Pan American World Airways System vs.

Pan American Employees Association

1 SCRA 527
FACTS:
Petitioner herein claims that the one hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work, because the evidence showed
that complainants could rest completely, and were not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The
court below found, on the contrary, that during the so-called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency
work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the lead man; that as in fact it happened
on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to hurry up eating to perform work during this period.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hour meal period of the mechanics is considered working time.
HEL:
!es. The "ndustrial #ourt$s order for permanent adoption of a straight %-hour shift including the meal period was but a
consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest but was actually a work hour, since for its duration, the
laborers had to be on ready call.
PHILIPPI!E AI"LI!ES vs. !L"C et al
#.". !o. $%&'()
Fe*. &+ $,,,
FACTS: Private respondent &r. 'abros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. (e was assigned at the P)*
+edical #linic and was on duty from ,-.. in the afternoon until /-.. midnight.
0n 'eb.1, 22,, at around 1-.. in the evening, &r. ')bros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou t3-
minute drive away. ) few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the P)* #argo 4ervices. 0ne of its
employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, +r. 5usebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the
emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 1-3. in the evening and +r. 5usebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When
&r. 'abros reached the clinic at around 1-3 in the evening, +r. 5usebio had already left with the patient to the hospital. The
patient died the following day.
6pon learning about the incident, P)* +edical &irector ordered the #hief 'light 4urgeon to conduct an investigation. "n his
e7planation, &r. 'abros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon
being informed by +r. 5usebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that +r. 5usebio panicked
and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.
'inding private respondent$s e7planation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with abandonment of post
while on duty. (e denied that he abandoned his post on 'ebruary 1, 22,. (e said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner
at home. "n fact, he returned to the clinic at 1-3 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.
)fter evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months effective
&ecember 8, 22,.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
0n 9uly 8, 228, the *abor )rbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. "t also ordered
petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of
suspension plus P3..,...... moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the :*;#.
The :*;#, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the *abor )rbiter is supported by the facts on record
and the law on the matter. The :*;# likewise denied petitioner$s motion for reconsideration.
(ence, this petition.
ISSUE:
. W0: the nullifying of the <-month suspension by the :*;# erroneous.
/. W0: the awarding of moral damages is proper.
HEL: The petition is P);T")**! =;):T5&. The portion of the assailed decision awarding moral damages to private
respondent is &5*5T5&. )ll other aspects of the decision are )''";+5&
. The legality of private respondent$s suspension- &r. 'abros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house, which
was only a few minutes$ drive away from the clinic. (is whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could be easily
reached in case of emergency. 6pon being informed of +r. )costa$s condition, private respondent immediately left his home and
returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioner$s claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee,
private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight >%? hours. (ence, he may not leave the
company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not impressed. )rt. %< and %3 of the *abor #ode read- )rt.
%<. :ormal hours of work. @ The normal hours of work of any employee shall not e7ceed eight >%? hours a day. (ealth
personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million >,...,...? or in hospitals and clinics with a bed
capacity of at least one hundred >..? shall hold regular office hours for eight >%? hours a day, for five >3? days a week, e7clusive
of time for meals, e7cept where the e7igencies of the service require that such personnel work for si7 >8? days or forty-eight >,%?
hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent ><.A? of their regular wage for
work on the si7th day. 'or purposes of this )rticle, Bhealth personnelC shall include- resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists,
dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and
all other hospital or clinic personnel. >emphasis supplied? )rt. %3. +eal periods. @ 4ubDect to such regulations as the 4ecretary of
*abor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than si7ty >8.? minutes time-off for
their regular meals. 4ec. 1, ;ule ", Eook """ of the 0mnibus ;ules "mplementing the *abor #ode further states- 4ec. 1. +eal and
;est Periods. @ 5very employer shall give his employees, regardless of se7, not less than one >? hour time-off for regular meals,
e7cept in the following cases when a meal period of not less than twenty >/.? minutes may be given by the employer provided
that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee; >a? Where the work is non-manual work
in nature or does not involve strenuous physical e7ertion; >b? Where the establishment regularly operates not less than si7teen
hours a day; >c? "n cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment
or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and >d? Where the work is necessary to prevent
serious loss of perishable goods. ;est periods or coffee breaks running from five >3? to twenty >/.? minutes shall be considered as
compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. :owhere in the law may it be
inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises. 5mployees are not prohibited from going out of the
premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondent$s act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does
not constitute abandonment. /. The award of moral damages- :ot every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is
entitled to damages. )s a rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy "n the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of petitioner company was moved by some
evil motive in suspending private respondent. "t suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private
respondent$s act of leaving the company premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the
penalty of suspension. 6nder the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.
-anila Terminal Company Inc.+ v. CI"
C.ester Ca*al/a recommends .is visitors to please read t.e ori0inal 1 23ll te4t o2 t.e case cited. 5ie 4ie6
G.R. No. L-4148 July 16, 1952
-A!ILA TE"-I!AL C7-PA!8+ I!C.+ petitioner+
vs.
THE C7U"T 7F I!UST"IAL "ELATI7!S and -A!ILA TE"-I!AL "ELIEF A! -UTUAL AI
ASS7CIATI7!+respondents.
Facts:
+anila Terminal #ompany, "nc. hereinafter to be referred as to the petitioner, undertook the arrastre service in some of the piers
in +anilaFs Port )rea at the request and under the control of the 6nited 4tates )rmy. The petitioner hired some thirty men as
watchmen on twelve-hour shifts at a compensation of P< per day for the day shift and P8 per day for the night shift.
The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the service with a number of substitutions and additions, their salaries having been
raised during the month of 'ebruary to P, per day for the day shift and P8./3 per day for the nightshift. The private respondent
sent a letter to &epartment of *abor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated. Eut nothing was done by the &ept
of *abor.
*ater on, the petitioner instituted the system of strict eight-hour shifts.
The private respondent filed an amended petition with the #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations praying, among others, that the petitioner
be ordered to pay its watchmen or police force overtime pay from the commencement of their employment.
Ey virtue of #ustoms )dministrative 0rder :o. % and 57ecutive 0rder :o. //% of the President of the Philippines, the entire
police force of the petitioner was consolidated with the +anila (arvor Police of the #ustoms Patrol 4ervice, a =overnment
agency under the e7clusive control of the #ommissioner of #ustoms and the 4ecretary of 'inance The +anila Terminal ;elief
and +utual )id )ssociation will hereafter be referred to as the )ssociation.
9udge G. 9imeneH !anson of the #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations in his decision ordered the petitioner to pay to its police force but
regards to overtime service after the watchmen had been integrated into the +anila (arbor Police, the has no Durisdiction because
it affects the Eureau of #ustoms, an instrumentality of the =overnment having no independent personality and which cannot be
sued without the consent of the 4tate.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The )ssociation also filed a motion for reconsideration in so far its other
demands were dismissed. Eoth resolutions were denied.
The public respondent decision was to pay the private respondents their overtime on regular days at the regular rate and
additional amount of /3 percent, overtime on 4undays and legal holidays at the regular rate only, and watchmen are not entitled
to night differential pay for past services. The petitioner has filed a present petition for certiorari.
Iss3es:
a. Whether or not the #"; has no Durisdiction to render a money Dudgment involving obligation in arrears.
b. Whether or not the agreement under which its police force were paid certain specific wages for twelve-hour shifts, included
overtime compensation.
c. Whether or not the )ssociation is barred from recovery by estoppel and laches.
d. Whether or not the nullity or invalidity of the employment contract precludes any recovery by the )ssociation.
e. whether or not the #ommonwealth )ct :o. ,,,, does not authoriHe recovery of back overtime pay.
Held:
The 4upreme #ourt affirmed the appealed decision that the petitionerFs watchmen will be entitled to e7tra compensation only
from the dates they respectively entered the service of the petitioner, hereafter to be duly determined by the #ourt of "ndustrial
;elations.
0n the first issue, the #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations has no Durisdiction to award a money Dudgment was already overruled by this
#ourt on the case of &etective I protective Eureau, "nc. vs. #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations and 6nited 5mployees Welfare
)ssociation that under #ommonwealth )ct :o. .< the #ourt is empowered to make the order for the purpose of settling disputes
between the employer and employee.
0n the second issue, based on the case of &etective I Protective Eureau, "nc. vs. #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations and 6nited
5mployees Welfare )ssociation, the law gives them the right to e7tra compensation. )nd they could not be held to have impliedly
waived such e7tra compensation, for the obvious reason that could not have e7pressly waived it.
0n the third issue, the principle of estoppel and the laches cannot well be invoked against the )ssociation. it would be contrary to
the spirit of the 5ight (our *abor *aw, under which as already seen, the laborers cannot waive their right to e7tra compensation.
"f the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, the employee may be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere
silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the purpose of law by indirection.
0n the fourth issue, the employee in rendering e7tra service at the request of his employer has a right to assume that the latter has
complied with the requirement of the law, and therefore has obtained the required permission from the &epartment of *abor. This
was based on the case of =otamo *umber #o. vs. #ourt of "ndustrial ;elations, wherein both parties are in pari delicto.
+oreover, the 5ight-(our *aw, in providing that Jany agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee
contrary to the provisions of this )ct shall be null avoid ab initio.C
0n the fifth issue, based on 'air *abor 4tandards )ct of the 6nited 4tates which provides that Jany employer who violates the
provisions of section /.8 and section /.1 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compensation as the case may be,J @ a provision not incorporated in
#ommonwealth )ct :o. ,,,, our 5ight-(our *abor *aw.
We cannot agree to the proposition, because sections < and 3 of #ommonwealth )ct ,,, e7pressly provides for the payment of
e7tra compensation in cases where overtime services are required, with the result that the employees or laborers are entitled to
collect such e7tra compensation for past overtime work. To hold otherwise would be to allow an employer to violate the law by
simply, as in this case, failing to provide for and pay overtime compensation.
7vertime Pay and Premi3m Pay o2 -ana0erial Employees
"n 9une 222, PeKaranda was hired by Eaganga Plywood #orporation >owned by (udson #hua? to take charge of the operations
and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. PeKaranda was employed as a 'oremanLEoiler (eadL4hift 5ngineer tasked to do the
following tasks among others-
B. To supply the required and continuous steam to all consuming units at minimum cost.
B/. To supervise, check and monitor manpower workmanship as well as operation of boiler and accessories.
B<. To evaluate performance of machinery and manpower.
777
B3. To train new employees for effective and safety while working.
777
B1. To recommend personnel actions such as- promotion, or disciplinary action.
777
"n /.., EP# shut down due to some repairs and maintenance. EP# did not technically fire PeKaranda but due to the latter$s
insistence, EP# gave him his separation benefits.
EP# subsequently reopened but PeKaranda did not reapply.
PeKaranda now claims that EP# still needed to pay him his overtime pays and premium pays.
The :*;# ruled that PeKaranda is a managerial employee and as such he is not entitled to overtime and premium pay as stated
under the *abor #ode. PeKaranda appealed. (e said that he is not a managerial employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not PeKaranda is entitled to overtime and premium pay.
HEL: :o. Though there is an error made by the :*;# in finding PeKaranda as a managerial employee, the 4upreme #ourt still
ruled that PeKaranda is not entitled to overtime and premium pay.
PeKaranda is not a managerial employee. 6nder the "mplementing ;ules and ;egulations of the *abor #ode, managerial
employees are those that perform the following-
B>? Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or
subdivision thereof;
B>/? They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein;
B><? They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the
hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.C
PeKaranda does not meet the above requirements.
PeKaranda is instead considered as a managerial staff. 6nder the "mplementing ;ules and ;egulations of the *abor #ode,
managerial staffs are those that perform the following-
B>? The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer;
B>/? #ustomarily and regularly e7ercise discretion and independent Dudgment;
B><? >i? ;egularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of
the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or >ii? e7ecute under general supervision work along
specialiHed or technical lines requiring special training, e7perience, or knowledge; or >iii? e7ecute under general supervision
special assignments and tasks; and
B>,? who do not devote more than /. percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely
related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs >?, >/?, and ><? above.C
PeKaranda$s function as a shift engineer illustrates that he was a member of the managerial staff. (is duties and responsibilities
conform to the definition of a member of a managerial staff under the "mplementing ;ules.
PeKaranda supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. (is work involved overseeing the operation of the
machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and
independent Dudgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler.
'urther, PeKaranda in his position paper admitted that he was a supervisor for EP#. )s supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member
of the managerial staff.

Read full text here.
)4") P)#"'"# #();T5;":= >P("*4.? ":#. v. +);") *":&) ;. ');0*):<2< 4#;) ,3, >/../?, T(";& &"G"4"0:
>#arpio +orales, 9.?
The termination of a managerial employee on the ground of Mloss of confidenceN should have a basis and the determination of
the same cannot be left entirely to the employer.
Petitioner )sia Pacific #hartering >Phils.? "nc. >)sia? is tasked with the selling of passenger and cargo spacesfor 4candinavian
)irlines 4ystem. Petitioner )sia, through its Gice President #atalino Eondoc >Eondoc?,offered ;espondent +aria *inda ;.
'arolan >'arolan? the sales manager position to which 'arolan accepted.6pon Gice President EondocOs request, 'arolan
submitted a detailed report attributing the drop of salesrevenue to market forces beyond her control. #onsequently, )sia directed
;oberto PoHobrado >PoHobrado?to implement solutions. PoHobrado informally took over 'arolanOs marketing and sales
responsibilities butshe continued to receive her salary. )sia claims that the increase in sales revenue was due to
PoHobradoOsmanagement. )sia then sent a letter of termination to 'arolan on the ground of loss of confidence

, forcing 'arolan tofile a complaint for illegal dismissal. The *abor )rbiter found that the dismissal was illegal for lack of
Dustcause, however, such decision was reversed by the :ational *abor ;elations #ommission >:*;#? stating that the termination
of employment due to loss of confidence is within management prerogative. 0n appeal,the #ourt of )ppeals upheld the labor
arbiterOs decision. (ence, the filing of this petition.
"4465-
Whether or not ;espondent 'arolanOs dismissal was illegal

/

(5*&-
) statement of the requisites for a valid dismissal of an employee is thus in order, to wit- >a? the employeemust be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself; and >b?dismissal must be for a valid cause. The
manner by which ;espondent 'arolan was dismissed violated thebasic precepts of fairness and due process - ;espondent 'arolan
was dismissed, without being afforded theopportunity to be heard and to present evidence in her defense. 4he was never given a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for her dismissal as required by law. With respect to
rank and file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requiresproof of involvement in the alleged
events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions andaccusations by the employer will not be sufficient. Eut as regards a
managerial employee, mere e7istence of abasis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would
suffice for his dismissal.*oss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employeeOs dismissal must be based on a
w
illful
breach
and founded
on clearly established facts. ) breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly andpurposely, without Dustifiable e7cuse."t is
not disputed that 'arolanOs Dob description, and the terms and conditions of her employment, with thee7ception of her salary and
allowances, were never reduced to writing. 5ven assuming, however, that 'arolan was a managerial employee, the stated ground
>in the letter of termination? for her dismissal, loss of confidence,

should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be left entirely to the employer.
E)#0*0&-T)*"4)! ;5)*T! ):& &5G5*0P+5:T #0;P0;)T"0:, et al. v. ;0+50&5*) #;6P 3%1 4#;) <.,
>/..2?, 45#0:& &"G"4"0: >#arpio +orales, 9.?
The twin notice requirement provided by law should be observed in order for a dismissal to be vali
Samson vs NLRC
Leave a comment
#" !o. $$%$99+ Fe*r3ary $+ $,,9
FACTS
Petitioner had been working for respondent )tlantic =ulf and Pacific #o. +anila for appro7imately /% years and his proDect-to-
proDect employment was renewed several times. (is successive contracts of employment required him to perform virtually the
same kind of work throughout his period of employment. Petitioner would be re-hired immediately, some for a gap of one day to
one week from the last proDect to the succeeding one.
ISSUE
W0: petitioner is a regular employee
HEL
)rticle /% of the *abor #ode pertinently prescribes that the provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Where from the circumstances it appeared that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the
employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs, or public order. There can be no escape
from the conclusion that the employee is a regular employee of the respondent.
Union o2 Filipino Employees v. :ivar
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie
xie!
Union of Filipino Employees vs Vivar
G..R. No. 79255
January 2! "992
Excluded Employees: Field ersonnel
Fa#$s%
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the
change of the divisor in the computation of benefts from 251 to 261 days.
n !ovember "# 1$"5# respondent %ilipro# &nc. 'now !estle (hilippines# &nc.) fled with the !ational
Labor *elations +ommission '!L*+) a petition for declaratory relief see,ing a ruling on its rights and
obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the +ourt-s
decision in +hartered .an, /mployees 0ssociation v. ple '11" 2+*0 231 41$"55).
.oth %ilipro and the 6nion of %ilipino /mployees '6%/) agreed to submit the case for voluntary
arbitration and appointed respondent .enigno 7ivar# 8r. as voluntary arbitrator.
%ilipro fled a motion for clarifcation see,ing '1) the limitation of the award to three years# '2) the
exclusion of salesmen# sales representatives# truc, drivers# merchandisers and medical representatives
'hereinafter referred to as sales personnel) from the award of the holiday pay# and '1) deduction from
the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime# night di9erential# vacation and sic, leave benefts
due to the use of 251 divisor. '*ollo# pp. 11":1;5)
(etitioner 6%/ answered that the award should be made e9ective from the date of e9ectivity of the
Labor +ode# that their sales personnel are not feld personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay#
and that the use of 251 as divisor is an established employee beneft which cannot be diminished.
&ssue%
<=! the respondent-s sales personnel are not feld personnel under 0rticle "2 of the Labor +ode>
'el(%
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are? '1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales
target@ '2) good collection performance@ '1) proper compliance with good mar,et hygiene@ ';) good
merchandising wor,@ '5) minimal mar,et returns@ and '6) proper truc, maintenance. '*ollo# p. 1$A).
The +ourt thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be e9ective# not from the date of
promulgation of the +hartered .an, case nor from the date of e9ectivity of the Labor +ode# but from
ctober 21# 1$";# the date of promulgation of the &.00 case.
<B/*/%*/# the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby CD&%&/D. The divisor to be used in
computing holiday pay shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from
ctober 21# 1$";. &n all other respects# the order of the respondent arbitrator is hereby 0%%&*C/D.
(osted by +hester +abalEa at $?1A 0C
No comments:
SALA;A" :S. !L"C
#.". !o $(,&$(
AP"IL $<+ $,,9
FACTS: 0n 1 )pril 22., private respondent #arlos #onstruction, at a monthly salary of P,,3....., employed 4alaHar as
constructionLproDect engineer for the construction of a building in #ubao. )llegedly, by virtue of an oral contract, petitioner
would also receive a share in the profits after completion of the proDect and that petitioner$s services in e7cess of % ours on
regular days and services rendered on weekends and legal holidays shall be compensable overtime.
0n 8 )pril 22, petitioner received a memorandum issued by private respondent$s proDect manager informing him of the
termination of his services effective on %( April $,,$.
0n < 4eptember 22, 4alaHar filed a complaint against private respondent for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, illegal
deduction, non-payment of wages, overtime rendered, service incentive leave pay, commission, allowances, profit-sharing and
separation pay with the :*;#-:#; )rbitration Eranch, +anila.
The *abor )rbiter rendered a decision dismissing the instant case for lack of merit. Petitioner appealed to the :*;#, where it
affirmed in toto the decision of the *abor )rbiter. (is +; was likewise dismissed. (ence the instant petition.
ISSUE-
? W0: petitioner is entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for services rendered on rest days and holidays and service incentive
leave pay
/? W0: petitioner is entitled to a share in the profits of the construction proDect;.
<? W0: petitioner rendered services from +ay to 3 +ay 22 and is, therefore, entitled to unpaid wages;
,? W0: private respondent is liable to reimburse petitioner$s legal e7penses and;
3? W0: petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
HEL: The assailed decision is modified.
. :0. )lthough petitioner cannot strictly be classified as a managerial employee, nonetheless he is still not entitled to payment
of the aforestated benefits because he falls squarely under another e7empt category @ Bofficers or members of a managerial
staffC as defined under sec. />c? of the abovementioned implementing rules-
4ec. /. Exempto!. @ The provisions of this ;ule shall not apply to the following persons if they qualify for e7emption under the
condition set forth herein-777
>c? 0fficers or members of a managerial staff 777

That petitioner was paid overtime benefits does not automatically and necessarily denote that petitioner is entitled to such
benefits

. :0. petitioner insists that private respondent promised him a share in the profits after completion of the construction proDect.
"t is because of this oral agreement, petitioner elucidates, that he agreed to a monthly salary of P,,3....., an amount which he
claims is too low for a professional civil engineer like him with the rank of proDect engineer.

We cannot accede to petitioner$s demand. :owhere in the disbursement vouchers can we find even the remotest hint of a profit-
sharing agreement between petitioner and private respondent. Petitioner$s rationaliHation stretches the imagination way too far.
)lso, as said by the *abor )rbiter-

)s to the issue of profit sharing, we simply cannot grant the same on the mere basis of complainant$s allegation that respondent
verbally promised him that he is entitled to a share in the profits derive>d? from the proDects. Eenefits or privileges of this nature
>are? usually in writing, besides complainant failed to >establish? that said benefits or privileges >have? been given to any of
respondent>Qs? employees as a matter of practice or policy.

<. !54. 0n )pril <., he was advised by the +anager to continue supervising the finishing touches to the building until +ay 3,
the date appearing in the #ertificate of 4ervice as the date of the termination of the contract between 4alaHar and the #ompany.
Eut the +anager insists that 4alaHar$s services terminated at )pril <. according to the +emorandum given the petitioner.
The purpose for which the said certificate was issued becomes irrelevant. The fact remains that private respondent knowingly and
voluntarily issued the certificate. +ere denials and self-serving statements to the effect that petitioner allegedly promised not to
use the certificate against private respondent are not sufficient to overturn the same. (ence, private respondent is estopped from
assailing the contents of its own certificate of service.

,. !54. &uring the construction of the building, a criminal complaint for unDust ve7ation was filed against the officers of the
owner of the building. Petitioner avers that he was implicated in the complaint for the sole reason that he was the construction
engineer of the proDect.

)lthough not directly implicated in the criminal complaint, #arlos #onstruction is nonetheless obligated to defray petitioner$s
legal e7penses. Petitioner was included in the complaint not in his personal capacity but in his capacity as proDect engineer of
private respondent and the case arose in connection with his work as such. )t the construction site, petitioner is the representative
of private respondent being its employee and he acts for and in behalf of private respondent. (ence, the inclusion of petitioner in
the complaint for unDust ve7ation, which was work-related, is equivalent to inclusion of private respondent itself.

3. :0. 0n the last issue, we rule that petitioner is a proDect employee and, therefore, not entitled to separation pay.
The applicable provision is )rticle /%. of the *abor #ode which defines the term BproDect employee,C thus-
)rt. /%.. ;egular and #asual 5mployment. @ The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, ex"ept
#here the employme!t ha$ %ee! fxed for a $pe"f" perod or u!derta&!' the "ompleto! or term!ato! of #h"h ha$ %ee!
determ!ed at the tme of the e!'a'eme!t of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and
the employment is for the duration of the season. >5mphasis ours.?
"n the case at bench, it was duly established that private respondent hired petitioner as proDect or construction engineer
specifically for its +onte de Piedad building proDect. )ccordingly, as proDect employee, petitioner$s services are deemed
coterminous with the proDect, that is, petitioner$s services may be terminated as soon as the proDect for which he was hired is
completed. There can be no dispute that petitioner$s dismissal was due to the completion of the construction of the building.
!7TES:
. )lthough we agree with private respondent that appeals to the 4# from decisions of the :*;# should be in the form of a
special civil action for certiorari under ;ule 83 of the ;evised ;ules of #ourt, this rule is not infle7ible. "n a number of cases this
#ourt has resolved to treat as special civil actions for certiorari petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on
certiorari Bin the interest of Dustice.C
/. Policy "nstruction :o. /. entitled B4tabiliHing 5mployer-5mployee ;elations in the #onstruction "ndustryC e7plicitly mandates
that-
777 777 777
ProDect employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the proDect or any
phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of proDects in which they have been employed by a particular
construction company. +oreover, the company is not required to obtain a clearance from the 4ecretary of *abor in connection
with such termination. What is required of the company is a report to the nearest Public 5mployment 0ffice for statistical
purposes.
+5;#"&); '"4(":= #0;P0;)T"0: represented by its President &0+":=0 E. :)G)*,

petitioner,

vs.:)T"0:)* *)E0; ;5*)T"0:4 #0++"44"0: and '5;+": )=)0, 9;.,

respondentsL22%')#T4-

'ermin )gao, a BbodegeroC >or para sosy, Bship$s quartermasterC? at +ercidar
'ishing #orp.,filed complaint for illegal dismissal, violation of P& %3 and non-payment of 3-days serviceincentive leave; he
started work there in 2%% and claims to have been constructively dismissedin 22. when his employer refused to give him assig
nments aboard the company$s boats

*) ordered )gao$s reinstatement with backwages and payment of <
th
month pay and serviceincentive leave pay; :*;# dismissed the appeal of +ercidar 'ishing which claimed that )gao, as
a Bfield personnelC was not entitled
under the *# to such service incentive leave pay

Petitioner contends that )gao abandoned his work, while the latter alleges that after havingbeen on one-month leave following a
sickness, his employer refused to give him furtherassignments after he reported for work"4465-

W0: fishing crew members are deemed Bfield personnelC, as defined under )rt. %/ of *#
>:0?

W0: )gao had been constructively dismissed >!54?(5*&L;)T"0-

)rt. %/ - J'ield personnelJ shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform theirduties away from the principal
place of business or branch office of the employer and whoseactual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty. >Theprovisions of the Title on Working #onditions I ;est Period
R
according to par. of )rt. %/
R
donot apply, among others, to field personnel.?

#iting
6nion of Pilipro 5mployees >6'5? v. Gicar,
which sought to e7plain the meaning of

Jwhoseactual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certaintyJ, the #ourtsaid that, in deciding whether
or not an employeeFs actual working hours in the field can bedetermined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to
whether or not suchemployeeFs time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer.

(ere, the nature of the work necessarily means that the fishing crew stays on board the vesselin the course of the fishing voyage.
)lthough they perform non-agricultural work away frompetitionerFs business offices, the fact remains that throughout the
duration of their work theyare under the effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vesselFs patron ormaster as the
:*;# correctly held.

The #ourt also ruled that there was constructive dismissal of )gao. +edical certificate showshis fitness to work when he
presented the same to his employer. Eeside, as alreadyestablished in Durisprudence, to constitute abandonment of position, there
must be

concurrence of the intention to abandon
and
some overt acts from which it may be inferredthat the employee concerned has no more interest in working
. (ere, the filing of thecomplaint which asked for reinstatement plus backwages renders inconsistent therespondentsF defense of
abandonment.
)ntonio Eautista was employed by )uto Eus Transport 4ystems, "nc. in +ay 223. (e was assigned to the "sabela-+anila route
and he was paid by commission >1A of gross income per travel for twice a month?.
"n 9anuary /..., while he was driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by )uto Eus. (e claimed that he bumped the he
accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not slept for more than /, hours because )uto Eus required him to
return to "sabela immediately after arriving at +anila. &amages were computed and <.A or P13,33.3. of it was being charged
to Eautista. Eautista refused payment.
)uto Eus terminated Eautista after due hearing as part of )uto Eus$ management prerogative. Eautista sued )uto Eus for "llegal
&ismissal. The *abor )rbiter +onroe Tabingan dismissed Eautista$s petition but ruled that Eautista is entitled to P1%,1.%1 <
th

month pay payments and P<,1%%..3 for his unpaid service incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the :ational *abor ;elations #ommission. :*;# modified the *)$s ruling. "t deleted the award
for <
th
+onth pay. The court of )ppeals affirmed the :*;#.
)uto Eus averred that Eautista is a commissioned employee and if that is not reason enough that Eautista is also a field personnel
hence he is not entitled to a service incentive leave. They invoke-
Art. 95. ;"=(T T0 45;G"#5 ":#5:T"G5 *5)G5
>a? 5very employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days
with pay.
Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. #overage. Q This rule shall apply to all employees e7cept-
>d? 'ield personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged
on task or contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid in a fi7ed amount for performing work irrespective of
the time consumed in the performance thereof; . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not Eautista is entitled to 4ervice "ncentive *eave. "f he is, Whether or not the three ><?-year prescriptive
period provided under )rticle /2 of the *abor #ode, as amended, is applicable to respondent$s claim of service incentive leave
pay.
HEL: !es, Eautista is entitled to 4ervice "ncentive *eave. The 4upreme #ourt emphasiHed that it does not mean that Dust
because an employee is paid on commission basis he is already barred to receive service incentive leave pay.
The question actually boils down to whether or not Eautista is a field employee.
)ccording to )rticle %/ of the *abor #ode, Qfield personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their
duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
)s a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their DobLservice is not supervised by the employer or his
representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. (f re)ured
to %e at $pe"f" pla"e$ at $pe"f" tme$, employee$ !"lud!' dr*er$ "a!!ot %e $ad to %e feld per$o!!el de$pte the fa"t that
they are perform!' #or& a#ay from the pr!"pal off"e of the employee.
#ertainly, Eautista is not a field employee. (e has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that is a specific place that he
needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by )uto Eus to constantly check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who
inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away from the )uto
Eus main office.
0n the other hand, the < year prescriptive period ran but Eautista was able to file his suit in time before the prescriptive period
e7pired. "t was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from the time of his dismissal, that Eautista
demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. (is cause of action to claim the payment of
his accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his
accumulated leave credits.
Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only commenced from the time the
employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. 4ince Eautista had filed
his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the
prescriptive period provided for by )rticle /2 of the *abor #ode.
e2inition o2 Service Incentive Leave
4ervice incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served within / months, whether continuous or
broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including authoriHed absences and paid regular holidays unless the
working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than /
months, in which case said period shall be considered as one year. "t is also "ommuta%le to t$ mo!ey e)u*ale!t f !ot u$ed or
exhau$ted at the e!d of the year. (! other #ord$, a! employee #ho ha$ $er*ed for o!e year $ e!ttled to t. +e may u$e t a$ lea*e
day$ or he may "olle"t t$ mo!etary *alue.
Facts: The petitioners were engaged in the business of marine coastwise transportation. They had a #E) with the #ebu 4eamen$s
)ssociation. 0n 4eptember /, 23/, the respondent union filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that the officers and
men working on board the petitioners$ vessels have not been paid their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the
petitioners$ threatened then to accept the reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners; that after the +inimum Wage *aw
had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their vessels, to pay the sum of P..,. for every meal, while the
masters and officers were required to pay their meals and that because the captain had refused to yield to the general reduction of
salaries, the petitioners dismissed the captain. The petitioner, on their defense, stated that they have suffered a financial losses in
the operation of their vessels and there is no law which provides for the payment of sick leave or vacation leave to employees of
private firms; that with regards to their overtime pay, they have always observed the 5ight-hour labor *aw and that overtime does
not apply to those who provide means of transportation. The decision ruled in favor of the respondent union. (ence, this petition.
Iss3e: Whether or not the required meals which the petitioner company deducted from the salary of the employees is considered
as facilities, and not supplements.
Held: 4upplements constitute e7tra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and
above their ordinary earnings or wages. 'acilities, on the other hand, are items of e7pense necessary for the laborer$s and his
family$s e7istence and subsistence so that by e7press provisions of law, they form part of the wage and when furnished by the
employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay them Dust the same. "t is
argued that the food or meal given to the deck officers, marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were mere
facilities which should be deducted from wages, and not supplements which, according to 4ection 2 of the +inimum Wage *aw,
should not be deducted from such wages. "t was found out that the meals were freely given to crew members prior to the
effectivity of the +inimum Wage *aw while they were on the high seas not as part of their wages but as a necessary matter in the
maintenance of the health and efficiency of the crew members during the voyage. The deductions therein made for the meals
given after )ugust ,, 23, should be returned to them, and the operator of the coastwise vessels should continue giving the
benefits. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed, finding out that the meals or food in question are not facilities but supplements.
2,5 -.R/ 69 0 La%or La# - La%or -ta!dard$ 0 +our$ of 1or& 0 23 4ay of a 4ro5e"t 6a$ed Employee
"n 211, (ilario ;ada was contracted by Philnor #onsultants and Planners, "nc as a driver. (e was assigned to a
specific proDect in +anila. The contract he signed was for /.< years. (is task was to drive employees to the proDect
from 1am to ,pm. (e was allowed to bring home the company vehicle in order to provide a timely transportation
service to the other proDect workers. The proDect he was assigned to was not completed as scheduled hence, since he
has a satisfactory record, he was re-contracted for an additional . months. )fter . months the proDect was not yet
completed. 4everal contracts thereafter were made until the proDect was finished in 2%3.
)t the completion of the proDect, ;ada was terminated as his employment was co-terminous with the proDect. (e
later sued Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. (e said he is entitled to be paid 0T pay
because he uses e7tra time to get to the proDect site from his home and from the proDect site to his home everyday R
in total, he spends an average of < hours 0T every day.
ISSUE: Whether or not ;ada is entitled to separation pay and 0T pay.
HEL: 4eparation pay R :0. 0vertime pay R !es.
-eparato! 4ay
The 4# ruled that ;ada was a proDect employee whose work was coterminous with the proDect for which he was
hired. ProDect employees, as distinguished from regular or non-proDect employees, are mentioned in 4ection /% of
the *abor #ode as those Qwhere the employment has been fi7ed for a specific proDect or undertaking the completion
or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee.
QProDect employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the completion of the
proDect or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of proDects in which they have
been employed by a particular construction company. +oreover, the company is not required to obtain clearance
from the 4ecretary of *abor in connection with such termination.$
23 4ay
;ada is entitled to 0T pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along 5&4) in
going to the proDect site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home to
+arikina, +etro +anila is not merely incidental to ;ada$s Dob as a driver. 0n the contrary, said transportation
arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the employees, but primarily for the benefit of
Philnor. )s embodied in Philnor$s memorandum, they allowed their drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in
order for them to provide a timely transport service and to avoid delay R not really so that the drivers could enDoy the
benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to save on fair.

SP7!S7"E AS