as burgl ary) to l ow-
i ntensi ty confl i ct threats (such as unconventi onal warfare). Each of these
categori es descri bes predi ctabl e aggressors who pose threats to mi l i tary assets
and who share common objecti ves and tacti cs.
Cri mi nal s can be characteri zed based on thei r degree of sophi sti cati on.
They are cl assi fi ed as unsophi sti cated cri mi nal s, sophi sti cated
cri mi nal s, and organi zed cri mi nal groups. Thei r common objecti ve i s
the theft of assets; however, the assets they target, the quanti ti es they
seek, thei r rel ati ve effi ci ency, and the sophi sti cati on of thei r acti ons
vary si gni fi cantl y. Vandal s and acti vi sts may al so be i ncl uded under
thi s category.
Vandal s and acti vi sts are groups of protesters who are pol i ti cal l y or
i ssue ori ented. They act out of frustrati on, di scontent, or anger agai nst
the acti ons of other soci al or pol i ti cal groups. Thei r pri mary objecti ves
commonl y i ncl ude destructi on and publ i ci ty. Thei r sel ecti on of targets
wi l l vary based on the ri sk associ ated wi th attacki ng them. The degree
of damage they seek to cause wi l l vary wi th thei r sophi sti cati on.
Extremi sts are radi cal i n thei r pol i ti cal bel i efs and may take extreme,
vi ol ent acti ons to gai n support for thei r bel i efs or cause.
Protesters are consi dered a threat onl y i f they are vi ol ent. Lawful
protesters have to be consi dered, but si gni fi cant protecti ve measures
and procedures are not normal l y needed to control thei r acti ons. The
presence of extremi sts or vandal s/acti vi sts at a peaceful protest
i ncreases the chance of the protest becomi ng vi ol ent.
Terrori sts are i deol ogi cal l y, pol i ti cal l y, or i ssue ori ented. They
commonl y work i n smal l , wel l -organi zed groups or cel l s. They are
sophi sti cated, are ski l l ed wi th tool s and weapons, and possess an
effi ci ent pl anni ng capabi l i ty. There are three types of terrori sts
CONUS, OCONUS, and parami l i tary OCONUS.
I CONUS terrori sts are typi cal l y ri ght- or l eft-wi ng extremi sts
operati ng i n di sti nct areas of the US.
I OCONUS terrori sts general l y are more organi zed than CONUS
ter r or i sts. They usual l y i ncl ude ethni cal l y or r el i gi ousl y or i ented
groups.
FM 3-19.30
I Parami l i tary OCONUS terrori st groups show some mi l i tary
capabi l i ty wi th a br oad r ange of mi l i tar y and i mpr ovi sed weapons.
Attacks by OCONUS terrori sts are typi cal l y more severe.
2-29. Natural threats are usual l y the consequence of natural phenomena.
They are not preventabl e by physi cal -securi ty measures, but they are l i kel y to
have si gni fi cant effects on securi ty systems and operati ons. They may requi re
an i ncrease i n protecti ve measures ei ther to address new si tuati ons or to
compensate for the l oss of exi sti ng securi ty measures. They may reduce the
effecti veness of exi sti ng securi ty measures by such occurrences as col l apsed
peri meter fences and barri ers, i noperabl e protecti ve l i ghti ng, damaged patrol
vehi cl es, and poor vi si bi l i ty. Natural threats and thei r effects rel ati ve to
securi ty i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Fl oods may resul t i n property damage, destructi on of peri meter fences,
and damage to I DSs. Heavy rai ns or snowfal l s may have si mi l ar effects
even i f they do not resul t i n fl oodi ng.
Storms, tornadoes, hi gh wi nds, or rai n may cause nui sance al arms to
acti vate and cause damage to I DSs. They may l i mi t the vi si bi l i ty of
securi ty personnel and may affect cl osed-ci rcui t tel evi si on (CCTV)
systems. Wi nds may al so di srupt power or communi cati on l i nes and
cause safety hazards from fl yi ng debri s.
Earthquakes may cause nui sance al arms to acti vate or may di srupt
I DSs. They may al so cause broken water or gas mai ns, fal l en el ectri cal
or communi cati on l i nes, and weakened or col l apsed bui l di ngs.
Snow and i ce can make travel on patrol roads di ffi cul t, may del ay
responses to al arms, may i mpede the performance of I DSs, and may
freeze l ocks and al arm mechani sms. Heavy i ce may al so damage power
and communi cati on l i nes.
Fi res may damage or destroy peri meter barri ers and bui l di ngs,
possi bl y l eavi ng assets suscepti bl e to damage or theft.
Fog can reduce the vi si bi l i ty of securi ty forces, thereby requi ri ng
addi ti onal securi ty personnel . I t may al so i ncrease the response ti me to
al arms and reduce the effecti veness of securi ty equi pment such as
CCTV systems.
Aggressor Tactics
2-30. Aggressors have hi stori cal l y used a wi de range of offensi ve strategi es
refl ecti ng thei r capabi l i ti es and objecti ves. These offensi ve strategi es are
categori zed i nto 15 tacti cs that are speci fi c methods of achi evi ng aggressor
goal s (see TM 5-853-1). Separati ng these tacti cs i nto categori es al l ows faci l i ty
pl anners and physi cal -securi ty personnel to defi ne threats i n standardi zed
terms usabl e as a basi s for faci l i ty and securi ty-system desi gn. Common
aggressor tacti cs i ncl ude
Movingvehicle bomb. An aggressor dri ves an expl osi ve-l aden car or
truck i nto a faci l i ty and detonates the expl osi ves. Hi s goal i s to damage
or destroy the faci l i ty or to ki l l peopl e. Thi s i s a sui ci de attack.
Stationary vehicle bomb. An aggressor cover tl y parks an expl osi ve-
l aden car or truck near a faci l i ty. He then detonates the expl osi ves
ei ther by ti me del ay or remote control . Hi s goal i n thi s tacti c i s the
FM 3-19.30
same as for the movi ng vehi cl e bomb wi th the addi ti onal goal of
destroyi ng assets wi thi n the bl ast area. Thi s i s commonl y not a sui ci de
attack. I t i s the most frequent appl i cati on of vehi cl e bombi ngs.
Exterior attack. An aggressor attacks a faci l i tys exteri or or an
exposed asset at cl ose range. He uses weapons such as rocks, cl ubs,
i mprovi sed i ncendi ary or expl osi ve devi ces, and hand grenades.
Weapons (such as smal l arms) are not i ncl uded i n thi s tacti c, but are
consi dered i n subsequent tacti cs. Hi s goal i s to damage the faci l i ty, to
i njure or ki l l i ts occupants, or to damage or destroy assets.
Standoff weapons. An aggressor fi res mi l i tary weapons or
i mprovi sed versi ons of mi l i tary weapons at a faci l i ty from a si gni fi cant
di stance. These weapons i ncl ude di rect (such as anti tank [AT]
weapons) and i ndi rect LOS weapons (such as mortars). Hi s goal i s to
damage the faci l i ty, to i njure or ki l l i ts occupants, or to damage or
destr oy assets.
Ballistics. The aggressor fi res vari ous smal l arms (such as pi stol s,
submachi ne guns, shotguns, and ri fl es) from a di stance. Hi s goal i s to
i njure or ki l l faci l i ty occupants or to damage or destroy assets.
Forced entry. The aggressor forci bl y enters a faci l i ty usi ng forced-
entry tool s (such as hand, power, and thermal tool s) and expl osi ves. He
uses the tool s to create a man-passabl e openi ng or to oper ate a devi ce
i n the faci l i tys wal l s, doors, roof, wi ndows, or uti l i ty openi ngs. He may
al so use smal l arms to overpower guards. Hi s goal i s to steal or destroy
assets, compromi se i nformati on, i njure or ki l l faci l i ty occupants, or
di srupt operati ons.
Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter a faci l i ty or a porti on of
a faci l i ty by usi ng fal se credenti al s or steal th. He may try to carry
weapons or expl osi ves i nto the faci l i ty. Hi s goal s i ncl ude those l i sted for
forced entry.
Insider compromise. A person authori zed access to a faci l i ty (an
i nsi der) attempts to compromi se assets by taki ng advantage of that
accessi bi l i ty. The aggressor may al so try to carry weapons or expl osi ves
i nto the faci l i ty i n thi s tacti c. Hi s goal s are the same as those l i sted for
forced entry.
Visual surveillance. The aggressor uses ocul ar and photographi c
devi ces (such as bi nocul ars and cameras wi th tel ephoto l enses) to
moni tor faci l i ty or i nstal l ati on operati ons or to see assets. Hi s goal i s to
compromi se i nformati on. As a precursor, he uses thi s tacti c to
determi ne i nformati on about the asset of i nterest.
Acoustic eavesdropping. The aggressor uses l i steni ng devi ces to
moni tor voi ce communi cati ons or other audi bl y transmi tted
i nformati on. Hi s goal i s to compromi se i nformati on.
Electronic-emanations eavesdropping. The aggr essor uses
el ectroni c-emanati on survei l l ance equi pment from outsi de a faci l i ty or
i ts restri cted area to moni tor el ectroni c emanati ons from computers,
communi cati ons, and rel ated equi pment. Hi s goal i s to compromi se
i nformati on.
FM 3-19.30
Mail-bomb delivery. The aggressor del i vers bombs or i ncendi ary
devi ces to the target i n l etters or packages. The bomb si zes i nvol ved are
rel ati vel y smal l . Hi s goal i s to ki l l or i njure peopl e.
Supplies-bomb delivery. The aggressor conceal s bombs i n vari ous
contai ners and del i vers them to suppl y- and materi al -handl i ng poi nts
such as l oadi ng docks. The bomb si zes i n thi s tacti c can be si gni fi cantl y
l arger that those i n mai l bombs. Hi s goal i s to damage the faci l i ty, ki l l
or i njure i ts occupants, or damage or destroy assets. Appendi x H
addresses the acti ons to take when a bomb i s suspected.
Airborne contamination. An aggressor contami nates a faci l i tys ai r
suppl y by i ntroduci ng chemi cal or bi ol ogi cal agents i nto i t. Hi s goal i s
to ki l l or i njur e peopl e.
Waterborne contamination. An aggressor contami nates a faci l i tys
water suppl y by i ntroduci ng chemi cal , bi ol ogi cal , or radi ol ogi cal agents
i nto i t. These agents can be i ntroduced i nto the system at any l ocati on
wi th varyi ng effects, dependi ng on the quanti ty of water and the
contami nant i nvol ved. Hi s goal i s to ki l l or i njure peopl e.
2-31. The aforementi oned tacti cs are typi cal threats to fi xed faci l i ti es for
whi ch desi gners and physi cal -securi ty personnel can provi de protecti ve
measures. However, some common terrori st acts are beyond the protecti on
that faci l i ty desi gners can provi de. They cannot control ki dnappi ngs,
hi jacki ngs, and assassi nati ons that take pl ace away from faci l i ti es or duri ng
travel between faci l i ti es. Protecti on agai nst these threats i s provi ded through
operati onal securi ty and personal measures (see Appendi ces G and I ), whi ch
are covered i n doctri ne rel ati ve to those acti vi ti es and are under the general
responsi bi l i ty of the CI D.
TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS
2-32. When determi ni ng the assets and threats, the same consi derati ons
shoul d be gi ven to the systems approach i n the tacti cal envi ronment as when
i n the cantonment area. The same process of determi ni ng the assets, thei r ri sk
l evel , and any regul atory gui dance appl y. I denti fyi ng potenti al threats and the
l evel of protecti on requi red for the assets are necessary. Commanders and
l eaders must al so i denti fy addi ti onal vul nerabi l i ti es and other requi red
protecti ve measures. Commanders are not expected to have the same physi cal
protecti ve measures due to the i mpact of resources, budget, l ocati on, and
si tuati ons.
2-33. Commanders must consi der the vari ous tacti cs used by aggressors and
use thei r sol di ers abi l i ti es to counteract these tacti cs. Consi derati ons for
speci fi c assets (such as mi l i tary-worki ng-dog [MWD] and expl osi ve-ordnance-
di sposal [EOD] teams and thei r abi l i ti es to detect and di sassembl e a bomb)
must be i denti fi ed. Uni ts must have the abi l i ty to i mprovi se i n a tacti cal
envi ronment. Thei r trai ni ng and resourceful ness wi l l compensate for
shortcomi ngs i n the fi el d.
2-34. The systems approach to securi ty provi des focus and i ntegrati on of
resources. Protecti ve systems are mutual l y supporti ng and systemati cal l y
devel oped to negate the threat. Commanders conduct an i ntel l i gence
preparati on of the battl efi el d (I PB) and vul nerabi l i ty assessments (VAs) to
determi ne ri sks. Securi ty resources and measures are appl i ed to mi ti gate
ri sks and to deter, detect, defend, and defeat the threat.
Design Approach 3-1
Chapter 3
Design Approach
Devel opi ng pr otecti ve systems to pr otect assets depends on an effecti ve
partnershi p between engi neers and physi cal -securi ty personnel . Physi cal -
securi ty personnel need to understand the basi c approaches the engi neers
wi l l take i n l ayi ng out protecti ve systems. Engi neers must understand the
i ssues i nvol ved wi th ensur i ng that anythi ng they l ay out i s compati bl e
wi th secur i ty oper ati ons and the oper ati ons of the asset user s. The best
way to ensure a vi abl e desi gn i s through teamwork. Thi s chapter provi des
a summar y of the basi c appr oaches to pr otecti ng assets agai nst thr eats
(the desi gn str ategi es). Under standi ng these str ategi es i s cr i ti cal to bei ng
an effecti ve team member i n devel opi ng pr otecti ve systems.
DESIGN STRATEGIES
3-1. There are separate desi gn strategi es for protecti ng assets from each
tacti c descri bed i n Chapter 2. There are two types of strategi es associ ated
wi th each tacti cthe general -desi gn and speci fi c-desi gn strategi es. The
general -desi gn strategy i s the general approach to protecti ng assets agai nst
tacti cs. The speci fi c-desi gn strategy refi nes the general -desi gn strategy to
focus the performance of the protecti ve system on a parti cul ar l evel of
protecti on. (See TM 5-853-1 for more i nformati on.)
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
3-2. Pr otecti ve measur es are devel oped as a resul t of the gener al - and
speci fi c-desi gn strategi es. These protecti ve measures commonl y take the form
of si te-work, bui l di ng, detecti on, and pr ocedural el ements.
Si te-work el ements i ncl ude the area surroundi ng a faci l i ty or an asset.
Techni cal l y, they are associ ated wi th everythi ng beyond 5 feet from a
bui l di ng. They can i ncl ude peri meter barri ers, l andforms, and standoff
di stances.
Bui l di ng el ements are protecti ve measures di rectl y associ ated wi th
bui l di ngs. These el ements i ncl ude wal l s, doors, wi ndows, and roofs.
Detecti on el ements detect such thi ngs as i ntruder s, weapons, or
expl osi ves. They i ncl ude I DSs, CCTV systems used to assess i ntrusi on
al arms, and weapon and expl osi ve detectors. These el ements can al so
i ncl ude the guards used to support thi s equi pment or to perform
si mi l ar functi ons.
Procedural el ements are the protecti ve measures requi red by
regul ati ons, TMs, and standi ng operati ng procedures (SOPs). These
el ements provi de the foundati on for devel opi ng the other three
el ements.
FM 3-19.30
3-2 Design Approach
VEHICLE BOMBS
3-3. Vehi cl e-bomb tacti cs i ncl ude both movi ng and stati onary vehi cl e bombs.
I n the case of a movi ng vehi cl e bomb, the aggressor dri ves the vehi cl e i nto the
target. Thi s i s commonl y known as a sui ci de attack. I n a stati onary vehi cl e
bomb, he parks the vehi cl e and detonates the bomb remotel y or on a ti med
del ay.
GENERAL-DESIGN STRATEGY
3-4. Bl ast pressures near an expl odi ng vehi cl e bomb are very hi gh, but they
decrease rapi dl y wi th di stance from the expl osi on. The desi gn strategy for
these tacti cs i s to mai ntai n as much standoff di stance as possi bl e between the
vehi cl e bomb and the faci l i ty and then, i f necessary, to harden the faci l i ty for
the resul ti ng bl ast pressures. Barri ers on the peri meter of the resul ti ng
standoff zone mai ntai n the requi red standoff di stance. The di fference between
movi ng and stati onary vehi cl e-bomb tacti cs i s that the aggressor usi ng the
movi ng vehi cl e bomb wi l l attempt to crash through the vehi cl e barri ers; the
aggressor usi ng the stati onary vehi cl e bomb wi l l not. Therefore, vehi cl e
barri ers for the movi ng vehi cl e bomb must be capabl e of stoppi ng a movi ng
vehi cl e at the peri meter of the standoff zone. For a stati onary vehi cl e bomb,
vehi cl e barri ers must mark the peri meter of the standoff zone, but they are
not requi red to stop the movi ng vehi cl e. They onl y need to make i t obvi ous i f
an aggressor attempts to breach the peri meter.
LEVELS OF PROTECTION
3-5. There are three l evel s of protecti on for vehi cl e bombsl ow, medi um, and
hi gh. The pri mary di fferences between the l evel s are the degree of damage
al l owed to the faci l i ty protecti ng the assets and the resul ti ng degree of
damage or i njury to the assets.
Low. The faci l i ty or the protected space wi l l sustai n a hi gh degree of
damage but wi l l not col l apse. I t may not be economi cal l y repai rabl e.
Al though col l apse i s prevented, i njuri es may occur and assets may be
damaged.
Medium. The faci l i ty or the protected space wi l l sustai n a si gni fi cant
degree of damage, but the structure wi l l be reusabl e. Occupants and
other assets may sustai n mi nor i njuri es or damage.
High. The faci l i ty or the protected space wi l l sustai n onl y superfi ci al
damage. Occupants and other assets wi l l al so i ncur onl y superfi ci al
i njury or damage.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-6. The two pri mary types of si te-work el ements for vehi cl e bombs are the
standoff di stance and vehi cl e barri ers. The vehi cl es speed must al so be taken
i nto consi derati on.
Standoff Distance
3-7. The standoff di stance i s the mai ntai ned di stance between where a vehi cl e
bomb i s al l owed and the target. The i ni ti al goal shoul d be to make that di stance
FM 3-19.30
Design Approach 3-3
as far from the target faci l i ty as practi cal . Fi gure 3-1 shows the di stances
requi red to l i mi t bui l di ng damage to parti cul ar l evel s (i ncl udi ng the l evel s of
protecti on descri bed above) for a range of bomb wei ghts. Al l bomb wei ghts are
gi ven i n terms of equi val ent pounds of tri ni trotol uene (TNT), whi ch i s a
standard way of i denti fyi ng al l expl osi ves regardl ess of thei r composi ti on. The
exampl e i n Fi gure 3-1 i s a bui l di ng of conventi onal constructi on (common,
unhardened constructi on). Bui l di ngs bui l t wi thout any speci al constructi on at
these standoff di stances wi l l probabl y wi thstand the expl osi ve effects.
Conventi onal l y constructed bui l di ngs at standoff di stances of l ess than those
shown i n Fi gure 3-1 wi l l not adequatel y wi thstand bl ast effects. (Refer to TM
5-853-1 for i nformati on on hardeni ng bui l di ngs to resi st a bl ast.) Do not al l ow
vehi cl es to park wi thi n the establ i shed standoff di stances. Recogni ze that thi s
restri cti on can resul t i n si gni fi cant operati onal and l and-use probl ems.
3-8. Exclusive Standoff Zone. When an excl usi ve standoff zone i s
establ i shed, do not al l ow vehi cl es wi thi n the peri meter unl ess they have been
searched or cl eared for access. The zones peri meter i s establ i shed at the
di stance necessary to protect the faci l i ty agai nst the hi ghest threat expl osi ve.
Al l vehi cl es shoul d be parked outsi de the excl usi ve standoff zone; onl y
Clear zone
standoff zone
50 ft min
30 ft
min
Figure 3-1. Standoff Distance
FM 3-19.30
3-4 Design Approach
mai ntenance, emer gency, and del i ver y vehi cl es shoul d be al l owed wi thi n the
zone after bei ng searched. Fi gure 3-2 shows an excl usi ve standoff zone.
3-9. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone. A nonexcl usi ve standoff zone i s
establ i shed i n a l ocati on havi ng a mi xture of cars and trucks (wi th rel ati vel y
few trucks). A nonexcl usi ve standoff zone takes advantage of aggressors bei ng
abl e to conceal a smal l er quanti ty of expl osi ves i n a car than they can i n a
truck. Therefore, a nonexcl usi ve standoff zone i ncl udes i nner and outer
peri meters. The i nner peri meter i s set at a di stance correspondi ng to the
wei ght of expl osi ves that can be conceal ed i n cars. The outer peri meter i s set
at a di stance associ ated wi th the wei ght that can be pl aced i n trucks (refer to
TM 5-853-1). Wi th these two peri meters, cars can enter the outer peri meter
wi thout bei ng searched but they cannot enter the i nner peri meter. Trucks
cannot enter the outer peri meter, si nce i t i s establ i shed based on what they
can carry. Fi gure 3-3 shows a nonexcl usi ve standoff zone. The nonexcl usi ve
standoff zone provi des the advantages of al l owi ng better use of the parki ng
areas and l i mi ti ng the number of vehi cl es that need to be searched at the
outer per i meter. .
Entry-control point
d
e
Facility
d
e
= exclusive standoff-zone distance
Figure 3-2. Exclusive Standoff Zone
FM 3-19.30
Design Approach 3-5
VehicleBarriers
3-10. Two types of vehi cl e barri ers are used for vehi cl e bombsperi meter and
acti ve barri ers. The type of barri er used for a movi ng vehi cl e bomb di ffers
from the barri er used for a stati onary vehi cl e bomb. The barri er used for a
stati onary vehi cl e bomb does not have to stop a vehi cl es moti on. The goal for
that barri er i s to make anybody dri vi ng through the barri er noti ceabl e. The
assumpti on i s that the aggressors goal i n the stati onary vehi cl e bomb i s to
park the vehi cl e and sneak away wi thout bei ng noti ced. Crashi ng through a
barri er woul d be noti ceabl e. Barri ers for the movi ng vehi cl e bomb need to stop
the vehi cl es moti on; they must be much more substanti al .
3-11. Perimeter Barriers. Peri meter barri ers are fi xed barri ers pl aced
around the enti re peri meter of a standoff zone. Anythi ng that presents a fi xed
obstacl e wi l l work for the stati onary vehi cl e bomb. Common appl i cati ons
i ncl ude chai n-l i nk fences, hedges made of l ow bushes, and hi gh (over 8 i nches)
curbs. Aggressors dri vi ng through such barri ers are l i kel y to be noti ced.
Barri ers capabl e of stoppi ng movi ng vehi cl es i ncl ude chai n-l i nk fences
rei nforced wi th cabl e, rei nforced concrete Jersey barri ers, pi pe bol l ards,
pl anters, di tches, and berms. When barri ers such as the Jersey barri ers and
pl anters are used to stop movi ng vehi cl es, they must be anchored i nto the
ground to be effecti ve. The cabl es i n the rei nforced fence al so have to be
anchored i nto the ground or parti al l y buri ed. Spaces between barri ers shoul d
Entry-control point
d
e
d
n
Facility
d
e
d
n
d
e
d
n
Entry-
control
point
d
e
= exclusive standoff-zone distance
d
n
= nonexclusive standoff-zone distance
Figure 3-3. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone
FM 3-19.30
3-6 Design Approach
be no greater than 4 feet. Fi gure 3-4 shows common peri meter barri ers for
stati onary or movi ng vehi cl e bombs. Refer al so to TM 5-853-1.
3-12. Active Barriers. Acti ve barri ers are pl aced at openi ngs i n peri meters
where vehi cl es need to enter or exi t. These barri ers must be abl e to be rai sed
and l ower ed or moved asi de. For the stati onary vehi cl e bomb, bar r i ers can be
as si mpl e as chai n-l i nk, pi pe, or wooden gates that can be rai sed and l owered.
Aggressors crashi ng through any of these or si mi l ar obstructi ons wi l l l i kel y
draw attenti on. For the movi ng vehi cl e bomb, the barri ers are heavy
structures and have many constructi on and operati ons consi derati ons
Shallow ditch
Low berm
Trees
Fence
Fence with cables
Pipe bollards
Concrete planters
Barriers along perimeter
Facility
d
e
= distance from facility to exclusive zone perimeter
d
e
Shrubs
Moving vehicle-bomb barriers
High curb
Stationary vehicle-bomb barriers
Entry-control
point
Figure 3-4. Perimeter-Barrier Application
FM 3-19.30
Design Approach 3-7
associ ated wi th them. These barri ers may stop vehi cl es wei ghi ng up to 15,000
pounds and travel l i ng 50 mi l es per hour. They commonl y cost tens of
thousands of dol l ars (refer to TM 5-853-1). Some common acti ve vehi cl e
barri ers are shown i n Fi gure 3-5. For temporary or depl oyed condi ti ons, park a
vehi cl e across an openi ng and move i t asi de to grant access.
Speed Control
3-13. I t i s i mportant to control the speed of a vehi cl e approachi ng a barri er
used for a movi ng vehi cl e bomb. The energy from a vehi cl e that a barri er must
stop i ncreases as i ts speed i ncreases. The energy al so i ncreases wi th more
wei ght, but the effect of speed i s much greater. Therefore, decreasi ng the
vehi cl es speed resul ts i n smal l er and l ess costl y barri ers. The best way to
l i mi t a vehi cl es approach speed to peri meter barri ers i s to pl ace or retai n
obstacl es i n potenti al approach paths. The vehi cl es are forced to reduce speed
when goi ng around these obstacl es. The same pri nci pl e appl i es for road
approaches. Pl aci ng obstacl es i n a serpenti ne pattern on the road forces a
vehi cl e to reduce i ts speed (see Fi gure 3-6, page 3-8). I f the vehi cl e hi ts the
obstacl es i nstead of goi ng around them, they are sti l l sl owed down. Other
means to sl ow vehi cl es i ncl ude forci ng them to make sharp turns and
i nstal l i ng traffi c ci rcl es.
Cable-beam barrier
Retractable bollards
Drum-type barrier
Sliding-gate barrier
Figure 3-5. Active Vehicle Barriers
FM 3-19.30
3-8 Design Approach
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-14. Once the standoff di stance i s establ i shed and the si te has been l ai d out,
the desi gners can sel ect the bui l di ng components necessary to protect the
assets agai nst the threat expl osi ves at the standoff di stance. The bui l di ng
components i ncl ude the wal l s, roofs, doors, and wi ndows. Detai l ed desi gn
i ssues rel ated to these bui l di ng el ements are covered i n TM 5-853-1.
Walls and Roofs
3-15. I f the di stances shown for the desi red damage l evel s i n Fi gure 3-1, page
3-3, cannot be enforced, the bui l di ngs wal l s and roofs wi l l need to be
strengthened. Thi s can be achi eved i n new constructi on by usi ng rei nforced
masonry or rei nforced concrete i n the wal l s and rei nforced concrete i n the roof.
When the standoff di stance i s not avai l abl e for exi sti ng constructi on, a more
detai l ed anal ysi s may be requi red to determi ne what the expl osi ons i mpact
wi l l be on the structure. When the constructi on i s i nadequate, more standoff
di stance shoul d be i nvesti gated or the engi neers shoul d appl y speci al i zed
techni ques for retrofi tti ng the constructi on to i ncrease i ts strength.
Windows
3-16. Hi stori cal l y, gl ass fragments have caused about 85 percent of i njuri es
and deaths i n bomb bl asts. There are two basi c approaches to mi ti gati ng the
effects of bomb bl asts on gl assretrofi tti ng the wi ndows wi th fi l m or curtai ns
and usi ng bl ast-resi stant gl azi ng.
3-17. Retrofitting Windows. One of the most common means of decreasi ng
the hazards from broken gl ass i s to i nstal l fragment-retenti on fi l m on the
gl ass. The fi l m i s a pl asti c (pol yester) sheet that adheres to the wi ndow gl ass
wi th a speci al adhesi ve. The fi l m does not strengthen the gl ass; but when the
gl ass breaks, i t keeps the fragments from spreadi ng throughout the room. The
d
2
4
f
t
1
0
f
t
Perimeter barrier
Obstacles
d = distance to barrier
Figure 3-6. Serpentine Pattern
FM 3-19.30
Design Approach 3-9
gl ass fragments sti ck to the fi l m, and the fi l m ei ther stays i n the wi ndow
frame or fal l s i nto the room i n one or more l arge, rel ati vel y nonhazardous
pi eces i nstead of many smal l , l ethal pi eces. Another retrofi t approach i s to
i nstal l a bl ast curtai n or a heavy drape behi nd the wi ndow. The curtai n or
drape catches the gl ass fragments. The curtai ns are general l y used wi th
fragment-retenti on fi l m. Another retrofi t techni que i s to use fragment-
retenti on fi l m wi th a metal bar pl aced across the wi ndow. Thi s catcher bar
catches the wi ndow. The desi gns for thi s and other types of retrofi t devi ces are
compl i cated and requi re speci al i zed engi neeri ng-anal ysi s tool s. The retrofi t
techni ques are general l y thought of as provi di ng a l ower l evel of protecti on
than the gl azi ng repl acement techni ques. For depl oyed l ocati ons, removi ng
the wi ndows and coveri ng them wi th pl ywood mi ni mi zes the danger.
3-18. Blast-Resistant Glazing. To achi eve hi gher l evel s of protecti on, the
wi ndow gl ass must be repl aced and the wi ndow frame shoul d be rei nforced.
Because of i ts expense, thi s procedure i s general l y l i mi ted to new constructi on
and major renovati ons. Speci al bl ast-resi stant gl azi ng and frames are
avai l abl e that use ei ther tempered gl ass or a pl asti c gl azi ng (such as
pol ycarbonate). Another promi si ng type of bl ast-resi stant gl azi ng i s l ami nated
gl ass, i n whi ch several l ayers of common gl ass are adhered together wi th a
speci al i nterl ayer. The resul ti ng l ami nated constructi on i s usual l y stronger
than common gl ass whi l e retai ni ng the same thi ckness. The i nterl ayer acts
si mi l arl y to fragment-retenti on fi l m. For depl oyed l ocati ons, a means of
mi ni mi zi ng the danger of wi ndows i s to remove them and repl ace them wi th
pl ywood.
Doors
3-19. Doors are another bui l di ng component parti cul arl y vul nerabl e to an
expl osi ve bl ast. Common metal and wood door s pr ovi de l i ttl e resi stance to a
bl ast. The two ways to address the probl em of doors i s to i nstal l them i n foyers
or to repl ace them. Gl ass doors or doors contai ni ng wi ndows shoul d be
avoi ded.
Foyers
3-20. Door hazards can be reduced by i nstal l i ng doors i n foyers duri ng
constructi on or by addi ng foyers to exi sti ng bui l di ngs. When a door i s l ocated
i n a foyer and the outer door fai l s, the outer door fl i es i nto a wal l i nstead of the
bui l di ngs i nteri or (see Fi gure 3-7, page 3-10). The i nner door then has a
greater chance of remai ni ng i ntact. Thi s opti on general l y provi des a l ow l evel
of protecti on.
3-21. Another opti on i s to repl ace the doors wi th speci al l y constructed bl ast-
resi stant doors and frames. These doors are commerci al l y avai l abl e and can
provi de a hi gh l evel of protecti on, but they are very expensi ve and heavy. The
doorframe must be made of the same type of materi al and provi de the same
l evel of protecti on as the door.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-22. Detecti on el ements for vehi cl e bombs are l i mi ted to the use of guards to
control access i nto standoff zones. The guards search vehi cl es seeki ng entry
FM 3-19.30
3-10 Design Approach
i nto the peri meter through an entry-control poi nt. The recommended l evel s of
searches depend on the requi red l evel of protecti on (see TM 5-853-1). Guards
can be stati oned at entry-control poi nts conti nuousl y, or they can be
summoned to an entry-control poi nt when access i s needed. The l atter i s
commonl y the case for the i nner peri meter of excl usi ve standoff zones where
onl y del i very and mai ntenance vehi cl es need access.
EXTERIOR ATTACK
3-23. An exteri or attack i s a physi cal attack usi ng weapons such as rocks,
cl ubs, i mprovi sed i ncendi ary devi ces (I I Ds) such as Mol otov cocktai l s,
expl osi ves such as i mprovi sed expl osi ve devi ces (I EDs), and hand grenades.
The expl osi ves can be thrown at or pl aced near a faci l i tys exteri or. Exampl es
of I EDs for thi s tacti c range from pi pe bombs and hand grenades to bri efcase-
si zed expl osi ves.
3-24. Because the exteri or attack i s di rected at a faci l i ty's exteri or surfaces,
the general -desi gn strategy i s to keep aggressors away from the faci l i ty (at a
standoff di stance) and, i f necessary, to harden the faci l i ty's exteri or
components to resi st the effects of weapons and expl osi ves. A standoff di stance
from the faci l i ty reduces the degree of hardeni ng requi red to resi st weapons
effects. When bri efcase-si zed bombs are a threat, an obstacl e-free zone shoul d
be establ i shed around the faci l i ty and the expl osi ves pl aced wi thi n shoul d be
detected and di sarmed.
3-25. The l evel s of protecti on for exteri or attacks are si mi l ar to those for
vehi cl e bombs. Level s of protecti on vary based on the l evel of bui l di ng damage
and asset i njury or damage al l owed. However, due to the l i mi ted si zes of
expl osi ves i nvol ved i n thi s tacti c, the damage to the bui l di ng wi l l be much
more l ocal i zed and i njuri es or damage to assets wi l l be confi ned to smal l er
areas.
Building exterior
Alternate offset
opening
Offset
opening
Foyer
Figure 3-7. Door in Foyer
FM 3-19.30
Design Approach 3-11
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-26. Si te-work el ements for exteri or attacks are rel ati vel y l i mi ted because
the expl osi ve wei ghts are more l i mi ted. Large standoff di stances are not a
consi derati on. The common approach to si te-work el ements i s to l ay out a
standoff zone of about 50 feet and to provi de a fence or peri meter barri er
about 7 feet hi gh. The purpose of the standoff i s to make i t harder for
aggressors to throw pi pe bombs and hand grenades at targets i nsi de the
peri meter. Trees can be l eft around the peri meter to make i t harder for
aggressors to throw expl osi ves over the fence. The remai ni ng component of
si te-work el ements i s a cl ear zone around the faci l i ty. A cl ear zone i s appl i ed
so that anythi ng pl aced i n that area can be detected vi sual l y. Thi s l i mi ts the
aggressors abi l i ty to pl ace expl osi ves near the target faci l i ty.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-27. Bui l di ng el ements for exteri or attacks are si mi l ar to those for vehi cl e
bombs. For smal l I EDs and I I Ds, the bui l di ng-el ement requi rements do not
i ncrease the cost of the bui l di ng si gni fi cantl y. For l arger, bri efcase-si zed
bombs, the measures are more si gni fi cant than for i ncendi ary devi ces but l ess
than for vehi cl e bombs.
Walls and Roofs
3-28. Wal l s and roofs are not a probl em wi th smal l expl osi ves. Conventi onal
constructi on normal l y provi des adequate protecti on. Wal l s wi th 6-i nch
rei nforced concrete or 8-i nch, grout-fi l l ed, rei nforced masonry wi l l wi thstand
the effects of typi cal pi pe bombs or hand grenades. The correspondi ng roof
constructi on i s 6-i nch rei nforced concrete. I n the case of bri efcase-si zed bombs,
consi derati ons si mi l ar to those di scussed for vehi cl e bombs need to be
empl oyed.
Windows
3-29. A si gni fi cant goal when constructi ng wi ndows i s to make them di ffi cul t
to throw an expl osi ve or i ncendi ary devi ce through, especi al l y when
consi deri ng smal l er expl osi ves. Thi s i s accompl i shed by constructi ng smal l er
wi ndows or maki ng narrow wi ndows (see Fi gure 3-8, page 3-12). For exi sti ng
wi ndows, parts of the wi ndows can be covered to achi eve a narrow effect.
These wi ndows sti l l may be suscepti bl e to breakage due to expl osi ve effects,
even from the smal l er expl osi ves. Thi s probl em i s sol ved by i nstal l i ng 3/4-
i nch-thi ck pl asti c (pol ycarbonate) gl azi ng or by rai si ng the wi ndows over 6 feet
hi gh to devel op a smal l standoff di stance (as shown i n Fi gure 3-9, page 3-12).
A 3/4-i nch gl azi ng wi l l al so stop grenade fragments. Fragment-retenti on fi l m,
a bl ast curtai n, or a heavy drape as descri bed i n vehi cl e-bomb tacti cs are al so
good appl i cati ons for smal l bombs.
Conventionally Constructed Doors
3-30. Doors are not a si gni fi cant probl em wi th smal l bombs and i ncendi ary
devi ces. General l y, metal doors are adequate for i ncendi ary devi ces, and doors
pl aced i n foyers (as shown i n Fi gure 3-7) are adequate for pi pe bombs and
hand grenades. A si mi l ar appl i cati on for bri efcase-si zed bombs woul d provi de
FM 3-19.30
onl y a l ow l evel of protecti on. To achi eve hi gher l evel s of protecti on for
bri efcase-si zed bombs, bl ast-resi stant doors must be i nstal l ed.
3-31. The requi rements to meet the l evel s of protecti on for l arger expl osi ves
are si mi l ar to those descri bed for vehi cl e bombs, but they wi l l not stop grenade
fragments. Fragment-retenti on fi l m and drapes or curtai ns can provi de a l ow
Figure 3-8. Narrow Recessed Windows
Figure 3-9. Narrow Raised Windows
FM 3-19.30
l evel of protecti on, but bl ast-resi stant gl azi ng i s requi red to achi eve a hi gher
l evel of protecti on.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-32. Other than awareness of aggressor acti vi ty on or outsi de the si te,
detecti on i s onl y a speci fi c desi gn goal where bri efcase-si zed bombs are
anti ci pated. When that i s the case, the cl ear zone around the bui l di ng must be
vi sual l y moni tored so that any objects pl aced i n i t are detected. At hi gher
l evel s of protecti on, vi sual survei l l ance i s augmented by I DSs.
STANDOFF WEAPONS
3-33. The standoff-weapons tacti c i ncl udes the use of AT weapons and
mortars. I n both of these tacti cs, the aggressor fi res weapons at assets l ocated
i n the protected faci l i ty from a di stance. An AT-weapon attack requi res a cl ear
LOS to the target, whi l e mortars can fi re over obstacl es and onl y need a cl ear
l i ne of fl i ght.
3-34. Standoff-weapons attacks cannot be detected rel i abl y before they occur.
Protecti ve desi gn to resi st these tacti cs rel i es on bl ocki ng LOSs to protected
areas of a faci l i ty or hardeni ng the faci l i ty to resi st the parti cul ar weapons
effects. The approaches to protecti on agai nst mortars and AT weapons di ffer
from each other and wi l l be di scussed separatel y. Detecti on measures are not
appl i cabl e for these tacti cs.
3-35. There are two l evel s of protecti on agai nst both mortars and AT
weapons. For AT weapons, the l ow l evel of pr otecti on depends on detonati ng
the AT round before i t hi ts the target faci l i ty. The hi gh l evel of protecti on
avoi ds the ri sk associ ated wi th that and hardens the bui l di ng to resi st the
di rect i mpact of the AT round.
3-36. For mortars, the l ow l evel of protecti on i nvol ves al l owi ng some areas of
the faci l i ty to be sacri fi ced. Those spaces provi de a buffer to the assets to be
protected. The assets wi thi n the sacri fi ci al areas and the areas themsel ves
may be destroyed. At the hi gh l evel of protecti on, the bui l di ngs exteri or ful l y
resi sts the mortar rounds and there are no sacri fi ci al areas.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-37. The pri mary si te-work el ement for standoff weapons i s to obstruct LOSs
from vantage poi nts outsi de of the si te. Wi th AT weapons, the aggressor
cannot hi t what he cannot see. Thi s i s not true wi th mortars, but bl ocki ng
LOSs from mortar fi ri ng poi nts hel ps to make targeti ng more di ffi cul t. The
LOSs are bl ocked by usi ng trees, other bui l di ngs, vehi cl e parki ng areas, or
fences. Another si te-work el ement, a predetonati on screen, appl i es onl y to an
AT weapon. When usi ng a predetonati on screen, the AT round i s detonated on
the screen and i ts effects are di ssi pated i n the di stance between the screen
and the target (see Fi gure 3-10, page 3-14). Any screen materi al (such as a
FM 3-19.30
wooden fence) wi l l detonate the round unl ess i t has spaces i n i t. The screen
di stances vary from l ess than 10 feet to al most 40 feet, dependi ng on the
bui l di ng constructi on (see TM 5-853-1). Thi s measure onl y appl i es to the l ow
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-38. Bui l di ng el ements for AT weapons and mortars i nvol ve the bui l di ngs
l ayout. Thi s i ncl udes the materi al s used i n the constructi on.
Layout
3-39. A bui l di ngs i nteri or l ayout i s onl y an i ssue for the l ow l evel of protecti on
agai nst a mortar round. The l ayout i ssue i nvol ves desi gnati ng sacri fi ci al areas
i n whi ch uni mportant assets are l ocated. The assets to be protected are
l ocated i n a hardened i nteri or l ayer. Fi gure 3-11 i ncl udes a pl an vi ew (from
above). The sacri fi ci al area has to be both around and above the protected
area i n case a mortar round comes from above. I f such a l ayout i s not feasi bl e,
other opti ons i ncl ude goi ng to a hi gher l evel of protecti on and ei ther
hardeni ng the enti re bui l di ng or bui l di ng the faci l i ty underground (whi ch are
both very expensi ve).
Walls and Roofs
3-40. Wal l s and roofs must offer protecti on agai nst both AT weapons and
mortar rounds. The desi gn of wal l s that protect agai nst AT weapons vari es
wi th the l evel of protecti on. For the l ow l evel of pr otecti on wher e the round i s
predetonated, the wal l s can be of conventi onal constructi on, varyi ng wi th the
standoff di stance from the predetonati on screen to the wal l . For hi gher l evel s
of protecti on, the wal l s must resi st the ful l effect of the round, requi ri ng the
wal l s to be 24-i nch-thi ck rei nforced concrete. Roofs are not an i ssue i n
Protected facility
Predetonation screen
Standoff distance
Figure 3-10. Predetonation Screen
FM 3-19.30
protecti ng agai nst AT weapons because i t i s di ffi cul t to get di rect LOSs to
roofs. I f such LOSs are possi bl e, the roof shoul d be desi gned l i ke the wal l s.
3-41. To provi de protecti on agai nst mortar rounds, wal l s and roofs shoul d be
desi gned to resi st the expl osi ve effects i n the rounds at the standoff di stance
that the sacri fi ci al space provi des. I n the case of sacri fi ci al areas, the wal l s can
be of common constructi on. The i nteri or protected-area wal l s are then
desi gned of rei nforced concrete or rei nforced masonry for the standoff di stance
those sacri fi ci al wal l s provi de. When the wal l s must resi st the ful l effect of the
rounds (as i n the hi gher l evel of protecti on), they are l i kel y to be very thi ck (up
3
1
Asset
Asset
Asset
Multiple assets with
shared 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
layers
A
A
1
Multiple assets
shared 2nd and 3rd layers
C
A
A
Multiple assets with
shared 2nd and 3rd layers
C
1
1
2
2 2
3 3
1
2
Asset A
Asset B
2
1
1
Asset with 3 layers
Asset with shared
outer layer
Multiple assets with 3
shared layers
4
1 3
4
Figure 3-11. Assets Protected by Hardened Interior Layer
FM 3-19.30
to 30 i nches of rei nforced concrete for some i mprovi sed mortars). Si mi l ar
consi der ati ons shoul d be made for roofs. Roofs ar e desi gned to take the di rect
effects of the round or to take the round at the standoff di stance provi ded by
the sacri fi ci al area.
Doors and Windows
3-42. I t i s i mpracti cal to provi de doors and wi ndows that are resi stant to
mortar rounds and AT weapons. Wi ndows shoul d onl y be used i n sacri fi ci al
areas where there i s a mortar threat. When there i s an AT weapon threat,
wi ndows can onl y be used where the round i s predetonated. The wi ndows
shoul d be narrowed or rai sed to present a smal l er target (see Fi gures 3-8 and
3-9, page 3-12). Doors shoul d be pl aced i n foyers (see Fi gure 3-7, page 3-10) for
protecti on agai nst AT rounds and to achi eve a l ow l evel of protecti on agai nst
mortars. Bl ast-resi stant doors are necessary to achi eve a hi gh l evel of
protecti on agai nst mortar rounds.
BALLISTICS
3-43. I n a bal l i sti cs tacti c, aggressors fi re smal l arms at assets from vantage
poi nts outsi de of the target faci l i tys control . Bal l i sti c attacks cannot be
detected rel i abl y before they occur.
3-44. Protecti ve measures to resi st these tacti cs rel y on bl ocki ng LOSs to
protected areas of a faci l i ty or by hardeni ng the faci l i ty to resi st the bal l i sti c
effects. Thi s strategy focuses on assets wi thi n bui l di ngs. Protecti ng peopl e or
property i n the open i s di ffi cul t and can onl y be addressed through operati onal
measur es. Detecti on measur es ar e not appl i cabl e for thi s tacti c.
3-45. There are onl y two l evel s of protecti on for thi s tacti c. The l ow l evel of
protecti on depends on bl ocki ng LOSs to assets. Thi s strategy assumes that the
aggressor cannot hi t what he cannot see. The ri sk of an aggressor fi ri ng i nto a
bui l di ng randoml y and hi tti ng somethi ng i s what makes thi s the l ow l evel of
protecti on. The hi gh l evel of protecti on i nvol ves hardeni ng bui l di ng
components to resi st the bal l i sti c effects. These strategi es can be thought of as
ei ther hardeni ng or hi di ng.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-46. Si te-work el ements are of l i mi ted use for the bal l i sti cs tacti c. When they
are appl i ed, they are used to obstruct LOSs from vantage poi nts outsi de of the
si te, whi ch i s consi stent wi th the l ow l evel of protecti on. The LOSs can be
bl ocked usi ng trees, other bui l di ngs, motor pool s, or fences.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-47. Bui l di ng el ements are the pri nci pal means of protecti ng assets agai nst a
bal l i sti cs attack. They can be appl i ed to achi eve ei ther the l ow or hi gh l evel of
protecti on.
FM 3-19.30
Walls and Roofs
3-48. Wal l s and roofs are i nherentl y opaque, so i t i s easy to achi eve the l ow
l evel of protecti on (hi di ng) wi th them. Achi evi ng the hi gh l evel of protecti on
(hardeni ng) for wal l s and roofs can be done wi thi n conventi onal constructi on
usi ng rei nforced concrete, concrete-masonry uni ts (CMUs), or cl ay bri ck. The
materi al s requi red thi ckness i s shown i n Tabl e 3-1. The thi cknesses of CMUs
and cl ay bri ck are nomi nal , meani ng they do not represent the actual
thi ckness of the materi al ; they represent the thi cknesses at whi ch those
materi al s are commerci al l y avai l abl e. Steel pl ates (mi l d steel and armor steel )
and bul l et-resi stant fi bergl ass can be used to retrofi t exi sti ng bui l di ng
components that woul d not provi de the needed bul l et resi stance.
Windows
3-49. Wi ndows can i ncl ude openi ngs i n wal l s and skyl i ghts, al though
skyl i ghts are onl y an i ssue where there are LOSs to them. When skyl i ghts
requi re protecti on, treat them l i ke wi ndows. Achi evi ng the l ow l evel of
protecti on (hi di ng) for wi ndows requi res maki ng i t di ffi cul t to see through
them, such as i nstal l i ng refl ecti ve fi l m on the gl ass. An aggressor cannot see
through the wi ndows duri ng dayl i ght whi l e i t i s l i ghter outsi de than i nsi de,
but he may see through them at ni ght when the opposi te mi ght be true.
Drapes or bl i nds that can be cl osed at ni ght address that vul nerabi l i ty. To
achi eve the hi gh l evel of protecti on requi res bul l et-resi stant wi ndow
assembl i es. These are commerci al l y avai l abl e for a wi de range of bal l i sti cs
types. They are purchased as manufactured-and-tested assembl i es (i ncl udi ng
gl azi ng and frames, both of whi ch are equal l y bul l et-resi stant). The gl azi ng
materi al s and thi cknesses and the frami ng detai l s are propri etary to thei r
manufacturers. The manufacturers make them accordi ng to i ndustry test
standards to ensure an effecti ve product.
Doors
3-50. Doors wi thout gl ass easi l y meet the requi rements for the l ow l evel of
pr otecti on. Meeti ng the hi gh l evel of pr otecti on r equi r es the i nstal l ati on of
bul l et-resi stant door assembl i es. Doors can be i nstal l ed i n foyers so that there
i s no di rect LOS i nto assets wi thi n the bui l di ng (see Fi gure 3-7, page 3-10).
FORCED ENTRY
3-51. I n the forced-entry tacti c, an aggressor tri es to forci bl y gai n access to
assets. He may use tool s or expl osi ves to breach bui l di ng components or other
barri ers.
Table 3-1. Required Thicknesses, in Inches
Ballistics Type
Reinforced
Concrete
Grouted
CMU*
Clay
Brick*
Steel Plate
Bullet-Resistant
Fiberglass
Mild Armor
.38 special 2 4 4 1/4 3/16 5/16
9 mm 2 1/2 4 4 5/16 1/4 7/16
7.62 and 5.56 mm 4 6 6 9/16 7/16 1 1/8
7.62-mm AP 6 1/2 8 8 13/16 11/16 N/A
*Nominal thicknesses
FM 3-19.30
3-52. The general -desi gn strategy for forced entry i s to detect the aggressor
earl y i n the forced-entry attempt and del ay hi m l ong enough for a response
force to i ntercept hi m. The combi nati on of detecti on and defensi ve measures
must provi de suffi ci ent ti me for a response force to i ntercept the aggressor
before he reaches the asset or before he escapes wi th i t, dependi ng on the
protecti ve goal s for the asset. The fi rst goal woul d appl y where the asset i s
l i kel y to be destroyed or where access to i t i s not acceptabl e. The second goal
woul d be appl i ed when the i dea i s to prevent i t from bei ng stol en.
3-53. Several l evel s of protecti on appl y to forced entry. These l evel s vary i n
terms of system desi gn, del ay ti me, and response-force arri val ti me.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-54. Si te-work el ements do not normal l y pl ay a major rol e i n protecti ng
agai nst a forced entry. However, the si te shoul d be l ai d out and mai ntai ned so
that an aggressor does not have a hi di ng pl ace nearby that wi l l conceal hi s
attempts to break i nto the bui l di ng. Another si te-work el ement i s the
appl i cati on of peri meter barri ers, most commonl y fences. Fences are effecti ve
at del i neati ng a boundary and at keepi ng honest peopl e honest, but they are
i neffecti ve for preventi ng a forced entry. The desi gn strategy for forced entry i s
based on del ayi ng the aggressor, and any seri ous aggressor coul d cl i mb a fence
i n l ess than 4 seconds or can cut through a fence i n l ess than 10 seconds.
Therefore, fences are not used as del ay el ements, but they are used to
establ i sh boundari es and as pl atforms on whi ch to hang sensors. The fi nal
si te-work consi derati on i s securi ng uti l i ty-access ports such as manhol es. I f
there are uti l i ty tunnel s through whi ch aggressors can enter a bui l di ng, those
accesses shoul d be l ocked usi ng padl ocks or l ocki ng bol ts.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-55. Bui l di ng el ements are the pri nci pal constructi on el ements of a system
for protecti ng agai nst a forced entry. The bui l di ng el ements are used to
provi de del ay. The process for desi gni ng to resi st forced entry i nvol ves l ayi ng
out concentri c ri ngs of del ay (cal l ed defensi ve l ayers). These defensi ve l ayers
can i ncl ude the faci l i tys exteri or, i nteri or rooms wi thi n that l ayer, and
contai ners wi thi n the i nteri or rooms. The i ndi vi dual bui l di ng components for
each of the l ayers (wal l s, doors, wi ndows, fl oors, cei l i ngs, and roofs) provi de
the del ay ti me (see TM 5-853-1).
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-56. For a protecti ve system to be effecti ve agai nst a forced entry, the
aggressors must be detected at a poi nt of adequate del ay. Detecti on at that
poi nt can be achi eved by usi ng an I DS. Once a sensor detects an aggressor, the
al arm annunci ator communi cates that event to securi ty personnel , who then
di spatch a response force. The al arm can be assessed through a guard
response or vi a CCTV. Chapter 6 and TM 5-853-4 provi de detai l ed di scussi on
of I DSs, CCTV systems, and other el ements of ESSs.
FM 3-19.30
COVERT ENTRY AND INSIDER COMPROMISE
3-57. I n the covert-entry tacti c, an aggressor who i s not authori zed to be i n
the faci l i ty attempts to enter usi ng fal se credenti al s. I n the i nsi der-
compromi se tacti c, personnel wi th l egi ti mate access to a faci l i ty try to
compromi se an asset. The i nsi der may or may not have l egi ti mate access to
the asset i tsel f. The purpose of the entry i n ei ther case can be to steal or
otherwi se compromi se the asset or to destroy i t. I n the l atter case, the
aggressor may bri ng I EDs or I I Ds.
3-58. The general -desi gn strategy for both the i nsi der-compromi se and covert-
entry tacti cs i s to keep peopl e from enteri ng areas they are not authori zed to
enter. For covert entry, aggressors are deni ed access to control l ed areas. For
i nsi der compromi se, aggressors are deni ed access to assets wi thi n control l ed
areas based on thei r need to have access to them. The gener al -desi gn str ategy
al so i ncl udes detecti ng aggressors removi ng assets from protected areas and
detecti ng aggressors carryi ng tool s, weapons, and expl osi ves i nto protected
areas.
3-59. The l evel s of protecti on for these tacti cs address di fferent i ssues,
dependi ng on whether the aggressors goal i s to steal or otherwi se compromi se
an asset or to destroy i t. When the goal i s to steal or compromi se an asset, the
l evel s of protecti on vary wi th the number and sophi sti cati on of the access
control s requi red to veri fy personnel access i nto a control l ed area. When the
goal i s to destroy the assets, the l evel s of protecti on vary wi th the amount of
damage the bui l di ng (and the assets i nsi de) are al l owed to sustai n and the
sophi sti cati on of detecti ng weapons or expl osi ves at entry poi nts.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-60. Bui l di ng el ements vary wi th an aggressors goal . To protect agai nst
theft or compromi se of assets, bui l di ng el ements are used to establ i sh and
mai ntai n control l ed areas i nto whi ch onl y authori zed personnel can enter. For
i nsi der compromi se, there may be an addi ti onal requi rement that access be
fur ther l i mi ted among per sonnel other wi se author i zed access to the control l ed
area. That access i s based on the need to have access to a speci fi c asset. The
resul t i s that the control l ed area may be compartmental i zed, and each
compartmental i zed area may have separate access requi rements. There are
no speci al constructi on requi rements for these tacti cs i f the goal i s theft of
compromi se. The onl y requi rement i s that the bui l di ng el ements of control l ed
areas shoul d provi de enough resi stance to requi re aggressors to force thei r
way through them to gai n entry and to provi de evi dence of the forced entry i f
i t i s attempted. Forci ng entry woul d be contrary to the aggressors assumed
goal to be covert. I n addi ti on, a common desi gn goal woul d be to l i mi t the
number of entrances i nto control l ed areas because there wi l l need to be access
control at each entry.
3-61. To protect agai nst the destructi on of assets, bui l di ng el ements are used
to shi el d assets from the effects of expl osi ves goi ng off at access-control poi nts.
FM 3-19.30
The basi c approach i s to l ay out areas at access poi nts i n whi ch guards can
search for carri ed-i n weapons, expl osi ves, or i ncendi ary devi ces. The
constructi on of that area i s desi gned to l i mi t damage to the rest of the bui l di ng
i f an expl osi ve i s detonated i n that area. Those l evel s of damage are si mi l ar to
those di scussed i n rel ati on to vehi cl e bombs. The wal l s and doors between the
access poi nt and the protected area wi l l be hardened, and the wal l s and doors
to the outsi de wi l l be of l i ghtwei ght constructi on so that they may fai l and
vent the bl ast pressure away from the bui l di ng. At the hi gher l evel of
protecti on, the access-control area i s l ocated i n a separate faci l i ty and the
target bui l di ng i s hardened to resi st an expl osi on i n that separate faci l i ty.
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-62. Detecti on el ements for these tacti cs al so vary based on the aggressors
goal . For theft, the detecti on el ements are mai nl y rel ated to access control . For
destr ucti on, the detecti on el ements are used to detect weapons, expl osi ves, or
i ncendi ary devi ces.
3-63. The mai n detecti on el ements for theft or compromi se are access-control
devi ces. These can i ncl ude procedural systems (such as guards checki ng I D),
mechani cal systems (such as keyed or combi nati on l ocks), or el ectroni c entry-
control el ements (such as el ectroni c card readers, keypads, and bi ometri c
devi ces). Chapter 6 provi des detai l ed di scussi on of el ectroni c devi ces. The
sophi sti cati on of these el ements and the number used vari es wi th the l evel of
protecti on. For exampl e, achi evi ng the hi gher l evel s of protecti on requi res the
appl i cati on of mul ti pl e forms of access-control el ements such as a card reader
and an el ectroni c keypad for el ectroni c-entry control or a badge check and
badge exchange for a procedural system.
3-64. When destructi on of the assets i s the goal , detecti on i s ori ented toward
detecti ng weapons, expl osi ves, or i ncendi ary devi ces. At the l ower l evel s of
protecti on, i t i s suffi ci ent for guards to search for carri ed-i n i tems. Achi evi ng
hi gher l evel s of protecti on requi res the appl i cati on of such equi pment as metal
detectors, X-ray machi nes, and expl osi ve detectors.
SURVEILLANCE AND EAVESDROPPING
3-65. Survei l l ance and eavesdroppi ng tacti cs i ncl ude vi sual survei l l ance,
acousti c eavesdroppi ng, and el ectroni c-emanati ons eavesdroppi ng. I n these
tacti cs, aggressors remai n outsi de of control l ed areas and try to gather
i nformati on from wi thi n those areas. The tool s used for these tacti cs i ncl ude
ocul ar devi ces for the vi sual -survei l l ance tacti c and l i steni ng devi ces and
el ectroni c-emanati ons-eavesdroppi ng equi pment for the eavesdroppi ng tacti c.
3-66. The general -desi gn strategy for these tacti cs i s to deny aggressors
access to i nformati on assets. The ki nd of i nformati on (objects, operati ons, or
fi l es; secure conversati ons; or el ectroni cal l y processed data) and how i t can be
compromi sed di ffers for each tacti c as do the speci fi c protecti ve strategi es.
Therefore, each tacti c i s addressed separatel y.
FM 3-19.30
3-67. Each of these tacti cs has onl y one l evel of protecti on. Ei ther one protects
or fai l s to protect agai nst these tacti cs.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-68. Si te-work el ements pl ay a mi nor rol e i n protecti ng assets from al l
survei l l ance or eavesdroppi ng tacti cs. The mai n i ssue i s to el i mi nate or control
vantage poi nts from whi ch aggressors can survei l or eavesdrop on assets or
operati ons. I n addi ti on, for the vi sual -survei l l ance tacti c, a desi gn goal can be
to bl ock LOSs from vantage poi nts. I tems used to bl ock LOSs i ncl ude trees,
bushes, fences, and other bui l di ngs (see Fi gure 3-12).
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-69. Bui l di ng el ements are the pri nci pal components of the protecti ve
strategi es for survei l l ance and eavesdroppi ng tacti cs. For vi sual survei l l ance,
Plan view
Noncritical structure
Wall
Obscuration
fence
Asset
Asset
Section view
S
ig
h
t
lin
e
S
ig
h
t
lin
e
Obscuration
fence
Figure 3-12. LOS Blocked From Potential Vantage Points
FM 3-19.30
the bui l di ng el ements must bl ock LOSs from outsi de the bui l di ng. Wal l s and
roofs perform thi s functi on effecti vel y. Doors are onl y a probl em when they
have wi ndows i n them or are made of transparent materi al s. When thi s i s the
case, they can be treated l i ke wi ndows or they can be pl aced i n foyer s so that
there are no di rect LOSs through them. Wi ndows can be treated wi th
refl ecti ve fi l m and drapes or bl i nds as descri bed i n the bal l i sti cs tacti cs. When
there are LOSs through skyl i ghts, they shoul d be treated l i ke wi ndows.
3-70. Bui l di ng el ements for acousti c eavesdroppi ng rel ate to the constructi on
of areas (preferabl y separated from the bui l di ng exteri or) that mi ni mi ze the
sound that can be transmi tted through them. Thi s requi res speci al i zed
constructi on that has a sound-transmi ssi on-coeffi ci ent (STC) rati ng. Wal l s,
fl oors, and cei l i ngs can be constructed to achi eve speci fi c STC rati ngs usi ng
conventi onal constructi on materi al s as descri bed i n TM 5-853-1. Doors and
wi ndows that are STC rated are commonl y manufactured and tested as
assembl i es. Thi s type of desi gn and constructi on can be expensi ve.
3-71. Protecti on agai nst el ectroni c-emanati ons eavesdroppi ng i nvol ves the
appl i cati on of Termi nal El ectromagneti c-Pul se Emanati on Standard
(TEMPEST) gui dance, most of whi ch i s cl assi fi ed. The protecti on i s based on a
TEMPEST assessment done for the Army by the US Army I ntel l i gence and
Securi ty Command (I NSCOM) and on gui dance i n AR 380-19. The resul ts of a
TEMPEST assessment wi l l commonl y l ead to countermeasures from one or
more of the fol l owi ng categori es:
Fol l ow i nformati on securi ty pol i ci es and procedures recommended
duri ng the assessments.
Provi de control l ed space both i nsi de and outsi de the faci l i ty.
Pr ovi de TEMPEST-shi el ded equi pment.
Provi de separati on between el ectroni c ci rcui ts that handl e cl assi fi ed
i nformati on and those that do not. Thi s i s commonl y cal l ed red/bl ack
separati on.
Provi de TEMPEST-shi el ded encl osures. Thi s i s speci al i zed, metal -
shi el ded constructi on that i s very expensi ve.
MAIL AND SUPPLY BOMBS
3-72. I n mai l - and suppl y-bomb tacti cs, aggressors pl ace bombs i n materi al s
del i vered to a faci l i ty. Expl osi ves used i n suppl y bombs are si gni fi cantl y l arger
(bri efcase si ze) than those i n mai l bombs (pi pe bombs or smal l er). Mai l bombs
are usual l y di rected at i ndi vi dual s, whi l e suppl y bombs may be used to target
l arger numbers of peopl e. These tacti cs assume that the faci l i ty contai ni ng the
asset has a mai l -handl i ng area or a suppl i es-handl i ng and -recei vi ng area.
These tacti cs do not appl y i f mai l or suppl i es are handl ed and screened i n a
di fferent faci l i ty.
3-73. A bomb expl odi ng wi thi n a bui l di ng has more severe effects than the
same si ze bomb expl odi ng outsi de of the faci l i ty because the bl ast pressures
cannot di ssi pate i nsi de. Al so, there i s no standoff di stance between the
expl osi ve and the faci l i ty to mi ti gate bl ast effects. The general -desi gn strategy
FM 3-19.30
for mai l and suppl y bombs i s to detect del i vered bombs before they expl ode
and to harden the area where the expl osi on takes pl ace. Thi s mi ni mi zes the
damage to the remai nder of the faci l i ty. Occupants and contents wi thi n the
mai l room or suppl i es-handl i ng area are l i kel y to be ki l l ed or destroyed i f an
undetected bomb expl odes.
3-74. The l evel s of protecti on for mai l and suppl y bombs are based on the
amount of damage al l owed to the bui l di ng and, therefore, the occupants of the
bui l di ng. They al so vary based on the sophi sti cati on of the detecti on measures
used.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-75. The purpose of bui l di ng el ements i n rel ati on to these bomb tacti cs i s to
shi el d assets from the effects of expl osi ves goi ng off at suppl y areas, recei vi ng
poi nts, or mai l rooms. The basi c approach i s to l ay out ei ther a mai l room or a
suppl i es-recei vi ng area i n whi ch peopl e can search suspi ci ous packages for
expl osi ves or i ncendi ary devi ces. Constructi ng thi s type of area wi l l l i mi t the
damage to the rest of the bui l di ng i f an expl osi ve i s detonated there. Those
l evel s of damage are si mi l ar to those di scussed i n rel ati on to vehi cl e bombs.
Mail Rooms
3-76. Mai l rooms shoul d be l ocated on the faci l i tys exteri or, away from any
cri ti cal assets. The wal l s and cei l i ng between the mai l room and the
remai nder of the bui l di ng are hardened to keep the bl ast effects out of the
faci l i ty. The exteri or wal l s and doors shoul d be of l i ghtwei ght constructi on so
that they may fai l and vent the bl ast pressure away from the bui l di ng. There
may be an expl osi ves contai ner i n the mai l room where suspi ci ous packages
can be pl aced. I f the package expl odes, the contai ner wi l l keep i ts effects from
causi ng damage or i njury. The hardened constructi on wi l l protect assets
outsi de of the mai l room i f the expl osi on occurs outsi de of the contai ner. Check
wi th EOD personnel to determi ne the l ocal pol i cy for usi ng expl osi ve
contai ners. At hi gher l evel s of protecti on, the mai l room i s constructed to
compl etel y contai n the effects of an expl osi on ei ther through hardened
constructi on or by usi ng a speci al i zed constructi on cal l ed vented suppressi ve
shi el di ng. Mai l rooms shoul d not have wi ndows i nto protected areas. Doors
between the mai l room and the rest of the bui l di ng shoul d be avoi ded, pl aced
i n foyers, or repl aced wi th bl ast-resi stant doors, dependi ng on the desi red
Supplies-HandlingAreas
3-77. Suppl i es-handl i ng areas shoul d al so be on the bui l di ngs exteri or, away
from cri ti cal areas of the faci l i ty. Wal l s and doors between the handl i ng area
and the protected area shoul d be hardened, and the exteri or wal l s and doors
shoul d be of l i ghtwei ght constructi on so that they may fai l and vent the bl ast
pressure away from the bui l di ng. There shoul d be no wi ndows between the
handl i ng area and the protected area. At the hi gher l evel of protecti on, the
handl i ng area i s l ocated i n a separate faci l i ty and the target bui l di ng i s
hardened to resi st an expl osi on i n that separate faci l i ty.
FM 3-19.30
DETECTION ELEMENTS
3-78. Detecti on for these assets vari es wi th the l evel of protecti on. At the
l ower l evel s of protecti on, bombs are detected by i nspecti on. As the l evel of
pr otecti on goes up, the sophi sti cati on of the detecti on i ncr eases. At the hi gher
l evel s of protecti on, equi pment such as X-ray exami ni ng devi ces, metal
detectors, and expl osi ves detectors can be used. Expl osi ve-detecti on dogs are
an al ternati ve to expl osi ve detectors.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION
3-79. When usi ng chemi cal - and bi ol ogi cal -contami nati on tacti cs, aggressors
i ntroduce contami nants i nto the ai r or water suppl y to a faci l i ty or a group of
faci l i ti es. Both ai rborne and waterborne contami nants i ncl ude chemi cal ,
bi ol ogi cal , and radi ol ogi cal agents. Aggressors may al so forci bl y enter a
faci l i ty to contami nate water or ai r usi ng the forced-entry tacti c.
3-80. Both chemi cal and bi ol ogi cal agents are di ffi cul t to detect i n water and
ai r suppl i es. Radi ol ogi cal agents are rel ati vel y easy to detect i n water, but
they are not commonl y i ncl uded i n water-qual i ty exami nati ons. I t i s unl i kel y
that al l agents wi l l be detected, so the general -desi gn strategy for these tacti cs
i s to fi l ter out suspected ai rborne contami nants or to shut off suspected
waterborne contami nants. Al so, because contami nants can easi l y be entered
i nto the envi ronment from i nsi de a faci l i ty, the strategy i ncl udes l i mi ti ng
access to the faci l i ty (especi al l y mechani cal rooms, water i ntakes, and so
forth).
3-81. The l evel s of protecti on for each of these tacti cs di ffer onl y i n the
frequency wi th whi ch some protecti ve measures are exerci sed. For the l ow
l evel of protecti on, they are exerci sed onl y i n response to a known threat. I n
the hi gh l evel of protecti on, they are exerci sed conti nuousl y.
SITE-WORK ELEMENTS
3-82. Si te-work el ements are onl y si gni fi cant for waterborne contami nati on.
They i ncl ude protecti ng water-treatment pl ants and water-storage structures.
Thi s protecti on may i ncl ude constructi ng peri meter barri ers (such as chai n-
l i nk fences) and control l i ng access to the pl ant si te. These measures are used
because most contami nants requi re quanti ti es on the order of truckl oads to
contami nate a water suppl y, so the focus of securi ty i s to keep such l arge
vehi cl es under control . The peri meter barri ers do not need to stop the vehi cl es
because the assumpti on i s that the aggressor wants to be covert. An overt act
woul d al ert peopl e to avoi d the water suppl y.
BUILDING ELEMENTS
3-83. Bui l di ng el ements for both tacti cs i ncl ude control l i ng access so that
aggressors cannot sneak i n and pl ant devi ces i n the bui l di ng. Protecti on
agai nst ai rborne contami nati on at a faci l i ty i nvol ves maki ng el ements of the
FM 3-19.30
ai r-handl i ng system (i ncl udi ng ai r i ntakes) i naccessi bl e and l ayi ng out toxi n-
fr ee areas for peopl e to be protected. A toxi n-fr ee ar ea i s an area i n whi ch the
i nternal ai r pressure i s hi gher than the external ai r pressure. Therefore, i f a
chemi cal , bi ol ogi cal , or radi ol ogi cal devi ce i s set off outsi de, i ts contami nant
wi l l not be abl e to penetrate the protected area. Achi evi ng that net posi ti ve
pressure requi res a si gni fi cant ai r-handl i ng system wi th ai r fi l ters to fi l ter
contami nants out of the ai r. I t al so requi res an ai r-l ock entrance i nto the area
so contami nants cannot enter through the door. At the l ow l evel of protecti on,
the fi l ters and the ai r-handl i ng system are onl y used i n response to a credi bl e
threat. At the hi gh l evel of protecti on, that ri sk i s not acceptabl e and the
fi l ters are run conti nuousl y.
3-84. The bui l di ng-el ement i ssues for waterborne contami nati on are l i mi ted
to provi di ng protecti on agai nst forced and covert entri es i nto water-treatment
pl ants and water-storage areas. These methods have been previ ousl y
descri bed. The onl y addi ti onal i ssue i s the provi si on for al ternati ve water
sources. I f i t i s suspected or detected that the water i s contami nated, a backup
water source shoul d be i n pl ace (such as bottl ed water). For the hi gh l evel of
protecti on, bottl ed water shoul d al ways be used for dri nki ng.
Protective Barriers 4-1
Chapter 4
Protective Barriers
Protecti ve barri ers are used to defi ne the physi cal l i mi ts of an i nstal l ati on,
acti vi ty, or area. Barri ers restri ct, channel , or i mpede access and are ful l y
i ntegrated to form a conti nuous obstacl e around the i nstal l ati on. They ar e
desi gned to deter the worst-case threat. The barri er s shoul d be focused on
pr ovi di ng assets wi th an acceptabl e l evel of protecti on agai nst a threat.
OVERVIEW
4-1. Protecti ve barri ers form the peri meter of control l ed, l i mi ted, and
excl usi on areas. Uti l i ty areas (such as water sources, transformer banks,
commerci al power and fuel connecti ons, heati ng and power pl ants, or ai r-
condi ti oni ng uni ts) may requi re these barri ers for safety standards. Protecti ve
barri ers consi st of two major categori esnatural and structural .
Natural protecti ve barri ers are mountai ns and deserts, cl i ffs and
di tches, water obstacl es, or other terrai n features that are di ffi cul t to
traverse.
Structural protecti ve barri ers are man-made devi ces (such as fences,
wal l s, fl oors, roofs, gri l l s, bars, roadbl ocks, si gns, or other constructi on)
used to restri ct, channel , or i mpede access.
4-2. Barri ers offer i mportant benefi ts to a physi cal -securi ty posture. They
create a psychol ogi cal deterrent for anyone thi nki ng of unauthori zed entry.
They may del ay or even prevent passage through them. Thi s i s especi al l y true
of barri ers agai nst forced entry and vehi cl es. Barri ers have a di rect i mpact on
the number of securi ty posts needed and on the frequency of use for each post.
4-3. Barri ers cannot be desi gned for al l si tuati ons. Consi derati ons for
protecti ve structural barri ers i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Wei ghi ng the cost of compl etel y encl osi ng l arge tracts of l and wi th
si gni fi cant structural barri ers agai nst the threat and the cost of
al ternate securi ty precauti ons (such as patrol s, MWD teams, ground
sensors, el ectroni c survei l l ance, and ai rborne sensors).
Si zi ng a restri cted area based on the degree of compartmental i zati on
requi red and the areas compl exi ty. As a rul e, si ze shoul d be kept to a
mi ni mum consi stent wi th operati onal effi ci ency. A restri cted areas si ze
may be dri ven by the l i kel i hood of an aggressors use of certai n tacti cs.
For exampl e, protecti ng assets from a vehi cl e bomb often cal l s for a
substanti al expl osi ves standoff di stance. I n these cases, mi ti gati ng the
vehi cl e bomb woul d often be more i mportant than mi ni mi zi ng the
restri cted area to the extent necessary for operati onal effi ci ency.
Protecti ve barri ers shoul d be establ i shed for
I Control l i ng vehi cul ar and pedestri an traffi c fl ow.
FM 3-19.30
4-2 Protective Barriers
I Provi di ng entry-control poi nts where I D can be checked.
I Defi ni ng a buffer zone for more hi ghl y cl assi fi ed areas.
I Precl udi ng vi sual compromi se by unauthori zed i ndi vi dual s.
I Del ayi ng forced entry.
I Protecti ng i ndi vi dual assets.
4-4. I f a secured area requi res a l i mi ted or excl usi on area on a temporary or
i nfrequent basi s, i t may not be possi bl e to use physi cal structural barri ers. A
temporary l i mi ted or excl usi on area may be establ i shed where the l ack of
proper physi cal barri ers i s compensated for by addi ti onal securi ty posts,
patrol s, and other securi ty measures duri ng the peri od of restri cti on.
Temporary barri ers (i ncl udi ng temporary fences, coi l ed concerti na wi re, and
vehi cl es) may be used. Barri ers are not the onl y restri cti ve el ement, and they
may not al ways be necessary. They may not be i deal when worki ng wi th
l i mi ted or excl usi on ar eas or when i ntegr ated wi th other control s.
4-5. Because barri ers can be compromi sed through breachi ng (cutti ng a hol e
through a fence) or by nature (berms eroded by the wi nd and rai n), they
shoul d be i nspected and mai ntai ned at l east weekl y. Guard-force personnel
shoul d l ook for del i berate breaches, hol es i n and under barri ers, sand dunes
bui l di ng up agai nst barri ers, and the proper functi oni ng of l ocks.
FENCING
4-6. Three types of fenci ng are authori zed for use i n protecti ng restri cted
areaschai n l i nk, barbed wi re, and barbed tape or concerti na. The type used
for constructi on depends pri mari l y on the threat and the degree of
permanence. I t may al so depend on the avai l abi l i ty of materi al s and the ti me
avai l abl e for constructi on. Fenci ng may be erected for other uses besi des
i mpedi ng personnel access. I t can i mpede observati on, can serve as a means to
defeat standoff-weapon systems (such as rocket-propel l ed grenades [RPGs]),
and can serve as a barri er to hand-thrown weapons (such as grenades and
fi rebombs).
4-7. General l y, chai n-l i nk fenci ng wi l l be used for protecti ng permanent
l i mi ted and excl usi on areas. Al l three types of fenci ng may be used to augment
or i ncrease the securi ty of exi sti ng fences that protect restri cted areas.
Exampl es woul d be to create an addi ti onal barri er l i ne, to i ncrease exi sti ng
fence hei ght, or to provi de other methods that effecti vel y add to physi cal
securi ty. I t i s i mportant to recogni ze that fenci ng provi des very l i ttl e del ay
when i t comes to moti vated aggressors, but i t can act as a psychol ogi cal
deterrent.
CHAIN LINK
4-8. Chai n-l i nk fence (i ncl udi ng gates) must be constructed of 6-foot materi al ,
excl udi ng the top guard. Fence hei ghts for conventi onal arms and ammuni ti on
securi ty must be 6 feet for standard chai n-l i nk, wi re-mesh fenci ng. Chai n-l i nk
fences must be constructed wi th 9-gauge or heavi er wi re. They must be
gal vani zed wi th mesh openi ngs not l arger than 2 i nches per si de and have
twi sted and barbed sel vages at the top and the bottom. The wi re must be taut
and securel y fastened to ri gi d metal or rei nforced-concrete posts set i n
FM 3-19.30
concrete. I t must reach wi thi n 2 i nches of hard ground or pavement. On soft
ground, i t must reach bel ow the surface deep enough to compensate for
shi fti ng soi l or sand. Materi al s and constructi on must meet wi th the US Army
Corps of Engi neers (USACE) gui de speci fi cati ons shown i n the USACE
Standard (STD) 872-90 seri es. Weaknesses i n the chai n-l i nk fence occur as a
resul t of weather (rusti ng) or fai l ure to keep i t fastened to the post that affects
the desi red ti ghtness. Damage to the fence and fence fabri c may be the resul t
of al l owi ng vegetati on and trees to grow on or near the fence. The i nteracti on
between the fence and the overgrowth often l eads to fence damage and
reduces the i ntegri ty and conti nui ty of the fence as a peri meter boundary and
barri er. The peri meter fence i s the most obvi ous protecti ve measure. A wel l -
mai ntai ned fence i ndi cates that the asset owner i s dedi cated to physi cal
securi ty.
BARBED WIRE
4-9. Standard barbed wi re i s twi sted, doubl e-strand, 13.5-gauge wi re, wi th
four-poi nt barbs spaced an equal di stance apart. Barbed-wi re fenci ng
(i ncl udi ng gates) i ntended to prevent human trespassi ng shoul d not be l ess
than 6 feet hi gh and must be affi xed fi rml y to posts not more than 6 feet apart.
The di stance between strands shoul d not exceed 6 i nches, and at l east one
wi re shoul d be i nterl aced verti cal l y and mi dway between posts. The ends
must be stagger ed or fastened together, and the base wi re must be pi cketed to
the ground.
BARBED TAPE OR CONCERTINA
4-10. A barbed-taped obstacl e (BTO) i s fabri cated from 0.025-i nch stai nl ess
steel and i s avai l abl e i n 24-, 30-, 40-, and 60-i nch-di ameter coi l s. The barbs
shal l have a mi ni mum l ength of 1.2 i nches, and the barb cl usters wi dth shal l
be 1.21 i nches. A BTO depl oys tangl e-free for fast i nstal l ati on. I t may be
recovered and used agai n. Fi fty feet (pl us or mi nus 2 i nches) can be covered by
101 coi l l oops. Handl i ng barbed tape requi res the use of heavy barbed-tape
gauntl ets i nstead of standard barbed-wi re gauntl ets.
Barbed-TapeConcertina
4-11. Barbed-tape concerti na (standard concerti na barbed tape) i s a
commerci al l y manufactured wi re coi l of hi gh-strength-steel barbed wi re that i s
cl i pped together at i nterval s to form a cyl i nder. When opened, i t i s 50 feet l ong
and 3 feet i n di ameter. When used as the peri meter barri er for a restri cted area,
the concerti na must be l ai d between pol es wi th one rol l on top of another or i n a
pyrami d arrangement (wi th a mi ni mum of three rol l s).
4-12. Rei nforced barbed-tape concerti na consi sts of a si ngl e strand of spri ng-
steel wi re and a si ngl e strand of barbed tape. The secti ons between barbs of the
barbed tape are securel y cl i nched around the wi re. Each coi l i s about 37 1/2
i nches i n di ameter and consi sts of 55 spi ral turns connected by steel cl i ps to
form a cyl i ndri cal di amond pattern when extended to a coi l l ength of 50 feet.
One end turn i s fi tted wi th four bundl i ng wi res for securi ng the coi l when cl osed
and each end turn i s fi tted wi th two steel carryi ng l oops. The concerti na extends
to 50 feet wi thout permanent di storti on. When rel eased, i t can be retracted i nto
a cl osed coi l .
FM 3-19.30
4-13. When possi bl e, a top guard shoul d be constructed on al l peri meter
fences and may be added on i nteri or encl osures for addi ti onal protecti on. A top
guard i s an overhang of barbed wi re or tape al ong the top of a fence, faci ng
outward and upward at about a 45-degree angl e. Pl aci ng barbed wi re or tape
above i t can further enhance the top guard. Top-guard supporti ng arms wi l l be
permanentl y affi xed to the top of fence posts to i ncrease the overal l hei ght of
the fence by at l east 1 foot. (Due to l i abi l i ty i ssues i n some l ocati ons, the top
guards wi l l not be al l owed to face outward where the fence i s adjacent to
publ i c areas.) Three strands of barbed wi re spaced 6 i nches apart must be
i nstal l ed on the supporti ng arms. The number of strands of wi re or tape may
be i ncreased when requi red. The top guard of fenci ng adjoi ni ng gates may
range from a verti cal hei ght of 18 i nches to the normal 45-degree outward
protecti on but onl y for suffi ci ent di stance al ong the fence to open the gates
adequatel y. Bottom and top tensi on wi res shoul d be used i n l i eu of fence rai l s.
A concrete si l l may be cast at the bottom of the fence to protect agai nst soi l
erosi on. A bottom rai l i s used on hi gh-securi ty fences to prevent i ntruders
from l i fti ng the fence.
Gates and Entrances
4-14. The number of gates and peri meter entrances must be the mi ni mum
requi red for safe and effi ci ent operati on of the faci l i ty. Acti ve peri meter
entrances must be desi gned so that the guard force mai ntai ns ful l control .
Semi acti ve entrances, such as i nfrequentl y used vehi cul ar gates, must be
l ocked on the i nsi de when not i n use. When cl osed, gates and entr ances must
provi de a barri er structural l y comparabl e to thei r associ ated barri ers. Care
must be afforded agai nst the abi l i ty to crawl under gates. Top guards, whi ch
may be verti cal , are requi red for al l gates.
Triple-Standard Concertina (TSC) Wire
4-15. Thi s type of fence uses three rol l s of stacked concerti na. One rol l wi l l be
stacked on top of two rol l s that run paral l el to each other whi l e resti ng on the
ground, formi ng a pyrami d. I n many si tuati ons, thi s fence has been used
effecti vel y i n pl ace of a chai n-l i nk fence. (I f peri meter fenci ng consi sts of TSC,
a top guard i s not feasi bl e.)
Tangle-Foot Wire
4-16. Barbed wi re or tape may be used i n appropri ate si tuati ons to construct a
tangl e-foot obstructi on ei ther outsi de a si ngl e peri meter fence or i n the area
between doubl e fences to provi de an addi ti onal deterrent to i ntruders. The
wi re or tape shoul d be supported on short metal or wooden pi ckets spaced at
i rregul ar i nterval s of 3 to 10 feet and at hei ghts between 6 and 12 i nches. The
wi re or tape shoul d be cri sscrossed to provi de a more effecti ve obstacl e. The
space and materi al s avai l abl e govern the depth of the fi el d.
AIRCRAFT CABLE
4-17. Al though not used very often, ai rcraft cabl e can be used as a temporary
barri er. Refer to FM 5-34 for i nformati on requi red for determi ni ng the
barri ers strength. The barri er i s created usi ng wi re rope. Cl i ps are spaced si x
ti mes the di ameter of the wi re rope. Ai rcraft cabl e (depl oyed as descri bed
FM 3-19.30
above or attached to a chai n-l i nk fence) can al so be made to act as a barri er to
movi ng vehi cl es. To do so, the cabl e must be anchored i nto the ground at both
ends at about 200-foot i nterval s (see TM 5-853-1).
UTILITY OPENINGS
4-18. Sewers, ai r and water i ntakes and exhausts, and other uti l i ty openi ngs
of 10 i nches or more i n di ameter that pass through peri meter barri ers must
have securi ty measures equi val ent to that of the peri meter (see TM 5-820-4).
Speci fi c requi rements of vari ous openi ngs are di scussed bel ow:
Manhol e covers 10 i nches or more i n di ameter must be secured to
prevent unauthori zed openi ng. They may be secured wi th l ocks and
hasps, by wel di ng them shut, or by bol ti ng them to thei r frame. Ensure
that hasps, l ocks, and bol ts are made of materi al s that resi st corrosi on.
Keyed bol ts (whi ch make removal by unauthori zed personnel more
di ffi cul t) are al so avai l abl e.
Drai nage di tches, cul verts, vents, ducts, and other openi ngs that pass
through a peri meter and that have a cross-secti onal area greater than
96 square i nches and whose smal l est di mensi on i s greater than 6
i nches wi l l be protected by securel y fastened wel ded bar gri l l es (refer to
TM 5-853-3, Fi gure 8-1). As an al ternati ve, drai nage structures may be
constructed of mul ti pl e pi pes, wi th each pi pe havi ng a di ameter of 10
i nches or l ess. Mul ti pl e pi pes of thi s di ameter may al so be pl aced and
secured i n the i nfl ow end of a drai nage cul vert to prevent i ntrusi on i nto
the area. Ensure that any addi ti on of gri l l es or pi pes to cul verts or
other drai nage structures i s coordi nated wi th the engi neers so that
they can compensate for the di mi ni shed fl ow capaci ty and addi ti onal
mai ntenance that wi l l resul t from the i nstal l ati on.
OTHER PERIMETER BARRIERS
4-19. Bui l di ngs l ess than two stori es hi gh that form part of a peri meter must
have a top guard al ong the outsi de edge to deny access to the roof. When usi ng
masonry wal l s as part of a peri meter barri er, they must be at l east 7 feet hi gh
and have a barbed-wi re top guard. The top guard shoul d be sl oped outward at
a 45-degree angl e and carry at l east three strands of barbed wi re. Thi s wi l l
i ncrease the verti cal hei ght of the barri er by at l east 1 foot.
4-20. Protect wi ndows, acti ve doors, and other desi gnated openi ngs by
securel y fasteni ng bars, gri l l es, or chai n-l i nk screens. Fasten wi ndow barri ers
from the i nsi de. I f hi nged, the hi nges and l ocks must be on the i nsi de. Bui l di ng
el ements that provi de del ay agai nst forced entry have stri ngent requi rements.
These el ements shoul d be desi gned accordi ng to TM 5-853-1.
SECURITY TOWERS
4-21. I t i s not acceptabl e to observe a peri meter from towers onl y. However, al l
towers shoul d be l ocated to provi de maxi mum observati on and shoul d be
constructed for protecti on from smal l -arms fi re.
FM 3-19.30
4-22. Mobi l e towers are useful i n some temporary si tuati ons such as a l arge,
open storage area where recei vi ng and stori ng acti vi ti es take pl ace. Al l
faci l i ti es usi ng towers must have a support force avai l abl e for emergenci es.
Tower personnel shoul d be r otated at fr equent i nter val s.
4-23. The hei ght of a tower i ncreases the range of observati on duri ng dayl i ght
hours and at ni ght wi th arti fi ci al i l l umi nati on. However, duri ng i ncl ement
weather and duri ng a bl ackout, towers l ose thi s advantage and must be
suppl emented by on-ground observati on.
4-24. The fol l owi ng consi derati ons shoul d be made when pl anni ng for the use
of towers:
Hardeni ng the tower agai nst smal l -arms effects by usi ng sandbags,
sal vaged armor, or commerci al l y fabri cated bul l et-resi stant
constructi on. Thi s may requi re strengtheni ng the tower supports,
whi ch shoul d be performed onl y under the supervi si on of an engi neer.
The l evel of protecti on requi red must equate to the threat l evel
i denti fi ed duri ng the I PB or the mi l i tary deci si on-maki ng process
(MDMP). The best approach i s to desi gn for the worst i denti fi ed threat
rather than to try and modi fy the tower at a l ater date on short noti ce.
I nstal l i ng communi cati ons and al arm systems, both audi bl e and vi sual
(pri mary and al ternate).
Usi ng appropri ate survei l l ance, target-acqui si ti on, and ni ght-
observati on (STANO) equi pment wi th the tower and peri meter
barri ers bei ng survei l l ed. I nfrared (I R) i tems may be especi al l y
val uabl e. Consi derati ons for the sel ecti on and use of STANO
equi pment must be made whi l e eval uati ng the effects of peri meter
protecti ve l i ghti ng.
Provi di ng securi ty l i ghti ng for route protecti on to the tower. Securi ty
l i ghti ng al so al l ows for support of the guard force enteri ng or exi ti ng
the peri meter.
Ensuri ng that the towers hei ght i s determi ned accordi ng to the area of
observati on.
Ensuri ng that towers have overl appi ng, mutual l y supporti ng fi el ds of
observati on and fi re.
Provi di ng towers wi th a backup forti fi ed defensi ve fi ghti ng posi ti on, as
appropri ate.
INSTALLATION ENTRANCES
4-25. The number of i nstal l ati on or acti vi ty gates and peri meter entrances i n
acti ve use shoul d be l i mi ted to the mi ni mum number requi red for safe and
effi ci ent operati ons. When necessary, i nstal l vehi cl e barri ers i n front of vehi cl e
gates. Securi ty l i ghti ng shoul d be consi dered at entry poi nts (see Chapter 5).
Refer to TM 5-853-1 for the appl i cati on and sel ecti on of these barri ers.
4-26. Pl ans to use guards for control l i ng entry to an i nstal l ati on or acti vi ty
must be predetermi ned based on the threat condi ti ons (THREATCON). The
constructi on of the guard post must be i ncl uded i n the securi ty pl an.
FM 3-19.30
PERIMETER ENTRANCES
4-27. Acti ve peri meter entrances shoul d be desi gnated so that securi ty forces
mai ntai n ful l control wi thout an unnecessary del ay i n traffi c. Thi s i s
accompl i shed by havi ng suffi ci ent entrances to accommodate the peak fl ow of
pedestri an and vehi cul ar traffi c and havi ng adequate l i ghti ng for rapi d and
effi ci ent i nspecti on. When gates are not operati onal duri ng nonduty hours,
they shoul d be securel y l ocked, i l l umi nated duri ng hours of darkness, and
i nspected peri odi cal l y by a rovi ng patrol . Addi ti onal l y, warni ng si gns shoul d
be used to warn dri vers when gates are cl osed. Doors and wi ndows on
bui l di ngs that form a part of the peri meter shoul d be l ocked, l i ghted, and
i nspected.
ENTRY-CONTROL STATIONS
4-28. Entry-control stati ons shoul d be provi ded at mai n peri meter entrances
where securi ty personnel are present. Consi derati ons for constructi on and use
shoul d be based on the i nformati on outl i ned i n USACE STD 872-50-01.
4-29. Entry-control stati ons shoul d be l ocated as cl ose as practi cal to the
peri meter entrance to permi t personnel i nsi de the stati on to mai ntai n
constant survei l l ance over the entrance and i ts approaches. Addi ti onal
consi derati ons at entry-control stati ons i ncl ude
Establ i shi ng a hol di ng area for unauthori zed vehi cl es or those to be
i nspected further. A turnaround area shoul d be provi ded to keep from
i mpedi ng other traffi c.
Establ i shi ng control measures such as di spl ayi ng a decal on the
wi ndow or havi ng a speci al l y marked vehi cl e.
4-30. Entry-control stati ons that are manned 24 hours each day shoul d have
i nteri or and exteri or l i ghti ng, i nteri or heati ng (where appropri ate), and a
suffi ci ent gl assed area to afford adequate observati on for personnel i nsi de.
Where appropri ate, entry-control stati ons shoul d be desi gned for opti mum
personnel I D and movement control . Each stati on shoul d al so i ncl ude a
tel ephone, a radi o, and badge racks (i f requi red).
4-31. Si gns shoul d be erected to assi st i n control l i ng authori zed entry, to deter
unauthori zed entry, and to precl ude acci dental entry. Si gns shoul d be pl ai nl y
di spl ayed and be l egi bl e fr om any appr oach to the per i meter from a
reasonabl e di stance. The si ze and col ori ng of a si gn, i ts l etters, and the
i nterval of posti ng must be appropri ate to each si tuati on.
4-32. Entry-control stati ons shoul d be hardened agai nst attacks accordi ng to
the type of threat. The methods of hardeni ng may i ncl ude
Rei nforced concrete or masonry.
Steel pl ati ng.
Bul l et-resi stant gl ass.
Sandbags, two l ayer s i n depth.
Commerci al l y fabri cated, bul l et-resi stant bui l di ng components or
assembl i es.
FM 3-19.30
WARNING SIGNS
4-33. A si gni fi cant amount of warni ng si gns shoul d be erected to ensure that
possi bl e i ntruders are aware of entry i nto restri cted areas. Warni ng si gns
augment control si gns. They warn i ntruders that the area i s restri cted and
that trespassi ng may resul t i n the use of deadl y force.
4-34. Warni ng si gns shoul d be i nstal l ed al ong the l i mi ted areas physi cal
barri ers and at each entry poi nt where they can be seen readi l y and
understood by anyone approachi ng the peri meter. I n areas where Engl i sh i s
one of two or more l anguages commonl y spoken, warni ng si gns must contai n
the l ocal l anguage i n addi ti on to Engl i sh. The wordi ng on the si gns wi l l denote
warni ng of a restri cted area. The si gns shoul d be posted at i nterval s of no
more than 100 feet. They must not be mounted on fences equi pped wi th
i ntrusi on-detecti on equi pment. Addi ti onal l y, the warni ng si gns prescri bed i n
AR 190-13 shoul d be posted at al l entrances to l i mi ted, control l ed, and
excl usi on areas. See Chapter 7 for more detai l s.
OTHER SIGNS
4-35. Si gns setti ng forth the condi ti ons of entry to an i nstal l ati on or area
shoul d be pl ai nl y posted at al l pri nci pal entrances. The si gns shoul d be l egi bl e
under normal condi ti ons at a di stance not l ess than 50 feet from the poi nt of
entry. Such si gns shoul d i nform the entrant of the provi si ons (search of the
person, the vehi cl e, packages, and so forth) or prohi bi ti ons (such as agai nst
cameras, matches, and l i ghters and entry for reasons other than offi ci al
busi ness) that may be prescri bed by the i nstal l ati on commander.
4-36. Si gns or noti ces l egi bl y setti ng forth the desi gnati on of restri cted areas
and provi si ons of entry shoul d be pl ai nl y posted at al l entrances and at other
poi nts al ong the peri meter l i ne as necessary. The wordi ng of these si gns or
noti ces i s prescri bed i n AR 190-13.
INSTALLATION PERIMETER ROADS AND CLEAR ZONES
4-37. When the peri meter barri er encl oses a l arge area, an i nteri or al l -
weather peri meter road shoul d be provi ded for securi ty-patrol vehi cl es. Cl ear
zones shoul d be mai ntai ned on both si des of the peri meter barri er to provi de
an unobstructed vi ew of the barri er and the ground adjacent to i t. Roads
wi thi n the cl ear zone shoul d be as cl ose to the peri meter barri er as possi bl e
wi thout i nterferi ng wi th i t. The roads shoul d be constructed to al l ow effecti ve
road barri ers to deter motor movement of unauthori zed personnel duri ng
mobi l i zati on peri ods.
4-38. Cl ear zones shoul d be kept cl ear of weeds, rubbi sh, or other materi al
capabl e of offeri ng conceal ment or assi stance to an i ntruder attempti ng to
breach the barri er. A cl ear zone of 20 feet or more shoul d exi st between the
peri meter barri er and exteri or structures, parki ng areas, and natural or man-
made features. When possi bl e, a cl ear zone of 50 feet or more shoul d exi st
between the peri meter barri er and structures wi thi n the protected area,
except when a bui l di ngs wal l consti tutes part of the peri meter barri er.
Ammuni ti on suppl y poi nts (ASPs) wi l l have cl ear zones 12 feet outsi de of the
ASP and 30 feet i nsi de, and the vegetati on wi l l not exceed 8 i nches (4 i nches
FM 3-19.30
for hi gh-threat and hi ghl y control l ed areas). Refer to AR 190-11 and DOD
0-2000.12-H, Appendi x EE, for further i nformati on.
4-39. When i t i s i mpossi bl e to have adequate cl ear zones because of property
l i nes or natural or man-made features, i t may be necessary to i ncrease the
hei ght of the peri meter barri er, i ncrease securi ty-patrol coverage, add more
securi ty l i ghti ng, or i nstal l an i ntrusi on-detecti on devi ce al ong that porti on of
the peri meter.
4-40. When consi deri ng the constructi on of a new si te or peri meter, ensure
that the pl ans i ncl ude a fence l ocated wel l i nsi de the property l i ne, thus
permi tti ng control of enough space outsi de the fence to mai ntai n at l east a
mi ni mal cl ear zone. The fol l owi ng consi derati ons appl y:
On a l arge i nstal l ati on (such as a provi ng ground), i t i s unreasonabl e to
construct an expensi ve peri meter fence and keep i t under constant
observati on. Such an i nstal l ati on i s usual l y establ i shed i n a sparsel y
i nhabi ted area. I ts comparati ve i sol ati on and the depth of the
i nstal l ati on gi ve reasonabl e peri meter protecti on. Under these
ci rcumstances, i t i s usual l y suffi ci ent to post warni ng si gns or noti ces,
reduce access roads to a mi ni mum, and peri odi cal l y patrol the area
between the outer peri meter and the conventi onal l y protected vi tal
area of the i nstal l ati on.
An al ternati ve to erecti ng new or repl aci ng ol d chai n-l i nk fence
i nvol vi ng an enti re i nstal l ati on peri meter i s to rel ocate or i sol ate the
sensi ti ve area or i tem by
I Rel ocati ng the i tem wi thi n a safe peri meter.
I Consol i dati ng the i tem wi th other i tems.
I Erecti ng a chai n-l i nk fence (regul ati ons permi tti ng) around
i ndi vi dual assets rather than the i nstal l ati ons peri meter.
ARMS-FACILITY STRUCTURAL STANDARDS
4-41. I t i s next to i mpossi bl e to bui l d a protecti ve barri er that cannot be
penetrated by a human or heavy armor. Therefore, as opposed to protecti ng a
faci l i ty usi ng onl y one barri er, enhance securi ty by usi ng a combi nati on of
barri ers to i ncrease del ay. Mul ti pl e barri ers al so cause aggressors to expend
more energy tryi ng to breach al l of the barri ers. They al so provi de the
appearance of addi ti onal securi ty and may further deter some aggressors.
4-42. The i nterest of securi ty must be kept i n mi nd when constructi ng wal l s,
cei l i ngs, fl oors, and roofs. Faci l i ti es that house arms and ammuni ti on are
constructed as securi ty barri ers i n the i nterest of deterri ng and del ayi ng
penetrati on. Constructi on gui del i nes for arms faci l i ti es are outl i ned i n AR
190-11. AR 190-11 requi res coordi nati on wi th the engi neer offi ce, the safety
offi ce, the provost marshal offi ce (PMO), or the securi ty-force offi ce when
defi ni ti ve drawi ngs and speci fi cati ons for new constructi on or upgrades or
modi fi cati ons of AA&E storage structures are proposed. Thi s coordi nated
effort ensures that safety and physi cal -securi ty requi rements are met. AR
190-11 al so addresses wai vers and excepti ons for AA&E storage structures, as
wel l as the requi rements for a tacti cal (trai ni ng or operati onal ) or shi pboard
envi ronment. Wai vers and excepti ons are not di scussed i n thi s manual . The
FM 3-19.30
fol l owi ng gui del i nes are provi ded for securi ng AA&E i n tacti cal and shi pboard
envi ronments:
The cri teri a and standards for protecti ng AA&E wi l l be devel oped by
the major Army command (MACOM) accordi ng to AR 190-11.
The depl oyi ng commander wi l l establ i sh and enforce procedures for
securi ng depl oyed AA&E based on the assessment of the threat, the
objecti ves, the l ocati on, and the durati on of the depl oyment.
The AA&E i n the tacti cal envi ronment wi l l be secured at al l ti mes.
The AA&E wi l l be under conti nuous posi ti ve control .
Persons charged wi th the custody of AA&E wi l l have the capabi l i ty to
sound the al arm i f a forceful theft i s attempted.
A response force wi l l be avai l abl e to protect the AA&E.
A system of supervi sory checks wi l l be establ i shed to ensure that al l
personnel compl y wi th securi ty measures. Supervi sory checks of the
AA&E hol di ng area wi l l be made to ensure that the AA&E bei ng
guarded have not been tampered wi th.
Al l offi cers, noncommi ssi oned offi cers (NCOs), or ci vi l i an equi val ents
wi l l cl osel y moni tor the control of ammuni ti on and expl osi ves duri ng
fi el d trai ni ng or range fi ri ng.
Sel ecti on of personnel to perform guard duti es at AA&E hol di ng areas
wi l l be cl osel y moni tored by commanders to ensure that onl y
responsi bl e i ndi vi dual s are assi gned duti es.
Physical-Security Lighting 5-1
Chapter 5
Physical-Security Lighting
Securi ty l i ghti ng al l ows securi ty personnel to mai ntai n vi sual -assessment
capabi l i ty duri ng darkness. When securi ty-l i ghti ng provi si ons ar e
i mpracti cal , addi ti onal securi ty posts, patrol s, MWD patrol s, NVDs, or
other securi ty means are necessary.
OVERVIEW
5-1. Securi ty l i ghti ng shoul d not be used as a psychol ogi cal deterrent onl y. I t
shoul d al so be used al ong per i meter fences when the si tuati on di ctates that
the fence be under conti nuous or peri odi c observati on.
5-2. Li ghti ng i s rel ati vel y i nexpensi ve to mai ntai n and, when properl y used,
may reduce the need for securi ty forces. I t may al so enhance personal
protecti on for forces by reduci ng the advantages of conceal ment and surpri se
for a determi ned i ntruder.
5-3. Securi ty l i ghti ng i s desi rabl e for those sensi ti ve areas or structures
wi thi n the peri meter that are under observati on. Such areas or structures
i ncl ude pi er and dock areas, vi tal bui l di ngs, storage areas, motor pool s, and
vul nerabl e control poi nts i n communi cati on and power- and water-di stri buti on
systems. I n i nteri or areas where ni ght operati ons are conducted, adequate
l i ghti ng faci l i tates the detecti on of unauthori zed persons approachi ng or
attempti ng mal i ci ous acts wi thi n the area. Securi ty l i ghti ng has consi derabl e
val ue as a deterrent to thi eves and vandal s and may make the job of the
saboteur more di ffi cul t. I t i s an essenti al el ement of an i ntegrated physi cal -
securi ty program.
5-4. A secure auxi l i ary power source and power-di stri buti on system for the
faci l i ty shoul d be i nstal l ed to provi de redundancy to cri ti cal securi ty l i ghti ng
and other securi ty equi pment. Duri ng depl oyed operati ons, pri mary power
may not exi st or may be subject to constrai nts or i nterrupti ons due to poor
i nfrastructure or hosti l e acti vi ty. Auxi l i ary power sources must be avai l abl e
for cri ti cal el ectri cal l oads and must be secured agai nst di rect and i ndi rect
fi res as wel l as sabotage. I f automati c-transfer swi tches are not i nstal l ed,
securi ty procedures must desi gnate the responsi bi l i ty for the manual start of
the source.
COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY
5-5. Commanders determi ne peri meter l i ghti ng needs based on the threat,
si te condi ti ons al ong the peri meter, survei l l ance capabi l i ti es, and avai l abl e
guard forces. Commanders ensure that securi ty l i ghti ng i s desi gned and used
to di scourage unauthori zed entry and to faci l i tate the detecti on of i ntruders
approachi ng or attempti ng to gai n entry i nto protected areas.
FM 3-19.30
5-2 Physical-Security Lighting
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-6. Securi ty l i ghti ng usual l y requi res l ess i ntensi ty than worki ng l i ghts,
except for I D and i nspecti on at entry-control poi nts. Each area of a faci l i ty
pr esents i ts own uni que set of consi der ati ons based on physi cal l ayout,
terrai n, atmospheri c and cl i mati c condi ti ons, and securi ty requi rements.
I nformati on i s avai l abl e from the manufacturers of l i ghti ng equi pment and
from the i nstal l ati ons di rector of publ i c works, who wi l l assi st i n desi gni ng a
l i ghti ng system. Thi s i nformati on i ncl udes
Descri pti ons, characteri sti cs, and speci fi cati ons of vari ous l i ghti ng
fi xtures, arc, and gaseous-di scharge l amps.
Li ghti ng patterns of vari ous fi xtures.
Typi cal l ayouts showi ng the most effi ci ent hei ght and spaci ng of
equi pment.
Mi ni mum l evel s of i l l umi nati on and l i ghti ng uni formi ty requi red for
vari ous appl i cati ons.
5-7. I n pl anni ng a securi ty-l i ghti ng system, the physi cal -securi ty manager
consi ders the
Cost of repl aci ng l amps and cl eani ng fi xtures, as wel l as the cost of
provi di ng the requi red equi pment (such as l adders and mechani cal
buckets) to perform thi s mai ntenance.
Provi si on of manual -overri de capabi l i ty duri ng a bl ackout, i ncl udi ng
photoel ectri c control s. These control s may be desi rabl e i n a peaceti me
si tuati on but undesi rabl e when a bl ackout i s a possi bi l i ty.
Effects of l ocal weather condi ti ons on l i ghti ng systems.
Fl uctuati ng or errati c vol tages i n the pri mary power source.
Groundi ng requi rements.
Provi si ons for rapi d l amp repl acement.
Use of l i ghti ng to support a CCTV system.
Li mi ted and excl usi on areas. Speci fi c l i ghti ng requi rements are
referenced i n AR 190-59 and TM 5-853-2. TM 5-853-4 provi des
gui dance for faci l i ty appl i cati ons that i ncl ude CCTV cameras.
I Li ghti ng i n these areas must be under the control of the guard force.
I For cri ti cal areas (such as weapons storage areas), i nstantaneous
l i ghti ng wi th a back up sour ce i s r equ i r ed. Any per i od wi thou t
l i ghti ng i n a cr i ti cal ar ea i s unacceptabl e. Ther efor e, these ar eas
gener al l y have a r equi r ement for back up power (such as di esel -
engi ne gener ator s, uni nter r upted power suppl i es, and batteri es) i n
case of power l oss.
I Securi ty-l i ghti ng systems are operated conti nuousl y duri ng hours of
darkness.
I Protecti ve l i ghts shoul d be used so that the fai l ure of one or more
l i ghts wi l l not affect the operati on of the remai ni ng l i ghts.
Li ghti ng requi rements for adjoi ni ng properti es and acti vi ti es.
Restr i ke ti me (the ti me requi r ed before the l i ght wi l l functi on pr oper l y
after a bri ef power i nterrupti on).
FM 3-19.30
Col or accuracy.
Other faci l i ti es requi ri ng l i ghti ng, such as parki ng areas.
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY LIGHTING
5-8. Securi ty l i ghti ng enabl es guard-force personnel to observe acti vi ti es
around or i nsi de an i nstal l ati on whi l e mi ni mi zi ng thei r presence. An adequate
l evel of i l l umi nati on for al l approaches to an i nstal l ati on wi l l not di scourage
unauthori zed entry; however, adequate l i ghti ng i mproves the abi l i ty of
securi ty personnel to assess vi sual l y and i ntervene on attempts at
unauthori zed entry. Li ghti ng i s used wi th other securi ty measures (such as
fi xed securi ty posts or patrol s, fences, and ESSs) and shoul d never be used
al one. Other pri nci pl es of securi ty l i ghti ng i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Opti mum securi ty l i ghti ng i s achi eved by adequate, even l i ght on
borderi ng areas; gl ari ng l i ghts i n the eyes of an i ntruder; and l i ttl e
l i ght on securi ty-patrol routes. I n addi ti on to seei ng l ong di stances,
securi ty forces must be abl e to see l ow contrasts (such as i ndi sti nct
outl i nes of si l houettes) and must be abl e to detect an i ntruder who may
be exposed to vi ew for onl y a few seconds. Hi gher l evel s of i l l umi nati on
i mprove these abi l i ti es.
Hi gh bri ghtness contrast between an i ntruder and the background
shoul d be the fi rst consi derati on when pl anni ng for securi ty l i ghti ng.
Wi th predomi nantl y dark, di rty surfaces or camoufl age-type pai nted
surfaces, more l i ght i s needed to produce the same bri ghtness around
i nstal l ati ons and bui l di ngs than when cl ean concrete, l i ght bri ck, and
grass predomi nate. When the same amount of l i ght fal l s on an object
and i ts background, the observer must depend on contrasts i n the
amount of l i ght refl ected. Hi s abi l i ty to di sti ngui sh poor contrasts i s
si gni fi cantl y i mproved by i ncreasi ng the i l l umi nati on l evel .
The observer pri mari l y sees an outl i ne or a si l houette when the
i ntruder i s darker than hi s background. Usi ng l i ght fi ni shes on the
l ower parts of bui l di ngs and structures may expose an i ntruder who
depends on dark cl othi ng and darkened face and hands. Stri pes on
wal l s have al so been used effecti vel y, as they provi de recogni zabl e
breaks i n outl i nes or si l houettes. Provi di ng broad-l i ghted areas around
and wi thi n the i nstal l ati on agai nst whi ch i ntruders can be seen can
al so create good observati on condi ti ons.
5-9. To be effecti ve, two basi c systems or a combi nati on of both may be used to
provi de practi cal and effecti ve securi ty l i ghti ng. The fi rst method i s to l i ght
the boundari es and approaches; the second i s to l i ght the area and structures
wi thi n the propertys general boundari es. Protecti ve l i ghti ng shoul d
Di scourage or deter attempts at entry by i ntruders. Proper
i l l umi nati on may l ead a potenti al i ntruder to bel i eve detecti on i s
i nevi tabl e.
Make detecti on l i kel y i f entry i s attempted.
Prevent gl are that may temporari l y bl i nd the guards.
FM 3-19.30
TYPES OF LIGHTING
5-10. The type of l i ghti ng system used depends on the i nstal l ati ons overal l
securi ty requi rements. Four types of l i ghti ng uni ts are used for securi ty-
l i ghti ng systemsconti nuous, standby, movabl e (portabl e), and emergency.
5-11. Conti nuous l i ghti ng i s the most common securi ty-l i ghti ng system. I t
consi sts of a seri es of fi xed l i ghts arranged to fl ood a gi ven area conti nuousl y
duri ng darkness wi th overl appi ng cones of l i ght. Two pri mary methods of
usi ng conti nuous l i ghti ng are gl are projecti on and control l ed l i ghti ng.
The gl are securi ty-l i ghti ng method i s used when the gl are of l i ghts
di rected across the surroundi ng terri tory wi l l not be annoyi ng nor
i nterfere wi th adjacent operati ons. I t i s a strong deterrent to a
potenti al i ntruder because i t makes i t di ffi cul t to see i nsi de of the area.
Guards are protected by bei ng kept i n comparati ve darkness and bei ng
abl e to observe i ntruders at a consi derabl e di stance beyond the
peri meter.
Control l ed l i ghti ng i s best when i t l i mi ts the wi dth of the l i ghted stri p
outsi de the peri meter, such as al ong hi ghways. I n control l ed l i ghti ng,
the wi dth of the l i ghted stri p i s control l ed and adjusted to fi t the
parti cul ar need. Thi s method of l i ghti ng may i l l umi nate or si l houette
securi ty personnel .
5-12. Standby l i ghti ng has a l ayout si mi l ar to conti nuous l i ghti ng. However,
the l umi nari es are not conti nuousl y l i t but are ei ther automati cal l y or
manual l y turned on when suspi ci ous acti vi ty i s detected or suspected by the
securi ty force or al arm systems.
5-13. Movabl e l i ghti ng consi sts of manual l y operated, movabl e searchl i ghts
that may be l i t duri ng hours of darkness or onl y as needed. The system
normal l y i s used to suppl ement conti nuous or standby l i ghti ng.
5-14. Emergency l i ghti ng i s a system of l i ghti ng that may dupl i cate any or al l
of the above systems. I ts use i s l i mi ted to ti mes of power fai l ur e or other
emergenci es that render the normal system i noperati ve. I t depends on an
al ternati ve power source such as i nstal l ed or portabl e generators or batteri es.
FENCED PERIMETERS
5-15. Fenced peri meters requi re the l i ghti ng speci fi cati ons i ndi cated i n TM
5-853-2. Speci fi c l i ghti ng requi rements are based on whether the peri meter i s
i sol ated, semi -i sol ated, or noni sol ated.
I sol ated fenced peri meters are fence l i nes around areas where the
fence i s 100 feet or more from bui l di ngs or operati ng areas. The
approach area i s cl ear of obstructi on for 100 or more feet outsi de of the
fence. Other personnel do not use the area. Use gl are projecti on for
these peri meters and keep patrol routes unl i t.
Semi -i sol ated fenced peri meters are fence l i nes where approach areas
are cl ear of obstructi on for 60 to 100 feet outsi de of the fence. The
general publ i c or i nstal l ati on personnel sel dom have reason to be i n the
area. Use control l ed l i ghti ng for these peri meters and keep patrol
routes i n rel ati ve darkness.
FM 3-19.30
Noni sol ated fenced peri meters are fence l i nes i mmedi atel y adjacent to
operati ng areas. These areas may be wi thi n an i nstal l ati on or publ i c
thoroughfares. Outsi ders or i nstal l ati on personnel may move about
freel y i n thi s approach area. The wi dth of the l i ghted stri p depends on
the cl ear zones i nsi de and outsi de the fence. Use control l ed l i ghti ng for
these peri meters. I t may not be practi cal to keep the patrol area dark.
ENTRANCES
5-16. Entrances for pedestri ans wi l l have two or more l i ghti ng uni ts provi di ng
adequate i l l umi nati on for recogni ti on of persons and exami nati on of
credenti al s. Vehi cl e entrances wi l l have two l i ghti ng uni ts l ocated to faci l i tate
the compl ete i nspecti on of passenger cars, trucks, and frei ght cars as wel l as
thei r contents and passengers. Semi acti ve and i nacti ve entrances wi l l have
the same degree of conti nuous l i ghti ng as the remai nder of the peri meter, wi th
standby l i ghti ng to be used when the entrance becomes acti ve. Gatehouses at
entrances shoul d have a l ow l evel of i nteri or i l l umi nati on, enabl i ng guards to
see approachi ng pedestri ans and vehi cl es.
OTHER
5-17. Areas and structures wi thi n the i nstal l ati ons property l i ne consi st of
yards; storage spaces; l arge, open worki ng areas; pi ers; docks; and other
sensi ti ve areas and structures.
Open yards (unoccupi ed l and onl y) and outdoor storage spaces
(materi al storage areas, rai l road si di ngs, motor pool s, and parki ng
areas) shoul d be i l l umi nated. An open yard adjacent to a peri meter
(between guards and fences) wi l l be i l l umi nated accordi ng to the
peri meters i l l umi nati on requi rements. Where l i ghti ng i s necessary i n
other open yards, i l l umi nati on wi l l not be l ess than 0.2 foot-candl e at
any poi nt.
Li ghti ng uni ts are pl aced i n outdoor storage spaces to provi de an
adequate di stri buti on of l i ght i n ai sl es, passageways, and recesses to
el i mi nate shadowed areas where unauthori zed persons may hi de.
I l l umi nati ng both water approaches and the pi er area safeguards pi ers
and docks l ocated on an i nstal l ati on. Decks on open pi ers wi l l be
i l l umi nated to at l east 1 foot-candl e and the water approaches
(extendi ng to a di stance of 100 feet from the pi er) to at l east 0.5 foot-
candl e. The area beneath the pi er fl oor wi l l be l i t wi th smal l wattage
fl oodl i ghts arranged on the pi l i ng. Movabl e l i ghti ng i s recommended as
a part of the protecti ve l i ghti ng system for pi ers and docks. The
l i ghti ng must not i n any way vi ol ate mari ne rul es and regul ati ons (i t
must not be gl ari ng to pi l ots). Consul t the US Coast Guard (USCG) for
approval of protecti ve l i ghti ng adjacent to navi gabl e waters.
WIRING SYSTEMS
5-18. The wi ri ng ci rcui t shoul d be arranged so that fai l ure of any one l amp
wi l l not l eave a l arge porti on of the peri meter l i ne or a major segment of a
cri ti cal or vul nerabl e posi ti on i n darkness. Feeder l i nes wi l l be pl aced
underground (or suffi ci entl y i nsi de the peri meter i n the case of overhead
FM 3-19.30
wi ri ng) to mi ni mi ze the possi bi l i ty of sabotage or vandal i sm from outsi de the
peri meter. Another advantage to underground wi ri ng i s reduced effects from
adverse weather condi ti ons.
MAINTENANCE
5-19. Peri odi c i nspecti ons wi l l be made of al l el ectri cal ci rcui ts to repl ace or
repai r worn parts, ti ghten connecti ons, and check i nsul ati on. Keep fi xtures
cl ean and properl y ai med.
POWER SOURCES
5-20. Pri mary and al ternate power sources must be i denti fi ed. The fol l owi ng
i s a parti al l i st of consi derati ons:
The pri mary source i s usual l y a l ocal publ i c uti l i ty.
An al ternate source (standby batteri es or di esel -fuel -dri ven generators
may be used) i s provi ded where requi red and shoul d
I Start automati cal l y upon fai l ure of pri mary power.
I Be adequate to power the enti re l i ghti ng system.
I Be equi pped wi th adequate fuel storage and suppl y.
I Be tested under l oad to ensure effi ci ency and effecti veness.
I Be l ocated wi thi n a control l ed area for addi ti onal securi ty.
CCTV-CAMERA LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS
5-21. TM 5-853-4 provi des a detai l ed di scussi on of CCTV-camera l i ghti ng
requi rements and gui del i nes for mi ni mum l i ghti ng l evel s and l i ghti ng
uni formi ty. The fol l owi ng consi derati ons appl y when l i ghti ng systems are
i ntended to support CCTV assessment or survei l l ance:
The cameras fi el d of vi ew.
Li ghti ng i ntensi ty l evel s.
Maxi mum l i ght-to-dark rati o.
Scene refl ectance.
Dayl i ght-to-darkness transi ti ons.
Camera mounti ng systems rel ati ve to l i ghti ng.
The cameras spectral response.
The col d-start ti me.
The restri ke ti me.
Electronic Security Systems 6-1
Chapter 6
Electronic Security Systems
An overal l si te-securi ty system i s compri sed of three major subel ements
detecti on, del ay, and response. The detecti on subel ement i ncl udes
i ntrusi on detecti on, assessment, and entr y contr ol . An ESS i s an
i ntegrated system that encompasses i nteri or and exteri or sensors; CCTV
systems for assessi ng al arm condi ti ons; el ectroni c entry-control systems
(EECSs); data-transmi ssi on medi a (DTM); and al arm r eporti ng systems
for moni tor i ng, contr ol l i ng, and di spl ayi ng vari ous al arm and system
i nformati on. I nteri or and exteri or sensor s and thei r associ ated
communi cati on and di spl ay subsystems are col l ecti vel y cal l ed I DSs.
OVERVIEW
6-1. Many Army and DOD regul ati ons speci fy protecti ve measures, pol i ci es,
and operati ons rel ated to securi ty. Al though the regul ati ons speci fy mi ni mum
requi rements, i t i s possi bl e that more stri ngent requi rements wi l l be
necessary at speci fi c si tes. A desi gner wi l l use a previ ousl y performed si te
survey to determi ne whi ch regul ati ons appl y and to determi ne whether
ci rcumstances requi re more stri ngent measures. Refer to TM 5-853-4 for
addi ti onal detai l ed i nformati on.
6-2. AR 190-13 requi res the use of a standardi zed ESS, i f practi cal and
avai l abl e. The recei vi ng el ement must determi ne whether a standardi zed
system can meet the requi rements and whether i t i s avai l abl e. After
coordi nati ng wi th the product manager for physi cal -securi ty equi pment to
veri fy that a standardi zed system i s avai l abl e, the associ ated MACOM can
i ssue approval to procure a commerci al system i n l i eu of a standardi zed
system.
USE OF ESS
6-3. An ESS i s used to provi de earl y warni ng of an i ntruder. Thi s system
consi sts of hardware and software el ements operated by trai ned securi ty
personnel .
6-4. A system i s confi gured to provi de one or more l ayers of detecti on around
an asset. Each l ayer i s made up of a seri es of conti guous detecti on zones
desi gned to i sol ate the asset and to control the entry and exi t of authori zed
personnel and materi al s.
GENERAL ESS DESCRIPTION
6-5. An ESS consi sts of sensors i nterfaced wi th el ectroni c entry-control
devi ces, CCTV, al arm reporti ng di spl ays (both vi sual and audi bl e), and
securi ty l i ghti ng. The si tuati on i s assessed by sendi ng guards to the al arm
FM 3-19.30
6-2 Electronic Security Systems
poi nt or by usi ng CCTV. Al arm reporti ng devi ces and vi deo moni tors are
l ocated i n the securi ty center. The assets i mportance wi l l determi ne whether
mul ti pl e or redundant securi ty centers are requi red and, ul ti matel y, the
requi red sophi sti cati on of al l el ements i n the ESS. Di gi tal and anal og data are
transmi tted from l ocal (fi el d) i nteri or and exteri or l ocati ons to the securi ty
center for processi ng. Rel i abi l i ty and accuracy are i mportant functi onal
requi rements of the data-transmi ssi on system.
ESS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
6-6. The ESS i mpl ementati on process i s shown i n Fi gure 6-1. I mpl ementi ng
an ESS i s based on general requi rements tai l ored to a si te-speci fi c mi ssi on
and physi cal profi l e. The process begi ns wi th a si te survey that i ncl udes a top-
down vi ew of basi c needs and cl assi c confi gurati ons that are tai l ored to such
si te-speci fi c characteri sti cs as terrai n, si te geography, cl i mati c condi ti ons, the
type of asset, and pri ori ti es. Thi s data i s used to determi ne the hardware and
software requi rements, taki ng i nto account the addi ti onal capaci ty that
shoul d be factored i nto the desi gn system for future expansi on. Once the
requi rements for an ESS have been i denti fi ed, the user must determi ne
whether an exi sti ng standardi zed system i s sui tabl e for the appl i cati on. (AR
190-13 outl i nes the process for gai ni ng approval to use nonstandard
equi pment.) The user must al so secure fundi ng for the equi pment (refer to
Appendi x J). Dependi ng on the current fundi ng regul ati ons, operati on-and-
mai ntenance, procurement, or other funds may be requi red. For exampl e,
operati ons and procurement, Army (OPA) funds may be requi red for I DS
devi ces; and operati ons and mai ntenance, Army (OMA) funds may be requi red
for i nstal l ati on i tems. A contract i s normal l y awarded to procure and i nstal l
the equi pment. The procurement or i nstal l ati on must be overseen. Thi s may
be accompl i shed by revi ewi ng submi ttal s, i nspecti ng the contractors work, or
respondi ng to the contractors requests for i nformati on. Once the equi pment i s
i nstal l ed, the acceptance-testi ng acti vi ti es must be wi tnessed and veri fi ed.
Si te condi ti ons duri ng acceptance testi ng affect the demonstrated detecti on
capabi l i ty of an exteri or I DS. As feasi bl e, acceptance testi ng shoul d be
desi gned to determi ne a sensor systems probabi l i ty of detecti on (PD) under a
range of condi ti ons. For some types of sensor systems, thi s may be as
strai ghtforward as conducti ng both dayti me and ni ghtti me tri al s to
experi ence di fferences i n temperature and sol ar heati ng. After the ESS has
been accepted, i t must be operated and mai ntai ned throughout the remai nder
of i ts l i fe cycl e. Pl anni ng for manpower to operate the system and forecasti ng
the fundi ng and personnel to properl y mai ntai n the system i s cri ti cal for
success.
ESS DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
6-7. A faci l i ty may requi re i nteri or and exteri or ESS el ements, dependi ng on
the l evel of protecti on requi red. The appl i cabl e regul ati ons, threat, and desi gn
cri teri a wi l l defi ne the ESSs general requi rements. For an exi sti ng ESS,
hardware and software may need to be suppl emented, upgraded, or
compl etel y repl aced. A si te l ayout (i n whi ch al l assets are i denti fi ed and
l ocated) i s requi red. I t i s a useful desi gn tool for such tasks as confi guri ng the
DTM.
FM 3-19.30
6-8. The exteri or and i nteri or I DSs shoul d be confi gured as l ayers of unbroken
ri ngs concentri cal l y surroundi ng the asset. These ri ngs shoul d correspond to
defensi ve l ayers that consti tute the del ay system. The fi rst detecti on l ayer i s
l ocated at the outermost defensi ve l ayer necessary to provi de the requi red
del ay. Detecti on l ayers can be on a defensi ve l ayer, i n the area between two
defensi ve l ayers, or on the asset i tsel f, dependi ng on the del ay requi red. For
exampl e, i f a wal l of an i nteri or room provi des suffi ci ent del ay for effecti ve
response to aggressi on, detecti on l ayers coul d be between the faci l i ty exteri or
and i nteri or-room wal l or on the i nteri or-room wal l . These woul d detect the
i ntruder before penetrati on of the i nteri or wal l i s possi bl e.
RESPONSE AND DELAY
6-9. When deal i ng wi th an ESS, the response ti me i s defi ned as the ti me i t
takes the securi ty force to arri ve at the scene after an i ni ti al al arm i s recei ved
at the securi ty center. The total del ay ti me i s defi ned as the sum of al l of the
barri ers del ay ti mes, the ti me requi red to cross the areas between barri ers
after an i ntrusi on al arm has been reported, and the ti me requi red to
accompl i sh the mi ssi on and l eave the protected area.
6-10. An ESSs basi c functi on i s to noti fy securi ty personnel that an i ntruder
i s attempti ng to penetrate, or has penetrated, a protected area i n suffi ci ent
ti me to al l ow the response force to i ntercept and apprehend hi m. To
accompl i sh thi s, there must be suffi ci ent physi cal del ay between the poi nt
Controls
signals to
portals
Controls
signals to
portals
Biometric
device
System
processor
Local
processor
Card
reader
Card
reader
Keypad Keypad
Card
reader
Biometric
device
Local
processor
Real-time clock
Magnetic tape
Hard disk
Floppy disk
Alarm printer
Report printer
CCTV interface
IDS interface
Display
Keyboard
Enrollment station
Security
center
Field
Figure 6-1. Entry-Control System Configured With Distributed Control
FM 3-19.30
where the i ntruder i s fi rst detected and hi s objecti ve. Thi s provi des del ay ti me
equal to or greater than the response ti me (refer to TM 5-853-1).
6-11. When deal i ng wi th i nteri or sensors, boundary sensors that detect
penetrati on (such as structural -vi brati on sensors or passi ve ul trasoni c
sensors) provi de the earl i est warni ng of an attempted i ntrusi on. Thi s al arm i s
usual l y generated before the barri er i s penetrated. Thi s gi ves the securi ty
force advance noti fi cati on of an attempted penetrati on, thus al l owi ng the
barri ers del ay ti me to be counted as part of the total del ay ti me. Door-posi ti on
sensors and gl ass-breakage sensors do not generate an al arm unti l the barri er
has been breached; therefore, the del ay ti me provi ded by the barri er cannot be
counted as part of the total del ay ti me.
6-12. Vol umetri c moti on sensors do not generate an al arm unti l the i ntruder
i s al ready i nsi de the area covered by the sensors. Therefore, i f these sensors
are to be used to provi de addi ti onal response ti me, addi ti onal barri ers must be
pl aced between the vol umetri c moti on sensors and the protected asset. Poi nt
sensors, such as capaci tance sensors and pressure mats, provi de warni ng of
attempted penetrati on onl y i f they detect the i ntruder before access i s gai ned
to the protected area.
BASIC GUIDANCE
6-13. An I DS i s depl oyed i n and around barri ers (as detai l ed i n TM 5-853-1).
Voi ce communi cati on l i nks (radi o, i ntercom, and tel ephone) wi th the response
force are l ocated i n the securi ty center. Securi ty personnel wi l l man the center
and wi l l al ert and di spatch response forces i n case of an al arm.
6-14. The barri er shoul d al ways be depl oyed behi nd the I DS to ensure that
i ntegri ty i s mai ntai ned agai nst i ntruders. An i ntruder wi l l then acti vate the
al arm sensor before penetrati ng or bypassi ng the barri ers, thus provi di ng
del ay for al arm assessment and response. The del ay ti me i s the determi ni ng
factor i n whether an assessment i s conducted by di spatchi ng a guard or by
observi ng the CCTV. Normal l y, an i ntruder can cl i mb a fence before a guard
can be di spatched; therefore, a CCTV i s usual l y requi red wi th an exteri or I DS.
Barri ers can be l ocated ahead of an al arm sensor as a boundary demarcati on
and can serve to keep peopl e and ani mal s from causi ng nui sance al arms by
i nadvertentl y strayi ng i nto a control l ed area. These barri ers provi de no
addi ti onal response ti me because the barri er coul d be breached before the I DS
sensors coul d be acti vated.
6-15. Data for moni tori ng and control l i ng an ESS are gathered and processed
i n the securi ty center where the operator i nteracts wi th i nformati on from the
ESS components l ocated at remote faci l i ti es. The ESSs al arm-annunci ati on
computer and i ts DTM l i ne-termi nati on equi pment shoul d be l ocated i n a
control l ed area and provi ded wi th tamper protecti on. Supervi sory personnel
shoul d permi t changes to software onl y, and these changes shoul d be
documented. I f redundant DTM l i nks connect the central computer to the
l ocal processor, di verse paths shoul d be used to route these l i nks.
6-16. The preferred medi um for transmi tti ng data i n an ESS i s a dedi cated
fi ber-opti cs system. I t provi des for communi cati ons not suscepti bl e to vol tage
transi ents, l i ghtni ng, el ectromagneti c i nterference, and noi se. Addi ti onal l y,
FM 3-19.30
the fi ber opti cs wi l l provi de a measure of communi cati on-l i ne securi ty and
wi de bandwi dth for vi deo si gnal s and i ncreased data-transmi ssi on rates.
ESS EFFECTIVENESS
6-17. An ESS has a degree-of-protecti on effecti veness that i s based on i ts
probabi l i ty of detecti ng i ntruders attempti ng to go over, under, around, or
through the physi cal -securi ty system. The i ntruder may use forced-entry,
covert-entry, or i nsi der-compromi se tacti cs. A wel l -desi gned system wi l l
mi ni mi ze the possi bi l i ty of a successful penetrati on through covert entry or
i nsi der compromi se. I nteri or and exteri or al arm sensors have a PD based on
the capabi l i ty to detect an i ntruder passi ng through a sensi ng fi el d. An
i ntruder di sturbs the steady-state qui escent condi ti on of a sensor for a fi ni te
peri od. Sensors are desi gned to detect a person of mi ni mum stature movi ng
wi thi n a speci fi c range of speeds and di stances from the sensor, and any target
outsi de of those parameters wi l l probabl y not be detected. The PD for a
speci fi c sensor i s usual l y speci fi ed at 0.9 or greater, but the desi gner must be
aware that the PD i s based on certai n constrai nts and envi ronmental
condi ti ons.
6-18. Manufacturer speci fi cati ons usual l y do not di scuss envi ronmental or
nui sance al arms that can be caused by cl i mati c condi ti ons (such as wi nd or
rai n) or by the i ntrusi on of ani mal s (i ncl udi ng bi rds). The al arm annunci ati on
i s val i d because the sensors threshol ds have been exceeded; however, the
al arm does not represent a val i d penetrati on attempt. I f the assessment
system i s sl ow, the operator may not be abl e to determi ne the cause of the
al arm and must, therefore, treat an envi ronmental or nui sance al arm as real .
6-19. Another type of fal se al arm i s caused by el ectroni c-ci rcui t tol erances
bei ng exceeded, resul ti ng i n the sensors actuati on. Fal se al arms may al so
resul t from i mproper i nstal l ati on of the sensor or from effects of other
equi pment i n the i mmedi ate area.
6-20. After an al arm i s sensed and i nformati on i s di spl ayed i n the securi ty
center, the consol e operator must determi ne the cause of the al arm (i ntrusi on,
nui sance, envi ronmental , or fal se). Ti mel y assessment i s requi red when
determi ni ng i ts cause. For exampl e, i f an i ntruder scal es a fence i n 10 seconds
and runs 20 feet per second, the i ntruder wi l l have overcome the barri er and
be 2,200 feet from the poi nt of penetrati on i n 2 mi nutes. To conduct an
accurate assessment of the al arm after 2 mi nutes, guards wi l l have to search
an area of about 200 acres. A fi xed-tel evi si on camera properl y l ocated and
i ntegrated wi th the al arm processor can assess the si tuati on whi l e the
i ntruder i s sti l l i n the control l ed area.
6-21. For a CCTV camera to be effecti ve, the area i t vi ews must be adequatel y
l i ghted. To correl ate the al arms and cameras i n a l arge system (more than 10
cameras) i n a ti mel y manner, a computer-based processi ng system must be
used to sel ect and di spl ay al arms and camera scenes for the operator. A
compl ex ESS has the fol l owi ng basi c components:
I ntrusi on-detecti on sensors.
El ectroni c entry-control devi ces.
CCTV.
FM 3-19.30
Al arm-annunci ati on system.
DTM.
6-22. The i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors are normal l y depl oyed i n a seri es of
concentri c l ayers. The overal l PD i mproves wi th each added l ayer of sensors.
The l ayers (i nteri or and exteri or) shoul d be functi onal l y uni form; however,
thei r overal l effecti veness and cost are di fferent. The exteri or zones
si gni fi cantl y di ffer from the i nteri or zones due to the fol l owi ng consi derati ons:
The consi stency of the PD.
The PD.
The cost per detecti on zone.
The number of zones.
The over al l sensor coverage.
6-23. Exteri or I DSs usual l y have PDs equal to those of i nteri or I DSs.
However, exteri or sensors are more l i kel y to experi ence weather-rel ated
si tuati ons that cause the systems PD to vary. Sensor phenomenol ogy (passi ve
i nfrared [PI R], mi crowave radar, and so forth) determi nes whi ch
envi ronmental factors may al ter the systems PD. The frequency of occurrence,
severi ty, and durati on of a weather event joi ntl y determi ne whether i t
represents securi ty vul nerabi l i ty wi th the I DS i n use. Typi cal l y, sophi sti cated
i ntruders wi l l attempt thei r penetrati on and chal l enge an ESS under
condi ti ons most favorabl e to themsel ves. I ncl ement weather (fog, snow, and
rai n) affects the useful ness of CCTVs and securi ty l i ghti ng such that the
capabi l i ty for remote assessment of al arm events may be l ost. Exteri or I DSs
are not necessari l y l ess l i kel y to detect a penetrati on attempt duri ng fog, rai n
and snow; the effect of such si te condi ti ons on the I DS depends on sensor
phenomenol ogy. For exampl e, fence moti on caused by rai n i mpact may dri ve
the response of a fence-mounted sensor cl oser to sati sfyi ng the systems al arm
cri teri a, wi th the resul t that the margi n of di sturbance avai l abl e to the
i ntruder i s l ess. Al so, certai n buri ed sensors are more l i kel y to detect an
i ntruder when the ground i s wet because of rai n or mel ti ng snow. Si nce
i nteri or sensor systems are l ess i nfl uenced by envi ronmental condi ti ons, thei r
PD i s typi cal l y more consi stent than that of some types of exteri or sensor
systems. Other consi derati ons i n compari ng an i nteri or and exteri or ESS are
the cost, the number and si ze of detecti on zones requi red, and the detecti on
hei ght.
Because of envi ronmental condi ti ons, the exteri or el ectroni cs must be
desi gned and packaged for extremes of temperature, moi sture, and
wi nd. The resul t i s that exteri or el ectroni c packages are more costl y
than equi val ent packages for i nteri or appl i cati ons.
State-of-the-art exteri or sensors do not detect penetrati on attempts
above the hei ght of a fence (typi cal l y 8 feet). Fence-mounted sensors
are usual l y l i mi ted to thi s hei ght because the fence fabri c or pol es are
used to support the sensor. For aboveground sensors i n the control l ed
area between the fences, the sensors mounti ng brackets and posts
l i mi t the detecti on hei ght. I n some appl i cati ons of fi el d sensors
(especi al l y buri ed sensors), the detecti on hei ght i s no more than 3 feet.
For a faci l i ty, i nteri or sensors can be depl oyed on wal l s, fl oors, or
cei l i ngs, thus permi tti ng compl ete protecti on of the asset.
FM 3-19.30
6-24. An i nteri or ESS may be far l ess costl y than that of a comparabl e
exteri or ESS. Thi s compari son i ndi cates to the desi gner the val ue of sel ecti ng
and depl oyi ng a wel l -pl anned, wel l -desi gned, l ayered system. The basi c rul e i n
overal l desi gn of an ESS i s to desi gn from the i nsi de out; that i s, l ayered from
the asset to the si te boundary.
INTERIOR ESS CONSIDERATIONS
6-25. An i nteri or ESS i s typi cal l y depl oyed wi thi n a boundary i n the
i mmedi ate vi ci ni ty of the asset bei ng protected. I f the i nteri or ESS operates i n
a control l ed envi ronment, i ts PD wi l l be i ndependent of any weather-i nduced
vari ati on i n exteri or condi ti ons. Al so, the physi cal -securi ty systems
effecti veness i s enhanced by the i nteri or barri ers (wal l s, cei l i ng, and fl oor)
that i nherentl y i mpose a l onger del ay than exteri or barri ers (fences and
gates).
6-26. Functi onal l y, an i nteri or asset shoul d be vi ewed as bei ng contai ned
wi thi n a cube wi th sensors protecti ng al l si x faces. I nteri or sensors can be
depl oyed at the cubes peri meter, i n i ts i nteri or space, or i n the space
i mmedi atel y outsi de of the cube.
6-27. I f an i ncreased l evel of protecti on i s di ctated by the threat, and i f the
bui l di ng i s l arge enough, mul ti pl e l ayers of i nteri or sensors may be depl oyed
for a gi ven asset. A mul ti l ayered i nteri or I DS wi l l i mprove the overal l PD.
Tamper protecti on and access-/secure-mode capabi l i ti es must be consi dered
when pl anni ng and l ayi ng out i nteri or sensors.
TAMPER PROTECTION
6-28. To mi ni mi ze the possi bi l i ty of someone tamperi ng wi th ci rcui try and
associ ated wi ri ng, al l sensor-rel ated encl osures must be equi pped wi th tamper
swi tches. These swi tches must be posi ti oned so that an al arm i s generated
before the cover has been moved enough to permi t access to the ci rcui try of
adjustment control s. I n addi ti on, several types of sensors shoul d be equi pped
wi th tamper swi tches to protect agai nst bei ng reposi ti oned or removed.
Securi ty screens contai ni ng gri d-wi re sensors and vi brati on sensors that can
be easi l y removed from a wal l are exampl es of sensors that requi re tamper
swi tches.
ACCESS/SECURE MODE
6-29. Duri ng regul ar worki ng hours, many of the i nteri or sensors must be
deacti vated by pl aci ng the area i n the access mode. For exampl e, door-posi ti on
sensors and vol umetri c sensors i n occupi ed areas must be deacti vated to
prevent mul ti pl e nui sance al arms caused by the normal movement of peopl e.
Thi s can be done l ocal l y or remotel y. Wi th l ocal control , a swi tch i s used to
bypass or shunt al arm contacts when the sensor i s pl aced i n the access mode.
When done remotel y, the securi ty-center operator usual l y enters a command
that causes the processor software to i gnore i ncomi ng al arms from those
sensors pl aced i n the access mode. However, when a sensor i s pl aced i n the
access mode, i ts tamper-protecti on ci rcui try must remai n i n the acti vated or
secure mode. Duri ng nonworki ng hours when the faci l i ty i s unoccupi ed, al l
sensors must be pl aced i n the secure mode. Certai n devi ces (such as duress-
FM 3-19.30
al arm swi tches, tamper swi tches, gri d-wi re sensors coveri ng vent openi ngs,
and gl ass-breakage sensors) shoul d never be pl aced i n the access mode. The
desi gner must ensure that sel ected sensors can be pl aced i n an access mode (i f
requi red) and that certai n types of sensors (such as duress and tamper
swi tches) are confi gured so that they cannot be put i n the access mode under
any condi ti on.
EXTERIOR ESS CONSIDERATIONS
6-30. An exteri or ESS i s typi cal l y depl oyed at a si tes boundary or some other
si gni fi cant boundary such as the demarcati on fence for a group of bunkers. An
exteri or ESS has the advantage that i t remai ns i n the secure mode at al l
ti mes.
6-31. The i deal confi gurati on for an exteri or ESS i s a rectangl e or a pol ygon,
wi th al l si des bei ng strai ght. The ESS i s l ocated i n and around barri ers that
typi cal l y i ncl ude a dual fence. The outsi de fence i s used for demarcati on, and
the i nteri or fence i s used to ai d i n detecti on and provi de some del ay. I f dual
fences are not used, the sensors shoul d be depl oyed on the fence or i nsi de i t.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
6-32. The general -desi gn cri teri a of a peri meter I DS i nvol ves pri mari l y the
sel ecti on and l ayout of exteri or sensors that are compati bl e wi th the physi cal
and operati onal characteri sti cs of a speci fi c si te. I mportant factors to consi der
duri ng the sel ecti on process i ncl ude physi cal and envi ronmental condi ti ons at
the si te, the sensors performance, and the overal l cost of the system. Refer to
TMs 5-853-1 and 5-853-2 for addi ti onal gui dance on the requi rements for and
pl acement of exteri or sensor systems. Si nce exteri or barri ers provi de very
l i ttl e del ay, exteri or sensor systems general l y do not provi de a si gni fi cant
i ncrease i n the avai l abl e response ti me.
Physical and Environmental Considerations
6-33. Physi cal and envi ronmental consi derati ons are often the determi ni ng
factors for sel ecti ng exteri or sensors. The si tes characteri sti cs can
si gni fi cantl y affect a sensors operati onal performance, both i n terms of PD
and the suscepti bi l i ty to nui sance al arms. Exteri or sensor systems shoul d be
sel ected on the basi s of the frequency and durati on of weather-rel ated peri ods
of poor detecti on capabi l i ty. An exteri or I DS may have an unacceptabl y l ow
PD duri ng a parti cul ar weather event or si te condi ti on, yet otherwi se be
superi or to other I DSs i n terms of good detecti on capabi l i ty and a l ow
nui sance-al arm rate. I t may be appropri ate to sel ect that I DS i n spi te of i ts
known vul nerabi l i ty, preci sel y because the ci rcumstances of i ts vul nerabi l i ty
are known and precauti onary measures can be taken at those ti mes. The
overal l performance of that I DS, together wi th i ts cost, may justi fy i ts
sel ecti on.
6-34. Weather and cl i mati c condi ti ons at a speci fi c si te can si gni fi cantl y
i nfl uence sensor sel ecti on. For exampl e, I R detectors are not very effecti ve i n
heavy rai n, fog, dust, or snow. Deep snow can affect detecti on patterns and
performance of both I R and mi crowave sensors. Hi gh wi nds can cause
numerous fal se al arms i n fence-mounted sensors. El ectri cal storms can cause
al arms i n many types of sensors and may al so damage the equi pment.
FM 3-19.30
6-35. Vegetati on can be a si gni fi cant cause of nui sance al arms. Tal l grass or
weeds can di sturb the energy pattern of mi crowave and both thermal I R and
near-I R beam-break sensors. Vegetati on growi ng near el ectri c-fi el d sensors
and capaci tance sensors can cause nui sance al arms. Large weeds or bushes
rubbi ng agai nst a fence can produce nui sance al arms from fence-mounted
sensors. Large trees and bushes movi ng wi thi n the fi el d of vi ew of vi deo
moti on sensors can cause nui sance or envi ronmental al arms. A cl ear area
must be establ i shed for exter i or sensor s. Thi s area must be voi d of vegetati on
or contai n vegetati on of careful l y control l ed growth.
6-36. Topographi c features are extremel y i mportant. I deal l y, peri meter
terrai n shoul d be fl at, al though gentl y sl opi ng terrai n i s acceptabl e. I rregul ar
terrai n wi th steep sl opes may precl ude the use of LOS sensors and make
CCTV assessment di ffi cul t. Gul l i es and di tches crossi ng the peri meter
represent a vul nerabi l i ty to LOS sensors and may be a source of fal se al arms
(from fl owi ng water) for buri ed l i ne sensors. Large cul verts can provi de an
i ntruder wi th an entry or exi t route across the peri meter wi thout causi ng an
al arm. Li kewi se, overhead power and communi cati on l i nes may permi t an
i ntruder to bri dge the peri meter wi thout causi ng an al arm.
6-37. Large ani mal s (such as cows, horses, and deer) can cause nui sance
al arms i n both aboveground and buri ed sensors. Sensors sensi ti ve enough to
detect a crawl i ng or rol l i ng i ntruder are suscepti bl e to nui sance al arms from
smal l ani mal s such as rabbi ts, squi rrel s, cats, and dogs. To mi ni mi ze the
i nterference from ani mal s, a dual chai n-l i nk-fence confi gurati on may be
establ i shed around the si te peri meter wi th the sensors i nstal l ed between the
fences.
Sensor Performance
6-38. Exteri or sensors must have a hi gh PD for al l types of i ntrusi on and have
a l ow unwanted-al arm rate for al l expected envi ronmental and si te condi ti ons.
Unfortunatel y, no si ngl e exteri or sensor that i s presentl y avai l abl e meets both
these cri teri a. Al l are l i mi ted i n thei r detecti on capabi l i ty, and al l have hi gh
suscepti bi l i ty to nui sance and envi ronmental condi ti ons. Tabl e 6-1, page 6-10,
provi des esti mates of PDs for vari ous types of i ntrusi ons. Tabl e 6-2, page 6-10,
l i sts the rel ati ve suscepti bi l i ty of vari ous types of sensors to nui sance and
envi ronmental al arms.
Economic Considerations
6-39. Exteri or sensor costs are usual l y gi ven i n cost per l i near foot per
detecti on zone (typi cal l y 300 feet). These costs i ncl ude both equi pment and
i nstal l ati on. Fence-mounted sensors (such as strai n-sensi ti ve cabl e,
el ectromechani cal , and mechani cal ) are general l y l ess costl y than stand-al one
and buri ed l i ne sensors. I nstal l ati on costs can vary si gni fi cantl y, dependi ng on
the type of sensor. Tabl e 6-3, page 6-11, provi des a compari son of rel ati ve costs
for procuri ng and i nstal l i ng vari ous types of exteri or sensor systems. I t shoul d
be remembered that the sensor systems cost i s onl y a porti on of the total cost
for empl oyi ng a peri meter I DS. Addi ti onal costs i ncl ude fenci ng, si te
preparati on, CCTV assessment, and peri meter l i ghti ng.
FM 3-19.30
Table 6-1. Estimate of PD by Exterior Sensors
Intruder Technique
Type of Sensor
Fence mounted N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A VH VL L VL M/H H M/H
Taut wire N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A VH VL VL VL H H H
Electric field VH VH VH H VH VH VL L L N/A N/A N/A
Capacitance VH VH VH H H VH VL L L N/A N/A N/A
Ported cable H VH VH VH VH H M VH L N/A N/A N/A
Seismic H VH H M M M L M L N/A N/A N/A
Seismic/magnetic H VH H M M M L M L N/A N/A N/A
Microwave H VH H M/H M/H M/H VL L/M L N/A N/A N/A
IR VH VH VH M/H M/H H VL L VL N/A N/A N/A
Video motion H VH VH H H H VL L/M M N/A N/A N/A
VL = very low, L = low, M = medium, H = high, VH = very high, N/A = not applicable
Table 6-2. Relative Susceptibility of Exterior Sensors to False Alarms
Intruder Technique
Type of Sensor
Fence mounted H M L L VL L M L L L VL VL
Taut wire VL VL VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL
Electric field M L/H VL M VL M VH L M M L VL
Capacitance M M VL M VL M VH L M M L VL
Ported cable VL M H L VL VL M VL VL M VL L
Seismic M L L L VL L VH VL VL L L M
Seismic/magnetic M L L L VL L VH VL VL H M H
Microwave L L M/H L/M L M/H VH VL M L/M L VL
IR L L L M M M VH L M L VL VL
Video motion M L L L M/H L VH VL M L L VL
VL = very low, L = low, M = medium, H = high, VH = very high
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FM 3-19.30
PERIMETER LAYOUT AND ZONING
6-40. A protected areas peri meter i s usual l y defi ned by an encl osi ng wal l or
fence or a natural barri er such as water. For exteri or sensors to be effecti ve,
the peri meter around whi ch they are to be depl oyed must be preci sel y defi ned.
I n most appl i cati ons, a dual chai n-l i nk-fence confi gurati on wi l l be establ i shed
around the peri meter. Typi cal l y, fences shoul d be between 30 and 50 feet
apart; as the di stance i ncreases, i t i s harder for an i ntruder to bri dge the
fences. I f fence separati on i s l ess than 30 feet, some mi crowave and ported-
coax sensors cannot be used. The area between fences (cal l ed the control l ed
area or i sol ati on zone) may need to be cl eared of vegetati on and gr aded,
dependi ng on the type of sensor used. Proper drai nage i s requi red to precl ude
standi ng water and to prevent the formati on of gul l i es caused by runni ng
water after a heavy rai n or mel ti ng snow. Cl eared areas are requi red i nsi de
and outsi de of the control l ed area. These areas enhance routi ne observati on,
as wel l as sensor-al arm assessment, and mi ni mi ze the protecti ve cover
avai l abl e to a woul d-be i ntruder.
6-41. After the peri meter has been defi ned, the next step i s to di vi de i t i nto
speci fi c detecti on zones. The l ength of each detecti on zone i s determi ned by
eval uati ng the contour, the exi sti ng terrai n, and the operati onal acti vi ti es
al ong the peri meter. Detecti on zones shoul d be l ong and strai ght to mi ni mi ze
the number of sensors or cameras necessary and to ai d guard assessment i f
cameras are not used. I t may be more economi cal to strai ghten an exi sti ng
fence l i ne than to create numerous detecti on zones i n accommodati ng a
crooked fence l i ne. I f the peri meter i s hi l l y and LOS sensors or CCTV
assessment are used, the l ength of i ndi vi dual detecti on zones wi l l be
commensurate wi th sensor l i mi tati ons. Entry poi nts for personnel and
vehi cl es must be confi gured as i ndependent zones. Thi s enabl es deacti vati on
of the sensors i n these zones; that i s, pl aci ng them i n the access mode duri ng
customary worki ng hours (assumi ng the entry poi nts are manned) wi thout
havi ng to deacti vate adjacent areas.
6-42. The speci fi c l ength of i ndi vi dual zones can vary around the peri meter.
Al though speci fi c manufacturers may adverti se maxi mum zone l engths
Table 6-3. Exterior IDS Sensor Cost Comparison
Type of Sensor Equipment Installation Maintenance
Fence mounted L L L
Taut wire H H M
Electric field H M M
Capacitance M L M
Ported cable H M M
Seismic M M L
Seismic/magnetic H M L
Microwave M M L
IR M L M
Video motion M L M
L = low, M = medium, H = high
FM 3-19.30
exceedi ng 1,000 feet, i t i s not practi cal to exceed a zone l ength of 300 feet. I f
the zone i s l onger, i t wi l l be di ffi cul t for an operator usi ng CCTV assessment
or for the response force to i denti fy the l ocati on of an i ntrusi on or the cause of
a fal se al arm.
6-43. When establ i shi ng zones usi ng mul ti pl e sensors, the desi gner shoul d
establ i sh coi nci dent zones where the l ength and l ocati on of each i ndi vi dual
sensor wi l l be i denti cal for al l sensors wi thi n a gi ven zone. I f an al arm occurs
i n a speci fi c zone, the operator can readi l y determi ne i ts approxi mate l ocati on
by referri ng to a map of the peri meter. Thi s al so mi ni mi zes the number of
CCTV cameras requi red for assessment and si mpl i fi es the i nterface between
the al arm-annunci ati on system and the CCTV swi tchi ng system.
ESS ALARM-ANNUNCIATION SYSTEM
6-44. Status i nformati on from the vari ous i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors and
entry-control termi nal devi ces must be col l ected from the fi el d and
transmi tted to the al arm-annunci ati on system i n the securi ty center, where i t
i s processed, annunci ated, and acted on by securi ty personnel . The al arm-
annunci ati on system may al so i nterface wi th a CCTV system. There are
typi cal l y two types of al arm-annunci ati on confi gurati ons avai l abl e. The
si mpl est confi gurati on, whi ch i s sui tabl e for smal l i nstal l ati ons, i s the poi nt-
to-poi nt confi gurati on. Wi th thi s confi gurati on, a separate transmi ssi on l i ne i s
routed from the protected area to the securi ty center (see Fi gure 6-2). The
Joi nt-Servi ce I nteri or I ntrusi on-Detecti on System (J-SI I DS) i s typi cal of thi s
type of confi gurati on but wi l l not be further di scussed i n thi s manual . The
second, and more popul ar type, i s a di gi tal mul ti pl exed confi gurati on that
al l ows mul ti pl e protected areas to communi cate wi th the securi ty center over
a common data l i ne. A bl ock di agram of a typi cal mul ti pl exed al arm-
annunci ati on system i s shown i n Fi gure 6-3.
IDS sensors
IDS alarm
annunciation
IDS sensors
IDS
alarm
annunciation
Figure 6-2. Typical Point-to-Point IDS
FM 3-19.30
ALARM-ANNUNCIATION CONFIGURATION
6-45. A bl ock di agram of a typi cal al arm-annunci ati on system i s shown i n
Fi gure 6-4, page 6-14. As shown i n the fi gure, the central computer i s the hub
of the i nformati on fl ow. The central computer recei ves and di spl ays al arm and
devi ce status i nformati on and sends operator-control commands to the ESSs
l ocal processors. I t al so i nterfaces wi th the CCTV system. For l arger faci l i ti es,
the management of the DTM communi cati ons tasks may be del egated to a
separate communi cati on processor so that the central computer can turn i ts
ful l attenti on to i nterpreti ng the i ncomi ng i nformati on and updati ng the
control and di spl ay devi ces l ocated at the securi ty consol e (di spl ay, l oggi ng,
control , and storage devi ces).
6-46. The central computer may consi st of one or more di gi tal computers. The
real -ti me cl ock i s usual l y i ntegral to the central computer and provi des a ti me
stamp for al arms and other events. I t al l ows for ti me synchroni zati on wi th the
CCTV and other systems, i f i ncl uded. The consol e operator must be abl e to set
the cl ock, whi ch shoul d i ncl ude a battery backup. Al l system events must be
properl y ti me-correl ated. For exampl e, there wi l l be an exact ti me correl ati on
for an ESS al arm event reported on the al arm pri nter and the correspondi ng
vi deo scene recorded by the CCTVs vi deo processor.
DATA STORAGE
6-47. Computer-based systems are requi red to store l arge amounts of
i nformati on such as system software, appl i cati on programs, data structures,
and system events (al arm transacti ons and status changes). Therefore, a l arge
amount of nonvol ati l e memory i s requi red. The semi conductor memory
provi ded wi th a central computer i s desi gned for rapi d storage and retri eval
IDS alarm
annunciation
IDS sensors
IDS sensors
IDS alarm
annunciation
IDS sensors
Figure 6-3. Typical Multiplexed IDS
FM 3-19.30
and possesses extremel y fast access ti mes. The most commonl y used medi a for
archi val storage are magneti c tape; compact-di sk, read-onl y memory (CD-
ROM); and magneti c di sk. These medi a are capabl e of economi cal l y stori ng
l arge amounts of data.
OPERATOR INTERFACE
6-48. The operator i nteracts wi th the al arm-annunci ati on system through
devi ces that can be seen, heard, or touched and mani pul ated. Vi sual di spl ays
and pri nters can be used to i nform the operator of an al arm or the equi pments
status. Audi bl e devi ces are used to al ert an operator to an al arm or the
equi pments fai l ure. Devi ces such as push buttons and keyboards permi t an
operator to acknowl edge and reset al arms, as wel l as change operati onal
parameters.
CCTV interface
EECS interface
Display
Keyboard
Map
Real-time clock
Magnetic tape
Hard disk
Floppy disk
Alarm printer
Report printer
Central computer
DTM supervision
Local
processor
Local
processor
Local
processor
Sensor
Sensor Sensor
Sensor
Sensor
Sensor
Security
center
Field
DTM
Figure 6-4. Typical IDS Alarm-Annunciation System
FM 3-19.30
Visual displays. The type of di spl ay used to i nform the operator
vi sual l y of the ESSs status i s determi ned pri mari l y by the systems
compl exi ty. Status i nformati on i s usual l y di spl ayed on moni tors.
Al phanumeri c di spl ays and map di spl ays are sel dom used. Moni tors
provi de great fl exi bi l i ty i n the type and format of al arm i nformati on
that may be di spl ayed. Both text and graphi c i nformati on can be
di spl ayed i n a vari ety of col ors. Mul ti pl e al arms may al so be di spl ayed.
I f al arms are pri ori ti zed, hi gher-pri ori ty al arms may be hi ghl i ghted by
bl i nki ng, by usi ng bol d pri nt or reverse vi deo, or by changi ng col ors. To
assi st the operator i n determi ni ng the correct response, al arm-speci fi c
i nstructi ons may be di spl ayed adjacent to the al arm i nformati on.
Audible alarmdevices. I n conjuncti on wi th the vi sual di spl ay of an
al arm, the al arm-annunci ati on system must al so generate an audi bl e
al arm. The audi bl e al arm may be produced by the ri ngi ng of a bel l or
by the generati on of a steady or pul sati ng tone from an el ectroni c
devi ce. I n any case, the audi bl e al arm serves to attract the operator's
attenti on to the vi sual -al arm di spl ay. A si l ence swi tch i s usual l y
provi ded to al l ow the operator to si l ence the bel l or tone before actual l y
resetti ng the al arm.
Logging devices. Al l al arm-system acti vi ty (such as a change of
access/secure status, an al arm event, an entry-control transacti on, or a
troubl e event) shoul d be l ogged and recor ded. Logged i nfor mati on i s
i mpor tant not onl y for secur i ty per sonnel i nvesti gati ng an event, but
al so for mai ntenance personnel checki ng equi pment performance for
such causes as fal se and nui sance al arms. Most al arm-annunci ati on
systems are equi pped wi th l oggi ng and al arm pri nters.
Alarm printers. Al arm pri nters are typi cal l y of the hi gh-speed,
conti nuous-feed vari ety. The pri nter provi des a hard-copy record of al l
al arm events and system acti vi ty, as wel l as l i mi ted backup i n case the
vi sual di spl ay fai l s.
Report printers. Most ESSs i ncl ude a separate pri nter (report
pri nter) for generati ng reports usi ng i nformati on stored by the central
computer. Thi s pri nter wi l l usual l y be typi cal of those found i n modern
offi ce envi ronments.
Operator control. A means i s requi red to transmi t i nformati on from
the operator to the system. The type of control s provi ded usual l y
depends on the type of di spl ay provi ded. The fol l owi ng are consi stent
wi th the control s:
I Keypads consi st of a numeri c di spl ay system that wi l l general l y be
provi ded wi th a 12-di gi t keypad and several functi on keys such as
access, secure, acknowl edge, and reset. The keypad enabl es an
operator to key i n numeri c requests for the status of speci fi c zones.
I Moni tor-based systems are usual l y provi ded wi th a typewri ter-type
keyboard that enabl es an operator to enter more i nformati on usi ng a
combi nati on of al phanumeri c characters and functi on keys.
I An ESS may be equi pped wi th enhancement hardware/devi ces to
hel p the operator enter i nformati on or execute commands qui ckl y. A
mouse or a trackbal l are typi cal exampl es.
FM 3-19.30
FIELD-DATA COLLECTION
6-49. Sensor and termi nal devi ce data must be transmi tted to the central
al ar m moni tor l ocated i n the securi ty center usi ng a sel ected DTM. The
fol l owi ng are DTM methods that may be used:
Local Processors
6-50. Mul ti pl exi ng techni ques can be used to mi ni mi ze the number of data
l i nks needed to communi cate fi el d-devi ce status to the securi ty center. Thi s i s
done through devi ces cal l ed l ocal processors. The fol l owi ng i s descri pti ve of a
l ocal processors capabi l i ti es:
A l ocal processor may have very few devi ce i nputs, or i t may have many
(dependi ng on the manufacturer). Rather than havi ng a fi xed number
of i nputs, many l ocal processors are expandabl e. For exampl e, a basi c
l ocal processor may be provi ded wi th ei ght devi ce i nputs wi th
addi ti onal bl ocks of ei ght i nputs avai l abl e by usi ng pl ug-i n modul es.
The l ocal processor must provi de l i ne supervi si on for al l
communi cati on l i nks to sensors, termi nal devi ces, and so forth.
Usual l y, di rect-current (DC) l i ne supervi si on i s suppl i ed as the
standard wi th more secure techni ques avai l abl e as opti ons. The data
communi cati on l i nks between the l ocal processor and the central al arm
moni tor must al so be supervi sed.
Local processors can al so provi de output si gnal s that can be used for
such functi ons as acti vati ng sensor remote test features, l i ght control ,
or portal control or acti vati ng a deterrent (such as a l oud horn).
The l ocal processor contai ns a mi croprocessor, sol i d-state memory, and
appropri ate software. I t has the capabi l i ty to perform a number of
functi ons l ocal l y (such as access-/secure-mode sel ecti on, al arm reset,
card or keypad el ectroni c-entry control , portal control , and devi ce
testi ng). I f the communi cati on l i nk to the securi ty center i s temporari l y
l ost, l ocal processors can conti nue to operate i n a stand-al one mode,
stori ng data for transmi ssi on after the l i nk i s restored.
The number of l ocal processors requi red for a speci fi c si te depends on
the number of protected areas and thei r proxi mi ty to each other and
the number of sensors wi thi n a protected area. For exampl e, a smal l
bui l di ng may requi re one l ocal processor, whereas a l arge bui l di ng may
requi re one or more for each fl oor. An exteri or I DS peri meter wi th two
or three di fferent sensors may requi re one l ocal processor for every two
peri meter zones. Al l l ocal processors may be l i nked to the central
computer usi ng one common DTM l i nk, or the DTM may consi st of
several l i nks. The desi gner shoul d note that the temporary l oss of a
DTM l i nk woul d render al l l ocal processors on that l i nk i nacti ve for the
durati on of the l oss.
Central Computer and Local-Processor Data Exchange
6-51. When the ESS i s powered up or reset at the securi ty center, the central
computer wi l l downl oad al l necessary operati onal i nformati on over the DTM
to al l l ocal processors. After the downl oad i s compl ete, the central computer
wi l l automati cal l y begi n pol l i ng the l ocal processors for ESS devi ce status. I n
FM 3-19.30
addi ti on to al arm status, tamper i ndi cati ons, and l ocal -processor status, the
DTM may be requi red to convey securi ty-center consol e-operator commands to
fi el d devi ces. Exampl es i ncl ude securi ty-area access-/secure-mode changes
and i ni ti ati on of the i ntrusi on-sensor sel f test.
CCTV Interface
6-52. I f a CCTV assessment system i s depl oyed wi th the ESS, an i nterface
between the two i s requi red. Thi s i nterface al l ows CCTV system al arms (such
as l oss of vi deo) to be di spl ayed by the ESSs al arm-annunci ati on system. The
i nterface al so provi des I DS al arm si gnal s to the CCTVs vi deo swi tcher so that
the correct CCTV camera wi l l be di spl ayed on the CCTV moni tors to al l ow
real -ti me al arm assessment and vi deo recordi ng as requi red.
ESS SOFTWARE
6-53. The software provi ded wi th computer-based ESS al arm-annunci ati on
systems consi sts of three typesa standard operati ng system (such as the
Mi crosoft-di sk operati ng system [MS-DOS]); vendor-devel oped appl i cati on
programs; and user-fi l l ed, si te-speci fi c data structures.
System software. The desi gner wi l l ensure that system software
provi ded by the vendor conforms to accepted i ndustry standards so
that standard, fol l ow-on mai ntenance and servi ce contracts can be
negoti ated to mai ntai n the central computer system.
Application software. The vendor-devel oped appl i cati on programs
are typi cal l y propri etary and i ncl ude ESS moni tori ng, di spl ay, and
entry-control capabi l i ti es.
User-filled data structures. These data structures are used to
popul ate the si te-speci fi c database. Speci fi c el ectroni c address
i nformati on, personnel access schedul es, and normal duty hours are
typi cal l y i ncl uded i n the si te-speci fi c database. The i nformati on may
i ncl ude preferred route descri pti ons for the response force, the phone
number of the person responsi bl e for the al armed area, and any
hazardous materi al that may be l ocated i n the al armed area.
6-54. ESS software functi ons typi cal l y i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Alarm monitoring and logging. The software shoul d provi de for
moni tori ng al l sensors, l ocal processors, and data communi cati on l i nks
and noti fyi ng the operator of an al arm condi ti on. Al l al arm messages
shoul d be pri nted on the al arm pri nter, archi ved, and di spl ayed at the
consol e. As a mi ni mum, pri nted al arm data shoul d i ncl ude the date
and ti me (to the nearest second) of the al arm and the l ocati on and type
of al arm.
Alarm display. The software shoul d be structured to permi t several
al arms to be annunci ated si mul taneousl y. A buffer or al arm queue
shoul d be avai l abl e to store addi ti onal al arms unti l they are
annunci ated and, subsequentl y, acted upon and reset by the consol e
operator.
Alarm priority. A mi ni mum of fi ve al arm-pri ori ty l evel s shoul d be
avai l abl e. Hi gher-pri ori ty al arms shoul d al ways be di spl ayed before
FM 3-19.30
l ower-pri ori ty al arms. Thi s feature permi ts an operator to respond
qui ckl y to the more i mportant al arms before those of l esser i mportance.
For exampl e, the pri ori ty of al arm devi ces may be as fol l ows:
I Duress.
I I ntrusi on detecti on.
I El ectroni c-entry control .
I Tamper.
I CCTV al arms and equi pment-mal functi on al arms.
Reports. The appl i cati on software shoul d provi de for generati ng,
di spl ayi ng, pri nti ng, and stori ng reports.
PASSWORDS
6-55. Software securi ty wi l l be provi ded by l i mi ti ng access to personnel wi th
authori zed passwords assi gned by a system manager. A mi ni mum of three
password l evel s shal l be provi ded. Addi ti onal securi ty can be provi ded by
programmed restri cti ons that l i mi t the keyboard acti ons of l ogged-i n
passwords to the user ranks of system managers, supervi sors, and consol e
operators, as appropri ate.
OPERATOR INTERFACE
6-56. The software shoul d enabl e an operator wi th the proper password to
enter commands and to obtai n di spl ays of system i nformati on. As a mi ni mum,
an operator shoul d be abl e to perform the fol l owi ng functi ons through the
keyboard or the keypad:
Log on by password to acti vate the keyboard.
Log off to deacti vate the keyboar d.
Request di spl ay of al l keyboard commands that are authori zed for the
l ogged-i n password.
Request di spl ay of detai l ed i nstructi ons for any authori zed keyboard
command.
Acknowl edge and cl ear al arm messages.
Di spl ay the current status of any devi ce i n the system.
Command a status change for any control l ed devi ce i n the system.
Command a mode change for any access/secure devi ce i n the system.
Command pri ntouts of al arm summari es, status summari es, or system
acti vi ty on a desi gnated pr i nter.
Add or del ete ESS devi ces or modi fy parameters associ ated wi th a
devi ce.
INTERIOR INTRUSION-DETECTION SENSORS
6-57. I nteri or i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors are devi ces used to detect
unauthori zed entry i nto speci fi c areas or vol umetri c spaces wi thi n a bui l di ng.
These sensors are usual l y not desi gned to be weatherproof or rugged enough
to survi ve an outdoor envi ronment. Therefore, thi s type of sensor shoul d not
be used outdoors unl ess descri bed by the manufacturer as sui tabl e for outdoor
use.
FM 3-19.30
6-58. I nteri or i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors general l y perform one of three
detecti on functi onsdetecti on of an i ntruder penetrati ng the boundary of a
protected area, detecti on of i ntruder moti on wi thi n a protected area, and
detecti on of an i ntruder touchi ng or l i fti ng an asset wi thi n a protected area.
Therefore, i nteri or sensors are commonl y cl assi fi ed as boundary-penetrati on
sensors, vol umetri c moti on sensors, and poi nt sensors. Al though duress
swi tches are not i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors, they are i ncl uded i n thi s
di scussi on because they are usual l y wi red to the same equi pment that
moni tors the i nteri or i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors.
BOUNDARY-PENETRATION SENSORS
6-59. Boundary-penetrati on sensors are desi gned to detect penetrati on or
attempted penetrati on through peri meter barri ers. These barri ers i ncl ude
wal l s, cei l i ngs, duct openi ngs, doors, and wi ndows.
Structural-Vibration Sensors
6-60. Structural -vi brati on sensors detect l ow-frequency energy generated i n
an attempted penetrati on of a physi cal barri er (such as a wal l or a cei l i ng) by
hammeri ng, dri l l i ng, cutti ng, detonati ng expl osi ves, or empl oyi ng other
forci bl e methods of entry. A pi ezoel ectri c transducer senses mechani cal energy
and converts i t i nto el ectri cal si gnal s proporti onal i n magni tude to the
vi brati ons. To reduce fal se al arms from si ngl e acci dental i mpacts on the
barri er, most vi brati on sensors use a si gnal processor that has an adjustabl e
pul se-counti ng accumul ator i n conjuncti on wi th a manual sensi ti vi ty
adjustment. The count ci rcui t can be set to count a speci fi c number of pul ses of
speci fi c magni tude wi thi n a predefi ned ti me i nterval before an al arm i s
generated. However, the ci rcui try i s usual l y desi gned to respond i mmedi atel y
to l arge pul ses, such as those caused by an expl osi on. The sensi ti vi ty
adjustment i s used to compensate for the type of barri er and the di stance
between transducers. Typi cal l y, several transducers can be connected together
and moni tored by one si gnal processor. Fi gure 6-5, page 6-20, shows an
exampl e of wal l -mounted, structural -vi brati on sensors.
Glass-BreakageSensors
6-61. Gl ass-breakage sensors detect the breaki ng of gl ass. The noi se from
breaki ng gl ass consi sts of frequenci es i n both the audi bl e and ul trasoni c
range. Gl ass-breakage sensors use mi crophone transducers to detect the gl ass
breakage. The sensors are desi gned to respond to speci fi c frequenci es onl y,
thus mi ni mi zi ng such fal se al arms as may be caused by bangi ng on the gl ass.
PassiveUltrasonic Sensors
6-62. Passi ve ul trasoni c sensors detect acousti cal energy i n the ul trasoni c
frequency range, typi cal l y between 20 and 30 ki l ohertz (kHz). They are used
to detect an attempted penetrati on through ri gi d barri ers (such as metal or
masonry wal l s, cei l i ngs, and fl oors). They al so detect penetrati on through
wi ndows and vents covered by metal gri l l es, shutters, or bars i f these openi ngs
are properl y seal ed agai nst outsi de sounds.
FM 3-19.30
6-63. Detection Transducer. The detecti on transducer i s a pi ezoel ectri c
cr ystal that pr oduces el ectri cal si gnal s pr oporti onal to the magni tude of the
vi brati ons. A si ngl e transducer provi des coverage of an area about 15 by 20
feet i n a room wi th an 8- to 12-foot cei l i ng. A typi cal detecti on pattern i s
shown i n Fi gure 6-6. Ten or more transducers can be connected to a si gnal
pr ocessor. As wi th vi br ati on sensor s, the si gnal processor for a passi ve
ul trasoni c sensor has manual sensi ti vi ty adjustment and an adjustabl e pul se-
counti ng accumul ator.
6-64. Sensors. Passi ve ul trasoni c sensors detect ul trasoni c energy that
resul ts from the breaki ng of gl ass, the sni ppi ng of bol t cutters on metal
barri ers, the hi ssi ng of an acetyl ene torch, and the shatteri ng of bri ttl e
materi al s (such as concrete or ci nderbl ock). However, the sensors wi l l not
rel i abl y detect dri l l i ng through most materi al nor attacks agai nst soft
materi al such as wal l board. Thei r effecti ve detecti on range depends l argel y on
the barri er materi al , the method of attempted penetrati on, and the sensi ti vi ty
adjustment of the sensor. Exampl es of maxi mum detecti on di stances for a
typi cal sensor for di fferent types of attempted penetrati on are shown i n Tabl e
6-4.
Signal conduit
Vibration
sensors
Power
conduit
Control unit
Signal conduit
Vibration
sensors
Power
conduit
Control unit
Figure 6-5. Wall-Mounted, Structural-Vibration Sensors
FM 3-19.30
6-65. Balanced Magnetic Switches. Bal anced magneti c swi tches (BMSs)
are typi cal l y used to detect the openi ng of a door. These sensors can al so be
used on wi ndows, hatches, gates, or other structural devi ces that can be
opened to gai n entry. When usi ng a BMS, mount the swi tch mechani sm on the
Table 6-4. Detection Range for Passive Ultrasonic Sensors
Penetration Distance (in Feet)
Cut 1/4-inch-thick expanded metal with bolt cutters 55
Cut 5/8-inch reinforcing bar with bolt cutters 45
Use acetylene cutting torch 39
Cut wood with circular saw 30
Cut 5/8-inch reinforcing bar with hacksaw 19
Drill through brick 15
Drill through 1/8-inch steel plate 6
Cut 1/8-inch steel plate with hacksaw 4
Drill through cinderblock 3
3
0
f
t
Transducer
Figure 6-6. Typical Passive-Ultrasonic-Sensor Detection Pattern
FM 3-19.30
door frame and the actuati ng magnet on the door. Typi cal l y, the BMS has a
three-posi ti on reed swi tch and an addi ti onal magnet (cal l ed the bi as magnet)
l ocated adjacent to the swi tch. When the door i s cl osed, the reed swi tch i s hel d
i n the bal anced or center posi ti on by i nteracti ng magneti c fi el ds. I f the door i s
opened or an exter nal magnet i s brought near the sensor i n an attempt to
defeat i t, the swi tch becomes unbal anced and generates an al arm. A BMS
must be mounted so that the magnet recei ves maxi mum movement when the
door or wi ndow i s opened. Fi gur e 6-7 shows several confi gur ati ons for
mounti ng BMSs.
Grid-WireSensors
6-66. The gri d-wi re sensor consi sts of a conti nuous el ectri cal wi re arranged i n
a gri d pattern. The wi re mai ntai ns an el ectri cal current. An al arm i s
generated when the wi re i s broken. The sensor detects forced entry through
wal l s, fl oors, cei l i ngs, doors, wi ndows, and other barri ers. An enamel -coated
number 24 or 26 Ameri can wi re gauge (AWG) sol i d-copper wi re typi cal l y
forms the gri d. The gri ds maxi mum si ze i s determi ned by the spaci ng between
the wi res, the wi res resi stance, and the el ectri cal characteri sti cs of the source
provi di ng the current. The gri d wi re can be i nstal l ed di rectl y on the barri er, i n
a gri l l e or screen that i s mounted on the barri er, or over an openi ng that
requi res protecti on. The wi re can be stapl ed di rectl y to barri ers made of wood
or wal l board. Wood panel s shoul d be i nstal l ed over the gri d to protect i t from
day-to-day abuse and to conceal i t. When used on ci nder, concrete, and
Bracket or spacer
(as required)
Z bracket
Roll-up door
Spacer
Protected
area
BMS
BMS
Protected
area
BMS
Door opens into protected area Door opens out from protected area Roll-up door
Figure 6-7. BMS Mounting Configurations
FM 3-19.30
masonry surfaces, these surfaces must fi rst be covered wi th pl ywood or other
materi al to whi ch the wi re can be stapl ed. An al ternati ve method i s to stapl e
the wi re gri d to the back si de of a panel and i nstal l the panel over the surface.
VOLUMETRIC MOTION SENSORS
6-67. Vol umetri c moti on sensors are desi gned to detect i ntruder moti on
wi thi n the i nteri or of a protected vol ume. Vol umetri c sensors may be acti ve or
passi ve. Acti ve sensors (such as mi crowave) fi l l the vol ume to be protected
wi th an energy pattern and recogni ze a di sturbance i n the pattern when
anythi ng moves wi thi n the detecti on zone. Whereas acti ve sensors generate
thei r own energy pattern to detect an i ntruder, passi ve sensors (such as I R)
detect energy generated by an i ntruder. Some sensors, known as dual -
technol ogy sensors, use a combi nati on of two di fferent technol ogi es, usual l y
one acti ve and one passi ve, wi thi n the same uni t. I f CCTV assessment or
survei l l ance cameras are i nstal l ed, vi deo moti on sensors can be used to detect
i ntruder movement wi thi n the area. Si nce ul trasoni c moti on sensors are
sel dom used, they wi l l not be di scussed here.
MicrowaveMotion Sensors
6-68. Wi th mi crowave moti on sensors, hi gh-frequency el ectromagneti c energy
i s used to detect an i ntruders moti on wi thi n the protected area. I nteri or or
sophi sti cated mi crowave moti on sensors are normal l y used.
6-69. Interior Microwave Motion Sensors. I nteri or mi crowave moti on
sensors are typi cal l y monostati c; the transmi tter and the recei ver are housed
i n the same encl osure (transcei ver). They may each be provi ded wi th a
separate antenna or they may share a common antenna. The hi gh-frequency
si gnal s produced by the transmi tter are usual l y generated by a sol i d-state
devi ce, such as a gal l i um arseni de fi el d-effect transi stor. The power generated
i s usual l y l ess than 10 mi l l i watts, but i t i s suffi ci ent to transmi t the si gnal for
di stances up to about 100 feet. The shape of the transmi tted beam i s a
functi on of the antenna confi gurati on. The range of the transmi tted beam can
be control l ed wi th a range adjustment. A vari ety of detecti on patterns can be
generated (see Fi gure 6-8, page 6-24). The frequency of the transmi tted si gnal
i s compared wi th the frequency of the si gnal refl ected back from objects i n the
protected area. I f there i s no movement wi thi n the area, the transmi tted and
recei ved frequenci es wi l l be equal and no al arm wi l l be generated. Movement
i n the area wi l l generate a Doppl er frequency shi ft i n the refl ected si gnal and
wi l l produce an al arm i f the si gnal sati sfi es the sensors al arm cri teri a. The
Doppl er shi ft for a human i ntruder i s typi cal l y between 20 and 120 hertz (Hz).
Mi crowave energy can pass through gl ass doors and wi ndows as wel l as
l i ghtwei ght wal l s or parti ti ons constructed of pl ywood, pl asti c, or fi berboard.
As a resul t, fal se al arms are possi bl e because of the refl ecti on of the
mi crowave si gnal s from the movement of peopl e or vehi cl es outsi de of the
protected area. The desi gner can someti mes take advantage of thi s when the
protected area i s l arge and contai ns a number of parti ti ons, but thi s i s not
normal l y done.
FM 3-19.30
6-70. Sophisticated Microwave Motion Sensors. Sophi sti cated
mi crowave moti on sensors may be equi pped wi th el ectroni c range gati ng. Thi s
feature al l ows the sensor to i gnore the si gnal s refl ected beyond the settabl e
detecti on range. Range gati ng may be used to effecti vel y mi ni mi ze unwanted
al arms from acti vi ty outsi de the protected area.
PIR Motion Sensors
6-71. PI R moti on sensors detect a change i n the thermal energy pattern
caused by a movi ng i ntruder and i ni ti ate an al arm when the change i n energy
sati sfi es the detectors al arm cri teri a. These sensors are passi ve devi ces
because they do not transmi t energy; they moni tor the energy radi ated by the
surroundi ng envi ronment.
6-72. Al l objects wi th temperatures above absol ute zero radi ate thermal
energy. The wavel engths of the I R energy spectrum l i e between 1 and 1,000
mi crons. Because the human body radi ates thermal energy of between 7 and
14 mi crons, PI R moti on sensors are typi cal l y desi gned to operate i n the far I R
wavel ength range of 4 to 20 mi crons.
6-73. The I R energy must be focused onto a sensi ng el ement, somewhat as a
camera l ens focuses l i ght onto a fi l m. Two techni ques are commonl y used. One
techni que uses refl ecti ve focusi ng; parabol i c mi rrors focus the energy. The
other uses an opti cal l ens. Of the vari ous types of opti cal l enses, Fresnel l enses
are preferred because they can achi eve short focal l engths wi th mi ni mal
Half
Full
Half
Full
Half
Full
Figure 6-8. Typical Detection Patterns for Microwave Motion Sensors
FM 3-19.30
thi ckness. Because I R energy i s severel y attenuated by gl ass, l enses are
usual l y made of pl asti c.
6-74. The sensors detecti on pattern i s determi ned by the arrangement of
l enses or refl ectors. The pattern i s not conti nuous but consi sts of a number of
rays or fi ngers, one for each mi rror or l ens segment. Numerous detecti on
patterns are avai l abl e, several of whi ch are shown i n Fi gure 6-9. The PI R i s
not provi ded wi th a range adjustment, but the range can be adjusted
50 ft
Top view
Top view
Side view
Side view
Side view
90
o
6.5 ft
18 ft
50 ft
50 ft
100 ft
120 ft
5 ft
Top view
6.5 ft
90
o
8 ft
50 ft
Figure 6-9. Typical Detection Patterns for a PIR Motion Detector
FM 3-19.30
somewhat by mani pul ati ng the sensors posi ti on; therefore, careful sel ecti on of
the appropri ate detecti on pattern i s cri ti cal to proper sensor performance.
6-75. Most manufacturers use a pyroel ectri c materi al as the thermal sensi ng
el ement. Thi s materi al produces a change i n el ectri c charge when exposed to
changes i n temperature. To mi ni mi ze fal se al arms caused by changes i n
ambi ent temperature, most manufacturers use a dual -el ement sensor. The
sensi ng el ement i s spl i t i nto hal ves, one that produces a posi ti ve vol tage pul se
and the other a negati ve pul se when a change i n temperature changes. An
i ntruder enteri ng one of the detecti on fi ngers produces an i mbal ance between
the two hal ves, resul ti ng i n an al arm condi ti on. Quadel ement sensors that
combi ne and compare two dual -el ement sensors are al so i n use. Pul se-count
acti vati on, a techni que i n whi ch a predefi ned number of pul ses wi thi n a
speci fi c i nterval of ti me must be produced before an al arm i s generated, i s al so
used.
Dual-Technology Sensors
6-76. To mi ni mi ze the generati on of al arms caused by sources other than
i ntruders, dual -technol ogy sensors combi ne two di fferent technol ogi es i n one
uni t. I deal l y, thi s i s achi eved by combi ni ng two sensors that i ndi vi dual l y have
a hi gh PD and do not respond to common sources of fal se al arms. Avai l abl e
dual -technol ogy sensors combi ne an acti ve ul trasoni c or mi crowave sensor
wi th a PI R sensor. The al arms from each sensor are l ogi cal l y combi ned i n an
and confi gurati on; that i s, nearl y si mul taneous al arms from both acti ve and
passi ve sensors are needed to produce a val i d al arm. Al though combi ned
technol ogy sensors have a l ower fal se-al arm rate than i ndi vi dual sensors, the
PD i s al so reduced. For exampl e, i f each i ndi vi dual sensor has a PD of 0.95,
the PD of the combi ned sensors i s the product of i ndi vi dual probabi l i ti es (0.9).
Al so, ul trasoni c and mi crowave moti on sensors have the hi ghest probabi l i ty of
detecti ng movement di rectl y toward or away from the sensor, whereas PI R
moti on sensors have the hi ghest probabi l i ty of detecti ng movement across the
detecti on pattern. Therefore, the PD of sensors combi ned i n a si ngl e uni t i s
l ess than that obtai nabl e i f the i ndi vi dual sensors are mounted perpendi cul ar
to each other wi th overl appi ng detecti on patterns. Because of the l ower fal se-
al arm rate, the reduced PD can be somewhat compensated for by i ncreasi ng
the sensi ti vi ty or detecti on cri teri a of each i ndi vi dual sensor.
VideoMotion Sensors
6-77. A vi deo moti on sensor generates an al arm when an i ntruder enters a
sel ected porti on of a CCTV cameras fi el d of vi ew. The sensor processes and
compares successi ve i mages between the i mages agai nst predefi ned al arm
cri teri a. There are two categori es of vi deo moti on detectorsanal og and
di gi tal . Anal og detectors generate an al arm i n response to changes i n a
pi ctures contrast. Di gi tal devi ces convert sel ected porti ons of the anal og vi deo
si gnal i nto di gi tal data that are compared wi th data converted previ ousl y; i f
di fferences exceed preset l i mi ts, an al arm i s generated. The si gnal processor
usual l y provi des an adjustabl e wi ndow that can be posi ti oned anywhere on
the vi deo i mage. Avai l abl e adjustments permi t changi ng hori zontal and
verti cal wi ndow si ze, wi ndow posi ti on, and wi ndow sensi ti vi ty. More
sophi sti cated uni ts provi de several adjustabl e wi ndows that can be
i ndi vi dual l y si zed and posi ti oned. Mul ti pl e wi ndows permi t concentrati ng on
FM 3-19.30
several speci fi c areas of an i mage whi l e i gnori ng others. For exampl e, i n a
scene contai ni ng si x doorways l eadi ng i nto a l ong hal l way, the sensor can be
set to moni tor onl y two cri ti cal doorways.
POINT SENSORS
6-78. Poi nt sensors are used to protect speci fi c objects wi thi n a faci l i ty. These
sensors (someti mes referred to as proxi mi ty sensors) detect an i ntruder
comi ng i n cl ose proxi mi ty to, touchi ng, or l i fti ng an object. Several di fferent
types are avai l abl e, i ncl udi ng capaci tance sensors, pressure mats, and
pressure swi tches. Other types of sensors can al so be used for object
protecti on.
CapacitanceSensors
6-79. Capaci tance sensors detect an i ntruder approachi ng or touchi ng a metal
object by sensi ng a change i n capaci tance between the object and the ground.
A capaci tor consi sts of two metal l i c pl ates separated by a di el ectri c medi um. A
change i n the di el ectri c medi um or el ectri cal charge resul ts i n a change i n
capaci tance. I n practi ce, the metal object to be protected forms one pl ate of the
capaci tor and the ground pl ane surroundi ng the object forms the second pl ate.
The sensor processor measures the capaci tance between the metal object and
the ground pl ane. An approachi ng i ntruder al ters the di el ectri c val ue, thus
changi ng the capaci tance. I f the net capaci tance change sati sfi es the al arm
cri teri a, an al arm i s generated.
6-80. The maxi mum capaci tance that can be moni tored by thi s type of sensor
i s usual l y between 10,000 and 50,000 pi cofarads. The mi ni mum detectabl e
change i n capaci tance can be as l ow as 20 pi cofarads. The si gnal processor
usual l y has a sensi ti vi ty adjustment that can be set to detect an approachi ng
i ntruder several feet away or to requi re that the i ntruder touch the object
before an al arm i s generated.
6-81. Because ai r forms most of the di el ectri c of the capaci tor, changes i n
rel ati ve humi di ty wi l l affect the sensors sensi ti vi ty. An i ncrease i n humi di ty
causes the conducti vi ty of the ai r to i ncrease, l oweri ng the capaci tance.
Movi ng a metal object (such as a fi l e cabi net) cl oser to or away from the
protected object can al so affect the sensi ti vi ty of a capaci tance sensor. Fi gure
6-10, page 6-28, i l l ustrates a typi cal appl i cati on usi ng a capaci tance sensor.
PressureMats
6-82. Pressure mats generate an al arm when pressure i s appl i ed to any part
of the mats surface, as when someone steps on the mat. One type of
constructi on uses two l ayers of copper screeni ng separated by soft-sponge
rubber i nsul ati on wi th l arge hol es i n i t. Another type uses paral l el stri ps of
ri bbon swi tches made from two stri ps of metal separated by an i nsul ati ng
mater i al and spaced sever al i nches apart. When enough pr essur e i s appl i ed to
the mat, ei ther the screeni ng or the metal stri ps make contact, generati ng an
al arm. Pressure mats can be used to detect an i ntruder approachi ng a
protected object, or they can be pl aced by doors or wi ndows to detect entry.
Because pressure mats are easy to bri dge, they shoul d be wel l conceal ed, such
as pl aci ng them under a carpet.
FM 3-19.30
PressureSwitches
6-83. Mechani cal l y acti vated contact swi tches or si ngl e ri bbon swi tches can be
used as pressure swi tches. Objects that requi re protecti on can be pl aced on top
of the swi tch. When the object i s moved, the swi tch actuates and generates an
al arm. I n thi s usage, the swi tch must be wel l conceal ed. The i nterface between
the swi tch and the protected object shoul d be desi gned so that an adversary
cannot sl i de a thi n pi ece of materi al under the object to overri de the swi tch
whi l e the object i s removed.
DURESS-ALARM DEVICES
6-84. Duress-al arm devi ces may be fi xed or portabl e. Operati ons and securi ty
personnel use them to si gnal a l i fe-threateni ng emergency. Acti vati on of a
duress devi ce wi l l generate an al arm at the al arm-moni tori ng stati on.
Because of the nature of the al arm, duress devi ces shoul d never annunci ate at
the poi nt of threat. These devi ces are customari l y manual l y operated.
6-85. Fi xed duress devi ces are mechani cal swi tches permanentl y mounted i n
an i nconspi cuous l ocati on, such as under a counter or desk. They can be
si mpl e push-button swi tches acti vated by the touch of a fi nger or hand or foot-
operated swi tches attached to the fl oor.
6-86. Portabl e duress devi ces are wi rel ess uni ts consi sti ng of a transmi tter
and a recei ver. The transmi tter i s portabl e and smal l enough to be
conveni entl y carri ed by a person. The recei ver i s mounted i n a fi xed l ocati on
wi thi n the faci l i ty. Ei ther ul trasoni c or RF energy can be used as the
communi cati on medi um. When acti vated, the transmi tter generates an al arm
Coaxial cable
Insulating blocks
Capacitance-proximity-sensor
Insulators
Metal grille
signal processor
Figure 6-10. Capacitance-Proximity-Sensor Application
FM 3-19.30
that i s detected (wi thi n range) by the recei ver. The recei ver then acti vates a
rel ay that i s hardwi red to the al arm-moni tori ng system.
EXTERIOR INTRUSION-DETECTION SENSORS
6-87. Exteri or i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors are customari l y used to detect an
i ntruder crossi ng the boundary of a protected area. They can al so be used i n
cl ear zones between fences or around bui l di ngs, for protecti ng materi al s and
equi pment stored outdoors wi thi n a protected boundary, or i n esti mati ng the
PD for bui l di ngs and other faci l i ti es.
6-88. Exteri or sensors are desi gned to operate i n outdoor envi ronmental
condi ti ons. The detecti on functi on must be performed wi th a mi ni mum of
unwanted al arms such as those caused by wi nd, rai n, i ce, standi ng water,
bl owi ng debri s, ani mal s, and other sources. I mportant cri teri a for sel ecti ng an
exteri or sensor are the PD, the sensors suscepti bi l i ty to unwanted al arms,
and the sensors vul nerabi l i ty to defeat.
6-89. The PD of an exteri or sensor i s much more vul nerabl e to the physi cal
and envi ronmental condi ti ons of a si te than that of an i nteri or sensor. Many
uncontrol l abl e forces (such as wi nd, rai n, i ce, frozen soi l , standi ng or runni ng
water, fal l i ng and accumul ated snow, and bl owi ng dust and debri s) may affect
an exteri or sensors performance. Al though attenti on general l y i s di rected to
ci rcumstances that cause a dramati c drop i n the PD, envi ronmental factors
can al so cause short-term i ncreases i n the PD. I f control l ed i ntrusi ons
(i ntrusi ons by securi ty personnel to veri fy the current detecti on capabi l i ty of
an I DS) are done whi l e an I DS temporari l y has a hi gher than usual PD as the
resul t of current si te condi ti ons, the resul ts may gi ve a fal se i ndi cati on of the
general effecti veness of that I DS.
6-90. Because of the nature of the outdoor envi ronment, exteri or sensors are
al so more suscepti bl e to nui sance and envi ronmental al arms than i nteri or
sensors. I ncl ement weather condi ti ons (heavy rai n, hai l , and hi gh wi nd),
vegetati on, the natural vari ati on of the temperature of objects i n the detecti on
zone, bl owi ng debri s, and ani mal s are major sources of unwanted al arms.
6-91. As wi th i nteri or sensors, tamper protecti on, si gnal -l i ne supervi si on, sel f-
test capabi l i ty, and proper i nstal l ati on make exteri or sensors l ess vul nerabl e
to defeat. Because si gnal -processi ng ci rcui try for exteri or sensors i s general l y
more vul nerabl e to tamperi ng and defeat than that for i nteri or sensors, i t i s
extr emel y i mportant that encl osures ar e l ocated and i nstal l ed pr oper l y and
that adequate physi cal protecti on i s provi ded. Several di fferent types of
exteri or i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors are avai l abl e. They can be categori zed
as
Fence sensors.
Buri ed l i ne sensors.
LOS sensors.
Vi deo moti on sensors.
FM 3-19.30
FENCE SENSORS
6-92. Fence sensors detect attempts to penetrate a fence around a protected
area. Penetrati on attempts (such as cl i mbi ng, cutti ng, or l i fti ng) generate
mechani cal vi brati ons and stresses i n fence fabri c and posts that are usual l y
di fferent than those caused by natural phenomena l i ke wi nd and rai n. The
basi c types of sensors used to detect these vi brati ons and stresses are strai n-
sensi ti ve cabl e, taut wi re, and fi ber opti cs. Other types of fence sensors detect
penetrati on attempts by sensi ng changes i n an el ectri c fi el d or i n capaci tance.
Mechani cal and el ectromechani cal fence sensors are sel dom used and wi l l not
be di scussed here.
Strain-SensitiveCable
6-93. Strai n-sensi ti ve cabl es are transducers that are uni forml y sensi ti ve
al ong thei r enti re l ength. They generate an anal og vol tage when subject to
mechani cal di storti ons or stress resul ti ng from fence moti on. Strai n-sensi ti ve
cabl es are sensi ti ve to both l ow and hi gh frequenci es. The si gnal processor
usual l y has a band-pass fi l ter that passes onl y those si gnal s characteri sti c of
fence-penetrati on acti ons. An al arm i s i ni ti ated when the si gnal s frequency,
ampl i tude, and durati on characteri sti cs sati sfy the processors cri teri a.
Because the cabl e acts l i ke a mi crophone, some manufacturers offer an opti on
that al l ows the operator to l i sten to fence noi ses causi ng the al arm. Operators
can then determi ne whether the noi ses are natural l y occurri ng sounds from
wi nd or rai n or are from an actual i ntrusi on attempt. Thi s feature i s rel ati vel y
costl y to i mpl ement because i t requi res addi ti onal cabl e from each si gnal
processor to the securi ty center and, i f CCTV i s bei ng used, i t may be of
l i mi ted benefi t. Strai n-sensi ti ve cabl e i s attached to a chai n-l i nk fence about
hal fway between the bottom and top of the fence fabri c wi th pl asti c ti es. One
end of the cabl e i s termi nated at the si gnal processor and the other end wi th a
resi sti ve l oad. The DC through the cabl e provi des l i ne supervi si on agai nst
cutti ng or el ectri cal l y shorti ng the cabl e or di sconnecti ng i t from the processor.
A typi cal i nstal l ati on i s shown i n Fi gure 6-11.
Taut-WireSensor
6-94. A taut-wi re sensor combi nes a physi cal l y taut-wi re barri er wi th an
i ntrusi on-detecti on sensor network. The taut-wi re sensor consi sts of a col umn
of uni forml y spaced hori zontal wi res up to several hundred feet i n l ength and
securel y anchored at each end. Typi cal l y, the wi res are spaced 4 to 8 i nches
apart. Each i s i ndi vi dual l y tensi oned and attached to a detector l ocated i n a
sensor post. Two types of detectors are commonl y usedmechani cal swi tches
and strai n gauges.
The mechani cal swi tch consi sts of a speci al l y desi gned swi tch
mechani sm that i s normal l y open. The tensi oned wi res are
mechani cal l y attached to the swi tch, and movement of the wi re beyond
a preset l i mi t causes the swi tch to cl ose. To counteract smal l gradual
movements of a wi re (such as that caused by settl i ng of the fence or by
freezi ng or thawi ng of soi l ) swi tches are usual l y supported i n thei r
housi ng by a soft pl asti c materi al . Thi s materi al al l ows the swi tch to
sel f-adjust when acted upon by gradual external forces and wi re effects
FM 3-19.30
such as the rel axati on of the wi re wi th ti me and i ts thermal expansi on
or contracti on.
Strai n-gauge detectors are attached to the taut wi re wi th a nut on a
threaded stud. When a force i s appl i ed to the taut wi re, the resul ti ng
defl ecti on i s converted by the strai n gauge i nto a change i n el ectri cal
output that i s moni tored by a si gnal processor.
6-95. Wi th sensors that use mechani cal swi tches as detectors, the swi tches i n
a si ngl e sensor-post assembl y are wi red i n paral l el and are connected di rectl y
to the al arm-annunci ati on system. Pul se-count ci rcui try i s not used because a
si ngl e swi tch cl osure, such as that caused by an i ntruder movi ng or cutti ng
one wi re, i s i ndi cati ve of an i ntrusi on attempt. Strai n-gauge detectors i n a
sensor post are moni tored by a si gnal processor. When the si gnal from one or
more strai n gauges sati sfi es the processors cri teri a, an al arm i s i ni ti ated.
6-96. The taut-wi re sensor can be i nstal l ed as a freestandi ng fence or can be
mounted on an exi sti ng fence or wal l . Fi gure 6-12, page 6-32, shows a
freestandi ng confi gurati on.
Fiber-Optic CableSensors
6-97. Fi ber-opti c cabl e sensors are functi onal l y equi val ent to the strai n-
sensi ti ve cabl e sensors previ ousl y di scussed. However, rather than el ectri cal
si gnal s, modul ated l i ght i s transmi tted down the cabl e and the resul ti ng
recei ved si gnal s are processed to determi ne whether an al arm shoul d be
i ni ti ated. Si nce the cabl e contai ns no metal and no el ectri cal si gnal i s present,
fi ber-opti c sensors are general l y l ess suscepti bl e to el ectri cal i nterference from
l i ghtni ng or other sources.
Electric-Field Sensors
6-98. El ectri c-fi el d sensors consi st of an al ternati ng-current (AC) fi el d
generator, one or more fi el d wi res, one or more sense wi res, and a si gnal
Sensor cable
Termination of
sensor cable
To site security center
Signal processor
Figure 6-11. Typical Strain-Sensor Cable Installation
FM 3-19.30
pr ocessor. The generator exci tes the fi el d wi res around whi ch an el ectr ostati c-
fi el d pattern i s created. The el ectrostati c fi el d i nduces el ectri cal si gnal s i n the
sense wi res, whi ch are moni tored by the si gnal processor. Under normal
operati ng condi ti ons, the i nduced si gnal s are constant. However, when an
i ntruder approaches the sensor, the i nduced el ectri cal si gnal s are al tered,
causi ng the si gnal processor to generate an al arm.
6-99. Several di fferent fi el d- and sense-wi re confi gurati ons are avai l abl e.
They range from one fi el d wi re and one sense wi re to as many as four fi el d
wi res and one sense wi re or four fi el d wi res and four sense wi res. Fi gure 6-13
shows the detecti on pattern produced by verti cal three-wi re (one fi el d and two
sense wi res) confi gurati ons. The three-wi re system has a wi der detecti on
envel ope and i s l ess costl y (one l ess fi el d wi re and associ ated hardware).
However, because of the ti ghter coupl i ng between wi res, the four-wi re system
i s l ess suscepti bl e to nui sance al arms caused by extraneous noi se al ong the
l ength of the zone.
6-100. A si gnal processor moni tors the si gnal s produced by the sense wi res.
The processor usual l y contai ns a band-pass fi l ter that rejects hi gh-frequency
si gnal s such as those caused by objects stri ki ng the wi res. Addi ti onal cri teri a
that must be sati sfi ed before the processor i ni ti ates an al arm i ncl ude si gnal
ampl i tude and si gnal durati on. By requi ri ng the si gnal to be present for a
preset amount of ti me, fal se al arms (such as those caused by bi rds fl yi ng
through the detecti on pattern) can be mi ni mi zed.
6-101. As wi th taut-wi re sensors, el ectri c-fi el d sensors can be freestandi ng
(mounted on thei r own posts) or attached by standoffs to an exi sti ng fence.
They can al so be confi gured to fol l ow contours of the ground. The area under
the sensor must be cl ear of vegetati on, si nce vegetati on near or touchi ng sense
wi res can cause fal se al arms. These sensors can al so be i nstal l ed on the wal l s
and roof of a bui l di ng.
Sensor post
Tension wires
Anchor post
Figure 6-12. Typical Taut-Wire Installation
FM 3-19.30
CapacitanceProximity Sensors
6-102. Capaci tance proxi mi ty sensors measure the el ectri cal capaci tance
between the ground and an array of sense wi res. Any vari ati ons i n
capaci tance, such as that caused by an i ntruder approachi ng or touchi ng one
of the sense wi r es, i ni ti ates an al ar m. These sensors usual l y consi st of two or
three wi res attached to outri ggers al ong the top of an exi sti ng fence, wal l , or
roof edge. Fi gure 6-14, page 6-34, shows a typi cal capaci tance sensor
consi sti ng of three sensor wi res attached to the outri gger of a fence. To
mi ni mi ze envi ronmental al arms, the capaci tance sensor i s di vi ded i nto two
arrays of equal l ength. The si gnal processor moni tors the capaci tance of each
array. Changes i n capaci tance common to both arrays (such as produced by
wi nd, rai n, i ce, fog, and l i ghtni ng) are cancel ed wi thi n the processor. However,
when changes occur i n one array and not the other because of an i ntruder, the
processor i ni ti ates an al arm.
BURIED-LINE SENSORS
6-103. A buri ed-l i ne sensor system consi sts of detecti on probes or cabl e buri ed
i n the ground, typi cal l y between two fences that form an i sol ati on zone. These
devi ces are wi red to an el ectroni c processi ng uni t. The processi ng uni t
generates an al arm i f an i ntruder passes through the detecti on fi el d. Buri ed-
l i ne sensors have several si gni fi cant features:
They are hi dden, maki ng them di ffi cul t to detect and ci rcumvent.
They fol l ow the terrai ns natural contour.
They do not physi cal l y i nterfere wi th human acti vi ty, such as grass
mowi ng or snow removal .
f = field waves
S = sense waves
Fence
Fence
Three-wire sensor Four-wire sensor
S
S
f
S
f
f
S
Figure 6-13. Typical Electric-Field-Sensor Detection Patterns
FM 3-19.30
They are affected by certai n envi ronmental condi ti ons, such as runni ng
water and ground freeze/thaw cycl es. (Sei smi c, sei smi c/magneti c,
magneti c, and bal anced pressure sensors are sel dom used and wi l l not
be di scussed here.)
6-104. The ported-coax cabl e sensor consi sts of two coax cabl es buri ed i n the
ground paral l el to each other. An RF transmi tter i s connected to one cabl e and
a recei ver to the other. The outer conductor of each cabl e i s ported (fabri cated
wi th smal l hol es or gaps i n the shi el d). The transmi tter cabl e radi ates RF
ener gy i nto the medi um sur r oundi ng the cabl es. A porti on of thi s ener gy i s
coupl ed i nto the recei ver cabl e through i ts ported shi el d. (Because of the
por ted shi el ds, these cabl es are fr equentl y refer r ed to as l eaky cabl es.) When
an i ntruder enters the RF fi el d, the coupl i ng i s di sturbed, resul ti ng i n a
change of si gnal moni tored by the recei ver, whi ch then generates an al arm.
Two basi c types of ported-coax sensors are avai l abl epul se and conti nuous
wave.
Pul se-type sensors transmi t a pul se of RF energy down one cabl e and
moni tors the recei ved si gnal on the other. The cabl es can be up to
10,000 feet l ong. The si gnal processor i ni ti ates an al arm when the
el ectromagneti c fi el d created by the pul se i s di sturbed and i denti fi es
the di sturbances approxi mate l ocati on.
Conti nuous-wave sensors appl y conti nuous RF energy to one cabl e. The
si gnal r ecei ved on the other cabl e i s moni tor ed for el ectr omagneti c-fi el d
di sturbances that i ndi cate an i ntruders presence. Cabl e l engths are
l i mi ted to 300 to 500 feet. Addi ti onal l y, the sensor i s avai l abl e i n a
si ngl e-cabl e confi gurati on as wel l as two separate cabl es. The pattern
typi cal l y extends 2 to 4 feet above the ground and can be 5 to 13 feet
wi de, dependi ng on cabl e spaci ng and soi l composi ti on. Fi gure 6-15
represents a typi cal cross-secti on of a detecti on pattern created by a
ported-cabl e sensor.
Capacitance wires
Metal conduit
Signal processor
Wire to earth ground
Plastic conduit
Figure 6-14. Typical Capacitance-Sensor Configuration
FM 3-19.30
6-105. Sensor performance depends on properti es of the medi um surroundi ng
the cabl es. Vel oci ty and attenuati on of the RF wave that propagates al ong the
cabl es and the coupl i ng between the cabl es are functi ons of the di el ectri c
constant of the soi l and i ts conducti vi ty whi ch, i n turn, depends on i ts
moi sture content. For exampl e, the vel oci ty i s greater and the attenuati on i s
l ess for cabl es buri ed i n dry, l ow-l oss soi l than i n wet, conducti ve soi l . Freeze/
thaw cycl es i n the soi l al so affect the sensors performance. When wet soi l
freezes, the wave vel oci ty and the cabl e coupl i ng i ncrease and the attenuati on
decreases, resul ti ng i n greater detecti on sensi ti vi ty. Seasonal sensi ti vi ty
adjustments may be necessary to compensate for changi ng ground condi ti ons.
6-106. Al though usual l y buri ed i n soi l , ported cabl es can al so be used wi th
asphal t and concrete. I f the asphal t or concrete pavement area i s rel ati vel y
smal l and onl y a few i nches thi ck (such as a pedestri an pavement crossi ng the
peri meter), the ported cabl es can be routed under the pavement. However, for
the l arge and deep pavements, sl ots must be cut i nto the asphal t or concrete to
accept the cabl e.
6-107. A portabl e ported-coax sensor i s avai l abl e that can be rapi dl y depl oyed
and removed. The cabl es are pl aced on the surface of the ground rather than
buri ed. Thi s sensor i s useful for temporary peri meter detecti on coverage for
smal l areas or objects (such as vehi cl es or ai rcraft).
LOS SENSORS
6-108. The LOS sensors, whi ch are mounted above ground, can be ei ther
acti ve or passi ve. Acti ve sensors generate a beam of energy and detect changes
i n the recei ved energy that an i ntruder causes by penetrati ng the beam. Each
sensor consi sts of a transmi tter and a recei ver and can be i n a monostati c or
bi stati c confi gurati on. Passi ve sensors generate no beam of energy; they
si mpl y l ook for changes i n the thermal characteri sti cs of thei r fi el d of vi ew. For
effecti ve detecti on, the terrai n wi thi n the detecti on zone must be fl at and free
of obstacl es and vegetati on.
3 to 4 ft
8 to 12 in
5 to 13 ft
3 to 10 ft
Detection zone
Ported cable
Figure 6-15. Typical Ported-Cable Detection Pattern
FM 3-19.30
MicrowaveSensors
6-109. Mi crowave i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors are categori zed as bi stati c or
monostati c. Bi stati c sensors use transmi tti ng and recei vi ng antennas l ocated
at opposi te ends of the mi crowave l i nk, whereas monostati c sensors use the
same antenna.
A bi stati c system uses a transmi tter and a recei ver that are typi cal l y
separated by 100 to 1,200 feet and that are wi thi n di rect LOS wi th
each other. The si gnal pi cked up by the recei ver i s the vector sum of the
di rectl y transmi tted si gnal and si gnal s that are refl ected from the
ground and nearby structures. Detecti on occurs when an object
(i ntruder) movi ng wi thi n the beam pattern causes a change i n net-
vector summati on of the recei ved si gnal s, resul ti ng i n vari ati ons of
si gnal strength.
I The same frequency bands al l ocated by the Federal Communi cati ons
Commi ssi on (FCC) for i nteri or mi crowave sensors are al so used for
exteri or sensors. Because hi gh-frequency mi crowave beams are more
di recti ve than l ow-frequency beams and the beam pattern i s l ess
affected by bl owi ng grass i n the area between the transmi tter and
the recei ver, most exter i or sensors oper ate at the next to hi ghest
al l owabl e frequency, 10.525 gi gahertz (GHz).
I The shape of the mi crowave beam and the maxi mum separati on
between the transmi tter and the recei ver are functi ons of antenna
si ze and confi gurati on. Vari ous antenna confi gurati ons are avai l abl e,
i ncl udi ng parabol i c-di sh arrays, stri p-l i ne arrays, and sl otted arrays.
The parabol i c antenna uses a mi crowave-feed assembl y l ocated at
the focal poi nt of a metal l i c parabol i c refl ector. A coni cal beam
pattern i s produced (see Fi gure 6-16). A stri p-l i ne antenna
confi gurati on produces a nonsymmetri cal beam that i s hi gher than
i ts hei ght. Larger antenna confi gurati ons general l y produce
narrower beam patterns.
Figure 6-16. Stacked Microwave Configuration
FM 3-19.30
Monostati c mi crowave sensors use the same antenna or vi rtual l y
coi nci dent antenna arrays for the transmi tter and recei ver, whi ch are
usual l y combi ned i nto a si ngl e package. Two types of monostati c
sensors are avai l abl e. Ampl i tude-modul ated (AM) sensors detect
changes i n the net-vector summati on of refl ected si gnal s si mi l ar to
bi stati c sensors. Frequency-modul ated (FM) sensors operate on the
Doppl er pri nci pl e si mi l ar to i nteri or mi crowave sensors. The detecti on
pattern i s typi cal l y shaped l i ke a teardrop (see Fi gure 6-17).
Monostati c sensors can provi de vol umetri c coverage of l ocal i zed areas,
such as i n corners or around the base of cri ti cal equi pment.
.
IR Sensors
6-110. The I R sensors are avai l abl e i n both acti ve and passi ve model s. An
acti ve sensor generates one or more near-I R beams that generate an al arm
when i nterrupted. A passi ve sensor detects changes i n thermal I R radi ati on
from objects l ocated wi thi n i ts fi el d of vi ew.
6-111. Acti ve sensors consi st of transmi tter/recei ver pai rs. The transmi tter
contai ns an I R l i ght source (such as a gal l i um arseni de l i ght-emi tti ng di ode
[LED]) that generates an I R beam. The l i ght source i s usual l y modul ated to
reduce the sensors suscepti bi l i ty to unwanted al arms resul ti ng from sunl i ght
or other I R l i ght sources. The recei ver detects changes i n the si gnal power of
the recei ved beam. To mi ni mi ze nui sance al arms from bi rds or bl owi ng debri s,
the al arm cri teri a usual l y requi re that a hi gh percentage of the beam be
bl ocked for a speci fi c i nterval of ti me.
6-112. Acti ve sensors can be si ngl e- or mul ti pl e-beam systems. Because
si ngl e-beam sensors can be easi l y bypassed, mul ti pl e-beam systems are
general l y used i n peri meter appl i cati ons. There are two basi c types of
mul ti pl e-beam confi gurati onsone type uses al l transmi tters on one post and
al l recei vers on the other post; the second type uses one transmi tter and
several recei vers on each post. Both types are i l l ustrated i n Fi gure 6-18, page
6-38.
Transceiver
Microwave beam
Figure 6-17. Typical Monostatic-Microwave-Sensor Detection Pattern
FM 3-19.30
6-113. The spaci ng between transmi tters and recei vers can be as great as
1,000 feet when operati on i s under good weather condi ti ons. However,
condi ti ons such as heavy rai n, fog, snow, or bl owi ng dust parti cl es attenuate
the I R energy, reduci ng i ts effecti ve range to 100 to 200 feet or l ess.
VIDEO MOTION SENSORS
6-114. A vi deo moti on sensor generates an al arm whenever an i ntruder
enters a sel ected porti on of a CCTV cameras fi el d of vi ew. The sensor
processes and compares successi ve i mages from the camera and generates an
al arm i f di fferences between the i mages sati sfy predefi ned cri teri a. Di gi tal
devi ces convert sel ected porti ons of the anal og vi deo si gnal i nto di gi tal data
that are compared wi th data converted previ ousl y; i f di fferences exceed preset
l i mi ts, an al arm i s generated.
6-115. The si gnal processor usual l y provi des an adjustabl e wi ndow that can
be posi ti oned anywhere on the vi deo i mage. Avai l abl e adjustments permi t
changi ng the wi ndows hori zontal and verti cal si zes, i ts posi ti on, and i ts
sensi ti vi ty. More sophi sti cated uni ts provi de several adjustabl e wi ndows that
can be i ndi vi dual l y si zed and posi ti oned. Mul ti pl e wi ndows permi t
concentrati ng on several speci fi c areas of an i mage whi l e i gnori ng others. For
exampl e, i n a scene that contai ns several cri ti cal assets and mul ti pl e sources
of nui sance al arms (such as l arge bushes or trees), the sensor can be adjusted
to moni tor onl y the assets and i gnore the areas that contai n the nui sance-
al arm sources.
6-116. The use of vi deo moti on-detecti on systems for exteri or appl i cati ons has
been l i mi ted, pri mari l y because of di ffi cul ti es wi th uncontrol l ed exteri or
envi ronments. Li ghti ng vari ati ons caused by cl oud movement and shadows of
sl ow-movi ng objects, bi rds and ani mal s movi ng wi thi n the cameras fi el d of
vi ew, camera moti on and movi ng vegetati on duri ng wi ndy condi ti ons, and
severe weather condi ti ons have tradi ti onal l y caused a mul ti tude of unwanted
al arms i n thi s type of system. Systems usi ng more advanced si gnal -processi ng
al gori thms have i mproved moti on-detecti on capabi l i ty and nui sance-al arm
T = Transmitter R = Receiver
Infrared beams
Infrared beams
T
T
T
T
T
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
T
T
Figure 6-18. Typical IR-Sensor Beam Patterns
FM 3-19.30
rejecti on; however, they are sti l l subject to hi gh unwanted-al arm rates under
certai n condi ti ons and shoul d be used wi th due cauti on and extreme care.
ELECTRONIC ENTRY CONTROL
6-117. The functi on of an entry-control system i s to ensure that onl y
authori zed personnel are permi tted i nto or out of a control l ed area. Entry can
be control l ed by l ocked fence gates, l ocked doors to a bui l di ng or rooms wi thi n
a bui l di ng, or speci al l y desi gned portal s.
6-118. These means of entry control can be appl i ed manual l y by guards or
automati cal l y by usi ng entry-control devi ces. I n a manual system, guards
veri fy that a person i s authori zed to enter an area, usual l y by compari ng the
photograph and personal characteri sti cs of the i ndi vi dual requesti ng entry. I n
an automated system, the entry-control devi ce veri fi es that a person i s
authori zed to enter or exi t. The automated system usual l y i nterfaces wi th
l ocki ng mechani sms on doors or gates that open momentari l y to permi t
passage. Mechani cal hardware (such as l ocki ng mechani sms, el ectri c door
stri kes, and speci al l y desi gned portal hardware) and equi pment used to detect
contraband materi al (such as metal detectors, X-ray baggage-search systems,
expl osi ves detectors, and speci al nucl ear-materi al moni tors) are descri bed i n
other documentati on. Refer to TM 5-853-1 for addi ti onal i nformati on on
determi ni ng entry-control requi rements and i ntegrati ng manual el ectroni c-
entry control i nto a cohesi ve system.
6-119. Al l entry-control systems control passage by usi ng one or more of three
basi c techni quessomethi ng a person knows, somethi ng a person has, or
somethi ng a person i s or does. Automated entry-control devi ces based on these
techni ques are grouped i nto three categori escoded, credenti al , and
bi ometri c devi ces.
CODED DEVICES
6-120. Coded devi ces operate on the pri nci pl e that a person has been i ssued a
code to enter i nto an entry-control devi ce. Thi s code wi l l match the code stored
i n the devi ce and permi t entry. Dependi ng on the appl i cati on, a si ngl e code can
be used by al l persons author i zed to enter the contr ol l ed area or each
author i zed per son can be assi gned a uni que code. Gr oup codes ar e useful
when the group i s smal l and control s are pri mari l y for keepi ng out the general
publ i c. I ndi vi dual codes are usual l y requi red for control of entry to more
cri ti cal areas. Coded devi ces veri fy the entered codes authenti ci ty, and any
person enteri ng a correct code i s authori zed to enter the control l ed area.
El ectroni cal l y coded devi ces i ncl ude el ectroni c and computer-control l ed
keypads.
Electronic Keypad Devices
6-121. The common tel ephone keypad (12 keys) i s an exampl e of an el ectroni c
keypad. Thi s type of keypad consi sts of si mpl e push-button swi tches that,
when depressed, are decoded by di gi tal l ogi c ci rcui ts. When the correct
sequence of buttons i s pushed, an el ectri c si gnal unl ocks the door for a few
seconds.
FM 3-19.30
Computer-Controlled Keypad Devices
6-122. These devi ces are si mi l ar to el ectroni c keypad devi ces, except they are
equi pped wi th a mi croprocessor i n the keypad or i n a separate encl osure at a
di fferent l ocati on. The mi croprocessor moni tors the sequence i n whi ch the
keys are depressed and may provi de addi ti onal functi ons such as personal I D
and di gi t scrambl i ng. When the correct code i s entered and al l condi ti ons are
sati sfi ed, an el ectri c si gnal unl ocks the door.
CREDENTIAL DEVICES
6-123. A credenti al devi ce i denti fi es a person havi ng l egi ti mate authori ty to
enter a control l ed area. A coded credenti al (pl asti c card or key) contai ns a
prerecorded, machi ne-readabl e code. An el ectri c si gnal unl ocks the door i f the
prerecorded code matches the code stored i n the system when the card i s read.
Li ke coded devi ces, credenti al devi ces onl y authenti cate the credenti al ; i t
assumes a user wi th an acceptabl e credenti al i s authori zed to enter. Vari ous
technol ogi es are used to store the code upon or wi thi n a card. Hol l eri th,
opti cal l y coded, magneti c-spot, capaci tance, and el ectri c-ci rcui t cards are
sel dom used and wi l l not be di scussed here. The most commonl y used types of
cards are descri bed as fol l ows:
Magnetic-StripeCard
6-124. A stri p of magneti c materi al l ocated al ong one edge of the card i s
encoded wi th data (someti mes encrypted). The data i s read by movi ng the card
past a magneti c read head.
Wiegand-Effect Card
6-125. The Wi egand-effect card contai ns a seri es of smal l -di ameter, paral l el
wi res about one-hal f i nch l ong, embedded i n the bottom hal f of the card. The
wi res are manufactured from ferromagneti c materi al s that produce a sharp
change i n magneti c fl ux when exposed to a sl owl y changi ng magneti c fi el d.
Thi s type of card i s i mpervi ous to acci dental erasure. The card reader contai ns
a smal l read head and a ti ny magnet to suppl y the appl i ed magneti c fi el d. I t
usual l y does not requi re external power.
Proximity Card
6-126. A proxi mi ty card i s not physi cal l y i nserted i nto a reader; the coded
pattern on the card i s sensed when i t i s brought wi thi n several i nches of the
reader. Several techni ques are used to code cards. One techni que uses a
number of el ectri cal l y tuned ci rcui ts embedded i n the card. Data are encoded
by varyi ng resonant frequenci es of the tuned ci rcui ts. The reader contai ns a
transmi tter that conti nual l y sweeps through a speci fi ed range of frequenci es
and a recei ver that senses the pattern of resonant frequenci es contai ned i n the
card. Another techni que uses an i ntegrated ci rcui t embedded i n the card to
generate a code that can be magneti cal l y or el ectrostati cal l y coupl ed to the
reader. The power requi red to acti vate embedded ci rcui try can be provi ded by
a smal l battery embedded i n the card or by magneti cal l y coupl i ng power from
the reader.
FM 3-19.30
Laser Card
6-127. The opti cal memory card, commonl y cal l ed the l aser card, uses the
same technol ogy devel oped for recordi ng vi deo and audi o di sks for
entertai nment purposes. Data i s recorded on the card by burni ng a
mi croscopi c hol e (usi ng a l aser) i n a thi n fi l m coveri ng the card. Data i s read
by usi ng a l aser to sense the hol e l ocati ons. The typi cal l aser card can hol d
sever al megabytes of user data.
Smart Card
6-128. A smart card i s embedded wi th a mi croprocessor, memory,
communi cati on ci rcui try, and a battery. The card contai ns edge contacts that
enabl e a reader to communi cate wi th the mi croprocessor. Entry-control
i nformati on and other data may be stored i n the mi croprocessors memory.
Bar Code
6-129. A bar code consi sts of bl ack bars pri nted on whi te paper or tape that
can be easi l y read wi th an opti cal scanner. Thi s type of codi ng i s not wi del y
used for entry-control appl i cati ons because i t can be easi l y dupl i cated. I t i s
possi bl e to conceal the code by appl yi ng an opaque mask over i t. I n thi s
approach, an I R scanner i s used to i nterpret the pri nted code. For l ow-l evel
securi ty areas, the use of bar codes can provi de a cost-effecti ve sol uti on for
entry control . Coded stri ps and opaque masks can be attached to exi sti ng I D
badges, al l evi ati ng the need for compl ete badge repl acement.
BIOMETRIC DEVICES
6-130. The thi rd basi c techni que used to control entry i s based on the
measurement of one or more physi cal or personal characteri sti cs of an
i ndi vi dual . Because most entry-control devi ces based on thi s techni que rel y on
measurements of bi ol ogi cal characteri sti cs, they have become commonl y
known as bi ometri c devi ces. Characteri sti cs such as fi ngerpri nts, hand
geometry, voi cepri nts, handwri ti ng, and reti nal bl ood-vessel patterns have
been used for control l i ng entry. Typi cal l y, i n enrol l i ng i ndi vi dual s, several
reference measurements are made of the sel ected characteri sti c and then
stored i n the devi ces memory or on a card. From then on, when that person
attempts entry, a scan of the characteri sti c i s compared wi th the reference
data templ ate. I f a match i s found, entry i s granted. Rather then veri fyi ng an
arti fact, such as a code or a credenti al , bi ometri c devi ces veri fy a persons
physi cal characteri sti c, thus provi di ng a form of i denti ty veri fi cati on. Because
of thi s, bi ometri c devi ces are someti mes referred to as personnel i denti ty-
veri fi cati on devi ces. The most common bi ometri c devi ces are di scussed bel ow.
Fingerprints
6-131. Fi ngerpri nt-veri fi cati on devi ces use one of two approaches. One i s
pattern recogni ti on of the whorl s, l oops, and ti l ts of the referenced fi ngerpri nt,
whi ch i s stored i n a di gi ti zed representati on of the i mage and compared wi th
the fi ngerpri nt of the prospecti ve entrant. The second approach i s mi nuti ae
compari son, whi ch means that the endi ngs and branchi ng poi nts of ri dges and
val l eys of the referenced fi ngerpri nt are compared wi th the fi ngerpri nt of the
prospecti ve entrant.
FM 3-19.30
Hand Geometry
6-132. Several devi ces are avai l abl e that use hand geometry for personnel
veri fi cati on. These devi ces use a vari ety of physi cal measurements of the
hand, such as fi nger l ength, fi nger curvature, hand wi dth, webbi ng between
fi ngers, and l i ght transmi ssi vi ty through the ski n to veri fy i denti ty. Both two-
and three-di mensi onal uni ts are avai l abl e.
Retinal Patterns
6-133. Thi s type of techni que i s based on the premi se that the pattern of bl ood
vessel s on the human eyes reti na i s uni que to an i ndi vi dual . Whi l e the eye i s
focused on a vi sual target, a l ow-i ntensi ty I R l i ght beam scans a ci rcul ar area
of the reti na. The amount of l i ght refl ected from the eye i s recorded as the
beam progresses around the ci rcul ar path. Refl ected l i ght i s modul ated by the
di fference i n refl ecti vi ty between bl ood-vessel pattern and adjacent ti ssue.
Thi s i nformati on i s processed and converted to a di gi tal templ ate that i s
stored as the eyes si gnature. Users are al l owed to wear contact l enses;
however, gl asses shoul d be removed.
DeviceCombinations
6-134. Frequentl y, an automated entry-control system uses combi nati ons of
the three types of entry-control devi ces. Combi ni ng two di fferent devi ces can
si gni fi cantl y enhance the systems securi ty l evel . I n some cases, combi ni ng
devi ces resul ts i n reduced veri fi cati on ti mes.
APPLICATION GUIDELINES
6-135. The pri mary functi on of an automated entry-control system i s to
permi t authori zed personnel to enter or exi t a control l ed area. Features
avai l abl e to the desi gner are descri bed bel ow.
Enrollment. Al l entry-control systems must provi de a means of
enteri ng, updati ng, and del eti ng i nformati on about authori zed
i ndi vi dual s i nto the systems database fi l es. Thi s i s usual l y
accompl i shed wi th a dedi cated enrol l ment stati on for enrol l i ng and
di senrol l i ng purposes that i s di rectl y connected to the central -
processi ng uni t. When credenti al devi ces are used, al l authori zed users
must be provi ded wi th an appropri ate credenti al . A means shoul d al so
be provi ded to di senrol l a person qui ckl y wi thout havi ng to retri eve a
credenti al . When usi ng bi ometri c devi ces, addi ti onal enrol l ment
equi pment wi l l be requi red.
Entry-control techniques. Some entry-control functi ons requi re
addi ti onal hardware, whi l e others are accompl i shed wi th software.
Those features accompl i shed wi th software requi re that the
appropri ate database be avai l abl e for every portal affected by them.
Typi cal l y, these techni ques i ncl ude
I Area zones.
I Ti me zones.
I Team zones.
I Anti -pass back.
FM 3-19.30
I Anti tai l gate.
I Guard tour.
I El evator control .
Alarms. Several types of al arms can be used wi th an entry-control
system. These al arms must annunci ate audi bl y and vi sual l y i n the
securi ty center.
Entry denial. Most entry-control devi ces are confi gured to permi t the
user three entry attempts. I f more than three unsuccessful entry
attempts are made wi thi n a speci fi ed peri od, the devi ce generates an
al arm. An al arm i s al so generated i f an i nval i d credenti al i s used or
attempted entri es are detected that vi ol ate speci fi ed area, ti me, or
team zoni ng requi rements.
Communication failure. Thi s al arm i s generated when a l oss of
communi cati on between the central processor and the l ocal equi pment
i s detected.
Portal open. I f a portal door remai ns open l onger than a predefi ned
ti me, an al arm i s generated.
Duress. Thi s al arm i s generated when a speci al duress code i s entered
at a keypad.
Guard overdue. Thi s duress al arm i s generated when a securi ty
guard i s determi ned to be overdue at a checkpoi nt duri ng a predefi ned
guard tour.
Softwaretamper. Thi s type of al arm i s generated when unauthori zed
persons are detected attempti ng to i nvoke certai n system commands or
modi fy database fi l es.
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
6-136. The overal l performance of an entry-control system can be eval uated
by exami ni ng the veri fi cati on error rate and the throughput rate. An entry-
control system can produce two types of errorsdeni al of admi ssi on of a
person who shoul d be admi tted or admi ssi on of a person who shoul d not be
admi tted. These are commonl y referred to as fal se-reject errors (type I errors)
and fal se-accept errors (type I I errors). Al though a fal se-reject error does not
consti tute a breach of securi ty, i t does create an operati onal probl em that
must be handl ed by an al ternati ve method. Fal se-accept errors consti tute a
breach of securi ty. I deal l y, both fal se-reject and fal se-accept error rates shoul d
be zero; i n practi ce, however, they are not. I n fact, they tend to act i n
opposi ti on to each other. When the system i s adjusted to mi ni mi ze the fal se-
accept error rate, the fal se-reject error rate usual l y i ncreases. Veri fi cati on
error rates are typi cal l y measured i n percent (number of errors/number of
attempts x 100 percent). These error rates are typi cal l y very l ow for coded and
credenti al devi ces, but many become si gni fi cant i f bi ometri c devi ces are used.
6-137. The throughput rate i s the number of persons that can pass through
an entry poi nt i n a gi ven uni t of ti me and i s usual l y expressed i n persons per
mi nute. I t i s the ti me requi red to approach the entry-control devi ce and for the
devi ce to veri fy i nformati on (veri fi cati on ti me) and the ti me requi red passi ng
through the entry poi nt. Typi cal l y, an i ndi vi dual can approach the devi ce and
pass through i n 3 to 5 seconds. Veri fi cati on ti me depends on the type of devi ce
FM 3-19.30
and may vary from 3 to 15 seconds. Tabl e 6-5 provi des a l i st of typi cal
veri fi cati on ti mes for di fferent types of entry-control devi ces.
DATA TRANSMISSION
6-138. A cri ti cal el ement i n an i ntegrated ESS i s the DTM that transmi ts
i nformati on from sensors, entry-control devi ces, and vi deo components to
di spl ay and assessment equi pment. A DTM l i nk i s a path for transmi tti ng
data between two or more components (such as a sensor and al arm reporti ng
system, a card reader and control l er, a CCTV camera and moni tor, or a
transmi tter and recei ver). The DTM l i nks connect remote ESS components to
the securi ty center. An effecti ve DTM l i nk ensures rapi d and rel i abl e
transmi ssi on medi a, transmi ssi on techni que, associ ated transmi ssi on
hardware, and degree of securi ty to be provi ded for the communi cati on
system.
6-139. A number of di fferent medi a are used i n transmi tti ng data between
el ements of an I DS, an EECS, and a CCTV system. These i ncl ude wi re l i nes,
coaxi al cabl e, fi ber-opti c cabl e, and RF transmi ssi on.
Wire line. Wi re l i nes are twi sted pai rs that consi st of two i nsul ated
conductors twi sted together to mi ni mi ze i nterference by unwanted
si gnal s.
Coaxial cable. Coaxi al cabl e consi sts of a center conductor
surrounded by a shi el d. The center conductor i s separated from the
shi el d by a di el ectri c. The shi el d protects agai nst el ectromagneti c
i nterference.
Fiber optics. Fi ber opti cs uses the wi de bandwi dth properti es of l i ght
travel i ng through transparent fi bers. Fi ber opti cs i s a rel i abl e
communi cati on medi um best sui ted for poi nt-to-poi nt, hi gh-speed data
transmi ssi on. Fi ber opti cs i s i mmune to RF el ectromagneti c
i nter ference and does not pr oduce el ectr omagneti c r adi ati on emi ssi on.
The preferred DTM for an ESS i s fi ber-opti c cabl es unl ess there are
justi fi abl e economi c or techni cal reasons for usi ng other types of medi a.
RF transmission. Modul ated RF can be used as a DTM wi th the
i nstal l ati on of radi o recei vers and transmi tters. An RF transmi ssi on
system does not requi re a di rect physi cal l i nk between the poi nts of
communi cati on, and i t i s useful for communi cati ng over barri ers such
as bodi es of water and heavi l y forested terrai n. A di sadvantage i s that
the si gnal power recei ved depends on many factors (i ncl udi ng
transmi ssi on power, antenna pattern, path l ength, physi cal
Table 6-5. Typical Verification Times of Entry-Control Devices
Device Verification Time
Keypad 3 seconds
Card reader 3 seconds
Keypad/card reader 6 seconds
Biometric/keypad 6 to 15 seconds
Biometric/card reader 6 to 15 seconds
Biometric 2 minutes
FM 3-19.30
obstructi ons, and cl i mati c condi ti ons). Al so, RF transmi ssi on i s
suscepti bl e to jammi ng and an adversary wi th an appropri atel y tuned
recei ver has access to i t. The use of RF wi l l be coordi nated wi th the
communi cati ons offi cer to avoi d i nterference wi th other exi sti ng or
pl anned faci l i ty RF systems.
6-140. There are two basi c types of communi cati on l i nkspoi nt-to-poi nt and
mul ti pl ex l i nes. A poi nt-to-poi nt l i nk i s characteri zed by a separate path for
each pai r of components. Thi s approach i s cost effecti ve for several component
pai rs or when a number of scattered remote areas communi cate wi th a si ngl e
central l ocati on. The mul ti pl ex l i nk, commonl y referred to as a mul ti drop or
mul ti poi nt l i nk, i s a path shared by a number of components. Dependi ng on
the number and l ocati on of components, thi s type of confi gurati on can reduce
the amount of cabl i ng requi red. However, the cost reducti on from reduced
cabl i ng i s somewhat offset by costs of equi pment requi red to mul ti pl ex and
demul ti pl ex data.
6-141. Data l i nks used to communi cate the status of ESS devi ces or other
sensi ti ve i nformati on to the securi ty center must be protected from possi bl e
compromi se. Attempts to defeat the securi ty system may range from si mpl e
efforts to cut or short the transmi ssi on l i ne to more sophi sti cated
undertaki ngs, such as tappi ng and substi tuti ng bogus si gnal s. Data l i nks can
be made more secure by physi cal protecti on, tamper protecti on, l i ne
supervi si on, and encrypti on.
CCTV FOR ALARMASSESSMENT AND SURVEILLANCE
6-142. A properl y i ntegrated CCTV assessment system provi des a rapi d and
cost-effecti ve method for determi ni ng the cause of i ntrusi on al arms. For
survei l l ance, a properl y desi gned CCTV system provi des a cost-effecti ve
suppl ement to guard patrol s. For l arge faci l i ti es, the cost of a CCTV system i s
more easi l y justi fi ed. I t i s i mportant to recogni ze that CCTV al arm-
assessment systems and CCTV survei l l ance systems perform separate and
di sti nct functi ons. The al arm-assessment system i s desi gned to respond
rapi dl y, automati cal l y, and predi ctabl y to the recei pt of ESS al arms at the
securi ty center. The survei l l ance system i s desi gned to be used at the
di screti on of and under the control of the securi ty centers consol e operator.
When the pri mary functi on of the CCTV system i s to provi de real -ti me al arm
assessment, the desi gn shoul d i ncorporate a vi deo-processi ng system that can
communi cate wi th the al arm-processi ng system.
6-143. A candi date si te for a CCTV assessment system wi l l typi cal l y have the
fol l owi ng characteri sti cs:
Assets requi ri ng ESS protecti on.
A need for real -ti me al arm assessment.
Protected assets spaced some di stance apart.
6-144. Fi gure 6-19, page 6-46, shows a typi cal CCTV system confi gurati on. A
typi cal si te wi l l l ocate CCTV cameras
Outdoors, al ong si te-peri meter i sol ati on zones.
Outdoors, at control l ed access poi nts (sal l y ports).
FM 3-19.30
Outdoors, wi thi n the protected area, and at vi ewi ng approaches to
sel ected assets.
I ndoor s, at sel ected assets wi thi n the pr otected area.
6-145. The securi ty consol e i s central l y l ocated i n the securi ty center. The
CCTV moni tors and the anci l l ary vi deo equi pment wi l l be l ocated at thi s
consol e, as wi l l the ESS al arm-processi ng and -annunci ati on equi pment.
CCTV CAMERA COMPONENTS
6-146. An opti cal -l ens system that captures and focuses refl ected l i ght from
the scene bei ng vi ewed onto an i mage target i s common to al l CCTV cameras.
The i mage target converts refl ected l i ght energy i nto el ectri cal i mpul ses i n a
two-di mensi onal array of hei ght and wi dth. An el ectroni c scanni ng system
(readi ng these i mpul ses i n a predetermi ned order) creates a ti me-sensi ti ve
vol tage si gnal that i s a repl i ca of opti cal i nformati on captured by the l ens and
focused on the target. Thi s vol tage si gnal i s then transmi tted to a l ocati on
where i t i s vi ewed and possi bl y recorded. For components and techni cal
i nformati on regardi ng CCTV cameras, see the appropri ate TMs.
Real-time clock
Videotape
Video storage
Annotation
Loss detector
Camera Camera Camera
Field
Security
center
System
processor
Video
switch
IDS interface
EECS interface
Keyboard
Monitor
Monitor
Figure 6-19. Typical CCTV System
FM 3-19.30
VIDEO SIGNAL AND CONTROL LINKS
6-147. A CCTV transmi ssi on system i s needed to convey vi deo si gnal s from
vari ous faci l i ty cameras to the securi ty center and to carry commands from
the securi ty center to the cameras. I nformati on may be sent vi a metal l i c cabl e,
RF, or opti cal transmi ssi on.
Metallic Cable
6-148. Metal l i c vi deo cabl es are el ectri cal conductors manufactured
speci fi cal l y for the transmi ssi on of frequenci es associ ated wi th vi deo
components. Coaxi al cabl e i s a pri mary exampl e of thi s type of transmi ssi on
medi a. Devi ces such as vi deo-equal i zati on ampl i fi ers, ground l oop correctors,
and vi deo-di stri buti on ampl i fi ers may be requi red.
RF Transmission
6-149. For a system that has wi del y separated nodes, RF transmi ssi on may be
a good al ternati ve to metal l i c cabl e and associ ated ampl i fi ers. The i nformati on
can be transmi tted over a mi crowave l i nk. A mi crowave l i nk can be used for
di stances of about 50 mi l es, as l ong as the recei ver and the transmi tter are i n
the LOS.
Fiber-Optic Cable
6-150. I n fi ber-opti c cabl e systems, el ectri cal vi deo si gnal s are converted to
opti cal l i ght si gnal s that are transmi tted down the opti cal fi ber. The si gnal i s
recei ved and reconverted i nto el ectri cal energy. An opti c dri ver and a recei ver
are requi red per fi ber. The fi ber-opti c transmi ssi on method provi des a l ow-
l oss, hi gh-resol uti on transmi ssi on system wi th usabl e l ength three to ten
ti mes that of tradi ti onal metal l i c i n cabl e systems. Fi ber-opti c cabl e i s the
transmi ssi on medi a favored by DA.
CCTV-SYSTEMSYNCHRONIZATION
6-151. Ti mi ng si gnal s are processed wi thi n the i mage-scan secti on of the
CCTV camera. These si gnal s may be generated i nternal l y from a crystal cl ock,
deri ved from the cameras AC power source, or suppl i ed by an external si gnal
source. The camera shoul d be capabl e of automati c swi tchover to i ts i nternal
cl ock i n case of external si gnal l oss. When CCTV cameras are suppl i ed by a
common external (master) si gnal source or are al l powered from the same AC
power source, al l cameras scan i n synchroni sm. I n thi s case, a consol e CCTV
moni tor wi l l di spl ay a smooth transi ti on when swi tched from one vi deo source
to another. Wi thout thi s feature, the moni tor di spl ay breaks up or rol l s when
swi tched between vi deo sources. The rol l i ng occurs for as l ong as i t takes the
moni tor to synchroni ze i ts scan wi th that of the new vi deo source, typi cal l y
one second. The resynchroni zati on del ay wi l l be experi enced by al l system
components that recei ve vi deo i nformati on, i ncl udi ng recorders. To avoi d thi s
del ay, the desi gner must speci fy that al l camer as are powered fr om the AC
power phase or must speci fy master synchroni zati on for the desi gn.
FM 3-19.30
VIDEO PROCESSING AND DISPLAY COMPONENTS
6-152. As shown i n Fi gure 6-19, page 6-46, CCTV camera si gnal s propagate
through the vi deo transmi ssi on system and through coverage at the securi ty
center. I n very si mpl e confi gurati ons wi th onl y a few cameras and moni tors, a
hardwi red connecti on between each camera and consol e moni tor i s adequate.
As the number of cameras i ncreases, the need to manage and add
suppl emental i nformati on to camera si gnal s al so i ncreases. Psychol ogi cal
testi ng has demonstrated that the effi ci ency of consol e-operator assessment
i mproves as the number of consol e moni tors i s reduced, wi th the opti mum
number bei ng four to si x moni tors. Effecti veness i s al so enhanced by the use of
al arm-correl ated vi deo. Major components of the vi deo-processor system are
the vi deo swi tcher, the vi deo-l oss detector, the al arm-processor communi cati on
path, the master vi deo-sync generator, vi deo recorders, and moni tors.
Video switchers. Vi deo swi tchers are requi red when the number of
cameras exceeds the number of consol e moni tors or when a moni tor
must be capabl e of sel ecti ng vi deo from one of many sources. Vi deo
swi tchers are capabl e of presenti ng any of mul ti pl e vi deo i mages to
vari ous moni tors, recorders, and so forth.
Video-loss detector. Vi deo-l oss detectors sense the conti nued
i ntegri ty of i ncomi ng camera si gnal s.
ESS interfaceand communication path. There must be a means of
rapi d communi cati on between the ESS al arm-annunci ati on and vi deo-
processor systems. The al arm processor must send commands that
cause the vi deo swi tcher to sel ect the camera appropri ate for the sensor
reporti ng an al arm. The vi deo-processor system must report system
tamperi ng or fai l ures (such as l oss of vi deo) to the al arm processor. The
path shoul d al so pass date-and-ti me synchroni zi ng i nformati on
between processors so that recorded vi deo scenes and pri nted al arm
l ogs are properl y correl ated.
Master video-sync generation and distribution. Master vi deo
sync i ncl udes a crystal -control l ed ti mi ng generator, di stri buti on
ampl i fi ers, and a transmi ssi on l i nk to each camera.
Video recorders. Vi deo recorders provi de the means to record al arm-
event scenes i n real ti me for l ater anal ysi s. A recorder typi cal l y
recei ves i ts i nput through dedi cated vi deo-swi tcher outputs. To support
recorder pl ayback, the recorder output i s connected to a dedi cated
swi tcher i nput and must be compati bl e wi th the swi tcher-si gnal
format. I n addi ti on, the recorder recei ves start commands from the
swi tcher, and compati bi l i ty must exi st at thi s i nterface. Vi deocassette
recorders shoul d be used when al arm events are to be recorded for l ater
pl ayback and anal ysi s. The cassettes can record i n ti me l apse for up to
240 hours (dependi ng on the user-sel ected speed) and wi l l change to
real -ti me recordi ng on command. The cassettes can be erased and
reused or archi ved i f requi red.
Monitors. Moni tors are requi red to di spl ay the i ndi vi dual scenes
transmi tted from the cameras or from the vi deo swi tcher. I n al arm-
assessment appl i cati ons, the moni tors are dri ven by dedi cated outputs
of the vi deo swi tcher and the moni tors di spl ay vi deo sources sel ected by
the swi tcher. For securi ty-consol e operati ons, the 9-i nch moni tor i s the
FM 3-19.30
smal l est scr een that shoul d be used for oper ator recogni ti on of smal l
objects i n a cameras fi el d of vi ew. Two 9-i nch moni tors can be housed
si de by si de i n a standard 19-i nch consol e. I f the moni tors are to be
mounted i n freestandi ng racks behi nd the securi ty consol e, l arger uni ts
wi l l be used.
6-153. Vi deo-processor equi pment wi l l be speci fi ed to append the fol l owi ng
al phanumeri c i nformati on so that i t appears on both moni tors and recordi ngs.
The equi pment must al l ow the operator to program the annotated i nformati on
and di ctate i ts posi ti on on the screen. Thi s i nformati on i ncl udes
Ti me and date i nformati on.
Vi deo-source or al arm-zone i denti fi cati on.
Programmabl e ti tl es.
CCTV APPLICATION GUIDELINES
6-154. Si te-speci fi c factors must be taken i nto consi derati on i n sel ecti ng
components that compri se a parti cul ar CCTV system. The fi rst i s the systems
si ze i n terms of the number of cameras fi el ded, whi ch i s the mi ni mum number
needed to vi ew al l ESS sensor-detecti on fi el ds and survei l l ance cameras.
Another factor i s that some CCTV cameras may requi re arti fi ci al l i ght
sources. Fi nal l y, there are CCTV-system performance cri teri a and physi cal ,
envi ronmental , and economi c consi derati ons. Each i s di scussed i n detai l i n
TM 5-853-4.
SceneResolution
6-155. The l evel to whi ch vi deo detai l s can be determi ned i n a CCTV scene i s
referred to as resol vi ng abi l i ty or resol uti on. I t i s general l y accepted that for
assessment purposes, three resol uti on requi rements can be defi ned. I n order
of i ncreasi ng resol uti on requi rements, they are detecti on, recogni ti on, and
i denti fi cati on.
Detecti on i s the abi l i ty to detect the presence of an object i n a CCTV
scene.
Recogni ti on i s the abi l i ty to determi ne the type of object i n a CCTV
scene (ani mal , bl owi ng debri s, or crawl i ng human).
I denti fi cati on i s the abi l i ty to determi ne object detai l s (a parti cul ar
person, a l arge rabbi t, a smal l deer, or tumbl eweed).
6-156. A CCTV assessment system shoul d provi de suffi ci ent resol uti on to
recogni ze human presence and to detect smal l ani mal s or bl owi ng debri s. Gi ven
an al armed i ntrusi on sensor, i t i s cruci al that the consol e operator be abl e to
determi ne i f the sensor detected an i ntruder or i f i t i s si mpl y respondi ng to a
nui sance condi ti on. (Refer to TM 5-853-4 for detai l ed desi gn appl i cati ons.)
Illumination Levels
6-157. For i nteri or appl i cati ons where the same camera type i s used i n
several di fferent areas and the scene i l l umi nati on i n each area i s constant,
speci fy the manual l y adjustabl e i ri s. Thi s al l ows a manual i ri s adjustment
appropri ate for each parti cul ar areas i l l umi nati on l evel at the ti me of
i nstal l ati on. I f the camera must operate i n an area subject to a wi de dynami c
FM 3-19.30
range of i l l umi nati on l evel s (such as woul d be found outdoors), speci fy the
automati cal l y adjusted i ri s feature.
Cost Considerations
6-158. The cost of a CCTV system i s usual l y quoted as cost-per-assessment
zone. When esti mati ng the total system cost, vi deo-processor equi pment costs
and the vi deo-transmi ssi on systems costs must be i ncl uded. Other potenti al l y
si gni fi cant costs are outdoor l i ghti ng system upgrades and the si te
preparati on requi red to support the CCTV cameras. The CCTV systems are
expensi ve compared to other el ectroni c securi ty subsystems and shoul d be
speci fi ed wi th di screti on.
DESIGN GUIDELINES
6-159. The desi gn and appl i cati on of CCTV systems are qui te compl ex and
shoul d be l eft to professi onal s who are abreast of the current state-of-the-art
systems. Some of the general desi gn gui del i nes i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
System familiarity. Before desi gni ng an effecti ve CCTV assessment
system, the desi gner must be fami l i ar wi th the ESSs sensor pl acement
and the detecti on fi el ds shape.
CCTV camera placement and lighting. The pl acement of exteri or
cameras requi res more attenti on than that of i nteri or cameras because
of weather and i l l umi nati on extremes. The fi el d-of-vi ew al i gnment,
i l l umi nati on range, and bal anced l i ghti ng are major desi gn factors.
Exteri or CCTV desi gn consi derati ons i ncl ude envi ronmental housi ngs,
camera mounti ng hei ghts, system types, and so forth. I ndoor desi gn
consi derati ons i ncl ude the mounti ng l ocati on and tamper detecti on.
The l ayout for i ndoor al arm-assessment cameras i s subject to three
constrai nts
I The cameras l ocati on shoul d encl ose the compl ete sensor detecti on
fi el d i n the cameras fi el d of vi ew.
I Li ghti ng that i s adequate to support al arm assessment wi l l be
provi ded.
I Protecti on from tamperi ng and i nadvertent damage by col l i si on
duri ng normal area operati ons wi l l be provi ded.
Access Control 7-1
Chapter 7
Access Control
Per i meter bar r i er s, i ntr usi on-detecti on devi ces, and pr otecti ve l i ghti ng
provi de physi cal -securi ty safeguards; however, they al one are not enough.
An access-contr ol system must be establ i shed and mai ntai ned to precl ude
unauthor i zed entr y. Effecti ve access-contr ol pr ocedur es pr event the
i ntroducti on of harmful devi ces, materi el , and components. They mi ni mi ze
the mi sappr opr i ati on, pi l fer age, or compr omi se of mater i el or r ecor ded
i nfor mati on by contr ol l i ng packages, mater i el , and pr oper ty movement.
Access-contr ol r oster s, per sonal r ecogni ti on, I D car ds, badge-exchange
pr ocedur es, and per sonnel escor ts al l contr i bute to an effecti ve access-
control system.
DESIGNATED RESTRICTED AREAS
7-1. The i nstal l ati on commander i s responsi bl e for desi gnati ng and
establ i shi ng restri cted areas. A restri cted area i s any area that i s subject to
speci al restri cti ons or control s for securi ty reasons. Thi s does not i ncl ude
areas over whi ch ai rcraft fl i ght i s restri cted. Restri cted areas may be
establ i shed for the fol l owi ng:
The enforcement of securi ty measures and the excl usi on of
unauthori zed personnel .
I ntensi fi ed control s i n areas requi ri ng speci al protecti on.
The protecti on of cl assi fi ed i nformati on or cri ti cal equi pment or
materi al s.
DEGREE OF SECURITY
7-2. The degree of securi ty and control requi red depends on the nature,
sensi ti vi ty, or i mportance of the securi ty i nterest. Restri cted areas are
cl assi fi ed as control l ed, l i mi ted, or excl usi on areas.
A control l ed area i s that porti on of a restri cted area usual l y near or
surroundi ng a l i mi ted or excl usi on area. Entry to the control l ed area i s
restri cted to personnel wi th a need for access. Movement of authori zed
personnel wi thi n thi s area i s not necessari l y control l ed si nce mere
entry to the area does not provi de access to the securi ty i nterest. The
control l ed area i s provi ded for admi ni strati ve control , for safety, or as a
buffer zone for i n-depth securi ty for the l i mi ted or excl usi on area. The
commander establ i shes the control of movement.
A l i mi ted area i s a restri cted area wi thi n cl ose proxi mi ty of a securi ty
i nterest. Uncontrol l ed movement may permi t access to the i tem.
Escorts and other i nternal restri cti ons may prevent access wi thi n
l i mi ted areas.
FM 3-19.30
7-2 Access Control
An excl usi on area i s a restri cted area contai ni ng a securi ty i nterest.
Uncontrol l ed movement permi ts di rect access to the i tem.
7-3. The securi ty protecti on afforded by a restri cted area pertai ns parti cul arl y
to subversi ve-acti vi ty control ; that i s, protecti on agai nst espi onage, sabotage,
or any such acti on adversel y affecti ng nati onal defense. Wi thi n thi s context,
the desi gnati on restri cted area i s not appl i cabl e to an area sol el y for
protecti on agai nst common pi l ferage or mi sappropri ati on of property or
materi al that i s not cl assi fi ed or not essenti al to nati onal defense. For
exampl e, an area devoted to the storage or use of cl assi fi ed documents,
equi pment, or materi al s shoul d be desi gnated as a restri cted area to
safeguard agai nst espi onage. An i nstal l ati on communi cati ons center shoul d
al so be so desi gnated to safeguard agai nst sabotage. On the other hand, a
cashi er's cage or an ordi nary mechani c's tool room shoul d not be so
desi gnated, al though the commander may i mpose control s to access. Thi s may
be a si mpl e matter of posti ng an off l i mi ts to unauthori zed personnel si gn.
The PM or the physi cal -securi ty manager acts as an advi sor to the
commander. I n hi s recommendati ons, he must consi der eval uati ng the
purpose of desi gnati ng a restri cted area and coordi nati ng wi th the i ntel l i gence
offi cer and the staff judge advocate (SJA).
7-4. A restri cted area must be desi gnated i n wri ti ng by the commander and
must be posted wi th warni ng si gns accordi ng to AR 190-13. I n areas where
Engl i sh i s one of two or more l anguages commonl y spoken, warni ng si gns wi l l
be posted i n Engl i sh and i n the l ocal l anguage (see Fi gure 7-1).
7-5. An i nstal l ati on may have varyi ng degrees of securi ty. I t may be
desi gnated i n i ts enti rety as a restri cted area, wi th no further restri cti ons; or
i t may be subdi vi ded i nto control l ed, l i mi ted, or excl usi on areas wi th
restri cti ons of movement and speci fi c cl ear zones. Fi gure 7-2 depi cts a
si mpl i fi ed restri cted area and the degrees of securi ty.
CONSIDERATIONS
7-6. There are other i mportant consi derati ons concerni ng restri cted areas and
thei r l i nes of di vi si on. These consi derati ons i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
A survey and anal ysi s of the i nstal l ati on, i ts mi ssi ons, and i ts securi ty
i nterests. Thi s can determi ne i mmedi ate and anti ci pated needs that
requi re protecti on. Anti ci pated needs are determi ned from pl ans for
the future.
The si ze and nature of the securi ty i nterest bei ng protected. Safes may
provi de adequate protecti on for cl assi fi ed documents and smal l i tems;
however, l arge i tems may have to be pl aced wi thi n guarded encl osures.
Some securi ty i nterests are more sensi ti ve to compromi se than others.
Bri ef observati on or a si mpl e act by an untrai ned person may
consti tute a compromi se i n some cases. I n others, detai l ed study and
pl anned acti on by an expert may be requi red.
Al l securi ty i nterests shoul d be eval uated accordi ng to thei r
i mportance. Thi s may be i ndi cated by a securi ty cl assi fi cati on such as
confi denti al , secret, or top secret.
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-3
RESTRICTED AREA
THIS (INSTALLATION OR ACTIVITY) HAS BEEN DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA BY
AUTHORITY OF (TITLE, COMMANDING GENERAL OR COMMANDING OFFICER) IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE ON 20 AUGUST 1954, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21, INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1950. UNATHORIZED ENTRY IS PROHIBITED.
ALL PERSONS AND VEHICLES ENTERING HEREIN ARE LIABLE TO SEARCH.
PHOTOGRAPHING OR MAKING NOTES, DRAWINGS, MAPS, OR GRAPHIC REPRESENTATIVES
OF THIS AREA OR ITS ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITED UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY
THE COMMANDER. ANY SUCH MATERIAL FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF UNAUTHORIZED
PERSONS WILL BE CONFISCATED.
Figure 7-1. Sample Restricted-Area Warning
Legend:
Gate
Security post
Chain-link fence with top guard
Main shop
HQ Admin
area
Limited
area
Exclusion
area
Controlled
area
Power
house
Barracks
Figure 7-2. Schematic Diagram of a Simplified Restricted Area
and the Degrees of Security
FM 3-19.30
7-4 Access Control
Parki ng areas for pri vatel y owned vehi cl es (POVs) are establ i shed
outsi de of restri cted areas. Vehi cl e entrances must be kept at a
mi ni mum for safe and effi ci ent control .
Physi cal protecti ve measures (such as fences, gates, and wi ndow bars)
must be i nstal l ed.
EMPLOYEE SCREENING
7-7. Screeni ng job appl i cants to el i mi nate potenti al acts of espi onage and
sabotage and other securi ty ri sks i s i mportant i n peaceti me and i s cri ti cal
duri ng a nati onal emergency. Personnel screeni ngs must be i ncorporated i nto
standard personnel pol i ci es.
7-8. An appl i cant shoul d be requi red to compl ete a personnel securi ty
questi onnai re, whi ch i s then screened for compl eteness and used to el i mi nate
undesi rabl e appl i cants. A careful i nvesti gati on shoul d be conducted to ensure
that the appl i cant's character, associ ati ons, and sui tabi l i ty for empl oyment
are sati sfactory. The fol l owi ng sources may be hel pful i n securi ng empl oyment
i nvesti gati ve data:
State and l ocal pol i ce (i ncl udi ng nati onal and l ocal pol i ce i n overseas
areas).
Former empl oyers.
Publ i c records.
Credi t agenci es.
School s (al l l evel s).
References. (These references shoul d i ncl ude those names not
furni shed by the appl i cant. These are known as throw offs, and they
are obtai ned duri ng i ntervi ews of references furni shed by appl i cants.)
Others as appropri ate. (These may i ncl ude the FBI , the US Army
Cri mi nal Records Reposi tory, and the Defense I nvesti gati ve Agency).
7-9. Medi cal screeni ng consi derati ons shoul d be made (based on an
appl i cants posi ti on [such as a guard]) to eval uate physi cal and mental
stami na. Once an appl i cant has been i denti fi ed for empl oyment, he i s pl aced
on an access-control roster.
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
7-10. An I D system i s establ i shed at each i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty to provi de a
method of i denti fyi ng personnel . The system provi des for personal recogni ti on
and the use of securi ty I D cards or badges to ai d i n the control and movement
of personnel acti vi ti es.
7-11. Standard I D cards are general l y acceptabl e for access i nto areas that
are unrestri cted and have no securi ty i nterest. Personnel requi ri ng access to
restri cted areas shoul d be i ssued a securi ty I D card or badge as prescri bed i n
AR 600-8-14. The cards/badges desi gn must be si mpl e and provi de for
adequate control of personnel .
7-12. A securi ty I D card/badge system must be establ i shed for restri cted
areas wi th 30 or more empl oyees per shi ft. Commanders may (at thei r
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-5
di screti on) authori ze a card/badge system i n restri cted areas for l ess than 30
peopl e.
ID METHODS
7-13. Four of the most commonl y used access-control I D methods are the
personal -recogni ti on system, the si ngl e-card or -badge system, the card- or
badge-exchange system, and the mul ti pl e-card or -badge system.
Personal-Recognition System
7-14. The personal -recogni ti on system i s the si mpl est of al l systems. A
member of the securi ty force provi di ng access control vi sual l y checks the
person requesti ng entry. Entry i s granted based on
The i ndi vi dual bei ng recogni zed.
The need to enter has been establ i shed.
The person i s on an access-control roster.
Single-Card or -BadgeSystem
7-15. Thi s system refl ects permi ssi on to enter speci fi c areas by the badge
depi cti ng speci fi c l etters, numbers, or parti cul ar col ors. Thi s system l ends to
comparati vel y l oose control and i s not recommended for hi gh-securi ty areas.
Permi ssi on to enter speci fi c areas does not al ways go wi th the need to know.
Because the I D cards/badges frequentl y remai n i n the bearers possessi on
whi l e off duty, i t affords the opportuni ty for al terati on or dupl i cati on.
Card- or Badge-ExchangeSystem
7-16. I n thi s system, two cards/badges contai n i denti cal photographs. Each
card/badge has a di fferent background col or, or one card/badge has an
overpri nt. One card/badge i s presented at the entrance to a speci fi c area and
exchanged for the second card/badge, whi ch i s worn or carri ed whi l e i n that
area. I ndi vi dual possessi on of the second card/badge occurs onl y whi l e the
bearer i s i n the area for whi ch i t was i ssued. When l eavi ng the area, the
second card/badge i s returned and mai ntai ned i n the securi ty area. Thi s
method provi des a greater degree of securi ty and decreases the possi bi l i ty of
forgery, al terati on, or dupl i cati on of the card/badge. The l evel s of protecti on
descri bed i n TM 5-853-1 requi re mul ti pl e access-control el ements as the l evel s
of protecti on i ncrease. I n the case of the badge exchange, thi s system counts as
two access-control el ements.
Multiple-Card or -BadgeSystem
7-17. Thi s system provi des the greatest degree of securi ty. I nstead of havi ng
speci fi c marki ngs on the cards/badges denoti ng permi ssi on to enter vari ous
restri cted areas, the mul ti pl e card/badge system makes an exchange at the
entrance to each securi ty area. The card/badge i nformati on i s i denti cal and
al l ows for compari sons. Exchange cards/badges are mai ntai ned at each area
onl y for i ndi vi dual s who have access to the speci fi c area.
FM 3-19.30
7-6 Access Control
MECHANIZED/AUTOMATED SYSTEMS
7-18. An al ternati ve to usi ng guards or mi l i tary pol i ce (MP) to vi sual l y check
cards/badges and access rosters i s to use bui l di ng card-access systems or
bi ometri c-access readers. These systems can control the fl ow of personnel
enteri ng and exi ti ng a compl ex. I ncl uded i n these systems are
Coded devi ces such as mechani cal or el ectroni c keypads or combi nati on
l ocks.
Credenti al devi ces such as magneti c-stri p or proxi mi ty card readers.
Bi ometri c devi ces such as fi ngerpri nt readers or reti na scanners.
7-19. Access-control and I D systems base thei r judgment factor on a remote
capabi l i ty through a routi ne di scri mi nati ng devi ce for posi ti ve I D. These
systems do not requi re guards at entry poi nts; they i denti fy an i ndi vi dual i n
the fol l owi ng manner:
The system r ecei ves physi cal I D data fr om an i ndi vi dual .
The data i s encoded and compared to stored i nformati on.
The system determi nes whether access i s authori zed.
The i nformati on i s transl ated i nto readabl e resul ts.
7-20. Speci al i zed mechani cal systems are i deal for hi ghl y sensi ti ve si tuati ons
because they use a control l ed process i n a control l ed envi ronment to establ i sh
the requi red database and accuracy. One i nnovati ve techni que appl i ed to I D
and admi ttance procedures i nvol ves di mensi on compari sons. The di mensi on of
a person's ful l hand i s compared to previ ousl y stored data to determi ne entry
authori zati on. Other speci al i zed machi ne readers can scan a si ngl e
fi ngerpri nt or an eye reti na and provi de posi ti ve I D of anyone attempti ng
entry.
7-21. An al l -i ncl usi ve automated I D and access-control system rei nforces the
securi ty i n-depth ri ng through i ts easy and rapi d change capabi l i ty. The
computer i s abl e to do thi s through i ts memory. Changes can be made qui ckl y
by the systems admi ni strator.
7-22. The commerci al securi ty market has a wi de range of mechani zed and
automated hardware and software systems. Automated equi pment i s chosen
onl y after consi deri ng the securi ty needs and the envi ronment i n whi ch i t
operates. These consi derati ons i ncl ude whether the equi pment i s outdoors or
i ndoors, the temperature range, and weather condi ti ons. Assessment of
securi ty needs and the use of pl anni ng, programmi ng, and budgeti ng
procedures greatl y assi st a securi ty manager i n i mprovi ng the securi ty
posture.
CARD/BADGE SPECIFICATIONS
7-23. Secur i ty car ds/badges shoul d be desi gned and constr ucted to meet the
requi rements of AR 600-8-14. Upon i ssui ng a card/badge, securi ty personnel
must expl ai n to the bearer the wear requi red and the authori zati ons al l owed
wi th the card/badge. Thi s i ncl udes
Desi gnati on of the areas where an I D card/badge i s requi red.
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-7
A descri pti on of the type of card/badge i n use and the authori zati ons
and l i mi tati ons pl aced on the bearer.
The r equi red presentati on of the car d/badge when enter i ng or l eavi ng
each area duri ng al l hours of the day.
Detai l s of when, where, and how the card/badge shoul d be worn,
di spl ayed, or carri ed.
Procedures to fol l ow i n case of l oss or damage of the card.
The di sposi ti on of the card/badge upon termi nati on of empl oyment,
i nvesti gati ons, or personnel acti ons.
Prerequi si tes for rei ssui ng the card/badge.
VISITOR IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL
7-24. Procedures must be i mpl emented to properl y i denti fy and control
personnel . Thi s i ncl udes vi si tors presenti ng thei r cards/badges to guards at
entrances of restri cted areas. Vi si tors are requi red to stay wi th thei r assi gned
escort. Guards must ensure that vi si tors stay i n areas rel ati ng to thei r vi si t;
an uncontrol l ed vi si tor, al though conspi cuousl y i denti fi ed, coul d acqui re
i nformati on for whi ch he i s not authori zed. Forei gn-nati onal vi si tors shoul d be
escorted at al l ti mes.
7-25. Approval for vi si tors shoul d be obtai ned at l east 24 hours i n advance (i f
possi bl e). Where appropri ate, the i nstal l ati on shoul d prepare an agenda for
the vi si tor and desi gnate an escort offi cer. Measures must be i n pl ace to
recover vi si tor cards/badges on the vi si ts expi rati on or when they are no
l onger requi red.
7-26. Physi cal -securi ty precauti ons agai nst pi l ferage, espi onage, and sabotage
requi re the screeni ng, I D, and control of vi si tors. Further i nformati on about
vi si ti ng requi rements and procedures are found i n ARs 12-15 and 381-20.
Vi si tors are general l y cl assed i n the fol l owi ng categori es:
Persons wi th whom every i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty has busi ness (such as
suppl i ers, customers, i nsurance i nspectors, and government
i nspectors).
I ndi vi dual s or groups who desi re to vi si t an i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty for
personal or educati onal reasons. Such vi si ts may be desi red by
educati onal , techni cal , or sci enti fi c organi zati ons.
I ndi vi dual s or groups speci fi cal l y sponsored by the government (such
as forei gn nati onal s vi si ti ng under techni cal cooperati on programs and
si mi l ar vi si ts by US nati onal s). Requests for vi si ts by forei gn nati onal s
must be processed accordi ng to AR 380-10.
Gui ded tours to sel ected porti ons of the i nstal l ati on i n the i nterest of
publ i c rel ati ons.
7-27. The I D and control mechani sms for vi si tors must be i n pl ace. They may
i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Methods of establ i shi ng the authori ty for admi tti ng vi si tors and any
l i mi tati ons rel ati ve to access.
FM 3-19.30
7-8 Access Control
Posi ti ve I D of vi si tor s by per sonal recogni ti on, vi si tor per mi t, or other
i denti fyi ng credenti al s. Contact the empl oyer, supervi sor, or offi cer i n
charge to val i date the vi si t.
The use of vi si tor regi strati on forms. These forms provi de a record of
the vi si tor and the ti me, l ocati on, and durati on of hi s vi si t.
The use of vi si tor I D cards/badges. The cards/badges bear seri al
numbers, the area or areas to whi ch access i s authori zed, the bearers
name, and escort requi rements.
7-28. I ndi vi dual groups enteri ng a restri cted area must meet speci fi c
prerequi si tes before bei ng granted access. The fol l owi ng gui dance i s for group
access i nto a restri cted area:
Visitors
7-29. Before al l owi ng vi si tors i nto a restri cted area, contact the person or
acti vi ty bei ng vi si ted. After veri fyi ng the vi si tors i denti ty, i ssue a badge,
compl ete the regi strati on forms, and assi gn an escort (i f requi red). Vi si tors
may i ncl ude publ i c-uti l i ty and commerci al -servi ce representati ves.
Very Important Persons
7-30. The procedures for admi tti ng very i mportant persons (VI Ps) and forei gn
nati onal s i nto restri cted areas are contai ned i n AR 12-15. Speci al
consi derati ons and coordi nati on wi th the protocol offi ce are necessary. A 24-
hour advance noti ce i s desi rabl e for these requests, al ong wi th an agenda for
the vi si t and the desi gnati on of an escort, i f appropri ate.
Civilians Workingon J obs Under Government Contract
7-31. To al l ow these personnel to conduct busi ness i n restri cted areas, the
securi ty manager must coordi nate wi th the procurement offi ce. The securi ty
manager must al so i denti fy movement-control procedures for these
empl oyees.
CleaningTeams
7-32. Supervi sors usi ng cl eani ng teams must seek techni cal advi ce from the
physi cal -securi ty offi ce on i nternal control s for each speci fi c bui l di ng. Thi s
may i ncl ude provi di ng escorts.
DOD Employees in Work Areas After Normal OperatingHours
7-33. Supervi sors establ i sh i nternal control s based on coordi nati on wi th the
securi ty manager. They al so noti fy securi ty personnel of the workers'
presence, type, and durati on of work.
ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
7-34. The most vul nerabl e l i nk i n any I D system i s i ts enforcement. Securi ty
forces must be proacti ve i n performi ng thei r duti es. A routi ne performance of
duty wi l l adversel y effect even the most el aborate system. Posi ti ve
enforcement measures must be prescri bed to enhance securi ty. Some of these
measures may i ncl ude
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-9
Desi gnati ng al ert and tactful securi ty personnel at entry control
poi nts.
Ensuri ng that personnel possess qui ck percepti on and good judgment.
Requi ri ng entry-control personnel to conduct frequent i rregul ar checks
of thei r assi gned areas.
Formal i zi ng standard procedures for conducti ng guard mounts and
posti ng and rel i evi ng securi ty personnel . These measures wi l l prevent
posti ng of unqual i fi ed personnel and a routi ne performance of duty.
Prescri bi ng a uni form method of handl i ng or weari ng securi ty I D
cards/badges. I f carri ed on the person, the card must be removed from
the wal l et (or other hol der) and handed to securi ty personnel . When
worn, the badge wi l l be worn i n a conspi cuous posi ti on to expedi te
i nspecti on and recogni ti on from a di stance.
Desi gni ng entry and exi t control poi nts of restri cted areas to force
personnel to pass i n a si ngl e fi l e i n front of securi ty personnel . I n some
i nstances, the use of turnsti l es may be advi sabl e to assi st i n
mai ntai ni ng posi ti ve control .
Provi di ng l i ghti ng at control poi nts. The l i ghti ng must i l l umi nate the
area to enabl e securi ty personnel to compare the bearer wi th the I D
card/badge.
Enforci ng access-control measures by educati ng securi ty forces and
empl oyees. Enforcement of access-control systems rests pri mari l y wi th
the securi ty forces; however, i t i s essenti al that they have the ful l
cooperati on of the empl oyees. Empl oyees must be i nstructed to
consi der each uni denti fi ed or i mproperl y i denti fi ed i ndi vi dual as a
trespasser. I n restri cted areas where access i s l i mi ted to a parti cul ar
zone, empl oyees must report unauthori zed i ndi vi dual s to the securi ty
force.
Posi ti oni ng I D card/badge racks or contai ners at entry control poi nts so
that they are accessi bl e onl y to guard-force personnel .
Appoi nti ng a responsi bl e custodi an to accompl i sh control procedures of
cards/badges accordi ng to AR 600-8-14. The custodi an i s responsi bl e for
the i ssue, turn i n, recovery, and renewal of securi ty I D cards/badges.
7-35. The degree of compromi se tol erabl e i n the I D system i s i n di rect
proporti on to the degree of securi ty requi red. The fol l owi ng control procedures
are recommended for preservi ng the i ntegri ty of a card/badge system:
Mai ntenance of an accurate wri tten record or l og l i sti ng (by seri al
number) al l cards and badges and showi ng those on hand, to whom
they are i ssued, and thei r di sposi ti on (l ost, muti l ated, or destroyed).
Authenti cati on of records and l ogs by the custodi an.
A peri odi c i nventory of records by a commi ssi oned offi cer.
The prompt i nval i dati on of l ost cards/badges.
The conspi cuous posti ng at securi ty control poi nts of current l i sts of
l ost or i nval i dated cards/badges.
The establ i shment of control s wi thi n restri cted areas to enabl e securi ty
personnel to determi ne the number of persons wi thi n the area.
The establ i shment of the two-person rul e (when requi red).
FM 3-19.30
7-10 Access Control
The establ i shment of procedures to control the movement of vi si tors. A
vi si tor-control record wi l l be mai ntai ned and l ocated at entry control
poi nts.
SIGN/COUNTERSIGN AND CODE WORD
7-36. Thi s method of veri fyi ng i denti ty i s pri mari l y used i n a tacti cal
envi ronment. Accordi ng to the l ocal SOP, the si gn/countersi gn or code-word
procedures must be changed i mmedi atel y i f compromi sed.
DURESS CODE
7-37. The duress code i s a si mpl e word or phrase used duri ng normal
conversati on to al ert other securi ty personnel that an authori zed person i s
under duress. A duress code requi res pl anni ng and rehearsal to ensure an
appropri ate response. Thi s code i s changed frequentl y to mi ni mi ze
compromi se.
ACCESS-CONTROL ROSTERS
7-38. Admi ssi on of per sonnel to a r estr i cted area i s gr anted to those i denti fi ed
and l i sted on an access-control roster. Pen-and-i nk changes may be made to
the roster. Changes are publ i shed i n the same manner as the ori gi nal roster.
7-39. Rosters are mai ntai ned at access control poi nts. They are kept current,
veri fi ed, and accounted for by an i ndi vi dual desi gnated by the commander.
Commanders or thei r desi gnated representati ves authenti cate the rosters.
Admi ssi on of persons other than those on the rosters i s subject to speci fi c
approval by the securi ty manager. These personnel may requi re an escort
accordi ng to the l ocal SOP.
METHODS OF CONTROL
7-40. There are a number of methods avai l abl e to assi st i n the movement and
control of personnel i n l i mi ted, control l ed, and restri cted areas. The fol l owi ng
paragraphs di scuss the use of escorts and the two-person rul e:
ESCORTS
7-41. Escorts are chosen because of thei r abi l i ty to accompl i sh tasks
effecti vel y and properl y. They possess knowl edge of the area bei ng vi si ted.
Escorts may be guard-force personnel , but they are normal l y personnel from
the area bei ng vi si ted. Local regul ati ons and SOPs determi ne i f a vi si tor
requi res an escort whi l e i n the restri cted area. Personnel on the access l i st
may be admi tted to restri cted areas wi thout an escort.
TWO-PERSON RULE
7-42. The two-person rul e i s desi gned to prohi bi t access to sensi ti ve areas or
equi pment by a l one i ndi vi dual . Two authori zed persons are consi dered
present when they are i n a physi cal posi ti on from whi ch they can posi ti vel y
detect i ncorrect or unauthori zed procedures wi th respect to the task or
operati on bei ng performed. The team i s fami l i ar wi th appl i cabl e safety and
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-11
securi ty requi rements, and they are present duri ng any operati on that affords
access to sensi ti ve areas or equi pment that requi res the two-person rul e.
When appl i cati on of the two-person rul e i s requi red, i t i s enforced constantl y
by the personnel who consti tute the team.
7-43. The two-person rul e i s appl i ed i n many other aspects of physi cal -
securi ty operati ons, such as the fol l owi ng:
When uncontrol l ed access to vi tal machi nery, equi pment, or materi el
mi ght provi de opportuni ty for i ntenti onal or uni ntenti onal damage
that coul d affect the i nstal l ati ons mi ssi on or operati on.
When uncontrol l ed access to funds coul d provi de opportuni ty for
di versi on by fal si fi cati on of accounts.
When uncontrol l ed del i very or recei pt for materi al s coul d provi de
opportuni ty for pi l ferage through short del i veri es and fal se recei pts.
When access to an arms or ammuni ti on storage room coul d provi de an
opportuni ty for theft. Keys shoul d be i ssued so that at l east two peopl e
must be present to unl ock the l ocks requi red under the provi si ons of
AR 190-11.
7-44. The two-person rul e i s l i mi ted to the creati vi ty of the PM and the
physi cal -securi ty manager. They shoul d expl ore every aspect of physi cal -
securi ty operati ons i n whi ch the two-person rul e woul d provi de addi ti onal
securi ty and assurance and i ncl ude al l appropri ate recommendati ons and
provi si ons of the physi cal -securi ty pl an. An el ectroni c-entry control system
may be used to enforce the two-person rul e. The system can be programmed to
deny access unti l two authori zed peopl e have successful l y entered codes or
swi ped cards.
SECURITY CONTROLS OF PACKAGES, PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND
VEHICLES
7-45. A good package-control system hel ps prevent or mi ni mi ze pi l ferage,
sabotage, and espi onage. The l ocal SOP may al l ow the entry of packages wi th
proper authori zati on i nto restri cted areas wi thout i nspecti on. A package-
checki ng system i s used at the entrance gate. When practi cal , i nspect al l
outgoi ng packages except those properl y authori zed for removal . When a 100
percent i nspecti on i s i mpracti cal , conduct frequent unannounced spot checks.
A good package-control system assi sts i n the movement of authori zed
packages, materi al , and property.
7-46. Property control s are not l i mi ted to packages carri ed openl y, but they
i ncl ude the control of anythi ng that coul d be used to conceal property or
materi al . Personnel shoul d not be routi nel y searched except i n unusual
si tuati ons. Searches must be performed accordi ng to the l ocal SOP.
7-47. Al l POVs on the i nstal l ati on shoul d be regi stered wi th the PM or the
i nstal l ati ons physi cal -securi ty offi ce. Securi ty personnel shoul d assi gn a
temporary decal or other temporary I D tag to vi si tors vehi cl es to permi t ready
recogni ti on. The decal or the tag shoul d be di sti nctl y di fferent from that of
permanent-party personnel .
FM 3-19.30
7-12 Access Control
7-48. When authori zed vehi cl es enter or exi t a restri cted area, they undergo a
systemati c search, i ncl udi ng (but not l i mi ted to) the
Vehi cl es i nteri or.
Engi ne compartment.
External ai r breathers.
Top of the vehi cl e.
Battery compartment.
Cargo compartment.
Undercarri age.
7-49. The movement of trucks and rai l road cars i nto and out of restri cted
areas shoul d be supervi sed and i nspected. Truck and rai l road entrances are
control l ed by l ocked gates when not i n use and are manned by securi ty
personnel when unl ocked. The I D cards/badges are i ssued to operators to
ensure proper I D and regi strati on for access to speci fi c l oadi ng and unl oadi ng
areas.
7-50. Al l conveyances enteri ng or l eavi ng a protected area are requi red to
pass through a servi ce gate manned by securi ty forces. Dri vers, hel pers,
passengers, and vehi cl e contents must be careful l y exami ned. The
exami nati on may i ncl ude
Appropri ate entri es i n the securi ty l og (i ncl udi ng the date, operator's
name, l oad descri pti on, and ti me entered and departed).
A check of the operators l i cense.
Veri fi cati on of the seal number wi th the shi ppi ng document and
exami nati on of the seal for tamperi ng.
7-51. I ncomi ng trucks and rai l road cars must be assi gned escorts before they
are permi tted to enter desi gnated l i mi ted or excl usi on areas. Commanders
shoul d establ i sh publ i shed procedures to control the movement of trucks and
rai l road cars that enter desi gnated restri cted areas to di scharge or pi ck up
cargo (escorts wi l l be provi ded when necessary).
7-52. The best control i s provi ded when al l of these el ements are i ncorporated
i nto access-control procedures. Si mpl e, understandabl e, and workabl e access-
control procedures are used to achi eve securi ty objecti ves wi thout i mpedi ng
operati ons. When properl y organi zed and admi ni stered, access-control
procedures provi de a method of posi ti vel y i denti fyi ng personnel who have the
need to enter or l eave an area.
TACTICAL-ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS
7-53. Access-control procedures duri ng tacti cal operati ons may establ i sh
addi ti onal chal l enges for the commander. I n some i nstances, the commander
cannot provi de a peri meter barri er (such as a fence) based on METT-TC.
Commanders are sti l l requi red to provi de securi ty measures for restri cted
areas, al though they may not al ways have the necessary assets. Earl y-
warni ng systems and the use of guards become cruci al . A restri cted area may
become a requi rement wi thout pri or noti ce duri ng an operati on. Fi gure 7-3
and Fi gure 7-4, page 7-14, are exampl es of temporary tacti cal restri cted and
excl usi on areas.
FM 3-19.30
Access Control 7-13
7-54. Commanders must pl an for these consi derati ons when devel opi ng thei r
budget. Fundi ng must be requested and set asi de to support physi cal -securi ty
requi rements duri ng tacti cal operati ons. Resources wi l l not al ways be
avai l abl e; therefore, commanders must i mpl ement procedures that support
access-control measures. I mprovi si ng wi l l become common practi ce to
overcome shortfal l s concerni ng access-control equi pment i n the fi el d.
Single concertina
or other material
Foxhole, vehicle, or tent to
shelter weapon
Guard
Single concertina
or other material
Launcher
Vehicle or tent
Entrance guards
Entrance
guards
Security-unit personnel
Additional security posts if determined
necessary by commander
Entrance guards
NOTE: Equipment, personnel, and positioning is according to the units SOP.
EDM
EDM
Figure 7-3. Sample Layout of Temporary Tactical Restricted Areas
FM 3-19.30
7-14 Access Control
NOTE: Other vehicles and personnel, to include the LPs, form a defensive perimeter inside the
primary directions of fire of the M60 machine guns. During attack, alternate machine-gun crews
should be placed in the perimeter away from primary machine guns and be spaced so that they
can be used as replacements and so that large gaps do not appear in the perimeter.
Legend:
X MP rifleman Temporary exclusion area (size depends on
terrain and threat force)
Principal direction of fire ( Listening post
M249 SAW
(mounted or dismounted)
Typical exclusion area
for halted convoy
Driver
M249 SAW
Exclusion
area
Threat
Restricted
area
Restricted
area
T
h
r
e
a
t
Figure 7-4. Sample Layout for a Temporary Tactical Exclusion Area
Lock and Key Systems 8-1
Chapter 8
Lock and Key Systems
Lock s ar e the most acceptabl e and wi del y used secur i ty devi ces for
pr otecti ng faci l i ti es, cl assi fi ed mater i al s, and pr oper ty. Al l contai ner s,
rooms, and faci l i ti es must be l ocked when not i n actual use. Regardl ess of
thei r qual i ty or cost, l ocks ar e consi der ed del ay devi ces onl y. Some l ocks
r equi r e consi der abl e ti me and exper t mani pul ati on to open, but al l l ocks
can be defeated by for ce and wi th the pr oper tool s. Locks must never be
consi dered as a stand-al one method of securi ty.
INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE
8-1. The USACE i s responsi bl e for i nstal l i ng l ocki ng devi ces i n newl y
constructed faci l i ti es. I nstal l ati on-l evel engi neers are responsi bl e for
mai ntai ni ng the l ocki ng devi ces. Physi cal -securi ty personnel must work
cl osel y wi th engi neer personnel to ensure that l ocks meet the standards and
are i nstal l ed accordi ng to appl i cabl e regul ati ons. One source of assi stance and
i nformati on i s the DOD Lock Program Techni cal Support Hotl i ne at the Naval
Faci l i ti es Engi neeri ng Servi ces Center, Port Hueneme, Cal i forni a.
TYPES OF LOCKING DEVICES
8-2. The degree of protecti on afforded by a vaul t, a safe, or a fi l i ng cabi net
may be measur ed i n ter ms of the l ocks resi stance. Locki ng devi ces are l i sted
i n TM 5-805-8. Types of l ocki ng devi ces i ncl ude key and combi nati on l ocks.
8-3. ARs 190-11, 190-51, 50-5, and 50-6 prescri be speci fi c types of l ocks for
speci fi c types of faci l i ti es. AR 380-5 prescri bes standard faci l i ti es for stori ng
cl assi fi ed materi al and contai ns gui dance for di fferent storage requi rements.
KEY LOCKS
8-4. Key l ocks consi st of, but are not l i mi ted to, the fol l owi ng:
Cyl i ndri cal l ocksets are often cal l ed key-i n-knob or key-i n-l ever l ocks.
They are normal l y used to secure offi ces and storerooms. The l ocki ng
cyl i nder l ocated i n the center of the doorknob di sti ngui shes these l ocks.
Some cyl i ndri cal l ocksets have keyways i n each of the opposi ng knobs
that requi re a key on ei ther si de to l ock and unl ock them. Others
unl ock wi th a key, but may be l ocked by pushi ng or rotati ng a button on
the i nsi de knob. These l ocks are sui tabl e onl y for very l ow-securi ty
appl i cati ons. Usi ng these l ocks may requi re compensatory measures i n
the form of addi ti onal l ocks on contai ners wi thi n the room.
Dead-bol t l ocks are someti mes cal l ed tubul ar dead bol ts. They are
mounted on the door i n a manner si mi l ar to cyl i ndri cal l ocksets. The
pri mary di fference i s i n the bol t. When the bol t i s extended (l ocked),
FM 3-19.30
8-2 Lock and Key Systems
the dead bol t projects i nto the doorframe at l east one i nch, and i t
cannot be forced back (unl ocked) by appl yi ng pressure to the end of the
bol t. The dead-bol t l ock has the potenti al for provi di ng acceptabl e
l evel s of protecti on for storerooms and other areas where more securi ty
i s desi red. I t i s recommended for use i n mi l i tary housi ng as an effecti ve
securi ty measure i n the i nstal l ati ons cri me-preventi on program. I n
si tuati ons where there i s a wi ndow i n or adjacent to the door, a doubl e-
cyl i nder dead-bol t l ock (one that r equi res a key to open fr om ei ther
si de) shoul d be used.
Morti se l ocks are so named because the l ock case i s morti sed or
recessed i nto the edge of the door. The most common vari ety of morti se
l ocks has a doorknob on each si de of the door. Entrance doors often
have an exteri or thumb l atch rather than a doorknob. The morti se l ock
can be l ocked from i nsi de by means of a thumb turn or by a button.
Morti se l ocks are consi dered l ow-securi ty devi ces si nce they weaken
the door i n the morti sed area.
Drop-bol t l ocks (often referred to as ji mmy-proof l ocks) are normal l y
used as auxi l i ary l ocks si mi l ar to dead bol ts. Both the drop-bol t l ock
body and the stri ke have i nterl ocki ng l eaves si mi l ar to a door hi nge.
When cl osed, l ocki ng pi ns i n the l ock body drop down i nto the hol es
provi ded i n the stri ke and secure the l ocki ng system. Si nce the l ock
body and the stri ke are i nterconnected wi th l ocki ng pi ns when cl osed,
the l ock essenti al l y becomes a si ngl e uni t and i s extremel y di ffi cul t to
separate.
Ri m-cyl i nder l ocks are mounted to the doors i nsi de surface and are
secured by screws i n the door face. These l ocks are general l y used wi th
drop-bol t and other surface-mounted l ocks and l atches. They consi st of
an outer barrel , a cyl i nder and ri ng, a tai l pi ece, a back mounti ng pl ate,
and two mounti ng screws. The tai l pi ece screws are usual l y scored so
that the l ock can be tai l ored to fi t varyi ng door thi cknesses.
Uni t l ocks are i deal i n heavi l y travel ed faci l i ti es (such as hospi tal s or
i nsti tuti onal bui l di ngs). These l ocks are a compl ete, one-pi ece uni t that
sl i des i nto a notch cut i nto the doors l atch edge. The one-si ze cutout of
the door edge si mpl i fi es the door preparati on for the l ock.
Mechani cal , push-button combi nati on l ocks are di gi tal (push buttons
numbered 1 through 9) combi nati on door-l ocki ng devi ces used to deny
area access to any i ndi vi dual not authori zed or cl eared for a speci fi c
area. These l ocks are normal l y used for access control and shoul d be
backed up by door l ocki ng devi ces when the faci l i ty i s unoccupi ed.
Padl ocks are detachabl e l ocks that are typi cal l y used wi th a hasp. Low-
securi ty padl ocks, someti mes cal l ed secondary padl ocks, are used to
deter unauthori zed access, and they provi de onl y mi ni mal resi stance to
force. Low-securi ty l ocks are made wi th hardened steel shackl es.
Precauti ons must be taken to avoi d confusi ng these l ocks wi th si mi l ar
brass or bronze l ocks. The brass or bronze l ocks are commonl y used but
do not meet the securi ty requi rements of the hardened shackl ed l ocks.
Hi gh-securi ty padl ocks may be used to secure AA&E. They provi de the
maxi mum resi stance to unauthori zed entry when used wi th a hi gh-
securi ty hasp.
FM 3-19.30
Lock and Key Systems 8-3
8-5. Some l ocks have i nterchangeabl e cores, whi ch al l ow the same key system
to i ncl ude a var i ety of l ocks. Padl ocks, door l ocks, cabi net l ocks, and el ectri cal
key swi tches can al l be operated by the same key system. Because these cores
are removabl e by a speci al key, thi s system al l ows for rapi d rekeyi ng of l ocks
i n the event that the key i s compromi sed.
8-6. Locks are keyed i n several di fferent ways. When several l ocks are keyed
di ffer entl y, each i s operated by i ts own key. When they are keyed al i ke, one
key wi l l open them al l . Locks that ar e master-keyed ar e keyed di ffer entl y, yet
have one key that wi l l open them al l . Master-keyi ng i s done for conveni ence
and represents the control l ed l oss of securi ty. Master-keyi ng i s not used unl ess
permi tted by regul ati on.
COMBINATION LOCKS
8-7. Combi nati on l ocks are avai l abl e as padl ocks or as mounted l ocks. They
are l ow-securi ty padl ocks wi th combi nati ons that are ei ther fi xed or
changeabl e. Combi nati on l ocks may be ei ther mechani cal or el ectroni c. They
are operated by enteri ng a parti cul ar sequence of numbers. When the correct
combi nati on i s entered, the l ocks bol t i s retracted. Combi nati on l ocks used for
securi ng cl assi fi ed materi al must meet Federal Speci fi cati on FF-L-2740.
8-8. Al though the l ock i s the most accepted and wi del y used securi ty devi ce, i t
i s onl y a del ay devi ce and shoul d never be consi dered as a posi ti ve bar to
entry. A l ock can (and wi l l ) be defeated. The best defense for l ocki ng devi ces i s
a good key-control program. Refer to AR 190-51, Appendi x D, for standard key
and l ock procedures. Addi ti onal key and l ock procedures for AA&E can be
found i n AR 190-11, Chapter 3.
Security Forces 9-1
Chapter 9
Security Forces
The securi ty force for an i nstal l ati on or a faci l i ty provi des the enforcement
el ement i n the physi cal -securi ty program. Thi s force consi sts of personnel
speci fi cal l y or gani zed, tr ai ned, and equi pped to pr otect the commands
physi cal -secur i ty i nter ests. I t i s a commander 's most effecti ve tool i n a
comprehensi ve, i ntegrated, physi cal -secur i ty progr am. Vul nerabi l i ty tests
are per i odi cal l y conducted to determi ne and ensure the state of readi ness
of secur i ty for ces (see Appendi x K).
TYPES OF SECURITY FORCES
9-1. On i nstal l ati ons, securi ty forces may be MP forces, securi ty pol i ce, DOD
ci vi l -servi ce securi ty guards, or contract guards. I nteri or guard duti es are
performed by i nstal l ati on uni t troops on a roster basi s. MP forces normal l y
perform securi ty duti es that requi re hi gher degrees of trai ni ng and
experi ence. These i ncl ude
Securi ty of restri cted areas.
Securi ty of speci fi c sensi ti ve gates.
Supervi sory or coordi nated rol es wi th other mi l i tary or DOD ci vi l -
servi ce securi ty guards.
Responsi bi l i ty for moni tori ng and respondi ng to i ntrusi on al arms.
9-2. An MP uni t may perform the enti re physi cal -securi ty functi on al one
based on METT-TC, the area, and the faci l i ti es. When an MP uni t cannot
assume responsi bi l i ti es for al l of the physi cal -securi ty requi rements i n the
command, other forces may be requi red. Addi ti onal forces may consi st of the
fol l owi ng:
Personnel furni shed by uni ts of the i nstal l ati ons command on a dai l y
or weekl y basi s. Whi l e thi s method has the si ngl e advantage of
provi di ng addi ti onal manpower, i t has the di sadvantages of rapi d
turnover and the l ack of trai ni ng. I f thi s manpower i s used, personnel
shoul d be assi gned the l east sensi ti ve posts or patrol s. For extended
augmentati on, uni ts may be attached to MP uni ts. The MP uni t may
al so be augmented by reserve uni ts or uni ts i n rotati on.
The combat-arms branches (especi al l y the i nfantry) may attach thei r
forces to MP uni ts and may be desi gnated as securi ty guards assi sti ng
i n the requi red operati ons.
Mi l i tary or parami l i tary uni ts of the host country may al so be attached
to or operate i n coor di nati on wi th MP for ces. They may al so be
suppl emented wi th nati onal pol i ce of thei r own country.
FM 3-19.30
9-2 Security Forces
The i nstal l ati ons band may be a source of mi l i tary force duri ng
warti me. (The band i s assi gned enemy-pri soner-of-war [EPW] duty as a
warti me duty.) The band i s doctri nal l y capabl e of provi di ng securi ty at
the di vi si on tacti cal operati ons center (DTOC) and ASPs, assi sti ng i n
the peri meter defense of the command post (CP), and operati ng the
di smount poi nt for the CP. I t i s capabl e of provi di ng access control at
the DTOC and the ASPs and augmenti ng or rel i evi ng securi ty
personnel on the defensi ve peri meter.
9-3. Ci vi l -servi ce securi ty guards are uni formed ci vi l i an empl oyees from a
government agency. They are customari l y trai ned and organi zed al ong
mi l i tary l i nes. The organi zati on may be compl etel y ci vi l servi ce or may be
composed of ci vi l -servi ce personnel under mi l i tary supervi si on. I n ei ther case,
they are under the operati onal control of the PM or the securi ty offi cer.
9-4. Labor-servi ce personnel (l ocal ci vi l i an personnel ) have been organi zed
and used successful l y i n theaters of operati on. These types of uni ts were
organi zed after Worl d War I I and si nce that ti me have establ i shed envi abl e
records i n the physi cal -securi ty fi el d. They are di sti ncti vel y uni formed,
organi zed, and equi pped. They have set and mai ntai ned the hi ghest securi ty
standards, resul ti ng i n a mi ni mal l oss of property. Whi l e not mi l i tary
organi zati ons, these uni ts have successful l y devel oped a hi gh sense of duty
and espri t de corps that has been refl ected i n thei r outstandi ng contri buti ons
to the physi cal securi ty of i nstal l ati ons i n overseas commands.
AUTHORITY AND J URISDICTION
9-5. I t i s most i mportant that the PM or the securi ty offi cer determi ne (and
i nstruct hi s securi ty force i n) the extent and l i mi tati ons of the commander's
juri sdi cti on i n the fi el d of l aw enforcement and i nvesti gati ons. Those
juri sdi cti ons i ncl ude
Juri sdi cti on of pl ace.
I Mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons and faci l i ti es. Whether state or federal l aw or
both are appl i cabl e on a mi l i tary i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty depends
l argel y on the nature of juri sdi cti on over the l and i nvol ved. The
amount of federal juri sdi cti on may vary between di fferent areas of
the i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty. The l egal formal i ti es of acqui ri ng
juri sdi cti on over l and under the control of the Secretary of the Army
are accompl i shed at DA l evel and accordi ng to the provi si ons of AR
405-20. I nformati on and advi ce rel ati ng to juri sdi cti onal questi ons
shoul d be referred to the l ocal SJA.
I Areas outsi de of mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons. Areas outsi de of mi l i tary
i nstal l ati ons are general l y subject to state and l ocal l aws; however,
there are excepti ons. I nformati on and advi ce i n thi s regard shoul d be
obtai ned through the l ocal SJA.
I Overseas areas. I n overseas areas, juri sdi cti on vari es accordi ng to
the mi l i tary si tuati on and exi sti ng i nternati onal treati es, contracts,
and agreements. Gui dance shoul d be obtai ned i n each i nstance from
the commander and the SJA and set forth i n appropri ate command
di recti ves.
FM 3-19.30
Security Forces 9-3
Juri sdi cti on of personnel .
I Juri sdi cti on of personnel general l y fol l ows the l i mi tati ons of
juri sdi cti on of the i nstal l ati on.
I MP forces have juri sdi cti on and authori ty over personnel as
descri bed i n AR 190-14 and rel ated publ i cati ons.
I Authori ty for federal ci vi l i an empl oyees assi gned to securi ty, pol i ce,
and guard duti es i s deri ved from the i nstal l ati ons commandi ng
offi cer. These personnel can have no more authori ty than he
possesses and are subject to any l i mi tati ons i mposed thereon.
I Securi ty-force personnel may enforce al l offenses under the Uni form
Code of Mi l i tary Justi ce (UCMJ), mi l i tary regul ati ons, federal l aws
and regul ati ons, and state l aws where appl i cabl e.
I Securi ty-force personnel may be gi ven the same authori ty as MP
forces over al l personnel subject to mi l i tary juri sdi cti on, i ncl udi ng
apprehensi on, detenti on, and search.
I Ci vi l i an securi ty-force personnel have no speci fi c grant of authori ty
over ci vi l i ans other than the ri ght of ci ti zen's arrest.
I The commander i s the source of juri sdi cti on and authori ty for al l
other personnel assi gned to securi ty-force duti es.
PERSONNEL SELECTION
9-6. Regardl ess of the use of structural , mechani cal , or el ectroni c equi pment,
the human el ement i n securi ty operati ons makes the di fference between
success or fai l ure. Commanders and supervi sors have a responsi bi l i ty to
ensure that securi ty personnel who control access to restri cted areas and
cl assi fi ed acti vi ti es are qual i fi ed based on cri teri a i n AR 380-67. Personnel
who perform physi cal -securi ty duti es must be di sci pl i ned and al ert, have
sound judgment, be confi dent and physi cal l y fi t, and possess good
i nterpersonal communi cati on ski l l s.
SECURITY CLEARANCE
9-7. Securi ty-cl earance cri teri a for securi ty posi ti ons must be based on the
securi ty cl assi fi cati ons of the i nformati on to whi ch access wi l l be granted.
Securi ty posi ti ons are normal l y desi gnated as sensi ti ve and requi re a secret
securi ty cl earance. ARs 381-20 and 380-67 descri be cri teri a and procedures
governi ng securi ty cl earances. Appropri ate ci vi l i an-personnel regul ati ons
shoul d al so be consul ted when ci vi l i ans are i nvol ved.
9-8. Posi ti ve eval uati on of the rel i abi l i ty of al l personnel must be made before
they are entrusted wi th cl assi fi ed or sensi ti ve i nformati on. (The I ndi vi dual
Rel i abi l i ty Program i s prescri bed i n AR 190-56.) Fol l ow-up acti on must be
made on al l personnel who are granted a securi ty cl earance to ensure that
they conti nue to meet the cri teri a for thei r cl earance. Personnel not meeti ng or
adheri ng to the prescri bed standards must have thei r securi ty cl earances
revoked and thereby l ose thei r access to areas contai ni ng cl assi fi ed
i nformati on or materi al (see AR 380-67).
FM 3-19.30
9-4 Security Forces
ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES
9-9. The organi zati on of a securi ty force wi l l vary, dependi ng on
ci rcumstances and the forces avai l abl e. Forces consi st of
Mobi l e patrol s. A mobi l e detachment of ground, sea, or ai r forces
di spatched to gather i nformati on or carry out a securi ty mi ssi on.
The response force. A mobi l e force wi th appropri ate fi re support
(usual l y desi gnated by the area commander) to deal wi th Level I I
threats i n the rear area (Army). Thi s i s normal l y an MP functi on.
Reserves. That porti on of a force wi thhel d from acti on or uncommi tted
to a speci fi c course of acti on so as to be avai l abl e for commi tment at the
deci si ve moment. I ts pri mary purpose i s to retai n fl exi bi l i ty throughout
an offensi ve acti on.
Any combi nati on of these three.
9-10. I nstructi ons to the securi ty force shoul d be i ssued i n wri ti ng. These
i nstructi ons are normal l y i n the form of general , speci al , or temporary orders.
They shoul d be careful l y and cl earl y worded and i ncl ude al l phases of each
assi gnment. They shoul d be revi ewed at l east monthl y to ensure that they are
current. Categori es of i nstructi ons of each are as fol l ows:
General orders are those orders that concern the securi ty force as a
whol e and are appl i cabl e at al l posts and patrol s.
Speci al orders pertai n to a permanent post or patrol . Each permanent
post or patrol shoul d have speci al orders i ssued concerni ng the
l ocati on, duti es, hours manned, arms, ammuni ti on, and other
equi pment requi red and the i nstructi ons for usi ng force i n enforcement
and appr ehensi on acti vi ti es.
Temporary orders are i ssued for a short peri od and cover a speci al or
temporary si tuati on. I f i t can be predetermi ned, such orders shoul d
i ndi cate the peri od of ti me for whi ch they are val i d.
9-11. A securi ty-force SOP that outl i nes pol i ci es, organi zati on, authori ty,
functi ons, and other requi red i nformati on shoul d be prepared for requi red
readi ng. Each securi ty-force member shoul d be hel d responsi bl e for ful l
knowl edge and understandi ng of the contents of the SOP. Each i nstal l ati on
PM, physi cal -securi ty offi cer, or chi ef of a guard force shoul d conduct peri odi c
i nspecti ons and tests to determi ne each i ndi vi dual 's degree of understandi ng
of these i nstructi ons. I nstructi ons shoul d be provi ded i n wri ti ng regardi ng the
safeguardi ng and control of the SOP. I ts contents may not be cl assi fi ed;
however, the i nformati on coul d assi st an i ntruder i n breachi ng securi ty.
HEADQUARTERS AND SHELTERS
9-12. The l ocati on of the securi ty forces headquarters wi l l depend on the si ze
and l ayout of the i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty. The objecti ves are the effi ci ent control
of the securi ty force and the adequate securi ty of vi tal acti vi ti es. On a smal l
i nstal l ati on, there i s frequentl y onl y one ful l -ti me entrance that may be
suppl emented by several part-ti me entrances. At these i nstal l ati ons, the
l ogi cal l ocati on of the headquarters woul d be at or near the mai n entrance. On
FM 3-19.30
Security Forces 9-5
l arger i nstal l ati ons, i t mi ght be better to l ocate the headquarters near the
center of the cantonment area.
9-13. The securi ty forces headquarters shoul d be the control poi nt for al l
physi cal -securi ty matters for the i nstal l ati on and the moni tori ng poi nt for
protecti ve al arm and communi cati on systems. Thi s offi ce shoul d have a
rel i abl e and i ndependent means to contact nearby ci vi l authori ti es. A l i st of
key tel ephone numbers shoul d be avai l abl e for use i n emergency operati ons.
9-14. Personnel shel ters shoul d be avai l abl e to protect the guards from the
el ements. The desi gn can be temporary or hardened and i ncl ude adequate
space for guard-force personnel onl y. The faci l i ty shoul d have heat,
venti l ati on, storage space for essenti al accessori es, l i ghti ng that wi l l not
expose the occupant, and good vi si bi l i ty i n al l di recti ons.
EXECUTION OF SECURITY ACTIVITIES
9-15. Securi ty personnel must exerci se good i nterpersonal communi cati on
ski l l s when carryi ng out thei r duti es wi th other empl oyees. Bad empl oyee
rel ati ons can resul t i f securi ty personnel become i mperti nent and assume
powers not ri ghtful l y thei rs. Securi ty personnel must understand the methods
and techni ques that wi l l detect securi ty hazards and assi st i n i denti fyi ng
vi ol ators and i ntruders.
9-16. Wri tten reports or journal s are recommended for securi ty acti vi ti es.
These shoul d be prepared by ei ther the securi ty forces supervi sor or the
personnel at the securi ty post. These reports shoul d record al l acti vi ti es,
acti ons, and vi si ts at the securi ty post.
9-17. I t must be strongl y emphasi zed that securi ty personnel wi l l be used for
securi ty duti es onl y and shoul d not be gi ven other routi ne functi ons except as
di rected by the commander or hi s representati ve. Securi ty personnel shoul d
have no fi re-fi ghti ng or si mi l ar duti es regul arl y assi gned. Such emergenci es
offer an excel l ent di versi on to cover an i ntruders entrance. Consequentl y,
duri ng such ti mes, securi ty personnel must be excepti onal l y al ert when
performi ng thei r duti es. However, the securi ty force may be cross-trai ned i n
other areas (such as fi re fi ghti ng) so that they may be used when requi red and
when ci rcumstances permi t (such as when they are off duty).
9-18. Personnel who are assi gned to fi xed posts shoul d have a desi gnated
method of rel i ef. The securi ty forces shi ft supervi sor shoul d establ i sh a rel i ef
schedul e (about every two hours) accordi ng to l ocal pol i ci es and the SOP. A
si mpl e but effecti ve pl an of operati on shoul d be worked out for the securi ty
force to meet every foreseeabl e emergency. Practi ce al arms shoul d be
conducted frequentl y to test the pl ans effecti veness. Such pl ans shoul d be
desi gned to prevent a di versi on at one poi nt on the i nstal l ati on, drawi ng off
the guar ds or di stracti ng thei r attenti on fr om another secti on of the
i nstal l ati on where unauthori zed entry may be made. Routes and ti mes for
securi ty patrol s shoul d al so be vari ed at frequent i nterval s to precl ude
establ i shi ng a routi ne that may be observed by potenti al i ntruders.
FM 3-19.30
9-6 Security Forces
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
9-19. The extent and type of trai ni ng requi red for securi ty forces wi l l vary
accordi ng to the i mportance, vul nerabi l i ty, si ze, and other factors affecti ng a
parti cul ar i nstal l ati on or faci l i ty. The trai ni ng programs objecti ve i s to ensure
that al l personnel are abl e to perform routi ne and emergency duti es
competentl y and effi ci entl y.
BENEFITS OF PROPER TRAINING
9-20. Effi ci ent and conti nui ng trai ni ng i s the most effecti ve means of
obtai ni ng and mai ntai ni ng maxi mum profi ci ency of securi ty-force personnel .
Regar dl ess of the sel ecti on pr ocess, new personnel sel dom have al l of the
qual i fi cati ons and experi ence necessary to do the job. I n addi ti on, new or
revi sed job requi rements frequentl y mean that personnel must be retrai ned.
Trai ni ng can bri dge the voi d between abi l i ty and job requi rement.
9-21. Supervi sors need to remember that al l personnel do not have the same
trai ni ng needs. I t i s a waste of val uabl e ti me to trai n an i ndi vi dual i n a subject
that he has al ready mastered. Past experi ence, trai ni ng, acqui red ski l l s, and
duty assi gnments shoul d be eval uated for each person as an ai d i n pl anni ng
an effecti ve trai ni ng program.
9-22. A good trai ni ng program benefi ts both the i nstal l ati on and the securi ty
force. The task of supervi si ng the securi ty force i s made easi er, there i s much
l ess wasted ti me, fewer mi stakes are made, and there i s l ess fri cti on wi th
other agenci es. A good trai ni ng program hel ps to i nsti l l confi dence through
devel opi ng i ncreased ski l l profi ci ency. The trai ni ng program provi des for more
fl exi bi l i ty and better physi cal protecti on, fewer requi red personnel , and l ess
ti me to l earn duti es. Trai ni ng establ i shes systemati c and uni form work
habi ts.
BASIC TRAINING
9-23. As a mi ni mum, personnel (i ncl udi ng ci vi l -servi ce securi ty personnel )
who have not had securi ty trai ni ng shoul d recei ve trai ni ng i n thei r securi ty
duti es. Thi s trai ni ng i ncl udes
The care and use of weapons, i f requi red. No person shoul d be pl aced
on securi ty duty unl ess weapons trai ni ng has occurred wi thi n the past
12 months. Weapons trai ni ng must be accordi ng to AR 190-14.
Areas of responsi bi l i ty and authori ty of securi ty personnel , parti cul arl y
on apprehensi on, search and sei zure, and the use of force.
The l ocati on and use of fi rst ai d and fi re-control equi pment and
el ectri cal swi tches.
Duti es i n case of emergenci es such as al erts, fi res, expl osi ons, and ci vi l
di sturbances.
Common forms of sabotage and espi onage acti vi ty.
The l ocati on of hazardous and vul nerabl e equi pment and materi al .
FM 3-19.30
Security Forces 9-7
IN-SERVICE TRAINING
9-24. Al l newl y assi gned i ndi vi dual s are gi ven speci al i nstructi ons for each
post. When possi bl e, thei r fi rst assi gnment shoul d be wi th an exper i enced
person. Addi ti onal i n-servi ce trai ni ng and peri odi c retrai ni ng to revi ew basi c
materi al and procedures are conti nuous requi rements.
9-25. Schedul i ng i n-servi ce trai ni ng and cl asses to enabl e al l of the securi ty
force or a compl ete shi ft to parti ci pate i s often di ffi cul t. Therefore, the
supervi sor must exerci se good judgment when schedul i ng trai ni ng to ensure
that each person has the opportuni ty to recei ve the trai ni ng.
EVALUATION OF TRAINING
9-26. Testi ng desi gned to eval uate performance i s a necessary step i n the
trai ni ng program. These tests may be oral or wri tten or may be a type of
performance test. They shoul d be admi ni stered annual l y to ensure that the
enti re force mai ntai ns hi gh standards of profi ci ency. A testi ng program al so
hel ps to i mprove trai ni ng by
Di scoveri ng gaps i n l earni ng.
Emphasi zi ng mai n poi nts.
Eval uati ng i nstructi onal methods.
9-27. Securi ty trai ni ng recei ved by personnel at thei r uni ts must be entered
i n uni t trai ni ng charts or records. The record serves to
I ndi cate i ndi vi dual degrees of ski l l .
Establ i sh pri ori ti es of i nstructi on.
Present a consol i dated pi cture of the securi ty forces trai ni ng status.
Hel p certi fy guard personnel .
SUPERVISION
9-28. A securi ty supervi sor i s tasked wi th overseei ng and di recti ng the work
and behavi or of other members of the securi ty force. To obtai n maxi mum
performance from each member of hi s force, the supervi sor must have a
compl ete understandi ng of l eadershi p pri nci pl es and be capabl e of appl yi ng
them.
9-29. The supervi sor i s responsi bl e for understandi ng the operati ons of al l
posts. Addi ti onal l y, he i s often responsi bl e for sel ecti ng, i nducti ng, trai ni ng,
and ensuri ng the producti vi ty, safety, moral e, and advancement of guard-force
members.
9-30. To ensure an al ert, presentabl e, and effi ci ent securi ty force, the
l eadershi p must provi de consi stent and i ntel l i gent supervi si on. To earn the
respect and cooperati on of the guard force, supervi sors must be professi onal i n
thei r conduct. The securi ty forces moral e and effi ci ency i s a di rect refl ecti on of
the qual i ty of i ts supervi si on.
9-31. The rati o of supervi sory personnel to securi ty personnel shoul d be
determi ned by the i ndi vi dual characteri sti cs of each i nstal l ati on. At smal l
i nstal l ati ons, the rati o may be hi gher than at l arge i nstal l ati ons.
FM 3-19.30
9-8 Security Forces
9-32. There must be suffi ci ent supervi si on to enabl e the i nspecti on of each
post and patrol . I t i s al so essenti al that supervi sors be i n contact wi th securi ty
headquarters to control emergenci es that may ari se. Speci fi c duti es of a
supervi sor i ncl ude the i nspecti on and bri efi ng of the rel i ef shi ft and the
i nspecti on of posts, vehi cl es, and equi pment duri ng vi si ts to posts and patrol s.
SUPPLEMENTS TO SUPERVISION
9-33. Vari ous means and devi ces may be used as suppl ements to personnel
supervi si on. These i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
Recorded tour systems. Personnel record thei r presence at strategi c
poi nts throughout an i nstal l ati on by usi ng portabl e watch cl ocks or
si mi l ar devi ces. These are effecti ve means of ensuri ng that such poi nts
are regul arl y covered. Thi s system provi des an after-the-fact type of
supervi si on.
Supervisory tour systems. A si gnal i s transmi tted to a manned
central headquarters at the ti me the post i s vi si ted. These systems
provi de i nstantaneous supervi si on and a means of detecti ng
i nterference wi th normal securi ty acti vi ti es and i ni ti ati ng an
i nvesti gati on or other appropri ate acti on.
9-34. Al l personnel on securi ty duty shoul d be requi red to report peri odi cal l y
to headquarters by the usual means of communi cati on. The frequency of such
reports wi l l vary, dependi ng on a number of factors. Regul ari ty shoul d be
avoi ded to precl ude setti ng a pattern by whi ch an i ntruder can gauge an
appropri ate ti me for entrance.
MANAGEMENT
9-35. The physi cal -securi ty supervi sor i s responsi bl e for managi ng and
devel opi ng the securi ty organi zati on. A physi cal -securi ty program i s greatl y
enhanced by a wel l -devel oped educati onal program.
9-36. The physi cal -securi ty supervi sor acts as an advi sor and assi sts i n
formul ati ng pol i ci es for the i nstal l ati ons physi cal -securi ty measures. The goal
shoul d be the best securi ty wi thi n the restri cti ons of the commanders budget
gui dance. Physi cal -securi ty pl anners must remember that anyone can provi de
adequate securi ty wi th unl i mi ted funds; however, thi s i s not a real i sti c
approach. There must be a constant endeavor to effect justi fi abl e economy
where possi bl e wi thout jeopardi zi ng the physi cal -securi ty program.
UNIFORMS
9-37. Al l securi ty-force personnel are requi red to wear the compl ete
prescri bed uni form as outl i ned i n thei r speci al orders. Devi ati ons from the
prescri bed uni form shoul d not be made except for i tems to protect the guard
forces heal th, comfort, and safety. The duty uni form wi l l be worn duri ng al l
tours of duty and may be worn duri ng off-duty hours onl y between the pl ace of
resi dence and the pl ace of duty. Each member of the securi ty force i s requi red
to mai ntai n hi gh standards of appearance.
FM 3-19.30
Security Forces 9-9
VEHICLES
9-38. The securi ty force shoul d be furni shed wi th suffi ci ent and rel i abl e
vehi cl es to mai ntai n patrol standards establ i shed by the i nstal l ati on
commander. Vehi cl es assi gned to the force shoul d be equi pped wi th two-way
radi os to obtai n the greatest possi bl e use of al l personnel and vehi cl es.
FIREARMS
9-39. Before i ssui ng weapons, the securi ty force wi l l be bri efed on the use of
force. Securi ty-force personnel wi l l be i ssued weapons as prescri bed by AR
190-11 and the uni ts SOP. The commander may prescri be other weapons for
the securi ty force based on needs and requi rements. Weapons normal l y are
l oaded wi th l i ve ammuni ti on, except where prohi bi ted for safety reasons. The
use of pri vatel y owned weapons whi l e on duty i s not authori zed. Weapons and
ammuni ti on i ssued to securi ty-force personnel wi l l not be removed from the
i nstal l ati on except i n the course of offi ci al duty. When not i n use, weapons are
secured i n arm racks i n storage rooms as prescri bed by AR 190-11.
9-40. Weapons are i nspected as necessary to ensure proper mai ntenance. A
wri tten report i s prepared and fi l ed on the di scharge of any weapon except for
authori zed and supervi sed trai ni ng. The patrol supervi sor or an MP
i nvesti gator prepares the report (DA Form 3975).
9-41. Ammuni ti on suppl i es for the securi ty forces use must be mai ntai ned i n
secured storage contai ners accordi ng to AR 190-11. Ammuni ti on must be
i ssued onl y under proper supervi si on for authori zed purposes. Ammuni ti on
i ssued to members of the securi ty force must be accounted for by i ndi vi dual
members i mmedi atel y upon compl eti on of duty. Any ammuni ti on unaccounted
for wi l l be the subject of a report of i ts di sposi ti on by the i ndi vi dual .
COMMUNICATIONS
9-42. The securi ty force shoul d be equi pped wi th two-way radi os. These may
be vehi cl e-mounted and portabl e, or they may be tel ephones. A secure-voi ce
capabi l i ty shoul d be used where possi bl e. Thi s equi pment i s consi dered
essenti al for the effi ci ent operati on of the securi ty force and the
accompl i shment of i ts assi gned mi ssi on. Proper use and care by securi ty
personnel wi l l enhance the equi pments useful ness and capabi l i ty.
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT
9-43. Securi ty managers or supervi sors shoul d obtai n other equi pment
necessary to accompl i sh thei r securi ty mi ssi on. I tems i n thi s category may
i ncl ude (but are not l i mi ted to) warni ng l i ghts; si rens; spotl i ghts; portabl e
l i ghts; fl ashl i ghts; fi rst ai d ki ts; traffi c-control devi ces; and i tems of wear for
the heal th, comfort, and safety of securi ty personnel . Some of thi s equi pment
may requi re l ocal purchase.
FM 3-19.30
9-10 Security Forces
MILITARY WORKING DOGS
9-44. The requi rements for physi cal protecti on of i nstal l ati ons or faci l i ti es
wi thi n the US and overseas theaters of operati on conti nue to i ncrease.
Manpower avai l abl e for thi s purpose has al ways been (and probabl y wi l l
conti nue to be) l i mi ted. The MWD, properl y trai ned and properl y used, can
enhance a physi cal -securi ty program. See AR 190-12 and DA Pam 190-12 for
i nformati on regardi ng the use of MWDs.
SUMMARY
9-45. A securi ty force i s the cri ti cal el ement of a successful physi cal -securi ty
program. I t i s as strong as i ts weakest member. A comprehensi ve trai ni ng
program i s essenti al to a knowl edgeabl e, di sci pl i ned, and al ert securi ty force.
A wel l -trai ned securi ty force wi l l be prepared to respond to a securi ty breach.
In-Transit Security 10-1
Chapter 10
In-Transit Security
I n-tr ansi t secur i ty subj ects the movement of car go to di ffer ent, and
fr equentl y, mor e demandi ng aspects of physi cal secur i ty. Car goes may be
mov ed v i a por t, r ai l , pi pel i ne, or conv oy. Regar dl ess of the mode of
movement, commanders must aggressi vel y appl y the pr i nci pl es of physi cal
secur i ty to thei r pr otecti on. Secur i ty for ces must be pr ovi ded at the most
vul nerabl e areas of each car go movement.
IN-PORT CARGO
10-1. Ports and har bor s are pr i me tar gets for enemy and cr i mi nal acti vi ti es.
Per i meter ar eas of these faci l i ti es ar e mor e v ul ner abl e because of the
extensi ve di stance and exposed beach or pi er ar eas. Ter mi nal ar eas may
i ncl ude ful l y devel oped pi ers and warehouses or may be an uni mproved beach
wher e l ogi sti cs-over-the-shor e (LOTS) or r ol l -on/r ol l -off (RORO) oper ati ons
are conducted.
10-2. I f a Theater Ar my Ar ea Command (TAACOM) MP uni t must pr ovi de
secur i ty for car go i n a por t, the mai n effor t i s to pr ovi de secur i ty fr om the
per i meter of th e por t ou twar d. Secur i ty meas ur es focus on aggr essi ve
patrol l i ng to detect, r epor t and, i f need be, combat enemy thr eats. Measur es
may i ncl ude
Conducti ng route and area reconnai ssance patrol s.
Devel opi ng pol i ce i ntel l i gence i n the area of operati ons (AO).
Control l i ng traffi c i n the area surroundi ng the port.
Conducti ng mounted or di smounted patrol s (wi th MWDs, i f avai l abl e)
around the ports peri meter.
Establ i shi ng an access-control /I D secti on.
Watchi ng for di versi ons of suppl i es out of the port.
Provi di ng a response force to react to i nci dents i nsi de the ports
peri meter.
Provi di ng observati on and earl y warni ng of threat ground and ai r
attacks.
10-3. When provi di ng securi ty for car go, the focus i s on pr ovi di ng a secur i ty
overwatch for the cargo as i t moves from the port to the combat area. I nsi de a
port's peri meter, access to cargo i s l i mi ted by
Operati ng random mounted or di smounted patrol s (wi th MWDs, i f
avai l abl e).
Usi ng combi ned patrol s as a response force for i nci dents i nsi de the
peri meter.
FM 3-19.30
10-2 In-Transit Security
Control l i ng access to the most restri cted areas.
10-4. On occasi on, the MP may have to safeguard hi ghl y cri ti cal cargo i nsi de a
por ts per i meter. The type and degr ee of secu r i ty pr ovi ded i s based on
l ogi sti cal securi ty i nformati on. Some exampl es are the
Types and val ues of the cargo stored.
Vul nerabi l i ty of the cargo to a l and threat.
Li kel i hood of theft, di versi on, pi l ferage, or sabotage by mi l i tary
personnel , l ocal workers, bl ack marketers, or enemy agents.
Locati on and nature of the port faci l i ti es.
HN agreements.
Degree of entrance and exi t control s.
10-5. Safeguar di ng the most cr i ti cal car go wai ti ng to be tr ansfer r ed to l and
tr anspor t i s the pr i or i ty. The fol l owi ng measur es hel p to safeguar d stor ed
cargo:
Establ i shi ng access-control procedures.
Searchi ng bundl es and packages bei ng taken from the area.
Exami ni ng tri p ti ckets and documentati on of cargo vehi cl es.
10-6. I f the r estr i cted ar ea i s a pi er or other mar i ti me envi r onment, access
fr om the water must be contr ol l ed as wel l as fr om the l and. Entr y on the
l andwar d s i de of a pi er can be l i mi ted wi th fenci ng, pas s contr ol , and
aggr essi ve patr ol l i ng; but the par t of the pi er that pr otrudes over the water i s
accessi bl e from the si des and fr om bel ow. Methods for secur i ng the pi er al ong
i ts water boundari es i ncl ude
Patrol s (both wal ki ng on the pi er and i n smal l boats).
Protecti ve l i ghti ng.
Log booms.
Nets.
Buoys or fl oats.
Anchored or pi l e-mounted navi gati onal ai ds and si gnal i ng devi ces.
Barges.
10-7. Whi l e most of the barri ers descri bed above wi l l stop or i mpede access to
faci l i ti es fr om boats or swi mmer s, nets ar e among the most effecti ve. Wel l -
marked, parti al l y submerged objects are al so effecti ve; however, there may be
l egal pr ohi bi ti ons agai nst pl aci ng bar r i er s that may consti tute a hazar d to
navi gati on. These bar r i er s shoul d be pl aced onl y after coor di nati on wi th and
approval by the appropri ate l egal and HN authori ti es. Someti mes i t i s best to
cl ose off the water si de of a pi er. A fl oati ng boom wi l l keep smal l boats out.
Suspendi ng a cabl e or a chai n-l i nk net from the bottom of the boom wi l l deny
access underwater.
10-8. At l eas t two s ecu r i ty zon es mu s t be es tabl i s h ed on a faci l i ty s
water si dethe r eacti on zone and the keep-out (excl usi on) zone. Secur i ty
for ces i n these zones noti fy vessel s, cr aft, and swi mmer s that they ar e
enter i ng r estri cted water s and shoul d al ter thei r cour se. Securi ty forces may
stop and sear ch i ntr uders i f necessar y. Securi ty zones shoul d extend at l east
1,000 meter s fr om the near est pr otected asset; however, i n some por t ar eas
FM 3-19.30
thi s l arge securi ty zone i s not possi bl e. I n such cases, other measures (such as
boat patrol s) must be i ncreased to mi ti gate the possi bi l i ty of attack.
10-9. A reacti on zone extends from the hi gh-water mark to a di stance beyond
the maxi mum r ange of anti ci pated water bor ne thr eats. Secur i ty for ces wi l l
stop and chal l enge i ntruders i nsi de the reacti on zone.
10-10. The keep-out zone i s the zone cl osest to the protected assets. I t extends
from the asset to the maxi mum range of anti ci pated threat weapons. Securi ty
for ces shoul d pr event the entr y of al l unauthor i zed cr aft or vessel s i nto thi s
zone. The tacti cal response force (i n thi s case, a boat) may be used. I n addi ti on
to organi c securi ty, forces may be provi ded by HN or contracted personnel .
10-11. To k eep the car go secur ed whi l e tr ansfer r i ng fr om one tr anspor t
method to another, the traffi c movi ng i n and out of cargo-handl i ng areas must
be control l ed. MP forces can
Set up a si ngl e access-control poi nt.
Erect fi el d-expedi ent barri ers. Truck trai l ers or other l arge vehi cl es
can be used to constri ct the traffi c fl ow i f permanent barri ers are not i n
pl ace.
Li mi t entry to mi ssi on-essenti al personnel , vehi cl es, and equi pment (as
desi gnated by the port authori ty).
10-12. A hol di ng ar ea shoul d be provi ded i f gates ar e used by vehi cl es other
than car go vehi cl es. Car go vehi cl es can pul l i nto the hol di ng ar ea whi l e they
ar e bei ng checked. The hol di ng ar ea shoul d be l ar ge enough to handl e the
vol ume and si ze of tr affi c. A wooden deck or pl atfor m at, or sl i ghtl y hi gher
than, the l evel of the truck bed can be used to faci l i tate checki ng. The pl atform
must be at l east as l ong as the vehi cl e (such as an empty fl atbed trai l er). Such
a pl atform makes i t qui cker and easi er to observe and check cargo.
10-13. Car go i s l ess l i kel y to be di ver ted i f a cl ose watch i s kept on car go
documentati on and contai ner safety. Contai ner i zed car go i s l ess l i kel y to be
stol en or sabotaged. However, contai ners must be watched cl osel y as they are
fi l l ed and seal ed. Cargo can be pi l fered before the seal i s appl i ed. An unseal ed
contai ner can be moved to a stacki ng area; or someone may appl y a fal se seal ,
break the seal l ater, remove the cargo, and then appl y a l egi ti mate seal .
10-14. At access-control poi nts
I nbound and outbound contai ners shoul d be i nspected. Si gns of
damage or unservi ceabi l i ty shoul d be observed.
Contai ner s must be i nspected for the presence of seal s or l ocks and
hi nges. Thei r servi ceabi l i ty shoul d al so be checked.
The document's transport number, contai ner number, and seal number
shoul d be checked to ensur e that they match those number s on the
tr anspor tati on contr ol -and-movement document. (Check the seal s by
handl i ng them, not si mpl y by a vi sual check.)
Contai ners wi th val i d documents onl y shoul d be al l owed to pass
i nbound or outbound through the control poi nt.
FM 3-19.30
RAIL CARGO
10-15. Because a trai ns movement i s determi ned di rectl y by the condi ti on of
the tr acks, car go movi ng by r ai l i s par ti cul ar l y vul ner abl e to attack . The
destructi on of swi tches, si gnal s, or the track may be a del ayi ng harassment; or
i t coul d tr i gger a major catastr ophe. Si nce r ai l r oads can be such hi gh-val ue
tar gets, the commander may task MP or other US for ces to provi de on-boar d
securi ty for cri ti cal cargo.
10-16. Most trai n crews consi st of four or fi ve peopl e who control the trai n
the engi neer, a conductor, a fi reman, a seni or brakeman, and a brakeman or a
fl agman. The conductor i s the tr ai n commander unl ess a tr anspor tati on
r ai l way ser vi ce offi cer i s assi gned to the tr ai n. The tr ai n commander i s
r esponsi bl e for the tr ai ns oper ati on and secur i ty. He makes al l deci si ons
affecti ng the tr ai n. The secur i ty for ce s commander i s r esponsi bl e for the
cargos securi ty. The trai n crew and the securi ty force watch for and report any
di scr epanci es or i nter r upti ons to nor mal pr ocedur es at any ti me dur i ng the
movement. I nfor mati on about the mov emen t i s usual l y sen t al on g the
movement route by the chi ef di spatcher through a tel ephone ci rcui t.
10-17. A four- to si x-person securi ty force i s usual l y enough to secure rai l way
shi pments of sensi ti ve fr ei ght, but addi ti onal secur i ty for ces may be needed
for movi ng cri ti cal car go. I n addi ti on to a mi l i tar y secur i ty force, the shi pper
or l oadi ng agency may send speci al l y trai ned per sonnel wi th hi ghl y sensi ti ve
cargo. The number of MP i n a trai n securi ty force depends on the
Sensi ti vi ty of the frei ght.
Pri ori ty of need for the frei ght.
Terrai n over whi ch the trai n wi l l pass.
Length of the trai n.
Durati on of the tri p.
Degree of threat.
10-18. Secur i ty for ces pr epar e and mai ntai n a r ecor d (by car number ) of
guarded cars i n the trai n. Securi ty forces can ri de i n
A speci fi c car that requi res protecti on.
The caboose.
A securi ty-force car. (I f onl y one securi ty car i s used, i t shoul d be near
the center of the tr ai n; i f more than one i s used, cars shoul d be spaced
to provi de the best protecti on for the trai n.)
10-19. The securi ty force on a trai n must keep a constant check on car doors,
seal s, wi r es, and l ocks to detect tamper i ng. The fol l owi ng i nstances must be
noted and reported i mmedi atel y:
I rregul ari ti es i n procedures.
The presence or acti ons of unauthori zed persons.
Defi ci enci es or i nci dents that occur.
10-20. When pl anni ng r ai l -car go secur i ty, the ti me schedul e for the r ai l
movement must be obtai ned. A map r econnai ssance of the r oute shoul d be
provi ded, detai l i ng bri dges and tunnel s that are especi al l y vul nerabl e.
FM 3-19.30
10-21. Secur i ty-for ce acti ons shoul d be pl anned at schedul ed stops or r el i ef
poi nts, and for ces shoul d be depl oyed accor di ng to these pl ans. Locati ons of
MP uni ts and other fri endl y forces shoul d be pl otted al ong the route, and thei r
r adi o fr equenci es and cal l si gns shoul d be noted. An i ntel l i gence r epor t
cover i ng the r oute shoul d al so be obtai ned. Thi s r epor t shoul d i ndi cate si tes
wher e sabotage may occur, attacks may be expected, or thefts and pi l fer age
are l i kel y.
10-22. The shi pper i s responsi bl e for the securi ty of al l carl oad frei ght unti l i t
i s turned over to the Transportati on Rai l way Servi ce and the l oaded car s are
coupl ed to a l ocomoti ve for movement. The shi pper or fi el d tr anspor tati on
offi cer shoul d compl ete the fr ei ght waybi l l or the gover nment bi l l of l adi ng.
Thi s report shows the car number, a bri ef descri pti on of contents, the wei ght of
the l oad, the consi gnor, the consi gnee, the or i gi n, and the desti nati on. I n
addi ti on, i t may show speci al i nstructi ons for the movement or securi ty of the
car and i ts contents. Careful documentati on i s essenti al for
Securi ng the shi pment.
Locati ng cars wi th cri ti cal cargo.
Ensuri ng that pri ori ty movement i s authori zed.
10-23. Tr an s por tati on offi cer s ar e r es pon s i bl e for th e compl eten es s,
cor r ectness, and pr oper handl i ng of waybi l l s. Each car must have a waybi l l ;
thi s al l ows cars to be detached or l eft behi nd shoul d they become defecti ve en
r oute. I f thi s occur s, a team fr om the secur i ty for ce must r emai n wi th the
cargo unti l they are rel i eved.
10-24. Rai l way cars are seal ed after l oadi ng. A seal shows that a car has been
i nventori ed and i nspected. The standard method of seal i ng a r ai l way boxcar
door (i n addi ti on to padl ocks or wi res) i s wi th a soft metal strap or a cabl e seal
that contai ns a seri al number. Mai ntai ni ng r i gi d accountabi l i ty of al l seal s i s
necessar y to pr event the undetected r epl acement of an or i gi nal seal wi th
another. Whi l e seal i ng does not pr event pi l fer age, a br oken seal i s a good
i ndi cator that the car and i ts contents have been tamper ed wi th. Tr ai n
securi ty forces or operati ng crews can easi l y check the seal s on cars when the
trai n stops. Broken seal s shoul d be reported i mmedi atel y to hel p pi npoi nt the
ti me and pl ace of a possi bl e theft. When vehi cl es ar e shi pped by r ai l car,
sensi ti ve and hi gh-val ue i tems must not be secured i n the vehi cl es. Contai ner-
expr ess (CONEX) an d mi l i tar y-van (MI LVAN) contai ner s ar e i deal for
shi ppi ng these and other smal l i tems on fl atcars si nce they greatl y reduce the
chance of pi l fer age. These contai ner s must be l ock ed and seal ed and, i f
possi bl e, pl aced door to door for addi ti onal securi ty.
10-25. When oper ati ons per mi t, car s contai ni ng hi ghl y pi l fer abl e fr ei ght,
hi gh-pr i or i ty car go, or speci al shi pments ar e gr ouped i n the tr ai n to per mi t
the most economi cal use of securi ty forces. When fl atcars or gondol as are used
to tr anspor t sensi ti ve or easi l y pi l fer ed fr ei ght, secur i ty for ces shoul d be
pl aced where they can conti nuousl y observe and protect these cars.
10-26. When the tr ai n i s stopped, secur i ty for ces shoul d di smount and check
both si des of the tr ai n, veri fyi ng that seal s, l ocks, and wi res ar e i ntact. They
must report a br oken seal i mmedi atel y to hel p pi npoi nt the ti me and pl ace of
the theft.
FM 3-19.30
10-27. I f the securi ty force i s rel i eved by another securi ty force whi l e en route,
a joi nt i nspecti on of the car s i s conducted. The r el i ef for ce si gns the r ecor d
bei ng kept on the guar ded car s. Consi gnees assume r esponsi bi l i ty for the
secur i ty of l oaded fr ei ght car s at the ti me they ar r i ve at thei r desti nati on.
When the tri p i s compl ete, the recei ver or hi s agent wi l l i nspect the cars. The
securi ty force obtai ns a recei pt for the cars, whi ch i s then attached to the tri p
report. The tri p report shoul d i ncl ude
Dates and ti mes the tri p started and ended.
Any addi ti onal i nformati on requi red by the l ocal SOP or command
di recti ve.
Recommendati ons for correcti ng defi ci enci es or for i mprovi ng future
securi ty on trai ns.
10-28. Because unl oadi ng poi nts ar e hi ghl y vul ner abl e to pi l fer age and
s abotage, car s s h ou l d be u n l oaded as s oon as pos s i bl e to r edu ce th e
opportuni ty for l oss. MP forces are nor mal l y not avai l abl e for the secur i ty of
fr ei ght i n r ai l way yar ds. For mor e i nfor mati on r egar di ng r ai l car go, see FM
55-20.
PIPELINE CARGO
10-29. Pi pel i ne systems are wi del y used i n a theater of operati on to transport
bul k petrol eum products or other l i qui ds. Such systems are open to a number
of secur i ty thr eats fr om the poi nt of entr y to the poi nt of fi nal del i ver y.
Pi pel i ne systems ar e composed of stor age and di sper si ng faci l i ti es, pump
stati ons, and extended pi pel i nes. They al so i ncl ude di schar gi ng faci l i ti es for
tankers at ports or other water termi nal s.
10-30. The type and extent of ri sk to a pi pel i ne vari es wi th the l evel of confl i ct
i n the AO. I n a communi cati ons zone, the chi ef hazard i s l i kel y to be pi l ferage.
Pi pel i nes can be tapped by l ooseni ng the fl ange bol ts that joi n secti ons of pi pe
or by cutti ng hol es i n the hose l i ne. The r i sk r i ses i f gasol i ne i s scar ce and
expensi ve on the ci vi l i an mar ket. Sabotage i s a secur i ty hazar d dur i ng al l
l evel s of confl i ct. I t i s commi tted by any method such as si mpl y openi ng pi pe
fl anges, cutti ng a hose l i ne, or setti ng fi res and causi ng expl osi ons to destroy
porti ons of the l i ne.
10-31. I n ar eas of con fl i ct, th e l i k el i hood of sabotage an d i nter di cti on
i n cr eas es. Pi pel i n e s y s tems ar e v u l n er abl e to ai r attack s, es peci al l y
aboveground secti ons of the pi pel i ne, pump stati ons, and storage faci l i ti es.
10-32. Secur i ty for ces shoul d be depl oyed i n the best manner to pr ovi de
cover age to the most vul ner abl e por ti ons of the pi pel i ne that ar e at the
gr eatest r i sk to enemy, ter ror i st, par ti san, and gr ound attack. Patr ol s shoul d
be set up to scr een i sol ated ar eas and r emote pumpi ng stati ons. Sensor s
shoul d al so be consi dered, al ong wi th aeri al securi ty. Securi ty patrol s wi l l
Detect, report, and respond to attacks on or sabotages of the pi pel i ne.
Moni tor cri ti cal parts of the pi pel i ne on a routi ne but random basi s.
Moni tor ground sensors and other i ntrusi on-detecti on devi ces. These
ar e often used at pump stati ons and el sewher e al ong the pi pel i ne to
detect and i denti fy threats to the system.
FM 3-19.30
Check l i ne-pressure devi ces i n pi pel i ne and pumpi ng faci l i ti es. These
devi ces moni tor the fl ow and detect br eak s i n the l i ne, whi ch may
i ndi cate pi l ferage of gasol i ne (or other petrol eum products).
10-33. Dedi cated secur i ty for ces ar e r ar el y suffi ci ent i n number for the
sur vei l l ance of an enti r e pi pel i ne system. Al l avai l abl e suppor ti ng for ces (i n
th e cour s e of th ei r n or mal du ti es ) sh ou l d obser v e an d r epor t i tems of
i ntel l i gence for fur ther i nvesti gati on. Exampl es of suspi ci ous acti vi ti es i n the
pi pel i ne ar ea mi ght i ncl ude the unusual pr esence of commer ci al tank er
trucks, the appearance of gasol i ne drums or cans, or an i ncreased use of motor
vehi cl es i n fuel -scarce ar eas. Other r esources avai l abl e to the commander for
coor di nati on and suppor t i ncl ude HN and MP el ements r esponsi bl e for the
AO, as wel l as the securi ty offi cer of the petrol eum group or battal i on.
CONVOY MOVEMENT
10-34. As convoy movements are tacti cal i n nature and are di scussed i n detai l
i n FM 19-4, they wi l l be br i efl y di scussed her e. When movi ng by convoy,
consi derati on shoul d be made for the fol l owi ng:
Congested traffi c areas.
Travel duri ng ni ght hours when traffi c i s reduced rather than travel
duri ng dayl i ght hours when traffi c congesti on i s heavi est.
Nati onal hol i days. Traffi c may be three ti mes heavi er than on a normal
day. Al so, i f you are movi ng a convoy overseas on a nati onal hol i day, the
HN peopl e may not be r ecepti ve to your acti on and the r esul t may be
unwanted reacti ons on thei r part.
The use of a marked HN pol i ce vehi cl e i n conjuncti on wi th the convoy.
The HN peopl e are more recepti ve to an acti vi ty when i t i s represented
by one of thei r own. Addi ti onal l y, the HN pol i ce may be abl e to di ffuse a
potenti al cri si s.
Securi ty of the convoy. Securi ty of the convoy i s foremost i mportant
both duri ng movement and stops. Duri ng extended or overni ght stops,
speci al consi derati on must be gi ven to securi ng the l oaded vehi cl es.
Inspections and Surveys 11-1
Chapter 11
Inspections and Surveys
I nspecti ons and sur veys ar e val uabl e tool s to a commander s physi cal -
secur i ty pr ogr am. These tool s col l ecti vel y measur e and i denti fy the
r eadi nes s of a commander s phy s i cal -s ecur i ty pr ogr am. The sur v ey
pr ovi des the i nstal l ati on commander wi th an over al l secur i ty postur e of
the i nstal l ati on.
INSPECTIONS
11-1. Physi cal -securi ty i nspecti ons are conducted at DA i nstal l ati ons,
acti vi ti es, and faci l i ti es by trai ned physi cal -securi ty i nspectors. Some faci l i ti es
on an i nstal l ati on may be exempt from i nspecti on due to thei r mi ssi on. These
faci l i ti es are i nspected under the gui dance of regul ati ons and di recti ves
uni que to those acti vi ti es. I nspecti on personnel wi l l be trai ned and wi l l
conduct i nspecti ons accordi ng to AR 190-13.
11-2. A physi cal -securi ty i nspecti on i s a recorded assessment of physi cal -
securi ty procedures and measures i mpl emented by a uni t or an acti vi ty to
protect i ts assets. The i nspecti on i s recorded on DA Form 2806-1-R (see AR
190-13 for usi ng the form).
COORDINATION
11-3. Li ai son and coordi nati on shoul d be establ i shed wi th other agenci es on
the i nstal l ati on before an i nspecti on. The di rector of faci l i ty engi neers can
provi de i nformati on to benefi t the overal l securi ty program. Other agenci es,
such as MI (threat anal ysi s) and l ocal l aw-enforcement agenci es, may have
i nput essenti al to the securi ty program.
SECURITY LIBRARY
11-4. A securi ty l i brary i s necessary to hel p personnel prepare for and conduct
an i nspecti on. Thi s l i brary may i ncl ude
The mi ssi on and hi story of each acti vi ty to be i nspected.
Previ ous i nspecti on reports.
A copy of the most current ri sk anal ysi s.
The SOPs and ARs speci fi c to physi cal securi ty.
ENTRANCE INTERVIEWS
11-5. Entrance i ntervi ews are usual l y requi red before the actual i nspecti on.
Duri ng the i ntervi ew, the i nspector establ i shes a rapport wi th the uni t
representati ve. The i nspector i denti fi es the fol l owi ng duri ng the i ntervi ew:
Al l members of the i nspecti on team.
FM 3-19.30
11-2 Inspections and Surveys
An overvi ew of the l ast i nspecti on.
Areas to be i nspected and the order of i nspecti on.
A revi ew of wai vers, work orders, and excepti ons.
Changes to the uni ts mi ssi on (i f any).
CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS
11-6. The i nspecti on shoul d be conducted from the outsi de to the i nsi de of the
faci l i ty, acti vi ty, or area wi th regard to the fol l owi ng:
Observati on of the faci l i ty wi l l be conducted duri ng al l hours of the day.
I ntervi ews of manageri al and operati onal personnel wi l l be performed.
Securi ty forces shoul d be i nspected so as not to di srupt the mi ssi on (i f
possi bl e).
An assessment shoul d be made of securi ty-force trai ni ng, especi al l y i f
securi ty-force knowl edge proves i nadequate.
I nspecti on of entry and movement control by the guard force shoul d not
hi nder operati ons.
Al l communi cati ons systems used by the guard force shoul d be
thoroughl y i nspected. The guard force shoul d have two rel i abl e and
effi ci ent means of communi cati on, one of whi ch i s a radi o.
I nspecti ons shoul d be conducted accordi ng to regul ati ons appropri ate
for the faci l i ty.
EXIT INTERVIEWS
11-7. Exi t i ntervi ews shoul d be conducted as soon as possi bl e after the
i nspecti on. The commander shoul d be i nformed of any defi ci enci es or
compl i ments noted. A rati ng on the i nspecti ons resul ts wi l l not be provi ded
duri ng the exi t i ntervi ew. The approvi ng authori ty, not the i nspector, wi l l
determi ne the i nspecti on rati ng. The rati ng wi l l be forwarded to the uni t al ong
wi th the fi nal report.
11-8. Recommendati ons wi l l be made accordi ng to regul ati ons. Wri tten
reports shoul d be forwarded through channel s i n a ti mel y manner accordi ng
to the PMs SOP. The commanders report of acti ons taken wi l l be requi red
and revi ewed by the PMs staff.
SURVEYS
11-9. A physi cal -securi ty survey di ffers from an i nspecti on i n that a survey
covers a formal assessment of an i nstal l ati ons physi cal -securi ty program.
Each survey i ncl udes a compl ete reconnai ssance, study, and anal ysi s of
i nstal l ati on property and operati ons. The survey provi des the commander
wi th an assessment of the i nstal l ati ons overal l securi ty posture. I t consi sts of
the threat and the mi ssi on, and i t advi ses the commander on the i nstal l ati ons
physi cal -securi ty programs strengths and weaknesses.
FM 3-19.30
Inspections and Surveys 11-3
PHYSICAL-SECURITY SURVEY
11-10. The physi cal -securi ty survey i s a formal recorded assessment of an
i nstal l ati ons physi cal -securi ty program. See AR 190-13 for further
i nformati on on thi s type of survey.
SECURITY-ENGINEERING SURVEYS
11-11. Whi l e a securi ty-engi neeri ng survey i s l argel y an engi neer functi on, i t
must be coordi nated wi th physi cal -securi ty personnel to be successful . A
securi ty-engi neeri ng survey i s the process of i denti fyi ng (by means of an on-
si te survey) engi neeri ng requi rements associ ated wi th faci l i ty enhancements
for physi cal securi ty and anti terrori sm, i ncl udi ng an I DS i nstal l ati on. Thi s
type of survey shoul d be conducted when pl anni ng new constructi on,
renovati ons, or upgrades to exi sti ng faci l i ti es where there are l i kel y to be
physi cal -securi ty requi rements. A securi ty-engi neeri ng survey may al so be
requested by the PM or an equi val ent securi ty offi cer to eval uate exi sti ng
securi ty. Thi s survey
I denti fi es assets to be protected.
I denti fi es threats to these assets and the l evel of protecti on requi red to
protect them.
I denti fi es the protecti ve measures.
Determi nes the cost of the protecti ve measures.
Metric Conversion Chart A-1
Appendix A
Metric Conversion Chart
Thi s appendi x compl i es wi th cur rent Ar my di r ecti ves whi ch state that the
metri c system wi l l be i ncor por ated i nto al l new publ i cati ons. Tabl e A-1 i s a
conversi on chart.
Table A-1. Metric Conversion Chart
Metric to English English to Metric
Multiply By To Obtain Multiply By To Obtain
Length
Centimeters 0.0394 Inches Inches 2.54 Centimeters
Meters 3.28 Feet Feet 0.0305 Meters
Meters 1.094 Yards Yards 0.9144 Meters
Kilometers 0.621 Miles (stat) Miles (stat) 1.5609 Kilometers
Kilometers 0.540 Miles (naut) Miles (naut) 1.853 Kilometers
Millimeters 0.039 Inches Inches 25.40 Millimeters
Area
Square
centimeters
0.1550 Square inches Square inches 6.45
Square
centimeters
Square meters 10.76 Square feet Square feet 0.0929 Square meters
Square meters 1.196 Square yards Square yards 0.836 Square meters
Volume
Cubic
centimeters
0.610 Cubic inches Cubic inches 16.39
Cubic
centimeters
Cubic meters 35.3 Cubic feet Cubic feet 0.0283 Cubic meters
Cubic meters 1.308 Cubic yards Cubic yards 0.765 Cubic meters
Milliliters 0.0338 US liq ounces US liq ounces 29.6 Milliliters
Liters 1.057 US liq quarts US liq quarts 0.946 Liters
Liters 0.264 US liq gallons US liq gallons 3.79 Liters
Weight
Grams 0.0353 Ounces Ounces 28.4 Grams
Kilograms 2.20 Pounds Pounds 0.454 Kilograms
Metric tons 1.102 Short tons Short tons 0.907 Metric tons
Metric tons 0.984 Long tons Long tons 1.016 Metric tons
Sample Installation Crime-Prevention Handbook B-1
Appendix B
Sample Installation Crime-Prevention Handbook
Thi s appendi x pr ovi des gui dance on pl anni ng, or gani zi ng, di r ecti ng, and
contr ol l i ng i nstal l ati on cr i me-pr eventi on pr ogr ams. I t pr ovi des gui dance
on devel opi ng an i nstal l ati on pr ogr am, cr i mi nal anal yses to i denti fy
cr i mes, gui dance on whi ch cr i mes to addr ess, command and i ndi vi dual
cou n ter mea s u r es for par ti cu l ar cr i mes , an d pr ogr a m-ev al u a ti on
pr ocedures.
B-1. I n the past few years, the Army has shi fted an i ncreasi ngl y l arger
percentage of i ts manpower from combat-servi ce-support acti vi ti es to combat
organi zati ons. Thi s change means that fewer MP personnel are avai l abl e to
support a l arger number of uni ts. To meet thi s chal l enge, i t i s necessary to
reeval uate the way we do busi ness and to emphasi ze those programs or
procedures that have the greatest i mpact on our i nstal l ati on cri me rates.
Cri me preventi on i s one program that can have a major i mpact on i nstal l ati on
cri me rates at a rel ati vel y mi nor cost i n both dol l ars and manpower. I t takes
l ess effort to di scourage a cri mi nal from perpetrati ng a cri me or to teach a
sol di er to avoi d becomi ng a vi cti m than i t does to i nvesti gate a cri me, i denti fy
the offender, prosecute hi m, and puni sh hi m. I n addi ti on, a proacti ve approach
to l aw enforcement can hel p mai ntai n the hi gh qual i ty of servi ce l i fe that can
i mprove the retenti on of fi rst-term sol di ers.
B-2. The Army i s a l arge organi zati on that performs a vari ety of acti vi ti es i n
many di fferent envi ronments. Cri mes that are major probl ems on one
i nstal l ati on may be total l y absent from others. For exampl e, most mi l i tary
i nstal l ati ons have a si gni fi cant number of robberi es whi l e most depots have
none. Because of thi s, any ri gi d, central l y control l ed programno matter how
careful l y thought outi s bound to be i nappropri ate i n many l ocati ons.
Therefore, DA has el ected to provi de onl y the most general gui dance and to
al l ow commanders to devel op cri me-preventi on programs that address thei r
l ocal probl ems.
CRIME-PREVENTION WORKING GROUPS
B-3. The i nstal l ati on i s the smal l est practi cal l evel for i mpl ementi ng cri me-
preventi on programs. I f these programs are devel oped and i mpl emented at a
l ower l evel , then cri me i s often not el i mi nated but i s merel y di spl aced from
uni ts wi th good programs to uni ts wi th l ess effecti ve programs. Al so, cri me
does not affect personnel onl y when they are i n thei r pl ace of duty. I n many
SECTION I INSTALLATION CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS
FM 3-19.30
B-2 Sample Installation Crime-Prevention Handbook
cases, a company commanders troops are vi cti mi zed i n areas over whi ch he
has l i ttl e control . Uni t commanders are responsi bl e for i mpl ementi ng many
anti cri me measures; however, the sel ecti on of overal l program goal s, the I D of
appropri ate countermeasures, and qual i ty control shoul d be done at the
i nstal l ati on l evel .
B-4. Cri me preventi on must al ways be recogni zed as a commanders program
rather than as an MP program. MP personnel have the experti se to anal yze
data, i denti fy major probl ems, and devel op l i sts of possi bl e countermeasures.
They shoul d perform these functi ons i n support of an i nstal l ati on cri me-
preventi on counci l appoi nted by the i nstal l ati on commander and composed of
representati ves of al l of the i nstal l ati ons major organi zati ons and acti vi ti es.
The advantages of usi ng thi s type of system are
I t provi des representati ves of al l major segments of the post popul ati on
wi th a forum where they can i denti fy cri mi nal probl ems that are of the
greatest concern to them.
I t al l ows the representati ves of al l major commands to revi ew the
avai l abl e opti ons to counter a cri me and to sel ect the l evel of resource
commi tment that i s compati bl e wi th thei r mi ssi ons and i nternal
pri ori ti es.
I t hel ps ensure that the resources of the enti re communi ty, rather than
onl y those of the MP force, are mobi l i zed to attack the probl em.
I t i s easi er to obtai n the support of the whol e popul ati on i f i ts
representati ves are i nstrumental i n the devel opment of the program.
CRIME-PREVENTION OFFICERS
B-5. The i nstal l ati ons cri me-preventi on offi cer i s normal l y a seni or NCO or
an offi cer who has a sol i d background as an MP i nvesti gator or a physi cal -
securi ty i nspector (PSI ). He supports the i nstal l ati on counci l by performi ng a
cri me-data anal ysi s to i denti fy probl em areas, drafti ng programs for the
counci l s consi derati on, i nspecti ng the i mpl ementati on of counci l -mandated
measures, and coordi nati ng the efforts of uni t cri me-preventi on offi cers i n the
i mpl ementati on of the cri me-preventi on program.
B-6. As a member of the PMs staff, the cri me-preventi on offi cer devel ops the
l aw-enforcement secti on of the cri me-preventi on program, devel ops and
mai ntai ns the wri tten cri me-preventi on pl an, and coordi nates cri me-
preventi on programs wi th ci vi l i an pol i ce agenci es and communi ty groups.
B-7. Cri me-preventi on offi cers are al so appoi nted i n each organi zati on down
to the company l evel . At thi s l evel , wri tten cri me-preventi on pl ans are not
requi red; however, SOPs are establ i shed. The cri me-preventi on offi cers serve
as thei r organi zati ons focal poi nts for coordi nati ng i nstal l ati on cri me-
pr eventi on pl ans; they super vi se the i mpl ementati on of the i nstal l ati ons
program wi thi n thei r organi zati ons.
CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMDEVELOPMENT
B-8. The starti ng poi nt for devel opi ng a cri me-preventi on program must be a
thorough anal ysi s of cri mi nal acti vi ty on the i nstal l ati on. Thi s i denti fi es
FM 3-19.30
si gni fi cant cri mi nal probl ems that are suscepti bl e to cri me-preventi on efforts.
Cri mes that are most suscepti bl e to cri me-preventi on measures are those for
whi ch a hi gh probabi l i ty of reoccurrence exi sts. Cri mes such as murder
normal l y are not repeti ti ve and are poor candi dates for i ncl usi on i n the cri me-
preventi on program. Si nce i t i s sel dom practi cal to attack al l cri mi nal
probl ems si mul taneousl y, they shoul d be pri ori ti zed based on thei r i mpact on
the commands abi l i ty to perform i ts mi ssi on and thei r i mpact on i nstal l ati on
personnel . Next, the whol e range of countermeasures that can be used to
combat each probl em must be i denti fi ed (see Fi gure B-1). Tabl e B-1, page B-4,
i denti fi es (by offense) programs that have been successful i n counteri ng
speci fi c cri mi nal probl ems. Secti ons I I I and V of thi s appendi x contai n
di scussi ons of the strengths, weaknesses, and appl i cabi l i ty of the
countermeasures l i sted i n Tabl e B-1. Once devel oped and pri ori ti zed, the l i st
of cri mi nal probl ems and possi bl e countermeasures must be presented to the
i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on counci l for acti on. The counci l shoul d deci de
whi ch cri mes wi l l be addressed and whi ch countermeasures wi l l be used for
each cri me. The counci l must then i denti fy speci fi c objecti ves for i ts anti cri me
campai gns.
Start
Conduct
criminal
analysis
Criminal
target
list
Identify
counter-
measures
List of
possible
counter-
measures
Submit to
council for
approval
Installation
crime-prevention
plan
Implement
commanders
actions
(PM and cdr)
Implement
community
actions
Publicize
individual
actions (PAO)
Evaluate
crime-prevention
program
Actions Documents
REFERENCE
Chapter 2
Annex A
Chapters 3 and 4
Chapter 5
Start
Conduct
criminal
analysis
Criminal
target
list
Identify
counter-
measures
List of
possible
counter-
measures
Installation
crime-prevention
plan
Implement
commanders
actions
(PM and cdr)
Implement
community
actions
Publicize
individual
actions (PAO)
Submit to
council for
approval
Evaluate
crime-prevention
program
Documents
Actions
References
Chapter 2
Annex A
Table B-1
Chapters 3 and 4
Chapter 5
Figure B-1. Crime-Prevention Program-Development Cycle
FM 3-19.30
B-9. Objecti ves must i denti fy
What cri me wi l l be reduced.
What target popul ati on wi l l be addressed.
What speci fi c changes and behavi ors on the part of the vi cti ms or
perpetrators wi l l be encouraged.
What acti ons the command must take to reduce the opportuni ty for the
cri me to occur.
B-10. Once objecti ves have been cl earl y defi ned, speci fi c areas of
responsi bi l i ty shoul d be assi gned to each counci l member (based on thei r
organi zati ons pri mary area of responsi bi l i ty) and major mi l estones shoul d be
i denti fi ed for devel opi ng the campai gn agai nst each targeted cri me.
Table B-1. Offenses Countermeasure Matrix
Crime
Command/Law-Enforcement Countermeasures Community Programs
C
r
i
m
e
H
o
t
l
i
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e
L
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h
t
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i
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o
n
m
e
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t
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n
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e
s
P
a
t
r
o
l
/
S
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r
v
e
i
l
l
a
n
c
e
P
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l
i
c
i
t
y
C
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s
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t
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o
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n
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e
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a
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e
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b
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d
W
a
l
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M
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b
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a
t
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t
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o
c
k
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
Arson X X X X X X
Auto theft X X X X X X X X
Burglary/
housebreaking
X X X X X X X X X X X
Employee theft X X X X X X X
Fraud X X X X X
Larceny X X X X X X
Rape X X X X X X X X X X
Robbery X X X X X X X X X X
Juvenile delinquency X X X X X X X X
Vandalism X X X X X X X X X
FM 3-19.30
TRAINING
B-11. The prerequi si te ski l l s for successful performance as an i nstal l ati on
cri me-preventi on offi cer are best devel oped through on-the-job experi ence as
the supervi sor of MP i nvesti gati ons or physi cal -securi ty i nspecti ons. More
i mportant than any techni cal ski l l i s the cul ti vati on of a frame of mi nd that
i nsti ncti vel y exami nes each case to determi ne not onl y what occurred, but al so
how the cri me coul d have been prevented. Techni cal ski l l s (such as cri mi nal -
data anal ysi s) that may not have been devel oped as an MP i nvesti gator or
physi cal -securi ty supervi sor are presented i n courses taught by several
ci vi l i an agenci es. These cl asses shoul d be used to the ful l est extent possi bl e.
CIVILIAN CRIME-PREVENTION ORGANIZATIONS
B-12. There are many ci vi l i an cri me-preventi on organi zati ons at the nati onal ,
state, and l ocal l evel s. Many of these organi zati ons have produced cri me-
preventi on materi al (i ncl udi ng posters, radi o spots, and l eafl ets). Materi al and
programs sponsored by ci vi l i an agenci es shoul d be used to support Army
cri me-preventi on efforts. However, when materi al from a source outsi de of
DOD i s used, a copyri ght rel ease must be obtai ned. Normal l y, i t i s necessary
to get a rel ease for each separate i tem that i s used. I f there i s any doubt as to
the necessi ty of securi ng a copyri ght rel ease, the cri me-preventi on offi cer
shoul d refer the matter to the l ocal SJA.
B-13. Cri mi nal anal ysi s i s a system for i denti fyi ng trends and patterns where
they may exi st. I t i s a routi ne, ongoi ng functi on for the PM and battal i on- and
bri gade-l evel staffs. Cri mi nal anal ysi s i s the foundati on upon whi ch the
i nstal l ati on force-protecti on program i s based. Moreover, cri mi nal anal ysi s i s
an i ntegral component of the pol i ce i ntel l i gence-operati ons functi on and i s
appl i cabl e across the operati onal conti nuum. An effecti ve cri mi nal anal ysi s
establ i shes the fol l owi ng:
Cri mes havi ng a si gni fi cant i mpact on the i nstal l ati on.
The segments of the popul ati on bei ng vi cti mi zed.
The I D of cri mi nal s/perpetrators.
The most common ti me of occurrence.
The areas that experi ence the hi ghest number of i nci dents.
Offense i nformati on (such as types of weapons or vi cti ms acti ons that
contri bute to the offense).
I nformati on cri ti cal to an i nstal l ati ons VA.
I nformati on essenti al i n formul ati ng a successful patrol -di stri buti on
pl an.
Pol i ce i nformati on and cri mi nal i ntel l i gence fused wi th tacti cal
i ntel l i gence.
B-14. Wi th thi s type of i nformati on, speci fi c countermeasures are devel oped
to reduce the opportuni ty for a cri me to occur or to remove the i ncenti ves for
perpetrators. Wi thout an effecti ve cri mi nal anal ysi s, the overal l securi ty effort
SECTION II CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
FM 3-19.30
i s unfocused. Moreover, the i nstal l ati on/base patrol -di stri buti on pl an may be
skewed. When thi s occurs, broad countermeasures are i mpl emented and
meani ngful resul ts are l ost.
B-15. A professi onal anal ysi s of cri mi nal data i s essenti al for protecti ng
sol di ers, uni ts, and i nstal l ati ons. The Mi l i tary Pol i ce Management
I nformati on System (MPMI S) provi ded the i ni ti al software capabl e of
assi sti ng i n the devel opment of cri mi nal -anal ysi s i nformati on. As thi s system
i s moderni zed and repl aced by the Mi l i tary Pol i ce Automated Control System
(MPACS), the MP Corps and the CI D wi l l have i nterface wi th the Army Battl e
Command System (ABCS). The anal ysi s of pol i ce, cri mi nal , and tacti cal
i nformati on resul ts i n the devel opment of pol i ce i ntel l i gence (PI ). The PI ,
whi ch i s coordi nated wi th the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G2 (I ntel l i gence) (G2)
or the I ntel l i gence Di rectorate (Joi nt Command) (J2), provi des rel evant
i nformati on and i ntel l i gence (RI I ) that greatl y contri bute to the commanders
cri ti cal i nformati on requi rements (CCI R). The RI I provi ded verti cal l y and
hori zontal l y ensures that the common operati onal pi cture i s properl y shared.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
B-16. The basi c source for i denti fyi ng cri mes that warrant exami nati on i s the
i nstal l ati ons Law Enforcement and Di sci pl i ne Report (DA Form 2819). The
i nfor mati on i n thi s repor t can be used to pl ot the amount of and seasonal
vari ati ons for each major type of cri me. Thi s wi l l tel l l i ttl e about condi ti ons
that produce the cri me, but i t i s useful i n i denti fyi ng cri mes that can be
el i mi nated from detai l ed anal yses due to l ow frequency rates.
B-17. The Law Enforcement and Di sci pl i ne Report i denti fi es whi ch major
category of cri me shoul d be targeted, but i t does not tel l whi ch type of cri me i s
causi ng the most probl ems. For exampl e, I t may i ndi cate that robbery i s a
probl em, but i t wi l l not di scri mi nate between robbery of commerci al
establ i shments (such as the post exchange [PX], the Cl ass VI store, or banks)
and muggi ngs of i ndi vi dual s. Si nce countermeasures for these two types of
robbery are di fferent, i t i s necessary to col l ect addi ti onal i nformati on. The best
sources for thi s i nformati on are the mi l i tary-pol i ce report (MPR) and the CI D
report of i nvesti gati on (ROI ). I f there are fewer than 200 cases i n the past
year for a parti cul ar type of cri me, they shoul d al l be exami ned. Wi th a l arger
annual casel oad, a random sampl e that i s l arge enough to gi ve resul ts of pl us
or mi nus 5 percent accuracy shoul d be exami ned.
B-18. General factors must be i denti fi ed for any type of cri me. These are the
types of vi cti ms, the perpetrators, geographi cal data, and chronol ogi cal data.
VICTIMS
B-19. I t i s essenti al to determi ne (as preci sel y as possi bl e) the segment of a
post popul ati on that i s bei ng vi cti mi zed. Juni or sol di ers l i ve i n di fferent areas
on post than offi cers and seni or NCOs. They patroni ze di fferent cl ubs and, for
the most part, work i n di fferent areas. I nformati on programs must use
mul ti pl e sources to ensure that the same message reaches the di fferent
porti ons of the popul ati on. I f the speci fi c popul ati on segment that i s bei ng
vi cti mi zed i s not i denti fi ed, i t i s possi bl e to spend a l arge amount of resources
FM 3-19.30
and have l i ttl e i mpact on the targeted cri me because the message i s not
getti ng to the peopl e who need i t.
PERPETRATORS
B-20. As wi th the vi cti m profi l e, data on perpetrators i s essenti al to ensure
that countermeasures are targeted agai nst the correct popul ati on. When on-
post auto thefts are commi tted by ci vi l i ans wi th l egi ti mate reasons for
enteri ng the i nstal l ati on, i t may not make sense to i ncrease securi ty (as a
countermeasure) at post entrances. Countermeasures are devel oped based on
speci fi c profi l es i denti fi ed by case type and the i nformati on descri bed above.
Successful countermeasures depend on correct cri mi nal anal yses. An anal ysi s
and profi l e of perpetrators wi l l hel p to focus MP/CI D countermeasures.
GEOGRAPHICAL DATA
B-21. The MPR and the ROI shoul d contai n a street address or a descri pti on
of the i nci dents l ocati on (such as i n a parki ng l ot on the east si de of bui l di ng
1409). Thi s type of descri pti on ful fi l l s requi rements for i denti fyi ng the
l ocati on of the i nci dent i n court. I t i s further enhanced by i denti fyi ng the
normal duty hours and the type of acti vi ty that takes pl ace i n the l ocati on (for
exampl e, i n a parki ng l ot on the east si de of the NCO cl ub (bui l di ng 1401),
normal operati ng hours 1800-0400 or i n a parki ng l ot on the east si de of
bui l di ng 1408, a troop bi l l ets for Company A, 15th Cav). Thi s type of
i nformati on may hel p to devel op a l i st of speci fi c types of areas where a
parti cul ar cri me i s occurri ng, maki ng i t easi er for the PM to provi de i ncreased
MP patrol s i n these areas. For exampl e, i f there have been several i nci dents i n
whi ch vehi cl es have been broken i nto and stereos removed, i t woul d hel p to
know that 90 percent of them occurred i n the parki ng l ot by troop bi l l ets.
CHRONOLOGICAL DATA
B-22. As wi th geographi cal data, the more speci fi c the ti me-of-occurrence
pattern i s for a cri me, the easi er i t i s to appl y suffi ci ent resources to affect the
cri me rate. For each cri me havi ng a si gni fi cant i mpact, determi ne the
fol l owi ng:
Major seasonal vari ati ons.
Monthl y vari ati ons. I s there a concentrati on of cri mes i mmedi atel y
before or after payday?
Weekend occurrences. I s there a concentrati on of i nci dents on
weekends? Each day represents about 14.25 percent of the week.
Concentrati ons of cri me hi gher than that for any parti cul ar day may be
si gni fi cant.
Ti me of day. I s there a parti cul ar peri od that accounts for a
di sproporti onate share of the i nci dents?
CRIME-SPECIFIC FACTORS
B-23. I n addi ti on to the factors that shoul d be exami ned for al l cri mes, the
fol l owi ng cri me-speci fi c factors are useful i n anal yzi ng speci fi c offenses:
Housebreaki ng and burgl ary.
FM 3-19.30
I The type of bui l di ng that was attacked (fami l y-housi ng uni t, troop
barracks, PX, and so forth).
I Whether the faci l i ty was occupi ed or unoccupi ed.
I The poi nt of entry (door, wi ndow, and so forth).
I The method of entry (unsecured door, forced door, forced wi ndow,
and so forth).
I The property that was stol en. (Was i t marked?)
Robbery.
I The number of perpetrators.
I The perpetrators method of operati on.
I The type of weapon used.
I The type of robbery (street muggi ng, resi denti al robbery, or
commerci al robbery).
I The vi cti ms i njuri es.
I Acti ons by the vi cti m that contri buted to hi s bei ng targeted.
Larceny.
I The type of property taken.
I Whether the property was secured or unsecured.
Auto theft.
I The type of vehi cl e stol en (POV, motorcycl e, and so forth).
I Whether the vehi cl e was secured or unsecured.
I Whether the vehi cl e was recovered and where i t was recovered.
I Whether the vehi cl e was str i pped of par ts.
Forgery.
I The type of document that was forged.
I How the document was obtai ned.
I The type of I D used i n passi ng the forged document.
I The con games or techni ques used.
Rape and sex offenses.
I The rel ati onshi p between the vi cti m and the perpetrator (bl ood
rel ati ves, acquai ntances, or strangers).
I The degree of force used.
Aggravated assaul t or murder.
I The rel ati onshi p between the vi cti m and the perpetrator.
I The moti vati on.
I The weapon used.
B-24. Personnel who have tri ed to use MPRs and ROI s as a sol e source of data
know that i n many cases the requi red i nformati on i s not contai ned i n
suffi ci ent detai l to be useful . To correct thi s si tuati on, i nvesti gators and
i nspectors must be trai ned to recogni ze condi ti ons that contri buted to the
cri me as wel l as the i nformati on needed to i denti fy and prosecute the offender.
As a mi ni mum, the PM ensures that al l l aw-enforcement personnel know
FM 3-19.30
general and speci fi c cri me factors that are requi red to anal yze each type of
cri me. He must al so provi de feedback through the l aw-enforcement operati ons
staff when i ncompl ete reports are recei ved. I f thi s i s done, hi gh-qual i ty data
can be col l ected wi thout generati ng addi ti onal reports to col l ect cri mi nal
i nformati on for anal ysi s.
B-25. The MPRs and ROI s are not the onl y sources of i nformati on on whi ch to
base cri mi nal anal yses. Physi cal -securi ty i nspecti on resul ts, summari es of
common defi ci enci es noted by the i nspector general , data from the SJA cl ai ms
secti on, and i nformati on summari es from reports of survey on l ost
government materi al can al l produce worthwhi l e i nformati on on condi ti ons
that l ead to the commi ssi on of cri mes. Addi ti onal l y, a revi ew of ci vi l i an
cri mi nal stati sti cs and ci vi l i an pol i ce i nformati on may contri bute to the
pattern anal ysi s. The revi ewi ng authori ty must understand whi ch
i nformati on i s rel evant. The MP commanders ensure that the CCI R are
publ i shed i n operati ons orders (OPORDs), operati on pl ans (OPLANs), and
SOPs. Thi s effort ensures that MP forces at every l evel recogni ze rel evant
i nformati on.
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
B-26. A cri mi nal anal ysi s i s most effecti ve when i t i s appl i ed to the cl ass of
cri mi nal offenses wi th a hi gh probabi l i ty of recurrence. Si ngl e-i nci dent cri mes
do not l end themsel ves to anal yses. Most cri mes agai nst persons do not
usual l y benefi t from anal yses, wi th the notabl e excepti ons of rape, robbery,
and rel ated combi nati ons of offenses (such as ki dnappi ng and rape; robbery
and attempted murder; burgl ary and rape; and burgl ary, robbery, and
ki dnappi ng). Anal yzi ng i sol ated cri mi nal offenses has some val ue (such as
gai ni ng knowl edge of where these offenses are most l i kel y to reoccur).
However, thi s knowl edge i s usual l y di ffi cul t to use effecti vel y for preventi ve
purposes.
B-27. There are uni versal factors avai l abl e for anal ysi s for most cri mes. The
avai l abi l i ty of these factors vari es greatl y between cri mi nal types and speci fi c
reported offenses.
B-28. I n addi ti on to the uni versal factors, there are an al most i nfi ni te number
of factors that may be consi dered speci fi c to a parti cul ar cri mi nal cl ass or type.
These cri me-speci fi c factors are data el ements that are usual l y recorded
duri ng the reporti ng of a parti cul ar type of offense and are used for anal ysi s
purposes.
B-29. Cri me-speci fi c factors provi de i nformati on that can be used by the
anal yst to connect cri mes wi th si mi l ar characteri sti cs. I nformati on regardi ng
physi cal evi dence may have consi derabl e val ue i n the anal ysi s of several
cri mi nal types (such as burgl ary and auto theft). Therefore, the sui tabi l i ty of
di fferent cri mes to anal yses depends on the general factors, speci fi c modus
operandi (MO) factors, and physi cal evi dence. Wi th these consi derati ons i n
mi nd, di fferent cri mi nal types and cl assi fi cati ons are exami ned to determi ne
thei r appl i cabi l i ty.
FM 3-19.30
RESIDENTIAL HOUSEBREAKING AND BURGLARY
B-30. Al though housebreaki ng and burgl ary are two of the most di ffi cul t
cri mes to prevent, they are the most sui tabl e for anal yses. The typi cal
housebreaker or burgl ar establ i shes an MO pattern based on successful past
offenses. Usual l y, a burgl ar wi l l conti nue to commi t si mi l ar cri mes unti l he i s
apprehended.
B-31. The avai l abl e i nformati on for eval uati on must consi der the speci fi ci ty,
accuracy, and val ue of the i nformati on recei ved. I nformati onal factors are
presented i n the order of rel ati ve i mportance. I t shoul d be emphasi zed that
the factors l i sted i n Fi gure B-2 are for anal ysi s purposes; the order for
i nvesti gati ve sol uti ons may vary.
COMMERCIAL HOUSEBREAKING
B-32. The anal ysi s of commerci al housebreaki ng i s i n many respects easi er
than that of resi denti al housebreaki ng or burgl ari es. More perti nent
i nformati on i s avai l abl e to the anal yst for anal yzi ng commerci al
housebreaki ng (whi ch i s more speci al i zed and wi l l exhi bi t more speci fi c MO
characteri sti cs). The anal yst normal l y has speci fi c i nformati on regardi ng the
poi nt and method of entry, the vi cti m/target descri pti on, and the property-l oss
descri pti on. The ti me factors for commerci al housebreaki ng may be of l ess
val ue i n a commerci al -housebreaki ng anal ysi s than i n a resi denti al -burgl ary
anal ysi s si nce most commerci al housebreaki ngs occur at ni ght or duri ng
weekends.
B-33. The commerci al housebreaker i s general l y more mobi l e than the
resi denti al burgl ar. An anal ysi s of commerci al housebreaki ng i s not as
SPECIFIC
MO
FACTOR
SUSPECT
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTOR
SUSPECT
DESCRITOR
GEOGRAPHIC
FACTORS
CRIME TYPE
AND
CLASS
ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
TIME
FACTORS
VICTIM
TARGET
DESCRIPTOR
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
FACTOR
= High Availability (75%-100%)
= Relative Availability (25%-75%)
= Low Availability (0%-25%)
= High availability (75% - 100%)
= Relative availability (25% - 75%)
= Low availability (0% - 25%)
Specific
MO
factors
Suspect-
vehicle
descriptor
Suspect
descriptor
Geographic
factors
Crime type
and class
Time
factors
Physical-
evidence
factors
Victim/
target
descriptor
Property-
loss
descriptor
Analysis
information
Figure B-2. Residential Housebreaking and Burglary
FM 3-19.30
restri cted i n geographi cal area as an anal ysi s of resi denti al burgl ari es. The
commerci al burgl ar may travel a consi derabl e di stance to attack a parti cul ar
type of busi ness. The resi denti al burgl ar i s l ess di scri mi nati ng because he has
a greater number of potenti al targets.
B-34. The anal ysi s of commerci al housebreaki ng shoul d be systemati cal l y
di rected to exami ni ng the i nformati on factors shown i n Fi gure B-3. A
commerci al housebreaker may be a juveni l e cri mi nal , an addi ct, a professi onal
thi ef, a sol di er, or an enemy agent. Each of these types provi des a di fferent set
of factors to anal yze.
ROBBERY
B-35. Robberi es are wel l sui ted for anal ysi s. Thi s cl ass of cri mi nal offender
usual l y operates i n a gi ven geographi cal area. The commerci al robber
general l y seeks a si zeabl e amount of cash; whi l e targets of the street robber
frequentl y i ncl ude credi t cards, checks, and other val uabl es i n addi ti on to
cash.
B-36. The presence of physi cal evi dence i s more probabl e i n street robberi es
than i n commerci al robberi es because the cri mi nal offender frequentl y
di scards evi dence (such as purses and wal l ets) after compl eti ng the offense.
The mugger frequentl y uses surpri se as part of hi s MO i n order to reduce hi s
chance of apprehensi on by physi cal I D.
SPECIFIC
MO
FACTOR
SUSPECT
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTOR
SUSPECT
DESCRITOR
GEOGRAPHIC
FACTORS
CRIME TYPE
AND
CLASS
ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
TIME
FACTORS
PROPERTY
LOSS
DESCRIPTOR
VICTIM
TARGET
DESCRIPTOR
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
FACTOR
Specific
MO
factors
Suspect-
vehicle
descriptor
Suspect
descriptor
Geographic
factors
Crime type
and class
Time
factors
Physical-
evidence
factors
Victim/
target
descriptor
Property-
loss
descriptor
Analysis
information
Figure B-3. Residential Housebreaking &Burglary
Figure B-3. Commercial Housebreaking
FM 3-19.30
B-37. The pr obabi l i ty of uni versal and cr i me-speci fi c i nfor mati onal factor s
for a typi cal robbery i s a systemati c method for exami ni ng the case. See
Fi gur e B-4 for the anal ysi s of a robbery case.
AUTO THEFT
B-38. Auto theft i s probabl y the best-sui ted cri me for anal ysi s. The anal yst
frequentl y has more i nformati on avai l abl e on any gi ven auto theft than any
other cri me. Suspect descri pti ve i nformati on i s usual l y l acki ng i n auto l arceny
cases. However, the greater avai l abi l i ty of cri me-speci fi c i nformati on makes
auto theft extremel y recepti ve to an anal ysi s.
B-39. Auto-theft offenders i ncl ude joyri ders, professi onal car di smantl ers, and
whol esal ers of stol en vehi cl es. I n many cases, these offenders wi l l establ i sh
and mai ntai n a parti cul ar MO unti l apprehended.
B-40. Hel pful el ements i n anal yzi ng auto-theft cases are the avai l abi l i ty of
i nformati on, the presence of physi cal evi dence, and the abi l i ty of the stol en
property to be traced. Of speci al i mportance are the geographi c factors,
suspect-vehi cl e descri ptors, and property-l oss descri ptors. I n anal yzi ng an
auto theft, the anal yst usual l y has i nformati on concerni ng two geographi c
l ocati ons for anal ysi swhere the vehi cl e was stol en and where i t was
recovered. The suspect-vehi cl e descri ptors, property-l oss descri ptors, and
vi cti m/target descri ptors are the same (see Fi gure B-5). Thi s greatl y augments
the anal ysi s of auto thefts. I n an exami nati on of speci fi c MO factors i n an auto
SPECIFIC
MO
FACTOR
SUSPECT
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTOR
SUSPECT
DESCRITOR
GEOGRAPHIC
FACTORS
CRIME TYPE
AND
CLASS
ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
TIME
FACTORS
PROPERTY
LOSS
DESCRIPTOR
VICTIM
TARGET
DESCRIPTOR
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
FACTOR
Specific
MO
factors
Suspect-
vehicle
descriptor
Suspect
descriptor
Geographic
factors
Crime type
and class
Time
factors
Physical-
evidence
factors
Victim/
target
descriptor
Property-
loss
descriptor
Analysis
information
Figure B-4. Robbery
FM 3-19.30
theft, the anal yst wi l l pl ace emphasi s on the vehi cl es condi ti on when
recovered. Factors of pri mary i mportance i n anal yzi ng auto-theft cases are the
vehi cl es recovery l ocati on, the vehi cl es make and model , and the degree of
stri ppi ng. Coordi nati on wi th l ocal ci vi l i an pol i ce or HN pol i ce may reveal
potenti al buyers of stol en automobi l es.
B-41. Larceny and theft cases are not usual l y wel l sui ted for anal ysi s.
However, benefi ts are deri ved from anal yzi ng l arceny offenses when speci fi c
factors are sel ected, such as auto accessi on thefts.
B-42. The probl em wi th tryi ng to anal yze general theft cases resul ts from the
l arge vol ume of reported offenses, the l arge number of possi bl e cri me types,
and the many possi bl e MO patterns. To anal yze theft cases, the anal ysi s
operati on must fi rst restri ct the number of cases and cri me cl assi fi cati on to a
workabl e l evel . Thi s may be done by cl assi fyi ng general theft cases i nto
speci al categori es and anal yzi ng them by consi deri ng onl y speci al MO factors.
Logi cal cl assi fi cati ons i ncl ude thefts of autos, auto accessori es, bi cycl es, i tems
on shi ppi ng docks, and tool s and equi pment.
B-43. Many of the general theft cases are hel pful i n anal yzi ng other types of
cri mes. For exampl e, an i ncreasi ng trend i n stol en automobi l e parts may have
common perpetrators i nvol ved i n auto theft and stri ppi ng. When parti cul ar
patterns appear, a speci fi c i n-depth anal ysi s can be conducted. I t i s essenti al
that i nformati on devel oped duri ng the anal ysi s process be shared wi th the G2/
J2, the SJA, the CI D, and others (as authori zed).
SPECIFIC
MO
FACTOR
SUSPECT
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTOR
SUSPECT
DESCRITOR
GEOGRAPHIC
FACTORS
CRIME TYPE
AND
CLASS
ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
TIME
FACTORS
PROPERTY
LOSS
DESCRIPTOR
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
FACTOR
Specific
MO
factors
Suspect-
vehicle
descriptor
Suspect
descriptor
Geographic
factors
Crime type
and class
Time
factors
Physical-
evidence
factors
Victim/
target
descriptor
Property-
loss
descriptor
Analysis
information
Figure B-5. Auto Theft
FM 3-19.30
RAPE AND SEX CRIMES
B-44. Rape and sex cri mes fal l i nto two di sti nct categori esthose i n whi ch
the offender i s known to the vi cti m and those i n whi ch he i s unknown
(stranger to stranger). Those cases i n whi ch the vi cti m knows the offender are
of l i mi ted i nformati onal val ue to the anal yst. The i n-depth anal ysi s of rape
and sex cri mes i s restri cted to those cases i n whi ch there i s no apparent
rel ati onshi p between the suspect and the vi cti m. Rape and sex offenses i n
whi ch the vi cti m knows the suspect are often cri mes of opportuni ty. Usual l y,
these offenders do not establ i sh a parti cul ar MO. On the other hand, the
rapi st or the sex offender commi tti ng stranger-to-stranger cri mes wi l l usual l y
provi de defi ni te MO patterns, maki ng thi s cri me wel l sui ted for anal ysi s. For
exampl e, the burgl ary/rape moti ve i s parti cul arl y wel l -sui ted for anal ysi s, as
i s the ki dnapper/chi l d mol ester. The advantages to anal yzi ng stranger-to-
stranger rape and sex offenses l i es i n the seri ousness of the cri me, i ts rel ati ve
rareness, and the avai l abi l i ty of i nformati on for a parti cul ar offense or group
of offenses.
B-45. As wi th robbery, the suspect descri ptors are i mportant to the anal yst for
exami ni ng rape and sex offenses (see Fi gure B-6). The vi cti m descri ptors are
al so i mportant i n anal yzi ng rape and sex offenses. I n many cases, the
perpetrator wi l l restri ct hi s attacks to vi cti ms of a certai n age, a parti cul ar
race, or a parti cul ar occupati on groupi ng.
SPECIFIC
MO
FACTOR
SUSPECT
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTOR
SUSPECT
DESCRITOR
GEOGRAPHIC
FACTORS
CRIME TYPE
AND
CLASS
ANALYSIS
INFORMATION
TIME
FACTORS
PROPERTY
LOSS
DESCRIPTOR
VICTIM
TARGET
DESCRIPTOR
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
FACTOR
Specific
MO
factors
Suspect-
vehicle
descriptor
Suspect
descriptor
Geographic
factors
Crime type
and class
Time
factors
Physical-
evidence
factors
Victim/
target
descriptor
Property-
loss
descriptor
Analysis
information
Figure B-6. Rape and Sex Crimes
FM 3-19.30
FORGERY AND FRAUD
B-46. Forgery and fraud cases can provi de correl ati ve i nformati on for other
reported cri mi nal offenses such as burgl ary and strong-armed robbery. The
anal ysi s of forgeri es i s al so ai ded by the fact that most forgers are repeaters
who have establ i shed defi ni te MO patterns.
B-47. An anal ysi s of forgery and fraud cases can generate i nformati on that i s
di ssemi nated to area merchants i n the form of check-warni ng bul l eti ns. The
use of these bul l eti ns can enhance communi ty rel ati ons.
B-48. The pri mary probl em i n anal yzi ng forgery and fraud cases i s the
i mmedi ate avai l abi l i ty of i nformati on. I n some cases, a del ay of between three
or four days to several months occurs between the ti me the offense was
commi tted and the ti me i t was reported.
ASSAULT AND MURDER
B-49. Most cri mi nal offenses consti tuti ng assaul t and murder do not l end
themsel ves to anal ysi s. The comparati ve rari ty of these cri mes i nvol vi ng
compl ete strangers makes i t di ffi cul t to pl ot and predi ct assaul ts and murders.
A tremendous amount of ti me and research i s necessary to predi ct assaul ts
and murders effecti vel y. Thi s data may i denti fy speci fi c areas wi th hi gh rates
of vi ol ent cri me. Thi s al l ows the commander to i denti fy unsafe areas and warn
sol di ers to stay away from them.
CRIMINAL-ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
B-50. To organi ze the fl ow of i nformati on wi thi n a PMO and to faci l i tate
anal yses i n support of cri me-preventi on efforts, the staff revi ews a l i st of
offenses. Thi s l i st contai ns offenses that l end to anal yses. The anal yses
provi de the azi muth for cri me suppressi on and countermeasures (for exampl e,
focused i nvesti gati on/survei l l ance and patrol di stri buti on). When fi nal acti on
on an MPR or an ROI coveri ng one of these offenses i s compl eted, i t i s
forwarded to the staff for revi ew.
B-51. The staff uses prepri nted work sheets contai ni ng the factors of
parti cul ar i nterest for an offense. They annotate and revi ew the speci fi c
cri mi nal factors. I f some of the i nformati on i s not avai l abl e, the MP or CI D
i nvesti gator conti nues the i nvesti gati on. The peri od covered by each work
sheet wi l l depend on the vol ume of cases at the par ti cul ar i nstal l ati on. For a
l ow-i nci dence-rate cri me (such as robbery), one work sheet wi l l suffi ce for the
enti re cal endar year. For a more frequent cri me (such as l arceny), i t may be
necessary to use a di fferent work sheet for each month or quarter. A summary
sheet can be used to keep track of the data from al l of the reporti ng per i ods i n
the year.
B-52. The data-col l ecti on sheets gi ve speci fi c i nformati on on i ndi vi dual types
of cri me. Thi s i nformati on, together wi th general cri me trends that are
i denti fi ed by compari ng the data from DA Form 2819 for the current peri od to
earl i er peri ods and the geographi c data from the cri me-occurrence map, gi ves
most of the i nformati on that i s requi red to devel op ti ghtl y targeted cri me-
preventi on programs. Whi l e thi s system requi res addi ti onal forms (the data-
col l ecti on sheets and the cri me-occurrence map) to be devel oped for use by the
FM 3-19.30
MP I ntel l i gence Offi cer (US Army) (S2), i t does not i ncrease the patrol s
workl oad.
B-53. I n addi ti on to the i nformati on recorded i n the forms, handwri tten notes
shoul d be kept on i tems or trends that become apparent to the anal yst duri ng
the revi ew. For exampl e, as a resul t of readi ng the cases on robbery to extract
i nformati on for the col l ecti on form, the anal yst may noti ce that a hi gh
proporti on of the vi cti ms were attacked whi l e crossi ng an unl i ghted athl eti c
fi el d near a troop bi l l et area. Thi s shoul d be recorded so that i t may be used i n
publ i ci ty campai gns and so that i t may be passed al ong to patrol s who
routi nel y patrol the troop bi l l et areas.
B-54. A geographi c anal ysi s i s performed to determi ne i nformati on not
avai l abl e i n the ori gi nal data-el ement source (for exampl e, a cri me report).
When a pi n i s used to i ndi cate a cri me l ocati on on a map, the rel ati onshi p to
other reported cri mes of the same type becomes apparent to the anal yst.
Mappi ng i s usual l y the source for a geographi c anal ysi s.
B-55. Mappi ng-anal ysi s techni ques i nvol ve the use of a map to depi ct the
actual geographi cal rel ati onshi ps between parti cul ar cri mi nal events
accordi ng to prescri bed data el ements. A pi n map di spl ayi ng the actual
l ocati ons of burgl ari es over a peri od of ti me i s an exampl e of such a techni que.
B-56. I n sel ecti ng a mappi ng techni que, several thi ngs must be consi dered.
These i ncl ude the number of data el ements that are to be recorded i n the
mappi ng, the retri evabi l i ty of stored data, and the number of maps to be
mai ntai ned.
B-57. The number of data el ements to be recorded on a map can di ctate the
techni que to be used. For exampl e, i f the case number i s to be recorded i n
conjuncti on wi th the l ocati on of the offense, a dot (col or-coded, sel f-adhesi ve
paper di sk) map or a fl ag-pi n map can be used, whereas a typi cal col or-coded
pi n map cannot. I f parti cul ar MO factors are recorded, vari ous col or-coded and
marked pi ns can be appl i ed to i denti fy speci fi c MO patterns.
B-58. I n addi ti on, the l ength of ti me a parti cul ar map or set of maps i s
mai ntai ned shoul d be consi dered. No set rul es are establ i shed regardi ng a
maps mai ntenance ti me; however, a number of agenci es devel op annual
stati sti cs based upon maps. General l y, maps are mai ntai ned for short-term
(quarterl y) and l ong-term (annual l y) peri ods for each type of cri me. Thi s
deci si on shoul d be based on the vol ume of cri mi nal acti vi ty, physi cal -space
l i mi tati ons, the speci fi c mappi ng techni que adopted, and the number of maps
to be mai ntai ned. As geospati al -terrai n data becomes avai l abl e, mappi ng
techni ques can be ful l y i ntegrated i nto the MPACS.
B-59. Stored map data can be easi l y retri eved for compari ng data. Pi n maps
can be photographi cal l y recorded and di gi ti zed for software appl i cati ons.
Computers and scanni ng equi pment can be used to store the data for l ater
retri eval . Col or-coded paper dots pl aced on acetate overl ays coveri ng area
maps faci l i tate the retri eval of recorded data. Di gi ti zed photographs of the
maps are excel l ent sources of evi dence for tri al s and court-marti al s. Moreover,
the devel oped maps may contri bute to the CCI R.
B-60. The number of maps to be mai ntai ned must be based on physi cal -space
l i mi tati ons, staffi ng, the types of cri mes sel ected for anal ysi s, and the
FM 3-19.30
mai ntenance peri od for each map. There are fi ve types of cri me sui ted to
geographi cal anal ysi s (burgl ary, robbery, housebreaki ng, auto theft, and sex
cri mes). Other cri mes (such as theft of government property) may be depi cted
as a geographi cal anal ysi s and contri bute to RI I . Housebreaki ng and
burgl ari es can be pl aced on the same map by usi ng di fferent col ored pi ns for
each type of cri me. The i ncorporati on of numbered pi ns of di fferent col ors can
be used to desi gnate the type of premi se attacked. Auto-theft and recovery
maps may be kept on the same map wi th recorded i nformati on on thefts of
vehi cl e parts.
B-61. The number of maps mai ntai ned shoul d refl ect the needs of the agency
accordi ng to the vol ume of reported cri mes and the di fferent data el ements or
i nformati onal factors to be recorded. Therefore, the more detai l ed the
anal ysi s, the more maps are requi red. The actual number of maps mai ntai ned
must be l eft to the di screti on of the PM or the commander.
B-62. Peri odi cal l y, a summary of the i nformati on that i s col l ected,
countermeasures, and operati onal /tacti cal procedures are bri efed to the
i nstal l ati on commander. Whether thi s i s done monthl y, quarterl y, or
semi annual l y wi l l depend on the vol ume of reported cri me and the
commanders preference.
CRIMINAL-ANALYSIS SUMMARY
B-63. Cri mi nal anal ysi s i s an i mportant el ement to the MP functi on of PI .
The techni ques menti oned i n thi s appendi x are not al l -i ncl usi ve. The PM/CI D
commander establ i shes formal procedures for i ntegrati ng data and devel opi ng
PI . I t may requi re the formati on of an ad hoc team, or i t may be accompl i shed
wi th computers and the MPACS. Cri mi nal anal ysi s requi res cl ose
coordi nati on wi th the G2/J2, the publ i c affai rs offi ce (PAO), ci vi l i an pol i ce, and
others based on METT-TC.
B-64. Thi s secti on di scusses acti ons that commanders or PMs can take to
reduce cri me on Army i nstal l ati ons. I n many cases, the acti ons descri bed have
appl i cati ons other than stri ctl y cri me preventi on. However, onl y the cri me-
preventi on aspects are di scussed.
B-65. Most of the data avai l abl e on the effecti veness of l aw-enforcement
measures i n reduci ng cri me comes from studi es conducted by ci vi l i ans. Whi l e
most of the fi ndi ngs of these studi es are appl i cabl e to cri me-preventi on
programs on Army i nstal l ati ons, di fferences i n popul ati on, the degree of
control that can be exerci sed by authori ti es, and other envi ronmental factors
may di ctate that the ci vi l i an recommendati on be modi fi ed before
i mpl ementati on on mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons.
CRIME HOT LINES
B-66. A cri me hot l i ne i s a dedi cated cri me-reporti ng tel ephone number
l ocated at the MP or securi ty desk. Thi s hot l i ne al l ows anyone i n the
SECTION III COMMAND AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT COUNTERMEASURES
FM 3-19.30
communi ty to make an i mmedi ate report of an observed cri me or suspi ci ous
acti vi ty. An effecti ve cri me-reporti ng program i s a deterrent to cri me and
enhances l aw-enforcement responses to such i nci dents. Consi derati ons i n
i mpl ementi ng a reporti ng program i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
I t shoul d be publ i ci zed that personnel reporti ng i nci dents are al l owed
to remai n anonymous i f they desi re. Some i ndi vi dual s wi l l report thei r
observati ons onl y i f they know they can remai n anonymous. I f deemed
feasi bl e, nei ghborhood-watch bl ocks coul d be provi ded desi gnated bl ock
numbers that coul d be used when reporti ng cri mes or other suspi ci ous
acti vi ti es. Thi s system woul d al l ow nei ghborhoods to recei ve feedback
on the di sposi ti on of the reported i nci dent.
The hot l i nes phone number shoul d be easy to remember. Thi s coul d
i ncl ude a number where extensi on di gi ts are al l the same, are i n
ascendi ng or descendi ng order, or spel l out a word (such as 4357
[HELP]). Sti cker l abel s l i sti ng the number coul d be pl aced on the
phone wi th other emergency numbers for qui ck reference.
The program shoul d be wel l -publ i ci zed.
Member s on the i nstal l ati on shoul d be educated on the desi red
procedures for reporti ng i nci dents.
Each cal l shoul d be documented. Records shoul d be mai ntai ned
concerni ng the resul ts of these cal l s to eval uate the programs
effecti veness.
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
B-67. Cri me-preventi on practi ti oners are recogni zi ng the i mportance of
consi deri ng desi gn and physi cal pl anni ng i n cri me reducti on. The cri me-
preventi on offi cer has an opportuni ty to i nfl uence the desi gn of faci l i ti es
through the i nstal l ati on pl anni ng board. However, to be effecti ve, he must
understand a number of concepts about the rel ati onshi p between the physi cal
desi gn of bui l di ngs and cri me occurrences. These i ncl ude the concepts of
terri tori al i ty, natural survei l l ance, and defensi bl e space.
TERRITORIALITY
B-68. Hi stori cal l y, a si ngl e-fami l y home on i ts own pi ece of l and and
somewhat i sol ated from i ts nei ghbors (but often by as l i ttl e as a few feet) has
been consi dered to be the fami l ys terri tory. The si ngl e-fami l y home si ts on a
pi ece of l and buffered from nei ghbors and the publ i c street by i nterveni ng
grounds. At ti mes, symbol i c shrubs or fences rei nforce a boundary. The
posi ti oni ng of l i ghts i n wi ndows that l ook out on the grounds al so act to
rei nforce the cl ai m.
B-69. Unfortunatel y, as the popul ati on has grown and the need for housi ng
has i ncr eased, the trend toward devel opi ng si ngl e-fami l y uni ts has been
par al l el ed, i f not sur passed, by the devel opment of r ow houses, apar tment
bui l di ngs, and vari ous hi gh-ri se structures. Archi tects, pl anners, and
desi gners i nvol ved i n devel opi ng structures have not pai d a great deal of
attenti on to cri me control or the need for an i ndi vi dual or a fami l y group to
i denti fy wi th i ts home i n a manner that mi ght affect cri me. Therefore, most
fami l i es l i vi ng i n apartment bui l di ngs consi der the space outsi de thei r
FM 3-19.30
apartment door to be di sti nctl y publ i c. I n effect, they rel egate responsi bi l i ty
for al l acti vi ty outsi de the i mmedi ate confi nes of thei r apartment to publ i c
authori ti es. A questi on i s whether envi ronmental desi gn can be used to extend
the boundari es of these pri vate real ms, subdi vi di ng publ i c space outsi de
quarters so that more of the common space comes under the resi dents
i nfl uence and responsi bi l i ty.
B-70. Through extensi ve research of effi ci entl y functi oni ng housi ng
devel opments, a number of mechani sms have been i denti fi ed that may be used
i n the desi gn process (or may be added after constructi on). These mechani sms
encourage the resi dents of mul ti fami l y dwel l i ngs to i denti fy more wi th the
ground or area around thei r i mmedi ate home si te and to assume
responsi bi l i ty for i ts protecti on. Presented bel ow i s a bri ef di scussi on of a
number of the mechani sms.
Site design. I f the grounds around a set of quarters can be di rectl y
i denti fi ed wi th a parti cul ar bui l di ng and the resi dents of that bui l di ng
take a personal i nterest i n the use or upkeep of that area, they wi l l
pl ay a rol e i n protecti ng i t. Through proper si te desi gn, a recreati onal
area adjoi ni ng a bui l di ng may be used as a buffer zone by provi di ng
pl ay equi pment for young chi l dren and seati ng areas for adul ts. The
fact that chi l dren pl ay and adul ts si t i n these areas serves to i ncrease
the resi dents concerns wi th the acti vi ti es taki ng pl ace there. Strangers
are usual l y recogni zed and thei r acti vi ti es come under observati on and
i mmedi ate questi oni ng.
Street design. Research has shown that by the pl acement, encl osure,
or rerouti ng of streets and traffi c the nature of a parti cul ar area can be
changed and the cri me rate reduced. For exampl e, a parti cul ar porti on
of a street mi ght be cl osed to vehi cul ar traffi c, and pl ay equi pment and
seats may be added. I n a number of areas where thi s techni que has
been used, i t has been found that most resi dents know or at l east
recogni ze peopl e up and down the bl ock and strangers on the street are
i denti fi ed. Si mi l ar approaches that i nvol ve rerouti ng traffi c, usi ng one-
way streets, or bl ocki ng off streets has l owered the cri me rate i n some
areas.
Symbolic barriers. The types of barri ers that pl anners may use i n
l ayi ng out an area i ncl ude open gateways, l i ght standards, l ow wal l s,
and pl anti ngs. Both physi cal and symbol i c barri ers serve the same
purposeto i nform an i ndi vi dual that he i s passi ng from a publ i c to a
pri vate space. Symbol i c barri ers i denti fi ed by resi dents as boundary
l i nes serve as defi ni ng areas of comparati ve safety. Many pl aces
warrant the use of symbol i c barri ers, i ncl udi ng transi ti on poi nts
between a publ i c street and the semi publ i c grounds of a bui l di ng; an
area between a bui l di ngs l obby and i ts corri dors; or hal l ways on
parti cul ar fl oors of a bui l di ng.
Internal design. Al though economi cs may someti mes enter the
pi cture, a bui l di ngs i nteri or may be desi gned for speci fi c groupi ngs of
apartment uni ts and shared entrances. These factors may cause the
resi dents of these apartments to devel op a concern for the space
i mmedi atel y adjacent to thei r dwel l i ng. For exampl e, on each fl oor of
an apartment bui l di ng, two to four fami l i es mi ght be requi red to share
FM 3-19.30
a common corri dor area. The apartment doors woul d be grouped
around that common corri dor, and access to el evators or stai rs mi ght be
screened by a gl azed parti ti on. The net effect woul d be that the fl oors
resi dents woul d adopt the corri dor as a col l ecti ve extensi on of thei r
dwel l i ng uni t and woul d take an i ncreased i nterest i n i ts mai ntenance
and use.
Facilitiesand amenities. The l ocati on of parti cul ar faci l i ti es (such as
pl ay and si tti ng areas and l aundry faci l i ti es) wi l l tend to gi ve an area a
hi gh i ntensi ty of use and support the i dea of terri tori al i ty. The presence
of resi dents i nvol ved i n vari ous acti vi ti es (chi l dren at pl ay and peopl e
chatti ng or engaged i n other types of acti vi ti es) al l ows for casual
survei l l ance by concerned members of the fami l y and screens out
possi bl e i ntruders.
B-71. Reduci ng the number of apartment uni ts grouped together to share a
col l ecti vel y defi ned area and l i mi ti ng the number of bui l di ngs that compri se a
housi ng project are i mportant factors for creati ng an envi ronment that
resi dents wi l l hel p to protect. Research has documented the fact that housi ng
projects compri sed of fewer hi gh-ri se bui l di ngs (two to four) have l ower cri me
rates than projects contai ni ng a l arger number of bui l di ngs. Based on thi s
fi ndi ng, i t i s argued that there appears to be much l ess freedom of movement
i n the publ i c spaces of the smal l er hi gh-ri se projects. Unl i ke bui l di ngs and
l arge devel opments, every bui l di ng of a smal l groupi ng usual l y has an
entrance di rectl y off a publ i c street. These dwel l i ngs more cl osel y resembl e
mi ddl e-i ncome, hi gh-ri se devel opments and l ook more pri vate.
B-72. As a cri me-preventi on offi cer, you may not be i n a posi ti on to di rectl y
use these techni ques. However, your fami l i ari ty wi th these approaches and
the val ue of thei r use i n the cri me-preventi on process are i mportant el ements
i n your arsenal of tool s to create publ i c i nvol vement i n reduci ng cri me. I n
parti cul ar, the purpose of outl i ni ng these tool s i s not to equi p you to be a
desi gner, but rather to equi p you to communi cate wi th those who are i nvol ved
i n that professi on. The di scussi on that fol l ows wi l l further enhance your
abi l i ty to converse wi th desi gners.
NATURAL SURVEILLANCE
B-73. Experi ence has shown that the abi l i ty to observe cri mi nal acti vi ty may
not be adequate to sti mul ate an observer to respond wi th assi stance to the
person or property bei ng vi cti mi zed. The deci si on to act depends on the
presence of moti vati onal condi ti ons, i ncl udi ng
The degree to whi ch the observer has devel oped a sense of personal and
property ri ghts that are bei ng vi ol ated by the cri mi nal act.
The degree to whi ch the observer feel s that the event i s wi thi n hi s area
of i nfl uence.
The observers abi l i ty to cl earl y i denti fy whether the act i s unusual for
the parti cul ar area.
The observers i denti fi cati on wi th ei ther the vi cti m or the property
bei ng vandal i zed.
The degree to whi ch the observer bel i eves he can effecti vel y al ter the
course of events he i s observi ng.
FM 3-19.30
B-74. Based on these condi ti ons, a number of mechani sms have been
i denti fi ed that can be used to desi gn the grounds and i nternal areas of
apartment uni ts, housi ng devel opments, and other resi denti al areas to
faci l i tate natural moni tori ng of acti vi ti es taki ng pl ace. By provi di ng
opportuni ti es for survei l l ance through the posi ti oni ng of wi ndows i n rel ati on
to stai rs, corri dors, or outsi de areas, conti nual natural observati on wi l l be
mai ntai ned and cri me wi l l be deterred. I f such steps are taken, the securi ty of
observed areas wi l l be understood by the potenti al cri mi nal , maki ng hi m
thi nk twi ce before commi tti ng a cri me.
B-75. The fi rst of these natural survei l l ance mechani sms i nvol ves the
posi ti oni ng of servi ce areas and access paths l eadi ng to apartment bui l di ngs
to faci l i tate survei l l ance by resi dents and authori ti es. For exampl e, bui l di ngs
mi ght be desi gned so that thei r entri es face and are wi thi n 50 feet of a street,
so that wel l -l i t paths l ead to the front door or the l obby, and so that the l obby
i s arranged to afford good vi si bi l i ty from the street. Other rel ated steps focus
on the strategi c pl acement of wi ndows, fi re stai rwel l s, l obby l i ghts, and
mai l boxes so that they can be easi l y vi ewed from the street. El evator wai ti ng
areas on each fl oor can al so be desi gned so that they can be seen from the
street l evel . Research has proven that i f steps such as these are taken,
resi dents wi l l be more l i kel y to become i nvol ved wi th protecti ng the faci l i ty,
MP patrol s wi l l be i n a better posi ti on to observe what i s goi ng on, and
cri mi nal s wi l l be di scouraged from vandal i zi ng the si te.
B-76. A second techni que that mi ght be used to i ncrease survei l l ance i s to
desi gn faci l i ti es so that peopl e wi thi n them wi l l natural l y vi ew commonl y used
paths, entri es, and pl ay and seati ng areas duri ng thei r normal househol d
acti vi ti es. Thi s concept al so focuses on the strategi c pl acement of wi ndows,
l i ghti ng, and open areas so that natural survei l l ance by resi dents i s i mproved.
B-77. Another mechani sm i nvol ves the subdi vi si on of housi ng areas i nto
smal l , recogni zabl e, and i denti fi abl e groupi ngs that i mprove vi sual
survei l l ance possi bi l i ti es. Research has shown that i n housi ng devel opments
where the survei l l ance of a nei ghbors outsi de acti vi ti es was possi bl e,
resi dents were found to be very fami l i ar wi th everyones comi ngs and goi ngs.
The overal l effect was to cement col l ecti ve i denti ty and responsi bi l i ty through
soci al pressure.
DEFENSIBLE SPACE
B-78. Defensi bl e space i s a term for a range of combi ned securi ty measures
that bri ng an envi ronment more under the control of i ts resi dents. A
defensi bl e space i s a resi denti al envi ronment that can be used by i nhabi tants
for the enhancement of thei r l i ves whi l e provi di ng securi ty for thei r fami l i es,
nei ghbors, and fri ends. The physi cal mechani sms suggested to create safety
and i mprove upkeep (as part of the defensi bl e-space concept) are sel f-hel p
tool s wherei n desi gn catal yzes the natural i mpul ses of resi dents rather than
forci ng them to surrender thei r shared soci al responsi bi l i ti es to any formal
authori ty.
B-79. Research has reveal ed i nvesti gati ve techni ques that mi ght be used to
modi fy exi sti ng housi ng areas to make them more secure. The fol l owi ng
FM 3-19.30
methods may requi re al terati on or adaptati on to the parti cul ar si tuati on on
your i nstal l ati on:
Wi deni ng major pathways and usi ng col ored decorati ve pavi ng.
Di fferenti ati ng smal l pri vate areas (front l awns) outsi de each dwel l i ng
uni t from the publ i c path wi th l ow, symbol i c wal l s.
Addi ng publ i c-seati ng areas i n the center of publ i c paths far enough
from pri vate-dwel l i ng uni ts to el i mi nate confl i cts of use but cl ose
enough to be under constant survei l l ance by resi dents.
Desi gni ng pl ay areas as an i ntegral part of open space.
Addi ng new and decorati ve l i ghti ng to hi ghl i ght vari ous paths and
recreati on areas at ni ght and extendi ng the resi dents survei l l ance
potenti al and feel i ng of securi ty.
Addi ng seats and path networks to recreati onal faci l i ti es where l arge,
central court areas exi st. Thi s i ncreases the i nterest and usabi l i ty of
the areas.
Redesi gni ng parki ng and pl ay areas around bui l di ngs to create the
i l l usi on that the bui l di ngs are grouped where natural opportuni ti es
exi st.
Moderni zi ng bui l di ng entrances to create breezeways i nto bui l di ng
courts and to accommodate a tel ephone i ntercom for openi ng entry
doors to the l obby.
Provi di ng vi deo survei l l ance of publ i c grounds and central paths by
securi ty of publ i c moni tors.
I nstal l i ng audi o survei l l ance capabi l i ti es i n el evators and at the doors
of resi dences.
CRIME-PREVENTION MODEL
B-80. The model for cri me preventi on through envi ronmental desi gn i s based
on the theory that acti on must be taken to counter cri me before i t occurs. The
cri ti cal el ement i n thi s model i s the envi ronmental -engi neeri ng component. I t
provi des both di rect and i ndi rect control s agai nst cri mi nal acti vi ty by
reduci ng the opportuni ty for cri me through sci ence and technol ogy and the
use of vari ous urban pl anni ng and desi gn techni ques. The model expl ai ns
what envi ronmental engi neeri ng i s and how i t supports cri me preventi on.
Wi th thi s i nformati on, you may be i n a better posi ti on to understand and
respond to questi ons and di scussi ons on how urban desi gn and pl anni ng can
have an i mpact on the i nstal l ati ons cri mi nal el ement.
THE ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCE ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
B-81. The basi c theory that supports cri me preventi on through
envi ronmental desi gn i s that urban envi ronments can i nfl uence cri mi nal
behavi or i n two ways. Fi rst, the physi cal surroundi ngs i n whi ch peopl e l i ve
have an effect on each i ndi vi dual . These physi cal characteri sti cs i ncl ude noi se,
pol l uti on, overcrowdi ng, and the exi stence and unmoni tored spreadi ng of
refuse and other unsi ghtl y waste. The second el ement that must be deal t wi th
i n the envi ronmental -engi neeri ng formul a concerns the soci al characteri sti cs
of the communi ty that provi de i ndi vi dual s wi th soci al rel ati onshi ps to whi ch
FM 3-19.30
they must respond. Characteri sti cs such as al i enati on, l onel i ness, anxi ety, and
dehumani zati on are seen as keys to cri mi nal behavi or.
B-82. I n terms of these envi ronmental characteri sti cs, bui l di ngs are al l too
often constructed to be dangerous, wi th corri dors and passageways hi dden
from publ i c vi ew. El evators, basements, and storage and washroom areas are
al so l aden wi th danger due to thei r desi gn. Vari ous l arge-scal e housi ng
devel opments are not secur e i n that they ar e often i sol ated from the mai n fl ow
of traffi c (both human and automobi l e) and are cl osed to publ i c use and publ i c
vi ew.
B-83. Wi th regard to al teri ng the soci al characteri sti cs of the communi ty and
thei r rel ati onshi p to cri mi nal behavi or, i t shoul d be recogni zed that behavi or
i s future-ori ented, not past-ori ented. A man steal s so that he can have a car or
money i n the future, not because i n the past he experi enced psychi c trauma, a
broken home, poverty, or del i nquent associ ates. Cri mi nal behavi or can be
expl ai ned di rectl y i n terms of the consequences of behavi or and i n terms of
noncri mi nal vari abl es such as poverty, race, or soci al cl ass. Cri mi nal behavi or
i s vi ewed as a probl em to be deal t wi th and not symptomati c of other probl ems
(such as poverty, mental confl i ct, cl ass confl i ct, unempl oyment, or
undereducati on). To change cri mi nal behavi or, i t must be deal t wi th di rectl y
by removi ng the envi ronmental rei nforcement that mai ntai ns the behavi or.
The approach advocated i s to change the envi ronment to whi ch the i ndi vi dual
responds.
ACTION APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH PHYSICAL PLANNING
B-84. The pri mary focus of cri me preventi on has been on what archi tects,
pl anners, and other nonpol i ce professi onal s can do i n terms of vari ous
physi cal -pl anni ng strategi es to reduce cri mi nal opportuni ty. Experi enced MP
personnel have l ong recogni zed that certai n physi cal condi ti ons can contri bute
to the rate and nature of cri me. They have al so devel oped a capabi l i ty to
i denti fy hi gh cri me-ri sk l ocati ons by noti ng such factors as poor l i ghti ng and
weak poi nts of entry as potenti al targets. The cri ti cal job i s to i denti fy speci fi c
areas concerni ng physi cal pl anni ng and desi gn that can be responded to and
acti ons can be taken agai nst on the i nstal l ati on.
B-85. Attempti ng to reduce cri me or the fear of cri me by regul ati ng physi cal
envi ronments i s easi er sai d than done. I n fact, al though cri me preventi on can
be bui l t i nto al most every aspect of communi ty pl anni ng, i t i s often i gnored for
a number of reasons. For exampl e, fragmentati on of responsi bl e agenci es i s a
key probl em. I n addi ti on, cri me has hi stori cal l y been l ooked upon as the
excl usi ve responsi bi l i ty of MP forces; not of those i n charge of educati on,
housi ng, or heal th and wel fare. Yet, wi th an understandi ng of cri me
preventi on combi ned wi th the knowl edge that desi gn techni ques can change
the opportuni ty for cri mi nal behavi or, PSI s wi l l be abl e to tal k the l anguage of
the pl anner and the desi gner and to be abl e to advi se them from a pol i ce
perspecti ve.
B-86. I t i s notabl e that a number of ci vi l i an pol i ce agenci es have become
i nvol ved i n the physi cal -pl anni ng process and have achi eved notabl e resul ts
from thei r work. For exampl e, the Fremont, Cal i forni a, Pol i ce Department has
been i nvol ved i n a pl anni ng process and mai ntai ns that l aw enforcement
FM 3-19.30
shoul d become an i ntegral part of the master- or comprehensi ve-pl an revi ew
to screen al l redevel opment pl ans for safety and cri me hazards. Worki ng wi th
other uni ts of muni ci pal government as wel l as archi tects and desi gners, the
department drew up a set of model gui del i nes for the eval uati on of projects.
The model i ncl uded eval uati on cri teri a deal i ng wi th such subjects as the
accessi bi l i ty of bui l di ngs to patrol uni ts; traffi c fl ow and off-street parki ng
provi si ons; and the l ocati on and regul ati on of cul -de-sacs, pl aygrounds,
common greens, fences, and securi ty entrances. I n addi ti on, worki ng wi th
agenci es such as the Ameri can I nsti tute of Archi tects, the Nati onal Publ i c
Works Associ ati on, the Associ ati on of Publ i c Uti l i ti es, and others, the
department i denti fi ed a number of subjects that are of speci fi c concern to
pol i ce offi cers and that shoul d be consi dered i n the desi gn and pl anni ng stage.
As a resul t of these efforts, the fol l owi ng l i st of desi gn concerns was devel oped
by the department:
Bui l di ng setbacks (front, si de, and rear).
Wal l constructi on, i nteri or and exteri or (i ndustri al , commerci al , and
resi denti al ).
Door constructi on, setbacks and securi ty (i ndustri al , commerci al , and
resi denti al ) (i ncl udi ng carports, garages, and sl i di ng-gl ass doors).
Wi ndows and skyl i ghts, setbacks, hei ghts (from ground), show-wi ndow
di spl ays, and the type of frame or pane.
Stai rs (stai rwel l s and stai rcases).
Bal coni es.
Uti l i ty boxes.
Fences, wal l s, hedges, screens, setbacks, hei ghts, and l ouvers.
Parki ng (publ i c and pri vate).
Li ghti ng (i ndustri al , commerci al , and resi denti al ).
Streets, si dewal ks, and wal kways (l ocati ons, sl opes, curvature, grades,
and the l ength of a bl ock).
Al l eys (bl i nd and through al l eys).
Vi si bi l i ty of val uabl es (peopl e, safes, cash regi sters, and personal
property).
Si gns (street si gns and si gnal s, traffi c si gns and si gnal s, and
adverti si ng si gns).
Accessi bi l i ty; approach, entrance, and exi t (pedestri an, vehi cul ar,
servi ces, resi denti al , commerci al , and i ndustri al ).
Publ i c uti l i ti es and easements (gas, water, tel ephone, and el ectri cal ).
Publ i c areas and faci l i ti es (publ i c restrooms, parks, bus stops and
shel ters, pl aygrounds, recreati on hal l s, and so forth).
Street trees and shrubbery (types, hei ghts, and l ocati ons).
B-87. Wi th thi s i nformati on, you can i mprove the securi ty aspects of the
communi tys physi cal -pl anni ng process. There i s a probabi l i ty that the work
and recommendati ons of the Nati onal Advi sory Commi ssi on on Cri mi nal
Justi ce Goal s and Standards may hel p you i n your efforts to get i nvol ved i n
the desi gn process. More speci fi cal l y, the Commi ssi on noted that every pol i ce
agency shoul d parti ci pate wi th l ocal pl anni ng agenci es and organi zati ons,
FM 3-19.30
publ i c and pri vate, i n communi ty physi cal pl anni ng that affects the rate or
nature of cri me or the fear of cri me.
B-88. The future rol e of MP forces i n cri me preventi on through physi cal
pl anni ng wi l l depend on the PSI s i ni ti ati ve. The perspecti ves and knowl edge
of what i s happeni ng i n thi s fi el d, combi ned wi th a worki ng knowl edge of the
l anguage, shoul d equi p PSI s to sel l thi s approach as part of the overal l
program. I t i s i mportant to poi nt out that others who represent professi ons
other than cri me preventi on are aware of the rel ati onshi ps between urban
pl anni ng and cri me. Remember, they deal i n concepts, approaches, and i deas
that have not i nvol ved the real i ti es that l aw-enforcement personnel face.
SPECIALIZED PATROL TACTICS AND SURVEILLANCE
B-89. Speci al i zed patrol operati ons use a vari ety of tacti cs i n attempti ng to
control i denti fi ed cri me probl ems. The most common tacti cs i ncl ude uni formed
tacti cal patrol s and suspect and area survei l l ances. The fol l owi ng paragraphs
di scuss these tacti cs i n terms of thei r target cri mes, operati on requi rements
and characteri sti cs, and establ i shed or percei ved l evel s of effecti veness.
B-90. The appropri ateness of a gi ven tacti c depends on the characteri sti cs of a
parti cul ar cri me probl em. The sel ecti on of speci al i zed patrol tacti cs shoul d be
made on the basi s of a careful and conti nuous anal ysi s of cri mes. Most cri mes
can be addressed by more than one tacti c. Several tacti cs mi ght be tri ed i n an
effort to fi nd the best one, and i t i s qui te possi bl e that the most effecti ve
approach to a gi ven cri me probl em wi l l i ncl ude the combi nati on of several
tacti cs.
UNIFORMED TACTICAL PATROLS
B-91. A uni formed tacti cal patrol i s the most tradi ti onal and wi del y used form
of speci al i zed patrol . I t i s a si mpl e, strai ghtforward approach to speci al i zed
patrol that i nvol ves the same procedures and techni ques used by MP offi cers
on routi ne patrol . These i ncl ude constant vi si bl e movement throughout an
area to generate a sense of pol i ce presence, careful observati on of street
acti vi ty, vehi cl e and pedestri an stops, and ci ti zen contacts. The di fference
between uni formed tacti cal patrol s and routi ne patrol s are that uni formed
tacti cal patrol s use these tacti cs i n an i ntense, concentrated fashi on. MP
offi cers are rel i eved of the responsi bi l i ty for respondi ng to routi ne cal l s for
servi ces so that they can devote thei r ful l ti me and attenti on to patrol , thus
i ntensi fyi ng i ts i mpact. I n addi ti on, uni formed tacti cal operati ons typi cal l y
depl oy a number of MP offi cers i n target areas, thereby i ncreasi ng the l evel of
patrol i n these areas.
B-92. Uni formed tacti cal patrol s can be used to control vi rtual l y any type of
suppressi bl e cri me (for exampl e, cri mes that can be vi ewed from l ocati ons
where the pol i ce have a l egi ti mate ri ght to be and those that can be potenti al l y
affected by pol i ce operati ons). These suppressi bl e cri mes i ncl ude street
robberi es, purse snatches, vehi cl e thefts, burgl ari es, and housebreaki ngs.
Uni formed tacti cal patrol s can al so have an i mpact on other types of cri me as
offi cers use observati on, fi el d i nterrogati on, and ci ti zen contacts to devel op
i nformati on on the l ocati ons, acti vi ti es, vehi cl es, and associ ates of suspects.
FM 3-19.30
B-93. The pri mary purpose of uni formed tacti cal patrol i s deterrence. Thi s
tacti c i s based on the assumpti on that hi ghl y vi si bl e, acti ve patrol s wi l l deter
potenti al offenders. By i ncreasi ng the percei ved probabi l i ty of apprehensi on,
conspi cuous patrol i s thought to reduce the l i kel i hood that cri mes wi l l occur. I f
the deterrence shoul d fai l , hei ghtened patrol coverage i s bel i eved to i ncrease
the probabi l i ty of the i mmedi ate apprehensi on of the suspects.
B-94. Uni formed tacti cal patrol s are often used to saturate an area that i s
experi enci ng a parti cul arl y seri ous cri me probl em. Al though i t has been
wi del y used for years, saturati on patrol has never been cl earl y and adequatel y
defi ned. Exactl y what l evel and i ntensi ty of patrol consti tutes saturati on has
never been determi ned, nor have the effects of di fferent l evel s of patrol been
cl earl y establ i shed. I t i s di ffi cul t to prescri be the l evel of uni formed tacti cal
patrol s that shoul d be used to di srupt a cri me pattern i n a parti cul ar area.
Thi s shoul d be determi ned through an anal ysi s of the si ze and characteri sti cs
of the area of concentrati on of each potenti al target cri me pattern coupl ed
wi th an assessment of manpower avai l abi l i ty.
B-95. Some patterns can be effecti vel y handl ed by a very smal l i ncrease i n the
patrol l evel . For exampl e, i n Portl and, Oregon, Operati on Cri me Reducti on
I nvol vi ng Many Peopl e (CRI MP) had a si gni fi cant i mpact on street robberi es
and assaul ts i n the ci tys ski d-row area by i ni ti ati ng two-offi cer, uni formed
foot beats i n the area. Thi s was suffi ci ent to saturate the pri mary l ocati ons of
the target cri mes duri ng the hi gh-cri me hours, and i t l ed to a substanti al
reducti on i n these cri mes wi th l i ttl e apparent spi l l over i nto adjacent areas.
B-96. Other departments have used saturati on patrol s on a much l arger
scal e. For exampl e, i n the mi d-1950s, the New York Ci ty Pol i ce Department
attempted to saturate an enti re preci nct by assi gni ng over 200 addi ti onal
offi cers to the preci ncts patrol force. Foot beats coveri ng extremel y smal l
areas were arranged i n strai ght l i nes so that an offi cer coul d keep the enti re
street area of hi s beat i n vi ew at al l ti mes. The four-month experi ment l ed to a
dramati c reducti on i n cri me i n the preci nct. Compared wi th the same peri od
i n the previ ous year, street muggi ngs fel l by 89.9 percent, burgl ari es where
entry was made from the front of the bui l di ng dropped by 78 percent, and so
on. The onl y cri me category that was not affected was the rel ati vel y pri vate
cri me of murder. Si nce cri me di spl acement was not exami ned i n the
experi ment, i ts true i mpact remai ns unknown. The experi ment strongl y
suggests that massi ve addi ti ons of pol i ce manpower can have a substanti al
effect on cri me. The probl em i s that most departments do not have the abi l i ty
to conduct even a l i mi ted versi on of thi s experi ment.
B-97. The amount of resources requi red for saturati on patrol s can vary
tremendousl y, and there i s no defi ni te way of determi ni ng how much
addi ti onal patrol i s needed. Thi s can best be deci ded on a probl em-by-probl em
basi s, usi ng experi ence and eval uati ons of past efforts as a gui de. As a rul e,
patrol augmentati on shoul d be suffi ci ent to affect rather qui ckl y the
percepti ons of woul d-be offenders concerni ng the l evel of pol i ce acti vi ty i n a
parti cul ar area. I t appears that for such a strategy to be effecti ve, suffi ci ent
resources shoul d be appl i ed i n a l i mi ted area to ensure a true saturati on
effect.
FM 3-19.30
B-98. Uni formed tacti cal patrol s can use vari ous modes of transportati on.
Patrol cars are most often used; however, foot patrol s can be effecti ve i n
congested servi ce di stri cts and bi kes have been used to good advantage i n
hi gh-densi ty resi denti al areas. The mode of transportati on shoul d be sel ected
based on vi si bi l i ty, mobi l i ty, and access to ci ti zens.
B-99. Some speci al i zed uni ts depl oy MP offi cers i n unmarked pol i ce cars. Thi s
i s done i n an effort to effect a bal ance between overt and covert operati ons,
hopeful l y gai ni ng many of the advantages of both. Unmarked cars may al so be
readi l y avai l abl e si nce i n many departments i nvesti gators work pri mari l y
duri ng the day, whi ch l eaves thei r vehi cl es free for speci al i zed patrol i n the
eveni ng and earl y morni ng watches. Thi s approach has seri ous drawbacks.
Fi rst, unmarked MP cars are somewhat l ess vi si bl e than marked cars, yet
they are sti l l easi l y recogni zabl e as pol i ce vehi cl es to l arge segments of the
publ i c (especi al l y when the offi cers i n them are i n uni form). Second, the use of
these cars i n uni formed tacti cal patrol s coul d l ead to the sacri fi ce of some of
the deterrent effects of hi gh vi si bi l i ty wi thout real i zi ng the apprehensi on
benefi ts of trul y covert patrol s.
B-100. Several patrol techni ques have been tri ed to i ncrease the vi si bi l i ty of
uni formed patrol and to enhance the sense of pol i ce presence. A tandem patrol
uses two marked patrol cars that fol l ow each other at i nterval s of one-hal f to
several bl ocks. Two uni ts can al so patrol on paral l el streets one bl ock over or
i n an al l ey. Another approach combi nes foot and vehi cl e patrol s i n an effort to
i ncrease vi si bi l i ty. Offi cers park thei r marked cars i n conspi cuous l ocati ons i n
hi gh-cri me areas and then are transported to other hi gh-cri me areas where
they patrol on foot. The frequent repeti ti on of thi s procedure i s seen as a way
of mul ti pl yi ng patrol vi si bi l i ty.
B-101. Unl ess a target area i s more or l ess compl etel y saturated (as i n the
New York experi ment), MP patrol s shoul d move i n a random, unpredi ctabl e
pattern. Thi s wi l l make i t di ffi cul t for potenti al offenders to pl an thei r cri mes
on the basi s of observati on of patrol acti vi ti es. One department found that i ts
uni formed-tacti cal -patrol operati on was actual l y hel pi ng burgl ars to commi t
break-i ns. I ntervi ews wi th confessed burgl ars i ndi cated that they were aware
of a vi si bl e patrol passi ng through the nei ghborhoods at regul ar i nterval s and
they pl anned thei r cri mes accordi ngl y.
B-102. I n addi ti on to i ncreasi ng the l evel and vi si bi l i ty of patrol i n hi gh-cri me
areas, uni formed tacti cal patrol s often use aggressi ve patrol tacti cs i nvol vi ng
frequent vehi cl e and pedestri an stops. MP patrol s stop, questi on, and perhaps
search ci ti zens when there are reasonabl e grounds for suspecti ng that the
ci ti zens may have commi tted, may be commi tti ng, or may be about to commi t
a cri me. Si nce the concept of reasonabl e suspi ci on i s vague, MP offi cers have a
consi derabl e amount of di screti on i n conducti ng fi el d i ntervi ews. Fi el d
i ntervi ews that do not resul t i n ei ther i mmedi ate arrest of the ci ti zen or i n
al l evi ati on of the offi cers suspi ci ons are usual l y documented i n fi el d-i ntervi ew
cards or spot reports. Fi el d i ntervi ews serve to generate i nformati on about the
acti vi ti es of probabl e suspects; mor e i mportantl y, they make the suspects
aware that the pol i ce know of thei r presence i n a gi ven area, regard them as
suspi ci ous, and are watchi ng them cl osel y. Thi s i s expected to reduce the
l i kel i hood that they wi l l commi t cri mes, at l east i n the area i n whi ch the
tacti cal force i s worki ng.
FM 3-19.30
B-103. The extensi ve use of fi el d i ntervi ews i s often hi ghl y controversi al .
Tacti cal uni ts that emphasi ze fi el d i ntervi ews have been accused of bei ng
storm troopers who constantl y harass ci ti zens and abuse thei r ri ghts. There i s
someti mes a certai n amount of truth to the al l egati ons of harassment,
especi al l y when the acti vi ti es of a parti cul ar type or group of suspects are
bei ng cl osel y moni tored. Not surpri si ngl y, i ndi vi dual s who are stopped and
questi oned frequentl y are l i kel y to compl ai n, parti cul arl y i f they have reason
to be concerned about cl ose pol i ce scruti ny. A recent study of fi el d i ntervi ews
i n San Di ego found that when conducted at moder ate l evel s, fi el d-i nter vi ew
acti vi ti es do not have a major effect on pol i ce and communi ty rel ati ons. The
majori ty of ci ti zens i n al l three study areas accept fi el d i ntervi ews as
l egi ti mate and properl y conducted pol i ce acti vi ty. The majori ty of al l ci ti zens
who were the subjects of contacts fel t that the contact was justi fi ed and
properl y conducted. The study found that the suspensi on of fi el d i ntervi ews i n
a parti cul ar area was associ ated wi th a si gni fi cant i ncrease i n the l evel of
suppressi bl e cri me and when rei nstated i n the area, these cri mes decl i ned.
The resul ts of the San Di ego study provi de confi rmati on for the wi del y hel d
bel i ef that fi el d i ntervi ews can have an i mportant deterri ng effect on
suppressi bl e cri me wi thout doi ng i rreparabl e damage to pol i ce and
communi ty rel ati ons.
B-104. The potenti al l y negati ve i mpact of fi el d i ntervi ews on certai n
segments of the communi ty can be hel d to a mi ni mum i f the i ntervi ews are
conducted i n a professi onal manner. Ci ti zens shoul d be i nformed of the
reasons why they are bei ng stopped. They shoul d be detai ned for as l i ttl e ti me
as possi bl e and shoul d not be subjected to verbal or physi cal abuse. There i s
al so no need to stop everythi ng that moves.
B-105. Whi l e experi ence and a l i mi ted amount of research i ndi cate that
uni formed tacti cal patrol s can have a posi ti ve i mpact on the l evel of
suppressi bl e cri me i n areas, the overal l effecti veness of thi s tacti c i s a
controversi al and much-debated i ssue. The pri nci pal concern i s that rather
than reduci ng cri me, uni formed tacti cal patrol s may si mpl y l ead to i ts
di spl acement from one area to another or from one peri od to another.
B-106. When conducti ng uni formed tacti cal patrol s, a PM acti vi ty shoul d
careful l y moni tor cri me trends for i ndi cati ons of possi bl e di spl acement effects.
Thi s i s an i mportant aspect of eval uati ng the i mpact of tacti cal operati ons,
and i t wi l l provi de i nformati on to gui de future depl oyments and tacti cal
deci si ons.
AREA SURVEILLANCE
B-107. Covert patrol and survei l l ance of hi gh-cri me areas can be used to
make apprehensi ons for cri me probl ems. These probl ems i ncl ude those for
whi ch there are no suspects who warrant personal survei l l ance, the suspects
are too numerous to permi t personal survei l l ance, and there are too many
potenti al targets to conduct ei ther physi cal or el ectroni c stakeouts. Exampl es
of these types of probl ems woul d be a rash of resi denti al burgl ari es or auto
thefts i n a parti cul ar area.
B-108. Thi s tacti c si mpl y i nvol ves the covert patrol of a parti cul ar area and
the observati on of suspi ci ous or unusual acti vi ti es and occurrences that mi ght
FM 3-19.30
i ndi cate the l i kel i hood of a cri me. Suspi ci ous i ndi vi dual s are not stopped but
are watched unti l they ei ther commi t an offense or the offi cers suspi ci ons are
removed.
B-109. The l i st of vari ous techni ques that can be used i n an area survei l l ance
i s vi rtual l y endl ess. The fol l owi ng are some techni ques that have been
effecti vel y used by speci al i zed patrol uni ts:
Mi ngl i ng wi th ci ti zens at the cri me scene to pi ck up i nformati on on
possi bl e suspects.
Mai ntai ni ng rooftop survei l l ance of a shoppi ng centers parki ng l ot to
l ocate l arceni es from vehi cl es.
Survei l l i ng housi ng areas by posi ng as mai ntenance workers.
Fol l owi ng l i kel y cri me vi cti ms such as el derl y ci ti zens l eavi ng a bank.
Survei l l i ng rooftops for unusual acti vi ty from ai rcraft or hi gher
bui l di ngs. Bi nocul ars are used to faci l i tate survei l l ance, and rooftops
are marked so that street uni ts can be di spatched to check out
suspi ci ous ci rcumstances.
B-110. As i n al l types of pl ai n or uni formed patrol , care shoul d be taken to
ensure that area survei l l ance i s trul y covert. Rental vehi cl es that can be
changed frequentl y provi de an excel l ent, though expensi ve, means of covert
transportati on.
B-111. Pol i ce on covert patrol shoul d be dressed to bl end i n wi th the
envi ronment i n whi ch they are worki ng, and they shoul d have apparentl y
l egi ti mate, nonpol i ce-rel ated reasons for bei ng where they are. Several
speci al i zed uni ts have found that survei l l ance teams composed of one mal e
and one femal e offi cer can work i n many si tuati ons wi thout arousi ng
suspi ci on. An apparentl y marri ed or romanti cal l y i nvol ved coupl e l i ngeri ng i n
a park, meanderi ng sl owl y down the street, or si tti ng together i n a parked car
woul d general l y appear l ess suspi ci ous than two mal e MP offi cers doi ng the
same thi ngs. Fi nal l y, i t shoul d be noted that i n some smal l nei ghborhoods
where resi dents know each other wel l , covert survei l l ance may be di ffi cul t, i f
not i mpossi bl e, si nce the presence of any stranger arouses i mmedi ate curi osi ty
and suspi ci on.
SUMMARY
B-112. These tacti cs represent the basi c approaches that speci al i zed patrol
operati ons normal l y take i n tryi ng to control suppressi bl e cri me. Some of the
tacti cs (such as uni formed tacti cal patrol s) are di rected pri mari l y at cri me
deterrence, whi l e others (such as suspect survei l l ance) are used to achi eve
apprehensi ons for target cri mes. The tacti cs are most commonl y used
i ndependentl y of one another. However, there are some i ndi cati ons that the
combi ned use of several tacti cs i n an i ntegrated operati on mi ght be an
effecti ve way of copi ng wi th parti cul ar types of cri me. Especi al l y promi si ng i s
the coordi nated use of hi ghl y vi si bl e and covert patrol s. A vi si bl e patrol force
coul d be depl oyed to a parti cul ar area to deter cri me there and di rect i t toward
other areas i n whi ch MP forces usi ng covert tacti cs are worki ng. To date,
efforts to di rect cri mi nal acti vi ty to areas or targets where MP forces are set
up to make apprehensi ons have onl y been tri ed on a sporadi c basi s. However,
thi s appears to be a promi si ng approach to cri me control and warrants greater
FM 3-19.30
attenti on i n the future. I t can be vi ewed as the creati ve use of cri me
di spl acement.
B-113. Many of the tacti cs menti oned previ ousl y coul d not be effecti vel y used
by MP patrol s that are responsi bl e for handl i ng routi ne cal l s for servi ce. I t i s
obvi ous that the effecti veness of decoy operati ons, physi cal stakeouts, and
suspect survei l l ance woul d be destroyed i f the MP offi cers had to i nterrupt
these acti vi ti es to handl e cal l s for servi ce. I t i s al so general l y unwi se to have
MP offi cers i n ci vi l i an cl othes respond to cal l s for servi ce.
B-114. The i mportance of cri me anal yses i n i denti fyi ng cri me probl ems and
suggesti ng appropri ate tacti cs deserves repeti ti on. Speci al i zed patrol uni ts
shoul d be depl oyed to address cl earl y i denti fi ed cri me patterns, and they
shoul d choose thei r tacti cs on the basi s of an anal ysi s of these patterns and a
comprehensi ve knowl edge of the area of occurrence. The nature and
characteri sti cs of a parti cul ar cri me pattern shoul d be the dri vi ng force behi nd
the sel ecti on of tacti cs. None of the tacti cs of speci al i zed patrol can be
effecti vel y used unl ess cri me patterns have been i denti fi ed and anal yzed.
PUBLICITY CAMPAIGNS
B-115. Publ i c-i nformati on campai gns are an essenti al part of every cri me-
preventi on effort. The i nstal l ati on PAO can provi de assi stance i n
I nformi ng the publ i c of the magni tude of the l ocal cri me probl em.
Di ssemi nati ng i nformati on on cri me ci rcumstances.
Generati ng the i nterest and enthusi asm necessary to i ni ti ate and
sustai n communi ty cri me-preventi on programs.
B-116. The PAO shoul d be a member of the i nstal l ati ons cri me-preventi on
counci l and must be i nvol ved from the start i n pl anni ng cri me-preventi on
efforts. There are many i nformati on vehi cl es at the i nstal l ati on l evel avai l abl e
to carry the message to the publ i c, i ncl udi ng
Di gi tal marquees.
Radi o.
CCTV.
I nstal l ati on and uni t newspapers.
Posters and l eafl ets.
Commanders cal l s and si mi l ar meeti ngs.
Town-hal l meeti ngs.
B-117. Not al l medi a are equal l y effecti ve i n reachi ng a parti cul ar segment of
the post popul ati on. To ensure that the medi a campai gn i s effecti ve, i denti fy
the segment of the popul ati on requi ri ng the i nformati on and the exact
message to be communi cated. The more speci fi c the target audi ence, the more
effecti ve the medi a campai gn wi l l be.
B-118. Whatever medi a i s used, i t i s i mportant to provi de coordi nated i nput
to the PAO wel l i n advance of the desi red publ i ci ty campai gn date to al l ow for
wri ti ng, rewri ti ng, and publ i shi ng. For materi al to be publ i shed i n a
magazi ne, a mi ni mum l ead ti me of si x months i s normal l y requi red. For
FM 3-19.30
i nstal l ati on newspapers, a l ead ti me of a week may be suffi ci ent. Check wi th
the PAO to determi ne the correct l ead ti mes for l ocal publ i cati ons.
B-119. When addressi ng ci vi c groups or school audi ences, fi l ms are often more
effecti ve than strai ght l ectures because of the ani mati on and other speci al
techni ques used to i l l ustrate cri ti cal poi nts. Several Army fi l ms are avai l abl e
as are a l arge number of commerci al fi l ms.
RESIDENTIAL-SECURITY SURVEYS
B-120. A securi ty survey i s an i n-depth, on-si te exami nati on of a physi cal
faci l i ty and i ts surroundi ng property. The survey i s conducted to determi ne a
resi dences securi ty status, to i denti fy defi ci enci es or securi ty ri sks, to defi ne
the protecti on needed, and to make recommendati ons to mi ni mi ze cri mi nal
opportuni ty. Because of several common characteri sti cs, one expert has
l i kened the securi ty survey to the tradi ti onal cri mi nal i nvesti gati on. Thi s
compari son hi nges pri mari l y on the facts that both techni ques are systemati c
i n nature; are ai med at i denti fyi ng the method of a cri mi nal act; and are, i n
effect, more an art than a sci ence. I t shoul d be recogni zed, however, that the
survey has two other advantages. Fi rst, i t can be conducted before the
commi ssi on of a cri me; second, i t can offer protecti on agai nst, rather than just
remedi al acti on after, cri mi nal vi cti mi zati on.
THE RESIDENTIAL-SECURITY SURVEY AS A CRIME-PREVENTION TOOL
B-121. A resi denti al survey i s not a substi tute for an aggressi ve nei ghborhood
watch. I t suppl ements these efforts and shoul d be establ i shed after
Nei ghborhood Watch and Operati on I D programs are establ i shed.
B-122. The securi ty survey i s the pri mary tool used i n cri me preventi on to
recogni ze, apprai se, and anti ci pate potenti al l oss i n resi denti al areas. I t i s
often defi ned as the backbone of a l ocal cri me-preventi on program. I n practi ce,
i t combi nes the securi ty experi ence, trai ni ng, and educati on of the l ocal cri me-
preventi on offi cer and focuses on a si ngl e el ementthe anal ysi s of a
resi denti al faci l i ty.
B-123. The i nherent val ue of surveys has been proven by nearl y 300 ci vi l i an
pol i ce departments across the country that have establ i shed cri me-preventi on
bureaus or uni ts. An even broader endorsement of the survey techni que,
however, was provi ded by the Nati onal Advi sory Commi ssi on on Cri mi nal
Justi ce Standards and Goal s, whi ch stated that, Every pol i ce agency shoul d
conduct, upon request, securi ty i nspecti ons of busi nesses and resi dences and
recommend measures to avoi d bei ng vi cti mi zed by cri me.
B-124. I n short, the securi ty survey i s a tool that i nforms a homeowner of the
parti cul ar areas i n whi ch hi s home i s suscepti bl e to cri mi nal vi cti mi zati on
al ong wi th steps that can be taken to reduce and mi ni mi ze that potenti al .
Further, the survey i s a tangi bl e document that refl ects the efforts of the MP
force not onl y to be responsi ve to communi ty needs, but to get the communi ty
more di rectl y i nvol ved i n the cri mi nal -justi ce process.
FM 3-19.30
THE CRIME-PREVENTION SURVEYA PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION
B-125. An i mportant factor i n understandi ng the resi denti al -securi ty survey
i s that i t must be consi dered as an ongoi ng process. Whi l e a parti cul ar survey
wi l l resul t i n speci fi c recommendati ons, each survey wi l l provi de a foundati on
for future acti on. I n combi nati on, these surveys wi l l provi de a database that
can be used i n the anal ysi s of the communi tys cri me probl ems and gui de
acti on toward the resol uti on or reducti on of the probl em on a communi ty-wi de
basi s.
B-126. As a starti ng poi nt, fi ve steps must be used i n carryi ng out the actual
survey, whi l e four addi ti onal steps must be remembered afterward. These
steps are
Anal yzi ng the overal l envi ronment (nei ghborhood, bl ock, and so forth).
Assessi ng the general vul nerabi l i ty of the premi ses.
Defi ni ng the speci fi c poi nts of vul nerabi l i ty.
Recommendi ng speci fi c securi ty procedures.
I ncl udi ng speci fi c remedi al hardware recommendati ons.
Urgi ng the i mpl ementati on of the recommendati ons.
Conducti ng a fol l ow-up to ensure that recommendati ons have been
i mpl emented.
Keepi ng cri me stati sti cs to eval uate the surveys effect and the
i mpl ementati on of recommendati ons.
Conducti ng a second survey of the premi ses stati sti cal anal ysi s to
determi ne the al terati on i n cri mi nal acti vi ty i n the areas surveyed.
B-127. Thi s process i s the conti nued i nvol vement and parti ci pati on of the
pol i ce wi th the communi ty. Once the survey i s compl eted, the job i s not
fi ni shed. I n fact, i f thi s posture i s assumed, i t may l ater be l earned that the
recommendati ons were not i mpl emented and that the work was done i n vai n.
Thi s can easi l y l ead to a l oss of communi ty-wi de publ i c confi dence i n the
programs. Si mi l arl y, even i n those cases when recommendati ons are
i mpl emented, addi ti onal cri me mi ght be experi enced. Attenti on to thi s fact,
coupl ed wi th i mmedi ate fol l ow-up, wi l l be essenti al to avoi d l osi ng the
confi dence gai ned from the ori gi nal survey. Through prompt acti ons, the
proposal of addi ti onal tacti cs may become the fi nal step needed to
substanti al l y reduce cri mi nal opportuni ty. I n short, the securi ty-survey
process i s not a one-shot operati on and i t i s not to be l ooked upon as a si mpl e,
strai ghtforward task. I t i s a conti nui ng, di ffi cul t, ri gorous, yet effecti ve
approach to reduci ng cri me that has not been systemati cal l y appl i ed by pol i ce
agenci es i n thi s country.
THE ROLE OF POLICE IN IMPLEMENTING CRIME-REDUCTION PROGRAMS
THROUGH SECURITY SURVEYS
B-128. At a mi ni mum, there are two ways to encourage peopl e to i mprove
thei r personal securi ty. Fi rst, you can organi ze, conduct, and parti ci pate i n
broad-based publ i c-i nformati on and -educati on programs that make use of
such medi a as radi o, tel evi si on, and the press. Second, you can organi ze,
undertake, and fol l ow up on a seri es of person-to-person securi ty surveys.
Cl earl y, both of these techni ques have thei r advantages. The securi ty survey
FM 3-19.30
has a uni que qual i ty that does not exi st i n the publ i c-educati on program. I t
provi des an added i ncenti ve on the part of ci ti zens to i mpl ement
recommendati ons because of the personal rel ati onshi ps and respect
establ i shed duri ng the actual survey by a cri me-preventi on offi cer.
B-129. For exampl e, consi der a homeowner l i steni ng to someone on tel evi si on
recommendi ng i mprovements of securi ty by i nstal l i ng better l ocks or al arm
systems. You mi ght ask your sel f these questi ons: How secure am I ? Ar e the
l ocks that I have on my doors adequate? I f they are i nadequate, what ki nd of
l ocks shoul d I i nstal l ? Do I real l y need an al arm system? What can the MP
offi cers do for me i n terms of maki ng recommendati ons about securi ty? I n
short, you woul d be aware of the possi bl e need for i mproved securi ty, but you
woul d not know enough of the speci fi cs to warrant real acti on. Because home
securi ty i s a compl i cated matter requi ri ng careful anal ysi s and the
i nstal l ati on of careful l y tai l ored systems, i mpl ementati on must be approached
i n a personal way. Certai nl y, publ i c-educati on programs can assi st i n some
aspects of cri me preventi on (such as preventi on agai nst schemes, auto theft,
and personal protecti on), but they are not as effecti ve i n causi ng i mproved
securi ty as i s personal contact.
B-130. Moreover, for the fi rst ti me, pol i ce are pl aced i n a posi ti on where they
can actual l y provi de a di fferent ki nd of advi ce or servi ce that can be offered i n
an envi ronment where a cri si s has not yet occurred. Thi s i s a trul y uni que
opportuni ty for cri me-preventi on offi cers.
CONDUCTING THE SURVEY
B-131. To devel op a proper perspecti ve of the types of cri mes that a PSI wi l l
most frequentl y be tryi ng to reduce, a revi ew of the cases i s necessary to get a
broader feel for the actual condi ti ons i n your area. Duri ng thi s revi ew process,
pay speci fi c attenti on to photographs i n the fi l es. Study cri me scenes i n an
effort to i denti fy the type of securi ty devi ce that was defeated. I n parti cul ar, i f
a door was used as a poi nt of entry, note whether i t was of adequate
constructi on; i f the door frame was broken or separated; i f hardware, such as
stri ke pl ates and door tri m was i nadequate; and so forth. I n addi ti on, revi ew
photos to determi ne i f l ock cyl i nders were pul l ed or i f door chai ns fastened to
tri m mol di ngs were si mpl y pul l ed away to permi t easy entrance. I f
photographs of the cri me scenes are not avai l abl e, vi si t as many cri me scenes
as possi bl e. Whi l e doi ng so, photograph securi ty ri sks you can study l ater and
use as exampl es i n future presentati ons to communi ty groups.
B-132. By becomi ng fami l i ar wi th the MO of persons commi tti ng such cri mes
as burgl ary and l arceny, you wi l l be better-equi pped to understand potenti al
ri sk si tuati ons and to poi nt them out to potenti al vi cti ms. Qui te surpri si ngl y,
many of the cases i nvesti gated were i nvi ted by some obvi ous cri me-ri sk
hazard that was overl ooked by a resi dent. Al so, many addi ti onal cri me ri sks
exi sted at a parti cul ar cri me scene that a burgl ar coul d have expl oi ted. Such
vul nerabi l i ty mi ght be an i ndi cati on of other cri me targets wi thi n the
communi ty to whi ch you shoul d pay parti cul ar attenti on i n your survey work.
B-133. To be an effecti ve securi ty surveyor, i t i s necessary to devel op an
i nti mate knowl edge of the cri me factors i n your communi ty. You do not have to
become a stati sti ci an; however, the more you know and understand about
FM 3-19.30
cri me probl ems, the methods used i n your communi ty, and securi ty devi ces or
systems that were defeated, the better you wi l l be equi pped to anal yze the
potenti al cri me when surveyi ng a home.
B-134. I n addi ti on to the general types of cri mes that occur i n your
communi ty, i t i s necessary to devel op an understandi ng of the detai l s of
parti cul ar types of offenses. For exampl e, wi th regard to resi denti al
housebreaki ng, you shoul d be fami l i ar wi th the types of burgl ari es and
approaches used i n parti cul ar secti ons of the communi ty.
B-135. On the surface, i t mi ght appear as i f thi s woul d be a monumental task.
However, i n terms of housebreaki ng, you mi ght pul l the fi l es for the l ast
quarter and carry out the fol l owi ng steps:
Tal l y the number of ti mes entry was made through the front door, rear
door, or through a wi ndow.
I denti fy the approach used for entry (ki cki ng the l ock, throwi ng a
shoul der through the door, ji mmyi ng the l ock, and so forth).
Determi ne how often a wi ndow was broken or removed or a mechani sm
was used to force the l atch (when entry was made through a wi ndow).
Attempt to determi ne whether securi ty devi ces were used i n resi dences
(such as al arms, speci al l i ghti ng, or other systems).
I denti fy the burgl ars general escape route (down a back al l ey, through
a school yard, and so forth).
B-136. I n devel opi ng an understandi ng of the MO of cri mes, stati sti cs that
i l l ustrate exactl y what i s happeni ng i n your communi ty wi l l be val uabl e tool s.
Not onl y wi l l you be abl e to use thi s i nformati on i n expl ai ni ng cri me ri sks
whi l e you are surveyi ng the si te, but i t wi l l be i nval uabl e i n maki ng publ i c
presentati ons.
B-137. Onl y when you have devel oped the abi l i ty to vi sual i ze the potenti al for
cri mi nal acti vi ty wi l l you have become an effecti ve cri me-scene surveyor. I t i s
i mportant that when you arri ve on a survey si te, you are prepared to gi ve a
property owner sound advi ce on the type of securi ty precauti ons he shoul d
consi der.
B-138. I n summary, to be a good cri me-preventi on surveyor, you have to be a
good i nvesti gator. You must understand the cri mi nal s method of operati on
and the l i mi tati ons of standard securi ty devi ces. I n addi ti on, you must be
knowl edgeabl e about the type of securi ty hardware necessary to provi de
vari ous degrees of protecti on. (Speci fi c i nformati on on conducti ng surveys i s
contai ned i n Chapter 11).
J UVENILE CRIME PREVENTION
B-139. Law enforcement has l ong recogni zed the i mportance of establ i shi ng
personal contact wi th youth. Thi s need was fi rst met wi th the Offi cer
Fri endl y concept. The goal of thi s concept was to enhance the i mage of pol i ce
among younger chi l dren and attempt to negate the unfavorabl e i mage other
segments of soci ety provi ded chi l dren. Thi s concept has evol ved i nto todays
Drug Abuse Resi stance and Educati on (DARE) program whi ch has spread to
most l aw-enforcement agenci es.
FM 3-19.30
B-140. Cri me-preventi on offi cers can have an i mpact on juveni l e cri me by
establ i shi ng a posi ti ve i nteracti on wi th juveni l es. Many areas suffer a hi gh
cri me rate of whi ch over 50 percent i s attri butabl e to juveni l es. Nati onal l y, i t
i s known that youth 17 years of age and under (who make up just 16 percent
of the popul ati on) commi t 42 percent of the cri mes that cause i njury or l oss of
property. As the puni ti ve aspects of the juveni l e justi ce system today are of
questi onabl e val ue, i t i s l ogi cal that cri me-preventi on offi cers shoul d devel op
programs ai med at juveni l e cri me.
B-141. The basi c probl em i n establ i shi ng any juveni l e cri me-preventi on
program i s the destructi on of preconcei ved i deas by both youths and l aw-
enforcement personnel . Thi s obstacl e can onl y be overcome by the bui l di ng of
an honest rapport wi th i ndi vi dual youths. Just as a cri me-preventi on offi cer
must sel l cri me-preventi on procedures to the publ i c, he must al so sel l hi msel f
and hi s program to the youth.
B-142. One method of establ i shi ng the needed rapport wi th youth reverts to a
si mi l ar system used i n the Offi cer Fri endl y concept. Cl assroom presentati ons
i n hi gh school s and juni or hi gh school s can be used to destroy the preconcei ved
i deas hel d by youth regardi ng pol i ce and l aw enforcement i n general . Once an
MP offi cer enters the cl assroom, he di scovers that the majori ty of students
obtai n thei r i deas of pol i ce one of two ways
From tel evi si on shows that portray every offi cer as a sl ow-wi tted
moron (such as the ol d Car 54 show).
From thei r peers at school who rel ate every negati ve aspect of l aw
enforcement.
B-143. However the students gai n thei r i nformati on, i t sel dom resembl es fact
and must be changed to effecti vel y establ i sh a juveni l e cri me-preventi on
program.
B-144. I n maki ng cl assroom presentati ons for cri me-preventi on purposes, the
cri me-preventi on offi cer must di spl ay honesty at al l ti mes. When confronted
by uncomfortabl e questi ons, the MP offi cer shoul d render the l aw-
enforcements poi nt of vi ew and make a truthful expl anati on. Obvi ousl y, some
answers wi l l not al ways be wel l recei ved, but they wi l l establ i sh the credi bi l i ty
of hi s presentati on. Further, when maki ng these presentati ons, many areas
deal i ng wi th speci fi c areas of cri me preventi on wi l l ari se (such as rape
preventi on, property engravement, resi denti al and apartment securi ty, vehi cl e
theft, and burgl ary preventi on).
B-145. I n deal i ng wi th school s, the cri me-preventi on offi cer can establ i sh
many posi ti ve contacts wi th i ndi vi dual s i nsi de the school system that wi l l
prove to be of great val ue. I ndi vi dual s such as admi ni strators, counsel ors, and
facul ty members offer the cri me-preventi on offi cer assi stance i n many
di fferent ways. Perhaps the most val uabl e assi stance i s i n the area of
establ i shi ng a juveni l e cri me-preventi on program that i s based on peer
i nfl uence.
B-146. A cri me-preventi on program ai med at peer i nfl uence i s essenti al to a
cri me-preventi on uni t. Peer i nfl uence i s di rectl y rel ated to the Determi nati on
Theory of Del i nquency Causati on. Si mpl y stated, the theory hol ds that
del i nquency occurs as a resul t of external i nfl uences on youth. Whi l e
FM 3-19.30
attempti ng to control al l external i nfl uences on youths i s an i mpossi bl e task,
the control of peer i nfl uence i s possi bl e and perhaps the most i mportant
external i nfl uence to be control l ed.
PEER-INFLUENCE CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAM
B-147. A peer-i nfl uence cri me-preventi on program can be establ i shed after
the cri me-preventi on offi cer establ i shes hi msel f i n the juni or/seni or hi gh
school s as descri bed earl i er. The basi c concept of the program i s the negati on
of undesi rabl e peer i nfl uence on predel i nquent youths and the establ i shment
of a posi ti ve peer i nfl uence.
B-148. The peer-i nfl uence program functi ons wi thi n the school di stri ct. A
pr obl em youth i s detected at the juni or hi gh school l evel by hi s teacher,
counsel or, or the cri me-preventi on offi cer. When i t i s bel i eved that the peer-
i nfl uence program coul d serve a youth, hi s counsel or arranges a conference
wi th hi m. Duri ng the conference, the counsel or attempts to determi ne the
basi c probl em experi enced by the youth and has hi m compl ete an appl i cati on
for admi ttance i nto the program.
B-149. When the appl i cati on i s compl ete, the counsel or contacts the youths
parent or guardi an and expl ai ns the program. I f the parent agrees to al l ow
parti ci pati on, the appl i cati on i s sent to the parent for hi s si gnature.
B-150. When the compl eted appl i cati on i s returned to the counsel or, i t i s
forwarded to a seni or hi gh school counsel or for revi ew. I f necessary, the seni or
hi gh school counsel or may contact the juni or hi gh school counsel or personal l y
to di scuss the youth i n more detai l . The hi gh school counsel or then sel ects a
sui tabl e seni or hi gh school student who has been accepted for the peer-
i nfl uence program and matches the student wi th the juni or hi gh school youth.
B-151. Once the match has been made, the seni or hi gh school student i s gi ven
a bri efi ng on the juni or hi gh school student by the cri me-preventi on offi cer.
The seni or youth i s i nstructed to contact the juni or youth (preferabl y at the
juni or youths home) and i ntroduce hi msel f to the youth and to the youths
parent or guardi an. After the i ni ti al contact has been made, the seni or youth
i s i nstructed to pl an acti vi ti es wi th the juni or youth and spend as much ti me
as possi bl e wi th hi m.
B-152. Each seni or youth that vol unteers for the program i s requi red to
compl ete an appl i cati on. Thi s appl i cati on gi ves personal background
i nformati on and references that are thoroughl y checked by the cri me-
preventi on offi cer. The youths academi c record i s exami ned, but pri me
consi derati on i s gi ven to ci ti zenshi p factors rather than grades. The cri me-
preventi on offi cer personal l y i ntervi ews each appl i cant.
B-153. When a seni or youth i s sel ected for the program, he i s gi ven a basi c
outl i ne to fol l ow. He i s warned not to preach to the juni or youth but to l ead
hi m by al l owi ng hi m to observe the seni or youths acti ons at di fferent
acti vi ti es. The seni or youth must devote the necessary amount of ti me to l i mi t
the juni or youths opportuni ty to conti nue the negati ve associ ati ons he had i n
the past.
B-154. Whi l e the peer-i nfl uence program i s si mpl e i n nature, the resul ts can
be remarkabl e. Duri ng a three-year peri od i n I rvi n, Texas, approxi matel y 600
FM 3-19.30
students parti ci pated i n the program. From thi s number, seven arrests were
made from the group wi th one juveni l e accounti ng for four of the seven
arrests. As about 30 percent of the juveni l es parti ci pati ng were l egal l y judged
del i nquent, the rel apse rate was offi ci al l y establ i shed as 0.1 percent.
B-155. Whi l e juveni l es judged as del i nquent can parti ci pate i n the program,
the cri me-preventi on offi cer shoul d concentrate hi s efforts on those juveni l es
i denti fi ed as predel i nquent by counsel ors or facul ty members. Agai n, the
personal contact of the cri me-preventi on offi cer and the school facul ty i s
essenti al to the programs success. A personal rapport shoul d be cul ti vated
and mai ntai ned.
B-156. Operati onal l y, the peer-i nfl uence program can be admi ni stered by the
col l ecti ve efforts of school personnel and MP offi cers who are commi tted to the
program. Once the program i s establ i shed, i t wi l l probabl y not requi re the
servi ces of an offi cer on a ful l -ti me basi s (dependi ng on the number of students
i nvol ved). However, constant contact i s necessary; the more ti me that can be
devoted, the more success wi l l be apt to fol l ow.
CRIME-PREVENTION PRESENTATIONS FOR ELEMENTARY AND J UNIOR HIGH
SCHOOLS
B-157. As the tradi ti onal Ameri can fami l y structure has experi enced a
si gni fi cant decl i ne over recent years, more and more emphasi s i s bei ng pl aced
on school s to provi de gui dance for chi l dren. As a cri me-preventi on offi cer who
i s frequentl y i nvi ted to speak to students, you can pl ay an i mportant rol e i n
assi sti ng the school to provi de thi s gui dance. To stress the i mportance of the
above statement, many experts i n chi l d behavi or bel i eve that the school i s
second onl y to the fami l y i n mol di ng a chi l ds soci al i zati on and behavi or. Many
peopl e feel that the school i s i ncreasi ngl y repl aci ng much of the fami l y
soci al i zati on process. For thi s reason, school s are the most l ogi cal envi ronment
to begi n a juveni l e cri me-preventi on program.
B-158. Cri me-preventi on offi cers can have an i mpact on the most common
types of juveni l e cri me by prepari ng speci fi c l ectures for parti cul ar grade
l evel s i n the el ementary and juni or hi gh school s. Cl asses di scussi ng
shopl i fti ng, vandal i sm, and bi cycl e theft are wel l recei ved by students and
have a wi de-reachi ng effect on the communi ty as a whol e due to the chi l dren
rel ayi ng the i nformati on to thei r parents.
B-159. A number of fi l ms are currentl y on the market that assi st i n maki ng
cri me-preventi on presentati ons i n the cl assroom. I n addi ti on to speci fi cal l y
addressi ng juveni l e cri mes, the fi l ms di rectl y rel ate to the peer-i nfl uence
causati on of cri me.
OVERVIEWOF SELECTED J UVENILE CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS
B-160. I n addi ti on to the programs descri bed above, there are a vari ety of
other juveni l e programs. You wi l l noti ce that some of the programs are
desi gned to offer acti vi ti es for the juveni l e whi l e at the same ti me attempti ng
to provi de one or more of the fol l owi ng:
Posi ti ve peer i nfl uence.
Educati on.
FM 3-19.30
Pol i ce/juveni l e cooperati on.
An understandi ng of l aw-enforcement and MP duti es.
B-161. One program deal s wi th the enforcement aspect, wi th the goal bei ng
truancy reducti on. Al so menti oned are programs desi gned for chi l d safety and
vi cti mi zati on reducti on.
DARE Program
B-162. DARE i s a drug-abuse educati onal program that gi ves chi l dren and
parents the ski l l s to recogni ze and resi st the subtl e and overt pressures that
cause them to experi ment wi th drugs, al cohol , and vi ol ence. Thi s uni que
program uses uni formed l aw-enforcement offi cers to teach a formal
curri cul um to students rangi ng from ki ndergarten to twel fth grade. DARE
gi ves speci al attenti on to fi fth through ni nth graders to prepare them for
entry i nto mi ddl e/juni or hi gh and hi gh school where they are most l i kel y to
encounter pressures to use drugs or al cohol .
PoliceExplorer Programs
B-163. Expl orer programs are run i n conjuncti on wi th the Boy Scouts of
Ameri ca and a sponsori ng pol i ce agency. The programs offer a wi de range of
fl exi bi l i ty i n that they may be structured al ong the l i nes of a pol i ce cadet
program wi th al l acti vi ti es centered around l aw-enforcement trai ni ng. Thi s
type of expl orer program usual l y seeks juveni l es who have an acti ve i nterest
i n pursui ng a l aw-enforcement career. Bei ng an expl orer i n thi s type of
program wi l l offer the student the opportuni ty to vi ew the duti es of a pol i ce
offi cer and to take part i n mi nor pol i ce acti vi ti es (such as traffi c di recti on and
observati on ri di ng i n patrol cars). The sel ecti on and trai ni ng of the students
for thi s type of program stri ctl y depend on the sponsori ng agency.
B-164. Other pol i ce-sponsored expl orer programs may be desi gned to provi de
the members wi th other nonpol i ce acti vi ti es (such as hi ki ng, campi ng, and
canoei ng). At the same ti me, thi s type of program wi l l offer the student the
chance to meet wi th pol i ce offi cers and l earn more about pol i ce functi ons,
though thi s i s a secondary purpose. Sel ecti on for thi s program woul d not be as
stri ngent as the above-menti oned program. A l ocal counci l offi ce of the Boy
Scouts can provi de addi ti onal i nformati on on thi s program.
Alateen
B-165. The Al ateen program i s run i n cooperati on wi th the Al cohol i cs
Anonymous organi zati on. Thi s programs i ntended purpose i s to provi de
assi stance for a chi l ds emoti onal needs i f he or she i s faced wi th fami l y
pr obl ems caused by al cohol i sm of one or both parents. Your l ocal chapter of
Al cohol i cs Anonymous can provi de more i nformati on on thi s program.
Truancy-Enforcement Program
B-166. Vari ous ci ti es have successful l y adopted truancy-enforcement
programs that focus attenti on on i denti fyi ng and apprehendi ng youths that
are on unexcused absence from school . The pri mary goal behi nd thi s program
i s to prevent or reduce the i nci dence of dayti me resi denti al burgl ary. The San
Angel o, Texas, Truancy Enforcement Program sel ected a target area i n an
FM 3-19.30
effort to see how effecti ve the program woul d be i n reduci ng dayti me
burgl ari es. The i ni ti al eval uati on of the program showed posi ti ve resul ts. The
San Angel o program uses uni formed cri me-preventi on offi cers i n marked
pol i ce cars patrol l i ng around the school and known hangouts. Al l street
personnel i n the patrol di vi si on are al so encouraged to check school -age
i ndi vi dual s. Those students under 17 years of age who are suspected of
truancy are taken to the school offi ce whi l e those over 17 years of age are
detai ned onl y l ong enough to obtai n thei r name and other i denti fyi ng
i nformati on, whi ch i s then turned i nto the school offi ce. The assi stant
pri nci pal i n charge of attendance compl etes the i nvesti gati on and takes the
appropri ate acti on. The acti on vari es (dependi ng on the ci rcumstances) but
can i ncl ude counsel i ng wi th the student, the teacher, and the parents or, i n
extreme cases, suspensi on for a short peri od.
B-167. The emphasi s behi nd these programs i s to i nform youths of the facts of
the l aw. I t was shown that many of the probl ems wi th the youthful offenders
woul d be el i mi nated i f they were presented the facts of the l aw to whi ch they
are subject. The courses can be adapted to fi t the needs and desi res of the
i ndi vi dual school system, and the extent of the areas covered wi l l depend on
the commi tment and avai l abi l i ty of the l ocal MP offi cers. Vari ous ci vi l i an
school di stri cts have i ncorporated these l aw-enforcement courses as part of
thei r regul ar curri cul um.
Criminal Victimization Reduction
B-168. Programs desi gned toward thi s goal normal l y are structured to reduce
the possi bi l i ty of a chi l d becomi ng a vi cti m of a chi l d mol ester. Most commonl y,
offi cers gi ve a verbal presentati on to groups of chi l dren usi ng vi sual ai ds that
hel p to act as a posi ti ve rei nforcement to l earni ng. Some effecti ve methods
have been the use of tal ki ng traffi c l i ghts, tal ki ng bi cycl es, and tal ki ng
motorcycl es. These i tems are usual l y equi pped wi th a tape-recorded message
that can be control l ed by the offi cer conducti ng the program. The tal ki ng
traffi c l i ght uses a ful l -si ze traffi c l i ght that fl ashes red or green accordi ng to
the type of person that i s bei ng descri bed.
VANDALISM
B-169. Todays vandal s often attack thei r own terri tor y. School vandal i sm
the i l l egal and del i ber ate destructi on of school pr opertyi s commi tted by
students themsel ves. They break so many wi ndows that i n l arge di stri cts the
funds spent annual l y on repl aci ng broken wi ndows coul d pay for a new school .
Vandal s destroy about $3 mi l l i on worth of school -bus seats annual l y, and they
commi t enough arson to account for 40 percent of al l vandal i sm costs.
B-170. School vandal i sm outranks al l other assaul ts on pri vate and publ i c
property. At the end of the 1973 school year, the average cost of damages from
vandal i sm was esti mated at $63,031 per school di stri ct. That fi gure coul d
have pai d the sal ari es of ei ght readi ng speci al i sts or coul d have fi nanced a
school breakfast program for 133 chi l dren for one year. A typi cal school s
chance of bei ng vandal i zed i n a month are greater than one i n four, and the
average cost of each act of vandal i sm i s $81. Yet, these fi gures do not i ncl ude
the hi dden costs of school vandal i smi ncreased expenses for fenci ng,
i ntrusi on and fi re detectors, speci al l i ghti ng, emergency communi cati ons
FM 3-19.30
equi pment, and vandal -resi stant wi ndows. Every dol l ar spent i n repl aci ng a
wi ndow or i nstal l i ng an al arm cannot be spent on educati on.
B-171. School vandal i sm can al so have enormous soci al cost. The i mpact of an
89-cent can of spray pai nt used to cover a wal l wi th raci al epi thets far exceeds
the monetary cost of removi ng the pai nt. An abusi ve word scrawl ed across a
hal l way wal l can destroy student moral e, di srupt i ntergroup rel ati ons,
undermi ne the authori ty of an admi ni strati on, or even cl ose the school .
I nci dents wi th hi gh soci al costs damage the educati onal process as much as
those wi th hi gh monetary costs. Todays vandal i s not a hardened, war-scarred
veteran. I nstead of gri zzl ed whi skers, he sports peach fuzz. He i s al most
l i teral l y the boy next door. I n fact, the typi cal vandal di ffers qui te
dramati cal l y from the typi cal juveni l e del i nquent.
B-172. I t i s si gni fi cant that vandal s fal l i nto a wel l -defi ned and rel ati vel y
narrow age group. They are usual l y earl y adol escent mal es who are hi ghl y
subject to group pressures and transi tory i mpul ses. I t i s not at al l unusual for
adol escents to act out whatever i s control l i ng them at the momentrage,
boredom, pent-up energy, or the sheer joy of wreckreati on. Whi l e there are
condi ti ons that may predi spose or provoke a youth toward vandal i sm, the
probl em seems to be al most human nature. Few among us have never wri tten
on a si dewal k or scrawl ed i ni ti al s on a school desk. Vandal i sm cuts across al l
strata of soci ety, al l geographi c regi ons, and al l raci al l i nes.
B-173. The causes of vandal i sm remai n obscure. Though research addressi ng
the why of vandal i sm i s growi ng, i t has yet to yi el d cl ear-cut answers.
Among the moti vati ng factors often ci ted are anger, frustrati on, hosti l i ty,
bi tterness, al i enati on, futi l i ty, i nequal i ty, restri cted opportuni ty, emoti onal
pai n, fai l ure, prejudi ce, revenge, and the need for attenti on. Al though much of
the research i s convi nci ng, the fact remai ns that many vandal s do not appear
to be among the most angry, frustrated, hosti l e, al i enated, or needy youth.
Onl y a smal l fracti on of the youngsters who fal l i nto that category actual l y
commi t acts of vandal i sm. So, whi l e most experts agree that vandal i sm i s not
total l y sensel ess, they do not cl ai m to ful l y understand i ts causes. I n fact,
vandal i sm i s often not understood by vandal s themsel ves. Many vandal s
report that they do not know why they di d i t. Many others, accordi ng to case
reports, offer the unsol i ci ted observati on that destructi on i s fun. Sti l l others
express sati sfacti on and exhi l arati on. Few consi der themsel ves cri mi nal s. For
the ti me bei ng, we can concl ude onl y that moti ves for vandal i sm are di verse.
But the whys notwi thstandi ng, the vandal profi l e suggests that our task i s, i n
l arge part, to anti ci pate and redi rect the i mpul ses of young teenagers.
B-174. School s are by no means the hel pl ess vi cti ms of earl y adol escence.
Many school factors, most of whi ch are amenabl e to change, i nfl uence the
amount of vandal i sm that school s experi ence. The fol l owi ng characteri sti cs
are typi cal of school s that suffer hi gh property damage or l oss:
Vandal i sm i s hi gher when there i s poor communi cati on between the
facul ty and the admi ni strati on (such as when the pri nci pal fai l s to
defi ne pol i cy or makes pol i cy deci si ons uni l ateral l y).
Hosti l i ty and authori tari an atti tudes on the part of teachers toward
students often resul t i n students taki ng i t out on the school .
FM 3-19.30
Li mi ted contact between teachers and students reduces student
i nvol vement wi th the school and i ncreases the l i kel i hood of vandal i sm.
School s characteri zed by i ntense competi ti on for l eadershi p posi ti ons
suffer greater property damage and l oss.
The chances for vandal i sm i ncrease when the students do not val ue
thei r teachers opi ni ons of them.
School s at whi ch students stri ve to get good grades experi ence more
vandal i sm.
Parents of students i n hi gh-damage school s express l ess favorabl e
atti tudes toward thei r school s than do other parents.
The school i s a conveni ent target for vandal i sm when i t i s cl ose to
students homes.
The chances for vandal i sm are i ncreased when grades are used as a
di sci pl i nary tool .
Damage i s greater i n l arger school s where there i s more property to
destroy. Thi s correl ati on between school si ze and vandal i sm prevai l s
regardl ess of whether the school i s l ocated i n an urban, suburban, or
rural setti ng.
Fewer offenses occur when rul es are wel l understood by students and
are consi stentl y and fi rml y enforced by teachers and admi ni strators.
VandalismPrevention
B-175. I f the speci al probl ems of earl y adol escence, often i ntensi fi ed by soci al
or personal pressures, i nteract wi th school condi ti ons to produce vandal i sm,
then preventi ve measures must address the nature of both the chi l d and the
school . Furthermore, preventi on must i ncl ude both physi cal and human
responses. At present, most vandal i sm-preventi on or -reducti on programs rel y
on physi cal securi tybi gger and better el ectroni c al arm systems, patrol
guards, dogs, tamperproof l ocks, and wi ndow gri l l es. These techni ques hel p,
but they address onl y 20 percent of the probl emthose i nci dents i nvol vi ng
breakage. These i nci dents usual l y occur when school i s not i n sessi on and i n
the absence of wi tnesses. The techni ques have l i ttl e effect on the day-to-day
trashi ng of the school or on the di srupti ve acts ai med at the school s routi ne
(bomb threats, the setti ng of fi res, and fal se fi re al arms) that are commi tted
duri ng school hours. The most sophi sti cated physi cal and el ectroni c barri ers
are not suffi ci ent to keep vandal s from what they consi der an attracti ve
target. I n fact, i t has been argued that al arms and armed guards, besi des
l oweri ng student and staff moral e, often themsel ves become a chal l enge,
i nvi ti ng rather than deterri ng vandal s. Vandal i sm preventi on requi res not a
narrow or pi ecemeal approach, but a vari ed and comprehensi ve effort that
i ncl udes both physi cal and human components geared to the school s speci fi c
probl ems. Furthermore, an effecti ve l ong-term program must i nvol ve the
communi ty, parents, nei ghbors, pol i ce, and ci vi c groups as wel l as students,
teachers, and school admi ni strators.
B-176. School s are an easy target for vandal s. Most are publ i c, secul ar, and
often unoccupi ed. Most wi l l remai n publ i c and secul ar; but they need not
remai n unoccupi ed, unprotected, or unobserved. The fol l owi ng are techni ques
FM 3-19.30
that have made some school s l ess vul nerabl e to vandal s. These are especi al l y
effecti ve agai nst probl ems occurri ng duri ng nonschool hours.
B-177. Occupy the School. Empl oy a custodi al force around the cl ock. I n
most school s, the enti re custodi al force works at one ti me, l eavi ng the school at
ni ght. As an al ternati ve, custodi ans can be assi gned staggered shi fts so that
the school i s al ways occupi ed. Twenty-four-hour custodi ans are parti cul arl y
appropri ate i n school s sufferi ng sporadi c property damage that demand more
than a rovi ng patrol but l ess than permanent securi ty guards.
B-178. I nvi te pol i ce to use the school bui l di ngs at ni ght. Pol i ce can be i ssued
keys to the school s i n thei r patrol areas so that they can use school offi ces to
wri te thei r reports. Thi s pl aces a pol i ce offi cer i n the school when i t mi ght
otherwi se be unoccupi ed, and i t pl aces a pol i ce car i n front of the school .
B-179. Bri ng the communi ty i nto the school . The school i s an excel l ent pl ace
for recreati onal programs; heal th cl i ni cs; adul t-educati on cl asses; counsel i ng
centers; communi ty gatheri ngs; and Boy Scout, Gi rl Scout, and Parent-
Teacher Organi zati on (PTO) meeti ngs. The presence of peopl e i n the school
bui l di ng not onl y reduces the opportuni ty for vandal i sm, but al so sti mul ates
communi ty and student i nterest i n the school .
B-180. Watch theSchool. Use school nei ghbors as eyes and ears. Ask nearby
homeowners to watch the school and report suspi ci ous acti vi ti es. Emphasi ze
careful observati on and rapi d reporti ng, but di scourage di rect i nvol vement i n
any si tuati on observed. Such programs work best i f they are organi zed but
based on i nformal i nvol vement, i f they are accompani ed by overal l
i nvol vement of parents and communi ty wi th the school , and i f they offer some
sort of presti ge to parti ci pants.
B-181. Employ Roving Patrols. A uni formed patrol used i nstead of or i n
conjuncti on wi th an al arm system can deter vandal i sm. The i ndi vi dual s who
patrol shoul d establ i sh rapport wi th nei ghborhood youths and open
communi cati on wi th communi ty l eaders. They shoul d al so vary thei r patrol
patterns.
B-182. Hi re student patrol s duri ng the summer and on weekends. The school
di stri ct or communi ty can provi de i ts youth wi th part-ti me or summer
empl oyment and, at the same ti me, curb vandal i sm by payi ng students to
patrol the school grounds duri ng weekends, hol i days, and summer vacati ons.
These students shoul d be pai d an adequate wage and consi dered an i ntegral
part of the school s securi ty force.
B-183. Control AccesstotheSchool by Usingan AlarmSystem. Al arms
are the most expensi ve vandal i sm control measure a school can use. Whi l e
they can detect vandal s, they cannot apprehend them; they can merel y si gnal
the al arm-system moni tor, whi ch may be mi l es away. They can, however, be an
effi ci ent deterrent and shoul d be consi dered as part of any comprehensi ve
pl an to control vandal i sm. I f al arm systems are l i nked wi th a survei l l ance
camera, the chances of apprehendi ng i ntruders are greatl y i ncreased.
B-184. Design the School With Vandalism Prevention in Mind. The
fol l owi ng desi gns for preventi ng vandal i sm can be i mpl emented when
bui l di ng a school :
FM 3-19.30
Li mi t ground-to-roof access.
El i mi nate l ow, overhangi ng roofs.
Avoi d unnecessary exteri or fi xtures.
Pl ant trees that cannot be cl i mbed near bui l di ngs.
Consi der rai si ng as much of the school bui l di ng as possi bl e from
ground l evel .
Bui l d the school at some di stance from resi denti al areas. Whi l e i t
shoul d be l ocated near the homes of most of those i t serves, i t wi l l
suffer l ess property damage i f there i s a buffer zone between i t and
surroundi ng resi denti al areas.
Desi gn the school wi th pl enty of defensi bl e space so that the normal
fl ow of school traffi c al l ows conti nui ng, casual survei l l ance of the
premi ses.
Use vandal -resi stant surfaces. Use harder surfaces i n damage-prone
areas. For wal l s, use epoxy pai nt or gl azed ti l es that are easi l y and
i nexpensi vel y repl aced or repai red; use smal l wal l panel s and keep
repl acement panel s i n stock; and pl ace permanent si gns, bui l di ng
names, and decorati ve hardware at a l evel that cannot be reached from
the ground. Repl aci ng damaged areas i mmedi atel y shows a sense of
pri de i n the appearance and hel ps to el i mi nate copycat acts of
vandal i sm.
Pl an wi ndows careful l y. Avoi d wi ndows that are vul nerabl y pl aced. Use
smal l panes of gl ass to si mpl i fy repl acement; use thi ck, tempered gl ass,
thi ck acryl i c, or Pl exi gl asfor wi ndows i n heavi l y travel ed or hangout
areas. Avoi d usel ess wi ndows i n student stores, admi ni strati ve offi ces,
and i ndustri al -arts storage areas.
Pl an entri es wi th mul ti pl e uses i n mi nd. I nstal l fl exi bl e i nternal gates
to bl ock off speci fi c areas or corri dors when necessary. Provi de separate
exteri or entri es for communi ty and student use. I nsi de the bui l di ng,
create areas for i nformal gatheri ngs near entrances and exi ts by
i nstal l i ng soft-dri nk machi nes and benches.
Locate or rel ocate the pl aygrounds access roads to provi de better
survei l l ance by rovi ng patrol s.
Consi der outdoor l i ghti ng. Opi ni ons on thi s i ssue are di vi ded. Many
school s report a decl i ne i n vandal i sm after i nstal l i ng hardened exteri or
ni ght l i ghti ng. Others report that el i mi nati on of al l ni ght l i ghti ng
reduces vandal i sm, presumabl y because young adol escents are afrai d
of the dark. I f l i ghti ng i s used, i t shoul d be di rected away from wi ndows
to keep vandal s from seei ng the process of destructi on or i ts outcome.
Channel graffi ti . Graffi ti arti sts wi l l usual l y sel ect l i ght, smooth
surfaces rather than dark, rough surfaces. Therefore, school offi ci al s
can channel graffi ti onto one or two wal l s desi gned to wi thstand such
treatment. Students or mai ntenance staff can pai nt most wal l s at
regul ar but not too frequent i nterval s. One wal l can be offi ci al l y
desi gnated a l egi ti mate graffi ti wal l , though thi s approach removes
some of the chal l enge i nherent i n i nformal graffi ti .
B-185. Make the Target Less Attractive. The school i s not onl y an easy
target but al so an attracti ve one. I t represents enforced l earni ng, di sci pl i ne,
FM 3-19.30
and mandatory attendance to students who are, si mpl y by vi rtue of thei r age,
rejecti ng adul t standards and stri vi ng to achi eve i ndependence from adul t
control . Students are addi ti onal l y provoked i f the school functi ons i n an
i mpersonal , undemocrati c, repressi ve, or mani pul ati ve manner, further
i ncreasi ng the l i kel i hood of vandal i sm.
B-186. Revise the Curriculum. The l i st of characteri sti cs associ ated wi th
vandal s and vandal i zed school s i ndi cates that property damage and l oss are
hi gher when competi ti on for rewards i s i ntense, the avai l abi l i ty of rewards i s
l i mi ted, or the di stri buti on of rewards i s unfai r. Al l of thi s suggests that school
pol i cy and atmosphere have a di rect beari ng on school vandal i sm. Bel ow are
changes i n school governance that can hel p remove the features that make a
school an attracti ve target for vandal s. These procedures, especi al l y i n
combi nati on, have proven effecti ve agai nst al l forms of vandal i sm, i ncl udi ng
those that most commonl y occur whi l e school i s i n sessi on.
Alternative schools. Though ori gi nal l y desi gned to perform
educati onal functi ons, al ternati ve school s have proven effecti ve i n
reduci ng school vi ol ence and vandal i sm. They provi de an opti on to
students who are not benefi ti ng from the regul ar academi c cl assroom.
These school s operate wi thi n or al ongsi de the tradi ti onal school . They
are characteri zed by l ow student-to-teacher rati os, i ntense i ndi vi dual
counsel i ng, and extensi ve use of the communi ty as a l earni ng resource.
They offer an al ternati ve to suspensi on, personal i ze the l earni ng
envi ronment, and provi de successful experi ences to students who have
performed poorl y i n the past.
Law-related education and police-school liaison programs. I n
many communi ti es, the pol i ce department has assi gned school resource
or l i ai son offi cers to l ocal juni or and seni or hi gh school s. These offi cers
may on occasi on assume pol i ci ng duti es, but thei r pri mary functi on i s
to counsel students and teach l aw-rel ated courses. These acti vi ti es
acquai nt students wi th the posi ti ve rol e that l aw pl ays i n our soci ety
and personal i ze the rel ati onshi p between the cop on the beat and the
ki d on the corner.
Action learning. Thi s term refers to apprenti ceshi p programs as wel l
as trai ni ng i n practi cal aspects of adul t l i fe. The former al l ows students
academi c credi t for communi ty work (such as tutori ng and assi sti ng
physi ci ans, l awyers, or other professi onal s). The l atter provi des
i nstructi on i n ski l l s such as checkbook bal anci ng, comparati ve
shoppi ng, and appl yi ng for a job. Both address the boredom and
frustrati on that are l i nked to truancy, vi ol ence, and vandal i sm.
Reward distribution. The school s reward structure i s rel ated to
school cri me. Al though the school may offer attracti ve i ncenti ves, most
students recei ve very l i ttl e i n the way of rewards. Many of those who
l ose out sti l l care about the competi ti on. They become frustrated, and
they vent thei r anger on the apparent source of thei r probl ems, the
school . I t shoul d be possi bl e to spread the rewards around wi thout
compromi si ng performance standards, perhaps by recogni zi ng
i mprovement as wel l as achi evement or by acknowl edgi ng forms of
achi evement other than schol asti c, athl eti c, and soci al .
FM 3-19.30
B-187. Change Administrative Policy and Organizational Structure.
Accordi ng to the Nati onal I nsti tute of Educati ons Safe-School Study, the
pri nci pal s l eadershi p i s a cri ti cal factor i n reduci ng or preventi ng school
cri me. Strong pri nci pal s who are vi si bl e, avai l abl e, and responsi ve to students
and staff appear to be most successful i n el i mi nati ng vi ol ence and vandal i sm.
Those who are l ess successful are often descri bed as unavai l abl e and
i neffecti ve.
B-188. The Safe-School Study al so found that the exerci se of di sci pl i ne
through cl ear enunci ati on and even-handed enforcement of rul es i s associ ated
wi th a l ow i nci dence of school cri me. To i ncrease the l i kel i hood that students
wi l l fi nd school a ful fi l l i ng experi ence, many di stri cts are establ i shi ng
mi ni school sschool s smal l enough to al l ow the i ndi vi dual student to feel
si gni fi cant. Si mi l arl y, several l arge school s are currentl y functi oni ng on a
house basi sthe school i s di vi ded programmati cal l y i nto several smal l er
uni ts wi th whi ch students can more easi l y i denti fy.
B-189. Involve the Students. Establ i shi ng a vandal i sm fund uses peer
pressure to the school s advantage. The communi ty or the school di stri ct puts
asi de a certai n amount of money and announces that the funds wi l l be used to
cover the costs of vandal i sm. Any money l eft over reverts to the students to be
used as they choose. Thi s pl an wor ks because i t educates students about the
costs of vandal i sm, al l ows them to see the posi ti ve resul ts of curbi ng property
damage and, most i mportant, gi ves them ful l responsi bi l i ty for the probl em.
B-190. Several school di stri cts have establ i shed vol untary student securi ty
advi sory counci l s that conduct workshops and smal l group di scussi ons
focusi ng on vandal i sm and vi ol ence preventi on. These commi ttees i ncrease
awareness of the school s probl ems, generate recommendati ons for acti on, and
gi ve students opportuni ti es to parti ci pate i n school deci si on maki ng.
B-191. Ol der students can be hel pful i n i nfl uenci ng younger students. I n
several communi ti es, juni or and seni or hi gh school students vi si t fourth- and
si xth-grade cl assrooms where they show a fi l m about vandal i sm and then l ead
a di scussi on on the causes and consequences of vandal i sm.
B-192. School beauti fi cati on projects i nvol ve students i n the care of the school
bui l di ng and grounds i n an attempt to i ncrease thei r pri de i n the
responsi bi l i ty for the school . The more effecti ve projects are sel ected by the
students themsel ves and conti nue throughout the year. The projects focus on
margi nal students rather than school l eaders.
B-193. Involve the Parents. An open-door pol i cy al l ows parents to go
di rectl y to thei r chi l ds cl assroom whenever they wi sh wi thout securi ng a
speci al vi si tors permi t from the offi ce. Thi s si mpl e pol i cy offers parents
concrete evi dence that they are i ndeed wel come at school .
B-194. I n some school s, parents serve on anti truancy commi ttees al ong wi th
teachers and students. They vi si t youngsters and thei r fami l i es i n an effort to
resol ve truancy probl ems. I n other school s, parents serve as hal l moni tors,
supervi se extracurri cul ar acti vi ti es, and hel p i n cl assrooms. Parents are al so
the school s best source of guest speakers and contacts for work-study or
apprenti ceshi p programs. Some school di stri cts have i ni ti ated facul ty mens
cl ubs to acquai nt fathers wi th the mal e teachi ng staff and to encourage them
to assume more responsi bi l i ty for thei r chi l drens progress i n school .
FM 3-19.30
B-195. Involve the Community. I n some communi ti es, students and l aw-
enforcement, school -di stri ct, and ci ty personnel sponsor dayl ong forums on
vandal i sm. The forums i ntroduce ci ti zens to the causes and costs of vandal i sm
and gi ve them an opportuni ty to voi ce thei r concerns and i ni ti ate preventi ve
programs.
B-196. Pol i ce departments can i ni ti ate publ i c-rel ati ons programs wi thi n
school s and youth-servi ce agenci es. I n addi ti on, they can enl i st the hel p of
youth i n preventi ng vandal i sm through pol i ce-sponsored groups, such as the
Pol i ce-Youth Servi ce Corps, whi ch recrui ts adol escents from hi gh-cri me areas
to work as publ i c-safety ai des. Si mi l arl y, l aw students from nei ghbori ng
uni versi ti es can be brought i nto the school s at mi ni mal or no cost to di scuss
the l egal i mpl i cati ons of vandal i sm.
Pickingup thePieces
B-197. The preventi ve measures l i sted on the precedi ng pages can functi on as
part of a l ong-range, proacti ve response pl an. However, they do not address
the questi on of i mmedi ate response. What shoul d the school do, ri ght away,
about 20 broken wi ndows, a cherry bomb i n the toi l et, or recurri ng raci al
graffi ti on the wal l ? The answer i s to repai r the damage i mmedi atel y. Qui ck
repai r keeps perpetrators from admi ri ng thei r handi work, l essens the
epi demi c effect of vandal i sm, and mi ni mi zes any soci al i mpact the act may
have.
B-198. I ni ti ate formal record-keepi ng procedures, and ensure that they are
fol l owed. School s faced wi th seri ous probl ems shoul d begi n recordi ng al l acts
of vandal i sm. They shoul d al so consul t l aw-enforcement personnel about
when pol i ce shoul d and shoul d not be cal l ed. When a school begi ns to have
probl ems, i t shoul d work wi th the juveni l e justi ce system so that the two
i nsti tuti ons can coordi nate thei r efforts wi th regard to school -age offenders.
B-199. Careful record keepi ng al l ows a school to pl ot the i nci dence of
vandal i sm to fi nd out preci sel y where and when each type of offense i s
occurri ng. For exampl e, usi ng i nci dent anal yses, the Nati onal I nsti tute for
Educati ons Safe-School Study found that
Fi re and bomb threats most often occur on Tuesdays.
School -property offenses tend to occur wi th greater frequency toward
the end of each semester, especi al l y i n November and December.
Break-i ns and school -property offenses occur most often on weekends
and Mondays.
B-200. Thi s type of i nformati on i s i nval uabl e i n pl anni ng a vandal i sm
reducti on and preventi on pl an.
Restitution
B-201. Resti tuti on i s a set of l egal and admi ni strati ve procedures through
whi ch the school recei ves payment from vandal s for damages they cause.
Whi l e i t seems reasonabl e to requi re payment for damages, resti tuti on does
not appear to be worth the effort. I n the fi rst pl ace, most vandal s are not
caught. I n the Los Angel es School Di stri ct (whi ch has an aggressi ve
resti tuti on program), onl y 30 percent of the offenders are ever i denti fi ed.
FM 3-19.30
From thi s 30 percent, most resti tuti on i s pai d before matters get to court.
Goi ng through l engthy l egal processes to obtai n the rest i s si mpl y not cost-
effecti ve. However, a parent faced wi th the possi bi l i ty of a court case may
make a greater effort to keep hi s or her chi l d out of troubl e.
CONCLUSION
B-202. The goal of cri me preventi on i s to reduce cri me through publ i c
awareness and educati on. The ski l l s that cri me-preventi on offi cers acqui re
can eventual l y benefi t al l segments of our communi ti es. I t i s l ogi cal then for
cri me-preventi on offi cers to attack one of the major cri me probl ems i n our
soci etyjuveni l e del i nquency. Efforts of cri me-preventi on uni ts wi l l certai nl y
be l acki ng i f the juveni l e-cri me probl em i s not gi ven a hi gh pri ori ty and i f
juveni l e-cri me programs are not establ i shed.
FRAUD
B-203. Two types of fraud can be affected by cri me-preventi on effortsfraud
agai nst the government and fraud agai nst i ndi vi dual s i n the Army. Si nce the
countermeasures for each of these categori es of fraud are di fferent, they wi l l
be di scussed separatel y.
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
B-204. Fraud of thi s type i s a l oss to the Army due to mani pul ati on of systems
from wi thi n the government wi th cri mi nal i ntent. Typi cal exampl es of fraud
are
The di versi on or theft of government property by fal si fyi ng documents
such as purchase orders, shi ppi ng documents, and so forth.
Fal se cl ai ms for temporary-duty (TDY) pay, for rei mbursement for
l osses due to the movement of househol d goods, or for rei mbursement
for materi al reported as stol en.
Overcharges or underproducti on on contracts wi th the Army.
Bri bery.
Ki ckbacks to secure purchase orders.
Use of ones offi ci al posi ti on for personal gai n.
B-205. Thi s l i st i s not al l -i ncl usi ve. There are many more ways to defraud the
government. Some of the factors that make i t easy to perpetrate a fraud are
The l ack of i ndependent veri fi cati on of records, transacti ons, and
reports.
The l ack of adequate supervi si on.
Unreal i sti c budgeti ng and acqui si ti on requi rements.
Fai l ure to correct defi ci enci es i denti fi ed by exi sti ng systems.
Concentrati on, at the operati onal l evel , of responsi bi l i ty and authori ty
for an enti re process i n one i ndi vi dual .
B-206. There are bui l t-i n measures to di scourage fraud for most Army
materi al -control systems. These programs are routi nel y exami ned by the
i nspector general (I G) al ong wi th other command i nspectors. A cri me-
FM 3-19.30
preventi on offi cers mai n functi on i s to encourage the reporti ng of fraud by
ensuri ng that the communi ty understands what type of acti vi ti es shoul d be
reported and by ensuri ng that the numbers are posted i n work areas where
personnel are i n a posi ti on to detect fraud.
FRAUD AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
B-207. The second type of fraud i s con games or consumer fraud. Thi s cri me i s
perpetrated by professi onal con men, unscrupul ous busi nesses, and amateurs
who see a chance to make a fast buck. Most of the ti me, the operator offers a
somethi ng for nothi ng deal . By the ti me the vi cti m real i zes that he has been
duped, the con man i s l ong gone. Frequentl y, the vi cti m i s so embarrassed that
he has been duped that he does not report the cri me. The onl y way that a
cri me-preventi on offi cer can hel p prevent thi s cri me i s to publ i ci ze common
con games and i l l egal busi ness practi ces and to encourage vi cti ms to report
them. When a case of fraud occurs, the speci fi c con techni que that was used
shoul d be adver ti sed wi del y to pr event others fr om bei ng fool ed by the same
pl oy.
Repair Fraud
B-208. Repai r frauds are si mpl e to execute but di ffi cul t to detect. Some
unscrupul ous repai rmen do not fi x the probl em, but they charge you anyway.
Some use i nferi or parts; others charge you for work that you di d not expect or
need. Some al so do i nsurance work; they wi l l repai r one thi ng but ensure
that somethi ng el se wi l l soon go wrong. The fol l owi ng are methods that you
can use to protect yoursel f from repai r fraud:
Shop around. Ask fri ends, nei ghbors, or coworkers for references.
When you fi nd repai rmen you trust, sti ck wi th them.
Do not try to di agnose the probl em yoursel f unl ess you are an expert.
The mechani c may take your advi ce, even i f i t i s wrong. I f you know
exactl y what the probl em i s, do not tel l the mechani cs; wai t and see i f
thei r recommendati ons agree wi th your di agnosi s. That way you wi l l
know whether needl ess repai rs are suggested.
Try to get several detai l ed wri tten esti mates before any work i s done.
Compare job descri pti ons and materi al s to be used. Be sure to ask i f
there i s a charge for an esti mate.
Ask for the ol d parts to ensure that repl acements were real l y i nstal l ed.
Ensure that you get a guarantee on any work done.
Make sure that the work was done before you pay. Take your car for a
test dri ve. Pl ug i n the refri gerator. Test the tel evi si on.
Ask your l ocal consumer affai rs offi ce about the l aws i n your state and
what speci fi c protecti on i t gi ves regardi ng professi onal servi ces to be
l i censed or certi fi ed.
Home-Improvement Fraud
B-209. Home repai rs and i mprovements can be costl y. Be cauti ous i f
somebody offers to do an expensi ve job for an unusual l y l ow pri ce, i f a fi rm
offers to make a free i nspecti on, or i f the workers just happened to be i n the
nei ghborhood. These are the favori te tri cks of di shonest home-repai r fi rms.
FM 3-19.30
Some fi rms offer a pri ce you just cannot resi st. Once you si gn the contract, you
l earn whythey never del i ver the servi ce. Others send door-to-door i nspectors
to do a free roof, termi te, or furnace i nspecti on. These free i nspecti ons wi l l
turn up pl enty of expensi ve repai rs. Some fl y-by-ni ght compani es wi l l offer to
do the work on the spot. When they l eave, you may be l eft wi th a l arge bi l l and
a faul ty repai r job. To avoi d home-i mprovement fraud, try the fol l owi ng:
Get several esti mates for every repai r job. Compare pri ces and terms.
Check to see i f ther e i s a charge for esti mates.
Ask your fri ends for recommendati ons, or ask the fi rm for references
and check them.
Check the I D of al l i nspectors.
Cal l the l ocal consumer affai rs offi ce or the Better Busi ness Bureau to
check the companys reputati on before you authori ze any work.
Be suspi ci ous of hi gh-pressure sal es tacti cs.
Pay by check, never wi th cash. Arrange to make payments i n
i nstal l mentsone-thi rd at the begi nni ng of the job, one-thi rd when the
work i s nearl y compl eted, and one-thi rd after the job i s done.
Land Fraud
B-210. Real estate can be a great i nvestment. The enterpri si ng real estate
sal esperson knows how anxi ous you are to fi nd just the ri ght property,
especi al l y for an i nvestment or a reti rement homea ni ce warm cl i mate, not
too crowded, or a new devel opment. Some di shonest agents wi l l promi se you
anythi nga swi mmi ng pool , country cl ub, or pri vate l aketo get your name
on the contract. Even i f the sal es agent promi ses you l uxury, they may not
guarantee the basi cs such as water, energy sources, and sewage di sposal .
B-211. Most l and devel opers offeri ng 50 or more l ots (of l ess than 5 acres
each) for sal e or l ease through the mai l or by i nterstate commerce are requi red
by l aw to fi l e a Statement of Record wi th the Housi ng and Urban
Devel opment Admi ni strati on (HUD). Thi s document tel l s you al most
ever ythi ng you need to know about your futur e homel egal ti tl e, faci l i ti es
avai l abl e i n the area (such as school s and transportati on), avai l abi l i ty of
uti l i ti es and water, pl ans for sewage di sposal , and l ocal regul ati ons and
devel opment pl ans. Al l of thi s i nformati on must be gi ven to you i n a property
report prepared by the devel oper. Al ways ask to see thi s report before you si gn
anythi ng.
B-212. I f the devel oper does not gi ve you a copy of the property report for the
l ot you are consi deri ng, you can obtai n i t from HUD for a fee. Send requests to:
Department of Housi ng and Urban Devel opment, Offi ce of I nterstate Land
Sal es Regi strati on, 451 Seventh Street South West, Washi ngton, DC 20410.
Door-to-Door Sales
B-213. Beware of the fol l owi ng door-to-door sal es tacti cs:
Nothi ng l i ke i t i n the stores! Thi s i s a true statement. The vacuum
cl eaners i n the stores are probabl y of better qual i ty and come wi th a
better warranty.
FM 3-19.30
Won't fi nd thi s pri ce anywhere. Thi s i s al so a true statement. The
pri ces i n the stores are probabl y l ower.
Easy credi t! Thi s i s another true statement. They do not care what
your credi t rati ng l ooks l i ke. Once you si gn for the purchase, payi ng for
i t i s your probl em. Be wary of l ow monthl y payments. Fi nd out the total
amount you wi l l pay over the l i fe of the l oan, then subtract the actual
cost of the i tem i tsel f. The di fference i s what you wi l l pay i n i nterest.
Your bank, your credi t uni on, or a l ocal l egal -ai d soci ety can tel l you i f
the i nterest rate i s fai r.
B-214. Be cauti ous of these words, and be fi rm i f the sal esperson pressures
you to buy. I f you do get trapped, you are protected by a Federal Trade
Commi ssi on regul ati on. When you make a purchase i n your home total i ng $25
or more, the sal esperson must gi ve you a wri tten contract and two Noti ce of
Cancel l ati on forms. You have three days to change your mi nd and use one of
these forms to cancel your contract.
Charity Fraud
B-215. Chari ty fraud does a l ot of harm. The swi ndl er takes advantage of a
persons good wi l l and takes hi s cashmoney that was meant for peopl e i n
need. You can ensure that any money you gi ve gets i nto the ri ght hands.
Remember these poi nters when somebody asks you for a donati on:
Ask for I D, ei ther the organi zati ons or the sol i ci tors. Fi nd out what the
chari tys purpose i s and how the funds are used. Ask i f contri buti ons
are tax deducti bl e. I f you are not sati sfi ed wi th the answers, do not gi ve
money.
Gi ve to chari ti es that you know. Check out those you have never heard
of or others whose names are si mi l ar to a wel l -known chari ty.
Do not fal l for hi gh-pressure tacti cs. I f sol i ci tors wi l l not take no for an
answer, tel l them no anyway, but do not gi ve them your money.
Be suspi ci ous of chari ti es that onl y accept cash. Al ways send a check
made out to the organi zati on, not to an i ndi vi dual .
I f a sol i ci tor r eaches you by tel ephone, offer to mai l your donati on.
Shady sol i ci tors usual l y want to col l ect qui ckl y.
Self-Improvement Fraud
B-216. Con arti sts know that everyone wants to l ook better, feel better, and be
a better person. Sel l i ng worthl ess pl ans and cures i s one of the easi est ways
for them to make a qui ck buck. The fol l owi ng ads can l ook tempti ng:
Mi racl e reduci ng pl an.
Look l i ke a model i n onl y fi ve days.
Learn to speak Spani sh whi l e you sl eep.
You can have a new, dynami c personal i ty.
B-217. What can you do? Be careful ! Read the smal l pri nt. Know what the
product contai ns. You shoul d check wi th your doctor before you embark on any
di et or exerci se program.
FM 3-19.30
Medical and Health Fraud
B-218. Most of us do not know much about medi ci ne; that i s why we go to
doctors. I t i s al so why we fal l for mi racl e cures and other phony heal th
products and servi ces. Patent medi ci nes, heal th spas, and mai l -i n l ab tests
shoul d be warni ng si gns for the potenti al consumer. A l aboratory i n Texas
adverti sed nati onal l y that i t had perfected a fai l -safe uri ne test for cancer.
More than 15,000 tests were made at $10 each before authori ti es stopped thi s
fraudul ent company.
Unsolicited Merchandise
B-219. Cagey con arti sts wi l l send you a gi ft i n the mai l a ti e, a good l uck
charm, or a key chai n. What do you do wi th i t i f you di d not order i t? I f you are
the ki nd of person they are l ooki ng for, you wi l l feel gui l ty and pay for i t, but
you are not obl i gated to. I f you
Have not opened the package, mark i t return to sender. The post
offi ce wi l l send i t back at no charge to you.
Open the package and do not l i ke what you fi nd, throw i t away.
Open the package and l i ke what you fi nd, keep i t, free of charge. Thi s i s
a rare i nstance where the rul e of fi nders, keepers appl i es
uncondi ti onal l y.
B-220. Whatever you do, do not pay for i t. Look at your gi ft as an honest-to-
goodness way of getti ng somethi ng for nothi ng. Do not get conned i f the gi ver
fol l ows up wi th a phone cal l or a vi si tby l aw the gi ft i s yours to keep.
Mail Fraud
B-221. The fol l owi ng are exampl es of mai l fraud:
The contest winner. Youve won! Thi s beauti ful brand-name sewi ng
machi ne i s yours for a song. To cl ai m your pri ze, come to our store and
sel ect one of these attracti ve cabi nets for your new machi ne. Bri ng thi s
l etter wi th you and go home wi th a new sewi ng machi ne for next to
nothi ng. Treat an offer l i ke thi s careful l y. Shop around before you
cl ai m your pri ze. Chances are, the cost of the cabi net wi l l be more than
the machi ne and cabi net are worth.
The missing heir. You have just recei ved a very offi ci al l ooki ng
document. The sender i s l ooki ng for the ri ghtful hei rs to the estate of
someone wi th your l ast name. I t coul d be you. To fi nd out, just send $10
for more i nformati on. There may be thousands of peopl e wi th your l ast
name, and l etters l i ke these are often mai l ed nati onwi de. Even i f there
real l y was cl ai med estate, i t i s hi ghl y unl i kel y that you woul d be an
hei r. Save your money; why hel p a swi ndl er get ri ch?
B-222. These are just two exampl es of mai l fraud. Many of the other frauds
descri bed i n thi s secti on can be handl ed through the mai l . When they are, the
US Postal Servi ce can l aunch a ful l -scal e i nvesti gati on. I f you thi nk you have
been cheated i n a mai l -fraud scheme
Save al l l etters, i ncl udi ng envel opes.
FM 3-19.30
See i f your nei ghbors or busi ness associ ates recei ved the same
materi al .
Contact your l ocal postmaster who can di rect you to your regi onal
Postal I nspectors Offi ce.
SUMMARY
B-223. The fol l owi ng are recommendati ons to avoi d bei ng duped:
Do not bel i eve somethi ng-for-nothi ng offers. You get what you pay for.
Be suspi ci ous of hi gh-pressure sal es efforts.
Take your ti me. Thi nk about the deal before you part wi th your money.
Get al l agreements i n wri ti ng. I nsi st that agreements are made i n
pl ai n Engl i sh, not l egal ese.
Read al l contracts and agreements before si gni ng. Have a l awyer
exami ne al l major contracts.
Compare servi ces, pri ces, and credi t offers before agreei ng to a deal .
Ask fri ends what thei r experi ences have been wi th the fi rm or servi ce
i n questi on.
Check the fi rms reputati on wi th your l ocal consumer affai rs offi ce or
the Better Busi ness Bureau.
INTERNAL THEFT
B-224. Empl oyee theft i s a major probl em i n most l arge organi zati ons. I t i s
esti mated that one-thi rd of al l busi ness bankruptci es are a resul t of theft. Of
course, i n the Army there i s no danger of the organi zati on goi ng out of
busi ness; however, waste and i nternal theft can di vert si gni fi cant amounts of
cri ti cal resources from mi ssi on-essenti al acti vi ti es. Unl i ke many busi nesses,
the Army has recogni zed that i nternal l osses can be a probl em, and most
areas have adequate control s mandated by regul ati on. As cr i me-pr eventi on
offi cers, we shoul d moni tor reports of survey, physi cal -securi ty i nspecti on
reports, and resul ts of cri me-preventi on i nspecti ons to ensure that control
measures are bei ng fol l owed. When i t i s apparent that the correct measures
are not bei ng fol l owed, the probl em must be i denti fi ed for the seni or
commanders acti on.
B-225. Research has shown that an organi zati ons atmosphere i s just as
i mportant as management control s and physi cal securi ty i n preventi ng
empl oyee theft. To control thi s probl em, the fol l owi ng i tems are essenti al :
Empl oyees, both ci vi l i ans and sol di ers, must bel i eve they are part of a
professi onal organi zati on that expects superi or performance from al l of
i ts members. When second-rate work i s accepted, the l ax atti tude
carri es over i nto property-control procedures and l osses i ncrease.
Standards must be hi gh, but fai r.
Leadershi p must set the exampl e. I f l eaders, supervi sors, and
managers take advantage of thei r posi ti ons to use government
mater i al or ser vi ces for thei r own benefi t (even i n mi nor ways), thei r
empl oyees wi l l al so feel justi fi ed i n di verti ng Army resources to thei r
own use.
FM 3-19.30
The organi zati on must show a genui ne concern for the probl ems of i ts
per sonnel . I f an empl oyee feel s he has been treated unfai r l y, i t i s easy
for hi m to justi fy steal i ng from the organi zati on. He bel i eves that he i s
onl y taki ng what he woul d be getti ng i f the organi zati on was fai r.
The organi zati on must take appropri ate di sci pl i nary or admi ni strati ve
acti ons i n cases of theft. There can be no acceptabl e l evel of i nternal
theft. I f empl oyees bel i eve that an acti vi ty consi ders a certai n l evel of
l oss to be acceptabl e, then materi al theft wi l l grow rapi dl y. Everyone
wi l l consi der the materi al he takes to be wi thi n the 2 percent that the
acti vi ty expects to l ose.
Pol i ci es on i nternal thefts must be enforced. Frequentl y, a thi ef i s a
l ong-term empl oyee whose honesty has al ways been above questi on. I n
these cases, the temptati on i s very strong to l et the offender go wi th a
sl ap on the hand. However, thi s i s a cl ear si gnal to other empl oyees
that di versi on of Army resources for personal use i s acceptabl e to
management. I f an empl oyee chooses to steal and i s caught, he shoul d
be prosecuted.
Publ i ci ty campai gns usi ng posters and other medi a shoul d be used to
di ssemi nate command pol i ci es on i nternal theft. Cri me hot l i nes are
al so useful i n i ncreasi ng reports of empl oyee thefts.
PILFERAGE
B-226. The protecti on of property, i ncl udi ng the preventi on of pi l ferage of
government suppl i es and equi pment, i s one of the pri mary functi ons of the MP
and ci vi l servi ce securi ty forces. Thi s functi on may i ncl ude protecti ng suppl i es
and equi pment whi l e i n storage areas, duri ng the i ssue process, or whi l e they
are i n transi t.
B-227. Pi l ferage i s probabl y the most common and annoyi ng hazard wi th
whi ch securi ty personnel are concerned. I t can become such a fi nanci al
menace and detri ment to operati ons that a l arge porti on of the securi ty forces
efforts may have to be devoted to i ts control . Pi l ferage, parti cul arl y petty
pi l ferage, i s frequentl y di ffi cul t to detect, hard to prove, and dangerous to
i gnore.
B-228. Mi l i tary property l oss throughout the worl d woul d i ncrease mi l l i ons of
dol l ars each year i f subjected to uncontrol l ed pi l ferage. However, the ri sks
i ncurred cannot be measured i n terms of dol l ars al one. Loss of cri ti cal suppl i es
for tacti cal uni ts coul d resul t i n l oss of l i fe or a danger to nati onal defense. I n
some areas, l osses coul d assume such proporti ons as to jeopardi ze an
i nstal l ati ons mi ssi on. Al l i nstal l ati ons and faci l i ti es can anti ci pate l oss from
pi l ferage. Actual l osses wi l l depend on such vari abl e factors as the type and
amount of materi al s, equi pment, and suppl i es produced, processed, and stored
at the faci l i ty; the number of persons empl oyed; soci al and economi c
condi ti ons i n surroundi ng communi ti es; command atti tude; and physi cal -
securi ty measures used. Because these factors di ffer greatl y i n vari ous types
of i nstal l ati ons and i n di fferent geographi cal l ocati ons, each must be
consi dered separatel y.
B-229. To determi ne the severi ty of thi s hazard at any gi ven i nstal l ati on or
faci l i ty, i t i s necessary to determi ne the amount of l oss that may be occurri ng.
FM 3-19.30
Unfortunatel y, thi s i s not al ways an easy task. Accounti ng methods may not
be desi gned to pi npoi nt thefts; consequentl y, such l osses remai n undi scl osed or
they are l umped together wi th other shri nkages, thus effecti vel y camoufl agi ng
them.
B-230. I nventory l osses may be i naccuratel y l abel ed as pi l ferage for the
fol l owi ng reasons:
Fai l ure to detect shortages i n i ncomi ng shi pments.
I mproper stock usage.
Poor stock accounti ng.
Poor warehousi ng.
I mproper handl i ng and recordi ng of defecti ve and damaged stock.
I naccurate i nventori es.
B-231. I n some cases, i nventory l osses may be i mpossi bl e to detect because of
the nature and quanti ti es of materi al s i nvol ved. Stock i nventory records may
not be l ocal l y mai ntai ned, or there may be no method for spot checks or
runni ng i nventori es to di scover the shortages.
PROFILE OF PILFERERS
B-232. Physi cal -securi ty personnel must be abl e to recogni ze and counteract
two types of pi l ferer scasual and systemati c. A casual pi l ferer i s one who
steal s pri mari l y because he i s unabl e to resi st the temptati on of an
unexpected opportuni ty and has l i ttl e fear of detecti on. There i s usual l y l i ttl e
or no pl anni ng or premedi tati on i nvol ved i n casual pi l ferage, and the pi l ferer
normal l y acts al one. He may take i tems for whi ch he has no i mmedi ate need
or foreseeabl e use, or he may take smal l quanti ti es of suppl i es for the use of
fami l y or fri ends or for use around hi s home. The degree of ri sk i nvol ved i n
casual pi l ferage i s normal l y sl i ght unl ess a very l arge number of persons are
i nvol ved.
B-233. Casual pi l ferage occurs when the i ndi vi dual feel s the need or desi re for
a certai n arti cl e, and the opportuni ty to take i t i s provi ded by poor securi ty
measures. Though i t i nvol ves unsystemati c theft of smal l arti cl es, casual
pi l ferage i s neverthel ess very seri ous. I t may have a great cumul ati ve effect i f
permi tted to become wi despread, especi al l y i f the stol en i tems have a hi gh
cash or potenti al val ue.
B-234. There i s al ways the possi bi l i ty that casual pi l ferers, encouraged by
successful theft, may turn to systemati c pi l ferage. Casual pi l ferers are
normal l y empl oyees of the i nstal l ati on and usual l y are the most di ffi cul t to
detect and apprehend.
B-235. A systemati c pi l ferer i s one who steal s accordi ng to preconcei ved
pl ans. He steal s any and al l types of suppl i es to sel l for cash or to barter for
other val uabl e or desi rabl e commodi ti es. He may work wi th another person or
wi th a wel l -organi zed group of peopl e, some of whom may be members of a
cl eani ng team or even be i n an advantageous posi ti on to l ocate or
admi ni strati vel y control desi red i tems or remove them from storage areas or
transi t faci l i ti es.
FM 3-19.30
B-236. The act of pi l ferage may be a one-ti me occurrence, or such acts may
extend over a peri od of months or even years. A l arge quanti ty of suppl i es wi th
great val ue may be l ost to groups of persons engaged i n el aboratel y pl anned
and careful l y executed systemati c-pi l ferage acti vi ti es. Systemati c pi l ferers
may or may not be empl oyees of the i nstal l ati on; i f they are not, they
frequentl y conspi re wi th empl oyees.
TARGETS FOR PILFERAGE
B-237. Both casual and systemati c pi l ferers have certai n probl ems to
overcome to accompl i sh pi l ferage objecti ves. These probl ems i ncl ude the
fol l owi ng:
A pi l ferers fi rst requi rement i s to l ocate the i tem or i tems to be stol en.
For the casual pi l ferer, thi s may be accompl i shed through i ndi vi dual
search or even acci dental di scovery. I n systemati c pi l ferage, more
extensi ve means are general l y used. These may consi st of survei l l i ng
by members of the group or checki ng shoppi ng and storage areas or
documents by those who have access to them.
The second requi rement i s to determi ne the manner i n whi ch he can
gai n access to and possessi on of the desi red i tem. Thi s may i nvol ve
somethi ng as si mpl e as breaki ng open a box, or i t may be as compl ex as
surveyi ng securi ty factors (such as physi cal safeguards or securi ty
procedures) for weaknesses. I t may al so i nvol ve attempti ng to bri be
securi ty forces, al teri ng or forgi ng shi ppi ng documents or passes, or
creati ng di sturbances to di vert the attenti on of securi ty personnel
whi l e the actual theft i s taki ng pl ace.
The thi rd requi rement i s to remove the stol en i tems to a pl ace where
the thi ef may benefi t from hi s act. Arti cl es of cl othi ng may be worn to
accompl i sh thi s. Smal l i tems may be conceal ed i n many possi bl e pl aces
on the thi ef s body or i n vehi cl es. Through fal si fi cati on of documents,
whol e truckl oads of suppl i es may be removed from thei r proper pl ace
wi thout i mmedi ate di scovery.
Fi nal l y, to deri ve any benefi t from hi s act, the pi l ferer must use the
i tem hi msel f or di spose of i t i n some way. The casual pi l ferage of
suppl i es i s i ntended pri mari l y to sati sfy the need or desi res of the thi ef.
The systemati c pi l ferer usual l y attempts to sel l the materi al through
fences, pawnbrokers, or bl ack-market operati ons.
B-238. Detecti on of use or di sposal can hel p prevent si mi l ar pi l ferage
through i nvesti gati on and di scovery of the means used to accompl i sh the
ori gi nal theft. Si mi l arl y, each of the probl ems faced by woul d-be pi l ferers
offers an opportuni ty for constructi ve preventi ve measures. Careful study of
the possi bl e opportuni ti es for the pi l ferer to sol ve hi s probl em i s essenti al i n
securi ty work.
B-239. The pri mary concern of a systemati c pi l ferer i n sel ecti ng a target i s i ts
monetary val ue. Si nce he steal s for personal profi t, the systemati c pi l ferer
l ooks for i tems from whi ch he can real i ze the greatest fi nanci al gai n. Thi s
means he must al so have or be abl e to fi nd a ready market for i tems he may be
abl e to steal . He pi l fers smal l i tems of rel ati vel y hi gh val ue (such as drugs,
val uabl e metal s, or el ectroni c i tems). However, we cannot di scount the
FM 3-19.30
possi bi l i ty that a systemati c pi l ferer may, i f the profi t i s substanti al , sel ect a
target of great si ze and wei ght. As a rul e, bul k-storage areas contai n most of
the materi al that may be sel ected by systemati c pi l ferers.
B-240. The casual pi l ferer i s l i kel y to take any i tem easi l y accessi bl e to hi m.
Si nce he normal l y wi l l remove the i tem from the i nstal l ati on by conceal i ng i t
on hi s person or i n hi s POV, si ze i s al so an i mportant consi derati on. Monetary
val ue and avai l abl e markets are not of any great concern to the casual pi l ferer,
because he usual l y does not have any i dea of sel l i ng the property he steal s.
Storage areas contai ni ng l oose i tems are more l i kel y to tempt casual pi l ferers
than bul k-storage areas.
METHODS OF PILFERAGE
B-241. There are many ways that pi l fered i tems may be removed from
i nstal l ati ons. Because the moti ves and targets l i kel y to be sel ected by
systemati c and casual pi l ferers are very di fferent, the methods of operati on for
each are very di fferent.
B-242. As stated above, the casual pi l ferer steal s whatever i s avai l abl e to hi m
and general l y removes i t from the i nstal l ati on by conceal i ng i t on hi s person or
i n hi s automobi l e. The methods of the systemati c pi l ferer are much more
vari ed and compl ex. The means he may use are l i mi ted onl y by hi s i ngenui ty.
B-243. Shi ppi ng and recei vi ng operati ons are extremel y vul nerabl e to
systemati c pi l ferage. I t i s here that i nstal l ati on personnel and truck dri vers
have di rect contact wi th each other and readi l y avai l abl e means of
conveyance. Thi s offers a tempti ng opportuni ty for col l usi on.
B-244. One i ndi vi dual must not have control of al l shi ppi ng and recei vi ng
transacti ons. Obvi ousl y, thi s procedure i nvi tes mani pul ati on of government
bi l l s of l adi ng and i naccurate storage and movement procedures through
fai l ure of one acti vi ty to compare bi l l s and i nvoi ces wi th another acti vi ty. The
opportuni ti es for monetary ki ckbacks i ncrease wi thout a sound system of
checks and bal ances.
B-245. Rai l way empl oyees assi gned to swi tchi ng duti es on the i nstal l ati on
can operate i n a si mi l ar manner. However, thi s operati on i s more di ffi cul t
because a rai l way car normal l y cannot be di rected to a l ocati on where stol en
property can be easi l y and safel y removed.
B-246. Tanker trucks used for shi ppi ng petrol eum products may be al tered to
permi t pi l ferage of the product. Trash- and sal vage-di sposal acti vi ti es offer
excel l ent opportuni ti es to the systemati c pi l ferer to gai n access to val uabl e
materi al . Property may be hi dden i n waste materi al s to be recovered by a
accompl i ce who removes trash from the i nstal l ati on.
B-247. Other methods that may be used by systemati c pi l fers to remove
property from mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons i ncl ude
Throwi ng i tems over fences to be retri eved l ater by themsel ves or by
accompl i ces.
Packagi ng property and sendi ng i t to outsi de addresses through mai l
channel s.
Conspi ri ng wi th securi ty personnel .
FM 3-19.30
Weari ng l oose-fi tti ng cl othi ng to conceal smal l i tems.
Removi ng i tems by usi ng vehi cl es bel ongi ng to outsi de contractors and
vendors.
CONTROL MEASURES FOR CASUAL PILFERAGE
B-248. Speci fi c measures for preventi ng pi l ferage must be based on careful
anal yses of the condi ti ons at each i nstal l ati on. The most practi cal and
effecti ve method for control l i ng casual pi l ferage i s to establ i sh psychol ogi cal
deterrents. Thi s may be accompl i shed i n a number of ways, such as
Searchi ng i ndi vi dual s and vehi cl es l eavi ng the i nstal l ati on at
unannounced ti mes and pl aces.
Conducti ng spot searches occasi onal l y to detect attempts of theft.
Maki ng empl oyees aware that they may be apprehended i f they
attempt to i l l egal l y remove property.
B-249. Care must be taken to ensure that personnel are not demoral i zed nor
thei r l egal ri ghts vi ol ated by oppressi ve physi cal control or unethi cal securi ty
practi ces. An aggressi ve securi ty-educati on program i s an effecti ve means of
convi nci ng empl oyees that they have much more to l ose than to gai n by
engagi ng i n acts of theft. Case hi stori es may be ci ted where empl oyees were
di scharged or prosecuted for pi l ferage. Care must be taken i n di scussi ng these
cases to precl ude the i denti fi cati on of i ndi vi dual s because of possi bl e ci vi l
sui ts for defamati on of character. Al so, i t i s general l y poor pol i cy to publ i ci ze
derogatory i nformati on pertai ni ng to speci fi c i ndi vi dual s. I t i s i mportant for
al l empl oyees to real i ze that pi l ferage i s moral l y wrong no matter how
i nsi gni fi cant the val ue of the i tem taken.
B-250. I t i s parti cul arl y i mportant for supervi sory personnel to set a proper
exampl e and mai ntai n a desi rabl e moral cl i mate for al l empl oyees. Al l
empl oyees must understand that they have a responsi bi l i ty to report any l oss
to the proper authori ti es. Adequate i nventory and control measures shoul d be
i nsti tuted to account for al l materi al , suppl i es, and equi pment. Poor
accountabi l i ty, i f i t i s commonl y known, provi des one of the greatest sources of
temptati ons to the casual pi l ferer.
B-251. I denti fyi ng al l tool s and equi pment by some mark or code (where
feasi bl e) i s necessary so that government property can be i denti fi ed.
I nstal l ati on tool s and equi pment have counterparts on the ci vi l i an economy
and cannot otherwi se be i denti fi ed as government property. Another control
method requi res i ndi vi dual s to si gn for tool s and equi pment. The use of the
si gnature control method reduces the temptati on to pocket the i tem.
B-252. I n establ i shi ng any deterrent to casual pi l ferage, physi cal -securi ty
offi cers must not l ose si ght of the fact that most empl oyees are honest and
di sapprove of theft. Mutual respect between securi ty personnel and other
i nstal l ati on empl oyees must be mai ntai ned i f the faci l i ty i s to be protected
from other more dangerous forms of human hazards. Any securi ty measure
that i nfri nges on the human ri ghts or di gni ty of others wi l l jeopardi ze rather
than enhance the overal l protecti on of the i nstal l ati on.
FM 3-19.30
CONTROL MEASURES FOR SYSTEMATIC PILFERAGE
B-253. Unl i ke the casual pi l ferer, the systemati c thi ef i s not di scouraged by
psychol ogi cal control s. Nothi ng short of acti ve physi cal -securi ty measures are
effecti ve i n el i mi nati ng l oss from thi s source. Some of these measures
i ncl ude
Establ i shi ng securi ty survei l l ance at al l exi ts from the i nstal l ati on.
Establ i shi ng an effecti ve package- and materi al -control system.
Locati ng parki ng areas for POVs outsi de of the acti vi tys peri meter
fenci ng.
El i mi nati ng potenti al thi eves duri ng the hi ri ng procedure by careful
screeni ng and observati on.
I nvesti gati ng al l l osses qui ckl y and effi ci entl y.
Establ i shi ng an effecti ve key-control system.
Establ i shi ng adequate securi ty patrol s to check bui l di ngs, grounds,
peri meters, and l i kel y l ocati ons for cl andesti ne storage of property
removed from i ts proper l ocati on.
I nstal l i ng mechani cal and el ectri cal i ntrusi on-detecti on devi ces where
appl i cabl e and practi cal .
Coordi nati ng wi th suppl y personnel to establ i sh customer I D to
authenti cate suppl y-rel ease documents at warehouses and exi t gates.
Establ i shi ng appropri ate peri meter fenci ng, l i ghti ng, and parki ng
faci l i ti es and effecti ve pedestri an, rai l way, and vehi cl e gate-securi ty
control .
HOWTO STOP EMPLOYEE THEFT
B-254. No matter what i t i s cal l edi nternal theft, pecul ati on, embezzl ement,
pi l ferage, i nventory shri nkage, steal i ng, or defal cati onthefts commi tted by
empl oyees are behi nd at l east 60 percent of cri me-rel ated l osses. So many
empl oyees are steal i ng so much that empl oyee theft i s the most cri ti cal cri me
probl em faci ng busi nesses today.
B-255. Al though empl oyee theft resul ts i n part from factors beyond control ,
the extent of empl oyee theft i n any busi ness i s a refl ecti on of i ts
managementthe more mi smanagement, the more theft. An effecti ve stop-
empl oyee-theft pol i cy must i ncl ude at l east the fol l owi ng:
Pre-empl oyment screeni ng.
Anal ysi s of opportuni ti es for theft.
Anal ysi s of how empl oyees steal .
Management-empl oyee communi cati on.
Prosecuti on of empl oyees caught steal i ng.
B-256. Each empl oyer must reduce l osses as much as possi bl e. A pol i ce state
need not be created. Large monetary expendi tures need not be made.
B-257. The best way to stop empl oyee theft i s to si mpl y not hi re those
empl oyees i ncl i ned to steal . The best way i s al so i mpossi bl e. The empl oyer
must set up a screeni ng process that wi l l weed out obvi ous securi ty ri sks.
Many experts bel i eve that personnel screeni ng i s the most vi tal safeguard
FM 3-19.30
agai nst i nternal theft. The fol l owi ng are some basi c gui del i nes for the
empl oyer:
Have the appl i cant fi l l out a wri tten appl i cati on. Ensure that the
wri tten appl i cati on does not di scri mi nate and that i t conforms to any
appl i cabl e l aws.
Sol i ci t references, but keep i n mi nd that those contacted wi l l gi ve
favorabl e opi ni ons. Ask pri mary references for secondary references. I n
contacti ng the l atter, make i t cl ear that the appl i cant di d not refer
them.
I ntervi ew. Duri ng an i ntervi ew, assess the appl i cants maturi ty and
val ues. Observe hi s gestures.
Use psychol ogi cal deterrents. I nform the appl i cant that your busi ness
routi nel y runs a background securi ty check or that fi ngerpri nts wi l l be
taken. The hope i s that the di shonest appl i cant wi l l not be back.
Obtai n credi t-bureau reports, but onl y after fol l owi ng gui del i nes set
forth i n the Fai r Credi t Reporti ng Act.
Opportunities, Methods, and Control
B-258. Cases of empl oyee theft have been documented i n al most every
concei vabl e phase of busi ness operati ons, from theft of petty cash to theft of
rai l road cars. An i nfi ni te vari ety of methods have been used. Some of the
areas that are most vul nerabl e are
Shi ppi ng and recei vi ng.
I nventory.
Accounti ng and record keepi ng.
Cash, check, and credi t transacti ons.
Accounts payabl e.
Payrol l .
Faci l i ty storage uni ts.
B-259. Some of the methods used i ncl ude
Pi l feri ng (one i tem at a ti me).
Steal i ng from cash regi sters or al teri ng cash-regi ster records.
I ssui ng fal se refunds.
Usi ng the back door or trash contai ners.
Taki ng advantage as a supervi sor.
Avoi di ng package control s.
Embezzl i ng.
Forgi ng checks.
Steal i ng credi t cards.
Mani pul ati ng computers and steal i ng computer ti me.
Conspi ri ng wi th ni ght cl eani ng crews.
Dupl i cati ng keys or usi ng a master key that i s not properl y control l ed.
Conspi ri ng wi th outsi ders (such as i nfl ati ng i nsurance cl ai ms).
FM 3-19.30
B-260. Too many opportuni ti es exi st for empl oyees to expl oi t. Reduce these
opportuni ti es and the l osses wi l l be reduced. Reduce opportuni ti es by usi ng
the fol l owi ng control s:
Perform random spot checks on al l phases of busi ness i n addi ti on to
regul ar, comprehensi ve audi ts.
Check the payrol l . Make sure that you are not payi ng a fi cti ti ous or
dead empl oyee.
Take physi cal i nventory seri ousl y.
Know what you own. Be abl e to i denti fy i t.
Do not al l ow one empl oyee to perform al l functi ons. Separate recei vi ng,
purchasi ng, and accounts payabl e. Separate accountants from cash.
Control payment authori zati ons.
Keep bl ank checks secured. Do not presi gn or use uncoded,
unnumbered checks.
Reconci l e cancel l ed checks wi th ori gi nal i nvoi ces or vouchers.
Secure exi ts. Restri ct empl oyees to one exi t, preventi ng exi t from the
rear of bui l di ngs.
Establ i sh stri ct package control .
I nspect cash-regi ster recei pts dai l y. I nspect the tape and ensure that
the empl oyee i s i denti fi ed on the sl i p. Deposi t money dai l y.
I ssue I D badges to decrease empl oyee presence i n unauthori zed areas.
Si mpl i fy red tape; make i t harder for the empl oyee to di sgui se theft.
Locate empl oyee parki ng away from the busi ness area.
Establ i sh a usage schedul e of suppl i es to i sol ate i rregul ari ti es.
Management-EmployeeCommunication
B-261. Leadershi p must be fi rm, yet reasonabl e. Most empl oyees pattern
thei r val ues after thei r l eaders, so a good exampl e must be set. I f you expect
empl oyees to remai n honest, do not take home offi ce suppl i es or goods.
B-262. Trai n new empl oyees, advi si ng them of the companys val ues and the
standards by whi ch they wi l l be expected to perform. Expl ai n al l securi ty
procedures, stressi ng thei r i mportance. Emphasi ze that any devi ati ons wi l l be
thoroughl y i nvesti gated.
B-263. Establ i sh gri evance procedures; gi ve your empl oyees an outl et for
di sagreement and be recepti ve to al l gri evances submi tted. Ensure that
empl oyees are aware of gri evance procedures and that no repri sal s are taken.
B-264. Regul arl y eval uate empl oyee performance and encourage empl oyees to
eval uate management. Unreal i sti c performance standards can l ead ei ther to
desperati on and anger (resul ti ng i n di shonesty) or to get-even atti tudes.
Regul arl y revi ew sal ari es, wages, and benefi tsdo not force empl oyees to
steal from you.
B-265. Del egate responsi bi l i ty. Unl ess deci si on maki ng exi sts among l ower
and mi ddl e l evel s, there i s a tendency for devel opment of an i ts-us-agai nst-
them atti tude. Del egate accountabi l i ty as wel l ; no deci si on i s val i d i f i t i s l ost
i n a pass-the-buck routi ne.
FM 3-19.30
B-266. Proper accountabi l i ty by commanders and subordi nate personnel
cannot be overemphasi zed. To ensure accountabi l i ty of property, commanders
must establ i sh, i mpl ement, and supervi se an i nstal l ati ons, acti vi tys, or
organi zati ons securi ty program.
B-267. Weaknesses i n securi ty procedures at the i nstal l ati on, acti vi ty, or
organi zati onal l evel s i nvol vi ng mi l i tary property create vul nerabi l i ty
supported by cri mi nal acti vi ty. Cri mi nal acti vi ty i ncl udes
Theft.
Fraud.
Property di versi on.
Property mani pul ati on.
B-268. Commanders and subordi nate personnel must conduct a ri sk anal ysi s;
i denti fy mi l i tary property and; i n the i nterest of monetary val ue and mi ssi on
accompl i shment, desi gn mandatory securi ty measures for speci fi c property.
B-269. Securi ty doctri ne (as outl i ned i n thi s manual ) shoul d be used to the
maxi mum extent i n securi ng Army property vul nerabl e to theft, destructi on,
or mani pul ati on. Cer tai n categor i es of pr oper ty (such as i n Tabl e B-2, page
B-62) must be assessed for securi ty vul nerabi l i ty and protecti ve treatment.
Securi ty protecti ve measures addressi ng thi s mi l i tary property shoul d be
documented i n the i nstal l ati ons physi cal -securi ty pl an. I f the securi ty
measures recommended i n Tabl e B-2 are i mpl emented usi ng establ i shed
doctri ne, they shoul d el i mi nate or reduce the propertys vul nerabi l i ty. Thi s
wi l l reduce the i nci dents of theft, pi l ferage, and mani pul ati on at the
i nstal l ati on.
MOTOR VEHICLES
B-270. Securi ty of tacti cal vehi cl es shoul d be based on a uni form and cost-
effecti ve approach. For exampl e, to ensure that a tacti cal vehi cl e wi thout a
l ocki ng devi ce i s properl y secured, i nstal l a cl amp, chai n, and l ocki ng devi ce as
i l l ustrated i n Fi gure B-7, page B-63. To i nstal l the securi ty devi ce properl y
whi l e mai ntai ni ng safety, refer to Techni cal Bul l eti n (TB) 9-2300-422-20.
Army motor-vehi cl e securi ty shoul d al so i ncorporate the use of the fol l owi ng:
Key/l ock securi ty and accountabi l i ty.
Protecti ve l i ghti ng.
Fenci ng.
Wal ki ng patrol s, as appropri ate.
Frequent observati on and vi si ts by mobi l e patrol s or uni t personnel
(such as the charge of quarters [CQ], the staff duty offi cer [SDO], and
the staff duty noncommi ssi oned offi cer [SDNCO]).
SECTION IV ARMY PROPERTY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
FM 3-19.30
Table B-2. Recommended Security Measures
Property
Inventoriedby Inspected by
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
P
l
a
n
H
a
n
d
R
e
c
e
i
p
t
/
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
B
o
o
k
S
e
c
u
r
e
d
b
y
I
D
S
P
S
P
l
a
n
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
U
n
i
t
L
e
a
d
e
r
s
P
S
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
S
D
O
M
a
i
n
t
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
S
u
p
p
l
y
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
D
i
n
i
n
g
-
F
a
c
i
l
i
t
y
O
f
f
i
c
e
r
C
Q
S
D
N
C
O
Arms/ammunition x x x x x x x x x x x
Small arms x x x x x x x x x x x
Explosives x x x x x x x x x x x
Communications/electronic equip x x x x x x x x x x x
Hand tools, tool sets/kits, and shop equip x x x x x x x x x x
Subsistence items x x x x x x x x
Controlled substances, precious metals,
and tax-free items
x x x x x x x x x x
Accounts x x x x x x
POL products x x x x x x x x x x
Repair parts x x x x x x x x
Aircraft x x * x x x x x x
Vehicles x x x x x x x x x x x
Towed weapon systems/components x x x x x x x x x
Carriage-mounted weapon systems x x x x x x x x x x
Construction material x * x x x x x
Special-issue clothing (CTA) x x x x x x x x x
Individual clothing and equipment x x x x x x x x
Organizational equip/components x x * x x x x x x x x x
Compasses, binoculars, and flashlights x x x x x x x x
Medical-unique items x x x x x x x x x x
Housekeeping supplies and equipment x x x x x x x x
Housing furniture x x x x x x x
Mess equipment x x x x x x x x x x
Office machines x x x x x x x x x
Expendable/consumable supplies x x x ** x x x x x
* Depends on facility availability and cost effectiveness
** Depends on local policy
FM 3-19.30
CONSUMER OUTLETS
B-271. The l ack of i ni ti ati ve at the management l evel wi thi n operati onal
consumer outl ets does l i ttl e to prevent or reduce pi l ferage. Such shortcomi ngs
are i denti fi ed as
Fai l ure to present a professi onal i mage.
I Lack of conti nui ng i nterest, moti vati on, and di recti on.
I No al ertness to i nternal control of pi l ferage.
Fai l ure to i nsti tute and i mpl ement methods of operati onal
effecti veness and effi ci ency. These methods i ncl ude
I A cl earl y defi ned del egati on of responsi bi l i ty.
I I nsi stence on stri ngent accountabi l i ty
I Ori entati on and trai ni ng programs for subordi nate supervi sors and
current and new empl oyees.
Fai l ure to emphasi ze and enforce establ i shed cri teri a for conti nual
empl oyment.
I Rul es of conduct.
I Standards of job performance. (Offi ci al l y request appropri ate acti on
for empl oyees gui l ty of cr i mi nal acts or i nfr acti ons conduci ve to
cri mi nal acts.)
I I nattenti ve job atti tudes of subordi nate supervi sors.
I I nadequate personal checks of establ i shed accounti ng and i nventory
p r oce d u r e s . NOTE: Checks on both a r egul ar and
unannounced basis tend to control access to official stock
records and to ensure careful and organized storage or
stockingof merchandise.
I I nfrequent observati on of an empl oyees job performance.
Figure B-7. Typical Clamp and Chain Installation
FM 3-19.30
I Fai l ure to report mi sconduct, cri mi nal or otherwi se, to superi ors or
responsi bl e l aw-enforcement personnel i n the acti vi ty.
I Fai l ure to i mpl ement recommendati ons made duri ng physi cal -
securi ty i nspecti ons or cri me-preventi on surveys.
PILFERAGE
B-272. Pi l ferage may be accompl i shed by i ndi vi dual empl oyees, by a team of
empl oyees, or by empl oyees and patrons i n col l usi on. These acti ons can be
greatl y reduced by ti ghteni ng supervi si on and securi ty i n the fol l owi ng areas:
Merchandisedisplay or dispensingareas. The fol l owi ng measures
can reduce merchandi se pi l ferage i n di spl ay areas:
I Detecti ng unauthori zed pri ce reducti ons.
I Preventi ng or maki ng i t di ffi cul t to al ter pri ce tags.
I Checki ng procedures for decl ari ng merchandi se ol d, shopworn,
damaged, or sal vage.
I Provi di ng more unpackaged i tems for personal consumpti on.
I Di scouragi ng the carel ess waste of foods and other peri shabl e i tems.
Cash registers. The fol l owi ng are methods of pi l ferage from cash
regi sters:
I Steal i ng di rectl y from an unattended regi ster.
I Rerunni ng regi ster tapes at l ower fi gures (thi s i s preventabl e i f the
reset key i s mai ntai ned by the supervi sor).
I Cl eari ng the regi ster at a l ower total fi gure than actual recei pts for
the operati onal peri od.
I Reporti ng overri ngs and refunds fal sel y.
Theft of merchandise. The fol l owi ng methods enabl e merchandi se to
be pi l fered:
I Underri ngi ng.
I Reusi ng cash-regi ster tapes. Thi s occurs when empl oyees fai l to
pr ovi de patr ons wi th tapes or when patr ons al l ow empl oyees to
r etai n tapes. The tapes al l ow empl oyees to package mer chandi se
and remove i t from the premi ses.
I Removi ng i tems from bags or contai ners carri ed out by empl oyees.
SHOPLIFTING
B-273. Shopl i fti ng i s usual l y confi ned to sal es areas and i s commi tted by
casual and systemati c pi l ferers. I tems that are most frequentl y pi l fered
Are rel ati vel y smal l i n si ze.
Have a hi gh degree of consumer desi rabi l i ty.
Are easi l y carri ed i n pocketbooks or secreted on the person.
B-274. Amateur, adul t shopl i fters share the fol l owi ng characteri sti cs:
Theft i s from a sudden temptati on (i mpul se theft). There i s success i n
the i ni ti al theft, whi ch l eads to more temptati on, stronger i mpul ses,
and more thefts.
They rarel y have a genui ne need for the i tem.
FM 3-19.30
They usual l y have enough money to pay for the i tem.
They di spl ay symptoms of nervousness and uneasi ness.
B-275. Juveni l e shopl i fters have the fol l owi ng trai ts:
They act on a dare or to bel ong.
They may be coached or di rected by an adul t.
B-276. Professi onal shopl i fters share these characteri sti cs. They
May be tal kati ve and are usual l y pol i te and del i berate.
Look for opportuni ti es conti nual l y.
Do not take many chances.
Are very capabl e of spotti ng securi ty personnel .
Steal for resal e.
Have fences (usual l y).
Steal to order (often). They may have a l i st descri bi ng the i tems to be
pi l fered.
Use i nnovati ve techni ques.
B-277. Genui ne cases of kl eptomani a are rare. Kl eptomani acs share the
fol l owi ng characteri sti cs. They
Take i tems wi thout regard to thei r val ue or use.
Steal compul si vel y and often openl y.
Are nervous and shy.
B-278. Narcoti c addi cts as shopl i fters have the fol l owi ng characteri sti cs. Onl y
MP/securi ty personnel shoul d attempt apprehensi on. These types of
shopl i fters
Are desperate for money and they fear i mpri sonment.
Take bi g chances.
Take the merchandi se and exi t the premi ses qui ckl y.
Steal when they are at thei r l owest physi cal and/or psychol ogi cal ebb.
Are dangerous i f you try to apprehend them (someti mes vi ol ent).
B-279. Al cohol i cs and vagrants as shopl i fters share the fol l owi ng trai ts.
They
Usual l y steal because of need.
Are often under the i nfl uence of l i quor at the ti me of theft.
Take the merchandi se qui ckl y, then exi t the premi ses.
Are l ess l i kel y to steal regul arl y at a si ngl e l ocati on.
B-280. The most pi l ferage occurs when empl oyee coverage i s l ow or when
empl oyees are untrai ned, i nexperi enced, or i ndi fferent to the i ssue. The
i neffecti ve use of fl oor space ai ds shopl i fters by creati ng congesti on i n the
patrons traffi c fl ow. Al l owi ng an emphasi s on smal l rooms or parti ti oned
areas causes congesti on that cl usters, i sol ates, or parti al l y hi des di spl ays.
Shopl i fti ng i nvol ves the use of one or more of the fol l owi ng means to obtai n
i tems:
FM 3-19.30
Pal mi ng or pl aci ng an open hand on a smal l arti cl e, squeezi ng the
muscl es of the hand over the arti cl e to grasp i t, and l i fti ng the sti l l
open and apparentl y empty hand.
Usi ng fi tti ng rooms to put on ti ght or cl ose-fi tti ng garments under
cl othi ng worn i nto the store.
Tryi ng on hats, gl oves, sweaters, and jackets, then exi ti ng the store.
Steppi ng around counters and removi ng i tems from unl ocked
showcases.
Handl i ng several i tems at once and repl aci ng al l except the i tem
pi l fered.
Usi ng accompl i ces to create a di versi on of empl oyee attenti on when
secreti ng i tems on the person. Such i tems i ncl ude:
I Cl othi ng.
I Pocketbooks or handbags.
I Umbrel l as.
I Vari ous i tems pl aced i n packages or paper sacks contai ni ng
merchandi se pai d for at other departments.
ARSON
B-281. On an i nstal l ati on there i s l i ttl e i ncenti ve for a professi onal arsoni st to
operate si nce the government owns the bui l di ngs and i nsurance fraud i n
col l usi on wi th the property owner i s not possi bl e. However, arson can sti l l be a
probl em. I n the ci vi l i an communi ty, most del i berate fi res are not set for profi t.
They are set to get even wi th the pr operty owner or just for the exci tement of
watchi ng somethi ng burn. Mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons are suscepti bl e to thi s type of
cri me. On many Army posts, there i s a l arge number of empty, wooden
structures that are i deal targets for revenge seekers or vandal s.
B-282. Arson i s an easy cri me to perpetrate, and i t i s rel ati vel y di ffi cul t to
col l ect the i nformati on needed to convi ct an arsoni st. However, thi s does not
mean we are hel pl ess i n combati ng thi s cri me. Several major ci ti es, i ncl udi ng
Seattl e, Denver, Houston, and Phi l adel phi a, have devel oped successful
programs to reduce the number of arsons. Some of the successful , proacti ve
measures that have been devel oped are
Securi ng or di sposi ng of materi al s that coul d be used to start fi res.
Ensuri ng that the regul ati ons on the storage of gasol i ne, pai nt, and
sol vents are enforced and that pai nt l ockers are l ocked.
Enforci ng command pol i ci es on the pol i ce of the post. Removi ng pi l es of
trash, scrap l umber, and other materi al that burns easi l y.
Securi ng empty bui l di ngs (especi al l y empty wooden structures) and
posti ng them as off-l i mi ts areas.
Patrol l i ng areas suscepti bl e to arson.
Encouragi ng parti ci pati on i n nei ghborhood watches, taxi patrol s, and
other communi ty programs that i ncrease survei l l ance.
Encouragi ng the reporti ng of suspi ci ous acti vi ti es through the
establ i shment of cri me hot l i nes.
FM 3-19.30
Establ i shi ng a cl ose worki ng rel ati onshi p between fi re fi ghters and
l aw-enforcement personnel to ensure that fi res of suspi ci ous ori gi n are
reported and thoroughl y i nvesti gated.
Offeri ng rewards for i nformati on l eadi ng to the apprehensi on of the
arsoni st (i f there i s an outbreak of arson).
B-283. There are a number of cri me-preventi on programs set up i n
communi ti es to hel p deter and detect cri me. These programs are supported
and often headed by members of the communi ty i n conjuncti on wi th l ocal l aw-
enforcement agenci es. The programs are as di verse i n nature as they are i n
number, yet they compl ement one another.
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM
B-284. A nei ghborhood watch program i s an organi zed network of ci ti zens
i nteracti ng wi th other nei ghbors and the pol i ce i n preventi ng and detecti ng
cri me i n thei r nei ghborhood. Law-enforcement efforts to reduce cri me cannot
be accompl i shed effecti vel y wi thout the support and cooperati on of al l ci ti zens.
A strong communi ty i nvol vement wi th nei ghbors hel pi ng themsel ves and
other nei ghbors i n becomi ng more al ert to acti vi ti es i n the nei ghborhood,
protecti ng thei r property, and reporti ng suspi ci ous acti vi ti es i s essenti al to an
effecti ve cri me-preventi on program.
B-285. The Army Nei ghborhood Watch Program i s desi gned to encourage
Army servi ce members and thei r fami l i es to acti vel y parti ci pate i n protecti ng
thei r own property and the property of thei r nei ghbors, joi ni ng communi ty
cri me-preventi on programs, and reporti ng suspi ci ous acti vi ti es to MP offi cers.
The pr ogr am i s desi gned to devel op the fol l owi ng:
The awareness of communi ty cri me trends and preventi on efforts.
The knowl edge of quarters securi ty procedures.
A cooperati ve system of survei l l ance over each nei ghbors property.
Accurate observati on and reporti ng of suspi ci ous acti vi ti es.
The establ i shment of a rel i abl e, two-way i nformati on l i nk between the
communi ty and MP forces.
B-286. Most nei ghbors know the routi nes of the other fami l i es that l i ve near
them. They know what cars are normal l y parked i n the nei ghborhood and
when fami l i es are on vacati on or out of the area. Nei ghbors are i n a very good
posi ti on to recogni ze burgl ars and other i ntruders. Al so, resi dents are i n a
good posi ti on to recogni ze safety hazards and cri me-conduci ve condi ti ons near
thei r homes.
B-287. To capi tal i ze on these advantages, nei ghborhood watch programs
organi ze bl ocks i n fami l y-housi ng areas or fl oors i n troop bi l l ets to i mprove
pol i ce and communi ty i nteracti on. They al so di ssemi nate i nformati on on
cri me probl ems and countermeasures.
SECTION V COMMUNITY CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS
FM 3-19.30
BLOCK CLUBS
B-288. Bl ock cl ubs are the basi c components of an i nstal l ati on-wi de
nei ghborhood watch program. The geographi cal si ze of a bl ock cl ub may vary
wi del y dependi ng on the popul ati ons densi ty and the nature of the terrai n.
The key factor i s that the terrai n organi zed i nto a si ngl e bl ock cl ub shoul d
promote a feel i ng of uni ty and mutual assi stance. I n a troop bi l l et area, bl ock
cl ubs coul d be organi zed al ong company l i nes, by i ndi vi dual barracks, or by
fl oor. I n a fami l y-housi ng area, a bl ock cl ub coul d cover one hi gh-ri se
apartment bui l di ng, one bl ock, or one or more streets that are so si tuated that
the resi dents i denti fy themsel ves as a subcommuni ty wi thi n the housi ng area.
Organization
B-289. I ndi vi dual resi dents, communi ty-servi ce organi zati ons, or MP uni ts
can i ni ti ate bl ock cl ubs. Exi sti ng organi zati ons (such as the PTO) have
frequentl y establ i shed contacts wi thi n the communi ty and have sponsored the
organi zati on of bl ock cl ubs. Regardl ess of the approach used to organi ze the
i nstal l ati on, every fami l y or resi dent i n the area shoul d be contacted and
encouraged to attend a bl ock cl ub (see Fi gure B-8).
B-290. A bl ock captai n and a deputy bl ock captai n shoul d be el ected at the
i ni ti al bl ock meeti ng. These i ndi vi dual s serve as spark pl ugs to sustai n
i nterest i n thei r geographi c area. They al so represent thei r bl ock cl ub at
di stri ct meeti ngs. The effecti veness of the presentati on at the i ni ti al bl ock-
cl ub meeti ng i s cri ti cal . A PMO representati ve shoul d expl ai n the cri me
probl ems on the i nstal l ati on and cl earl y outl i ne the functi ons of a bl ock cl ub
and how i t can affect the cri me probl em. The mai n objecti ve shoul d be to
generate enthusi asm and bui l d a foundati on upon whi ch an effecti ve
nei ghborhood watch can be bui l t. The use of camcorders or other audi ovi sual
programs can generate i nterest. Associ ati on wi th programs i n the ci vi l i an
communi ty may al so hel p to generate i nterest.
B-291. The functi ons of a bl ock cl ub shoul d be cl earl y i denti fi ed. Bl ock cl ubs
Ser ve as the eyes and ears of the pol i ce.
Encourage the i mpl ementati on of i ndi vi dual countermeasures, such as
marki ng personal property.
Di ssemi nate cri me-preventi on i nformati on.
I mprove pol i ce and communi ty rel ati ons
Block-ClubDistricts
B-292. A bl ock-cl ub di stri ct shoul d be organi zed as an i ntermedi ate l i nk
between i ndi vi dual bl ock cl ubs and the i nstal l ati ons cri me-preventi on counci l .
These di stri cts shoul d cover at l east one housi ng area and shoul d be composed
of the bl ock captai ns and deputi es from each bl ock cl ub i n the di stri cts area.
Di stri ct l eaders shoul d be el ected from the bl ock captai ns and shoul d serve as
members of the i nstal l ati ons cri me-preventi on counci l . The pri mary functi ons
of di stri cts are to transmi t i nformati on from the cri me-preventi on counci l to
the bl ock cl ubs and to devel op i ncenti ve awards to recogni ze effecti ve
parti ci pati on by the cl ubs.
FM 3-19.30
MaintainingInterest
B-293. Mai ntai ni ng i nterest i n nei ghborhood watch programs i s a major
probl em. Typi cal l y, a parti cul ar i nci dent generates the l evel of i nterest
requi red to i ni ti al l y organi ze a system of bl ock cl ubs and di stri cts; but as the
parti cul ar probl em i s overcome, i nterest wanes and the cl ubs gradual l y
di ssi pate. A revi ew of programs that have mai ntai ned thei r effecti veness for
extended peri ods i ndi cates that successful programs have the fol l owi ng
characteri sti cs:
They are a formal organi zati on wi th el ected bl ock captai ns and di stri ct
l eaders.
They address a wi de range of probl ems.
They feature an i ncenti ve award program to recogni ze i ndi vi dual s and
cl ubs that parti ci pate effecti vel y.
BLOCK
CLUB
DISTRICTS
BLOCK
CLUBS
POST
COMMANDER
CRIME
PREVENTION
WORKING
PROVOST
MARSHAL
CRIME
PREVENTION
SECTION
= SUPERVISION/COMMAND
= COORDINATION/ASSISTANCE
Post
commander
Crime-
prevention
working group
Block-
club
districts
Block
clubs
Crime-
prevention
section
Provost
marshal
= Supervision/command
= Coordination/assistance
Figure B-8. Block-Club Organization
FM 3-19.30
Thei r members attend peri odi c workshops to trai n l eaders on vari ous
aspects of cri me preventi on.
They have cl ear-cut, attai nabl e objecti ves. The members need to see
accompl i shments.
They are acti vel y supported by the l ocal pol i ce.
Block-ClubOperations
B-294. Bl ock cl ubs may become umbrel l a organi zati ons that conduct the
enti re range of communi ty cri me-preventi on programs, i ncl udi ng foot and
mobi l e patrol s. However, each of these programs wi l l be di scussed i n a
separate secti on. I n thei r most basi c form, bl ock cl ubs di ssemi nate
i nformati on on resi denti al securi ty and report suspi ci ous acti vi ty i n thei r
nei ghborhood. Members of a nei ghborhood watch program shoul d exchange
names, addresses, and tel ephone numbers to enhance communi cati on among
nei ghbors. They must l earn how to record and report suspi ci ous acti vi ti es.
Some acti vi ti es that bl ock-cl ub members shoul d be al ert for and, when
observed, report to the MP offi cers are
A stranger enteri ng a nei ghbors house when i t i s unoccupi ed.
Someone screami ng.
An offer of merchandi se at a ri di cul ousl y l ow pri ce (i t coul d be stol en).
Persons enteri ng or l eavi ng a pl ace of busi ness after duty hours.
The sound of breaki ng gl ass or an expl osi on.
A per son goi ng door to door and then goi ng i nto a back or si de yard, or
a per son tr yi ng a door to see i f i t i s l ocked.
A per son l oi ter i ng ar ound a school , a par k, a secl uded area, or i n the
nei ghborhood.
A person carryi ng property at an unusual hour or i n an unusual pl ace.
A person exhi bi ti ng unusual mental or physi cal symptoms (he may be
i n need of medi cal hel p).
A vehi cl e bei ng l oaded wi th val uabl es when parked by a cl osed
busi ness or untended resi dence.
A busi ness transacti on conducted from a vehi cl e.
ARMY NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH MEETINGS
B-295. A PMO representati ve shoul d attend the i ni ti al nei ghborhood bl ock
meeti ng to expl ai n the rel ati onshi ps of cri me preventi on and the nei ghborhood
watch programs. The meeti ng shoul d be publ i ci zed wi th handout i nvi tati ons
announci ng the ti me, l ocati on, and purpose of the meeti ng. I f possi bl e, the
meeti ng shoul d be hel d i n the nei ghborhood (such as the trai ni ng room i n the
troop bi l l ets, a l ocal school , or a resi dence i n fami l y quarters). I n addi ti on to
expl ai ni ng the program concepts, the i ni ti al meeti ng coul d i ncl ude the
fol l owi ng:
I nstal l ati on and communi ty cri mi nal stati sti cs concerni ng the nature
and vol ume of housebreaki ngs, l arceni es, and other cri mes.
An exchange of names and tel ephone numbers (i f appl i cabl e) of
attendees. Thi s i nfor mati on shoul d al so be pl aced on a nei ghbor hood
bl ock sheet that i s a geographi cal di agram of the bl ock showi ng the
FM 3-19.30
l ocati on of each room, apartment, and bui l di ng address number i n the
bl ock. The names and phone numbers of parti ci pants woul d be added
to the address number of each resi dence drawn on the di agram. Thi s
bl ock sheet shoul d be di stri buted to bl ock members at a subsequent
meeti ng.
Determi nati on of the second meeti ng date and l ocati on.
B-296. Other agenda i tems and acti vi ti es for subsequent meeti ngs coul d
i ncl ude the fol l owi ng di scussi ons:
Resi denti al securi ty procedures and the conduct of quarters securi ty
i nspecti ons.
Operati on I Dmarki ng and recordi ng of personal property.
The observati on and report of suspi ci ous acti vi ti es.
Other cri me-preventi on measures and procedures bei ng i mpl emented
at the i nstal l ati on (such as rape preventi on and ci ti zen escort patrol s).
Fi re preventi on, personal safety, and other rel ated acti vi ti es.
OPERATION ID
B-297. Operati on I D, whi ch entai l s marki ng of property to make i t
i denti fi abl e and traceabl e to i ts owner i f l ost or stol en, was i ni ti ated by the
Monterey Park, Cal i forni a, Pol i ce Department i n 1963 and has been adopted
by more than 80 percent of the pol i ce departments i n the US. Operati on I D i s
a l ow-cost, hi ghl y effecti ve cri me-preventi on program. However, i ts success i s
conti ngent upon the wi l l i ngness of i ndi vi dual s and communi ti es to acti vel y
parti ci pate i n marki ng and i denti fyi ng thei r personal property.
B-298. Operati on I D i s desi gned to encourage Army servi ce members and
thei r fami l i es to mark thei r personal property wi th a standard Army-wi de,
owner-appl i ed number. Thi s numberi ng system permi ts the posi ti ve I D of the
property and determi nes the l ocati on of the owner i n case of theft or l oss.
B-299. The pri nci pal advantages of Operati on I D are theft deterrence and
recovery of personal property. Marked stol en property i s more di ffi cul t to
di spose of, and i l l egal possessi on can resul t i n the prosecuti on of a thi ef.
Recovered l ost or stol en property can onl y be returned i f there i s some means
of i denti fyi ng and l ocati ng the ri ghtful owner.
METHODS OF IDENTIFYING PROPERTY
B-300. Vari ous methods of establ i shi ng posi ti ve I D and ownershi p of property
i n case of l oss are avai l abl e for i ndi vi dual s. Each method has advantages and
l i mi tati ons, and a combi nati on of these methods woul d be requi red to ensure
the I D of al l hi gh-val ue personal property.
I nscri bi ng the owners appl i ed number wi th an etchi ng or engravi ng
tool woul d al l ow the recoveri ng agency to vi sual l y i denti fy the number
i nscri bed on the property for noti fi cati on and subsequent return of the
property. El ectrostati c markers are avai l abl e for use at no cost to the
i ndi vi dual . However, some personnel are rel uctant to use thi s method
si nce i t can mar the property. The i nscri pti on shoul d be made i n a
l ocati on that can be readi l y seen by the recoveri ng agency but whi ch
FM 3-19.30
woul d not deface the propertys appearance or reduce i ts val ue. Some
hi gh-val ue personal i tems such as coi ns, jewel ry, and si l ver cannot be
i nscri bed wi th an owners appl i ed number. Another method of
i denti fyi ng these i tems woul d be requi red.
Usi ng i nvi si bl e fl uorescent i nk, powder, or paste to mark the property
can make i t easi er for the agency recoveri ng the property to use an
ul travi ol et l i ght and i denti fy the owner. Thi s marki ng wi l l not mar the
property. However, the fl uorescent marki ngs and ul travi ol et l i ght are
an addi ti onal cost, and many agenci es do not have ul travi ol et l i ghts to
i nspect recovered property.
Usi ng a l aser photographi c process to i denti fy di amonds. Every
di amond emi ts a uni que refl ecti on when penetrated by a l ow-l evel l aser
l i ght. A l aser photographi c process has been devel oped to record a
di amonds pattern of l i ght refl ecti on on fi l m. Several jewel ers
throughout the country have the l aser photographi c equi pment
avai l abl e. To regi ster a di amond, two photographs are taken. One i s
provi ded to the owner and the other to a central regi stry. I f a di amond
i s l ost or stol en, the recoveri ng agency can take the di amond to a
jewel er that mai ntai ns the l aser photographi c equi pment for pri nt.
Thi s photograph woul d then be forwarded to the regi stry for owner I D.
Photographi ng the personal i tem. I ndi vi dual s can photograph personal
hi gh-val ue i tems that cannot be engraved. Al though the agency
recoveri ng the l ost or stol en i tems coul d not i denti fy the owner, use of
photographs coul d assi st i n veri fyi ng ownershi p i f i t i s known that the
i tem has been recovered. I n addi ti on, a photograph woul d assi st i n
submi tti ng cl ai ms agai nst the government or pri vate i nsurance
compani es, as appropri ate.
RECORDING PERSONAL PROPERTY
B-301. I ndi vi dual s shoul d record i denti fyi ng data (such as brand name,
model , seri al number, and val ue of the personal i tems), even i f they use other
methods of i denti fyi ng property. Thi s i nformati on woul d assi st i n determi ni ng
what i tems may be l ost, stol en, or damaged through fi re, expl osi on, or other
hazards. Thi s i nformati on can al so be used i n cl ai ms agai nst the government
or pri vate i nsurance compani es, as appropri ate.
IDENTIFICATION NUMBERING
B-302. There are vari ous types of owner-appl i ed numberi ng systems used to
mark personal hi gh-val ue i tems. Cri teri a that shoul d be consi dered i n
determi ni ng whi ch owner-appl i ed numberi ng system to i ncorporate i ncl ude
Uni queness, where no two peopl e have the same i denti fi er.
Permanence, so that the owner-appl i ed number wi l l not change.
Ubi qui ty, so that an i denti fyi ng number i s avai l abl e to any i ndi vi dual
who desi r es one.
Avai l abi l i ty, where the i denti fyi ng number can be easi l y obtai ned and
remembered.
I ndi spensabl e, so that there are i ncenti ves requi ri ng an i ndi vi dual to
have the number.
FM 3-19.30
Pri vacy, so that the number i s not a means of i nfri ngi ng upon an
i ndi vi dual s ri ght to pri vacy.
Uni formi ty, so that the owner-appl i ed number woul d be readi l y
recogni zed by l aw-enforcement agenci es who handl e or come i nto
contact wi th the recovered property.
Traceabi l i ty, so that the property owner can be i denti fi ed and l ocated.
B-303. The most commonl y used owner-appl i ed numberi ng systems i ncl ude
Dri vers l i cense number wi th the i ssui ng state abbrevi ati on prefi x.
Soci al securi ty number.
Personal numbers assi gned to i ndi vi dual s by a l ocal l aw-enforcement
agency.
Personal numbers wi th the marki ng agencys Nati onal Cri me
I nformati on Center ori gi nati ng-agency I D number.
A pri vate numberi ng system mai ntai ned by a commerci al organi zati on.
STANDARD ARMY NUMBERING SYSTEM
B-304. To ensure that cri teri a for property I D numberi ng are met, the
standard Army-wi de, owner-appl i ed numberi ng system i s desi gnated as the
servi ce members soci al securi ty number wi th a USA prefi x. Upon recovery
of l ost or stol en property by other mi l i tary or ci vi l i an l aw-enforcement
agenci es, the USA prefi x, owner-appl i ed number woul d al ert the recoveri ng
agency that the property bel ongs to a member of the Army. The recoveri ng
agency can then contact the nearest Army i nstal l ati ons PMO/securi ty offi ce
concerni ng the property and the owner-appl i ed number i nscri bed. The servi ce
number can then be i denti fi ed and l ocated through the Army worl dwi de
l ocator system. Si nce thi s l ocator system l i sts onl y soci al securi ty numbers
and l ocati ons of acti ve Army servi ce members, fami l y members shoul d al so
use the servi ce members soci al securi ty number wi th the USA prefi x when
marki ng thei r personal i tems.
IDENTIFYING AND LOCATING OWNERS OF RECOVERED PROPERTY
B-305. The i nstal l ati ons PMO/securi ty offi cer shoul d be the i ni ti ator of tracer
acti ons to i denti fy and l ocate the owner of recovered property marked by the
standard Army Operati on I D numberi ng system. Conti nuous l i ai son shoul d be
mai ntai ned wi th l ocal ci vi l i an l aw-enforcement agenci es and other mi l i tary
i nstal l ati ons to ensure that they are cogni zant of the standard Army owner-
appl i ed numberi ng system and wi l l contact the PMO/securi ty offi ce upon
recovery of pri vate property marked wi th thi s system. The PMO/securi ty
offi cer shoul d readi l y accept custody of the pri vate property i f the recoveri ng
agency i s wi l l i ng to rel ease the property and i t i s not requi red as evi dence for
cri mi nal prosecuti on.
B-306. Upon noti fi cati on of recovered property and the i nscri bed Army
standard owner-appl i ed number, the PMO/securi ty offi cer shoul d contact the
servi ci ng mi l i tary personnel offi ce (MI LPO) for assi stance i n determi ni ng the
name and l ocati on of the property owner by usi ng the Armys worl dwi de
l ocator mi crofi che.
FM 3-19.30
B-307. I f the owner-appl i ed soci al securi ty number i s not l i sted on the Armys
worl dwi de l ocator mi crofi che and the servi ci ng MI LPO i s unabl e to provi de
the requested i nformati on, the PMO/securi ty offi ce shoul d contact the
fol l owi ng offi ces:
For enl i sted members: USA Enl i sted Records and Eval uati on Center,
ATTN: PCRE-RF-L, Fort Benjami n Harri son, I ndi ana 46249.
For offi cers: PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S, 200 Stoval l Street,
Al exandri a, Vi rgi ni a 22332-0444.
For warrant offi cers: PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-OPW, 200 Stoval l
Street, Al exandri a, Vi rgi ni a 22332-0444.
B-308. I n case the owner-appl i ed number cannot be i denti fi ed by ei ther the
servi ci ng MI LPO or the USA Enl i sted Records and Eval uati on Center, the
Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) shoul d be contacted for
assi stance. The AR-PERSCOM retai ns fi l es on separated, reti red, and Reserve
component Army members. Wri tten requests shoul d be forwarded to:
Commander, AR-PERSCOM, ATTN: ARTC-PS, 1 Reserve Way, St. Loui s,
Mi ssouri 63132.
B-309. When the name and l ocati on of the servi ce member associ ated wi th
the owner-appl i ed number i nscri bed on the property i s veri fi ed, the PMO/
securi ty offi ce shoul d noti fy the servi ce member i n wri ti ng that the property
has been recovered. The noti fi cati on shoul d ascertai n i f the recovered property
bel ongs to the servi ce member, i f the servi ce member ever reported the
property as l ost or stol en, and i f a cl ai m was submi tted to the SJA cl ai ms
servi ce for l oss or theft of the property. Noti fi cati on shoul d al so state where
the property i s l ocated and a poi nt of contact that the owner can deal wi th for
the return of the property. I f the property i s to be retai ned as evi dence for l egal
proceedi ngs, the owner shoul d be i nformed that the property wi l l be returned
upon compl eti on of the proceedi ng. A copy of thi s l etter shoul d be provi ded to
the US Army Cl ai ms Servi ce, Fort Meade, Maryl and 20755. The Army Cl ai ms
Servi ce wi l l advi se the PMO/securi ty offi ce i f a cl ai m was or was not
submi tted.
B-310. I f the owner cannot be l ocated, recovered property i n the custody of the
PM/securi ty offi ces shoul d be di sposed of accordi ng to AR 190-22 and DOD
4160.21-M.
USE OF THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER
B-311. Stol en arti cl es may be entered i nto the Nati onal Cri me I nformati on
Center (NCI C) fi l e i f a theft report has been made, i f the i tem i s val ued at
$500 or more, and i f i t has a uni que manufacturers assi gned seri al number
and/or owner-appl i ed number. Enteri ng stol en personal property i tems
meeti ng the above cri teri a i nto the NCI C or other pol i ce i nformati on systems
as outl i ned i n AR 190-27 i s encouraged.
NEIGHBORHOOD WALKS
B-312. Whi l e most peopl e are unwi l l i ng to parti ci pate more acti vel y than as
observers i n a nei ghborhood watch, there are some i ndi vi dual s who want to
become more acti vel y i nvol ved i n securi ng thei r nei ghborhoods. For thi s
FM 3-19.30
segment of the popul ati on, the organi zati on of nei ghborhood wal ks provi des
a wel come opportuni ty to make a more acti ve contri buti on. The basi c i dea i s
si mpl e; resi dents patrol on foot thr ough thei r own nei ghbor hoods to obser ve
and report cri me. I n practi ce, i t i s a l i ttl e more compl i cated; however,
nei ghborhood wal ks can have a dramati c i mpact on the cri me rate, so the
effort expended i s worthwhi l e. The poi nts that must be consi dered are
Patrol composition. Both adul ts and teenage chi l dren can vol unteer
to parti ci pate i n nei ghborhood wal ks. However, there shoul d be at l east
one adul t i n each party. There shoul d be at l east two peopl e i n each
patrol group. Groups of four to si x i ndi vi dual s are desi rabl e si nce, by
thei r numbers al one, they di scourage attacks on the wal kers. Larger
groups are al so more fun, and thi s i s i mportant when vol unteers are
provi di ng the manpower.
Times/patrol duration. As wi th other cri me-preventi on programs,
mai ntai ni ng a hi gh l evel of i nterest can be a probl em. A successful
wal k program i n Phi l adel phi a schedul es groups for one 2-hour patrol
per month. More frequent tours caused hi gh drop-out rates among
parti ci pants. Nei ghborhood wal ks shoul d be conducted onl y duri ng
those ti mes when the cri me rate i s the hi ghest. Normal l y, there are not
enough vol unteers to conduct wal ks at ti mes other than peak cri me
peri ods.
Functions. Members of nei ghborhood-wal k groups must understand
that they are to observe onl y and not acti vel y i ntervene i n cri mi nal
acts. Parti ci pants and the government are l egal l y l i abl e for thei r
acti ons duri ng wal ks. When a cri me or a suspi ci ous acti vi ty i s spotted,
the nei ghborhood wal kers shoul d report i t to the pol i ce. I n
Phi l adel phi a, the wal kers are equi pped wi th horns. When a cri me i s
spotted, they acti vate thei r horn and go to the nearest house to cal l the
pol i ce. When resi dents hear the wal kers horn, those i n the i mmedi ate
area turn on al l of thei r l i ghts and sound thei r own horns. The noi se
and i ncreased l i ghti ng i nvari abl y causes the cri mi nal to fl ee.
Neighborhood escorts. I n addi ti on to observi ng and reporti ng
cri mi nal acti vi ty, nei ghborhood patrol s can escort chi l dren and ol der
persons between communi ty-servi ce faci l i ti es and resi dences. They can
al so request that owners secure property when they fi nd i t unsecured;
for exampl e, when there are unsecured bi cycl es parked on a front l awn.
VIGILANTISM
B-313. Whi l e acti ve communi ty parti ci pati on i s essenti al , vi gi l anti sm must be
di scouraged at al l costs. Both formal l aw codes and US common l aw offer few
pr otecti ons for pri vate ci ti zens who take the l aw i nto thei r own hands. Bl ock
captai ns and i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on offi cers must be al ert for
i ndi cati ons that nei ghborhood patrol s are doi ng more than observi ng and take
swi ft remedi al acti on when requi red. Of course, al l nonpol i ce parti ci pants
must be prohi bi ted from carryi ng weapons of any type whi l e engaged i n cri me-
preventi on programs. Experi ence i n nei ghborhoods havi ng much hi gher
vi ol ent cri me rates than found on Army i nstal l ati ons has demonstrated that
passi ve devi ces l i ke horns or whi stl es were adequate to di scourage attacks.
FM 3-19.30
These devi ces, pl us the assi gnment of four to si x i ndi vi dual s to a nei ghborhood
patrol , provi de suffi ci ent protecti on.
MOBILE PATROLS
B-314. Some communi ti es wi th hi gh street-cri me rates have been successful
i n organi zi ng pri vate ci ti zens i nto mobi l e-patrol programs. Li ke nei ghborhood
foot patr ol s, these mobi l e patrol s ser ve as the eyes and ears of the pol i ce but
do not acti vel y i ntervene when they spot a cri me i n progress.
B-315. I n a typi cal program, bl ock captai ns or pol i ce cri me-preventi on offi cers
assi gn speci fi c patrol areas to each pri vate mobi l e patrol . I n addi ti on, each
patrol recei ves trai ni ng on the patrol s functi ons, communi cati ons procedures,
and emergency acti ons. Normal l y, patrol s are i nstructed to bl ow thei r auto
horns steadi l y when they observe a cri me i n progress. Thi s i s usual l y
suffi ci ent to dri ve off the cri mi nal .
B-316. Most pri vate ci ti zen patrol s use cel l ul ar tel ephones or ci ti zens band
(CB) radi os as di rect communi cati ons l i nks wi th the supporti ng pol i ce
department. I nstal l ati on CB radi o cl ubs are often wi l l i ng to sponsor anti cri me
patrol s under pol i ce supervi si on. Commerci al taxi compani es that operate on
mi l i tary i nstal l ati ons are al so excel l ent candi dates to organi ze i nto patrol s.
The cab dri vers normal l y cover most of the hi gh-cri me-rate areas on the
i nstal l ati on. Because of the frequency wi th whi ch they cover them, they are
fami l i ar wi th the routi ne condi ti ons i n each area and are qui ck to spot
suspi ci ous acti vi ty.
B-317. The government cannot provi de gasol i ne for POVs used for anti cri me
patrol s; however, i t may often provi de magneti c si gns to affi x to the vehi cl e for
i denti fyi ng i t as part of the pol i ce-sponsored, nei ghborhood-patrol program. As
i n the case of foot patrol s, the i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on offi cer must be
al ert for si gns of vi gi l anti sm and must take posi ti ve acti on to di scourage i t i f i t
appears.
PROJ ECT LOCK
B-318. Nearl y one mi l l i on automobi l es are stol en i n the US every year. The
total val ue of cars stol en i s around the bi l l i on dol l ar mark, maki ng auto theft
the nati ons costl i est cri me i nvol vi ng property. Of even greater i mportance i s
the soci al i mpact of auto theft. For a growi ng number of young peopl e each
year, steal i ng cars represents the fi rst step toward a l i fe of cri me.
B-319. Pol i ce agenci es have been di l i gent i n the apprehensi on of auto thi eves
and the recovery of stol en vehi cl es, but the auto-theft probl em seems to be
more amenabl e to i mprovement through preventi on rather than puni shment.
Barri ng stri ct securi ty, auto theft i s one of the easi er cri mes to commi t. Al l
vehi cl es l eft unattended are vul nerabl e, and wi despread preventi on by pol i ce
survei l l ance i s a physi cal i mpossi bi l i ty.
B-320. The probl em has grown to seri ous proporti ons despi te determi ned l aw
enforcement because motori sts conti nue to be negl i gent or unaware of thei r
responsi bi l i ty. As l ong as peopl e i nvi te theft by l eavi ng thei r cars unl ocked or
l eavi ng the key i n the i gni ti on, auto thefts wi l l conti nue to cl i mb. Al most hal f
FM 3-19.30
of al l stol en cars each year had been l eft wi th keys i n the i gni ti on; ni ne out of
ten of the stol en vehi cl es had been l eft unl ocked.
B-321. I f a si gni fi cant reducti on i s to be made, the motori sts themsel ves must
make i t. Wi despread adopti on of accepted and effecti ve preventi on practi ces
by motori sts presents the most l ogi cal and i mmedi ate i mprovement to thi s
growi ng probl em.
B-322. I n 1963, the Boston pol i ce department conducted a broad i nformati on
campai gn wi th the assi stance of the Nati onal Automobi l e Theft Bureau and
the I nsurance I nformati on I nsti tute. Si nce then, more than 525 Lock Your
Car campai gns have been hel d i n about 400 communi ti es i n 49 states.
B-323. I n the months fol l owi ng these campai gns i n such ci ti es as Denver,
Chi cago, Atl anta, and San Franci sco, si gni fi cant reducti ons i n the number of
auto thefts (rangi ng from 9 to 54 percent) have been recorded. Undoubtedl y,
the Lock Your Car campai gns contri buted to reduci ng auto-theft stati sti cs.
B-324. Project Lock i s desi gned to permi t sponsori ng groups to conduct one-
day or one-week Lock Your Car campai gns. I ts purpose i s twofol d; i t
Al erts the publ i c on the i mportance of l ocki ng cars and removi ng keys
as a deterrent to auto theft.
Contri butes to the wel fare of youths by preventi ng the commi ssi on of a
fi rst cri me.
B-325. The fol l owi ng materi al s can be ordered to support Project Lock:
Wi ndshi el d fl yers.
I denti fyi ng i nsi gni a to be worn by i nspectors.
Tal l y cards for noti ng cars l eft wi th keys i n i gni ti ons or unl ocked doors.
B-326. Groups consi deri ng sponsorshi p of thi s campai gn shoul d consi der
i nstal l ati on areas known to have car-theft probl ems. The PMO shoul d assi gn
patrol men to accompany the teams on i nspecti on day. Usual l y, the teams
routes can be arranged to fi t the regul ar patrol s of the MP offi cers. I f
uni formed pol i ce wi l l not be avai l abl e, the campai gn shoul d not be hel d.
COMMUNITY ORIENTATION
B-327. I f the commander desi res, a communi ty ori entati on meeti ng mi ght be
hel d a month or so i n advance of the campai gn. Thi s woul d be more desi rabl e
for a week-l ong rather than a day-l ong campai gn. I f such a meeti ng i s
pl anned, the PMO shoul d i ssue i nvi tati ons to representati ves of the
i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on counci l , servi ce cl ubs, womens cl ubs, PTOs,
hi gh school s, and churches.
B-328. The meeti ng shoul d be opened wi th an i ntroducti on of the i nstal l ati on
commander. After appropri ate comments, the commander woul d read a
procl amati on setti ng the date for Lock-Your-Car Week. I f possi bl e, a
representati ve of the Nati onal Automobi l e Theft Bureau shoul d be asked to
address the meeti ng. An al ternati ve woul d be to have the PM revi ew nati onal
and l ocal trends i n auto thefts stressi ng the i mportance of the forthcomi ng
campai gn. I n concl usi on, a representati ve of the sponsori ng group mi ght
revi ew the schedul e of acti vi ti es for the campai gn.
FM 3-19.30
PROGRAMACTIVITIES
B-329. I f the campai gn i s conducted i n one day, a ki ck-off breakfast mi ght be
substi tuted for the ori entati on meeti ng. The program and the attendance
mi ght be si mi l ar i f a weekl ong campai gn i s pl anned and the ori entati on
meeti ng were hel d. The ki ck-off breakfast mi ght have a si mpl e program wi th
attendance l i mi ted to the sponsori ng group and pol i ce representati ves. An
al ternati ve to the breakfast woul d be a l uncheon at whi ch resul ts to the
moment are reported. Whether the campai gn wi l l l ast a week or a day, the
general acti vi ti es wi l l be si mi l ar.
B-330. Wi th the assi stance of the MP offi cers, the i nstal l ati on shoul d be zoned
accordi ng to the establ i shed MP patrol areas where possi bl e. The si ze and
number of the zones wi l l depend on the number of pol i ce and vol unteer
personnel that wi l l be avai l abl e. However, the zones shoul d cover most of the
i nstal l ati ons servi ce areas, troop bi l l et areas, and fami l y-housi ng areas.
B-331. The i nspecti on teams are each composed of a uni formed patrol man
and three to fi ve sponsori ng group members, cover thei r assi gned zones and
pl ace fl yers under the wi ndshi el d wi pers of al l cars found to have keys i n the
i gni ti on or to be unl ocked. Under no ci rcumstances shoul d the fl yers be pl aced
i nsi de the cars, even through open wi ndows.
B-332. I t i s suggested that fl yers be ordered earl y enough to al l ow a l ocal
pri nter to i nscri be an overl eaf statement such as Thi s publ i c servi ce i s
provi ded as a courtesy of the MP force. The tal l y cards shoul d be used to
record the number of cars i nspected, the number that were unl ocked, and the
number wi th keys i n the i gni ti on.
SCHOOL PROGRAM
B-333. The cri me-preventi on offi ce mi ght sponsor a poster contest for art
students. I t shoul d be announced at l east a month before the campai gn to
al l ow the entri es to be pl aced i n publ i c i n advance of the date. The PMO
shoul d present awards i n an offi ce ceremony. The ceremony shoul d take pl ace
at noon on the campai gn day or mi dweek i f the campai gn i s l onger.
PUBLIC ADDRESSES
B-334. Cl ose to or duri ng the campai gn date, addresses by cri me-preventi on
professi onal s shoul d be schedul ed for programs of servi ce cl ubs, womens
cl ubs, PTOs, and other ci vi c groups. Wel l i n advance of the campai gn, the PAO
shoul d be vi si ted by the PM and the other sponsors to devel op comprehensi ve
i nternal -i nformati on programs i n support of the i nstal l ati ons Project Lock.
Pl ans for the publ i c-affai rs program shoul d i ncl ude advance publ i ci ty for the
campai gn, coverage of events duri ng the campai gn, and wrap-up coverage
fol l owi ng i ts compl eti on. Duri ng the i nspecti on days, fi ndi ngs on how many
cars were unl ocked and how many had keys i n the i gni ti on shoul d be reported
regul arl y to a headquarters (preferabl y to the MP uni t).
CONCLUSION
B-335. Project Lock has been outl i ned to provi de basi c suggesti ons for a Lock
Your Car day or week. No procedure can be desi gned to fi t al l needs or
FM 3-19.30
ci rcumstances, and vari ati ons often wi l l be desi rabl e. However, i f the
suggesti ons and the materi al s contai ned i n thi s secti on are used, Project Lock
wi l l not be di ffi cul t to organi ze and conduct. I t provi des better publ i ci ty
opportuni ti es than most publ i c-servi ce projects. I t presents an opportuni ty for
acti ve parti ci pati on by a number of cri me-preventi on groups. I t has been fi el d-
tested and found to be an outstandi ng success.
B-336. Eval uati ons of i nstal l ati on cri me-preventi on programs (see Fi gure
B-9, page B-80) do not rel y on control groups, a ti ght control of vari abl es, or
el aborate stati sti cal anal yses to produce worthwhi l e resul ts. Most often, the
resources to conduct a formal eval uati on that wi l l stand up to ri gorous
academi c scruti ny are not avai l abl e.
CRIME-PREVENTION PROGRAMS
B-337. Sever al i nher ent di ffi cul ti es i n data col l ecti on on cr i me-pr eventi on
pr ogr ams make i t di ffi cul t to deter mi ne wi th 100 per cent accur acy that a
parti cul ar r educti on i n the cr i me r ate was a r esul t of a par ti cul ar cr i me-
pr eventi on measur e (unl ess a ver y el abor ate anal ysi s and contr ol system ar e
used). These di ffi cul ti es i ncl ude the contr ol of var i abl es, the di spl acement
effect, and unr epor ted cr i me.
CONTROL OF VARIABLES
B-338. I n i ts si mpl est form, the type of eval uati on most commonl y used i n
academi c or sci enti fi c setti ngs seeks to determi ne the rel ati onshi p between
two vari abl es. By varyi ng the i ndependent vari abl e (for exampl e, the dosage of
a drug), the effect on the dependent vari abl e (for exampl e, a pul se rate) i s
determi ned whi l e al l other vari abl es (such as food i ntake) are hel d constant.
B-339. Al though more compl ex i n form, the same model can be used to
eval uate compl ex programs. Experi mental and control groups can be sel ected.
The treatment can be admi ni stered by researchers or those taught by
researchers. The resul ts can be anal yzed for thei r stati sti cal si gni fi cance.
However, si nce cri me-preventi on programs deal wi th human subjects, certai n
compl i cati ons ari se. The degree of success may have nothi ng to do wi th the
effi cacy of the program, but onl y wi th the way i t was i ntroduced or wi th the
personal predi l ecti ons of the groups i nvol ved. There i s no standard
popul ati on; human bei ngs are not standardi zed as mi ce are for l aboratory
purposes. A program found successful at one i nstal l ati on may be a fai l ure i n
another.
B-340. These consi derati ons al so appl y i n the eval uati on of cri me-control
programs. Thi s eval uati on i s further compl i cated by another probl emthe
peopl e whose behavi or i s to be modi fi ed (the offenders) cannot be treated
di rectl y or separated i nto experi mental and control groups; they wi l l not stand
up and be counted. Al though publ i c-heal th programs often encounter thi s
probl em, they often deal wi th physi cal cause-and-effect l i nks between
treatment and i mprovement. The same i s not true for cri me-control programs.
SECTION VI EVALUATION
FM 3-19.30
The effecti veness of these programs i s normal l y determi ned by l ooki ng at
stati sti cs of reported cri me and arrests, whi ch are more i ndi rect i ndi cators.
B-341. I n a cri me-control program, i t may be i mpossi bl e to cl assi fy vari abl es
as dependent and i ndependent; they may al l affect and be affected by each
other. Furthermore, because of the di ffi cul ty i n determi ni ng why peopl e
behave the way they do, a number of i nterveni ng and antecedent vari abl es
Develop
program
objectives
Identify
measures of
effectiveness
Identify
data
requirements
Develop
baseline
data
Collect
program
data
Identify
changes
caused by
program
Describe
results and
recommended
changes
Figure B-9. Crime-Prevention Program Evaluation
FM 3-19.30
may go unnoti ced. Pol i ce programs desi gned to reduce cri me may have thei r
most di rect effect on the behavi or of the general publ i c toward the pol i ce,
whi ch i n turn affects the cri me rate.
B-342. Eval uati ons are not necessari l y restri cted to the anal ysi s of objecti ve
cri me data; they can al so i ncl ude subjecti ve consi derati ons and percepti ons.
These subjecti ve eval uati ons can be of si gni fi cant benefi t i n augmenti ng the
stati sti cal anal yses of the programs resul ts. They are especi al l y hel pful i n
assessi ng why and how a program worked and whether a stati sti cal outcome
i s actual l y evi dence that the program was successful . I ntervi ews of
parti ci pati ng agency personnel and resi dents of the programs area are
usual l y used to suppl y thi s i nformati on. They can gi ve the eval uator new
i nsi ght i nto the actual program operati on.
DISPLACEMENT EFFECT
B-343. I n many cases where cri me reducti ons have been measured and
attri buted to programs, i t i s uncl ear whether there has been an actual
reducti on i n cri me or whether the cri me has been di spl aced. The amount of
di spl acement depends to an extent on the offenders characteri sti cs. An
opportuni sti c offender can be pi ctured as havi ng a rel ati vel y el asti c demand
i f the ri sk i s too hi gh, he wi l l forgo the cri me. An addi ct offender i s typi cal l y
pi ctured as havi ng a rel ati vel y i nel asti c demand for the product because of hi s
i nel asti c demand for drugsdespi te the ri sks, he needs the product.
B-344. Deterrents may have l i ttl e effect on perpetrators of expressi ve cri mes.
These are cri mes i n whi ch the perpetrator i s emoti onal l y i nvol ved and i s
expressi ng these emoti ons. Most assaul ts and homi ci des fi t thi s category. On
the other hand, deterrents may have a strong effect on i nstrumental cri mes,
those that are seen by the offender onl y as a means to an end (usual l y money).
I f al ternati ve avenues to the same end are made more attracti ve by
compari son, the offender may wel l be deterred. Deterrence may produce a
di versi on to l egal al ternati ves to cri me; i t al so may cause di spl acement to
i l l egal al ternati ves.
Displacement to Other Crimes
B-345. There i s no i mmutabl e l aw that says a burgl ar cannot hol d up a l i quor
store and a robber cannot burgl ari ze a warehouse. I f a speci fi c cri me or a set of
cri mes i s the target of a cri me-control program, offenders may deci de to avoi d
the target cri mes and pl y thei r trade i n other ways. Some offenders wi l l be
deterred from al l cri me i f thei r cri me speci al ty i s the object of a cri me-control
program, but the extent of thi s deterrence shoul d not be overesti mated. The
statutory categori es of cri me shoul d not be confused wi th categori es that serve
to cl assi fy offenders.
B-346. I n some cases, the resul t of di spl aci ng offenders to other cri mes i s
benefi ci al . I f the targeted cri mes are more seri ous than the ones to whi ch
offenders are di verted, the net effect on the program may be the reduced
danger to soci ety. Of course, the converse may al so be true; cl osi ng off the
vul nerabl e and more easi l y protected targets of cri me may cause an offender
to commi t more seri ous cri mes wi th a net i ncrease i n the danger to soci ety.
FM 3-19.30
B-347. I n some i nstances, the i ndi vi dual effect may be substanti al but the
overal l effect may be negl i gi bl e. Protecti ng a smal l fracti on of premi ses
agai nst burgl ary wi l l reduce the number of cri mes commi tted agai nst them,
but the burgl ary rate agai nst unprotected premi ses may go up.
Displacement to Other Tactics and Targets
B-348. Offenders can change thei r manner of commi tti ng a cri me when a new
program i s establ i shed to counter thei r acti vi ty. One exampl e of thi s took pl ace
i n 1969 i n a secti on of the Bronx that was havi ng a rapi d i ncrease i n outdoor
cri me. The cri mes took pl ace pri mari l y i n the eveni ng hours when peopl e were
returni ng from work. The program i nsti tuted by the pol i ce consi sted of
i ntensi ve sweeps of randoml y sel ected ci ty bl ocks, coupl ed wi th pl ai ncl othes
pol i ce offi cers patrol l i ng the streets. I t succeeded i n reduci ng the number of
offenses commi tted duri ng the eveni ng hours, but at the expense of i ncreasi ng
the number taki ng pl ace i n the l ate afternoon when patrol men were taki ng
thei r l unch hours or were occupi ed wi th school crossi ngs or shi ft changes.
Displacement to Other Areas
B-349. The most frequentl y di scussed type of cri me di spl acement i s from one
area to another. For i nstance, i t has been cyni cal l y suggested that the goal of
the New York subway pol i ce i s to chase cri me i nto the streets where i t bel ongs.
More seri ousl y, some recent pol i ce-hel i copter-program eval uati ons have been
questi oned because they di d not consi der possi bl e area di spl acements.
B-350. One type of boundary of i nterest to cri me di spl acement i s the
juri sdi cti onal boundary between the i nstal l ati on and surroundi ng ci ti es. I t
has been conjectured that the cri me reducti on experi enced i n some central
ci ti es has been at the expense of the surroundi ng suburbs that have
experi enced i ncreased cri me rates.
B-351. An i ni ti al study of cri me di spl acement was performed for the
Washi ngton, DC, area. I t concl uded that, al though the decrease i n
Washi ngtons cri me rate was concurrent wi th an i ncrease i n the suburban
cri me rate, there i s no evi dence that the reducti on i n reported cri me i n
Washi ngton, DC, has resul ted i n a correspondi ng cri me i ncrease i n the nearby
suburbs.
B-352. The area-di spl acement effect can be measured wi th some degree of
rel i abi l i ty. Three zones can be defi ned for the purposes of the measurement
the area contai ni ng the cri me-control program (zone 1), a border around the
area (zone 2), and the area chosen as the control area (zone 3). The wi dth of
the border may depend on the type of program i mpl emented. I f the program
i nvol ves pol i ce hel i copters, a quarter-mi l e-wi de border may be necessary; for a
patrol car, one or two bl ocks may suffi ce.
B-353. Cri me rates before program i ni ti ati on shoul d be determi ned for al l
three zones. I f zone 2 records a greater i ncrease i n cri me than zone 3 whi l e
zone 1s cri me rate decreases, then the i ncrease i n zone 2 can be attri buted to
two factors
The general i ncrease i n cri me rate veri fi ed by any i ncrease i n zone 3.
The i ncrease caused by a di spl acement of cri me from zone 1.
FM 3-19.30
B-354. A di spl acement of thi s cri me does not mean that the program i s
i neffecti ve. I t may suggest that the program shoul d be expanded for al l three
zones.
UNREPORTED CRIME
B-355. Cri me stati sti cs are based on cri mes reported to the pol i ce. I t i s wel l
known that many cri mes go unreported. Vi cti mi zati on studi es can determi ne
the extent of unreported cri me and i ts change from year to year by area of the
country or the reasons for fai l ure to report them. These vi cti mi zati on studi es
are best sui ted to determi ni ng l ong-term effects. They are not wel l sui ted to
most cri me-control eval uati ons i n whi ch short-term changes must be assessed.
B-356. The amount of unreported cri me i s i mportant but not for pl anni ng
cri me-control programs affecti ng pol i ce acti vi ti es. The extent of unreported
cri mes i s of l i ttl e si gni fi cance unl ess a program affects i t. I f a program
encourages reported cri me, the reported-cri me rate may i ncrease despi te the
programs effecti veness.
B-357. I roni cal l y, a l owered reported-cri me rate may be the di rect resul t of an
i ncrease i n the actual cri me rate. Taki ng reports from vi cti ms of cri mes
occupi es a substanti al amount of a patrol mans ti me. Many of these cri mes are
mi nor and have no potenti al for sol uti on. I n an effort to i ncrease the pol i ce
departments ti me on patrol , some pol i ce chi efs have stopped the practi ce of
sendi ng a patrol man to get reports from the vi cti m of a mi nor cri me. Thi s
requi res the vi cti m to travel to the pol i ce stati on to report the cri me. I f the
cri me i s mi nor or i s seen by the vi cti m to be unsol vabl e or the theft i s not
covered by i nsurance, the vi cti m may deci de not to i nconveni ence hi msel f by
goi ng to the pol i ce stati on to report the cri me. Therefore, the number of cri mes
reported to the pol i ce may drop. Thi s may l ead to a l arger number of
unreported cri mes and prevent a compl ete pi cture to the cri me-preventi on
counsel . Conversel y, an actual decrease i n cri me due to the i ncreased
effecti veness of the pol i ce may produce an i ncrease i n the reported cri me rate.
CRIME RATES
B-358. I t has been poi nted out that the cri me rates, as presentl y cal cul ated,
do not refl ect the true si tuati on. For exampl e, the rape rate shoul d be
cal cul ated by di vi di ng the annual number of rape cases by the number of
women (si nce they are the popul ati on at ri sk). You woul d expect that the rate
of commerci al burgl ari es woul d be l ess i n a resi denti al area than a commerci al
area. When cal cul ated on the basi s of per thousand peopl e, thi s woul d be
true; however, these rates shoul d be obtai ned by di vi di ng the number of cases
by the number of commerci al establ i shments (the popul ati on at ri sk) i n each
area.
B-359. The vi cti m or the target i s onl y one aspect of the cri me. The offender
can al so be cal cul ated i nto the rate. For exampl e, the potenti al offenders i n
stranger-to-stranger cri mes are usual l y consi dered to be mal es between 16
and 25 years of age. Therefore, one woul d expect fewer of these cri mes i n a ci ty
ful l of pensi oners and reti rees than i n a ci ty of the same popul ati on but wi th a
hi gher proporti on of young men. Thi s fact i s of mi nor i mportance i n eval uati ng
cri me-control programs, si nce the age di stri buti on of peopl e i n a ci ty or a
FM 3-19.30
secti on of a ci ty does not normal l y change greatl y over the eval uati on peri od.
However, the former factor (the popul ati on at ri sk of becomi ng vi cti mi zed) can
be mi sl eadi ng i f i t i s not taken i nto account. I f possi bl e, cri me rates i n
experi mental and control areas shoul d be compared to the popul ati on that
ri sks becomi ng vi cti ms of the target cri mes.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
B-360. The goal s of the program determi ne the cri teri a that are used to
measure i ts effecti veness. These goal s and cri teri a shoul d not be seen as
confi ni ng; the eval uator shoul d be amenabl e to broadeni ng the cri teri a,
especi al l y i f the program to be eval uated i s a new one. For exampl e, the
program mi ght be benefi ci al i n some unforeseen way, whol l y outsi de the
ori gi nal cri teri a. Conversel y, the program may be an overal l fai l ure but a
success accordi ng to the eval uati on. I t may be that the speci fi ed measures
were the wrong ones to use for the program or shoul d not have been used
al one.
B-361. Programs ai med at control l i ng cri me shoul d not be eval uated sol el y for
thei r effect on cri me. Most programs cannot, by thei r very nature, focus on one
speci fi c objecti ve al one. They normal l y are mul ti faceted i n thei r effect and
shoul d be eval uated wi th respect to al l of thei r facets. Si mi l arl y, the measures
of effecti veness di scussed i n thi s secti on may not be adequate for every cri me-
control program, but they compri se some of the more useful measures that can
be used.
B-362. Thi s secti on concentrates on the two eval uati on typesi nternal and
external . I nternal and external refer to whether the eval uati on i s conducted
on the programs i nner worki ngs and l ogi c or the external effect of the
program (whi ch depends on the program type). An i nternal eval uati on of a
cri me-control program i nvol vi ng the use of new pol i ce patrol techni ques woul d
i ncl ude the anal ysi s of pol i ce response ti me and how i t was effecti ve i n
control l i ng cri me or why i t was successful i n one area and not i n another. The
external eval uati on woul d focus onl y on the effecti veness of the program i n
reduci ng cri me rates or sol vi ng cri mes, not on how or why or the condi ti ons
under whi ch the resul ts were achi eved.
B-363. Eval uati ng how wel l a program achi eved i ts goal s i s not the onl y
purpose of an eval uati on; how and why the resul ts were achi eved are of equal
i mportance. External measures rel ate to the former eval uati on; i nternal
measures are concerned wi th the l atter. The fol l owi ng exampl es wi l l further
ser ve to hi ghl i ght the di ffer ences between these measur es:
Many cri me-control programs depend on good communi ty rel ati ons i n
order to achi eve thei r goal s. I n these cases, a publ i c-affai rs campai gn i s
often i nsti tuted concurrent wi th the cri me-control program. The
success of the publ i c-affai rs campai gn shoul d not be i nterpreted as
program success. I t may be a necessary part of the program, but i t does
not substi tute for the resul ts of the program i n control l i ng cri me.
Testi moni al s from peopl e i nvol ved i n the program shoul d al so be
consi dered onl y as a suppl ement to the eval uati on based on external
measures.
FM 3-19.30
A study undertaken for the Presi dents Cri me Commi ssi on showed that
for certai n types of i nci dents, the probabi l i ty of arrest i ncreased as the
response ti me decreased. As a resul t of thi s fi ndi ng, many pol i ce
departments purchased new equi pment or tri ed novel techni ques to
reduce response ti me wi thout fi rst determi ni ng whether thei r
workl oads i ncl uded enough of the i nci dents for whi ch qui ck response i s
useful . I f thi s measure (response ti me) i s to be used, i t shoul d be
recogni zed as an i nternal measure and not substi tuted for the external
eval uati on.
INTERNAL MEASURES
B-364. Each program wi l l have i ts own i nternal measures of effecti veness
based on the l ogi cal el ements of whi ch i t i s consti tuted. Thi s secti on covers
onl y the i nternal measures of effecti veness that are common to most cri me-
control program eval uati ons. The measures covered i ncl ude the cri me rate,
the cl earance rate, the arrest rate, the cri me-seri ousness i ndex, and the fear of
cri me.
CRIME RATE
B-365. The cri me rate (the number of a speci fi ed type of cri me commi tted per
resi dent i n a speci fi ed ti me peri od) i s normal l y consi dered to be a measure of
deterrence. I f the cri me rate decreases, i t i s presumed that potenti al offenders
have modi fi ed thei r behavi or to some extent and have commi tted fewer
cri mes. Thi s i s based on the assumpti on that the program has made the target
cri mes unattracti ve by i ncreasi ng the actual or percei ved ri sk of
apprehensi on, by reduci ng the expected return from the cri me, or by maki ng
al ternati ve forms of behavi or more attracti ve than the target group of
offenses.
B-366. These deterrent effects use di fferent means for thei r accompl i shment.
Most cri me-control programs are pol i ce-ori ented and concentrate on the ri sk-
rel ated aspects of deterrence. Vi cti m-ori ented programs focus on reduci ng the
expected return. Many soci al and recreati onal programs deal wi th maki ng
al ternati ves more attracti ve. Regardl ess of the ori entati on of the programs,
thei r deterrent effects are determi ned by measuri ng reported cri me rates.
B-367. Reported cri me rates can be changed by a number of factors, some of
whi ch are mi sl eadi ng. The publ i c may feel that the pol i ce are becomi ng l ess
effecti ve i n deal i ng wi th cri mes and, therefore, report them l ess often.
Conversel y, i f the publ i c percei ves that the pol i ce are becomi ng more effecti ve,
they may begi n to report cri mes that previ ousl y woul d have gone unreported.
Another apparent cri me-rate reducti on may be due to the pol i ce not recordi ng
cri mes that have been reported to them. Di spl acement effects that can
produce mi sl eadi ng cri me-rate reducti ons were di scussed earl i er.
B-368. There may al so be an actual reducti on i n cri me due to a programs
deterrent effect. I n some cases, the reducti on i n cri me can be attri buted to
psychol ogi cal deterrence. That i s, the pol i ce department may have i nsti tuted
some change (such as pai nti ng al l pol i ce cars canary yel l ow) i n preexi sti ng
patterns of operati on that may cause a change i n the behavi or patterns of
potenti al offenders. Thi s type of deterrence i s rarel y l ong-l i ved.
FM 3-19.30
B-369. On the other hand, there may have been a change i nsti tuted by the
pol i ce that had the desi red effect of i ncreasi ng the actual ri sk of apprehensi on
and, therefore, reduci ng the number of target offenses. An exampl e of thi s i s
the pol i ce-operated burgl ar al arm of commerci al establ i shments. I n the
experi mental program, the number of al arms were i ncreased al most tenfol d
compared to the (nonal armed) control establ i shments. There was 1 capture i n
36 control -group burgl ari es (2.8 percent), whi l e there were 12 captures i n 46
experi mental -group burgl ari es (26 percent). Cri me di spl acements to other
cri mes, tacti cs, targets, and areas reduced the actual effecti veness of the
program, but thi s exampl e shows that a si gni fi cant change can be made i n the
actual ri sk of apprehensi on. Prel i mi nary resul ts i ndi cate that the rate of
i ncrease of commerci al burgl ari es has been decreased from about 15 percent
per year to about 0 percent (at the expense of a greater i ncrease i n resi denti al
burgl ari es).
B-370. I t i s di ffi cul t but useful to di sti ngui sh between actual deterrence (due
to an actual i ncrease i n ri sk) and deterrence that i s purel y psychol ogi cal i n
nature (due to a percei ved i ncrease i n ri sk). I f i t i s suspected that part of the
deterrent effect may be transi ent, a l ong-term study woul d be of benefi t. I n
thi s way, the hal f l i fe of the psychol ogi cal deterrence can be gauged, whi ch can
gi ve some i ndi cati on of the extent to whi ch resources shoul d be commi tted to
the program.
B-371. Some forms of psychol ogi cal deterrence are al most enti rel y
counterproducti ve. They may appear effecti ve to those who woul d not commi t
a cri me and i neffecti ve to those who are i n the busi ness and study the
presumed deterrent more cl osel y. For exampl e, a tear-gas pen may gi ve a
person a sense of securi ty that i s enti rel y wi thout foundati on. I t may be
dangerous to hi m i f he actual l y attempts to use i t when faced wi th an
assai l ant.
B-372. One i nvesti gator has poi nted out that for gi ven cri mi nal si tuati ons,
nondel i nquents percei ve a hi gher ri sk of apprehensi on than do del i nquents; i n
al l probabi l i ty, the del i nquents have a more real i sti c assessment of the
si tuati on. A purel y psychol ogi cal deterrent may have the unfortunate effect of
maki ng onl y a cosmeti c i mprovement. Thi s gi ves the general popul ati on the
i mpressi on that there has been a change for the better, whi l e i n real i ty the
si tuati on may not have changed or may have changed for the worse because of
the di vi si on of resources to a nonexi stent sol uti on.
B-373. The cri me rate can be used as a measure of effecti veness. However, the
eval uator shoul d del ve i nto the determi nati on of the cri me rate to see i f any
change i n the rate refl ects a change i n reporti ng procedures or the deterrent
effect (wi th tangi bl e evi dence).
CLEARANCE RATE
B-374. The cl earance rate i s normal l y consi dered to be a measure of the
abi l i ty of pol i ce to sol ve cri mes. A cl eared cri me i s one i n whi ch the pol i ce have
i denti fi ed the offender and have suffi ci ent evi dence to arrest hi m. The
cl earance rate i s the percentage of total cri mes that were cl eared.
B-375. Thi s measure of effecti veness shoul d be used wi th care. A decreasi ng
cl earance rate may not mean that a pol i ce department i s becomi ng l ess
FM 3-19.30
effecti ve, and an i ncreasi ng cl earance rate may not mean that i t i s becomi ng
more effecti ve. Thi s i s due to a number of factors, pri mari l y the publ i cs
concepti on of the rol e of the pol i ce wi th respect to cri me and the present
method of col l ecti ng cri me data.
B-376. Often overl ooked i n di scussi on about cri me i s the rol e of the publ i c i n
assi sti ng the pol i ce. Pol i ce rel y on communi ty support to l egi ti mi ze thei r
authori ty as wel l as to hel p them carry out thei r work. I f a segment of the
communi ty becomes al i enated from the pol i ce (for whatever reason) and offers
them l i ttl e assi stance i n pursui ng offenders, cri me rates i n these areas may
ri se. However, i t i s not onl y al i enati on of communi ty groups that reduces the
abi l i ty of the pol i ce to deal wi th cri me; the profi t moti ve i s al so to bl ame. Many
store owners that have been robbed refuse to gi ve thei r cl erks ti me off (wi th
pay) to hel p the pol i ce i n thei r i nvesti gati on. They absorb the l oss of a robbery
easi l y (i t rarel y comes cl ose to the amount l ost from shopl i fti ng, empl oyee
theft, and damaged goods) and are unwi l l i ng to i ncrease i t by hel pi ng the
pol i ce. They may feel that the chances of apprehendi ng the offender are too
sl i m, or they may be afrai d of retri buti on i f the offender di scovers thei r
assi stance. They may al so be afrai d that thei r i nsurance wi l l be cancel l ed.
B-377. I f a pol i ce department begi ns a dri ve to i ncrease i ts cl earance rate, the
i ncrease may be forthcomi ng wi thout any real change i n pol i ce effecti veness. A
survey of three pol i ce departments found that arrests for fel oni es were not
made by the pol i ce i n about 43 percent of the cases, i n whi ch there was
probabl e cause, whi l e the pol i ce were accompani ed by wi tnesses. Maki ng
arrests i n such i nstances woul d i nfl ate the cl earance rate qui te easi l y.
However, i t shoul d be noted that the pol i ce offi cer has a great deal of
di screti on i n the exerci se of hi s power of arrest. He may feel that the arrest
charges wi l l not hol d up. One measure of the arrest qual i ty i s the percentage
of arrests that l eads to prosecuti ons.
B-378. I n summary, cl earance rate can be a measure for determi ni ng the
effecti veness of cri me-control programs. I ts use can be i ncreased by careful
sel ecti on and speci fi cati on of the cri me categori es that are studi ed, by
determi ni ng the manner i n whi ch the cri mes were cl eared, and by
determi ni ng i f there has been a change i n where the pol i ce draw the l i ne i n
the exerci se of thei r di screti on.
ARREST RATE
B-379. Another measure of effecti veness that i s often used as a determi nant
of cri me-control effecti veness i s the arrest rate, cal cul ated ei ther per pol i ce
offi cer or per resi dent for a speci fi ed ti me peri od. Most of the consi derati ons
concerni ng the cl earance rate (di scussed above) al so appl y to the arrest rate.
However, the arrest rate i s di sti ngui shed from the cl earance rate by an
addi ti onal factori t i s not rel ated to the total number of offenses. For
exampl e, the number of arrests for drug vi ol ati ons has ri sen consi derabl y over
the past few years. However, thi s i ncrease i s i ndi cati ve of the extent of the
probl em, not of the effecti veness of the sol uti on. I t has been descri bed how
drug arrests may be traded off agai nst arrests for other offenses and vi ce
versa, especi al l y when i nformal arrest quotas are establ i shed. Therefore, the
use of the arrest rate by i tsel f does not appear to be appropri ate as a measure
of the effecti veness for most cri me-control programs.
FM 3-19.30
CRIME-SERIOUSNESS INDEX
B-380. Among the many cri ti ci sms of cri me stati sti cs i s the contenti on that,
even i f the data were rel i abl e and compl ete, we woul d sti l l have onl y a count of
the number of i nci dents wi thout an i ndi cati on of thei r rel ati ve seri ousness.
The cri me-seri ousness i ndex was proposed to i ncl ude some of the major
di suti l i ti es of cri me typi cal l y commi tted by juveni l es. Cri mes are wei ghted
accordi ng to the degree and nature of i njury to the vi cti mswhether they
were i nti mi dated and the nature of the i nti mi dati on or whether premi ses were
forci bl y entered, and the ki nd and val ue of property stol en. The wei ghts were
determi ned by requesti ng a sampl e of peopl e to esti mate the rel ati ve
seri ousness of vari ous cri mes.
B-381. Al l of the factors used to determi ne the wei ght are (or shoul d be)
i ncl uded i n offense reports. I t woul d not be di ffi cul t to cal cul ate an i nci dent-
seri ousness score based on these reports, ei ther for a speci fi c eval uati on or as
a matter of course. Use of the seri ousness i ndex has al so been proposed to
measure the rel ati ve performance of l aw-enforcement agenci es.
B-382. The cri me-seri ousness i ndex i s not the ul ti mate wei ghti ng scheme.
The seri ousness appears to be cal cul ated more from the offenders vi ewpoi nt
and the event than from the vi cti m or soci etys vi ewpoi nt. For exampl e, most
peopl e woul d consi der the murder of a robbery vi cti m by hi s assai l ant to be
more seri ous than the murder of one spouse by the other. Wi th regard to
property l oss, there i s a di fference between l oss suffered by an i ndi vi dual who
i s i nsured and one who i s not covered.
B-383. The l oss rel ati ve to the i ndi vi dual s i ncome i s al so an i mportant factor;
the theft of a $100 tel evi si on from a l ow-i ncome fami l y has a much greater
i mpact than the l oss of $10,000 of jewel s from a weal thy fami l y. Perhaps a
better i ndex of the rel ati ve val ue of property l oss to the vi cti m woul d be the
val ue of the l oss i n rel ati on to the amount of the i ndi vi dual s di screti onary
i ncome (that i s, i ncome not used for the basi c necessi ti es of l i fe). Of course,
such i nformati on i s not avai l abl e on pol i ce cri me reports.
FEAR OF CRIME
B-384. I t has been poi nted out that the percei ved ri sk of cri me i s greater than
the actual ri sk of cri me, and that thi s percei ved ri sk does not seem to be
correl ated wi th the actual cri me rate. Unl ess the publ i c feel s safer i n
proporti on to i ts i ncreased actual safety, the ful l potenti al of i mprovements
wi l l not have been reached. Therefore, the goal of a cri me-control program can
be broadened to i ncl ude not onl y i mproved publ i c safety (deterrence),
effecti veness (cl earance rate), and reduced cri me i mpact (seri ousness); but
al so i mproved, more accurate, publ i c percepti ons of safety as wel l .
B-385. Measurements of percei ved safety can be both di rect and i ndi rect.
Publ i c-opi ni on surveys wi th regard to percepti ons about cri me and safety have
been made frequentl y. I t i s al so possi bl e to gauge the effect of thi s fear usi ng
i ndi rect measures by observi ng what peopl e do rather than what they say. The
number of patrons of movi e theaters and restaurants at ni ght (or other
observati ons of thi s type of acti vi ty) coul d be used to gauge the fear of cri me.
FM 3-19.30
B-386. A rel i abl e measure of the publ i cs percepti on of publ i c safety has not
been devel oped. Addi ti onal research i s bei ng done and needs to be done before
thi s type of measure of effecti veness can be used wi th confi dence.
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis C-1
Appendix C
Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis
I ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence make up the fi rst l i ne of defense i n an
anti terrori sm pr ogram. A wel l -pl anned, systemati c, al l -source i ntel l i gence
and counteri ntel l i gence program i s essenti al . The r ol e of i ntel l i gence and
counter i ntel l i gence i n anti terrori sm i s to i denti fy the threat. Addi ti onal l y,
counter i ntel l i gence pr ovi des a warni ng of potenti al terrori st attacks and
pr ovi des i nformati on for counterterrori sm operati ons. Thi s appendi x
pr ovi des the el ements of the i ntel l i gence cycl e that have parti cul ar
i mportance i n a vi abl e anti terrori sm pr ogram. Effecti ve i ntel l i gence and
counter i ntel l i gence support requi res effort, pl anni ng and di recti on,
col l ecti on and anal ysi s, producti on, i nvesti gati on, and di ssemi nati on. The
enti re process provi des deci si on makers wi th i nformati on and ti mel y
warni ngs upon whi ch to recommend anti terrori sm acti ons.
INFORMATION SOURCES
C-1. The pr i mar y sour ces of i ntel l i gence and counter i ntel l i gence for the
anti ter r or i sm pr ogr am ar e open-sour ce i nfor mati on, cr i mi nal i nfor mati on,
government i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence, and l ocal i nformati on.
Open-sourceinformation. Thi s i nformati on i s publ i cl y avai l abl e and
can be col l ected, r etai ned, and stor ed wi thout speci al author i zati on.
Th e n ews medi a i s an ex cel l en t open s ou r ce of i n for mati on on
terrori sm. The medi a reports many major terrori st i nci dents and often
i n cl u des i n -d epth r epor ts on i n di v i du a l s , gr ou ps , or v a r i ou s
gov er n men t cou n ter s tr a tegi es . Gov er n men t s ou r ces i n cl u de
congr essi onal hear i ngs; publ i cati ons by the Defense I ntel l i gence
Agency (DI A), the FBI , the Centr al I ntel l i gence Agency (CI A), the
Department of State (DOS), and the nati onal cri mi nal justi ce reference
servi ces. Addi ti onal l y, there are pri vate data servi ces that offer ti mel y
i nfor mati on on ter r or i st acti vi ti es wor l dwi de. Ter r or i st gr oups and
thei r affi l i ates may al so have manual s, pamphl ets, and newsl etter s
that reveal thei r objecti ves, tacti cs, and possi bl e targets.
Criminal information. Both mi l i tary and ci vi l l aw-enforcement
agenci es col l ect cr i mi nal i nfor mati on. Because ter r or i st acts ar e
cr i mi nal acts, cr i mi nal i nfor mati on i s a maj or sour ce for ter r or i st
i n tel l i gen ce. Comman der s mu st wor k th r ou gh es tabl i s h ed l aw-
enfor cement l i ai son channel s because the col l ecti on, r etenti on, and
di ssemi nati on of cr i mi nal i nfor mati on ar e r egul ated. Local mi l i tar y
cr i mi nal i nvesti gati ve offi ces of the CI D; the Naval I nvesti gati ve
Ser v i ce Comma n d (NI SCOM); th e Ai r For ce Of f i ce of Speci a l
I n v es ti gati on s (AFOSI ); an d Headqu ar ter s, US Mar i n e Cor ps,
FM 3-19.30
C-2 Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Threat Analysis
Cr i mi nal I nvesti gati ons Di vi si on, mai ntai n cur r ent i nfor mati on that
wi l l assi st i n determi ni ng the l ocal terrori st threat.
Government intelligence and counterintelligence. The
Commu n i ty Cou n ter ter r or i s m Boar d (CCB) i s r es pon s i bl e f or
coor di nati ng wi th th e nati on al i n tel l i gence agenci es concer n i ng
combati ng i nter nati onal ter r or i sm. These agenci es i ncl ude the CI A
(the l ead agency), the DI A, the Nati onal Secur i ty Agency (NSA), the
DOS, the Depar tment of Justi ce (DOJ), the FBI , the Depar tment of
En er gy (DOE), th e Feder al Av i ati on Admi n i s tr ati on (FAA), th e
Depar tment of Tr anspor tati on (DOT) (i ncl udi ng the USCG), and the
DOD. Ser v i ce i n tel l i gen ce an d cou n ter i n tel l i gen ce pr odu cti on
or gani zati ons i ncl ude the US Ar my Counter i ntel l i gence Anal ysi s
Cen ter ; th e Nav y An ti ter r or i s m An al y s i s Cen ter (NAVATAC);
Headquar ter s, US Mar i ne Cor ps, Counter i ntel l i gence; and the US
AFOSI Operati ons Center. These organi zati ons compi l e comprehensi ve
i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence for di str i buti on on a need-to-know
basi s thr oughout the ser vi ces. I n combatant commands, the J2 i s
responsi bl e for the i ntel l i gence fusi on center. The Counteri ntel l i gence
Suppor t Offi cer (CI SO) pr ovi des i nter face between the combatant
command, the component commands, and the joi nt staff.
Local information. Other val uabl e sources of i nformati on are the
sol di ers, ci vi l servants, fami l y members, and i ndi vi dual s wi th regi onal
k n owl e d ge (s u ch a s col l e ge f a cu l t y or me mb er s of cu l t u r a l
or gani zati ons). Local cr i me or nei ghbor hood watch pr ogr ams can be
val uabl e sour ces of i nfor mati on and can ser ve as a means to k eep
i ndi vi dual s i nfor med i n di sper sed and r emote ar eas. I ntel l i gence
ex ch an ges wi th l ocal gov er n men t agenci es th r ough cooper ati ve
arrangements can al so augment regi onal i nformati on.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF US GOVERNMENT LEAD AGENCIES
C-2. The FBI i s r esponsi bl e for col l ecti ng and pr ocessi ng domesti c ter r or i st
i n f or ma t i on . Ov er s ea s , ter r or i s t i n tel l i gen ce i s pr i n ci p a l l y a CI A
responsi bi l i ty; but the DOS, the DI A, and the HN are al so acti ve pl ayers. The
MI acti vi ti es are conducted accordi ng to Presi denti al executi ve orders, federal
l aw, status of for ces agr eements (SOFAs), memor andums of under standi ng
(MOUs), and appl i cabl e ser vi ce r egul ati ons. Responsi bi l i ti es of i ntel l i gence
acti vi ti es i ncl ude the fol l owi ng:
The combatant commander (through the commander's J2 and the
CI SO i n coor di nati on wi th the DI A, the CI A, the embassy staff, the
country team, and appl i cabl e HN authori ti es) obtai ns i ntel l i gence and
cou n ter i n tel l i gen ce s peci fi c to th e AO. Th e comman der i s s u es
i n tel l i gen ce a n d cou n ter i n tel l i gen ce r epor ts, a dv i s or i es, an d
assessments to the uni ts wi thi n hi s command or those operati ng wi thi n
hi s command's AO. Thi s networ k i s the backbone for communi cati ng
i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence i nformati on and advi sori es and for
warni ng of terrori st threats throughout the regi on.
The Secretari es of the mi l i tary departments were asked (i n DOD
Di r ecti ve 2000.12) to ensur e that a capabi l i ty exi sts to r ecei ve and
eval uate data from a servi ce perspecti ve and that the capabi l i ty exi sts
FM 3-19.30
to di ssemi nate al l r el evant data on ter r or i st acti vi ti es, tr ends, and
i ndi cators of i mmi nent attack. To accompl i sh thi s task, each Secretary
appoi nts an MI agency (I NSCOM, NI SCOM, or AFOSI ) to conduct
i ntel l i gen ce an d counter i n tel l i gen ce acti v i ti es di r ected agai ns t
ter r or i s ts an d to detect, n eu tr al i ze, or deter ter r or i s t acts. To
accompl i sh thi s mi ssi on, the mi l i tar y depar tment i ntel l i gence agency
establ i shes counter i ntel l i gence offi ces on an ar ea basi s to col l ect and
di ssemi nate i nfor mati on to combatant commander s. Each mi l i tar y
departments i ntel l i gence agency
I Coordi nates wi th appropri ate US and HN agenci es.
I Provi des overal l di recti on and coordi nati on of the servi ce
counteri ntel l i gence effort.
I Operates a 24-hour operati ons center to recei ve and di ssemi nate
wor l dwi de ter r ori st thr eat i nfor mati on to and from the combatant
commands J2, appl i cabl e ser vi ce staff el emen ts, subor di nate
commands, and nati onal agenci es.
I Provi des servi ce commanders wi th i nformati on on terrori st threats
concerni ng thei r personnel , faci l i ti es, and operati ons.
I I nvesti gates terrori st i nci dents for i ntel l i gence, counteri ntel l i gence,
and force-protecti on aspects (wi th the FBI or HN authori ti es).
I Provi des terrori st threat i nformati on i n threat bri efi ngs.
I Conducts l i ai son wi th representati ves from federal , state, and l ocal
agenci es (as wel l as HN agenci es) to exchange i nfor mati on on
terrori sts.
I Provi des i nternati onal terrori sm summari es and other threat
i nformati on to supported commanders. On request, provi des current
i ntel l i gence and counter i ntel l i gence data on ter r or i st gr oups and
di s semi n ates ti me-s en s i ti v e an d s peci fi c th r eat war n i n gs to
appropri ate commands.
Servi ce cri mi nal i nvesti gati ve servi ces (such as the CI D, the NI SCOM,
an d th e AFOSI ) col l ect an d ev al u ate cr i mi n al i n for mati on an d
di ssemi nate terrori st-rel ated i nformati on to supported i nstal l ati on and
acti v i ty comman der s as wel l as to th e s er v i ce l ead agen cy. As
appropri ate, cri mi nal i nvesti gati ve el ements al so conduct l i ai son wi th
l ocal mi l i tary or securi ty pol i ce and ci vi l i an l aw-enforcement agenci es.
I ntel l i gence staff el ements of commanders at al l echel ons
I Report promptl y al l actual or suspected terrori st i nci dents,
acti vi ti es, and earl y war ni ngs of ter ror i st attacks to supported and
suppor ti ng acti vi ti es, to the l ocal counter i ntel l i gence offi ce, and
through the chai n of command to the servi ce l ead agency.
I I ni ti ate and mai ntai n l i ai son wi th the securi ty pol i ce or PMO; l ocal
mi l i tar y cr i mi nal i nvesti gati ve offi ces; l ocal counter i ntel l i gence
offi ces ; secu r i ty offi ces ; HN agenci es an d; as r equ i r ed, other
organi zati ons, el ements, and i ndi vi dual s.
I Devel op and present terrori sm threat-awareness bri efi ngs to al l
per sonnel wi thi n thei r commands (i n cooper ati on wi th the l ocal
counteri ntel l i gence offi ces).
Law-enforcement staff el ements wi l l
FM 3-19.30
I Report al l actual or suspected terrori st i nci dents or acti vi ti es to
thei r i mmedi ate commander, suppor ted acti vi ti es, and ser vi ce l ead
agency through establ i shed reporti ng channel s.
I I ni ti ate and mai ntai n l i ai son wi th l ocal counteri ntel l i gence offi ces
and mi l i tary cri mi nal i nvesti gati ve offi ces.
I Mai ntai n l i ai son wi th federal , HN, and l ocal l aw-enforcement
agenci es or other ci vi l and mi l i tar y anti ter r or i sm agenci es as
appropri ate.
I nstal l ati on, base, uni t, and port securi ty offi cers
I Report al l actual or suspected terrori st i nci dents or acti vi ti es to
thei r i mmedi ate commander, suppor ti ng mi l i tar y l aw-enforcement
offi ce, other suppor ted acti vi ti es, l ocal counter i ntel l i gence offi ce,
and l ocal mi l i tary cri mi nal i nvesti gati on offi ce.
I Conduct regul ar l i ai son vi si ts wi th the supporti ng mi l i tary l aw-
enfor cement offi ce, counter i ntel l i gence offi ce, and l ocal cr i mi nal
i nvesti gati on offi ce.
I Coordi nate wi th the supporti ng mi l i tary l aw-enforcement offi ce and
coun ter i n tel l i gence offi ce on th ei r pr epar ati on and conti nu al
updati ng of the threat assessments.
I Assi st i n provi di ng terrori sm threat-awareness trai ni ng and
bri efi ngs to al l per sonnel and fami l y members as requi r ed by l ocal
si tuati ons.
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
C-3. To focus the threat anal ysi s, i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence offi cers
devel op i nfor mati on r equi r ements to i denti fy tar gets usi ng the fol l owi ng
terrori st consi derati ons
Organi zati on, si ze, and composi ti on of group.
Moti vati on.
Long- and short-range goal s.
Rel i gi ous, pol i ti cal , and ethni c affi l i ati ons.
I nternati onal and nati onal support (moral , physi cal , and fi nanci al ).
Recrui ti ng methods, l ocati ons, and targets (students).
I denti ty of group l eaders, opportuni sts, and i deal i sts.
Group i ntel l i gence capabi l i ti es and connecti ons wi th other terrori st
groups.
Sources of suppl y and support.
I mportant dates, such as rel i gi ous hol i days.
Pl anni ng abi l i ty.
I nternal di sci pl i ne.
Preferred tacti cs and operati ons.
Wi l l i ngness to ki l l .
Wi l l i ngness for sel f-sacri fi ce.
Group ski l l s, demonstrated or percei ved (for exampl e, sni pi ng,
demol i ti on s, masqu er ade, i n du s tr i al s abotage, ai r pl an e or boat
FM 3-19.30
oper ati ons, tunnel i ng, under water, el ectroni c survei l l ance, poi sons, or
contami nants).
Equi pment and weapons (on hand and requi red).
Transportati on (on hand and requi red).
Medi cal -support avai l abi l i ty.
Means and methods of C
2
.
Means and method of communi cati on.
THREAT ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
C-4. The preparati on of the terr or i st threat anal ysi s i s a conti nual process of
compi l i ng and exami ni ng al l avai l abl e i nfor mati on to i denti fy ter r or i st
tar geti ng of US i nter ests. A vul ner abi l i ty anal ysi s i s a conti nual pr ocess of
compi l i ng and exami ni ng i nfor mati on on a faci l i tys secur i ty postur e. The
thr eat anal ysi s i s then pai r ed wi th the faci l i ty's vul ner abi l i ty anal ysi s to
cr eate the thr eat and vu l n er abi l i ty ass essment. Thr eat anal ys i s i s an
essenti al step i n i denti fyi ng the pr obabi l i ty of a ter r or i st attack. To enhance
the capabi l i ty to col l ect and anal yze i nformati on from many sour ces, the DI A
mai ntai ns a terr ori sm database. The combatant command's J2 and CI SO (i n
coor di nati on wi th the DI A) focus thi s database i nfor mati on and r egi onal
i nformati on towar d the i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence needs speci fi c to
the secur i ty of the command. However, thi s ter r or i sm database i s l i mi ted to
for ei gn ter r or i st gr oups because of l i mi tati ons on US i ntel l i gence-col l ecti on
oper ati ons. A countr ys thr eat assessments, i nfor mati on and bi ogr aphi es
abou t ter r or i s t or gan i zati on s, an d i n ci den ts i n th e databas e can be
di ssemi nated to commands. Commands at al l echel ons then augment or refi ne
the DI As thr eat anal ysi s to focus on thei r ar ea of i nter est. Thi s pr ocess,
oper ati ve acr oss the ful l r ange of mi l i tar y oper ati ons, pr omotes coor di nati on
between al l l ev el s of th e i n tel l i gen ce, cou n ter i n tel l i gen ce, an d l aw-
enfor cement communi ti es; br oadens acqui si ti on channel s; and enhances
ti mel y di stri buti on of i nformati on to the supported commander.
C-5. Several factors compl i cate i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence col l ecti on
and operati ons. The smal l si ze of terrori st groups, coupl ed wi th thei r mobi l i ty
and cel l ul ar or gani zati on, make i t di ffi cul t to i denti fy the member s. Unl i ke
other cri mi nal s, terr ori st cadr es often r ecei ve tr ai ni ng i n counter i ntel l i gence
and securi ty measur es fr om for ei gn i ntel l i gence agenci es or other ter r or i sts.
Addi ti onal l y, the tr adi ti onal or i entati on of pol i ce or gani zati ons i s towar d
i ndi vi dual cr i mi nal s, whi l e MI or gani zati ons focus on conventi onal for ces.
Ter r or i st acti vi ty, ther efor e, r equi r es some degr ee of r eor i entati on for pol i ce
and MI and counteri ntel l i gence col l ecti on and operati ons.
C-6. An i ntel l i gence systems abi l i ty to provi de cri ti cal and ti mel y i nformati on
to the user depends not onl y on effi ci ent col l ecti on and processi ng, but al so on
the abi l i ty to or gani ze, stor e, and r etr i eve thi s i nfor mati on r api dl y. Thi s
capabi l i ty, coupl ed wi th earl y warni ng, careful observati on, and assessment of
threat acti vi ty, enhances the probabi l i ty of accuratel y predi cti ng the types and
ti mi ng of terrori st attacks.
FM 3-19.30
C-7. Commander s must car eful l y exer ci se judgment i n esti mati ng both the
exi sti ng ter r or i st thr eat and the need for changes i n anti ter r or i sm measur es.
Key questi ons are
What has changed (mi ssi on, pol i ti cal cl i mate, i nstal l ati on and uni t
personnel or equi pment, terrori st capabi l i ti es)?
What affect wi l l the changes have on the securi ty posture?
C-8. Extr aor di nar y secur i ty measur es, unl ess par t of a del i ber ate decepti on
dur i ng cr i ti cal or hi gh-thr eat si tuati ons, dr aw attenti on and detr act fr om
mi ssi on accompl i shment. Sound physi cal securi ty, per sonnel who ar e awar e,
accur ate thr eat and vul nerabi l i ty assessments, and wel l -r ehearsed r esponse
pl ans r educe the pr obabi l i ty of a successful ter r or i st ventur e. The goal i s to
make an attack too di ffi cul t or the l evel of ri sk unacceptabl e to the terrori st.
DETERMINATION OF THE THREAT LEVEL
C-9. Thi s threat-anal ysi s methodol ogy i s used by the DI A, the joi nt staff, and
the uni fi ed and speci fi ed commands for sel ecti ng the l evel of thr eat for an
i nstal l ati on. I t i s appl i cabl e i n an overseas setti ng, but fai l s to address i ssues
uni que to the sustai ni ng base wi thi n CONUS. I n CONUS ther e i s a l ack of
i ntel l i gence and counteri ntel l i gence i nformati on from the CI A, the DI A, or the
mi l i tar y ser vi ces for the CONUS-based thr eat. That i nfor mati on must be
extr acted from l aw-enfor cement channel s at the l ocal , r egi onal , and nati onal
l evel s. I n that context, the factors menti oned i n thi s appendi x are not as cl ear
as they ar e wi thi n the i ntel l i gence pr ocess i n pl ace over seas. A modi fi ed
ver si on of thi s appendi x shoul d be consi der ed for assessi ng thr eat l evel s i n
CONUS.
C-10. Thr eat l evel s wi thi n CONUS hi stor i cal l y have been ei ther l ow or
negl i gi bl e. Thi s tr end wi l l most l i kel y conti nue at l east thr ough the next
decade. Domesti c gr oups not cover ed by DOD i ntel l i gence r epor ti ng pose the
greatest threat to the CONUS-based mi l i tary. Due to the l ack of reporti ng and
i nfor mati on on these groups, the domesti c ter r or i st gr oups are not curr entl y
factor ed i nto the cur r ent ter r or i st thr eat pr ogr am. Ther efor e, the l aw-
enfor cement communi ty must become a key pl ayer i n establ i shi ng the threat
l evel s i n the context of the r ecommended model . A possi bl e methodol ogy
woul d be the establ i shment of an addi ti onal thr eat l evel between l ow and
medi umone that al l ows l ocal commanders more fl exi bi l i ty i n i mpl ementi ng
addi ti onal securi ty measures. Tabl e C-1 shows the procedur e for determi ni ng
the threat l evel .
FM 3-19.30
Table C-1. Threat Levels
Threat Level
Critical
Factors 1, 2, and 5 are present. Factors 3 or 4 may
be present.
High Factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 are present.
Medium Factors 1, 2, and 4 are present.
Low
Factors 1 and 2 are present.
Factor 4 may be present.
Negligible Factors 1 and/or 2 may be present.
Explanation of Factors
Factor 1: Existence. A terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or
able to gain access to a given locale.
Factor 2: Capability. The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of
capability to conduct terrorist attacks.
Factor 3: Intentions. Recent demonstrated anti-US terrorist activity or stated
and/or assessed intent to conduct such activity.
Factor 4: History. Demonstrated terrorist activity over time.
Factor 5: Targeting. Current credible information on activity indicative of
preparations for specific terrorist operations and/or specific intelligence that
shows an attack is imminent.
Crisis-Management Plan D-1
Appendix D
Crisis-Management Plan
The fol l owi ng pages hi ghl i ght ar eas of concer n i n cr i si s-management
pl anni ng. Thi s pl an i s not meant to be al l -i ncl usi ve or r i gi dl y fol l owed.
Fi gur e D-1 i s a sampl e for mat onl y. I t does not r efl ect a for mat devel oped
and appr oved for use wi th OPLANs or conti ngency pl ans (CONPLANs)
pr epar ed by the CI NCs to ful fi l l tasks assi gned i n the Joi nt Str ategi c
Capabi l i ti es Pl an (JSCP) or as otherwi se di rected by the Chai rman of the
Joi nt Chi efs of Staff. Fi gur e D-2, page D-4, i s a sampl e of the Cr i si s-
Management-Pl an Check l i st, whi ch i s Annex A or Appendi x H to the
cr i si s-management pl an. Thi s checkl i st wi l l hel p ensur e that the pl an i s
sound.
Figure D-1. Sample Crisis-Management Plan
Crisis-Management Plan
Ref: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.
Time Zone: X
Task Organization: List units organized to conduct antiterrorism operations. Include attachments,
supporting roles, and the delegation of operational control as necessary.
1. Situation. Identify essential information to understand ongoing events.
a. Terrorist force. Identify the terrorists composition, disposition, methods of operation, and
estimated strengths and capabilities that could influence the crisis-management operation. Refer to an
appropriate annex.
b. Response force. Explain the response forces abilities and responsibilities. The response forces
abilities can influence the crisis-management mission.
c. Attachments and detachments. Address here or refer to an annex.
d. Assumptions. Provide assumptions used as a basis for this plan (for example, the strength of the
response force to be supported and the support availablefrom other agencies).
Copy No. ________
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date of Issue
FM 3-19.30
D-2 Crisis-Management Plan
Figure D-1. Sample Crisis-Management Plan (continued)
(1) Tactical-situation possibilities. Obtained from the commander's planning guidance.
(2) Personnel situation. Provided by the personnel officer.
(3) Logistics situation. Provided by the logistics officer.
(4) Legal-situation possibilities. Provided by the SJA.
2. Mission. Identify the antiterrorism mission (for example, detect, deter, contain, and neutralize
terrorist threats and actions aimed at the disruption of the installation).
3. Execution.
a. Concept of operations. State the commander's tactical plan. The purpose is to inform. It may
address how the commander will conduct combat-terrorism operations. It provides enough detail to
ensure proper action by subordinates in the absence of specific instructions. If the required details are
extensive, address them in an annex. If an operation involves two or more distinct phases, designate
each phase and use subparagraphs (for example, Phase I and Phase II).
b. Tasks. Identify specific tasks for each command element charged with executing a crisis-
management mission. When giving multiple instructions, itemize and indicate the priority or sequence.
c. Coordinating instructions. Include coordination and control measures applicable to two or more
command elements.
4. Service Support. Provide a statement of service-support instructions and arrangements supporting
the crisis-management operation. Use the following subparagraphs as required:
a. General. Outline the general plan for service support.
b. Materiel and services. Address supply, transportation, labor, and services required.
c. Medical evacuation and hospitalization. Provide the plan for evacuating and hospitalizing sick,
wounded, or injured personnel. Address evacuation responsibilities and the air-evacuation policy.
d. Personnel. Provide required information and instructions to supporting unit personnel.
(1) Maintenance of unit strength.
(a) Strength reports. Provide instructions for submitting status reports. Include requirements
for routine and special reports.
(b) Replacements. Address validating existing personnel requisitions, instructions for
submitting requisitions, and instructions for processing and removing replacements.
(2) Personnel management. Address military and civilian personnel and civilian detainee
management procedures.
(3) Development and maintenance of morale.
(a) Morale and personnel services. Provide postal and financial services, religious activities,
personal hygiene, and special services activity information.
(b) Graves registration. Include evacuation procedures and handling personal effects.
FM 3-19.30
(4) Maintenance of discipline, law, and order. Obtain this guidance from the PMO/security
officer.
(5) Miscellaneous. Include personnel administrative matters not specifically assigned to
another coordinating staff section or included in preceding subparagraphs.
e. Miscellaneous. Provide special instructions or special reports not covered in preceding
paragraphs.
5. Command and Signal. Provide instructions for the command and operation of communications-
electronics equipment. Communications-electronics instructions may refer to an annex but should
list the index and issue number of the command, control, and communications (C
3
) operation
instructions in effect. If not already issued, give instructions for the control, coordination, and
establishment of priorities in the use of electromagnetic emissions. Command instructions include
subordinate and higher unit CP locations and designated alternate CPs.
6. Acknowledgement Instructions.
/s/
Commander
Annexes as applicable
Distribution:
Figure D-1. Sample Crisis-Management Plan (continued)
FM 3-19.30
Annex A
Crisis -Management Plan Checklist
Yes No
1. Intelligence and/or Counterintelligence.
____ ____ Does the plan allow for the threat - analysis process (collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination) to help identify the local threat?
____ ____ Does the plan consider restrictions placed on the collection and storage
of inf ormation?
____ ____ Does the plan indicate an awareness of sources of information for the
threat -analysis process (MI, counterintelligence, federal agencies, and
state and local authorities)?
____ ____ Does the plan allow for liaison and coordination of information (such as
establishing a committee)?
2. Threat Assessment.
____ ____ Does the plan identify the local threat (immediate or long term)?
____ ____ Does the plan identify other threats (such as national and international
groups that have targeted or might target US installations)?
____ ____ Does the installation incorporate factors for assessing the threat? Does
it address
____ ____ Geography of the area concerned?
____ ____ Law-enforcement resources?
____ ____ Population cultural resources?
____ ____ Communication capabilities?
____ ____ Does the plan establish a priority of identified weaknesses and
vulnerabilities?
____ ____ Is the threat assessment periodically updated?
3. Security Countermeasures.
____ _ ___ Does the plan have specified THREATCONs and recommended
actions?
____ ____ Do security countermeasures include a combination of physical
operations and sound-blanketing security measures?
____ ____ Do the THREATCONs correspond to DOD 0- 2000.12-H, Appendix BB?
Figure D-2. Sample Crisis-Management-Plan Checklist
FM 3-19.30
Yes No
4. OPSEC.
____ ____ Have procedures been established that prevent terrorists from readily
obtaining information about plans and operations (for example, not
publishing the commanding generals itinerary and safeguarding
classified material)?
____ ____ Does the plan allow for in-depth coordination with the installations
OPSEC program?
____ ____ Has an OPSEC annex been included in the CONPLAN?
5. Personnel Security.
____ ____ Has the threat analysis identified individuals vulnerable to terrorist
attacks?
____ ____ Has a training program been established to educate both military and
civilian personnel in the proper techniques of personnel protection and
security commensurate with the local threat and the type of position
held?
6. Physical Security.
____ ____ Are special-threat plans and physical-security plans mutually
supportive?
____ ____ Do security measures establish obstacles to terrorist activity (such as
guards, HN forces, lighting, and fencing)?
____ ____ Does the special-threat plan include the threats identified in the threat
statements of higher headquarters?
____ ____ Does the physical-security officer assist in the threat analysis and
corrective action?
____ ____ Does the installation have and maintain detection systems and an
appropriate assessment capability?
7. Security Structure.
____ ____ Does the plan indicate that the FBI has primary domestic investigative
and operational responsibility in the US and US territories?
____ ____ Has coordination with the SJA been established?
____ ____ Does the plan allow for close cooperation between principal agents of
the military, civilian, and HN communities and federal agencies?
____ ____ Does the plan clearly indicate parameters for the use of force, including
briefing any elements augmenting MP assets?
____ ____ Is there a mutual understanding between all local agencies (military,
local, FBI resident or senior agent-in-charge, HN forces, and local law
enforcement) that might be involved in a terrorist incident on the
installation regarding authority, jurisdiction, and possible interaction?
Figure D-2. Sample Crisis-Management-Plan Checklist (continued)
FM 3-19.30
Yes No
____ ____ Has the SJA considered the ramifications of closing the post (such as
possible civilian union problems)?
____ ____ Does the plan identify the DOS as having primary investigative and
operational responsibilities overseas?
8. Operations-Center Training.
____ ____ Has the operational command and coordination center been established
and exercised?
____ ____ Is the operations center based on the needs of the installation while
recognizing manpower limitations, resource availability, equipment, and
command?
____ ____ Does the plan include a location for the operations center?
____ ____ Does the plan designate alternate locations for the operations center?
____ ____ Does the plan allow for the use of visual aids (chalkboards, maps with
overlays, and bulletin boards) to provide status reports and
countermeasures?
____ ____ Does the plan create and designate a location for a media center?
____ ____ Have the operations and media centers been activated together within
the last quarter?
____ ____ Does the operations center have SOPs covering communications and
reports to higher headquarters?
____ ____ Does the operations center offer protection from a terrorist attack?
9. Reaction-Force Training.
____ ____ Has the force been trained and exercised under realistic conditions?
____ ____ Has corrective action been applied to shortcomings and deficiencies?
____ ____ Has the reaction force been formed and mission-specified trained (for
example, building entry and search techniques, vehicle assault
operations, countersniper techniques, and equipment)?
____ ____ Has the reaction force been tested quarterly (alert procedures,
response time, and overall preparedness)?
____ ____ Has responsibility been fixed for the negotiation team? Has the
negotiation team been trained and exercised under realistic conditions?
____ ____ Does the negotiation team have the proper equipment?
10. General Observations.
____ ____ Was the plan developed as a coordinated staff effort?
____ ____ Does the plan outline reporting requirements (logs, journals, and after-
action reports)?
FM 3-19.30
Yes No
____ ____ Does the plan address the medias presence?
____ ____ Does the plan include communication procedures and communication
nets?
____ ____ Does the plan consider the possible need for interpreters?
____ ____ Does the plan consider the need for a list of personnel with various
backgrounds to provide cultural profiles on foreign subjects and victims
as well as to assist with any negotiation efforts?
____ ____ Does the plan provide for and identify units that will augment MP
assets?
____ ____ Does the plan delineate specific taskings for each member of the
operations center?
____ ____ Does the plan provide for a response force for each phase of
antiterrorism activity (initial response, negotiation, and assault)?
____ ____ Does the plan designate service-support communications?
____ ____ Does the plan make provisions for the notification of an accident-and-
incident control officer?
____ ____ Does the plan provide for EOD support?
____ ____ Does the plan take into consideration the movement from various
locations, including commercial airports, of civilian and military advisory
personnel with military transportation assets?
____ ____ Does the plan allow for the purchase or use of civilian vehicles,
supplies, and food (if needed)? (This includes items used to satisfy a
hostage demand.) Does the plan make provisions for paying civilian
employees overtime if they are involved in a special -threat situation?
____ ____ Does the plan take into consideration the messing, billeting, and
transportation of civilian personnel?
____ ____ Do appropriate personnel have the necessary language training?
____ ____ Is WMD support available?
Office Security Measures E-1
Appendix E
Office Security Measures
The offi ce envi ronment shoul d afford executi ves the greatest degree of
physi cal securi ty. Executi ves usual l y work i n faci l i ti es where attackers
must pass by guards, securi ty checkpoi nts, offi ce wor kers, ai des, or
secretari es befor e reachi ng them. Unfortunatel y, the hi gh medi a val ue of
attacki ng executi ves i n securi ty stronghol ds where they are cl earl y
associ ated wi th government acti vi ty i ncreases the val ue of such attacks to
terrori sts. Hence, there may be a need to add securi ty measures to offset
the escal ati ng capabi l i ty of attack on more secure offi ce areas by terrori st
gr oups.
PHYSICAL-SECURITY SURVEY
E-1. A thor ough physi cal -secur i ty sur vey of an offi ce faci l i ty shoul d be
conducted. Offi ces of defense components attached to US embassi es abr oad
shoul d have these surveys performed by the DOS. Other DOD faci l i ti es shoul d
have sur veys per for med by the cogni zant physi cal -secur i ty and faci l i ti es-
engi neeri ng staffs. The best way to approach a physi cal -securi ty si te survey i s
to thi nk l i ke an i ntr uder. Consi der how appr oaches to the i nstal l ati on or
faci l i ty coul d be made, how access to the bui l di ng that houses executi ve offi ces
coul d be gai ned, and how attacks on offi ces or other frequentl y used faci l i ti es
coul d be mounted.
SECURITY-ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT
E-2. The next step i n eval uati ng the need for suppl emental physi cal -securi ty
measur es i s a thor ough and detai l ed assessment of the weapons and tacti cs
that ter r or i sts mi ght use to attack the str uctur e i n whi ch DOD executi ves
wor k . Secur i ty en gi n eer s and ar ch i tects need techn i cal thr eat data or
assessments contai ni ng the fol l owi ng i nformati on
The mode of attack, such as
I Standoff weapons (man-portabl e AT/anti ai rcraft weapons, sni per
ri fl es, rock grenades, and mortars).
I Cl ose combat weapons (submachi ne guns, pi stol s, kni ves, and
garrotes).
I Contact weapons (bombs, i ncendi ary devi ces, and mi nes).
Peri meter penetrati on ai ds (such as power tool s, hand tool s, or
expl osi ves), i f used.
The ti me of attack.
The attacki ng forces si ze.
The anti ci pated degree of outsi de support or autonomy.
FM 3-19.30
E-2 Office Security Measures
E-3. Engi neer i ng desi gn r equi r ements ar e devel oped fr om the secur i ty
engi neeri ng assessments. The data i s used to
Assess the abi l i ty of bui l di ng components to resi st the effects of the
threat.
I denti fy appropri ate securi ty wi ndow-gl azi ng materi al s and wi ndow
tr eatments to deter mi ne what i s r equi r ed to achi eve the desi r ed
penetrati on resi stance ti mes for anti ci pated threats.
Cal cul ate the total amount of del ay ti me. Thi s ti me i s achi eved by
usi ng camoufl age, decepti on, bar r i er s, and secur i ty devi ces to per mi t
response forces to reach the scene of a terrori st attack i n ti me to thwart
the attack, captur e or el i mi nate the ter r or i sts, and r escue executi ves
and thei r staffs or dependents.
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSES
E-4. After establ i shi ng a basi c-desi gn thr eat, engi neer s need data on the
anti ci pated per for mance of r esponse for ces to be ar r ayed agai nst the desi gn
threat and the expected or desi red behavi or of the pr otected executi ve. Some
speci fi c i nformati on needed i ncl udes
The response forces si ze, capabi l i ty, supporti ng weapons, response
ti me, and esti mated effecti veness agai nst the range of attacks.
The desi red opti ons for the executi ves protecti onevacuate on
warni ng, on detecti on, onl y i f attacked, or onl y i f forced to capi tul ate or
do not evacuate.
E-5. Secur i ty pl anner s need to know how l ong the str uctur e that houses
executi ves can wi thstand an attack befor e hel p ar r i ves. Matchi ng thr eat
capabi l i ti es and anti ci pated oper ati ons by r esponse for ces establ i s hes
si gni fi cant physi cal -secur i ty-system per for mance par ameter s. These can be
quanti fi ed and used to devel op detai l ed pl ans, drawi ngs, and physi cal -securi ty
equi pment-acqui si ti on pl ans.
PHYSICAL-SECURITY ENHANCEMENT MEASURES
E-6. Sever al physi cal -secur i ty measur es i ntended to pr ovi de addi ti onal
protecti on for executi ves can be consi dered based on the requi rements defi ned
thr ough the detai l ed anal yses outl i ned above. The pr i mar y pur pose of such
measur es shoul d be to i ncr ease the ti me r equi r ed by per sons outsi de an
i nstal l ati on to r each the executi ves housed at an i nstal l ati on. A secondar y
pur pose of such measur es shoul d be to r educe or el i mi nate hazar ds to
executi ves that mi ght r esul t fr om vi ol ence i n the vi ci ni ty. Exampl es of
physi cal -securi ty measures to consi der are
I ncrease the threat-detecti on ti me by i nstal l i ng sensors on peri meters
and barri ers. Thi s i ncl udes
I Combi ni ng survei l l ance systems i ncl udi ng sei smi c, acousti c, and I R
sensors at or beyond the outer peri meter.
I Suppl ementi ng survei l l ance systems wi th CCTV/i magi ng I R systems
ti ed i nto the al ert response-force stagi ng area.
FM 3-19.30
Office Security Measures E-3
I Extendi ng restri cted areas or excl usi on zones and rel ocati ng access-
control poi nts from the executi ve offi ce ar ea to a poi nt cl oser to the
i nstal l ati ons boundary.
I Enl argi ng and extendi ng i ntrusi on-detecti on sensors from wi thi n the
i nstal l ati on to i ts per i meter, al l owi ng the I DS to col l ect addi ti onal
data necessar y and suffi ci entl y cl assi fy and i denti fy an i ntr usi on
before the response force arri ves.
I Enhanci ng both the number and the phenomenol ogy of survei l l ance
and detecti on systems wi thi n the executi ve offi ce ar ea as wel l as
appr oaches l eadi ng to and fr om i t i n conjuncti on wi th measur es
l i sted bel ow.
I ncr ease the thr eats del ay ti me between the per i meter and the
executi ve offi ce bui l di ng. Thi s i ncl udes
I I nstal l i ng vehi cl e barri ers and real i gni ng roadways to el i mi nate
strai ght, l evel stretches of road i n excess of 50 meters i n l ength.
I I ncreasi ng concentri c ri ngs of fences, Jersey barri cades, pl anters,
bol l ards, and vehi cl e/personnel barri ers.
I Enhanci ng access-control areas suppl emented by fi re doors/securi ty
doors kept i n a cl osed condi ti on between the entrance to the bui l di ng
that houses executi ve offi ces and the executi ve offi ce area.
Confuse, camoufl age, and decei ve observers by hi di ng an executi ve's
l ocati on. Accompl i sh thi s by
I Rel ocati ng executi ves to bui l di ngs not usual l y associ ated wi th offi ce
acti vi ti es (bar r acks, motor pool s, r esear ch and devel opment [R&D]
faci l i ti es, and so forth).
I Constructi ng offi ce areas i n the barracks, motor pool , R&D faci l i ti es,
and so forth.
I Addi ng executi ve styl es, decorati ve l i ghti ng, and wi ndow treatments
to s ev er al di ffer en t ar eas of offi ce bu i l di n gs to mi n i mi ze th e
di ffer en ces i n ex ter n al appear an ces between ex ecu ti v e an d
nonexecuti ve offi ces.
I ncrease the del ay ti me between the entrance to the bui l di ng that
houses executi ves and the executi ve offi ce area. Execute thi s by
I Addi ng fi re doors, access-control poi nts, dead-end corri dors, and
mi dcor r i dor physi cal bar r i er s to compl i cate access to the executi ve
offi ce areas.
I Addi ng securi ty devi ces that, when acti vated, di srupt the i ntruders
abi l i ty to r etai n hi s thought processes (for exampl e, fl ashi ng str obe
l i gh ts , f og gen er a t or s , n oi s e gen er a tor s , s i r en s , a n d f i r e-
exti ngui shi ng systems).
I ncrease the del ay ti me by maki ng access more di ffi cul t wi thi n the
executi ve offi ce structure. Thi s may be accompl i shed by
I Substi tuti ng hi gh-securi ty doors and door frames for standard doors
i n areas l eadi ng to or from executi ve offi ces.
I I nstal l i ng hi gh-securi ty grati ng, wi re mesh, or other materi al s to bar
acces s to th e ex ecu ti v e offi ce ar ea th r ou gh u ti l i ty tu n n el s or
condui ts.
FM 3-19.30
E-4 Office Security Measures
I Strengtheni ng wal l s, fl oors, and cei l i ngs by substi tuti ng steel -pl ate,
concr ete-fi l l ed, steel -r ei nfor ced ci nder bl ock s or other bal l i sti c-
r esi stant mater i al s for pl aster /l ath or wal l boar d r oom di vi der s,
thereby protecti ng agai nst expl osi ve devi ces that are used as tool s to
breach a barri er.
I ncrease the protecti on for bui l di ng occupants agai nst weapons and
expl osi ves effects. Thi s i ncl udes
I Substi tuti ng bl ast- or bul l et-resi stant panel s for gl ass wi ndows or
addi ng a fragment-retenti on fi l m at l east 4 mi l l i meter s thi ck to the
i nter i or of gl ass wi ndows.
I Addi ng exteri or screens/pl ates to cover wi ndow areas and protect
agai nst gunfi re and grenade/bomb fragments.
I I nstal l i ng bl ast curtai ns, metal bl i nds, metal shutters, or other
wi ndow treatments i n executi ve offi ces to protect i nteri or space from
gl ass shards and other smal l projecti l es.
I Strengtheni ng wal l s to resi st weapons and expl osi ves effects by
addi n g s teel pl ates, r ei n for ced con cr ete, or oth er r etr ofi tti n g
measures.
I Addi ng steel pl ates or other bal l i sti c materi al s i n crawl spaces above
dr opped cei l i ngs or extendi ng wal l s separ ati ng the executi ve offi ce
ar ea fr om other por ti ons of an offi ce bui l di ng fr om fl oor to fl oor,
ther eby pr eventi ng unobser ved and undetected access to the space
between dropped cei l i ngs.
I ncrease the hol d ti me to contai n penetrators by
I Addi ng posi ti ve-acti on control s to a faci l i tys doors and gates so that
gates defaul t to a cl osed and l ock ed condi ti on unl ess manual l y
rel eased.
I Addi ng posi ti ve-acti on control s to access-control areas so that
per sons i nsi de an access-contr ol ar ea can nei ther advance nor
wi thdr aw wi thout affi r mati ve acti on by a secur i ty offi cer posted
outsi de the access-control area.
E-7. These measur es ar e used to faci l i tate the appr ehensi on of ter r or i sts.
There may be some i nstances when defeati ng terrori st attempts to gai n access
to the executi ve enhances the securi ty of the executi ve and the response force.
Thi s i s accompl i shed by channel i ng the ter r or i sts out of the faci l i ty and
i nstal l ati on al ong one r oute, l eavi ng al ternati ve r outes avai l abl e to evacuate
executi ves and other key per sonnel .
E-8. I nstal l emer gency executi ve-suppor t faci l i ti es (i ncl udi ng a safe haven
and an emergency evacuati on faci l i ty) by
I nstal l i ng hel i copter l andi ng ai ds on a structures roof or on an
adjacent fi el d far removed from parki ng areas.
I nstal l i ng a safe haven or other rei nforced securi ty structure adjacent
to a hel i copter l andi ng faci l i ty to pr ovi de a secur e wai ti ng pl ace for
executi ves unti l a rescue hel i copter wi th addi ti onal supporti ng ai r and
ground uni ts can extract the executi ves.
Physical-Security Plan F-1
Appendix F
Physical-Security Plan
I t i s essenti al and i n the best i nter est of secur i ty that each i nstal l ati on,
uni t, or acti vi ty mai ntai ns and uses a detai l ed physi cal -securi ty pl an. The
pl an shoul d i ncl ude at l east speci al and gener al guar d or der s, access and
materi al control , pr otecti ve barri ers/l i ghti ng systems, l ocks, and I DSs. Al l
physi cal -secur i ty pl ans have the potenti al of bei ng cl assi fi ed documents
and must be tr eated accor di ngl y. Fi gur e F-1 depi cts a sampl e physi cal -
securi ty pl an.
Figure F-1. Sample Physical-Security Plan
Map Reference Copy No. ________
Issuing Headquarters
Place of Issue
Date of Issue
Physical-Security Plan
1. Purpose. State the plans purpose.
2. Area Security. Define the areas, buildings, and other structures considered critical and establish
priorities for their protection.
3. Control Measures. Define and establish restrictions on access and movement into critical areas.
a. Categorize restrictions as to personnel, materials, and vehicles:
(1) Personnel access:
(a) Establishment of controls pertinent to each area or structure.
Authority for access.
Criteria for access.
Unit personnel.
Visitors.
Maintenance personnel.
Contractor personnel.
National guard.
Emergency response teams (police, fire, ambulance, and so forth).
FM 3-19.30
F-2 Physical-Security Plan
Figure F-1. Sample Physical-Security Plan (continued)
(b) Identification and control.
Description of the system to be used in each area. If a badge system is used,
a complete description covering all aspects should be used in disseminating
requirements for ID and control of personnel conducting business on the
installation.
Application of the system:
Unit personnel.
Visitors to restricted areas.
Visitors to administrative areas.
Vendors, tradesmen, and so forth.
Contractor personnel.
Maintenance or support personnel.
Fail-safe procedures during power outages.
(2) Material control.
(a) Incoming.
Requirements for admission of material and supplies.
Search and inspection of material for possible sabotage hazards.
Special controls on delivery of supplies or personal shipments in restricted
areas.
(b) Outgoing.
Documentation required.
Controls, as outlined in paragraph 3a(2a).
Classified shipment not involving nuclear/chemical material.
(c) Nuclear/chemical material.
Controls on movement of warheads/chemicals on the installation.
Controls on shipments or movement of training warheads/chemicals.
Controls on pickup or delivery of warheads/chemicals outside the installation.
(3) Vehicle control.
(a) Policy on search of military and privately owned vehicles.
(b) Parking regulations.
FM 3-19.30
(c) Controls for entrance into restricted and administrative areas:
Military vehicles.
POVs.
Emergency vehicles.
Vehicle registration.
b. Indicate the manner in which the following security aids will be implemented on the installation.
(1) Protective barriers:
(a) Definition.
(b) Clear zones.
Criteria.
Maintenance.
(c) Signs.
Types.
Posting.
(d) Gates.
Hours of operation.
Security requirements.
Lock security.
Barrier plan.
(2) Protective lighting system:
(a) Use and control.
(b) Inspection.
(c) Action taken in case of commercial power failure.
(d) Action taken in case of failure of alternate power source.
(3) Emergency lighting system:
(a) Stationary.
(b) Portable.
:
FM 3-19.30
(4) IDSs:
(a) Security classification.
(b) Inspection.
(c) Use and monitoring.
(d) Action taken in case of alarm conditions.
(e) Maintenance.
(f) Alarm logs or registers.
(g) Tamper-proof provisions.
(h) Monitor-panel locations.
(5) Communications:
(a) Locations.
(b) Use.
(c) Tests.
(d) Authentication.
(6) Security forces: General instructions that would apply to all security-force personnel (fixed
and mobile). Detailed instructions such as special orders and SOP information should be attached as
annexes. Security-force facets include
(a) Composition and organization.
(b) Tour of duty.
(c) Essential posts and routes.
(d) Weapons and equipment.
(e) Training.
(f) Use of MWD teams.
(g) Method of challenging with signs and countersigns.
(h) Alert forces:
Composition.
Mission.
Weapons and equipment.
Location.
Deployment concept.
FM 3-19.30
(7) Contingency plans: Required actions in response to various emergency situations.
Detailed plans for situations (counterterrorism, bomb threats, hostage negotiations, disaster, fire, and
so forth) should be attached as annexes.
(a) Individual actions.
(b) Alert-force actions.
(c) Security-force actions.
(8) Use of air surveillance.
(9) Coordinating instructions. Matters that require coordination with other military and civil
agencies such as
(a) Adjacent installations or units.
(b) State and local agencies.
(c) Similar host-country agencies.
(d) Federal agencies.
The coordination/interaction allows for an exchange of intelligence information on security measures
being used, contingency plans, and any other information to enhance local security.
On an installation, the host activity shall assume responsibility for coordinating physical-security efforts
of all tenants, regardless of the components represented, as outlined in the support agreements and
the host-activity security plan. Applicable provisions shall be included in, or be an appendix to, the
support agreement. A formal agreement will contain definite assignment of physical-security
responsibility for the items stored. The agreement should address
Maximum qualities to be stored.
Physical safeguards to be used.
Frequency of, and responsibility for, physical inventories or reconciliations.
Reporting of losses for investigation.
Lock and key control.
The unit that has overall responsibility.
Procedures for authorization and ID of individuals to receipt for and physically take custody of Army
property. The purpose of such coordination is protection in depth. Authority, jurisdiction, and
responsibility must be set forth in a manner that ensures protection and avoids duplication of effort.
/s/ Commander
FM 3-19.30
ANNEXES
F-1. Annexes to the pl an shoul d i ncl ude, but are not l i mi ted to, the fol l owi ng.
More i nformati on can be found i n AR 190-13.
Annex A. The i nstal l ati on threat statement (i ntel l i gence). Thi s annex
shoul d contai n the Terrori sm Counteracti on Pl an (refer to AR 190-13).
Annex B. A bomb-threat pl an. As a mi ni mum, the bomb-threat pl an
shoul d provi de gui dance for
I Control of the operati on.
I Evacuati on.
I Search.
I Fi ndi ng the bomb or suspected bomb.
I Di sposal .
I Detonati on and damage control .
I Control of publ i ci ty.
I After-acti on report.
Annex C. An i nstal l ati on cl osure pl an.
Annex D. A natural -di saster pl an. Thi s pl an wi l l be coordi nated wi th
natur al -di saster pl ans of l ocal j u r i sdi cti ons. At a mi ni mum, the
natural -di saster pl an shoul d provi de gui dance for
I Control of the operati on.
I Evacuati on.
I Communi cati on.
I Control of publ i ci ty.
I After-acti on report.
Annex E. A ci vi l -di sturbance pl an. I t i s the commanders
r esponsi bi l i ty to for mul ate a ci vi l -di stur bance pl an based on l ocal
thr eats. (For exampl e, commander s of chemi cal faci l i ti es shou l d
anti ci pate the need to devel op cr owd-contr ol pr ocedur es to handl e
anti chemi cal demonstrati ons.)
Annex F. A resource pl an to meet the mi ni mum-essenti al physi cal -
securi ty needs for the i nstal l ati on or acti vi ty.
Annex G. A communi cati on pl an. Thi s pl an i s requi red to establ i sh
communi cati ons wi th other federal agenci es and l ocal l aw-enforcement
a ge n ci e s t o s h a r e i n f or ma t i on a bou t p os s i b l e t h r ea t s . Th e
communi cati ons pl an shoul d addr ess al l communi cati on needs for
annexes B through F above.
Annex H. A l i st of desi gnated restri cted areas.
Annex I. A l i st of i nstal l ati on MEVAs.
Annex J . A conti ngency pl an. I n most i nstances, i t wi l l be necessary to
i ncr ease secur i ty for AA&E and other sensi ti ve pr oper ty, assets, and
faci l i ti es dur i ng peri ods of natur al di saster s, natur al emergenci es, or
i ncr eased thr eat fr om ter r or i sts or cr i mi nal el ements. Ther efor e,
CONPLANs shoul d i ncl ude pr ovi si ons for i ncr easi ng the physi cal -
secur i ty measur es and pr ocedur es based on the l ocal commander s
assessment of the si tuati on. Such conti ngenci es may i ncl ude hostage
negoti ati ons, pr otecti ve ser vi ces, and speci al -r eacti on teams. These
FM 3-19.30
pr ovi si ons shoul d be desi gned for ear l y detecti on of an attempted
i ntrusi on, theft, or i nterrupti on of normal securi ty condi ti ons.
Annex K. Work-stoppage pl an. Thi s i s a requi rement for conducti ng a
physi cal -securi ty survey.
TACTICAL-ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS
F-2. I n a tacti cal envi ronment, the devel opment of a physi cal -securi ty pl an i s
based on METT-TC (usi ng the OPORD for mat and the hi gher headquar ter s
or der ). The or der may be speci fi c about the tasks the uni t wi l l per for m. Ti me
avai l abl e may be l i mi ted and the scheme of maneuver may be di ctated, but the
l eader must sti l l eval uate the mi ssi on i n terms of METT-TC to determi ne how
MP el ements can best carry out the commanders order.
F-3. Consi der each of the fol l owi ng factor s and compar e cour ses of acti on to
form a base for the physi cal -secur i ty pl an. When the pl an i s fi rm, i ssue i t as
an order.
Concepts for reconnai ssance, coordi nati on wi th adjacent and/or
supporti ng uni ts, and troop movement.
Physi cal -securi ty i nstal l ati on confi gurati ons and faci l i ti es. Areas to
consi der may i ncl ude dr op zones, l andi ng zones, r anges, and tr ai ni ng
areas.
MISSION
F-4. The mi ssi on i s usual l y the empl acement of defensi ve secur i ty r i ngs to
pr otect the popul ace agai nst i nsur gents. The number of defensi ve secur i ty
r i ngs depends on the par ti cul ar si te and si tuati on. The fol l owi ng questi ons
must be eval uated:
What i s the mi ssi on?
What speci fi c and i mpl i ed tasks are there to accompl i sh the mi ssi on?
What i s the commanders i ntent?
ENEMY
F-5. The commander i denti fi es i nsurgent uni ts operati ng i n the area and tri es
to deter mi ne the type and si ze of the uni t; the enemys tacti cs, weapons,
equi pment, and probabl e col l aborators; and the i nhabi tants atti tudes toward
the i nsurgents. The fol l owi ng questi ons must be eval uated:
What i s known about the enemy?
Where i s the enemy and how strong i s he?
What weapons does the enemy have?
What i s the enemy doi ng?
What can the enemy do i n response to MP acti ons?
How can we expl oi t the enemys weaknesses?
TERRAIN AND WEATHER
F-6. The comman der can us e obser v ati on and fi el ds of fi r e, cov er an d
conceal ment, obstacl es, key ter r ai n, and avenues of appr oach (OCOKA) to
FM 3-19.30
pl an for the physi cal -securi ty defensi ve si tes. The fol l owi ng questi ons must be
eval uated:
How wi l l the terrai n and weather affect the operati on?
How fast can movement be accompl i shed, and how much space does
the terrai n and uni t formati ons take up?
Wi l l the weather affect the terrai n or personnel ?
Has the weather al ready affected the terrai n?
TROOPS
F-7. The commander must consi der avai l abl e equi pment, the r eacti on ti me,
r eacti on for ces, communi cati on assets, or gani zati on of tr oops, and medi cal
support (i f avai l abl e). The fol l owi ng questi ons must be eval uated:
What are the present condi ti ons of vehi cl es and personnel ?
What i s the status of ammuni ti on and suppl i es?
Who i s best abl e to do a speci fi c task?
How much sl eep have the sol di ers had i n the past 24 hours?
What other assets are avai l abl e to support the mi ssi on?
How many teams/squads are avai l abl e?
What suppl i es and equi pment are needed?
What fi re support i s avai l abl e and how can i t be obtai ned?
TIME AVAILABLE
F-8. Thi s factor i s cr i ti cal si nce the i nhabi tants must be r eady to r espond to
an i nsurgent attack wi th l i ttl e or no warni ng. The fol l owi ng questi ons must be
eval uated:
How much ti me i s avai l abl e to conduct pl anni ng?
How l ong wi l l i t take to reach the objecti ve?
How l ong wi l l i t take to prepare the posi ti on?
How much ti me do subordi nates need?
How l ong wi l l i t take the enemy to reposi ti on forces?
CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS
F-9. The commander al so must consi der nonbel l i gerent thi rd parti es (such as
di s l ocated ci v i l i an s, per s on n el of i n ter n ati on al bu s i n es s es an d r el i ef
organi zati ons, and the medi a). Every commander must prepare a si te overl ay
that shows, as a mi ni mum, the fol l owi ng:
The atti tude of the HN toward US forces.
The popul ati on densi ty near the objecti ve.
The condi ti on of the l ocal ci vi l i ans.
The possi bl e effect of refugees and di sl ocated ci vi l i ans on the mi ssi on.
Personal-Protection Measures G-1
Appendix G
Personal-Protection Measures
Terr ori sts frequentl y emul ate mi l i tary organi zati ons as they devel op, pl an,
trai n, and carry out terrori st attacks agai nst DOD assets. Terrori sts have
a cri ti cal need for i nformati on r egardi ng the whereabouts, habi ts, worki ng
envi ronments, home envi ronments, and other potenti al poi nts of l everage
agai nst thei r tar gets. The thr ee i ntel l i gence-col l ecti on methods used by
ter r or i sts agai nst potenti al tar gets ar e human i ntel l i gence (HUMI NT),
photographi c i ntel l i gence (PHOTI NT), and si gnal i ntel l i gence (SI GI NT).
PERSONAL PROTECTION
G-1. The measures that fol l ow are useful i n provi di ng personal protecti on for
US gover nment empl oyees and DOD ci vi l i an contr actor s i n CONUS or
OCONUS faci l i ti es.
OVERCOME ROUTINES
G-2. The r educed pr obabi l i ty of success i n ki dnappi ng or ki l l i ng a tar get
makes the target far l ess desi rabl e. Perform the fol l owi ng measures to prevent
dai l y routi nes from bei ng observed:
Vary your route to and from work and your arri val and departure
ti mes.
Vary your exerci se schedul e, usi ng di fferent routes and di stances. I t i s
best not to exerci se al one.
Do not di vul ge fami l y or personal i nformati on to strangers.
Enter and exi t bui l di ngs through di fferent doors, i f possi bl e.
Avoi d other routi nes.
MAINTAIN A LOWPROFILE
G-3. Ameri cans are easy to i denti fy i n an overseas area. Perform the fol l owi ng
measures to reduce easy I D:
Dress and behave i n publ i c i n a manner consi stent wi th l ocal customs.
I tems that are di sti ncti vel y Amer i can shoul d not be worn or di spl ayed
outsi de Ameri can compounds.
Reduce vi si bi l i ty i n the l ocal communi ty.
Avoi d fl ashi ng l arge sums of money, expensi ve jewel ry, or l uxury i tems.
Avoi d publ i c di sputes or confrontati ons, and report any troubl e to the
proper authori ti es.
Ensure that personal i nformati on (home address, phone number, or
fami l y i nformati on) i s not di vul ged.
FM 3-19.30
G-2 Personal-Protection Measures
PREPARE FOR UNEXPECTED EVENTS
G-4. Al l DOD per sonnel , contr actor s, and thei r fami l y member s shoul d
i mpl ement the fol l owi ng general measur es:
Get i nto the habi t of checki ng i n wi th fri ends and fami l y.
Know how to use the l ocal phone system.
Know the l ocati ons of ci vi l i an pol i ce, mi l i tary pol i ce, government
agenci es, and the US embassy.
Know certai n key phrases i n the l ocal l anguage.
Set up si mpl e si gnal systems that can al ert fami l y members or
associ ates that danger i s present.
Carry I D showi ng your bl ood type and any speci al medi cal condi ti ons.
Keep personal affai rs i n good order.
Avoi d carryi ng sensi ti ve or potenti al l y embarrassi ng i tems.
WORKING ENVIRONMENT
G-5. Th e wor k i n g env i r onment i s not i mmu ne fr om attempted acts by
cr i mi nal s or ter r or i sts. DOD i nstal l ati ons i n CONUS and OCONUS usual l y
pr ovi de a l evel of basi c secur i ty compar abl e or super i or to the basi c l evel of
secur i ty pr ovi ded i n the sur r oundi ng communi ty. The fol l owi ng ar e gener al
practi ces that can hel p reduce the l i kel i hood of a terrori st attack:
Establ i sh and support an effecti ve securi ty program.
Di scourage the use of offi ce faci l i ti es to store objects of si gni fi cant
i ntri nsi c val ue unl ess i t i s mi ssi on essenti al .
Trai n personnel to be al ert for suspi ci ous acti vi ti es, persons, or objects.
Arrange offi ce i nteri ors so that strange or forei gn objects l eft i n the
room wi l l be recogni zed i mmedi atel y.
Provi de for securi ty systems on exteri or doors and wi ndows.
Ensure that access-control procedures are ri gorousl y observed at al l
ti mes for access to
I The i nstal l ati on.
I Bui l di ngs wi thi n an i nstal l ati on.
I Restri cted or excl usi on areas wi thi n bui l di ngs.
Use an I D badge system contai ni ng a photograph.
I denti fy offi ces by room number, col or, or object name and not by rank,
ti tl e, or the name of the i ncumbent.
Avoi d usi ng namepl ates on offi ces and parki ng pl aces.
OFFICE PROCEDURES
G-6. I n an offi ce, the fol l owi ng steps can be tak en to mak e i ntel l i gence
col l ecti on and targeti ng more di ffi cul t for terrori sts:
Tel ephone and mai l procedures:
I When answeri ng the tel ephone, avoi d usi ng r anks or ti tl es.
I When taki ng tel ephone messages, do not reveal the whereabouts or
acti vi ti es of the per son bei ng sought.
FM 3-19.30
I When l eavi ng tel ephone messages, pl ace them i n unmarked fol ders;
do not l eave them exposed for observers to i denti fy cal l er names and
phone numbers, persons cal l ed, and messages l eft.
I When openi ng mai l , use a checkl i st to hel p i denti fy l etter bombs or
packaged I EDs.
Vi si tor-control procedures:
I Pl ace stri ct l i mi tati ons on access to the executi ve offi ce area.
I Lock doors (from the i nsi de) from the vi si tor-access area to
executi ve offi ces or other restri cted areas of a faci l i ty.
I Ensure that recepti oni sts cl ear al l vi si tors before they enter i nner
offi ces.
I Permi t workmen or vi si tors access to restri cted areas or excl usi on
areas under escort and onl y wi th proper I D. Confi rm the work to be
done before admi tti ng workmen to restri cted areas of the faci l i ty.
I Li mi t publ i ci ty i n publ i c wai ti ng areas to i nformati on that does not
i denti fy personnel by name, posi ti on, or offi ce l ocati on.
I Avoi d posti ng uni t rosters, manni ng boards, or photo boards where
vi si tors or l ocal contractors can vi ew them.
I Restri ct the use of message boards, si gn-i n/-out boards, and other
vi sual communi cati ons to general statements of avai l abi l i ty.
General worki ng procedures:
I Avoi d carryi ng attach cases, bri efcases, or other couri er bags
unl ess necessary.
I Avoi d carryi ng i tems wi th marki ngs that i denti fy the owner by rank
or ti tl e, even wi thi n the offi ce envi ronment.
I Avoi d worki ng al one l ate at ni ght and on days when the remai nder
of the staff i s absent.
I Ensure that offi ce doors are l ocked when the offi ce i s vacant for any
l engthy per i od, at ni ght, and on weekends. I f l ate-ni ght wor k i s
necessar y, wor k i n confer ence r ooms or i nter nal offi ces wher e
outsi de observati on i s not possi bl e.
I Ensure that the securi ty offi ce retai ns the offi ce keys.
I Ensure that papers, correspondence, communi cati ons materi al s,
and other documents are not l eft unattended overni ght.
I Ensure that mai ntenance acti vi ty and jani tori al servi ces i n key
offi ces, pr oducti on offi ces, or mai ntenance faci l i ti es ar e per for med
under the supervi si on of securi ty personnel .
I Prohi bi t the removal of property, materi al , or i nformati on stored on
any medi a from the faci l i ty wi thout proper wri tten authori zati on.
I Consi der prohi bi ti ng the i mportati on of property, materi al , or
i nformati on stored on any medi a i nto the faci l i ty unl ess such i tems
have been properl y i nspected.
I Lock offi ces not i n use to prohi bi t unauthori zed access of stored
materi al thatcoul dbeusedtohi deI EDsori ntel l i gence-col l ecti ondevi ces.
I Mi ni mi ze the use of vehi cl es or vehi cl e marki ngs that make i t
possi bl e to r eadi l y i denti fy the vehi cl e and i ts occupants as US-
government or DOD-contractor personnel .
FM 3-19.30
G-4 Personal-Protection Measures
I Ensure that al l personnel have access to some sort of duress al arm
to annunci ate and warn of a terrori st attack.
I Ensure that secretari es and guard posts are equi pped wi th covert
duress al arms that can be used to al ert backup forces.
I Avoi d pl aci ng offi ce furni shi ngs di rectl y i n front of exteri or
wi ndows.
SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR EXECUTIVE ASSISTANTS
G-7. The fol l owi ng suggesti ons are i ntended to be a gui de for secr etari es and
executi ve assi stants who may fi nd themsel ves per formi ng per sonnel -secur i ty
duti es as col l ateral duty. Executi ve assi stants and secur i ty personnel shoul d
r egul ar l y tr ai n and exer ci se pr ocedur es used i n case they must evacuate
mi ssi on-cri ti cal personnel to safe havens.
Request the i nstal l ati on of physi cal barri ers (such as
el ectr omagn eti cal l y oper ated door s) to separ ate offi ces of seni or
executi ves from other offi ces.
Request the i nstal l ati on of a si l ent troubl e-al arm button wi th a si gnal
termi nati ng i n the securi ty department.
Admi t vi si tors i nto the executi ve area when they are posi ti vel y
screened i n advance or are personal l y recogni zed.
Do not i nform unknown cal l ers of an executi ves whereabouts, home
address, or tel ephone number.
Store a fi re exti ngui sher, a fi rst ai d ki t, and an oxygen bottl e i n the
offi ce area.
Remai n cal m and l i sten careful l y when recei vi ng a threateni ng cal l .
Do not accept packages from strangers unti l sati sfi ed wi th the
i ndi vi dual 's i denti ty and the nature of the parcel .
Keep travel i ti nerari es for al l personnel confi denti al .
Di stri bute dai l y schedul es for seni or offi cers and ci vi l i an offi ci al s on a
l i mi ted basi s.
HOME ENVIRONMENT
G-8. The fol l owi ng di scussi on i s i ntended to assi st per sonnel i n for mul ati ng
pl ans to obtai n housi ng outsi de US government compounds or DOD faci l i ti es.
Per sonnel assi gned to gover nment housi ng may al so fi nd the anti ter r or i sm
and secur i ty ti ps pr esented bel ow hel pful i n r educi ng the thr eat of vi ol ence
and l oss of property.
G-9. For gener al r esi denti al -secur i ty routi nes, di scuss wi th fami l y members
the i mportance of
Varyi ng routi nes i n thei r dai l y acti vi ti es.
Bl endi ng i n wi th the l ocal envi ronment.
Avoi di ng unnecessary publ i ci ty and photographs that i denti fy
i ndi vi dual fami l y members.
Bei ng al ert to i ndi vi dual s, parked or abandoned vehi cl es, unusual
uti l i ty wor k, or gatheri ngs of peopl e i nconsi stent wi th the r esi denti al
envi ronment.
FM 3-19.30
SECURITY PRACTICES AT HOME
G-10. The fol l owi ng measur es ar e speci fi cal l y r ecommended for r esi denti al
i mpl ementati on. These measur es ar e an extensi on of offi ce anti ter r or i sm-
securi ty practi ces.
Do not use namepl ates or uni quel y Ameri can symbol s on the exteri or of
resi dences occupi ed by DOD personnel overseas.
Do not use namepl ates on parki ng pl aces, and avoi d parki ng pri vate or
government vehi cl es i n the same l ocati on day after day.
Ensure that al l fami l y members answer the tel ephone pol i tel y but that
they provi de no i nfor mati on as to the name of the occupants unti l the
cal l ers i denti ty has been establ i shed.
Treat al l tel ephone conversati ons as though anyone who wanted to
l i sten i n was doi ng so.
Exami ne careful l y al l mai l del i vered to the resi dence.
SOCIAL AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES
G-11. DOD per sonnel ar e encour aged to par ti ci pate i n many soci al and
recreati onal acti vi ti es. The fol l owi ng precauti ons are recommended:
Respond to for mal soci al i nvi tati ons i n per son (wher e possi bl e) or by
di rect tel ephone contact.
Be attenti ve to the securi ty envi ronment of soci al gatheri ngs.
Avoi d the devel opment of patterns wi th respect to ti me of arri val or
departure at soci al events.
Avoi d prol onged presence at soci al functi ons where there i s a hi gh
concentrati on of persons thought to be terrori st targets.
Refrai n from excessi ve use of al cohol at soci al functi ons; remai n
cl earheaded and uni mpai red.
Vary routes to and from soci al events hel d at a central faci l i ty.
Mi ni mi ze appearances i n uni form or formal atti re.
Decl i ne i nvi tati ons to appear i n publ i ci ty photos.
Parti ci pate i n recreati onal acti vi ti es wi thi n the Ameri can compound or
at a DOD i nstal l ati on whenever possi bl e.
NOTE: Refer to DOD 0-2000.12-H, Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 19-4-3,
and J oi nt Servi ces (J S) Gui de 5260 for further gui dance and
explanation regardingprotectivemeasures.
Bombs H-1
Appendix H
Bombs
Ter r or i sts have fr equentl y used homemade devi ces or I EDs to car r y out
thei r attacks agai nst DOD per sonnel , faci l i ti es, and assets. The I EDs ar e
i deal terrori st weapons. They are r el ati vel y i nexpensi ve to make, and the
components of many I EDs ar e common i tems that can be obtai ned fr om
many sources and are di ffi cul t to trace. The I EDs can be l arge or smal l and
be desi gned so that they are transported to the attack si te i n components
for l ast-mi nute assembl y. Such desi gn concepts mak e detecti on mor e
di ffi cul t and pr ovi de an addi ti onal i ncr ement of per sonal safety to the
ter ror i sts.
GENERAL
H-1. The use of I EDs can enhance the vi ol ence that gi ves terrori st groups thei r
abi l i ty to i nti mi date or coerce a target popul ati on. The detonati on i tsel f creates
a hi ghl y vi sual , newswor thy scene, even hour s after the detonati on occur s.
Bombs can detonate anywhere, wi thout apparent reason and wi thout warni ng.
The use of bombs i n a terror campai gn emphasi zes the authori ti es i nabi l i ty to
safeguar d the publ i c and mai ntai n l aw and or der. Bombs ar e i deal weapons
because they can be desi gned to gi ve terrori sts opportuni ti es to escape from the
scene of thei r cri mes.
CONCEALING BOMBS
H-2. Gi ven the questi on, Where have terrori sts pl aced bombs i n the past, and
where shoul d we l ook for them? resul ts i n no easy answer. Tabl e H-1, page H-2,
l i sts a few obvi ous l ocati ons that shoul d be exami ned. Terrori sts who use bombs
as thei r weapons of choi ce can be very creati ve i n desi gni ng and pl aci ng thei r
weapons.
H-3. Bombs can be found anywhere peopl e can pl ace them. Wi thout becomi ng
par anoi d and seei ng a bomb under ever y r ock and behi nd ever y tr ee, the
pr acti cal answer to the above questi ons i s: Wher e they can be easi l y pl aced
wi thout the bomber bei ng caught.
DAMAGE AND CASUALTY MECHANISMS
H-4. The I EDs and other expl osi ve devi ces i nfl i ct casual ti es i n a var i ety of
ways, i ncl udi ng the fol l owi ng:
Bl ast over pressure (a crushi ng acti on on vi tal components of the body;
eardrums are the most vul nerabl e).
Fal l i ng structural materi al .
Fl yi ng debri s (especi al l y gl ass).
Asphyxi ati on (l ack of oxygen).
FM 3-19.30
H-2 Bombs
Sudden body transl ati on agai nst ri gi d barri ers or objects (bei ng pi cked
up and thrown by a pressure wave).
Bomb fragments.
Burns from i ncendi ary devi ces or fi res resul ti ng from bl ast damage.
I nhal ati on of toxi c fumes resul ti ng from fi res.
H-5. I t i s i mpossi bl e to cal cul ate a si ngl e mi ni mum safe di stance from an I ED
or other expl osi ve devi ce. The safe di stance var i es wi th each devi ce and i ts
pl acement. As a rul e, the farther away from a bomb, the safer the i ntended or
col l ater al tar gets ar e. Bl ast effects, fr agmentati on i nj ur i es, and i nj ur i es
resul ti ng from fl yi ng debri s di mi ni sh greatl y as the di stance between a bomb
and possi bl e targets i ncrease. The amount of materi al i n the devi ce, the type of
expl osi ve mater i al , the manner i n whi ch the devi ce i s constr ucted, and the
l ocati on or the contai ner i n whi ch i t i s pl aced al l have a beari ng on the speci fi c
destructi ve potenti al for each I ED.
H-6. The fol l owi ng are four general rul es to fol l ow to avoi d i njury from an I ED:
Move as far fr om a suspi ci ous object as possi bl e wi thout bei ng i n
further danger from other hazards such as traffi c or secondary sources
of expl osi on (such as POL storage).
Stay out of the objects LOS, thereby reduci ng the hazard of i njury
because of di rect fragmentati on.
Keep away from gl ass wi ndows or other materi al s that coul d become
fl yi ng debri s.
Remai n al ert for addi ti onal or secondary expl osi ve devi ces i n the
i mmedi ate area, especi al l y i f the exi stence of a bomb-threat evacuati on
assembl y area has been hi ghl y publ i ci zed.
H-7. Some ter r or i sts have used two especi al l y devi ous tacti cs i n the past to
i ntensi fy the magni tude of casual ti es i nfl i cted by bombi ng attacks. I n some
i nstances, they have detonated a smal l devi ce to l ur e medi a attenti on and
cur i osi ty seeker s to the si te; a l ar ger, mor e deadl y devi ce has detonated some
ti me after the fi rst devi ce, thereby i nfl i cti ng a l arge number of casual ti es.
Table H-1. Potential IED Hiding Places
Outside Areas
Trash cans
Dumpsters
Mailboxes
Bushes
Street drainage
systems
Storage areas
Parked cars
Inside Buildings
Mail parcels or letters
Inside desks/storage containers
Ceilings with removable panels
Areas hidden by drapes or curtains
Recent repaired/patched segments
of walls, floors, or ceilings
Restrooms
Trash receptacles
Utility closets
Boiler rooms
Under stairwells
In Plain Sight
FM 3-19.30
Bombs H-3
H-8. Other ter r or i sts have used a r eal or si mul ated devi ce to for ce the
evacuati on of a faci l i ty onl y to detonate a much mor e substanti al devi ce i n
i denti fi ed bomb-threat evacuati on assembl y areas. These attacks are especi al l y
harmful because the evacuati on assembl y areas often concentrate government
or commer ci al offi ce wor ker s mor e densel y than they ar e when di sper sed
throughout thei r usual workpl aces.
TELEPHONIC THREATS
H-9. When r ecei vi ng a tel ephoni c thr eat, tr eat the cal l ser i ousl y. Often, an
anonymous tel ephone cal l i s made regardi ng a bomb or an I ED. See Fi gure H-1,
page H-4, for i nformati on to record/obtai n when recei vi ng these cal l s
H-10. When an anonymous warni ng or threat i s recei ved, i ni ti ate the bomb-
thr eat data card and noti fy the PMO, securi ty pol i ce, securi ty for ces, or other
l aw-enfor cement/secur i ty offi ces i mmedi atel y. Local SOPs wi l l deter mi ne
subsequent acti ons. I mmedi ate acti on may i ncl ude a search wi thout evacuati on,
the movement of personnel wi thi n the establ i shment, a parti al evacuati on, or a
total evacuati on. The fol l owi ng cri teri a hel ps determi ne what i mmedi ate acti on
to take:
Factors favori ng a search before the movement of personnel :
I There i s a hi gh i nci dence of hoax tel ephone threats.
I Effecti ve securi ty arrangements have been establ i shed.
I I nformati on i n the warni ng i s i mpreci se or i ncorrect.
I The cal l er sounded i ntoxi cated, amused, or very young.
I The prevai l i ng threat of terrori st acti vi ty i s l ow.
Factors favori ng movement of personnel before searchi ng:
I The area (post or base) i s comparati vel y open.
I I nformati on i n the warni ng i s preci se as to the matters of l ocati on, a
descri pti on of the devi ce, the ti mi ng, and the moti ve for the attack.
I A prevai l i ng threat of terrori st acti vi ty i s hi gh.
EVACUATION DRILLS
H-11. Evacuati on and search dri l l s shoul d be performed peri odi cal l y under the
supervi si on of the i nstal l ati ons or uni ts seni or offi cer. The dri l l s shoul d be hel d
i n cooper ati on wi th l ocal pol i ce i f possi bl e. Per sonnel i n adjacent bui l di ngs
shoul d be i nformed of dri l l s to avoi d causi ng unnecessary al arm.
H-12. Evacuati on procedures depend on the ci rcumstances. Prepare, publ i ci ze,
and rehearse evacuati on pl ans i n advance. Address al arm systems, assembl y
areas, routes to assembl y areas, personnel -evacuati on responses, bui l di ng and
area cl earances, and evacuati on dri l l s.
PERSONNEL-EVACUATION RESPONSE
H-13. The bomb-threat al arm system shoul d be easi l y di sti ngui shed from the
fi re al arm. When the al arm sounds, personnel shoul d
Lock up or secure al l cl assi fi ed materi al s.
Conduct a qui ck vi sual search of thei r i mmedi ate worki ng area.
FM 3-19.30
H-4 Bombs
.
Instructions: Be calm. Be courteous. Listen, do not interrupt the caller. Notify supervisor/security officer by
prearranged signal while caller is on line.
Name of Operator Time Date
Callers Identity
Sex: J Male J Female J Adult J Juvenile Approximate age: Years
Origin of Call
J Local J Booth J Internal (From within bldg)
J Long Distance If internal, leave line open for tracing the call.
Bomb Facts
Pretend difficulty with your hearing. Keep caller talking.
If caller seems agreeable to further conversation, ask questions like
When will it go off? Certain Hour - Time Remaining - What kind of bomb? - Where are you now?
How do you know so much about the bomb? - What is your name and address?
If building is occupied, inform caller that detonation could cause injury or death.
Did caller appear familiar with plant or building by his description of the bomb location?
Write out the message in its entirety and any other comments on a separate sheet of paper and attach to this
checklist.
Action To Take Immediately After Call
Notify your supervisor/security officer as instructed. Talk to no one other than as instructed by your supervisor/
security officer.
Voice Characteristics Speech Language
J Loud J Soft J Fast J Slow J Excellent J Good
J High Pitch J Deep J Distinct J Distorted J Fair J Poor
J Raspy J Pleasant J Stutter J Nasal J Foul J Other
J Intoxicated J Other J Slurred J Lisp
J Other
Accent Manner Background Noises
J Local J Calm J Angry J Factory Machines J Trains
J Not Local J Rational J Irrational J Bedlam J Animals
Region J Coherent J Incoherent J Music J Quiet
J Foreign J Deliberate J Emotional J Office Machines J Voices
Race J Righteous J Laughing J Mixed J Airplanes
J Street Traffic J Party Atmosphere
Figure H-1. Sample Bomb-Threat Data Card
FM 3-19.30
Bombs H-5
Open wi ndows (wherever possi bl e).
Leave the bui l di ng, taki ng onl y val uabl e personal bel ongi ngs.
Leave doors open and i mmedi atel y proceed to the assembl y area.
H-14. Openi ng the bui l di ng wi l l reduce i nternal damage due to bl ast effects. I t
wi l l al so somewhat mi ti gate the extent of debri s fl yi ng out of or fal l i ng from the
bui l di ng shoul d a detonati on occur.
ASSEMBLY AREAS
H-15. Choose the routes to the assembl y area so that personnel do not approach
the I ED at any ti me. Pr esel ect the routes to the assembl y ar ea, but devi se a
system to i nform personnel of the l ocati on of the suspected I ED and al ternate
r outes. Routes pr event confusi on and bunchi ng and avoi d potenti al hazar ds
(such as pl ate gl ass, wi ndows, and l i kel y l ocati ons of addi ti onal I EDs).
H-16. Assembl y ar eas shoul d be pr esel ected and wel l known to per sonnel .
Establ i sh a cl earl y defi ned procedure for control l i ng, marshal i ng, and checki ng
per sonnel wi thi n the assembl y ar ea. I f bui l di ngs or establ i shments ar e i n a
publ i c area, coordi nate the assembl y areas wi th l ocal pol i ce. Assembl y areas are
sel ected usi ng the fol l owi ng cri teri a:
Locate assembl y areas at l east 100 meters from the l i kel y target or
bui l di ng (i f possi bl e).
Locate assembl y areas i n areas where there i s l i ttl e chance of an I ED
bei ng hi dden. Open spaces are best. Avoi d parki ng areas because I EDs
can be easi l y hi dden i n vehi cl es.
Sel ect al ternate assembl y areas to reduce the l i kel i hood of ambush
wi th a s econ d dev i ce or smal l -ar ms fi r e. I f pos s i bl e, s ear ch the
assembl y area before personnel occupy the space.
Avoi d l ocati ng assembl y areas near expanses of pl ate gl ass or wi ndows.
Bl ast effects can cause wi ndows to be sucked outwar d r ather than
bl own i nward.
Sel ect mul ti pl e assembl y areas (i f possi bl e) to reduce the concentrati on
of k ey per son nel . Dr i l l and exer ci se per son nel to go to di ffer en t
assembl y ar eas to avoi d devel opi ng an evacuati on and emer gency
patter n that can be used by ter r or i sts to attack i denti fi abl e k ey
personnel .
BUILDING AND AREA CLEARANCE
H-17. Establ i sh procedures to ensure that threatened bui l di ngs and areas are
cl eared. Prevent personnel from reenteri ng the bui l di ng. Establ i sh a cordon to
pr event per sonnel fr om enter i ng the danger ar ea. Establ i sh an i ni ti al contr ol
poi nt (I CP) as the focal poi nt for the PMO and for MP control .
H-18. Cordon suspi ci ous objects to a di stance of at l east 100 meters, and cordon
suspi ci ous vehi cl es to a di stance of at l east 200 meter s. Ensur e that nobody
enter s the cor doned ar ea. Establ i sh an I CP on the cor don to contr ol access;
r el i nqui sh I CP r esponsi bi l i ty to the PMO or l ocal pol i ce upon thei r ar r i val .
Mai ntai n the cor don unti l the PMO, secur i ty pol i ce, secur i ty for ces, or l ocal
pol i ce have compl eted thei r exami nati on or stated that the cor don may stand
down.
FM 3-19.30
H-6 Bombs
SEARCHING FOR A SUSPECTED IED
H-19. Searches are conducted i n response to a tel ephoni c threat or a report of
an uni denti fi ed object on or near pr emi ses occupi ed by DOD per sonnel . The
fol l owi ng types of searches may be used when searchi ng for a suspected bomb or
I ED:
An occupant search i s used when the threats credi bi l i ty i s l ow.
Occupants sear ch thei r own ar eas. The sear ch i s compl eted qui ckl y
because occupants k now thei r ar ea and ar e most l i k el y to noti ce
anythi ng unusual .
A team search i s used when the threats credi bi l i ty i s hi gh. The search
i s very thorough and pl aces the mi ni mum number of personnel at ri sk.
Evacuate the ar ea compl etel y, and ensur e that i t r emai ns evacuated
unti l the search i s compl ete. Search teams wi l l make a sl ow, thorough,
systemati c search of the area.
H-20. The fol l owi ng pr ocedur es shoul d be fol l owed i f a sear ch for expl osi ve
devi ces must be conducted before qual i fi ed EOD teams arri ve:
Make an audi o check, l i steni ng for unusual sounds.
Sweep the area vi sual l y up to the wai st, then sweep up to the cei l i ng.
Do not forget the tops of cabi nets and cupboards.
Perform a thorough and systemati c search i n and around contai ners
and fi xtures.
Pass search resul ts as qui ckl y as possi bl e to the l eader responsi bl e for
contr ol l i ng the sear ch ar ea. Do not use a r adi o; i t may detonate the
expl osi ve.
H-21. Ci rcumstances mi ght ari se i n the case of a very short warni ng peri od. I n
other i nstances, a thr eat of a bomb agai nst some faci l i ti es (i f tr ue) mi ght
necessi tate the evacuati on of a ver y l ar ge ar ea. I n these ci r cumstances,
sear chi ng for the pr esence of an expl osi ve devi ce to i denti fy i ts l ocati on,
appearance, and possi bl e operati ng characteri sti cs may be warranted.
H-22. Personnel who have not been trai ned i n I ED search and I D techni ques
shoul d not search for expl osi ve devi ces. Two types of errors are very common
the fal se I D of objects as I EDs and the i ncorrect I D of I EDs as beni gn objects.
Dependi ng on the devi ces used to arm and tri gger an I ED, the search process
coul d actual l y resul t i n an expl osi on.
SEARCH ORGANIZATION
H-23. The person control l i ng the search shoul d have a method of tracki ng and
recordi ng the search resul ts (such as a di agram of the area). Del egate areas of
r esponsi bi l i ty to the sear ch-team l eader, who shoul d r epor t to the per son
contr ol l i ng the sear ch when each ar ea has been cl ear ed. Pay par ti cul ar
attenti on to entrances, toi l ets, corri dors, stai rs, unl ocked cl osets, storage spaces,
r ooms and ar eas not checked by usual occupants, exter nal bui l di ng ar eas,
wi ndow l edges, venti l ators, courtyards, and spaces shi el ded from normal vi ew.
FM 3-19.30
Bombs H-7
DISCOVERY OF A SUSPECTED IED
H-24. When a suspi ci ous object has been found, report i ts l ocati on and general
descri pti on i mmedi atel y to the nearest l aw-enforcement or supervi sory person.
Do not touch or move a suspi ci ous object. I nstead, perform the fol l owi ng steps:
I f an object appears i n an area associ ated wi th a speci fi c i ndi vi dual or a
cl earl y i denti fi ed area
I Ask the i ndi vi dual /occupant to descri be objects they have brought to
work i n the past few days.
I Ask for an accounti ng of objects.
I Ask for a verbal descri pti on/I D of objects.
I f an objects presence remai ns i nexpl i cabl e
I Evacuate bui l di ngs and surroundi ng areas, i ncl udi ng the search
team.
I Ensure that evacuated areas are at l east 100 meters from the
suspi ci ous object.
I Establ i sh a cordon and an I CP.
I I nform personnel at the I CP that an object has been found.
I Keep the person who l ocated the object at the I CP unti l questi oned.
I Avoi d reenteri ng the faci l i ty to i denti fy an object that may or may
not be an I ED.
REACTING TO AN EXPLODED IED
H-25. The fol l owi ng pr ocedur es shoul d be tak en when an expl osi ve/I ED
detonates at a DOD faci l i ty:
For expl osi ons wi thout casual ti es
I Mai ntai n the cordon. Al l ow onl y authori zed personnel i nto the
expl osi on area.
I Fi ght any fi res threateni ng undamaged bui l di ngs wi thout ri ski ng
personnel .
I Report the expl osi on to the PMO, securi ty pol i ce, securi ty forces, or
l ocal pol i ce i f they are not on the scene.
I Report the expl osi on to the i nstal l ati on operati ons center even i f an
EOD team i s on i ts way. Pr ovi de as much detai l as possi bl e, such as
the ti me of the expl osi on, the number of expl osi ons, the col or of
smoke, and the speed and spread of fi re.
I Ensure that a cl ear passage for emergency vehi cl es (fi re trucks,
a mbu l a n ces, a n d s o f or th ) an d cor r es pon di n g per s on n el i s
mai ntai ned.
I Refer medi a i nqui ri es to the PAO.
I Establ i sh a separate i nformati on center to handl e i nqui ri es from
concerned fri ends and rel ati ves.
For expl osi ons wi th casual ti es
I Sel ect a smal l number of personnel to hel p search for casual ti es.
I Assi gn addi ti onal personnel the responsi bi l i ty for mai ntai ni ng the
cor don to k eep addi ti onal vol unteer s sear chi ng for casual ti es.
FM 3-19.30
H-8 Bombs
Mai n tai n th e cor don u n ti l th e EOD team v er i fi es n o fu r th er
presence of bombs/I EDs at the si te and the fi re marshal determi nes
that r i sk of addi ti onal i njur y to sear cher s fr om fal l i ng debr i s i s
acceptabl e.
I Prepare a casual ty l i st for noti fi cati on of next of ki n; del ay
publ i cati on of the l i st unti l i ts accuracy i s determi ned.
I Arrange for unaffected personnel to contact thei r next of ki n
i mmedi atel y.
H-26. Ci vi l i an management offi ci al s and subor di nate mi l i tar y commander s
conti nue to have i mportant personal rol es to ful fi l l duri ng a bomb/I ED attack on
DOD personnel , faci l i ti es, and assets. Perform the fol l owi ng procedures when
reporti ng an attack:
Pass avai l abl e i nformati on to the operati ons center.
Avoi d del ayi ng reports due to l ack of i nformati on; report what i s
known. Do not take ri sks to obtai n i nformati on.
I ncl ude the fol l owi ng i nformati on i n the report:
I Any warni ng recei ved and i f so, how i t was recei ved.
I The i denti ty of the person who di scovered the devi ce.
I How the devi ce was di scovered (casual di scovery or organi zed
search).
I The l ocati on of the devi ce (gi ve as much detai l as possi bl e).
I The ti me of di scovery.
I The esti mated l ength of ti me the devi ce has been i n i ts l ocati on.
I A descri pti on of the devi ce (gi ve as much detai l as possi bl e).
I Safety measures taken.
I Suggested routes to the scene.
I Any other perti nent i nformati on.
H-27. Perform the fol l owi ng procedures when provi di ng emergency assi stance
to authori ti es:
Ensure that the PMO, securi ty pol i ce, securi ty forces, and other
emer gency-r esponse uni ts from l ocal pol i ce, fi r e and r escue, and EOD
teams ar e not i mpeded fr om r eachi ng the I CP. Hel p mai ntai n cr owd
control and emergency servi ces access to the si te.
Evacuate through the doors and wi ndows of bui l di ngs.
Assi st the on-scene commander by obtai ni ng a bui l di ng di agram
showi ng detai l ed pl ans of the publ i c-ser vi ce condui ts (gas, el ectr i ci ty,
central heati ng, and so forth), i f possi bl e. I f unavai l abl e, a sketch can
be drawn by someone wi th detai l ed knowl edge of the bui l di ng.
Locate, i denti fy, and make wi tnesses avai l abl e to i nvesti gati ve agency
r epr esentati ves when they arr i ve on the scene. Wi tnesses i ncl ude the
person who di scovered the devi ce, wi tnessed the expl osi on, or possesses
detai l ed knowl edge of the bui l di ng or area.
H-28. Per for mi ng the above steps wi l l pr ovi de substanti al assi stance to the
cr i si s-management team and gi ve other per sonnel constr ucti ve, suppor ti ve
acti ons to take i n resol vi ng the cr i si s. Car e must be exerci sed, however, that
addi ti onal expl osi ve devi ces are not conceal ed for detonati on duri ng the mi dst of
FM 3-19.30
Bombs H-9
r escue oper ati ons. These attacks add to the physi cal damage and emoti onal
devastati on of bomb/I ED attacks.
H-29. The use of bombs and I EDs dur i ng ter r or i st attack s agai nst DOD
per sonnel , faci l i ti es, and assets i s a common occur r ence. The pr ocedur es
outl i ned i n thi s appendi x ar e i ntended to hel p a DOD faci l i ty r espond to an
attack before an expl osi ve devi ce detonates. The procedures are al so i ntended to
hel p mi ti gate the consequences of an attack i n case efforts to fi nd an expl osi ve
devi ce and render i t i noperabl e are not successful . I ncurri ng the costs to DOD
faci l i ti es and i nstal l ati ons of detecti ng an expl osi ve devi ce and ter mi nati ng a
terrori st i nci dent before the devi ce can detonate are al most al ways preferabl e
rather than exerci si ng pl ans and opti ons to respond to a detonati on. Several of
the securi ty measures di scussed wi l l hel p reduce the l i kel i hood of a successful
bomb/I ED attack agai nst DOD assets.
Executive Protection I-1
Appendix I
Executive Protection
DOD Di recti ve 2000.12 recogni zes a need to provi de protecti on to mi l i tary
offi cer s and DOD ci vi l i ans who ar e assi gned to hi gh-r i sk bi l l ets, who ar e
(by the natur e of thei r wor k) hi gh-r i sk per sonnel , or who ar e assi gned to
faci l i ti es i denti fi ed as hi gh-ri sk targets. The di recti ve defi nes these terms
as fol l ows:
Hi gh-ri sk bi l l et. Authori zed personnel bi l l et (i denti fi ed and
r ecommended by appr opr i ate author i ty) that because of gr ade,
assi gnment, travel i ti nerary, or symbol i c val ue may make personnel
fi l l i ng them an especi al l y attracti ve or accessi bl e terrori st target.
Hi gh-ri sk personnel . US personnel and thei r fami l y members
whose gr ade, assi gnment, tr avel i ti ner ar y, or symbol i c val ue may
make them an especi al l y attr acti ve or accessi bl e terrori st target.
Hi gh-ri sk target. US faci l i ti es and materi al resources that, because
of mi ssi on sensi ti vi ty, ease of access, i sol ati on, or symbol i c val ue
may be an especi al l y attracti ve or accessi bl e terrori st target.
NOTE: For purposes of this appendix, the termexecutive will be
applied to all persons requiring additional security protection
who are assigned to high-risk billets, designated as high-risk
personnel, or identified as high-risk targets.
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY MEASURES
I -1. The speci fi c suppl emental securi ty measures that may be furni shed to
executi ves are subject to a wi de range of l egal and pol i cy constrai nts. US l aw
establ i shes stri ngent requi rements that must be met before certai n securi ty
measures may be i mpl emented. DOD regul ati ons, i nstructi ons, and l egal
opi ni ons may further constrai n the i mpl ementati on of some protecti ve
measures descri bed i n thi s chapter. The SOFAs and MOUs between the US
and a forei gn government wi l l al so l i mi t the use of some suppl emental
securi ty measures. Leases and other condi ti ons i mposed by contract for
purchase of l and or bui l di ngs by the US for DOD use may al so l i mi t the
appl i cati on of certai n securi ty techni ques. Al l of these constrai nts shoul d be
careful l y consi dered when conducti ng securi ty surveys, devel opi ng pl ans, and
i mpl ementi ng addi ti onal securi ty measures to protect hi gh-ri sk personnel .
EXECUTIVE PROTECTION GOALS
I -2. I n the di scussi on that fol l ows, several measures are outl i ned that can
afford seni or mi l i tary offi cers and DOD personnel addi ti onal protecti on
agai nst terrori st acts. The purpose underl yi ng these measures i s to
FM 3-19.30
I-2 Executive Protection
I ncrease the i nterval of ti me between detecti ng a threat and the onset
of hosti l e acti on agai nst executi ves and thei r dependents.
I ncrease the amount of ti me requi red by terrori sts to gai n physi cal
access to executi ves fr om the onset of hosti l e acti ons, whether the
executi ves are at home, at the offi ce, or i n transi t.
I -3. The i mpl ementati on of suppl emental securi ty measures shoul d stri ve to
achi eve the fol l owi ng pri ori ti zed goal s:
Enhancements shoul d hol d the terrori st threat at bay unti l a response
force arri ves (del ay at a di stance).
Enhancements i n physi cal securi ty shoul d enabl e executi ves to fl ee to
safety (del ay to permi t fl i ght).
Enhancements shoul d permi t the executi ve to retreat i nto a safe haven
of suffi ci ent str ength and sur vi vabi l i ty. Thi s shoul d enabl e a r esponse
for ce to wage an effecti ve counter attack to l i ber ate executi ves and
others accompanyi ng them to a safe haven, i ncl udi ng fami l y members
at h ome an d col l eagu es an d v i s i tor s at wor k (del ay, h ol d, an d
counterattack).
I -4. The fol l owi ng suppl emental measures shoul d be appl i ed wi th care. There
i s a cl ear trade-off between i ncreasi ng the l evel of physi cal securi ty at the
offi ce and at home and preservi ng the anonymi ty of executi ves, thereby
avoi di ng tel l tal e si gns of acti vi ty that poi nt to promi nence or cri ti cal i ty. These
measures can be expensi ve. Expense can be measured not just i n terms of
dol l ars, but al so i n terms of changes to organi zati onal routi ne. Therefore,
three questi ons must be resol ved before i mpl ementi ng bol d, di srupti ve, and
expensi ve suppl emental securi ty enhancements:
What are the most cost-effecti ve means of enhanci ng the securi ty of
executi ves at ri sk?
How many changes i n organi zati onal routi nes and personal behavi ors
wi l l have to be made for secur i ty measur es to be effecti ve i n r educi ng
the ri sk of terrori st attacks and the vul nerabi l i ty of executi ves to such
attacks?
What are the anti ci pated costs of addi ti onal securi ty measures i n
terms of dol l ars, organi zati onal functi onal i ty, and mi ssi on capabi l i ty?
I -5. Securi ty enhancements can be made to i mprove the securi ty of executi ves
and can be even more effecti ve i f executi ves and thei r fami l i es take ful l
advantage of and rei nforce those measures. I f executi ves do not change thei r
behavi or to accommodate addi ti onal securi ty and protecti ve measures, then
the behavi ors can effecti vel y defeat the purpose of addi ti onal protecti on.
Addi ti onal i ncrements of securi ty can be obtai ned to defeat vi rtual l y any
threat. However, there i s a poi nt at whi ch i t i s no l onger cost-effecti ve to add
l ayer upon l ayer of protecti ve measures to defeat a threat.
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES
I -6. Whi l e terrori st groups conduct i ntel l i gence operati ons to i denti fy targets,
mi stakes have been made i n the past. DOD personnel shoul d avoi d l easi ng
resi dences previ ousl y used by representati ves of governments or
organi zati ons known to be targets of vari ous terrori st groups. DOD personnel
FM 3-19.30
l easi ng resi dences formerl y used by representati ves of such governments may
be pl aci ng themsel ves unnecessari l y at ri sk of bei ng attacked as a resul t of
mi staken i denti ty.
I -7. An executi ves enti re l i festyl e shoul d be i ncl uded i n securi ty surveys used
to assess the need for suppl emental physi cal -securi ty measures at the offi ce.
The executi ves home and transportati on from home to offi ce and back shoul d
al so be exami ned for ri sk and vul nerabi l i ty. The same pri nci pl es used to
i denti fy suppl emental securi ty i mprovements i n an offi ce envi ronment appl y
to an executi ves home envi ronment as wel l . The purposes of physi cal -securi ty
enhancements are to
I ncrease the amount of ti me terrori sts need to i ni ti ate and compl ete an
attack on executi ves whi l e at home, ther eby gi vi ng r esponse for ces
more ti me to rescue executi ves and thei r dependents.
Reduce potenti al harm to executi ves and thei r fami l i es because of a
terrori st assaul t mounted agai nst the resi dence.
I -8. The goal s of enhanced resi denti al physi cal -securi ty measures are to
I ncrease the amount of ti me between detecti on of a threat and the
onset of hosti l e acti ons.
Del ay the terrori sts as l ong as possi bl e. Prevent terrori st access to
executi ves and thei r fami l y members and make i t di ffi cul t to l eave the
scene to escape pr osecu ti on. Th ese measur es sh oul d not fu r ther
jeopardi ze the l i ves of executi ves and thei r fami l y members.
Provi de a safe haven where executi ves and thei r fami l y members may
fl ee for securi ty pendi ng the arri val of a response force on the scene.
I -9. The fol l owi ng measures can be i mpl emented sel ecti vel y to hel p securi ty
personnel achi eve these objecti ves:
I ncrease the ti me i nterval between threat detecti on and the onset of
hosti l e terrori st acts by
I Ensuri ng that al l door l ocks and wi ndow cl asps are worki ng.
I Ensuri ng that al l doors and wi ndows are properl y secured to thei r
frames and that the frames are properl y anchored to the resi denti al
structure.
I Locki ng dri veway gates wi th a securi ty l ock to prevent entry.
I I nstal l i ng a through-door vi ewi ng devi ce or vi si tor i ntercom.
I I nstal l i ng securi ty l i ghts to ai d i n vi ewi ng entrances.
I ncrease the number of physi cal barri ers between the outer peri meter
of the resi dence and the i nteri or of the resi dence by
I Addi ng heavy, remotel y operated gates to al l fences, wal l s, and
peri meter barri ers consi stent wi th the penetrati on resi stance of the
barri er between the resi dence, the street, and adjacent nei ghbors.
I Creati ng a vesti bul e or ai r l ock between l i vi ng quarters and the
exteri or of a resi dence, ensuri ng that no one can enter the resi dence
di rectl y from the outsi de.
I Addi ng fi re doors or securi ty doors or gates between the resi dences
bedrooms and l i vi ng areas.
FM 3-19.30
I ncrease the ti me requi red to penetrate exteri or structural wal l s by
expl osi ves, hand-hel d power tool s, and hand tool s by
I Addi ng addi ti onal armor covered by aestheti cal l y pl easi ng
materi al s to exteri or wal l s.
I Addi ng a separate rei nforced masonry wal l around the resi dence.
I ncrease the survei l l ance of the resi dence and decrease response ti me
by
I I nstal l i ng CCTV systems to permi t remote vi ewi ng of al l doors and
wi ndows accessi bl e fr om the gr ound, near by str uctur es, tr ees, or
easi l y acqui red pl atforms (such as a van parked next to a wal l ).
I I nstal l i ng area I DSs between the resi dences peri meter and the
r esi dence i tsel f, var yi ng the number and types of sensor s, and
addi ng backup communi cati on channel s between the I DS and a
survei l l ance assessment/response di spatch center.
I ncrease the resi dences durabi l i ty and survi vabi l i ty to a terrori st
attack by
I Fi tti ng wi ndows wi th ei ther veneti an bl i nds or thi ck curtai ns to
r educe the obser vabi l i ty of acti vi ti es wi thi n the r esi dence and to
r educe h azar ds of fl yi ng gl ass i n case of near by expl osi ons or
gunfi re.
I I nstal l i ng backup power systems for securi ty devi ces (survei l l ance
systems, communi cati on systems, and access-control systems).
I Ensuri ng that backup communi cati on i s avai l abl e wi th the
i nstal l ati on or embassys securi ty department vi a a secure l andl i ne
or two-way radi o.
I Fi tti ng a pani c-al arm bel l to the outsi de of the house wi th swi tches
on al l fl oor l evel s. Such an al arm shoul d al so annunci ate at the l ocal
pol i ce and cogni zant DOD or DOS securi ty offi ce.
I I nstal l i ng a safe haven i n the home.
TRANSPORTATION MEASURES
I -10. Hi gh-ri sk personnel are most accessi bl e to terrori sts whi l e i n transi t i n
offi ci al or pri vatel y owned vehi cl es. Speci fi c steps can be taken to reduce the
vul nerabi l i ty of executi ves i n transi t.
SPECIAL TRANSPORTATION IN TRANSIT FROM DOMICILE TO DUTY
I -11. As a rul e, Congress has strongl y opposed the provi si on of domi ci l e-to-
duty transportati on by the federal government to i ts offi cers and empl oyees.
Onl y 16 offi ci al s are enti tl ed by statute to such assi stance. Congress di d,
however, grant authori ty to the Presi dent and the heads of executi ve agenci es
and departments to provi de domi ci l e-to-duty transportati on under certai n
ci rcumstances. Accordi ng to the statute, a passenger carri er may be used to
transport between resi dence and pl ace of empl oyment an offi cer or empl oyee
wi th regard to whom the head of a Federal agency makes a determi nati on,
[provi ded] that hi ghl y unusual ci rcumstances present a cl ear and present
danger, that an emergency exi sts, or that compel l i ng operati onal
consi derati ons make such transportati on essenti al to the conduct of offi ci al
busi ness.
FM 3-19.30
I -12. The phrase hi ghl y unusual ci rcumstances whi ch present a cl ear and
present danger i s understood to mean that
The percei ved danger i s real , not i magi nary.
The percei ved danger i s i mmedi ate or i mmi nent, not merel y potenti al .
Proof i s provi ded that the use of a government vehi cl e woul d provi de
protecti on not otherwi se avai l abl e.
I -13. Such a danger woul d exi st where there i s an expl i ci t threat of terrori st
attacks or ri ot condi ti ons and such transportati on woul d be the onl y means of
provi di ng safe passage to and from work.
I -14. The phrase emergency exi sts means that there i s an i mmedi ate,
unforeseeabl e, temporary need to provi de home-to-work transportati on for an
agencys essenti al empl oyees. The phrase si mi l arl y compel l i ng operati onal
consi derati ons means that there i s an el ement of gravi ty or i mportance for
the need of government-furni shed transportati on comparabl e to the gravi ty or
i mportance associ ated wi th a cl ear and present danger or an emergency.
Congress suggested further, i n such i nstances, [i t i s expected] that home-to-
work transportati on woul d be provi ded onl y for those empl oyees who are
essenti al to the operati on of the government.
I -15. The Secretary of Defense has the statutory authori ty to al l ow a CI NC to
use government-owned or -l eased vehi cl es to provi de transportati on i n an area
outsi de of the US for members of the uni formed servi ces and other DOD
personnel under certai n ci rcumstances. These ci rcumstances i ncl ude and are
l i mi ted to a determi nati on by the CI NC that publ i c or pri vate transportati on
i n the area i s unsafe or i s not avai l abl e. Under these ci rcumstances, DOD may
provi de transportati on (usual l y i n government buses or passenger vans) to
personnel and thei r fami l y members i f i t wi l l hel p the CI NC and hi s
subordi nate commanders mai ntai n the capabi l i ty to perform or undertake
assi gned mi ssi ons. Thi s transportati on i s not i ntended for transporti ng
personnel from thei r resi dences to thei r pl aces of work. The Secretary of
Defense and the Servi ce Secretari es al so have the statutory authori ty to
provi de transportati on from home to duty stati ons and back on a l i mi ted basi s.
Thi s authori ty i s usual l y i mpl emented by provi di ng a nontacti cal armored
vehi cl e (NTAV) to protect personnel .
I -16. I t i s a DOD pol i cy to make NTAVs avai l abl e where necessary to enhance
the securi ty of DOD personnel consi stent wi th the requi rements and
l i mi tati ons found i n the statute. DOD i ssuances, servi ce regul ati ons, and
CI NC gui dance sti pul ate detai l ed procedures by whi ch DOD manages NTAV
programs. The statute al so establ i shes a procedure for Presi denti al wai ver of
the buy Ameri can requi rement; DOD and servi ce regul ati ons provi de for the
del egati on of Presi denti al authori ty from the Presi dent to the Secretary of
Defense; to the Di rector, Defense Securi ty Assi stance Agency; and to the
Di rector, DI A. DOD I nstructi on 5210.84 authori zes DOS acqui si ti on and
i nstal l ati on of l i ght vehi cl e armori ng to DOS speci fi cati ons i n l ocal defense-
component vehi cl es on a r ei mbur sabl e basi s. The l evel of pr otecti on pr ovi ded
to the Defense Component Offi ce wi l l compl y wi th appr oved over seas secur i ty
pol i cy group armored-vehi cl e standards.
I -17. The DOD recogni zes two cl asses of NTAVsheavy and l i ght. Heavy
NTAVs are ful l y armored vehi cl es i ntended to protect occupants from attack
FM 3-19.30
by bombs; I EDs; grenades; and hi gh-vel oci ty, smal l -arms projecti l es. Li ght
NTAVs are l ess than ful l y armored vehi cl es and are i ntended to protect
occupants from attack by medi um-vel oci ty, smal l -arms projecti l es and at l east
some types of I EDs.
I -18. The di vi di ng l i nes between heavy and l i ght NTAVs have become l ess
di sti nct over ti me as armori ng techni ques and materi al s have gi ven greater
capabi l i ty to NTAVs that are not cl assi fi ed as heavy. As a practi cal matter,
add-on vehi cl e-armori ng ki ts are now i n producti on whi ch (when properl y
i nstal l ed i n an appropri atel y powered and suspended vehi cl e) wi l l provi de a
l evel of protecti on approachi ng that of the heavy NTAVs.
Heavy NTAVs
I -19. Heavy NTAVs may be assi gned to US personnel upon certi fi cati on by a
Servi ce Secretary onl y under the fol l owi ng condi ti ons:
Hi ghl y unusual ci rcumstances present a cl ear and present danger to
the heal th and safety of a nomi nated protectee.
Compel l i ng operati onal consi derati ons make such transportati on
essenti al to conducti ng offi ci al busi ness.
I -20. I f the physi cal -securi ty survey concl udes that a heavy NTAV i s
warranted, the nomi nated protectees Servi ce Secretary shal l , on the advi ce
and recommendati on of a combatant commander, determi ne whether the use
of a heavy NTAV i s warranted. I f so, the Servi ce Secretary shal l authori ze the
use of a vehi cl e for a renewabl e 90- to 360-day peri od. At the end of the peri od,
the requi rement wi l l be reexami ned and a recerti fi cati on for the protecti on
shal l be i ssued by the Servi ce Secretary.
I -21. Each of the servi ces manages a porti on of the DODs NTAV program.
Each servi ce has i ssued suppl ementary mandatory gui dance for processi ng
requests for, as wel l as al l ocati on and use of, these scarce assets.
I -22. Heavy NTAVs are compl ex systems requi ri ng speci al i zed mai ntenance
and operati on. Normal l y, they wi l l be assi gned to DOD personnel wi th a dri ver
who has been properl y trai ned i n the operati on and mai ntenance of the
vehi cl e. The operator i s not a chauffeur; he i s an i ntegral part of a
suppl emental securi ty package provi ded by DOD to meet i ts obl i gati ons i n
protecti ng key assets.
Light NTAVs
I -23. Li ght NTAVs may al so be provi ded to US empl oyees and offi cers where
hi ghl y unusual ci rcumstances present a cl ear and present danger to the
heal th and safety of a nomi nated protectee or compel l i ng operati onal
consi derati ons warrant thei r use. Thi s category of NTAV features add-on
armori ng. Whi l e they are a l ess-compl ex armori ng system than those used i n
heavy NTAVs, l i ght NTAVs afford substanti al protecti on to occupants agai nst
a vari ety of threats. New devel opments i n after-manufacture armori ng ki ts for
vehi cl es are occurri ng at a rapi d pace, i ncreasi ng the number of vehi cl e
manufacturers and model s for whi ch other NTAV modi fi cati ons are sui tabl e.
Each servi ce and the DI A have i nstructi ons for i mpl ementi ng DOD pol i cy that
authori zes the use of other NTAVs to enhance personnel protecti on of hi gh-
ri sk persons.
FM 3-19.30
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES
I -24. Hi gh-ri sk personnel may wi sh to forego the use of POVs duri ng peri ods
of extreme ri sk. Consi derati ons i ncl ude sel ecti ng measures that
Deter secret entry, maki ng undetected pl acement of I EDs i n or under
the vehi cl e di ffi cul t for terrori sts to accompl i sh.
Enhance the vehi cl es abi l i ty to i ncrease di stance between i t and
pursuers.
Assi st response forces i n case of an i nci dent.
Make the vehi cl e appear l i ttl e di fferent than i ts standard model s.
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES
I -25. Executi ves can enhance thei r personal securi ty i n the offi ce
envi ronment by
Di scouragi ng staff members who are taki ng tel ephone messages from
di scl osi ng thei r whereabouts.
Ensuri ng that cauti on i s used when openi ng mai l and bei ng especi al l y
careful wi th l etters or packages that mi ght contai n I EDs.
Ensuri ng that access i s stri ctl y l i mi ted to thei r offi ce area.
Li mi ti ng publ i ci ty and keepi ng offi ci al bi ographi es short. Thi s i ncl udes
usi ng outdated photographs i f a publ i ci ty photograph i s essenti al .
Ensuri ng that they are not worki ng al one l ate at ni ght and on days
when the remai nder of the staff i s absent.
Worki ng i n conference rooms or i nternal offi ces where outsi de
obser vati on i s not possi bl e i f l ate-ni ght wor k i s necessar y. Secur i ty
offi cers shoul d be noti fi ed of the work so that they can peri odi cal l y l ook
i n.
Ensuri ng that offi ce furni shi ngs are not pl aced di rectl y i n front of
exteri or wi ndows.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS AWAY FROM THE OFFICE
I -26. The fol l owi ng suggesti ons rei nforce efforts by executi ves to mai ntai n the
hi gh l evel of securi ty provi ded i n the home or offi ce envi ronment whi l e on
offi ci al busi ness outsi de of these l ocati ons:
Di scuss securi ty requi rements wi th the person pl anni ng the functi on.
Travel to and from the functi on wi th escorts.
Choose the route careful l y.
Avoi d publ i ci zi ng pl anned attendance at offi ci al functi ons (unl ess
requi red).
Attempt to si t away from both publ i c areas and wi ndows.
Encourage the functi ons sponsor to cl ose the curtai ns to mi ni mi ze the
l i kel i hood that anyone outsi de wi l l be abl e to see i nsi de and determi ne
who i s attendi ng the functi on. Thi s i s extr emel y i mpor tant for an
eveni ng functi on, when a wel l -l i t i nter i or can be easi l y vi ewed from a
darkened exteri or.
Request that external fl oodl i ghts be used to i l l umi nate the area around
the bui l di ng where an eveni ng functi on wi l l occur.
FM 3-19.30
LOCAL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL TRAVEL
I -27. Executi ves can greatl y enhance thei r personal securi ty when conducti ng
offi ci al and unoffi ci al travel by fol l owi ng these general practi ces:
Vary dai l y patterns, such as l eavi ng and returni ng at di fferent ti mes.
Consi der escorts to and from work or travel wi th a nei ghbor.
Establ i sh a si mpl e oral or vi sual duress procedure between executi ves
and dri vers (for exampl e, a phrase or movement used by the executi ve
or dri ver onl y i f somethi ng i s ami ss).
Vary taxi compani es. Ensure that the I D photo on the l i cense matches
the dri ver. I f uneasy for any reason, take another taxi .
Attend soci al functi ons wi th others, i f possi bl e.
Exami ne the car before enteri ng to see i f there has been any
i nterference. A smal l mi rror on a rod i s a cheap and effecti ve method to
i nspect under neath car s. Do not touch the vehi cl e unti l i t has been
thoroughl y checked (i nsi de, around, and under).
Avoi d l eavi ng personal i tems exposed i n the car (uni form i tems,
servi ce-i ssued maps, offi ci al bri efcases, and so forth).
SECURITY PRACTICES WHILE DRIVING
I -28. Executi ves can take the fol l owi ng measures to enhance securi ty whi l e
dri vi ng:
Keep car doors l ocked. Do not open wi ndows more than a few i nches.
Avoi d overl oadi ng a vehi cl e, and wear seat bel ts.
Park vehi cl es i n parki ng areas that are ei ther l ocked or moni tored.
Never park overni ght on the street. Before enteri ng vehi cl es, check for
si gns of tamperi ng.
Keep the trunk l ocked.
Dri ve i n the i nner l anes to keep from bei ng forced to the curb.
Use defensi ve and evasi ve dri vi ng techni ques. Dri l l wi th your dri ver by
watchi ng for suspi ci ous cars and taki ng evasi ve acti on.
Avoi d dri vi ng cl ose behi nd other vehi cl es (especi al l y servi ce trucks),
and be awar e of acti vi ti es and r oad condi ti ons two to thr ee bl ocks
ahead.
Beware of mi nor acci dents that coul d bl ock traffi c i n suspect areas such
as cr ossr oads. Cr ossr oads ar e pr efer red ar eas for ter ror i st or cr i mi nal
acti vi ti es because they offer escape advantages.
I -29. I f a terrori st roadbl ock i s encountered, use the shoul der or curb (hi t at a
30- to 45-degree angl e) of the road to go around i t or ram the terrori sts
bl ocki ng vehi cl e. Bl ocki ng vehi cl es shoul d be rammed i n a nonengi ne area, at
a 45-degree angl e, i n l ow gear, and at a constant moderate speed. The goal i s
to knock the bl ocki ng vehi cl e out of the way. I n al l cases, do not stop and never
al l ow the executi ves vehi cl e to be boxed i n wi th a l oss of maneuverabi l i ty.
Whenever a target vehi cl e veers away from the terrori st vehi cl e, i t gi ves
adverse maneuveri ng room and presents a better target to gunfi re.
FM 3-19.30
INTERURBAN, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL SECURITY PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES
I -30. To enhance securi ty i n i nterurban, nati onal , and i nternati onal
ci rcumstances, executi ves shoul d
Book ai rl i ne seats at the l ast moment. Consi der usi ng an al i as.
Restri ct the use of ranks or ti tl es.
Avoi d al l owi ng unknown vi si tors i n the hotel room or sui te.
Keep staff and fami l y members advi sed of the i ti nerary and
subsequent changes. Cl earl y and emphati cal l y restri ct thi s i nformati on
to those havi ng a need to know.
HOME SECURITY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
I -31. To enhance securi ty at home, executi ves shoul d
Check the I D of persons enteri ng the premi ses (el ectri ci ans, pl umbers,
tel ephone-mai ntenance per sonnel , and so for th). When i n doubt, cal l
thei r offi ce to veri fy thei r i denti ty before al l owi ng them i n your home.
Avoi d openi ng the door to a cal l er at ni ght unti l he i s vi sual l y i denti fi ed
through a wi ndow or a door vi ewer.
Cl ose curtai ns i n a room before turni ng on l i ghts.
Consi der pl aci ng the tel ephone where you wi l l not be seen from doors
or wi ndows when answeri ng.
I nvesti gate the househol d staff (especi al l y temporary staff members).
Stay al ert and be on the l ookout for the unusual . Ensure that the home
i s l ocked and secure whenever the resi dence i s unattended. Be cauti ous
upon return and l ook for the movement of furni ture or the pl acement of
unusual wi res.
Note and report suspi ci ous persons.
Contr ol house keys stri ctl y.
Park the car i n a l ocked garage.
Consi der i nstal l i ng a pani c-al arm bel l to the outsi de of the house wi th
swi tches l ocated on al l fl oor l evel s.
Cl ear the area around the house of dense fol i age or shrubbery.
Test duress al arms (i f avai l abl e). Make certai n that fami l y members
understand how they work as wel l as the i mportance of thei r use.
Cooperate wi th l aw-enforcement personnel , and abi de by thei r securi ty
recommendati ons.
SECURITY AT SOCIAL AND RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES
I -32. The ri sk of terrori st i nci dents i s al ways present for hi gh-ri sk personnel
or personnel assi gned to hi gh-ri sk bi l l ets. The fol l owi ng measures are
i ntended to permi t executi ves to l i ve a cl ose-to-normal l i fe whi l e sti l l
remai ni ng mi ndful of the ri sks to thei r securi ty.
Ensure that the host i s aware of and takes appropri ate measures for
your securi ty.
Have your personal staff assi st a ci vi l i an host, i f requi red.
Arrange for vi si tors to be subject to adequate securi ty control .
FM 3-19.30
Screen the i nvi tati on l i st, i f possi bl e.
Vary the ti mes of sporti ng acti vi ti es (gol fi ng, joggi ng, and so forth).
COMBATING-TERRORISMTRAINING FOR EXECUTIVES
I -33. Combatant commanders annual l y compi l e a l i st of hi gh-ri sk bi l l ets i n
thei r AO. These l i sts are forwarded through the appropri ate servi ce personnel
channel s, enabl i ng each servi ce to i denti fy, pl an, and provi de resources to
meet trai ni ng requi rements. Al l personnel and adul t fami l y members en route
to hi gh-ri sk bi l l ets must attend the I ndi vi dual Terrori sm Awareness Course
(I NTAC) conducted at the US Army John F. Kennedy Speci al Warfare Center
at Fort Bragg, North Carol i na. Duri ng thi s one-week course, personnel wi l l
recei ve i nstructi on i n defensi ve-dri vi ng techni ques and survi val shooti ng as
wel l as i ndi vi dual protecti ve measures and hostage survi val . These
i ndi vi dual s shoul d al so attend the appropri ate regi onal ori entati on course
(Mi ddl e East, Asi a/Paci fi c, Lati n Ameri ca, or Afri ca) offered at the US Ai r
Force Speci al Operati ons School at Hurl burt Ai r Force Base (AFB), Fl ori da.
The servi ce member whose duti es wi l l requi re frequent vehi cl e operati on
shoul d attend an appropri ate evasi ve-dri vi ng course. I nformati on on current
offeri ngs may be obtai ned by contacti ng the servi ce representati ve to the DOD
Anti terrori sm Coordi nati ng Commi ttee or the Combati ng Terrori sm Branch
i n the Offi ce of the Assi stant Secretary of Defense (OASD) Speci al Operati ons/
Low-I ntensi ty Confl i ct (SO/LI C).
TRAVEL TO POTENTIAL PHYSICAL-THREAT RISK AREAS
I -34. Personnel en route to potenti al physi cal -threat ri sk areas (as i denti fi ed
by the OASDSO/LI C) shoul d attend one of the fol l owi ng courses:
The Dynami cs of I nternati onal Terrori sm Course conducted at the US
Ai r Force Speci al Oper ati ons School at Hurl burt AFB, Fl or i da. Duri ng
thi s one-week cour se, per sonnel wi l l r ecei ve l ectur es on thr eats by
regi on (Europe, Mi ddl e East, Lati n Ameri ca, Asi a/Paci fi c, and Afr i ca),
th e h i s tor y an d ps y ch ol ogy of ter r or i s m, per s on n el combati n g-
ter r or i sm measures (vehi cl e, personal , ai r l i ne, and physi cal secur i ty),
and hostage survi val .
A Regi onal Ori entati on Course (Mi ddl e East, Lati n Ameri ca, Afri ca,
Asi a/Paci fi c) at the US Ai r Force Speci al Operati ons School at Hurl burt
AFB, Fl or i da. Thi s one-week cour se offer s per sonnel i nstr ucti on i n
cul tur al , pol i ti cal /mi l i tar y, and i ndi vi dual secur i ty factor s associ ated
wi th the regi on.
I -35. I nstal l ati on securi ty personnel may al so recei ve the above trai ni ng i f
they have compl eted the Anti terrori sm I nstructor Qual i fi cati on Course
(AI QC) at Fort Bragg, North Carol i na.
PROTECTIVE SECURITY DETAILS
I -36. Each servi ce can provi de bodyguards for key seni or mi l i tary offi cers,
DOD ci vi l i ans, other US offi ci al s, or forei gn di gni tari es requi ri ng personal
protecti on. Each Servi ce Secretary i s responsi bl e for assi gni ng protecti ve
securi ty detai l s (PSDs) to servi ce members based on the recommendati on of
FM 3-19.30
thei r counteri ntel l i gence and/or l aw-enforcement i nvesti gati on staffs. The
PSDs are assi gned to DOD personnel who meet requi rements establ i shed by
servi ce regul ati ons. I n general , PSDs may be assi gned onl y to those personnel
whose posi ti on or assi gnment pl aces them at ri sk and whose conti nued
avai l abi l i ty to the Nati onal Command Authori ti es and the CI NCs i s vi tal to
DODs mi ssi on executi on.
I -37. A PSD provi des hi gh l evel s of securi ty to an executi ve by establ i shi ng a
seri es of protecti ve cordons around hi m. The establ i shment of defense i n depth
often means that the i nner most pr otecti ve l ayer i s i n cl ose contact wi th the
executi ve at al l hours of the day and ni ght.
I -38. A PSD i s trai ned to mai ntai n a l ow profi l e. I t i s concerned about the
executi ves vi si bi l i ty and i ts abi l i ty to bl end i nto hi s surroundi ngs. There i s
nothi ng more damagi ng to the securi ty of an executi ve than the obvi ous,
detectabl e presence of a PSD when al l other measures to have hi m bl end i nto
the l ocal envi ronment have been successful . A PSD wi l l stri ve to keep travel
routes and means of transportati on from bei ng publ i ci zed. I f thi s cannot be
accompl i shed, the PSD may suggest edi tori al changes to the i ti nerary
schedul ed for rel ease to l i mi t detai l s of pl anned travel from publ i c di scl osure.
For exampl e, routes to and from announced appoi ntments usual l y do not need
to be reveal ed.
I -39. Duri ng the course of a PSDs mi ssi on, i ts members may be asked to
perform several di fferent securi ty functi ons. They may, for exampl e, perform
di rect or i ndi rect protecti on or escort duty. Di rect protecti on i s open and
obvi ous; i ndi rect i s general l y a survei l l ance measure. The securi ty-guard uni t
may operate as an i nteri or guard and may consi st of one or more men
stati oned at fi xed posts. A PSDs members shoul d know the i denti ty of each
i ndi vi dual i n the party of a protected offi ci al ; executi ves can hel p by
i ntroduci ng them to each member of the offi ci al party.
I -40. The protected persons atti tude i s cri ti cal to the success of the PSDs
mi ssi on. Executi ves have a ri ght and a responsi bi l i ty to make thei r wi shes
known wi th respect to thei r personal securi ty. They al so have an obl i gati on to
l i sten careful l y to the head of the PSD who i s trai ned and hi ghl y qual i fi ed to
hel p make reasonabl e judgments about manageabl e ri sks. A PSDs members
understand that thei r functi on i s i nherentl y i ntrusi ve and that executi ves can
easi l y resent the l oss of pri vacy that accompani es the protecti on offered. On
the other hand, PSDs have jobs to do, not merel y to protect executi ves, but to
hel p safeguard mi ssi on-cri ti cal assetsseni or mi l i tary and ci vi l i an l eaders.
I -41. One of the most demandi ng functi ons pl aced on a PSD i s to l i mi t the
abi l i ty of i ndi vi dual s to ci rcul ate and approach the executi ve. Thi s i s often
very frustrati ng to executi ves who wi sh to shake hands, engage i n cl ose
conversati ons wi th vi si tors, and move freel y and wi thout i mpedi ment i n a
soci al si tuati on. The PSDs are trai ned to stri ctl y enforce l i mi tati ons on the
ci rcul ati on of i ndi vi dual s, careful l y checki ng each person for I D and
ascertai ni ng that he i s authori zed to be present at the occasi on.
I -42. DOD personnel who are provi ded wi th PSDs and must conduct offi ci al
busi ness or hol d soci al engagements i n l arge rooms can take steps to mi ni mi ze
the di srupti ons to such functi ons. These steps i ncl ude
FM 3-19.30
Provi di ng advance attendee l i sts to the head of the PSD.
Havi ng one or more members of the staff who know the attendees
stand wi th PSD member s and i denti fy the attendees as they arr i ve.
I nformi ng attendees that they wi l l be admi tted onl y at speci fi ed
entrances.
I -43. The PSDs members are hi ghl y trai ned securi ty speci al i sts. Whi l e i n the
company of executi ves, they wi l l be accommodati ng and hel pful . Executi ves
shoul d remember, however, that the pri mary functi on of the PSDs members i s
to protect them, not perform errands or carry out personal servi ces. A PSDs
members who are performi ng val et or other chores cannot effecti vel y protect
the seni or offi cers or ci vi l i an offi ci al s to whom they have been assi gned.
EXECUTIVE-PROTECTION SYSTEMINTEGRATION
I -44. Thi s appendi x has focused on suppl emental securi ty measures used to
address terrori st threats to seni or hi gh-ri sk personnel wi thi n the DOD.
Vari ous methods and measures have been di scussed that provi de i ncrements
of securi ty over and above the base l evel of securi ty provi ded to al l DOD
personnel assi gned to an i nstal l ati on, faci l i ty, acti vi ty, or uni t. I n maki ng
deci si ons to al l ocate protecti ve resources to enhance the securi ty of seni or
offi cers and seni or DOD offi ci al s, i t i s essenti al to remember that measures
must be appl i ed systemati cal l y. Addi ti onal securi ty measures i mpl emented to
protect hi gh-ri sk personnel i n the offi ce envi ronment must be carri ed over to
offi ci al functi ons conducted outsi de the offi ce. The securi ty measures must
al so be extended to protected persons pri vate l i ves and, dependi ng on the
nature of the threat, the l i ves of thei r fami l y members.
I -45. The converse i s equal l y true. I t makes no sense to provi de domi ci l e-to-
duty transportati on for a hi gh-ri sk person and make no provi si on for
addi ti onal protecti on at home, at the offi ce, and at offi ci al busi ness and soci al
functi ons. I n vi ew of the total costs of securi ty measured i n dol l ars, ti me, and
i nconveni ence to protected persons, thei r staffs, col l eagues, and fami l i es, i t
may be more prudent to radi cal l y al ter l i vi ng and worki ng arrangements than
to try to augment securi ty i n a pi ecemeal manner. For exampl e, i t mi ght be
prudent to house hi gh-ri sk personnel wi thi n a DOD i nstal l ati on rather than to
try to secure a detached, pri vate resi dence at a substanti al di stance from the
operati ons base of a response force. The key to successful executi ve protecti on
i s to ensure that the l evel of protecti on afforded by physi cal -securi ty
measures, operati onal procedures i n the offi ce and at home, and PSDs i s
constant. The l evel of protecti on must be matched to the threat and must be
sustai nabl e. Executi ves have a speci al responsi bi l i ty to set a personal exampl e
of combati ng-terrori sm awareness; of attenti on to personal , fami l y, offi ce,
i nformati on, and OPSEC concerns; and of combati ng-terrori sm securi ty
measures i mpl ementati on. By doi ng so, they make thei r col l eagues and
subordi nates more aware and more consci ous of thei r securi ty envi ronment
and l ess l i kel y to be vi cti mi zed by terrori st attacks.
Resource Management J-1
Appendix J
Resource Management
Pr ogr ams need annual fundi ng to oper ate. Thi s fundi ng i s obtai ned by
devi si ng and documenti ng a r esource progr am that l ooks seven years out.
Looki ng ahead one or two year s i s gener al l y not a pr obl em. Commander s
must be abl e to descr i be futur e r equi r ements i n the out year s so that
money wi l l be avai l abl e when the program arri ves i n future years.
FUNDING PROGRAMS
J-1. Physi cal secur i ty i s dependent on i ntegr ated systems wi th budgetar y
constr ai nts. Thi s appendi x ser ves to i nfor m commander s of thr ee basi c
fundi ng programs contri buti ng to physi cal securi ty
The RJC6, whi ch resources physi cal -securi ty equi pment purchase and
mai ntenance.
The QLPR, whi ch resources l aw-enforcement operati ons (to i ncl ude
securi ty guards and speci al -reacti on teams).
The VTER, whi ch provi des resources for projects and temporary
pr ogr ams that enhance any type of secur i ty due to an i ncr ease i n
terrori st threat.
PROJ ECTED REQUIREMENTS
J-2. Recurr i ng VTER r equi rements ar e usual l y shi fted to QLPR as standard
r equi r ements after a per i od of a few year s. I nstal l ati ons send seven-year
pr oj ected r equi r ements to the MACOMs for submi ssi on i nto the Ar mys
Program Objecti ve Memorandum (POM), whi ch i s an annual si gni fi cant event
for r esour ce manager s at al l l evel s. I nstal l ati on r equi r ements shoul d be
i ncl uded i n the POM bui l d; other wi se, the i nstal l ati ons pr ogr am l oses
vi si bi l i ty fr om the star t of the fundi ng pr ocess. I nput for mat i s deter mi ned
l ocal l y, but a gener i c exampl e of the for mat and the type of i nfor mati on
requested i s provi ded at Fi gure J-1, page J-2.
OBLIGATION PLAN
J-3. Budget executi on deal s wi th the cur r ent fi scal year (October thr ough
September ), wi th the excepti on of some types of dol l ar s (appr opr i ati ons) that
ar e mul ti year (such as pr ocur ement dol l ar s that ar e executabl e for thr ee
year s). Once the r esour ce manager noti fi es an i nstal l ati on of i ts avai l abl e
annual fundi ng, an obl i gati on pl an by month or quar ter i s devel oped to
di spl ay how and when the funds wi l l be spent. Thi s obl i gati on pl an i s al so
used to forecast when the pr ogr am wi l l r un out of money, whi ch i n tur n wi l l
justi fy the submi ssi on of an unfi nanced r equi r ement (UFR) to obtai n the
proper l evel of resources. Exampl es of an annual obl i gati on pl an and UFR are
l ocated at Fi gures J-2 and J-3, page J-3.
FM 3-19.30
J-2 Resource Management
TYPES OF APPROPRIATIONS
J-4. The most common types of appropri ati ons that managers wi l l be i nvol ved
wi th ar e day-to-day oper ati ons or mi ssi on (OMA) funds and pr ocur ement
(OPA) dol l ars that must be used for major projects or equi pment buys over the
$100,000 th r es h ol d. Ar my Mater i el Comman d (AMC) u s es r es ear ch ,
devel opment, and engi neeri ng (RD&E) dol l ars for operati ons at US Army Test
and Eval uati on Command (TECOM) faci l i ti es and for testi ng new equi pment.
Constr ucti on pr ojects over $500,000 use mi l i tar y constr ucti on (MI LCON)
funds.
J-5. Resour ces needed for physi cal secur i ty ar e the r esul t of pl anni ng.
Commanders i ncl ude physi cal -securi ty programs and i mprovements as a part
of al l annual budgets. When the si tuati on changes based on METT-TC,
physi cal -secur i ty pr ogr ams ar e r evi ewed, updated and, when necessar y,
appr oved. Commander s al l ocate resour ces consi stent wi th the threat. For ce-
pr otecti on r equi r ements pr ovi de the fundamental r easons for r esour ci ng
physi cal securi ty. Secur i ty manager s, for ce-protecti on offi cers, and PMs hel p
i denti fy secur i ty r equi r ements and pr i or i ti ze expendi tur es. When physi cal -
securi ty i mprovements are not properl y pl anned, i ntegrated, and budgeted for,
commanders accept ri sks for physi cal -securi ty fai l ures.
Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
Installation: Fort McClellan, AL
Activity: Military Police School
Appropriation: Operation & Maintenance, Army (OMA)
Army Management Structure (AMS): 321731
Management Decision Package (MDEP): VTER
Element of Resource (EOR): 2500
Issue: Force Protection/Antiterrorism Courses
Justification/Impact:
Funding is required to continue the eight functional contract training courses conducted by the US Army
Military Police School in Force Protection/Antiterrorism for the Army and selected DOD services and
agencies. Courses focus on the five pillars of force protection and provide students with a variety of
force-protection expertise to prevent, react to, and
contain a terrorist event. If funds are not provided, the projected annual student load of 2,500 cannot be
trained.
Resources FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
($000) 500 510 520 530 540 550 560
Figure J-1. Sample POM
FM 3-19.30
Resource Management J-3
Annual Obligation Plan
FY 99
Issue: Force Protection/Antiterrorism
Phased Monthly Obligation Plan (Cumulative):
Month $000
Oct 40
Nov 80
Dec 120
Jan 160
Feb 200
Mar 240
Apr 280
May 320
Jun 360
Jul 360
Aug 360
Sep 360
Figure J-2. Sample Annual Obligation Plan
Unfinanced Requirement (UFR)
FY 99
Issue: Force Protection/Antiterrorism
Justification/Impact:
Funds in the amount of $360K have been provided to conduct the eight Force-Protection/Antiterrorism
contract courses in the US Army Military Police School. This amount will only support training through
June 99. An additional $120K is required to conduct training during 4th quarter FY99. Unless additional
funds are provided, 625 students will not be trained.
Figure J-3. Sample UFR
Vulnerability Assessment K-1
Appendix K
Vulnerability Assessment
After a commander has obtai ned a threat anal ysi s, he proceeds to compl ete
the anal ysi s by conducti ng the vul ner abi l i ty and cr i ti cal i ty assessments.
(Thi s appendi x wi l l di scuss onl y the VA.) Thi s process consi ders a mi ssi on
revi ew and anal ysi s of the i nstal l ati on, base, uni t, or por t i n rel ati on to the
ter r or i st thr eat. The r evi ew shoul d assess the cost of anti ter r or i sm
measur es i n terms of l ost or reduced mi ssi on effecti veness. I t shoul d then
assess the l evel of acceptabl e r i sk to faci l i ti es and per sonnel gi ven the
esti mated er osi on of mi ssi on effecti veness. Often the best oper ati onal
method and r outi ne may be the wor st to counter potenti al ter r or i st
a cti v i ti es . Th i s r ev i ew a n d an a l y s i s i s per f or med r ou ti n el y a n d
parti cul arl y for depl oyment.
ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS
K-1. The i nstal l ati on, base, uni t, or por t assessment i s der i ved fr om the
r esul ts of the vul ner abi l i ty and cr i ti cal i ty assessments. The assessment
pr ovi des the staff wi th the overal l vul nerabi l i ty to terr or i st attack. The staff
then devel ops the cr i si s-management pl an, whi ch addr esses al l ter r or i st
thr eat l evel s r egar dl ess of the pr esent l evel . The THREATCONs ar e then
appl i ed accordi ng to the l ocal threat. The consi derati ons are
Vulnerability. The VA i s a sel f-assessment tool used to eval uate i ts
vul nerabi l i ty to terrori st attack. The more vul nerabl e an i nstal l ati on,
base, uni t, or port i s, the more attracti ve i t becomes to terrori st attack.
Criticality. The cri ti cal i ty assessment i denti fi es key assets and
i nfrastructures l ocated on and adjacent to the i nstal l ati on, base, uni t,
or port. These assets are normal l y symbol i c targets that tradi ti onal l y
appeal to a speci fi c terrori st group (such as headquarters bui l di ngs and
monuments). I t addresses the i mpact of the temporary or permanent
l oss of key assets or i nfrastructures to the abi l i ty of the i nstal l ati on,
base, uni t, or port to perform i ts mi ssi on. The staff determi nes and
pri ori ti zes cri ti cal assets. The commander approves the pri ori ti zed l i st.
The assessment
I Sel ects key assets.
I Determi nes whether cri ti cal functi ons can be dupl i cated under
vari ous attack scenari os.
I Determi nes the ti me requi red to dupl i cate key assets or
i nfrastructure efforts i f temporari l y or permanentl y l ost.
I Determi nes the vul nerabi l i ty of key assets or i nfrastructures to
bombs, vehi cl e crashes, armed assaul t, and sabotage.
I Determi nes the pri ori ty of response to key assets and i nfrastructures
i n case of fi re, mul ti pl e bombi ngs, or other terrori st acts.
FM 3-19.30
K-2 Vulnerability Assessment
Damage. The damage assessment determi nes the abi l i ty of the
i nstal l ati on, base, uni t, or port to pl an for and respond to a terrori st
attack agai nst key assets and i nfrastructures.
Recovery procedures. The recovery-procedures assessment
determi nes the capabi l i ty to recover from the temporary or permanent
l oss of key assets and i nfrastructures. Based on thi s assessment, the
staff establ i shes recovery procedures to ensure the conti nued abi l i ty to
perform the mi ssi on.
THREATCON LEVELS
K-2. Speci fi c secur i ty measures shoul d be di r ectl y l i nked wi th THREATCON
l evel s. These consi derati ons are
THREATCON Normal. Thi s THREATCON l evel exi sts when a
general threat of possi bl e terrori st acti vi ty exi sts but warrants onl y a
routi ne securi ty posture.
THREATCON Alpha. Thi s THREATCON appl i es when there i s a
general threat of possi bl e terrori st acti vi ty agai nst personnel and
faci l i ti es (the nature and extent of whi ch are unpredi ctabl e) and when
ci rcumstances do not justi fy ful l i mpl ementati on of THREATCON
Bravo measures. I t may be necessary to i mpl ement measures from
hi gher THREATCONs ei ther resul ti ng from i ntel l i gence or as a
deterrent. The measures i n thi s THREATCON must be capabl e of
bei ng mai ntai ned i ndefi ni tel y.
THREATCON Bravo. Thi s THREATCON appl i es when an i ncreased
and more predi ctabl e threat of terrori st acti vi ty exi sts. The measures
i n thi s THREATCON must be capabl e of bei ng mai ntai ned for weeks
wi thout causi ng undue hardshi p, affecti ng operati onal capabi l i ty, or
aggravati ng rel ati ons wi th l ocal authori ti es. Whi l e i n Bravo, the
i nstal l ati on shoul d bri ng manni ng l evel s and physi cal -protecti on l evel s
to the poi nt where the i nstal l ati on can i nstantl y transi ti on to
THREATCON Charl i e or Del ta.
THREATCON Charlie. The transi ti on to THREATCON Charl i e must
be done on short noti ce. I t i s a resul t of an i nci dent occurri ng or the
recei pt of i ntel l i gence i ndi cati ng that some form of terrori st acti on
agai nst personnel and faci l i ti es i s i mmi nent. Charl i e measures shoul d
pri mari l y focus on manni ng adjustments and procedural changes.
Securi ty forces wi l l usual l y enhance thei r securi ty presence by
acqui ri ng addi ti onal manni ng or by adjusti ng the work-rest rati o (such
as movi ng from a 3:1 to a 6:1 rati o). At Charl i e, off-i nstal l ati on travel
shoul d be mi ni mi zed.
THREATCON Delta. Si nce the transi ti on to THREATCON Del ta i s
i mmedi ate, Del ta measures shoul d pri mari l y focus on manni ng
adjustments and procedural changes. THREATCON Del ta appl i es i n
the i mmedi ate area where a terrori st attack has occurred or when
i ntel l i gence has been recei ved that terrori st acti on agai nst a speci fi c
l ocati on or person i s l i kel y. The securi ty forces manni ng l evel i s usual l y
peaked i n Charl i e; therefore, Del tas addi ti onal manni ng wi l l usual l y
come from an augmentati on force. Once i n Del ta, nonessenti al
operati ons wi l l cease i n order to enhance the securi ty and response
FM 3-19.30
Vulnerability Assessment K-3
posture. Normal l y, thi s THREATCON i s decl ared as a l ocal i zed
condi ti on.
K-3. Wi th excepti on of THREATCON Nor mal , al l THREATCON l evel s have
cer tai n measur es associ ated wi th them. These measur es ar e l i sted i n JP
3-07.2, Appendi x J, and AR 525-13.
ASSESSING VULNERABILITY
K-4. A VA addr esses the consequences of ter r or i st attacks i n ter ms of the
abi l i ty of uni ts, i nstal l ati ons, commands, or acti vi ti es to accompl i sh thei r
assi gnments successful l y, even i f ter r or i sts have i nfl i cted casual ti es or
destr oyed or damaged DOD assets. The VA focuses on two br oad areas
Preventi ng and, fai l i ng that, substanti al l y mi ti gati ng the effects of a
terrori st act.
Mai ntai ni ng emergency preparedness and cri si s response.
K-5. The VA pr ovi des the commander wi th a tool to assess the potenti al
vul ner abi l i ty of an i nstal l ati on, base, uni t, or por t acti vi ty; but i t i s not a
su bsti tu te for s ou n d j u dgmen t. Th e VA mu st s tan d on i ts own an d be
suppor ted by val i d consi der ati ons. Typi cal l y, a smal l group of knowl edgeabl e
i ndi vi dual s devel op the VA. The VA team consi sts of per sonnel wi th requi red
areas of experti se. Some of these team members are the
Assessment-team chi ef.
Physi cal -securi ty speci al i st.
Structural engi neer.
I nfrastructure engi neer.
Operati ons-readi ness speci al i st.
I ntel l i gence and/or counteri ntel l i gence speci al i st.
K-6. The functi ons and responsi bi l i ti es of each team member are outl i ned i n
JP 3-07.2. The fol l owi ng par agr aphs pr ovi de basi c i nfor mati on r egar di ng
these areas:
The assessment-team chi ef s key responsi bi l i ti es i ncl ude overseei ng
the management, trai ni ng, and performance of the vul nerabi l i ty-team
members; fi nal i zi ng the assessment-team out bri efi ng; and prepari ng
the popul ati on dynami cs and ri sk assessment.
The physi cal -securi ty speci al i st i s responsi bl e for the securi ty and
safety of the i nstal l ati on, faci l i ty, and personnel .
The structural engi neer exami nes a vari ety of potenti al terrori st
weapon effects and structural responses. Thi s functi on serves to better
protect personnel from shocks and bl asts by reduci ng damage through
the techni cal l y appropri ate use of standoff measures, hardeni ng, bl ast
shi el di ng, and shatter-resi stant wi ndow fi l m (such as Myl ar) as
descri bed i n Chapter 3. The structural engi neers mai n responsi bi l i ty i s
threat and damage assessment from terrori st weapons esti mates and
suggesti ons for threat protecti on or damage-mi ti gati on measures.
The i nfrastructure engi neer exami nes protecti on agai nst the effects of
WMD, protecti on agai nst terrori st-i nci dent i nduced fi res, and uti l i ty
systems that can be used to mi ni mi ze terrori st-i nci dent casual ti es
FM 3-19.30
K-4 Vulnerability Assessment
(i ncl udi ng el ements of power, envi ronmental control , and l i fe-support
systems). The pri mary responsi bi l i ti es i ncl ude i nfrastructure securi ty
and fi re, safety, and damage control .
The operati ons-readi ness speci al i st exami nes pl ans, procedures, and
capabi l i ti es for cri si s response, consequence management, and
recovery operati ons shoul d a terrori st i nci dent occur. The mai n
responsi bi l i ti es of thi s posi ti on i ncl ude emergency-medi cal and
i ndi vi dual -readi ness assessments.
The i ntel l i gence and/or counteri ntel l i gence speci al i st has the pri mary
responsi bi l i ty of performi ng l ogi cal anal yses and prepari ng possi bl e
concl usi ons regardi ng terrori st targets and target vul nerabi l i ti es.
These are based on processed i ntel l i gence i nformati on and knowl edge
of terrori st capabi l i ti es and methods i n vi ew of US i nstal l ati on, faci l i ty,
and personnel safety and securi ty practi ces.
CONDUCTING THE ASSESSMENT
K-7. Upon i ts ar r i val , the assessment team pr ovi des an i n br i efi ng for the
commander, staff, and desi gnated techni cal poi nt of contact. Si te per sonnel
shoul d conduct a si te-fami l i ar i zati on br i efi ng and tour. Admi ni str ati ve
acti v i ti es may i ncl u de establ i sh i n g th e team su ppor t ar ea, s etti ng u p
equi pment, schedul i ng team and techni cal poi nts of contact meeti ngs and
di scussi ons, ensur i ng cl assi fi ed-mater i al contr ol , establ i shi ng a per sonnel
l ocator, and or gani zi ng mater i al s for the out br i efi ng and si te fol der. Each
assessment-team member conducts the assessment based on the speci fi c
responsi bi l i ti es for each functi on wi thi n hi s area.
POST-ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
K-8. Wi th i n 30 day s of th e v i s i t, a s u mmar y n ar r ati v e r epor t an d an
annotated bri efi ng shoul d be del i vered to the i nstal l ati on commander. Fol l ow-
on assi stance for the commander may be appl i cabl e i n ar eas of techni cal
characteri sti cs of i mprovement opti ons, cost esti mates, and generi c sources of
materi al s and equi pment.
DRILLS AND EXERCISES
K-9. Mul ti echel on war gami ng of possi bl e ter r or i st attacks i s the best test,
shor t of an actual i nci dent, to anal yze the r esponse of an i nstal l ati on, base,
u n i t, or por t. Dr i l l s an d ex er ci s es tes t s u s pected v u l n er abi l i ti es an d
anti terr or i st measur es. These exer ci ses and dr i l l s al so tr ai n the staff as wel l
as r eacti on-for ce l eader shi p and hel p mai ntai n a val i d threat assessment by
i denti fyi ng and adjusti ng to changi ng threat capabi l i ti es.
Glossary-1
Glossary
AA&E arms, ammuni ti on, and expl osi ves
ABCS Army Battl e Command System
AC
al ternati ng current
admin admi ni strati on
ADP automated data processi ng
AF Ai r Force
AFB Ai r Force base
AFM Ai r Force manual
AFMAN Ai r Force manual
AFOSI Ai r Force Offi ce of Speci al I nvesti gati ons
AFR Ai r Force regul ati on
AIQC Anti terrori sm I nstructor Qual i fi cati on Course
AIS automated i nformati on system
AL Al abama
AM ampl i tude-modul ated
AMC Army Materi el Command
AMS Army management structure
AO area of operati ons
AP armor pi erci ng
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-2
Apr Apri l
AR Army regul ati on
AR-PERSCOM Army Reserve Personnel Command
ASP ammuni ti on suppl y poi nt
AT anti tank
AT/FP anti terrori sm/force protecti on
attn attenti on
Aug August
AWG Ameri can wi re gauge
bldg bui l di ng
BMS bal anced magneti c swi tch
BTO barbed-tape obstacl e
BUPERS Bureau of Naval Personnel
C
2
command and control
C
3
command, control , and communi cati ons
cav caval ry
CB ci ti zens band
CCB Communi ty Counterterrori sm Board
CCIR commanders cri ti cal i nformati on requi rements
CCTV cl osed-ci rcui t tel evi si on
CD-ROM compact-di sk, read-onl y memory
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-3
cdr commander
CG command gui dance
chap chapter
CIA Central I ntel l i gence Agency
CID Cr i mi nal I nvesti gati on Di vi si on
CINC commander i n chi ef
CISO counteri ntel l i gence support offi cer
CMU concrete-masonry uni t
CONEX
contai ner express
CONPLAN conti ngency pl an
CONUS conti nental Uni ted States
CP
command post
CPWG cri me-preventi on worki ng group
CQ charge of quarters
CRIMP Cri me Reducti on I nvol vi ng Many Peopl e
CTA common tabl e of al l owance
DA Department of the Army
DARE Drug Abuse Resi stance and Educati on
DC di rect current
DC Di stri ct of Col umbi a
Dec December
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-4
DIA Defense I ntel l i gence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justi ce
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportati on
DS di rect support
DTM data-transmi ssi on medi a
DTOC di vi si on tacti cal operati ons center
EDM emergency-destruct measures
EECS el ectroni c entry-control system
EOD expl osi ve-ordnance di sposal
EOR el ement of resource
EPW enemy pri soner of war
equip equi pment
ESS el ectroni c securi ty system
FAA Federal Avi ati on Admi ni strati on
FBI Federal Bureau of I nvesti gati on
FCC Federal Communi cati ons Commi ssi on
Feb February
FIS forei gn-i ntel l i gence servi ces
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-5
FM fi el d manual
FM frequency-modul ated
ft foot, feet
FY fi scal year
G2 Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G2 (I ntel l i gence)
GHz gi gahertz
GTA graphi c trai ni ng ai d
HN host nati on
HQ headquarters
HUD Housi ng and Urban Devel opment Admi ni strati on
HUMINT human i ntel l i gence
Hz hertz
IAW i n accordance wi th
ICP i ni ti al control poi nt
ID i denti fi cati on
IDS i ntrusi on-detecti on system
IED i mpr ovi sed expl osi ve devi ce
IG i nspector general
IID i mprovi sed i ncendi ary devi ce
in i nch(es)
INSCOM US Army I ntel l i gence and Securi ty Command
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-6
INTAC I ndi vi dual Terrori sm Awareness Course
IPB i ntel l i gence preparati on of the battl efi el d
IR i nfrared
ISS i nformati on systems securi ty
J 2 I ntel l i gence Di rectorate (Joi nt Command)
J an January
J S Joi nt Servi ce
J SAT Joi nt Securi ty Assi stance Trai ni ng
J SCP Joi nt Strategi c Capabi l i ti es Pl an
J SIIDS Joi nt-Servi ce I nteri or I ntrusi on-Detecti on System
J ul Jul y
J un June
K one thousand
kHz ki l ohertz
LED l i ght-emi tti ng di ode
liq l i qui d
LOS l i ne of si ght
LOTS l ogi sti cs over the shore
LP l i steni ng post
LRA l ocal reproducti on authori zed
MACOM major Army command
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-7
maint mai ntenance
Mar March
MCO Mari ne Corps order
MDEP management deci si on package
MDMP mi l i tary deci si on-maki ng process
METT-TC
mi ssi on, enemy, terrai n, troops, ti me avai l abl e, and ci vi l i an
consi derati ons
MEVA mi ssi on-essenti al or vul nerabl e area
MI
mi l i tary i ntel l i gence
MILCON
mi l i tary constructi on
MILPO mi l i tary personnel offi ce
MILVAN mi l i tary van
min mi ni mum
mm mi l l i meter(s)
MO modus operandi
MOU memorandum of understandi ng
MP mi l i tary pol i ce
MPACS Mi l i tary Pol i ce Automated Control System
MPMIS Mi l i tary Pol i ce Management I nformati on System
MPR mi l i tary-pol i ce report
MS-DOS Mi crosoft-di sk operati ng system
MWD mi l i tary worki ng dog
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-8
N/A not appl i cabl e
naut nauti cal
NAVATAC Navy Anti terrori sm Anal ysi s Center
NBC nucl ear, bi ol ogi cal , and chemi cal
NCIC Nati onal Cri me I nformati on Center
NCO noncommi ssi oned offi cer
NISCOM Naval I nvesti gati ve Servi ce Command
No. number
Nov November
NSA Nati onal Securi ty Agency
NTAV nontacti cal armored vehi cl e
NVD ni ght-vi si on devi ce
O offi ci al
OASD Offi ce of the Assi stant Secretary of Defense
OCOKA
observati on and fi el ds of fi re, cover and conceal ment, obstacl es,
key terrai n, and avenues of approach
OCONUS outsi de the conti nental Uni ted States
Oct October
OMA operati ons and mai ntenance, Army
OPA operati ons and procurement, Army
OPLAN operati on pl an
OPORD operati ons order
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-9
OPSEC operati ons securi ty
Pam pamphl et
PAO publ i c affai rs offi ce(r)
PD probabi l i ty of detecti on
PERSCOM Personnel Command
PHOTINT photographi c i ntel l i gence
PI pol i ce i ntel l i gence
PIR passi ve i nfrared
PM provost marshal
PMO provost marshal offi ce
POL petrol eum, oi l , and l ubri cants
POM Program Objecti ve Memorandum
POV pri vatel y owned vehi cl e
PS physi cal securi ty
PSD protecti ve securi ty detai l
PSI physi cal -securi ty i nspector
PTO Parent-Teacher Organi zati on
PX post exchange
R&D research and devel opment
RD&E research, devel opment, and engi neeri ng
ref reference(s)
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-10
RF radi o frequency
RII rel evant i nformati on and i ntel l i gence
ROI report of i nvesti gati on
RORO rol l on/rol l off
RPG rocket-propel l ed grenade
/s/ si gned
S2 I ntel l i gence Offi cer (US Army)
SAW squad automati c weapon
SDNCO staff duty noncommi ssi oned offi cer
SDO staff duty offi cer
Sep September
SIGINT si gnal i ntel l i gence
SJ A staff judge advocate
SO/LIC Speci al Operati ons/Low-I ntensi ty Confl i ct
SOFA status of forces agreement
SOP standi ng operati ng procedure
St. Sai nt
STANO survei l l ance, target acqui si ti on, and ni ght observati on
stat statute
STC sound-transmi ssi on coeffi ci ent
STD standard
STU secure tel ephone uni t
FM 3-19.30
Glossary-11
TAACOM Theater Army Area Command
TB techni cal bul l eti n
TDY temporary duty
TECOM US Army Test and Eval uati on Command
TEMPEST Termi nal El ectromagneti c-Pul se Emanati on Standard
THREATCON threat condi ti ons
TM techni cal manual
TMDE test, measurement, and di agnosti c equi pment
TNT tri ni trotol uene
TRADOC US Army Trai ni ng and Doctri ne Command
TSC tri pl e-standard concerti na
UCMJ Uni form Code of Mi l i tary Justi ce
UFR unfi nanced requi rement
US Uni ted States
USACE US Army Corps of Engi neers
USACIDC US Army Cri mi nal I nvesti gati on Command
USAMPS US Army Mi l i tary Pol i ce School
USCG US Coast Guard
VA vul nerabi l i ty assessment
VIP very i mportant person
vol vol ume
WMD weapons of mass destructi on
Bibliography-1
Bibliography
AR 12-15. J oint Security AssistanceTraining(J SAT) Regulation (Navy I nstructi ons
4950.4; AFR 50-29). 28 February 1990.
AR 50-5. Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and MaterialNuclear Surety.
3 October 1986.
AR 50-6. Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel, Chemical Surety.
1 February 1995.
AR 190-11. Physical Security of Arms, Ammunitions, and Explosives.
30 September 1993.
AR 190-12. Military PoliceWorkingDogs. 30 September 1993.
AR 190-13. TheArmyPhysical Security Program. 30 September 1993.
AR 190-14. Carryingof FireArms and Useof Forcefor LawEnforcement and Security
Duties. 12 March 1993.
AR 190-22. Searches, Seizures and Disposition of Property. 1 January 1983.
AR 190-27. ArmyParticipation in National CrimeI nformation Center. 28 May 1993.
AR 190-51. Security of Unclassified Army Property (Sensitiveand Nonsensitive).
30 September 1993.
AR 190-56. TheArmyCivilian Policeand SecurityGuard Program. 21 June 1995.
AR 190-59. Chemical Agent SecurityProgram. 27 June 1994.
AR 380-5. Department of theArmy I nformation Security Program. 25 February 1988.
AR 380-10. Technology Transfer, Disclosureof I nformation and Contacts with Foreign
Representatives. 30 December 1994.
AR 380-19. I nformation Systems Security. 27 February 1998.
AR 380-67. TheDepartment of theArmyPersonnel SecurityProgram. 9 September 1988.
AR 381-20. TheArmyCounterintelligenceProgram. 15 November 1993.
AR 405-20. Federal LegislativeJ urisdiction. 1 August 1973.
AR 525-13. AntiterrorismForceProtection (AT/ FP): Security of Personnel, I nformation,
and Critical Resources. 10 September 1998.
AR 600-8-14. I dentification Cards for Members of theUniformed Services, Their Family
Members, and Other EligiblePersonnel (AF 36-3026[I ]; BUPERS I 1750.10A;
MCO P5512.1B; CG M5512.1; Manual 29.2, I nstructi ons 1 and 2). 1 March 1998.
FM 3-19.30
Bibliography-2
AR 604-5. Personnel Security Clearance, Department of theArmy Personnel Security
ProgramRegulation 1 February 1984.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes toPublications and Blank Forms.
1 February 1974.
DA Form 2806-R. Physical Security SurveyReport. Apri l 1985.
DA Form 2806-1-R. Physical Security I nspection Report (LRA). Apri l 1985.
DA Form 2819. LawEnforcement and DisciplineReport. May 1988.
DA Form 3975. Military PoliceReport. May 1988.
DA Pam 190-12. Military WorkingDogProgram. 30 September 1993.
DA Pam 190-51. Risk Analysis for Army Property. 30 September 1993.
DOD 0-2000.12-H. Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism
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DOD 4160.21-M. DefenseReutilization and MarketingManual. August 1997.
DOD Di recti ve 2000.12. DOD Antiterrorism/ ForceProtection (AT/ FP) Program.
13 Apri l 1999.
DOD I nstructi on 2000.16. DOD CombatingTerrorismProgramStandards.
10 May 1999.
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22 January 1992.
Federal Speci fi cati on FF-L-2740. Locks, Combination. 12 October 1989.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999.
FM 19-4. MilitaryPoliceBattlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy
Prisoner of War Operations. 7 May 1993.
FM 55-20. ArmyRail Transport Units and Operations. 1 June 00.
GTA 19-4-3. I ndividual ProtectiveMeasures. Jul y 1997.
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JS Gui de 5260. ServiceMembers Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Handbook to
CombatingTerrorism. Jul y 1996.
TB 9-2300-422-20. Security of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. 27 August 1988.
TM 5-805-8. Builders Hardware. 20 January 1992.
TM 5-820-4. Drainagefor Areas Other Than Airfields (AFM 88-5, Chap 4).
14 October 1983.
TM 5-853-1. (O) Security EngineeringProject Development (AFMAN 32-1071, Vol 1).
12 May 1994.
FM 3-19.30
Bibliography-3
TM 5-853-2. (O) Security EngineeringConcept Design (AFMAN 32-1071, Vol 2).
12 May 1994.
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12 May 1994.
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USACE STD 872-90-02. FE5 Chain-Link Security FenceDetails. May 1992.
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USACE STD 872-90-05. FE7 Chain-Link Security FenceDetails for Sensored Fence.
May 1992.
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May 1992.
USACE STD 872-90-07. FE5 Chain-Link FenceGateDetails. May 1992.
Index-1
Index
A
ABCS. See Army Battle Command
System (ABCS).
access control, 3-19, 3-20, 7-6,
7-12, 10-1, 10-2
area, 3-20
devices, 3-20
elements, 2-5, 3-20, 7-5
points, 3-19, 10-3
roster, 7-1, 7-4, 7-10, 7-11
system, 7-1
access mode, 6-7, 6-8
activists, 1-2, 2-7
aggressor,
categories, 2-7
objectives, 2-7
tactics, 2-8
aircraft cable, 4-4
AIS. See automated information
system (AIS).
alarm-annunciation system, 6-6,
6-126-17, 6-31
alarm printers, 6-15
alarms, 6-43
environmental, 6-5, 6-9, 6-29
false, 6-5, 6-9
nuisance, 6-5, 6-8, 6-9, 6-29,
6-37, 6-38
antiterrorism, C-1, C-6
antiterrorism/force-protection
(AT/FP), 2-3
area surveillance, B-28
Army Battle Command System
(ABCS), B-6
arrest rate, B-87
arson, B-66
assault, B-8, B-15
AT/FP. See antiterrorism/force-
protection.
audible alarm devices, 6-15
authority, 9-2, 9-3
auto theft, B-8, B-12
automated information system
(AIS), 1-1, 1-2, 1-3
B
badges,
exchange, 7-1
security, 7-6
balanced magnetic switch (BMS),
6-21, 6-22
ballistics tactic, 3-16, 3-17
barbed-tape obstacle (BTO), 4-3
barriers, 2-4, 4-2, 6-4
active, 3-5, 3-6
perimeter, 3-5, 3-7, 4-3, 4-8,
4-9
protective. See protective
barriers.
vehicle, 3-2, 3-53-7, 4-5
biometric-access readers, 7-6
biometric devices, 6-41, 6-42, 7-6
block clubs, B-67B-69
BMS. See balanced magnetic
switch (BMS).
bomb-threat plan, F-6
bombs,
mail, 2-9, 3-223-24
moving vehicle, 2-8, 3-2
stationary vehicle, 2-8, 3-2
supply, 2-9, 3-223-24
vehicle, 3-5, 3-6, 3-9, 4-1
BTO. See barbed-tape obstacle
(BTO).
building elements, 3-1
burglary, B-7, B-10
C
C
2
. See command and control
(C
2
).
card-access systems, 7-6
CCTV. See closed-circuit
television (CCTV) systems.
challenges, 1-2
civil-disturbance plan, F-6
classified material, 1-3, 8-1, F-1
clear zone, 3-11, 3-13, 4-8, 4-9, 5-5
clearance rate, B-86
closed-circuit television (CCTV)
systems, 2-8, 3-18, 5-6, 6-1,
6-4, 6-5, 6-11, 6-12, 6-13,
6-17, 6-23, 6-38, 6-44, 6-45
6-50
code words, 7-10
coded devices, 6-39, 6-40, 7-6
command and control (C
2
), 1-2
communication, 9-9
failure, 6-43
links, 6-45
compromise, 3-20
construction standards, 2-3
contamination,
airborne, 2-10, 3-24
biological, 3-24, 3-25
chemical, 3-24, 3-25
waterborne, 2-10, 3-24, 3-25
contingency plan, F-7
controlled area, 6-11, 7-1, 7-2,
7-10, 7-12
convoy movement, 10-7
counterintelligence, C-1
countersigns, 7-10
counterterrorism, C-1
covert entry, 3-19, 3-20, 6-5
credential devices, 6-40, 6-41, 7-6
crime displacement, B-29
crime hot line, B-17, B-18
crime prevention, B-1, B-2, B-23
council, B-69
juvenile, B-34B-47
organizations, B-5
programs, B-1, B-15, B-17,
B-31, B-66, B-71, B-75,
B-79
working groups, B-1
crime rates, B-83, B-85
crime-scene surveyor, B-34
crime-seriousness index, B-87
crime-specific factors, B-7B-9
criminal analysis, B-5, B-6, B-9,
B-15
criminal information, C-1
criminals, 2-7
crisis-management plan, 2-1, D-1
FM 3-19.30
Index-2
D
data-transmission media (DTM),
6-1, 6-2, 6-4, 6-6, 6-13, 6-44,
6-45
defeat, 2-5, 2-6, 2-10
defense, 2-5, 2-6, 2-10
defensible space, B-21, B-22
defensive layers, 3-18
defensive measures,
active, 2-6
passive, 2-6
defensive security rings, F-7
delay, 6-1
delay time, 6-3, 6-4
design basis threat, 2-4, 2-5
design strategy, 3-1, 3-2, 3-18
general, 3-1, 3-10, 3-18, 3-19,
3-20, 3-22, 3-24
specific, 3-1
detection, 2-5, 2-10, 6-1
detection elements, 3-1
detection zones, 6-11
deterrence, 2-5, 2-10, B-25, B-29,
B-42, B-57, B-71, B-81, B-85,
B-86, B-87, B-88
displacement effects, B-81, B-82,
B-85
DTM. See data-transmission
media (DTM).
duress, 6-43
alarm, 6-28
code, 7-10
E
eavesdropping, 3-203-22
acoustic, 3-20
electronic-emanations, 3-20
EECS. Seeelectronic entry-control
system (EECS).
electronic entry-control system
(EECS), 6-1, 6-44
electronic security system (ESS),
2-1, 3-18, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4,
6-5, 6-6, 6-17, 6-18, 6-44,
6-45
exterior, 6-2, 6-3, 6-86-12
interior, 6-2, 6-3, 6-7
employee screening, 7-4
employee theft, B-58
entry,
accidental, 4-7
authorized, 4-7
denial, 6-43
point, 4-8, 6-11
unauthorized, 4-7, 5-3, 7-1
entry-control
device, 6-1, 6-5, 6-12, 6-39,
6-41, 6-44
point, 3-9, 4-2, 5-2
stations, 4-7, 4-8
system, 6-39, 6-42, 6-43, 7-11
EOD. See explosive-ordnance
disposal (EOD).
errors,
false-accept, 6-43
false-reject, 6-43
escorts, 7-1, 7-7, 7-8, 7-10, 7-12
espionage, 7-2, 7-4, 7-7, 7-11
ESS. See electronic security
system (ESS).
evacuation drills, H-4
exclusion area, 4-2, 5-2, 7-1, 7-2
exclusive standoff zone, 3-3
executive protection, I-1
explosive containers, 3-23
explosive-ordnance disposal
(EOD), 2-10
exterior attack, 3-103-13
extremists, 2-7
F
fenced perimeters, 5-4
isolated, 5-4
nonisolated, 5-5
semi-isolated, 5-4
fencing, 4-2
barbed concertina, 4-2, 4-3
barbed tape, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4
barbed wire, 4-2, 4-3
chain-link, 4-2, 4-3
perimeter, 4-3, 4-4, 4-9, 5-1
tangle-foot wire, 4-4
triple-standard concertina, 4-4
field interview, B-27
firearms, 9-9
FIS. See foreign intelligence
services (FIS).
force protection, 1-1
force-protection officer, 2-1
forced entry, 3-17, 3-18, 3-24, 6-5
foreign-intelligence services (FIS),
1-2
forgery, B-8, B-15
fraud, B-47B-52
funding, 6-2
G
government intelligence, C-2
guard overdue, 6-43
H
hackers, 1-2
high-crime areas, B-28
holding area, 4-8, 10-3
home security practices, I-9
housebreaking, B-7, B-10, B-11
I
ID. See identification (ID).
identification (ID),
badge, 7-5
cards, 7-1, 7-4
system, 7-47-10
IDS. See intrusion-detection
system (IDS).
IED. See improvised explosive
device (IED).
IID. See improvised incendiary
device (IID).
improvised explosive device (IED),
3-10, 3-11, H-1, H-2, H-5
H-8
improvised incendiary device (IID),
3-10, 3-11
individual protective measures, I-7
information systems security (ISS),
1-2
insider compromise, 3-19, 3-20,
6-5
inspections, 11-1
installation perimeter, 4-9
intelligence, C-1
human, G-1
photographic, G-1
signal, G-1
intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB), 2-10
internal theft, B-52
intrusion-detection system (IDS),
2-4, 3-13, 3-18, 6-1, 6-4, 6-8,
6-44
exterior, 6-4, 6-6
interior, 6-6
perimeter, 6-8
IPB. See intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB).
isolation zone, 6-11
ISS. See information systems
security (ISS).
J
jurisdiction, 9-2, 9-3
juvenile delinquent, B-40
FM 3-19.30
Index-3
K
keep-out zone, 10-2, 10-3
L
larceny, B-8, B-13
level of protection, 2-4, 2-10
lighting systems,
continuous, 5-4
controlled, 5-4, 5-5
emergency, 5-4
glare, 5-4
movable, 5-4
standby, 5-4, 5-5
likelihood rating, 2-4
limited area, 4-2, 5-2, 7-1, 7-2,
7-10, 7-12
locks
combination locks, 8-2
key locks, 8-1
logging devices, 6-15
M
mail bomb. See bombs, mail.
MEVA. See mission-essential or
vulnerable area (MEVA).
military-policereport, B-6, B-7, B-8,
B-9, B-15
Military Police Automated Control
System (MPACS), B-6, B-16,
B-17
Military Police Management
Information System (MPMIS),
B-6
military working dog (MWD), 2-10,
9-10
mission-essential or vulnerable
area (MEVA), 2-2
mobile patrols, 9-4, B-75
moving vehicle bomb. See bombs,
moving vehicle.
MPACS. See Military Police
Automated Control System
(MPACS).
MPMIS. See Military Police
Management Information
System (MPMIS).
multiplexing, 6-16, 6-45
murder, B-8, B-15
MWD. See military working dog
(MWD).
N
natural-disaster plan, F-6
natural surveillance, B-20, B-21
natural threats, 2-8
neighborhood watch programs,
B-67B-70
nonexclusive standoff zone, 3-4
nontactical armored vehicle
(NTAV), I-5I-7
NTAV. See nontactical armored
vehicle (NTAV).
O
office security, 2-5
open-source information, C-1
Operation ID, B-71B-74
operations security (OPSEC), 1-3
OPSEC. See operations security
(OPSEC).
P
passwords, 1-3, 6-18
PD. See probability of detection
(PD).
peer influence, B-35B-38
perimeter entrance, 4-4, 4-6, 4-7,
4-8
perimeter layout, 6-11
perimeter lighting, 5-1
personal recognition, 7-1
physical intrusion, 1-2
physical security, 1-1
challenges, 1-1, 1-3
equipment, 1-1
measures, 1-1, 1-3, 2-1, E-2
E-4
plan, 2-5, 7-11, F-1, F-7
posture, 1-3
survey, E-1
pilferage, 7-11, 10-5, 10-6, 10-7,
B-53B-60, B-63
pipeline cargo, 10-6, 10-7
PM. See provost marshal (PM).
political groups, 1-3
POVs. See privately owned
vehicles (POVs).
privately owned vehicles (POVs),
I-7
probability of detection (PD), 6-2
procedural elements, 3-1
Project Lock, B-76B-78
protective barriers, 4-1
natural, 4-1
structural, 4-1
protective lighting, 4-6, 5-3, 5-5
protective measures, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5,
2-10, 3-1
personal, 2-5
physical, 2-5
protective security detail (PSD),
I-11, I-12
protective systems, 2-2, 2-5, 2-10
protest groups, 2-7
provost marshal (PM), 2-1
PSD. See protective security detail
(PSD).
psychological deterrent, 4-1, B-59
publicity campaign, B-30
R
rail cargo, 10-410-6
rape, B-8, B-14
reaction area, 10-2, 10-3
recovered property, B-73, B-74
religious groups, 1-3
report of investigation (ROI), B-6,
B-7, B-8, B-9, B-15
report printers, 6-15
reserves, 9-4
residential security surveys, B-31
response, 6-1
response force, 9-4
response plans, C-6
response time, 6-3, 6-4
restitution, B-46
restricted areas, 4-8, 7-1, 7-2,
7-10, 7-12, 10-2
retrofitting windows, 3-8
risk analysis, 2-2, 2-4
risk levels, 2-2, 2-3, 2-10
robbery, B-8, B-11
ROI. See report of investigation
(ROI).
S
sabotage, 7-2, 7-4, 7-7, 7-11, 10-5,
10-6
sacrificial areas, 3-13, 3-15, 3-16
secure mode, 6-7, 6-8
security,
clearance, 9-3
forces, 9-1
in-transit, 10-1
lighting, 4-6, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3
measures, 2-1
procedures, 2-5
threats, 2-6
towers, 4-5
training, 9-6
sensors,
boundary, 6-4, 6-196-23
buried, 6-6, 6-9, 6-29, 6-33
6-35
capacitance, 6-4, 6-27
capacitance proximity, 6-33
door-position, 6-4, 6-7
dual-technology, 6-26
electric field, 6-31
exterior, 6-6, 6-8, 6-9, 6-11
FM 3-19.30
Index-4
fence-mounted, 6-9, 6-29,
6-306-33
fiber-optic cable, 6-31
glass-breakage, 6-4, 6-19
grid-wire, 6-22
interior, 6-4, 6-6, 6-7
intrusion-detection, 6-5,
6-186-39
line-of-sight, 6-29, 6-356-38
microwave-motion, 6-23, 6-24
passive ultrasonic, 6-4, 6-19
point, 6-4, 6-19, 6-27, 6-28
pressure mats, 6-4, 6-27
pressure switches, 6-27, 6-28
proximity, 6-27
structural vibration, 6-4, 6-19
taut-wire, 6-30, 6-31
video motion, 6-26, 6-29,
6-38, 6-39
volumetric-motion, 6-4, 6-7,
6-19, 6-236-27
sensor phenomenology, 6-6
sex offenses, B-8, B-14
shoplifting, B-64B-66
signs, 7-10
site-work elements, 3-1
software tamper, 6-43
specialized tactics, B-25
speed control, 3-7
standoff,
distance, 3-2, 3-3, 3-8, 3-10,
3-11, 3-14, 3-16, 3-22,
4-1
weapons, 3-133-16
zone, 3-3, 3-4, 3-9, 3-11
stationary vehicle bomb. See
bombs, stationary vehicle.
supply bomb. See bombs, supply.
surveillance, 3-203-22
surveys, 11-2
systems approach, 2-2, 2-10
T
tamper switches, 6-7
telephonic threats, H-3
territoriality, B-18B-20
terrorism, 2-1
counteracting, 2-1
threats, 2-3
terrorists, 1-2, 2-7
incidents, C-3, C-4, C-5
threat analysis, C-5
theft, 3-20, B-13
threat,
assessment, 2-6, C-5, C-6
identification, 2-32-4
travel security practices, I-9
two-person rule, 7-10, 7-11
U
uniformed tactical patrols, B-25
B-27
uniforms, 9-8
unreported crime, B-82
utility openings, 4-5
V
VA. See vulnerability assessment
(VA).
value rating, 2-4
vandalism, B-39B-47
vandals, 2-7
vehicle barriers, 3-2, 3-53-7
vented suppressive shielding, 3-23
vigilantism, B-75, B-76
visitors, 7-8
visual displays, 6-15
visual surveillance, 3-20
vulnerability, 2-3, 2-4, 2-10
vulnerability assessment (VA),
2-10, C-5, C-6, K-1
W
warning signs, 4-8
weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), 2-5
window replacement, 3-9
WMD. See weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
FM 3-19.30 (FM 19-30)
8 JANUARY 2001
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0033202
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in
accordance with the initial distribution number 110142, requirements for
FM 3-19.30.

Physical Security - FM 3-19.30

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