STATCON Case Digests

ROUND 1
1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977)
Chapter I, Page 2, Footote No.3
F!C"#$
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy.
Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court has no
!urisdiction to ta"e further cogni#ance of this case$ without pre!udice to the re%filing
thereof in the Juvenile &ourt, 'ecause he 'elieved that !urisdiction over 1( years olds
up to under )1 was transferred to the Juvenile &ourt 'y the issuance of P* (+, or the
&hild and -outh .elfare &ode, which defines youthful offenders as those over /
years of age 'ut under )1 at the time of the commission of the offense.
I##%&$
.01 the issuance of P* (+, transferred the case of the accused from the
regular courts to the Juvenile &ourt.
'&L($
2he Juvenile and *omestic Relations &ourt e3pressly confers upon it a special
and limited !urisdiction over criminal cases wherein the accused is under 1( years of
age at the time of the filing of the case$. 2he su'se4uent issuance of P* (+, "nown
as the &hild and -outh .elfare &ode and defines a youth offender as one who is
over / years of age 'ut under )1 at the time of the commission of the offense$ did
not 'y such definition transfer !urisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who
are 1( and under )1 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile &ourt.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,5
Primicias v. Municipality of 6rdaneta
Case No. 244
G.R. No. L-2*7+2 (,cto-er 1., 1979)
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Petitioner, while driving his car in the !urisdiction of 6rdaneta, was charged
with violation of 7rdinance 1o. ,, 8eries of 1/(9, particularly, for overta"ing a truc"$.
Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the
issuance of preliminary in!unction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said
ordinance.
I##%&$
.01 7rdinance 1o. ,, 8eries of 1/(9, 'y the Municipality of 6rdaneta,
Pangasinan is valid.
'&L($
1o. 7rdinance 1o. , is said to 'e patterned after and 'ased on 8ection 5, of
:ct 1o. ,//). However, :ct 1o. ,//) has 'een e3plicitly repealed 'y R: 1o. 91,(
;2he <and and 2ransportation &ode=. >y this e3press repeal, the general rule is that a
later law prevails over an earlier law. :lso, an essential re4uisite for a valid ordinance
is that it must not contravene ? the statute$ for it is fundamental principle that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and su'ordinate to the laws of the state.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9, (c, 9/
&asco Philippine &hemical &o. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro @imene#
Case No. 4.
G.R. No. L-17931 (Fe-r/ar0 2., 19*3)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought
the refund of the margin fees relying on R: )(+/ ;Aoreign B3change Margin Aee <aw=
stating that the &entral >an" of the Philippines fi3ed a uniform margin fee of )5C on
foreign e3change transactions. However, the :uditor of the >an" refused to pass in
audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that PetitionerDs separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of 8ec. ),
par. 1E of R: )(+/. 2he pertinent portion of this statute readsF 2he margin
esta'lished 'y the Monetary >oard ? shall 'e imposed upon the sale of foreign
e3change for the importation of the followingF GHIII. 6rea formaldehyde for the
manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported 'y and for the e3clusive use
of end%users.$
I##%&$
.01 urea$ and formaldehyde$ are e3empt 'y law from the payment of the
margin fee.
'&L($
2he term urea formaldehyde$ used in 8ec. ) of R: )(+/ refers to the finished
product as e3pressed 'y the 1ational Institute of 8cience and 2echnology, and is
distinct and separate from urea and formaldehyde$ which are separate chemicals
used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. 2he one mentioned in the law is a finished
product, while the ones imported 'y the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the
importation of urea$ and formaldehyde$ is not e3empt from the imposition of the
margin fee.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (c, )5a

:storga v. Hillegas
Case No. 23
G.R. No. L-23471 (!pr23 3+, 1974)
F!C"#$
House >ill 1o. /)(( was passed from the House of Representatives to the
8enate. 8enator :rturo 2olentino made su'stantial amendments which were
approved 'y the 8enate. 2he House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter
signed its approval until all the presiding officers of 'oth houses certified and attested
to the 'ill. 2he President also signed it and thereupon 'ecame R: 9+(5. 8enator
2olentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House >ill 1o. /)(( was a
wrong version of the 'ill 'ecause it did not em'ody the amendments introduced 'y
him and approved 'y the 8enate. >oth the 8enate President and the President
withdrew their signatures and denounced R: 9+(5 as invalid. Petitioner argued that
the authentication of the presiding officers of the &ongress is conclusive proof of a
'illDs due enactment.
I##%&$
.01 House >ill 1o. /)(( is considered enacted and valid.
'&L($
8ince 'oth the 8enate President and the &hief B3ecutive withdrew their
signatures therein, the court declared that the 'ill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not 'ecome a law.
2he &onstitution re4uires that each House shall "eep a !ournal. :n importance
of having a !ournal is that in the a'sence of attestation or evidence of the 'illDs due
enactment, the court may resort to the !ournals of the &ongress to verify such.
.here the !ournal discloses that su'stantial amendment were introduced and
approved and were not incorporated in the printed te3t sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the 'ill has not 'een duly enacted and did not
'ecome a law.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernande#, etc., and 8armiento
Case No. 133
G.R. No. L-7991 (Ma0 31, 1917)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a &hinese merchant who 4uestions the constitutionality of R:
11E+ :n :ct to Regulate the Retail >usiness$ on the following groundsF a= It is a
violation of the B4ual Protection of the <aw &lause, denies them of their li'erty,
property and due process of law )= It is a violation of the constitutional re4uirement
that a 'illDs title must reflect the su'!ect matter of the same 'ecause regulate$ does
not really mean nationali#e$ and prohi'it$ ,= the :ct violates International treaties
and <aws
I##%&$
.01 R: 11E+ is constitutional.
'&L($
R: 11E+ is constitutional. In the a'ovementioned case, what has 'een
pointed out is the constitutional re4uirement that : 'ill shall em'race only one
su'!ect as e3pressed in its title.$ 2his is to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'ecause the
title must 'e a'le to apprise legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and
conse4uences of that particular law. &onstitution precludes the encroaching of one
department to the responsi'ilities of the other departments. 2he legislature is primarily
the !udge of necessity, ade4uacy, wisdom, reasona'leness, and e3pediency of the
law, and the courts have no !urisdiction to 4uestion this.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )9a, d
Municipality of Jose Pangani'an v. 8hell &o. of the Philippines
Case No. 1.1
G.R. No. L-2171* (4/30 2., 19**)
F!C"#$
2his is an appeal from the decision of the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila
dismissing the PlaintiffDs complaint for the collection of sales ta3es from *efendant on
the ground that the law which authori#es collection of the same is unconstitutional.
*efendant &ompany refused to pay ta3es accruing from its sales 'ecause
according to them the ta3a'le sites of the property sought to 'e ta3ed is not the said
Municipality. :ccording to the *efendant, R: 19,5 or :ct to Provide Means for
Increasing Highway 8pecial Aund is unconstitutional 'ecause it em'races two
su'!ects which are 1=amendment of the ta3 code, and )= grant of ta3ing power to
the local government, and ma"es reference to Road and >ridge Aund.
I##%&$
.01 R: 19,5 is constitutional.
'&L($
R: 19,5 is constitutional 'ecause it em'races only one su'!ect reflected 'y its
title Road and >ridge Aund.5 8tatutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
term. 2he constitutional re4uirement as to the title of the 'ill must 'e li'erally
construed. It should not 'e technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power
of legislation. .hen there is dou't as to its validity, it must 'e resolved against the
dou't and in favor of its validity. In the a'ovementioned cases, what is pointed out is
the constitutional re4uirement that : 'ill shall em'race only one su'!ect, e3pressed
in its title.$ 2his is to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'ecause the title must 'e a'le to
apprise legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and conse4uences of
that particular law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1)a, ,7, d
People of the Philippines v. >uenvia!e
Case No. 2+3
G.R. No. L-22941 (March 3, 1921)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footote No.4*
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*efendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the
violation of illegal practice of medicine$ and illegally advertising oneself as a
doctor.$ *efendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a
certificate to practice medicine. 8he Itreated and manipulatedD the head and 'ody
of Regino 1o'le. 8he also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do
with medicine and that unauthori#ed use of title of doctor$ should 'e understood to
refer to doctor of medicine$ and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that :ct
,111 is unconstitutional as it does not e3press its su'!ect.
I##%&$
.01 chiropractic$ is included in the term practice of medicine$ under
Medical laws provided in the Revised :dministrative &ode.
'&L($
:ct ,111 is constitutional as the title :n :ct to :mend ;enumeration of
sections to 'e amended=$ is sufficient and it need not include the su'!ect matter of
each section. I&hiropracticD is included in the Ipractice of medicine.D 8tatutory
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. 2he constitutional re4uirement as
to the title of the 'ill must 'e li'erally construed. It should not 'e technically or
narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. .hen there is dou't as to
its validity, it must 'e resolved against the dou't and in favor of its validity. : 'ill shall
em'race only one su'!ect, e3pressed in its title,$ to prohi'it duplicity in legislation 'y
apprising legislators and the pu'lic a'out the nature, scope, and conse4uences of
the law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 7a, )5c, ,7, d
:lalayan v. 1ational Power &orporation
Case No. .
G.R. No. L-2439* (4/30 29, 19*.)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footote No.4*
F!C"#$
Repu'lic :ct 1o. ,+9, is entitled :n :ct to Aurther :mend &ommonwealth
:ct 1o. 1)1$. In 8ection , of the same act, Respondent is empowered, in any
franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 5+C of the electric
power and energy of that franchisee, to reali#e a net profit of not more than 1)C
annually of its investments plus )%month operating e3pensesJ and 1P& is allowed to
renew all e3isting franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could 'e given
effect.
I##%&$
.01 8ection , is a su'!ect which the 'ill title :n :ct to Aurther :mend
&ommonwealth :ct 1o. 1)1$ does not em'race, thus ma"ing it a rider 'ecause it is
violative of the constitutional provision re4uiring that a 'ill, which may 'e enacted
into law, cannot em'race more than one su'!ect, which shall 'e e3pressed in its
title.$
'&L($
8ection , is constitutional.
Repu'lic :ct ,+9, is an amendatory act. It is sufficient that the title ma"es
reference to the legislation to 'e amended ;in this case &ommonwealth :ct 1)1=.
&onstitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the
general o'!ect which the statute see"s to effect without e3pressing each and every
ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. 2itle doesnDt need to 'e a
complete inde3 of the contents of the act.
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)9a, ,7, d
&ordero v. Hon. &a'atuando
Case No. .1
G.R. No. L-14142 (,cto-er 31, 19*2)
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Repu'lic :ct 1o. 11// is the :gricultural 2enancy :ct of the Philippines.
8ection 59 of this act e3pressed that indigent tenants should 'e represented 'y
Pu'lic *efendant of *epartment of <a'or. &ongress then amended this in Repu'lic
:ct 1o. ))(,F :n :ct :mending &ertain 8ections of Repu'lic :ct 1o. 11//.$ 8ection
1/ of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under
authority of 8ecretary of Justice. 8ection )+ also provides that indigent tenants shall
'e represented 'y trial attorney of the 2enancy Mediation &ommission.
I##%&$
.01 8ections 1/ and )+ of Rep. :ct 1o. ))(, is unconstitutional 'ecause of
the constitutional provision that 1o 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall
em'race more than one su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$
'&L($
8ections 1/ and )+ are constitutional.
2he constitutional re4uirement is complied with as long the law has a single
general su'!ect, which is the :gricultural 2enancy :ct, and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may 'e, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general su'!ect, will 'e regarded as valid. &onstitutional
provisions relating to su'!ect matter and titles of statutes should not 'e so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation.
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)9a, ,7, d
2o'ias v. :'alos
Case No. 291
G.R. No. L-1147.3 ((ece6-er ., 1994)
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Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Repu'lic :ct 1o. 7(75, otherwise
"nown as K:n :ct &onverting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
6r'ani#ed &ity to 'e "nown as the &ity of Mandaluyong$ 'ecause :rticle HIII,
8ection 9/ of this act provided that the congressional district of 8an Juan0
Mandaluyong shall 'e split into two separate districts.
I##%&$
.01 the aforestated su'!ect is germane to the su'!ect matter of R.:. 1o.
7(75.
'&L($
R: 7(75 is constitutional.
&ontrary to PetitionersL assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a su'!ect separate and distinct from the su'!ect of its
conversion into a highly ur'ani#ed city 'ut is a natural and logical conse4uence of its
conversion into a highly ur'ani#ed city
Moreover, a li'eral construction of the Kone title%one su'!ectK rule has 'een
invaria'ly adopted 'y this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. 2he
&onstitution does not re4uire &ongress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully inde3 or catalogue all the contents and
the minute details therein.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)+a, d
:yson and Ignacio v. Provincial >oard of Ri#al
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 14+19 (4/30 2*, 1919)
F!C"#F
2he municipal council of 1avotas, Ri#al adopted its 7rdinance 1o. 1,, section
) of which provided that all owners and proprietors of the industry "nown as fishing,
with nets denominated Icua"itD and Ipantu"os,D 'efore engaging in fishing in the 'ay
of this !urisdiction within three leagues from the shore%line of this municipality, are
o'liged to provide themselves with a license issued 'y this municipal government,
after payment of a fee of P5+ annually, paya'le every three months.$ 2he authority
for the enactment of the ordinance was from section ))7+ of the :dministrative
&ode.
I##%&$
.01 8ection ))7+ of the :dministrative &ode of 1/1(, now 8ection ),)9 of the
:dministrative &ode of 1/17, is invalid.
'&L(F
8ection ))7+ of the :dministrative &ode of 1/1(, now section ),), of the
:dministrative &ode of 1/17 is valid. It does not violate Paragraph 17, section 5 of
the Philippine >ill which provided that no private or local 'ill which may 'e enacted
into law shall em'race more than one su'!ect, and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in
the title of the 'ill$ 'ecause the :dministrative &ode is neither a private nor a local
'ill.
2he :dministrative &ode of 1/17 has for its title, :n :ct amending the
:dministrative &ode.$ It does not violate Paragraph 17, section , of the Jones <aw,
which provided that no 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more
than one su'!ect and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill,$ 'ecause
it was merely a revision of the provisions of the :dministrative &ode enacted for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones <aw and the Reorgani#ation :ct.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7
<idasan v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 14.
G.R. No. L-2.+.9 (,cto-er 21, 19*7)
F!C"#F
Petitioner challenged Repu'lic :ct 97/+, which is entitled :n :ct &reating
the Municipality of *ianaton in the Province of <anao del 8ur$ as unconstitutional on
the ground that it includes 'arrios located in another province, which is &ota'ato,
violating the constitutional mandate that 1o 'ill which may 'e enacted into law
shall em'race more than one su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$
2his 4uestion was initially presented to the Respondents, which adopted a resolution
in favor of R: 97/+, prompted 'y the upcoming elections.
I##%&$
.01 Repu'lic :ct 97/+ is constitutional.
'&L($
Repu'lic :ct 97/+ is null and void. 2he title :n :ct &reating the Municipality
of *ianaton, in the Province of <anao del 8ur$ pro!ects the impression that solely the
province of <anao del 8ur is affected 'y the creation of *ianaton. 1ot the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the ad!acent province of &ota'ato are
incorporated in this new <anao del 8ur town. 2he phrase in the Province of <anao
del 8ur$ ma"es the title misleading and deceptive. 2he title did not inform the
mem'ers of the &ongress as to the full impact of the lawJ it did not apprise the
people in the towns of &ota'ato that were affected 'y the law, and the province of
&ota'ato itself that part of their territory is 'eing ta"en away from their towns and
provinces and added to the ad!acent Province of <anao del 8urJ it "ept the pu'lic in
the dar" as to what towns and provinces were actually affected 'y the 'ill. 2hese
are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Repu'lic :ct
97/+.
L!"IN M!)IM$
d
Manila 2rading M 8upply &o. v. Reyes
Case No. 1*9
G.R. No. 432*3 (,cto-er 31, 1931)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footote No. 13
F!C"#F
Respondent e3ecuted a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. He failed to
pay some of the installments. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage.
2he mortgaged property was sold at a pu'lic auction 'y the sheriff of the &ity of
Manila. :fter applying this sum, with interest, costs, and li4uidated damages to
RespondentDs inde'tedness, the latter owed the company a 'alance of P)75.97 with
interest. 2he company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the
deficiency of the de't. He pleaded as a defense that the company, having chosen
to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against him for the recovery
of the unpaid 'alance owed 'y him, as provided 'y :ct 1o. 91)).
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. 91)), entitled :n :ct to amend the &ivil &ode 'y inserting
'etween 8ections fourteen hundred and fifty%four and fourteen hundred and fifty%five
thereof a new section, to 'e "nown as section fourteen hundred and fifty%four%:,$ is
valid.
'&L(F
:ct 1o. 91)) is valid and enforcea'le. 2he controlling purpose of :ct 1o.
91)) is revealed to 'e to close the door to a'uses committed in connection with the
foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were paya'le in installments.
2he general rule is adopted in this !urisdiction to the effect that a title which
declares a statute to 'e an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the
precise nature of the amendatory act need not 'e further stated. 2he proper
approach in cases of this character should 'e to resolve all presumptions in favor of
the validity of an act in the a'sence of a clear conflict 'etween it and the
&onstitution.
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/a, ,7
People of the Philippines v. Aerrer
Case No. 2+.
G.R. No. L-32*13-14 ((ece6-er 27, 1972)
Chapter I, Page 13, Footote No.1+
F!C"#$
Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Repu'lic
:ct 1o. 17++, otherwise "nown as the :nti%8u'version :ct. R: 17++ outlaws the
&ommunist Party of the Philippines ;&PP= and other su'versive associations$ and
punishes any person who "nowingly, willfully and 'y overt acts affiliates himself with,
'ecomes or remains a mem'er$ of the &PP or any other organi#ation su'versive$ in
nature. 2ayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its
constitutional violations. 2he lower court declared the statute void on the grounds
that it was a 'ill of attainder and that it is vague and over'road. 2he cases were
dismissed, to which the @overnment appealed.
I##%&$
.01 the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on 'ill titles.
'&L($
-es. 2he title of the 'ill need not 'e a catalogue or an inde3 of its contents,
and need not recite the details of the :ct. It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms
the nature, scope and conse4uences of the proposed law and its operation. :
narrow and technical construction is to 'e avoided, and the statute will 'e read fairly
and reasona'ly in order not to thwart the legislative intent. 2he :nti%8u'version act
fully satisfies these re4uirements.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /d, 51d
*el Rosario v. &ar'onell, et al.
Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-3247* (,cto-er 2+, 197+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner 4uestions the constitutionality of R: (1,). 2he said :ct purportedly
encompasses more than one su'!ect for the title of the :ct allegedly fails to include
the phrase 27 PR7P78B :MB1*MB128 27 2HB &7182I262I71 7A 2HB PHI<IPPI1B8.$
2he statute plainly readsF :n :ct Implementing Resolution to >oth Houses 1um'ered
2wo as :mended 'y Resolution of >oth Houses 1um'ered Aour of the &ongress of the
Philippines &alling for a &onstitutional &onvention, Providing for Proportional
Representation 2herein and 7ther *etails Relating to the Blection of *elegates to and
the Holding of the &onstitutional &onvention, Repealing for the Purpose Repu'lic :ct
Aour 2housand 1ine Hundred Aourteen, and for 7ther Purposes.$
I##%&$
.01 R: (1,) is unconstitutional for em'racing more than one su'!ect.
'&L($
1o. 2he inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary 'ecause
the title e3pressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on 'oth Houses 1os. )
and 9 respectively of 1/(7 and 1/(/, and 'oth Resolutions 1o. ) and 9 li"ewise
categorically state in their titles that the &onstitutional &onvention called for therein is
to propose amendments to the &onstitution of the Philippines,$ which phrase is
reiterated in 8ec. 1 of 'oth Resolutions.
2he power to propose amendments to the &onstitution is implied in the call
for the convention itself, whose raison dDetre is to revise the present &onstitution. It is
not re4uired that the title of the 'ill 'e an inde3 to the 'ody of the act or 'e
comprehensive in matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general
su'!ect and reasona'ly covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead
&ongress or the people. :ll the details provided for in R: (1,) are germane to and
are comprehended 'y its title.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /d, 51d
People of the Philippines v. Haleriano Halensoy y Masa
Case No. 23+
G.R. No. L-9*19 (Ma0 29, 1917)
F!C"#$
*efendant was charged in the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila for violation of
8ection )( of :ct 1o. 17E+ 'y concealment of a 'olo. 2he defendant moved to
4uash the information on the ground that the title of the act, which was an :ct to
regulate the importation, ac4uisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to
prohi'it the possession of same e3cept in compliance with the provisions of this :ct,$
did not include weapons other than firearms, and that 8ection )( violated the
constitutional provision that no 'ill which may 'e enacted into law shall em'race
more than one su'!ect which shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$
I##%&#$
1. .01 :ct 1o. 17E+ violated the one su'!ect%one title rule
). .01 it was inconsistent with the &onstitution.
'&L($
1o. :t the time of the enactment of :ct 1o. 17E+ on 7cto'er 1), 1/+7, the
one su'!ect%one title rule referred to private and local 'ills only, and to 'ills to 'e
enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and e3isting at the time
the 1/,5 &onstitution too" effect. 2he provision of 8ection )( germane to the su'!ect
e3pressed in the title of the :ct remained operative 'ecause it was not inconsistent
with the &onstitution, pursuant to 8ection ) of :rticle GHI of the 1/,5 &onstitution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a, ,(a, 9(a, 5+
People of the Philippines v. :polonio &arlos
Case No. 2+4
G.R. No. L-239 (4/e 3+, 1947)
Chapter I, Page 1*, Footote No.*3
F!C"#$
2he PeopleDs &ourt found the :ppellant, guilty of treason. :ppellant attac"ed
the constitutionality of the PeopleDs &ourt :ct on the ground that it contained
provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the su'!ect matter e3pressed in its
title, such asF ;1= a provision which retains the !urisdiction of the &ourt of Airst InstanceJ
;)= a provision which adds to the dis4ualification of Justices of the 8upreme &ourt
and provides a procedure for their su'stitutionJ ;,= a provision which changed the
e3isting Rules of &ourt on the su'!ect of 'ail, and ;9= a provision which suspends
:rticle 1)5 of the Revised Penal &ode.
I##%&$
.01 the PeopleDs &ourt :ct was unconstitutional.
'&L($
1o. 2he PeopleDs &ourt was intended to 'e a full and complete scheme with
its own machinery for the indictment, trial and !udgment of treason cases. 2he
provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the su'!ect matter and purposes
of the PeopleDs &ourt :ct. 2he &ongress is not e3pected to ma"e the title of an
enactment a complete inde3 of its contents. 2he constitutional rule is satisfied if all
parts of a law relate to the su'!ect e3pressed in its title.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a
People of the Philippines v. <eoncio <im
Case No. 21+
G.R. No. L-14432 (4/30 2*, 19*+)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footote No..3
F!C"#$
In March 1/59, the 8ecretary of :griculture and 1atural Resources pursuant to
the authority granted him 'y 8ections , and 9 of :ct 1o. 9++, ;Aisheries :ct= issued
Aisheries :dministrative 7rder 1o. ,7. 8ection ) of said order prohi'its trawl fishing in
certain areas in 8amar. A:7 1o. ,7 was su'se4uently amended with A:7 1o. ,7N1.
<eoncio <im, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the
ground that A:7 1o. ,7N1 was contrary to :ct 1o. 9++,, the former having no fi3ed
period and thus esta'lishing a 'an for all time while the latter stating that prohi'ition
was for any single period of time not e3ceeding five yearsD duration.$
I##%&$
.01 8ection ) of A:7 1o. ,7N1 was invalid.
'&L($
8ection ) of A:7 1o. ,7N1 was valid. :lthough A:7 1o. ,7N1 was defective
'ecause it failed to specify a period for the 'an, it was ruled that in case of
discrepancy 'etween a 'asic law and a rule issued to implement it, the 'asic law
prevails 'ecause the rule cannot go 'eyond the terms and provisions of the law. A:7
1o. ,7N1 would 'e inoperative in so far as it e3ceeded the period of five years for any
single period of time, 'ut it was not necessarily rendered void 'y the omission.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, ,Ea
OM6 <a'or &enter v. @arcia Jr.
Case No. *.
G.R. No. 1113.1 ((ece6-er 23, 1994)
F!C"#$
*72& Memorandum 7rder 1o. /+%,/5 was filed as"ing the <2AR> to allow
provincial 'us operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15C a'ove
and 'elow the <2AR> official rate for a period of one year. <2AR> issued Memorandum
&ircular 1o./)%++/ allowing for a range of plus )+C and minus )5C of the prescri'ed
fares. P>7:P, without a pu'lic hearing and permission from <2AR>, availed of the
deregulatory policy and announced )+C increase in e3isting fares. Petitioner filed a
petition opposing the increase in fares. 8& issued a temporary restraining order to
prevent P>7:P from implementing fare increase.
I##%&#$
1. .01 authority given 'y <2AR> to P>7:P to increase prices at )+C instead of 15C is
unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the
said increase.
). .01 P>7:P proved that there was a pu'lic necessity for the increase thus violating
the Pu'lic 8ervice :ct and Rules of the &ourt.
'&L($
1. <2AR> did not have authority to delegate its powers to P>7:P.
). P>7:P was not a'le to prove and provide such pu'lic necessity as reason for the
fare increase.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1one
Hi!o Plantation, Inc. v. &entral >an"
Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-3412* (!/g/st 9, 19..)
F!C"#$
&ongress approved R: 1o. (1)5 entitled :n act imposing 82:>I<IP:2I71 2:G
71 &718I@1MB128 :>R7:* 27 :&&B<BR:2B 2HB B&717MI& *BHB<7PMB12 7A 2HB
PHI<IPPI1B8 A7R 72HBR P6RP78B8$ Petitioners e3pected to pay 9C of the aggregate
value from July 1, 1/7)% June ,+, 1/7,, as provided in the :ct. 2he &entral 'an"
released Monetary Resolution 1o. 1//5 which states thatF Aor e3ports of 'ananas
shipped during the period from January 1, 1/7)% June ,+, 1/7)J the sta'ili#ation ta3
shall 'e at the rate of (C. Aor e3ports of 'ananas shipped during the period from July
1, 1/7) to June ,+, 1/7,J the sta'ili#ation ta3 shall 'e at the rate of 9C. Aor e3ports of
'ananas shipped during the period from July 1, 1/7,% June ,+, 1/79J the sta'ili#ation
ta3 shall 'e at the rate of )C.
I##%&$
.01 &entral 'an" acted with grave a'use of discretion amounting to lac" of
!urisdiction when it issued Monetary >oard Resolution 1o. 1//5.
'&L($
&entral >an" acted with grave a'use of discretion. In case of discrepancy
'etween the 'asic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law,
the 'asic law prevails. 2he rule or regulation cannot go 'eyond the terms of the 'asic
law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c
&hina >an"ing &orp. v. &:
Case No. 19
G.R. No. 12111. ((ece6-er 1, 199*)
Chapter I, Page 19, Footote No..4
F!C"#$
Petitioner e3tended loans to 1ative .est &orp. and its president, 8o &hing, in
return for promissory notes to pay the loans. 2wo e3tra mortgages were additionally
e3ecuted 'y 8o &hing and his wife on July and :ugust 1/E/. 2he loans matured 'ut
8o &hing was not a'le to repay the said loans. 2his caused Petitioner to file for e3tra
!udicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. 2he properties were to 'e
sold0auctioned on :pril ,, 1//,. 7n :pril )E, 1/E/ the court ruled on the side of 8o
&hing. 2he issuance of the preliminary in!unction was grantedJ therefore the sale of
the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration
and elevated the case to the &ourt of :ppeals. 2hey were appealing that :ct 1o.
,1,5 was the governing rule in their case, instead of :dministrative 7rder 1o. , as 8o
&hing was contending.
I##%&$
1. .01 Petitioner can e3tra%!udicially foreclose the properties.
). .01 :dministrative 7rder 1o. , should govern the e3tra !udicial foreclosure.
'&L($
1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties.
). :ct 1o. ,1,5 is the governing law. :dministrative 7rder 1o. , cannot prevail over
:ct ,1,5. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative
directive. 2hus, the statute cannot 'e repealed or amended 'y the administrative
directive.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1one
8antos v. Honora'le Bsten#o
Case No. 14+
G.R. No. L-1474+ (#epte6-er 2*, 19*+)
F!C"#$
2he decedent is a driver for PeopleDs <and 2ransportation &ompany, of which
Petitioners are manager and proprietor. 2he .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission
awarded the decedentDs widow the amount of P,,9/9.9+, plus 'urial e3penses not
e3ceeding P)++. :fter 5 years, Respondent, in a civil case filed 'y the mother of the
decedent, ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P5++ as attorneyDs fees for
failure to comply. Petitioners pray that the decision 'e annulled or modified 'ased
on 8ection 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission and
prays further that the P5++ in attyDs fees e3ceeded the allowed fees according to
8ec.( Rule )( of the said Rules.
I##%&$
1. .01 the Rules of the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission amended R.:. 1o.
77) and as a result deprived the court of its !urisdiction over the case.
). .01 the court committed a grave a'use of discretion in awarding the P5++ in
attorneyDs fees.
'&L($
Petition was dismissed.
1. 2he &ommission, or any of its rules, cannot amend an act of &ongress.
Aurthermore, the Rule was promulgated more than ) years after the court had
ac4uired !urisdiction over the main case.
). 2he court did not commit grave a'use of discretion in awarding the P5++ since the
said rule only applies to the &ommission and not the &ourt.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+, ,5, 9(a
@rego v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 12+
G.R. No. 121911 (4/e 19, 1997)
Chapter I, Page 23, Footote No.9.
F!C"#$
7ne of the Respondents was elected for his ,
rd
and final term as councilor of the
)
nd
*istrict of Manila. His 4ualifications are 'eing 4uestioned 'y herein Petitioner, who is
also as"ing for the suspension of his proclamation. Petitioner 'rings into consideration
the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as *eputy 8heriff upon finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on 7cto'er ,1, 1/E1. Petitioner
argues that Respondent should 'e dis4ualified under 8ection 9+;'= of the <ocal
@overnment &ode. Petitioner further argues that the <ocal @overnment &ode should
'e applied retroactively.
I##%&$
.01 or not the 8ection 9+ of the <ocal @overnment &ode should 'e applied
retroactively due to its wording.
'&L($
8ection 9+;'= of the <ocal @overnment &ode should not 'e applied
retroactively. It is understood that statutes are not to 'e construed as intended to have
a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is e3pressly
declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. 2he
fact that the provision of the &ode in 4uestion does not 4ualify the date of a
candidateDs removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court
from applying the law prospectively.
2he term to 'e loo"ed at in the issue is RBI182:2BMB12, which has a technical
meaning, referring only to an appointive position. 8ince Respondent was reelected, this
does not fall under the scope of the term.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5a, 9(c
8antos v. Municipal of &aloocan
Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-11.+7 (!pr23 22, 19*3)
F!C"#$
Respondent issued 7rdinance 1o. )9 charging slaughterhouses in the
municipality certain fees including slaughterhouse fees,$ meat inspection fees,$
corral fees,$ and internal organ fees,$ pursuant to &ommonwealth :ct 1o. (55.
Petitioners 4uestioned the validity or said 7rdinance.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent, in the issuance of 7rdinance 1o. )9, e3ceeded the limits of its
!urisdiction provided 'y &ommonwealth :ct (55.
'&L($
Respondent e3ceeded its !urisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. 2he
&ommonwealth :ct only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. .hen
Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees, it overstepped the limits of its
statutory grant. 2he only other fees that would 'e accepta'le were veterinary or
sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. Incidentally, the court
ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the e3ception of slaughterhouse fees.$
7ne of the rules of statutory construction is that certain sections or parts of sections of
an ordinance may 'e held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains, if the
parts are not so inter'lended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates
the others.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
15a, ,7
1ational Housing :uthority v. Reyes
Case No. .1
G.R. No. 49439 (4/e 29, 19.3)
F!C"#F
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of )5,+++ s40rn, su'!ect of an
e3propriation proceedings granted 'y the court in favor 1H:. Respondents claimed
they should 'e paid the assessed value of P(,(++.++ pursuant to P* 9). Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too e3cessive. He cited P* 9(9 which
provides !ust compensation not to e3ceed the mar"et value declared 'y the owner
in the amount of P1,9++.++. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P(,(++.++,
'ut Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to P* 1))9 which states that the government
shall choose 'etween the value of real property as declared 'y the owner 3 3 3 or
the mar"et value determined 'y the &ity or Provincial :ssessor, whichever is lower.
I##%&F
.01 P* 9(9 as amended 'y P* 1))9 determines the valuation on !ust
compensation.
'&L(F
&ourts accord the presumption of validity to e3ecutive acts and legislative
enactments, 3 3 3 'ecause the legislature is presumed to a'ide 'y the &onstitution 3
3 3. 2he Respondent Judge should have followed !ust compensation in e3propriation
cases, that the lower value made 'y the landowner should 'e the 'asis for fi3ing the
price. 2he petition for &ertiorari is granted.
L!"IN M!)IMF
,7
Arancisco <ao <im v. &: and >enito Hillavicencio *y
Case No. 73
G.R. No. .7+47 (,cto-er 31, 199+)
F!C"#F
Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a
period of , years. :fter it e3pired, Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises,
and hence, the filing of an e!ectment suit against the Respondent. 2he case was
terminated 'y a compromise agreement, and the lease continued from 1/7/ to
1/E), then from 1/E) to 1/E5. 2he Petitioner filed another e!ectment suit. 2he trial court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that ;1= the lease contract has not e3piredJ
and ;)= the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res !udicata. Petitioner
appealed to the R2& of Manila and then to the &: which also affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
I##%&F
1. .01 the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lesseeQ
). .01 the action for e!ectment is 'arred 'y compromise agreement on res
!udicataQ
'&L(F
2his is untena'le 'ecause the continuance of lease is not dependent upon
the will of the lessee. 7n the compromise agreement, the lease is not for perpetual
renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the
parties.
7n the second issue, the compromise agreement does not apply 'ecause
the present case re4uires a different set of evidence. 2he compromise agreement
does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof,
and hence, res !udicata does not apply.
L!"IN M!)IMF
1, 11a, )(,
Hon. :lfredo 8. <im v. Aelipe @. Pac4uingJ
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 111+44 (4a/ar0 27, 1991)
F!C"#F
B3ecutive 7rder 1o. ,/) was issued transferring the authority to regulate Jai%
:lai from local governments to the @ames and :musements >oard ;@:>=. 2he &ity of
Manila passed an 7rdinance 1o. 7+(5 authori#ing the mayor to allow the :ssociated
*evelopment &orporation ;:*&= to operate a J:I%:<:I. 2hen President Marcos
issued a P* 771 revo"ing all powers and authority of local governments to grant
franchise, license or permit, to Jai%:lai and other forms of gam'ling. 2hen President
:4uino issued an B.7. 1o. 1(/ e3pressly repealing P*. 1o. E1+ which revo"es and
cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai%:lai and :musement &orporation.
In 1//E, :*& tried to operate a Jai%:lai, 'ut the @ames and :musement >oard
intervened and invo"ed P.*. 771 which e3pressly revo"ed all e3isting franchises and
permits to operate all forms of gam'ling issued 'y local governments.
I##%&F
1. .01 the franchise granted 'y the &ity of Manila to :*& is valid in view of B. +.
1o. ,/) which transferred from local governments to the @:> the power to
regulate Jai%:lai.
). .01 the :*& is correct in assailing that P.*. 771 is violative of e4ual
protection and non%impairment clauses of the &onstitution.
'&L(F
R.:. 9+/ provides that &ongress did not delegate to the &ity of Manila the
power to franchise$ the operation of Jai%:lai. :nd B.7. ,/) removes the power of
local governments to issue license and permit.
:ll laws are presumed valid and constitutional. P* 771 was not repealed or
amended 'y any su'se4uent law. It did not violate the e4ual protection clause of
the &onstitution 'ecause the said decree had revo"ed all franchises issued 'y the
local governments without e3ceptions.
L!"IN M!)IMF
5a, (c, ,7, 99, 5+
Hictoriano v. Bli#alde Rope .or"ersD 6nion
Case No. 1*9
G.R. No. L-2124* (#epte6-er 12, 1974)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an Iglesia ni &risto$, was a mem'er of the Respondent 6nion
which had with their &ompany a collective 'argaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision allowed under R.:. E75F Mem'ership in the 6nion shall 'e
re4uired as a condition of employment for all permanent employees wor"ers
covered 'y this :greement
R: ,,5+ amended R: E75F 'ut such agreement shall not cover mem'ers of
any religious sect which prohi'it affiliation of their mem'ers in any such la'or
organi#ation.$ Petitioner resigned from Respondent 6nion, which wrote a formal letter
to the &ompany as"ing to separate the Petitioner from service.
I##%&$
1. .01 R: ,,5+ violates right to form or !oin associationQ
). .01 R: ,,5+ is constitutionalQ
,. .01 the lower court committed grave a'use of discretion when ruling that
the 6nion should pay 5++ and attorneyDs fee.
'&L($
2he right to !oin associations includes the right not to !oin or to resign from a
la'or organi#ation. 8ection 1 /(+ of :rt III of the 1/,5 &onstitution, as well as 8ection 7
of :rt IH of the 1/7, &onstitution, provide that the right to form associations for
purposes not contrary to law shall not 'e a'ridged.
:rticle ))+E of the &ivil &ode provides that attorneyDs fees and e3penses of
litigation may 'e awarded when the defendantDs act has compelled the Plaintiff to
incur e3penses to protect his interest$ and in any other case where the court deems
it !ust and e4uita'le that attorneyDs fees and e3penses of litigation should 'e
recovered$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9+'
2aRada v. 2uvera
Case No. 2.7
G.R. No. L-*3911 ((ece6-er 29, 19.*)
F!C"#$
*ue process was invo"ed 'y the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
num'er of Presidential *ecrees which they claimed had not 'een pu'lished as
re4uired 'y law. 2he government argued that while pu'lication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided$ as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to 'ecome effective immediately upon their approval.
I##%&$
.01 the clause otherwise provided$ in :rticle ) of &ivil &ode pertains to the
necessity of pu'lication.
'&L($
1o, the clause otherwise provided$ refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the re4uirement of pu'lication per se, which cannot in any event 'e omitted.
Pu'lication in full should 'e indispensa'le. .ithout such notice or pu'lication,
there would 'e no 'asis for the application of the ma3im ignorantia <egis non
e3cusat$. 2he court, therefore, declares that presidential issuances of general
application which have not 'een pu'lished shall have no force and effect, and the
court ordered that the unpu'lished decrees 'e pu'lished in the 7fficial @a#ette
immediately.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a
@utierre# v. &arpio
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 31+21 (!/g/st 11, 1929)
F!C"#$
2he <itigants here compromised a civil case on July 1,, 1/)E, agreeing that if
within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain
land, the ownership would vest in the *efendants. >ut when the Plaintiffs duly
tendered the amount, the *efendants appealed that 'y that time, :ugust 1,, 1/)E,
the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it, the stipulated or fi3ed period had already
elapsed.
I##%&$
.01 the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering.
'&L($
1o. 2he repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. 2he
a'ove issue depends upon the "ind of month agreed upon 'y the parties, and on
the day from which it should 'e counted. :rticle 7 of the &ivil &ode had 'een
modified 'y 8ec. 1, of the :dministrative &ode, according to which month$ now
means the civil month and not the regular%,+%day month. In computing any fi3ed
period of time, with reference to the performance of an act re4uired 'y law or
contract to 'e done within a certain limit of time, the day from which the time is
rec"oned is to 'e e3cluded and the date of performance included, unless otherwise
provided. 2here is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,/a
@u#man v. <ichauco
Case No. 1*
G.R. No. L-179.* (,cto-er 21, 1921)
F!C"#$
Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain
properties in Manila. 2he trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. 2he unsuccessful
*efendants having appealed in 'oth cases on *ec. /, 1/)+ to the &ourt of Airst
Instance of Manila, it is their duty to conform with the provisions of 8ec. EE of the &&P,
as amended 'y :ct 1o. )5EE, in case they desire to avoid the immediate e3ecution
of the !udgment pending the appeal, to pay the Plaintiff, or to deposit in court, on or
'efore the 2B12H day of each &alendar month$, the sums of money fi3ed 'y the
Justice of the Peace as the reasona'le value of the use and occupation of the
property held 'y them. 2he *efendants made such dilatory payments however they
failed to ma"e such payments on or 'efore the tenth day of the month. :s a result,
the Plaintiff moved the court to e3ecute the !udgments. 2he court ordered the
immediate e3ecution of the !udgment.
I##%&$
.01 the payments were made on or 'efore the 2enth day of each month.
'&L($
2he payment made on :ugust 11, 1/)1 was one day late. 2he term month$
must now 'e understood to refer to calendar month, inasmuch as 8ec 1, of the
:dministrative &ode has modified :rt. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fi3es
the length of a month at thirty days.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5a, )5c
6.8. v. Paniaga
Case No. 1*1
G.R. No. .223 (March 4, 1914)
F!C"#$
2his is an appeal 'y the government from an order of the court, setting aside
the forfeiture of a 'ail 'ond. Judgment was rendered against the principal on
Ae'ruary 7, and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof
their principal. 7n Ae' )E, the court ordered that the *efendantDs 'ond 'e forfeited
and the e3ecution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount
thereof, and that an alias warrant 'e issued for the arrest of the *efendant. >y
various orders of the court, the sale was postponed from time to time, and finally
occurred on July E, 1/1), with government as the purchaser. 7n July 1+, 1/1), the
principal was arrested. 7n July 1,, 1/1), the court, on application of the sureties, set
aside the order of forfeiting the 'ond, and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale.
I##%&$
.01 the e3ecution sale occurred on the date directed 'y the court.
'&L($
8ec. 9 of the &ode of &ivil Procedure providesF unless otherwise specially
provided, the time within which an act is re4uired 'y law to 'e done shall 'e
computed 'y e3cluding the first day and including the lastJ if the last 'e a 8unday or
a legal holiday, it shall 'e e3cluded.$ 2his section is only applica'le if there is a
computation needed to 'e done. However, in this case, there is no necessity for such
computation for the date is fi3ed for when the act 'e performed. It is also directed
that the sale should ta"e place on a named future date. 2he sale here of the
property must stand.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
P1> v. &:
Case No. 23.
G.R. No. 9.3.2 (Ma0 17, 1993)
F!C"#$
2o secure payments of his loans, Private Respondent mortgages two lots to
Petitioner 'an". Aor failure to pay the o'ligation, Petitioner 'an" e3tra!udicially
foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest 'idder at the auction sale.
2hen, a final deed of sale was registered in the >uacan Registry of Property in favor of
the Petitioner 'an" and later sold the said lots to a third party.
2he notices of sale of :ppellantDs foreclosed properties were pu'lished on
March )E, :pril 11 and :pril 1), 1/(/ issues of the newspaper *aily Record$. 2he date
March )E, 1/(/ falls on a Ariday, while the dates :pril 11 and 1) fall on a Ariday and
8aturday, respectively. 8ection , of :ct 1o. ,1,5 re4uires that the notice of auction
sale shall 'e pu'lished once a wee" for at least three consecutive wee"s$.
I##%&$
.01 the Petitioner 'an" complied with the re4uirements of wee"ly
pu'lication of notice of e3tra!udicial foreclosure of mortgages.
'&L($
It must 'e conceded that that :rticle 1, is completely silent as to the
definition of what is wee"$. In &oncepcion v. :ndueta, the term wee"$ was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. 2he
*efendant%:ppellee 'an" failed to comply with the legal re4uirement of pu'lication.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, /a, /'
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-2132* (Ma0 29, 197+) a7 G.R. No. L-21327 (Ma0 29, 197+)
Chapter II, Page 12, Footote No.19
F!C"#$
Petitioners pray to :grarian &ourt to 'e entitled as share tenants to redeem
parcel of land they are wor"ing from the purchasers where no notice was previously
given to them 'y the vendor of the latterDs intention to sell the property and where
the vendor did not e3ecute the affidavit re4uired 'y 8ec. 1, of the :gricultural <and
Reform &ode 'efore the registration of the deed of sale. :grarian &ourt dismissed
petitions, stating that the right of redemption granted 'y 8ec. 1) of the same code is
only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants, claiming that share tenancy and
leasehold tenancy are within the !urisdiction of the code N that the code e3pressly
grants said right to leaseholders only and no'ody else. Moreover, the court held that
if the intention of &ongress was to e3tend the right of redemption to share tenants
through !udicial legislation, the section would have e3pressly said so.
I##%&$
.01 not the right of redemption granted 'y 8ec. 1) of the :grarian Reform
&ode addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.
'&L($
:grarian &ourt fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises, reducing
agricultural lessee$ to only leasehold tenants$. 2he purpose of the :gricultural
<and Reform &ode is the a'olition of agricultural share tenancy. 2he policy of the
8tate is to esta'lish owner cultivatorship. :dherence to the letter would result in
a'surdity, in!ustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
of the statute.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, 11a, 1)a, ,(a, ,7, 9+a
Ma3ims invo"ed 'y lower courtF (c, ,+', 9,
6.8. v. 1avarro
Case No. 3++
G.R. No. *1*+ (March 21, 1911)
Chapter II, Page 12, Footote No.2+
F!C"#$
2hey made an oath 'efore an election officer in the municipality of Piddig ;in
proceedings in connection with the general election held on 1ov. ), 1/+/= that they
owned real property with the value of P5++. Bvidence showed that the :ppellants,
e3cept for *aniel 1avarro and @enaro &ali3tro, did not own property of the assessed
value of P5++.
I##%&$
.01 the said statuteDs true test of property 4ualification to vote is the
actual0mar"et value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof.
'&L($
It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an e3amination of the
immediate conte3t of provisions of the statute defining property 4ualifications$ of a
voter, and of the statute as a whole. In the statute, property 4ualification is an
alternative to 4ualification 'ased upon an annual payment. >oth 4ualifications are
under a single head, suggesting an intimate relation 'etween the two in the mind of
the legislator. :nother section of the statute dis4ualifies people who are delin4uent in
the payment of pu'lic ta3es assessed since :ug. 1,, 1E/E, from voting. 2his provision
was directed to the case of delin4uency in the payment of land ta3es as well as all
other ta3es. 2he statute as a whole ;as an election law= is intended to secure purity of
the 'allot 'o3. If the property 4ualification is actual0mar"et value, it would 'e highly
impro'a'le to enforce the statute within a reasona'le time 'ecause it will 'e difficult
to determine.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1+, 11a, 1)a, )E, ,(a, ,7
<ite3 Bmployees :ssociation v. Bduvala
Case No. 149
G.R. No. L-411+* (#epte6-er 22, 1977)
F!C"#$
Respondent, 7fficer%in%&harge of >ureau of <a'or Relations, re4uired
referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation
with Aederation of Aree .or"ers. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory
authori#ation for the Respondent to re4uire referendum election and that
Respondent and the >ureau were 'eyond !urisdiction.
I##%&$
.01 there is a statute authori#ing Respondents and giving them !urisdiction.
'&L($
:rticle ))( of the <a'or &ode addresses this. Respondent and the >ureau
were within !urisdiction. Petition denied. :rticle ))( of <a'or &ode is very clear
concerning e3ecutive departmentDs original and e3clusive authority to act$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, )+a, )9a
Regalado v. -ulo
Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-42293 (Fe-r/ar0 13, 1931)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao, :l'ay. 7n 1ovem'er 1(, 1/,1,
:ct 1o. ,E// which provided for the age retirement among !ustices was approved. :
few years later, Petitioner 'ecame (5 years of age ;age retirement as provided 'y
8ec. )+, of the :dministrative &ode, amended further 'y :ct. 1o. ,E//=. 8hortly
thereafter, Bste'an 2. Hillar was appointed as Justice of Peace to ta"e the place of
Petitioner. 7n *ecem'er 17, 1/,9, Hillar assumed office.
I##%&$
.01 under the provisions of 8ection )+, of the :dministrative &ode, as further
amended 'y :ct 1o. ,E//, the Justices of Peace and au3iliary !ustices appointed
prior to the approval of the :ct shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of
(5.
'&L($
Justices appointed prior to the approval of the :ct will not 'e affected 'y
said amendment ;:ct 1o. ,E//=.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 9(a
>.B. 8an *iego Inc. v. &:
Case No. 2*
G.R. No. .+223 (Fe-r/ar0 1, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 1*, Footote No. 27
F!C"#$
7n March ,, 1/E(, Petitioner instituted an action in the R2& of Halen#uela
against Private Respondent *e Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in
said area. In her defense, *e Jesus argued that the land in 4uestion was covered 'y
P* )+1( ;a complementary provision of P* 1517, which aims to protect tenants from
un!ust eviction.=
I##%&$
.01 P* )+1( is a valid defense of *e Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee.
'&L($
P* )+1( is a valid ground for *e Jesus in invo"ing her rights as a tenant. .hile
it may depart from its source, P* 1517, said provision still aims to protect the tenants
from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land, as well as
un!ust eviction.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1)a, )5a
:raneta v. *inglasan
Case No. .4
G.R. No. L-2+44 (!/g/st 2*, 1949)
Chapter II, Page 1*, Footote No. 29
F!C"#$
B3ecutive 7rders, in pursuance of &ommonwealth :ct 1o. (71 ;Bmergency
Powers :ct=, were 4uestioned for its validity until the 1ational :ssem'ly &onvention
of 1/9)
I##%&$
.01 the proclamations are valid.
'&L($
2hese B3ecutive 7rders are valid 'ecause they have 'een enacted during
the time of the ina'ility of the &ongress to function. 2hat when &ongress convened
again on Jan. 1, 1/9), said proclamations were also terminated.

L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, /a
Bndencia and Jugo v. *avid
Case No. 9.
G.R. No. L-*311-1* (!/g/st 31, 1913)
Chapter II, Page 1*, Footote No.33
F!C"#$
R: 5/+ declares that no salary received 'y a pu'lic officer shall 'e
considered e3empt from income ta3, payment of which is here'y declared not to 'e
a diminution of his compensation fi3ed 'y law. .hile :rt. E, 8ec. / of the &onstitution
states that !udges shall receive compensation as fi3ed 'y law, which shall not 'e
diminished during their continuance in office. Petitioners 4uestion the legality of R:
5/+.
I##%&$
.01 R: 5/+ unconstitutional.
'&L($
1o. 8aying that the ta3ing of the salary of a !udicial officer is not a decrease in
compensation is a clear interpretation of .hich shall not 'e diminished during their
continuance in office$, 'y the <egislature. 2hrough the separation of powers, such a
tas" must 'e done 'y the Judiciary. Judicial officers are e3empt from ta3es on his
salary not for his own 'enefit 'ut for the pu'lic, to secure and preserve his
independence of !udicial thought and action.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (c, 7a, )9a
*aoang v. Municipal Judge of 8an 1icolas, Ilocos 1orte
Case No. .4
G.R. No. L-341*. (March 2., 19..)
Chapter II, Page *1, Footote No.1+
F!C"#$
Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Suirino >onilla and
.ilson Marcos 'y, :ntero :gonoy and :manda :gonoy, stating that under :rt. ,,5
of the &ivil &ode, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, ac"nowledged
natural children, or children 'y legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the
:gonoys already had a daughter of the Bstrella :gonoy, who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners, and that the :gonoys also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. Aurthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. 2he Respondent &ourt ruled in favor for
:gonoy.
I##%&$
.01 the Respondent &ourt erred in their decision.
'&L($
1o, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in
:rt. ,,5, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and,
do not include grandchildren. 2o add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchild is included would violate the legal ma3im that, what is e3pressly included
would naturally e3clude what is not included.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, ,+a
&IR v. <impan Investment &orporation
Case No. 77
G.R. No. L-2.171 a7 L-2.*44 (4/30 31, 197+)
Chapter II, Page *2, Footote No.11
F!C"#$
In 1/5/ and 1/(+, Respondent &orporation filed income ta3 returns which
later were 'ases for deficiency due to disallowance 'y the >IR. >rought to the &ourt
of 2a3 :ppeals, the deficiencies on 'oth cases were decided upon at P)(,1,7 and
P7,)9+.9E, resolved at 8eptem'er )+, 1/(7 ;<%)E571= and *ecem'er 11, 1/(7 ;<%)E(99=
respectively.
I##%&$
.01 the &2: committed an error in its fi3ed date of the payment of
surcharges and interests.
'&L($
2he &2:Ds decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in
error. 8ection 51 of the 1IR& provides the following% 7n 2a3 shown on the return, in
failure to pay the re4uired amount on or 'efore the date prescri'ed, interest upon
such unpaid amount shall 'e collected as part of the ta3, at the rate of one per
centum a month, from the date prescri'ed for the payment until paid, provided that
the ma3imum amount for the interest doesnDt e3ceed the amount corresponding to
a period of , years. 2he same goes with deficiencies, e3cept that the additional ta3
must 'e paid within ,+ days of the notice, else the same interests apply. .ith regard
to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isnDt paid within ,+ days, a surcharge of 5
per centum of the amount of ta3 unpaid. In <%)E571, the interest shall 'e computed
from 8eptem'er 7, 1/() to 8eptem'er (, 1/(5, at 1C for , years, plus the surcharge of
5C on failure to pay the deficiency ta3. In <%)E(99, from :pril 9, 1/(, to :pril ,, 1/((,
the interest shall 'e at 1C a month for , years, plus the 5C surcharge.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (c, 7a, )9a, )(
&e'u Portland &ement v. Municipality of 1aga, &e'u
Case No. 13
G.R. Nos. 2411*-17 (!/g/st 22, 19*.)
Chapter II, Page *2, Footote No.1*
F!C"#$
Bfforts of defendant 2reasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license ta3
from 1/(+, 1/(1, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P)+9,,++, have all
'een met with re'uff. Municipal ta3 imposed 'y :mended 7rdinance 1o. )1. Ainally
on June )(, 1/(1, defendant 2reasurer decides to avail of &ivil remedies as provided
for under 8ec. ),+9 of the Revised :dministrative &odeJ he gives Plaintiff a period of
ten ;1+= days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. 7n July (, 1/(1,
defendant 2reasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining
1++,+++ 'ags of :po &ement in satisfaction of PlaintiffDs delin4uency in municipal
license ta3J notice was received 'y Plant 7fficer%in%&harge Hicente 2. @aragay, who
ac"nowledged the distraint. 8aid articles ;the cement 'ags= will 'e sold 'y pu'lic
auction to the highest 'idder on July )7, 1/(1, proceeds thereof will in part 'e utili#ed
to settle the account. *espite notice of sale, it did not ta"e place on July )7, 1/(1
'ut on January ,+, 1/()
I##%&$
.01 the distraint and pu'lic auction were valid.
'&L($
>oth actions are valid. :ccording to the Revised :dministrative &odeF 2he
remedy 'y distraint shall proceed as followsF 6pon failure of the person owing any
municipal ta3 or revenue to pay the same, at the time re4uired, the municipal
treasurer may sei#e and distraint any personal property 'elonging to such person or
any property su'!ect to the ta3 lien, in sufficient 4uantity to satisfy the ta3 or charge in
4uestion, together with any increment thereto incident to delin4uency and the
e3penses of the distraint.$ 2he clear and e3plicit language of the law leaves no room
for dou't. :lso, this 'eing a direct appeal to the 8upreme &ourt, Plaintiff must 'e
deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which
upheld the validity of the auction.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 9,
Resins, Inc. v. :uditor @eneral
Case No. 2*+
G.R. No. L-17... (,cto-er 29, 19*.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner see"s a refund from Respondent &entral >an" on the claim that it
was e3empt from the margin fee under R: )(+/ for the importation of 6RB: :1*
A7RM:<*BH-*B$, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. 2he
specific language of the :ct spea"s of 6RB: A7RM:<*BH-*B$, a finished product
which is distinct and different from 6RB:$ and A7RM:<*BH-*B$. Petitioner argues
his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the 8enate, during consideration
of the 'ill 'efore said House, 'y mem'ers thereof ;referring to the Journal=. Petitioner
would assail as devoid of support in law the action ta"en 'y the Respondent :uditor
@eneral in an endorsement to &entral >an" causing it to overrule its previous
resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the
importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the
purview of the statutory language that granted such e3emption.
I##%&$
.01 PetitionerDs allegations are valid.
'&L($
2he :ct clearly states 6RB: A7RM:<*BH-*B$ as a finished product and not
6RB:$ and A7RM:<*BH-*B$ as separate units. Individual statements made 'y
8enators do not necessarily reflect the view of the 8enate. Much less do they indicate
the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mista"e in the printing of
the 'ill, it should 'e corrected 'y legislation and not 'y !udicial decree. 2he :uditor
@eneral was !ust doing his duty, following what was written in the statute.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 9,
Sui!ano v. *evelopment >an" of the Philippines
Case No. 24.
G.R. No. L-2*419 (,cto-er 1*, 197+)
Chapter II, Page *2, Footote No.1.
F!C"#$
Petitioners filed an application for an ur'an estate loan with the Reha'ilitation
Ainance &orporation ;RA&=, predecessor%in%intent of Respondent. 2hey mortgaged
real estate properties to secure the loanJ loan was approved on :pril ,+, 1/5,.
Mortgage contract was e3ecuted 'y Petitioners in favor of *>P on March ),, 1/59.
:s of July ,1, 1/(5, outstanding o'ligation of the Petitioners with *>P was P1,, /E,.5/.
Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P19, +++ for his outstanding o'ligation
out of his 'ac" pay pursuant to R: E/7 ;>ac" Pay <aw=. Respondent advised
Petitioners of the non%acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not
incurred 'efore or su'sisting on June )+, 1/5,, when R: E/7 was approved.
Respondent filed on 7cto'er 19, 1/(5 an application for the foreclosure of real
estate mortgage e3ecuted 'y the PetitionersJ Respondent 8heriff scheduled the
pu'lic auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed 'y *>P.
I##%&$
.01 the o'ligation of the Petitioners was su'sisting at the time of the
approval of R: E/7, the :mendatory :ct of June )+, 1/5,, to R: ,+9, the original
>ac" Pay <aw.
.01 the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not
su'sisting when R: E/7 was enacted on June )+, 1/5,.
'&L($
R: E/7 has clear provisions that e3pressly re4uire that the o'ligations for which
'ac" pay certificates may 'e accepted as payments must 'e su'sisting at the time
R: E/7 was approved ;June )+, 1/5,=. .hile PetitionerDs loan was approved on :pril
,+, 1/5,, they only availed of it much later on March ),, 1/59. 2he o'ligation
therefore attaches only on March ),, 1/59. It cannot 'e said that there was an
o'ligation su'sisting at the time of the approval of R: E/7.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 9,
OMMR& &redit 6nion v. Manila Railroad &ompany
Case No. **
G.R. No. L-2131* (Fe-r/ar0 2., 1979)
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied.
Petitioner see"s to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the
Petitioner, R: )+), grants to them. Paragraphs 1 M ) of section () of R: )+), compels
employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of mem'ers of credit unions the
de'ts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. 2he lower court has already
granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the
payroll collection.
I##%&$
.01 R: )+), converts OMMR& credit unionDs credit into a first priority credit.
'&L($
1o. 2he 8upreme &ourt affirmed the decision of the lower court. 2he R:
Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall 'e granted first priority in the
salary collections. :ccording to Justice Recto in a su'se4uent opinion, it is well
esta'lished that only specific legal rights are enforcea'le 'y mandamus, that the
right sought to 'e enforced must 'e certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases
where the right is dou'tful$. Justice >arrera addsF $? the writ never issues in dou'tful
cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
e3ercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7a
*avao <ight M Power &o. v. &ommissioner of &ustoms
Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-2.739 (March 29, 1972)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and
maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of *avao. 7n two
different occasions it imported materials and e4uipment for installation in its facilities.
Petitioner is arguing that the ta3es levied against its imports should 'e waived 'y the
collector of customs in &e'u ;the materials were delivered at the port of &e'u=
pursuant to section 17 of ;pre%commonwealth= :ct ,(,( ;8tandard Blectric Power
and <ight Aranchise <aw= which states that if any competing company should 'e
granted franchise more favora'le than the one previously granted to another
company, the latter shall en!oy the same advantages given in the other franchise.
I##%&$
.01 section 17 of act ,(,( applies to the case of Petitioner.
'&L($
1o. Airstly, the provision cited 'y Petitioner states that the franchise must 'e
granted to a Icompeting partyD. 1P&, to which the contract with ta3 e3emptions was
given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. 8econdly, Petitioner cannot rely on R:
,5E as amended 'y R: /E7 to support its ta3 e3emption. B3emption from ta3ation is
never presumed, it is always e3plicitly stated.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
:lfredo Ramos v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 212
G.R. No. L-41291 ((ece6-er 4, 19.9)
Chapter II, Page *2, Footote No.*+
F!C"#$
2he municipality of Hagonoy, >ulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its
79 hectare fishpond. :tty. :ngel &ru#, a private lawyer and head of the &ru#, *urian
and :cademia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the
municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is o'liged to pay
them not less than )+C of the amount to 'e recovered. Petitioners move to dis4ualify
said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to
hire a private counsel.
I##%&$
.01 it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case.
'&L($
1o. 6nder section 1(E, of the Revised :dministrative &ode, the provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any
court. Aurthermore, under section , of the <ocal :utonomy :ct, the municipal
attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and
e3ercise such powers as may 'e assigned to them 'y the council. 2he municipalityDs
interest would 'e 'est protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. 2hese
laws are implemented as well so as not to 'urden the municipality with the e3pense
of hiring a private lawyer.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7a
Aloresca v. Phile3 Mining &orporation
Case No. 47
G.R. No. L- 3+*42 (!pr23 3+, 19.1)
F!C"#$
Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent
&orporation who died as a result of a cave%in while wor"ing in underground mining
operations. Petitioners, with the e3ception of Aloresca, recovered damages under the
.or"menDs &ompensation :ct. However, a later report on the accident showed
there was negligence on the part of Respondent &orporation. 2hereafter, Petitioners
filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent &orporationDs rec"less and
wanton negligence.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioners have the right to choose 'etween availing of the wor"erDs
right under the .or"menDs &ompensation :ct or suing in the regular courts under the
&ivil &ode for higher damages.
'&L($
Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the &ivil &ode for higher
damages. However, in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages
from the .or"menDs &ompensation :ct, if they are awarded a greater amount in the
regular courts, the amount received from this :ct shall 'e deducted to prevent the
instance of dou'le recovery. :n in!ured party cannot pursue 'oth courses of action
simultaneously. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts, the &ourt stated that it
did not legislate in this case 'ut rather, applied and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social !ustice.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 17, 9+a
Bnrile v. 8ala#ar
Case No. 4+
G.R. No. 921*3 (4/e 1, 199+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of re'ellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt
from 1ovem'er )/ to *ecem'er 1+, 1//+.
Petitioners contend that they are 'eing charged for a criminal offense that
does not e3ist in the statute 'oo"s 'ecause technically, the crime of re'ellion cannot
'e comple3ed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof.
I##%&$
.01 case of Petitioners falls under the Hernande# doctrine.
'&L($
2he doctrine in the case People v. Hernande# remains as the 'inding doctrine
operating to prohi'it the comple3ing of re'ellion with any other offense committed
on the occasion thereof. 2he charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are
a'sor'ed in the crime of simple re'ellion. 2herefore, charges against Petitioners in the
information should 'e understood as that of simple re'ellion under the RP&.
Aurthermore, in a concurring opinion, Justice Aeliciano states that if the court ruled
that the charges of murder could 'e prosecuted separately from re'ellion, then the
principle of non%retroactivity would 'e violated.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 9(a, 9E
Mani"ad v. 2anod'ayan
Case No. 1*2
G.R. No. *1+97 (Fe-r/ar0 2+, 19.4)
Chapter II, Page *3, Footote No.*1
F!C"#$
Petitioners were mem'ers of the B3port Processing Pone :uthority ;BPP:=
Police Aorce and were charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of :nti%
@raft <aw and :nti%Aencing <aw 'efore the Respondent. Petitioners argue that the
power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged e3clusively upon the BPP:
and is not in the RespondentDs !urisdiction. 8ection 7 of P.*. 171(%: statesF 2he BPP: in
the e3ercise of its sole police authority over the e3port processing #ones shall have
the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws
committed inside the #ones owned and administered 'y the :uthority?$
I##%&$
.01 8ection 7 of P.*. 171(%: precludes the Respondent from investigating
complaints within the B3port Processing Pone.
'&L($
1o, the use of sole$ in P.*. 171(%: refers to police authority. :lthough the
BPP: Police Aorce is the only police authority within the Pone, it is not the only
authority that may investigate complaints, especially those which fall under the
!urisdiction of the 8andigan'ayan.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, ,5
8enarillos v. Hermosisimo
Case No. 27.
G.R. No. L-1+**2 ((ece6-er 14, 191*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was appointed as &hief of Police in 8i'onga, &e'u. 6pon the
charges filed 'y Petitioner, 8enarillos was suspended 'y Municipal Mayor of 8i'onga
and investigated 'y a police committee$ composed of , councilors created 'y
Resolution 1o.) 8eries 1/5) of the municipal council.
2he committee came up with an adverse decision su'se4uently signed 'y
the mem'ers of the council. 2his was appealed to and affirmed 'y the &ommissioner
of &ivil 8ervice and 'y the &ivil 8ervice >oard of :ppeals.
I##%&$
.01 8i'onga had !urisdiction to investigate the &hief of Police 8enarillos.
'&L($
1o. 6nder R: 1o.557 the investigation of police officers must 'e conducted
'y council itself and not 'y a mere committee thereof. 8i'onga therefore had no
!urisdiction to investigate the &hief of Police 8enarillos. R: 1o.557 has eliminated the
provision authori#ing investigation 'y a committee council. Hence, the decision
against him was invalid, even if concurred in 'y the rest of the councilors.
2he fact that the decision of the Municipal &ouncil was issued 'efore the
decision of the 8upreme &ourt cannot validate the action of the police committee.
2he initial proceeding was illegal a' initio and the su'se4uent reaffirmation of the
decision of the municipal council 'y the civil service authorities could not validate
the proceeding.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, ,a, (', 7a
People of the Philippines v. Moro Macarandang
Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-12+.. ((ece6-er 23, 1919)
Chapter II, Page *9, Footote No..7
F!C"#$
*efendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in
<anao. *efendant, admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and
ammunitions, invo"es as his legal e3cuse the appointment issued to him 'y @overnor
*ima"uta as secret agent shown in the @overnorDs letter which he presented as and
evidence. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith 'y
previously surrendering to the office of the @overnor a firearm. He has then 'een
appointed as 8B&RB2 :@B12 to assist on the maintenance of peace and order
campaigns and is authori#ed to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun.
I##%&$
.01 a 8ecret :gent tas"ed to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
falls among those authori#ed to possess firearms.
'&L($
-es. It may 'e true that the @overnor has no authority to issue any firearm
license or permit 'ut section E7/ of the Revised :dministrative &ode provides the
peace officers$ are e3empted from the re4uirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. 2he appointment sufficiently put him in the category of
peace officer$ e4uivalent even to a Municipal Police e3pressly covered 'y section
E7/. .herefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the *efendant
ac4uitted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )9a
People of the Philippines v. Mapa
Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-223+1 (!/g/st 3+, 19*7)
Chapter II, Page *9, Footote No..9
F!C"#$
*efendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms. He invo"es in his
defense that he was an appointed 8ecret :gent of the provincial @overnor of
>atangas. He sought to 'e ac4uitted as the case of People v. Macarandang used
the same defense providing evidences of his appointment.
I##%&$
.01 a 8ecret :gent falls among those authori#ed to possess firearms.
'&L($
1o. 2he court held that the law cannot 'e any clearer. 2he law does not
contain any e3ception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not
constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions. .herefore the conviction of the accused must stand. 2he
&ourtDs ruling overturned that of People v. Macarandang.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (c, 7a, ,+a, ,5, 9(c
&o v. &:
Case No. *1
G.R. No. 1++77* (,cto-er 2., 1993)
F!C"#$
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on 8eptem'er 1, 1/E, a chec"
drawn against the :ssociated &iti#ensD >an", postdated 1ovem'er ,+, 1/E,. 2he
chec" was deposited on January ,, 1/E9. It was dishonored two days later, the
tersely%stated reason given 'y the 'an" 'eingF &<78B* :&&7612.$ : criminal
complaint for violation of >atas Pam'ansa >ilang )) was filed 'y the salvage
company against Petitioner. :t the time of the issuance of the chec", the delivery of
a ru''er$ or 'ouncing$ chec" as a guarantee for an o'ligation was not
considered a punisha'le offense, an official promulgation made in a &ircular of the
Ministry of Justice.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is criminally lia'le.
'&L($
1o. :ccording to them, Sue v. People should not 'e applied retroactively in
accordance with the prospectivity principle of !udicial rulings and the operative fact
doctrine. 2he decision in Sue should not 'e given retroactive effect to the pre!udice
of &o and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the 8ecretary of
Justice.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, )a, 9(a
8y Oiong v. 8armiento
Case No. 11+
G.R. No. L-2934 (No8e6-er 29, 1911)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the &ity of
Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to 'a"eries or to retail dealers for
purposes of retail. 8ometime in 8eptem'er 1/9E, the 2reasurer of the &ity of Manila
assessed against him the sum of 5((.5+php which represents the alleged deficiency
municipal license ta3 due from him on his gross sales of flour to 'a"eries after
deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale.
I##%&$
.01 the sales of flour made 'y the Petitioner to 'a"eries to 'e manufactured
into 'read are retail or wholesale.
'&L($
2he sale of flour to 'a"eries to 'e manufactured into 'read and to 'e resold
to the pu'lic, in the a'sence of any e3press provision of law on the matter, should 'e
treated as a sale at retail and should su'!ect the vendor to the retail ta3 law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )9a, ,7, 9,
8umulong v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 149
G.R. No. 4.*34 (,cto-er ., 1941)
F!C"#$
7n 8eptem'er 15, 1/91, Respondent granted the Popular Aront Party of :'ad
8antos the e3clusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first
congressional district of Pampanga, and to the Popular Aront Party of Petitioner, the
minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Bleven
days later, Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the
Popular Aront Party of :'ad 8antos.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent committed grave a'use of discretion.
'&L($
.here the minimum num'er of votes re4uired 'y law was polled 'y a mere
coalition or alliance of minority parties, the right to minority representation in the
'oard of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled, cannot 'e claimed 'y
any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. Respondent shall
have the discretion to choose the minority inspector.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,(a, ,7, d
&entral &api# v. Ramire#
Case No. 1*
G.R. No. L-1*197 (March 12, 192+)
Chapter III, Page 79, Footote No..
F!C"#$
Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner &orporation for a term of ,+
years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to 'e
converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encum'rance upon the land, and 'inding to all future owners of the same. 2he
Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thin"ing it might violate :ct 1o.
)E79, :n :ct to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of pu'lic domain,
and for other purposes,$ since more than (1 percent of the capital stoc" of the
corporation is held and owned 'y persons who are not citi#ens of the Philippine
Islands or of the 6nited 8tates. 2he land involved is a private agricultural land.
I##%&$
.01 said :ct no. )E79 is applica'le to agricultural lands, in the Philippine
Islands which are privately owned.
'&L($
2he limit and purpose of the <egislature in adopting :ct 1o. )E79 was and is to
limit its application to lands of pu'lic domain and that lands held in private ownership
are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever there'y.
Jones <aw of 1/1(F 2hat no 'ill may 'e enacted into law shall em'race more
than one su'!ect, and that su'!ect shall 'e e3pressed in the title of the 'ill.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
d
Bugenio v. *rilon
Case No. 1+4
G.R. No. 1+94+4 (4a/ar0 22, 199*)
Chapter III, Page .1, Footote No.2+
F!C"#$
Private Respondent purchased on installment 'asis from Petitioner, two lots.
Private respondent suspended payment of his amorti#ations 'ecause of non%
development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses
Relevo and the title was registered under their name. Respondent prayed for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. :pplying P.*. /57 2he
8u'division and &ondominium >uyersD Protective *ecree$, the Human 8ettlements
Regulatory &ommission ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate
Private RespondentDs purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of
the payment ;including interest= he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitioner
claims that the B3ec. 8ec. erred in applying P.*. /57 saying it should have not 'een
given retroactive effect and that non%development does not !ustify the non%payment
of the amorti#ations.
I##%&F
.01 the B3ecutive 8ecretary acted with grave a'use of discretion when he
decided P.*. /57 will 'e given retroactive effect.
'&L(F
1o. Respondent B3ecutive 8ecretary did not act with grave a'use of
discretion and P.*. /57 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts e3ecuted prior to its enactment in 1/7(. P.*. /57 did not e3pressly provide
for retroactivity in its entirety, 'ut such can 'e plainly inferred from the unmista"a'le
intent of the law. 2he intent of the statute is the law.$
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a
People of the Philippines v. Purisima
Case No. 221
G.R. Nos. L-42+1+-** (No8e6-er 2+, 197.)
Chapter III, Page 7*, Footote No.1*
F!C"#$
2wenty%si3 petitions for review were filed charging the respective *efendant
with illegal possession of deadly weapon$ in violation of Presidential *ecree 1o. /.
:n order 4uashed the information 'ecause it did not allege facts which constitute
the offense penali#ed 'y P.*. 1o. /. It failed to state one essential element of the
crime, vi#.F that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a 'laded,
pointed, or 'lunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to su'version, insurrection, or re'ellion, organi#ed lawlessness or pu'lic
disorder. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P.*. 1o. / shows that the prohi'ited acts
need not 'e related to su'versive activities and that they are essentially malum
prohi'itum penali#ed for reasons of pu'lic policy.
I##%&F
.01 P.*. 1o. / shows that the prohi'ited acts need not 'e related to
su'versive activities.
'&L($
2he primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. <egislative intent is the
controlling factor. >ecause of the pro'lem of determining what acts fall under P.*. /,
it 'ecomes necessary to in4uire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
'e found among others in the pream'le or whereas$ clauses which enumerate the
facts or events which !ustify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions
stated therein.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ')
People of the Philippines v. Bchaves
Case No. 2+7
G.R. Nos. L-47717-*1 (4a/ar0 2., 19.+)
Chapter III, Page 77, Footote No.22
F!C"#$
2he issue is whether or not P.*. 77), which penali#es s4uatting and similar acts
applies to agricultural lands. 2he lower court denied the motion and ruled that
agricultural land is not part of P.*. 77) on the 'asis of B!usdem @eneris ;of the same
"ind or species= since its pream'le does not mention the 8ecretary of :griculture. 2he
order of dismissal 'y Bchaves was then appealed to the 8upreme &ourt, thus 'ringing
the case at hand.
I##%&$
.hether or not P.*. 77) applies to agricultural lands
'&L($
2he 8upreme &ourt held the same ruling that the lower court did, declaring
that P.*. 77) does not apply to pasture lands 'ecause its pream'le shows that it
was intended to apply to s4uatting in ur'an communities or more particularly to
illegal constructions in s4uatter areas made 'y well%to%do individuals.$ >ut the
8upreme &ourt disagreed to the lower courtDs usage of the ma3im B!usdem @eneris
'ecause the intent of the decree is unmista"a'le. It stated that the rule of B!usdem
@eneris is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative is uncertain.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,('
:'oiti# 8hipping &orporation v. &ity of &e'u
Case No. 4
G.R. No. L-1412* (March 31, 19*1)
Chapter III, Page .2, Footote No.23
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented 'y Respondent
should 'e declared null and void 'ecause the ordinance see"s to generate revenue
'y collecting wharfage from vessels which doc" at the pu'lic wharves of piers
located in the said &ity 'ut owned 'y the 1ational @overnment. :ccording to
Respondent, the legislature made no distinction 'etween those owned 'y the &ity of
&e'u and the 1ational @overnment and that conse4uently, 'oth fall within the
scope of the power granted. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light
of the meaning of pu'lic wharf$ as it may have 'earing on the right to charge
wharfage.
I##%&$
.01 the &ity of &e'u, through its ordinance, has the right to charge
wharfages from doc"s which are owned 'y the 1ational @overnment.
'&L($
2he term pu'lic$ refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. Hence,
the power to impose wharfage rests on a different 'asis and that is ownership. 2he
&ourt also referred to the previous su'section of the 4uestioned portion of the
ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those doc"s that are
owned 'y the &ity and those of the 1ational @overnment. 2he &ourt states that only
those which are constructed 'y the &ity shall 'e considered as its property.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )5a, ,('
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. 2MG 8ales, Inc.
Case No. .+
G.R. No. .373* (4a/ar0 11, 1992)
F!C"#$
Respondent &ompany wants a refund to an erroneously collected ta3 as
provided in 8ec. )/) of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode ;1IR&= which includes a
two%year prescription. 2he Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in
the law for refund of such ta3 is already e3pired since it is already more than two
years from the date the 4uarterly income ta3 was paid. 2he Respondent contends,
on the other hand, that the date of filing of the final payment ;Ainal :d!ustment
Return= is the one that should 'e considered with respect to the prescriptive period
and not the 4uarterly payment made.
I##%&$
.01 the two%year prescriptive period provided in 8ec. )/) of the 1ational
Internal Revenue &ode commence to run from the date the 4uarterly income ta3
was paid or from the date of filing of the Ainal :d!ustment Return ;final payment=.
'&L($
2he date of filing of the final payment should 'e considered. 2he 8upreme
&ourt said that, 8ec. )/) of the 1IR& should 'e interpreted in relation to the other
provisions of the 2a3 &ode in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid
an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and a'surdity. 2he
intention of the legislator must 'e ascertained from the whole te3t of the law and
every part of the act is to 'e ta"en into view.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
11a, ,(', ,(d
Aeliciano v. :4uino
Case No. 1+1
G.R. No. 1+2+1 (#epte6-er 23, 1917)
Chapter III, Page .3, Footote No.2.
F!C"#$
Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of &oncepcion, 2arlac. Aour
days after the proclamation, defeated candidate Petitioner instituted 4uo warranto
proceedings, challenging PetitionerDs eligi'ility on the ground that Respondent was
not yet ), years old at the time of his election. :4uino claimed that age re4uirement
refers only to the age at assumption of office. He appealed that the e3istence of a
semi%colon, converted into a comma in the 1/51 Revised :dministrative &ode, does
not re4uire him to possess the remaining 4ualifications at the time of the election 'ut
rather at the time of the assumption of office, provided that he had fulfilled the first
two re4uirements.
I##%&$
.01 the election of :4uino is unlawful and illegal.
'&L($
2he primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation mar"s cannot 'e
disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. Punctuation mar"s are aids of low
degree and can never control against the intelligi'le meaning of written words. 1o
reason is shown why, after plainly and une4uivocally re4uiring that the candidates of
other elective offices should possess the age 4ualification at the time of the
election$, the law should suddenly change the re4uirement for the case of municipal
officers. 1o argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as
eligi'le or ineligi'le in the said section, ta"ing part in the election is meant, not
capacity to assume office. *ecision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of
Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /d, 11a, 11e, ,('
68. v. Hart
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-.327 (March 2., 1913)
F!C"#$
Respondent was caught in a gam'ling house and was penali#ed under :ct
1o. 51/ which punishes every person found loitering a'out saloons or dram shops or
gam'ling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visi'le means
of support$. 2he said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated 'y the
comma, separating those caught in gam'ling houses and those straying through the
country without means of support. 2hough it was proven that Hart and the other
*efendants had visi'le means of support$, it was under the first part of the portion of
law for which they were charged with. 2he prosecution persisted that the phrase
without visi'le means of support$ was in connection to the second part of the said
portion of :ct 1o. 51/, therefore was not a via'le defense.
I##%&$
How should the provision 'e interpretedQ
'&L($
2he construction of a statute should 'e 'ased upon something more
su'stantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is
reasona'le and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may 'e as an additional
argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus
punctuated. :n argument 'ased on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the
court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the
effect intended 'y the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect
punctuation mar"s, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had,
visi'le means of support$ and that the a'sence of such was necessary for the
conviction for gam'ling and loitering in saloons and gam'ling houses, defendants
are ac4uitted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11e, ,,
In reF Bstate of Johnson
Case No. 131
G.R. No. 127*7 (No8e6-er 1*, 191.)
Chapter III, Page .*, Footote No.3.
F!C"#$
Petitioner was a native of 8weden and a naturali#ed citi#en of the 6nited
8tates 'ut died and left a will in Manila. 8ec. (,( of the &ode of the &ivil Procedure
states .ill made here 'y an alienTwill made within the Philippine Islands 'y a citi#en
or su'!ect of another state or country, which is e3ecuted in accordance with the law
of the state or country of which he is a citi#en or su'!ect, and which might 'e proved,
allowed 'y the law of his own state or country, may 'e proved, allowed and
recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if e3ecuted
according to the laws of these Islands.$ 2he will of Johnson was pro'ated and
allowed in the lower court, 'ut Petitioner contends that 8ec. (,( is applica'le only to
wills of aliensJ and in this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the
epigraph of this section spea"s only of the will made here 'y an alien and to further
fact that the word state$ in the 'ody of the section is not capitali#ed.
I##%&$
.01 the will of Petitioner, a citi#en of the 6.8 and therefore an alien, is
covered 'y 8ec. (,(.
'&L($
2he fact that the words state$ and country$ are not capitali#ed does not
mean that the 6nited 8tates is e3cluded from the phrase another state or country$. It
is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitali#ation are aids of low degree
in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligi'le
meaning of the written words. 2he epigraph, or heading, of a section 'eing nothing
more than a convenient inde3 to the contents of the provision, cannot have the
effect of limiting the operative words contained in the 'ody of the te3t. Petitioner,
'eing a 68 citi#en, thus an alien, is covered 'y 8ec. (,(. 2he will duly pro'ated.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)9a, )5a, )(, ,7, 9)a, 9E
People of the Philippines v. -a'ut
Case No. 231
G.R. No. .1472 (#epte6-er 27, 1993)
F!C"#F
*efendant was convicted for homicide. .hile serving sentence, he "illed
another prisoner. He was conse4uently charged for murder. :fter conviction, he was
punished with the ma3imum period for murder, in accordance with :rt. 1(+ of the
Revised Penal &ode.
I##%&F
.01 the lower court erred in applying :rt. 1(+.
'&L(F
1o. Respondent relied on the word another$ appearing in the Bnglish
translation of the head note of :rt. 1(+, and suggests that the law is applica'le only
when the new crime committed 'y a person serving sentence is different from the
crime for which he is serving sentence. :ccording to him, his conviction for murder is
not different 'ecause it involved homicide. 1o such deduction is warranted from the
te3t itself, or from the 8panish caption. .hen the te3t of the law is clear and
unam'iguous, there is no need to resort to the pream'le, heading, epigram or head
note of a section for interpretation of the te3t, which are mere catchwords or
reference aids, consulted to remove, not create dou'ts.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, 7a
People of the Philippines v. Mendo#a
Case No.112
G.R. No. L-3.+7* (No8e6-er 4, 1933)
F!C"#F
Respondents were accused for violation of 8ection )(59 of the :dministrative
&ode for allegedly depositing in the official 'allot 'o3 51 official 'allots which they
prepared without the "nowledge and consent of the voters. 2hey were tried and
convicted.
I##%&F
.01 the evidence is sufficient to convict.
'&L(F
1o. .hat was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election
case which has no pro'ative value to esta'lish the guilt of the defendants in the
criminal case. 2he Bnglish te3t of 8ection )(59 is defective as the head note clearly
shows that this section is only applica'le when a person fraudulently depositDs a
'allot in the 'allot 'o3. 2he evidence presented was insufficient to convict that
defendants fraudulently deposited the 'allots in 4uestion. Judgment was reversed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+, d
People of the Philippines v. Mana'a
Case No. 11+
G.R. No. L-39+37 (,cto-er 3+, 1933)
F!C"#$
*efendant was charged for rape. 2he complaint was signed 'y the &hief of
Police. :fter trial, *efendant was convicted 'ut the !udgment was set aside and the
case dismissed on his motion that the court had no !urisdiction over his person or the
su'!ect matter, 'ecause the complaint was not signed 'y the offended party.
8u'se4uently, the offended party signed a complaint charging *efendant of rape.
*efendant as"ed for dismissal on the ground of dou'le !eopardy, 'ut it was denied
and he was convicted.
I##%&F
.01 the *efendant was placed in dou'le !eopardy.
'&L(F
1o. .hether or not *efendant was placed in dou'le !eopardy depends on
whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. :rt. ,,9 of the
Revised Penal &ode re4uires the offended party to file the complaint. :s the first
complaint was not signed 'y the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with law, and the !udgment of the court was void for lac" of !urisdiction
over su'!ect matter, and defendant was never in !eopardy. 2he 8panish e4uivalent of
the word filed$ is not 'ound in the 8panish te3t which is controlling, 'ecause it was
the 8panish te3t approved 'y the legislature.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, ,(a
6.8. v. Suintanar
Case No. 1*2
G.R. No. 1*14 (!/g/st 27, 191+)
F!C"#$
*efendants, on the night of March 1, 1/+E were caught in the act of smo"ing
opium, in violation of 8ec. ,) of :ct 1o. 17(1, the 7pium <aw$. 7n appeal,
*efendants contend that they could not 'e legally convicted for they rely on the
8panish translation of the :ct which provides that it will ta"e effect despues del
primero de Mar#o.$ ;after the first of March=
I##%&$
.01 the *efendant should 'e punished under :ct 1o 17(1 which ta"es
effect despues del primero de Mar#o.$
'&L($
2he translation of the *efendant is not accurate. 2he Bnglish and original te3t
saysF on and after March 1, 1/+E$. .here the :ct was originally promulgated in
Bnglish, it shall prevail over its translation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
BmployeesD &lu', Inc. v. &hina >an"ing &orporation
Case No. 39
G.R. No. 4+1.. (4/30 27, 1934)
F!C"#$
Respondent &orporation contends that the order re4uires it to surrender the
register of deeds of the &ity of Manila which is the duplicate of 2&2 1o. )11/) so that
the contract lease might 'e noted and entered in the corresponding records. 2hey
argue that the contract lease cannot 'e registered in the register of deeds 'ecause
it is not a real rightJ and under the &ivil &ode and the Mortgage <aw, only real rights
can 'e registered. 2he only e3ceptions, which it does not har'or, are a term
e3ceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an e3press
covenant re4uiring the lease to 'e registered.
I##%&$
.01 contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not 'e
registered.

'&L($
2he property in 4uestion is 172 under the Mortgage law 'ut under :ct 1o.
9/(, or the 2orrens system, 8ec. 51 and 5). 2his act e3pressly provides that all interests
must 'e registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising
from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. 2he 8panish te3t of the law was
relied upon 'y the Petitioner N the Mortgage <aw. >ut the Bnglish enacted 'y the
<egislature, :ct 1o. 9/(, should prevail.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, 9/
McMic"ing v. <ichauco
Case No. 171
G.R. No. 7.9* (March 3+, 1914)
Chapter III, Page .., Footote No.49
F!C"#F
2his is an appeal on a !udgment in favor of current Respondent against
*efendant &hu &han &hac. However, there was another case pending in its
durationF an appeal in the !udgment in favor of :ntonio Alor Mata N where !udgment
e3ecution is. :nd li"ewise, in the duration of MataDs !udgment, there was yet another
pending appeal where *efendant <ichauco owed his :unt &lara <ichauco
P17,(((.(+.
I##%&$
.ith these two cases, who has preference over the funds owed 'y <ichauco.
'&L($
Preference should 'e secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. 2he
preference on Mata was 'ased on :rt. 1/)9 of the new &ode of &ivil Procedure,
which secures preference to sentencias firmes only ;!udgments which are final in the
sense that no appeal lies therefrom=. Mata must have immediate recourse to the
property of <ichauco 'ased on the first !udgment. However, until the allotment of
time for perfecting of a 'ill is not done yet and the appeal was not ta"en, the
!udgment, strictly, is not 8entencia Airme as used in 8panish legal terminology N where
it would 'e e3plained that the right to share in the distri'ution of the de'tor
;<ichauco= could not accrue the !udgment creditor ;Mata= until he has the right to.
7ne must ta"e into account that classification and the incidents of !udgments, orders
and decrees that were once under 8panish 2erminology have 'een modified under
the new &ode of &ivil Procedure, drawn in part from :merican and Bnglish
precedents. 7ne should loo" rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. 2he lien of a
!udgment is not necessarily destroyed 'y the perfecting of an appeal 'ut simply
suspended. Bven if there was a new !udgment, it is simply reversed, not destroyed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, 9/
:lon#o v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-72.73 (Ma0 2., 19.7)
F!C"#$
Aive si'lings inherited in e4ual pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. 2wo si'lings sold their share to the same
vendee. >y virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales,
)05 of the lot, representing the portions 'ought. 2hey su'se4uently enclosed their
portion with a fence and 'uilt a semi%concrete house. 7ne of the sisters filed a
complaint invo"ing the right to redeem the area sold. 2he trial court dismissed this
complaint 'ecause the time had lapsed, not having 'een e3ercised within ,+ days
from notice of the sales.
I##%&$
1. .01 there was a valid notice.
). .01 :rt. 1+EE of the &ivil &ode was interpreted correctly.
'&L($
:lthough there was no written notice, there was actual "nowledge of the
sales satisfying the re4uirement of the law. It is un'elieva'le that the co%heirs were
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi%concrete structure. .hile
:rt. 1+EE of the &ivil &ode stresses the need for a written notice of saleJ the Petitioners
claimed that 'ecause there was no written notice, despite their o'vious "nowledge
of it, the ,+%day period for redemption had not yet 'egun. 2he intent of the
lawma"ers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the ,+%day period of
redemption. 2he co%heirs in this case were undenia'ly informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given to them.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, E, /a, 1+, 11d, 11e, 1)a, 17
Hda. *e Maca'enta v. *avao 8tevedore 2erminal &ompany
Case No. 11*
G.R. No. L-274.9 (!pr23 3+, 197+)
F!C"#$
:t the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on 8eptem'er 1), 1/(1,
which led to his death 1( days later, the claimant%widow was not yet married to the
decedent although they had already 'een living together as hus'and and wife for
the past , months. However, on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded. 2he claimant widow gave 'irth on :pril E, 1/(), to the posthumous
daughter of the deceased, Rac4uel.
I##%&$
.01 the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the
.or"menDs &ompensation :ct.
'&L($
-es. :ccording to the .or"menDs &ompensation :ct, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if
under 1E years of age or incapa'le of supporting herself, and unmarried, whether or
not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. :lthough not
his wife at the time of the accident 'ut at the time of his death, are still considered
dependents under the :ct.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, /c, 1)a, ,7
2inio, et al. v. Arances, et al.
Case No. 29+
G.R. No. L-7747 (No8e6-er 29, 1911)
Chapter III, Page 9+, Footote No.*1
F!C"#$
8ergio 1icolas applied for a parcel of land in 1ueva Bci!a and was approved
in 1/17. In 1/9,, the final proof was approved 'y the *irector of <ands who issued a
patent in his favor, 'ut 'ecause 8ergio 1icolas died, he was su'stituted 'y his heirs,
represented 'y his widow. In 1/97, the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead
to the *efendants, with approval 'y the 8ecretary of :griculture and &ommerce,
and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1/5,, heirs of the
deceased 8ergio 1icolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover
the land, together with the fruits of the land as damages.
I##%&$
.01 the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of 8ergio 1icolas over the parcel of
land was valid.
'&L($
1o. &onveyances made 'y the heirs of the homesteader to the *efendants
do not comply with the first re4uirement of 8ec. )+ of the Pu'lic <ands :ct that the
*irector of lands is satisfied from proofs su'mitted 'y the homesteader that he could
not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and that the
conveyance must 'e made with the prior or previous approval of the 8ecretary of
:griculture and &ommerce. 2hus the conveyance made 'y the heirs of 1icolas was
null and void.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /', ,7, ,E', 9E
Home Insurance &ompany v. Bastern 8hipping <ines
Case No. 121
G.R. No. 343.2 (4/30 2+, 19.3)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footote No.*4
F!C"#$
Plaintiff &ompany instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
*efendant &ompany. 2he Petitioner &ompany claimed for reim'ursement with
regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered 'y
the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
I##%&$
.01 the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lac"s legal capacity
to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.
'&L($
-es. 2he law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff
&ompany, must, in order to 'e capacitated to sue in the Philippine !urisdiction, prove
legal capacity 'y esta'lishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint
was 'ased was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authori#ed 'y law to
transact in the Philippines. 7therwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the
Plaintiff as it has no legal right to see" relief from the court. In the case at 'ar, the
insurance contracts 'etween the Plaintiff and the *efendant were e3ecuted long
'efore the Plaintiff secured its license to transact 'usiness in the Philippines. 2herefore,
said insurance contracts were void from the 'eginning as the purpose was contrary
to pu'lic policy.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9, E, /c, 11a, ,(a, ,7
<u#on 8tevedoring &ompany v. 2rinidad
Case No. 114
G.R. No. 1.31* (#epte6-er 23, 1922)
F!C"#$
Plaintiff is a corporation duly organi#ed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, doing 'usiness in the &ity of Manila. Bngaging in a stevedoring 'usiness,
consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports, at certain rates of
charge per unit of cargo, Plaintiff &ompany hopes to recover from *efendant, the
Internal Revenue &ollector, the sum of P),9)).E1, which had 'een paid under
protest. *efendant alleged that during the first 4uarter of 1/)1, the Plaintiff was
engaged in 'usiness as a contractor, with its gross receipts from the said 'usiness
amounting to P)9), )E1.,,. 6nder the provisions of 8ec. 19() of :ct 1o. )711, the
percentage ta3 amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring 'usiness.
I##%&$
.01 the Plaintiff is considered a KcontractorK provided 'y 8ec. 19() of :ct 1o.
)711.
'&L($
: contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an
independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of
his wor", and not as to the means 'y which it is accomplished. Plaintiff is not a
KcontractorK 'ased on 8ec. 19() of :ct 1o. )711. 2herefore, the ta3 paid 'y the
Plaintiff was illegally collected and should 'e repaid.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 9, 5', /c, 11a, )E
@o &hioco v. Martine#
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 19.*4 a7 19*.1 (,cto-er 17, 1923)
F!C"#$
Petitioner made a loan of P9+,+++ to Respondent. 2hey e3ecuted a promissory
note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay 'ac" the loan within three
months. 7n the same day, Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note
and sent a chec" of P1,E++ to Petitioner, which was cashed. :fter three months,
Respondent Hermanos was una'le to pay the principal. He now e3ecuted a new
promissory note, again due within the ne3t three months, and with this note,
Respondent Hermanos sent a chec" for P1,E++. :gain, he could not pay so they
e3ecuted another promissory note and sent another chec" worth P1,E++. 2his cycle
was repeated a total of 7 times, with the third cycleLs promissory note 'ring due only
a month later and with a chec" for only P(++. 2hen Respondent Hermanos paid
P)5,+++ for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15,+++. 2herefore,
Petitioner filed a complaint. 2he trial court ruled that the interest rate of 1EC was in
violation of the 6sury <aw ;:ct )(55 as amended 'y :ct 1o. )//)=. 2hus, he must give
'ac" P11,E5+ from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15,+++.
I##%&$
.01 the charging of a usurious interest of 1EC forfeits the principal loaned
together with the interest.
'&L($
1o, since only the interest is forfeited. 2a"ing into consideration the history of
the 6sury <aw, the intent of the framers is clear. In a previous law R: )+7,, the
principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. However, unli"e the previous
law, the current law R: )(55 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for
violations. 2he current law also does not e3pressly mention that the principal is also
forfeited. :s a rule of construction, when the intent of a law is am'iguous, one may
consult the history of the law and its pream'le to ascertain the framers intent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, ,(a, ,7
68 v. *e @u#man
Case No. 297
G.R. No. L-9144 (March 27, 1911)
F!C"#$
*efendant, along with Pedro and 8erapio Macarling, was convicted of
asesinato ;murder= and sentenced to life imprisonment. *efendant was discharged
'efore he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a
witness for the @overnment against his co%accused. 6pon reaching the witness
stand, *efendant denied all "nowledge of the murder. He denied ever saying
anything that implicated his co%accused and swore that statements made 'y him
were made in fear of the police officers. 2he 8olicitor%@eneral as"s for the discharge
of the Respondent though it may result in a palpa'le miscarriage of !ustice,
nevertheless, the law provides for his dismissal and e3pressly 'ars a future prosecution.
I##%&$
.01 *efendant should 'e discharged.
'&L($
8ec. 1/ and )+ are constitutional. 2here is no provision for per!ury should the
*efendant fail to comply with the agreement with the 8tate. However, loo"ing at the
legislative history of the statute, it can 'e gleaned that faithful performance is
necessary to avail of the 'ar to criminal prosecution. Aailure of the *efendant in the
case at 'ar to faithfully and honestly carry out his underta"ing to appear as witness
and to tell the truth at the trial of his co%accused deprived him of the right to plead
his formal dismissal as a 'ar to his prosecution. Ainally, discharge cannot 'e an
ac4uittal since it was made prior to his trial.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ))a, ')
>asiana v. <una
Case o. 31
G.R. Nos. L-34131-3* (Fe-r/ar0 24, 19.1)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footote No.1+2
F!C"#$
Petitioner entered into a private agreement with &ipriano <una to prospect
with <una getting (+C and Petitioner receiving the rest. Petitioner prospected 1E,
claims, /, were recorded for him with the rest going to <una, a clear disregard of their
agreement. Reali#ing that there was something wrong with the declaration of
location records, <una amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim
names and tie pointsJ Petitioner however, disclaimed such consent. &onse4uently,
<una cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping
PetitionerDs claims. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid, and were merely
a'andoned for failure to pay occupation fees.
I##%&$
.01 PetitionerDs mining claims are valid.
'&L($
8ec. 97 par. ) of the Mining <aw ;&.:. 1o. 1,7= providesF Aor the purpose of
this section, a permanent and prominent o'!ect used as a tie point M:- 'e an
intersection of "nown roadsJ a !unction of "nown rivers or cree"s, a "nown pu'lic or
private structureJ a corner of approved pu'lic, private or mineral land surveyJ a
"ilometer post of pu'lic roadJ or location monument or triangulation station
esta'lished 'y the >ureau of <ands, >ureau of Mines, :rmy &orps of engineers,
>ureau of &ost and @eodetic 8urvey, or other government agencies.$ :n initial post
is not enumerated as a valid tie point. PetitionerDs contention that the word M:-
suggests non%e3clusivity is untena'le since it goes against the legislatorDs intent to
eliminate claim !umping and overlapping claims.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, ,+a, ,,, ,('
>aga v. P1>
Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-9*91 (#epte6-er 1+, 191*)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footote No.1+3
F!C"#$
Petitioner was the recipient of 'enefits with Respondent as the guardian
under R: ,/+ or the 6niform Heterans @uardianship :ct which was passed with the
intention of 'eing modeled after the 68 version. R: ,/+ provides that a guardianship
can only 'e terminated upon reaching the age of ma!ority. Petitioner alleges that
she has married and has 'ecome emancipated under :rt. ,// of the 1ew &ivil &ode
thus terminating the guardianship.
I##%&$
.01 :rt. ,// of the &ivil &ode shall prevail over R: ,/+.
'&L($
1o. 2he &ivil &ode does not prevail. It was the clear intent of the legislator to
create a uniform law for material aid. Inserting provisions of the &ivil &ode would
result in discordance with intent. R: ,/+ is a special law and thus must 'e ta"en to
constitute an e3ception to the general law which is the &ivil &ode. R: ,/+ 8ec. ),
applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to !udicial restoration and
discharge of guardians.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 5+, ')
*e Hilla v. &:
Case No. ..
G.R. No. .741* (!pr23 ., 1991)
Chapter III, Page 9*, Footote No.11+
F!C"#$
Petitioner was charged with a violation of >P )) ;>ouncing &hec"s <aw= for
issuing a worthless chec". However, he contends that the chec" was drawn against a
dollar account with a foreign 'an", and is therefore, not covered 'y the said law.
I##%&$
.01 the Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt has !urisdiction over the case in 4uestion.
'&L($
2he Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt has !urisdiction. 2he determinative factor ;in
determining venue= is the place of the issuance of the chec". 2he offense was
committed in Ma"ati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
!urisdiction in the Ma"ati Regional 2rial &ourt. 2he &ourt ac4uires !urisdiction over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or
information in court which initiates a criminal action. .ith regard to PetitionerDs
allegation that the chec" is not covered 'y >P )), it will 'e noted that the law does
not distinguish the currency involved in the case. 2hus, the &ourt revealed that the
records of >atasan, Hol. III unmista"a'ly show that the intention of the lawma"ers is to
apply the law to whatever currency may 'e the su'!ect thereof.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 17, )9', )(, 9,, ')
1ational Police &ommission v. *e @u#man, Jr.
Case No. 1.1
G.R. No. 1+*724 (Fe-r/ar0 9, 1994)
Chapter III, Page 9*, Footote No.11+
F!C"#$
R: (/75, otherwise "nown as :n :ct Bsta'lishing the P1P 6nder a
Reorgani#ed *ept. of the Interior and <ocal @overnment,$ laid down the compulsory
retirement age of P1P officers. Respondents argue that the age of retirement ;5(= of
said law cannot 'e applied to them since they are covered 'y 8ec. E/ of the same
law ;which temporarily e3tended the age of retirement=. In other words, Respondents
wanted to 'e e3tended the same privileges as the local police. Hence, they
contend that the term I1P$ includes 'oth the former mem'ers of the Philippine
&onsta'ulary ;P&= and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the
Integrated 1ational Police ;I1P=.
I##%&$
.01 the legislative intent was to classify the I1P as applica'le only to the
local police force.
'&L($
2he intent was to classify the I1P in such manner that 8ec. E/ of R: (/75 is
applica'le only to the local police force. 2he use of the term I1P is not synonymous
with the P&. Had it 'een otherwise, the statute could have !ust made a uniform
reference to the mem'ers of the whole P1P for retirement purposes and not !ust the
I1P. Indeed, the law distinguishes I1P from the P& and it cannot 'e construed that
I1P$ as used in 8ec. E/ includes the mem'ers of the P&. 2he legislature did intend to
e3clude the mem'ers of the P& from the coverage of 8ec. E/ insofar as the
retirement age is concerned.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, 11a, 1)a, )7, ')
&hina >an"ing &orporation v. 7rtega
Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-349*4 (4a/ar0 31, 1973)
F!C"#$
: complaint was filed against >M> Aorest *evelopment &orporation for the
collection of a sum of money. 2he trial court declared the said corporation in default.
2he Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the 'an" deposit of >M> Aorest with current
Petitioner >an". 2hus, a notice of garnishment was issued 'y the *eputy 8heriff and
served on Petitioner >an" through its cashier, 2an Oim <iong. He refused to disclose
the sought information, citing the provisions of R: 19+5 which prohi'its the disclosure
of any information relative to 'an" deposits to any person e3cept upon written
permission of the depositor. Aurthermore, R: 19+5 also imposes criminal lia'ility on any
official or employee of a 'an"ing institution who 'rea"s the confidential nature of this
law.
I##%&$
.01 a 'an"ing institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the 'an" deposit of a !udgment de'tor, 'y invo"ing R: 19+5.
'&L($
1o. It was not the intention of the lawma"ers to place 'an" deposits 'eyond
the reach of e3ecution to satisfy a final !udgment. 2he discussion of the conference
committee report of the two houses of &ongress indicates that the prohi'ition
against e3amination of or in4uiry into a 'an" deposit under R: 19+5 does not
preclude its 'eing garnished to insure satisfaction of a !udgment.
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a, 11e, 1)', ,+', ,5, ,E', 9,, ')
Mayon Motors v. :cting &IR
Case No. 173
G.R. No. 11+++ (March 29, 19*1)
Chapter III, Page 9*, Footote No.111
F!C"#$
Petitioner &ompany imported 17 Pontiac automo'iles in three different
shipments. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales ta3 on
the automo'iles. Petitioner re4uested for reconsideration and, this re4uest having
'een denied, it recurred to the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals. :fter the hearing, said court
modified RespondentDs decision 'y re4uiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what
the acting &ommissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a
refund. Hence this appeal. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted 'y the ta3 court
and insists the courtDs interpretation of the 2a3 &ode erroneous invo"ing a statement
made 'y then &ongressman Aerdinand Marcos during the deli'erations on the
amendments for the 2a3 &ode.
I##%&$
.01 the opinion of a legislator in the deli'erations of a law, controlling in the
interpretation of the law.
'&L($
1o. &ourts are not 'ound 'y a legislatorDs opinion e3pressed in congressional
de'ates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed to 'e a
mere personal opinion of the legislator.
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
Oilos'ayan, Inc. v. Morato
Case No. *7
G.R. No. 11.91+ (No8e6-er 1*, 1991)
F!C"#$
Petitioners see" for reconsideration of Oilos'ayan, et al. v. @uingona. 2he
&ourt has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue 'ut did not dismiss the
case. Petitioners insist that the P&87 cannot hold and conduct charity sweepsta"es,
lotteries and other similar activities in colla'oration or !oint venture with any other
party 'ecause of the clause e3cept for the activities mentioned in the preceding
paragraph ;:=$ in paragraph ;>= of 8ec. 1 of R: 11(/ as amended 'y >P 9).
I##%&$
.01 under its charter ;R: 11(/, as amended= the Philippine &harity
8weepsta"es 7ffice can enter in any form of association or colla'oration with any
party in operating an on%line lottery.
'&L($
1o. PetitionerDs interpretation fails to ta"e into account not only the location
of the phrase in paragraph ;>=, when it should 'e in paragraph ;:= had that 'een
the intention of the lawma"ing authority, 'ut also the phrase 'y itself.$ .hat the
P&87 is prohi'ited from doing is from investing in a 'usiness engaged in sweepsta"es,
races, lotteries and other similar activities. It is prohi'ited from doing so whether in
colla'oration, association or !oint venture$ with others or 'y itself.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
,9, ,('
<u#on 8tevedoring &o., Inc. v. <u#on Marine *epartment 6nion
Case No. 77
G.R. No. 92*1 (!pr23 29, 1917)
F!C"#$
Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued 'y the &ourt of Industrial
Relations ruling that the )+ minutesD rest given to employees after mealtime should
not 'e deducted from the four hours of overtime wor". Bmployees of the company
are seamen wor"ing in tug'oats from (F++ am N (F++ pm ;1) hours of wor", four hours
overtime=, given three free meals a day and )+ minutesD rest after mealtime.
I##%&$
1. .01 the definition for Khours of wor"K as presently applied to dry land
la'orers e4ually applica'le to seamen.
). .01 a different criterion should 'e applied 'y virtue of the fact that the
seamenLs employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of wor"
from that of a dry land la'orer.
'&L($
2he definition of hours of wor"$ e4ually applies to seamen and no need for a
different criterion. 8ec. 1 of &.:. 1o. 999, "nown as the Bight%Hour <a'or <aw, provides
that when the wor" is not continuous, the time during which the la'orer is not
wor"ing and can leave his wor"ing place and can reset completely, shall not 'e
counted$ in the eight wor"ing hours. : la'orer need not leave the premises of the
factory, shop or 'oat in order that his period of rest shall not 'e counted, it 'eing
enough that he cease to wor",$ and may rest completely.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )(
&ommissioner of &ustoms v. &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals
Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 4...*-. (4/30 21, 1993)
Chapter III, Page 1+1, Footote No.133
F!C"#$
Iligan B3press &orporation maintains a 'erthing facility at Oiwalan, Iligan &ity.
Respondent &ompany availed of such facilities and as thus assessed 'erthing fees 'y
the &ollector of &ustom which were paid 'y the said shipping company under
protest.
I##%&$
.01 a vessel 'erthing at a privately%owned wharf should 'e charged
'erthing fees under 8ec. )/+1 of the 2ariff and &ustom &ode, as amended 'y P.*.
,9.
'&L($
1o. <ia'ility does not attach if the port is privately%owned. 8ec. )/+1 of the
2ariff and &ustom &ode, as amended 'y P.*. ,9 spea"s of the national ports$ only.
8ec. )/+1 did not distinguish 'etween national ports and private ports until it was
amended 'y the presidential decree, and this amendment indicates a legislative
intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original. 8ince the said law
limits the 'erthing ta3es to national ports only, it is o'vious that the private ports are
not included. Oiwalan is not a national port in the &ustom memorandum circular
,,%7, or B.7. 7).
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )5d, ,+a
>uenaseda v. 8ecretary Alavier
Case No. 4+
G.R. No. 1+*719 (#epte6-er 21, 1993)
F!C"#$
2he Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
7m'udsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the :nti%graft and &orrupt
Practices :ct. In response, the 7m'udsman filed an order directing the preventive
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
health. 2he Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid 'y the
7m'udsman under 8ec. )9 of R: (77+ is contemplated in 'y 8ec. 1,;E= of :rt. / of
the 1/E7 &onstitution, while the Petitioner contends that the 7m'udsman can only
recommend to the Heads of *epartments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted
'y his office.
I##%&$
.01 the 7m'udsman has the power to preventively suspend government
officials wor"ing in other offices other than that of the 7m'udsman pending the
investigation of administrative complaints.
'&L($
-es. 2he 7m'udsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said
institution may it 'e in punitive or preventive suspension. 8ec. 1,;,= of the &onstitution
refers to suspension$ in its punitive sense, as the same spea"s of penalties in
administrative cases, while 8ec. )9 of R: (77+ grants the 7m'udsman the power to
preventively suspend pu'lic officials and employees facing administrative charges.
2his statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient
investigation on cases filed against the officers. : preventive measure is not in itself a
punishment 'ut a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)7, )E
&arolina Industries Inc. v. &M8 8toc" >ro"erage Inc.
Case No. 47
G.R. No. L-4*9+. (Ma0 17, 19.+)
Chapter III, Page 1+*, Footote No.14*
F!C"#$
Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing,
carrying and selling stoc"s and securities listed in the Ma"ati stoc" e3change. .ithin
three months, the PetitionerDs amount deposited was completely wiped out without
his permission. Respondent says there was consent 'ut the evidence did not suffice
to prove such consent. Respondent now 4uestion the appellate courtDs ruling on their
violation of the 8B& rules and securities :ct, and how these statutes are interpreted,
the appellate court used foreign !urisprudence in coming up with this decision.
I##%&$
.01 there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stoc" trading.
'&L($
If the law renders the customers as incapa'le of protecting himself, it is the
duty of the 'ro"er to do so. 2he courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right
'ecause the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the 6nited 8tates.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(d, /
Pamora v. &ollector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 17*
G. R. No L-1129+ (Ma0 31, 19*3)
F!C"#$
Mariano Pamora, owner of the >ay Hiew Hotel and Aarmacia Pamora Manila,
filed his income ta3 returns for the years 1/51 and 1/5). 2he &ollector of Internal
Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the
sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowa'le.
Mariano Pamora and his deceased sister Aelicidad Pamora, 'ought a piece
of land located in Manila on May 1(, 1/99, for P1,),+++.++ and sold it for P75,+++.++
on March 5, 1/51. 2hey also purchased a lot located in S.&. for P(E,/5/.++ on
January 1/, 1/99 which they sold for P/9,+++.++ on Ae'. /, 1/51. 2he &2: ordered the
estate of the late Aelicidad Pamora, to pay the sum of P),5.++, representing alleged
deficiency income ta3 and surcharge due from said estate. Bsperan#a Pamora
appealed and alleged that the &2: erred.
I##%&$
.01 the &2: erred in computing the ta3es due for payment 'y Mariano
Pamora.
'&L($
1o. 2he appraisal is correct and the court found no plausi'le reason to distur'
the same.
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
2amayo v. @sell
Case No. 2.2
G. R. No 1+7*1 ((ece6-er 22, 191*)
Chapter III, Page 1+*, Footote No.149
F!C"#$
2his is an action for damages against the *efendant for personal in!uries
suffered 'y >raulio 2amayo, 11%year old son of the Plaintiff. 2he in!ury was attri'uted to
the 'oyDs ine3perience in the wor" which he had 'een assigned for the first time and
without prior instruction.
I##%&$
.01 the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the BmployerDs <ia'ility
:ct.
'&L($
-es. 2he <egislature intended that the measure of damages in personal in!ury
cases 'rought under the BmployerDs <ia'ility :ct to 'e the same as that in the
country from which the :ct was ta"en, 'eing of :merican origin.
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
7ssorio v. Posadas
Case No. 93
G.R. No. L-31+.. ((ece6-er 3, 1929)
F!C"#$
Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the *efendant &ollector of
Internal Revenue the sum of P5(,)9(.7), which the *efendant, according to the
complaint, collected from the Plaintiff in e3cess of what he should have collected 'y
way of income ta3.
I##%&$
.01 the paraphernal property of the PlaintiffDs wife constitutes her separate
estate$ within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the
additional income ta3.
'&L($
-es. It is ordered that the *efendant ma"e two separate assessments of the
additional income ta3, one against the Plaintiff, and the other against his wife on her
paraphernal property, returning the sum of P5(,)+,.5/ to said plaintiff, without
pre!udice to his levying against and collecting from said PlaintiffDs wife upon her own
separate individual declaration, in accordance with law, the additional income ta3
for the income from her paraphernal property.
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
&ampos Rueda &orp. v. 8ta. &ru# 2im'er &o. and Aeli3
Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-*..4 (March 21, 191*)
F!C"#$
2he &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against
Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1,1)5
and P1,+75, for lac" of !urisdictionJ holding that the two notes constitute two separate
causes of action involving less than P),+++. 2he Municipal &ourt li"ewise dismissed the
case of Petitioner &orporation against Respondents for collection of the same
promissory notes o'!ect of the former action, on the ground that the amount of two
notes, which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action, was in
e3cess of its !urisdiction.
I##%&$
.01 the Municipal &ourt of Manila has !urisdiction over the su'!ect matter of
appellantDs complaint.
'&L($
1o. 2he !urisdiction of a court depends, not upon the value or demand in
each single case of action contained in the complaint, 'ut upon the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a
:ng @io" &hio vs. 8pringfield Aire M Marine Insurance &o.
Case No. .
G.R. No. 33*37 ((ece6-er 31, 1931)
F!C"#$
PetitionerDs warehouse was destroyed 'y fire while the policy ta"en out with
Respondent for the amount of P1+,+++ was in force. 2he Respondent &ompany has
appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract.
I##%&$
.01 a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void
'ecause it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance :ct.
'&L($
-es. : rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in
the contract of insurance, is valid and sufficient under 8ec. (5 of the Philippine
Insurance :ct as it was ta"en ver'atim from 8ec. )(+5 of the &ivil &ode of &alifornia
which states, 2he section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty
may 'e contained in another instrument than the policy when e3pressly referred to in
the policy as forming a part thereof.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, ')
Pando v. Oette and 8ellner
Case No. 99
G.R. No. 32124 (March 27, 193+)
F!C"#$
2his is a foreclosure of mortgage. In pursuant thereof, the sheriff on January ,+,
1/)/, posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in , pu'lic places, to wit, upon
the land itself, at the mar"et, and on the municipal 'uilding of Pasay. 1otice of the
sale was sent to the newspaper <a 7pinion for pu'lication, and the editor certified
that he pu'lished it once a wee" for , consecutive wee"s, more particularly on the
)
nd
, /
th
, and 15
th
of Ae'ruary, 1/)/ and the sale too" place on Ae'ruary 1/, 1/)/.
I##%&$
.01 the posted notices of the sale in , pu'lic places and pu'lication in <a
7pinion once a wee" for , consecutive wee"s satisfied the re4uirements of the law
regarding the notice of the sale in 4uestion.
'&L($
-es. 2he Provision of our &ode of &ivil Procedure having 'een adopted from
8ec. (/) of the &alifornia &ode, the re4uirements of the law regarding the notice of
the sale in 4uestion have 'een su'stantially complied with.
L!"IN M!)IM$
')
Reyes v. .ells
Case No. 131
G.R. No. 3+1.7 ((ece6-er 4, 1929)
F!C"#$
*efendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine
and an International truc" in a shed lot for P),,+++. However, Plaintiff @uerrero said
that he could not do so for the lac" of money to operate the machine. Respondent
Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. Plaintiff
would !ust have to ma"e out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage.
*efendant Rader and Plaintiff @uerrero went to J. 1orthcott, and on June )/, 1/)),
the former endorsed the mortgage deed. However, neither the said amount nor any
part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff @uerrero, or to any of his co%Plaintiffs. *ue to
the failure of J. B. Rader and J. 1orthcott to pay said amount of P1),+++, the Plaintiff
sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due.
I##%&$
.01 the promissory notes in 4uestion which have not 'een paid, are not
supported 'y the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of
@uerrero.
'&L($
2here was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in 4uestion. 2hese are
also in line with 8ec. 9(+9 of the &ode of Iowa. 2he prohi'ition contained in said law
against a witnessD testifying upon any transaction or communication 'etween himself
and a deceased person, is su'stantially the same as that contained in 8ec. ,E,;7= of
our &ode of &ivil Procedure, as amended 'y :ct 1o. ))5). 2herefore, we 'elieve
that the construction placed upon it 'y the court in the cases cited is applica'le to
the case at 'ar.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, ')
Phil. Bduc. &o. v. 8oriano
Case No. 231
G.R. No. L-224+1 (4/e 3+, 1971)
Chapter III, Page 1+7, Footote No.11*
F!C"#$
Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post 7ffice. He
managed to leave the 'uilding without "nowledge of the teller. Palomar received
one money order as part of their sales receipt and su'se4uently deposited it in the
>an" of :merica. Respondent, &hief of the Money 7rder *ivision of the Manila Post
7ffice notified the >an" of irregularity, and deducted from the 'an"Ds clearing
account the said amount, in the same way the 'an" of :merica de'ited PetitionerDs
account with the same amount. Petitioner re4uested to reconsider the action 'ut
was denied.
I##%&$
.01 the postal money order in 4uestion is a negotia'le instrument.
'&L($
Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the 68. 2hese
are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of 68Ds
own postal statutes, in the a'sence of any special reason !ustifying departure from
the policy or practice. 68 held that postal money orders are not negotia'le
instruments.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)', /a, ')
&ru# v. Pahati
Case No. 2.
G.R. No. L-.217 (!pr23 13, 191*)
F!C"#$
*efendant 'ought an automo'ile from >ulahan, for P9,/++ which he paid in
chec". He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the chec" upon
impoundment and as a result, he returned the automo'ile to >ulahan who in then
surrendered the chec" for cancellation. He set up a counterclaim for attorneyLs fees.
>ulahan claims that he 'ought the automo'ile from >eli#o without having any
"nowledge of any defect in the title. It was found out that >eli#o falsified a letter that
ena'led him to sell the car of >ulahan for profit. 2he court rendered !udgment
declaring *efendant >ulahan entitled to the automo'ile in 4uestion and ordered the
Plaintiff to return it to said *efendant and, upon his failure to do so, to pay him the
sum of P9,/++, with legal interest from the date of the decision. 2he claim for
damages and attorneyLs fees of >ulahan was denied. *efendant >eli#o was however
ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P9,/++ and pay the sum of P5,+++
as moral damages. 2he counterclaim of *efendant was denied for lac" of evidence.
I##%&$
.ho has a 'etter right of the two over the car.
'&L($
Plaintiff has a 'etter right to the car than >ulahan and therefore can recover
the said car. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived 'ecause of the
scheme of >eli#o even if 'oth the Plaintiff and >ulahan acted in good faith.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a
Repu'lic v. .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 132
G.R. No. L-29+19 (Ma0 1., 1972)
F!C"#$
Petitioners see" full compensation of P(,+++.++ plus attorneyDs fee of P(++.++
under the .&&, without deducting the P,,+++.++ as death 'enefit which they had
'een previously paid 'y virtue of the provisions of R: (1+.
I##%&$
.01 the 'eneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death
gratuity under R: (1+ should still 'e paid the death compensation under the .&&.
'&L($
2he resolution of the .&& is modifiedJ the P,,+++.++ received under R: (1+
should 'e deducted from the full grant received under the .&&. It is difficult to
construe that the legislature intended to dou'le the compensations received,
considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the
government could not have conceiva'ly permitted the outlays needed for the
purpose. Aurthermore, 8ec. / of R: (1+ and 8ec. 5 of .&& 'ar payment under other
laws. It was also contended that the phrase or any other law granting similar
'enefits to officers or employees, generally, of the national, provincial or municipal
government$ in 8ec. / is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further
recovery of compensation 'enefits under other laws.
L!"IN M!)IM$
17, 1/', )/, ,E', ,/, 9+'
@arcia et al. v. Hipolito et al.
Case N,. 13
G.R. No. L-1449 (No8e6-er 3+, 19+3)
F!C"#$
Judgment was rendered for the *efendants on May 1, 1/+,. 2he Plaintiffs
were notified thereof on May )1. 2wo days after, they e3cepted to the !udgment
and presented a motion for a new trial, which was denied on July ),. 7n July )E, the
Plaintiffs presented their proposed 'ill of e3ceptions, which on :ugust 5 was allowed
and signed 'y the court. 2he term of the court in which the case was tried e3pired on
May ,+.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. 19, of the &ode of &ivil Procedure allows the parties to consent to
or for the !udge to order an e3tension of the 1+%day period.
'&L($
2he period of 1+ days and the su'se4uent period of 5 days have to do with
the mechanical part of the appealTthe preparation of the papers for transmission to
the 8upreme &ourt. 2he right of the parties to the appeal was already fi3ed 'y the
notice of the intention to prepare a 'ill of e3ceptions entered of record in the cler"Ds
office. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in
most other laws of :merican origin, it cannot 'e e3tended. >ut that period is entirely
different from the 1+ days for allowing the preparation of papers, after the right to
remove the case has 'een secured. 2herefore, it cannot 'e said that an e3tension of
this time is an e3tension of the time to appeal. Moreover, considering when the law
was adopted, it seems impossi'le that the &ommission intended to deprive the court
and the parties of the power to e3tend the term, given the physical impossi'ility to
comply with it in many cases.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11a, 1/', )7, 9E
B887 8tandard Bastern Inc. v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 41
G.R. No. 7++37 (4/30 7, 19.9)
F!C"#$
2he case is an appeal on the decision of the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals denying
the PetitionerDs claims for refund of the margin fees P1+),)9(.++ for 1/5/ and
P9,9,),9./) for 1/(+.
I##%&$
.01 R: )(+/, entitled :n :ct to :uthori#e the &entral >an" of the Philippines
to Bsta'lish a Margin over >an"sD 8elling Rates of Aoreign B3change$, is a police
measure or a revenue measure.
'&L($
R: )(+/ is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our countryDs
international reserve. Petitioner contended that margin fees are ta3es and cited the
'ac"ground and the legislative history of the Margin Aee <aw showing that R: )(+/
was nothing less than a revival of the 17C e3cise ta3 on foreign e3change imposed
'y R: (+1. 2his was a revenue measure formally proposed 'y President &arlos P.
@arcia to &ongress as part of, and in order to 'alance, the 'udget for 1/5/%1/(+.
2he &2: stated that it is a well%settled !urisprudence that only in e3tremely
dou'tful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of &ongress
'ecome important. :s a matter of fact, there may 'e no resort to the legislative
history of the enactment of a statute, the language of which is plain and
unam'iguous, since such legislative history may only 'e resorted to for the purpose of
solving dou't, not for the purpose of creating it. Moreover, at least two cases had
'een decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a ta3.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 7a
&ommissioner of &ustoms v. B887 8tandard Bastern Inc.
Case No. 2*
G.R. No. L-2.329 (!/g/st 17, 1971)
F!C"#$
Petitioner contends that the special import ta3 under R: 1,/9 is separate and
distinct from the customs duty prescri'ed 'y the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode, and that
the e3emption en!oyed 'y Respondent from the payment of customs duties under
the Petroleum net of 1/9/ does not include e3emption from the payment of the
special import ta3 provided in R: 1,/9.
I##%&$
.01 the e3emption en!oyed 'y Respondent from customs duties granted 'y
R: ,E7 should include the special import ta3 imposed 'y R: 1,/9, or the 8pecial
Import 2a3 <aw.
'&L($
Petitioner too" e3ception to the finding of the &2: that K2he language of R:
1,/9 seems to leave no room for dou't that the law intends that the phrase L8pecial
Import 2a3L is ta"en to include customs dutiesK. In order to determine the true intent of
the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not 'e ta"en
as detached and isolated e3pressions, 'ut the whole and every part thereof must 'e
considered in fi3ing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should
receive such construction as will ma"e it harmoni#e with the pre%e3isting 'ody of laws.
:ntagonism 'etween the :cts to 'e interpreted and e3isting or previous laws is to 'e
avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism
should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either e3pressly or 'y implication.
:nother rule applied 'y this &ourt is that the courts may ta"e !udicial notice of the
origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and
administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. 2he
&ourt e3amined the si3 statuettes repealed 'y R: 1,/9.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,(', ,Ea, ')
Pascual v. *irector of <ands
Case No. 1++
G.R. No. L-11.1* (Fe-r/ar0 29, 19*4)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed with Respondents, pursuant to the provisions of 8ec. 1+) &.:.
1o. 191, a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground
that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the ta3es
thereon since 1/97, and on the further ground that he and his successors%in%interest
had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon, in violation of
the terms and conditions of the lease. 2he policy in the disposition and concession of
pu'lic land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. 2hus, in cases of
lease the law re4uires that no lease shall 'e permitted to interfere with any prior
claim 'y settlement or 'y occupation, until the consent of the occupant or settler is
first had, or until such claim shall 'e legally e3tinguished ;8ec. ,,, &.:. 1o. 191=. If
anyone should 'e given prior right of entry at all, it should 'e the actual occupants
who have presented several petitions for the su'division or and sale of the land to
them.
I##%&$
.01 the ruling of the trial court upholding PetitionerDs claim to a right of entry
was correct.
'&L($
1o. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given 'y
administrative officials to a law they are 'ound to enforce or implement deserves
great weight. In the present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the
decision of Respondent and of the 8ecretary of :griculture and 1atural Resources
'ut that of the 7ffice of the President, without the record disclosing in our opinion,
that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. 2o the contrary, they appear to
'e in consonance with the purpose of the law invo"ed 'y Petitioner, namely, to give
priority or preference to the actual occupant of pu'lic land which Petitioner is not.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a
7rencia v. Bnrile
Case No. 92
G.R. No. L-2.997 (Fe-r/ar0 22, 1974)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy cler" of court of the &ler"s of &ourt
*ivision of the <and Registration &ommission, and he has 'een performing functions
of :ssistant &hief of said division and has 'een considered and recogni#ed as such
until R: 9+9+, increasing the salaries of :ssistant &hiefs of *ivisions, among others, was
implemented where he was left out while co%assistant chief of the nine other divisions
of the <and Registration &ommission were so recogni#ed and e3tended increased
compensation. Respondents filed their answer, and after usual admissions and
denials, interposed a defense that Petitioner is un4ualified for the position of :ssistant
&hief, and 'eing a new position created under R: 9+9+, the same can only 'e filed
'y a 4ualified personJ that Respondent, 'eing a lawyer, is more 4ualified than
Petitioner, who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service
eligi'ility, and praying that the petition 'e dismissed
I##%&$
.01 the Petitioner should 'e recogni#ed as the deputy cler" of court of the
&ler"s of &ourt *ivision of the <and Registration &ommission.
'&L($
Aor Respondent officials, the answer was not in dou't. 8ince there was a new
legal provision to 'e construed, one which admittedly, to follow the approach of
counsel for Petitioner, has an am'iguous aspect, they chose to follow the principle
that a pu'lic office is a pu'lic trust. &ertainly, such a contemporaneous construction,
one moreover dictated 'y the soundest constitutional postulate, is entitled to the
highest respect from the !udiciary.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a
m i " i People of the Philippines v. Hernande#
Case No. 1+7
G.R. Nos. L-39.4+ a7 L-39.41 ((ece6-er 23, 1933)
F!C"#$
Respondent ran for governor in &amarines 1orte and assumed office on
7cto'er 1(, 1/,1. :t this time, he was a delin4uent in the payment of P),+++ for land
ta3es to the government. 2wo or three days 'efore Respondent assumed office, the
municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said ta3es 'ut he failed to do so. 2he
Insular :uditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor, on the
condition that it would 'e used to pay off the delin4uent ta3es. 2he &hief of
B3ecutive >ureau and :ttorney @eneral agreed with Insular :uditor. >y 8eptem'er,
1/,), ta3es had 'een paid for. However, in :pril 1/,), he was charged for violating
8ec. )(5/ of the :dministrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the
right to suffrage and pu'lic office.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. )(5/ can 'e applied to refrain Respondent from ta"ing office as
@overnor in &amarines 1orte.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. )(5/ refers to a person who assumes office to which he had 'een
elected without possessing the necessary 4ualifications to hold pu'lic office as
provided 'y law. *elin4uency of payment of ta3es is no longer a dis4ualification for
assuming a pu'lic office. Hence, even though Respondent did not pay his land
ta3es, this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. 6nder these
circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs.
RaffertyF long continued administrative interpretation of a ta3 law, while not
conclusive, should 'e followed unless clearly erroneous. :nd in this case, it was not.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,), 9)'
8agun v. PeopleDs Homesite and Housing &orporation
Case No. 2**
G.R. No. 73*+3 (4/e 22, 19..)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footote No.1.+
F!C"#$
Respondent &orporation was created to provide decent, low cost housing for
those who are una'le to provide themselves with this. In accordance with R: ,)+E,
the lots located in >loc" ,,+, <&H Pro!ect ,, Sue#on &ity were meant to 'e used for
this purpose. However, the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes, 'efore
converting these store units into their dwelling homes. In 1/71, Petitioners decided
that they wanted to 'uy these lots from Respondent &orporation 'ut filed a petition
for mandamus alleging that Respondent &orporation was selling the lots at P5+0s4
m., which was in violation of R: ,E+).
I##%&$
.01 Respondent &orporation can 'e compelled 'y mandamus to sell these
lots for not more than P1+0s4 m. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest,
in reference to 8ec. 1 of R: ,E+).
'&L($
1o. Aor mandamus to lie, PetitionerDs rights should 'e well%defined, clear and
certain. In the case at 'ar, there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel
Respondent &orporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is 'eing
offered. 2he Petitioners first leased these units for 'usiness purposes. 2hus, the price of
P5+ is not e3cessive or unreasona'le considering that the mar"et value for the lots is
at least P1)+. 2he action of Respondent &orporation neither conflicts with the law nor
does it demonstrate any a'use of discretion to warrant its reversal. Moreover, there is
no o'ligation of Respondent &orporation, under R: ,E+), aside from the fact that
the determination of the selling price re4uires e3ercise of discretion on their part.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, /a
Philippine @lo'al &ommunications, Inc. v. Relova
Case No. 23*
G.R. No. L-*+14. (No8e6-er 1+, 19.*)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footote No.1.1
F!C"#$
In 1/7(, Petitioner filed with the >oard of &ommunication, now 12&, an
application for authority to esta'lish a 'ranch station in &e'u for the purpose of
rendering international telecommunication services from &e'u to any point outside
the Philippines where it is authori#ed to operate. In 1/77, Manila was designated as
the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In January 1/7/, >7& gave
Petitioners authority to esta'lish a station in &e'u, su'!ect to that as soon as domestic
carriers have upgraded their facilities, applicant shall cease its operations.
Respondents filed a !oint motion for reconsideration of said decision, which ruled in
favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to
esta'lish other stations aside from the station in Ma"ati. 2his is a petition see"ing to set
aside the ruling rendered.

I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is authori#ed under R: 9(17 to esta'lish stations in places or
points outside Metro ManilaQ
'&L($
-es. R: 9(17 clearly authori#es Petitioner to construct, maintain, and operate,
apart from its principal station in Ma"ati, other stations or 'ranches within the
Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. 2his can 'e
seen in 8ec. , and 9 wherein other stations may 'e esta'lished as long as it is
approved 'y the 8ecretary of Pu'lic .or"s and &ommunications. 2he opinion of the
8ecretary and 6ndersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authori#ation of other
stations is material and must 'e considered in favor of the Petitioners.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,('
:sturias 8ugar &entral v. &ommissioner of &ustoms
Case No. 24
No. L-19337 (#epte6-er 3+ 19*9)
Chapter III, Page 112, Footote No.1.3
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavora'le decision of the &2:
which denied the recovery of the sum of P)E,()/.9) which the Petitioner paid under
protest in the concept of customs duties and special import ta3.
6nder the law in effect at that time, the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of
ta3es and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re%e3ports said
containers within a 1year period.
:lso :sturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the
said amount minus 1C under 8ec. 1+(;'= of the &ustoms and 2ariff :ct.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import ta3es and duties.
'&L($
1o. 2he 1%year period mentioned in the Philippine 2ariff :ct contains no
e3press mention of any e3tension or of any grounds for it to 'e e3tended.
2he provisions invo"ed 'y the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund, offer
two options to an importer. 2he first gives him the privilege of importing, free from
import duties, the containers mentioned therein as long as he e3ports them within
one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry, it is non%e3tendi'le. 2he
second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid su'!ect to refund to
the e3tent of //C of the amount paid, provided the articles mentioned are e3ported
within three years from importation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 9, ,E', 9,
Phil. 8ugar &entral :gency v. &ollector of &ustoms
Case No. 241
No. 277*1 ((ec. * 1927)
Chapter III, Page 113, Footote No.1.*
F!C"#$
Petitioner acts as agency and attorney%in%fact of Ma%ao 8ugar &entral &o.
Ma%ao 8ugar &entral &o. shipped 5,1)9,91( gross "ilos of centrifugal sugar to 6nited
8tates in a wharf on Pulapandan, 7ccidental 1egros on steamship Hannover. .harf
was 'uilt and maintained solely 'y the Ma%ao 8ugar &entral &o. *efendant
collected wharfage dues on petitionerDs wharf.
I##%&$
.01 the *efendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned 'y
government.
'&L($
-es. 2he @overnment can 'e allowed to collect 'ecause not to do so would
overthrow and destroy the whole system of the @overnment, in and 'y which millions
of pesos have 'een levied and collected and e3pended in the construction of
@overnment wharves, and it would have defeated the construction of the
@overnment wharf at Pulapandan.$
(2sset2g ,p22o$
Historically, wharves not owned nor operated 'y government cannot 'e
ta3ed or levied upon.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,a, 9, ,7, 5', 11d
Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc. v. @ames and :musement >oard
Case No. 1*4
No. L-12727 (Fe-r/ar0 29, 19*+)
Chapter III, Page 114, Footote No.19+
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain 8undays unreserved for
any event and that reducing the num'er of said days is an infringement of their right.
Petitioner relies on the strength of 8ec. 9 of R: ,+/, as amended 'y R: /E,, that the
unreserved 8undays may 'e used 'y private individuals or groups duly licensed 'y
the @ames and :musement >oard ;@:>=. R: 15+) increased the sweepsta"es draw
and races to 1) 'ut without specifying the days on which they are to 'e run, the @:>
reduced the num'er of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities 'y si3.
I##%&$
.01 the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days.
'&L($
1o. Arom the wording of the R: ,+/ and R: /E,, it is clear that the te3t is
permissive and is not mandatory. 2he private individuals and entities are not entitled
to the use of such days. PetitionerDs claim that the intent of the legislature was to
allow the races and sweepsta"es to 'e run on the same day are untena'le. 2he
words of mem'ers of &ongress are not representative of the entire House of
Representatives or 8enate. :lso, PetitionerDs claim that to allow the P&87 to use their
e4uipment and property is deprivation of property is also untena'le 'ecause they
have a rental agreement with the P&87.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (g, ,7, ,E'
Ramos v. &:
Case No. 213
G.R. No. L-22713 ((ece6-er 1., 19*7)
F!C"#$
2he present case had its incipiency in a petition filed 'y the then 1ational
Rice and &orn &orporation ;1:RI&= wor"ers for an o'ligation created 'y agreement
confirmed 'y the &ourt of Industrial Relations directing 1:RI& to pay )5C for
additional compensation for overtime wor", night wor" and wor" rendered on
8undays and legal holidays 'y its la'orers and employees. Rice and &orn
:dministration ;R&:= claims that unli"e 1:RI&, which was possessed with a distinct
and separate corporate e3istence, they are merely an office directly under the
President, a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to
sta'ili#e the price of palay, rice, and corn, and not for profit. 2o carry out this
function, 'y law of the &ommonwealth :ct otherwise "nown as the >udget :ct, R&:
depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside 'y the
@eneral :ppropriations :ct. 2here has 'een consistent administrative interpretation
'y the 7ffice of the President as to what may, under law, 'e granted to R&: wor"ers
and employees for overtime wor" and wor" on 8undays and holidays. 1ot a matter
of right, such compensation was given upon authority of the >udgetary :ct.
I##%&$
.01 R&: should 'e held answera'le N when 1:RI& ceased to e3ist and R&:
was created N for the said o'ligation.
'&L($
.hile e3ecutive construction is not necessarily 'inding upon courts, it is
entitled to great weight and consideration. 2he reason for this is that such
construction comes from the particular 'ranch of government called upon to
implement the particular law involved. 2hus, unless the President specifically
appropriates the )5C compensation, R&: is not lia'le to the a'ovementioned
o'ligation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 11a, ,E'
8alaria v. >uenvia!e
Case No. 2*7
G.R. No. L-41*42 (Fe-r/ar0 2., 197.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner has 'een staying on the land of &ailao when the latter sold the said
land to Private Respondent Mendiola. : formal letter of demand to vacate the
premises was sent 'y Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. : complaint for unlawful
detainer was filed 'y Mendiola against Petitioner 8alaria. :fter the trial, the &ity &ourt
ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. 7n appeal, the &AI through
Respondent Judge >uenvia!e affirmed the decision of the inferior court. 2hus, a
petition for review on &ertiorari was filed with the 8upreme &ourt.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent can e!ect Petitioner from the lot.
'&L($
1o. Memorandum &ircular 1o. /7+ was issued 'y the President stating that
e3cept for the causes for !udicial e!ectment of lessees ? 'ona fide tenants of
dwelling places covered 'y said decree are not su'!ect to eviction, particularly if the
only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property 'y the owners or their
families.$ &onstruction 'y B3ecutive >ranch of @overnment of a particular law
although not 'inding upon courts must 'e given weight as the construction comes
from that 'ranch called upon to implement the law. 2he ground relied upon 'y the
lessor in this case, namely, personal use of property 'y the owner or lessors or their
families is not one of the causes for !udicial e!ectment of lessees.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,+a, ,E'
6niversity of the Philippines v. &:
Case No. 3+1
G.R. No. L-2.113 (4a/ar0 2., 1971)
F!C"#$
.ith the filing of Petition for in!unction in the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila,
Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing
them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not 'e dismissed from
the Philippine @eneral Hospital 'y herein Respondent 'ut 'y the &ivil 8ervice
&ommissioner.
I##%&$
.01 the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case 'y the >oard of Regents is
final, or re4uires further action 'y the &ivil 8ervice &ommission.
'&L($
2he management of Philippine @eneral hospital was initially under the 7ffice
of the President of the Philippines. 6nder R: 51 and B.7. /9, the President transferred
them under herein Respondent. 2hus, the 8upreme &ourt ruled that the President and
>oard of Regents of the 6.P. possess full and final authority in disciplining, suspension,
and removal of the civil service employees of the 6niversity, including those of the
Philippine @eneral Hospital, independently of the &ommissioner of the &ivil 8ervice
and the &ivil 8ervice >oard of :ppeals.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (c, /', )+c, ,E'
Philippine :ssociation of Aree <a'or 6nions ;P:A<6= v. >ureau of <a'or Relations
Case No. 12+
G.R. No. L-437*+ (!/g/st 21, 197*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner lost to 1ational Aederation of Aree <a'or 6nions ;1:A<6= in the
certification elections for the e3clusive 'argaining agent of the employees in
Philippine >looming Mills, &ompany, Inc.
2allied votes are as followsF
1:A<6 9)/
P:A<6 919
8poiled >allots 17 ;not counted=
:'stained 9
2otal >allots E(9
;1oteF 1:A<6 didnDt o'tain the ma!ority vote, which is 9,).=
Petitioner contends that the spoiled should 'e considered as in the ruling in a
previous case. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was 'ased
on the Industrial Peace :ct, which has 'een superseded 'y the present <a'or &ode
and as such cannot apply to the case at 'ar.
I##%&$
.01 the Respondent acted with grave a'use of discretion 'y not allowing
the spoiled 'allots to 'e considered as in the previous case of :llied .or"ers
:ssociation of the Philippines vs. &IR.
'&L($
2here was no grave a'use of discretion made 'y Respondent since the 'asis
of the ruling in the :llied .or"ers case has 'een superseded 'y the present <a'or
&ode. :lso, the Rules and Regulations implementing the present <a'or &ode has
'een already 'een made "nown to pu'lic and as such has the enforcing power in
the case at 'ar.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, )a, ,/a
Bverett v. >autista
Case No. 43
G.R. No. 4*1+1 (No8e6-er 7, 1939)
F!C"#$
Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed
SueenDs 2heater during the first Suarter of 1/,7. 2he partnership charged admission
fees of P+.9+ per seat and at other times charged more than P+.9+ 'ut not more than
P+.7+ per seat. *uring the first Suarter of 1/,7, their receipts were P15, EE1.91. :t that
time, imposition ta3 is at 5C of the gross receipts of theaters, cinematographs, etc.
whose admission price e3ceeds P+.9+ ;8ec. 1M, of &.:. 1o. 1)E=. 2he law does not
say how ta3 should 'e imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at
the same rate. :s such, the &ollector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations 1o. /9,
which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will 'e !ointly ta"en
into account for computation purposes. 8ec. 195E of the :dministrative &ode states
that penalty for late payment will 'e at )5C of the ta3 imposed. 2he parties failed to
pay the ta3 on time and therefore su'!ect to 8ec. 195E. 2hey were as"ed to pay
P//).5+, which they refused to pay.
I##%&$
1. .01 the collection to said ta3 is in accordance with law.
). .01 Regulations 1o. /9 is in accordance with law.
'&L($
-es to 'oth. 2he interpretation given to a law 'y an officer charged 'y reason
of his office to carry out its provisions should 'e respected. It has also 'een held that
where there is am'iguity in the language of the law, contemporaneous construction
is given weight.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a
Insular >an" of :sia and :merica BmployeesD 6nion ;I>::B6= v. Inciong
Case No. *2
G.R. No. L-12411 (,cto-er 23, 19.4)
F!C"#$
Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower &ourt against Insular >an" of :sia
and :merica ;I>::= for not paying the holiday pay. 2he Petition was granted and
I>:: paid for the holiday wage. <ater, I>:: stopped paying the holiday wage in
compliance to the issuance of 8ec. ) of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
<a'or &ode and the Policy Instruction 1o. / issued 'y Respondent ;then 8ecretary of
*7<B=. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of e3ecution to enforce the ar'iterDs
decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. I>:: then
appealed to 1<R& and 1<R& dismissed the appeal. :t this point, I>:: filed a motion
for reconsideration to Respondent. Respondent granted I>::Ds motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of
grave a'use of discretion amounting to lac" of !urisdiction.
I##%&$
1. .01 the decision of the <a'or :r'iter can 'e set aside 'y Respondent
considering that it has 'ecome final and had 'een partially e3ecuted.
). .01 8ec. ) of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction 1o. / are valid.
'&L($
: !udgment in a la'or case that has 'ecome e3ecutory cannot 'e revo"ed
after finality of !udgment. In the case at 'ar, I>:: waived its right to appeal 'y
paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the !udgment
as correct. 8ec. ) and Policy Instruction 1o. / are 'oth null and void since they
amended the provisions of the <a'or &ode. It has 'een held that where the
language of the law is clear and une4uivocal the law must 'e ta"en to mean
e3actly what it says. :nd also, if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous, the
same must 'e declared null and void.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 17, ,7, 9+c
Philippine :pparel .or"ers 6nion vs. 1<R&
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-1+32+ (March 3+, 19..)
F!C"#$
: collective 'argaining agreement was made 'etween Petitioners and
Management of Philippine :pparel Inc. ;P:I= on :pril ), 1/77 and was signed on
8eptem'er 7, 1/77. &>: stipulated a P)).++ increase in monthly wage of wor"ers that
will retroact from :pril 1, 1/77. However, on May of the same year, P.*. 11), granted
a P(+.++ increase in living allowance which will ta"e effect from January 1, 1/77,
provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P(+.++ will 'e given
the difference. Management argues that since on :pril ), there has 'een an
agreement to a P)).++ increase, P:I only had to pay the difference of P,E.++.
Moreover, P:I was a'le to get the opinion of the 6ndersecretary of <a'or supporting
the P:I Management. <a'or contends that increase does not fall within the
e3emption since the &>: was signed on 8eptem'er after P.*. 11), has 'een passed.
I##%&$
.01 the case falls under the e3ception of P.*. 11),.
'&L($
1o. 2here was no formal agreement on :pril ), 1/77 regarding the increase.
Moreover, the opinion of the 6ndersecretary of <a'or was 'ased on a wrong premise
and misinterpretation 'y P:I Management. It was unlawful and 'eyond the scope of
law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a
6nited &hristian Missionary 8ociety vs. 8ocial 8ecurity &ommission
Case No. 293
G.R. No. L-2*712-1* ((ece6-er 27, 19*9)
Chapter III, Page 2+*, Footote No.2+*
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not "now that they had to pay ta3 for
their operations. 1evertheless, upon "nowledge thereof, they paid their premium
remittances 'ut refused to pay the incredi'le penalty fees since they did not "now
that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances, claiming that the
assessed penalties were ine4uita'le. Respondent said that their organi#ation is
em'raced in the 8ocial 8ecurity :ctJ therefore the assessed penalties are imposed
on them.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the 8ocial
8ecurity :ct to condone, waive or relin4uish the penalty prescri'ed 'y law for late
payment of remittances.
'&L($
Respondent has no such authority. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in
the a'sence of an e3press provision in the 8ocial 8ecurity :ct vesting Respondent the
power to condone penalties, it has no legal authority to condone, waive, or
relin4uish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the
88 :ct. 2he reason of the law is to develop, esta'lish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall 'e suita'le to the needs of the people? to provide
employees against the ha#ards of disa'ility, sic"ness, old age, and death.$ @ood
faith and 'ad faith are irrelevant since the law ma"es no distinction. .here the
language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is e4ually plain, there is
no room for interpretation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, (', 7a, /a, )(
-ra v. :'aRo
Case No. 31*
G.R. No. 3+1.7 (No8e6-er 11, 192.)
Chapter III, Page 11., Footote No.214
F!C"#$
Respondent was running for office in >ulacan, his hometown. However, he is a
registered voter in Manila and to 'e a candidate, one of the 4ualifications is that
he0she who is running should 'e a duly 4ualified elector therein$.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent is an eligi'le to run as a local official of >ulacan.
'&L($
-es. He is 4ualified to run for local office. In a previous case contested in the
Philippine :ssem'ly, Aernando Ma. @uerrero a candidate for representative to the
Phil. :ssem'ly was alleged to 'e un4ualified for the position on the ground that he
was not registered in his electoral district. 2he conclusion to which was, 4ualified
elector$ meant that he has all the 4ualifications provided 'y the law to 'e a voter
and need not 'e register. 2he same was the case and decision of the B3ecutive
>ureau on the 4ualifications of 8enator Jose P. <aurel. It is sufficient that he possess
the 4ualifications stated in 8ec. 9,1 and none of the dis4ualifications stated in 8ec.
9,) of the Blection <aw. However, it is not least to disregard the forci'le argument
advanced that when the law ma"e use of the phrases, 4ualified electors$ and
4ualified voter$ the law means what it says. It would 'e an a'surdity to hold one a
4ualified elector who was not eligi'le to vote in his own municipality.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,a, (c, 11a
Interprovincial :uto'us &o., Inc. v. &IR
Case No. 134
G.R. No. L-*741 (4a/ar0 31, 191*)
Chapter III, Page 12+-121, Footote No.222 9 227
F!C"#$
Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight 'y means of 2P6
'uses in Misamis 7ccidental and 1orthern Pam'oanga. 2he provincial revenue
agent for Misamis 7ccidental e3amined the stu's of the freight receipts that had
'een issued 'y Petitioner. 2he stu's and the daily reports of the conductor did not
state the value of the goods transported. Pursuant to 8ec. 1)1 and 1)7 of the Revised
*ocumentary 8tamp 2a3 Regulations of the *epartment of Ainance, the agent
assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5. Petitioner as"ed for a refund
and the &ourt of Airst Instance of Misamis 7ccidental rendered a !udgment in their
favor 'ut the &ourt of :ppeals reversed the decision.
I##%&$
1. .01 the &ourt of :ppeals has !urisdiction over the case.
). .01 the &ourt of :ppealsD decision is erroneous.
'&L($
2he &ourt of :ppeals has no !urisdiction 'ecause according to 'oth the Judiciary
:ct of 1/9E and the &onstitution the 8upreme &ourt has the e3clusive appellate
!urisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any ta3, impost, assessment or tolls,
or any penalty in relation thereto. 2he decision of the &ourt of :ppeals however was
not erroneousF
a. 8ec. 1)1 falls within the scope of administrative power of the 8ecretary of
Ainance as authori#ed in 8ec. 7/ of the Revised :dministrative &ode.
'. 2he regulation ;8ec. 1)1= is valid also 'ecause of the principle of legislative
approval 'e re%enactment. 2he regulations were approved on 8eptem'er 1(,
1/)9. .hen the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode was approved on Ae'ruary
1E, 1/,/, the same provisions of stamp ta3, 'ills of landing and receipts were
re%enacted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 9
In reF Mc&ulloch *ic"
Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-13.*2 (!pr23 11, 191.)
Chapter III, Page 12+, Footote No.223
F!C"#$
Petitioner, the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Aree Press, filed for a writ
of ha'eas corpus so that he may 'e discharged from detention 'y the acting chief
of police of the city of Manila. He is 'eing detained 'ecause the @overnor%@eneral
of the Philippines ordered his deportation. >efore the @overnor%@eneral gave his
order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescri'ed in 8ec. (/ of the
:dministrative &ode.
I##%&$
.01 the @overnor%@eneral has the power under :ct 1o. )11, and 8ec. (/ of
the :dministrative &ode to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.
'&L($
-es, the @overnor%@eneral has the power to institute and maintain
deportation proceedings. .hen the provisions of :ct 1o. )11, were enacted and
Icontinued in forceD 'y the enactment of the :dministrative &ode and again
Icontinued in forceD 'y the enactment of the Jones <aw the construction theretofore
placed upon it 'y this court 'ecame an integral part of these statutes having the
force and the effect of a legislative command.$ In the interpretation of reenacted
statutes, the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in
force. 2he legislature will 'e presumed to "now the effect which such statutes
originally had, and 'y reenactment to intend that they should again have the same
effect.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, ,a, 9, /a
Howden M &o., <td. v. &ollector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-19392 (!pr23 14, 19*1)
Chapter III, Page 12+, Footote No.222 a7 224
F!C"#$
&ommonwealth Insurance &o. ;&I&=, a domestic corporation, entered into
reinsurance contracts with ,) >ritish companies not engaged in 'usiness in the
Philippines represented 'y herein Plaintiff. &I& remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance
premiums and, on 'ehalf of Plaintiff, paid income ta3 on the premiums. Plaintiff filed
a claim for a refund of the paid ta3, stating that it was e3empted from withholding
ta3 reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies 'y foreign
insurance companies not authori#ed to do 'usiness in the Philippines. Plaintiffs stated
that since 8ec. 5, and 59 were su'stantially re%enacted$ 'y R: 1+(5, 1)/1 and ),9,,
said rulings should 'e given the force of law under the principle of legislative
approval 'y re%enactment.
I##%&$
.01 the ta3 should 'e withheld.
'&L($
1o. 2he principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is
suscepti'le of the meaning placed upon it 'y a ruling of the government agency
charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re%enacts the provisions
without su'stantial changes, such action is confirmatory to an e3tent that the ruling
carries out the legislative purpose. 2his principle is not applica'le for the
aforementioned sections were never re%enacted. 7nly the ta3 rate was amended.
2he administrative rulings invo"ed 'y the &IR were only contained in unpu'lished
letters. It cannot 'e assumed that the legislature "new of these rulings. Ainally, the
premiums remitted were to indemnify &I& against lia'ility. 2his too" place within the
Philippines, thus su'!ect to income ta3.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 9
<a3amana v. >alta#ar
Case No. 144
G.R. No. L-1911 (#epte6-er 19, 1912)
F!C"#$
2he Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. >y virtue of 8ec. )1/5 of the
Revised :dministrative &ode, Respondent Hice Mayor assumed the office. However,
the Provincial @overnor, 'y virtue of 8ec. )1 of the Revised Blection &ode, appointed
herein Petitioner as the mayor.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent is the right person to assume office.
'&L($
-es, Respondent should assume the vacated position. 8ec. )1 of the Revised
Blection &ode, which was ta"en from 8ec. )1E+ of the Revised :dmin &ode, applies
to municipal officers in general while 8ec. )1/5 of the Revised :dministrative &ode
applies to the office of mayor in particular. : special provision overrides a general
one. :lso, the incorporation of 8ec. )1E+ in 8ec. )1 does not enlarge its scope 'ut
merely supplements it. It has also 'een consistently held in case of suspension of the
mayor, the vice%mayor shall assume officeJ the legislature is presumed to 'e
ac4uainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re%enacting 8ec.
)1E+, the interpretation is deemed to have 'een adopted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 9, ,E', 5+
>eng#on v. 8ecretary of Justice
Case No. 32
G.R. No. L-42.21 (4a/ar0 1., 193*)
Chapter III, Page 121, Footote No.22*
F!C"#$
Petitioner was appointed !ustice of the peace for <ingayen, Pangasinan. He
relin4uished his office after he had reached the age of (5 'ecause of the provisions
of :ct 1o. ,E//. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the 'enefits under the
vetoed 8ec. 7 of the Retirement @ratuity <aw which entitled !ustices of the peace to
gratuities. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the @overnor%@eneral
'y claiming that the :ct was not an appropriation 'ill and hence, was not su'!ect to
item%veto.
I##%&$
.01 the veto of the @overnor%@eneral of 8ec. 7 was valid.
'&L($
-es. It is clear from reading 8ec. 1) that the <egislature intended this :ct to 'e
an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possi'ility of a future veto 'y
the &hief B3ecutive. Hence, the @overnor can constitutionally veto certain items on
this 'ill. Aurthermore, the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to
override it. 2he e3ecutive department sustained the validity of the veto as well.
&ontemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, 'ut when two co%e4ual
'ranches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes,
they must 'e given great respect. :lso, this practice of vetoing the separate items in
a 'ill 'y the &hief B3ecutive has long 'een allowed and to rule against it would
re4uire a clear showing of unconstitutionality.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, )', ,a, (c
1P& v. Province of <anao del 8ur
Case No. 1.7
G.R. No. 9*7++ (No8e6-er 19, 199*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner &orporation was assessed real property ta3es 'y Respondent since
its ta3 e3empt status was revo"ed 'y P.*. 1/,1. >ecause of the PetitionerDs failure to
pay, the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole 'idder.
Petitioner contends that its status was never revo"ed 'ut merely suspended. .ith the
Resolutions issued 'y the Aiscal Incentives Review >oard ;AIR>=, the ta3 e3emption
privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However, Respondent contends that the
Resolutions issued 'y the said >oard was void relying on an earlier case 'etween the
Petitioner and the Province of :l'ay stating that AIR> does not have power to restore
ta3 e3emptions and that the said >oard can only recommend to the President or the
Minister of Ainance which su'sidiary of the @overnment can 'e given e3emptions.
1ote however, that the :l'ay case was already superceded 'y the Maceda vs.
Macaraig case stating that the AIR> Resolution is in accordance with the
re4uirements of the law if it was properly approved 'y the Minister of Ainance. In the
present case, the AIR> Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved 'y
the Minister of Ainance.
I##%&$
1. .01 Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully
assess RP2 against, and thereafter sell at pu'lic auction the su'!ect properties of the
Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such ta3es.
). .01 Petitioner has ceased to en!oy its ta3 and duty e3emption privileges,
including its e3emption from payment of RP2.
'&L($
2he Petitioner never lost its ta3 e3empt status, 'ut its privileges were only
suspended. 2hus, the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RP2 against the Petitioner.
Aurthermore, since the Petitioner was never delin4uent in paying RP2, the su'se4uent
auction and sale of the PetitionerDs assets is also considered void.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 5a, 5', /a, )+a, ,7, ,Ea, 9/
J.M. 2uason M &o. v. Mariano M :4uial M &ordova
Case No. *4
G.R. No. L-3314+ (,cto-er 23, 197.)
F!C"#$
Plaintiffs :4uial ;herein Respondents= claimed ownership of a parcel of land
located in S& having an area of ,E, hectares. 2hey alleged that it had 'een
fraudulently or erroneously included in 7&2 1o. 7,5 of the Registry of *eeds of Ri#al
and that it was registered in the names of *efendants 2uason ;herein Petitioners=
pursuant to a decree issued on July (, 1/19 in &ase 1o. 7(E1 of the &ourt of <and
Registration. Plaintiffs :4uial prayed that 7&2 1o. 7,5 and the titles derived therefrom
'e declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. 2he
2uasonDs prayed that the petition 'e dismissed on the ground that the court has no
!urisdiction over the case, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior !udgment.
Respondents &ordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they
were a'le to purchase 11 hectares from the :4uials.
I##%&$
.01 7&2 1o. 7,5 is valid.
'&L($
7&2 1o. 7,5 is valid. 2he validity of 7&2 1o. 7,5 was already decided upon
'y the 8upreme &ourt in the cases of >enin vs. 2uason, :lcantara vs. 2uason and Pili
vs. 2uason. 2he ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the
validity of 7&2 1o. 7,5.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, 5'
J.M. 2uason v. <and 2enure :dministration
Case No. 131
G.R. No. L-21+*4 (Fe-r/ar0 1., 197+)
Chapter )I, Page 434, Footote No.7
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the owner of a land called 2atalon Bstate in Sue#on &ity. 2hey
see" to nullify R: )(1( which directs the e3propriation of two lots inside the estate.
6nder :rt. E, 8ec. 9 of the &onstitution, 2he &ongress may authori#e, upon payment
of !ust compensation, the e3propriation of lands to 'e su'divided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals$ Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional
'ecause the provision in the &onstitution refers to lands$ not landed estates.
I##%&$
.01 R: )(1( is unconstitutional.
'&L($
1o. 2he 4uestion is one of constitutional construction. 2he &onstitution clearly
states that land$ not landed estates$ can 'e e3propriated. It has a 'roader scope,
allowing the legislature to e3propriate more types of land. 2he law does not
distinguish 'etween different types regardless of how 'ig or small it may 'e, as long
as there is a need to address a growing social pro'lem such as ine4uality.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, )9a, )(, ,7, 9+c
2olentino v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 114
G.R. No. L-3411+ (,cto-er 1*, 1971)
F!C"#$
2he 1/71 &onstitutional &onvention see"s to amend 8ec. 1 of :rt. 5 of the
&onstitution reducing the voting age from )1 to 1E years old. 2his proposal was to 'e
su'mitted to the people for ratification in a ple'iscite coinciding with the 1ovem'er
1/71 elections relying on 8ec. 1, :rt. 15 of the &onstitutionF 2he &ongress in a !oint
session assem'led, 'y a vote of three%fourths of all the Mem'ers of the 8enate and
the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this
&onstitution or call a convention for the purpose. 8uch amendments shall 'e valid as
part of this &onstitution when approved 'y a ma!ority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are su'mitted to the people for their ratification.$
I##%&$
.01 there is a limitation or condition in 8ec. 1 of :rt. 15 of the &onstitution
calling for a ple'iscite on the sole amendment contained in 7rganic Resolution 1o.
1.
'&L($
2here was a violation. >ecause such amendments regardless of how many
are to 'e su'mitted to the people for their ratification in an election, :n election$
only means one. :lso, no fi3ed frame of reference is given to the voter. 1o one
"nows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would 'e
modified. 2he amendments 'eing proposed 'y the convention in must 'e seen in
relation to the whole.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a
:glipay v. Rui#
Case No. 4
G.R. No. 41419 (March 13, 1937)
F!C"#$
Respondent, who is the *irector of Post, announced that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the cele'ration of the ,,
rd
International Bucharistic &ongress in accordance with :ct 1o. 9+5). Petitioner, who is
the 8upreme Head of the Philippine Independent &hurch, see"s prohi'ition of such
'ecause it violates 8ec. 1,, :rt. ( of the &onstitution.
I##%&$
.01 the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of
religious freedom.
'&L($
:ct 1o. 9+5) contemplates no religious purpose in view. .hat it gives the
Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would 'e Kadvantageous to the @overnment. In this case, the
issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired 'y any sectarian feeling. :ct. 1o.
9+5) grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs Kas
often as may 'e deemed advantageous to the @overnment.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,(a, ,7
6.8. v. :ng 2ang Ho
Case No 291
G.R. No. 17122 (Fe-r/ar0 27, 1922)
F!C"#$
Respondent was charged for violating B.7. 5, ;which fi3es the ceiling price at
which rice may 'e sold= when he sold rice at a price greater than that fi3ed 'y law.
B.7. 5, follows :ct 1o. )E(E which penali#es monopoly and hoarding of products
under e3traordinary circumstances. Respondent contends that the <egislature has
not defined any 'asis for the order 'ut has left it to the discretion of the @overnor
@eneral. .ithout leaving the discretion to say which e3traordinary circumstances to
the @overnor @eneral are, *efendant will not 'e charged.
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. )E(E is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative
power.
'&L($
2he act is unconstitutional. 2he &onstitution is something solid, permanent and
su'stantial. :s "nown, no nation living under repu'lican form of government can
enact a law delegating the power to fi3 the price at which rice should 'e sold. 2hat
power can never 'e delegated under a repu'lican form of government. 2his power
is e3clusive to the legislative. In fi3ing the price, the law is dealing with private
property and private rights, which are sacred under the &onstitution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1one
7rdillo v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 192
G.R. No. 93+14 ((ece6-er 4, 199+)
F!C"#$
: ple'iscite was held pursuant to R.:. 1o. (7(( ;7rganic :ct creating the
&ordillera :utonomous Region= with the votes of the people in the provinces of
>enguet, Mountain Province, Oalinga%:payao, Ifugao, :'ra and the city of >aguio.
7ut of the provinces, only Ifugao managed to get a ma!ority vote. Resolutions and
memorandum from the &7MB<B& and the 8ecretary of Justice states that only
provinces voting favora'ly in the ple'iscite shall constitute the region.
I##%&$
.01 Ifugao 'eing the only one which voted for the creation of &:R can
alone, legally and validly constitute a region.
'&L($
:rt. G, 8ec. 15 of the 1/E7 &onstitution e3plicitly provides that there shall 'e
created autonomous regions? consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas?$ Arom this, it can 'e derived that the term region$ used in its
ordinary sense means two or more provinces. 2he provisions of R.:. 1o. (7(( also
show that the &ongress never intended that a single province may constitute the
:utonomous Region.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 11g, )5a, )E
*e los 8antos vs. Mallare
Case No. .9
G.R. Nos. L-3+41-* (!/g/st 31, 191+)
Chapter )I, Page 44+ a7 41+, Footote No.33 a7 14
F!C"#$
2his case 4uestions the legality of the PetitionerDs removal from the same
office which would 'e the effect of RespondentDs appointment. Petitioner contends
that under the &onstitution, he can not 'e removed against his will and without
cause, citing 8ec. 9, :rt. 1) of the &onstitution which readsF 1o officer or employee
of the &ivil 8ervice shall 'e removed or suspended e3cept for a cause provided 'y
law.$ Respondent admits that the position of &ity Bngineer 'elongs to the
unclassified service$. :ccording to <acson vs. Romero, all officers or employees in the
unclassified service are protected 'y the a'ove provisionJ 'ut notes that there is a
difference 'etween this case and the <acson case. 8ec. )595 of the Revised
:dministration &ode authori#es the President to remove at pleasure any of the
officers enumerated therein, one of who is the city engineer. 2he two provisions are
repugnant and a'solutely irreconcila'le.
I##%&$
.01 the position of &ity Bngineer is an unclassified service.

'&L($
1o. Reading :rt. 1), 8ec. 1 of the &onstitution, it is clear that 8ec. 9 protects
those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the followingF policy%
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature$. 2he position of city
engineer is neither of the a'ove%stated. 2his is confirmed 'y the enactment of &.:.
1o. 177. :s a contemporaneous construction, this :ct affords an inde3 to the
meaning of &ivil 8ervice as conceived 'y the framers of the &onstitution.
Aurthermore, the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction
are to 'e given the sense they have in common use. 2he &ourt therefore held that
Petitioner *e los 8antos is entitled to remain in office as the &ity Bngineer of >aguio
with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or
is removed for cause, and that RespondentDs appointment is ineffective in so far as it
may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,/
&ivil <i'erties 6nion vs. B3ecutive 8ecretary
Case No. *4
G.R. No. .3.9* (Fe-r/ar0 22, 1991)
Chapter )I, Pages 443, 41+ a7 414, Foototes No. 41, 11 a7 71
F!C"#$
Petitioners maintain that the B3ecutive 7rder which, in effect, allows mem'ers
of the &a'inet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. 2his runs counter
to :rt. 7, 8ec. 1, of the &onstitution which provides that the President, Hice%President,
the Mem'ers of the &a'inet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided 'y the &onstitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure.
I##%&$
.01 the prohi'ition in :rt. 7, 8ec. 1, admits of the 'road e3ceptions made for
appointive officials in general under :rt. /%>, 8ec. 7, par. ).
'&L($
1o. : foolproof yardstic" in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision. 2he practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government would lead to a'uses 'y unscrupulous pu'lic officials who too" the
scheme for purposes of self%enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. 2he
4ualifying phrase unless otherwise provided in this &onstitution$ of 8ec. 1,, :rt. 7
cannot possi'ly refer to the 'road e3ceptions of 8ec. 7, :rt. /%> of the 1/E7
&onstitution. 2he former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple
offices applica'le to all elective pu'lic officials and employees while the latter is
meant for the e3ception of the President, Hice%President, mem'ers of the &a'inet,
their deputies and assistants. 2o construe otherwise would 'e to render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the &onstitution. B.7.
)E9 is therefore declared null and void.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', /a, ')
People of the Philippines vs. MuRo#
Case No. 217
G.R. No. L-3.9*9 (Fe-r/ar0 9, 19.9)
Chapter )I, Page 44*, Footote No.42
F!C"#$
2he *efendant was convicted of three counts of murder. 2he penalty for
murder under :rt. )9E of the Revised Penal &ode was reclusion temporal in its
ma3imum period to death 'ut this was modified 'y :rt. ,, 8ec. 1/;1= of the 1/E7
&onstitution providing that ?any death penalty already imposed shall 'e reduced
to reclusion temporal.$
I##%&$
.01 this &ourt would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the a'olition of the
death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium.
'&L($
1o. In the case at 'ar, the &ourt found that the applica'le sentence would
'e the medium period of penalty prescri'ed in :rt. )9E of the Revised Penal &ode,
which does not follow the Masangkay ruling, and that would 'e reclusion perpetua.
L!"IN M!)IM#$
1, (c, )+a

1itafan v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 19+
G.R. No. 7.7.+ (4/30 23, 19.7)
Chapter )I, Page 447, Footote No.4*
F!C"#$
Petitioners su'mit that any ta3 withheld from their emoluments and
compensations as !udicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of 8ec. 1+, :rt. E of the &onstitution mandating that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not 'e decreased$, even as it is
anathema to the ideal of an independent !udiciary envisioned 'y the &onstitution.
I##%&$
.01 the salary of the mem'ers of the !udiciary is su'!ect to the general
income ta3 applied to all ta3payers.
'&L($
-es. 2he salary of the mem'ers of the !udiciary is su'!ect to the general
income ta3. :ccording to Perfecto vs. Meer, income ta3es are part of the diminution
of !udgesD salaries 'ecause the independence of !udges is of far greater
importance than any revenue that could come from ta3ing their salaries$. Bndencia
vs. *avid confirmed Perfecto vs. Meer.

However 'oth decisions must 'e discarded
'ecause the framers of the fundamental law ;i.e. Ao3, &oncepcion, and >ernas=, as
the alter ego of the people, have e3pressed in clear and unmista"a'le terms the
meaning of 8ec. 1+ :rt. E of the 1/E7 &onstitutionJ that is, to ma"e the salaries of the
mem'ers of the !udiciary ta3a'le.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,, '1
2aRada v. &uenco, et al
Case No. 2.*
G.R. No. L-1++1* (Fe-r/ar0 2., 1917)
Chapter )I, Page No. 411, Footote No.11
F!C"#$
2he 8enate upon nomination of the 1acionalista Party chose 8enator <aurel,
<ope#, and Primicias, as mem'ers of the 8enate Blectoral 2ri'unal ;8B2=. 6pon
nomination of the &iti#ens Party, Petitioner was ne3t chosen 'y the 8enate as
mem'er of 8B2. 2hen, the 8enate chose Respondents as mem'ers of the same 8B2.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of 8enator <aurel, <ope#,
and Primicias of the 1acionalista Party as mem'ers of the 8B2, the other 8enators
must 'e nominated 'y the &iti#ens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that si3
mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal shall 'e mem'ers of the 8enate or the House of
Representatives$, is mandatory. 2he word shall$ is imperative in nature relative to the
num'er of mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal

and this is 'orne in the opinion of the
8ecretary of Justice.
I##%&$
.01 the election of Respondents as mem'ers of the Blectoral 2ri'unal was
valid or lawful.
'&L($
1o. 2he application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted ? e3cept as to matters committed 'y the &onstitution itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily 'inding upon the courts, even in a dou'tful case.$ Hence, if the
!udgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not
made imperative 'y any paramount considerations of pu'lic policy, it may 'e
re!ected.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (', /', 11a
:ratuc v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-497+1-+9 (Fe-r/ar0 ., 1979)
Chapter )I, Page 412, Footote No.*2
F!C"#$
2wo petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to
address irregularities in the &entral Mindanao elections for the Interim >atasang
Pam'ansa.
I##%&$
.01 the 8upreme &ourt has the power to review decisions made 'y the
Respondent in handling the pre%proclamation controversies cited 'y the Petitioners.
'&L($
1o. 2he 8upreme &ourt may only review actions carried out with grave a'use
of discretion amounting to lac" or e3cess of !urisdiction. 2he 8upreme &ourt cited
differences in the 1/,5 and 1/7, &onstitutions with regard to the 8upreme &ourtDs
power over &7MB<B& decisions N in 1/,5, the 8upreme &ourt may review
Respondents decisions on either review or certiorariJ 1/7,, RespondentDs decisions
may only 'e 'rought up on ground of certiorari alone. 2his highlights the 1/7,
&onstitutionDs intent to strengthen RespondentDs independence. &onse4uently, errors
of !udgment that were 'ased on su'stantial evidence are not reviewa'le in
certiorari.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, /a, )5a
In ReF :ppointment of Halen#uela and Hallarta
Case No. 19
!.M. No. 9.-1-+1-#C (No8e6-er 9, 199.)
F!C"#$
Judges were appointed to the R2& 'y the President on May 1) 1//E, within )
months 'efore the election. 2here are two conflicting provisions in the 1/E7
&onstitution, the former validating this action and the latter proscri'ing it. 7n the one
hand, :rt. E, 8ec. 9 re4uires that all vacancies in the !udiciary 'e filled within /+ days
of such vacancy. 7n the other hand, :rt. 7, 8ec. 15 prohi'its the President from
ma"ing any appointments two months 'efore Presidential elections, e3cept for
temporary appointments to e3ecutive positions when pu'lic interest is at sta"e.
I##%&$
.01 the appointments were valid.
'&L($
1o, the appointments were void. 2he general rule is that the President must fill
in vacancies in the Judiciary within /+ days, 'ut this does not apply in the special
circumstance of Presidential elections, which occurs only once every si3 years.
2emporary appointments to e3ecutive positions are the only e3ception. 2he
prohi'ition is for pu'lic policy purposes, to prevent midnight appointments$ N which
is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the !udiciary.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, ,5, ,(', ,Ea, 5+, '
Magtoto v. Manguera
Case No. 119
G.R. Nos. L-372+1-+2 (March 3, 1971)
F!C"#$
2he present cases involve the interpretation of 8ec. )+ :rt. 9 of the 1ew
&onstitution which too" effect on Jan. 17, 1/7,. 2he provision readsF ? :ny person
under investigation?shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to 'e
informed of such right?. :ny confession o'tained in violation of this section shall 'e
inadmissi'le.$ Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two
informations 'oth dated Ae'. ),, 1/7,. *uring the trial, his e3tra!udicial confession
dated 1ov. 15, 1/7) was admitted in evidence over the o'!ection that it was ta"en
while the accused was in the preventive custody of the P& without his having 'een
informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
I##%&$
1. .01 the PetitionerDs e3tra%!udicial confession dated on 1ov. 15, 1/7) is
admissi'le as evidence.
). .01 8ec. )+, :rt. 9 of the 1ew &onstitution can 'e applied retroactively.
'&L($
1. -es. PetitionerDs confession is admissi'le. 2he court ruled that a confession
o'tained from a person under investigation, who has not 'een informed of his right to
counsel, is admissi'le in evidence if the same had 'een o'tained 'efore the
effectivity of the 1ew &onstitution, since no law gave the accused the right to 'e so
informed 'efore that date. &onversely, such confession is inadmissi'le if the same
had 'een o'tained after the effectivity of the 1ew &onstitution.
). 1o. 2he constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective
effect. @iving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship
on the part of the prosecutor.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1)a, 9(a
Ailoteo v. 8andigan'ayan
Case No. 1+*
G.R. No. 79143 (,cto-er 1*, 199*)
Chapter )I, Page 417, Footote No..+
F!C"#$
Petitioners were held guilty 'y Respondent &ourt for the crime of ro''ery of a
postal delivery van. 6pon the capture of his co%accused, he was pointed out as the
mastermind. .hen Petitioner was captured, he admitted involvement in the crime
and pointed his other confederates. 7n May ,+, 1/E), Petitioner e3ecuted sworn
statements ;confessing what had happened=, without the presence of a counsel. 2he
1/E7 &onstitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot 'e
waived e3cept in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Petitioner claims that such
proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applica'le to him retroactively, even
though his custodial investigation too" place in 1/E,.
I##%&$
1. .01 the PetitionerDs e3tra%!udicial confession is admissi'le even without the
presence of a counsel.
). .01 the said provisions of 1/E7 &onstitution can 'e applied retroactively.
'&L($
1. -es, it is admissi'le under the 1/7, &onstitution. :ccordingly, waivers of the
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the 'enefit of counsel during
the effectivity of the 1/7, &onstitution should, 'y such argumentation, 'e admissi'le.
). 1o. 2he specific provision of the 1/E7 &onstitution re4uiring that a waiver 'y
an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must 'e made with
the assistance of a counsel may not 'e applied to him retroactively or in cases where
the e3tra!udicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 5a, 9(a
&o v. Blectoral 2ri'unal, House of Representatives
Case No. **
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 a7 922+2-+3 (4/30 3+, 1991)
Chapter )I, Page 417, Footote No..2
F!C"#$
Respondents declared Jose 7ng Jr., elected representative of 1orthern
8amar, as a natural 'orn Ailipino citi#en. Petitioners contend that 'ased on the 1/E7
&onstitution, Jose 7ng, Jr. who was 'orn on June 1/, 1/9E ;during which the 1/,5
&onstitution was operative=, is not a natural 'orn Ailipino citi#en having 'een 'orn to
a &hinese father, Jose 7ng &huan and a Ailipina mother :grifina <ao.
I##%&$
1. .01 people who have elected Philippine citi#enship under the 1/,5
&onstitution are to 'e considered natural 'orn Ailipino citi#ens.
). .01 this provision should 'e applied retroactively.
'&L($
-es. 6nder of :rt. 9 8ec. 1 par. , of the &onstitution, children 'orn of Ailipino
mothers 'efore January 17, 1/7, shall 'e accorded natural 'orn status if they elect
Philippine citi#enship upon reaching the age of ma!ority. 2hey need not perform any
act of election$ granted that his father was naturali#ed and declared a Ailipino
citi#en 'y 1/57, when he was only / years old. 2he provision in 4uestion must 'e
applied retroactively since it see"s to remedy the ine4uita'le situation under the 1/,5
&onstitution wherein people 'orn of Ailipino fathers and alien mothers were
considered natural 'orn while children 'orn of Ailipino mothers and alien fathers were
not.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, /a, 9)a
8armiento v. Mison
Case No. 277
G.R. Nos. .+119-21 ((ece6-er 17, 19.7)
Chapter )I, Page 41., Footote No..4
F!C"#$
Petitioners 4uestion the validity of appointment of Respondent as
&ommissioner of the >ureau of &ustoms on the ground that it was not confirmed 'y
the &ommission on :ppointments. 2he &ourt favored the Respondent 'ased on
e3press provisions of the 1/E7 &onstitution.

I##%&$
.01 8ec. 1(, :rt. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to 'e
appointed with the consent of the &ommission on :ppointments.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. 1( :rt. 7 only provides for the appointment, 'y the President of
heads of e3ecutive departments, am'assadors, other pu'lic ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the ran" of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this &onstitution$ with the
re4uirement of &: approval. *eli'erations of the &onstitutional &ommission reveal
that the framers of the 1/E7 &onstitution deli'erately e3cluded the position heads of
'ureaus$ from &: confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1/,5 &onstitution
which turned the &ommission into a venue for horse%trading$, and that of the 1/7,
&onstitution which placed a'solute power of appointment in the President. 2he word
also$ in the second sentence of 8ec. 1( :rt. 7 must not 'e construed as to suppose
that officers in the second sentence shall 'e appointed in a li"e manner$ as that of
the first group.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )9', ,), ,/a, '
*omingo v. &ommission on :udit
Case No. 37
G.R. No. 112371 (,cto-er 7, 199.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the
personnel of the entire Region H of *8.*. Respondent sent a communication to the
Petitioner informing her that post%audit reports on the *8.* dis'ursement accounts
showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting
transportation allowances when they should not 'e. Petitioner asserted that even if
she was assigned a government vehicle, she was entitled to transportation
allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle.
I##%&$
.01 a commuta'le transportation allowance may still 'e claimed 'y a
government official provided with a government vehicle, for the days the official did
not actually use the vehicle.
'&L($
2he @eneral :ppropriations :ct of 1/EE, 1//+ and 1//1 clearly provides that
transportation allowance will not 'e granted to officials who are assigned a
government vehicles e3cept as approved 'y the President.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )9a
@lo'e%Mac"ay v. 1<R& and 8ala#ar
Case No. 112
G.R. No. .2111 (March 3, 1992)
Chapter I:, Page 124, Footote No.3
F!C"#$
Petitioner placed Respondent 8ala#ar under preventive suspension 'ecause it
appeared that she had full "nowledge of the loss and wherea'outs of an air
conditioner that *elfin 8aldivar had stolen from the company 'ut failed to inform her
employer. Respondent 8ala#ar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other
damages. 7n appeal, the Respondent &ourt affirmed the decision of the <a'or
:r'iter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent 'ut limited 'ac"
wages to ) years and deleted award for moral damages.
I##%&$
1. .01 the <a'or 2ri'unal committed grave a'use of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of Respondent 8ala#ar.
). .01 there e3isted independent legal grounds to hold Respondent 8ala#ar
answera'le as well and, there'y, !ustify her dismissal.
'&L($
2he <a'or &ode clearly provides that an employee who is un!ustly dismissed
from wor" shall 'e entitled to reinstatement and to his full 'ac" wages. :n e3ception
to this is when the reinstatement may 'e inadmissi'le due to strained relations
'etween the employer and the employee. 2he position of Private Respondent as
systems analyst is not one that may 'e characteri#ed as such. Moreover, Petitioner
merely insinuated that since Respondent 8ala#ar had a special relationship with
8aldivar, she might have had direct "nowledge of 8aldivarDs 4uestiona'le activities.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
<u#on >ro"erage &o v. Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission
Case No. 7*
G.R. No. L-37**1 (No8e6-er 1*, 1932)
F!C"#$
Petitioner has 'een operating a fleet of truc"s utili#ed e3clusively for the
carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. 7n May /, 1/,), Respondent
re4uired the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an
application for a certificate of pu'lic convenience for the operation of his truc"s
since they were said to 'e devoted to the transportation of cargo with
compensation as provided in 8ec. 1, of the Pu'lic 8ervice <aw.
I##%&$
.01 the amendments introduced into 8ec. 1, of :ct 1o. ,1+E 'y :ct 1o.
,,1( conferred !urisdiction on the Respondents over the PetitionerDs 'usiness,
although it is not a common carrier.
'&L($
2he omission from 8ec. 1, of the phrase for pu'lic use$ in the definition of a
pu'lic service does not mean that the <egislature meant to e3tend the !urisdiction of
the P8& to private enterprises not devoted to pu'lic use. Pu'lic service is a service for
pu'lic use. 2he insertion of the phrase for hire or compensation$ does not show the
intent either. 2his is a stoc" phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and
a pu'lic utility. :lso, notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of
the term pu'lic service$ introduced 'y :ct 1o. ,,1(, there were no alterations
made in the 'asic provisions of the other sections. Respondent has no !urisdiction
over Petitioner.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, ,('
ROUND 2
:parri v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-3++17 (4a/ar0 31, 19.4)
F!C"#$
R.:. 11(+ created the 1ational Resettlement and Reha'ilitation
:dministration ;1:RR:=. 8aid law also empowered its >oard of *irectors to appoint
and fi3 the term of office of the @eneral Manager su'!ect to approval of the
President.
7n January 15, 1/(+, the >oard approved Resolution 1o. 1, appointing
Petitioner as @eneral Manager of 1:RR:.
7n March 15, 1/(), the >oard approved Resolution 1o. )9 wherein the
President e3pressed his desire to fi3 the term of office of the incum'ent @eneral
Manager up to March ,1, 1/().
I##%&$
.01 Resolution 1o. )9 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause.
'&L($
1o, PetitionerDs term of office is deemed e3pired. R.:. 11(+ e3pressly gives the
>oard the power to appoint and fi3 the term of office of the @eneral Manager. 2he
word ItermD descri'es the period that an office may hold office and upon e3piration
of such term, his rights, duties, and authority must cease. In this case, the term of
office is not fi3ed 'y law, 'ut 'y the >oard.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, (c
People v. Sui!ada
Case No.
G.R. Nos. 111++. (4/30 24, 199*)
F!C"#$
Respondent "illed *iosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. He was
convicted of ) offenses, which were separately filedF
1= Murder under :rt. )9E of the RP&
)= Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under P* 1E((
Par ) of 8ec 1 of P.*. 1E(( states that, If homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall 'e imposed.$

I##%&$
1= .01 the trial courtDs !udgment should 'e sustained in conformity with the
doctrine laid down in People v. 2ac%an, People v. 2io#on, People v. &aling,
etc. 7R to modify the !udgment and convict the appellant only of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v. >arros.
)= .01 the )
nd
par of 8ec 1 of P*1E(( integrated illegal possession of firearm and
the resultant "illing into a single integrated offense.
'&L($
1= 2he trial courtDs !udgment is affirmed.
)= )
nd
par of 8ec 1 of P.*. 1E(( does not support a conclusion that intended to
treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of illegal
possession with homicide or murder$. It does not use the clause as a result$ or
on the occasion of $to evince an intention to create a single integrated
crime, 'ut rather it uses the clause with the use of$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
>aranda v. @ustillo
Case No. 3+
G.R. No. L-.11*3 (#epte6-er 2*, 19..)
F!C"#$
>oth parties claim that they own a parcel of land, <ot 1o. 9517. 2he &ourt,
after discovering that private respondentDs 2&2 was fraudulently ac4uired, ordered a
writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion
for reconsideration filed 'y Private Respondents. :nother group filed a separate civil
case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the 2&2 of said lot, which the
court found out to 'e privies of the Private Respondents tas"ed to delay the
implementation of the final decisions of the &ourt.
I##%&$
1. .01 the pendency of the appeal in su'se4uent civil case with the &ourt of
:ppeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the
certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and
su'sisting 'y this &ourt.
). .hat is the nature of the duty of the Register of *eeds to annotate or annul
the notice of lis pendens in a 2orrens &ertificate of 2itleQ
'&L($
1. Respondent Judge a'used his discretion in sustaining the :cting Register of
*eedDs stand. He forgot the 1
st
par of 8ec. 77 of P.*. 15)/ which providesF
&ancellation of lis pendens N >efore the final !udgment, a notice of lis
pendens may 'e cancelled upon order of the &ourt after proper showing
that ? it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to 'e
registered. ?$
). 8ec 1+ of P* 15)/ states that, It shall 'e the duty of the Register of *eeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration ?. If the
instrument cannot 'e registered, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground
therefore, and advising him of his rights to appeal 'y consulta.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
>as'acio v. 7ffice of the 8ecretary, *ept. of Justice
Case No.
G.R. No. 1+9441 (No8e6-er 7, 1994)
F!C"#$
R: 7,+/, among other things, provides for compensation of persons un!ustly
accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son%in%law >alderrama were
charged with murder and frustrated murder for "illing >oyon and wounding his wife
and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the &:,
Petitioner was ac4uitted on the ground that conspiracy 'etween him and his son%in%
law was not proven. .hat was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime
with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son%in%law.
Petitioner claims he was un!ustly accused and is entitled to compensation.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to R: 7,+/.
'&L($
1o, he is not. Aor one to 'e un!ustly accused$ one must 'e wrongly accused
from the very 'eginning, un!ustly convicted ;when a !udge "nowingly and
deli'erately rendered an un!ust !udgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any
'asis for !udgment= and imprisoned. In the case at 'ar, Petitioner was ac4uitted
'ecause the prosecution was una'le to prove 'eyond reasona'le dou't that
Petitioner was guilty. 2hus, he does not fall under R: 7,+/.
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a, 11a, )5a
8egovia v. 8andigan'ayan
Case No.
G.R. No. 124+*7 (March 27, 199.)
F!C"#$
Petitioners were designated as mem'ers of the &ontracts &ommittee for
1P&Ds Mindanao pro!ect. 2he lowest 'idder, Joint Henture was dis4ualified after the
P&:> verified that Joint Henture as well as the )
nd
lowest 'idder, 6r'an &onsolidated
&onstructors, were downgraded$ there'y ineligi'le as 'idders. 8ince all other 'ids
e3ceeded the allowa'le government estimate on the pro!ect, the committee
declared a failure of 'idding and directed a re%'idding. 1P& >oard approved, 'ut
for reasons not on record. 2he pro!ect was eventually cancelled. Petitioners were
charged under R: ,+1/ for in one way or the other, e3tending undue advantage to
Joint Henture through manifest partiality, evident 'ad faith and gross ine3cusa'le
negligence.$ Aor this, petitioners were suspended from office.
I##%&$
.01 it is mandatory or discretionary for 8andigan'ayan to place under
preventive suspension pu'lic officers who stand accused 'efore it.
'&L($
-es, it is mandatory. 6nder the act, one accused of any offense involving
fraud upon government pu'lic funds or property whether the crime is simple or
comple3, regardless of stage of e3ecution and mode of participation, shall 'e
suspended from office. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity
of the information, a court must issue a suspension order as held in @on#aga v.
8andigan'ayan, <uciano, et al. v. Mariano, 8ocrates v. 8andigan'ayan.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 5a, 7a
2anada v. -ulo
Case No. 2..
No. 43171 (Ma0 31, 1931)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed 'y the @ov. @en. with the consent
'y the Philippine &ommission, assigned to :la'at, 2aya'as. <ater in his service, he
was transferred to Pere#, 2aya'as. He reached his (5
th
'irthday on 7cto'er ,5, 1/,9,
su'se4uent to the approval of :ct 1o. ,E// which ma"es mandatory the retirement
of all !ustices who have reached (5 years of age at the time said :ct ta"es effect on
January 1, 1/,,. 2he !udge of Airst instance, acting upon the directive of the 8ecretary
of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to :ct
1o. ,E//.
I##%&$
1. .01 Petitioner should cease to hold office.
). .01 his transfer is considered a new transfer$ and re4uires confirmation 'y
the Philippine &ommission.
'&L($
1o, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as :ct 1o. ,E// clearly states
that those who will cease to hold office are those (5 yrs of age at the time the :ct
ta"es effect, not thereafter. 2herefore, Petitioner shall 'e a Justice of Peace for life as
long as he stays in good 'ehavior or does not 'ecome incapacitated.
1o, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is re4uired
as it is !ust an enlargement of the !urisdiction grounded on original appointment.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a
Bliseo 8ilva v. >elen &a'rera
Case No. 14*
G.R. No. L-3*29 (March 19, 1911)
F!C"#$
Respondent filed an application with the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission for a
certificate of pu'lic convenience, to 'e a'le to operate an ice plant in the &ity of
<ipa. Petitioner, owner of another ice plant already in the same area, opposed
RespondentDs application, claiming that pu'lic convenience did not need another
ice plant. :tty. :spillera was delegated 'y the &ommissioner to receive testimony
and conduct hearing of the contestJ thereafter the &ommission en 'anc rendered a
decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant. :fter which,
Petitioner claimed that under the law, no one e3cept the &ommissioner may hear
contested cases.
I##%&$
.01 delegation to :tty. :spillera to hear the case is lawful.
'&L($
1o, the delegation is unlawful. :lthough 8ec. ,) of Pu'lic 8ervice :ct allows
the &ommission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or
ta"e testimony, 8ec. , of the same act provides that in ;1= all contested cases and ;)=
cases involving fi3ing of rates, the reception of evidence may only 'e delegated to
one of the &ommissioners.
2hus, though the law ma"es it inconvenient or cum'ersome for the
&ommission to handle contested cases, where the law is clear, the &ommission nor
the &ourt may not disregard, circumvent, or interpret the law any other way. Plus,
you have to loo" at the entire :ct, and not !ust specific provisions, in applying the
law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, Ea, ,('
Radio &ommunications of the Philippines v. 1ational 2elecom. &om.
Case No. 129
G.R. No. L-*.729 (Ma0 29, 19.7)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1/57 'y R: )+,( to operate a
radio communications system, recogni#ed 'y the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission ;P8&=.
Petitioner then esta'lished services in 8orsogon, Mindoro, and 8amar. In 1/E+, the
Respondent, which replaced the P8&, authori#ed Oayumanggi to set up radio
systems in Mindoro and 8amar too. Respondent, after conducting a hearing upon a
complaint 'y Oayumanggi, ordered Petitioner to stop operating, 'ecause it didnDt
have a certificate of pu'lic convenience, which is necessary under B7 59( for any
pu'lic service to operate.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy 'efore it can validly
operate.
'&L($
-es, they need such certificates to validly operate.
Petitioner was created under R: )+,(, governed 'y the Pu'lic 8ervice
&ommission. 6nder it, radio companies did not need a certificate of pu'lic
convenience to operate. However, P.*. 1 a'olished the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission
and B7 59( created the Respondent &ommission. 6nder B7 59(, Respondent must
issue a certificate of pu'lic convenience for the operation of radio communications
systems. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (c, ,+, 9(a, 9/
1ational Aederation of <a'or v. Hon. Bisma
Case No. .4
G.R. No. L-*123* (4a/ar0 31, 19.4)
F!C"#$
Pam'owood 6nion went on stri"e 'ecause of the illegal termination of their
union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. In the process, they
'loc"ed the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the
premises. 2hereafter, Respondent filed in court for damages for o'struction of private
property. Petitioners contended that !urisdiction over this case 'elongs to <a'or
:r'iter and not for courts to decide.
I##%&$
.01 courts may 'e la'or ar'iters that can pass on a suit for damages filed 'y
an employer or is it the <a'or :r'iter of the 1<R&Q
'&L($
-es, the <a'or :r'iter has !urisdiction.
In the <a'or &ode, 8ec. )17 vested <a'or :r'iters with original !urisdiction.
However, P.*. 1,(7 amended 8ec. )17, vesting courts of first instance with original
!urisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. >ut again P.*. 1(/1 amended 8ec.
)17 to return the !urisdiction to <a'or :r'iters. :dditionally, >P 1,+ amended the same
section, 'ut without changing original !urisdiction of <: over money claims arising
from employer%employee relations. 2hus the law is clear, respondent Judge has no
!urisdiction to act on the case.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (c, 7a
Pascual v. Pascual%>autista
Case No. 19.
G.R. No. .424+ (March 21, 1992)
Chapter I:, Page 127, Footote No.1*
F!C"#$
Petitioners are the ac"nowledged natural children of the late Bligio Pascual,
the latter 'eing the full 'lood 'rother of the decedent *on :ndres Pascual, who died
intestate without any issue, legitimate, ac"nowledged natural, adopted or spurious
children.
I##%&$
.01 :rt. //) of the &ivil &ode of the Philippines, which states that :n
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or motherJ nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child$, can 'e interpreted to e3clude recogni#ed
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
'&L($
In *ia# v. I:&, this &ourt ruled that :rt. //) of the &ivil &ode provides a
'arrier or iron curtain in that it prohi'its a'solutely a succession ab intestate 'etween
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
of said legitimate child. 2hey may have a natural tie of 'lood, 'ut this is not
recogni#ed 'y law for the purposes of :rt. //).$
Bligio Pascual is a legitimate child 'ut petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the
intestate estate of the decedent :ndres Pascual, full 'lood 'rother of their father.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 7', ,('
People v. :migo
Case No. 2+1
G.R. No. 11*719 (4a/ar0 1., 199*)
F!C"#$
2he Regional 2rial &ourt rendered a decision finding the :ccused guilty
'eyond reasona'le dou't of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
:ccused%:ppellant argues that error was committed 'y the trial court in
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the
fact that 8ec. 1/ ;1=, :rt. , of the 1/E7 &onstitution was already in effect when the
offense was committed.
:ccused%:ppellant contends that under the 1/E7 &onstitution and prior to
the promulgation of R: 7(5/, the death penalty had 'een a'olished and hence, the
penalty that should have 'een imposed for the crime of murder committed 'y
:ccused%:ppellant should 'e reclusion temporal in its medium period to )+ years of
reclusion temporal.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. 1/ ;1=, :rticle , of the 1/E7 &onstitution means to re4uire a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohi'ition against
the death penalty.
'&L($
In People vs. MuRo#, the &ourt held that : reading of 8ection 1/ ;1= of :rticle
III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which e3pressly declares the
a'olition of the death penalty.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, 7'
People v. 8antayana
Case No. 111
No. L-22291 (No8e6-er 11, 197*)
F!C"#$
:ccused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years,
and to pay the costs.
I##%&$
.01 the appointment of the :ppellant as a special agent of the &I8, which
apparently authori#es him to carry and possess firearms, e3empts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
'&L($
-es. :t the time of appellantDs apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing was
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang wherein it was held that the
appointment of a civilian as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of
a Ipeace officerD e4uivalent even to a mem'er of the municipal police e3pressly
covered 'y 8ection E7/$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(a
1ational Mar"eting &orp. ;1:M:R&7= v. Miguel *. 2ecson
Case No. 1.4
G.R. No. L-29131 (!/g/st 27, 19*9)
Chapter 4, Page 127, Footote No.1.
F!C"#$
7n 19 1ovem'er 1/55, defendants were ordered 'y the &ourt of Airst
Instance of Manila to pay PR:2R:, the sum of P7,)++ plus 7C interest until the amount
was fully paid until May )5, 1/(+. 7n )1 *ecem'er 1/(5, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against the same defendants for the revival of the !udgment rendered in the initial
case. *efendants moved to dismiss the said complaint, on the ground of lac" of
!urisdiction over the su'!ect matter thereof and prescription of action. 2he complaint
was dismissed as having prescri'ed.
I##%&$
.01 the date on which ten years from *ecem'er )1, 1/55 e3pired was
considered to 'e *ecem'er )1, 1/(5.
'&L($
17. K.hen the laws spea" of years ... it shall 'e understood that years are of
three hundred si3ty%five days eachK according to :rt. 1, of our &ivil &ode. 1/(+ and
1/(9 'eing leap years, the month of Ae'ruary in 'oth had )/ days, so that ten ;1+=
years of ,(5 days each, or an aggregate of ,,(5+ days, from *ecem'er )1, 1/55,
e3pired on *ecem'er 1/, 1/(5.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7'
8antiago v. &ommission on Blections, et al.
Case No. 9+
G.R. No. 127321 (March 19, 1997)
F!C"#$
7n *ecem'er (, 1//(, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
&ommission a petition to amend the &onstitution through a system of initiative 8ec. ),
:rt. 17 of the 1/E7 &onstitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohi'ition
'ased on the argument that the constitutional provision on peopleDs initiative can
only 'e implemented 'y law to 'e passed 'y &ongress and no such law has 'een
passed. R: (7,5 provides for three systems of initiativeF initiative on the &onstitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any su'title on
initiative on the &onstitution, unli"e in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in 8u'title II and 8u'title III. 2his deli'erate omission indicates
that the matter of peopleLs initiative to amend the &onstitution was left to some
future law.
I##%&$
.01 R: (7,5 is an ade4uate statute to implement 8ection ), :rticle 17 of the
1/E7 &onstitution.
'&L($
17. .hile the :ct provides su'titles for 1ational Initiative and Referendum
;8u'title II= and for <ocal Initiative and Referendum ;8u'title III=, no su'title is provided
for initiative on the &onstitution. 2his conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the :ct is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If &ongress intended R.:. 1o. (7,5 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the &onstitution, it could have provided for a su'title
therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the &onstitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a, 9,
Hillanueva v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 17+
No. L ; 1471. ((ece6-er 4, 19.*)
F!C"#$
7n January )5, 1/E+, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Hice Mayor
of *olores for the January ,+ elections in su'stitution for his companion Mendo#a
who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 9. Petitioner won in the
election 'ut Respondent >oard disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent
&andidate as the winner on the presumption that PetitionerDs candidacy was not
duly approved 'y Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the
proclamation 'ut was dismissed 'y Respondent &ommission on the grounds that
Mendo#aDs unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, PetitionerDs candidacy was not valid since Mendo#a did not withdraw after
January 9.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner should 'e dis4ualified on the ground of formal or technical
defects.
'&L($
1o. 2he fact that Mendo#aDs withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not 'e used to frustrate the peopleDs will in favor of Petitioner as the su'stitute
candidate. :lso, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his
candidacy should 'e considered as having 'een made su'stantially and in truth
after the last day, even going 'y the literal reading of the provision 'y Respondent
&ommission. 2he spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided
Respondent &ommission in resolving the issue of last%minute withdrawal and
su'stitution of other persons as candidates.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, /a, ,/c
Mario R. Melchor v. &ommission on :udit
Case No. 177
G.R. No. 9139. (!/g/st 1*, 1991)
Chapter I:. Page 133, Footote No.31
F!C"#$
7n July 15, 1/E,, Petitioner, as school administrator of :langalang :gro%Industrial
8chool of <eyte, entered into a contract with &e'u *iamond &onstruction for the
construction of one of the school 'uildings. 2he school accountant issued a
certificate of availa'ility of funds to cover the construction cost 'ut failed to sign as a
witness to the contract, which was approved 'y the Minister of Bducation. *uring
construction, the contractor sought additional charges due to la'or cost increase,
'ut eventually gave up the pro!ect to save itself from losses. &onse4uently, the
matter was referred to Respondent &ommission who disallowed the payment in post%
audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lac" of signature of the
chief accountant of the school as witness to it. Aor this reason the petitioner was
made personally lia'le for the amount paid to the contractor.
I##%&$
1. .01 the contract was null and void.
). .01 the petitioner should 'e held personally lia'le for the amount paid to the
contractor.
'&L($
1o. 2he chief accountantDs issuance of a certificate of fund availa'ility served
as su'stantial compliance with the re4uirements of <7I /(E in the e3ecution of the
contract. 2he contract was also valid and enforcea'le 'ecause it already 'ore the
approval of the Minister of Bducation. :lso, it was highly ine4uita'le for the &ourt to
compel the Petitioner, who had su'stantially complied with the mandate of <7I /(E,
to shoulder the construction cost of the 'uilding, which was 'eing utili#ed 'y the
school when he was not reaping 'enefits from it.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, /a, 1)a
Mateo &asela v. &ourt of :ppeals, and B3e4uiel Magsaysay
Case No. 1+
G.R. No. L ; 2*714 (,cto-er 1*, 197+)
Chapter I:, Page 134, Footote No.3.
F!C"#$
Petitioner was ordered, on 7ct. )(, 1/5(, to vacate the premises and remove his
house. Petitioner refused to comply. 2hus, the &ourt issued two more writs on May (,
1/5E and :pril 19, 1/5/. Instead of o'eying the writs, the Petitioner filed a case 'efore
the &ourt of Airst Instance of Pam'ales, as"ing Private Respondent to pay him the
value of his house in addition to damages. He also filed a motion for suspension of
the implementation of the writ of e3ecution. 2he &ourt granted the motion for
suspension 'ut the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent &ourt. Aor
this reason, Magsaysay filed a motion for e3ecution of the writ dated *ec. (, 1/(,
and another on Ae'. 11, 1/(9. &:R denied the motion holding that its decision dated
7ct. )(, 1/5( could no longer 'e e3ecuted on mere motion for the reason that a
period of five years has already elapsed from the said date.
I##%&$
.01 the motion for e3ecution which was filed 'eyond the reglementary
period was time%'arred.
'&L($
1o. Arom *ec. 17, 1/5( when the decision in 4uestion 'ecame final and
e3ecutory, to *ec. 11, 1/(,, the date when Private RespondentDs motion for
e3ecution was filed, a period of ( years, 11 months and )9 days elapsed. Arom this
period, the time during which the writs of e3ecution could not 'e served, or a period
of , years, / months and )5 days must 'e su'tracted. &onse4uently, only , years, 1
month and )/ days can 'e charged against the reglementary period. Hence Private
RespondentDs motion for e3ecution was not time%'arred.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, /c, 11a, 11d, 11e
*e Jesus v. &ity of Manila
Case No. .*
G.R. No. L-9337 ((ece6-er 24, 1914)
F!C"#$
In 1/+7, Petitioner 'ought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila
which was under the 2orrens system. :pparently, the original owner incorrectly
declared the si#e of the land. 8o, from 1/+1 N 1/+7, the original owner was paying
lesser ta3es than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1/+7 N 1/1+. 6pon
finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of ta3es, Petitioner paid the
ta3es, fees, and interest of P), +/(.9/ for the unpaid 'alance of the years 1/+1%1/1+.
8oon after, he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount.
Petitioner was awarded P1, (9/.E).
Petitioner contends that the supposed ta3es from 'efore 1/1+ were not
actually ta3es 'ecause they had not yet 'een assessed. 2a3es may not 'e due and
paya'le until they are assessed.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner should still pay the ta3es which were not assessed 'efore.
'&L($
Petitioner should only pay the ta3es when he was the owner of the property.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(, /a, ,E', 9,, 5+
Aederation of Aree .or"ers v. Inciong
Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-4..4. (Ma0 11, 19..)
F!C"#$
In :pril 1/77, P* 11), was promulgated re4uiring all employers in the private
sector to pay their employees an e3tra P(+0month as emergency allowance. 2he
increase was set at May 1, 1/77, as well as the rules issued on the same day. 8ec. (
stated that Bmployers may apply for e3emption with the 8ecretary of <a'or within ,+
days from the effectivity of these rules. 7n 8eptem'er )7, 1/77, the company filed
with the .age &ommission its application for e3emption from paying the increase.
Respondent approved 'oth applications granting e3emptions for the company.
Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave a'use of discretion, amounting
to loss of !urisdiction 'y approving 'oth applications.
I##%&$
1. .01 the first application was filed 'eyond the ,+%day reglementary period.
). .01 the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency
allowance.
'&L($
1o, the application was not a strict rule. 2he purpose of the P* is to protect
wages and income. 2he law ta"es into consideration that there is a possi'ility that
some employers are not financially capa'le to pay such wages and such
incapa'ility may happen anytime within the year.
1o, only the *epartment of <a'or and .age &ommission can decide if the
petitioner was in a financial position to pay. 2he *epartment is in a 'etter position to
assess the matter. In a'sence of any grave a'use of discretion, their
recommendations will 'e respected 'y the courts. Moreover, the company was a'le
prove their financial situation 'y giving financial statements.
L!"IN M!)IM$
E, /a, 9)
Morales v. Paredes
Case No. .3
G.R. No. L-3442. ((ece6-er 29, 193+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other
people have already registered such land as their own.
Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the &ourt of Airst Instance of
Pangasinan. .hile the Motion was still pending, Petitioner 'rought the present action
to the 8upreme &ourt praying that the decision of Respondent Judge 'e set aside
and a new trial should 'e granted in accordance with 8ec. 51, if the &ode of &ivil
Procedure.
I##%&$
.01 a new trial should 'e granted in accordance with 8ec. 51, of the &ode
of &ivil Procedure.
'&L($
8upreme &ourt cannot open a new trial. 2he 8upreme &ourt does not have
!urisdiction to reopen !udgments under 8ec. 51, if there are other ade4uate remedies
availa'le. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the
&ourt of Airst Instance of Pangasinan, therefore, that action should 'e finished first.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c
Prasni" v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-.*39 (March 23, 191*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner see"s to adopt four children which he claims to 'e his and Pa#
Has4ue#D children without the 'enefit of marriage. 2he 8olicitor @eneral opposed this
stating that :rt. ,,E of the &ivil &ode allows a natural child to 'e adopted 'y his
father refers only to a child who has not 'een ac"nowledged as natural child. It
maintains that in order that a natural child may 'e adopted 'y his natural father or
mother there should not 'e an ac"nowledgment of the status of the natural child for
it will go against :rt. ,,5.
I##%&$
.01 the &ivil &ode allows for the adoption of ac"nowledged natural children
of the father or mother.
'&L($
2he law intends to allow adoption whether the child 'e recogni#ed or not. If
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecogni#ed children, :rticle ,,E would
'e of no useful purpose. 2he rights of an ac"nowledged natural child are much less
than those of a legitimated child. &ontending that this is unnecessary would deny the
illegitimate children the chance to ac4uire these rights. 2he trend when it comes to
adoption of children tends to go toward the li'eral. 2he law does not prohi'it the
adoption of an ac"nowledged natural child which when compared to a natural
child is e4uita'le. :n ac"nowledged natural child is a natural child also and following
the words of the law, they should 'e allowed adoption.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, Ea, /, 1), )(, ,(a, ,7, ,/'
*e @uia v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 3+
G.R. No. 1+4712 (Ma0 *, 1992)
F!C"#$
Petitioner contends that under Par ;d= of 8ec. , of R: 71((, mem'ers of the
8angguniang Panlulungsod and 8angguniang >ayan shall 'e elected at large.
I##%&$
.01 par ;d= 8ec. , of R: 71(( should 'e interpreted to mean that elective
officials of the 8angguniang Panlulungsod and 8angguniang >ayan shall 'e elected
at large.
'&L($
1o. Par ;d= 8ec., of the R: refers only to elective officials of the 8angguniang
Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the 8angguniang >ayan
for municipalities outside Metro Manila. 2he law specifically stated that provinces with
only one legislative district should 'e divided into two and therefore should
necessarily 'e elected 'y districts. Par ;d= should 'e interpreted in line with the rest of
the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have 'een
no reason for the R: to single out the single district provinces. 2he court reali#ed that
the language of the law in this case seems a'struse and the "ey to determine what
legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute.
2he e3planatory note in the proposed 'ill provided that the reason for the division
into two legislative districts is to reduce the num'er of candidates to 'e voted for in
the 1//) elections.
L!"IN M!)IM$
), /c, 11a, ,(', ,7, ')
8alenillas v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. *.
G.R. No. 7.*.7 (4a/ar0 31, 19.9)
F!C"#$
7n *ecem'er 9, 1/7,, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to
Philippine 1ational >an" as security for a loan of P),5++. Aor failure to pay their loan,
the property was foreclosed 'y P1> and was 'ought at a pu'lic auction 'y Private
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property
under 8ec.11/ of the Pu'lic <and :ct. Respondent states that the sale of the property
dis4ualified Petitioners from 'eing legal heirs vis--vis the said property. Respondent
also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescri'ed 'ased on
Monge et al. vs. :ngeles.
I##%&$
1. .01 petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said :ct.
). .01 the prescription period had already prescri'ed.
'e37$
2he provision ma"es no distinction 'etween the legal heirs. 2he distinction
made 'y Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the :ct. PetitionersD
contention would 'e more in "eeping with the spirit of the law.
.ith regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale
and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would 'e different.
Aor foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the e3piration of
the period of redemption when the deed of a'solute sale was e3ecuted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/', )(, )7, /', 9)a
8arcos v. &astillo
Case No. 27*
G.R. No. L-29711 (4a/ar0 31, 39*9)
Chapter I:, Page 13*, Footote No. 4.
F!C"#$
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of >aro'o, 8urigao del 8ur, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office 'y Respondent, the Provincial @overnor of
8urigao del 8ur. 2he act, constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office
consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in
the cutting and selling of tim'er or logs for their own use and 'enefit, to the damage
and pre!udice of the pu'lic and of the government. :nd on the 'asis of such
administrative complaint, Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension 'y
Respondent pursuant to 8ec. 5, of R: 1o. 51E5, otherwise "nown as the
*ecentrali#ation :ct of l/(7$.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension
under the *ecentrali#ation :ct of l/(7.
'&L($
2he new law e3plicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the
Provincial >oard. 2he purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations 'y
vesting the power on a 'oard where no one person may have monopoly over the
power of suspension. 2he Provincial @overnor may no longer have the power of
preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor.
L!"IN M!)IMF
1, (c, (d, 7a, /a, ,(', 9/
:la Mode @arments, Inc. v. 1<R&
Case No. 7
G. R. No. 1221*1 (Fe-r/ar0 17, 3997)
Chapter I:, Page 13., Footote No. 13
F!C"#$
Respondents were 'oth employees of Petitioner and holding position as line
leaders, tas"ed to supervise ,( sewers each. 7n May 5 and (, l//,, all the line leaders
did not report for wor". 7n May (, l//,, Private Respondents were not allowed to
enter the premises of the Petitioner, and then re4uired to su'mit written e3planations
as to their a'sence. 7n May 1+, l//,, Private Respondents tendered their
e3planation letters.
*espite their e3planation, they were not allowed to resume their wor" and
were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real
reason for their a'sence was intended to sa'otage the operations of Petitioner. >ut
other line leaders were allowed to resume their wor" despite their a'sence on May 5
and (, l//,.
I##%&$
1. .01 the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their
wor" constitutes dismissal from the serviceQ
). .01 the <a'or :r'iter erred in limiting the award of 'ac"wages for only a
period not e3ceeding three , yearsQ
'&L(F
6nder the old doctrine, the 'ac"wages that can 'e awarded to illegally
dismissed employees was not to e3ceed a period of three years. However, a new
doctrine allowed the awarding of full$ 'ac"wages and also prevented the
company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees
elsewhere during the pendency of their case. 2he <a'or :r'iter was wrong in
awarding 'ac"wages for a period of not e3ceeding three years.
L!"IN M!)IMF
1, 5a, (a, (c, 7a, 9/
Jose &omendador v. Renato 8. *e Hilla
Case No. *9
G.R. No. 93177 (!/g/st 2, 1991)
Chapter I:, Page 142, Footote No. *1
F!C"#$
2he petitioners are officers of the :rmed Aorces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their participation in the failed coup dDetat on *ecem'er l to /, l/E/.
In connection with their prosecution, a Pre%Investigation Panel and a &ourt
Martial was formed. *uring their trial, petitioners invo"ed their right to peremptory
challenge. 2he same was denied 'y the &ourt Martial on the ground that the right
was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential *ecree.
I##%&$
1. .01 there was su'stantial compliance in the conduct of pre%trial
investigation.
). .01 there was a legal 'asis for the @&M 1o. 19 to deny the right of
petitioners to invo"e a peremptory challenge.
,. .01 there was a legal 'asis for the Regional 2rial &ourts to grant 'ail and
order for the release of petitioners.
'&L(F
2he right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial <aw was
declared. >ut when the same was lifted, the right to peremptory challenge was
effectively revived. 2he reason 'eing, the right was suspended due to the creation of
military tri'unals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may 'e
referred to them, so when martial law was lifted and the tri'unals were a'olished, the
right to peremptory challenge was revived.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, /a, 1+
Mata'uena v. &ervantes
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-2.771 (March 31, 1971)
Chapter I:, Page 143, Footote No.*9
F!C"#$
Aeli3 Mata'uena coha'itated with Respondent. *uring this period, Aeli3
Mata'uena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. <ater the two were married.
:fter the death of Aeli3 Mata'uena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing :rt.1,, of the &ivil &ode Bvery donation 'etween the spouses
during the marriage shall 'e void.$
2he trial court ruled that this case was not covered 'y the prohi'ition 'ecause
the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet
married and were simply coha'itating.
I##%&$
.01 the prohi'ition applies to donations 'etween live%in partners.
'&L($
-es. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. 8ince the reason for
the 'an on donations 'etween spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possi'ility of undue influence and improper pressure 'eing e3erted 'y one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohi'ition shall not apply also to common%law
relationships.
2he court, however, said that the lac" of the donation made 'y the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
e3clusive rights to the disputed property 'ecause the relationship 'etween Aeli3 and
Respondent were legitimated 'y marriage.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, /c
<ope# M 8ons, Inc. v. &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals
Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-9274 (Fe-r/ar0 1, 1917)
F!C"#$
Petitioner imported wire nettings from @ermany. 2he Manila &ustoms
&ollector assessed the customs duties on the 'asis of the suppliers invoice. 2he duties
were paid and the shipment released. 2hereafter, the Manila &ustoms &ollector
reassessed the duties due on the 'asis of the dollar value of the importation and
imposed additional duties.
Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent &ourt 'ut they dismissed it for lac"
of !urisdiction citing 8ec. 7 of R: 11)5 creating said 2a3 &ourt. Provision says that the
&ourt has !urisdiction to review decisions of &ommissioner of &ustoms. However,
under 8ec. 11 of same :ct, the &ourt has !urisdiction to review rulings of the &ollector
of &ustoms when 'rought 'y persons affected there'y.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent &ourt has !urisdiction to review the decisions of the &ollector
of &ustoms.
'&L($
-es, there is indeed a disparity 'etween 8ec. 7 and 11 of same R:. 2he
8upreme &ourt concurred with the positions of the 8olicitor @eneral that a clerical
error was committed in 8ec. 11 and the word &ollector should read &ommissioner. 2o
support this, the 8upreme &ourt cited that under the &ustoms <aw as found under
8ec. 11,7 to 191+ of the Revised :dministrative &ode, Ithe &ollectors of &ustoms are
mere 8u'ordinates of the &ommissioner of &ustoms over whom he has supervision
and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in !udicial legislation. It merely rectified
an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous
intention of the <egislature. 6nder the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter,
'ut the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, 1(a, 1(c, ,(a
<am' v. Phipps
Case No. 143
G.R. No. L-7.+* (4/30 12, 1912)
Chapter 4, Page 144, Footote No.7.
F!C"#$
Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds
of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig
Penal &olony and that all of his accounts are 'alanced. Petitioner thus filed an
action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a
clearance. However, it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot
prosper since there is no showing that, as provided 'y law, there is no plain, speedy
and ade4uate remedy in the ordinary courts of law.$
I##%&F
.01 the legislature intended to limit the !urisdiction to cases where there is no
other ade4uate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts$ of law.
'&L(F
2here appears to 'e a typographical error in the wording of 8ec. ))) of :ct
1o. 1/+ which reads in partF .hen the complaint in an action in a court of Airst
Instance alleges that any inferior tri'unal, ? it may if there is no other plain, speedy
and ade4uate remedy in the ordinary courts$ of law.$
2he phrase courts of law$ should read as course of law$. &opied ver'atim
from the &ode of &ivil Procedure of &alifornia, the said section in the &alifornia &ode
reads course of law$ instead of courts of law$. 8panish translation of said 8ec. )))
more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. In 8panish, the other remedy is
not limited to the ordinary courts of law$. 7n its face, this evident typographical
error, which, if uncorrected, would render the law nonsensical. It is therefore the duty
of the court to give the statute a sensi'le construction, such as will effectuate the
legislative intent and to avoid in!ustice or an a'surd conclusion.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, /d, 11a, 11d, 1)a, ,(a, ,(', ,(d, ,(f, ,7
&om. of Internal Revenue v. B887
Case No. 27
G.R. No. L-2.1+2-+3 (!pr23 1., 19.9)
F!C"#$
Respondent overpaid its 1/5/ income ta3. It was accordingly granted a ta3
credit 'y Petitioner on :ugust 5, 1/(9. However, RespondentDs payment for 1/(+ was
found to 'e short. 2hus, Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency ta3 together
with interest for the period of :pril 1E, 1/(1 to :pril 1E, 1/(9. 7n :ugust 1+, 1/(9,
Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to 'e due. It protested the
computation of interest, arguing that it was more than what was properly due,
claiming that it should only 'e re4uired to pay interest for the amount of the
difference 'etween the deficiency ta3 and RespondentDs overpayment.
I##%&F
1. .01 Respondent shall pay the deficiency ta3 of P,(7, //9 with interest.
). .01 Respondent is entitled to a refund.
'&L(F
2he government already had in its hands the sum of P))1, +,, representing
the e3cess payment of Respondent. Having 'een paid and received 'y mista"e, the
sum 'elonged to Respondent and the government had the o'ligation to return such
amount, which arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time
that the payee admits the o'ligation to reim'urse. 8ince the amount of P))1, +,,
was already in the hands of the government as of July, 1/(+, whatever o'ligation
Respondent might su'se4uently incur in favor of the government would have to 'e
reduced 'y that sum, in respect of which no interest could 'e charged.
It is well esta'lished that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as
to su'vert these truisms simply cannot and should not 'e countenanced. 1othing is
'etter settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would
lead to a'surd and unreasona'le conse4uences. Moreover, a literal interpretation is
to 'e re!ected if it would 'e un!ust or lead to a'surd results. 8tatutes should receive a
sensi'le construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to
avoid an un!ust or a'surd conclusion.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, E', 11a, 11d, 11e, 1)a, 1)'
People v. Hillanueva
Case No. 11*
G. R. L-11+14 (!pr23 29, 19*1)
F!C"#$
*efendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical in!uries
with damage to property in amount of P),,() through rec"less imprudence in the
Justice of the Peace &ourt of >atangas. 2he case was considered 'eyond the
courtDs !urisdiction 'ecause of the fine imposa'le upon the accused. 2he case was
forwarded to the &ourt of Airst Instance, which also declared itself without !urisdiction
'ecause the penalty for the more serious offense of physical in!uries through rec"less
imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, and even
applied to its ma3imum degree. It should remain within the !urisdiction of the Justice
of Peace.
I##%&$
.hether or not the &ourt of Airst Instance has !urisdiction.
'&L($
-es. :ngeles et al vs. Jose, a similar case, held that !urisdiction was with the
&ourt of Airst Instance and not the municipal court. :lso, since the &ourt of Airst
Instance would have !urisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property, it
would 'e a'surd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical
in!uries com'ined with damage to property through rec"less imprudence is in
!urisdiction of the Justice of Peace.
Moreover, there is the possi'ility that the prosecution will fail to prove the
physical in!uries aspect of the case and esta'lish only the damage to property. 2he
Justice of Peace, if given !urisdiction, would find itself without !urisdiction to impose
the P),(,( fine for the damage to property committed, since such fine cannot 'e less
than the amount of the damage.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5, 11
People v. *u4ue
Case No. 1+*
G. R. 1++2.1 (!/g/st 13, 1992)
F!C"#$
:ccused was charged with illegal recruitment 'ecause he was not licensed
nor authori#ed 'y the proper government agency, P7B:. 2he <a'or &ode provides
that the offense shall prescri'e in , years 'ut does not contain any provision of how
to compute it. 8ec. ) of :ct 1o. ,,)( provides that prescription shall 'egin to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same 'e not
"nown at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of !udicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment$. :ccording to :ccused, a literal reading
suggests that the prescriptive period would never 'egin to run.
I##%&$
.hat is the prescription of the criminal offense of the :ccusedQ
'&L($
Prescription 'egan from the time the activities of the :ccused were
ascertained 'y the complainants and 'y the P7B: to have 'een carried out without
any license or authority from the government. 2here is a'surdity in 8ec. ) 'ut
:ccused does not 'enefit from a literal reading. It must 'e construed in such a way
as to give effect to the intention and avoid a'surd results. Institution of !udicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment$ may 'e either disregarded as
surplusage or should 'e deemed preceded 'y the word until$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/, 11a, 11d, 1), 15, ,E
>ello v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 11
G. R. L-3.1*1 (March 29, 1974)
F!C"#$
Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the &ourt of Airst Instance, which should
have 'een ta"en directly to Respondent &ourt. 2he Prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invo"ed an analogous provision ;Rule 5+, 8ec. ,= directing
the &ourt of :ppeals in cases erroneously 'rought to it to certify the case to the
proper court. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal.
Petitioners then filed their petition for prohi'ition and mandamus to prohi'it the
e3ecution of !udgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent &ourt. 2hey dismissed
the petition. :lthough Respondent &ourt recogni#ed that the &ourt of Airst Instance
may have e3ercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent &ourt, it held
that Petitioners did not implead the &ourt of Airst Instance as principal party
respondent$ and thus it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that
Petitioners can 'e said to deserve some e4uities$.
I##%&$
.01 the case should 'e elevated to Respondent &ourt despite finality of
!udicial decision.
'&L($
-es. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance acted with grave a'use of discretion. 2he
8upreme &ourt cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its purpose
and stressed that it is the essence of !udicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid
such a deplora'le result of in!ustice or a'surdity$. 2he provision should also 'e ta"en
within the conte3t and spirit of Rule 5+, 8ec. , as an analogous provision. 2he
8upreme &ourt finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
!ustice to 'e 'ound 'y the same rule.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, /d, /e, 11a, 11g, 11h, 1), ,(, E'
&esario 6rsua v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 3+*
G.R. No. 11217+ (!pr23 1+, 199*)
Chapter 4, Page 112, Footote No.112
F!C"#$
Petitioner was charged 'efore the 7ffice of the 7m'udsman. He was
re4uested 'y his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the 7m'udsman
'ecause the law firmDs messenger, 7scar Pere#, had to attend some personal
matters. :t the 7ffice of the 7m'udsman, he wrote his name at the log'oo" as
7scar Pere#.$ PetitionerDs real identity was eventually discovered 'y the employees
of the 7m'udsman. He was charged and convicted for violation of &.:. 1o. 19).
I##%&$
.01 the acts committed 'y the petitioner were among the evils sought to 'e
remedied 'y &.:. 1o. 19)
'&L($
Petitioner was ac4uitted. 8tatutes are to 'e construed in the light of the
purposes to 'e achieved and the evils sought to 'e remedied. 2he court may
consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to in!ustice and
a'surdity. <i"ewise, &.:. 1o. 19) is a penal statute that should 'e construed strictly
against the state, and in favor of the accused.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 11a, 1)a, 91a
Paat v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 91
G.R. No. 1111+7 (4a/ar0 1+, 1997)
F!C"#$
Petitioner 4uestioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truc" used in illegal
logging operations. He insists that only the &ourt can do so, citing 8ection (E of P*
7+5 as amended 'y B7 )77 which reads 2he court shall further the order of
confiscation in favor of the @overnment?as well as the machinery, e4uipment?
which are illegally used?$
I##%&$
.01 the petition should 'e granted in light of 8ec. (E of P.*. 7+5.
'&L($
1o. 2he a'ove%4uoted provision should 'e read together with 8ec. (Ea.
8tatutes should 'e construed in the light of the o'!ect to 'e achieved and the evil to
'e suppressed, and they should 'e given such construction as will advance the
o'!ect, suppress the mischief, and secure the 'enefits intended.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,(a
Pritchard v. Repu'lic
Case No. 241
G.R. No. L-1711 (4/30 17, 194.)
Chapter 4.1*, Footote No.114, page 11*
F!C"#$
2he 8olicitor @eneral opposed the claim of the Petitioner for e3emption from
filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the re4uirement for
e3emption, it is imperative that PetitionerDs children should 'e enrolled during the
entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his
children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions re4uired to entitle
him to e3emption from filing a declaration of intention.
Iss/e$
.01 the Petitioner should 'e allowed to avail of the e3emption 'y invo"ing
the aforementioned provision.
'&L($
2he provision of law invo"ed 'y appellant must 'e interpreted in the sense
that the enrollment re4uired 'y law must 'e made at any time during the entire
period of the residence of the applicant. 2he drafters of the law could not have
intended to create an a'surd or impossi'le situation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11a, 1/a
8alvacion v. &entral >an" of the Philippines
Case No. 241
G.R. No. 94723 (!/g/st, 21, 1997)
Chapter 4.1*, Footote No.114, page 11*
F!C"#$
:n :merican tourist raped 1) year old girl. In order to pay for moral damages,
the *eputy 8heriff of Ma"ati sent a notice of garnishment to &hina >an" in order to
draw from the :mericanDs 'an" account to pay the fees. &hina >an" responded 'y
invo"ing 8ec. 11, of &ircular /(+ of &entral >an", which states that foreign currency
deposits shall 'e e3empt from attachment, garnishment or any other process of any
court. Respondent >an" states that though the law is harsh, such is the law and stood
firm on the policy.
I##%&#$
.01 8ection 1, of &entral >an" &ircular /(+ and 8ection E of R: (9)7, as
amended 'y P* 1)9( should 'e made applica'le to a foreigner.
'&L($
&entral >an" contends that the reason for the e3emption is to encourage the
deposit of foreign currency. R: (9)9 was enacted during a period of economic crisis,
where foreign investments were minimal. :s, some time has already passed since the
crisis that enacted R: (9)9, the economy has now somewhat recovered from the
financial drought.
Hence, the &ourt ruled that it is unthin"a'le that the guilty would 'e ac4uitted at the
e3pense of the innocent, stating that if &ircular /(+ is to 'e followed, !ustice would 'e
undermined, stating :rt. 1+ of the &ivil &ode, in case of dou't as to the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawma"ing 'ody intended right and
!ustice to prevail.
L!"IN M!)IM$
), 19, ,/
*emafiles v. &omelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-2.39* ((ece6-er 29, 19*7)
Chapter 4.1., Footote 12*, page 119
F!C"#$
Respondent @alido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial >oard voting to
re!ect returns. Petitioner challenged the right of ) 'oard mem'ers to sit, considering
that they were reelectionists. Respondent &ommission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
@alido then as"ed for reconsideration, stating that the ) 'oard mem'ers in 4uestion
were dis4ualified only when the 'oard was acting as a provincial 'ut not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent &ommission reversed its previous decision.
I##%&#$
1. .01 this case is moot and the 'oard had the authority to re!ect the returns from
Precinct 7.
). .01 the 'oard mem'ers who were candidates for reelection were dis4ualified
from sitting in the 'oard in its capacity as a municipal 'oard of canvassers.
,. .01 Respondent &ommission can order the 'oard of canvassers to count a return.
'&L($
R: 9/7+ reads the first mayor, vice%mayor and councilors of the municipality
of 8e'aste shall 'e elected in the ne3t general elections for local officials and shall
have 4ualified.$ 2he 8upreme &ourt ruled that and shall have 4ualified$ is devoid of
meaning. 2he term of office of municipals shall 'egin in the 1
st
day of January
following their election, despite the fact that 8e'aste was a newly created
municipality.
1o, a canvassing 'oard may not re!ect any returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possi'ility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should 'e annulled. 2he law states any mem'er of a provincial 'oard or of
municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall 'e incompetent
to act on the said 'ody.$ 8ince Respondent &ommission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing 'odies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.
L!"IN M!)IM$
15, ,5, 9,, )(
1ational Housing &orporation v. Juco
Case No. .*
G.R. No. L-*4313 (4a/ar0 17, 19.1)
F!C"#$
Aor 'eing declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned 'y Petitioner, Private
Respondent was terminated. He filed a complaint with Respondent &ourt and
Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent &ourt is without !urisdiction as
Petitioner &orporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for
dismissal were for valid reasons. Respondent &ourt however, despite past decisions,
decided in favor of the Private Respondent.
I##%&$
.01 employees of Petitioner are covered 'y the <a'or &ode or 'y the laws
and regulations governing the civil service.
'&L($
Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stoc"holders. 2he
1/,5 constitutionDs section 1 article 1) states that : civil service em'racing all
'ranches and su'divisions of the government shall 'e provided 'y law.$ .hile the
amendments in section 1 article 1)' of the 1/7, constitution states that 2he civil
service em'races every 'ranch, agency, su'division and instrumentality of the
government, including every government owned or controlled corporation.$
&learly, the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries
out a message that the coverage is 'road and all%em'racing. Aurthermore, P.*. E+7
8ec. 5( implements the said provision. In addition to this, the <a'or &ode states that
the mentioned corporations shall 'e governed 'y the &ivil 8ervice <aw.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(, 7, )9, )(, ,E'
People v. Me!ia
Case No. 111
G.R. Nos. 11.94+-41 a7 G.R. No. 1194+7 (4/30 7, 1997)
F!C"#$
8ec. 19 of the :nti%&arnapping :ct readsF
8ec. 19. :ny person who is found guilty of carnapping shall, irrespective of
the value of the motor vehicle ta"en, 'e punished 'y imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed 'y means of violence or in intimidation of
persons or force upon thingsJ and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
when the owner, driver, or occupant is "illed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.$
I##%&$
1. .01 the phrase is "illed$ covers 'oth homicide and murder.
). If the crime was frustrated murder, would the penalty 'e life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua to deathQ
,. .01 frustrated homicide would 'e treated as a separate offense.
'&L($
2he words is "illed$ ma"e no distinction 'etween homicide and murder.
.hether it is one or the other which is committed in the course of carnapping or on
the occasion thereof$ ma"es no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. 2he
"illing, whether it is homicide or murder, cannot 'e treated as a separate offense and
only serves to 4ualify the carnapping.
2he phrase is "illed$ refers only to consummated murder, and not frustrated
murder.
Arustrated homicide ;or murder= is not treated as a separate offense as it is
deemed to fall under the clause of 8ec. 19 'y means of violence or in intimidation of
persons$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )(, ,Ea, 9,, 9E
&ity of Manila v. Judge @ome# and Bsso Philippines
Case No. 23
G. R. No. L-37211 (!/g/st 31, 19.1)
F!C"#$
2he Revised &harter of Manila too" effect on June 1E, 1/9/. It fi3es the annual
realty ta3 at one and one%half percent. 2he 8pecial Bducation Aund <aw ;R: 5997=,
which too" effect on Jan. 1, 1/(/, imposed an annual additional one percent ta3
and fi3es the total realty ta3 at three percent. .ith the three percent ma3imum limit
set 'y R: 5997, the municipal 'oard of Manila enacted 7rdinance 1o. 71)5,
effective 'eginning the third 4uarter of 1/7), imposing an additional one%half
percent realty ta3. Respondent &orporation paid the ta3, 'ut protested the
7rdinanceJ the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila ruled that the ta3 ordinance is void
as it is not authori#ed 'y the city charter or 'y any law, and that the city of Manila
should reim'urse Respondent &orporation said ta3.
I##%&$
.01 the ta3 ordinance is valid.
'&L($
2he &ourt holds that the doctrine of implications in 8tatutory &onstruction
sustains the &ity of ManilaDs contention that the additional one%half percent realty ta3
is sanctioned 'y the provision of the 8pecial Bducation Aund <aw that the total real
property ta3 shall not e3ceed a ma3imum of three per centum$. .hile the 1/9/
Revised &harter of Manila fi3ed the realty ta3 at one and one%half percent, the 1/(/
8pecial Bducation Aund <aw fi3ed three percent as the ma3imum real property ta3.
2he o'vious implication is that an additional one%half percent ta3 could 'e imposed
'y municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fi3ed at two percent the realty ta3
that would accrue to the city or municipality. 2he fact that the 1/79 Real Property
2a3 &ode specially fi3es the real property ta3 at two percent confirms the prior
intention of the lawma"er to impose two percent as the realty ta3 proper. 2hat was
also the avowed intent of the 4uestioned ordinance.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, )+a, ,E', 9,, 9/
&hua v. &ivil 8ervice &ommission
Case No. *+
G.R. No. ..979 (Fe-r/ar0 7, 1992)
Chapter I:, Page 1*4, Footote No.14*
F!C"#$
R: ((E, provided 'enefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorgani#ation. 8ection ) covers those who
are 4ualifiedF
8ec. ). &overage. N 2his :ct shall cover all appointive officials and employees
of the 1ational @overnment. 2he 'enefits authori#ed under this :ct shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two ;)= consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation?$
Petitioner <ydia &hua, 'elieving that she is 4ualified to avail of the 'enefits of
the program, filed an application on January ,+, 1/E/ with Respondent
:dministration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse 'y the petitioner to
Respondent &ommission yielded the same result.
I##%&$
.01 PetitionerDs status as a co%terminus employee is e3cluded from the
'enefits of R: ((E, ;Barly Retirement <aw=.
'&L($
2he petition is granted. 2he Barly Retirement <aw would violate the e4ual
protection clause of the constitution if the 8upreme &ourt were to sustain
RespondentDs su'mission that the 'enefits of said law are to 'e denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered 'y the said law.
2he court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 11e, 1)a, )+a, )+', ,7
8olid Homes Inc. v. 2eresita Payawal
Case No. 2.+
G.R. No. .4.11 (!/g. 29, 19.9)
Chapter I:, Page 1*9, Footote No.1*4
F!C"#$
2he &ourt of :ppeals sustained that the Regional 2rial &ourt of Sue#on &ity
has !urisdiction over the case filed 'y the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to
deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends that the
case should have 'een heard 'y the Housing and <and 6se Regulatory >oard and
not the R2&.
I##%&$
1. .01 the R2& has !urisdiction over the case.
). .01 the applica'le law is the general law ;>P 1)/= or the special law ;P* 1,99=
'&L($
2he R2& has no !urisdiction over the case since the respondentDs argument
relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, )+c, 5+
Richard @ordon v. Regino Heridiano II
Case No. 11*
G.R. No. L-1123+ (No8. ., 19..)
Chapter I:, Page 17+, Footote No.171
F!C"#$
Respondent -am'ao owns a 8an 8e'astian *rugstore and an 7longapo &ity
*rugstore. : Itest 'uyD operation at 8an 8e'astian *rugstore, wherein agents were
sold )++ ta'lets of Halium without a doctorDs prescription, gave rise to the closure
ordered 'y the A*:. >efore such order was promulgated, the Mayor revo"ed the
MayorDs Permits issued to 8an 8e'astian *rugstore and su'se4uently, a sign'oard
was posted 'y the Hice%Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure.
7n May 7, 1/E+, A*: approved RespondentDs re4uest to e3change the locations of
the two drugstores ;which were 5m apart and in the same 'uilding=. 6pon
"nowledge of this, Petitioner then revo"ed the MayorDs Permit issued to 7longapo
&ity *rugstore.
I##%&$
2he conflict 'etween the A*:Ds and the mayorDs power to grant and revo"e
licenses for the operation of drugstores.
R%LING$
2he A*: had the authority to order the closure of 8an 8e'astian *rugstore, the
Mayor however did not. In the case of 7longapo &ity *rugstore however, the
authority rested on the Mayor ;local !urisdiction=.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)+c, ,E'
Bufronio <lanto v. Mohamad :li *imaporo
Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-219+1 (Mar, 31, 19**)
Chapter I:, Page 171, Footote No.17.
F!C"#$
2he Provincial >oard of <anao del 1orte reverted the D(+%D(1 salary
appropriation for the position of :ssistant Provincial :ssessor to the general fund. 2he
position, then held 'y the Petitioner, was a'olished. Petitioner came to the court on
mandamus, wherein the RespondentDs motion to dismiss was granted hence the
current action.
I##%&$
1. .as the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismissQ
). Is it voidQ
R%LING$
2here is no need for a hearing and no, it is not void. 2he motion to dismiss is
grounded on lac" of cause of action, which can 'e determined 'y reference to the
facts in the averred pleading. 2he 4uestion raised is purely one of law. 2he legal issue
was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. 7ral arguments are then
reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. Aurther, petitioner contends that the stamp of
approval of the 8ecretary of Ainance is needed in a'olishing his position. 8uch action
was, however, done away with 'y the <ocal :utonomy :ct ;8ec. ,a of R:))(9=.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )+a, ,), ,7, 9/
People v. &oncepcion
Case No. 2+1
G.R. No. 1919+ (No8e6-er 29, 1922)
Chapter I:, Page 17*, Footote No.2+2
F!C"#F
*efendant authori#ed an e3tension of credit in favor of Puno - &oncepcion,
8. en &, a co%partnership. *efendantDs wife was a director of this co%partnership.
*efendant was found guilty of violating 8ec. ,5 of :ct 1o. )797 which says that 2he
1ational >an" shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the mem'ers of the
>oard of *irectors of the 'an" nor to agents of the 'ranch 'an"s.$ 2his 8ection was in
effect in 1/1/ 'ut was repealed in :ct 1o. )/,E approved on January ,+, 1/)1.
I##%&F
.01 *efendant can 'e convicted of violating 8ections of :ct 1o. )797, which
were repealed 'y :ct 1o. )/,E.
'&L($
In the interpretation and construction, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the <egislature. 8ection 9/ in relation to 8ec. )5 of :ct 1o.
)797 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the :ct.
*efendant contends that the repeal of these 8ections 'y :ct 1o. )/,E has served to
ta"e away 'asis for criminal prosecution. 2he &ourt holds that where an act of the
<egislature which penali#es an offense repeals a former act which penali#ed the
same offense, such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the
&ourts of !urisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of
the old law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, (', /a, ,7, ,E'
2antuico, Jr. v. *omingo
Case No. 2.1
G. R. No. 9*422 (Fe-r/ar0 2., 1994)
Chapter I:, Page 17*, Footote No.2+1
F!C"#$
2he petition 4uestions the withholding of one%half of PetitionerDs retirement
'enefits. Petitioner was &hairman of the &7: from 1/7( to 1/E(. 7n *ecem'er 1/E5,
he applied for and o'tained clearance, which covered the period from 1/7( to
1/E5, from all money, property, and other accounta'ilities in preparation for his
retirement. :fter the B*8: Revolution, he su'mitted his resignation and sought a
second clearance for the period from January 1, 1/E( to March /, 1/E(. Respondent,
who too" over as &hairman, created an inventory0audit of all e4uipment ac4uired
during the tenure of his ) predecessors. :fter the committee recommended
PetitionerDs clearance from accounta'ility and after another special audit,
Respondent approved PetitionerDs application for retirement 'ut added that U of the
money value of 'enefits due would 'e withheld su'!ect to the findings of the audit.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent can authori#e that half of PetitionerDs retirement 'enefits
may 'e withheld.
'&L($
1o. 6nder 8ection 9 of R: 15(E providing for life pension to the :uditor
@eneral and mem'ers of &7MB<B&, the 'enefits granted shall not 'e su'!ect to
garnishment, levy or e3ecution. <i"ewise, under 8ection ,, of P.*. 119( ;Revised
@overnment 8ervice Insurance :ct=, the 'enefits granted shall not 'e su'!ect,
among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.$ .ithholding
PetitionerDs 'enefits is not allowed in this case. .ell%settled is the rule that retirement
laws are li'erally interpreted in favor of the retiree 'ecause the intention is to provide
for the retireeDs well%'eing.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /', /d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, ,E', 9)a
:lpha Investigation and 8ecurity :gency, Inc. v. 1<R&
Case No. 12
G.R. No. 111722 (Ma0 27, 1997)
Chapter :, Page 177, Footote No.2
F!C"#$
Petitioner provides security services. 7ne of its clients is *on Mariano Marcos
8tate 6niversity ;*MM86=. 8ecurity guards wor"ing in *MM86 filed 'efore the Regional
7ffice of the *7<B a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current
minimum wage order. 2he <a'or :r'iter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and
*MM86 solidarily lia'le for the salary differential owed to the security guards.
Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should 'e 'orne 'y *MM86.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner may 'e held !ointly and severally lia'le with *MM86 for non%
payment of minimum wage.
'&L($
-es, Petitioner is !ointly and severally lia'le with *MM86 for the payment of
wage increases. 8ection ( of R: (7)7 ;.age Rationali#ation :ct= provides that in
case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the lia'ility of the principal
and contractor shall 'e !oint and several. 2he same lia'ility attaches under :rticles
1+(, 1+7 and 1+/ of the <a'or &ode. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in
the case at 'ar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescri'ed in
8ection ( of R: (7)7, and not wages in general as provided 'y the <a'or &ode. 2his
interpretation is not accepta'le. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in
interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole
law, as well as the intendment of the law, must 'e made. <egislative intent must 'e
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated
part or a particular provision alone.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, )5a, ,(a, ,(c, ,E'
:lfon v. Repu'lic
Case No. 6
G.R. No. L-112+1 (Ma0 29, 19.+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Bstrella
Heronica Primitiva *uterte to Bstrella :lfon.
2he reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the
followingF
1. 8he has 'een using the name Bstrella :lfon from infancy.
2. 8he has 'een enrolled from @rade school to &ollege in the same name.
3. :ll ac4uaintances "now her as Bstrella :lfon.
4. 8he e3ercised her right to suffrage under the same name.
I##%&$
.01 legitimate and legitimated children are re4uired to use the
surname of their father.
'&L($
1o. 2he word KprincipallyK as used in :rticle ,(9 is not e4uivalent to
Ke3clusivelyK so that there is no legal o'stacle if a legitimate or legitimated child
should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is e4ually entitled.
Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Bstrella Heronica
Primitiva :lfon *uterte to Bstrella :lfon
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 17, 9)a
Bspino v. &leofe
Case No. 1+2
G.R. No. L-3341+ (4/30 13, 1973)
Chapter :, Page 1.2, Footote No.21
F!C"#$
Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed 'y
1E Respondents for a !udicial declaration of their rights under R: 1E() as amended
'y R: 9/+) in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement
pension.
I##%&$
.01 the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June
17, 1/(7.
'&L($
1o. <oo"ing at the legislative intent through the e3planatory note the persons
referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after
June )), 1/57 'ut prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1/(7.
: contrary interpretation which would allow or authori#e retired military
personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would
virtually a'olish the essential distinction 'etween the two types of retirement 'enefits
and render the IoptionD under the law meaningless and nugatory.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, /a, )5a
Repu'lic Alour Mills, Inc v. &ommissioner of &ustoms
Case No$ 21.
G. R. No. L-2.4*3 (Ma0 31, 1971)
F!C"#$
2his is a petition for review of the decision of the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals in which
they found in 8ec. )E+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode.
Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the e3portation of 'ran ;ipa= and
pollard ;darak= under 8ec. )E+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode which statesF
There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the
Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for !harfage"
I##%&$
.01 the words products of the Philippines$ e3cludes 'ran and pollard on the
ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines.
'&L($
1o. Bven without undue scrutiny it does appear 4uite o'vious that as long as
the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the a'ove
section. 2he law is clearJ it must 'e o'eyed. 2he 2erm product of the Philippines$
should 'e ta"en in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the
countryJ hence, 'ran;ipa# and pollard;darak# produced from wheat imported into
the country are products of the Philippines.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (d, 7a, )9a, )9'
:siatic Petroleum &o. v. &ollector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 1+
G.R. No. 12*.7 (!/g/st 27, 191.)
F!C"#$
2he *efendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the
Internal Revenue 2a3 provided for under 8ec. 17 of :ct 1o. )9,) upon all such oils
which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1
st
day of January, 1/15. 2he ta3 was paid
under protest. 2he Plaintiff contends that the ta3 collected was illegal. 8ec. 17 Par 7)a
of :ct 1o. )9,) provides that no ta3 ;imposed 'y this law= shall 'e collected on such
articles which, 'efore the ta"ing effect of this :ct, shall have 'een disposed of to
consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.$ 8aid :ct too"
effect upon the 1
st
day of January, 1/15.
I##%&$
.01 a dealer is re4uired to pay the Internal Revenue 2a3, provided for under
8ec. 17 Par 7)a of :ct 1o. )9,), upon mineral oils, composed of "erosene and
gasoline which had 'een sold, 'ut not delivered, prior to the 1
st
day of January 1/15.
'&L($
1o. 2he <egislature evidently intended, 'y said phrase, to mean that
merchandise dispose of$ had 'een sold. 2he <egislature, 'y :ct 1o. )995, fully
recogni#ed that the phrase disposed of$ meant nothing more or less than a
contract where'y the vendor was 'ound to furnish an article, 'ecause in said :ct it
provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was su'!ect to pay such ta3 in the
a'sence of stipulations to the contrary. 2he phrase disposed of$ as used in 8ec. 17 of
:ct 1o. )9,), should 'e given its commercial sense and not a technical
interpretation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
$, %c, &a, 9,
.il .ilhemsen, Inc v. >aluyut
Case No. 173
G.R. Nos. L-2731+-11 (Ma0 11, 197.)
F!C"#$
Bmpty cargo vans were used 'y Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale
storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of
Manila among others. :fter the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo
vans had 'een emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de 8an
Arancisco 8talag. 2he *efendant applied to the 8urveyor of Port for the transfer of
these empty sea vans. 2he re4uest was 'ased on the Memorandum 7rder 1o. 1/
and the Memorandum 7rder dated :pril )+, 1/(9. 2he trial court held that the
transfer of :ppellantsD empty cargo vans to the warehouse of :ppellee was done 'y
authority of &ustoms Memorandum of :pril )+, 1/(9 and &ustoms :dministrative
7rder 1o. ))%(9, and that the said o'!ects were lawfully detained 'y :ppellee in his
warehouse pending the payment of storage charges.
I##%&$
.01 the decision of the trial court is legally valid.
'&L($
-es. :s plainly worded in the administrative order, it 'ecomes necessary for all
empty sea vans to 'e removed from the pier premises 'y their owners or shipping
agents within ten days after the vans have 'een completely emptied of all their
contents. 2his is in order to ma"e availa'le at all times ade4uate space in all ports for
the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no
re4uirement similar to that found in Memorandum 7rder 1o. 1,+%(, where'y the
owners of the impounded vans should 'e notified in writing. 2he two customs
regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as 'oth operate under the
fle3i'le cargo system.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )5a, ,), ,5, ,Ea, 5+
&alder M &o v. 2he 6nited 8tates
Case No. 44
G.R. No. 2.39 (!/g/st 11, 19+7)
Chapter :, Page 1.7, Footote No.4*
F!C"#F
2he following were imported into the Philippines K7ne steam tur'ine,
condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessoriesK
the steam tur'ine was classified under Par )57' as other machinery and detached
parts not otherwise provided forK. 2he trial court reversed the classification made 'y
customs authorities and classified it under Par )5+ as K*ynamos, generators, e3citers,
and all other machinery for the generation of power.K
I##%&$
.01 the machinery in 4uestion should 'e classified under Par )57' or Par )5+.
'&L(F
: tur'ine engine and generator, although intended for use as a power%
generating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine.
&omponent parts must still 'e added for that purpose to 'e achieved it should 'e
classified as Kother machineryK under Par )57'.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', /c, )5a, 9,
Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o v. Ramos
Case No. 1*3
G. R. No. L-42*. (4a/ar0 1., 1911)
Chapter :, Page 1.., Footote No.11
F!C"#F
Respondent filed a li'el suit, doc"eted as &ivil &ase 1o. 115,1, against
:proniano @. >orres, Pedro Padilla and <oreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and
reporter, respectively, of the *aily Record, a daily newspaper, as"ing damages
aggregating P/+,+++. .ith the filing of this suit, the Plaintiff secured a writ of
preliminary attachment upon putting up a P5+,+++ 'ond. 2he 8heriff of the &ity of
Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing e4uipment found in
the premises of the *aily Record. Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o., Inc. and Printers, Inc.
commenced a !oint suit against the sheriff, Respondent Suirino and Respondent
&orporation, in which the former sought ;1= to en!oin the defendants from
proceeding with the attachment of the properties a'ove mentioned and ;)= P95,+++
damages. 2his suit was doc"eted as &ivil &ase 1o. 1))(,. Respondent Judge
declared that the suit, in case 1o. 1))(,, was Kunnecessary, superfluous and illegalK
and so dismissed the same. He held that what Manila Herald Pu'lishing &o., Inc., and
Printers, Inc., should do was intervene in &ase 1o. 115,1.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss &ase 1o. 1))(, at the stage
when it was thrown out of court.
'&L($
-es, the right to intervene, unli"e the right to 'ring a new action, is not
a'solute 'ut left to the sound discretion of the court to allow.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )5a, ,+, ,(a, ,('
Malanyaon v. <ising et. al
Case No. 1*+
GR No. L-1*+2. (4/30 3+,19.1)
Chapter :, Page 1.., Footote No.12
F!C"#$
: Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of R: ,+1/ ;:nti @raft and
&orrupt Practices :ct=. He was suspended from office 'ut he died during his
incum'ency, and while the case was pending. 2he case was dismissed due to his
death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension
pursuant to 8ec 1, of R: ,+1/ which provides, 'hould he be convicted by final
(udgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any la!, but if he is
ac)uitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits !*c
he failed to receive during suspension"+
I##%&$
.01 the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes
ac4uittal.
'&L($
1o. It is o'vious that when the statute spea"s of the suspended officer 'eing
Kac4uittedK it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
against him the court found that his guilt has not 'een proven 'eyond reasona'le
dou't. *ismissal of the case is not e4ual to ac4uittal of the accused. In People vs.
8alico ;E9 Phil. 7))=, K :c4uittal is always 'ased on the merits 'ut dismissal does not
decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )5a
Rura v. <opena
Case No. 139
G. R. No. L-*9.1+-14 (4/e 19, 19.1)
Chapter 1, Page 1.9, Footote No.13
F!C"#F
Petitioner was accused, tried and convicted of five ;5= counts of estafa
committed on different dates. 2he counts were consolidated and tried !ointly. 7nly a
single decision was rendered. 2he Petitioner then applied for pro'ation 'ut was
denied 'y the fiscal on the ground that he had 'een previously convicted 'y final
!udgment of an offense. 2he fiscal invo"ed 8ec. / of the Pro'ation <aw, which
dis4ualifies persons who have previously 'een convicted 'y final !udgment from
applying for pro'ation. 2he trial court denied his application on the 'elief that since
the crimes were committed on different dates, he was guilty on each of those dates.
Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision, he has not yet
'een previously convicted.
I##%&$
How should the word previously$ 'e construedQ
'&L($
2he word previously$ refers to the date of the conviction and not to the
dates of the crimes involved. :lthough he was guilty of five counts of estafa, they
were tried !ointly and only one decision was handed down. Hence, when Petitioner
applied for Pro'ation he had not yet had a final !udgment of conviction on his
record. He is eligi'le for pro'ation under such circumstances.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 9E
Oriven"o v. Register of *eeds
Case No. 139
G.R. No. L-3*+ (No8e6-er 11, 1947)
Chapter 1, Page 19+, Footote No.*+
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an alien, 'ought a residential lot 'ut its registration was interrupted
'y the war. In 1/95, he sought to accomplish the registration 'ut was denied 'y the
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot ac4uire land in this
!urisdiction. Petitioner 'rought the case to the &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila which
ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds.
I##%&$
.01 residential land$ falls under the phrase agricultural lands$ as stated in :rticle
GIII of the 1/,5 &onstitution.
'&L($
6nder the &onstitution, aliens may not ac4uire private or pu'lic agricultural
lands, which includes residential lands. It may safely 'e presumed that what the
mem'ers of the &onstitutional &onvention had in mind when they drafted the
&onstitution was this well%"nown classification and its technical meaning then
prevailing. 8oon after, the 1ational :ssem'ly revised the Pu'lic <and <aw and passed
&.:. 1o. 191 which permits the sale of residential lots to Ailipino citi#ens or to
corporations controlled 'y such citi#ens. 8uch revision is e4uivalent to a declaration
that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for under the &onstitution,
only agricultural lands may 'e alienated. In addition, the interpretation given 'y the
8ecretary of Justice ;1/,/= also supports the claim that residential land$ is part of
pu'lic agricultural lands$.
It is clear that the three 'ranches of the @overnment have always maintained that
residential lots$ are included in agricultural lands$. If the term Kprivate agricultural
landsK is to 'e construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would not 'e in line with the conservative spirit of the &onstitution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, )a, 5a, /a, )5a, ,+a, '
&hang -ung Aa, et al. v. @ian#on, etc. and *e la &ru#, etc.
Case No. 19
G.R. No. L-77.1 (No8e6-er 21, 1911)
F!C"#$
Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre%arranged employment as
immigrants under &.:. 1o. (1, with the e3press condition that their stay shall 'e
limited to two years. :n amendatory law was then passed which changes the
classification of pre%arranged employees from immigrants to non%immigrants.
Petitioners contend that having 'een classified as non%4uota immigrants$, they
should have 'een admitted for permanent residence in this country 'ecause the
word immigrant$ is defined to 'e a person who comes into a country for a
permanent residence.
I##%&$
.01 the word immigrant$ only refers to a person who comes into a country
for a permanent residence.
'&L($
2he only definition given 'y our law to the term KimmigrantK isF Kany alien
departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other
than a nonimmigrant.K 2he law gives no definition to the term KnonimmigrantK from
which we may imply that the term KimmigrantK is merely intended to include any alien
coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended 'y appellants. :
review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the
purpose of the law is to give 'road power to the &ommissioner of Immigration on
matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', /a, ,('
@arcia v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 1+9
G.R. No. 111111 (,cto-er 1, 1993)
Chapter :, Footote No.*7, Page No. 192
F!C"#$
In its Pam'ayang Oapasyahan >lg. 1+, 8erye 1//,, the 8angguniang >ayan ng
Morong, >ataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the
8u'ic 8pecial Bconomic Pone in accord with Repu'lic :ct 1o. 7))7. Respondent
&ommission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum
on the ground that its su'!ect is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. It
contends through the 7ffice of the 8olicitor @eneral that under the <ocal
@overnment &ode of 1//1, a resolution cannot 'e the su'!ect of a local initiative.
2he same is 'eing asserted 'y the respondent 8angguniang >ayan ng Morong.
I##%&$
.01 a local resolution of a municipal council can 'e the su'!ect of an
initiative and referendum.

'&L($
2he petition to review and set aside the issued &7MB<B& resolutions is
granted 'ecause resolutions are appropriate su'!ects for initiative and referendum
;8ec. ,) of :rt. HI of the &onstitution=. :lso, R: (7,5, the law providing for a system on
initiative and referendum, includes resolutions as among the su'!ects of initiative.
:lthough the <ocal @overnment &ode does not include the word resolution in its
definition, the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local
initiatives to ordinances alone. Resolutions are still proper su'!ects of an initiative
according to the &onstitution and R: (7,5.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, /c, 11a, 5+
Motoomull v. dela Pa#
Case No. 1.+
G.R. No. L-413+2 (4/30 24, 199+)
Chapter :, Footote No.73, Page No. 191
F!C"#$
2he Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the 8ar"ara
2rading &orporation. 2he &orporation issued a resolution authori#ing the issuance of
unissued stoc"s on a one is to one 'asis to its stoc"holders. 2he resolution was then
amended authori#ing the issuance of unissued shares of stoc" on a two is to one 'asis
to its stoc"holders paya'le on :ug. ,1, 1/79. Petitioner sought issuance of a
preliminary in!unction 'y the &ourt of :ppeals to stop the enforcement of the 8B&
decision pending resolution of the appeal. 2he &ourt however held that it had no
!urisdiction according to R: 59,9 which readsF :ppeal shall not stay the award, order,
ruling, decision or !udgment unless the officer or 'ody rendering the same or the
court, on motion, after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem !ust, should
provide otherwise. 2he propriety of a stay granted 'y the officer or 'ody rendering
the award, order, ruling, decision or !udgment may 'e raised only 'y motion in the
main case.
I##%&$
1. .01 the word court$ refers to a trial court and not the &ourt of :ppeals
). .01 the &ourt of :ppeals can grant a stay in the e3ecution of the decision.

'&L($
-es, the word court refers to the trial court. 2he law une4uivocally stated its
declared o'!ection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision, award, order.$
2he e3ception is given where the officer or 'ody rendering the same, or the court on
motion, after hearing should provide otherwise. 2he law provides further that the
propriety of a stay granted 'y the officer or 'ody rendering the award, order,
decision or ruling may 'e raised only 'y motion in the main case. More importantly
where a particular word or phrase is am'iguous in itself or is e4ually suscepti'le of
various meanings, its o'scurity or dou't may 'e reviewed 'y reference to associate
words. :ccordingly, an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must 'e
re!ected as not in accordance with the legislative intent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 1)a, ,(a
People v. 1a#ario
Case No. 21.
G.R. No. L-44143 (!/g/st 31, 19..)
Chapter :, Footote No..1, Page No. 197
F!C"#$
:ccused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance re4uiring him to
pay municipal ta3es worth P,().5) as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated
demands. 8ec. 1 7rdinance 1o. 9 8eries of 1//5 providesF :ny owner or manager of
fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pag'ilao, Sue#on, shall pay a
municipal ta3 in the amount of P,.++ per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per
annum.$ He admits to the non%payment of the ta3es 'ut contends that the
ordinance is unconstitutional, or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to
him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager.
I##%&$
1. .01 the ordinance is null and void 'ecause it is am'iguous and uncertain.
). .01 the ordinance applies to :ccused.

'&L($
1o, the ordinance is constitutional. In no way may the ordinance at 'ar 'e said
to 'e tainted with vagueness. It is unmista"a'le from the a'ove provision that the
:ccused falls within the coverage. :s the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes
within the term manager$. .hile it appears that the 1ational @overnment is the
owner of the fishpond, the @overnment never shared in the profits they generated. It
is therefore, logical that :ccused alone shoulders the 'urden of the ta3es under the
ordinance. :nd o'viously, the word owner cannot 'e construed to include the
@overnment 'ecause of the ancient principle that the government is immune from
ta3es.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (c, ,7
People v. Bvangelista
Case No. 1+*
G.R. No. .4332-33 (Ma0 ., 199*)
F!C"#F
Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide.
Private Respondent filed a petition for pro'ation. However, &hief Pro'ation and
Parole 7fficer recommended denial of Private respondentDs application for
pro'ation on the ground that 'y appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already
waived his right to ma"e his application for pro'ation. 2he R2& set aside the
Pro'ation 7fficerDs recommendation and granted Private RespondentDs application
on :pril ),, 1//,.
I##%&$
.01 the Respondent Judge committed a grave a'use of discretion 'y
granting private respondentDs application for pro'ation.
'&L($
-es. Private Respondent filed his application for pro'ation on *ecem'er )E,
1//), after P* 1//+ had ta"en effect. It is thus covered 'y the prohi'ition that no
application for pro'ation shall 'e entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the !udgment of conviction$ and that the filing of the
application shall 'e deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.$ Having appealed from
the !udgment of the trial court and applied for pro'ation only after the &ourt of
:ppeals had affirmed his conviction, Private Respondent was clearly precluded from
the 'enefits of pro'ation.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(, )(, 9/
>anco de 7ro 8avings and Mortgage >an" v. B4uita'le >an"ing &orporation
Case No. 12
G.R. No. 74917 (4a/ar0 2+, 19..)
F!C"#F
Respondent >an" filed a case against Petitioner >an" for reim'ursement of
P95,/E).), as a conse4uence of si3 crossed ManagerDs chec"s which turned out to
have forged and0or unauthori#ed endorsements appearing at the 'ac" of each
chec". Philippine &learing House &orp. ;P&H&= ordered Petitioner >an" to pay the
said amount. Petitioner >an" appealed saying that P&H& had no !urisdiction
'ecause the chec"s involved were non%negotia'le chec"s.
I##%&F
.01 P&H& had !urisdiction over chec"s which are non%negotia'le.
'&L($
-es. :s provided in the articles of incorporation of P&H&, its operation e3tends
to clearing chec"s and other clearing items.$ &learly, the term chec"s$ refer to
chec"s in general use in commercial and 'usiness activities, including non%
negotia'le chec"s. 1o dou't non%negotia'le chec"s are within the am'it of P&H&Ds
!urisdiction.
2here should 'e no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated for courts are not authori#ed to distinguish where the law ma"es no
distinction. 2hey should instead administer the law not as they thin" it ought to 'e 'ut
as they find it and without regard to conse4uences.
L!"IN M!)IMF
)9a, )9', )5a, )5', )(
Ro'les v. Pam'ales &hromite Mining &o., et. al.
Case No. 2*1
G.R. No. L-121*+ (#epte6-er 3+, 191.)
Chapter :, Page 199, Footote No.9+
F!C"#F
Petitioner and Respondent &ompany entered into a contract 'y virtue of
which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it
had control to Petitioner who was to e3tract, mine and sell ores from said properties
upon payment of certain royalties. 6pon violation of the terms of agreement, the
company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without !urisdiction in
ta"ing cogni#ance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land.
I##%&F
.01 8ec. 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of &ourt includes any "ind of land, including
mineral lands.
'&L(F
-es. :ny land spo"en of in this provision o'viously includes all "inds of land,
whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well "nown ma3im in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
L!"IN M!)IMF
)9a, )(
Helasco v. <ope#
Case No. 3+.
G.R. No. 9+1 (Fe-r/ar0 12, 19+3)
F!C"#$
8antiago Helasco died in 1amacpacan, <a 6nion on *ecem'er 9, 1E/5,
leaving a last will and testament. 2he Plaintiff see"s to declare such will void on
several grounds, most importantly that the hour is not stated.
I##%&$
.01 the will of 8antiago Helasco is void 'ecause the hour of its e3ecution is
not stated.
'&L($
-es. >oo" III, 2itle II, &hapter I, :rticle (/5 and (E7 of the civil &ode e3plicitly
states that said wills without necessary formalities will 'e voidF
2he testator shall e3press his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. :fter the
testament has 'een drafted in accordance with the same, stating the place, year,
month, day and hour of its e3ecution its shall 'e read aloud,$ ;art (/5=
:ny will, in the e3ecution of which the formalities respectively esta'lished in
this chapter have not 'een o'served, shall 'e void.$ ;art (E7=
2he law e3plicitly defines what shall consist in open wills ;art (/5= and what the
sanctions shall 'e if such formalities arenDt met. ;art (E7=
It was stated that if the decision would 'e in favor of the *efendant
;overloo"ing the a'sence of the hour= the &ourt may disregard one formality after
another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system esta'lished 'y the
code.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(d, 7a
&olgate%Palmolive Phil, Inc v. @imene#
Case No. *7
G.R. No. L-147.7 (4a/ar0 2., 19*1)
F!C"#$
Petitioner &orporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
household remedies. Importation of materials including sta'ili#ers and flavors$ is
among those Petitioner imports. Aor every importation, Petitioner pays the &entral
>an" of the Philippines 17C special e3cise ta3 on the foreign e3change used for the
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to R: (+1, the
B3change 2a3 <aw. 6nder such law, it was also provided thatF
Aoreign e3changed used for the payment of cost, transportation and0or other
charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of ? sta'ili#er and flavors ?
shall 'e refunded to any importer ma"ing application therefore.$
2he petitioner therefore see"s a refund of the 17C special e3cise ta3
I##%&$
.01 the imports of dental cream sta'ili#ers and flavors$ are su'!ect to a 17C
transportation ta3 e3emption under the B3change 2a3 <aw.
'&L($
1o. 2he refusal to deny refund was 'ased on the following argumentF
:ll the items enumerated for the ta3 e3emption fall under one specific class, namelyF
food products, 'oo"s supplies0 materials and medical supplies. 2he sta'ili#ers and
flavors$ the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food
products. >ecause such items will 'e used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and
therefore not su'!ect to e3emption
PetitionerDs arguments effected the grant of the refundF
R: (+1 does not categori#e the e3ceptions as stated a'ove. 2hough sta'ili#ers and
flavors$ are preceded 'y items that might fall under food products, the following
which were included are hardly suchF fertili#er, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate,
cattle, and industrial starch.
2herefore, the law must 'e seen in its entire conte3t, not the parts and
categori#ations posited 'y the respondent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)(, )/, ,(
7liva v. <amadrid
Case No. 191
G.R. No. L-2319* (,cto-er 31, 19*9)
Chapter :, Page 2++, Footote No.9*
F!C"#$
Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for
the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan, the property
was foreclosed and sold to Respondent. However, under R: 7)+, the land could 'e
redeemed two ;)= years after the sale, Ae'. 9 1/(,. 1o redemption was made within
that time. 7n May ,1 1/(,, Plaintiff offered to repurchase, claiming that under &.:.
1o. 191, he was entitled to repurchase the land, not two ;)=, 'ut five ;5= years after
the title was sold 'ecause he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title.
I##%&$
.01 the period of redemption is governed 'y 8ec. 11/ of &.:. 1o. 191 of 8ec.
5 of R: 7)+.
'&L($
1o. Petitioner, as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a
torrens title, is not included in those enumerated in R: (+1 and therefore not su'!ect
to the two ;)= year allotment for redemption.
In July ,+, 1/51, the &ourt had already decided that 8ec. 11/ of &.:. 1o. 191
is applica'le to foreclosure sales of lands covered 'y a homestead or a free patentJ
therefore, the plaintiff may use its provision of five ;5= years.
.here the general law is the &ommonwealth :ct and the specific law is the
Repu'lic :ct, they should 'e unified, and should a'ide 'y the conditions of the
times.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, ,+a, ,Ea, ,/a, &,, b, b
Bscosura v. 8an Miguel >rewery, Inc.
Case No. 1++
G.R. No. L-1**9* 9 L-1*7+2 (4a/ar0 31, 19*2)
Chapter :, Page 2++, Footote No.97
F!C"#$
Petitioners are employees of 8an Respondent &orporation who at various
times during employment, fell ill. 2hey were given sic" leave pay pursuant to its
Health, .elfare and Retirement Plan. *espite receipt of the sic" leave pay from
Respondent &orporation, the employees claimed for sic"ness 'enefit allowances
under the 8ocial 8ecurity :ct contending that their receipt of sic" leave pay of less
than the full !age does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances
provided in the law. Respondent &orporation countered that having already
received sic" leave pay, they cannot claim 'enefits under the 8ocial 8ecurity :ct as
these are e3clusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the
employer.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioners were entitled to additional sic"ness 'enefit allowance under
the 8ocial 8ecurity :ct.
'&L($
2o uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as
sic" leave pay 'y a private 'enefit plan, the employee cannot avail of the privileges
under the 8ocial 8ecurity :ct, would 'e to ena'le the employer to defeat the
purpose of the law. 2he 8ocial 8ecurity :ct, having 'een enacted for the welfare of
the employees, cannot 'e given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)(, )', ,a, ,E'
Philippine >ritish :ssurance v. Intermediate :ppelate &ourt
Case No. 234
G.R. No. L-72++1 (Ma0 29, 19.7)
Chapter 1, Page 2++, Footote No.99
F!C"#$
8ycwin &oatingM .ires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money
against Harian Industrial &orporation. *uring the pendency, Respondent attached
some of the properties of Harian Industrial &orp upon the posting of a supersedes
'ond. 2he latter in turn posted a counter 'ond through Petitioner so the attached
properties were released. 8ycwin filed a petition for e3ecution pending appeal
against the properties of Harian, which was granted. However, the writ of e3ecution
was returned unsatisfied as Harian failed to deliver the previously attached personal
properties upon demand. 8ycwin prayed that Petitioner &orporation 'e ordered to
pay the value of its 'ond which was granted.
I##%&$
.01 the counter 'ond issued was valid.
'&L(F
2he counter 'ond was issued in accordance with 8ec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules
of &ourt. 1either the rules nor provisions of the counter 'ond limited its application to
a final and e3ecutory !udgment. It appllies to the payment of any !udgment that may
'e recovered 'y Plaintiff. 2he only logical conclusion is that an e3ecution of any
!udgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may 'e charged
against such counter 'ond. 2he rule therefore, is that the counter 'ond to life
attachment shall 'e charged with the payment of any !udgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and e3ecutory !udgment 'ut also the e3ecution
of a !udgment of pending appeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)9a, )(, ,(a
Ramire# v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 211
G.R. No. L-1**9* 9 L-1*7+2 (4a/ar0 31, 19*2)
Chapter 1, Page 2+1 , Footote No.1++
F!C"#F
: civil case was filed 'y Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a
confrontation in the latterDs office allegedly ve3ed, insulted and humiliated him.
Petitioner produced a ver'atim transcript of the event to support her claim. 2he act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 2hus, respondent and filed a criminal
case.
I##%&$
.01 the facts charged against him constituted an offense.
'&L(F
2he law ma"es it illegal for any person, not authori#ed 'y all the parties in any
private communication to secretly record such communication 'y means of a tape
recorder. 2he law ma"es no distinction as to whether the party sought to 'e
penali#ed 'y the statute ought to 'e a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. 2he statuteLs intent to penali#e all persons
unauthori#ed to ma"e such recording is underscored 'y the use of the 4ualifier KanyK.
.here the law ma"es no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, 7a, /a, 11a, )9a, >)
Pilar v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 242
G. R. No. 111241 (4/30 11, 1991)
Chapter 1, Page 2+1, Footote No.1++
F!C"#$
7n March )), 1//), Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of mem'er of the 8angguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isa'ela. 2hree days
later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. :s a result, Respondent &ommission
imposed a fine of P1+,+++ pesos for failure to file his statement of contri'utions and
e3penditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.
I##%&:
.01 Petitioner can 'e held lia'le for failure to file a statement of contri'utions
and e3penditures since he was a non%candidate$, having withdrawn his certificate
of candidacy three days after its filing.
'&L($
-es. 8ec. 19 of R: 71(( states that every candidate$ has the o'ligation to file
his statement of contri'utions and e3penditures. :s the law ma"es no distinction or
4ualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term every candidate$ must 'e deemed to refer not only to a candidate
who pursued his campaign, 'ut also to one who withdrew his candidacy. 8ec. 1, of
Resolution 1o. ),9E categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificate
of candidacy$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )(, ,7, ')
8anciangco v. RoRo
Case No. 273
G. R. No. *.7+9 (4/30 19, 19.1)
Chapter 1, Page 2+3 , Footote No.1+*
F!C"#$
Petitioner was elected as >arangay &aptain. <ater, he was elected President
of the :ssociation of >arangay &ouncils ;:>&= of 7#ami# &ity 'y the >oard of
*irectors of the said :ssociation. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his &ertificate of
&andidacy for the May 19, 1/E9 elections for Misamis 7ccidental under the 'anner
of the Mindanao alliance. He was not successful in the said elections.
I##%&$
.01 an appointive mem'er of the 8angguniang Panglungsod, who ran for
the position of Mam'a'atas Pam'ansa in the elections of May 19, 1/E9, should 'e
considered as resigned or on forced leave of a'sence upon filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
'&L(:
2he legislative intent of 8ec. 1,;)= of >P (/7 is clear that even appointive
>arangay officials are deemed also covered 'y the said provision. 8ince he is
un4uestiona'ly an appointive mem'er, he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to
'e such mem'er when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1/E9 >atasan
elections.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, /c, )E, ,('
Bastern 8hipping <ines, Inc. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 3.
G. R. No. 11*31* (4/e 29, 199.)
F!C"#$
*avao Pilots :ssociation elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of
money and attorneyDs fees alleging that *P: had rendered the pilotage services to
Petitioner 'etween January 19, 1/E7 to July )), 1/E/ with total unpaid fees of
P7+,,)/+.1E. *espite repeated demands, Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the
latter 'e directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaintJ attorneyDs fees e4uivalent to )5C of the principal o'ligation.
I##%&$
.01 B7 1+EE is unconstitutional.
'&L($
1o. In Philippine Interisland 8hipping :ssociation of the Philippines v. &ourt of
:ppeals, the court upheld the validity of B7 1+EE and it shall not depart from this
ruling. 2he &ourtDs holding clearly de'un"s PetitionerDs insistence on paying the
pilotage fees 'ased on the memorandum circulars issued 'y the PP:. :dministrative
or B3ecutive :cts, 7rders and Regulations shall 'e valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the &onstitution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 5a, /a, ,7 9/
&astillo%&o v. >ar'ers
Case No.
G.R. No. 129912 (4/e 1*, 199.)
F!C"#$
&ongressman Junie &ua filed a complaint 'efore the 7ffice of the
7m'udsman against @overnor &astillo%&o and Provincial Bngineer Hirgilio Ringor
alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy e4uipment 'y the @overnor and
Provincial Bngineer. 2he items purchased were reconditioned$ instead of 'rand new
and included other irregularities. Bmilio :. @on#ales III, *irector, and Jesus @uerrero,
*eputy 7m'udsman for <u#on, placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension
for ( months. Petitioners contest that the *eputy 7m'udsman has no power to sign
the order of preventive suspension.
I##%&$
.01 the deputy 7m'udsman possessed the authority to sign the order for
preventive suspension.
'&L($
-es. 2he deputy 7m'udsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend
the Petitioners. 2here is nothing in R: 7/75 which may suggest that the 7m'udsman
and only the 7m'udsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials
occupying positions classified as grade )7 or a'ove. 2he word or$ is clearly
dis!unctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a
People v. Martin
Case No. 214
G.R. No. L-334.7 (Ma0 31, 1971)
Chapter 1, Page 2+4, Footote No.11+
F!C"#$
Respondents were charged with violating 8ec. 9( of &.:. 1o. (1, or the
Philippine Immigration :ct 'y the &ourt of Airst Instance of <a 6nion, specifically in the
act of 'ringing in and landing. 2he &ourt dismissed the charges on the ground of it
'eing a continuous offense with &riminal &ase ()5E%M filed in >ulacan against other
Respondents who were concealing and har'oring the same &hinese Immigrants who
were 'rought in therefore they had no !urisdiction.
I##%&$
.01 the act of 'ringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with
concealing and har'oring.
'&L($
1o. 2hey are two separate offenses.
&.:. 1o. (1, clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.
Bach act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. 2he word 7R
in &.:. 1o. (1, cannot 'e given a non%dis!unctive meaning signifying the separation
of one act from the other. 2he words in the information suggesting conspiracy are
considered a mere surplusage.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, ,7, 15'
@M&R v. >ell 2elecommunications Inc.
Case No. 49
G.R. No. 12*49* (!pr23 3+, 1997)
F!C"#$
12& &ommissioner Ointanar denied the re4uest of >ell 2elecommunications
for a &ertificate of Pu'lic &onvenience and 1ecessity for the installation of
telecommunications e4uipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate.
2he denial was promulgated despite the approval of the &&:* of its feasi'ility and
the endorsement of *eputy &ommissioners Aidelo S. *umlao and &onsuelo Pere#.
I##%&$
.hether the 12& is a collegial 'ody or under the direct and sole control of
&ommissioner Ointanar.
'&L($
2he 12& is a collegial 'ody and its decisions should 'e reached 'y a ma!ority
vote. B3ecutive 7rder 19( creating the 12& clearly shows that the 12& shall 'e
composed of a head commissioner and ) deputy commissioners suggesting its
collegial nature. 2herefore the acts of &hairman Ointanar are void a' initio for 'eing
una'ashedly contrary to law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 15a, )9a
Magta!as v. Pryce Properties &orp., Inc.
Case No. 11.
G.R. No. 111+97 (4/30 2+, 1994)
Chapter :, Page 2+., Footote No. 13+
F!C"#$
P:@&7R, created 'y P.*. 1E/(, leased a 'uilding 'elonging to Pryce in order
to prepare to open a casino in &agayan de 7ro &ity. Harious civic organi#ations,
religious elements, womenDs and youth groups, and even the local officials angrily
denounced the pro!ect. 2he 8angguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two
ordinances disallowing the 'uilding of the planned casino. Petitioners argue that 'y
virtue of the <ocal @overnment &ode ;<@&=, the 8angguniang Panlungsod may
prohi'it the operation of casinos 'y passing ordinances to protect the general
welfare of their citi#ens from the harmful effects of gam'ling.
I##%&$
.01 the two ordinances as enacted 'y the 8angguniang Panlungsod of
&agayan de 7ro are valid.
'&L($
2he two local ordinances are not valid. In >asco v. Phil. :musements and
@aming &orp., this &ourt sustained the constitutionality of the decree. 6nder the
<@&, local government units are authori#ed to prevent or suppress gam'ling and
other prohi'ited games of chance.$ 8ince the world gam'ling$ should 'e read as
referring to only illegal gam'ling which, li"e the other prohi'ited games of chance,
must 'e prevented or suppressed. 7n the assumption of a conflict 'etween P.*. 1E(/
and the <@&, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other 'ut to give
effect to 'oth 'y harmoni#ing them if possi'le. &asino gam'ling is authori#ed 'y P.*.
1E(/. 2his decree has the status of a statute that cannot 'e amended or nullified 'y
a mere ordinance.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, /c, 11e, )E, ,7, ,E, 5+
&ommissioner of &ustoms v. Philippine :cetylene &ompany
Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-22443 (Ma0 29, 1971)
Chapter :, Page 21+, Footote No. 131
F!C"#$
&harles >utler, manager of Respondent &ompany, imported a custom%'uilt
<P@ tan" which is used to contain <P@ from the refinery in >atangas and to transport
it to the companyDs plant in Manila. R: 1,/9 provides a ta3 e3emption for the
importation of machinery and0or raw materials to 'e used 'y new and necessary
industries as determined in accordance with R: /+1. 2he 2a3 &ourt held that the term
industry should 'e understood in its ordinary and general definition, which is any
enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and0or la'or.
I##%&$
.01 the Philippine :cetylene &o., Inc. may 'e considered engaged in an
industry as contemplated in 8ec. ( of R: 1,/9 and therefore e3empt from the
payment of the special import ta3 with respect to the gas tan" in 4uestion.
'&L($
Philippine :cetylene is not e3empt from the special import ta3. 2a3
e3emptions are held strictly against the ta3payer. 2he o'vious legislative intent is to
confine the meaning of the term industries$ to activities that tend to produce or
create or manufacture, and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary
and general definition. In granting the e3emption, it would have 'een illogical for
&ongress to specify importations needed 'y new and necessary industries as the
term is defined 'y law and in the same 'reath allowed a similar e3emption to all
other industries in general.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, 11a, 11d, )E, 9,
People v. 8antiago
Case No. 224
G.R. No. L-17**3 (Ma0 3+, 19*2)
Chapter :, Page 13*, Footote No. 211
F!C"#$
2he information alleges that 8antiago has committed the crime of Kli'el.K 2he
accused delivered false, malicious, and highly defamatory statements against Mayor
<acson through an amplifier system 'efore a crowd of around a hundred persons.
*efendant moved to 4uash this information upon the ground that the crime charged
therein is not li'el 'ut oral defamation.
I##%&$
.hether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under :rt.
,5E of the Revised Penal &ode, or li'el, under :rt. ,55, in relation to :rt. ,5,, of the
same &ode.
'&L($
2he facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation.
2he word KradioK should 'e considered in relation to the terms with which it is
associated, all of which have a common characteristic, namely, their permanent
nature as a means of pu'lication, and this e3plains the graver penalty for li'el than
that prescri'ed for oral defamation. Radio as a means of pu'lication is the
transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
intervening 'etween transmitter and receiver, while transmission of words 'y means
of an amplifier system is not thru Kelectromagnetic wavesK 'ut thru the use of
Kconducting wiresK intervening 'etween the transmitter and the receiver. It has also
'een held in the 6nited 8tates that slanderous statements forming part of a
manuscript read 'y a spea"er over the radio constitute li'el.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11h, )5a, )E, ')
&alte3 ;Phil.=, Inc. v. Palomar
Case No. 41
G.R. No. 19*1+ (#epte6-er 29, 19**)
Chapter :, Page 137, Footote No. 211
F!C"#$
Petitioner conceived the &alte3 Hooded Pump &ontest$ where participants
have to estimate the actual num'er of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense
during a specific period of time. 2here was no fee or consideration re4uired to 'e
paid, nor any purchase of any &alte3 products to 'e made in order to !oin the
contest. Aoreseeing the e3tensive use of mail for advertising and communications,
&alte3 re4uested clearance for Respondent Postmaster @eneral 'ut was denied
citing said contest is a gift enterprise$ deemed as a non%maila'le matter under the
anti%lottery provisions of the Postal <aw. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
declaratory relief.
I##%&$
.01 the &alte3 Hooded Pump &ontest$ falls under the term gift enterprise$
which is 'anned 'y the Postal <aw.
'&L($
1o, said contest is not a gift enterprise. 2he word lottery$ is defined as a
game of chance where the elements of which are ;1= consideration, ;)= chance,
and ;,= pri#e. 2he term gift enterprise$ and scheme$ in the provision of the Postal
<aw ma"ing unmaila'le any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the distri'ution of
money or any real or personal property 'y lot, chance, or drawing of any "ind$
means such enterprise as will re4uire consideration as an element. 2he intent of the
prohi'ition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gam'ling spirit and to corrupt
pu'lic morals. 2here 'eing no element of consideration in said contest, the spirit of
the law is preserved.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )E
8an Miguel &orp. v. 1<R&
Case No. 272
G.R. No. .+774 (Ma0 31, 19..)
Chapter :, Page 211, Footote No. 13.
F!C"#$
Petitioner &orporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded
cash to 8M& employees who will su'mit ideas and suggestions 'eneficial to the
corporation. Rustico Hega su'mitted his proposal entitled Modified @rande
Pasteuri#ation Process$ and claimed entitlement to the cash award. 8M& denied
utili#ing such proposal 'ut Hega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the
1<R& which ar'itrated against the Petitioner.
I##%&$
.01 the money claim of Hega falls within the !urisdiction of the la'or ar'iter
and the 1<R&.
'&L($
1o, said money claim falls outside the !urisdiction of said agencies. 2he
!urisdiction of the 1<R& is outlined in :rt. )17 of the <a'or &ode which includes in par.
, all money claims of wor"ers, including those 'ased on nonpayment or
underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other 'enefits
provided 'y law or appropriate agreement?$ .hile par. , refers to all money
claims of wor"ers,$ it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money
claims has 'een a'sor'ed into the !urisdiction of the 1<R&. Par. , should not 'e read
in isolation with the conte3t formed 'y par. 1 ;unfair la'or practices=, par. ) ;terms
and conditions of employment=, par. 9 ;household services=, par. 5 ;prohi'ited
activities=. 2he unifying element of pars. 1%5 is that they refer to cases or disputes
arising out of or in connection with an employer%employee relationship. 2he scope of
par. , is clarified 'y its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the
original and e3clusive !urisdiction of the 1<R& are those which have some reasona'le
causal connection with the employer%employee relationship.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)E, ,(', ,(e
@otiaco v. 6nion Ins. 8oc. 7f &amilon
Case No. 114
G.R. No. 139.3 (#epte6-er 1, 1919)
F!C"#$
2he @otiaco >rothers transported a cargo of rice from 8aigon to &e'u. 2he
rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage
'ecause of a defect in one of its drain pipes. Plaintiffs sought recovery from
*efendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo fromF Perils?
of the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, !ettisons,? 'arratry of
the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes?$ 2he trial
court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and *efendant is not lia'le. Plaintiffs
appealed hence this action.
I##%&$
.01 the insurer is lia'le for the loss.
'&L($
1o, the owners of the damaged rice must loo" to the shipowner for redress
and not to the insurer. 2he words all other perils, losses, and misfortunes$ are to 'e
interpreted as covering ris"s which are of li"e "ind with the particular ris"s which are
enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. : loss which, in the
ordinary course of events, results from the natural and inevita'le action of the sea,
from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship, or from the negligent failure of the shipDs
owner to provide the vessel with proper e4uipment to convey the cargo under the
ordinary condition is not a peril of the sea.$ 2he insurer underta"es to insure against
perils of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. It was found that the
cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargea'le with
negligence for failure to protect the pipe 'y putting a case over it. It was
appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)/
Pilipinas 8hell Petroleum &orporation v. 7il Industry &ommission
Case No. 122
G.R. No. L-41311 (No8e6-er 13, 19.*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner &orporation was contending that Respondent &ommission had no
!urisdiction over the contractual disputes 'etween them and a gasoline dealer in the
name of Manuel -ap.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent &ommission had !urisdiction over the contractual disputes.
'&L($
2he contention of the Petitioner is well founded. : detailed reading of the
entire 7I& :ct will say that there has not 'een an e3press provision providing for
disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company.
8ec ( of R.:. (17, restricts the e3tent and scope the 7I& prerogative of
!urisdiction in su' paragraph a to f.
.hat the law intend here is to 'e all em'racing to the !urisdictional power of
Respondent &ommission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot 'e presumed
or indicated. 2hus, the !urisdictional power should 'e restricted to mere regulatory
and supervisory power and not !udicial. 2he phrase, $to set the conditions$ means the
right to prescri'e rules and conduct. It only pertains to rule ma"ing power and not
ad!udication. 8uch limitation is included in the provision in 8ec. 7;9d=
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5, ,+, ,1, ,(
&agayan Halley Bnterprises, Inc. vs. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 43
G.R. No. 12324. (,cto-er 1*, 1997)
Chapter :, Page 217, Footote No.11.
F!C"#$
<a 2ondeRa registered with the Philippine Patent 7ffice, pursuant to R: (),1,
the ,5+ c.c. white flint 'ottles it has 'een using for its gin popularly "nown as @ine'ra
8an Miguel$. 2hereafter, a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the ,5+ c.c.,
white flint 'ottles with the mar" <a 2ondeRa, Inc.$ and @ine'ra 8an Miguel$
stamped or 'lown%in therein 'y filling the same with PetitionerDs li4uor product
'earing the la'el 8onny >oy$ for commercial sale and distri'ution, without <a
2ondeRaDs written consent, and in violation of 8ec. ) of R: (), as amended 'y R:
57++.
I##%&$
.01 <a 2ondeRa was part of the protected 'everages of R: (), amended
'y R: 57++.
'&L($
2he words other lawful 'everages$ is used in its general sense, referring to all
'everages not prohi'ited 'y law. >everage is defined as a li4uor or li4uid for drin"ing.
Hard li4uor, although regulated, is not prohi'ited 'y lawJ hence, it is within the
purview and coverage of R: (),, as amended. 2o limit the coverage of the law only
to those enumerated or of the same "ind or class as those specifically mentioned will
defeat the very purpose of the law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )(, )/
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and 2ecson
Case No. 217

F!C"#$
:cting on information received, which indicated the ac4uisition of wealth
'eyond his lawful income, the Philippine :nti%@raft >oard re4uired Private
Respondent to su'mit his e3planation or comment, together with his supporting
evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was una'le to produce his
supporting evidence, despite several postponements, 'ecause they were allegedly
in the custody of his 'oo""eeper who had gone a'road. 2he anti%graft >oard was
created 'y the P&@@ to investigate the une3plained wealth and corrupt practices
of :AP personnel, 'oth retired and in active service.$
I##%&$
.01 Private Respondent may 'e investigated and prosecuted 'y the >oard,
an agency of the P&@@, for violation of R: ,+1/ and 1,7/.
'&L($
1o. :pplying the rule in statutory construction, the term su'ordinate$ as used
in B7 1 and ) would refer to one who en!oys a close association or relation with
former President Marcos and0or his wife, similar to the immediate family mem'er,
relative, and close associate in B7 1 and the close relative, 'usiness associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee in B7 ).
L!"IN M!)IM$
)E, ,+, ,(', ,E
&ommissioner of &ustoms vs. &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals
Case No. 71
G.R. Nos. 4...*-.. (4/30 21, 1993)
F!C"#$
Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in 4uestion is prohi'ited and
the articles thus imported may 'e su'!ect to forfeiture under 8ec. )5,+ ;f= and 1+) ;"=
of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode. 2he foodstuffs in 4uestion 'eing articles of prohi'ited
importation cannot 'e released under 'ond.
I##%&$
.01 the imported foodstuffs in 4uestion are not contra'and, and are not as
stated 'y Respondent &ourt, among the prohi'ited importations enumerated in 8ec.
1+) of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode therefore these foodstuffs may 'e released
under 'ond as provided in 8ec. ),+1 of the same code.
'&L($
-es. 2he imported foodstuffs are considered prohi'ited importation under 8ec.
1+) ;"= of the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)/
6nited 8tates vs. 8to. 1ino
Case No. 3+2
Chapter :, Page 22+, Footote No.172
F!C"#$
Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted
under :ct 1o. 17E+, which stated that it shall 'e unlawful for any person to carry
concealed upon his person any 'owie "nife, dir" dagger, "ris or other deadly
weapons, provide that this prohi'ition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of
persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same
under the provision of this :ct.
2he trial court ruled that, using the principle of e(usdem generis, the law will only
apply to 'laded weapons
I##%&$
.01 the trial court was correct in applying e(usdem generis+
'&L($
1o. 2he trial court erred in applying e!usdem generis 'ecause the latter is only
resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is clear, the rule
must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were
covered 'y the law and as such the law is not limited to 'laded weapons.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )/
Roman &atholic :rch'ishop of Manila vs. 8ocial 8ecurity &ommission
Case No. 2*3
G.R. No. L-11+41 (4a/ar0 2+, 19*1)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed with Respondent &ommission a re4uest that &atholic &harities,
and all religious and charita'le institutions and0or organi#ations, which are directly or
indirectly, wholly or partially, operated 'y the Roman :rch'ishop of Manila$ 'e
e3empted from compulsory coverage of R: 11(1, otherwise "nown as the 8ocial
8ecurity <aw of 1/59.
Petitioner contends that the term employer$ as defined in the law shouldT
following the principle of e(usdem generis%%% 'e limited to those who carry on
underta"ings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or which are
pursued for profit or gain,$ 'ecause the phrase activity of any "ind$ in the definition
is preceded 'y the words any trade, 'usiness, industry, underta"ing.
I##%&$
.01 the rule of e(usdem generis can 'e applied in this case.
'&L($
1o. 2he rule of e(usdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not
controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the <egislature would there'y 'e
hindered and defeated. 2he definition of the term employer$ is sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charita'le institutions or entities not
organi#ed for profit. 2his is made more evident 'y the fact that it contains an
e3ception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )/
Rep. v. Bsten#o
Case No.
G.R. No. L ; 3137* (#epte6-er 11, 19.+)
F!C"#$
Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision 'y the &adastral
&ourt to declare <ot 1o. 9)7, of the 7rmoc &adastre as pu'lic land. Petitioners filed
an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming !urisdiction over the
petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings.
I##%&$
.01 R: (),( applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain
lands which were declared pu'lic lands.
'&L($
1o. R: (),( does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on
certain lands which were declared pu'lic lands. 2he Respondent !udge was wrong in
interpreting that R: (),( is applica'leJ the !o' of the !udiciary is to apply laws, not
interpret it.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(d, 7a, ,+, ,)
In re estate of Bnri4ue# and Reyes
Case No. 13+
G.R. No. 9311 (4a/ar0 *, 1911)
Chapter :, Page 223, Footote No. 1.+
F!C"#$
Arancisca Reyes died intestate and was survived 'y his ) legitimate
daughters, Petra and Pascuala. Petra had ) legitimate children, Rafael and Josefa.
Pascuala had 1 legitimate child, :urea, and had 'egotten a natural child 'y a priest,
Hicente. Petra, Pascuala, and :urea have since died. 2he lower court held that
Hicente was the owner of all the separate property of :urea and half of the estate of
Arancisca.
I##%&$
.01 Hicente was an ac"nowledged natural child.
'&L($
-es. @. B. (E, which was promulgated on *ecem'er. 1E, 1E//, repealed the
law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. 8ince Hicente was
'orn in 1/+5 after the said law was enacted, he is considered an ac"nowledged
natural child.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a, ,5, 9/
Bmpire Insurance &o. v. Rufino
Case No. 97
G.R. No. L ; 3.2*. (Ma0 31, 1979)
Chapter :, Page 223, Footote No. 1.1
F!C"#$
Hicente :. Rufino died intestate and was survived 'y his widow and 7
children. 2hey then e3ecuted a Partition :greement agreeing to pay for all lia'ilities
or o'ligations of the decedent.
:lmost 1 year later, Petitioner filed a &ivil &ase claiming lia'ilities and o'ligations from
the Rufino estate. 2he trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file
within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. :
Petition for Review on &ertiorari was filed 'y the Petitioner on the decision of the trial
court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the
estate of the decedent, 'ut a claim on the estates of the Respondents.
I##%&$
.01 the petition has merit.
'&L($
2he petition is dismissed for lac" of merit. 2he lia'ilities claimed 'y Petitioner
were not listed in the o'ligations ac"nowledged 'y the Partition :greement.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)/, ,+a, 95a
&hing <eng v. @alang
Case No.
G. R. No. L-11931 (,cto-er 27, 191.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner o'tained !udgment granting his petition for naturali#ation. He and
his wife later petitioned to the &ourt of Airst Instance in Ri#al for the adoption of his
five children who were all minors and &hinese nationals. 2he petition was later
granted. Petitioner then re4uested the &ommissioner of Immigration to cancel the
alien certificate of registration of their children 'ased on the following groundsF ;1= 'y
virtue of their naturali#ation, the children are now considered as Ailipino citi#ens, ;)=
adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the
legitimate children of the adopter, ;,= since a legitimate child follows the nationality
of the adopter, the children are considered Ailipino &iti#ens.
I##%&$
.01 citi#enship can 'e ac4uired 'y a child through adoption.
'&L($
&iti#enship is not a right 'ut a mere privilege. :rt. )59 of the &ivil &ode
enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and ac4uisition is not a part of the said
enumeration. Aurthermore, :rt. ,91 of the &ivil &ode does not include ac4uisition of
citi#enship. :lso, :rt. 9/ of a special law that provides the character of naturali#ation
enumerates the means of ac4uiring citi#enship and adoption is not part of it.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a
:costa v. Alor
Case No. 1
G. R. No. 2122 (#epte6-er 13, 19+1)
Chapter :, Page 224, Footote No. 1.7
F!C"#$
2he Plaintiff and the *efendant were candidates for the 7ffice of the
Municipal President of <aoag, Ilocos 1orte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected
to said office and that the *efendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same.
However, not a single witness presented 'y Plaintiff confirmed the latterDs allegations
that he had o'tained a ma!ority of 1++ votes at the said election. 1or can it 'e
inferred from the evidence introduced 'y the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said
election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of Municipal President of
<aoag, now held 'y *efendant.
I##%&$
&an the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of e3cluding the
*efendant from the e3ercise of said officeQ
'&L($
1o. :rt. 1//, )++, and )+1 of the &ode of &ivil Procedure has reserved to the
:ttorney%@eneral and to the provincial fiscals, as the case may 'e, the right to 'ring
such action. If the legislative had intended to give all citi#ens ali"e the right to
maintain an action for usurpation of pu'lic office, it would have plainly said so in the
law in order to avoid dou't on a su'!ect of such far%reaching importance.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a
<erum v. &ru#
Case No. 14*
G. R. No. L-27.3 (No8e6-er 29, 191+)
F!C"#$
2his is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. :ttys. <erum and
Aernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and pro'ative value of a
testimony in a 'igamy case 'y ;former= Judge &ru# regarding the issuance of a
divorce decree.
I##%&$
&an the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency
and pro'ative value of ;former= Judge &ru#Ds testimonyQ
'&L($
1o, the petition for declaratory relief cannot 'e granted. 6nder 8ec 1, Rule ((
of the Rules of &ourt, declaratory relief may only 'e granted to a person whose rights
are affected 'y a statute or ordinance, or who is interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument.$ 2he sufficiency and pro'ative value of a
testimony, which is the su'!ect matter for declaratory relief in the instant case, is not
included in the enumeration. 2hus, the assailed order is affirmed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a
&entral >arrio v. &ity 2reasurer of *avao
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-21.11 (!pr23 3, 19*.)
F!C"#$
7n :ugust )/, 1/(), the &ity of *avao passed Resolution 1o. 7,), pursuant to
R: ),7+, declaring as officially and legally e3isting several 'arrios of the city. :mong
these were 'arrios :gdao, >ucana and Po'lacion. 8u'se4uently, 'arrio Po'lacion,
also called 'arrio &entral, as"ed for its alleged 1+C share in ta3es collected on real
property located within the 'arrio, as provided in 8ec. , of R: ,5/+. Respondent
refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said
'arrio, in relation to 'arrios :gdao and >ucana, cannot 'e determined 'ecause the
respective 'oundaries of said 'arrios were not yet fi3ed as re4uired 'y law. 2he
Petitioner thus filed a case against *avao &ityDs 2reasurer, &ouncil, :uditor and
Mayor with the &ourt of Airst Instance ;&AI= of *avao, which dismissed the case on
the ground that the issue had 'een rendered academic 'y the passage of R: 9,59,
amending the charter of *avao &ity.
I##%&$
.01 the dismissal order was correct.
'&L($
2he dismissal was affirmed. 8ec. ) of R: 9,59 enumerated the 'arrios
comprising the &ity of *avao, which did not include the Petitioner. 2hus, there prima
facie arises the conclusion that said law a'olished >arrio &entral as part of *avao
&ity. : non%e3istent 'arrio or a 'arrio not situated in *avao &ity cannot present a
claim against it or its officials for a share in ta3es under R: ,5/+.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+
Hera v. Aernande#
Case No. 11
G.R. No.L-313*4 (March 3+, 1979)
F!C"#$
2his case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated 'y the &AI of
1egros 7ccidental, >ranch H in relation to the intestate estate of <uis *. 2ongoy. 2he
cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income ta3es in the total sum of
P,,)59.E+ with 5C surcharge and 1C monthly interest, as provided in the 2a3 &ode.
2he Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were 'arred under
8ec. 5, Rule E( of the Rules of &ourt.
I##%&$
.01 the statute of non%claims under 8ec. 5, Rule E( of the 1ew Rules of &ourt
'ars claim of the government for unpaid ta3es.
'&L($
2he order appealed from is reversed. : perusal of the afore4uoted provision
shows that it ma"es no mention of claims for monetary o'ligations of the decedent
created 'y law, such as ta3es which is entirely different from the claims enumerated
therein. Par. ,15 of the 2a3 &ode states that payment of income ta3 shall 'e a lien in
favor of the government from the time the assessment was made 'y the
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests, penalties, etc. 2hus, 'efore
the inheritance has 'een passed to the heirs, the unpaid ta3es due the decedent
may 'e collected, even without its having 'een presented under 8ec. ) of Rule ,( of
the Rules of &ourt.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)7, ,+, 99
Hillanueva v. &ity of Iloilo
Case No. 312
G.R. No. L-2*121 ((ece6-er 2., 19*.)
F!C"#$
2he case is an appeal 4uestioning the lower courtDs !udgment declaring
7rdinance 1o. 11 as illegal. 2he Petitioners, Buse'io and Remedios Hillanueva, are
owners of 5 tenement houses containing 9, apartments. >y virtue of the ordinance,
the city was a'le to collect P5,E)9 from the spouses for the years 1/(+%1/(9.
I##%&$
1. Is 7rdinace 11 illegal 'ecause it imposes dou'le ta3ationQ
). Is the &ity of Iloilo empowered 'y the <ocal :utonomy :ct to impose tenement
ta3esQ
,. Is it oppressive and unreasona'le 'ecause it carries a penal clauseQ
9. *oes it violate the uniformity of ta3ationQ
'&L($
2he !udgment is reversedJ the ordinance is valid.
1. 1o. 2he same ta3 may 'e imposed 'y the national government as well as 'y the
local government.
). -es. R: ))(9 confers on local governmentsD 'road ta3ing authority. It is clear that
the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment ta3, which is
not among the e3ceptions listed in 8ec. ) of the <ocal :utonomy :ct.
,. 1o. 2he lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that no person shall
'e imprisoned for a de't or non%payment of a poll ta3$, which should not applyJ
the ta3 in 4uestion is neither a de't nor a poll ta3.
9. 1o. 2a3es are uniform and e4ual when imposed upon all property of the same
class or character within the ta3ing authority.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7a, )+c, ,+, ,5, 9)
8anto 2o v. &ru#%PaRo
Case No. 271
G.R. No. L-1113+ (4a/ar0 17, 19.3)
F!C"#$
Petitioner 8anto 2o was convicted of estafa for a 'ouncing chec" and was
sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. He appealed to the &ourt of :ppeals,
which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. He then filed a
petition for pro'ation 'ut was denied 'y the Respondent !udge, Hon. &ru#%PaRo,
despite the favora'le recommendation of the Pro'ation 7ffice, on the ground that
granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, and that 8anto 2o was
not a penitent offender. In a motion for reconsideration, the 8olicitor @eneral
recommended the grant 'ecause the Petitioner was not among the offenders
dis4ualified to avail pro'ation, as enumerated in the pro'ation law ;P.*. /(E= 8ec. /.
I##%&$
&an Petitioner 2o avail himself of pro'ationQ
'&L($
-es. 2he law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. He is a
first%time offender and his offense has relative lightness. In addition, the Respondent
!udge cannot assume that 2o had not shown repentance. >esides, where the
Pro'ation <aw e3pressly enumerates the persons dis4ualified to avail of its 'enefits,
the clear intent is to allow the 'enefits of pro'ation to those not included in the
enumeration.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,('
8amson v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 27+
G.R. No. L-431.2 (No8e6-er 21, 19.*)
Chapter :, Page 22*, Footote No. 2++
F!C"#$
Petitioner 8amson, the mayor of &aloocan, terminated the services of
Respondent, Mr. 2alens, as :ssistant 8ecretary, through :dministrative 7rder 1o. ,,
'ecause of lac" and loss of confidence, and appointed Mr. <iwag, co%Petitioner, to
said position. R: ))(+ ;&ivil 8ervice :ct of 1/5/= 8ec 5;f= declares that the position of
secretaries to city mayors as non%competitive. 2alens asserts his position was not
covered 'y the said act and, 'eing permanently appointed, he can only 'e
removed for a cause and after due process. 2he &ourt of Airst Instance ruled in favor
of 2alens, declaring the order null and void. 2he &ourt of :ppeals also affirmed said
decision.
I##%&$
.as the termination of 2alens illegalQ
'&L($
-es, 2alensD termination was illegalJ his position is not among those e3pressly
declared 'y law as highly confidential. 2he nature of functions attached to a position
determines whether such position is highly confidential. .here the law provides that
positions in the government 'elong to the competitive service, e3cept those
declared 'y law to 'e in the noncompetitive service and those which are policy%
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, the legislature is
presumed to have intended to e3clude those not enumerated, for otherwise, it would
have included them in the enumeration.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,+
Ainman @eneral :ssurance &orp. vs. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 1+7
G.R. No 1++97+ (#epte6-er 2, 1992)
Chapter :, Page 22., Footote No. 2+2
F!C"#$
&arlie 8urposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his
'eneficiaries. 7n 7cto'er 1E, 1/EE, &arlie 8urposa died of a sta' wound. :fter a
written notice of claim 'y the 'eneficiaries to the insurance company, the latter
denied the claim, saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the
coverage of the insurance policy. 2he insurance company was found lia'le 'y the
Insurance &ommission to pay P15,+++, and this decision was affirmed 'y the
appellate court. Petitioner contends that the &: was wrong in using e3pressio unius
e3clusio alterius$ in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from
murder and0or assault are impliedly e3cluded therefrom.
I##%&$
*id the &: ma"e a mista"e in using the said principleQ
'&L($
1o. 2he fact remains that the death of 8urposa was pure accident on the
part of the victim. Aurthermore, the personal accident insurance policy specifically
enumerated only 1+ circumstances where no lia'ility attaches to the insurance
company. Aailure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not 'een
intended to 'e e3empt from lia'ilities resulting from such.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,+
&entano v. Hillalon%Pornillos
Case No. 14
G.R. No. 113+92 (#epte6-er 1, 1994)
Chapter :, Page 22., Footote No. 2+3
F!C"#$
In 1/E5, the officers of 8amahang Oatandaan ng 1ayon ng 2i"ay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of >arrio 2i"ay in >ulacan. Martin
&enteno, chairman of the group, approached Judge :ngeles, President of 2i"ay,
and the latter solicited P 1,5++. However, this solicitation was made without a permit
from the *8.* and as a result, it was contended that &enteno violated P.*. 15(9,
which states :ny person to solicit or receive contri'utions for charita'le or pu'lic
welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional 7ffice of the *epartment of
8ocial services and *evelopment.$
I##%&$
.01 the phrase charita'le purposes$ in P.*. 15(9 is meant to include
religious purposes.
'&L($
1o. .here a statute is e3pressly limited to certain matters, it may not, 'y
interpretation or construction, 'e e3tended to others. 2he 1/E7 &onstitution treats the
words charita'le$ and religious$ separately and independently from each other.
8ince P.*. 15(9 merely states that charita'le or pu'lic welfare purposes need a
permit from *8.*, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. 2he term charita'le$ should 'e
strictly construed to e3clude solicitations for religious$ purposes. Moreover, since this
is a criminal case, penal law must 'e construed strictly against the 8tate and li'erally
in favor of the accused.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 11g, 11i, )5, )7, ,+, 9E
Bscri'ano v. :vila
Case No. 1+1
G.R. No. L-3+371 (#epte6-er 12, 197.)
Chapter :, Page 229, Footote No. 2+1
F!C"#$
&ongressman 8alipada Pendatun of &oto'ato, filed a complaint for li'el
against Mayor Jose Bscri'ano of 2acurong 'efore the &ourt of Airst Instance ;now the
R2&= to Judge *avid :vila. Bscri'ano 4uestioned Judge :vilaDs authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of
&oto'ato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation,
pursuant of R: 9,(, and :rt. ,(+ of the RP& which does not empower the &ourt of
Airst Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for :rt ,(+.
I##%&$
.hether the &ourt of Airst Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation of the crime of li'el or whether that power is lodged
e3clusively in the city attorney of that city.
'&L($
-es. 2he &ourt of Airst Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations
'ecause this power is not lodged e3clusively in the city attorney. 2he enumeration in
the law of the pu'lic officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary
investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power 'ut
not to deprive the &ourt of Airst Instance of that same power. 2he power of the &A2 to
conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power
for a !udge to hold a preliminary e3amination and to issue warrants of arrest and
search warrants. .hat is important to remem'er is that preliminary investigations 'y
the &A2 is the e3ception to the rule and not the general rule.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, 11e, 1), ,7
Mana'at v. *e :4uino
Case No. 1*1
G.R. No. L-111. (!pr23 29, 1913)
Chapter :, Page 229, Footote No. 2+.

F!C"#$
Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,)(1.79 plus interest for usury, wherein the
couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. 1otified of the
decision on 8eptem'er 7, 1/51, they filed for an appeal 'y registered mail on
8eptem'er )) of that same year. However, the papers were actually received 'y the
court on 8eptem'er )9. 2hus, the Judge of Airst Instance declared that the appeal
was late and dismissed it.
I##%&$
1. .hether the appeal was deemed filed on 8eptem'er )), when they were
deposited 'y registered mail, or 8ept )9, when they were actually received
'y the court.
). .01 the appeal has 'een perfected within 15 days.
'&L($
-es. 2he appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule )7 8ec. 1 of the Rules of
&ourt must 'e applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office 'y
registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. 6niformity of rules is to 'e desired
to simplify procedure. 2hus, Petitioners filed their appeal !ust in time.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,a, /c, 11d, 1)a
@ome# v. Hentura and >oard of Medical B3aminers
Case No. 111
No. 32441. March 29, 193+
Chapter :, Page 229, Footote No.2+9
F!C"#$
Plaintiff had his license revo"ed on unprofessional conduct due to the
administration of opium. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients
was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct 'ecause it has 'een repealed 'y
su'se4uent 7pium <aws.
I##%&$
.01 Plaintiff should have his license restored.
'&L($
1o, Plaintiff should not have his license restored. 2he su'se4uent 7pium <aws
cannot 'e held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or
remove said prior laws. 2he 7pium <aws are in fact in force and the ill%defined term of
unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,E'
Primero v. &:
Case No. 12*
G.R. Nos. 4.4*.-*9. No8e6-er 22, 19.9
F!C"#$
Petitioner carried a 'laded weapon outside of his residence while P* /, the
prohi'ition against fan "nives, 'alisong$ or clu's was in effect which thereafter
resulted in his arrest.
Petitioner answers in his defense that a 'ayonet, the 'laded weapon he was
carrying, was neither a 'lunt nor 'laded weapon enumerated in P* / and therefore
he was not guilty of violating the law against 'laded or 'lunt weapons.
I##%&$
.01 a 'ayonet is not a 'laded or 'lunt weapon that falls under the purview
of P* /.
'&L($
1o, the 'ayonet is a 'laded weapon that falls under P* /. Petitioners defense
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is wea" and incomplete. It would ma"e no
sense if possession of a fan "nife, which is less lethal than a 'ayonet, would 'e
punisha'le while possession of a 'ayonet would not.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,+a
8B& <egal 7pinion re >IR Bmployees :ssociation Inc.
Case No. 142
,ct. 23, 19.7
F!C"#$
Petitioners in4uired as to whether or not past presidents can run as 'oard
mem'ers or are merely e3%officio 'oard mem'ers.
I##%&$
.01 past presidents of the association can run again as mem'ers of the
'oard or are automatically e3 officio mem'ers.
'&L($
Past Presidents may run again for positions in the 'oard. 2here is nothing in the
rules and regulations of the association or the >IR that past presidents of the
association may not run again for 'oard mem'ership even as they are automatically
made e3 officio mem'ers of the 'oard.
L!"N M!)IM$
/a
Roldan v Hillaroman
Case No. 2*2
G.R. No. 4*.21 (,cto-er 1., 1939)
F!C"#$
Respondents were charged of murder. *uring the trial, Respondent &uevas
'ecame ill and had to 'e confined to a hospital. Judge Roldan, the Petitioner,
denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of
&uevas. 2he court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence
and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused. Respondents then instituted a
certiorari proceeding in the &ourt of :ppeals against the Petitioner, impugning the
decision of the !udge for proceeding with the case in the a'sence of &uevas. 2he
&: then issued a writ of preliminary in!unction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing
with the trial.
I##%&$
.01 the &: has !urisdiction over the case.
'&L($
1o. 2he &: resolutions denying the motions of the 8olicitor%@eneral rely
principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mu!er vs. &AI of <aguna, which
held that the phrase in aid of its appellate !urisdiction$ only refers to its pro3imate
antecedent and to all other au3iliary writs and process.$ 2his ruling is in con!unction
with the rule of interpretation that a 4ualifying phrase should 'e understood as
referring to the nearest antecedent. Moreover, the rule in the interpretation applied is
in fact the general rule in the interpretation of 4ualifying or conditional phrases found
in a law, 'ut this rule is su'!ect to the e3ception that where the intention of the law is
to apply the phrase to all the antecedents em'raced in the provision, the same
should 'e made e3tensive to the whole.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (d, /c, ,,, ,(', ')
Herras 2eehan"ee v. *irector of Prisons
Case No. 122
G.R. No. L-27. (4/30 1., 194*)
Chapter :, Page 234, Footote No. 23+
F!C"#$
Petitioner was apprehended 'y the 68 &ounter Intelligence &orps
*etachment under 8ecurity &ommitment 7rder 1o. )E( wherein she was specifically
charged with ;a= active colla'oration with the Japanese,$ and ;'= previous
association with the enemy.$ .hen she, along with her co%detainees and co%
Petitioners in that case, was delivered 'y the 68 :rmy to the &ommonwealth
@overnment pursuant to the proclamation of @eneral *ouglas Mac:rthur of
*ecem'er )/, 1/99, she was detained 'y said @overnment under that charge. :nd
under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custody
of the &ommonwealth @overnment.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is constitutionally entitled 'ail.
'&L($
-es. 2he constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall
'efore conviction 'e 'aila'le, e3cept those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. 8ince the PeopleDs &ourt :ct and the &onstitution and
other statutes in this !urisdiction should 'e read as one law, and since the language
used in this court in construing the &onstitution and other statutes on the matter of
'ail is su'stantially the same as the language used 'y the PeopleDs &ourt :ct on the
same su'!ect, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital
offenses 'efore conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 2o hold that the PeopleDs &ourt has
uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny 'ail even where the evidence of
guilt is not strong or there is a'solutely no evidence at all, is to ma"e the :ct offensive
not only to the letter 'ut also to the spirit of the &onstitution, which is contrary to the
most elementary rules of statutory construction.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (d, 11g, 1)a, )(, ,5, ,7, ,E', 9)a
Jose :ntonio Mapa v. Hon. Jo"er :rroyo and <a'rador *evelopment &orporation
Case No. 17+
G.R. No. 7.1.1 (4/30 1, 19.9)
F!C"#$
Mapa 'ought lots from <a'rador *evelopment &orporation which are
paya'le in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to
do so despite constant reminders 'y <a'rador. 2he latter informed Mapa that the
contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, 'ut Mapa invo"ed &lause )+ of the four
contracts. 8aid clause o'ligates <a'rador to complete the development of the lots,
e3cept those re4uiring the services of a pu'lic utility company or the government,
within , years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.*. /57
re4uires <a'rador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the
lots, and other forms of development$ if offered and indicated in the approved
su'division plans.
I##%&$
.01 &lause )+ of the said contracts include and incorporate P.*. /57 through
the doctrine of last antecedent, ma"ing the cancellation of the contracts of sale
incorrect.
'&L($
1o. <a'rador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to
&lause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default
payment from Mapa. P.*. /57 does not apply 'ecause it was enacted long after the
e3ecution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in &lause )+, no
further written commitment was made 'y the developer. 2he words which are
offered and indicated in the su'division or condominium plans$ refer not only to
other forms of development$ 'ut also to facilities, improvements, and
infrastructures$. 2he word and$ is not meant to separate words, 'ut is a con!unction
used to denote a !oinder or a union.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(d, 7a, ,,
People of the Philippines v. 2eodoro 2amani
Case No. 227
G.R. No. L-221*+ a7 G.R. No. L-221*1 (4a/ar0 21, 1974)
F!C"#$
2amani was convicted of murder and attempted murder 'y the lower court
on Ae'ruary 19, 1/(,. 6pon receipt of a copy of this order, his counsel su'se4uently
filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1/(,, which was denied. 2he lower
court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel 'y registered mail on July 1,,
1/(, through the counselDs wife. &ounsel filed his appeal only on 8eptem'er 1+, 1/(,,
forty%eight days from July )9
th
, which is the reglementary fifteen%day period for
appeal. :ppellees contend that the case should 'e dismissed on the ground that the
appeal was forty%eight days late. 2hey invo"ed 8ec. (, Rule 1)) of the Rules of &ourt
which states that an appeal must 'e ta"en within fifteen ;15= days from the
promulgation or notice of the !udgment or order appealed from.
I##%&$
.01 the fifteen%day period should commence from the date of promulgation
of the decision.
'&L($
-es. 6sing the rule of reddendo singula singulis, the word promulgation$
should 'e construed as referring to !udgment$, while notice$ should 'e construed
as referring to order$. 2amaniDs appeal is therefore 5E days late, not 97, as :ppellees
contendJ he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 1,.
1onetheless, the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand to o'viate any
possi'le miscarriage of !ustice$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, Ea 11g, ,9
:ndres >orromeo v. Aermin Mariano
Case No. 3.
G.R. No. L-1*.+. (4a/ar0 3, 1921)
Chapter :, Page 23*, Footote No. 24+
F!C"#$
:ndres >orromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the 2wenty%
fourth Judicial *istrict, effective July 1, 1/19. 7n Ae'ruary, )5, 1/)+, he was appointed
Judge of the 2wenty%first Judicial *istrict, and Aermin Mariano was appointed Judge
of the 2wenty%fourth Judicial *istrict. Judge >orromeo has since the latter date
consistently refused to accept appointment to the 2wenty%first Judicial *istrict. 2he
:ttorney%@eneral assails the validity of the later appointment 'y arguing on the 'asis
of 8ec. 155 of the :dministrative &ode, which states that nothing herein shall 'e
construed to prevent a !udge of first instance of one district from 'eing appointed to
'e !udge of another district.$
I##%&$
.01 >orromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the )9
th
Judicial *istrict.
'&L($
-es. 2he concluding part of 8ec. 155 of the :dministrative &ode used 'y the
:ttorney%@eneral should 'e construed as a proviso, although it did not start with the
usual introductory word, provided$. 2he word appointed$ in the proviso should 'e
given its meaning in the ordinary sense, and thus, should mean the nomination or
designation of an individual$. 2he provisions of the Judiciary <aw are plain and
unam'iguous. Judges of Airst Instance are appointed Judges of the &ourts of Airst
Instance of the respective !udicial districts of the Philippine Islands. 2hey hold these
positions of Judges of Airst Instance of definite districts until they resign, retire or are
removed through impeachment proceedings. 2he power to appoint lies on the
appointing officer, 'ut the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. Hence,
appointeeDs consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. In
upholding the independence of the !udiciary and the stateDs separation of powers,
the only way to remove >orromeo from power is 'y impeachment.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, /a, /c, 1)a, )9a, ,7
:<6%26&P v. 1<R&
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 1+932. (!/g/st 1*, 1994)
Chapter :, Page 24+, Footote No. 21+
F!C"#$
Petitioners were employed 'y the 1ational 8teel &orporation for their five year
e3pansion program. 2he wor"ers contend that they should 'e considered regular
wor"ers as opposed to pro!ect wor"ers, as the 18& and 1<R& ruled. :<6%26&P claims
that they have 'een wor"ing in 18& for more than ( years and that their wor" is
necessary for the 'usiness, and that would have 'een more than enough to consider
them as regular employees. PetitionersD contentions stemmed from :rt. )E+ of the
<a'or &ode.
I##%&F
.01 Petitioners should 'e considered regular employees.
'&L($
1o. 2he provision calls for casual employees. 8ince Petitioners were
considered pro!ect employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the
fact that they have 'een wor"ing in 18& for more than a year does not mean they
are automatically converted into regular employees. ;2hey were hired as pro!ect
employees for the 5%year e3pansion program. 7nce that pro!ect$ is done, their
services will no longer 'e needed.= In Mercado, 8r. vs. 1<R&, the proviso in par. ) of
:rt.)E+ relates only to casual employees and is not applica'le to those who do not
4ualify under the definition of such wor"ers in par. 1. 2he proviso is to 'e construed
with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof.
L!"IN M!)IMF
1, (, ,,
:renas v. &ity of 8an &arlos, Pangasinan
Case No. 2+
G.R. No. L-34+24 (!pr23 1, 197.)
Chapter :, Page 24+, Footote No. 211
F!C"#$
R: 5/(7 provides that second and third class !udges would receive an annual
salary of P1E,+++. :renas was receiving a monthly salary of P1+++.++, P,5+ of which
was from the national government and the remaining P(5+ comes from the city
government. Petitioner had repeatedly re4uested the city to enact the said R: 'ut
the Respondent &ity refused.
I##%&$
.01 Judge :renas should 'e granted the increase in his salary from P1),+++
to P1E,+++.
'&L($
<oo"ing at the 8enate deli'erations, the intention in enacting the R: was that
the salary of a city !udge should not 'e higher than the salary of the city mayor.
Moreover, e3ceptions, as a general rule, should 'e strictly 'ut reasona'ly construedJ
they e3tend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all dou'ts should 'e
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the e3ception. In case there is
repugnancy 'etween the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision,
whether a proviso or not, is given preference 'ecause it is the latest e3pression of the
intent of the legislation, 'ut more so 'ecause provisos are negatively written and
gives off a more mandatory tone.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, ,,, 9,,9E, ')
2olentino v. 8ecretary of Ainance
Case No. 292
G.R. No. 111.12 (!/g/st 21, 1994)
Chapter :, Page 243, Footote No. 2**
F!C"#$
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of R: 771( saying that 8. 1o. 1(,+ did not
pass three reading on separate days as re4uired in the &onstitution 'ecause the
second and the third readings were done on the same day. 2he President had
certified 8. 1o. 1(,+ as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the
re4uirement not only of the printing 'ut also that of reading the 'ill on three separate
days.
I##%&$
.01 R: 771(, an act that see"s to widen the ta3 'ase of the e3isting H:2
system and enhance its administration 'y amending the 1ational Internal Revenue
&ode, has 'een constitutionally passed.
'&L($
2here is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses
only with the re4uirement for the printing of the 'ill and its distri'ution three days
'efore its passage 'ut not with the re4uirement of three readings on separate
days. 2he phrase Ke3cept when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc.K in :rt. HI, 8ec )(;)= 4ualifies the two stated
conditions 'efore a 'ill can 'ecome a lawF ;i= the 'ill has passed three readings
on separate days and ;ii= it has 'een printed in its final form and distri'uted three
days 'efore it is finally approved. In other words, the KunlessK clause must 'e read
in relation to the Ke3ceptK clause, 'ecause the two are really coordinate clauses
of the same sentence. 2o construe the Ke3ceptK clause as simply dispensing with
the second re4uirement in the KunlessK clause ;i+e., printing and distri'ution three
days 'efore final approval= would not only violate the rules of grammar 'ut it
would also negate the very premise of the Ke3ceptK clauseF the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a 'ill which is certified in order to meet a
pu'lic calamity or emergency.
L!"IN M!)IMF
,,
:<*B&7: v. Hong"ong and 8hanghai >an"
Case No. 12*
3+ Ph23. 22., (March 23, 1911)
F!C"#$
2he mother of the Plaintiffs, Isa'el Palet, was a general partner in the firm,
:ldecoa M &ompany. 2he said firm, however, was heavily inde'ted to the
*efendant corporation. Isa'elDs remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and
o'ligations to the *efendant &orporation, and to mortgage certain real properties of
her sons. In order to mortgage these properties, she emancipated her sons and
mortgaged their properties with her consent. 2he Petitioners now see" to cancel the
instruments of mortgage e3ecuted 'y them.
I##%&$
.01 Isa'el Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force
in this country in 1/+,, and in so doing, confer upon them the capacity to e3ecute a
valid mortgage on their real property with her consent.
'&L($
.e must loo" at the provisions of the &ode of &ivil Procedure ;:merican=
relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the &ivil &ode ;8panish=
relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor
children. 2he &ode of &ivil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old
8panish code. :ccording to the &ode of &ivil Procedure, there is no longer a need to
'e formally emancipated 'y the parents after attaining the age of ma!ority. :t the
time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents, Joa4in was already
of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid, while PoiloDs mortgage was not
valid even if he signed it with his mother 'ecause he was a minor when he e3ecuted
the mortgage.
L!"IN M!)IMF
9/
7campo v. >uenaventura
Case No. ..
G.R. No. L-32293 (4a/ar0 24, 1974)
F!C"#$
7n 8eptem'er 11, 1/(( the &e'u Police *epartment arrested and detained
Bdgardo 7campo and other minors for an alleged violation of 7rdinance 1o. ))E
which fi3ed curfew hours. 2he minors were then convicted for violation of said
ordinance. 7n appeal, the minors were ac4uitted since the reason they violated the
ordinance was to attend a 'irthday, which is considered as a wholesome
assem'lage, and therefore falls under the e3ception to the curfew rule. Ro'erto
7campo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave
a'use of authority, and commission of a felony. 2he Mayor issued an ordinance
e3onerating the policemen. 7n March 17, 1/(/ a complaint was lodged with the
Police &ommission for the same grounds.
I##%&$
.01 the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving
police service and personnel.
'&L($
2he RespondentsD argument is devoid of merit. 2he power of local officials to
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel
has 'een transferred to the P7<&7M under R: 9E(9. :ccording to &ommission v.
Hon. >ello, 8ec. )( of the Police :ct is a mere saving clause and refers only to
administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of
the effectivity of the :ct ;8eptem'er E, 1/(/=. 8ec. )( may not 'e interpreted to
mean that the >oard of Investigators and Police &ommission could not legally
function to carry into effect the purpose of the :ct until after the lapse of the 1++
days.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, (c, (d
:isporna v. &ourt of :ppeals and People
Case No. *
G.R. No. L-39419 (!pr23 12, 19.2)
Chapter :I, Page 24., Footote No. .
F!C"#$
Petitioner Mrs. :isporna was charged with violation of 8ec. 1E/ of the
Insurance :ct for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a
certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance &ommissioner.
Mrs. :isporna, however, maintained that she was not lia'le 'ecause she only assisted
her hus'and, and that she did not receive any compensation.
I##%&$
.01 the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of 8ec.
1E/.
'&L($
Receipt of compensation is essential to 'e considered an insurance agent.
Bvery part of a statute must 'e considered together with the other parts, a "ept
su'servient to the general intent of the enactment, and not separately and
independently. 2he term agent$ used in par. 1 of 8ec. 1E/ is defined in par. ) of the
same section. :pplying the definition of an insurance agent in par. ) to the agent in
par. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned , paragraphs of 8ec. 1E/. :
statute must 'e construed so as to harmoni#e and give effect to all its provisions
wherever possi'le. Bvery part of the statute must 'e considered together with the
other parts and "ept su'servient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /c, )E, ,(', ,(c, ,(d, ,7
@aanan v. Indeterminate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. 1+.
G.R. No. L-*9.+9 (,cto-er 1*, 19.*)
Chapter :I, Page 249, Footote No. 11
F!C"#$
:tty. Pintor called <eonardo <aconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal
of his complaint for direct assault against <aconico in the &ity Aiscal of &e'u. 2hat
same day, <aconico called the :ppellant, :tty. Bdgardo @aanan to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. .hen
complainant Pintor called up, <aconico re4uested :ppellant @aanan to secretly
listen to the telephone call through the e3tension phone.
I##%&$
.01 an e3tension telephone is one of the prohi'ited devices covered 'y 8ec.
1 of R: 9)++.
'&L($
2elephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the :ct. 2here
must 'e either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deli'erate installation
of a device. :n e3tension telephone cannot 'e placed in the same category as the
devices enumerated in 8ec. 1 R: 9)++. In order to determine the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not 'e ta"en as
detached and isolated e3pressions, 'ut the whole and every part thereof must 'e
considered in fi3ing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of -mpire .nsurance
/ompany v+ 0ufino, held that the phrase device or arrangement$ in 8ec. 1 of R:
9)++, although not e3clusive to that enumerated therein, should 'e construed to
comprehend instruments of the same nature, that is, instruments the use of which
would 'e tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. Aurthermore, it is a
general rule that penal statutes must 'e construed strictly in favor of the accused.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 11g, )/, ,+a, ,(c, ,(d, 9E, ')
Radiola%2oshi'a Phils. Inc. v. Intermediate :ppellate
Case No. 249
G.R. No. 71222 (4/30 1., 1991)
Chapter :I, Page 212, Footote No. 2+
F!C"#$
2he levy on attachment against the su'!ect properties of spouses &arlos and
2eresita @atmaytan was issued on March 9, 1/E+ 'y the &ourt of Airst Instance of
Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the &ourt of Airst Instance of :ngeles
&ity was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said
attachment. 6nder the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola%2oshi'a Phils. contended
that its lien on the su'!ect properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was
not dissolved there'y.
I##%&$
.01 the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against
Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. ,) of the Insolvency <aw is clear that there is a cut off period N one
month in attachment cases and thirty days in !udgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. :lso, there is no conflict 'etween
8ec. ,) and 8ec. 7/. .here a statute is suscepti'le to more than one interpretation,
the court should adopt such reasona'le and 'eneficial construction as will render
the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, ,(a, ,7
<ope# v. Bl Hogar Ailipino
Case No. 112
G.R. No. L-22*7. (4a/ar0 12, 1921)
Chapter :I, Page 211, Footote No. 1*
F!C"#$
Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage, Bl Hogar Ailipino caused the
mortgaged properties to 'e sold pu'licly in an e3tra%!udicial sale. <ope# and
Javelona, in whose favor the loan was made, sought to have the contract of loan
and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. 2hey
contended that the court erred in holding that the word void$, as used in the 6sury
<aw, was intended to ma"e the entire transaction a nullity.
I##%&$
.01 the meaning of the word void$, as used in the 6sury <aw, was intended
to ma"e the entire transaction a nullity.
'&L($
1o. Arom the very conte3t of the law, the legislature, in using the word void$,
did not intend that the transaction should 'e a complete nullity. It was only with
respect to the usurious interest. 2he intention of the legislature must 'e ascertained,
not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, 'ut from
the conte3t of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the whole.
Bvery part of the act should 'e read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the
legislature.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/', )5a, ,7
JMM Promotions v. 1<R&
Case No. 13*
G.R. No. 1+9.31 (No8e6-er 22, 1993)
F!C"#$
JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P,+, +++ and posted a cash
'ond of P1++, +++ and a surety 'ond of P5+,+++, as re4uired 'y the P7B: Rules.
.hen JMM Promotions appealed to 1<R& regarding a decision rendered 'y P7B:,
the 1<R& dismissed the petition for failure to post the re4uired appeal 'ond as
re4uired 'y :rt. )), of the <a'or &ode.
I##%&$
Is JMM Promotions still re4uired to post the re4uired appeal 'ond, as re4uired
'y :rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, considering it has already posted a cash 'ond and
surety 'ond, as re4uired 'y the P7B:Q
'&L($
-es. 2he P7B: Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. : reading of the
P7B: Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety 'onds and the escrow
money, an appeal 'ond in an amount e4uivalent to the monetary award is re4uired
to perfect an appeal from a decision of the P7B:.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', (d, 7a, 1)a, ,(a, ,7
:raneta v. &oncepcion
Case No. 17
G.R. No. L-9**7, (4/30 31, 191*)
F!C"#$
2he hus'and filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground
of adultery. :fter the issues were !oined, *efendant therein filed an omni'us petition
to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,+++ for
herself and said children, and the return of her passportJ to en!oin Plaintiff from
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting herJ and to have Plaintiff therein
pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. 2he !udge rendered his decision
regarding the omni'us petition and granted the custody of the children to
*efendant, a monthly allowance of P),,++ for support for her and the children, P,++
for a house, and P),+++ as attorneyDs fees. 2he !udge refused to reconsider the order.
I##%&$
.01 the parties are re4uired to su'mit evidence 'efore deciding the
omni'us petition.
'&L($
1o. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omni'us
petition, it would violate the intent of the law regarding the (%month cooling period
contained in :rt. 1+, of the &ivil &ode. : recital of grievances in court may fan their
grievances against one anotherJ the legislatureDs intent is to give them opportunity for
dispassionate reflection. 1ote, however, that the case was filed after ( months of the
filing of the legal separation case. :s such, the determination of the custody and
alimony must have 'een given force and effect, provided it did not go to the e3tent
of violating the policy of the cooling off period.
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a, )7, ,(a, ,(c, ,(d, ,7
<ichauco vs. :postol
Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-19*2. ((ece6-er 4, 1922)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the 'usiness of importing cara'ao and
other draft animals. It now desires to import from Pnom%Pehn a shipment of draft
cattle and 'ovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the *irector of
:griculture refuses to admit said cattle, e3cept upon the condition stated in
:dministrative 7rder 1o. )1 of the >ureau of :griculture that said cattle shall have
'een immuni#ed from rinderpest 'efore em'ar"ation at Pnom%Pehn.
<egislations involved in the caseF
8ec. 17() of the :dministrative &ode N prohi'ition against 'ringing of animals from
infected foreign country
8ec. 177+ of the :dministrative &ode N >ringing of diseased animal into islands
for'idden
8ec. 17() of the :dministrative &ode as amended 'y :ct 1o. ,+5) N >ringing of
animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands
I##%&$
.01 8ec. 17() of the :dministrative &ode, as amended 'y :ct 1o. ,+5), has
'een repealed 'y the implication in 8ec. 177+.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. 17(), as amended, is of a general nature, while 8ec. 177+ deals with
a particular contingency not made the su'!ect of legislation in 8ec. 17(). 8ec. 177+
therefore is not considered as inconsistent with 8ec. 17() and it must 'e considered
as a special 4ualification of 8ec. 17(). 8ec. 177+ of the :dministrative &ode remains
in full force and effect, 'eing a special law having special contingency not dealt
within 8ec. 17(), which e3tends merely to the importation of draft animals for
purposes of manufacturing serum.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, ,(a, ,E', 5+
&assion v. >anco Ailipino
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L- 314+ (4/30 3+, 1911)
Chapter :I, Page 21*, Footote No. 31
F!C"#$
Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to P1> for P(++. Plaintiffs defaulted
and P1> e3tra !udicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to &a'atigan. :fter 1
year 'ut 'efore the e3piration of 5 years, Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land 'ut
P1> turned down the offer. P1> relied on R: )/,E and R: ,1,5, which created the
P1> and authori#es it to have e3tra !udicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively,
while Plaintiffs relied on R: )E79, "nown as the Pu'lic <and act, which provided that
every conveyance of land ac4uired under free patent or homestead provisions shall
'e su'!ect to repurchase 'y the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of
conveyance
I##%&$
.hich of the conflicting statues should prevailQ
'&L($
.hen two or more conflicting statues e3ist, as when general and special
provisions are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former and a particular
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the
respective dates of passage. R: )E79 specially relates to specific property, thus it is
an e3ception to the coverage of R: )/,E and ,1,5.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/, ,Ea, ,E', 9+', 5+
People v. Palmon
Case No. 22+
G.R. No. L-2.*+ (Ma0 11, 191+)
F!C"#$
Palmon was charged with serious physical in!uries ;prision correctional in med
and ma3 period N ) yrs, 9 mos. 1 day N ( yrs= 'efore the &AI of &api#. >efore the
arraignment of the accused, the !udge motu proprio dismissed the case on the
ground that under 8ec. E7 of R: )/(, the crime falls under the !urisdiction of the
!ustice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that &AI has
!urisdiction.
I##%&$
.hich court has !urisdiction to try the caseQ
'&L($
8ec 99;f= of the Judiciary :ct of 1/9E confers original !urisdiction on the &AI
over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than (
months. 8ec. E7 of the same act also confers original !urisdiction on the !ustice of the
peace and the !udges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults
where the intent to "ill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the &AI and !ustice of the
peace courts have concurrent original !urisdiction over the case.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,(c, ,(d, ,7
&hartered >an" v. Imperial and 1ational >an"
Case No. 17
G.R. No. 17222 (March 11, 1921)
F!C"#$
6m'erto de Poli was declared to 'e in a state of insolvency at the instance of
Plaintiff, and the sheriff was ordered to ta"e possession of all property of said
*efendant. In an earlier case, the P1> had o'tained a writ 'y virtue of which the
sheriff also sei#ed certain goods owned 'y the insolvent. Plaintiff asserted that since
the insolvent had 'een declared as such, all civil proceedings against him should
have 'een suspended according to the last portion of 8ec. (+ of the insolvency law.
I##%&$
.hich provision is controlling upon the caseQ
'&L($
2o ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law, every
section, provision and clause of a statue must 'e e3pounded in reference to every
other. 2hus, 8ec. (+ should 'e understood in reference with the other provisions of
the same law, and as such the P1> falls under the e3ception to 8ec. (+ as stated in
the other provision of the same law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/, ,(c, ,(d, ,(e, ,7, ')
Montenegro v. &astaReda and >alao
Case No. 179
G.R. No. L-4221 (!/g/st 3+, 1912)
Chapter :I, Page 21., Footote No. 39
F!C"#$
Ma3imino Montenegro was arrested in Manila 'y agents of the Military
Intelligence 8ervice of the :AP for complicity with a communistic organi#ation in the
commission of acts of re'ellion, insurrection or sedition. Ma3iminoDs father then
su'mitted an application for writ see"ing the release of his son. 2hree days after, Pres.
Suirino issued Proclamation 1o. )1+ suspending the privilege of the writ of ha'eas
corpus.
I##%&$
1. .01 Proclamation 1o. )1+ is erroneous since it included sedition, which is not
under the &onstitution.
). .01 the >ill of Rights prohi'ited the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
'&L($
2here is no dou't that it was erroneous to include sedition.$ :rt. 7 only
provides invasion, insurrection, re'ellion or imminent danger as grounds for
suspension. 8edition$ should 'e deemed as a mista"e or surplusage that does not
taint the decree as a whole. :lso, as posed 'y Prof. :ruego, the >ill of Rights impliedly
denied suspension in case of imminent danger, while :rt. 7 e3pressly authori#ed the
President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Moreover, during the
&onstitutional &onvention, the de'ates voted do!n an amendment to add another
cause, which is imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or re'ellion.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 15a, )+', ,(f, ')
:ra'ay Inc. v. &AI of Pam'oanga
Case No. 1*
G.R. No. L-37*.4 (#epte6-er 1+, 1971)
Chapter :I Page 219, Footote No. 43
F!C"#$
2he Municipality of *ipolog enacted 7rdinance 1o. 1/ that charged ta3 for
the selling and distri'ution of gasoline, lu'ricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleum%
'ased products. :ra'ay Inc., distri'utor of gas, oil and other petroleum products,
contested the validity of such on the ground that the ta3 is 'eyond the power of a
municipality to levy under 8ec. ) of R: 1o. ))(9, which provides that municipalities
may not impose ta3 on articles su'!ect to specific ta3 e3cept gasoline.
I##%&$
.01 :ra'ay Inc. is entitled to a refund.

'&L($
2he ordinance levied a sales ta3 not only 'ecause of the character of the
ordinance as a sales ta3 ordinance, 'ut also 'ecause the phraseology of the
provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a ta3 on sale. It is evident from
the terms that the amount of the ta3 that may 'e collected is directly dependent
upon to the volume of sales. 8ince 8ec. ) of the <ocal :utonomy :ct prohi'its the
municipality from imposing sales and specific ta3, with the e3ception of gasoline,
there su'sists the right of :ra'ay Inc. to a refund. 2he reasona'le and practical
interpretation of the terms of the proviso in 4uestion resulted in the conclusion that
&ongress, in e3cluding gasoline, deli'erately and intentionally meant to put it within
the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of ta3es.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 11e, 1)a, 19, )+a
Paras v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 19*
G.R. No. 1231*9 (No8e6-er 4, 199*)
Chapter :I, Page 219, Footote No. 1+
F!C"#$
: petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incum'ent Punong
>arangay. 2he recall election was deferred due to PetitionerDs opposition that under
8ec. 79 of R: 1o. 71(+, no recall shall ta"e place within one year from the date of the
officialDs assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local
election. 8ince the 8angguniang Oa'ataan ;8O= election was set on the first Monday
of May )++(, no recall may 'e instituted.
I##%&$
.01 the 8O election is a local election.
'&L($
1o. Bvery part of the statute must 'e interpreted with reference to its conte3t,
and it must 'e considered together and "ept su'servient to its general intent. 2he
evident intent of 8ec. 79 is to su'!ect an elective local official to recall once during his
term, as provided in par. ;a= and par. ;'=. 2he spirit, rather than the letter of a law,
determines its construction. 2hus, interpreting the phrase regular local election$ to
include 8O election will unduly circumscri'e the &ode for there will never 'e a recall
election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the &ourt assumed
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. :n interpretation should 'e
avoided under which a statute or provision 'eing construed is defeated,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 11d, )5', )7, ,(', ,7, ,E
Javellana v. Ointanar
Case No. 13.
G.R. No. L-331*9 4/30 3+, 19.2
Chapter :I, Page 2*2, Footote No.11
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the owner of a mar"et ;'uilding and lot= in &rossing >ago, >ago
&ity, which consists of store spaces and of permanent and mova'le stalls leased to
vendors. 8aid mar"et has served the general population of the &ity of >ago for more
than twenty ;)+= years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a
municipal license for the ,
rd
4uarter of 1/(E on the ground that 7rdinance 1o. 15+
had 'een enacted prohi'iting the esta'lishment, maintenance or operation of a
pu'lic mar"et in the &ity of >ago 'y any person, entity, or corporation other than the
local government. :ppellant claims that a pu'lic mar"et is one that is not owned
privatelyJ whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general pu'lic.
I##%&$
.01 the mar"etplace owned 'y Petitioner is a pu'lic mar"et.
'&L($
2he test of a pu'lic mar"et is its dedication to the service of the general
pu'lic and not its ownership. : scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that
'y pu'lic mar"et, it is meant one that is intended to serve the general pu'lic. 2he
Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his mar"et is engaged in
servicing the pu'lic, not only in >ago &ity, 'ut also those coming from other
municipalities.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 2a, *7, 4+c
1iere v. &AI of 1egros 7ccidental, >ranch II
Case No. 1..
G.R. No. L-3+324 No8e6-er 29, 1973
Chapter :I, Page 2*2, Footote No.*+
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a &ivil 8ervice eligi'le and was appointed city engineer of <a
&arlota &ity 'y the &ity Mayor pursuant to the provisions of 8ec. )1 of R: 9E5E ;the
&ity &harter=. :fter the enactment of the *ecentrali#ation :ct, Private Respondent
was appointed 'y the President of the Philippines as city engineer of <a &arlota &ity.
Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally
appointed as city engineer under R: 9E5E. House >ill 1o. /711, which 'ecame R:
95E5, originally e3pressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor
can appoint under 8ec. )1 of said R:, 'ut during the period of amendment in the
8enate, the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of 8ec. )1.
I##%&$
1. .01 deletion of the position of city engineer in 8ec. )1 of R: 95E5 an amendment
purely of form only or not.
). .01 appointing authority for the post of city engineer 'elongs to the city Mayor or
not.
'&L($
1. 17, it is a su'stantial amendment. 1othing could 'e more su'stantial than the
vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. If
&ongress wanted to authori#e the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of
city department, it could have easily re%phrased 8ec. )1 of the &ity &harter to that
effect. 8uch section e3pressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor.
). 17. 8ince the city mayor under 8ec. )1 is without authority to appoint the city
engineer, this prerogative can only 'e e3ercised 'y the President of the Philippines,
who, under 8ec. 1+;,= of :rticle HII of the 1/,5 &onstitution, shall nominate with the
consent of the &ommission on :ppointments all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for?$
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )/, ,+a, ,), ,E', ')
6ytengsu vs. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 3+7
G.R. No. L-*379 (#epte6-er 29, 1914)
Chapter :I, Page 2*3, Footote No.*1
F!C"#$
Petitioner%appellee was 'orn, of &hinese parents in *umaguete, 1egros
7riental n 7cto'er (, 1/)7. :fter finishing primary and secondary education here in
the Philippines, he went to the 6nited 8tates to further his studies from the year
1/97%1/5+. In :pril of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four ;9= months
vacation. 7n July 15, 1/5+, he filed for naturali#ation. Aorthwith, he returned to the
6nited 8tates and too" a post%graduate degree which he finished in July 1/51l 'ut he
did not return to the Philippines until 7cto'er 1,, 1/51. Hence, the original date of
hearing the case, originally scheduled to ta"e place on July 1), 1/51, had to 'e
postponed.
I##%&$
1. .01 the application for naturali#ation may 'e granted, notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.
). .01 domicile and residence are synonymous.
'&L($
1. 1o. 8ection 7 of &.:. 1o. 97, re4uires applicant for naturali#ation to reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time
of his admission to Philippine citi#enship.
). 1o. :lthough the words residence$ and domicile$ are often used
interchangea'ly, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different
from that of the other. :ctual and su'stantial residence within the Philippines, not
legal residence or domicile, is re4uired. Residence indicates permanency of
occupation, distinct from lodging or 'oarding, or temporary occupation. *omicile is
residence with intention to stay.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7, 11a, )5a, ,7
Manila <odge 1o. 17( v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 1*1
G.R. No.L-41++1 a7 G.R. No.L-41+12 (#epte6-er 3+, 197*)
Chapter :I, Page 2*4, Footote No. *3
F!C"#$
2he Philippine &ommission enacted :ct 1o. 1,+( which authori#ed the &ity of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila >ay. 2he reclaimed area was to form part of the
<uneta e3tension. 2he act provided that the reclaimed area shall 'e the property of
the &ity of Manila, and the city is authori#ed to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. <ater, the &ity of Manila conveyed a
portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. 2hen Petitioner sold the land, together with
all the improvements, to the 2arlac *evelopment &orporation ;2*&=.
I##%&$
.01 the su'!ect property was patrimonial property of the &ity of Manila.
'&L($
2he petitions were denied for lac" of merit. 2he court found it necessary to
analy#e all the provisions of :ct 1o. 1,(+, as amended, in order to unravel the
legislative intent. 2he grant made 'y :ct 1o. 1,(+ of the reclaimed land to the &ity of
Manila is a grant of a pu'lic$ nature. 8uch grants have always 'een strictly construed
against the grantee 'ecause it is a gratuitous donation of pu'lic money or resources,
which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. In the case at 'ar, the area
reclaimed would 'e filled at the e3pense of the Insular @overnment and without cost
to the &ity of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute should 'e narrowed to e3clude
matters which, if included, would defeat the policy of legislation.

L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (c, /a, ,(', ,7, 9,
:lmeda v. Alorentino
Case No. 1+
G.R. No.L-23.++ ((ece6-er 21, 19*1)
Chapter :I, Page 2*1, Footote No. *7
F!C"#$
R:1E,, the charter of Pasay &ity ;enacted June )1, 1/97=, provides in its 8ec. 19
that the >oard shall have a secretary who shall 'e appointed 'y it to serve during the
term of office of the mem'ers thereof?$

7n June 1E, 1/(+, R: )7+/ amended 8ec. 1)
of R: 1E,. 7n the strength of Par. ) of 8ec. 1) of the Pasay &ity &harter, as amended,
the Hice%Mayor of Pasay &ity appointed Petitioner :lmeda as secretary of the
Municipal >oard of said &ity.

2he very ne3t day, the >oard refused to recogni#e
Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Alorentino to the position,
purportedly under 8ec. 19 of the &ity &harter.
I##%&$
.hich law applies on the matter of the appointment of the 8ecretary of the
Municipal >oard of Pasay &ityQ
'&L($
2he petition was dismissed. 2here is nothing in R: )7+/ that indicates any
intention on the part of the <egislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the
provisions of 8ec. 19 of R.: 1E,. Repeals 'y implication are not favored, unless it is
manifested that the legislature so intended.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, ,7, 9/, 5+
:'ellana v. Marave
Case No. 3
G.R. No.L-277*+ (Ma0 29, 1974)
Chapter :I, Page 2**, Footote No. 71
F!C"#$
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical in!uries through rec"less
imprudence. 2he criminal case was filed with the city court of 7#amis &ity, which
found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the &AI. :t
this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another 'ranch
of the &AI of Misamis 7ccidental presided 'y Respondent Judge, a separate and
independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such
action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in
the &ity &ourt of 7#amis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order
to deny PetitionersD motion to dismiss.
I##%&$
.01 the order was issued with grave a'use of discretion.
'&L($
Petition for certiorari is dismissed. PetitionerDs literal reading

of the 8ec. 1 of Rule
111 of the Rules of &ourt ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city
courts as provided in 8ec. 7 of Rule 1),. 8uch interpretation, does li"ewise, give rise to
a constitutional 4uestion that may trench on a su'stantive right in accordance to :rt.
,, of the &ivil &ode.
)
:s stated in :rt. G, 8ec. 5, par.5 of the 1/7, &onstitution, the
grant of power to this &ourt does not e3tend to any diminution, increase or
modification of su'stantive rights. 2hus, it is a well%settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional dou't. <astly, in the case at 'ar, literal construction of the law is not
favored. 2he law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an
ingenious construction sought to 'e fastened on a legal norm, particularly a
procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant 'eing given an
opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.

L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 1)a, ,7
-u &ong Bng v. 2rinidad
Case No. 317
G.R. No. L-2+479 (Fe-r/ar0 *, 1921)
Chapter :I, Page 2*7, Footote No. 7.
F!C"#$
:ct )/7) prohi'ited record 'oo"s of Merchants from 'eing written in a
language other than Bnglish, 8panish, or a local dialect. -u &ong Bng, a &hinese
merchant, was penali#ed for "eeping 'oo"s written in &hinese. He and other &hinese
merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law.
I##%&$
Is :ct )/7) constitutionalQ
'&L($
It is constitutional. 2he purpose of the :ct is to prevent fraud in 'oo" "eeping
and evasion of ta3es for the protection of the pu'lic good. 2his decision is consistent
with the ruling in Owong 8ing v. &ity of Manila, where laundrymen were prohi'ited
from issuing receipts written in &hinese. &lass legislation is thus allowed if it is for the
pu'lic good. Instead of interpreting the :ct as a 'lan"et prohi'ition against "eeping
'oo"s in &hinese, it may 'e interpreted as a directory measure that records
pertaining to ta3es must 'e written or annotated in Bnglish, 8panish, or a local dialect,
or have a duplicate in any of these languages. 2his li'eral interpretation is reasona'le
and it upholds constitutionality.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1a, (d, /c, 11e, ,7
&ity of 1aga v. :gna
Case No. *3
G.R. No. L-3*+49 (Ma0 31, 197*)
Chapter :I, Page 2*., Footote No. .3
F!C"#$
2he &ity of 1aga changed its ta3 system from graduated ta3 to percentage
ta3. Respondent ta3payers insisted on paying the new ta3es the following year,
pursuant to the Revised :dministrative &ode ;8ec. ),+/=. It stated that ta3
enactments changing the current system prior to *ecem'er 15 should ta"e effect
the following year. 2he 1aga &ity government, on the other hand, claimed that
under the <ocal :utonomy :ct ;R: ))(9=, ta3 ordinances ta"e effect 15 days after
pu'licationJ this allegedly impliedly repealed 8ec. ),+/ of the :dmin &ode.
I##%&$
*id R: ))(9 repeal 8ec. ),+/ of the Revised :dministrative &odeQ
'&L($
1o, it did not. 2here is a presumption against implied repealJ a su'se4uent
provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. If two laws can 'e
harmoni#ed, then the &ourts shall do so. 8ec. ),+/ of the Revised :dmin &ode
applies in this case 'ecause the new ta3 changed a prior ta3 system. R: ))(9 only
applies for entirely new ta3 provisions.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, ,Ea, ,E'
2an v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 112
G.R. No. 112+93 (,cto-er 4, 1994)
F!C"#$
>P EE5 is an act creating the new province of 1egros del 1orte. 2he ple'iscite
for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively
composing the new province. 2he parent provinces, which will get also affected,
were not included in the ple'iscite.
I##%&$
Is >P EE5 unconstitutionalQ
'&L($
It is unconstitutional. 2he &onstitution provides that a ple'iscite must 'e held
in all units affected, including the parent province, and not !ust the new areas. 2he
draft 'ill provided that the ple'iscite 'e conducted in all units, and not !ust the areas
constituting the new province, 'ut the final 'ill only limited it to the latter.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1)a
Philippine @overnment v. Municipality of >inangonan
Case No. 11.
G.R. No. L-1+2+2 (March 29, 191*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner Municipality of &ardona challenged the constitutionality of B7 ((
'y the @overnor%@eneral granting >inangonan municipal authority over 7 additional
'arrios. Petitioner claimed that the @overnor%@eneral has no legislative authority and
that this legislation was not for the pu'lic good.
I##%&$
Is B7 (( constitutionalQ
'&L($
It is constitutional. Bvery act of legislation is presumed to 'e constitutional and
for the pu'lic goodJ facts need not 'e stated to prove it.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1)a, ,7
People v. *el Rosario
Case No. 1+1
G.R. No. L-7234 (Ma0 21, 1911)
F!C"#$
7n July )7, 1/5,, information was filed in the Municipal &ourt of Pasay
charging Pa# M. del Rosario with slight physical in!uries committed on May )E, 1/5,.
2he accused presented a motion to 4uash the information on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescri'ed in accordance with :rt. /+ and :rt. /1 of
the RP&. 2he municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Hence,
an appeal against the dismissal is made to the 8upreme &ourt.
I##%&$
1. .hether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on
which the crime was committed, or from the day following that in which it was
committedJ
). .01 the term month$ in the RP& should 'e understood to 'e a month of ,+
days, instead of the civil0calendar month.
'&L($
1. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to 'e done, the law has
always directed that the first 'e e3cluded and the last included ;1rt+ 2$, /ivil /ode =.
:rt. 1E of the && directs that any deficiency in any special law must 'e supplied 'y
its provisions. :s the RP& is deficient in that it does not e3plicitly define how the period
is to 'e computed, resort must 'e had to :rt. 1, of the &&.
). >y e3press provision of :rticle 1, on the new &ivil &ode, a month is to 'e
considered as the regular ,+%day month. In accordance therewith, the term month
used in :rt. /+ of the RP& should 'e understood to mean the regular ,+%day month
and not the solar or civil month. Hence, the &ourt held that the offense charged had
not yet prescri'ed 'ecause July is the (+
th
day from May )/.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, ,E', 9(a
8alvatierra v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No.
G.R. No. 1+7797 (!/g/st 2*, 199*)
F!C"#$
Bnri4ue 8alvatierra died intestate and was survived 'y his legitimate 'rothers,
2omas, >artolome, Henancio, and Macario, and a sister, Marcela. His estate
consisted of , parcels of land ;<ots )5, )(, M )7=. Macario sold the 9+5 s4. mts. out of
the 79/ s4. mts. total area of <ot )( to his son, :nselmo. Bventually, an e3tra!udicial
partition with confirmation of sale$ was e3ecuted 'y and among the surviving legal
heirs of Bnri4ue, which consisted of the aforementioned lots. 2hereafter, Henancio
sold <ot 1o. 7 ;which 'elonged to him 'y virtue of the said partition=, and a 19/%s4. m.
portion of <ot )( to spouses <ongalongs. It turned out, however, that :nselmo already
o'tained an 7&2 covering the whole of <ot 1o. )(. 2he complaints for reconveyance
were filed 5 years after the issuance of such 7&2 to :nselmo.
I##%&$
1. .hich prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, :rt. 1,/1 of
the new && or :rt. 1199 of the same &odeQ
). .01 there was a dou'le sale.
'&L($
1. :rt. 1199 of the && prevails. 2he prescriptive period for such actions is 1+ years, as
held in previous cases. Hence, the action for reconveyance had not yet prescri'ed.
2here is no am'iguity in the terms and stipulations of the e3tra!udicial partition. 2hus,
the literal and plain meaning thereof should 'e o'served. .hat :nselmo 'ought
from his father was only 9+5 s4. m of <ot )(. 2he registration of the whole <ot )( in the
name of :nselmo was, therefore, done with evident 'ad faith.
). 2here was no dou'le sale. >oth parties did not dispute the contents of the
e3tra!udicial partition.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, (c, 7a
Pasno v. Ravina and Ravina
Case No. 199
G.R. No. 311.1 (Fe-r/ar0 3, 193+)
Chapter :I, Page 273, Footote No. 1+4
F!C"#$
<a'itoria, during her lifetime, mortgaged , parcels of land to the P1>. .hen
<a'itoria died, a petition was presented for the pro'ate of her last will and
testament. *uring the pendency of the case, a special administrator of the estate of
the deceased was appointed 'y the court. 2he special administrator failed to
comply with the conditions of the mortgage, and the P1> as"ed the sheriff to
proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. 2he &AI ruled in favor of the special
administrator re4uiring the sheriff to a'stain from selling the said lands.
I##%&$
1. .01 the will is valid
). .01 the P1> had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was
e3ecuted 'y <a'itoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis.
'&L($
1. 2he law does not re4uire that the will shall 'e dated. :ccordingly, an erroneous
date will not defeat a will.
). -es. 2he P1> had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. 2he
mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with 8ec. 7+E of the &ode
of &ivil Procedure. 8ince :ct ,1,5 fails to ma"e provision regarding the sale of the
mortgaged property which is in custodia legis, it would 'e logical to suppose 8ec. 7+E
of the &ode of &ivil Procedure would govern latter contingency. :ct ,115 must 'e
presumed to have 'een ac4uainted with the provisions of the &ode of &ivil
Procedure.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,Ea, ,E'
& M & &ommercial v. 1:.:8:
Case No. 42
G.R. No. L-27271 (No8e6-er 1., 19*7)
Chapter :I, Page 274, Footote No. 1+7
F!C"#$
1:.:8: conducted three separate 'ids for the three different waterwor"s
pro!ects in Manila, *avao and Iloilo. However, & M & &ommercial &orporation, one
of those who participated in the 'idding 'ut eventually lost, filed three
corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterwor"s
pro!ects contending that 1:.:8: violated 8ec. 1 of R: /1), which should give
preference to local materials that are availa'le, practica'le and usa'le. 2he said
law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced
materials is in relation to the construction or repair wor" underta"en 'y the
@overnment.$ 1:.:8: alleged that it should not 'e included within the meaning of
the term @overnment$ as used in the said law.
I##%&$
.01 1:.:8: falls under the term government$ under R: /1).
'&L($
-es. 2he 1:.:8: should 'e deemed em'raced within the term
government$ found in R: ,1), and in the construction of their wor"s or purchase of
materials thereof, local material should 'e given preference whenever availa'le,
practica'le and usa'le. @overnment%owned or controlled corporations are not
e3empted from R: /1). 2wo laws are 'eing considered in this caseF &.:. 1o. 1,E and
R: /1). >oth relate to the same su'!ect matter and have the same nationalistic
purpose or o'!ect which is to give preference to locally produced materials in
purchases, wor"s or pro!ects of the @overnment ;referring to Ailipino%Airst policy=.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,5, ,(, ,7, ,Ea, ,E'
>utuan 8awmill, Inc. v. &ity of >utuan
Case No. 41
G.R. No. L-2111* (!pr23 29, 19**)
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under R: ,// for an electric
light, heat, and power system in >utuan and &a'ad'aran, :gusan, together with the
issuance of a certificate of pu'lic convenience and necessity 'y the Pu'lic 8ervice
&ommission. However, the &ity of >utuan issued 7rdinances num'ered 11, 1,1 and
19E imposing a )C ta3 on the gross sales or receipts of any 'usiness operated in the
city. >utuan 8awmill, Inc. 4uestioned the validity of the ta3ing ordinance which is
deemed to have impaired the o'ligation of contract there'y depriving the Petitioner
of property without due process of law. 7n the other hand, Respondent maintained
that it was vested with the power to provide for the levy and collection of ta3es for
general and special purposes$ as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1/5+.
I##%&$
.01 the inclusion of the franchise 'usiness of Petitioners falls within the
coverage of the ta3ing ordinances pursuant to the cityDs power of ta3ation.
'&L($
1o. the inclusion of the franchise 'usiness of the >utuan 8awmill, Inc. 'y the
&ity of >utuan is 'eyond the 'road power of ta3ation of the city under its charter.
1either could the latterDs power therein granted 'e ta"en as an authority delegated
to the city to amend or alter the franchise, considering the a'sence of an e3press or
specific grant of power to do so. .here there are two statutes, the earlier special
and the latter general N and the terms of the general are 'road enough to include
the matter provided for in the special N the fact that one is special and the other is
general creates a presumption that the special is to 'e considered as a remaining
e3ception to the general as a general law of the land, while the other as the law of a
particular case.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5, 5+, d
Manila Railroad &o. v. Rafferty
Case No. 1*.
G.R. No. 142+1 (#epte6-er 3+, 1919)
F!C"#$
2he *efendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal
revenue ta3es upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine 'y virtue of an
act of &ongress in 1/1,. 2he latter contended that the ta3es had 'een illegally
collected pursuant to a private charter granted 'y the legislature in 1/+(. 7n the
other hand, Rafferty asserts that the 1/1, :ct of &ongress repealed the 1/+( private
charter.
I##%&$
.01 the 1/1, :ct of &ongress repealed the 1/+( private charter.
'&L($
1o. : special law ;including private charters= having the character of a
private contract, supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts
and circumstances, the consideration of such 'eing em'odied in the special law. :
general law su'se4uently enacted 'y the legislature cannot 'e ta"en to have
modified or altered the charter, unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. .here
the general act is later, the special statute will 'e construed as remaining an
e3ception to its terms, unless repealed e3pressly or 'y necessary implication.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, 5+
*e Jesus v. People of the Philippines
Case No. .7
G. R. No. L-*199. (Fe-r/ar0 22, 19.3)
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner, &7MB<B& registrar of &asiguran, was charged 'y the
2anod'ayan 'efore the 8andigan'ayan with the violation of the 1/7E Blection &ode.
He filed a motion to 4uash the information on the ground that the !urisdiction to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the
&7MB<B&, and, coincidentally, the &ourt of Airst Instance ;now R2&=.
I##%&$
.01 the 8andigan'ayan has !urisdiction over election offenses with respect to
pu'lic officers.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. ) of :rt. GII V&W of the 1/7, &onstitution granted &7MB<B& the power
to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,$ while 8ec
1E) of the 1/7E Blection &ode vested the &ommission with authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and su'se4uently prosecute all election offenses punisha'le
under the same &ode. 2he legislative intent in granting &7MB<B& the said power is to
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections. 2o divest the &7MB<B& of its
authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned
constitutional mandate. :t the same time, 8ec 1E9 of the Blection &ode, which deals
specifically with election offenses, must 'e favored over provisions of P.*. 1(+( which
spea"s generally of other crimes or offenses committed 'y pu'lic officers in relation
to their office. 2he former cannot 'e construed as impliedly repealed 'y the latter
there'y continuing to 'e an e3ception granted the more specific legislative intent it
evinces.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(, /, ,7, ,E, 5+
68 v. :lmond
Case No. 117
G.R. No. 2117 (4/e 2, 19+*)
F!C"#$
2he complaint alleges that R... :lmond, master and in charge of the
steamship Ru'i 'rought 2awas 2ahan, is an alien of Bast India who is afflicted with
trachoma. He permitted 2awas 2ahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the
steamship at a place and time other than that designated 'y the immigration
officers. 2he evidence showed that *efendant adopted due precautions to prevent
the landing of 2awas 2ahan, and that if the landing was made, it was made without
the *efendantDs "nowledge or consent.
I##%&$
.01 a conviction can 'e sustained when it appears that there was no
consent, either tacit or e3press, to the landing of the alien.
'&L($
8ec. 1E imposes upon one who has 'rought immigrant aliens into a 6nited
8tates port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such
alien at any time or place other than that designated 'y the immigration officers and
fi3es a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. 2he word permit$ implies that the
landing of the alien must 'e with the e3press or tacit consent of the owner, officer,
agent or person in charge of the vessel.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 11e, 91a, 9E
68 v. Bstapia
Case No. 29.
G.R. No. 12.91 (,cto-er 19, 1917)
Chapter :II, Page 2.9, Footote No. 23
F!C"#$
: case was filed against *efendants for having engaged in coc"fighting, in
violation of 8ec. 1 of :ct. 1o. 9E+. 2he *efendants held a coc"fight on a clearing
near a grove of 'uri palms. 2he prosecution argued that the term coc"pit$ should
'e construed to mean any place in which a coc"fight ta"es place.
I##%&$
.01 the clearing where the coc"fight was held 'y the *efendants is a
coc"pit within the contemplation of the law.
'&L($
2he term coc"pit$ as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot
'e construed to mean or include a clearing such as had 'een used 'y the
*efendants. Penal provisions of a statute are to 'e construed strictly and particular
words used in the law should 'e construed in relation to the conte3t.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5, ,7, 9E
6.8. v. :'ad 8antos
Case No. 294
G.R. No. 122*2 (Fe-r/ar0 1+, 1917)
Chapter :II, Page 29+, Footote No. 2.
F!C"#$
2he :ppellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue
<aw 'y failing to ma"e an entry for the January 5, 1/15 indicating whether any
'usiness was done on that day or not. He had employed a 'oo""eeper with the
e3pectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position,
including the entries re4uired to 'e made 'y the &ollector of Internal Revenue.
I##%&$
.01 the :ppellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue <aw.
'&L($
2he :ppellant must 'e ac4uitted since it is undisputed that he too" no part in
the "eeping of the 'oo" in 4uestion and that he never personally made an entry in it
as he left everything to his 'oo""eeper. &ourts will not hold one person criminally
responsi'le for acts of another done without his "nowledge or consent, unless the law
clearly so provides.
L!"IN M!)IM$
91a, 9E
ROUND 3
People v. :top
Case No. 2+2
G.R. Nos. 1243+3-+1 (Fe-r/ar0 1+, 199.)
Chapter :II, Page 29+, Footote No. 29
F!C"#$
:ppellant was found guilty of , counts of rape. 2he trial court sentenced him
to ) terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third,
holding that his common%law relationship with the victimDs grandmother aggravated
the penalty. Private complainant Regina @uafin, 1) years old, is the granddaughter
of 2rinidad Me!os, the common%law wife of the :ppellant.
I##%&$
1. .01 the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposa'le for the rape allegedly committed.
). .01 the trial court erred in finding :ppellant guilty 'eyond reasona'le
dou't of the crimes charged.
'&L($
1. 2he trial court erred. 1octurnity must have 'een deli'erately sought 'y the
:ppellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or
facilitate his escape. 1either can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. 2he
scope of the relationship under :rt. 15 of the RP& encompasses only the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted 'rother or sister, and relative
'y affinity in the same degrees.$ 7utside these enumerations and consistent with the
doctrine that criminal laws must 'e li'erally construed in favor of the accused, no
other relationship 'etween the offender and the victim may aggravate the
imposa'le penalty for the crime committed.
). 2he :ppellant was found guilty 'eyond reasona'le dou't. 2he offended
partyDs straightforward and une4uivocal statements show indeli'le 'adges of truth.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a
People v. Padilla
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 47+27 (Fe-r/ar0 4, 1941)
Chapter :II, Page 291, Footote No. 3+
F!C"#$
:ppellants Padilla, a Ailipino citi#en, and Hon :rend, a @erman citi#en, acting
!ointly and conniving with each other, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally evaded the
provisions of :rt. 9 of &.:. 1o. 1,E, which re4uires Philippine or 6.8. citi#enship 'efore
the e3ercise or en!oyment of the privilege esta'lished in said article. It is contended,
however, that notwithstanding the infringement of 8ec. 9. of :ct 1o. 1,E, the
:ppellants cannot 'e punished therefore since the said :ct imposes no penal
sanction whatsoever.
I##%&$
.01 a violation of &.:. 1o. 1,E may 'e prosecuted under &.:. 1o. 1+E,
entitled :n :ct to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationali#ation or certain
rights, franchises or privileges.$
'&L($
-es. :ny citi#en of the Philippines or of the 6nited 8tates who "nowingly allows
his name or citi#enship to 'e used so that a person not so 4ualified may en!oy the
privilege granted to domestic entities 'y &.:. 1o. 1,E, as well as any alien profiting
there'y, is guilty of violation of &.:. 1o. 1+E.
2he very title of :ct 1o. 1+E gives unmista"a'le notice of the legislative intent
and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationali#ation of
certain rights, franchise or privileges. 8ec. 1 of the same :ct applies punishment
provided therein to all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision re4uires
Philippine or 6nited 8tates citi#enship as a re4uirement for the e3ercise or en!oyment
of a right, franchise or privilege.$ 6nder :ct 1o. 1+E, any legal provision, whenever
e3isting at the time of the passage of said :ct or promulgated thereafter, would fall
within its scope. 7ne of such legal provision is :rt. 9 of :ct 1o. 1,E.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, (c, /a
People v. 8ala#ar
Case No. 223
G.R. No. L-13371 (#epte6-er 24, 1919)
Chapter :II, Page 292, Footote No. 3*
F!C"#$
2he :ppellant was charged with the crime of malversation of pu'lic funds.
2he :ppellant 'eing the then *eputy Provincial and Municipal 2reasurer, and as
such, accounta'le for the funds collected and received 'y him, did willfully,
feloniously and with grave a'use of confidence, misappropriate, and convert to his
own personal use and 'enefit, from said funds, the sum of P1,,E/7.77. 6pon
arraignment, the :ppellant pleaded not guilty, which he later withdrew and
changed to guilty. He was sentenced to 'e imprisoned, to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special dis4ualification, to pay a fine, to indemnify the @overnment
without su'sidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 2he
:ppellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to
suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lac" of malice in the commission
of the crime, in that, he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and
'enefit 'ut lost the same while he was drun".
I##%&$
.01 the penalties imposed 'y the lower court were e3cessive given the
contention of :ppellant.
'&L($
1o. 2here is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds
were lost while the :ppellant was drun". .hen he entered the plea of guilty, he
there'y admitted, not only his guilt, 'ut also all the material facts alleged in the
information, namely, that he willfully, feloniously and with grave a'use of
confidence, misappropriate, misapply, em'e##le, and convert to his own personal
use and 'enefit, from said funds, the sum of P1,,E/7.77,$ thus clearly indicating
malice or evil intent on his part. His plea of guilt carried with it the ac"nowledgement
or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7', 11e, 91a, 9,
People v. @arcia
Case No. 2+9
No. L-2.73 (Fe-r/ar0 2., 191+)
Chapter :II, Page 293, Footote No. 41
F!C"#$
2he lower court, ignoring the :ppellantDs minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of 9 years, ) months and 1 day of prision correccional to E
years of prision mayor for the crime of ro''ery. R: 97 which amended :rt. E+ of the
RP& 'y reducing from 1E to 1( the age 'elow which the :ppellant has to 'e
committed to the custody or care of a pu'lic or private, 'enevolent or charita'le
institution,$ instead of 'eing convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the
controversy. 2he 8olicitor @eneral 'elieves that the amendment 'y implication has
also amended par. ) of :rt. (E of the RP&, which provides that when the offender is
over 15 and under 1E years of age, the penalty ne3t lower than that prescri'ed 'y
law shall 'e imposed, 'ut always in the proper period.$
I##%&$
.01 the :ppellant, 'eing 17 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of :rt. (E, par. ) of
the RP&.
'&L($
-es. .e find no irreconcila'le conflict 'etween :rt. (E, par. ), as it now stands
and :rt. E+ as amended. 2here is no incompati'ility 'etween granting :ppellant of
the ages of 15 to 1E a privileged mitigating circumstance and fi3ing at 1( the
ma3imum age of persons who are to 'e placed in a reformatory institution. :ll parts
of a statute are to 'e harmoni#ed and reconciled so that effect may 'e given to
each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are
never to 'e supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court 'y an
unam'iguous language.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, ,E'
People v. 2errada, et. al.
Case No. 229
G.R. No. L-23*21 (No8e6-er 21, 19.3)
F!C"#$
7n 1ovem'er 1/51 and May 1/5), :ppellees 7'o, @undran, and 2errado
applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in
&amarines 8ur. 2hese parcels of land were forest land and as such are not
disposa'le. 7n March 1/(), three separate informations for falsification of pu'lic
document were filed against the :ppellees for having conspired with one another
through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the
4ualifications and had complied with all legal re4uirements of the law to entitle them
to a free patent. :ppellees claim that the crime has already prescri'ed according
to the RP&, 'ut the 8tate argues that the crime has not prescri'ed under :ct 1o.
,5E5 where the crime of per!ury prescri'es in E years.
I##%&$
.01 the prescriptive period to 'e applied should 'e 1+ years under the RP&
or E years under :ct 1o. ,5E5.
'&L($
2he E year prescriptive period should 'e applied. Penal statutes must 'e
strictly applied. .here a crime is punisha'le 'y 'oth a special law and the RP& 'ut
with different prescriptive periods, the one favora'le to the accused or the shorter
prescriptive period should 'e applied.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9,, 9E
68 v. 2ori'o
Case No. 3+4
G.R. No. 1+*+ (4a/ar0 2*, 191+)
Chapter :II, Page 291, Footote No. 4.
F!C"#$
Bvidence suggests that :ppellant slaughtered the cara'ao for human
consumption, which is in violation of :ct 1o. 1197, :n :ct Regulating the
Registration, >randing, 8laughter of <arge &attle.$ It appears that in the town of
&armen in >ohol, there arenDt any slaughterhouses. :ppellant suggests that under
such circumstances, the provisions of :ct 1o. 1197 do not penali#e slaughter of large
cattle without permit. :ppellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over
his property ;cara'ao=.
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. 1197 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and
the slaughter of a cara'ao is made therein.
'&L(F
1o. :s long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done
without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the :ct
applies. 2he :ct primarily see"s to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands,
against theft and to ma"e recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it
is to protect the very life and e3istence of the inha'itants of the Philippines, imperiled
'y the continued destruction of large cattle 'y disease, ma"ing it reasona'le for the
legislative to prohi'it and penali#e a perfectly legal act utili#ing personal properties of
citi#ens ;cattle= if not for the e3traordinary conditions0threat present. .ell settled is
the doctrine of the 8tateDs legitimate e3ercise of the right of eminent domain laid
down in !urisprudence. .here the language of the statute is fairly suscepti'le of
many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must 'e
o'served.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, /a, ,7
68 v. @o &hico
Case No. 299
G.R. No. 49*3 (#epte6-er 11, 19+9)
F!C"#$
:ppellant is charged with the violation of 8ec. 1 of :ct 1o. 1(/( or the Alag
<aw, displaying in his store a num'er of medallions, in the form of a small 'utton,
upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Bmilio :guinaldo,
and the flag or 'anner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the
Philippine Islands against the 6.8. :ppellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and
conse4uently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims ac4uittal on the
ground that his guilt must 'e proven 'eyond reasona'le dou't and that the law was
referring to identical$ 'anners, em'lem, flag, etc.
I##%&$
1. .01 to 'e in violation of the Alag <aw, :ppellant must have acted with
criminal intent.
). .01 the wording of the law e3empts the articles displayed 'y the
*efendant.
'&L($
1. 1o, criminal intent isnDt necessary for violation of the Alag <aw.
). 2he medallions, though not e3actly identical, comes within the purview of
the class of articles referred to 'y the law.
Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made 'y statutory re4uirement, criminal
intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial 'ecause to
hold otherwise would render the statute su'stantially worthless, and its e3ecution
impossi'le. 2he statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear
so no interpretation is re4uired. &learly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid
defense for violation thereof. 2he description in the law refers not to a particular flag,
'ut to a type of flag.
L!"IN M!)IMF
5a, 7a, /a, /c, 11a, 9,, a
:rriete v. *irector of Pu'lic .or"s
Case o. 22
G.R. No. 37121 (#epte6-er 3+, 1933)
Chapter :II, Page 29*, Footote No. 12
F!C"#$
:ppellant :rriete, as legal guardian on 'ehalf of minor &armen Jagunap,
sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold 'y the sheriff
in a pu'lic auction to :ppellee <edesma ;and thereafter sold to Aermin &aram= to
satisfy the !udgment of a lien for nonpayment of ta3es, under the Irrigation :ct 1o.
)15). However, it was found that the delin4uent ta3payer was not the owner of said
lots, 'ut &armen Jagunap was.
I##%&$
.01 :ppellee <edesma has any rights over the lots ac4uired in good faith
under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff.
'&L($
1o, she ac4uired no right at all. :ct 1o. )15) provided that regarding
e3propriation of land, the list of lands filed 'y the *irector of Pu'lic <ands must 'e
pu'lished, and notice should 'e given to the owners to file answer or appear in the
civil case. 1o such pu'lication or notice was evident in this case.
It is not sufficient that they had actual$ "nowledge. 8tatutes in the
derogation of rights are construed strictly. 2his is 'ecause people in a repu'lican
state li"e ours en!oy inherent rights guaranteed 'y the &onstitution or protected 'y
law, li"e the right against undue deprivation of property. 2hus, whenever there are
statutes authori#ing the e3propriation of private land or property, these statutes are
construed strictly.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 9,
Provincial &hapter of <aguna v. &7MB<B&
Case No. 24*
G.R. No. L-134*+ (Ma0 27, 19.3)
F!C"#$
1acionalista Party ;1P= filed a petition against Respondent 8an <uis of the
Oilusang >agong <ipunan ;O><= for turncoatism. .hen Respondent 8an <uis ran as
@overnor of <aguna under <i'eral Party ;<P= in 1/7), he won. 2he normal e3piry for
the term was 1/75, 'ut it was e3tended lawfully 'y the President. 1ow ;1/E+= he is
running for @overnor again under O><. 6nder the law, 1o elective pu'lic officer
may change his political party affiliation during his term of office?or within si3 months
immediately preceding or following an election.$
I##%&$
.01 &7MB<B& was correct in dismissing petition which contended that
Respondent 8an <uis should 'e dis4ualified from running due to turncoatism.
'&L($
1o, he cannot 'e dis4ualified. He did not change affiliations during his term.
He was e3pelled from the <P in 1/7E and this canDt 'e construed as a willful change
of affiliation. :t that time, no one even "new when the ne3t elections were, so
Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the ne3t
election.
2he constitutional prohi'ition cannot 'e applied to the period 'eyond the
frame%up ;1/71%1/75= term to which pu'lic officials were elected in 1/71 'ecause this
would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all.
>etween two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict
fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter
construction must 'e adopted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11a, ,7, 9E
@enaro >. Reyes &onstruction Inc. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 1+.71. (4/30 14, 1994)
F!C"#$
Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent *P.H from implementing the
notice of pre%termination in their contract for construction of the flood control
facilities and land improvement wor"s in >utuan &ity. Petitioners won in a pu'lic
'idding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a /.E(C negative
slippage ;delay in the infrastructure pro!ect=, the government was either authori#ed
to ta"e over the pro!ect or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however
claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly 'y *P.H, 'ut also
termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15C.
I##%&$
.01 termination of contract with Petitioners is valid.
'&L($
1o, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the
contract to other 'idders. 2he discretion of Respondent *P.H to terminate or rescind
the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a
negative slippage of 15C or more, according to P.*. 1E7+ and *P.H &ircular 1o.
1+).
2he intent of the law in allowing the government to ta"e over delayed
construction pro!ects with negative slippage of 15C or more is primarily to save
money and to avoid dislocation of the financial pro!ections and0or cash flow of the
government.$ 2erminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously
dis4ualified 'idder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, 1)a
2enorio v. Manila Railroad &o.
Case No. 2.9
G.R. No. L-**9+ (March 29, 1912)
Chapter :II, Page 297, Footote No. *2
F!C"#$
*efendant company too" possession of and occupied a small parcel of land
without the e3press consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore,
alleging that the land is a part of certain lands descri'ed in condemnation
proceedings.
I##%&$
.01 Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for
trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to see" redress in the
condemnation proceedings instituted 'y *efendant company.
'&L($
:s a general rule, the steps prescri'ed 'y the statute must 'e followed or the
proceedings will 'e void. 8ince these statutes are in derogation of general right and
of common%law modes of procedure, they must 'e strictly construed in favor of the
landowner, and must 'e at least su'stantially or Ifully and fairlyD complied with.
In the a'sence of proof of a su'stantial compliance with the provisions of law
touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any
appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result
of an unauthori#ed and unlawful sei#ure and occupation of her property.
2he theory on which the trial !udge correctly proceeded was that *efendant
company having unlawfully ta"en possession of a part of the tract of land in
4uestion, and 'y its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the
Plaintiff. 2hus, Plaintiff is entitled to a'andon the entire tract, and recover damages
for its full value.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)1a, 9,
&ity of Manila v. &hinese &ommunity of Manila, et al.
Case No. *1
G.R. No. L-14311 (,cto-er 31, 1919)
Chapter :II, Page 297, Footote No. *4
F!C"#$
:ppellant presented a petition in the &AI of Manila praying that certain lands,
'e e3propriated for the purpose of constructing a pu'lic improvement N the
e3tension of Ri#al :venue. :ppellee denied that it was either necessary or e3pedient
that the parcels of land 'e e3propriated for street purposes.
I##%&$
.01 in e3propriation proceedings 'y the :ppellant, the courts may in4uire
into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the e3propriation.
'&L($
In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right e3ists for the
e3ercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should in4uire into, and hear
proof upon, those 4uestions ;of necessity=.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in 4uestion may 'e used 'y
the general community of &hinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a pu'lic cemetery, would ma"e the cemetery in 4uestion pu'lic
property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must 'e denied, for the reason that
the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to e3propriate pu'lic property.
Bven granting that a necessity e3ists for the opening of the street in 4uestion,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. 2he record shows that ad!oining and ad!acent lands have 'een offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )9a, 9,
Helasco v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 1*1
G.R. No. L-14214 (Ma0 21, 19*+)
F!C"#$
Petition for naturali#ation of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the
re4uirements of the law.
I##%&$
.01 the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturali#ation.
'&L($
1o. &onsidering that naturali#ation laws should 'e rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant$, we are
constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for
naturali#ation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9,
<ee &ho v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-124+. ((ece6-er 2., 1919)
F!C"#$
>efore an applicant may apply for Philippine citi#enship, the law re4uires that
he file a declaration of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en one year prior to the
filing of application unless he is e3empt from complying with said re4uirement. 2he
law e3empts one from filing a declaration of intention in two casesF ;a= if he is 'orn in
the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school
recogni#ed 'y the governmentJ and ;b= if he has continuously resided in the
Philippines for a period of ,+ years or more provided that he has given primary and
secondary education to all his children either in a pu'lic school or private schools
recogni#ed 'y the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any
declaration of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en 'ecause, as he claims, he has
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than ,+ years and has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
recogni#ed 'y the government.
I##%&$
.01 the Petitioner has complied with the re4uirement of the law regarding his
duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children.
'&L($
1o. 2he government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education
to his daughters :ngelita and <ourdes. 2he reason that :ngelita was not a'le to
complete her studies 'ecause she got married is not only unsatisfactory 'ut 'etrays
the sincerity of Petitioner in em'racing our citi#enship. It was further shown that in
spite of <ourdesDs alleged sic"ness, she continued her studies in a &hinese school
which strictly employed a &hinese curriculum. &onsidering that the provisions of the
1aturali#ation <aw should 'e strictly construed in order that its lauda'le and
nationalistic purpose may 'e fully fulfilled, the 8upreme &ourt concluded that
Petitioner has failed to 4ualify to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en and so his petition should
'e denied.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7', 9,
&o v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 24
G.R. No. L-1211+ (Ma0 2*, 19*+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed his petition for naturali#ation in the trial court. 2he court
ordered that a certificate of naturali#ation 'e issued to Petitioner after the lapse of
two years from the date the decision 'ecame final and all the re4uisites provided for
in R: 5+, were met. 2he government appealed the decision contending that from
the evidence itself introduced 'y Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply
with some of the re4uirements prescri'ed 'y law in order to 4ualify him to 'ecome a
Ailipino citi#en. 2hus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he 'elieves in the principles
underlying the constitution, 'ut rather stated that he 'elieves in democracy upon
cross%e3amination. It is contended that such 'elief is not sufficient to comply with the
re4uirement of the law that one must 'elieve in the principles underlying our
constitution.
I##%&$
.01 the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the 4ualifications for
naturali#ation and none of the dis4ualifications mentioned in the law.
'&L($
-es. In so stating that he 'elieves merely in our laws, Petitioner did not
necessarily refer to those principles em'odied in our constitution which are referred
to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproacha'le
manner in his relation with our government as evidenced 'y his failure to register his
family with the >ureau of Immigration and to file his income ta3 return. &onsidering
that Knaturali#ation laws should 'e rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant,K the 8upreme &ourt held that the trial
court erred in granting the petition for naturali#ation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7', 9,
Mactan &e'u International :irport :uthority v. Marcos
Case No. 117
G.R. No. L-12++.2 (#epte6-er 11, 199*)
Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No. .1
F!C"#$
Respondent &esa, 7I&, 7ffice of the 2reasurer of the &ity of &e'u,
demanded payment for realty ta3es on several parcels of land 'elonging to the
Petitioner, who o'!ected to such demand claiming in its favor 8ec. 19 of R: (/5E
which e3empt it from payment of realty ta3es.
Respondent &ity of &e'u alleges that as an <@6 and a political su'division, it
has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect ta3es within its !urisdiction. 8uch
power is guaranteed 'y the &onstitution

and enhanced further 'y the <@&. .hile it
may 'e true that under its &harter the Petitioner was e3empt from the payment of
realty ta3es,

this e3emption was withdrawn 'y 8ec. ),9 of the <@&.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is a ta3a'le$ person.
'&L($
-es. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a ta3a'le person$ under its
&harter. It was only e3empted from the payment of real property ta3es. 2he grant
of the privilege only in respect of this ta3 is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to
ma"e it a ta3a'le person su'!ect to all ta3es, e3cept real property ta3.
Bven if the Petitioner was originally not a ta3a'le person for purposes of real
property ta3, in light of the foregoing dis4uisitions, it had already 'ecome, a ta3a'le
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of 8ec. ),9 of
e3emptions from the payment of real property ta3es.
8ince ta3es are what we pay for civili#ed society,

or are the life'lood of the
nation, the law frowns against e3emptions from ta3ation and statutes granting ta3
e3emptions are thus construed strictissimi (uris against the ta3payers and li'erally in
favor of the ta3ing authority.

Blse wise stated, ta3ation is the rule, e3emption therefore
is the e3ception.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9,
2he Roman &atholic :postolic &hurch in the Philippines v. :. .. Hastings, :ssessor
and &ollector of the &ity of Manila, and the &ity of Manila
Case No. 13*
G.R. No. 1974 (March 11, 19+*)
Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. 79
F!C"#$
In 1/+1, :ppellant imposed a ta3 upon the residence of the Roman &atholic
arch'ishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was e3empt from ta3ation as
provided 'y 8ec. 9E of :ct 1o. 1E, of the Philippine &ommission. 2he :ppellant
contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not ad!acent to the
cathedral, 'eing E+ to 1++ meters distant from the church, and that the e3emption
privilege was already e3hausted 'y its allowance to the parsonage of the ad!oining
chapel.
I##%&$
.01 the house of the arch'ishop of Manila should 'e e3empted from ta3.
'&L($
In enacting its e3emption laws, the &ommission had in view not only the conditions
peculiar to and inherent in Roman &atholic parishes in the Islands, 'ut their intent was
to e3tend the e3emption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. :nd it is a
general rule that statutes e3empting charita'le and religious property from ta3ation
should 'e construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as
to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. :lthough separated from the
cathedral 'y an intervening 'loc", and although a parsonage within the area was
already e3empt, the residence of the arch'ishop should still 'e e3empted from
ta3ation as a parsonage ad!acent to the cathedral.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, /', 9,
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt 7f :ppeals, &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals and
:teneo de Manila 6niversity
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 111349 (!pr23 1., 1997)
Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. .1
F!C"#$
Private Respondent is a non%stoc", non%profit educational institution with
au3iliary units and 'ranches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of
Philippine &ulture ;IP&=, which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine
society and culture. In 1/E,, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the
institutionDs ta3 lia'ilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an
independent contractor$ within the purview of 8ec. )+5 of the 2a3 &ode, and was
conducting studies for a fee, and therefore su'!ect to ,C contractorDs ta3.
I##%&$
.01 Private Respondent, through its au3iliary unit or 'ranch, the IP&,
performing the wor" of an independent contractor and, thus su'!ect to ,C
contractorDs ta3 levied 'y 8ec. )+5 of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode.
'&L($
1o. 2he research activity of the IP& was done in pursuance of maintaining private
RespondentDs university status and not in the course of an independent 'usiness of
selling such research with profit in mind. 2here was no evidence that the IP& ever
sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in 'usiness apart from the
academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of ta3
e3emption without first applying a strict interpretation of the ta3 laws.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9,
Manila Railroad &ompany v. Insular &ollector of &ustoms
Case No. 1*7
G.R. No. 3+2*4 (March 12, 1929)
F!C"#$
:ppellee Manila Railroad &ompany used dust shields made of wool on all of
its railway wagons to cover the a3le 'o3 which protects from dust the oil deposited
therein which serves as lu'ricant of the 'earings of the wheel. 6nder par. 191 of 8ec.
E of the 2ariff <aw of 1/+/, manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for are
su'!ect to 9+C ad valorem. 7n the other hand, under par. 1/7 of same law, vehicles
for use on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof are su'!ect to 1+C ad
valorem. :ppellant Insular &ollector of &ustoms classified dust shields as
manufactures of wool, not otherwise provided for.$ 6pon appeal, however, the &AI
overruled the decision and classified dust shields as detached parts$ of vehicles for
use on railways.
I##%&$
.hether dust shields should 'e classified as manufactures of wool or as
detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
'&L($
*ust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of
vehicles under par. 1/7. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying
ta3es not to e3tend their provisions 'eyond the clear import of the language used. In
case of dou't, they should 'e construed strictly against the government and in favor
of the citi#en. :nd when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a
general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is em'raced in
the former, the particular enactment must 'e operative, and the general one must
'e ta"en to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
<:2I1 M:GIMF
,Ea, 9,, 5+
Repu'lic v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. 21*
G.R. No. L-*9344 (!pr23 2*, 1991)
F!C"#$
Respondent spouses :ntonio and &lara Pastor owed the @overnment P1,)E,,
()1.(, for ta3es from the years 1/55%1/5/. : reinvestigation of their de't was made
and the amount was changed to P17,117.+E. 2hey applied for ta3 amnesty under
P.*. ),, )1, and ,7+. *ue to this, their de't even decreased to a'out P1),+++. 2hey
paid such de't to the @overnment and had receipts as proofs of such.
2he @overnment contended that the spouses could not avail of the ta3
amnesty under P.*. )1, 'ecause of Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) which stated that
amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the >IR.
Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) was
null 'ecause P.*. )1, did not contain any e3emption wherein one should not 'e
allowed to amnesty.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent spouses were properly given ta3 amnesty.
'&L($
-es, 'ecause Revenue Regulation 1o. E%7) was null and void. If Revenue
Regulation 1o. E%7) provided an e3ception to the coverage of P.*. )1,, then such
provision is null and void for 'eing contrary to the Presidential *ecree. Revenue
regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential *ecree.
L!"IN M!)IM$
E, )(
Misamis 7riental :ssociation of &oco 2raders, Inc. v. *epartment of Ainance
8ecretary
Case No. .2
G.R. No. 1+.124 (No8e6-er 1+, 1994)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a corporation whose mem'ers are engaged in 'uying and selling
copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum &ircular ;RM&= 97%/1, copra was classified as
a food product under 8ec. 1+,;'= of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode and
therefore e3empt from ta3 in all stages, including distri'ution.
6nder 8ec. 1+,;a=, the sale of agricultural 171%food products in their original
state is e3empt from H:2 only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of
the land which the same is produced. 6nder 8ec. 1+,;'=, the sale of agricultural
food products in their original state is e3empt from H:2 in all stages.
RM& 97%/1 then reclassified copra as a non%food product.
I##%&$
.01 copra is an agricultural food product which is e3empt from H:2 and thus
not under the purview of RM& 97%/1.
'&L($
1o, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not e3empt from H:2. 2he
&ommissioner of Internal RevenueDs interpretation is entitled to great respect
'ecause it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and
implementation of ta3 laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and E+C of the
coconut plant is edi'le, copra per se is not intended for human consumption.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 9)a, '
:cting &ommissioner of &ustoms v. Manila Blectric &ompany
Case No. 3
G.R. No. L-23*23 (4/e 3+, 1977)
F!C"#$
R: 1,/9 e3empted payment of special import ta3 for spare parts used for
industries and also insulators from all ta3es of whatever nature. Respondent contends
that their insulating oils are e3empt from ta3es.
I##%&$
.01 insulating oil is an insulator ma"ing Respondent e3empt from paying its
ta3es.
'&L($
1o, insulating oil is different from insulators. 2he 8upreme &ourt loo"ed into
the definition of insulating oils$ under Materials Hand'oo" 'y @eorge J. >rady, E
th
Bdition.
2he court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as
insulating. :nd there is no 4uestion that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing
is used for cooling instead of insulating. 2he law frowns on e3emption from ta3ationJ
hence an e3empting provision must 'e construed stictissimi (uris.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9,, '
&ollector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc.
Case No. *.
G.R. No. L-.711 (March 23, 191*)
Chapter :II, Page 3+4, Footote No. 97
F!C"#$
Respondents Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc. and Philippine Racing &lu' Inc. are
corporations organi#ed primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending that
payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease
are su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3 in the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode.
I##%&$
.01 rentals received 'y the Respondents from private horse owners or
trainers, the P&87, the .hite &ross, the Philippine :nti%2u'erculosis 8ociety are
su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3.
'&L($
2he law refers to gross receipts$ and not gross income$. 2his clause is plain
demonstration that the gross receipts$ refer to the collections on days when the
race trac" is open to the general pu'lic and admission fees are or are not charged.
2his necessarily e3cludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do
not legally and actually hold horse races. 2he lease 'y the Respondents of the land
clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to 'e remem'ered that the law
ma"es the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place lia'le for the
amusement ta3, the three ta3 payers 'eing connected 'y the dis!unctive
con!unction or$, there'y positively implying that the ta3 should 'e paid 'y either the
proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may 'e, singly and not all at one
and the same time.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )7
People v. &astaReda Jr.
Case No. 1+4
G.R. No. L-4*..1 (#epte6-er 11, 19..)
Chapter :II, Page 3+*, Footote No. 1+2
F!C"#$
Respondents were charged of E criminal cases for violating the 1ational
Internal Revenue &ode for manufacturing alcoholic products su'!ect to specific ta3
without having paid the annual privilege ta3 therefore. Respondents argued that
they are e3empt from ta3es 'ecause they are entitled to the 'enefits availa'le
under P.*. ,7+ which declares ta3 amnesty.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent is entitled to the 'enefits of ta3 amnesty under the P.*.
'&L($
2o 'e entitled to the e3tinction of lia'ility provided 'y P.*. ,7+, the claimant
must have voluntarily disclosed his previously unta3ed income or wealth and paid the
re4uired 15C ta3 on such previously unta3ed income or wealth. .here the disclosure
was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the 'enefits e3pressly e3cluded from
the coverage of P.*. ,7+. In the instant case, the violations with which the
Respondents were charged had already 'een discovered 'y the >IR when P.*. ,7+
too" effect. It is necessary to note that the Kvalid information under R: ),,EK referred
to in 8ec. 1;a=;9= of P.*. ,7+ refers not to a criminal information filed in court 'y a
fiscal or special prosecutor, 'ut rather to the sworn information or complaint filed 'y
an informer with the >IR under R: ),,E in the hope of earning an informerLs reward.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )5a, 9,
Pamora v. &ity of Manila
Case No. 171
G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 19+7)
F!C"#$
:ct 1o. /75 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have
paid an e3cessive assessment on ta3es prior to the creation of the >oard of 2a3
revision.
Petitioner prays that the word land$ in the title and 'ody of the statute 'e
interpreted to mean land including 'uildings and improvements thereon$.
I##%&$
.01 the word land$ should 'e interpreted li'erally to mean land with the
'uildings and improvements thereon.
'&L($
.hile the distinction does not appear to have 'een consciously made in :ct
1o. 1),, it is disregarded in :ct 1os. E) and 551. 2he rule of strict construction of
statutes granting e3emptions from ta3ation is not applica'le in this case. 2his rule is
not without its e3ceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of !ustice suggest
that the act under consideration should 'e construed with some li'erality. It is a
remedial statute, providing for a refund of ta3es which have 'een collected un!ustly
and upon an unfair and ine4uita'le valuation of land. .hile some of the :cts of the
&ommission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a
special signification, nevertheless such use has not 'een uniform and the deviations
therefrom have 'een so fre4uent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /d, /f, )7, ')
Repu'lic Alour Mills, Inc. v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 219
G.R. No. L- 21*+2 31 (Fe-r/ar0 1., 197+)
F!C"#F
In 1/57, Petitioner was granted ta3%e3emption privileges pursuant to R: /+1.
In 1/5E, Petitioner imported a 4uantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used in
the 'usiness that year. 2he surplus of wheat grains were finally utili#ed into flour and
sold in 1/5/. Petitioner paid sales ta3 of P,7,)75.55, 'ut the cost of wheat left over
was treated as deducti'le item from gross sales in 1/5/. Respondent &ommissioner
finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency ta3 of P),,17+.17 'ecause materials
purchased from ta3%e3empt industries were not ac4uired from one en!oying ta3%
e3emption privilege under our laws.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent &ommissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales ta3.
'&L(F
1o. 8ec. 1E(%: of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a ta3%free product
is utili#ed in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the
value of such finished article, the value of such ta3%free product shall 'e deducted.
.hile It is true that ta3 e3emptions ;and deductions= are not favored in the law, and
are construed strictissimi !uris against the ta3payer, it is e4ually a recogni#ed principle
that where the provision of the law is clear and unam'iguous, so that there is no
occasion for the courtDs see"ing the legislative intent, the law must 'e ta"en as it is,
devoid of !udicial addition or su'traction.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, 7a, 9,
:!ero v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 1
G.R. No. 1+*72+ (#epte6-er 11, 1994)
F!C"#F
Petitioners filed a petition for pro'ate of holographic will left 'y the late :nnie
8and. 2hey alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was
capacitated to dispose of her estate 'y will.
Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was
not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was
also opposed 'y *r. Jose :!ero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of
the property. 2he trial court granted and0or admitted the decedentDs holographic
will to pro'ate. 7n appeal, said *ecision was reversed 'y the &: for its failure to
comply with :rt. E1, and E19 of the 1ew &ivil &ode.
I##%&F
.01 the &: is correct that the will did not comply with the law.
'&L(F
1o. Aailure to strictly o'serve other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is un4uestiona'ly handwritten 'y the testator. :rt. E1, of
the 1ew &ivil &ode affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, 'ut not its
pro'ate. : holographic will can still 'e admitted to pro'ate, notwithstanding non%
compliance with :rt. E19. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lac"
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, 'ut not its entirety.
2he &:, however, correctly held that :nnie 8and could not dispose the other
property including the house and lot, which she shares with her fatherDs other heirs.
L!"IN M!)IMF
1, (c, 7a, /a
In reF 2estate Bstate of 2ampoy
Case No. *1
G.R. No. L-14322 (Fe-r/ar0 21, 19*+)
F!C"#F
In the matter of Petition for Pro'ate Proceedings 'efore the &AI of &e'u, the
will consists of two pages and the last page had 'een duly signed 'y the testatri3
and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page 'ut the testatri3
failed to sign the left margin of the first page.
2he lower court denied the petition 'ecause the will was not e3ecuted in
accordance with law, citing 8ec. (1E of :ct 1o. 1/+, as amended.
I##%&F
.01 the pro'ate court ;&AI= is correct in denying the petition for the
allowance of the will.
'&L(F
-es. 8ec. (1E of :ct 1o. 1/+, as amended, re4uires that the testator sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the
latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator
and of each other, which re4uirement should 'e e3pressed in the attestation clause.
2his re4uirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the
will. 2hus, it has 'een held that 8tatutes prescri'ing the formalities to 'e o'served in
the e3ecution of wills are very strictly construed. : will must 'e e3ecuted in
accordance with the statutory re4uirementsJ otherwise it is entirely void. :ll these
re4uirements stand as of e4ual importance and must 'e o'served, and courts
cannot supply the defective e3ecution of the will.$ :ccordingly, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot 'e
admitted to pro'ate.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, 7a
:.<. :mmen 2ransportation &ompany, Inc. v. >or!a
Case No. 1
G.R. No. L-1771+ (!/g/st 31, 19*2)
F!C"#$
Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the &AI of :l'ay to recover
compensation for overtime wor" rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent
filed the present proceedings on the &ourt of Industrial Relations.
I##%&$
1. .01 the scope of the term action$ falls under R: 1//9.
). .01 the &ourt of Industrial Relations has !urisdiction.
'&L($
1. 2he Petitioner contends that the phrase action already commenced$
employed in the statute should 'e construed as meaning only actions filed in a
regular court of !ustice. .ith this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot agree.
2he statute under consideration is undou'tedly a la'or statute and as such must 'e
li'erally construed in favor of the la'orer concerned.
). 2he allegation in the complaint filed 'y the Respondent employee that he
was separated automatically from the said employment with *efendants, and
notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, *efendants refused and still refuse to
reinstate Plaintiff,$ and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs !ustify the
conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages.
2his was within the !urisdiction of the &ourt of Industrial Relations.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a
<a#o v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 7+
G.R. No. 7.*17 (4/e 1., 199+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is a security guard of the &entral >an" of the Philippines assigned to
its main office. His regular tour of duty is from )pm to 1+pm. 7n June 1E, 1/E(, the
Petitioner rendered full duty. >ut, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed
to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the ne3t day. 7n his way
home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained in!uries. Aor in!uries sustained,
he claimed for disa'ility 'enefits under P.*. ()( 'ut was denied 'y the @8I8.
I##%&$
.01 the denial of compensation under P.*. ()( was valid.
'&L($
1o. In the case at 'ar, it can 'e seen that Petitioner left his station at the
&entral >an" several hours after his regular time off, 'ecause the reliever did not
come on time. 2here is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his
usual, regular homeward route. .hile presumption of compensa'ility and theory of
aggravation under the .or"menDs &ompensation :ct may have 'een a'andoned
under the 1ew <a'or &ode, it is significant that the li'erality of the law in general
favor of the wor"ingman still su'sists.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a
Hillavert v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 313
G.R. No. L-4.*+1 ((ece6-er 14, 19.1)
F!C"#$
2he Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Hillavert, who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine &onsta'ulary.
8he filed a claim for income 'enefits for the death of her son under P.*. ()(, as
amended, with the @8I8. 2he said claim was denied 'y the @8I8 on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner
had failed to show that there was a causal connection 'etween the fatal ailment of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. 2he Petitioner appealed to the B&&
which affirmed the denial.
I##%&$
.01 the B&& committed grave a'use of discretion in denying the claim of
the Petitioner.
'&L($
Arom the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated 'y the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and cler" typist of the
Philippine &onsta'ulary. 2here is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a 'out of
alcoholic into3ication$ shortly 'efore he died. 1either is there a showing that he used
drugs. :ll dou'ts in the implementation and interpretation of this &ode, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall 'e resolved in favor of the la'or.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a
:'ella v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 71.13 (4/30 2+, 19.7)
F!C"#$
Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda *anaoNRamona, in 1egros
7ccidental for a period of ten years. It is renewa'le at her instance, which she opted
to do, for another ten years. *uring the e3istence of the lease she employed the
private Respondents. 6pon e3piration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed the
two Respondents.
I##%&$
.01 the Respondents are entitled to separation pays.
'&L($
-es. 2he applica'le law on the case is :rt. )E9 of the <a'or &ode.
1otwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision
violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of o'ligations and
contracts, 'ecause when she leased the farm land, neither she nor the lessor
contemplated the creation of the o'ligation to pay separation pay to the wor"ers
upon the e3piration of the lease. 2he court held such contention untena'le as the
issue had already 'een ad!udicated in the case of :nucension v. 1<R&. It was stated
in the said case that the prohi'ition to impair the o'ligation of contracts is not
a'solute and un4ualified. 2he prohi'ition is general.$ 2he court further stated that the
purpose of :rt. )E9 is for the protection of the wor"ers whose employment is
terminated 'ecause of the closure of esta'lishment. .ithout such law, employees
li"e the Respondents will lose the 'enefits to which they are entitled. Moreover, it is
well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
<a'or &ode, the wor"erDs welfare should 'e the primordial and paramount
consideration, and that all dou'ts shall 'e resolved in favor of la'or.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, /a, /d
*el Rosario M 8ons v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission
Case No. 3*
No. L-*42+4 (Ma0 31, 19.1)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with
&almar 8ecurity :gency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. 2he security
guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against
the Petitioner and the security agency. 2he <a'or :r'iter found the security agency
to 'e lia'le for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging
company.
2he security agency appealed the case to the 1<R&. 2he latter allowed the
appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure 'y which the
appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.
I##%&$
.01 the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should
invalidate the appeal.
'&L($
1o. :ccording to :rt. ))1 of the <a'or &ode, in any proceeding 'efore the
&ommission or any of the <a'or :r'iters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or e4uity shall not 'e controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the &ode that
the &ommission and the :r'iters shall use every and all reasona'le means to
ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of !ustice.$ 2he lac"
of verification could have easily 'een corrected 'y ma"ing an oath and even
though the payment was late, it was still paid.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /d, 9+'
Manahan v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 79
G.R. No. L-44.99 (!pr23 22, 19.1)
F!C"#$
1a#ario Manahan, Jr., died of Bnteric Aever while he was employed as a
teacher in the <as PiRas Municipal High 8chool. 2he claimant, the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim in the @8I8 for she contends that the death of her hus'and
was due to his occupation. However, @8I8 denied such claim. &laimant filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to
his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attri'uta'le to his
employment. :gain she was denied 'y the @8I8. 8he then appealed her case to
the Bmployees &ompensation &ommission which also denied her claim.
I##%&$
.01 the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim 'enefits.
'&L($
-es. 2he findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in
perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his
employment, he was treated for Bpigastric pain% and ulcer%li"e symptoms. 2his was
supported 'y his medical records and a medical certificate issued 'y *r. >erna'e.
Bpigastric pain is a symptom of 6lcer and 6lcer is a common complication of Bnteric
Aever.
Pursuant to the doctrine of &orales v. B&&, the provisions of the .or"menDs
&ompensation :ct shall 'e applied, thus the presumption of compensa'ility should
'e in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of dou't, the case
should 'e resolved in favor of the wor"er and that <a'or laws should 'e li'erally
construed to give relief to the wor"er and his dependents.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, /a, /d, 9+'
<iwanag v. .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 71
G.R. No. L-121*4 (Ma0 2, 1919)
F!C"#$
:ppellants >enito <iwanag and Maria <iwanag Reyes are co%owners of
<iwanag :uto 8uppy. 2hey hired Ro4ue >alderama as a security guard, who was
"illed in the line of duty 'y criminals. His widow and children filed a claim for
compensation with the .or"menDs &ompensation &ommission, which was granted in
an award that ordered the :ppellants to pay !ointly and severally the amount of
P,,9/9.9+ to the claimant in lump sum. :ppellants did not 4uestion the right of
:ppellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. However, they claim that
'ecause the .or"menDs &ompensation :ct did not give an e3press provision
declaring solidary o'ligations of 'usiness partners, the compensation should 'e
divisi'le.
I##%&$
.01 the &ommission erred in ordering the :ppellants to pay !ointly and
severally.
'&L($
1o. :lthough the .&: does not contain any provision e3pressly declaring
that the o'ligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show
how their lia'ility is solidary. :rt. 1711 and 171) of the 1ew &ivil &ode and 8ec. ) of
the .&: reasona'ly indicate that in compensation cases, the lia'ility of 'usiness
partners should 'e solidary. If the responsi'ility were to 'e merely !ointly, and one of
them happens to 'e insolvent, the award would only 'e partially satisfied, which is
evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. 2he
.&: should 'e construed fairly, reasona'ly and li'erally for the employee and
dependents.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, /d, ,(, ,E, 9+
8i'ulo v. :ltar
Case No. 279
G.R. No. L-191* (!pr23 3+, 1949)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of
tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the wor" animals and farm
implements and Respondent was to defray all e3penses of planting and cultivation.
2he net produce was to 'e divided e4ually. 2he contract was disapproved 'y the
2enancy <aw Bnforcement *ivision of the *epartment of Justice 'ecause the division
contravenes with a provision of the 2enancy <aw. It was ta"en to the &ourt of
Industrial Relations, which declared the contract illegal as against pu'lic policy as
contemplated in 8ec. 7 of the 2enancy <aw, for the reason that instead of receiving
(+C of his total share, the tenant shall receive 5+C only. Petitioner claimed that the
contract is not among those e3pressly declared to 'e against pu'lic policy in 8ec. 7
of the 2enancy <aw, which he argues to 'e an e3haustive list.
I##%&$
.01 the contract is against pu'lic policy as contemplated in 8ec. 7 of the
2enancy <aw.
'&L($
1o. In declaring certain stipulations to 'e against pu'lic policy, the legislature
could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified, are
similar to those e3pressly mentioned. 2he purpose of the law might easily 'e
defeated otherwise. 2he 2enancy :ct is a remedial legislation intended to 'etter the
lot of the share%cropper 'y giving him a more e4uita'le participation in the produce
of the land which he cultivates. >eing a remedial statute, it should 'e construed to
further its purpose in accordance with its general intent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, 1)a, ,(, 9+
@uerrero v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 14
G.R. No. L-4417+ (Ma0 3+,19.*)
Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 12*
F!C"#$
:polonio >enite# was hired 'y the Petitioners to wor" in their plantation. He
was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 10, of
the proceeds with his coconut%related responsi'ilities. :fterwards, the Petitioners and
>enite# e3ecuted an agreement allowing >enite# to continue wor"ing as tenantJ the
:gricultural 2enancy :ct would govern their relationship. <ater the Petitioners ordered
>enite# out. >enite# sued in the &ourt of :grarian Relations, which ordered his
reinstatement. 2he Petitioners appealed to the &:, which affirmed the &ourt of
:grarian ReformDs decision. 2he Petitioners then appealed to the 8upreme &ourt.
Pending appeal, the &ode of :grarian Reforms was passed repealing the
:gricultural 2enancy :ct. 2he Petitioners then claimed that since the 'asis of the suit
was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity.
I##%&$
.01 share tenancy ended.
'&L($
1o. :n agreement is not a'rogated 'y the su'se4uent repeal of the law.
2he phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants
into farmhands or hired la'orers with no rights. 2he :gricultural 2enancy :ct and
:gricultural <and Reform &ode have not 'een entirely repealed 'y the &ode of
:grarian Reform. >ut assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a statute
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the e3ception when
vested rights are affected and o'ligations of contract are impaired.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 1), ,), ,E
Hicente v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 1*.
G.R. No. .1+24 (4a/ar0 23, 1991)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. :t the course of his
employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. 8o at
the age of forty%five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income
'enefits$ under the @8I8 retirement program. 2he application was supported 'y a
physicianDs certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total
disa'ility.$ 2he significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could
avail of the full income 'enefits. @8I8 contended that Petitioner was only permanent
partial disa'ility$. 2he B&& affirmed the @8I8 decision.
I##%&F
.hether Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility or permanent partial
disa'ility.
'&L($
Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility. 2he test of whether or not an
employee suffers from permanent total disa'ility is a showing of the capacity of the
employee to continue performing his wor" notwithstanding the disa'ility he incurred.
2he &ourt ta"es this occasion to stress once more its a'iding concern for the welfare
of government wor"ers, especially the hum'le ran" and file. It is for this reason that
the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its 'eneficiaries and re4uires a
construction of utmost li'erality in their favor.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 11', 1)a
2amayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel &ompany
Case No. 2.3
G.R. No. L-.971 (4/e 29, 1917)
F!C"#$
)(5 employees of :ppellee Manila Hotel &o., who had to 'e dismissed and
paid the value of their accumulated leave under 8ec. )(( of the :dministrative
&ode, as amended 'y R: (11, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on
June ,+, 1/59, 'rought the present action to recover from the :ppellee Manila Hotel
&o. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to 'e due them under the
same section of the :dministrative &ode, as later amended 'y R: 1+E1, approved
on June 15, 1/59, that is to say, 15 days 'efore they were separated from the
company.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued 'enefits.
'&L($
1o. :rt. 9 of the 1ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided. :s R: 1+E1 does not provide that it is to have a
retroactive effect, it can only 'e given effect from the date of its approval.
L!"IN M!)IMF
9(a
&orporal v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. .3
G.R. No. .*+2+ (!/g/st 1, 1994)
F!C"#F
1orma &orporal was an employed pu'lic school teacher. *uring the course
of her wor", she had several pregnancies. 7n her 9
th
pregnancy, she suffered
complete a'ortion. 7n her 5
th
pregnancy, she gave 'irth to a 'a'y 'oy with the
help of a hilot$. :n hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal
'leeding. 8he underwent hysterectomy 'ut she died afterwards. Her hus'and,
herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation 'enefit with @8I8. >ut said agency
denied. 2he matter was elevated to B&& 'ut the petition was also dismissed 'ecause
the cause of his wifeDs death was non%wor"%related.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner could avail the compensation 'enefit.
'&L($
1o. 2he determination of whether the prolapse of 1ormaDs uterus developed
'efore or after her 5
th
pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her
physiological structure and changes in the 'ody. .hile as a rule that la'or and
social welfare legislation should 'e li'erally construed in favor of the applicant, there
is also a rule that such li'eral construction cannot 'e applied if the pertinent
provisions of the <a'or &ode are clear.
L!"IN M!)IMF
(c, 9,
People v. Moran
Case No. 21*
G.R. No. 179+1 (4a/ar0 27, 1923)
Chapter :II, Page 32+, Footote No. 1*7
F!C"#$
:ppellant was punished for violating the Blection <aw. .hen the decision
was pu'lished, it was increased to ( months. *efendant alleges that the crime has
already prescri'ed, pursuant to 8ec. 71 of :ct 1o. ,+,+, which was enacted 'y the
<egislature on March /, 1/)).
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. ,+,+ is meant to apply to the :dministrative &ode and whether
the said act should 'e retroactive with respect to :rt. )) and 7 of the RP&.
'&L($
:ct 1o. ,+,+ is intended to 'e amendatory to several sections of the
:dministrative &ode. Aurthermore, :rt. )) of the RP& can only 'e invo"ed with
reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to :rt. 7, the 8& contends
that :rt. )) should still apply to special laws.
:lso, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the
penalty. : statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to
annul prosecution of the offender. .hen the statute ma"es no distinction, it ma"es
no e3ception. 8tatutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to
destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention.
2he new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign
ac"nowledges that the previous one was un!ust and enforcing the latter would 'e
contradictory.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)(, ,7, 9(a, 9E
People v. Reyes
Case No. 222
G.R. Nos. 7422*-227 (4/30 27, 19.9)
Chapter :II, Page 32+, Footote No. 1*.
F!C"#$
7n June 1/E,, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of
their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mi#aph Reyes through falsified
signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the deed
was registered on May )(, 1/(1, the lower courts held that the period of prescription
has long passed.
I##%&$
.hether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the
passing of the prescriptive period.
'&L($
2he 8& ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of
land acts as a notice to the whole world. 6nder this, it is also presumed that the
purchaser has e3amined the instruments of the record.
2he court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of
criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not 'e left on a
precarious 'alance, always suscepti'le possi'le challenges. 2his should also apply to
criminal cases.
Aurthermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and
that of the prescription of crimes, a li'eral reading that is most favora'le to the
accused is the one to 'e adopted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9E
>oard of :dministrators of the PH: v. >autista
Case No. 37
G.R. No. L-37.*7 (Fe-r/ar0 22, 19.2)
Chapter :II, Page 321, Footote No. 17+
F!C"#$
Respondent @asilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to
receive his pension. :fter finally complying with all the necessities, he was awarded
with the full 'enefits of R: (5, 8ec. / and R: 1/)+, for P1++ a month and an
additional P1+ per minor. <ater, on June )), 1/(/, R: 575, was approved. However,
due to the lac" of funds, Respondent @asilao only received a )5C increase and only
after January 15, 1/71.
2he lower court granted Respondent @asilao his pension, starting from
*ecem'er 1E, 1/55 at the rate of P5+, and then P1++ plus P1+ per minor, from June
)), 1/57 up to :ugust 7, 1/(E. 2o pay the difference of P1++ plus P,+ per month and
P)+ per month for each minor from June )), 1/(/ up to January 15, 1/71, the
difference of P75 plus P)).5+ per month for his wife, and P)+ per minor from January
1(, 1/71 up to *ecem'er ,1, 1/71.
I##%&$
.01 the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent @asilaoDs
pension.
'&L($
Respondent @asilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the
prescriptive period for filing for his pension. 2he laws on veteran pension must 'e
li'erally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. @ranting such
pensions the earliest possi'le time is more in tune with the spirit of R: (5. >ut, as the
government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the !udgment of the lower courts
is modified as, effective *ecem'er 1E, 1/55 at P5+ plus P1+ per month for each
minor, increased to P1++ from June )), 1/57 to :ugust 7, 1/(E. 2he difference from
June )), 1/(/ to January 19, 1/7) is su'!ect to the release of funds 'y the
government.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9+'
<egaspi v. B3ecutive 8ecretary and :grarian Reforms
Case No. 141
No. L-3*113 (No8e6-er 2., 1971)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an employee of the *epartment of :grarian Reforms, sent a letter
to the Respondent 8ecretary of the *epartment, &onrado Bstrella. Petitioner
e3pressed his desire to 'e laid%off under the provisions of R: ,E99, as amended 'y R:
(,E/, on the condition that he would also 'e paid the gratuity 'enefits to which he
might 'e entitled under &.:. 1o. 1E(, as amended 'y R: 1(1(. @8I8 approved his
retirement gratuity under &.:. 1o. 1E(, as amended 'y R: 1(1( 'ut denied his claim
for gratuity under R: ,E99, as amended 'y R: (,E/.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner is entitled to 'oth gratuity 'enefits under &.:. 1o. 1E(, as
amended 'y R: 1(1(, and R: ,E99, as amended 'y R: (,E/.
'&L($
1o. 2here is nothing in R: ,E99, as amended 'y R: (,E/, that would suggest
that an employee who is laid%off or prefers to 'e laid%off can receive two pension
'enefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to &.:. 1o. 1E(.
2his interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law em'odied in &.:.
1o. 1E( prohi'iting an employer from paying dou'le retirement 'enefits to an
employee. >eing the law governing the retirement of government employees, all
other laws e3tending retirement 'enefits to government employees should, in case of
am'iguity, 'e construed in relation to &.:. 1o. 1E( and in the light of its provisions. It
is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is
understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same su'!ect matter,
and that in the a'sence of an e3press repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision should 'e deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy em'odied in
prior statutes, which should all 'e construed together.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, ,E'
ReF Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices
Case No. *+
!.M. No. +9-9-+19-#C (,cto-er 4, 199+)
F!C"#$
2his matter was 'rought a'out due to two separate pu'lications in the 7fficial
@a#ette of the same amendment to R: /1+ ;8pecial Retirement <aw of Judges and
Justices=. P.*. 19,E was pu'lished in Hol. 79 of the 7fficial @a#ette, 1o. ,+, which did
not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the si3th year of
retirement. However, in Hol. 79 of the 7fficial @a#ette, 1o. 91 provided that the
monthly pension starting from the si3th year of retirement is e4uivalent to the monthly
salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. 8ince 1/7E however, @8I8
computed the monthly pension as followsF 1= highest salary, plus )= highest
representation and transportation allowances ;R:2:=, plus ,= longevity pay ;which
was considered part of the salary starting in 1/E, pursuant to 8ec. 9), >P 1)/=. 2he
'asis was the copy of P.*. 19,E which was pu'lished in Hol. 79 of the 7fficial @a#ette,
1o. ,+.
I##%&$
.hich version of P.*. 19,E must 'e followed.
'&L($
2he &ourt directed @8I8 to continue implementing R: /1+, as amended 'y
P.*. 19,E, in the same manner as it has done since 1/7E. 2his is definitely more in
"eeping with and gives su'stance to the elementary rule of statutory construction
that, 'eing remedial in character, retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to 'e 'enefited and all dou'ts as to
the intent of the law should 'e resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its
humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with
relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor 'ut, more so, for
those who have 'een incapacitated 'y illness or accident.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9+'
ReF :pplication Aor Retirement 6nder R.:. 1o. /1+ of :ssociate Justice Ramon >.
>ritanico of the I:&
Case No. 12.
!.M. No. *4.4-Ret. (Ma0 11, 19.9)
F!C"#$
Justice >ritanico re4uested that he 'e granted retirement 'enefits under R:
/1+ in addition to or in lieu of 'enefits he received under R: 1(1( upon termination of
his service in the Judiciary 'y the acceptance of his courtesy resignation 'y President
:4uino, pursuant to Proclamation 1o. 1 dated Ae'ruary )5, 1/E(, re4uiring all
appointive pu'lic officials to su'mit their courtesy resignations 'eginning with the
mem'ers of the 8upreme &ourt. Justice >ritanico served the government for ,(.),
years, of which 1+ years, ) months, and )7 days were served in the Judiciary. :s
provided in 8ec. 1 of R: /1+, the !udges or !ustices who may en!oy retirement 'enefits
with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered at least )+ years service in the
!udiciary or in any other 'ranch of the government or 'oth.$ 2hey fall into three
categoriesF
G G G
). those who resign 'y reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their
office and had rendered at least )+ years service in the !udiciary or in any
other 'ranch of the government or 'oth
G G G
I##%&$
.hich category Justice >ritanico 'elongs to.
'&L($
He 'elongs to the second category of 8ec. 1. 2he acceptance of his
courtesy resignation, not 'eing a voluntary resignation ;as held in 3rti4 v+ /3M-5-/=,
resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have
very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 7+ years.
Retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed to and applied in favor of the
persons intended to 'e 'enefited there'y.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 9+', 9,c
ReF @regorio @. Pineda
Case No. 132
!.M. No. *7.9-R&" (4/3 13, 199+)
F!C"#$
2hese are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed 'y si3 retired !udges,
namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de <ara, Montecillo, Paredes and @erochi, as"ing that
they 'e granted gratuity and0or retirement 'enefits under R: /1+, as amended, in
addition to or in lieu of the 'enefits under R: 1(1( or P.*. 119(. 2hey want to ta"e
advantage of the Plana and >ritanico ruling.
I##%&$
.01 they should 'e granted 'enefits under R: /1+ pursuant to the Plana or
>ritanico ruling.
'&L($
1o. : close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the
!udges is necessary to determine their 4ualification to receive 'enefits under R: /1+.
2he rule is that retirement laws are construed li'erally in favor of the retiring
employee. .hen the court allows e3emptions to fi3 rules for certain !udges, there are
ample reasons 'ehind each grant. 2he crediting of leaves is not done
indiscriminately. 2he court only allows the use of the Plana or >ritanico ruling if the
career of the !udge was mar"ed 'y competence, integrity and dedication to the
pu'lic service. Most of the !udges however retired 'owing to policy considerations, id
est courtesy resignations. 2he *e <a <lana ruling is an essential factor in determining
whether or not the !udges should 'e granted the 'enefits they as" for. It stated that if
a !udge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy
resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found
wanting.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, /e, ,7, 9)a
Ramire# v. :rrieta
Case No. 13+
G.R. No. L-191.3 (No8. 29, 19*2)
Chapter :II, Page 321, Footote No. 1.1
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed an action against :polinar 8erina see"ing the annulment of a
transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 2he &AI
dismissed the complaint. 2he Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. 2he end of
the ,+ day period fell on a 8unday hence it was moved to the following Monday 'ut
one of the two 'ondsmen was una'le to sign the appeal 'ond. 2he cler" of court
suggested that the document first 'e completed 'y the Plaintiff 'efore filing it.
Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the ne3t day.
*efendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal 'ond since it was filed
one day after the end of the reglementary period. 2he !udge disapproved the 'ond
and rendered the !udgment final and e3ecutory. Plaintiff interposed a petition for
mandamus to the 8& saying that the &AI committed a grave a'use of discretion.
I##%&$
.01 the &AI committed grave a'use of discretion in disallowing the appeal
'ond.
'&L($
-es, it did. 2he action of the &AI is harsh and improvident according to the
8&. 2he 'ond would have 'een filed on time if it had not 'een for the defect.
:ccording to the Rules of &ourt, a personal appeal 'ond need not necessarily 'e
su'scri'ed 'y ) sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Aurthermore,
the Rules of &ourt also state that the appeal needs only one surety. 8o long as the
surety is solvent and accepta'le to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the defect
in the appeal 'ond, even if indeed ) sureties were needed, the court would not
have 'een deprived of !urisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period.
Rules of procedure should 'e li'erally construed in order to promote their o'!ect and
assist the parties in o'taining a !ust determination of their cases.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /d, /e, 11'
International &orporate >an" v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. *3
G.R. No. L-*97+ (4a. 3+, 19..)
Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 1.1
F!C"#$
Private Respondent secured a loan from PetitionerDs predecessor in interest 'y
mortgaging her properties. 2he amount approved for release was used to pay for her
other o'ligations to Petitioner. 2hus, private Respondent claimed that she never
received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money
mar"et placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the 'an"
refused to pay the interest earned 'y the placement, applying the amount instead
to the deficiency in the mortgage. 2he mortgaged properties were auctioned.
Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the
money mar"et investment which was su'se4uently granted 'y the court. 2he court
issued a writ of e3ecution against PetitionerDs property. Private Respondent filed an e3
parte motion praying that five 'ranches of the 'an" pay her the total amount of the
money mar"et interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the
said orders. 2he supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred 'y
erasures, alterations, and0or additions. 8uch 'ond was therefore rendered without
force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made 'y
the insurance company itself since there were no ready%made forms availa'le.
I##%&$
.01 there can 'e legal compensation in the case at 'ar.
'&L($
&ompensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set%
off against the other is neither clear nor li4uidated. &ompensation cannot e3tend to
unli4uidated disputed claim arising from 'reach of contract. Petitioner is inde'ted to
private Respondent in the amount of the money mar"et interest. 2he de't of P(.E1M
of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in dou't. 2his prevents legal
compensation from ta"ing place under :rt. 1)/+ of the &ivil &ode. 2he filing of
insufficient or defective 'ond does not dissolve a'solutely and unconditionally the
in!unction issued. 2he decision of the &: is affirmed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, /d, 11'
*el Rosario v. Hamoy
Case No. 31
No. L-77114 (4/e 3+, 19.7)
F!C"#$
Aor want of a one%peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney
for pre%trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent
Judge declared him non%suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the
Plaintiff to appear for pre%trial conference.$
I##%&$
.01 Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case 'ecause the document
did not have the re4uired one%peso documentary stamp.
'&L($
-es. Had Respondent Judge 'een less technical and more sensi'le, the
present proceedings and the conse4uent waste of time of this &ourt would have
'een avoided. >y such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner su'stantial !ustice.
He could have easily re4uired counsel for Plaintiff to 'uy the documentary stamp
and affi3 it to the special power of attorney and it would not have ta"en ten minutes.
2he Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of &ourt themselves,
fortified 'y !urisprudence, mandate a li'eral construction of the rules and pleadings
in order to effect su'stantial !ustice.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ec, /d, 1Ea, 1E'
<acsamana v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. *9
No. L-7314*-13 (!/g/st 2*, 19.*)
F!C"#$
: decision was rendered against Petitioner 'y the R2&, thus counsel for
Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days e3tension to file a petition
for review. However, a decision was promulgated 'y the Respondent court ruling
that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot 'e
e3tended and declared the case terminated. 2he Respondent court cited a
8upreme &ourt decision where the issue was regarding an e3tension to file a motion
for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the 4uestion of granting a motion
for e3tension of time to file a petition for review.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent court erred in terminating the case.
'&L($
-es. 2he &ourt rules, for the guidance of >ench and >ar, that a motion for
e3tension of time to file a petition for review under 8ec. )) of the Judiciary
Reorgani#ation :ct and 8ec. ));'= of the Interim Rules, may properly 'e filed with
and granted 'y the I:& ;now the &ourt of :ppeals=. 2he &ourt further restates and
clarifies the modes and periods as followsF ? ;(= Period of e3tension of time to file
petition for reviewF >eginning one month after the promulgation of this *ecision, an
e3tension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may 'e granted 'y the &:,
save in e3ceptionally meritorious cases. 2he motion for e3tension of time must 'e
filed and the corresponding doc"et fee paid within the reglementary period of
appeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, 5', )7
@imene# v. 8ecurities and B3change &ommission
Case No. 12
No. L-*.1*. ((ece6-er 2*, 19.4)
F!C"#$
@imene# 8toc"'ro"erage filed a motion for reconsideration 'efore the
&ommissioners of the 8B& )7 days after receiving their decision. 2he 8B& denied their
motion for reconsideration for 'eing filed out of time. 2he 8B& ruled that the ,+%day
period provided for in 8ec. ( of P.*. /+)%: was modified 'y 8ec. ,/ of the Judiciary
Revamp <aw ;>P 1)/= which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final
order, resolutions, awards of decisions of any court.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. ,/ of >P 1)/ applies to the 8B&.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. ,/ of >P 1)/ e3pressly refers to courts$. 2he 8B& is not a court. It is
an administrative agency. Repeals 'y implication are not favored. 2he ,+%day
period fi3ed 'y P.*. /+)%:, the organic law of the 8B&, is still in force.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, )9a, ,7, ,E'
>lanco v. >erna'e and <awyers &ooperatuve Pu'lishing &o.
Case No. 3*
G.R. No. L-4497+ (March 31, 193*)
F!C"#$
2o comply with the re4uirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the
notice along with a money order for the sum of P1( to the &ollector of Internal
Revenue. However the &ollector returned the said money order to sender for the
reason that he had no authority to 'e its depositary. .ith such, the appeal was not
deemed filed for failure to comply with the re4uirements.
I##%&$
.01 the re4uisites were complied with and .01 the court should grant the
remedy prayed for 'y the Petitioners.
'&L($
6nder 8ec. 7( of :ct 1o. 1/+ on how appeals are perfected, ? 2he 'ond to
'e given shall 'e filed with the !ustice of peace ?. In lieu of such 'ond the :ppellant
may file with the !ustice a certificate of the proper official that the :ppellant has
deposited P)5 with the municipal treasurer ;In Manila with the &ollector of Internal
Revenue=. 2he Petitioners therefore have complied with said re4uirements.
2he non%presentation of this certificate was not due to the PetitionerDs failure
or omission 'ut to the refusal of the &ollector of Internal Revenue to receive the
deposit tendered 'y the Petitioner. 2he fact that the corresponding receipt therefore
has not 'een issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect
the remedy.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (d, 7a
&ase and 1ant# v. Jugo
Case No. 49
G.R. No. L-.32 (,cto-er 14, 194*)
F!C"#$
Herein *efendants were to pay a counter'ond to which they had complied
with. 2hey furnished the 8heriff with a copy of the said counter'ond to comply with
the re4uirement. 2he 8heriff is then tas"ed to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. 7n the
occasion when the 8heriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintiff was
present in his office. He as"ed the latter if there were o'!ections to the said
counter'ond and the counsel replied none. *ue to unfortunate circumstances the
8heriff failed to deliver a copy of such counter'ond to the counsel to formali#e the
act of furnishing a copy.
I##%&$
.01 the *efendants complied with the re4uirement of filing a counter'ond
and .01 the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such.
'&L($
-es to 'oth issues. 1egligence or unavoida'le circumstances should not
adversely affect the *efendant under the circumstance of this case. 2he sole
purpose of the counter'ond is to ena'le the Plaintiff to see that the 'ond is in the
prescri'ed form and for the right amount. 2here was su'stantial compliance with this
when their attorney was shown in the 8heriffDs office the *efendantDs counter'ond.
L!"IN M!)IM
(d, /a, /d
&. Hiuda de 7rdove#a v. Raymundo
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-41111 (4/30 31, 193*)
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the
opposing party failed to file her 'rief within the 15%day period which ma"es her
appeal ipso facto dismissed and the &: had no authority to grant additional 5 days
to file her 'rief.
I##%&$
.01 the &: had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the :ppellant
an additional , days with which to file her 'rief.
'&L($
-es. 6nder the Rules of &ourt the court may, on motion to the :ppellee and
notice the :ppellant or on its own motion dismiss the 'ill of e3ceptions or the
appeal.$ 2he word may$ implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests
within the sound discretion of the court.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/d
Javellana v. Mirasol and 1uRe#
Case No. *1
G.R. No. 14..1 (Fe-r/ar0 1, 192+)
Chapter :II, Page 32., Footote No. 192
F!C"#$
: redemption of property from an e3ecution sale, which had 'een effected
in 'ehalf of a 'rother of the e3ecution de'tor ;Julio Javellana=, was attac"ed in this
case as void 'ecause of a supposed collusive agreement 'etween the
redemptioner ;<uis Mirasol= and sheriff ;@eronimo 1uRe#= where'y the latter agreed
to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the
redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in esta'lishing his title to the same
property in other litigation.
I##%&$
.01 the redemption has 'een effected in good faith and in accordance
with the re4uirements of law.
'&L($
: li'eral construction will 'e given to statutes governing the redemption of
property, to the end that the property of the de'tor may 'e made to satisfy as many
lia'ilities as possi'le. Redemption of property sold under e3ecution is not rendered
invalid 'y reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of
redemption is effected 'y means of a chec" for the amount due. :ny ordinary
creditor, or assignee as such, having a !udgment su'se4uent to that under which the
property was sold may e3ercise the right of redemption. 2he act of the redemptioner
in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an
officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasona'le
protection of his right as a su'se4uent !udgment%creditor of Ma3imino Mirasol.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,E', 91
*el Rosario v. B4uita'le Ins. and &asualty &o., Inc.
Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-1*211 (4/e 29, 19*3)
F!C"#$
*efendant company issued Personal :ccident Policy 1o. 71,( on the life of
Arancisco del Rosario, 'inding itself to pay the sum of P1,+++ to P,,+++, as indemnity
for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim for
payment with *efendant company when his son died of drowning after 'eing
forced to !ump off the motor launch I8<:M:$ on account of fire. *efendant
company refused to pay more than P1,+++ since they alleged that their lia'ility was
only said amount pursuant to 8ec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy.
I##%&$
How much the *efendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of
Arancisco del Rosario.
'&L($
2he policy does not positively state any definite amount that may 'e
recovered in case of death 'y drowning. 2here is an am'iguity in this respect in the
policy, which am'iguity must 'e interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against
the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P,,+++.
2he insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,+++ to Petitioner so that
there still remains a 'alance of P),+++ of the amount to which he is entitled to
recover.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11a, ,E
*e la &ru# v. &apital Ins. M 8urety &o.
Case No. 11*
G.R. No. L-1*13. (!pr23 29, 19*1)
F!C"#F
Bduardo de la &ru# was the holder of an accident insurance policy
underwritten 'y the &apital Insurance M 8urety &o., Inc. In a 'o3ing contest
participated into 'y the insured, Bduardo slipped and was hit 'y his opponent on the
left part of the 'ac" of the head, causing Bduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. 2he cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
8imon de la &ru#, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company
for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. *efendant company set
up the defense that the death of the insured, caused 'y his participation in a 'o3ing
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered 'y insurance.
I##%&$
.01 BduardoDs death falls under the definition of the policy against death or
disa'ility caused 'y accidental means.$
'&L(F
2he terms accident$ and accidental$, as used in insurance contracts, have
not ac4uired any technical meaning, and are construed 'y the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. 2here is no accident when a deli'erate act is
performed unless some additional, une3pected, independent and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or 'rings a'out the result of in!ury or death. 2he
failure of the *efendant company to include death resulting from a 'o3ing match or
other sports among the prohi'itive ris"s leads to the conclusion that it did not intend
to limit or e3empt itself from the lia'ility for such death.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,, )5a, ,+a
2y Hs. Airst 1ational 8urety M :ssurance &o., Inc.
Case No. 11*
G.R. No. L-1*13. (!pr23 29, 19*1)
F!C"#$
Plaintiff *iosdado &. 2y insured himself in 1E local insurance companies,
among which 'eing the eight a'ove named *efendants, which issued to him
personal accident policies. 7n *ecem'er )9, 1/5,, a fire 'ro"e out which totally
destroyed the >roadway &otton Aactory. Aighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff
was in!ured on the left hand 'y a heavy o'!ect which caused temporary total
disa'ility of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and
notice of claim with all of the *efendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the
policy 'ut the *efendants re!ected plaintiffLs claim for indemnity for the reason that
there 'eing no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disa'ility suffered 'y
him was not covered 'y his policy.
I##%&$
.01 it is necessary that there should 'e an amputation of the left hand of the
Plaintiff 'efore he can recover on the insurance policies.
'&L($
2he clear and e3press conditions of the insurance policies define partial
disa'ility as loss of either hand 'y amputation through the 'ones of the wrist. 2here
was no such amputation in the case at 'ar. :ll that was found 'y the trial court,
which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical in!uries Kcaused temporary
total disa'ility of plaintiffLs left hand.K In addition, the agreement contained in the
insurance policies is the law 'etween the parties. :s the terms of the policies are
clear, e3press and specific that only amputation of the left hand should 'e
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture
or other temporary disa'ility not covered 'y the policies would certainly 'e
unwarranted.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', 7a, /c
&apati v. 7campo
Case No. 4*
G.R. No. L-2.742 (!pr23 3+, 19.2)
Chapter :III, Page 33+, Footote No. .
F!C"#$
Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a su'%contract with the
*efendant, a resident of 1aga &ity. 2he *efendant completed a construction !o'
for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what
was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the &AI of Pampanga an action
for recovery of conse4uential damages due to the delay. *efendant filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. 2he
&AI of Pampanga dismissed the PlaintiffLs complaint on ground of improper venue.
I##%&$
.01 the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was
correct.
'&L($
1o. 2he rule on venue of personal actions cogni#a'le 'y the &AI is found in
8ec. );'=, Rule 9 of the Rules of &ourt, which provides that such Kactions may 'e
commenced and tried where the *efendant or any of the *efendants resides or
may 'e found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the Plaintiff.K 2he word KmayK is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon a party. 6nder ordinary circumstances, the term Kmay 'eK connotes possi'ilityJ
it does not connote certainty. KMayK is an au3illary ver' indicating li'erty,
opportunity, permission or possi'ility.

L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )5a, '
&hartered >an" v. 1ational @overnment :uditing 7ffice
Case No. 1.
G.R. No. L-3.113 (March 31, 19.7)
Chapter :III, Page 331, Footote No. 1+
F!C"#$
Iloilo city 'ranch of Petitioner 'an" was accepting postal money order from
the general pu'lic since 1/9(. 2hese orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for
payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their
remaining 'alance. 7n 1/(E, the >ureau of Posts issued an unnum'ered circularF
KMemorandum of 6nderstanding &overing &ashing and &learing of Money 7rders,K
effective 7cto'er 1, 1/(E, involving the installation of a new postal money order
system which re4uires that all commercial 'an"s, regardless of location, must clear all
postal money orders they have received and paid with the &entral >an" at Manila.
Petitioner 'an" continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice
through the latterLs :cting &ashier 'eyond 7cto'er 1, 1/(E. 2he post office said that
the arrangements made 'y the acting cashier and the Petitioner 'an" were private,
unauthori#ed arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money
orders should 'e directed against the said cashier.
I##%&$
.01 the unnum'ered circular and the undated memorandum of
understanding are directory and permissive in nature.

'&L($
Respondents are correct 'y saying that the purposes of the new postal
money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are
not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial 'an"s
operating in the Manila area only.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7a, /a, ,(a, ,('
@uiao v. Aigueroa
Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-*4.1 (Ma0 17, 1914)
Chapter :III, Page 333, Footote No. 17
F!C"#$
In the trial of People v. @ope#, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio *i#on
and Bmiliano Manalo as witnesses for the 8tate. :fter the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus
@uiao and Bulogio 8errano. >ut *i#on and Manalo were not included. In view of the
failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus
was filed 'y Jesus @uiao to compel the fiscal to include *i#on and Manalo as
accused in his information.
I##%&$
.01 a fiscal may 'e compelled 'y mandamus to include in an information
persons who appear to 'e responsi'le for the crime charged therein.
'&L($
-es. 8ec. 1 of Rule 1+( of the Rules of &ourt ta"en from :ct 1o. )7+/ states
that, Bvery prosecution for a crime shall 'e in the name of the 6nited 8tates against
all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le therefor, e3cept in the cases determined in
8ec. ) of this :ct.$ : perusal of :ct 1o. )7+/ discloses the legislative intent to re4uire
that all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le for an offense should 'e included in
the information. 2he use of the word KshallK and of the phrase Ke3cept in cases
determinedK shows 8ec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, )5a
<oyola @rand Hillas Homeowners ;8outh= :ssociation, Inc. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 113
G.R. No. 1171.. (!/g/st 7, 1997)
F!C"#$
2he <oyola @rand Hillas Homeowners :ssociation Inc. ;<@HH:I= was registered
with Respondent Home Insurance and @uaranty &orporation ;HI@&= as the sole
homeownersD organi#ation in the said su'division 'ut it did not file its corporate 'y%
laws. <ater, it was discovered that there were two other organi#ations within the
su'divisionF the 1orth and 8outh :ssociations. Respondent HI@& then informed the
president of <@HH:I that the latter has 'een automatically dissolved 'ecause of
non%su'mission of its 'y%laws as re4uired 'y the &orporation &ode. 2his resulted in
the registration of Petitioner association. <@HH:I complained and got a favora'le
result from Respondent HI@& declaring the registration of Petitioner association
cancelled and Respondent &: su'se4uently affirmed the said decision. Hence,
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
I##%&$
.01 the failure of a corporation to file its 'y%laws within one month from the
date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
'&L($
1o. 2he legislatureDs intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its
failure to pass its 'y%laws. 2he word must$ in a statute is not always imperative 'ut it
may 'e consistent with an e3ercise of discretion. 2he language of the statute should
'e considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the
word must$ or shall$.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/c, )5a, ,(a, ,E', '
*irector of <ands v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 91
G.R. No. 1+2.1. (4/30 2., 1997)
F!C"#$
Private Respondent 2eodoro :'istado filed a petition for original registration
of a land title. *uring the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were
represented 'y Josefa :'istado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the
petition. 2he trial court dismissed the petition for want of !urisdiction$. However, it
was found that the applicant had 'een in open, continuous and e3clusive possession
of the su'!ect land since 1/,E. 2he reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed
to pu'lish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant
to a law. 2he &: set aside the decision of the trial court. 2hus, Petitioner 'rought the
case to the 8upreme &ourt.
I##%&$
.hether the newspaper pu'lication of the notice of initial hearing in an
original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
'&L($
It is mandatory. 2he law used the term KshallK in prescri'ing the wor" to 'e
done 'y the &ommissioner of <and Registration upon the latterLs receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. 2he said word denotes an imperative and
thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. .hile such literal mandate is
not an a'solute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
conte3t in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must 'e
understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due
process.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a
>ersa'al v. 8alvador
Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-3191+ (4/30 21, 197.)
F!C"#$
Private Respondents filed an e!ectment suit against the Petitioner. 2he
su'se4uent decision was appealed 'y the Petitioner and during its pendency, the
court issued an order stating that ?counsels for 'oth parties are given ,+ days from
receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to 'e
su'mitted for decision 'y the court.$ :fter receipt, Petitioner filed a motion e3 parte
to su'mit memorandum within ,+ days from receipt of notice of su'mission of the
transcript of stenographic notes ta"en during the hearing of the case which was
granted 'y the court. >ut the Respondent !udge issued an order dismissing the case
for failure to prosecute PetitionerDs appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration citing the su'mitted e3 parte motion 'ut the court denied it.
I##%&$
.01 the mere failure of an :ppellant to su'mit the mentioned memorandum
would empower the &AI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.
'&L($
2he court is not empowered 'y law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure
of an :ppellant to su'mit his memorandum. 2he law provides that &ourts? shall
decide? cases on the 'asis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city?
courtsF Provided? parties may su'mit memoranda? if so re4uested?$ It cannot 'e
interpreted otherwise than that the su'mission of memoranda is optional.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c
Repu'lic Planers >an" v. :gana 8r.
Case No. 133
G. R. No. 117*1 (March 3, 1997)
F!C"#$
Private Respondents filed in court a )uo, an action for specific performance
to compel petitioner to redeem E++ preferred shares of stoc" with a face value of
PE,+++.++ and to pay 1C 4uarterly interest thereon as 4uarterly dividend owing them
under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stoc". 2he court a )uo rendered
!udgment in favor of Private Respondents.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent Judge committed grave a'use of discretion amounting to
e3cess or lac" of !urisdiction in compelling Petitioner 'an" to redeem Private
RespondentsD preferred shares
'&L($
-es. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in
4uestion, stated that, 7n the 4uestion of the redemption 'y the *efendant of said
preferred shares of stoc", the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stoc"
certificates clearly allows the same.$ .hat Respondent Judge failed to recogni#e
was that while the stoc" certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was
clearly vested in the Petitioner >an". 2he redemption therefore is clearly the type
"nown as KoptionalK. Aurthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the
word KmayK. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word KmayK
denotes discretion, and cannot 'e construed as having a mandatory effect.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (', 7a, ,+', ,(a
Phil. &onsumers Aoundation , Inc. v. 1atDl 2elecommunications &ommission
Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-*331. (No8e6-er 21, 19.3)
F!C"#$
Respondent &ommission approved a revised schedule for 8u'scri'er
Investment Plan ;8IP= filed 'y Private Respondent. Petitioner states that 8IP schedule
presented 'y the Private Respondent is pre%mature and, therefore, illegal and
'aseless, 'ecause the Respondent &ommission has not yet promulgated the
re4uired rules and regulations implementing 8ec. ) of P.*. )17 which provides, 2he
*epartment of Pu'lic .or"s, 2ransportation and &ommunications through its >oard
of &ommunications and0or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein
declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for
this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may 'e promulgated ...$
I##%&$
.01 Respondent &ommission acted with grave a'use of discretion.
'&L($
-es. P.*. )17 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that
e3isting su'stantive and procedural laws would not 'e applica'le. 2hus, the 8IP was
so set up precisely to ensure the financial via'ility of pu'lic telecommunications
companies which in turn assures the en!oyment of the population at minimum cost
the 'enefits of a telephone facility. .ithout promulgation of rules and regulation
there would 'e confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers
and the government itself. 2he plan to e3pand the company program and0or
improve its service is lauda'le, 'ut the e3penses should not 'e shouldered 'y the
telephone su'scri'ers. &onsidering the multi%million profits of the company, the cost
of e3pansion and0or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.
L!"IN M!)IM$
E', /d, 11', 1)a
Phil. &onsumers Aoundation, Inc. v. 12& and P<*2 ;Resolution=
Case No. 94
G.R. No. L-*331. (!/g/st 1., 19.4)
F!C"#$
Respondent &ommission filed a manifestation that it is !oining Private
Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. 2he
decision promulgated interprets the rule%ma"ing authority delegated in 8ection ) of
P.*. )17 to the then *epartment of Pu'lic .or"s, 2ransportation and
&ommunications as mandatory, which construction is not supported 'y the actual
phraseology of said 8ection ).
I##%&$
.01 the previous decision rendered ma"ing it mandatory to set rules and
regulations implementing P.*. )17 should 'e reconsidered.
'&L($
-es. 2he 'asic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law
must 'e given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law
itself. Hence, the phrase Kmay 'e promulgatedK should not 'e construed to mean
KshallK or KmustK.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, (d, /f, ,+', )9, ,(, ,/c
*io"no v. Reha'ilitation Ainance &orporation
Case No. 93
G.R. No. L-4712 (4/30 11, 1912)
Chapter :III, Page 33*, Footote No. 32
F!C"#$
Petitioner, the holder of a 'ac" pay certificate of inde'tedness issued under
R: ,+9, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his 'ac" pay certificate
as payment of his loan from the latter. His 'asis was 8ec. ) of R: ,+9, which provides
that investment funds or 'an"s or other financial institutions owned or controlled 'y
the government shall su'!ect to availa'ility of loana'le funds ? accept or discount
at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate$ for
certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the
word shall$ used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. 2he lower
court sustained Respondent company.
I##%&$
.01 Petitioner can use his 'ac" pay certificate to pay for his loan to
Respondent company.
'&L($
1o. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall$ is imperative.
However, the rule is not a'soluteJ it may 'e construed as may$ when re4uired 'y
the conte3t or 'y the intention of the statute. 2he modifier, at not more than two
per centum per annum for ten years.$, the interest to 'e charged, that the ver'%
phrase is mandatory 'ecause not only the law uses at not more$ 'ut the legislative
purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the 'ac" pay certificate for the 'enefit
of the holders, for whose 'enefit the same have 'een issued, can 'e carried out 'y
fi3ing a ma3imum limit for discounts. >ut as to when the discounting or acceptance
shall 'e made, the conte3t and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the
acceptance or discount of the certificate is to 'e su'!ect$ to the condition of the
availa'ility of loana'le funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the
acceptance shall 'e allowed on the condition that there are availa'le loana'le
funds.$ In other words, acceptance or discount is to 'e permitted only if there are
loana'le funds.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, )5a, )(
>erces v. @uingona, et. al.
Case No. 33
G.R. No. 112+99 (Fe-r/ar0 21, 1991)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of 2iwi,
:l'ay for 1= a'use of authorityJ and )= dishonesty, with the 8angguiniang
Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in
'oth cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the 7ffice of the President and prayed
for stay of e3ecution under 8ec. (7;'= of the <@&. 2he 7ffice of the President stayed
e3ecution, citing 8ec. (E of R: 71(+ and 8ec. ( of :.7. 1o. 1E. :ccording to
Petitioner, the governing law is R: 71(+, which contains a mandatory provision that
an appeal shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final and e3ecutory.
Petitioner further contends that :.7. 1o. 1E was repealed 'y R: 71(+.
I##%&$
.01 R.:. 71(+ repealed :.7. 1o. 1E.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. 5,+;f=, R: 71(+ did not e3pressly repeal 8ec. (, :.7. 1o. 1E 'ecause
it failed to identify or designate the laws on e3ecutive orders that are intended to 'e
repealed. If there was any repeal, it was 'y implication which is not favored. In the
a'sence of an e3press repeal, a su'se4uent law cannot 'e construed as repealing a
prior law unless an irreconcila'le inconsistency and repugnancy e3ists 'etween the
two. 2here is none in this case. 2he first sentence of 8ec. (E provides that an appeal
shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final or e3ecutory.$ It gives discretion to
reviewing appeals to stay e3ecution. 2he term shall$ may 'e read mandatory or
directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5a, )(, 5+
Mers 8hoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission, et al.
Case No. .1
G.R. No. 123**9 (Fe-r/ar0 27, 199.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner hired Respondent wor"ers as piece rate wor"ers. :lleging serious
'usiness decline, Petitioner 'arred its wor"ers from entering the company to wor". 2he
wor"ers challenged the legality of PetitionerDs stoppage of operations. 2he <a'or
:r'iter found the shutdown with cause 'ut without the re4uired notice, and ordered
Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay. Petitioner appealed to Respondent
1<R& 'ut sought a reduction of the cash or surety 'ond. *espite the reduction
granted, Petitioner still failed to post 'ond within 1+ days, resulting to the dismissal of
appeal for failure to perfect it.
I##%&$
.01 Respondent 1<R& committed grave a'use of discretion.
'&L($
1o. 6nder :rt. )), of the <a'or &ode, an appeal 'y the employer may 'e
perfected only upon posting of cash or surety 'ond in an amount e4uivalent to the
monetary award. Perfection of appeal is !urisdictional and non%compliance with
such legal re4uirements is fatal. 2he word only$ ma"es it perfectly clear that the
posting of 'ond is to 'e the e3clusive means 'y which an employerDs appeal may 'e
perfected.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5a, )(
Aule v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 4.
G.R. No. L-79+94 (4/e 22, 19..)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an agent of the 2owers :ssurance &orporation, issued and made
out chec" 1o. )(791 in favor of Roy 1adera. 8aid chec" was dishonored for the
reason that the said chec"ing account was already closed, thus in violation of >P )),
the >ouncing &hec"s <aw. 6pon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence
and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he su'mitted a memorandum confirming
the 8tipulation of Aacts. He was convicted 'y the trial court, and on appeal, the
:ppellate &ourt.
I##%&$
.01 the &: erred in affirming the decision of the R2& 'ased on the 8tipulation
of Aacts that was not signed 'y the Petitioner nor his counsel.
'&L($
2he &: erred. &ase is re%opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. 8ec. 9 of
the Rules on &riminal Procedure provides, 1o agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre%trial conference shall 'e used in evidence against the
accused unless reduced to writing and signed 'y him and his counsel$.
>ecause of the word shall$, in its language, the rule is mandatory. 1egative
words and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative
are merely directory. 2herefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is
mandatory. :lso, penal statues are to 'e li'erally construed in favor of the accused.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/d
Mc@ee v. Repu'lic
Case No. 174
G.R. No. L-13.7 (!pr23 29, 1914)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an :merican citi#en married to <eonarda &risostomo, wants to
adopt her children 'y her first hus'and. However, he is 'arred from doing so under
:rt. ,,5 of the old &ivil &ode which states that those who have legitimate,
legitimated, ac"nowledged natural children, or natural children 'y legal fiction$
cannot adopt. Petitioner and <eonarda have one legitimate child. *espite :rt. ,,5,
the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption, invo"ing :rt. ,,E which states that a
step%child, 'y the step%father or step%mother$ can 'e adopted.
I##%&$
.01 a hus'and having a legitimate child may adopt a step%child.
'&L($
1o. 7ne strong argument presented 'y the trial court in upholding the
adoption is that to hold otherwise would render :rt. ,,E meaningless and a
surplusage. However, it must 'e noted that :rt. ,,5 and :rt. ,,E should 'e
considered in relation to each other. 2hat a parent can adopt a step%child is limited
'y :rt. ,,5 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to 4ualify as an
adopter. 7ne principle 'ehind this is to protect the successional rights of the
legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negative words
and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory. :rt. ,,5 is phrased in a negative mannerF cannot adopt+ .hile :rt.
,,E is positiveF the follo!ing may be adopted+"
L!"IN M!)IM$
15a
Penid v. Hirata
Case No. 1+1
G.R. No. L-44++4 (March 21, 19.3)
Chapter :III, Page 33., Footote No. 4+
F!C"#$
&onfidential Information 1o. )E of the >IR was filed 'y the Petitioners. It is a
sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had 'een
falsely declaring their gross earnings N on the 'asis of a parity rate of P).++ to 68 X1.++
N defrauding the Philippine @overnment of millions of pesos in ta3es. Aurther,
Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the &onfidential
Information. 7ne of these was Pan Ail &o. Inc. 1ow the Petitioners see" their )5C
reward ta"en from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment
for their deficiencies N as provided 'y R: ),,E.
I##%&$
.01 the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Ail &o. Inc, a company
which is not included in the &onfidential Information.
'&L($
-es. :ccording to 8ec. 9 of R: ),,E, In order to entitle an informer to a
reward, the information given 'y him must lead to or 'e instrumental in the discovery
of the fraud or violation ? and results in the recovery of collection of revenues ?.$
1ot only did the >IR rely on the &onfidential Information su'mitted 'y the
Petitioners for their investigation, 'ut also on the categorical statement that other
shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further
investigations and, conse4uently, recovery of collection. 2herefore, this information
was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation.
In !urisprudence, statues offering rewards must 'e li'erally construed in favor
of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /d
Pahilan v. 2a'al'a, et al.
Case No. 9*
G.R. No. 11+17+ (Fe-r/ar0 21, 1994)
Chapter :III, Page 342, Footote No. *3
F!C"#$
Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of @uinsili'an,
&amiguin. Respondent 2a'al'a was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an
election protest although the doc"et fees he paid were insufficient. 2he trial court
dismissed the election protest for non%payment on time of the re4uired fees for filing
an initiatory pleading. .ithin the 5%day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a verified
appeal$ 'rief. >ut the &ler" of &ourt said that his office did not receive any notice
of appeal$ from Petitioner. PetitionerDs appeal was then dismissed for failure to
appeal within the prescri'ed period.
I##%&F
1. .01 the verified appeal$ was validly dismissed.
). .01 the trial !udge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for
non%payment on time of the re4uired fees.
'&L(F
1. 1o. 2he notice of appeal can 'e validly su'stituted 'y an appeal 'rief. 2he
filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the
notice of appeal. 2he R2& was sent copies 'y registered mail within the prescri'ed
period, and is assumed to 'e received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the
date of mailing.
). 1o. 2he doc"et fee was paid although insufficient. 8tatutes providing for
election contests are to 'e li'erally construed that the will of the people in the
choice of pu'lic officers may not 'e defeated 'y mere technical o'!ections.
L!"IN M!)IMF
/a, /c, /d, 9+'
Pimentel v. Aeste!o
Case No. 124
G.R. No. L-2327 (4a/ar0 11, 1949)
Chapter :III, Page 342, Footote No. *4
F!C"#F
Aeste!o was proclaimed Mayor of 8anta <ucia with :ppellant protesting.
:ppellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 5/ 'allots
which would have made him win. :ppellantDs name in the 5/ 'allots were written on
different lines such as those corresponding to vice%mayor, mem'er of the provincial
'oard or councilor. :ppellant claimed that his name was only misplaced 'ut the
intention to elect him as mayor was apparent.
I##%&F
.01 :ppellant can claim as votes in his favor 'allots with his name which
does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor.
'&L($
1o. Aor any 'allot to 'e counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensa'le
that his name 'e written 'y the voter in the 'allot and cannot 'e mista"en 'y a
person who, as provided 'y the &onstitution, is a'le to read. : name can 'e
counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the
'allot for the vote for such office. It is impossi'le to count a 'allot as vote for a
candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for
another office.
&onsidering that in 5/ 'allots claimed 'y :ppellant in this appeal his name
does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as
votes in his favor as candidate for mayor.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(d, 7', 9,
Ro3as v. Rafferty
Case No. 2*4
G.R. No. L-121.2 (March 27, 191.)
F!C"#$
Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1/1,, the construction of
a reinforced concrete 'uilding was 'egun. It was finished in all respects on Ae'ruary
15, 1/15.
2he city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of *ecem'er 1,
1/19, sent Plaintiffs notice, received 'y them on *ecem'er )5, 1/19, re4uiring them
to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1/15. Plaintiffs paid
the amount of the ta3es, which amounted to P,,+++, under protest. 8uit was 'egun
in the &AI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of
payment.
I##%&$
.01 the assessment was legal.
'&L(F
1o. 2he assessor cannot ma"e a valid assessment unless he has given proper
notice. 2he law re4uires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during
1ovem'er. His attempted notification on *ecem'er )5, 1/19, was not given during
the time fi3ed 'y statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Ro3as >uilding for
the year 1/15.
Aurthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the o'ligation to add
any completed improvements to the assessment list. 2he city assessor and collector
could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 1/
8erfino v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 141
G.R. No. 4+.1. (#epte6-er 11, 19.7)
F!C"#$
: parcel of land, consisting of )1.1(7( hectares situated in 8agay, 1egros
7ccidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico &asamayor, under Homestead
Patent 1o. 991,/. 6pon registration of said patent, 7&2 1o. 1E,/ was issued 'y said
office in the name of Pacifico &asamayor. In 1/95, &asamayor sold the land in favor
of 1emesia >alta#ar. :pparently, 7&2 1o. 1E,/ was lost during the war and upon the
petition of >alta#ar, the &AI of 1egros ordered its reconstitution in the name of
&asamayor. 7n the same day, 2&2 1o. 57%1 was issued in the name of 1emesia
>alta#ar 'ut after the cancellation of 7&2 1o. 19%R. In 1/51, >alta#ar sold the
property to Respondent <ope# 8ugar &entral, which did not present the documents
for registration until *ecem'er 1/(9 to the 7ffice of Registry of *eeds. 8aid office
refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered 'y
another certificate of title, 2&2 1o. )E/E5, in the name of Petitioner.
I##%&$
.01 the purchase 'y Respondent <ope# 8ugar &entral of the lot in 4uestion
was null and void from the 'eginning.
'&L($
1o, applying 8ec. 11E of &.:. 1o. 191, which prohi'its the alienation of
homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of
the patent, and not 8ec. 1)1 which governs sale to corporations. 8ince the grant was
more than 5 years 'efore, the transfer to 1emesia >alta#ar was valid and legal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7', 9,
Sui!ano v. *evelopment >an" of the Philippines
Case No.
G. R. No. 2*419 (,cto-er 1*, 197+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed an ur'an estate loan with respondent which was approved.
2he loan was to 'e released in installments. 2he outstanding o'ligation of the
petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P1,,/E,.5/. Petitioner
wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P19,+++ for his outstanding
o'ligation, out of the proceeds of his 'ac" pay pursuant to R: 1o. E/7 ;R: E/7=.
Respondent advised petitioners of the non%acceptance of the offer on the ground
that the loan was not incurred 'efore or su'sisting on June )+, 1/5, when R: E/7 was
approved.
I##%&$
.01 petitionerDs o'ligation is su'sisting at the time of the approval of R: E/7.
'&L($
1o. 2he provision e3pressly provides that the o'ligations must 'e su'sisting at
the time of the approval of R: E/7. Hence, when such 'ac"pay certificates are
offered in payment to a government%owned corporation of o'ligation thereto which
was not su'sisting at the time of the enactment of said :ct on June )+, 1/5,, such
corporation may not legally 'e compelled to accept the certificates. 2he &ourt
cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unam'iguous
language of the provision of law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)E, 7a, (c, 1
Romualde#%Marcos v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. 137
G.R. No. 11997* (#epte6-er 1., 1991)
Chapter :III, Page 347, Footote No..4
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed her &ertificate of &andidacy for the position of Representative
of the Airst *istrict of <eyte. Private respondent Monte!o, the incum'ent
Representative of the Airst *istrict of <eyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for &ancellation and *is4ualification$ with respondent &7MB<B&
alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional re4uirement for residency.
I##%&$
.01 petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the Airst *istrict of
<eyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1//5 elections.
'&L($
-es. Residency 4ualification pertains to domicile. :s a minor, petitioner
followed the domicile of her parents in 2aclo'an, <eyte. :s domicile, once ac4uired,
it is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of the 'eing 'orn in Manila, 2aclo'an
was her domicile of origin 'y operation of law. Parenthetically, when she married
then &ongressman Marcos, petitioner was o'liged, 'y virtue of :rt. 11+ of the &ivil
&ode, to follow her hus'andDs actual place of residence fi3ed 'y him. :lthough Mr.
Marcos has different places of residence, and even if he had designated one, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. 2herefore, she did not lose
her domicile of origin.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)5a, ,7, ,/a
Portillo v. 8alvani
Case No. 243
G.R. No. L-321.1 (March 1+, 193+)
Chapter III, Page 1+1, Footote No. 13+
F!C"#$
:ppellant 8alvani won the elections in 1/)E for the office of provincial
governor of :nti4ue. :ppellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest
on July /, 1/)E. *ecision was rendered on :ugust 15, 1/)/ declaring appellee Portillo
the winner.
I##%&$
.01 the decision 'y the trial !udge declaring appellee Portillo is valid.
'&L($
2he decision is void for want of !urisdiction. 2he Blection <aw provides that all
proceedings in an electoral contest shall 'e terminated within one year. <egislative
history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from
silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and
e3plicit provision suggests the legislative intent to ma"e the provision mandatory.
7ne year having already elapsed, the proceeding is deemed terminated and the
court loses !urisdiction rendering any su'se4uent decision void for want of !urisdiction.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 7', /a, 9,, 95, ')
Sueru'in v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 247
G.R. No. L-21.1 ((ece6-er 2, 194.)
F!C"#$
Petitioner defeated Aelipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan.
Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereafter. 2he
appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case
for the court had lost !urisdiction.
I##%&$
.01 the &: had lost their !urisdiction to decide the appeal.
'&L($
1o. 8ec. 17E of the Blection &ode provides that appeals from decisions in
election contests should 'e decided within three months after filing. However, this
provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat
the purpose of due process of the law. 2he dismissal in such a case will constitute a
miscarriage of !ustice. 2he doctrine in Portillo v. 8alvani should 'e a'andoned.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, ), 5', 1E', ,/'
1ilo v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 1.9
G.R. No. L-341.* (!pr23 2, 19.4)
Chapter III, Page .9, Footote No. 19
F!C"#$
Private respondent @atchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at
>ulacan with an area of ) hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system.
Private respondent then filed for e!ection citing personal cultivation$ on March 7,
1/(E. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that R:
,E99 was amended on 8eptem'er 1+, 1/71 removing personal cultivation$ from the
grounds for e!ectment.
I##%&$
.01 the amendment of R: (,E/ has retroactive effect.
'&L($
1o. :rt. 9 of the 1ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless it is e3plicitly provided. 2he legislation involves social !ustice, however
the landowners 'eing holders of only small parcels of land should also 'e entitled to
social !ustice. Aurthermore, to rule against the small landowners would 'e thwarting
legislative intent of creating independent and self%reliant farmers.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9(a, 9('
8alcedo and Ignacio v. &arpio and &arreon
Case No. 13.
G.R. No. L-4491 (4/e *, 1911)
F!C"#$
Petitioners were appointed mem'ers of the >oard of *ental B3aminers. R:
59( was approved and 8ec. 1 thereof amended 8ec. 1+ of the Reorgani#ation :ct
1o. 9++7. >y virtue of this law, a >oard of *ental B3aminers was appointed 'y the
President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the
petitioners.
I##%&$
.01 it was the intention of &ongress, in enacting R: 59(, to a'olish all the
pre%e3isting >oards of B3aminers e3isting after the time of the enactment thereof.
'&L($
:ppointment of the respondents is valid. It is o'vious that it is the intention of
&ongress to do so, 'ecause the provisions of said :ct are inconsistent with those of
the Revised :dministrative &ode as amended 'y :ct 1o. 9++7.
In the case of &amacho vs. &ourt of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a
well esta'lished rule recogni#ed 'y all authorities without e3ception, that a
retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new o'ligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disa'ility in respect to a transaction already pastJ 'ut
that status is not made retrospective 'ecause it draws on antecedent facts for its
operation, or in other words part of the re4uirements for its action and application is
drawn from a time antedating its passage.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, /c, 9(, 9/
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. <ingayen @ulf Blectric Power &o., Inc.
Case No. 7.
G.R. No. L-23771 (!/g/st 4, 19..)
Chapter I), Page 311, Footote No. 14
F!C"#$
2he >ureau of Internal Revenue ;>IR= assessed and demanded from
respondent deficiency franchise ta3es and surcharges applying the franchise ta3 rate
of 5C as prescri'ed in 8ec. )5/ of the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode, instead of the
lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, R: ,E9, was
passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light,
heat, and power. 2his law lowered the franchise ta3 rate to )C.
I##%&$
.01 R: ,E9, is unconstitutional for 'eing violative of the uniformity and
e4uality of ta3ation$ clause of the &onstitution.
'&L($
It is valid. 8ec. )5/ of the 2a3 &ode was never intended to have a universal
application. R: ,E9, did not only fi3 and specify a franchise ta3 of )C on its gross
receipts, 'ut made it in lieu of any and all ta3es, all laws to the contrary
notwithstanding,$ thus leaving no room for dou't regarding the legislative intent.
&harters or special laws granted and enacted 'y the <egislature are in the
nature of private contracts. 2hey do not constitute a part of the machinery of the
general government. 2he <egislature considers and ma"es provision for all the
circumstances of a particular case.
R: ,E9, specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /c, 9(, 9/
@allardo v. >orromeo
Case No. 1+
G.R. No. L-3*++7 (Ma0 21, 19..)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he
;plaintiff= may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government !o' as a letter
carrier. 6pon appeal, the &: applying 8ec. 7 of R: (,E/, held that the landownerDs
desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant.
I##%&$
.01 the &: correctly gave retroactive application to 8ec. 7 of R: (,E/.
'&L($
1o. 2he applica'le law when petitioner filed his complaint was R: ,E99 which
provided a ground for the e!ectment of the tenant should the landowner have a
desire to personally cultivate the landholding. 2he newer law, R.:. (,E/ eliminated
this ground.
In applying :rt. 9 of the 1ew &ivil &ode, R: (,E/ cannot 'e given retroactive
effect in the a'sence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of
the law to that effect. 8ince &ongress failed to e3press an intention to ma"e said R:
retroactive, it may not apply to e!ectment cases then already pending ad!udication
'y the courts.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 9(e
&e'u Portland &ement v. &IR
Case No. 12
G.R. No. 2+1*3 (,cto-er 29, 19*.)
F!C"#$
2he case involves petitionerDs claim for refund of sales ta3 paid from
1ovem'er 1/59 to March 1/55, and ad valorem ta3 paid from :pril 1/55 to
8eptem'er 1/5( from the sale of :P7 Portland cement produced 'y petitioner.
8ince 1/5), however, petitioner had 'een protesting the imposition of the sales ta3 on
its :P7 Portland cement, and on January 1/5,, it also protested the payment of the
ad valorem ta3es. Petitioner claimed for refund and 'rought its case to the &ourt of
2a3 :ppeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage ta3es collected 'y respondent
are refunda'le since under R: 1))/ ;effective June 1/55=, producers of cement are
e3empt from the payment of said ta3. 2he &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals ruled otherwise.
I##%&$
.hether R: 1))/ applies prospectively or retroactively.
'&L($
: statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the
legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either 'y the e3press terms of the
statute or 'y necessary implication. In every case of dou't, the dou't must 'e
resolved against the retrospective effect. .hile the purpose of the amendment, as
mentioned in the e3planatory note to the 'ill, was not only to accelerate the
collection of mining royalties and ad valorem ta3es 'ut also clarify the dou't of the
ta3%paying pu'lic on the interpretative scope of the two terms,$ it certainly could not
have 'een the intention of the lawma"ers to unsettle previously consummated
transactions 'etween the ta3payer and the @overnment.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(a, 9(c, 9(e
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ailipinas &ompa Y ia de 8eguros
Case No. 7*
G.R. No. 14..+ (!pr23 29, 19*+)
Chapter I:, Page 134, Footote No. 41
F!C"#$
Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in 'usiness as a real
estate dealer. R: 1(1) amended the 1ational Internal Revenue &ode and provided
for a scale of graduated ratesJ this too" effect on :ugust of 1/5(. Petitioner assessed
against the respondent ta3es ;to which the insurance company has already paid in
full on January 1/5(= for the year 1/5( 'ased on R: 1(1). Respondent appealed to
the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted
a decision in favor of it.
I##%&$
.01 R: 1(1) should 'e applied retroactively.
'&L($
1o. :s a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
2he rule applies with greater force to the case at 'ar, considering that R: 1(1),
which imposes the new and higher ta3es, e3pressly provides that said :ct shall ta"e
effect upon its approval.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(a, 9(c, 9(e
<aceste v. 8antos
Case No. 14+
G.R. No. 3*..* (Fe-r/ar0 1, 1932)
F!C"#$
Petitioner committed rape along with 1icolas <achica. 2he crime too" effect
'efore the effectivity of the RP&. However, <achica married the victim, Magdalena
de 7campo, and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. 2he petitioner
continued to serve his sentence 'ut now prays for the &ourt to set him at li'erty
through the writ of ha'eas corpus, pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for
continuing his imprisonment any longer 'ased on the last sentence of :rt. ,99 of the
RP&.
I##%&$
.01 the last paragraph of :rt. ,99 of the RP& has retroactive effect.
'&L($
-es. 2he petition for ha'eas corpus was granted. 2he principle granting to
the accused in certain cases an e3ception to the general rule that laws shall not 'e
retroactive when the law in 4uestion favors the accused applies. &onscience and
good law !ustify this e3ception.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9E
>alat'at v. &ourt of :ppeals and Passion
Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-3*37. (4a/ar0 27, 1992)
Chapter I), Page 3*3, Footote No. 73
F!C"#$
Petitioner has an agricultural land in 8ta. :na, Pampanga containing 1E,9/+
s4uare meters of land owned 'y @arcia. @arcia sold the land to private respondent
Pasion and had declared it for ta3ation purposes under 2a3 *eclaration 1o. 1)(.
Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to 8ec. ,(;1=
of R: ,E99. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have 'een decided
in light of 8ec. 7 of R: (,E/ since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not
have the vested right to ac4uire the land.
I##%&F
.01 8ec. 7 of R: (,E/ should 'e given retroactive effect.
'&L($
1o. :rt. 9 of the &ivil &ode provides that there should 'e no retroactive
effect unless otherwise provided 'y law. In order for a law to have a retroactive
effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should 'e
understood which is not em'odied in the law. Aurthermore the law is a rule
esta'lished to guide our action with no 'inding effect until it is enacted, thus laws
have no effect in past times 'ut laws loo" forward in the future.
L!"IN M!)IMF
)+, 9(', 9(e
People v. Peta
Case No. 232
G.R. No. L-714+ ((ece6-er 22, 1911)
Chapter :I, Page 2**, Footote No. 72
F!C"#$
:ppellant was found guilty of violating R: 195 for having collected fees in
e3cess of 5C of the amount received 'y the claimant as compensation for services
rendered. :t the time the agreement was made the law in force was &.:. 1o. (75
which allowed a person to charge not more than 5C of any amount that the
claimant would collect. 2he trial court in convicting appellant held that the
agreement for the payment of a 5C fee on the amount collected was void and
illegal.
I##%&$
.01 R: 195 has a retroactive effect.
'&L($
1o. It does not appear in the language of R: 195 that it should 'e given
retroactive effect. 2here is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of R: 195 for it to
act on cases under the old law. <aws cannot 'e given retroactive effect unless it is
specifically stated in the provision. Aurthermore, strict construction on the law was
made so as not to pre!udice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law
not to have any retroactive effect.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11', )+, 9(e
8an Jose v. Reha'ilitation Ainance & orp.
Case No. 271
G.R. No. L-77** (No8e6-er 29, 1911)
Chapter I), Page 3*9, Footote No. 1+4
F!C"#$
Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in
her pre%war loan with defendant. 2he 'asis of the suit was R: (71 amending R: 9+1,
the former law condoning the pre%war loans and the interest corresponding from
January 1, 1/9( to March 19, 1/51. 2he lower court decided for defendant to return
the interest to the plaintiff.
I##%&$
.01 the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff
'y the defendant.
'&L($
-es. R: (71 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include
within its term completed payment and paid interest. .here a statute was amended
and reenacted, the amendment should 'e construed as if it had 'een included in
the original actJ 'ut it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so 'y the
terms of the amendment.
L!"IN M!)IM$
)+, 9(e
People v. 8umilang
Case No. 22*
G.R. No. L-491.7 ((ece6-er 1., 194*)
F!C"#$
2he petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 9 months and )1 days of prision correctional
to 1+ years and 1 day of prision mayor. 7n appeal, 'oth the &: and the 8& affirmed
the sentence of the lower court.
>ased on the records, a copy of the resolution of the &ourt denying the
motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitionerDs attorney. However, the
attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice 'ecause then he
was already hiding in the mountains of <aguna as a guerilla officer of the Mar"ings
guerilla. 2he attorney prays that the reading of the sentence 'e suspended and that
petitioner 'e allowed to file whatever pleading that may 'e allowed 'y this
Honora'le 2ri'unal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner.
I##%&$
.01 the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or
motion should 'e granted.
'&L(F
1o. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that e3tent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(e
Palomo >uilding 2enants :ssociation v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. 97
G.R. No. L-*.+43 (,cto-er 31, 19.4)
F!C"#$
Petitioner filed an action for *eclaration of 1ullity of 8ale and *amages with
Preliminary In!unction 'efore the then &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila against
respondents @overnment 8ervice Insurance 8ystem ;@8I8= and &apitol Hills, as
principal defendants, and the five ;5= !udges of the then &ity &ourt of Manila in the
in!unction aspect of the case. Respondent @8I8 and &apitol Hills filed separate
motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and
that there are other actions pending 'etween the same parties for the same cause.
Respondent !udge granted private respondentsL motion to dismiss.
I##%&$
.01 the Intermediate :ppellate &ourt ;I:&= erred in sustaining the order of
respondent, denying petitionerLs motion for approval of the record on appeal due to
failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them.
'&L($
-es. Petitioners invo"e 8ection ,/ of the Judiciary Reorgani#ation :ct of 1/E+
;>P 1)/= which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein
respondent I:& erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in 1lday vs+
/amilon, KVtWhe reorgani#ation having 'een declared to have 'een completed, >P
>ig. 1)/ is now in full force and effect. : Record on :ppeal is no longer necessary for
ta"ing an appeal. 2he same proviso appears in 8ection 1E of the Interim Rules and
@uidelines issued 'y this &ourt on January 11, 1/E,. >eing procedural in nature, those
provision s may 'e applied retroactively for the 'enefit of petitioners, as appellants.
L8tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that e3tentL ;People vs+ 'umilang, 77 Phil. 7(9
V1/9(1.W K
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, 9(e
MR&:, Inc. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 7.
G.R. No. .**71 ((ece6-er 19, 19.9)
F!C"#$
2he petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the &: affirming the order of
the R2& dismissing the complaint for non%payment of the proper filing fees as the
prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, e3emplary
damages, attorneyDs fees and litigation e3penses sought to 'e recovered 'y it from
the defendants 'ut left them to the discretion of the Honora'le &ourt.
I##%&$
.01 the petition has merit.
'&L($
-es. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that e3tent.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(e
7campo v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. .9
G.R. No. 79*+ ((ece6-er ., 19.9)
F!C"#$
Petitioner 'egan construction of his house without permit from the owner,
while 'eing informed of P.*. 77). Petitioner never showed title to the land he
claimed to have purchased. 8ec. 1 of P.*. 77), otherwise "nown as the :ntiN
84uatting <aw has three elementsF
;a= accused is not the owner of the landJ
;'= he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force,
intimidation, or threat or 'y ta"ing such advantage of the a'sence or
tolerance of the ownerJ
;c= such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of
the owner.
8ec. 15, Rule 11/ of the Rules on &riminal Procedure states that after
prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.$
I##%&$
1. .01 petitioner is guilty of the crime of s4uatting.
). .01 a motion to dismiss 'ars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.
'&L($
-es on 'oth counts. >y moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to su'stantiate his defense
and in effect su'mits the case for !udgment on the 'asis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
L!"IN M!)IM$
95a, 9('
-a"ult Philippines v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 311
G.R. No. 91.1* (,cto-er 1, 199+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for in!uries arising from
alleged criminal negligence, 'eing without malice, cannot 'e filed independently of
the criminal action under :rt. ,, of the &ivil &ode.
I##%&$
.01 a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper
even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.
'&L($
-es. 6nder the 1/E5 Rules of &riminal Procedure, the civil action for the
recovery of civil lia'ility is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,E', 9(e
:ris ;Phil.= Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission
Case No. 21
G.R. No. 9+1+1 (!/g/st 1, 1991)
F!C"#$
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of 8ec. 1) of R: (71( to :rt. )), of the
<a'or &ode, and 2ransitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the 'asis of 'eing in
violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws, respectively.
I##%&$
.01 amendments introduced 'y 8ec. 1) of R: (715 to :rt. )), of the <a'or
&ode, and 2ransitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional.
'&L($
-es on 'oth counts. 2he provision concerning the mandatory and automatic
reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found un!ustified 'y the la'or ar'iter
is a valid e3ercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provision is
then a police legislation$. 2he 4uestioned Interim Rules can 'e given retroactive
effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ea, 9(e
:tlas &onsolidated Mining and *evelopment &o. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-143+1 (Fe-r/ar0 14, 199+)
F!C"#$
Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with &6B1&7%HB<BP where'y
the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 1) mining claims 'elonging to
the latter located at 2oledo &ity, &e'u. Petitioner also entered into a similar
agreement with >I@: &7PPBRJ su'!ect of this 7perating :greement are ,1 mining
claims of >I@:%&7PPBR li"ewise located at 2oledo &ity, &e'u. However, of the total
mining claims KleasedK 'y petitioner from 'oth &6B1&7%HB<BP and >I@: &7PPBR, /
mining claims overlap. 2hese / overlapping mining claims 'ecame the su'!ect of
administrative cases where &6B1&7%HB<BP won. *uring the pendency of this appeal,
&6B1&7%HB<BP and >I@: &7PPBR, entered into a compromise agreement. 2his
compromise agreement ena'led >I@:%&7PPBR to eventually lay claim over the /
overlapping mining claims. *ue to the promulgation of P.*. 1)E1, a num'er of the
defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 2hey alleged that the operating
agreement which >I@: &7PPBR signed with petitioner had already 'een revo"ed 'y
a letter and that 'y reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost
!urisdiction pursuant to 8ec. 7;a=;c= and 8ec. 1) of P.*. 1)E1.
I##%&$
.01 P.*. 1)E1 prevails.
'&L($
P.*. 1)E1 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general
application.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
@overnment of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of >inalonan
Case No. 117
G.R. No. L-.243 ((ece6-er 24, 1911)
F!C"#$
2his is a registration proceedings instituted 'y the *irector of <ands under 8ec.
(1 of :ct 1o. /)(, see"ing to compel the registration of all private property within a
prescri'ed area in the municipality of >inalonan, Pangasinan on two parcels of land.
:ct 1o. /)( is not applica'le to any other than pu'lic lands, or, at most, lands
claimed 'y the @overnment. 2he :ct does not touch upon the compulsory
registration of private titles. &adastral :ct ;1o. ))5/= authori#es the *irector of <ands
to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of
property within any area which has 'een regularly surveyed and platted under the
procedure prescri'ed in the :ct. 8ec. (1 of :ct 1o. /)( does not permit of similar
proceedings. 2he title of the Pu'lic <and :ct contains no mention of compulsory
registration proceedings. 1o reference is made in :ct 1o. ))5/ to the repeal or
amendment of 8ec. (1 of :ct 1o. /)(.
I##%&$
.hether 8ec. (1 of :ct 1o. /)( authori#es the institution of compulsory
registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined
e3clusively to pu'lic lands.
'&L($
:ct 1o. ))5/ was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of e3isting legislation
on the same su'!ect. 2he fact that the new :ct does not e3pressly state that it
amends or repeals 8ec. (1 of :ct 1o. /)( does not necessarily re'ut this conclusion.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(e
*evelopment >an" of the Phil. v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 92
G.R. No. L-2.774 (Fe-r/ar0 2., 19.+)
Chapter I:, Page 171, Footote No. 199
F!C"#$
2he >oard of @overnors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing
pro!ect for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for )+ years.
However, the area sold was then part of a 'igger parcel of land and 'ecause the
su'division plan for the area was still pending approval 'y the >ureau of <ands, the
sales agreement 'etween the *>P and the PHH& was not presented immediately for
registration 'y the *>P. *>P e3pressed its dou'ts as to whether it could ac4uire the
property in 4uestion for the intended purpose of a housing pro!ect in the light of the
then 8ec. 1, of R: E5. However, without the "nowledge of the *>P, a portion of the
property including the 15/ lots sold to the *>P, were segregated and a separate
certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHH& wherein
there was no annotation whatsoever to the title. 2hen, R: ,197 was enacted,
amending certain provisions of the *>P &harter ;R: E5=, among which was 8ec. 1,.
I##%&$
.01 there is retroactivity of the amendment of 8ec. 1, of R: E5, 'y R: ,197.
'&L($
-es. 7ne of the purposes of &ongress when it enacted R: ,197, 'y amending
8ec. 1, of R: E5, was to erase any dou'ts regarding the legality of the ac4uisition 'y
the *>P of the 15/ lots from the PHH& for the housing pro!ect which it intended to
esta'lish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a
curative statute to render valid the ac4uisition 'y the *>P of the 15/ lots from the
PHH&.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(e
>riad :gro *evelopment &orp. v. Hon. dela 8erna, and dela &ru#, et al.
Case No. 39
G.R. No. .3221 (4/e 29, 19.9)
Chapter I), Page 37*, Footote No. 13*
F!C"#$
2he case arose out of a complaint filed 'y 2rade 6nion of the Philippines and
:llied 8ervices .A26 <ocal &hapter 1o. R7I%++5 against respondent agricultural firm
for alleged underpayment0non%payment of minimum wage, B&7<:, overtime pay,
legal holiday pay, night shift differential pay, 1,
th
month pay and service incentive
leave pay. Respondent failed to su'mit controverting evidence despite due noticeJ
*irector >al'in thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay
P5,,(/,/+/.,+.
In its appeal to the 1<R&, >riad :gro 4uestioned the Regional *irectorDs
authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of wor"ers, which 1<R& dismissed on the
strength of B.7. 111 amending :rt. 1)E;'= of the <a'or &ode, which granted to
Regional *irectors !urisdiction over monetary claims.
I##%&$
.01 the !urisdiction over money claims is e3clusive to the <a'or :r'iters, 'y
force of :rt. )17 of the <a'or &ode.
'&L($
2he &ourt held that B.7. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a
defect that attached to the provision su'!ect of the amendment. 2his was clear from
the provisoF 2he provisions of :rt. )17 of this &ode notwithstanding?$ 2he intended
effect was clearly to ma"e the 8ecretary of <a'or and the various Regional *irectors
have concurrent !urisdiction. B.7. 111 therefore has retroactive effect.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, /, ,+', ,E', 9(e
Brectors, Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission, Hon. :ndres, Jr. and >urgos
Case No. 99
G.R. No. 1+4211 (Ma0 ., 199*)
Chapter I), Page 377, Footote No. 14+
F!C"#$
Private respondent was recruited to wor" in 8audi :ra'ia as a service
contract driver. Months after, another contract was e3ecuted which changed his
position into that of a helper0la'orer. .hen private respondent returned to the
Philippines, he invo"ed his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the
difference 'etween his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and
the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual 'onus.
Private respondent filed the complaint with the <a'or :r'iter 'ut B.7. 1o. 7/7
was passed, creating the Philippine 7verseas Bmployment :dministration ;P7B:=,
vested with the original and e3clusive !urisdiction over money claims 'etween
employers and employees a'road. 2he <a'or :r'iter still proceeded with the case
and rendered a *ecision in favor of private respondent.
I##%&$
.01 B.7. 7/7 should 'e given retroactive effect and thus divest the <a'or
:r'iter of !urisdiction.
'&L($
1o. B.7. 7/7 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the
e3ception to the rule on prospectivity. <aws should only 'e applied prospectively
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is e3pressly declared or is
necessitated. Aurthermore, the !urisdiction over the su'!ect matter is determined 'y
the law in force at the time of the commencement of the actionJ in this case, these
were P.*. 1(/1 and 1,/1.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,5, 9(a, 9(c, 9(e
8antos v. *uata and the &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 274
G.R. No. L-2+9+1 (!/g/st 31, 19*1)
Chapter I), Page 37*, Footote No. 134
F!C"#$
*uata and :guilar 'ought a parcel of land which su'se4uently 'ecame a
4uarter part of <ot 1o. ,7. 2he lot was purchased 'y 8antos, @aanan and :guilar. Aor
convenience, the title was issued in 8antosDs name.
7n :ugust ,, 1/55, private respondent *uata, the daughter of the *uata
spouses, instituted an action for reconveyance of Z of <ot 1o. ,7. 8antos denied the
spousesD ownership, claiming that the land had 'een sold to her 'y :guilar in a
private document. 2he trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro
sale and ruled in favor of 8antos. 6pon appeal, the &: ruled that the transaction was
actually an e4uita'le mortgage under :rt. 1(+) of the 1ew &ivil &ode and set aside
the decision of the trial court.
I##%&$
.hether 8antos and :guilar, in e3ecuting the said private document,
intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro.
'&L($
It is a mortgage. :rt. 1(+) was designed primarily to curtail the evils 'rought
a'out 'y contracts of sale with right of repurchaseJ it envisioned contracts of sale
with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended
purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a
contract purporting to 'e a pacto de retro sale is drawn up.
8aid article is remedial in nature and can thus 'e applied retroactively to
cases arising prior to the effectivity of the 1ew &ivil &ode.
L!"IN M!)IM$
Ec, 17, )1, 9(e
Municipality of 8an 1arciso, Sue#on v. Mende#, 8r.
Case No. 1.2
G.R. No. 1+37+2 ((ece6-er *, 1994)
Chapter I), Page 3.1, Footote No. 11+
F!C"#$
President &. @arcia, issued B.7. ,5, creating the municipal district of 8an
:ndres, Sue#on. 2hen 'y virtue of B.7. 179, issued 'y President *. Macapagal, the
municipal district of 8an :ndres was later officially recogni#ed to have gained the
status of a fifth class municipality 'y operation of 8ec. ) of R: 1515. It was then
attac"ed of its validity.
.hile petitioners would grant that the enactment of R: 71(+ may have
converted the Municipality of 8an :ndres into a de facto municipality, they contend
that since the petition for )uo !arranto had 'een filed prior to the passage of said
law, petitioner municipality had ac4uired a vested right to see" the nullification of
B.7. ,5,, and any attempt to apply 8ec. 99) of R: 71(+ to the petition would
perforce 'e violative of the e4ual protection clause of the &onstitution.
I##%&$
.01 the B.7. creating the municipality of 8an :ndres was cured 'y 8ec.
99);d= of R: 71(+.
'&L($
-es. 2he de !ure status of the Municipality of 8an :ndres in the province of
Sue#on must 'e conceded. 8ec. 99);d= of the <@& of 1//1, which provides that
municipal districts organi#ed pursuant to presidential issuances or e3ecutives orders
and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth 'e considered as regular
municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities 'y
e3ecutive orders which had 'een held to 'e an invalid usurpation of legislative
power.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9(e, (c
7rtigas M &o. v. Aeati >an" M 2rust
Case No. 193
G.R. No. L-24*7+ ((ece6-er 14, 1979)
F!C"#$
:ppellee 'egan laying the foundation and commenced the construction of
a 'uilding on <ots 1os. 5 and (, to 'e devoted to 'an"ing purposes. :ppellant
demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial 'uilding on the
said lots. 2he latter refused to comply, contending that the 'uilding was 'eing
constructed in accordance with the #oning regulations, defendant having filed
'uilding and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong.
I##%&$
.01 the resolution of the Municipal &ouncil of Mandaluyong declaring <ots
1os. 5 and (, among others, as part of the commercial and industrial #one of the
municipality, prevailed over the 'uilding restrictions imposed 'y plaintiff%appellant on
the lots in 4uestion and if Resolution 1o. )7 s%1/(+ is a valid e3ercise of police power.
'&L($
2he trial court held that the su'!ect restrictions were su'ordinate to Municipal
Resolution 1o. )7. It upheld the classification 'y the Municipal &ouncil of the area
along B*8: :venue as a commercial and industrial #one, and held that the same
rendered Kineffective and unenforcea'leK the restrictions in 4uestion as against
defendant.

Resolution 1o. )7 was passed in the valid e3ercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of
the people in the locality.
Bven if the su'!ect 'uilding restrictions were assumed 'y the defendant as
vendee of <ots 1os. 5 and (, in the deeds of sale and in the 2&2s the contractual
o'ligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution 1o. )7.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 9(e
>illones v. &ourt of Industrial Relations
Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-171** (4/30 3+, 19*1)
F!C"#$
Petitioners were allegedly employees of <u#on 8tevedoring &orporation,
which re4uired them to wor" 1E hours a day without giving them additional
compensation. 2here was an amica'le settlement 'ut petitioners disclaimed having
"nowledge stating they did not authori#e the filing.
Respondent contends that petitioners are 'arred due to prescription under
8ec. 7%: of &.:. 1o. 199, as amended 'y R: 1//,.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. 7%: of &.:. 1o. 199, as amended 'y R: 1//, to the effect that any
action to enforce any cause under this :ct shall 'e commenced within three years
after such cause of action accruedJ otherwise it shall 'e 'arred forever.
'&L($
It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced 'efore the
effective date of this act shall not 'e affected 'y the period prescri'ed. :s the
statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it
retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the
si3 years from their accrual. 2he court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in
nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. >ecause the
statute shortened the period within which to 'ring an action and in order not to
violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims
were in!uriously affected there'y should have a reasona'le period of one year from
the time the new statute too" effect within which to sue on such claims.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 9(e
Philippine 1ational >an" v. :suncion
Case No. 237
G.R. No. L-4*+91 (No8e6-er 23, 1977)
Chapter ), Page 3.7, Footote No. 3
F!C"#$
7n January 1/(,, Philippine 1ational >an" ;P1>= granted Aa'ar Incorporated
a loan secured 'y !oint signatures of Jose >arredo, &armen and 2omas >orromeo
and Manuel >arredo. >y May, 1/77 the outstanding 'alance was over PE million. P1>
filed a case against all 9 signatories. However, 'efore the case was decided, Manuel
>arredo passed away. 2he case was dismissed pursuant to 8ec. (, Rule E( of the Rules
of &ourt that the claim of P1> should 'e filed with the estate proceedings of M.
>arredo and cannot 'e 'rought against other surviving de'tors.
I##%&$
.01 the &ourts interpretation of 8ec. (, Rule E( prevents a creditor from
proceeding against the surviving solidary de'tors is accurate.
'&L($
1o. :rt. 1)1( of the 1ew &ivil &ode gives the creditor the right to proceed
against anyone of the solidary de'tors, or some, or all$. 2hus, the choice is left up to
P1> to decide. 8ec. ( of Rule E( simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor
desires to go against the deceased de'tor. 2o re4uire P1> to go against the estate
would deprive P1> of his su'stantive rights provided 'y :rt. 1)1(. In this case, the
Rules of &ourt may not prevail over :rt. 1)1( 'ecause su'stantive law cannot 'e
amended 'y a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1/E7 &onstitution states that rules
promulgated 'y the 8upreme &ourt should not diminish, increase of modify
su'stantive rights.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c
7ngsia"o v. @am'oa
Case No. 9+
G.R. No. L-1.*7 (!pr23 ., 191+)
F!C"#$
In 1/9(, 7ngsia"o ;landowner= and @am'oa ;tenant= entered into a contract
pursuant of 8ec. E of :ct 9+59. 2his act provided that the palay would 'e divided
e4ually 'y the ) parties. However, later that same year, :ct 9+59 was amended 'y
R: ,9. *uring li4uidation, @am'oa sought application of the amendatory law which
provided for crop division on a 55%95 'asis in favor of the tenants. 7ngsia"o insists that
R: ,9 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot 'e given retroactive effect.
>ecause of this, the original contract starting an e4ual sharing of profits should 'e
followed.

I##%&$
.01 R: ,9 is remedial in nature and should 'e given retroactive effect.
'&L($
-es. In the past, laws concerning this issue have 'een amended with the
intent of 'eing remedial and therefore, producing retroactive effect. Moreover, it is
clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning R: ,9 that this 'ill
see"s to amend the Rice 8hare 2enancy :ct in such a way to ma"e the division of the
crops more e4uita'le to the tenants? 2he principal feature of this 'ill is to increase
the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
)a, (', /a, 9/
:mandy v. People
Case No. 7
G.R. No. 79+1+ (Ma0 23, 19..)
F!C"#$
Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.( grams of mari!uana.
>ecause he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of si3 years and 1 day
;the minimum time for his offense=. Petitioner then filed for pro'ation alleging P.*.
/(E. However, the petition was denied 'ecause P.*. 1//+ had repealed P.*. /(E, no
longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligi'le for pro'ation.
I##%&$
.01 the lower court erred in disapproving :mandyDs petition for pro'ation.
'&L($
1o. 2he law clearly declares who are entitled to pro'ation and who arenDt.
Petitioner does not fall under those entitled 'ecause those who have 'een
sentenced to serve a ma3imum term of more than si3 years$ are e3cluded from the
'enefits of the Pro'ation <aw. >ecause P.*. 1//+ was promulgated after P.*. /(E, the
former prevails. .here the law is clear and unam'iguous, it must 'e ta"en as it is,
devoid of !udicial addition or su'traction.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 7', ))a, )5a, ,(a, 9,, 9/
Parras v. <and Registration &ommission
Case No. 197
G.R. No. L-1*+11 (4/30 2*, 19*+)
Chapter ), Page 39+, Footote No. 1*
F!C"#$
Petitioner was re4uired 'y the <and Registration &ommissioner ;<R&= to remit
to the &ommissionerLs office, pursuant to 8pecial Provisions of R: ),++, otherwise
"nown as the :ppropriations :ct for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.++ as
estimated cost of pu'lication in the 7fficial @a#ette of the initial notice of the
hearing of the case.
Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is
unconstitutional 'eing as it is revenue%raising. He prays that he 'e e3empt from such
a deposit and that the <R& and the *irector of Printing 'e ordered to pu'lish the
notice in the 7fficial @a#ette.
I##%&$
1. .01 petitioner can 'e e3empted.
). .01 the law states that persons will 'e made to pay for the pu'lication.
'&L($
Petitioner was made to pay. 2he law that petitioner relies on was 8ec. 119 of
:ct 9/(. 2he reenactment of the same law as R: 117 did not include the said
provision of :ct 9/(.
L!"IN M!)IM$
11, ,), ,E'
*iu v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 9*
G.R. No. 111213 ((ece6-er 19, 1991)
Chapter ), Page 391, Footote No. 2.
F!C"#$
7n several occasions, private respondent Pag'a purchased on credit various
articles of merchandise from petitionersL store all valued at P7,E().55. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioners 'rought the matter 'efore the >arangay &hairman and the latter
set the case for hearing, 'ut private respondents failed to appear. .hen the parties
met, they failed to reach an amica'le settlement.
Private respondents in their :nswer, while admitting inde'tedness, interposed
two counterclaimsF ;1= for P(,))7.++ as alleged e3penses for maintenance and repair
of the 'oat 'elonging to petitioners, and ;)= another for P1),++++.++ representing the
cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated.
I##%&$
.01 parties did not meet in presence of a Pang"at as re4uired 'y law.
'&L($
Petition was granted without pre!udice to the re%filing of the case 'y
petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.*. 15+E, otherwise "nown as
the KOatarungang Pam'arangay <awK.
It must 'e noted that P.*. 15+E has 'een repealed 'y codification in the <@&
of 1//1. 2he 'asic complaint was filed 'y petitioners 'efore the trial court 'efore the
effectivity of the <@&. 1evertheless, 8ec. 9 and ( of the former law have 'een
su'stantially reproduced in 8ec. 91+;'= and 91) respectively, of the latter law.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9, 5', /a, ,('
@overnment v. 8pringer
Case No. 119
G.R. No. L-2*979 (!pr23 1, 1927)
Chapter I, Page 3., Footote No. 1**
F!C"#$
2he 1ational &oal &ompany elected its 'oard of directors via vote in
accordance with its 'y%laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and
illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected 'y the proper
shareholders.
2he 1ational &oal &ompany was formed 'y the Philippine @overnment. 2he
@overnment intended to retain a ma!ority sta"e in the said companyJ however, it
ended up occupying almost /+C of the stoc". *uring the election of directors, three
mem'ers of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the
e3ecutive.
I##%&$
.01 the e3ecutive is the sole administrator of the Philippine @overnment.
'&L($
-es. 8ec. 9 of :ct 1o. )7+5, as amended 'y 8ec. ) of :ct 1o. )E)), as
purports to vest the voting power of the government%owned stoc" in the 1ational
&oal &ompany in the President of the 8enate and the 8pea"er of the House of
Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, /a, ,+a, ,E'
Mecano v. &ommission on :udit
Case No. 17*
G.R. No. 1+39.2 ((ece6-er 11, 1992)
Chapter ), Page 391, Footote No. 41
F!C"#$
Petitioner see"s to nullify the decision of the &ommission on :udit ;&7:=
em'odied in its Bndorsement denying his claim for reim'ursement under 8ec. (// of
the Revised :dministrative &ode ;R:&=, as amended.
Petitioner is a *irector II of the 1ational >ureau of Investigation ;1>I=. He was
hospitali#ed for cholecystitis from March )( to :pril 7, 1//+, on account of which he
incurred medical and hospitali#ation e3penses, the total amount of which he is
claiming from the &7:. However, the reim'ursement process was stalled 'ecause of
the issue that the R:& 8ec. (// was repealed 'y the :dministrative &ode of 1/E7.
I##%&$
1. .01 petitioner can claim from the &7:.
). .01 8ec. (// of R:& was repealed 'y the :dministrative &ode of 1/E7.
'&L($
Petition was granted. 2he 4uestion of whether or not petitioner can claim from
&7: is rooted on whether or not 8ec. (// of the R:& has 'een repealed. 2he &ourt
finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the
:dministrative &ode of 1/E7 is merely under implied repeal, and the &ourt considers
such implied repeal as not favora'le. :lso the &ourt finds that laws must 'e in accord
with each other. 2he second sentence of :rt. 17, of the <a'or &ode, as amended 'y
P.*. 1/)1, e3pressly provides that Kthe payment of compensation under this 2itle shall
not 'ar the recovery of 'enefits as provided for in 8ec. (// of the R:& ? whose
'enefits are administered 'y the system ;888 or @8I8= or 'y other agencies of the
government.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
,+a, ,), ,7, ,E', 9/
&hin :h Aoo and -ee 8hee v. &oncepcion and <ee Hoo
Case No. 2+
G.R. No. 332.1 (March 31, 193+)
F!C"#$
2he accused, one &han 8am, was ac4uitted of murder 'ut was ordered to
'e committed to an asylum. 2he court permitted accused to leave the hospital two
years later on the strength of doctorDs reports. In issuing the order of release the
respondent !udge relied upon :rt. E, par. 9, of the Penal &ode. 7n the other hand,
8ec. 1+9E of the :dministrative &ode confers on the *irector of Health the authority
to say when a patient may 'e discharged from an insane asylum.
I##%&$
.01 the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an
asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person su'se4uently to leave the
asylum without the approval of the *irector of Health.
'&L(F
It is a well%"nown rule of statutory construction that when there is no e3press
repeal, none is presumed to 'e intended. <i"ewise, when two portions of the law can
'e construed so that 'oth can stand together, this should 'e done. :rt. E of the
Penal &ode has not 'een impliedly repealed 'y 8ec. 1+9E of the :dministrative
&ode. 2he powers of the courts and the *irector of Health are complementary with
each other. 2hus, any person confined in any asylum 'y order of the court in
accordance with :rt. E of the Penal &ode cannot 'e discharged from custody
without the ac4uiescence of the *irector of Health. 2he converse proposition e4ually
holds true.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,E', 9/
-nchausti M &o v. 8tanley
Case No. 174
G.R. No 1233+ (4a/ar0 21, 1917)
F!C"#$
2he petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping 'usiness,
sought to prohi'it the Insular &ollector of &ustoms from enforcing the re4uirement,
which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on
each vessel. 2he petitioner relied upon the ground that :ct 1o. )(19 was not and
could not have 'een repealed 'y the :dministrative &odeJ :ct 1o. )(19 'eing
specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels.
I##%&$
.01 there is a conflict 'etween :ct 1o. )(19 and paragraph ;e= of 8ec. 1,1)
of the :dministrative &ode.
'&L(F
2here is no e3press repeal of :ct 1o. )(19. It is apparent that there was no
specific intention to repeal the statute. 2he Philippine <egislature could not have
intended to repeal said :ct within less than three wee"s after its passage and
su'stitute in its place a'solutely nothing e3cept the uncontrolled !udgment of the
Insular &ollector of &ustoms.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, /c, 9/, 5+

6.8. v. 2antoco
Case No. 1*4
G.R. No. 1133. (!/g/st 11, 191*)
F!C"#$
2he defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under
his control a certain amount of opium. 2he trial court dismissed the complaint on the
theory that :ct 1o. ),E1 and all other laws had 'een repealed 'y the :ct of the
6nited 8tates &ongress. 2he @overnment appealed.
I##%&$
.hat the effect of said :ct was upon local legislation dealing with the su'!ect
of opium.
'&L($
2hat the 6nited 8tates &ongress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws
dealing with the su'!ect of opium appears from the law itself. .hether or not an :ct
is impliedly repealed is a 4uestion of legislative intent to 'e ascertained 'y an
e3amination of 'oth statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and o'!ect of
'oth. 2he 6nited 8tates &ongress never intended to rela3 the stringent provisions
relating to the smo"ing of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9/
Aa'ros, et al. v. <aya
Case No. 44
G. R. No. 7+.32 ((ece6-er 1., 19.7)
F!C"#$
2his is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental
proceeds of authori#ed tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in 8ec.
,;a= of P.*. 951, and thereafter, under the Bducation :ct of 1/E) ;>P ),)=. 2hen
Minister of Bducation Jaime &. <aya promulgated the disputed MB&8 7rder 1o. )5,
entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of >P ),), 2he Bducation
:ct of 1/E), relative to 8tudent Aees for 8chool -ear 1/E5%1/E(. Petitioners prayed for
temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations, which was granted to
them. However, four schools prayed for the lifting of the 2R7 on the ground that their
tuition fee increase has already 'een approved pursuant to P.*. 951, which the
&ourt there'y lifted.
I##%&$
.01 >P ),) has repealed P.*. 951 which there'y ma"es MB&8 7rder 1o. )5
valid.
'&L($
-es. 6nder P.*. 951, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and
other school fees or charges 'y private schools is lodged with the 8ecretary of
Bducation and &ulture, where 8ec. 9) of >P ),) li'erali#ed the procedure 'y
empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school
fees or charges. P.*. 951 provides that (+C of the incremental proceeds of tuition
fee increases shall 'e applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of
mem'ers of the faculty and other employees of the schoolJ while >P ),) provides
that the increment shall 'e applied or used in accordance with the regulations
promulgated 'y the MB&8. Hence, there was a repeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9, ,/'
Iloilo Palay and &orn Planters :ssociation, Inc. v. Aeliciano
Case No. 127
G.R. No. L-24+22 (March 3, 19*1)
Chapter ), Page 399, Footote No. *1
F!C"#$
Private respondent Aeliciano, the &hairman and @eneral Manager of the
Rice and &orn :dministration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the
immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may
designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the 1ational Bconomic &ouncil as
em'odied in its Resolution 1o. 7+, series of 1/(9. It was approved. 2he President
designated the Rice and &orn :dministration as the government agency authori#ed
to underta"e the importation pursuant to which &hairman Aeliciano announced an
invitation to 'id for said importation and set the 'idding date. Petitioners contend
that the importation is contrary to R: ,95) which prohi'its the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.
I##%&$
.01 R: ))+7 was repealed 'y R: ,95).
'&L($
2he importation may 'e illegal on the ground that such importation 'elong
e3clusively to private parties, there'y prohi'iting any government agency from doing
so. R: ))+7 provides that should there 'e an e3isting or imminent shortage in the
local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is
certified 'y the 1ational Bconomic &ouncil, the President may authori#e such
importation thru any government agency that he may designate. 2he two laws,
although with a common o'!ective, refer to different methods applica'le to different
circumstances. 2he two laws can therefore 'e construed as harmonious parts of the
legislative e3pression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to
effect a repeal 'y implication, the latter statute must 'e irreconcila'ly inconsistent
and repugnant to the prior e3isting law, hence there was no repeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,E', ,/a
>rias de &oya v. 2an <ua, et al.
Case No. 1*
G.R. No. 3+71* (#epte6-er 22, 1931)
F!C"#$
*efendant%appellant 2an <ua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines
while she was in &hina. :t this, she appointed her son to manage, sell and encum'er
her properties situated in the Philippines. : certain Hicente 1epomuceno was
appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. *efendant%appellant e3ecuted a
mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. 2he assignee
filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him.
I##%&$
.01 the mortgage given 'y respondent to petitioner was valid and legal
considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer
has 'een made.
'&L($
2he Insolvency <aw and the <and Registration :ct compliment each other
and are 'oth intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors, according the
latter a means for securing their insolvent de'torLs property, against which they may
enforce their credits. &onstruing the Insolvency <aw together with the <and
Registration :ct, we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the
insolvent de'torLs real property made 'y the cler" of the proper court to the assignee
may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of
the insolvency proceedings, 'oth such proceedings and the assignment must have
'een recorded in the registry of deeds, the former from their commencement.
Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land
given to him 'y the latter, which was registered with a 2orrens title, is legal and valid.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,E', ,/a
Hillegas vs. 8u'ido
Case No. 314
G.R. No. L-31711, (#epte6-er 3+, 1971)
Chapter ), Page 411, Footote No.9*
F!C"#$
2he 8ecretary of Ainance authori#ed Jose R. @loria of the 7ffice of the &ity
2reasurer of Manila to assume the duties of :ssistant &ity 2reasurer. In an
:dministrative 7rder, series of 1/(E, Petitioner, Mayor of the &ity of Manila, directed
@loria to desist and refrain from e3ercising the duties and functions of the :ssistant
&ity 2reasurer, saying that Romualde# is not empowered to ma"e such designation.
Petitioner, appointed Manuel *. <apid as :ssistant &ity 2reasurer. Respondent,
disapproved the appointment, 'asing his action, on an opinion of the 8ecretary of
Justice, to the effect that the appointment of :ssistant Provincial 2reasurers is still
governed 'y 8ec. )+EEa of the Revised :dministrative &ode, and not 'y 8ec. 9 of the
*ecentrali#ation <aw, R: 51E5.
I##%&$
.01 the *ecentrali#ation <aw should govern.
'&L($
1o. It has 'een the constant holding of this court that repeals 'y implication
are not favored and will not 'e so declared unless it 'e manifest that the legislature
so intended. 8uch a doctrine goes as far 'ac" as 6nited 8tates v. Reyes, a 1/+E
decision. It is necessary then 'efore such a repeal is deemed to e3ist that it 'e shown
that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same su'!ect matter and that
the latter 'e inconsistent with the former.
: su'se4uent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is
not to 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the
legislative purpose to do so is manifest.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, /, 5+
Jalandoni vs. Bndaya
Case No. 137
G.R. No. L-23.94, (4a/ar0 24, 1974)
Chapter ), Footote No. *2
F!C"#$
Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for li'el against a 8erafin &ru# in the
Municipal &ourt of >atangas presided over 'y the Respondent Judge. *uring the
hearing of the li'el case &ru#, through counsel manifested in open court that under
:rt. ,(+ of the Revised Penal &ode, ;the court of first instance of the province or city
where the li'elous article is printed and first pu'lished or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense=, Respondent
Judge was devoid of !urisdiction to do so. 2here was, as noted, a negative response.
Respondent still tried the case.
I##%&$
.01 Municipal &ourt of >atangas has !urisdiction over case at hand.
'&L($
1o. :s is clear from his well%written memorandum, he did 'ase his action on
what for him was the conse4uence of the Judiciary :ct as amended 'y R: ,E)E,
8ec. E7 of which would confer concurrent !urisdiction on municipal !udges in the
capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for 'y law
does not e3ceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than si3 years or
fine not e3ceeding si3 thousand pesos or 'oth. <i'el is one of those offenses included
in such category. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into
effect on June )), 1/(,, the provisions of :rt. ,(+ as last amended 'y R: 1)E/
conferring e3clusive !urisdiction on courts of first instance, was thus repealed 'y
implication.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, /, 9/
&IR vs. Rio 2u'a 1ic"el Mining &orporation.
Case No. 79
G.R. Nos. .31.3-.4 #epte6-er 3+, 1991
Chapter ), Page 4++, Footote No.*4
F!C"#$
Respondent &orporation filed with the &ommissioner of Internal Revenue two
separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P/79,/7E.5+ and P9)9,,+,.,,,
respectively, representing )5C of the specific ta3es collected on the refined and
manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utili#ed in its
operations as a mining concessionaire, using R: 19,5 as 'asis. 2he &ourt of 2a3
:ppeals decided that Respondent &orporation can no longer claim this due to P.*.
),1, 9,( and 711.
I##%&$
.01 Repu'lic :ct 1o. 19,5 ;:n :ct 2o Provide Means of Increasing the
Highway 8pecial Aund= or certain provisions thereof have 'een repealed 'y
su'se4uent statutes.
'&L($
-es. .e find that the disputed proviso found in 8ec. 5 of R: 19,5 was drafted
to favor a particular group of ta3payers%the miners and the lum'ermen%'ecause it
was KunfairK to su'!ect them to the increased rates and in effect ma"e them su'sidi#e
the construction of highways from which they did not directly 'enefit. @iven the
present concept of the general fund and its wide application, then the proviso in
8ec. 5 of R: 19,5 has truly 'ecome an anachronism. It is inevita'le that, sooner or
later, the miners will stand to 'enefit from any of the government endeavors and it
will no longer 'e correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in
specific ta3es to augment the general fund for government underta"ings is KunfairK to
the miners 'ecause they are not directly convenienced.
.hile we generally do not favor repeal 'y implication, it cannot 'e denied
that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative 'ut to
concede the point that an earlier law has 'een impliedly repealed or revo"ed 'y a
later law 'ecause of an o'vious inconsistency.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9/
Halde# v. 2ua#on
Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-14917 (March 1*, 192+)
Chapter ), Page 3.., Footote No. 9
F!C"#$
2his is a petition for divorce filed 'y petitioner against his respondent wife. :ct
1o. )71+ states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concu'inage cannot 'e
granted e3cept upon conviction. 2he respondent has never 'een convicted of the
offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce 'ased on
prevailing laws 'efore the enactment of :ct 1o. )71+.
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. )71+ should 'e applied in the case.
'&L($
:ct 1o. )71+ should 'e applied. Bven if the said :ct has no repealing clause,
when there is a plain and unavoida'le repugnancy 'etween two laws, the later must
'e given effect. 1egative statutes are mandatory, and must 'e presumed to have
'een intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions.
2he situation in this case does not re4uire the application of any of the
artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its
meaning is unmista"a'le.
L!"IN M!)IM$
7a, 9/
Bstate of Mota v. &oncepcion
Case No. 42
G.R. No. L-341.1 (March 31, 1932)
F!C"#$
In 1/1/, <a#aro Mota and 8alvador 8erra entered into a partnership to
construct several "ilometers of railroad in 7ccidental 1egros. In 1/)+, 8erra
transferred his half interest to &oncepcion and .hita"er. In *ecem'er of the same
year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. 7n the last sale, only part of the
price was paid, so &oncepcion and .hita"er mortgaged to Mota the railroad. Mota
registered the contract as an unregistered real property.
I##%&$
1. .01 a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid.
). .01 enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission.
'&L($
1. :ccording to 8tandard 7il &o. vs. &astro, 8ec. 1/9 of the :dministrative
&ode clearly recogni#es the validity of such a contract 'etween the contracting
parties.
). 2he election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of
rescission. 8erra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion
of the selling price of the railway.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1
2orrente v. @rove
Case No. 111
G.R. No. L-234+ ((ece6-er 21, 19+1)
F!C"#$
2his case is an appeal from a ha'eas corpus proceeding, discharging the
petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in
that the Justice of the Peace had no !urisdiction to issue the order directing the
ma"ing of an arrest outside the Province of &e'u. It is contended that the arrest and
detention of petitioner, were illegal and void.
I##%&$
.01 the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may
'e in the Philippines.
'&L($
6nder the provision of 8ec. 1, of @.7. 1o. 5E, a !ustice of the peace is vested
with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may 'e in the Philippines.
*ue to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed the 8panish law.
2he contention of the petitioner that :ct 1o. 5/ is a proof that the &ivil &ommission
deemed it necessary to ma"e an e3press grant of such authority and that they were
of opinion that prior to the pu'lication of the said law the processes of the !ustices of
the peace did not run throughout the province, much less the archipelago. 2he court
however said that the opinion of the law ma"ing authority as to the meaning and
effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to
respectful consideration, 'ut it is not conclusive on the courts.
L!"IN M!)IM$
9, 9/
Pamil v. 2eleron
Case No. 191
G.R. No. L-34.14 (No8e6-er 2+, 197.)
Chapter I, Page 33, Footote No. 14.
F!C"#$
Respondent Ar. @on#aga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of
:l'u4uer4ue, >ohol. 2he petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for
@on#agaDs dis4ualification 'ased on 8ec. )175 of the :dministrative &ode which
stated that in no case can ecclesiastics 'e elected to a municipal office.
I##%&$
.01 an ecclesiastic is eligi'le to 'e elected.
'&L($
2he vote was indecisive. 8even 'elieved 8ec. )175 was no longer operative.
Aive 'elieved that the prohi'ition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity.
2hough the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the
provision ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. @on#aga was ordered to vacate
the mayoralty.
(2sset2g #e8e$ 2he challenged provision was superseded 'y the 1/,5
&onstitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall 'e
re4uired for the e3ercise of political rights. 8ec. )175 was also repealed 'y the
Blection &ode for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of
ineligi'le persons. :lso, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the
su'!ect shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law.
M2or F28e$ Aor a later provision to repeal a prior one there must 'e such
a'solute repugnance 'etween the two. 1o such repugnance is discerni'le. 8ec.
)175 has neither 'een repealed nor superseded. 2he section also admitted no
e3ception, therefore there can 'e none. 2he &ourt cannot rewrite the law under the
guise of interpretation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(2sset2g #e8e$ /a, ,+a, ,), 9/ M2or F28e$ (c, 7a, 7c, ,7, 9,
People v. :lmuete
Case No. 2++
G.R. No. L-2*111 (Fe-r/ar0 27, 197*)
Chapter I:, Page 142, Footote No. *1
F!C"#$
:lmuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of 8ec. ,/ of the :gricultural
2enancy <aw ;:2<=. 2he accused, tenants of Aernando, allegedly pre%threshed a
portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or o'taining her consent. 2he
accused filed a motion to 4uash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense,
there was no longer any law punishing the act.
I##%&$
.01 pre%threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed.
'&L($
8ec. ,/ was impliedly repealed 'y the :gricultural <and Reform &ode which
was already in force at the time of the act. 2he :<R& suspended the :2<. It instituted
the leasehold system and a'olished the rice share tenancy system. 2he prohi'ition
against pre%threshing is premised on the e3istence of the rice share tenancy system
and is the 'asis for penali#ing clandestine pre%threshing. 2he evident purpose is to
prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of
the harvests. 2he legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenantDs act of pre%
threshing is evident 'y not re%enacting 8ec. ,/ of the :2<. : su'se4uent statute,
revising the whole su'!ect matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former
statute. 2he repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of !urisdiction to punish persons
charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 1+, 97, 9/
8mith >ell M &o. v. Municipality of Pam'oanga
Case No. 14.
G.R. No. L-3331. ((ece6-er 2+, 193+)
F!C"#F
Municipality of Pam'oanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its
machine for the 'aling of hemp in accordance with 7rdinance 1o. ))(. Plaintiff paid
the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to
impose such ta3 and that the ordinance in 4uestion is null and void. 2he defendant
argues that the latter has no power to levy the ta3 in 4uestion under 8ec. )()5;d= of
the :dministrative &ode 'ut it does have such power under a su'se4uent
enactment of :ct 1o. ,9)).
I##%&F
.01 :ct 1o. ,9)) repealed 8ec. )()5;d= the :dministrative &ode.
'&L($
Repeals 'y implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its repeal, it
would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in e3pressly
repealing 8ec. )9+7 of the :dministrative &ode. : general affirmative act will not 'e
construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest.
L!"IN M!)IMF
,7, 5+
<echoco v. &ivil :eronautics >oard
Case No. 71
G.R. No. L-32979-.1 (Fe-r/ar0 29, 1972)
F!C"#$
Petitioner contends that 'y the enactment of R: )(77 amending 8ec. 1,;a=
and 19 of &.:. 1o. 19(, !urisdiction to control rates of airships was ta"en away from
the &ivil :eronautics >oard ;&:>= and re%vested in the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission
;P8&= since R: )(77 impliedly repealed R: 77( which conferred to the &:> the
power of control over air rates and fares.
7n the other hand, respondents argue that !urisdiction over air fares and rates
were, under 'oth statutes, e3ercisa'le concurrently 'y the &:> and the P8&.
I##%&F
.hether the authority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in the &:> or in the P8&.
'&L($
:uthority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in 'oth the &:> and the P8&. 6nder
R: 77(, the &:> can fi3 and determine reasona'le individual, !oint or special rates
charges or fares for air carriers 'ut is su'!ect to the ma3imum rates on freights and
passengers that may 'e set 'y the P8& under R: )(77. Aurthermore, implied repeal of
statutes is not favored.
L!"IN M!)IMF
,7, ,E'
Hillegas v. Bnrile
Case No. 171
G.R. No. L-29.27 (March 31, 1973)
F!C"#F
It is the contention of the petitioner that if 8ec. 9 of the *ecentrali#ation :ct
'e given effect, then the authority to appoint a &ity Aiscal is not lodged in
respondent 8ecretary of Justice 'ut in him as Mayor of the &ity of Manila.
2he defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity
of the provision of the &harter of the &ity of Manila, which negates the assumption of
authority on the part of the petitioner.
I##%&F
.01 the *ecentrali#ation :ct impliedly repealed the provision of the &harter
of the &ity of Manila.
'&L($
1o. 2he issue in this case was already decided in previous !urisprudence in the
case of Hillegas v. 8u'ido. Aurthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that the &ity
Aiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the *ecentrali#ation :ct.
L!"IN M!)IMF
)a, 5a, ,7
Hillegas v. 8u'ido
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-24+12 9 L- 24+4+ (!/g/st 9, 19*1)
F!C"#$
2he &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice claims that R: ))(+ impliedly repealed R:
557and 9+/ providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. 2he &ity Mayor
was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees
in Manila and su'mit to the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice all pending disciplinary
cases.
I##%&
.01 R: ))(+ impliedly repeal R: 557 and 8ec. )) of R: 9+/ so as to vest in the
&ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice the e3clusive and original !urisdiction to remove,
suspend and separate policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila in the
competitive service.
'&L($
1o. R: ))(+ states that the removal and suspension 'y the &ity Mayor can 'e
passed upon or reviewed 'y the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice. It does not state that
the power of removal is conferred to the other 'ody. R: 557 and 9+/ are special
laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila,
R: 557 and 9+/ su'sists side%'y%side with R: ))(+ and are not impliedly repealed 'y
the latter which is a general law. R: ))(+ contemplates appeal from the decision of
the &ity Mayor to the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice, instead of to the President.
Repeal 'y implication is not favored and if two laws can 'e reconciled, the
construction will 'e against such repeal.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,E', 5+
6.8. v. Palacio
Case No. 3+1
G.R. No. 11++2 (4a/ar0 17, 191*)
Chapter ), Page 4+*, Footote No. 77
F!C"#$
Respondent was accused of violating 8ec. E7 of :ct 1o. E) when he willfully
omitted from the ta3 lists real property which he "nows to 'e lawfully ta3a'le. He
posits that :ct 1o. )),E repeals 'y implication :ct 1o. E) 'ecause of the clause in
8ec. 1E that states all acts or parts of :cts in conflict therewith are repealed.$
I##%&$
.01 :ct 1o. )),E had repealed the penal effect of :ct 1o. E).
'&L($
1o. :ct 1o. )),E had done nothing 'ut to change the method and
procedure provided in :ct 1o. E). Repeals 'y implication are not favored, unless it is
manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. :ct 1o. )),E provides no penalty
thus, 8ec. E7 of :ct 1o. E) continues in force.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, ,E'
Marin v. 1acianceno
Case No. 171
G.R. No. 1939 (March 29, 1911)
Chapter ), Page 411, Footote No. 1++
F!C"#$
Aelisa Hernande# died 'efore the testatri3, 'ut the testatri3 did not alter her
will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 2he petitioners are the
surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon 8ec. 75E of the &ode of &ivil Procedure
which provides that .hen a devise or a legacy is made to a child? and the
devisee or legatee dies 'efore the testator, leaving issues? such issue shall ta"e the
estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done? unless a different
disposition is re4uired 'y law.$ 2he e3ecutor of the will opposes the payment upon
the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died 'efore the testator
so as to pass to the heirs.
I##%&$
.01 the heirs of Aelisa Hernande# 'ecome the heir to her legacy after her
death even if the testator did not alter her will.
'&L($
-es. 2he construction 'y the respondent would repeal or annul the section
a'solutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and
repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this
legacy, then 8ec. 75E would have no value and might as well have never 'een
written which is an a'surd interpretation.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 11
Helunta v. &hief, Philippine &onsta'ulary
Case No. 3+9
G.R. No. L-71.11 (4a/ar0 2+, 19..)
Chapter ), Page 412, Footote No. 1+2
F!C"#$
Petitioner as patrolman and mem'er of the Integrated 1ational police ;I1P=
apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. :n altercation
occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver <o#ano. :nacorita,
the widow of <o#ano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there e3ists
a prima facie evidence that petitioner, with deli'erate intent and with intent to "ill,$
shot <o#ano during the performance of duty. Petitioner contends that @eneral &ourt
Martial has no !urisdiction since P.*. 1E5+ was repealed 'y B.7. 1+9+ M 1+1).
I##%&$
.01 the &ourt Martial has !urisdiction.
'&L($
-es. It is specifically stated under B.7. 1+1) that it is only the operational
supervision and direction$ over all units of the I1P that was transferred from the
&onsta'ulary to the city0municipal government. 6nder B.7. 1+9+, it is the e3ercise of
administrative control and supervision$ over units of the I1P that was transferred to
the President. 2he allegation that P.*. 1E5+ has 'een e3pressly repealed 'y clear and
precise provision of B.7. 1+9+ is inaccurate. Repeals 'y implication are not favored
and will not 'e so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )+c, )7, ,7
Pacis v. :veria
Case No. 194
G.R. No. L-2212* (No8e6-er 29, 19**)
F!C"#$
Petitioner, the :cting &ollector of &ustoms, commenced a sei#ure and
forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode referring to the
incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for 'oat loaded with unta3ed
cigarettes. 7n the same day, Marges, the alleged 'oat owner, filed a &ivil &ase for
replevin alleging that the 'oat was stolen. 2he fishing 'oat therein was transferred to
the Provincial 8heriff, and later on to Marges as commanded 'y respondent Hon.
:veria.
I##%&$
3. .01 Marges could recover the fishing 'oat.
9. .01 Provincial 8heriff may 'e held in contempt for failure to comply with
the writ.

'&L($
1. 1o. 2he !urisdiction of the &ollector of &ustoms is provided for in R:
1/,7 which too" effect much later than the Judiciary :ct. It is a3iomatic that the later
law prevails over the prior statute.
). -es. 2he writ was received 'y respondent 8heriff. It has also caught
the 8upreme &ourtDs notice that respondent sheriff has practically ta"en the cudgels
for the 'oat owner. He went 'eyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the
cause of the 'oat owner giving impression that his interest in the su'!ect is more than
!ust the interest of a pu'lic official.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, )+c, 9/
Herman v. Radio &orporation of the Philippines
Case No. 123
G.R. No. 2*.+2 (4/30 11, 1927)
F!C"#$
2wo Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio
'usiness ;Aar Bastern Radio Inc. and Radio &orp.= agreed to merge. 2he petitioner
herein has 'een largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in
consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was
agreed in the contract of merger that he should 'e offered the post of manager of
the traffic department.
I##%&$
.01 HermanDs claim for salary has 'een e3pressly waived in the final
agreement.
'&L($
-es. In 8ec. ,,, of the &ode of &ivil Procedures, it mentions that whenever a
party has, 'y his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deli'erately led
another to 'elieve a particular thing is true and to act upon such 'elief, he cannot
'e permitted to falsify it. 8ec. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode also does not apply since the
transaction was more than a compromise. 2he &ode of &ivil Procedures must prevail
'ecause it is a later e3pression of legislative will than :rt. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 9/
Philippine 1ational >an" v. &ru#, et al.
Case No. 239
G.R. No. .+193 ((ece6-er 1., 19.9)
Chapter ), Page 414, Footote No. 1+.
F!C"#$
:ggregate Mining B3ponents ;:MBG= suffered huge financial losses and was
una'le to pay its remaining employees. 2wo years after, :MBG entered into an
operation contract agreement with 2.M. 8an :ndres *evelopment &orporation, thus
ena'ling the latter to ac4uire on lease the e4uipment of :MBG.
2he unpaid wor"ers filed for monetary compensation 'efore the <a'or :r'iter.
2he said :r'iter awarded 'ac"wages and separation pay. :MBG did not appeal 'ut
P1>, as mortgage%creditor, appealed and alleged that the wor"ers should 'e given
their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay. 2he 1<R& denied the appeal
of P1>. Hence, this instant petition 'y the P1> on the grounds that :rticle 11+ of the
<a'or &ode does not create lien in favor of the wor"ers for unpaid wages upon the
properties of the employer.
I##%&$
.01 :rt. 11+ of the <a'or &ode is to 'e construed as not favoring the unpaid
wor"ers 'ecause of the order of preference provided in :rt. ))91 to ))95 of the &ivil
&ode.
'&L($
1o. :rt. 11+ of the <a'or &ode provides for wor"er preference in case of
'an"ruptcy$. It specifically states that In the event of 'an"ruptcy? of an employerDs
'usiness, his wor"ers shall en!oy AIR82 preference as regards to their unpaid wages,
any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding? such unpaid wages shall 'e
paid in A6<< 'efore claims of the government and other creditors may 'e paid.$
L!"IN M!)IM$
(a, 9/
*avid v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. .1
G.R. No. 12711* (!pr23 ., 1997)
F!C"#$
>arangay &hairman :le3 *avid raised the 4uestion of when the 'arangay
elections should 'e held and 4uestions the &7MB<B&Ds schedule of holding such
elections on the )
nd
Monday of May 1//7. 2he &7MB<B&Ds 'asis is R.:. 71(+ or the
<ocal @overnment &ode which mandates 'arangay elections every , years.
Petitioner *avid contends that an earlier law, R.:. ((7/, should 'e the one followed.
R.:. ((7/ provides that 'arangay elections should 'e held every 5 years. He also
contends that there is a violation of :rt. 1+, 8ec. E of the &onstitution.
I##%&$
1. .hat the term of office of 'arangay officials is.
). .01 there was a violation of :rt. 1+, 8ec. E of the &onstitution.
'&L($
1. It is 'asic in cases of irreconcila'le conflict 'etween two laws that the later
legislative enactment prevails. Aurthermore, the 8upreme &ourt in Paras v+ /3M-5-/
had the opportunity to mention when the ne3t 'arangay election should 'e when it
stated that the ne3t regular election involving the 'arangay office is 'arely 7
months away, the same having 'een scheduled in May 1//7$.
). 1o. :rt. 1+, 8ec. E of the &onstitution provides that, I2he term of office of
elective local officials, e3cept 'arangay officials, which shall 'e determined 'y law,
shall 'e three years?$ It is not to 'e construed as prohi'iting a ,%year term of office
for 'arangay officials.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, /a, )+a, 9/
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 73
G.R. No. 91+22 (March 23, 1992)
Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. .1
F!C"#$
2his is a petition to reverse the *ecision ordering the refund of the @&<
Retirement Plan representing the withholding ta3 on income.
R: 9/17 e3empted the @&< Retirement Plan, including all the retirement
'enefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income ta3. 8oon
after, P.*. 1/5/ was promulgated a'olishing the e3emption from withholding ta3 of
interest on 'an" deposits previously given 'y P.*. 17,/ if the recipient of the interest is
e3empt from income ta3ation. 2he @&< Plan is one of those e3empted from income
ta3 under R: 9/17.
Petitioner contends that P.*. 1/5/ impliedly repealed the provisions of R: 9/17
and R: 1/E,, and that @&< Plan is su'!ect to the final withholding ta3.
I##%&$
.01 @&< Retirement Plan retains its ta3 e3emption after the promulgation of
P.*. 1/5/.
'&L($
-es. 2he deletion in P.*. 1/5/ of the provisions regarding ta3 e3emption under
the old law canDt 'e deemed to 'e applica'le to the employeesD trusts. P.*. 1/5/ is
a general law, hence, it canDt repeal a specific provision impliedly.
It is "nown in statutory construction that a su'se4uent statute that is general in
character canDt 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless
there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. :lso in Hillegas v. 8u'ido, such rule is
upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to
include what was set forth in the special act.
L!"IN M!)IM$
1, 5a, 9,, 5+
People v. <eachon, Jr.
Case No. 1+.
G.R. No. 1+.721-2* (#epte6-er 21, 199.)
F!C"#F
2he Provincial Prosecutor of 7ccidental Mindoro filed two separate
information for violation of P.*. 77), also "nown as :nti%84uatting <aw 'efore the R2&
presided over 'y respondent !udge. :fter presenting the evidence, the prosecution
rested the cases.
:lmost a year after the prosecution has rested, respondent !udge issued an
order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lac" of !urisdiction.
2hereafter, the &: ordered the continuation of trial of the su'!ect case. : month
after, the respondent !udge dismissed the case again, opining that P.*. 77) is
o'solete and deemed repealed 'y 8ec. / and 1+ of :rt. 1, of the 1/E7 &onstitution,
which provide that, ur'an or rural poor dwellers shall not 'e evicted nor their
dwellings demolished e3cept in accordance with law and in a !ust and humane
manner.$
I##%&F
.01 responded !udge acted in grave a'use of discretion in dismissing the
su'!ect criminal case.
'&L(F
-es. 2he :nti%84uatting law en!oys the presumption of constitutionality. 6nless
otherwise repealed 'y a su'se4uent law or ad!udged unconstitutional 'y this court,
a law will always 'e presumed valid.

:t the time the order was issued 'y respondent
!udge, P.*. 77) was still effective. 1either has this court declared its
unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social !ustice provision of the &onstitution.
L!"IN M!)IMF
,7, 5+
Philippine :irlines Inc. v. 1ational <a'or Relations &ommission
Case No. 11.
G.R. No. 1143+7 (4/30 ., 199.)
F!C"#F
Private respondent Bdil'erto &astro was hired as manifesting cler" 'y petitioner
P:<. Respondent was apprehended 'y government authorities while a'out to 'oard a
flight en route to Hong"ong in violation of &entral >an" ;&>= &ircular )(5, as amended 'y
&> &ircular ,E,, in relation to 8ec. ,9 of R: )(5, as amended.
P:< placed &astro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. 2hree years
and si3 months after his suspension, P:< issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the
offense charged 'ut nonetheless reinstated the latter. 2he said resolution li"ewise re4uired
respondent to affi3 his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action ta"en 'y
P:<. 6pon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against P:< for 'ac"wages and
salary increases granted under the collective 'argaining agreement ;&>:= covering the
period of his suspension.
I##%&F
.01 &astro is entitled to 'ac"wages and salary increases granted under the &>:
during his period of suspension.
'&L(F
-es. 2he rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not e3ceed a
ma3imum period of ,+ days, after which period, the employee must 'e reinstated to his
former position. If the suspension is otherwise e3tended, the employee shall 'e entitled to
his salaries and other 'enefits that may accrue to him during the period of such
suspension.
L!"IN M!)IMF
7a, 1,'
Province of Misamis 7riental v. &agayan Blectric Power and <ight &ompany, Inc.
Case No. 127
G.R. No. 41311 (4a/ar0 12, 199+)
F!C"#F
Respondent &BP:<&7 was granted a franchise under R: ,)97, ,57+, and
(+)+ to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in
&agayan de 7ro &ity and its su'ur's including the municipalities of 2agoloan, 7pol,
Hillanueva, and Jasaan. 2he franchise of &BP:<&7 e3pressly e3empts it from
payment of all ta3es of whatever authority$ e3cept ,C ta3 on its gross earnings.
2he Provincial treasurer of Misamis 7riental, however, demanded payment of
the provincial franchise ta3 from &BP:<&7 in accordance with the <ocal 2a3 &ode
;P.*. ),1= and pursuant thereto, the Provincial Revenue 7rdinance 1o. 1/.
I##%&F
.01 &BP:<&7 is e3empt from paying the provincial franchise ta3.
'&L(F
1o. 1o provision in P.*. ),1 e3pressly or impliedly amends or repeals R: ,)97,
,57+ and (+)+. : special and local statute applica'le to a particular case is not
repealed 'y a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application
even if the terms of the general act are 'road enough to include cases in the special
law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.

:lso, the
8ecretary of Ainance made it clear that the franchise ta3 provided in the <ocal 2a3
&ode may only 'e imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain
e3empting clause.
L!"IN M!)IMF
)a, 5+
*e Joya v. <antin
Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-24+37 (!pr23 27, 19*7)
F!C"#$
Respondent Arancindy &ommercial purchased 'ales of te3tile from &e'u
&ompany Brnerose &ommercial. However, the >ureau of &ustoms discovered that
the goods to 'e delivered 'y Brnerose were different from those declared. &ustoms
too" custody of the shipment.
Arancindy &ommercial filed a petition in the &ourt of Airst Instance for
&ustoms to release the goods. Arancindy insisted that the &AI had !urisdiction N on
the 'asis of the Judiciary :ct N and not the >ureau of &ustoms. R: 1/,7 and 11)5, on
the other hand, vest e3clusive !urisdiction over sei#ure and forfeiture proceedings to
the >ureau of &ustoms.
I##%&$
.ho has !urisdiction over the shipment.
'&L($
2he >ureau of &ustoms does. R: 1/,7 and 11)5 are special laws, whereas the
Judiciary :ct is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general
ones.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
:rayata v. Joya
Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-2.+*7 (March 1+, 192.)
F!C"#$
&ecilio Joya was leasing si3 friar lots, and he started paying the @overnment
for such. >ecause the num'er of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of
the lots to respondent A. Joya as administrator.
&ecilio died 'efore fully paying the @overnment for the lands. His widow,
herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one%half of the lot 'ased on the &ivil &ode
provision on con!ugal property. 2he court then sought to deliver the property to
Alorentino for li4uidation and distri'ution.
Petitioner claimed that under :ct 11)+, 8ec. 1(, the widow receives all deeds
of her deceased spouse upon compliance with re4uirements of the law.
I##%&$
.hether the &ivil &ode provision on con!ugal property prevails or :ct 11)+Ds
full conveyance of the property to the widow.
'&L($
:ct 11)+ prevails. It lays down provisions regarding ac4uisition, disposition,
and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the &ivil &ode. 2he &ivil &ode is
a general law, while :ct 11)+ is a special law. 2he special law must prevail.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
8itchon, et al. v. :4uino
Case No. 147
G.R. No. L-.1++ (Fe-r/ar0 27, 191*)
F!C"#$
Respondent :4uino, the &ity Bngineer of Manila, demolished the houses of
the si3 petitioners in this class suit, 'ecause their houses were pu'lic nuisances$ 'uilt
on pu'lic streets and river 'eds.
Petitioners contend that under the &ivil &ode, :rt. 7+1 and 7+), it is the district
health officer who should remove pu'lic nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand,
argues that R: 9+/, the Revised &harter of the &ity of Manila, grants the power to
remove pu'lic nuisances to the &ity Bngineer.
I##%&$
.hose !o' it is to determine and demolish pu'lic nuisances, the health officer
under the &ivil &ode or the city engineer under R: 9+/.
'&L($
2he &ity Bngineer, under R: 9+/, has !urisdiction. 2he &ivil &ode is a general
law applica'le throughout the Philippines, whereas R: 9+/ is a special law that
pertains solely to the &ity of Manila. .hen a general and a special law are in conflict,
the latter prevails.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
>ellis v. >ellis
Case No. 14
G.R. No. L-23*7. (4/e *, 19*7)
F!C"#$
:mos >ellis, a citi#en of 2e3as 68:, died. He had 7 legitimate and , illegimate
children, all surnamed >ellis. :fter the e3ecution of the decedentDs will, which was
e3ecuted in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the e3ecutor
divided the residuary estate into 7 e4ual portions for the 'enefit of the testatorDs 7
legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground
that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying on :rt. 1(
of the 1ew &ivil &ode which provides that the national law of the decedent should
apply ;2e3as <aw=, which did not provide for legitimes, the &AI of Manila denied such
oppositions.
I##%&$
.hether 2e3as <aw or the Philippine <aw must apply in intestate and
testamentary succession.
'&L($
2e3as <aw should apply. :rt. 1(, par ), and :rt. 1+,/ of the &ivil &ode render
applica'le the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions. It must have 'een the purpose of the &ongress to ma"e :rt. 1(, par. ) a
specific provision in itself which must 'e applied in testate and intestate succession.
:s further indication of this intent, :rt. 1+,/ provides that the capacity to succeed is
governed 'y the national of the decedent. It is thus evident that &ongress has not
intended to e3tend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', /c
Philippine 2rust &o. v. Macuan
Case No. 123
G.R. No. 322.+ (March 24, 193+)
F!C"#$
*efendant Macuan married A. 2ormo, who 'ecame mentally incapacitated.
*efendant filed a petition to the &ourt as"ing that he 'e appointed guardian of the
person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land
with improvements, which is claimed to 'e con!ugal property. 8u'se4uently, M.
2ormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted 'y the &ourt, praying that the
guardian 'e instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property 'elonging to
his ward. : special guardian, Philippine 2rust &o., was appointed for the recovery of
the ownership and possession of the property herein involved.
I##%&$
1. .01 a married woman !udicially declared mentally incapacitated is
entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is con!ugal.
). .01 the defendant may 'e compelled to include in the inventory of his
mentally incapacitated wifeDs property, her undivided half of the con!ugal property.
'&L($
1. 1o. 8he is not entitled to include half of the legal con!ugal partnership,
which still su'sists, in the inventory of her property.
). 2he defendant, 'eing the guardian, cannot 'e compelled to include in the
inventory of the same, said half of the con!ugal property. 2he &ourt relied on 1= the
&ode of &ivil Procedure, which is general in characterJ and )= the &ivil &ode, which
is more specific, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward
who is married. 2hus, &ivil &ode ta"es precedence over the &ode of &ivil Procedure.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
2an <iao v. :merican President <ines, <td.
Case No. 113
G.R. No. L-72.+ (4a/ar0 2+, 191*)
F!C"#$
2his is an action filed 'y plaintiff%appellant 2an <iao for the recovery of
P/),755.++, with interest from the damages allegedly suffered 'y plaintiff due to the
wrongful and unauthori#ed delay and careless handling in the transportation of a
cargo of eggs underta"en 'y defendant for plaintiff from the port of 1ew -or", 68:
to the port of Manila. 2he suit was 'rought more than a year from the receipt of the
goods, and there'y, claimed 'y the defendant to have already prescri'ed in
accordance with the prescription given 'y the &arriage of @oods 'y 8ea :ct.
I##%&$
.01 the action for damages had already prescri'ed, and thus, 'arred the
appellant to receive compensation for damages.
'&L($
-es, it has already prescri'ed. 2he &arriage of @oods 'y 8ea :ct provides
that loss or damage suit must 'e 'rought within one year after the delivery of the
goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the &ourt held that the prescriptive
period of 1 year esta'lished 'y the &arriage of @oods 'y 8ea :ct modified pro tanto
the provisions of :ct 1o. 1/+ as to goods transported in foreign trade, the former
'eing a special act while the latter is a law of general application.
L!"IN M!)IM$
5a, 5+
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of 2a3 :ppeal
Case No. 71
G.R. No. 44++7 (March 2+, 1991)
Chapter ), Page 411, Footote No. 111
F!C"#$
Private respondent, a >ritish%owned foreign corporation was granted a
legislative franchise, pursuant to R: E+E, which included a ta3 e3emption from the
payment of all ta3es e3cept a franchise ta3 of 5C on the gross earnings and ta3 on its
real property. 2he &IR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos
representing deficiency income ta3 maintaining that the franchise was inoperative
for failure to comply with 8ec. E, :rt. 19 of the 1/,5 &onstitution which limits the grant
of franchise to Ailipino%owned corporations. 2he &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals rendered the
franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitionerDs assessment without effect
having 'een made 'eyond the prescri'ed period stipulated in the 2a3 &ode.
I##%&$
.01 the provision in the franchise re4uiring the payment of only 5C of the
gross receipts in lieu of any and all ta3es is unenforcea'le and without legal effect,
for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1/,5 &onstitution, the
&orporation <aw and the Pu'lic 8ervice :ct.
'&L($
1o. 2he legislative franchise was valid. :s a charter is in the nature of a private
contract, the imposition of another franchise ta3 on the corporation 'y the local
authority would constitute an impairment of the contract 'etween the government
and the corporation. R: E+E as a special statute must 'e deemed an e3emption to
the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and
circumstances.
L!"IN M!)IM$
/a, 5+
1PH& v. Presiding Judge R2& >r. GGH
Case No. 87
G.R. No. 72477 (,cto-er 1*, 199+)
F!C"#$
2he Province of Misamis 7riental filed a complaint with the Regional 2rial
&ourt of &agayan de 7ro &ity, >ranch GGH against 1:P7&7R for the collection of
real property ta3 covering the period 1/7E to 1/E9. Petitioner contends that the court
has no !urisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the ad!udication
of the case pursuant to P.*. )9) which provides that disputes 'etween agencies of
the government including @7&&Ds shall 'e administratively settled or ad!udicated 'y
the 8ecretary of Justice. 7n the other hand respondent invo"es P.*. 9(9 which
governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of ta3ation 'y
provinces, cities and municipalities there'y !ustifying its position in favor of the
concerned municipal corporations.
I##%&$
.01 the respondent court has !urisdiction over the civil action.
'&L($
-es. P.*. )9) must yield to P.*. 9(9 on the matter of which tri'unal or agency
has !urisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property ta3es. granted
that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property ta3es whereas
P.*. )9) is a general law that deals with a 'road coverage concerning administrative
settlement of disputes, claims and controversies 'etween or among government
agencies and instrumentalities. 8pecial laws ought to 'e upheld and construed as
e3ceptions to the general law in the a'sence of special circumstances calling for a
contrary conclusion
L!"IN M!)IM$
5+
<ope#, Jr. v. &ivil 8ervice &ommission
Case No. 11+
G.R. No. .7119 (!pr23 1*, 1991)
Chapter ), Page 411, Footote No. 11*
F!C"#$
2he Hice%mayor of Manila su'mitted to the &ivil 8ervice &ommission the
appointment of 1/ officers in the B3ecutive 8taff of the 7ffice of the Presiding 7fficer
pursuant to the provisions of R: 9+/. However, the &ity >udget of Manila 4uestioned
whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may 'e paid out of city funds
on the 'asis of the appointments signed 'y the Hice Mayor. 2he &ity <egal 7fficer
then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the &ity Mayor and
not the &ity &ouncil.
I##%&$
.01 the &harter of the &ity of Manila has 'een repealed 'y R: 51E5 giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out 'y city funds and >P ,,7
empowering local e3ecutives to appoint all officers and employees of the city.
'&L($
1o. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law ;R: 9+/= providing
specifically for the organi#ation of the @overnment of the &ity of Manila prevails over
a general law. R: 51E5 and >P ,,7 as general laws were not meant to deprive the
&ity &ouncil of Manila of its appointing power. :lso, since repeals 'y implication are
not favored, conflict 'etween the statutes should 'e very clear to favor the
assumption that the latter in time repeals the other.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, ,E', 5+
Man#ano v. Halera
Case No. 80
G.R. No. 122+*. (4/30 ., 199.)
F!C"#$
: criminal complaint for li'el was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who
initially recogni#ed that the Regional 2rial &ourt had !urisdiction over the case
thereafter forwarding the records to the 7ffice of the Provincial Prosecutor. However,
the latter opined that the M2& should ta"e cogni#ance of the case 'ased on
Repu'lic :ct 7(/1 which e3panded the !urisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal 2rial,
and Municipal &ircuit 2rial &ourts to hear and decide criminal cases where the
penalty does not e3ceed ( years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the
respondentDs acceptance of the case for the M2&Ds lac" of !urisdiction over the
offense charged.
I##%&$
.01 the M2& has e3clusive !urisdiction over complaints for li'el.
'&L($
1o. 2he applica'le law is still :rticle ,(+ of the Revised Penal &ode which
categorically provides that !urisdiction over li'el cases are lodged with the &ourts of
Airst Instance ;now Regional 2rial &ourts=. :lthough R: 7(/1 was enacted to
decongest the clogged doc"ets of the Regional 2rial &ourts 'y e3panding the
!urisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and does not alter
the provisions of :rticle ,(+ of the RP&, which is a law of special nature. @ranted that
there seems to 'e no manifest intent to repeal or alter the !urisdiction in li'el cases
from the provisions of R.:. 7(/1it must 'e maintained that a special law cannot 'e
repealed, amended or altered 'y a su'se4uent general law 'y mere implication.
L!"IN M!)IM$
,7, ,E, 5+
@arcia v. Pascual, et al.
Case No. 11+
G.R. No. L-1*91+ ((ece6-er 22, 19*1)
Chapter :I, Page 277, Footote No. 11.
F!C"#$
Petitioner, a !unior typist civil service eligi'le, was appointed 'y the Justice of
Peace as cler" of the municipality of 8an Jose, 1ueva Bci!a. .hen vouchers were
su'mitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was R: 1551
has repealed 8ec. 75 of R: /)(, otherwise "nown as the Judiciary :ct.
8ec. 75 of the Judiciary :ct provides that !ustices of peace may have cler"s of
court at the e3pense of the municipalities and shall 'e appointed 'y respective
!ustices. R: 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed 8ec. 75 of R: )/(
provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the
municipalities shall 'e appointed 'y the mayor.
I##%&$
.01 8ec. 75 of R: /)( has 'een repealed 'y R: 1551.
'&L($
2he !udge ruled that said R: 1551 did not e3pressly repeal 8ec. 75 of the
Judiciary :ct and that the two laws may 'e reconciled following the principle of law
that a prior specific statute is not repealed 'y a su'se4uent general law. :lso, there
'eing no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the cler" of
court, the power to appoint should not 'e considered lodged in the said mayor.
<astly, the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the cler"s in the !ustice of
the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of pre!udicial politics.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(', /a, ,), ,(d, 5+, ')
<agman v. &ity of Manila, et al.
Case No. 141
G.R. No. L-233+1 (4/e 3+, 19**)
Chapter ), Page 42+, Footote No. 12*
F!C"#$
Petitioner operates 15 auto truc"s with fi3ed routes and regular terminal for
the transportation of passengers and freight.
2he Municipal of Manila repealed R: 9+/ and enacted 7rdinance 1o. 9/E(,
entitled :n 7rdinance Rerouting 2raffic on Roads and 8treets within the &ity of
Manila, and Aor 7ther Purposes.$
I##%&$
.01 the enactment and enforcement of 7rdinance 1o. 9/E( is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
'&L($
1o. R: 9+/ is a special law and of later enactment than &.:. 1o. 59E and the
Pu'lic 8ervice <aw, so that even if conflict e3ists 'etween the provisions of the former
act and the latter acts, R: 9+/ should prevail over 'oth &ommonwealth :cts.
Moreover, the powers conferred 'y law upon the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission
were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments
over motor traffic.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 11a, 9/, 5+
>agatsing v. Ramire#
Case No. 2.
G.R. No. L-41*31 ((ece6-er 17, 197*)
F!C"#$
2he Municipal >oard of Manila enacted 7rdinance 1o. 75)), :n 7rdinance
Regulating the 7peration of Pu'lic Mar"ets and Prescri'ing Aees for the Rentals of
8talls and Providing Penalties for Hiolation thereof and for other Purposes.$
Respondent were see"ing the declaration of nullity of the 7rdinance for the
reason that a= the pu'lication re4uirement under the Revised &harter of the &ity of
Manila has not 'een complied with, '= the Mar"et &ommittee was not given any
participation in the enactment, c= 8ec. ,;e= of the :nti%@raft and &orrupt Practices
:ct has 'een violated, and d= the ordinance would violate P.*. 7 prescri'ing the
collection of fees and charges on livestoc" and animal products.
I##%&$
.hat law shall govern the pu'lication of ta3 ordinance enacted 'y the
Municipal >oard of Manila, the Revised &ity &harter or the <ocal 2a3 &ode.
'&L($
2he fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the
presumption that the special law is to 'e considered an e3ception to the general.
2he Revised &harter of Manila spea"s of ordinance$ in general whereas the <ocal
2a3 &ode relates to ordinances levying or imposing ta3es, fees or other charges$ in
particular. In regard therefore, the <ocal 2a3 &ode controls.
L!"IN M!)IM$
(c, 7a, 11a, 17, 9+', 9/, 5+
Latin Maxims
&hapter II N &7182R6&2I71 :1* I12BRPRB2:2I71
>. P7.BR 27 &7182R6B
1. Leg2s 2terpretat2o 3eg2s 826 o-t2et.
Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute ac4uires the force of law.
&hapter III N :I*8 27 &7182R6&2I71
&. &712BMP7R:R- &7182R6&2I71
). Cote6poraea e<pos2t2o est opt26a et =ort2ss26o 2 3ege.
&ontemporary construction is strongest in law.
,pt26a est 3eg/6 2terpres cos/et/7o.
&ustom is the 'est interpreter of a statute.
Reg/3a pro 3ege, s2 7e=2c2t 3e<.
In default of the law, the ma3im rules.
,. ,pt26/s 2terpres rer/6 /s/s.
2he 'est interpreter of the law is usage.
Co66/2s error =ac2t >/s.
&ommon error sometimes passes as current law.
?/o7 a- 22t2o o 8a3et 2 tract/ te6por2s o co8a3esc2t.
2hat which was originally void, does not 'y lapse of time 'ecome valid.
9. Rat2ha-2t2o 6a7ato ae@/2parat/r.
<egislative ratification is e4uivalent to a mandate.
5. #tare 7ec2s2s et o @/2eta 6o8ere.
Aollow past precedents and do not distur' what has 'een settled.
Iterest rep/-32cae /t s2t =22s 32t2/6.
2he interest of the state demands that there 'e an end to litigation.
&hapter IH N :*HBRB1&B 27, 7R *BP:R26RB AR7M, <:1@6:@B 7A 82:262B <I2BR:<
I12BRPRB2:2I71
(. I7e< a262 ser6o est.
8peech is the inde3 of intention.
!26/s ho622s est a26a scr2pt2.
2he intention of the party is the soul.
:er-a 3eg2s o est rece7e7/6.
Arom the words of the statute there should 'e no departure.
Ma3e72cta et e<pos2t2o @/ae corr/6p2t te<t/6.
It is 'ad construction which corrupts the te3t.
L2ttera scr2pta 6aet.
2he written word endures.
C3a/s/3a re-/s s2c stat2-/s.
2hings thus standing.
7. !-so3/ta setet2a3 e<pos2tore o 272get.
.hen the language of the law is clear, no e3planation is re4uired.
(/ra 3e< se7 3e<.
2he law may 'e harsh 'ut it is the law.
'oc @/27e6 per@/a6 7/r/6 est, se7 2ta 3e< scr2pta est.
It is e3ceedingly hard, 'ut so the law is written.
>. *BP:R26RB AR7M <I2BR:< I12BRPRB2:2I71
E. !e@/2tas /@/a6 cotra8e2t 3eg2s.
B4uity never acts in contravention of the law.
!e@//6 et -o/6 est 3e< 3eg/6e.
.hat is good and e4ual is the law of laws.
4/s ars -o2 et ae@/2.
<aw is the art of e4uity.
/. Rat2o 3eg2s est a26a 3eg2s.
2he reason of the law is the soul of the law.
L2ttera ecat sp2r2t/s 8282=2cate.
2he letter "ills 'ut the spirit gives life.
:er-a 2tet2o2, o e cotra, 7e-et 2ser82ce.
.ords ought to 'e more su'servient to the intent, and not the intent to the
words.
Ae2g/s 3eges 2terpreta7ae s/t, @/o7 8o3/tas era/6 coser8et/r.
<aws are to 'e construed li'erally, so that their spirit and reason 'e preserved.
?/2 haret 2 32ttera haret 2 cort2ce.
He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes 'ut s"in deep into its
meaning.
?/a7o 8er-a stat/te s/t spec2a32, rat2o a/te6 geera32a, stat/6 geera32ter
est 2te332ge7/6.
.hen the words used in a statute are special, 'ut the purpose of the law is
general, it should 'e read as the general e3pression.
1+. Cessate rat2o2 3eg2s, cessat et 2psa 3e<.
.hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
11. Iterpretat2o ta32s 2 a6-2g/2s s26per =2e7a est /t e82tet/r 2co8e2es et
a-s/r7/6.
.here there is am'iguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid
inconveniences and a'surdity is to 'e adopted.
Leg2s costr/ct2o o =ac2t 2>/r2a6.
2he construction of the law will not 'e such as to wor" in!ury or in!ustice.
!rg/6et/6 a- 2co8e2et p3/r26/6 8a3et 2 3ege.
:n argument drawn from inconvenience is forci'le in law.
:er-a 2h23 operar2 6e32/s est @/a6 a-s/r7e.
It is 'etter that words should have no operation at all than that they should
operate a'surdly.
Le< s26per 2te72t @/o7 co8e2t rat2o2.
2he law always intends that which is in accordance with reason.
%-2 ea7e6 rat2o 2-2 27e6 >/s.
<i"e reason doth ma"e li"e law.
!rg/6et/6 a s26232 8a3et 2 3ege.
:n argument drawn from a similar case, or analogy, prevails in law.
(e s26232-/s 27e6 est >/72c2/6.
&oncerning similars, the !udgment is the same.
%-2 ea7e6 est rat2o, 2-2 est ea7e6 3eg2s 72spos2t2o.
.here there is the same reason, there is the same law
1). &a est acc2p2e7a 2terpretat2o @/ae 82t2o caret.
2hat interpretation is to 'e adopted which is free from evil or in!ustice.
Le< 2>/sta o est 3e<.
:n un!ust law is not a law.
1,. F2at >/st2t2a, r/at coe3/6 .
<et right 'e done, though the heavens fall.
Ne6o est s/pra 3eg2s.
1o'ody is a'ove the law.
N/33a potet2a3 s/pra 3eg2s esse 7e-et.
1o power must 'e a'ove the law.
19. 4/rae at/rae ae@//6 est e62e6 c/6 a3ter2/s 7etr26eto et 2>/r2a =2er2
3oc/p3et2ore6.
It is certainly not agreea'le to natural !ustice that a stranger should reap the
pecuniary produce of another manDs wor".
15. #/rp3/sag2/6 o ocet.
8urplusage does not vitiate a statute.
%t23e per 2/t23e o 82t2at/r.
2he useful is not vitiated 'y the non%useful.
=
1(. Fa3sa 7e6ostrat2o o ocet, c/6 7e corpore costat.
Aalse description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of
the statute.
N23 =ac2t error o622s c/6 7e corpora 8e3 persoa costat.
Brror in name does not ma"e an instrument inoperative when the description
is sufficiently clear.
Cert/6 est @/o7 cert/6 re772 potest.
2hat is sufficiently certain which can 'e made certain.
17. I-2 @/27 geera32ter coce72t/r, 2est haec e<cept2o, s2 o a32@/27 s2t cotras
>/s -as@/e.
.here anything is granted generally, e3emption from rigid application of law
is impliedJ that nothing shall 'e contrary to law and right.
1E. #/66/6 >/s, s/66a 2>/r2a.
2he rigor of the law would 'e the highest in!ustice.
4/s s/66/6 saepe, s/66a est 6232t2a.
B3treme law is often e3treme wrong.
1/. Ne6o teet/r a7 26poss2-232a.
2he law o'liges no one to perform an impossi'ility.
I6poss2-23/6 /33a o-2gat2o est.
2here is no o'ligation to do an impossi'le thing.
Le< o cog2t a7 26poss2-232a.
2he law does not re4uire an impossi'ility.
Le< o 2te72t a32@/27 26poss2-3e.
2he law does not intend the impossi'le.
&. IMP<I&:2I718
)+. &< ecess2tate 3eg2s.
>y the necessary implication of law.
I eo @/o7 p3/s s2t, s26per 2est et 62/s.
2he greater includes the lesser.
C/2 >/r2s72ct2o 7ata est, ea @/o@/e cocessa esse 827et/r s2e @/2-/s
>/r2s72ct2o e<p32car2 o pot/2t.
.hen !urisdiction is given, all powers and means essential to its e3ercise are
also given.
)1. %-2 >/s, 2-2 re6e72/6.
.here there is a right, there is a remedy for violation thereof.
%-2 >/s 2cert/6, 2-2 >/s /33/6.
.here the law is uncertain, there is no right.
)). &< 7o3o 6a3o o or2t/r act2o.
:n action does not arise from fraud.
N/332/s co66o7/6 capere potest 7e 2>/r2a s/a propr2a.
1o one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act.
I par2 7e32cto pot2or est co72t2o 7e=e7et2s.
.here the parties are e4ually at fault, the position of the defending party is
the 'etter one.
),. ?/a7o a32@/27 proh2-et/r e< 72recto, proh2-et/r et per o-32@//6.
.hat cannot, 'y law, 'e done directly cannot 'e done indirectly.
&hapter H N I12BRPRB2:2I71 7A .7R*8 :1* PHR:8B8
:. I1 @B1BR:<
)9. Geera32a 8er-a s/t geera32ter 2te332ge7a.
@eneral words should 'e understood in their general sense.
Geer2s 72ct/6 geera32ter est 2terpreta7/6.
: general statement is understood in its general sense.

)5. :er-a acc2p2e7a s/t sec/7/6 s/->ecta6 6ater2a6.
: word is to 'e understood in the conte3t in which it is used.
:er-a 6ere ae@/28oca, s2 per co66/e6 /s/6 3o@/e72 2 2te33ect/ certo
s/6/t/r, ta32s 2te33ect/s pre=ere7/s est.
B4uivocal words or those with dou'le meaning are to 'e understood
according to their common and ordinary sense.
:er-a art2s e< arte.
.ords of art should 'e e3plained from their usage in the art to which they
'elong.
:er-a geera32a restr2g/t/r a7 ha-232tate6 re2 8e3 persoa6.
@eneral words should 'e confined according to the su'!ect%matter or
persons to which they relate.
)(. %-2 3e< o 72st2g/2t eco 72st2g/ere 7e-e6/s.
.here the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
)7. (2ss2623/6 72ss26232s est rat2o.
7f things dissimilar, the rule is dissimilar.
>. :887&I:2B* .7R*8
)E. Nosc2t/r a soc22s.
: thing is "nown 'y its associates.
)/. &>es7e6 geer2s.
7f the same "ind or specie.
,+. &<press2o /2/s est e<c3/s2o a3ter2/s.
2he e3press mention of one person, thing or conse4uence implies the
e3clusion of all others.
&<press/6 =ac2t cessare tac2t/6.
.hat is e3pressed puts an end to that which is implied.
,1. !rg/6et/6 a cotrar2o.
1egative%7pposite *octrineF what is e3pressed puts an end to that which is
implied.
,). Cass/s o62ss/s pro o62sso ha-e7/s est.
: person, o'!ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must 'e held to have
'een omitted intentionally.
,,. !7 pro<26/6 atece7es =2at re3at2o 2s2 26pe72at/r setet2a3.
: 4ualifying word or phrase should 'e understood as referring to the nearest
antecedent.
,9. Re77e7o s2g/3ar s2g/32s.
Referring each to each, or referring each phrase or e3pression to its
appropriate o'!ect, or let each 'e put in its proper place.
&. PR7HI878, BG&BP2I718 :1* 8:HI1@ &<:68B8
,5. &<cept2o =2r6at reg/3a6 2 cas2-/s o e<cept2s.
: thing not 'eing e3pected must 'e regarded as coming within the purview
of the general rule.
&hapter HI N 82:262B &718I*BRB* :8 : .H7<B I1 RB<:2I71 27 72HBR 82:262B8
:. 82:262B &7182R6B* :8 : .H7<B
,(. ,pt26a stat/te 2terpretatr2< est 2ps/6 stat/t/6.
2he 'est interpreter of the statute is the statute itself.
&< tota 6ater2a e6ergat reso3/t2o.
2he e3position of a statute should 'e made from all its parts put together.
I>/st/6 est, 2s2 tota 3ege 2specta, 7e /a a32@/a e>/s part2c/3a propos2ta
272care 8e3 respo7ere.
It is un!ust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without
e3amining the whole of the law.
Ne6o e26 a32@/a6 parte6 recte 2te332gere poss2t ate@/a6 tot/6 2ter/6
at@/e 2ter26 per3eg2t.
2he sense and meaning of the law is collected 'y viewing all the parts
together as one whole and not of one part only 'y itself.
&< atece7et2-/s et cose@/et2-/s =2t opt26a 2terpretat2o.
: passage will 'e 'est interpreted 'y reference to that which precedes and
follows it.
:er-a poster26a propter cert2t/72e6 a772ta a7 pr2ora @/ae cert2t/72e
272get s/t re=ere7a.
Reference should 'e made to a su'se4uent section in order to e3plain a
previous clause of which the meaning is dou'tful.
,7. Iterpretat2o =2e7a est /t res 6ag2s 8a3eat @/a6 pereat.
: law should 'e interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it.
>. 82:262B &7182R6B* I1 RB<:2I71 27 &7182I262I71 :1* 72HBR 82:262B8
,E. Par2 6ater2a.
7f the same matter.
Iterpretare et cocor7are 3eges 3eg2-/s est opt26/s 2terpreta72 6o7/s.
Bvery statute myst 'e so construed and harmoni#ed with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of law.
,/. (2st2g/e te6pora et cocor7a-2s >/ra.
*istinguish times and you will harmoni#e law.
% "e6pora 6/tat/r et 3eges 6/tat/r 2 2332s.
% 2imes have changed and laws have changed with them.
M/tat2s 6/ta72s.
.ith the necessary changes.
&hapter HII N 82RI&2 7R <I>BR:< &7182R6&2I71
:. I1 @B1BR:<
9+. #a3/s pop/32 est s/pre6a 3e<.
2he voice of the people is the supreme law.
#tat/ta pro p/-32co co66o7o 3ate 2terpretat/r.
8tatutes enacted for the pu'lc good are to 'e construed li'erally.
Pr28at/6 2co66o7/6 p/-32co -oo pesat/r.
2he private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of
the pu'lic.
>. 82:262B8 82RI&2<- &7182R6B*
91. !ct/s o =ac2t re/6 2s2 6es s2t rea.
2he act does not ma"e a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty.
!ct/s 6e 282to =act/rs o est 6e/s act/s.
:n act done 'y me against my will is not my act.
9). Pr2823eg2a rec2p2/t 3arga6 2terpretat2oe6 8o3/tate cosoe6 coce7et2s.
Privileges are to 'e interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants
them.
Re/c2at2o o praes/62t/r.
Renunciation cannot 'e presumed.
9,. #tr2ct2ss262 >/r2s.
Aollow the law strictly.
99. N/33/6 te6p/s occ/r2t reg2.
2here can 'e no legal right as against the authority that ma"es the law on
which the right depends.
&hapter HIII N M:1*:27R- :1* *IRB&2I71:< 82:262B8
:. M:1*:27R- 82:262B8
95. :2g23at2-/s et o 7or62et2-/s >/ra s/-8e2/t.
2he law aids the vigilant, not those who slum'er on their rights.
Pot2or est 2 te6pore, pot2or est 2 >/re.
He who is first in time is preferred in right.
&hapter IG N PR78PB&2IHB :1* RB2R7:&2IHB 82:262B8
:. I1 @B1BR:<
9(. Le< prosp2c2t, o resp2c2t.
2he law loo"s forward, not 'ac"ward.
Le< 7e =/t/ro, >/7e< 7e praeter2to.
2he law provides for the future, the !udge for the past.
% No8a cost2t/t2o =/t/r2s =or6a6 26poere 7e-et o praeter2t2s.
% : new statute should affect the future, not the past.
Leges @/ae retrospc2/t, et 6aga c/6 ca/t2oe s/t a7h2-e7ae e@/e
e26 >a/s 3ocat/r 2 3eg2-/s.
<aws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received, for Janus has
really no place in the laws.
Leges et cost2t/t2oes =/t/r2s cert/6 est 7are =or6a6 egot22s, o a7 =acta
praeter2ta re8ocar2, 2s2 o62at26 et 7e praeter2to te6pore et a7h/c
pe7et2-/s egot22s ca/t/6 s2t.
<aws should 'e construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are
e3pressly made applica'le to past transactions and to such as are still
pending.
>. 82:262B8 @IHB1 PR78PB&2IHB BAAB&2
97. N/33/6 cr26e s2e poea, /33a poea s2e 3ege.
2here is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law.
9E. Fa8ora-232a s/t a6p32a7a, o72osa restr2ge7a.
Penal laws which are favora'le to the accused are given retroactive effect.
&hapter G N :MB1*MB12, RBHI8I71, &7*IAI&:2I71 :1* RBPB:<
:. RBPB:<
9/. Leges poster2ores pr2ores cotrar2as a-rogat.
<ater statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.
5+. Geera32a spec2a32-/s o 7erogat.
: general law does not nullify a specific or special law.
>I1*I1@ A7R&B 7A R6<B8 7A I12BRPRB2:2I71 :1* &7182R6&2I71
:. Igorat2a 3eg2s e62e6 e<c/sat.
Ignorance of the law e3cuses no one.
<:1@6:@B 7A 82:262B .HB1 :M>I@6768
>. I o-sc/r2s 2sp2c2 so3ere @/o7 8ers26232/s est, a/t @/o7 p3er/6@/e
=2er2 so3et.
.hen matters are o'scure, it is customary to ta"e what appears to 'e more
li"ely or what usually often happens.
!6-2g/2tas 8er-or/6 pates /33a 8er2=2cat2oe e<c3/72t/r.
: patent am'iguity cannot 'e cleared up 'y e3trinsic evidence.
PRB86MP2I71 :@:I182 I1J682I&B :1* H:R*8HIP
&. !7 ea @/ae =re@/et2-/s acc27/t >/ra a7aptat/r.
<aws are understood to 'e adapted to those cases which most fre4uently
occur.
4/s cost2t/2 oportet 2 h2s @/ae /t p3/r26/6 acc27/t o @/ae e< 2or72ato.
<aws ought to 'e made with a view to those cases which happen most
fre4uently, and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence.
?/o7 se6e3 a/t -2s e<2st2t praetere/t 3eg2s3atores.
<egislators pass over what happens only once or twice.
(e 62262s o c/rat 3e<.
2he law does not concern itself with trifling matters.
2I2<B 7A 2HB :&2 ;I12RI18I& :I*=
*. N2gr/6 N/@/a6 &<ce7ere (e-et R/-r/6.
2he 'lac" ;'ody of the act printed in 'lac"= should never go 'eyond the red
;title or ru'ric of the statute printed in red=.

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