Applying MESE processes to Improve Online E-Voting

Prototype System with

Paillier Threshold Cryptosystem
We Services
Version !"##
A project submitted to the Faculty of Graduate School, University of Colorado at
Colorado Springs in Partial Fulfillment of the Reuirements for the !egree of
"aster of #ngineering in Soft$are #ngineering !epartment of Computer Science
Prepared y $a%an Evece%
CS&#!
'r" Chow
Spring (##&
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page * of +,
-his project for the "asters of #ngineering in Soft$are #ngineer degree by
.a(an #vece(
has been approved for the
!epartment of Computer Science
/y
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
!r1 C1 #d$ard Cho$, Chair
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
!r1 Richard 2einer
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
!r1 3iaobo 4hou

!ate
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Tale o) Contents
%nline #&'oting System Project !ocumentation 6
Abstract 7
*1 8ntroduction ,
51 #&'oting System Related 9iterature :
51*1 Public ;ey Cryptography :
5151 .omomorphic #ncryption *<
51+1 4ero ;no$ledge Proofs *<
5161 -hreshold Cryptography *<
51=1 Cryptographic 'oting Protocol **
5171 8ssues in secure e&voting system *5
51,1 Completely Automated Public -uring test to tell Computers and .umans Apart
>CAP-C.A? *+
51@1 Chinese Remainder -heorem >CR-? *6
+1 %nline #&'oting System Project !escription *,
+1*1 Paillier -hreshold Crytosystem 2eb Services Architecture and !esign *,
61 %nline #&'oting Prototype System 55
61*1 #&'oting System %vervie$ 55
61*1* User 9ogin 5+
61*151 #lection Set&Up 56
61*1+1 Creating /allots 5=
61*161 'ote Format 57
6151 'oting 5,
6151*1 Creating the 'ote 5,
61+1 -ally the 'ote 5@
=1 P-C 2eb Services #fficiency 8mprovement 5:
=1* Pre&Computation 5:
=15 Chinese Remainder -heorem >CR-? 5:
=1+ Paillier Scheme Pre&computations for !ecryption +<
71 Results +*
71* Pre&Computation Performance #valuations +*
7151 !efects Found +5
71+1 Conclusion +6
71=1 Future Suggestions +6
,1 References +7
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Online E-Voting System Pro*ect 'oc+mentation
-he subseuent files are located on the follo$ing $eb siteA
httpA))cs1uccs1edu)Bgsc)pub)master)hevece()doc)
o CS&#!Proposal,EVotingPrototype"doc - -his document describes $hat the project
$ould be for the advisory committee1 8t $as submitted in February 5<<,1
o EVoting,S.S 'oc+ment"doc- -his is the online #&'oting prototype System
Reuirements Specification document for the project1 -he demonstration $indo$s
application created used to get the reuirements for the online tool1 8t also has the use
cases1
o EVoting,S'S 'oc+ment"doc - -his describes the internal design of the project1 -his
document has both blac( boC and $hite boC designs1 Also class diagrams from the
$eb services are also prepared for documenting although they $ere developed
previously1 8t has the main use cases to ma(e it easier to create the S!S1 8t also
involves database design1
o EVoting,Test Plan"doc- -he tests for the project are documented in this document1
-est plans cover all the reuirements testing1
o Online E-Voting Prototype with PTC We Services"doc- -his is the project report
document1 8t is the final report for the project that has discussions about e&voting
system1 -here are some e&voting related papers researched about the online e&voting
system implementation and 8 tried to eCplain $hy it is so hard to implement, develop
and deploy today by using these papers1 Also in this report for the P-C design section
and P-C develop description, D*=E is used1 9astly, some efficiency improvements
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applied in the code and according to the results that $ill be eCplained, it has
improved1
o Paillier ThresholdCryptoService,/ser0+ide,/pdated"doc- -his document that is
the user guide for the P-C $eb services1 Source files for the code is placed in the
lin( belo$A httpA))cs1uccs1edu)Bgsc)pub)master)hevece()src)
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Astract
-he purpose of this masterFs project is to develop an %nline #&'oting prototype
system utiliGing the Paillier -hreshold Cryptosystem >P-C? $eb services and applying
"#S# processes to it in an attempt to find possible solutions to further improve eCisting
P-C $eb services1
%nline voting >e&voting? $ould be more convenient, relatively secure and utiliGe
fe$er resources1 -o be able to access e&voting system from a personal, business or even a
public library computer may be more convenient for many people needing to vote1 -his
could potentially be a solution for the lo$ voter turnout at the polls1 .o$ever, it is still
uestionable $hether elections can be conducted online or over the internet due to the
high level of concern over security1
Systems considered to be apart of e&voting are "achine readable >create, read,
count? ballot systems, !irect Recording #lectronic >!R#? systems, voting using mobile
devices and internet voting D*E1 As part of this project, an online e&voting prototype
system has been constructed using the demonstration $indo$s application tool created
for P-C $eb services1 A pre&computation process is applied due to efficiency
improvements1 -he details of this optimiGation and improvement in the $eb services
process $ill be eCplained in the subseuent sections1
8n addition to the application of the pre&computation to the process, the Chinese
Remainder -heorem can be applied during the decryption process1 -his change might not
be as noticeable as the pre&computation, ho$ever it $ill ma(e it more efficient as the
calculation gets easier1
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!" Introd+ction
8n traditional elections, a voter usually goes to the voting stations1 After direct
person&person verification $ith some 8!s, the voter is allo$ed to vote1 -he voter is then
given a ballot $hich allo$s a single vote1 %nce the ballot is used, it cannot be used again1
.o$ever, this ballot must also be anonymous1 -he ballot must identify the voter as being
permitted to vote, but not reveal their actual identity, and the voter must also be given
assurances of this1 -raditional polling methods trust a lot of parties during the election1
-he current methods reuire an attac(er interact directly $ith the voting process to
disrupt it1 -here is a greater chance of getting caught as there $ill be physical evidence in
the traditional polling1
%n the other end, internet is harder to control and manage the security as Het$or(
and internet related attac(s are more difficult to trace1 8n the traditional polling, you (no$
$ho is in the election room1 Also $ith the internet or net$or( related voting, from all
around the $orld you $ill have attac(ers, not only by the fe$ people in the room D+E1
Figure * sho$s the hierarchy of the voting schemes just discussed D*,E1
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Figure *A -he categoriGation of the voting schemes D*,E1
Another issue $ith e&voting is educating the voters1 2e can not consider that all
the users are computer gurus and they $ill use the e&voting systems easily1 2hen e&voting
is designed it needs to be easy to use1 2e should consider the fact that a large portion of
the voting public has a very little (no$ledge about the computers1 According to some of
the research done by the Public Policy 8nstitute of California over =<I of *@&66 years of
age voters prefers 8nternet voting D+E1
Some recent studies have focused on e&voting, its security concerns and ma(ing it
more secure1 /elo$ is the list of related literature about e&votingA
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(" E-Voting System .elated 1iterat+re
("!" P+lic 2ey Cryptography
Public (ey cryptography, also (no$n as asymmetric cryptography, is a form of
cryptography in $hich each user $ill have a (ey that didnFt have to be (ept secret1
.aving this public (ey $ill not inhibit the systemFs secrecy as a message encrypted $ith
the public (ey can be decrypted only $ith the corresponding private (ey1 -he private (ey
is (ept secret, $hile the public (ey may be $idely distributed1 -he public and private
(eys are related mathematically1 -he private (ey cannot be practically derived from the
public (ey D6E1 -he t$o main branches of public (ey cryptography areA
Public (ey encryption J a message encrypted $ith a recipientKs public (ey cannot
be decrypted by anyone eCcept the recipient possessing the corresponding private (ey1
-his is used to ensure confidentiality D6E1
-he problem $ith the public (ey encryption is the intruder can easily replace the
private (ey $ith his $hen the sender reuests the public (ey1 -his means the ne$ly
received public (ey $ill have the intruderFs private (ey and he can easily decrypt the
message1 -o avoid this issue digital signature can be used1
!igital Signatures J a message signed $ith a senderKs private (ey can be verified
by anyone $ho has access to the senderKs public (ey, thereby proving that the sender
signed it and that the message has not been tampered $ith1 -his is used to ensure
authenticity D6E1
Conversely, Secret (ey cryptography, also (no$n as symmetric cryptography uses
a single secret (ey for both encryption and decryption1 8t is also (no$n as one&(ey or
private&(ey encryption1 -he reuirement is the shared secret that both parties should have
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a copy1 8n this e&voting prototype shared (eys $ill be used for the usersF encryption in our
tests1
("(" $omomorphic Encryption
-he encryption algorithm # > ? is homomorphic if given #>C? and #>y?, one can
obtain #>C L y? $ithout decrypting CM y for some operation L1
8n that case, homomorphic encryption is a special type of cryptography in $hich
the sum of t$o encrypted values is eual to the encrypted sum of the values1 8n simple
mathematics, this is euivalent to the communicative property of multiplication1 For a
majority of cryptographic algorithms, this does not hold true1
8t is one of the schemes that can be used in e&voting especially to be able to tally
the votes even though the results are encrypted1 -here are fe$ cryptosystems $hich uses
homographic encryption1 -hey $ill be discussed in the neCt section1
("3" 4ero 2nowledge Proo)s
8n cryptography it is often needed to prove some statement to someone $ithout
giving eCtra information1 -his is accomplished by 4ero ;no$ledge Proofs1 #specially for
the authentication systems 4ero ;no$ledge Proofs can be used1 For eCample, a party
might $ant to prove his identity $ith secret information and does not $ant the other party
to learn anything about this secret1 8n other $ords, second party can only (no$ the
correctness of the statement or identity of the first party and no more information1
("5" Threshold Cryptography
-hreshold Cryptography is a term used to describe a cryptosystem in $hich the
ability to perform a cryptographic function can be distributed amongst several
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participants in such a $ay that only through cooperation of a specified subset of the
participants can the operation be performed1 8n addition, if less than the reuired number
of participantsF attempts to perform the action, no useful information can be constructed
or obtained1 -he threshold value is typically denoted by the letter t1 8n a threshold
system as defined here, only tN* cooperating authorities can perform the desired
cryptographic operation1
-he essential components of a threshold cryptography system are a (ey
generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm, a share decryption algorithm, and a
combining algorithm D=E1 First, the (ey generation algorithm generates the public (ey
parameters, a set of secret (ey OsharesP, and a set of Overifier (eysP1 -he secret (ey
shares are distributed to the participants in a secure manner1 -he encryption algorithm
provides encryption services for an appropriately&siGed message m by applying the public
(ey parameters and an encryption algorithm to generate the cipherteCt c1 -he share
decryption algorithm is used by each participant $ith a secret (ey share to Opartially
decryptP the encrypted message c1 #ach participant also uses the verifier (ey
corresponding to the secret (ey share to generate a proof of correct encryption1 -he
combining algorithm ta(es all of the Opartial decryptionsP or Odecryption sharesP, verifies
their corresponding proofs, and combines the decryption shares to reveal the original
message m1 -he combining step only succeeds if tN* valid decryption shares are used1
("6" Cryptographic Voting Protocol
/asic reuirements for electronic voting
Privacy Q All votes should be (ept secret
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Completeness Q All valid votes should be counted correctly
Soundness Q Any invalid vote should not be counted
Unreusability Q Ho voter can vote t$ice
#ligibility Q %nly authoriGed voters can cast a vote
Fairness Q Hothing can affect the voting
#Ctended Reuirements for electronic voting
Robustness Q faulty behavior of any reasonably siGed coalition of
participants can be tolerated1 8n other $ords, the system must be able to tolerate to certain
faulty conditions and must be able to manage these situations1
Universal 'erifiability Q any party can verify the result of the voting
Receipt&freeness Q 'oters are unable to prove the content of his)her vote
8ncoercibility Q 'oter cannot be coerced into casting a particular vote by a
coercer1
-here are four main approaches to efficient and fully secure electionsA
Schemes based on homomorphic encryption
Schemes based on miCnets
.eterodoC schemes
Schemes based on secret sharing among several mutually distrustful
election authorities1
("7" Iss+es in sec+re e-voting system
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-he issues behind e&voting need to be eCamined conservatively before such
potentially dangerous moves are made1 8n a voting system, privacy and security are
desired, but are not al$ays simultaneously achievable at a reasonable cost1 8n online
voting systems, verification is very difficult to do accurately, and anonymity is difficult to
ensure1 -his document sho$s some of the many problems $ith practical e&voting and
$hy public elections are too important to trust to it D+E1
2hen e&voting system scheme is considered there are different modules involved
to consider the security and design1 -hree important phases of having a secure system
are considered as design, development and deployment1 8n other $ords, it is important tp
have the foundation in designing a secure and practical e&voting scheme to produce a
secure, efficient and publicly acceptable implementation of voting schemes in the real
$orld1
("&" Completely A+tomated P+lic T+ring test to tell Comp+ters and $+mans Apart
8CAPTC$A9
Any additional chec( for the security or spam $ill decrease the security concerns
users have today for the e&voting systems1 A CAP-C.A is a program that can generate
and grade tests that humans can pass but current computer programs cannot1 8n our
project this is used to confirm that users are trying to vote instead of the automated
computer systems1 CAP-C.As have several applications for practical security li(e
preventing comment spam in blogs, protecting $eb registrations, online polls $here you
$ant to ma(e sure that humans are voting not the programs, preventing dictionary
attac(s, search engine bots, $orms and spasm etc1 %fficial Captcha site has published
some guidelines for it D7E1
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AccessibilityA 8t should be easily accessible for reading the teCt1 8f it is a problem
due to legal reasons audio CAP-C.A can also be used1
8mage SecurityA 8mages should be distorted randomly1 2ithout random distortion,
application $ill be open to the attac(s1
Script SecurityA /y using this, systems are closed to any computer attac(s1
.o$ever $e also need to ma(e sure that scripts used are not easily accessible so that
attac(er $ill find the easy $ay around them to use the systems1
Security #ven After 2ide Spread AdoptionA Some of the sites might be using the
sites that have CAP-C.As setup1 8t is important that the security level (ept the same and
these sites are still secure even after a significant number of sites adopt them D7E1
(":" Chinese .emainder Theorem 8C.T9
%n several papers for improving the efficiency, CR- is recommended to use both
on encryption and encryption process D*7E, D5*E1 As described belo$ CR- is not affecting
to the multiplication1 8n other $ords, multiplying t$o big prime numbers and processing
the multiplication $ill be the same as processing them first and then multiplying1 -his
$ay the process $ill be done $ith smaller numbers and $ill be faster1 -hen multiplication
can be done1
Theorem Statement-
Suppose n*, n5, R, nk are integers $hich are pair$ise coprime1 -hen, for any
given integers a*,a5, R, ak, there eCists an integer x solving the system of simultaneous
congruences
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Furthermore, all solutions x to this system are congruent modulo the product
N S n*n5Rnk1
Sometimes, the simultaneous congruences can be solved even if the ni's are not
pair$ise coprime1 A solution x eCists if and only ifA
All solutions x are then congruent modulo the least common multiple of the ni1
8n that case,
2e can perform 5 operations mod p and mod li(e belo$1
C T a mod p,
C T b mod ,
-he Chinese Remainder -heorem can be used to efficiently reduce the decryption
$or(load of the cryptosystems D5*E1 -o see this, one has to employ the functions 9p and
9 defined over
/y
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!ecryption can therefore be made faster by separately computing the message
mod p and mod and recombining modular residues after$ardsA
2ith pre&computations
2here p & * and & * have to be replaced by U in the fast variant1
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3" Online E-Voting System Pro*ect 'escription
8n this project, P-C 2eb services are used1 8n this section, 8 $ill eCplain ho$ the
P-C $eb services $or(1 #fficiency improvement that $ill be applied to the P-C $eb
services reuired some changes on some of the classes used1 Applying more
improvements $ill need more changes on the classes $here calculations applied1 !etails
$ill be eCplained in the follo$ing sections of this report1
3"!" Paillier Threshold Crytosystem We Services Architect+re and 'esign
-he Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public (ey
cryptography, first published by Pascal Paillier in *:::1 -his probabilistic scheme has
generated a good amount of interest and further study since it $as discovered1
-he problem of computing n&th residue classes is believed to be computationally
difficult to compute1 -his is (no$n as the Composite Residuosity >CR?1 -he scheme is an
additive homomorphic cryptosystemM this means that, given only the public&(ey and the
encryption of m* and m5, one can compute the encryption of m* N m51
%ne of the properties of Paillier as mentioned above is the homomorphic property
$hich can allo$ this cryptosystem to do simple addition operations on several encrypted
values and obtain the encrypted sum1 -he encrypted sum can later be decrypted $ithout
ever (no$ing the encrypted values that made up the sum1 !ue to these useful
characteristics of Paillier, the scheme has been suggested for use in threshold
cryptosystems, secret sharing schemes and the design of voting protocols especially the
e&voting systems1
Another property of Paillier cryptosystem is self&blinding1 -his property is
essential as it means a cipherteCt can be re&encrypted $ith a random parameter $ithout
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changing the underlying clearteCt and $ithout changing the ability to decrypt the
cipherteCt using the original (eypairD*=E1 Probabilistic property of Paillier $ill help to
protect voterFs privacy since none of the votes $ill be encrypted to the same cipherteCt1
Paillier has described three different methods in his research1 P-C 2eb services
that $ill be used in this project are using one of these three methods1 /elo$ are the
schemes invented by Pascal Paillier D5*E and
Scheme !A Scheme * is probabilistic encryption scheme based on composite
residuosity1 According to theorem mentioned in his paper D5*E Scheme * is one&$ay if an
only if the Computational Composite Residuosity Assumption holds1 8t is also
semantically secure if and only if the !ecisional Composite Residuosity Assumption
hold1 n is the multiplication of t$o prime numbers, n S p1 g is randomly selected base1
-his can be done by chec(ing $hether 1 -his is done on the
P-C $eb services used1 n and g are public parameters and >p, ? or V remains private1
Encryption-
plainteCt m W n
randomly select r W n
cipherteCt c S
'ecryption-
cipherteCt c W n5
-able +1* PaillierFs Scheme * D5*E
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Scheme (- Scheme 5 is a trapdoor permutation based on composite residuosity1
As described above n is the product of t$o prime numbers1 From the table belo$, there
are steps eCplained for decryption1 -o be able to retrieve m, all these steps $ill be
reuired1 Scheme 5 is one&$ay if and only if RSA Dn,aE is hard D5*E1
Encryption-
plainteCt m W n5
split m into m*, m5 such that m S m* N nm5
cipherteCt c S
'ecryption-
cipherteCt c W n5
plainteCt m S m* N n m5
-able +15 PaillierFs Scheme 5 D5*E
Scheme 3A -hird scheme is the variant $ith fast decryption1 As this is a fast
decryption, this scheme can be applied to improve the efficiency1 8n the follo$ing
sections this scheme $ill be re&visited and it $ill be recommended for efficiency
improvements in the current $eb services1
Encryption-
plainteCt m W n
randomly select r W n
cipherteCt S
'ecryption-
cipherteCt c W n5

-able +1+ PaillierFs Scheme + D5*E
8t is assumed that g X for some * Y U Y V1 8n other $ords U and V are not the
same secret (eys1
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/elo$ are the steps for the (ey generation, encryption and decryption used D55E1
2ey generation
*1 Choose t$o large prime numbers p and q randomly1
51 Compute n S pq and V S lcm>p Z *, q Z *?
+1 Select random integer g $here
61 #nsure n divides the order of g by chec(ing the eCistence of the follo$ing
multiplicative inverseA
$here function L is defined as
-he public >encryption? (ey is >n,g?1
-he private >decryption? (ey is >V,[?1
Encryption
*1 9et m be a message to be encrypted $here
51 Select random r $here
+1 Compute cipherteCt asA
'ecryption
*1 CipherteCt
51 Compute messageA
8t is the same as the scheme * described above1 -his computation ta(es some time
due to the large prime numbers used1 -he secret (ey is S; S V>n? S lcm>>p&*?,>&*??1
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5" Online E-Voting Prototype System
-he capabilities of the Paillier -hreshold Cryptography system has been
demonstrated on an %nline #&'oting Prototype system created for this project1 -his is a
prototype and should not be used in the real $orld scenarios1 8t sho$s the use of the
Paillier -hreshold Cryptography 2eb Service1 8t also has some additional security
features li(e Completely Automated Public -uring test to tell Computers and .umans
Apart >CAP-C.A? added to decrease the security concerns1 -his prototype system SRS
and S!S document are all created and they can be do$nloaded from
httpA))$$$1cs1uccs1edu)Bgsc)pub)master)hevece()doc) folder1

5"!" E-Voting System Overview
-he e&voting system allo$s for * out of 9 candidate ballots1 Ho options are
provided for n out of 9 ballots or $rite&in ballots1 An OelectionP may consist of more
than one ballot1 An election administrator creates the ballots and other election
parameters1 -he administrator reuests the Paillier threshold encryption parameters from
the P-C 2eb Service during the initial election set&up1 -he administrator submits the
election parameters to a 'otingService $eb service, and saves the election parameters
>including the cryptosystem parameters? to an 3"9 file1 'oters then load the election
parameters by opening the 3"9 file, ma(e their selection>s?, and cast their encrypted
vote>s? to the 'otingService $eb service1 !uring the tally phase, the votes are multiplied
together, and, due to the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem, the
product can be decrypted to reveal the sum total of all the votes D*=E1
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5"!"! /ser 1ogin
User 9ogin is the first form users connected $hen the voting page is loaded from
the internet1 8t $ill have a connection to the database to validate the user credentials1 User
types are either voters or Administrators1 8t is assumed that users have used another
interface or form to register for voting1 8n the same login page there $ill be Completely
Automated Public -uring test to tell Computers and .umans Apart >CAP-C.A?
validation $ith random numbers1 SiC digit random numbers $ill be created each time the
page is loaded to be able to stop any (ind of computer attac(s to the voting site1
Figure 61* User 9ogin Form
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5"!"(" Election Set-/p
-he election administrator uses the #lection /uilder form to create or modify an
election >before the election is posted to the voting $eb service?1 -o create a ne$
election, the administrator clic(s on the OHe$ #lectionP button1 A ne$ election is created
and a uniue election id is assigned1 -he administrator must then enter his)her name and
a descriptive title for the election1 #lection page is the most important Administrator
page as it has all the functionality setup for the election1
/efore ballots can be added to the election, the encryption parameters must be
specified and retrieved from the $eb service1 -his must occur before the ballots are
added or created, since the vote format is dependent on the specified (ey siGe1 -he
administrator clic(s to the O#ncryption ParametersP 1 -his button $ill be available after
the Administrator details are entered1 %nce this button is clic(ed, the administrator
specifies the (ey siGe and $hether or not to encrypt the returned (ey shares1 -he
administrator can then add the (ey share o$ner information for each o$ner that is to
receive a secret (ey share1 8f the (ey shares $ill be encrypted, the administrator $ill be
reuired to enter the o$nerFs username $hich is the same as the users login and
certificate name to be able to choose automatically1 %nce all o$ners have been added, the
administrator selects the cryptosystem threshold value and then clic(s OSend ReuestP,
$hich sends the reuest to the $eb service1 8n the current configuration, a (ey siGe of
larger than 5=7 and sometimes =*5 bits $ill result in such a delay that a OtimeoutP error is
caused, so it is not recommended that (ey siGes greater than 5=7 be used for the $eb
application1 -he $eb service $ill generate the reuested parameters, encrypt the (ey
shares >if specified?, and return them D*=E1 -he #ncryption Parameter Reuest form $ill
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transfer the returned parameters to the #lection /uilder form and close automatically1
-he election crypto parameters are displayed at the bottom of the #lection /uilder form1
9astly, on the same election page ballots can be added for the election1 8f the
ballots are created prior to the election creation page, the list $ill appear in the $indo$
for administrator to choose from the list1 -hey can be added to any election by
highlighting from the list and clic(ing to thePAdd /allotsP button1 8f the ballot is valid, it
$ill be imported into the election and displayed in the #lection Summary teCtboC in the
form1
After all the users, ballots and Administrator details loaded from the election
form, the Administrator $ill need to save and post the election to be able to initialiGe
election voting1 -he election $ill be saved as an 3"9 file1 First save the election by
clic(ing to the OSave #lectionP button1 8t $ill be saved in the $eb server
OApp0!ata)3"9Files FolderP1 !etails of the folder structures are documented in the
Soft$are !esign Specification document1 Posting the election to the voting $eb service
is a non&reversible operation in the application unless the details are manually deleted
from the database1 Post #lection button $ill be enabled after saving the election1 -o post
the election, clic( to OPost #lectionP button1 A $eb service call $ill be made that posts
the election data to the $eb service, $hich then creates the appropriate database entries
that are used to manage the election D*=E1
5"!"3" Creating ;allots
#Cisting ballots can no$ be added to the election or ne$ ballots can be created
using the options from the #lection form1 -o create a ne$ ballot, the administrator $ill
need to clic( to the OHe$ /allotP lin( from the elections page1 8t $ill open the /allot
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 56 of +,
/uilder form1 A ne$ ballot $ill be created and the random ballot id displayed in the
form1 Administrator $ill need to put ballot issue) problem, and then enter all of the
available choices, one at a time by using the OAdd ChoicesP button and the teCt boC1
#ach choice is entered by typing the appropriate teCt1 A choice can be deleted by
selecting the choice in the list, and clic(ing O!elete CandidateP button1 2hen the ballot
is complete, the ballot should be saved by clic(ing OSave ballotP button1 -his button $ill
get all the details entered and save the ballot in 3"9 format in the $eb server
OApp0!ata\3"9 Files\/allotsP folder1 -he /allot /uilder Form must be closed and then
re&opened in order to create another ballot1 /allot creation page is also accessible from
the Administrator menu1
5"!"5" Vote <ormat
2hen a ballot is added to an election, the format of the vote for that ballot is
derived from the (ey siGe chosen for the election and the number of OcandidateP choices
on the ballot1 -hese t$o values determine the maCimum number of voters allo$ed1 -he
total siGe of the vote is limited to the (ey siGe k >in bits?1 -he vote is split into c bit fields
$here c is the number of candidates1 -he siGe of the bit fields vcS k/c1 .o$ever, vc is
limited to +5 bits so that each candidateFs field $ill fit into a +5&bit integer >for ease of
eCtraction only?1 -herefore, if k/c ] +5, vcS+5 and only the first +5^c bits of the vote $ill
be used1 -o cast a vote, a voter votes the value 5_>ic^vc? $here ic is the desired candidates
ballot indeC ><,R,c&*?1 /y using votes of this format, the tally can be computed by
multiplying all of the votes together and decrypting the product1 !ue to the
homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem, the multiplication carried out in the
cipherteCt space corresponds to addition in the clearteCt space, and thus the decryption of
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 5= of +,
the product $ill contain the summed votes for each candidate1 #ach candidateFs bit field
can then be eCtracted and evaluated to determine the total number of votes for that
candidate D*=E1
5"(" Voting
5"("!" Creating the Vote
%nce an election has been created, saved, and posted to the election $eb service,
voters can create and cast votes1 After the user login page user logs in either as an
Administrator or a voter1 8f the user logs in as an Administrator, he $ill have a lin( from
the menu for the voting page1 8f the user has logged in $ith voter credentials, then he $ill
be connected to the voting page automatically1 2hen connected to the voting page, a list
boC $ill have all the elections available for the voters1 -his list is the list of the elections
in the elections folder1 After highlighting the election and clic(ing to the button to load
the election, election details $ill be loaded for voters to vote1 -he ballots from the
election $ill be loaded, $ith each issue being loaded into the issue teCt boC, and itFs
corresponding choices loaded into the teCtboC to the right >the choices teCtboC?1 -he
voter can ma(e his)her choice simply by clic(ing on the desired choice1 -hat issueFs
choices $ill then be displayed in the choices teCtboC1 Again, select the desired choice by
clic(ing on it in the choices teCtboC1 %nce a choice has been selected, the ballot issue
and the selected choice $ill appear in the OCurrent 'otesP teCtboC1 -o the right of the
issue uestion and the selected choice is the heC value of the vote to be cast1 %nce all
choices have been made, the voter can submit his)her vote by selecting OSubmit 'oteP
button at the bottom of the page1 -his button $ill cal the $eb services and save the vote
into the database1 %nce the vote is submitted, no changes can be made1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 57 of +,
At any time after submitting his)her vote, a voter can chec( the posted values of
his)her vote by selecting OChec( Submitted 'oteP button1 -his invo(es a $eb service call
to the voting $eb service $hich retrieves the encrypted vote values posted for that
election D*=E1
5"3" Tally the Vote
Administrator $ill have access to use the -all 'ote option during the election
process to tally the vote1 Administrator $ill need to clic( the O-ally)!ecrypt 'oteP button
on the menu1 -he -ally form $ill open1 8n a list boC elections list $ill appear for
Administrator to choose and tall the vote1 8f the secret (ey shares $ere encrypted, the
program $ill automatically get the certificates according to the issued names of the users
to decrypt the o$nerFs Paillier secret (ey share1 -hatFs $hy it is important for
Administrator to collect all the registration details from the user to be able to create the
users1 .e)she $ill assign the right certificates so that there $onFt be any issues in the
future process li(e tally ) decrypt vote process1 -he product of the votes for each ballot
is then calculated and displayed both encrypted and decrypted, and the candidateFs tallies
are eCtracted from the decrypted bit field and displayed1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 5, of +,
6" PTC We Services E))iciency Improvement
-his can be done in three different $ays1
6"! Pre-Comp+tation
-his change $ill be done for the (ey generation $here the prime numbers $ill be
calculated prior1 Any real&time computations $ill slo$ do$n the process on cryptography
application1 Any pre&computation $ill improve the efficiency of the application1 -his pre&
computation can be done via bac(ground thread setup in the application1
<setting name="ServerPath" serializeAs="String">
<value>c:\inetpub\wwwroot\EVoting\Preomputation\<!value
>
<!setting>
<setting name="Prime"umberalculation#$pe"
serializeAs="String">
<value>%&<!value>
<!setting>
-his pre&computation is applied to the SafePrimeHumbers generator function1
-his function is used for the pre&computation1
6"( Chinese .emainder Theorem 8C.T9
Chinese Remainder -heorem is one of the most useful theorems of number theory
as it says it is possible to reconstruct the integers in a certain range from their residues
module a set of pair $ise relatively prime module1 !etails of CR- is eCplained in the
previous sections1 Paillier has suggested to use CR- for especially (ey generation and
decryption processes D5*E1 Also CR- has become standard today in many RSA
applications as it increases the decryption up to 6 times D*7E1 !ecryptions can be made
faster by separately computing the messages mod p and mod instead of mod n and
recombining modular residues later1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 5@ of +,
2ith pre&computationsA
$here p&* and &* have to be placed by U
6"3 Paillier Scheme Pre-comp+tations )or 'ecryption
Scheme * used in this project is not the most efficient one especially for
decryption as it is also mentioned in Pascal papers study D5*E1 Scheme + improves the
performance of decryption and he suggested in the same paper to pre&compute the
constant instead of only p and values applied in this project1 Also
another constant parameter belo$ can be pre&computed D5*E1
-hese constant pre&computations can be done $ith the same methods used in this project1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page 5: of +,
7" .es+lts
7"! Pre-Comp+tation Per)ormance Eval+ations
Pre&computations results are put into both the teCt file and the Pre&Computation
tables created in the S`9 Server1 /oth the teCt file and the database solutions have
increased the performance in other $ords response time more than @<I in average for
both 5=7 and *5@ bit (ey siGes1 Unfortunately this test failed $ith *<56 and =*5 bit (ey
siGes due to time out issues1
-here is a parameter setup in the settings to use the random prime number
generator either real time or teCt file or database1 As a default it $ill set to the real time1
3"9 solution also needs some improvements and this $ill be suggested in the future
improvements section of the project1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +< of +,
2ith Pre&Computation Real -ime Computation Change I
Algorithm *5@ bit *5@ bit *5@ bit
Regular Avg <15@+ *1:+, @7I
"aC <1+7@ 51@<6 +@I
"in <15<+ <1+5: @=I
-able 71*a *5@ bit safe Prime numbers calculation table
-able 71*b *5@ bit safe Prime numbers calculation1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +* of +,
2ith Pre&Computation Real -ime Computation Change I
Algorithm 5=7 bit 5=7 bit 5=7 bit
Regular Avg <1+@* 51*++ @5I
"aC <1=65 51:57 @*I
"in <15:* <1+<7 =I
-able 715a 5=7 bit safe Prime numbers calculation table
-able 715b 5=7 bit safe Prime numbers calculation1
7"(" 'e)ects <o+nd
-hese defects are listed in the order in $hich they $ere found1 8t only includes
those defects found $hile creating the automated test suites, not those found and fiCed
during soft$are development1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +5 of +,
!efect8! *A 2hen the election is created, it can not save title and username
details in the Cml file1
SolutionA 0election parameter stored in the session $as not initialiGed in the
beginning of the function1 After initialiGing it is fiCed1
!efect8! 5A /ac( button is reuired after the ballots are created1
SolutionA After ballots are created, bac( button is reuired by the Administrator to
be able to complete the election creation or ballot creation1 -$o lin( buttons are added,
one to the "ain menu lin( and the other one is a lin( to the #lections page1
!efect8! +A %utside the compiler application $as not able to respond to the
certificate assignment for the users1
SolutionA -his is fiCed by assigning ports each time $e run the application1 A
dedicated port needs to be used by the administrator1
!efect8! 6A 3"9 output for the pre&computation does not $or( properly and
need to be fiCed1 %nly real time computation and !/ computations $or( $hich is
enough to sho$ the efficiency improvements in the code1
SolutionA -his need to be fiCed in the future releases1
!efect8! =A User 9ogin page does not hide the pass$ord teCt1
SolutionA -his is fiCed by changing the teCt boC property1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page ++ of +,
!efect8! 7A User Hame is the same as the certificate issued name used in the
certificate1 8f these names do not match, certificate can not be used and this $ill thro$ an
error1 -o minimiGe the issues, user name from the login page $ill be passed to the voting
page automatically1 -his enhancement needs to be applied as this is an additional
reuirement1
SolutionA -his is done by using Sessions in ASP 1Het1 username session is created
and the username is passed to the neCt form $hich is voting form.
7"3" Concl+sion
%nline #&voting system is a prototype developed by using P-C 2eb services1 As
the need for voting system has started to increase and some organiGations or countries has
started to loo( for the solutions, this can be the starting point to improve and deploy in
the real $orld scenarios1
8n this project 8 have tried to eCplain the importance of Paillier cryptosystem, , its
uniue properties and its application areas especially in e&voting1
2e need to (eep in mind htat voting is not the only process during the $hole
voting processes1 -here might be some other security concerns that need to be considered
$hen such an application is built for practical reasons1
9astly, Paillier Cryptosystem efficiency can be improved as suggested in many
papers D*E, D@E1 Random numbers pre&computation is one of the $ays implemented in this
project1 8t has increased the calculation more than one of the $ays1 8n the neCt section, 8
$ill be listing all improvements that can be done to this $eb service and application1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +6 of +,
7"6" <+t+re S+ggestions
8n this project #&'oting %nline prototype application has been implemented1 P-C
2eb Services are used for the encryption and decryption process1 -he method
implemented and used on the P-C 2eb services is the first scheme invented by Paillier
ad eCplained above1 8n the follo$ing years in numerous projects other similar method
called Second Paillier Cryptosystem is used and this calculation simplifies the decryption1
-his can be implemented in P-C 2eb services to improve the efficiency1
Additionally, there are fe$ suggestions made about the efficiency improvement
above1 Any of these or all of these can be applied to ma(e the $eb services more
efficient1 "ost of the suggestions involve pre&computation of the constants in the
schemes invented1 -he pre&computation applied in this project can be applied to more
generic constants and have a dll application running continuously on the bac( ground
thread from the server instead of a button from the $eb server1
9astly, tests failed on =*5 and *<56 bit (ey siGe encryption1 !esign can be
changed to ma(e it $or( $ith these (ey siGes1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page += of +,
&" .e)erences
D*E httpA))cris1joongbu1ac1(r)publication)evoting0implementation&AP8#"S5<<61pdf
Implementation issues in a secure e-voting schemes, RiGa Aditya, /youngcheon 9ee,
Colin /oyd and #d !a$son1
D5E httpA))$$$1euractiv1com)en)egovernment)estonia&country&$orld&introduce&internet&
voting)article&*6=,+=, Estonia first country in the worl to introuce internet voting,
%ctober 5<<=1
D+E httpA))$$$1cs1virginia1edu)Bpev=b)$riting)academic)thesis)thesis1html
!ote Early" !ote #ften" an !ote$ere% & 'ecurity &nalysis of !ote$ere, Philip #1 'arner,
"ay **, 5<<*1
D6E httpA))en1$i(ipedia1org)$i(i)Public&(ey0cryptography (u)lic-key cryptography1
D=E httpA))$$$1trustycom1fr)pdf)FoPoSt<<1pdf P1 Fouue, G1 Poupard, a1Stern, 'haring
*ecryption in the +ontext of !oting or Lotteries, Financial Cryptography 5<<<
Proceedings1
D7E httpA))$$$1captcha1net) , the %fficial CAP-C.A $eb site1
D,E httpA))$$$1vote1caltech1edu)reports)alv&nag0loyola1pdf R1 "ichael AlvareG, aonathan
Hagler, ,he Likely consequences of Internet !oting for (olitical -epresentations.
D@E P1 Paillier, (u)lic-.ey +ryptosystems /ase on +omposite *egree -esiuosity +lasses,
#urocrypt b::
D:E P1 Fouue, G1 Poupard, a1Stern, 'haring *ecryption in the +ontext of !oting or
Lotteries, Financial Cryptography 5<<< Proceedings1
D<E 81 !amgard, "1 auri(, a1 Hielson, & 0enerali1ation of (aillier2s (u)lic-.ey 'ystem with
&pplications to Electronic !oting, Aarhus University, !ept1 of Computer Science1
D*E A1 Shamir, $ow to 'hare a 'ecret, Communications of the AC" *:,:
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +7 of +,
D5E A1a1 "eneGes, P1 C1 van %orschot, and S1A1 'anstone, $an)ook of &pplie
+ryptography, CRC Press, *::,1
D+E !1 Haccache, *ou)le-'pee 'afe (rime 0eneration, Gemplus Card 8nternational1
D6E "1 2iener, 'afe (rime 0eneration with a +om)ine 'ieve, Cryptographic Clarity1
D=E /1 2ilson, C1 #1 Cho$, (aillier ,hreshol +ryptography 3e) 'ervice 4ser2s 0uie,
University of Colorado Q Colorado Springs "asterFs Project, 5<<71
D*7Ehttp://www.cs.rit.edu:8080/ms/static/spr/2005/4/kar1141/report.pdf ,
Progress on Probabilistic #ncryption Schemes, ;ert Richardson, auly 5<<71
D*,E http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkatz/THEE/stau!.pdf."z An Analysis of
ChaumFs voter&verifiable election scheme, aulie Ann Staub, 5<<=
D*@E httpA))$$$1brics1d()RS)<<)6=)/R8CS&RS&<<&6=1pdf 8van !amgard and "ads a1
auri(, A GeneraliGation, a Simplification and Some Applications of PaillierFs Probabilistic
Public&;ey System, P;C 5<<*1
D*:E httpA))$$$1cryptovirology1com)cryptovfiles)ne$boo()Chapter61pdf 8mplementing
Perfect `uestionable #ncryptions, Adam 91 coung and "oti "1 cung1
D5<E httpA))$$$1rsa1com)rsalabs)cryptobytes)Crypto/ytes0aanuary05<<50final1pdf
Crypto/ytes, !an /oneh, .ovav Shacham, Spring 5<<51
D5*E httpA))$$$1gemplus1com)smart)rd)publications)pdf)Pai::pai1pdf Public&;ey
CryptoSystems /ased on Composite !egree Residuosity Classes, Pascal Paillier, *:::
D55E httpA))en1$i(ipedia1org)$i(i)Paillier0cryptosystem , Paillier Crytosystem from
2i(ipedia, the free encyclopedia1
%nline #&'oting Prototype System #vece( ) Page +, of +,