Supplement to Analysis

Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic

Philosophy
1. Introduction
2. Frege
3. Russell
4. Moore
5. Wittgenstein
6. The Cambridge chool o! "nal#sis
$. Carna% and &ogical 'ositi(ism
). *+!ord &inguistic 'hiloso%h#
,. Contem%orar# "nal#tic 'hiloso%h#
1. Introduction to Supplement
This su%%lement %ro(ides an account o! the de(elo%ment o! conce%tions o!
anal#sis in anal#tic %hiloso%h#. The emergence o! logical anal#sis as the
distincti(e !orm o! anal#sis in earl# anal#tic %hiloso%h# is outlined in -6 o! the
main document.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.1
2. Frege
"lthough Frege0s 1or2 sho1s the enormous %otential o! logical anal#sis/ it is
not incom%atible 1ith other !orms o! anal#sis. Indeed/ its 1hole %oint 1ould
seem to be to %re%are the 1a# !or these other !orms/ as %hiloso%hers in the
second %hase o! anal#tic %hiloso%h# came to argue 3see The Cambridge
chool o! "nal#sis4. *ne such !orm is traditional decom%ositional anal#sis5
understood/ more s%eci6call#/ as resol(ing a 1hole into its %arts 3e.g./ a
7thought0 or 7%ro%osition0 into its 7constituents04. 8ecom%ositional anal#sis
does indeed %la# a role in Frege0s %hiloso%h#/ but 1hat is o! greater
signi6cance is Frege0s use o! !unction9argument anal#sis/ 1hich o%erates in
some tension to 1hole9%art anal#sis.
In de(elo%ing his logic in his 6rst boo2/ the Begrifsschrift/ Frege0s 2e# mo(e
1as to re%resent sim%le statements such as 7ocrates is mortal0 not in
sub:ect9%redicate !orm 37S isP0/ i.e./ anal#;ing it into sub:ect and %redicate
:oined b# the co%ula4 but in !unction9argument !orm 37Fa045ta2ing 7ocrates0
as the argument and 7x is mortal0 as the !unction/ 1hich #ields as (alue 1hat
Frege calls the 7:udgeable content0 o! the statement 1hen the argument
indicated b# the (ariable 7x0 is 6lled b# the name 7ocrates0. 3I gloss o(er
here the contro(ersial issue as to ho1 Frege understands !unctions/
arguments and :udgeable contents at this %articular time. In his later 1or2/
he regards the result o! 7saturating0 a conce%t b# an ob:ect as a truth9(alue.4
It 1as this that allo1ed him to de(elo% <uanti6cational theor#/ enabling him
to anal#;e com%le+ mathematical statements.
To a%%reciate some o! the %hiloso%hical im%lications o! !unction9argument
anal#sis/ consider the e+am%le that Frege gi(es in the Begrifsschrift 3-,4=
3>&C4 >#drogen is lighter than carbon dio+ide.
"ccording to Frege/ this can be anal#;ed in either o! t1o 1a#s/ de%ending on
1hether 1e ta2e h#drogen as the argument and is lighter than carbon
dioxide as the !unction/ or carbon dio+ide as the argument and is heavier
than hydrogen as the !unction. I! 1e res%ected sub:ect9%redicate %osition/ 1e
might 1ish to e+%ress the latter thus=
3C>>4 Carbon dio+ide is hea(ier than h#drogen.
.ut on Frege0s (ie1/ 3>&C4 and 3C>>4 ha(e the same 7content0 37Inhalt04/ each
merel# re%resenting alternati(e 1a#s o! 7anal#;ing0 that content. There does
seem to be something that 3>&C4 and 3C>>4 ha(e in common/ and !unction9
argument anal#sis seems to %ermit alternati(e anal#ses o! one and the same
thing/ since t1o di?erent !unctions 1ith di?erent arguments can #ield the
same (alue.
>o1e(er/ in res%onse to this/ it might be suggested that both these anal#ses
%resu%%ose a more ultimate one/ 1hich identi6es two arguments/ h#drogen
and carbon dio+ide/ and arelation 3a !unction 1ith t1o arguments4. Michael
8ummett 31,)1b/ ch. 1$4/ !or e+am%le/ has suggested that 1e distinguish
bet1een analysis and decomposition= there can be alternati(e
decom%ositions/ into 7com%onent0 conce%ts/ but onl# one anal#sis/ into
uni<ue 7constituents0. 3.# 7anal#sis0 8ummett means 1hat has here been
called 7decom%osition0/ 1hich5pace 8ummett5seems to im%l# a uni<ue
end9%roduct !ar more than 7anal#sis0/ and b# 7decom%osition0 8ummett
means !unction9argument anal#sis.4 .ut 1hich relation do 1e then choose/ is
lighter than or is heavier than@ Clearl# the# are not the same/ since one is
the con(erse o! the other. o i! 1e acce%t that 3>&C4 and 3C>>4 ha(e the
same 7content05and there is undoubtedl# something that the# ha(e in
common5then it seems that there can be alternati(e anal#ses e(en at the
su%%osedl# ultimate le(el.
The issue/ ho1e(er/ is contro(ersial/ and leads us <uic2l# into the dee%est
%roblems in Frege0s %hiloso%h#/ concerning the criteria !or sameness o!
7content0 3and o! 7Sinn0 and 7Bedeutung0/ into 1hich 7content0 later
bi!urcated4/ the !ruit!ulness o! de6nitions/ and the relationshi% bet1een
Frege0s conte+t %rinci%le and com%ositionalit#. For discussion/ see .a2er and
>ac2er 1,)4/ ch. 6A .eane# 1,,6/ ch. )A 2BB$dA .ell 1,)$/ 1,,6A .ermCde;
2BB1A Currie 1,)5A 8ummett 1,)1b/ ch. 15A 1,),A 1,,1a/ chs. ,916A
Dara(aso 1,,1A >ale 1,,$A &e(ine 2BB2/ 2BB$A 'icardi 1,,3A Ta%%enden
1,,5bA Weiner 1,,B/ ch. 3.
For more on Frege0s %hiloso%h#/ see the entr# on Frege in this Enc#clo%edia.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.2
3. Russell
In My Philosophical Development/ Russell 1rote= FE(er since I abandoned the
%hiloso%h# o! Gant and >egel/ I ha(e sought solutions o! %hiloso%hical
%roblems b# means o! anal#sisA and I remain 6rml# %ersuaded/ in s%ite o!
some modern tendencies to the contrar#/ that onl# b# anal#sing is %rogress
%ossibleH 3MPD/ 114. imilar remar2s are made else1here 3c!. e.g.POM/ 3A
MP/ 192A P!"/ 1), IJuotationsK4. Ln!ortunatel#/ ho1e(er/ Russell ne(er s%ells
out :ust 1hat he means b# 7anal#sis05or rather/ i! 1e %iece together his
scattered remar2s on anal#sis/ the# b# no means reMect his actual %ractice.
In a %a%er entitled 7The Regressi(e Method o! 8isco(ering the 'remises o!
Mathematics0/ dating !rom 1,B$/ !or e+am%le/ Russell tal2s o! 7anal#sis0 in
the regressi(e sense/ i.e./ as the %rocess o! 1or2ing bac2 to 7ultimate logical
%remises0/ and this as an inducti(e rather than deducti(e %rocess. In the
cha%ter on anal#sis and s#nthesis in his abandoned 1,13 manuscri%t/ #heory
of $nowledge/ on the other hand/ he de6nes 7anal#sis0 as Fthe disco(er# o!
the constituents and the manner o! combination o! a gi(en com%le+H 3#$/
11, IJuotationK4. This best ca%tures Russell0s 7oNcial0 (ie1/ and
decom%ositional anal#sis undoubtedl# %la#ed a ma:or role in Russell0s
thought 3c!. >#lton 1,,6A .eane# 2BB$a4. Oet as suggested in -6 o! the main
document/ 1hat characteri;es the !ounding b# Frege and Russell o! 3at least
one central strand in4 the anal#tic mo(ement 1as the use made o! logical
anal#sis/ in 1hich a crucial element 1as the !ormali;ation o! ordinar#
language statements into a logical language.
It 1as logical anal#sis that 1as in(ol(ed in Russell0s celebrated theor# o!
descri%tions/ 6rst %resented in 7*n 8enoting0 in 1,B5/ 1hich Ramse# called a
7%aradigm o! %hiloso%h#0 and 1hich %la#ed a ma:or role in the establishment
o! anal#tic %hiloso%h#. In this theor#/ 3Ga4 is re%hrased as 3Gb4/ 1hich can
then be readil# !ormali;ed in the ne1 logic as 3Gc4=
3Ga4 The %resent Ging o! France is bald.
3Gb4 There is one and onl# one Ging o! France/ and 1hate(er is Ging o! France
is bald.
3Gc4 xI$x P y3$y y Q x4 P BxK.
The %roblems generated b# attem%ting to anal#;e 3Ga4 decompositionally
disa%%ear in this anal#sis. Russell0s %roblem 1as this= i! there is no Ging o!
France/ then the sub:ect term in 3Ga45the de6nite descri%tion 7the %resent
Ging o! France051ould seem to lac2 a meaning/ in 1hich case ho1 could the
1hole ha(e a meaning@ Russell sol(ed this %roblem b# 7anal#;ing a1a#0 the
de6nite descri%tion. The de6nite descri%tion has no meaning in itsel!/ but
3Ga4 as a 1hole does ha(e a meaning/ a meaning that is gi(en b# 3Gb4/ to
1hich 3Ga4 is seen as e<ui(alent. The meaning o! 3Gb4 has still to be
e+%lained/ but this can be done b# dra1ing on the resources o! the logical
theor#/ in 1hich the logical constants and <uanti6cational structure re(ealed
in 3Gc4 are clari6ed.
Rust as Frege %ro(ided a diagnosis o! 1hat is 1rong 1ith the ontological
argument/ at least in its traditional !orm 3see -6 o! the main entr#4/ so
Russell sho1ed ho1 to a(oid unnecessar# rei6cation o! the %ur%orted ob:ects
o! our discourse. I! 1e can 6nd an e<ui(alent to a statement in(ol(ing some
%roblematic e+%ression/ then the %roblems dro% a1a# in the (er# %rocess o!
7translating0 it into a logical language. "lthough Frege himsel! seems not to
ha(e !ull# a%%reciated the eliminati(ist %ossibilities o%ened u% b# this
strateg# o! logical anal#sis/ Russell clearl# did/ and in the %rocess initiated a
reductionist %rogramme that has been inMuential e(er since. "lthough/ as
Russell and Whitehead ac2no1ledge in their %re!ace toPrincipia
Mathematica/ FIn all <uestions o! logical anal#sis/ our chie! debt is to FregeH
3PM/ (iii4/ Russell0s o1n ad(ance la# in e+tending logical anal#sis and in
suggesting the %ossibilities o! eliminati(ism.
For detailed discussion o! Russell0s theor# o! descri%tions and its
de(elo%ment/ see DriNn 1,,6A >#lton 1,,B/ ch. 6A 2BB3A 2BB$A &ins2# and
Imaguire 2BB5A Seale 2BB5A Soonan 1,,6.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.3
4. oore
Moore is generall# regarded as one o! the !ounders o! anal#tic %hiloso%h#/
#et his o1n earl# conce%tion o! anal#sis is sur%risingl# traditional. In 7The
Sature o! Rudgement0/ %ublished in 1),,/ he sees anal#sis sim%l# as the
decom%osition o! com%le+ conce%ts 31hich is 1hat %ro%ositions 1ere !or
Moore at the time4 into their constituents= F" thing becomes intelligible 6rst
1hen it is anal#sed into its constituent conce%tsH 3%&/ ) IJuotationK4. This
conce%tion underlies the main theses o! Moore0s 6rst ma:or 1or2/ Principia
'thica 31,B34/ including his !amous 7o%en <uestion0 argument.
In the 6rst cha%ter/ entitled 7The ub:ect9Matter o! Ethics0/ Moore considers
ho1 7good0 is to be de6ned. .# 7de6nition0 here Moore means 7real0 rather
than 7nominal0 de6nition/ concerned not 1ith the meaning o! a 1ord but 1ith
the nature o! the ob:ect denoted 3c!. P'/ 64. >e comes to the conclusion that
7good0 is inde6nable/ since good has no %arts into 1hich it can be
decom%osed=
M# %oint is that 7good0 is a sim%le notion/ :ust as 7#ello10 is a sim%le notionA
that/ :ust as #ou cannot/ b# an# manner o! means/ e+%lain to an# one 1ho
does not alread# 2no1 it/ 1hat #ello1 is/ so #ou cannot e+%lain 1hat good is.
8e6nitions o! the 2ind that I 1as as2ing !or/ de6nitions 1hich describe the
real nature o! the ob:ect or notion denoted b# a 1ord/ and 1hich do not
merel# tell us 1hat the 1ord is used to mean/ are onl# %ossible 1hen the
ob:ect or notion in <uestion is something com%le+. Oou can gi(e a de6nition
o! a horse/ because a horse has man# di?erent %ro%erties and <ualities/ all o!
1hich #ou can enumerate. .ut 1hen #ou ha(e enumerated them all/ 1hen
#ou ha(e reduced a horse to his sim%lest terms/ then #ou no longer de6ne
those terms. The# are sim%l# something 1hich #ou thin2 o! or %ercei(e/ and
to an# one 1ho cannot thin2 o! or %ercei(e them/ #ou can ne(er/ b# an#
de6nition/ ma2e their nature 2no1n. 3P'/ $.4
Inso!ar as something is com%le+/ according to Moore/ it can be 7de6ned0 in
terms o! its com%onent %arts/ and/ unless 1e are to go on ad in(nitum/ 1e
must e(entuall# reach sim%le %arts/ 1hich cannot themsel(es be de6ned 3P'/
$9)4. ince 7good0/ li2e 7#ello10/ is not a com%le+ notion/ it is inde6nable.
Moore0s 7o%en <uestion0 argument is then o?ered to su%%ort his claim that
7good0 is inde6nable. Consider a %ro%osed de6nition o! the !orm=
3D4 The Dood is ).
3uggested candidates !or 7)0 might be 7that 1hich causes %leasure0 or 7that
1hich 1e desire to desire0A c!. P'/ 15916.4 Then either 7the Dood0 means the
same as 7)0/ or it does not. I! it does/ then the de6nition is tri(ial/ since
7anal#tic0A but i! it does not/ then the de6nition is incorrect. .ut !or an#
substitution !or 7)05other than 7the Dood0 itsel!/ 1hich 1ould ob(iousl# ma2e
3D4 anal#tic51e can al1a#s raise the <uestion 3i.e./ it is al1a#s an 7o%en
<uestion04 as to 1hether 3D4 is trueA so 7)0 cannot mean the same as 7the
Dood0 and hence cannot be o?ered as a de6nition o! 7good0. In %articular/
an# attem%t at %ro(iding anaturalistic de6nition o! 7good0 is bound to !ail/ the
contrar# (ie1 being dubbed b# Moore the 7naturalistic !allac#0.
This argument has been inMuential5and contro(ersial5in metaethical
discussions e(er since. .ut in its general !orm 1hat 1e ha(e here is the
paradox of analysis. 3"lthough the %roblem itsel! goes bac2 to the %arado+ o!
in<uir# !ormulated in 'lato0s Meno/ and can be !ound articulated in Frege0s
1ritings/ too IJuotationK/ the term 7%arado+ o! anal#sis0 1as indeed 6rst used
in relation to Moore0s 1or2/ b# &ang!ord in 1,42.4 Consider an anal#sis o! the
!orm 7" is *0/ 1here " is the analysandum 31hat is anal#sed4 and * the
analysans 31hat is o?ered as the anal#sis4. Then either 7"0 and 7*0 ha(e the
same meaning/ in 1hich case the anal#sis e+%resses a tri(ial identit#A or else
the# do not/ in 1hich case the anal#sis is incorrect. o it 1ould seem that no
anal#sis can be both correct and in!ormati(e.
There is a great deal that might be said about the %arado+ o! anal#sis. "t the
(er# least/ it seems to cr# out !or a distinction bet1een t1o 2inds o!
7meaning0/ such as the distinction bet1een 7sense0 and 7re!erence0 that Frege
dre1/ arguabl# %recisel# in res%onse to this %roblem 3see .eane# 2BB54. "n
anal#sis might then be deemed correct i! 7"0 and 7*0 ha(e the same
reference/ and in!ormati(e i! 7*0 has a di?erent/ or more richl# articulated/
sensethan 7"0. In his o1n res%onse/ 1hen the %arado+ 1as %ut to him in
1,42/ Moore tal2s o! theanalysandum and the analysans being the same
concept in a correct anal#sis/ but ha(ing di?erent expressions. .ut he
admitted that he had no clear solution to the %roblem 3+*/ 6664. "nd i! this is
so/ then it is e<uall# unclear that no de6nition o! 7good051hether naturalistic
or not5is %ossible.
>o1e(er/ i! Moore %ro(ided no general solution to the %arado+ o! anal#sis/
his 1or2 does o?er clari6cations o! indi(idual conce%ts/ and his later 1ritings
are characteri;ed b# the %ainsta2ing attention to the nuances o! language
that 1as to inMuence *+!ord linguistic %hiloso%h#/ in %articular.
For !uller discussion o! Moore0s conce%tion o! %hiloso%hical anal#sis/ see
.ald1in 1,,B/ ch. $A .ell 1,,,.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.4
!. "ittgenstein
In the %re!ace to his 6rst 1or2/ the #ractatus !ogico,Philosophicus/
Wittgenstein records his debt to both Frege and Russell. From Frege he
inherited the assum%tions that the logic that Frege had de(elo%ed 1as the
logic o! our language and that %ro%ositions are essentiall# o! !unction9
argument !orm. F&i2e Frege and Russell I construe a %ro%osition as a !unction
o! the e+%ressions contained in it.H 3#!P/ 3.31)A c!. 5.4$.4 From Russell he
learnt the signi6cance o! the theor# o! descri%tions. FIt 1as Russell 1ho
%er!ormed the ser(ice o! sho1ing that the a%%arent logical !orm o! a
%ro%osition need not be its real one.H 3#!P/ 4.BB31.4 Lnli2e Frege and Russell/
ho1e(er/ he thought that ordinar# language 1as in %er!ect logical order as it
1as 3#!P/ 5.55634. The aim 1as :ust to sho1 ho1 this 1as so through the
construction o! an ideal notation rather than an ideal language/ re(ealing the
underl#ing semantic structure o! ordinar# %ro%ositions no longer obscured b#
their sur!ace s#ntactic !orm.
"rguabl# unli2e Frege/ too/ Wittgenstein 1as con(inced at the time o! the
#ractatus that F" %ro%osition has one and onl# one com%lete anal#sisH 3#!P/
3.254. The characteristic theses o! the #ractatus result !rom thin2ing through
the conse<uences o! this/ in the conte+t o! Fregean logic. 'ro%ositions are
seen as truth9!unctions o! elementar# %ro%ositions 34.221/ 5/ 5.34/ and
elementar# %ro%ositions as !unctions o! names 34.22/ 4.244. The meaning o!
each name is the sim%le ob:ect that it stands !or 33.2B3/ 3.224/ and these
sim%le ob:ects necessaril# e+ist as the condition o! the meaning!ulness o!
language 32.B2?.4. For Wittgenstein/ the e+istence o! sim%le ob:ects 1as
guaranteed b# the re<uirement that sense be determinate 33.23A c!. %B/ 634.
It 1as in this 1a# that Wittgenstein reached meta%h#sical conclusions b#
rigorousl# %ursuing the im%lications o! his logical (ie1s. "s he noted in his
%oteboo-s in 1,16/ FM# 1or2 has e+tended !rom the !oundations o! logic to
the nature o! the 1orldH 3%B/ $,4.
"ccording to Wittgenstein/ then/ anal#sis5in %rinci%le5ta2es us to the
ultimate constituents o! %ro%ositions/ and indeed/ to the nature o! the 1orld
itsel!. That Wittgenstein 1as unable to gi(e an# e+am%les o! sim%le ob:ects
1as not seen as an ob:ection to the logical conce%tion itsel!. E<uall# de6nite
conclusions 1ere dra1n as !ar as our thought 1as concerned. FI! 1e 2no1 on
%urel# logical grounds that there must be elementar# %ro%ositions/ then
e(er#one 1ho understands %ro%ositions in their unanal#sed !orm must 2no1
it.H 3#!P/ 5.5562.4 The claim might seem ob(iousl# !alse/ but it 1as %recisel#
the tas2 o! anal#sis to bring out 1hat 1e onl# tacitly 2no1.
This 1hole logical and meta%h#sical %icture 1as dismantled in Wittgenstein0s
later 1or2 3see es%eciall# P/ --192424. The assum%tion that Fregean logic
%ro(ides the logic o! language and the 1orld 1as re:ected/ and the man#
di?erent uses o! language 1ere stressed. The idea that names mean their
bearers/ the (arious theses o! !unctionalit# and com%ositionalit#/ and the
associated a%%eal to tacit %rocesses o! generating meaning 1ere critici;ed.
*n Wittgenstein0s later (ie1/ Fnothing is hiddenH 3P/ -435A c!. Malcolm 1,)6/
1164A %hiloso%h# is sim%l# a matter o! getting clear about 1hat is alread# in
the %ublic domain5the grammar o! our language 3P/ -- 122/ 1264.
*ur in(estigation is there!ore a grammatical one. uch an in(estigation
sheds light on our %roblem b# clearing misunderstandings a1a#.
Misunderstandings concerning the use o! 1ords/ caused/ among other things/
b# certain analogies bet1een the !orms o! e+%ression in di?erent regions o!
language.5ome o! them can be remo(ed b# substituting one !orm o!
e+%ression !or anotherA this ma# be called an Fanal#sisH o! our !orms o!
e+%ression/ !or the %rocess is sometimes li2e one o! ta2ing a thing a%art. 3P/
-,B IFull JuotationK4
Wittgenstein0s earlier conce%tion o! anal#sis/ as combining logical anal#sis
1ith decom%ositional anal#sis/ has gi(en 1a# to 1hat has been called
7connecti(e0 anal#sis 3tra1son 1,,2/ ch. 2A >ac2er 1,,6/ ch. 54. Di(en ho1
dee%l# embedded that earlier conce%tion 1as in the 1hole meta%h#sics o!
the #ractatus/ the criti<ue o! the #ractatus has been seen b# some to im%l#
the re:ection o! anal#sis altogether and to herald the age o! 7%ost9anal#tic0
%hiloso%h#. .ut e(en Wittgenstein himsel! does not re%udiate anal#sis
altogether/ although 3as the %assage :ust <uoted suggests4 he does tend to
thin2 o! 7anal#sis0 %rimaril# in its crude decom%ositional sense. Sot onl# ma#
logical anal#sis/ in the sense o! 7translating0 into a logical language/ still ha(e
(alue in !reeing us !rom misleading (ie1s o! language/ but 7connecti(e0
anal#sis is still 1orth# o! being called 7anal#sis0 3as 1e shall see in the ne+t
three sections4.
For !urther discussion/ see .a2er and >ac2er 1,)B/ chs. 293A Carruthers
1,,B/ ch. $A Dloc2 1,,6/ 2B39)A >ac2er 1,,6/ chs. 2/ 5A Malcolm 1,)6/ chs.
69$.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.5
#. $he Cam%ridge School of Analysis& 'ogical and
etaphysical Analysis
The Cambridge chool o! "nal#sis/ as it 1as 2no1n at the time/ 1as %rimaril#
acti(e in the 1,3Bs. .ased in Cambridge/ it dre1 its ins%iration !rom the
logical atomism o! Russell and Wittgenstein and the earlier 1or2 o! Moore. "s
1ell as Moore himsel!/ its central 6gures included Rohn Wisdom/ usan
tebbing/ Ma+ .lac2 and "ustin 8uncan9Rones. Together 1ith C.". Mace and
Dilbert R#le/ tebbing and 8uncan9Rones 31ho 1as its 6rst editor4 !ounded
the :ournal "nalysis/ 1hich 6rst a%%eared in So(ember 1,33 and 1hich
remains a 2e# :ournal o! anal#tic %hiloso%h# toda#.
The %aradigm o! anal#sis at this time 1as Russell0s theor# o! descri%tions/
1hich 3as 1e ha(e seen in relation to Russell and Wittgenstein abo(e4
o%ened u% the 1hole %ro:ect o! re%hrasing %ro%ositions into their 7correct0
logical !orm/ not onl# to a(oid the %roblems generated b# misleading sur!ace
grammatical !orm/ but also to re(eal their 7dee% structure0. Embedded in the
meta%h#sics o! logical atomism/ this ga(e rise to the idea o! anal#sis as the
%rocess o! unco(ering the ultimate constituents o! our %ro%ositions 3or the
%rimiti(e elements o! the 7!acts0 that our %ro%ositions re%resent4.
This characteri;ation suggests a distinction that has alread# been im%licitl#
dra1n/ and 1hich 1as 6rst e+%licitl# dra1n in the 1,3Bs b# usan tebbing
31,32/ 1,33b/ 1,344 and Rohn Wisdom 31,344/ in %articular/ bet1een 1hat
1as called 7logical0 or 7same9le(el0 anal#sis and 7%hiloso%hical0 or
7meta%h#sical0 or 7reducti(e0 or 7directional0 or 7ne19le(el0 anal#sis. The 6rst
translates the %ro%osition to be anal#;ed into better logical !orm/ 1hilst the
second aims to e+hibit its meta%h#sical %resu%%ositions. In Russell0s case/
ha(ing 7anal#;ed a1a#0 the de6nite descri%tion/ 1hat is then sho1n is :ust
1hat commitments remain5to logical constants and conce%ts/ 1hich ma# in
turn re<uire !urther anal#sis to 7reduce0 them to things o! our su%%osed
immediate ac<uaintance.
The (alue o! dra1ing this distinction is that it allo1s us to acce%t the 6rst
t#%e o! anal#sis but re:ect the second/ 1hich is :ust 1hat Ma+ .lac2 31,334
did in res%onding to tebbing 31,33b4. "ttac2ing the idea o! meta%h#sical
anal#sis as unco(ering !acts/ he considers the !ollo1ing e+am%le=
3E4 E(er# economist is !allible.
.lac2 suggests that a meta%h#sical anal#sis/ on tebbingTs conce%tion/ at
least at an intermediate le(el/ 1ould #ield the !ollo1ing set o! !acts=
3EU4 Ma#nard Ge#nes is !allible/ Rosiah tam% is !allible/ etc.
Oet 3E4 does not mean the same as 3EU4/ .lac2 ob:ects/ unless 7means0 is
being used loosel# in the sense o! 7entails0. .ut anal#sis cannot e+hibit the
%ro%ositions entailed/ since this 1ould re<uire 2no1ing/ in this e+am%le/ the
name o! e(er# economist. The correct anal#sis/ .lac2 suggests/ is sim%l#=
3EV4 3x4 3x is an economist4 entails 3x is !allible4.
This is a logical anal#sis o! structure rather than a meta%h#sical unco(ering
o! !acts. 31,33/ 25$.4
imilar arguments might be o?ered in the case o! other general %ro%ositions/
1hich together 1ith negati(e %ro%ositions %ro(ed %articularl# resistant to
7reducti(e0 anal#sis/ and the re:ection o! the latter in !a(our o! logical
anal#sis/ and later/ linguistic anal#sis/ came to characteri;e the ne+t %hase
o! anal#tic %hiloso%h#.
For !urther discussion/ see .eane# 2BB2bA >ac2er 1,,6/ ch. 4A 'assmore
1,66/ ch. 15A Lrmson 1,56.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.6
(. Carnap and 'ogical Positi)ism& *uasi+analysis
and ,-plication
The re:ection o! meta%h#sical anal#sis is characteristic o! logical %ositi(ism/
1hich de(elo%ed in Wienna during the 1,2Bs and 1,3Bs. The central 6gure
1as Rudol! Carna%/ 1ho 1as inMuenced not onl# b# Frege/ Russell and
Wittgenstein but also b# neo9Gantianism 3see Friedman 2BBB/ Richardson
1,,)4. >is 1or2 can be seen as mar2ing the transition to logical and
linguistic !orms o! anal#sis unencumbered/ at least oNciall#/ b# meta%h#sical
baggage.
Carna%0s 2e# methodological conce%tion in his 6rst ma:or 1or2/ Der logische
"ufbau der .elt 31,2)4 is that o! /uasi,analysis. Carna% held that the
!undamental 7units0 o! e+%erience 1ere not the <ualities 3the colours/ sha%es/
etc.4 in(ol(ed in indi(idual e+%eriences/ but those e+%eriences themsel(es/
ta2en as indi(isible 1holes. .ut this meant that anal#sis5understood in the
decompositional sense5could not #ield these <ualities/ %recisel# because
the# 1ere not seen as constituents o! the elementar# e+%eriences 31,2)/
-6)4. Instead/ the# 1ere to be 7constructed0 b# /uasi,analysis/ a method that
mimics anal#sis in #ielding 7<uasi9constituents0/ but 1hich %roceeds
7s#ntheticall#0 rather than 7anal#ticall#0 31,2)/ -- 6,/ $44.
In essence/ Carna%0s method o! <uasi9anal#sis is :ust that method o! logical
abstraction that Frege had used in -62 o! the 0rundlagen 3albeit 1ithout
seeing it as 7abstraction04. "n e<ui(alence relation holding bet1een things o!
one 2ind 3conce%ts in Frege0s case4 is used to de6ne or 7construct0 things o!
another 2ind 3numbers in Frege0s case4. Rust as numbers are not constituents
o! the conce%ts to 1hich the# are ascribed/ but can be constructed !rom
a%%ro%riate e<ui(alence relations/ so too can other 7<uasi9constituents0 be
constructed. 3For detailed discussion o! <uasi9anal#sis/ and the com%lications
and diNculties that it gi(es rise to/ see Doodman 1,$$/ ch. 5A Richardson
1,,)/ ch. 2.4
Carna%0s use o! the term 7<uasi9anal#sis0 is re(ealing/ !or the 7<uasi0 suggests
that he is still in thrall to the decom%ositional conce%tion o! anal#sis/ des%ite
his recognition that there are other !orms o! anal#sis/ e.g./ 1hich use
abstraction instead. .# the earl# 1,3Bs/ ho1e(er/ Carna% is ha%%# to use the
term 7anal#sis05or more s%eci6call#/ 7logical anal#sis05!or methods o!
abstraction and construction. In a %a%er called 7The Method o! &ogical
"nal#sis0/ gi(en at a con!erence in 1,34/ !or e+am%le/ he 1rote= FThe logical
anal#sis o! a %articular e+%ression consists in the setting9u% o! a linguistic
s#stem and the %lacing o! that e+%ression in this s#stem.H 31,36/ 143.4 .#
this time/ Carna%0s 7linguistic turn0 had occurred 3see Carna% 1,32/ 1,344A
but the conce%tion underl#ing the "ufbau remained= anal#sis in(ol(es
e+hibiting the structural relations o! something b# locating it in an abstract
theoretical s#stem.
In his later 1or2 Carna% tal2s o! anal#sis as 7e+%lication0/ though this also
goes bac2 to the"ufbau/ 1here Carna% tal2ed o! 7rational reconstruction0.
3The connection bet1een the t1o ideas is made clear in Carna%0s %re!ace to
the 2nd edition o! the "ufbau4. In Meaning and %ecessity 31,4$4/ Carna%
characteri;es e+%lication as !ollo1s=
The tas2 o! ma2ing more e+act a (ague or not <uite e+act conce%t used in
e(er#da# li!e or in an earlier stage o! scienti6c or logical de(elo%ment/ or
rather o! re%lacing it b# a ne1l# constructed/ more e+act conce%t/ belongs
among the most im%ortant tas2s o! logical anal#sis and logical construction.
We call this the tas2 o! e+%licating/ or o! gi(ing an explication !or/ the earlier
conce%t X 31,4$/ $9)4
Carna% gi(es as e+am%les Frege0s and Russell0s logicist e+%lication o!
number terms such as 7t1o05Fthe term 7t1o0 in the not <uite e+act meaning
in 1hich it is used in e(er#da# li!e and in a%%lied mathematicsH5and their
di?erent e+%lications o! de6nite descri%tions 31,4$/ )4.
" !uller discussion o! e+%lication is %ro(ided in the 6rst cha%ter o! !ogical
Foundations of Probability 31,5B IJuotationK4/ 1here Carna% o?ers criteria o!
ade<uac# !or e+%lication/ and gi(es as his main e+am%le the conce%t o!
tem%erature as e+%licating the (aguer conce%t o! 1armth. The idea o! a
scienti6call# de6ned conce%t replacing an e(er#da# conce%t ma# be
%roblematic/ but the idea that anal#sis in(ol(es 7translating0 something into a
richer theoretical s#stem is not onl# characteristic o! a central strand in
anal#tic %hiloso%h# but has also been !ruit!ul throughout the histor# o!
%hiloso%h#. In e?ect/ it originates in ancient Dree2 geometr#/ though it can
be seen more %rominentl# in anal#tic geometr# 3see the su%%lementar#
section on 8escartes and "nal#tic Deometr#4. It is not there!ore ne1/ but it
1as certainl# !oregrounded in %hiloso%h# and gi(en a modern lease o! li!e in
the conte+t o! the ne1 logical s#stems de(elo%ed b# Frege/ Russell and
Carna%.
For !urther discussion o! Carna%0s methodolog#/ see .eane# 2BB4A .eth
1,63A Co?a 1,,1/ 'art IIA 'roust 1,),/ 'art IWA tra1son 1,63A Lebel 1,,2.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.$
.. /-ford 'inguistic Philosophy& 'inguistic and
Connecti)e Analysis
Michael 8ummett 31,,1a/ 1114 has suggested that the %recise moment at
1hich the 7linguistic turn0 in %hiloso%h# 1as ta2en is -62 o! Frege0s
0rundlagen/ 1here in ans1er to the <uestion as to ho1 numbers are gi(en to
us/ Frege %ro%oses to de6ne the sense o! a %ro%osition in 1hich a number
term occurs. 8ummett has also stated that 7the !undamental a+iom o!
anal#tical %hiloso%h#0 is that Fthe onl# route to the anal#sis o! thought goes
through the anal#sis o! languageH 31,,3/ 12)4. Oet both Frege and Russell
1ere hostile to ordinar# language/ and the 7linguistic turn0 1as onl# %ro%erl#
ta2en in WittgensteinTs #ractatus/ be!ore being consolidated in the 1or2 o!
Carna% in the earl# 1,3Bs. .ut 8ummett0s a+iom has been held b# man#
anal#tic %hiloso%hers and it 1as certainl# characteristic o! *+!ord %hiloso%h#
in the t1o decades or so a!ter the econd World War.
Dilbert R#le can be ta2en as re%resentati(e here. In one o! his earliest 1or2s/
dating !rom be!ore the 1ar/ he had argued that language is 7s#stematicall#
misleading0 31,324/ although as he himsel! later remar2ed 3in Rort# 1,6$/
3B5 IJuotationK4/ he 1as still under the inMuence o! the idea that 1as al1a#s
a 7correct0 logical !orm to be unco(ered 3see -6 o! the main document4. .ut
1ith the brea2do1n o! logical atomism 3see -6 abo(e4/ the em%hasis shi!ted
to the care!ul descri%tion o! 1hat R#le called the 7logical geogra%h#0 o! our
conce%ts. R#le0s most im%ortant 1or2 1as #he *oncept of Mind/ %ublished in
1,4,/ in 1hich he argued that the Cartesian dogma o! the 7Dhost in the
Machine0 1as the result o! a 7categor#9mista2e0/ con!using mental
descri%tions 1ith the language o! %h#sical e(ents. "gain/ R#le 1as later
critical o! the im%lication that the single notion o! a categor#9mista2e could
!unction as a 7s2eleton92e#0 !or all %roblems 31,54/ ,4A but the detailed
accounts o! indi(idual conce%ts that he %ro(ided in his 1or2 as a 1hole
demonstrated the %o1er and (alue o! linguistic anal#sis/ and o?ered a model
!or other %hiloso%hers. In cha%ter 2/ !or e+am%le/ he dra1s an im%ortant
distinction bet1een -nowing how and -nowing that. There are man# things
that I -now how to do5such as ride a bic#cle51ithout being able to e+%lain
1hat I am doing/ i.e./ 1ithout -nowing that I am !ollo1ing such9and9such a
rule. The tem%tation to assimilate -nowing how to -nowing that must thus be
resisted.
R. &. "ustin 1as another inMuential 6gure in *+!ord at the time. &i2e R#le/ he
em%hasi;ed the need to %a# care!ul attention to our ordinar# use o!
language/ although he has been critici;ed !or (aluing subtle linguistic
distinctions !or their o1n sa2e. >e 1as inMuential in the creation o! s%eech9
act theor#/ 1ith such distinctions as that bet1een locutionar#/ illocutionar#
and %erlocutionar# acts 3"ustin 1,62a4. "lthough "ustin shared R#le0s belie!
that reMection on language could resol(e traditional %hiloso%hical %roblems/
linguistic anal#sis has since come to be em%lo#ed more and more as a tool in
the construction o! theories o! language. .ut one good illustration o! the
im%ortance o! such reMection !or %hiloso%h# occurs in section IW o! "ustin0s
boo2 Sense and Sensibilia 31,62b4/ 1here "ustin considers the (arious uses
o! the (erbs 7a%%ear0/ 7loo20 and 7seem0. Com%are/ !or e+am%le/ the !ollo1ing
31,62b/ 364=
314 >e loo2s guilt#.
324 >e a%%ears guilt#.
334 >e seems guilt#.
There are clearl# di?erences here/ and thin2ing through such di?erences
enables one to a%%reciate :ust ho1 crude some o! the arguments are !or
theories o! %erce%tion that a%%eal to 7sense9data0.
R#le/ in %articular/ dominated the %hiloso%hical scene at *+!ord 3and %erha%s
in .ritain more generall#4 in the 1,5Bs and 1,6Bs. >e 1as Wa#nMete
'ro!essor o! Meta%h#sical 'hiloso%h# !rom 1,45 to 1,6) and Editor o! Mind
!rom 1,4$ to 1,$1. >is successor in the chair 1as '.F. tra1son/ 1hose
criti<ue o! Russell0s theor# o! descri%tions in his o1n seminal %a%er o! 1,5B/
7*n Re!erring0/ and his ntroduction to !ogical #heory o! 1,52 had also hel%ed
establish ordinar# language %hiloso%h# as a counter1eight to the tradition o!
Frege/ Russell and Carna%. The a%%earance o! ndividuals in 1,5, and #he
Bounds of Sense in 1,66 signalled a return to meta%h#sics/ but it 1as a
meta%h#sics that tra1son called 7descri%ti(e0 3as o%%osed to 7re(isionar#04
meta%h#sics/ aimed at clari!#ing our !undamental conce%tual !rame1or2s. It
is here that 1e can see ho1 7connecti(e0 anal#sis has re%laced 7reducti(e0
anal#sisA and this shi!t 1as e+%licitl# discussed in the 1or2 tra1son
%ublished shortl# a!ter he retired/ "nalysis and Metaphysics 31,,24. tra1son
notes that anal#sis has o!ten been thought o! as Fa 2ind o! brea2ing do1n or
decom%osing o! somethingH 31,,2/ 24/ but %oints out that it also has a more
com%rehensi(e sense 31,,2/ 1,4/ 1hich he dra1s on in o?ering a 7connecti(e
model0 o! anal#sis to contrast 1ith the 7reducti(e or atomistic model0 31,,2/
214. *ur most basic conce%ts/ on this (ie1/ are 7irreducible0/ but not 7sim%le0=
" conce%t ma# be com%le+/ in the sense that its %hiloso%hical elucidation
re<uires the establishing o! its connections 1ith other conce%ts/ and #et at
the same time irreducible/ in the sense that it cannot be de6ned a1a#/
1ithout circularit#/ in terms o! those other conce%ts to 1hich it is necessaril#
related. 31,,2/ 22934
uch a (ie1 is not ne1. The %oint had also been made b# ".C. E1ing/ !or
e+am%le/ in a boo2 on ethics %ublished in 1,53. Res%onding directl# to
Moore0s arguments in Principia 'thica 3see -4 abo(e4/ E1ing remar2s that FTo
maintain that good is inde6nable is not to maintain that 1e cannot 2no1
1hat it is li2e or that 1e cannot sa# an#thing about it but onl# that it is not
reducible to an#thing elseH 31,53/ ),4. Whate(er one0s (ie1 o! reductionist
%rogrammes/ an essential %art o! %hiloso%h# has al1a#s been the
clari6cation o! our !undamental conce%ts. ReMected in the idea o! connecti(e
anal#sis/ it is %erha%s this/ abo(e all/ that has allo1ed tal2 o! 7anal#tic0
%hiloso%h# to continue des%ite the demise o! logical atomism and logical
%ositi(ism.
For !urther discussion/ see .ald1in 2BB1A .eane# 2BB$bA >ac2er 1,,6/ ch. 6A
&#ons 1,)BA 'assmore 1,66/ ch. 1)A Rort# 1,6$A troll 2BBB/ ch. 6A Warnoc2
1,),.
"nnotated .ibliogra%h#/ -6.)
0. Contemporary Analytic Philosophy& $he 1arieties
of Analysis
"s mentioned at the beginning o! this entr#/ anal#tic %hiloso%h# should reall#
be seen as a set o! interloc2ing subtraditions held together b# a shared
re%ertoire o! conce%tions o! anal#sis u%on 1hich indi(idual %hiloso%hers dra1
in di?erent 1a#s. There are conMicts bet1een these (arious subtraditions. In
his inaugural lecture o! 1,6,/ 7Meaning and Truth0/ tra1son s%o2e o! a
7>omeric struggle0 bet1een theorists o! !ormal semantics/ as re%resented in
their di?erent 1a#s b# Frege/ the earl# Wittgenstein and Choms2#/ and
theorists o! communication9intention/ as re%resented b# "ustin/ 'aul Drice
and the later Wittgenstein 31,6,/ 1$1924. The ideas o! the !ormer 1ere to be
de(elo%ed/ most notabl#/ b# 8onald 8a(idson and Michael 8ummett/ and
the ideas o! the latter b# tra1son himsel! and Rohn earleA and the debate
has continued to this da#/ rami!#ing into man# areas o! %hiloso%h#. Sor is
there agreement on 1hat 8ummett called the 7!undamental a+iom0 o!
anal#tic %hiloso%h#/ that the anal#sis o! language is %rior to the anal#sis o!
thought 31,,3/ 12)4. "s 8ummett himsel! noted 3ibid./ 44/ Dareth E(ans0s
1or2/ #he 1arieties of +eference31,)24/ 1ould seem to %ut him outside the
anal#tic tradition/ so characteri;ed. To suggest that he onl# remains inside in
(irtue o! Fado%ting a certain %hiloso%hical st#le and X a%%ealing to certain
1riters rather than to certain othersH 38ummett 1,,3/ 54 is alread# to admit
the inade<uac# o! the characteri;ation.
ince the 1,6Bs/ the centre o! gra(it# o! anal#tic %hiloso%h# has shi!ted
to1ards Sorth "merica/ counterbalanced slightl# b# the blossoming in recent
#ears o! anal#tic %hiloso%h# in continental Euro%e and outh "merica and its
continued gro1th in "ustralasia. "lthough man# o! the logical %ositi(ists5
most notabl#/ Carna%5emigrated to the Lnited tates in the 1,3Bs/ it too2 a
1hile !or their ideas to ta2e root and de(elo%. Juine is the to1ering 6gure
here/ and his !amous criti<ue o! Carna%0s anal#ticYs#nthetic distinction
3Juine 1,514 1as instrumental in inaugurating a (ie1 o! %hiloso%h# as
continuous 1ith the natural sciences/ 1ith the corres%onding re:ection o! the
(ie1 that there 1as an#thing distincti(e about conce%tual anal#sis. >is
criti<ue 1as <uestioned at the time b# Drice and tra1son 31,564/ but it is
onl# in the last !e1 #ears that the issue has been re(isited 1ith a more
charitable (ie1 o! Carna% 3Ebbs 1,,$/ 'art IIA Friedman 1,,,/ ch. ,A
Richardson 1,,)/ ch. ,4.
*ne recent de!ence o! conce%tual anal#sis/ 1ith a <uali6ed re:ection o!
Juine0s criti<ue o! anal#ticit#/ has been o?ered b# Fran2 Rac2son in his boo2/
From Metaphysics to 'thics31,,)4. *n Rac2son0s (ie1/ the role o! conce%tual
anal#sis is to ma2e e+%licit our 7!ol2 theor#0 about a gi(en matter/ elucidating
our conce%ts b# considering ho1 indi(iduals classi!# %ossibilities 31,,)/ 319
34. To the e+tent that it in(ol(es 7ma2ing best sense0 o! our res%onses 3ibid./
364/ it is closer to 1hat Juine called 7%ara%hrasing0 31,6B/ -- 33/ 534 than the
sim%le recording o! our ordinar# intuitions 3Rac2son 1,,)/ 454. Rac2son argues
!or a 7modest0 role !or conce%tual anal#sis/ but in so !ar as he admits that a
certain Fmassaging o! !ol2 intuitionsH ma# be re<uired 3ibid./ 4$4/ it is not
clear that his conce%tion is as neutral as he suggests. Consider/ !or e+am%le/
his central argument in cha%ter 4/ o?ered in de!ence o! the (ie1 that colours
are %rimar# <ualities o! ob:ects 3ibid./ ,34=
3'r. 14 Oello1ness is the %ro%ert# o! ob:ects %utati(el# %resented to sub:ects
1hen those ob:ects loo2 #ello1.
3'r. 24 The %ro%ert# o! ob:ects %utati(el# %resented to sub:ects 1hen the
ob:ects loo2 #ello1 is at least a normal cause o! their loo2ing #ello1.
3'r. 34 The onl# causes 3normal or other1ise4 o! ob:ectsT loo2ing #ello1 are
com%le+es o! %h#sical <ualities.
3Conc.4 Oello1ness is a com%le+ o! the %h#sical <ualities o! ob:ects.
3'r. 14 e+em%li6es 1hat Rac2son calls our F%rime intuition about colourH/ 3'r.
24 is a Fconce%tual truth about %resentationH/ and 3'r. 34 is the em%irical
truth that is re<uired to reach the meta%h#sical conclusion 3Conc.4 that
7locates0 #ello1ness in our ontolog#. 3'r. 14 is intended to enca%sulate our
ordinar# 7!ol2 (ie10. .ut as it stands it is ambiguous. 8oes 3'r. 14 sa# that
there is a %ro%ert#/ but one about 1hich 1e are unsure 1hether it is reall#
%resented to us or not/ or that the %ro%ert# itsel! is onl# %utati(e@ The latter
reading is closest to the 7tri(ialit#0 Rac2son sa#s he 1ants as his Fsecure
starting9%laceH/ 1hich might be better e+%ressed as F#ello1ness is the
%ro%ert# ob:ects loo2 to ha(e 1hen the# loo2 #ello1H 3c!. 1,,)/ ),4A but it is
the !ormer that is doing the 1or2 in the argument. I! the %ro%ert# itsel! is
onl# %utati(e 3i.e./ i! colours are not %ro%erties o! ob:ects at all/ as some
%eo%le ha(e held4/ then 3'r. 24 is !alseA at the (er# least/ it is not a
conce%tual truth that %utati(e %ro%erties can be normal causes. This is not to
sa# that Rac2son is 1rong about the %rimar# <ualit# (ie1 o! colour. .ut it
does illustrate :ust 1hat assum%tions ma# alread# be in(ol(ed in articulating
7!ol2 intuitions0/ e(en on a su%%osedl# 7modest0 understanding o! conce%tual
anal#sis. In the end/ as the histor# o! conce%tions o! anal#sis sho1s/ no
conce%tion can be dissociated !rom the logical and meta%h#sical conte+t in
1hich it o%erates.
"nal#tic %hiloso%h#/ then/ is a broad and still rami!#ing mo(ement in 1hich
(arious conce%tions o! anal#sis com%ete and %ull in di?erent directions.
Reducti(e and connecti(e/ re(isionar# and descri%ti(e/ linguistic and
%s#chological/ !ormal and em%irical elements all coe+ist in creati(e tensionA
and it is this creati(e tension that is the great strength o! the anal#tic
tradition.
For !urther discussion/ see .eane# 2BB1 3on Rac2son4A 8ummett 1,,3A
>ac2er 1,,6/ chs. $9)A >oo21a# 1,)) 3on Juine4A troll 2BBB/ chs. $9,.