G.R. No.

L-34029 February 26, 1931

THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands, defendant-appellee.
Facts: Standard is a foreign corporation duly authorized to do business in the Philippines. They delivered in the Philippines for the
use of US Army, fuel oil and asphalt. Collector of Internal Revenue demanded a tax of one and one-half per cent upon the value of the
merchandise by virtue of section 1459 of the Administrative Code and Act No. 3243 of the Philippine Legislature. During the same
period Standard delivered fuel to US Navy to be paid in New York , and which contract provided that all internal revenue taxes and
charges under the laws of the Philippine Islands were to be assumed and paid by the United States Navy. Collector collected sales tax
which was paid by Standard under protest. Standard sue for refund.
Issue: whether sales of merchandise made in the Philippines to the United States Army and the United States Navy are subject to the
sales tax.
Ruling: No. It would be absurd to think that a derivative sovereignty like the Government of the Philippine Islands, could tax the
instrumentalities of the very Government which brought it into existence. If a sovereign State of the American Union cannot abridge
or restrict the activities of the United States Government, much less can a creature of that Government, as the Philippine Government
is, do so. (Note the well-considered opinion of Attorney-General Wickersham of June 8, 1912, appearing in 29 Opinions, Attorneys-
General, United States, 442.)
Judgment reversed, and the record ordered returned to the court of origin for further proceedings, without express finding as to costs in
either instance.

G.R. No. L-18125 May 31, 1963
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY (NAWASA),
respondents.
Facts: NAWASA is a public corporation owned by the Philippines. Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System was taken
over by petitioner NWSA. Provincial Assessor of Laguna assessed, for purposes of real estate taxes, the property comprising the
Cabuyao-Sta. Rosa-Bian Waterworks System. NWSA protested, claiming that the property described under Tax Declaration No.
5987 (Exh. "A-l") are exempted from the payment of real estate taxes in view of the nature and kind of said property and functions and
activities of petitioner, as provided in Republic Act No. 1383. BAA denied the protest which was reversed by the CTA, hence, this
petition.
Issue: whether or not the water pipes, reservoir, intake and buildings used by NAWASA in the operation of its waterworks system in
the municipalities of Cabuyao, Sta. Rosa and Bian, province of Laguna, are subject to real estate tax.
Ruling: No. Upon the other hand, in exempting from taxation "property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, any province, city,
municipality or municipal district . . .," said section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 470 makes no distinction between property held in a
sovereign, governmental or political capacity and those possessed in a private, proprietary or patrimonial character. And where the law
does not distinguish neither may we, unless there are facts and circumstances clearly showing that the lawmaker intended the contrary,
but no such facts and circumstances have been brought to our attention.
Taxes are financial burdens imposed for the purpose of raising revenues with which to defray the cost of the operation of the
Government, and a tax on property of the Government, whether national or local, would merely have the effect of taking money from
one pocket to put it in another pocket (Cooley on Taxation, Sec. 621, 4th Edition.)
G.R. No. 51593 November 5, 1992
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CEBU CITY and AUGUSTO PACIS as Treasurer of Cebu City, defendant-appellants.
Facts: NDC is a GOCC authorized to engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural and other enterprises necessary or
contributory to economic development or important to public interest. It also operates, in furtherance of its objectives, subsidiary
corporations one of which is the now defucnt National Warehousing Corporation (NWC). The President issued a proclamation
reserving a parcel of land for warehousing purposes, Subsequently a warehouse was erected thereon. NWC was dissolved and NDC
took over its assets and function. City of Cebu assessed real estate tax to the said property and was paid by NDC under protest. City
Assessor denied the claim for refund. NDC filed a suit and CFI of Manila ruled in their favour.
Issue: Whether or not NDC is exempted from payment of the real estate taxes on the land reserved by the President for warehousing
purposes as well as the warehouse constructed thereon

Ruling: As already adverted to, one of the principal issues before Us is the interpretation of a provision of the Assessment Law, the
precursor of the then Real Property Tax Code and the Local Government Code, where "ownership" of the property and not "use" is the
test of tax liability. It may be stated that the Republic owns NDC, it does not necessary follow that properties owned by NDC, are also
owned by Republic in the same way that stockholders are not ipso facto owners of the properties of their corporation.
The Republic, like any individual, may form a corporation with personality and existence distinct from its own. The separate
personality allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its own name and, thus, permit greater independence and flexibility in its
operations. It may, therefore, be stated that tax exemption of property owned by the Republic of the Philippines "refers to properties
owned by the Government and by its agencies which do not have separate and distinct personalities (unincorporated entities).
However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a different rule should apply because "[t]he exemption of
public property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other
claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed on the
reserved land by NWC (now under administration by NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as such improvement
does not appear to belong to the Republic.
WHEREFORE, finding that National Development Company (NDC) is exempt from real estate tax on the reserved land but liable for
the warehouse erected thereon, the decision appealed from is accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, let this case be remanded to the
court of origin, now the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to determine the proper liability of NDC, particularly on its warehouse, and
effect the corresponding refund, payment or set-off, as the case may be, conformably with this decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD
NG PARAAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF PARAAQUE, respondents.
Facts: MIAA was the operator of NAIA as provided under its charter. The Bureau of Air Transportation transferred 600 hectares of
land including runways and buildings which they cannot dispose of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the
President as provided further in their charter. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion declaring that
the LGC withdrew the tax exemption for real estate tax provided in their charter. MIAA paid some of the real estate taxes due to them.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for 1992-2001. City Treasurer issued a
notice of levy on the properties to be sold in public auction if MIAA failed to pay its tax delinquencies. OGCC issued another opinion
declaring that MIAA is exempted from real estate tax. MIAA filed a petition for prohibition before the CA which was dismissed so as
the motion for reconsideration hence this petition. City of Paranaque then issued notice of public auction sale.
Issue: whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws
Ruling: Yes. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly against
local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt
whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments
seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants
an exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the
national government instrumentality. As this Court declared in Maceda v. Macaraig, J r.:
The reason for the rule does not apply in the case of exemptions running to the benefit of the government itself or its
agencies. In such case the practical effect of an exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be handled by
government in the course of its operations. For these reasons, provisions granting exemptions to government agencies may be
construed liberally, in favor of non tax-liability of such agencies.19
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
G.R. No. 150301 October 2, 2007
PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 169, MALABON,
METRO MANILA, THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAVOTAS, METRO MANILA, HON. FLORANTE M. BARREDO, in his
official capacity as Municipal Treasurer of Navotas, Metro Manila, and HON. NORBERTO E. AZARCON, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Public Auction Sale Committee of Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.
Facts: Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from petitioner Philippine Fisheries Development
Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation located inside the Navotas
Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). Taxes were not paid despite the demands of the treasures hence they give notice of sale by public
auction of the properties of PFDA. Petitioner sought the deferment of sale contending they are exempted from such tax. The matter
was referred to the DOF and ordered to conduct an ocular inspection to determine who the actual users of the properties concerned
are. Despite the order of DOF Navotas proceeded to publish the notice of sale. PFDA instituted a civil case before the RTC to enjoin
the auction sale. RTC ruled in favor of PFDA issuing a writ of preliminary injuction. The writ dissolved when PFDA failed to present
clear and convincing evidence that they are exempted from real property tax. Upon appeal CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, hence
this petition.
Issue: whether or not petitioner is liable to pay real property tax.
Ruling: No. Section 234 (a) of the LGC states that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions is exempted from payment of the real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."
Thus, as a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality20 of the national government, is exempt from real property tax but the
exemption does not extend to the portions of the NFPC that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial
use.
In light of the above, petitioner is only liable to pay the amount of P62,841,947.79 representing the total taxes due as of December 31,
2001 from PFDA-owned properties that were leased, as shown in the Summary of Realty Taxes Due Properties Owned and/or
Managed by PFDA as per Realty Tax Order of Payment dated September 16, 2002.
G.R. No. 166494 June 29, 2007
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP., doing business under the name and style "Carlos Superdrug," ELSIE M. CANO, doing
business under the name and style "Advance Drug," Dr. SIMPLICIO L. YAP, JR., doing business under the name and style
"City Pharmacy," MELVIN S. DELA SERNA, doing business under the name and style "Botica dela Serna," and LEYTE
SERV-WELL CORP., doing business under the name and style "Leyte Serv-Well Drugstore," petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD), DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (DOH),
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), respondents.
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior
Citizens Act) was signed into law granting senior citizens a discount of 20% for their purchase of medicine. Drugstores may claim the
discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered to be deducted from their gross
income. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Act contending that it was confiscatory because their property is taken
without just compensation. DOF is of opinion that the tax deduction did not compensate the Drugstores because in tax deduction, the
discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed.
Issue: whether or not the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program
Ruling: Yes. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners
that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence
demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.26
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business,
because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial report, so that they have not been able to
show properly whether or not the tax deduction scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,
respondents.
Facts: Fortune is a manufacturer of different kinds of cigarette. Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. CIR wants to classify HOPE and
Champion as foreign brands because they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory. Fortune changed the names of the
brands to remove them to foreign category. Ad valorem tax was imposed on the said brands. RA 7654 was enacted
increasing the tax on foreign brands of cigarettes. Before the effectivity of the said law BIR issued a memorandum
declaring Hope, More and Champion as foreign brands subject to Ad valorem Tax of 55%. Fortune requested BIR to
review the memorandum but it was denied. Fortune filed a petition for review before the CTA which ruled in favor of
Fortune. CIR filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the memorandum issued by the CIR is uniform and equitable
Ruling: NO. Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987 Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and equitable.
Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or put on equal footing
both in privileges and liabilities. Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class must be taxed at the
same rate and the tax must operate with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.
Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" cigarettes and, unless
petitioner would be willing to concede to the submission of private respondent that the circular should, as in fact my
esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo so expresses in his separate opinion, be considered adjudicatory in nature and
thus violative of due process following the Ang Tibay
16
doctrine, the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation.
In its decision, the CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing foreign brands have not been similarly included
within the scope of the circular. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of Tax
Appeals, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. L-4817 May 26, 1954
SILVESTER M. PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts: Petitioners are lawyers and professionals practising in Manila seeking the annulment o f Ordinance No. 3398 which
imposes a municipal occupation tax and provides for penalty for non-payment. Petitioners also seek to refund the taxes they paid
under protest. The trial court declared that the ordinance was void because the penalty it provides was not legally authorized. Both
parties appealed assailing the decision of the court. Petitioner contends that the ordinance constitutes class legislation.
Issue: Whether or not the this ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and oppressive, and authorize
what amounts to double taxation
Ruling: NO. In raising the hue and cry of "class legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the professions to which
they respectively belong have been singled out for the imposition of this municipal occupation tax; and in any event, the Legislature
may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for
taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that there
is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or
activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is reversed.






G.R. No. L-23645 October 29, 1968
BENJAMIN P. GOMEZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as Postmaster General, HON. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, in his capacity as Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, and DOMINGO GOPEZ, in his capacity as Acting Postmaster of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respondent-appellants.

Facts: Republic Act 1635 was enacted to help the Philippine Tuberculosis Society by way of implementing the use of semi-postal
stamp at a certain period provided. Such stamp has an additional charge of 5 centavos which will constitute as special fund to be used
by PTS. On the period provided Gomez mailed a letter without using the said stamp, hence, his mail was returned to him. Gomez filed
a suit for Declaratory Relief assailing the constitutionality of RA 1635 contending that it violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution as well as the rule of uniformity and equality of taxation. CFI declared the law unconstitutional, hence the appeal of the
respondents which reversed the decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 1635 violates the equal protection clause of the constitution
Ruling: No. To begin with, it is settled that the legislature has the inherent power to select the subjects of taxation and to grant
exemptions.
4
This power has aptly been described as "of wide range and flexibility."
5
Indeed, it is said that in the field of taxation,
more than in other areas, the legislature possesses the greatest freedom in classification.
6
The reason for this is that traditionally,
classification has been a device for fitting tax programs to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the
tax burden.
We are not wont to invalidate legislation on equal protection grounds except by the clearest demonstration that it sanctions invidious
discrimination, which is all that the Constitution forbids. The remedy for unwise legislation must be sought in the legislature. Now, the
classification of mail users is not without any reason. It is based on ability to pay, let alone the enjoyment of a privilege, and on
administrative convinience. In the allocation of the tax burden, Congress must have concluded that the contribution to the anti-TB
fund can be assured by those whose who can afford the use of the mails.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-1104 May 31, 1949
EASTERN THEATRICAL CO., INC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICTOR, ALFONSO as City Treasurer of Manila, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and JUAN
NOLASCO, as Mayor of the City of Manila, defendants-appellees.
Facts: Ordinance No. 2958 was enacted by City of Manila imposing amusement tax on tickets sold by cinematographs, theatres
vaudeville companies theatrical shows and boxing exhibition. Twelve corporation engaged in motion picture business assailed the
validity of the said ordinance. Petitioners contended that the ordinance violated the uniformity and equality of taxation and thee equal
protection of the laws because it does not impose tax on other kinds of amusement such as race tracks, cockpits, cabarets, concert
halls, circuses, and other places of amusement. City of Manila alleges that the ordinance was a valid exercise of legislative power and
the purpose was to regulate the film and theatre industry. CFI uphold the validity of the ordinance, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed violated the uniformity and equality of taxation and thee equal protection of the laws

Ruling: NO. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; and the
appellants cannot point out what places of amusement taxed by the ordinance do not constitute a class by themselves and which can be
confused with those not included in the ordinance.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs against appellants.





G.R. No. L-24756 October 31, 1968
CITY OF BAGUIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FORTUNATO DE LEON, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Ordinance 99 was passed by Baguio City imposing a license fee on any person, firm, entity or corporation doing business in the
City by virtue of Republic Act No. 329, amending the city charter of Baguio empowering it to fix the license fee and regulate
"businesses, trades and occupations as may be established or practiced in the City." De Leon assailed the validity of the ordinance
because he was obligated to pay tax as a real estate dealer. Lower court ruled in favor of the validity of the ordinance, hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance violated the uniformity and equality of taxation
Ruling: On its face, therefore, the above ordinance cannot be assailed as violative of the constitutional requirement of uniformity. In
Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,
12
Justice Laurel, speaking for the Court, stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found."
There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a constitutional requirement where there is a classification.
The opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso.
13
Thus: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable
and natural classifications for purposes of taxation; ..." About two years later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race
Horses Trainers Assn. v. De la Fuente
14
incorporated the above excerpt in his opinion and continued: "Taking everything into
account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution."
This Court is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case
16
that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation."
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of December 19, 1964, is hereby affirmed.

G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; MANUEL
ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commissioner on Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA,
Minister of Finance, respondents.
Facts: Sison assailed the constitutionality of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 contending that he would be unduly
discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession
vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section
as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. For petitioner, therefore, there is a
transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation. OSG filed an answer contending that the allegations of the petitioner was only his opinion and that
BP135 was valid exercise of the State's power to tax.
Issue: whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on
compensation is constitutionally infirm.
Ruling: No. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds
no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the confiscation of property.
That would be a clear abuse of power. It then becomes the duty of this Court to say that such an arbitrary act amounted to
the exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly calls for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been
held that where the assailed tax measure is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case
of a retroactive statute is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is without merit, considering the (1) lack of factual foundation to
show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision;
31
(2) the force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal
protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net
income of professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-3538 May 28, 1952
JUAN LUNA SUBDIVISION, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
M. SARMIENTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants
Facts: Juan Luna Subdivision issued a check to City of Manila drawn upon the Philippine Trust Company as an advance payment of
their tax which was yet to be determined and was entered to the ledger. When the actual amount of the tax was determined a balance
of P1,868.92 was noted to the ledger and was credited to San Juan. During the Japanese occupation PTC was closed by the Japanese
military. After the occupation PTC re-opened and the City refused after liberation to refund the plaintiff's deposit or apply it to such
future taxes as might be found due, while the Philippine Trust Company was unwilling to reverse its debit entry against the Juan Luna
Subdivision, Inc. Petitioner sued the City Treasurer and the PTC for the full amount of the check he issued in favour of the
Government. The plaintiff claims the whole amount of the check contending that taxes for the last semester of 1941 have been
remitted by Commonwealth Act No. 703.
Issue: Whether or not CA 703 was unfair in not remitting the taxes already paid before the Japanese occupation
Ruling: NO. The remission of taxes due and payable to the exclusion of taxes already collected does not constitute unfair
discrimination. Each set of taxes is a class by itself, and the law would be open to attack as class legislation only if all taxpayers
belonging to one class were not treated alike. They are not.
As to the justice of the measure, the confinement of the condonation to deliquent taxes was not without good reason. The property
owners who had paid their taxes before liberation and those who had not were not on the same footing on the need of material relief. It
is true that the ravages and devastations wrought by war operations had rendered the bulk of the people destitute or impoverished and
that it was this situation which prompted the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 703.
The appealed judgment should, therefore, be modified so that the defendant City Treasurer shall refund to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,868.92 instead P2,210.52, without costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-4376 May 22, 1953
ASSOCIATION OF CUSTOMS BROKERS, INC. and G. MANLAPIT, INC., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY BOARD, THE CITY TREASURER, THE CITY ASSESSOR and THE CITY MAYOR, all of the City
of Manila, respondents-appellees.
Facts: City of Manila under the authority conferred by section 18 (p) of Republic Act No. 409 enacted Ordinance No. 3379 imposisng
property tax on motor vehicles. Petitioners assail the validity of Ordinance No. 3379 on the ground that (1) while it levies a so-called
property tax it is in reality a license tax which is beyond the power of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila; (2) said ordinance
offends against the rule of uniformity of taxation; and (3) it constitutes double taxation as it imposes property tax on motor vehicles
which was also the same tax imposed by the Motor Vehicle Law. CFI of Manila sustained the validity of the said ordinance, hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordiance violated the rule of the uniformity of taxation ordained by our Constitution
Ruling: It is also our opinion that the ordinance infringes the rule of the uniformity of taxation ordained by our Constituti on. Note that
the ordinance exacts the tax upon all motor vehicles operating within the City of Manila. It does not distinguish between a motor
vehicle for hire and one which is purely for private use. Neither does it distinguish between a motor vehicle registered in t he City of
Manila and one registered in another place but occasionally comes to Manila and uses its streets and public highways. The distinction
is important if we note that the ordinance intends to burden with the tax only those registered in the City of Manila as may be inferred
from the word "operating" used therein. The word "operating" denotes a connotation which is akin to a registration, for under the
Motor Vehicle Law no motor vehicle can be operated without previous payment of the registration fees. There is no pretense that the
ordinance equally applies to motor vehicles who come to Manila for a temporary stay or for short errands, and it cannot be denied that
they contribute in no small degree to the deterioration of the streets and public highway. The fact that they are benefited by their use
they should also be made to share the corresponding burden. And yet such is not the case. This is an inequality which we find in the
ordinance, and which renders it offensive to the Constitution.
Wherefore, reversing the decision appealed from, we hereby declare the ordinance null and void.