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Air National Guard History: 9/11 Insights

- Prior to 9/11, 1st Air Force was responsible for aerospace warning and control of the continental U.S., organizing Air National Guard forces worldwide, and working with Joint Forces Command on consequence management after CBRNE events. - 1st Air Force's region was divided into three command sectors responsible for radar coverage and scrambling aircraft. Seven Air National Guard fighter units provided air sovereignty alert at bases around the country. - The requirement was for alert aircraft to scramble as soon as possible, with a goal of less than 15 minutes for response. However, the commander felt coverage was inadequate to respond to unknown aircraft over much of the country within a reasonable time.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
114 views28 pages

Air National Guard History: 9/11 Insights

- Prior to 9/11, 1st Air Force was responsible for aerospace warning and control of the continental U.S., organizing Air National Guard forces worldwide, and working with Joint Forces Command on consequence management after CBRNE events. - 1st Air Force's region was divided into three command sectors responsible for radar coverage and scrambling aircraft. Seven Air National Guard fighter units provided air sovereignty alert at bases around the country. - The requirement was for alert aircraft to scramble as soon as possible, with a goal of less than 15 minutes for response. However, the commander felt coverage was inadequate to respond to unknown aircraft over much of the country within a reasonable time.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

SECRET

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1
NATI ONAL GUARD BUREAU
AI R GUARD HI STORY
TAPE TRANSCRI PTI ON
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-042, document no. 2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014
x - - - - - - - - - - - X
I NTERVI EW OF
LARRY K. ARNOLD
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
19 November 2001
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DR. GROSS: 11m Dr . Char l es J . Gr oss, t he Ai r Nat i onal Guar d
Hi st or i an i n t he Nat i onal Guar d Bur eau. Todayl s dat e i s 19
November 2001. 11m at Tyndal l Ai r For ce Base, Fl or i da, at 1st
Ai r For ce headquar t er s t o i nt er vi ew Maj or Gener al Lar r y K.
Ar nol d, t he Commander of 1st Ai r For ce concer ni ng t he t er r or i st
at t acks on t he Uni t ed St at es on 11 Sept ember 2001 and t he
r esponse of 1st Ai r For ce and ot her Ai r Def ense asset s t o t hose
event s.
* * * * *
DR. GROSS: Si r , f or t he sake of t he hi st or i cal r ecor d,
coul d you i dent i f y your sel f ?
MG ARNOLD: Lar r y Ar nol d, Commander , 1st Ai r For ce,
Cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es NORAD Regi on ( CONR) .
DR. GROSS: Okay, ver y good.
MG ARNOLD: Maj or Gener al , Ai r Nat i onal Guar d, Uni t ed
St at es Ai r For ce.
DR. GROSS: Par t of t hat i s somet i mes over l ooked by t he
publ i c.
Coul d you l ayout t he f or ce st r uct ur e r ul es of
engagement s, maj or or gani zat i onal el ement s and r esponsi bi l i t i es
of your command pr i or t o 11 Sept ember 20017
MG ARNOLD: Okay. Pr i or t o 11 Sept ember 2001, we wer e
t he -- we had r eal l y t hr ee r esponsi bi l i t i es. By t he way, t o some
degr ee t hose have not si gni f i cant l y changed. NORAD i s di vi ded up
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i nt o t hr ee r egi ons: t he Al askan r egi on, t he Canadi an r egi on, and
t he Uni t ed St at es or t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es NORAD r egi on.
I was t he Commander of t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es
NORAD r egi on r esponsi bl e f or ai r sover ei gnt y or I shoul d say
Aer ospace War ni ng and Aer ospace Cont r ol of t he Cont i nent al Uni t ed
St at es NORAD r egi on.
Addi t i onal l y, as Commander of 1st Ai r For ce, I was
r esponsi bl e f or or gani zi ng, t r ai ni ng and equi ppi ng our f or ces
t hat wer e suppor t i ng CI NCs wor l dwi de. For exampl e, Nor t her n
Wat ch, Sout her n Wat ch, t hat sor t of t hi ng.
A t er t i ar y r ol e t hat I had was wor ki ng f or J oi nt For ces
Command as t he Commander of Ai r For ce For ces f or J oi nt Task For ce
Ci vi l Suppor t whi ch had t o do wi t h consequence management af t er a
CBRNE event , as we cal l af t er weapon of mass dest r uct i on,
Chemi cal Bi ol ogi cal Radi ol ogi cal Nucl ear or Hi gh Expl osi ve,
CBRNE, C-B-R-N-E, sor t of event .
The command-and-cont r ol f or ce i n t he NORAD busi ness had
t o do wi t h peacet i me ROE [ i . e. , r ul es of engagement ] . Those ROE
ar e pr et t y st andar d t hr oughout t he Ai r For ce. Do you want t hi s
cl assi f i ed or uncl assi f i ed?
DR. GROSS: Cl assi f i ed i f you t hi nk t hat ' s wher e t he
i nf or mat i on i s and we' l l handl e i t t hat way.
MG ARNOLD: Al l r i ght . ROE mat t er s ar e nor mal l y
sensi t i ve i f not cl assi f i ed; but , basi cal l y, under peacet i me ROE,
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CI NC NORAD nor mal l y has t he r esponsi bi l i t y f or decl ar i ng a t ar get
host i l el
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. Can you t al k a l i t t l e bi t about
your f or ce st r uct ur e?
MG ARNOLD: For ce st r uct ur e. Our r egi on was di vi ded
i nt o t hr ee command-and-cont r ol sect or s. The Sout heast Ai r
Def ense Sect or , at Tyndal l Ai r For ce Base [ Fl or i da] ; Nor t heast
Ai r Def ense Sect or at Rome, New Yor k; and t he West er n Ai r Def ense
Sect or at McChor d Ai r For ce Bas. e i n t he st at e of Washi ngt on,
r esponsi bl e f or pr ovi di ng command-and-cont r ol t o t hose
geogr aphi cal ar eas.
And what I ' m t al ki ng about i s t hey r un t he r adar s and
scr ambl e ai r cr af t . They have scr ambl e aut hor i t y over ai r cr af t
assi gned t o t hei r sect or ar ea. And, of cour se, we had 10 Ai r
Nat i onal Guar d [ f i ght er ] uni t s t hat wer e assi gned t o 1st Ai r
For ce, seven of whi ch wer e pul l i ng ai r sover ei gnt y al er t pr i or t o
11 Sept ember 2001, seven l ocat i ons ar ound t he count r y wher e t hey
. .
wer e pul l i ng al er t , st ar t i ng up i n t he nor t heast woul d be Ot i s
Ai r Nat i onal Guar d Base i n Massachuset t s, pul l ed by t he 102nd,
Fi ght er Wi ng. At Langl ey Ai r For ce Base, Vi r gi ni a, pul l ed by t he
119t h Fi ght er Wi ng. At Homest ead Ai r For ce or Ai r For ce Reser ve
Base Iguess now, i n Fl or i da, pul l ed by t he 125t h Fi ght er Wi ng.
At El l i ngt on Ai r Nat i onal Guar d Base i n Texas pul l ed by our
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El l i ngt on uni t whi ch i s 147
t h
Out at Ol d Mar ch Ai r For ce Base
now cal l ed Ri ver si de, Ri ver si de, Cal i f or ni a, pul l ed by t he Fr esno
Ai r Nat i onal Guar d uni t 144t h Fi ght er Wi ng. And, pul l ed al er t at
Por t l and by t he 142nd Fi ght er Wi ng.
Now, I l ef t of f Tyndal l . Tyndal l Ai r For ce Base, we
had t he 148t h out of Dul ut h, t he 148t h Fi ght er Wi ng out of Dul ut h
pul l i ng al er t her e.
DR. GROSS: What was t he r equi r ement f or t he al er t i n
t er ms of how soon t hey had t o scr ambl e and who coul d do i t and
t hat sor t of t hi ng?
MG ARNOLD: Over t he year s, t hat ' s changed t o some
degr ee, but t he al er t ai r cr af t obvi ousl y t he r esponse post ur e
i mmedi at e has come t o be def i ned as soon as possi bl e, but not
l at er t han I ---J
Now, year s ago, we used t o cal l i t 1 _
Wi t h t he advent of t he i ner t i al navi gat i on syst ems, i t t ook a
l i t t l e l onger t hanl ' -- . . . J l t o get ai r bor ne j ust f or t he
i ner t i al NAVs t o come up, even t hough t hat ' s not a pr obl em t oday
because of our updat ed I NS syst ems t hat we have.
I t has somet i mes t aken up t o 1~ l because peopl e
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DR. GROSS: And i n your opi ni on, how good of a cover age 0
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wear exposur e sui t s and we di d not ever want t hat t o be an i ssue
dur i ng peacet i me. So we wer e al l owed up t o _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 t o be abl e
t o r espond t o a scr ambl e pr i or t o t he 11t h.
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5
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f r om an ai r sover ei gnt y st andpoi nt --
MG ARNOLD: We di dn' t have ai r sover ei gnt y, we had
t oken ai r sover ei gnt y. Seven si t es ar ound t he count r y was
i nadequat e t o be abl e t o r espond. We had numer ous event s wher e
no f i ght er s i n a sui t abl e l ocat i on woul d be t he end r esul t . And
t hat basi cal l y meant t her e was no way t o get t her e, f r om her e t o
t her e.
You know, t he nor t heast , f r om Ot i s al l t he way down t o
Langl ey, i t seems l i ke a l ong di st ance. I f you wer e goi ng af t er
-- i f you wer e i n t he l at t er days of t he Col d War when t he
Russi ans had been f l yi ng t hei r Bear s down t o Cuba and you wer e
r espondi ng j ust t o t hose ki nds of event s, t he east coast was
r
okay. I t wasn' t gr eat , but i t was okay. You pr obabl y coul d have
r esponded t o t hose event s. I f you had some t anker s, it woul d
have hel ped.
But t o say t hat we had ai r sover ei gnt y wher e we coul d
get ai r bor ne and go out and t ouch an unknown ai r cr af t . wi t hi n a
r easonabl e per i od of t i me -- I woul d def i ne r easonabl e per i od of
t i me, wi t hi n a hal f hour , al t hough t hat ' s not sat i sf act or y.
Ther e was no way t hat we coul d do t hat i n ver y many pl aces i n t he
count r y unl ess t he unknown happened t o be cr opped up.
The most di f f i cul t pl aces wer e i n t he sout heast er n par t
of t he Uni t ed St at es wher e you have 70 per cent of t he unknown
ai r cr af t appear i ng.
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IE.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)(g) I
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E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)(g)
So. t o say t hat we had ai r sover ei gnt y was a myt h. We
had t oken ai r sover ei gnt y at best and I ' m not t he onl y per son t o
say t hat . GEN. [ Ri char d B. ] Myer s when he was Commander of NORAD
[ 14 August 1998 t o 22 Febr uar y 2000] sai d t hat as wel l .
DR. GROSS: I assume t 6i s was poi nt ad but t o peopl e i n
t he Pent agon. What was t he r esponse t o al l t hat ?
MG ARNOLD: Wel l , I t hi nk t he t hought pat t er n was t hat
we wer e i n deep peace and t he onl y count r y t hat had t he
capabi l i t y of at t acki ng t he Uni t ed St at es count r y, nat i on, st at e,
wi t h ai r cr af t was Russi a and t hat t he Col d War was supposed t o be
over and so, t her ef or e, we di dn' t have t o wor r y about i t ; pl us
t hei r mi l i t ar y was -- had been dr i ven down.
Our concer n, of cour se, had been f or some t i me about a
t er r or i st at t ack on t he Uni t ed St at es usi ng asymmet r i cal
met hodol ogi es such as a cr ui se mi ssi l e or an unmanned ai r cr af t of
some t ype whi ch can f l y sl owl y but l ong di st ances and car r y smal l
payl oads t hat mi ght be abl e t o do si gni f i cant damage, or t he
scenar i o I pai nt ed t o you f r om an ai r pl ane cr ossi ng over f r om
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9
Mexi co or f r om some ot her i sl and.
So I t hi nk i t was a mat t er of pr i or i t i es and t he
Pent agon and i n some cases, t he amount of money saved was smal l .
My opi ni on i s t hat havi ng wor ked on t he Ai r For ce Boar d t hat
of t en at t hat l evel wher e -- t hese ki nds of deci si ons ar e
pr i nci pal l y suppor t ed and sol d. Most of t he t i me at t hat l evel ,
t he abi l i t y t o af f ect t he budget i s ni bbl i ng on t he f r i nges. And
I woul d consi der t he r educt i on of t he t ot al number of asset s t o
have pr oper ai r sover ei gnt y was cl assi f i ed as ni bbl i ng on t he
f r i nges.
DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm. But , t hat l ef t you basi cal l y
wi t hout t he capabi l i t y t o accompl i sh t he mi ssi on?
MG ARNOLD: I f your mi ssi on was t o pr ovi de ai r
sover ei gnt y f or t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es, i t l ef t us wi t hout
t he capabi l i t y t o do t hat .
Now, on t he good si de, t he good si de i s t hat t he
command-and-cont r ol st r uct ur e, t he i nf r ast r uct ur e, t he r adar s,
t he COM t o be abl e t o pr ot ect agai nst a t ar get comi ng f r om
out si de t he Uni t ed St at es r emai ned i n pl ace. Not t hat t hey wer e
r obust . The r adar i s i nadequat e, desi gned f or FAA, not desi gned
t o l ook down, desi gned t o l ook up. They' r e gr eat at 30, 000 f eet .
They wer e nonexi st ent bel ow I l al Ong t he east coast / west
coast . I t doesn' t mat t er wher e. They j ust wer en1t desi gned t o
e
~ do t hat par t i cul ar j ob.
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So we had ser i ous concer ns about cr ui se mi ssi l es and
had i ni t i at ed an advanced concept t echnol ogy demonst r at i on, whi ch
had been appr oved f or cr ui se mi ssi l e def ense. And basi cal l y
devel oped a por t abl e J oi nt Expedi t i onar y Base Command-and-Cont r ol
Cent er t hat we coul d pl ace i nt o a si t uat i on, i nt o an ar ea, a
geogr aphi cal ar ea based on an event t hat we want ed t o pr ot ect .
And t hen our concept of oper at i ons woul d be t o l i nk
avai l abl e mi l i t ar y asset s t hat mi ght be cal l ed upon t o def end
t hat ar ea.
We' ve never been asked t o do t hat , but we had a pl an t o
be abl e t o do t hat .
DR. GROSS: Okay. Okay. Wel l , I want t o cl ar i f y one
poi nt . You' r e t al ki ng about bei ng abl e t o pr ovi de ai r
sover ei gnt y. I n t hat , as we t al ked ear l i er t oday, t hat was i n
t he cont ext of st uf f comi ng i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es f r om out si de
t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es. I don' t bel i eve t hat anybody ever
r eal l y was l ooki ng at what happened on t he 11t h of Sept ember f r om
somet hi ng.
MG ARNOLD: No, I don' t t hi nk so. I don' t t hi nk peopl e
-- you know, we t hought t her e was a possi bi l i t y of peopl e per haps
hi j acki ng ai r pl anes and hol di ng peopl e host age or put t i ng a bomb
on t hem or bl owi ng t hem up. I don' t t hi nk we t hought of usi ng a
f uel ai r bomb, bei ng an Amer i can ai r l i ner , of t aki ng of f i n t he
Uni t ed St at es and t hen goi ng i n and cr ashi ng i nt o t he Wor l d Tr ade
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Cent er .
I t hi nk we' d become -- I hat e t o use t he wor d,
" compl acent , " but cer t ai n i t ' s appl i cabl e i n r et r ospect . I t hi nk
we bel i eved t hat t he poi nt of depar t ur e secur i t y t hat we had i n
our ai r l i ne t er mi nal s was suf f i ci ent t o st op t hat . So we never
i magi ned somet hi ng l i ke t hat anyway. But we di d wor r y about
ai r pl anes t hat mi ght t ake of f i nsi de t he Uni t ed St at es t hat woul d
per f or m some host i l e act wi t hi n t he Uni t ed St at es. Our t hought
t o t hat was t hat was a l aw enf or cement i ssue.
You know, when you t hi nk of t he Uni t ed St at es mi l i t ar y,
our obj ect i ve i s t o pr ot ect t he Uni t ed St at es agai nst , nor mal l y,
agai nst f or ei gn enemi es. But , you know, when you t ake t he Pl edge
of Al l egi ance or your Oat h of Of f i ce, i t ' s f or ei gn and domest i c,
you know.
DR. GROSS: Al l .
MG ARNOLD: Al l . Al l enemi es of t he Uni t ed St at es.
DR. GROSS: Yes.
MG ARNOLD: However , we or gani ze -- we or gani ze our l aw
enf or cement i ssues and our i nt el l i gence col l ect i on, i t ' s agai nst
t he l aw f or t he Uni t ed St at es mi l i t ar y t o col l ect i nt el l i gence
i nt er nal l y wi t hi n t he Uni t ed St at es, except under emer gency
condi t i ons.
That ' s why we have t he FBI . They ar e al l owed f or l aw
enf or cement pur poses wi t h ver y st r i ct cont r ol s t o guar ant ee your
NCT0070443
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const i t ut i onal r i ght s and mi ne; but t hey ar e al l owed t o col l ect
i nf or mat i on when t hey have pr obabl e cause and wi t h adequat e cour t
or der s, t hey' r e al l owed t o col l ect i nf or mat i on.
The CI A, whi ch i s r eal l y par t of t he Depar t ment of
Def ense i n my mi nd, cer t ai nl y par t of t he def ense i nf r ast r uct ur e,
col l ect s i nf or mat i on out si de of t he Uni t ed St at es. And t hen, of
cour se, we i n t he mi l i t ar y unl ess t her e has been a st at e of
emer gency decl ar ed ar e onl y al l owed t o f i ght out si de of our
bor der s, not i nsi de.
DR. GROSS: Okay. We' ve pr et t y much cover ed most of
t he st uf f i n i t em 2. I ' d l i ke you t o ski p ahead t o quest i on
number 3 i f t hat ' s al l r i ght .
MG ARNOLD: I n t he 1996 -- okay. Had t her e been a
ser i ous ef f or t t o r educe or even el i mi nat e al t oget her 1st Ai r
For ce as a dedi cat ed Ai r Def ense or gani zat i on pr i or t o 11
Sept ember 01, of cour se.
DR. GROSS: That woul d be t heone, yeah.
MG ARNOLD: And t her e had been. I t had gone back, as
we had dr awn down t he mi l i t ar y -- l et me go back a l i t t l e bi t i n
hi st or y even f ur t her back. I ' l l go back t o 1978.
DR. ' GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: When t hey shut down Ai r Def ense Command
I may be wr ong a year on t hat . I t mi ght have been ' 77. But
r eal l y we shut down Ai r Def ense Command and when Ai r Def ense
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Command was shut down, we di dn' t now how t o do t he ai r
sover ei gnt y mi ssi on even t hen. So some peopl e had made deci si ons
about what t o get r i d of , but a l ot of peopl e di d not t hi nk about
t he f ol l ow-on st r uct ur e t hat was r-equi r ed .
So we cr eat ed t hi s t hi ng cal l ed ADTAC and r eal l y t he
commander of ADTAC was cal l ed t he Deput y Commander of Tact i cal
Ai r Command f or Ai r Def ense. That ' s what ADTAC r eal l y st ood f o~.
DR. GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: Deput y Commander of Tact i cal Ai r Command
f or Ai r Def ense. Wel l , a deput y commander doesn' t do anyt hi ng and
I r emember t al ki ng t o t he commander at t he t i me had been t he
been out t her e and I ' m t r yi ng t o . t hi nk of hi s name-- i t wi l l come
t o me her e i n a mi nut e -- of what was t he i ssue.
And he t ol d me i n a conver sat i on I had wi t h hi m a f ew
year s ago t hat he t ol d t he Commander of Tact i cal Ai r Command t hi s
di d not make any sense and t hat t he st af f at Tact i cal Ai r Command
i n t hose days want ed not hi ng t o do wi t h any command or gani zat i on
bei ng r esponsi bl e f or t he ai r def ense of . t he Uni t ed St at es.
Wel l , event ual l y, t he power s t hat be r ose hi gher i n t he
power i n t he Ai r For ce and deci ded t hat i f you' r e goi ng t o have
t o do t hi s mi ssi on, t hen you have t o cr eat e a command
or gani zat i on. They cr eat ed 1st Ai r For ce. So, 1st Ai r For ce was
cr eat ed, ul t i mat el y moved t o Tyndal l , not necessar i l y f or al l t he
r i ght r easons, but moved t o Tyndal l anyway.
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And as we ended t he Col d War , but st i l l doi ng t he ai r
sover ei gnt y mi ssi on, st i l l r esponsi bl e f or what ever came f r om
wi t hout , t her e began t o be pr essur e t o cut t he budget even
f ur t her .
And I t al ked about i t bef or e: ni bbl i ng down.
So dur i ng t he QDR [ i . e. , Quadr enni al Def ense Revi ew]
t hat was essent i al l y t he 1996 QDR, but i t r eal l y wasnl t r el eased
unt i l about , you know, l at e i n ' 96, [ t hat t he] QDR got r el eased.
The QDR r educed t he ai r def ense por t i on of t hi s mi ssi on even
f ur t her and suggest ed t hat t her e onl y be f our dedi cat ed ai r
def ense f l yi ng uni t s and t hat any ot her r equi r ement s woul d be
suppl i ed by J oi nt For ces Command.
The good news i s t hat t he commander of NORAD at t he
t i me, GEN. Howel l Est es [ 27 August 1996 t o 13 August 1998] , woul d
not buy t hat and he f ought t o mai nt ai n seven al er t si t es at
l east .
Al so what was not vi si bl e i n t he QDR, but was behi nd
t he scenes was t hat i n t he budget ar ena t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r
For ce had t aken ever y ef f or t t o shut down 1st Ai r For ce al ong
wi t h, I mi ght add, 8t h Ai r For ce, and 13t h Ai r For ce because t hey
t hought t hat t hei r j obs had gone away. I can go i nt o a gr eat
deal of di scussi on about each of t hese, but 1111 st ay wi t h 1st
Ai r For ce.
So f r om 1997 essent i al l y unt i l t he end of 197 and
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per haps even unt i l cl ose t o t he end of ' 98 t her e st i l l had been a
l ot of di scussi on about shut t i ng down t hese number ed Ai r For ces.
The bot t om l i ne was i n t he Ai r For ce t hey deci ded t hat
t hey coul dn' t do away wi t h t hei r number ed Ai r For ces. They st i l l
had a j ob t o do f or t hem; but , even at t he l ast mi nut e, what used
t o be Tact i cal Ai r Command i s now, of cour se, Ai r Combat Command,
t he st af f went t o GEN. [ Ri char d E. ] Hawl ey, by t hi s t i me,
Commander of ACC [ i . e. , Ai r Cbmbat Command] and sai d, " What i s
your posi t i on on shut t i ng down 1st Ai r For ce?"
He sai d, " I don' t have a posi t i on. I s t her e a bet t er
way t o do t he mi ssi on?"
And, of cour se, t hat was news t o t hese f ol ks because
t hei r bel i ef was t hat t he r eason you wer e shut t i ng down 1st Ai r
For ce was because t her e was no mi ssi on.
They went back, t hey l ooked and t hey st udi ed. They
came back and f i nal l y, t he f i nal answer t o GEN Hawl ey was, " No,
we haven' t f ound a bet t er way t o do t he mi ssi on. "
The quest i on t hat t hey shoul d have been asked bef or e
t hey ever asked t he quest i on: I s t her e a bet t er way t o do t he
mi ssi on?
Or t hey shoul d have asked t hemsel ves and shoul d have
got t en a sat i sf act or y answer : I s t he mi ssi on no l onger a mi ssi on
of t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce?
DR. GROSS: Wel l , bef or e we go on t o t he event s of t he
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11 Sept ember , I t hi nk i t mi ght be a good t i me t o t al k about t he
RAM Team t hat you commi ssi oned sever al year s ago t o exami ne t hi s
quest i on of t he mi ssi on and wher e i t f i t i n t he f ut ur e of t he Ai r
For ce and t he Ai r Guar d.
MG ARNOLD: Yeah. Wel l , I ' d had a l ong conver sat i on
wi t h [ Col onel ] Dan Navi n ( Ret . ) [ Speci al Assi st ant t o MG Ar nol d] ,
r eal l y, f or a coupl e of year s about we needed a t eam t o go out
and do some anal ysi s. I t hought t hat t eam shoul d have been
sponsor ed by Ai r Combat Command. Ai r Combat Command. Or by t he
Nat i onal Guar d Bur eau. Someone. Because we had so l i t t l e
suppor t at t he Nat i onal Guar d Bur eau al one, we wer e -- we wer e
j ust somet hi ng t hat was event ual l y goi ng t o go away and nobody
gave us much suppor t .
So I knew t hat t he new QDR was comi ng up. I t was
supposed t o be r el eased and has been r el eased, obvi ousl y, i n t he
Year 2001. And so my goal was t o do a st udy t o l ook at t he
mi ssi on as we t al ked about bef or e. I s t her e a mi ssi on?
And number I, i f t her e i s no mi ssi on, t hen we ought t o
di vest our sel ves of t he r esour ces and f i gur e out a bet t er way t o
use t hese r esour ces doi ng anot her mi ssi on t hat we have.
I f t her e was a mi ssi on, whi ch I suspect ed t her e st i l l
was -- I mean t her e was a mi ssi on -- t hen we needed t o have - I
asked t he quest i on: . I s t her e a bet t er mor e ef f i ci ent not
necessar i l y mor e ef f i ci ent , but ef f i ci ent i s one par t of i t , but
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i s t her e a mor e ef f ect i ve way t o do t hi s mi ssi on and save
r esour ces and st i l l be abl e t o do t he mi ssi on?
So a st udy composed of most l y Guar d peopl e,
unf or t unat el y, but we i ncl uded act i ve dut y peopl e f r om Tact i cal
Ai r Command or ACC, Ai r Combat Command, and f r om NORAD i n t hat
st udy and t her e wer e act ual l y peopl e f r om t he Rand Cor por at i on i n-
t her e as wel l as Nat i onal Guar d Bur eau and 1st Ai r For ce
headquar t er s.
I chose Maj or Gener al Paul Pockmar a t o r un t hat st udy
because Paul , even t hough he was a Guar d gener al of f i cer , had
never been par t of Ai r Def ense Command and I want ed someone t o
head up t hi s st udy t hat was not l abel ed as a 1st Ai r For ce t ype
of f i cer .
And, of cour se, t he r esul t s of t hat wer e, t her e i s --
t her e i s st i l l a mi ssi on. Al l t he f our st ar s sai d so. And no
one t hought t hat we wer e goi ng t o st op doi ng aer ospace war ni ng
and aer ospace cont r ol agai nst ai r br eat hi ng t hr eat s t o Nor t h
Amer i ca.
And t hey al so di d an exhaust i ve st udy of anot her way,
doct r i nal l y sound way, of beddi ng t hi s mi ssi on down f r om a
headquar t er s per spect i ve i n anot her number ed ai r f or ce.
And t he answer si mpl y was t he ot her number ed ai r f or ces
wer e f ul l y engaged and had pl ent y t o do.
DR. GROSS: How di d peopl e i n t he Pent agon and
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t hr oughout t he Ai r For ce r espond t o your f i nal concl usi ons of
t hose st udi es?
MG ARNOLD: I t hought i t was usef ul . You know, I ' m not
sur e how much vi si bi l i t y i t had, but i t had enough vi si bi l i t y
t hat it t ur ned t he t i de, f i r st of al l , i n t he Guar d Bur eau.
DR. GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: I f ound t hat f r om a per sonal i t y poi nt of
vi ew t hat [ MAJ . ] GEN. Weaver , Paul Weave [ ANG Di r ect or ] , who had
never been a f oe, cer t ai nl y, but he began t o r eal ~ze because of
t he st udy and because of t he debr i ef i ng t hat we wer e goi ng t o be
ar ound f or a whi l e.
I t hi nk [ LT. ] GEN. [ Russ] Davi s [ Chi ef , Nat i onal Guar d
Bur eau] had deci ded at one t i me t hat we woul d not be ar ound f or a
l ong t i me and had expr essed t o me concer n over t he pot ent i al --
we wer e t al ki ng at t hat t i me about conver t i ng t he Al askan 611t h
Ai r Def ense Ai r Def ense Squadr on i nt o t he Ai r Nat i onal Guar d and
he was opposed t o t hat because he t hought t hat t he ai r def ense
mi ssi on was a sunset mi ssi on. But as a r esul t of t he Rol es and
Mi ssi on St udy, he concl uded t hat i t was not a sunset mi ssi on. I t
may not be a bi g mi ssi on, but i t was st i l l goi ng t o be t her e;
and, t her ef or e, t hen act i vel y suppor t ed t he conver si on of t he
611t h t o t he Ai r Nat i onal Guar d whi ch i s i n pr ogr ess as you know.
DR. GROSS: Okay. Wel l , so much f or t he pr el i mi nar i es.
Coul d you t al k about t he event s of 11 Sept ember and how you
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r eact ed and what act i ons wer e t aken her e? And whom t o do what .
I know i t l s a l ong st or y.
MG ARNOLD: I t i s a l ong st or y. On t he 11t h, we had
been engaged i n a NORAD Vi gi l ant Guar di an Exer ci se. I t was
basi cal l y a SEMEX, a command post t ype exer ci se. Then wel d been
oper at i ng -- had been i n f or about , agai n, f or f our days.
I was on t he mor ni ng of 11 of Sept ember I was up i n our
vi deo t el econf er enci ng f aci l i t y, j ust had a VTC wi t h t he NORAD
st af f . The CI NC, I donl t bel i eve was act ual l y pr esent dur i ng
t hat br i ef i ng, but hi s seni or st af f was.
And, as we wal ked out t he door , I got a -- somebody had
come upst ai r s and t hey gr abbed me and sai d, " We got a r eal wor l d
hi j acki ng goi ng on. "
And so I r an downst ai r s t o our bat t l e cab and up t o t he
upper dai s t her e, got on t he phone wi t h Col onel , [ Bob] Mar r , whol s'
t he Nor t heast er n Def ense Sect or [ Commander ] and he. t ol d me,
HBost on i s -- we donl t know wher e t he ai r pl ane i s, but Bost on i s,
has a f l i ght , Uni t ed Ai r l i ne f l i ght t hat t hey bel i eve has been
hi j acked.
H
And he sai d, HI ' ve got t he f i ght er s on cockpi t al er t . "
DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.
MG ARNOLD: Now, l et me expl ai n t hi s. The pr ocedur e
f or us r espondi ng t o a hi j ack i s f or t he FAA [ i . e. , Feder al
Avi at i on Admi ni st r at i on] t o go t o t he Depar t ment of Def ense and
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r equest assi st ance. I t ' s consi der ed a l aw enf or cement i ssue.
DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.
MG ARNOLD: They t hen, t he Depar t ment of Def ense, i f
t hey agr ee t o t ake t hi s on ar e t hen supposed t o go t o CI NC NORAD.
He t hen comes down us and di r ect s us t o l aunch ai r pl anes i n
suppor t of t he hi j acked ai r pl ane.
DR. GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: You can i magi ne how l ong t hat mi ght t ake.
DR. GROSS: Qui t e a bi t , yeah.
MG ARNOLD: But i n r eal i t y, as soon as I got i n t her e,
Bob Mar r , he says, " I t hi nk, " he says, " I t hi nk we need t o
scr ambl e t he ai r pl anes. II
I . sai d, " Go ahead and scr ambl e t hem and we' l l hol d t hem
out i n 105 unt i l we get t he necessar y cl ear ance. II
I ' m on t he phone i n t he meant i me, si mul t aneousl y
t al ki ng t o t he NJ 3, Gener al Ri ck Fi nl ey, who i s br and spanki ng
new, up at NORAD. He' s a Canadi an of f i cer and he sai d,
" Absol ut el y, we' l l go ahead and suppor t i t . "
By t hem I ' m l ooki ng -- as I -- as we' r e t al ki ng about
scr ambl i ng t he ai r pl anes whi ch was at 8: 46, t he news f l ash
suddenl y came up on t el evi si on and we saw t hi s smoki ng hol e i n
t he si de of t he Nor t h Tower of t he Wor l d Tr ade Cent er and t he
t hought t hat went t hr ough my mi nd was, " I wonder i f t hi s coul d be
a hi j acked ai r pl ane. II I al most di smi ssed i t because I knew t hat
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t he hi j ack was out of Bost on.
DR. GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: And we di dn' t know wher e t he ai r pl ane was.
We j ust knew t hat we wer e bei ng r equest ed f or assi st ance. But
i n t he meant i me, t hi s occur r ed.
Shor t l y af t er t hat , t hat par t i cul ar col l i si on wi t h t hat
Uni t ed Ai r l i ne f l i ght t hat col l i ded i nt o t he Wor l d Tr ade Cent er
was conf i r med as a hi j acked ai r pl ane. But I don' t bel i eve at
t hat t i me t hat t hat wor d had got t en t o me. I t had j ust been
conf i r med; but we di d not r ecei ve t hat i nf or mat i on. And i n t he
f og and f r i ct i on of war as you know t her e, t he next t hi ng t hat I
saw was t hi s ot her ai r pl ane f l yi ng i nt o t he Sout h Tower as many
of us saw.
And by t hen, you know, t hi s was -- you begi n t o r eal i ze
t hat one coul d be an acci dent : some ai r pl ane has f l own i nt o t he
Tower . Two? Thi s l ooks l i ke some sor t of concer t ed ef f or t .
Ar e you get t i ng r eady t o t ur n t hat t hi ng over ? What
ar e you t hi nki ng about doi ng?
DR. GROSS: I can t ake a l ook.
( Of f t he r ecor d. )
DR. GROSS: We' r e f i ne.
MG ARNOLD: Al l r i ght . By now we begi n t o get ot her
cal l s. By t he way, t he second ai r pl ane, t he Amer i can Ai r l i nes 70
-- no, 11, yeah. Amer i can Ai r l i ne 11 I bel i eve i t was.
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DR. GROSS: Okay.
MG ARNOLD: Had cr ashed i nt o t he Sout h Tower . By now,
we ar e get t i ng cal l s about a Uni t ed Ai r l i ne t hat had t aken of f
out of Newar k and was now wonder i ng ar ound up i n Ohi o ar ea t her e
and we had a cal l t hat t hat was a possi bl e hi j acki ng.
And so we wat ched -- we wer e t r yi ng t o f i gur e out wher e
he' s goi ng. At one t i me, we t hought t hat ai r pl ane was goi ng t o
Cl evel and. He went by Cl evel and. We t hought maybe he was goi ng
t o Chi cago. We t r i ed t o get ai r pl anes ai r bor ne out of Tol edo.
We t hought -- at one t i me we got a cal l f or a Del t a
f l i ght . And t hat Del t a f l i ght was t hought t o be a possi bl e
hi j acki ng;
We l ooked at t he ai r bor ne ai r pl anes we had up i n
Mi chi gan t o see i f t hey coul d be any hel p t o us. Nobody was i n
posi t i on. The Del t a Ai r l i nes [ f l i ght ] event ual l y l anded. The
Uni t ed 93 st ar t ed headi ng sout h. We scr ambl ed we, t al ki ng t he
nor t heast [ ai r def ense sect or ] , t al ki ng t o Bob Mar r , we scr ambl ed
t hr ee ai r pl anes out of t he Langl ey det achment of t he 119t h and
headed t hem t o Washi ngt on, D. C. t o put t hem over head i n case t hat
Uni t ed 93 was comi ng.
I n t he meant i me, as we wer e goi ng t hr ough t hi s pr ocess
o~ get t i ng t hese guys ai r bor ne, we get a cal l of a possi bl e
hi j acki ng of Amer i can Ai r l i ner 77, t he one t hat hi t t he Pent agon.
Had no cl ue wher e i t was. Di dn' t see i t . No poi nt out on t hi s
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t hi ng.
And t hen we get a phone cal l t hat i t ' s headed t owar ds
Washi ngt on, D. C. We di dn' t know whet her i t was headed t owar ds
Washi ngt on, D. C. , f r om t he nor t h, t he sout h, di dn' t know.
And, i n f act , I wasn' t so sur e t hat one of t hose
ear l i er cal l ed hi j acki ngs mi ght have been headed down t owar ds
Washi ngt on, D. C. , and some ot her ai r pl anes had r un i nt o t he, i nt O
t he Wor l d Tr ade Cent er .
But we t hen wat ched t he smoke go up i n Washi ngt on,
D. C. , we di dn' t know wher e i t was at t he t i me. As our ai r pl anes
ar e get t i ng ai r bor ne, t hey come up Washi ngt on, D. C. We' r e
wat chi ng t hi s Uni t ed -- by now we know i t i s t he Pent agon. We' r e
wat chi ng t hi s ai r pl ane and we' r e t hi nki ng, " We' r e goi ng t o have
t o out and shoot t hi s ai r pl ane down. "
I n my mi nd, i t wasn' t even a quest . i on of ROE. I t was a
quest i on of we had had host i l e act s and, t her ef or e, we had a
cl ear ance t o f i r e.
Now, t heor et i cal l y, It hi nk t hat i s t r ue under . our
exi st i ng ROE. I t woul dn' t be t r ue t oday, but I don' t bel i eve
t hat Ineeded t he Pr esi dent t o t el l me t o do t hat . As i t t ur ns
out , t hat ai r pl ane, you know t he passenger s we bel i eve r ushed
f or war d on t hat ai r pl ane. That ai r pl ane cr ashed up I n
Pennsyl vani a and we di d not have t o or der t hat ai r pl ane t o be
shot down.
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As i t t ur ns out , t he Vi ce Pr esi dent had decl ar ed, gi ven
CI NC NORAD t he aut hor i t y t o shoot down ai r l i ner s t hat had shown
host i l e i nt ent i n t he Uni t ed St at es about t hr ee mi nut es af t er t he
Uni t ed 93 cr ashed. So t he l ast ai r pl ane cr ashed bef or e we got
cl ear ance.
I n t he meant i me -- I di dn' t know i t at t he t i me, but
t he Whi t e House Secr et Ser vi ce had cal l ed up Andr ews [ Ai r For ce
Base, Mar yl and t o t he 113
th
Wi ng, Di st r i ct of Col umbi a Ai r
Nat i onal Guar d] and Andr ews had got t en [ F-16) ai r pl anes ai r bor ne
out of Andr ews and t hey t o f l y under neat h our CAP whi ch was over
Washi ngt on, D. C. We wer e up ar ound 20, 000 f eet ; t hey wer e f l yi ng
down r eal l y l ow and t al ki ng di r ect l y t o Washi ngt on Appr oach
Cont r ol whi ch mi ght have been a bet t er t hi ng t o do because t he
r adar s t hat wer e bei ng used by t he FAA wer e much bet t er t han t he
r adar s we wer e usi ng. Our r adar s ar e l ong-r ange r adar s as I sai d
bef or e. They wer e t al ki ng t o Appr oach Cont r ol and pr obabl y had a
bet t er pi ct ur e of what i s goi ng on.
DR. GROSS: Mm-hmm.
MG ARNOLD: .I n t he meant i me, t he Vi ce Pr esi dent had.
decl ar ed Washi ngt on [ DC) a f r ee f i r e zone, any ai r pl ane t hat was
ent er i ng t he Washi ngt on, D. C. ar ea was t ol d t o t ur n ar ound or be
shot down or l and i mmedi at el y.
And, by t he way, i n t he mi ddl e of al l t hi s f og of war ,
. we ended up wi t h 21 unknown or 21 pot ent i al hi j acked ai r pl anes.
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Ther e wer e no mor e, but we wer e wor ki ng al l of t hem at t hat t i me.
We knew t hat t he Pr esi dent was down i n Fl or i da. We
asked i f we we di dn' t know what he . was goi ng t o do.
Event ual l y, we asked t he quest i on i f he t akes of f do we need t o
.escor t ?
We wer e t ol d no. But t hen t he ai r pl ane t ook of f and we
)
got i mmedi at e wor d t hat t he Secr et Ser vi ce had asked us t o
escor t .
DR. GROSS: Gees.
MG ARNOLD: And we wer e i n posi t i on anyway. At t hat
t i me, we had f i ght er s ai r bor ne al l over -- we wer e st ar t i ng t o
get mul t i pl e f i ght er s al l over t he count r y t o become ai r bor ne.
We di ver t ed an AWACS ai r cr af t t hat was on a t r ai ni ng
f l i ght . We had di ver t ed t hem ear l i er over t o wher e t he Pr esi dent
was, down t her e i n t he Sar asot a ar ea of Fl or i da. And so t he
AWACS was comi ng acr oss Fl or i da f r om t he east coast . He t hought
he was on some ki nd of an exer ci se, not a r eal wor l d t hi ng. And
we event ual l y escor t ed t he Pr esi dent al l t he way over t o
Bar ksdal e Air For ce Base.
We di dn' t know wher e he was goi ng, t hey woul dn' t say.
We l anded t he. f i ght er s at Bar ksdal e Ai r For ce Base. We had ot her
f i ght er s pr epar ed t o cover . AWACS r emai ned on or bi t . We had
t anker s. We wer e di ver t i ng t anker s, scr ambl i ng t anker s i n or der
t o cover t hi s.
NCT0070457
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The Pr esi dent subsequent l y t ook of f agai n, you know,
about an hour l at er I bel i eve and pr oceeded t o Of f ut t Ai r For ce
Base and we, agai n, we di d not know wher e he was goi ng, but our
f i ght er s t 09k of f wi t h hi m, escor t ed hi m up t o Of f ut t , had AWACS
over head as wel l . And t hen af t er -- ' when he was at Of f ut t , he
was t al ki ng t o t he Secr et ar y of Def ense. I r el at ed t hat t o you
t hi s mor ni ng.
I t hi nk t he l ast unknown we had was a US Ai r ways f l i ght
t hat had t aken of f out of Madr i d, Spai n, and was headed t o New
Yor k and had been r epor t ed as a possi bl e hi j acki ng.
And t he Nor t heast Ai r Def ense Sect or , wor ki ng t hr ough
t he FAA had cal l ed US Ai r ' s headquar t er s and t hey sai d, " No. We
j ust t al ked t o t he pi l ot s and t hey' r e back on t he gr ound at
Madr i d. They t ur ned ar ound. Not hi j acked. "
And t hat was . t he end of t he bi g r un/ f l ur r y of possi bl e
hi j acki ngst hat we wer e supposed t o have at t hat t i me. The
Pr esi dent t hen got back i n hi s ai r pl ane and pr oceeded back t o
D. C. But even doi ng t hat , we wer e escor t i ng f r om t he r ear . We
,
had been t ol d t o st ay back. We wer e back 5 t o 10 mi l es j ust
wat chi ng. And I t hi nk t he Secr et Ser vi ce st i l l not knowi ng t hat
we wer e t her e, f og and f r i ct i on of war , t ol d t he Di st r i ct of
Col umbi a [ ANG] t o i nt er cept t he Pr esi dent comi ng back i nt o
Washi ngt on.
And t hey di d. They came up and j oi ned r i ght up on t he
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wi ngs of t he ai r pl ane. Ther e was a l ot of pi ct ur es t aken at t hat
par t i cul ar t i me.
DR. GROSS: Yes.
MG ARNOLD: But we di dn' t or der t hem f r om NORAD t o do
t hat . That was j ust Secr et Ser vi ce t r yi ng t o do t hei r own t hi ng
out t her e and t he Pr esi dent came back and l anded i n Washi ngt on,
D. C.
I n t he meant i me, we wer e -- we sat down wi t h a map. I
j ust dr ew circles ar ound about 15 maj or met r opol i t an ar eas.
DR. GROSS: Nobody was t el l i ng you t o do t hi s at t hi s
t i me?
MG ARNOLD: No.
DR. GROSS: You j ust sai d, " Hey, do t hi s. "
MG ARNOLD: " Let ' s do t hi s. "
And we st ar t ed f l owi ng ai r cr af t . We st ar t ed get t i ng
communi cat i ons wi t h al l t hese f i ght er uni t s. Some wer e 1st Ai r
For ce uni t s. Many -- most wer e not . And we st ar t ed put t i ng
peopl e on al er t st at us and as t hey woul d l oad t hei r ai r pl anes and
st ar t ed l aunchi ng t hem i nt o t hese or bi t s up i nt o t o cover t he
popul at i on cent er s.
We di scover ed t hat t he Navy had pushed shi ps but t o sea
on t he east coast event ual l y, wi t hi n t he next 12-13 hour s,
unbel i evabl e r esponse t i me. [U.S.S.] Geor ge Washi ngt on was of f
t he coast up by New Yor k. [U.5.5.] J FK [ J ohn F. Kennedy] was
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al so on t he east coast . We wor ked wi t h ADM Dawson out of 2nd
Fl eet and he r eadi l y under st ood doct r i ne. I t ' s a good t hi ng we' d
been st udyi ng doct r i ne. CI NC NORAD had al r eady been decl ar ed t he
suppor t ed CI NCo He r ol l ed t hose f or ces r i ght under neat h us.
We r ol l ed t he Geor ge Washi ngt on under t he Nor t heast Ai r
Def ense Sect or . We r ol l ed t he J FK under t he Sout heast Ai n
Def ense Sect or and t hei r Aegi s Cr ui ser s al so wer e al ong wi t h t hem
and we r ol l ed t hem r i ght under t he same t hi ng. And t hat r eal l y
was wor ki ng out f r om our per spect i ve pr et t y wel l at t hat t i me.
J oe, I ' mgoi ng t o have t o st op and get wi t h you agai n.
DR. GROSS: Okay. Gr eat , t hank you ver y much.
( The i nt er vi ew was adj our ned. )
SECRE~
NCT0070460

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