Chapter I

INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS
Why study semantics? Semantics (as the study of meaning) is central to the study of
communication and as communication becomes more and more a crucial factor in social
organization, the need to understand it becomes more and more pressing. Semantics is also at
the centre of the study of the human mind - thought processes, cognition, conceptualization -
all these are intricately bound up with the way in which we classify and convey our
eperience of the world through language.
!ecause it is, in these two ways, a focal point in man"s study of man, semantics has
been the meeting place of various cross-currents of thin#ing and various disciplines of study.
$hilosophy, psychology, and linguistics all claim a deep interest in the sub%ect. Semantics has
often seemed baffling because there are many different approaches to it, and the ways in
which they are related to one another are rarely clear, even to writers on the sub%ect. (&eech
'(()* +,).
Semantics is a branch of linguistics, which is the study of language- it is an area of
study interacting with those of synta and phonology. . person"s linguistic abilities are based
on #nowledge that they have. /ne of the insights of modern linguistics is that spea#ers of a
language have different types of linguistic #nowledge, including how to pronounce words,
how to construct sentences, and about the meaning of individual words and sentences. 0o
reflect this, linguistic description has different levels of analysis. So - phonology is the study
of what sounds combine to form words- synta is the study of how words can be combined
into sentences- and semantics is the study of the meanings of words and sentences.
1. A Short History of Semantics
+t has often been pointed out, and for obvious reasons, that semantics is the youngest
branch of linguistics (1llmann '(23, 4reimas '(23). 5et, interest in what we call today
6problems of semantics6 was 7uite alive already in ancient times. +n ancient 4reece,
philosophers spent much time debating the problem of the way in which words ac7uired their
meaning. 0he 7uestion why is a thing called by a given name, was answered in two different
ways.
Some of them believed that the names of things were arrived at naturally, physei, that
they were somehow conditioned by the natural properties of things themselves. 0hey too#
'
great pains to eplain for instance that a letter li#e 6rho6 seems apt to epress motion since the
tongue moves rapidly in its production. 8ence its occurence in such words as rhoein (6to
flow6), while other sounds such as 9s, f, #s9, which re7uire greater breath effort in production,
are apt for such names as psychron (6shivering6) or kseon (6sha#ing6), etc. 0he obvious
inadvertencies of such correlations did not discourage philosophers from believing that it is
the physical nature of the sounds of a name that can tell us something about its meaning.
/ther philosophers held the opposite view, namely that names are given to things
arbitrarily through convention, thesei. 0he physei-thesei controversy or physis-nomos
controversy is amply discussed in $lato"s dialogue Cratylus. +n the dialogue, :ratylus appears
to be a part of the physei theory of name ac7uistion, while 8ermogenes defends the opposite,
nomos or their point of view. 0he two positions are then debated by Socrates in his usual
manner. +n an attempt to mediate between the two discussants he points out first of all that
there are two types of names. Some are compound names which are divisible into smaller
constituent element and accordingly, analyzable into the meaning of these constituent
elements* Poseidon derives his name from posi (6for the feet6) and desmos (6fetter6) since it
was believed that it was difficult for the sea god to wal# in the water.
0he words, in themselves, Socrates points out, give us no clue as to their 6natural6
meaning, ecept for the nature of their sounds. :ertain 7ualities are attributed to certain types
of sounds and then the meaning of words is analyzed in terms of the 7ualities of the sounds
they are made of. When faced with abundant eamples which run counter the apriori
hypothesis* finding a 6l6 sound (6lambda6) 6characteristic of li7uid movements6 in the word
sklerotes (6hardness6) for instance, he concludes, in true socratic fashion, that 6we must admit
that both convention and usage contribute to the manifestation of what we have in mind when
we spea#6.
+n two other dialogues, Theatetus and Sophists, $lato dealt with other problems such
as the relation between thought language, and the outside world. +n fact, $lato opened the way
for the analysis of the sentence in terms which are parly linguistic and partly pertaining to
logic. 8e was dealing therefore with matters pertaining to syntactic semantics, the meaning of
utterrances, rather than the meaning of individual words.
.ristotle"s wor#s (Organon as well as Rhetoric and Poetics) represent the net ma%or
contribution of anti7uity to language study in general and semantics in particular. 8is general
approach to language was that of a logician, in the sense that he was interested in what there is
to #now how men #now it, and how they epress it in langugage (;inneen, '(2<* <)) and it is
through this perspective that his contribution to linguistics should be assessed.
3
+n the field of semantics proper, he identified a level of language analysis - the leical
one - the main purpose of which was to study the meaning of words either in isolation or in
syntactic constructions. 8e deepened the discussion of the polysemy, antonymy, synonymy
and homony and developed a full-fledged theory of metaphor.
0he contribution of stoic philosophy to semantics is related to their discussion of the
nature of linguistic sign. +n fact, as it was pointed out (=a#obson, '(2>* 3', Stati '(<'* '?3,
etc.) centuries ahead of @erdinand de Saussure, the theory of the =anus-li#e nature of the
linguistic sign - semeion - is an entity resulting from the relationship obtaining between the
signifier - semainon - (i.e. the sound or graphic aspect of the word), the signified -
semainomenon (i.e. the notion) and the ob%ect thus named - tynkhanon -, a very clear
distinction, therefore, between reference and meaning as postulated much later by /gden and
Aichards in the famous 6triangle6 that goes by their name.
Btymology was also much debated in anti7uity- but the eplanations given to changes
in the meaning and form of words were marred on the one hand by their belief that semantic
evolution was always unidirectional, from a supposedly 6correct6 initial meaning, to their
corruption, and, on the other hand, by their disregard of phonetic laws (Stati, '(<'* '?3).
;uring the Ciddle .ges, it is worth mentioning in the field of linguistics and
semantics the activity of the 6Codistae6 the group of philosophers so named because of their
writings On the Modes of Signification. 0hese writings were highly speculative grammars in
wich semantic considerations held an important position. 0he 6Codistae6 adopted the 6thesei6
point of view in the 6physei-thesei6 controversy and their efforts were directed towards
pointing out the 6modi intelligendi6, the ways in which we can #now things, and the 6modi
significandi6, the various ways of signifying them (;inneen, '(2<* 'DE).
+t may be concluded that throughout anti7uity and the Ciddle .ges, and actually until
the '(
th
century almost everything that came to be #nown about meaning in languages was the
result of philosophic speculation and logical reasoning. $hilosophy and logic were the two
important sciences which left their strong impact on the study of linguistic meaning.
+t was only during the '(
th
century that semantics came into being as an independent
branch of linguistics as a science in its own right. 0he first words which confined themselves
to the study of semantic problems as we understand them today, date as far bac# as the
beginning of the last century.
+n his lectures as 8alle 1niversity, the 4erman linguist :h. :. Aeisig was the first to
formulate the ob%ect of study of the new science of meaning which he called semasiology. 8e
E
conceived the new linguistic branch of study as a historical science studying the principles
governing the evolution of meaning.
0owards the end of the century ('?(<), C. !rFal published an important boo# Essay
de smantique which was soon translated into Bnglish and found an immediate echo in @rance
as well as in other countries of Burope. +n many ways it mar#s the birthday of semantics as a
modern linguistic discipline. !rFal did not only provide the name for the new science, which
became general in use, but also circumscribed more clearly its sub%ect-matter.
0he theoretical sources of semantic linguistics outlined by !rFal are, again, classical
logic and rethorics, to which the insights of an upcoming science, namely, psychology are
added. +n following the various changes in the meaning of words, interest is focused on
identifying certain general laws governing these changes. Some of these laws are arrived at by
the recourse to the categories of logic* etension of meaning, narrowing of meaning, transfer
of meaning, while others are due to a psychological approach, degradation of meaning and the
reverse process of elevation of meaning.
.longside these theoretical endeavours to 6modernize6 semantics as the youngest
branch of linguistics, the study of meaning was considerably enhanced by the writing of
dictionaries, both monolingual and bilingual. &eicographic practice found etensive
evidence for the categories and principles used in the study of meaning from anti7uity to the
more modern approaches of this science* polysemy, synonymy, homonymy, antonymy, as well
as for the laws of semantic change mentioned above.
0he study of language meaning has a long tradition in Aomania. Stati mentioned
('(<'* '?D) ;imitrie :antemir"s contribution to the discussion of the difference between
categorematic and syncategorematic words so dear to the medieval scholastics.
&eicography attained remar#ably high standards due mainly to !. $. 8asdeu. 8is
Magnum Etymologicum Romaniae ran#s with the other great leicographic wor#s of the time.
+n '??<, ten years ahead of C. !rFal, &azar Saineanu published a remar#able boo#
entitled ncercare asupra semasiologiei lim!ei romane" Studii istorice despre tran#itiunea
sensurilor. 0his constitutes one of the first wor#s on semantics to have appeared anywhere.
Saineanu ma#es ample use of the contributions of psychology in his attempts at identifying
the semantic associations established among words and the 6logical laws and affinities6
governing the evolution of words in particular and of language in general.
.lthough it doesn"t contain an eplicit theory of semantics, the posthumous
publication of @erdinand de Saussure"s Cours de linguistique gnrale '('2, owing to the
D
revolutionary character of the ideas on the study of language it contained, determined an
interest for structure in the field of semantics as well.
Within this process of development of the young linguistic discipline, the '(3'-'(E'
decade has a particular significance. +t is mar#ed by the publication of three important boo#s*
=ost 0rier, $er $eutsche %ortschat# im Sinn!e#ink des &erstandes ('(E'), 4. Stern, Meaning
and Change of Meaning ('(E') and :. G. /gden and =. .. Aichards* The Meaning of
Meaning ('(3E).
=ost 0rier"s boo# as well as his other studies which are visibly influenced by W. von
8umbold"s ideas on language, represents an attempt to approach some of the Saussurean
principles to semantics. .nalyzing the meaning of a set of leical elements related to one
another by their content, and thus belonging to a semantic 6field6, 0rier reached the
conclusion that they were structurally organized within this field, in such a manner that the
significative value of each element was determined by the position which it occupied within
the respective field. @or the first time, therefore, words were no longer approached in
isolation, but analyzed in terms of their position within a larger ensemble - the semantic field -
which in turn, is integrated, together with other fields, into an ever larger one. 0he process of
subse7uent integrations continues until the entire leicon is covered. 0he leicon therefore is
envisaged as a huge mosaic with no piece missing.
4ustav Stern"s wor# is an ambitious attempt at eamining the component factors of
meaning and of determining, on this ground, the causes and directions of changes of meaning.
1sing scientific advances psychology (particularly Wundt"s psychlogy) Stern postulates
several classifications and principles which no linguist could possibly neglect.
.s regards /gden and Aichard"s boo#, its very title The Meaning of Meaning is
suggestive of its content. 0he boo# deals for the most part with the different accepted
definitions of the word 6meaning6, not only in linguistics, but in other disciplines as well,
identifying no less than twenty-four such definitions. 0he overt endeavour of the authors is to
confine semantic preoccupations to linguistic problems eclusively. 0he two authors have the
merit of having postulated the triadic relational theory of meaning - graphically represented
by the triangle that bears their names.
. short supplement appended to the boo#* The Pro!lem of Meaning in Primiti'e
(anguages due to an anthropologist, !. Calinows#i, was highly instrumental in the
development of a new 6contetual6 theory of meaning advocated by the !ritish school of
linguistics headed by =. A. @irth.
>
0he following decades, more specifically the period '(E)-'(>) is #nown as a period
of crisis in semantics. Ceaning was all but completely ignored in linguistics particularly as an
effect of the position adopted by &. !loomfield, who considered that the study of meaning
was outside the scope of linguistics proper. +ts study falls rather within the boundaries of other
sciences such as chemistry, physics, etc., and more especially psychology, sociology or
anthropology. 0he somewhat more conciliatory positions which, without denying the role of
meaning in language nevertheless alloted it but a marginal place within the study of language
(8oc#ett, '(>?), was not able to put an end to this period of crisis.
Aeference to semantics was only made in etremis, when the various linguistic
theories were not able to integrate the compleity of linguistic events within a unitary system.
8ence the widespread idea of viewing semantics as a 6refuge6, as a vast container in which all
language facts that were difficult to formalize could be disposed of.
0he picture of the development of semantics throughout this period would be
incomplete, were it not to comprise the valuable accumulation of data regarding meaning, all
due to the pursuing of tradition methods and primarily to leicographic practice.
+f we view the situation from a broader perspective, it becomes evident that the so-
called 6crisis6 of semantics, actually referred to the crisis of this linguistic discipline only
from a structuralist standpoint, more specifically from the point of view of .merican
descriptivism. /n the other hand, however, it is also salient that the renovating tendencies, as
inaugurated by different linguistic schools, did not incorporate the semantic domain until very
late. +t was only in the last years of the sities that the organized attac#s of the modern
linguistic schools of different orientations was launched upon the vast domain of linguistic
meaning.
.t present meaning has ceased to be an 6anathema6 for linguistics. Coreover, the
various linguistic theories are unanimous in admitting that no language description can be
regarded as being complete without including facts of meaning in its analysis.
. specific feature of modern research in linguistics is the ever growing interest in
problems of meaning. =udging by the great number of published wor#s, by the etensive
number of semantic theories which have been postulated, of which some are complementary,
while some other are directly opposed, we are witnessing a period of feverish research, of
effervescence, which cannot but lead to progress in semantics.
.n important development in the direction of a psycholinguistic approach to meaning
is &a#off"s investigation of the metaphorical basis of meaning (&a#off and =ohnson '(?)).
0his approach draw on Blinor Aosch"s notion of protype, and adopt the view opposed to that
2
of :homs#y, that meaning cannot be easily separated from the more general cognitive
functions of the mind.
4. &eech considers that the developments which will bring most rewards in the future
will be those which bring into a harmonious synthesis the insights provided by the three
disciplines which claim the most direct and general interest in meaning* those of linguistics,
philosophy and psychology.
2. Definition an O!"ect of Semantics
+n linguistic terminology the word semantics is used to designate the science of word-
meaning. 0he term, however, has ac7uired a number of senses in contemporary science. .lso,
a number of other terms have been proposed to cover the same area of study, namely the study
of meaning. .s to meaning itself, the term has a variety of uses in the metalanguage of several
sciences such as logic, psychology, linguistics, and more recently semiotics.
.ll these factors render it necessary to discuss on the one hand the terminology used
in the study of meaning and on the other hand, the main concerns of the science devoted to the
study of meaning.
/ne particular meaning of the term semantics is used to designate a new science,
)eneral Semantics, the psychological and pedagogical doctrine founded by .lfred Gorzybs#y
('(EE) under the influence of contemporary neo-positivism. Starting from the supposed
eercise upon man"s behaviour, 4eneral semantics aims at correcting the 6inconsistencies6 of
natural language as well as their tendency to 6simplify6 the comple nature of reality.
. clearer definition of the meaning (or meanings) of a word is said to contribute to
removing the 6dogmatism6 and 6rigidity6 of language and to ma#e up for the lac# of
emotional balance among people which is ultimately due to language. 0his school of thought
holds that the study of communicative process can be a powerful force for good in the
resolution of human conflict, whether on an individual, local, or international scale. 0his is a
rather naHve point of view concerning the causes of conflicts (4. &eech '(()* ,+). 5et, certain
aspects of the relationship between linguistic signs and their users - spea#ers and listeners
ali#e - have, of course, to be analyzed given their relevance for the meaning of the respective
signs.
.lso, that there is a dialectic interdependence between language and thought in the
sense that language does not serve merely to epress thought, but ta#es an active part in the
very moulding of thought, is beyond any doubt.
<
/n the whole, however the etreme position adopted by general semanticists as
evidenced by such formulations as 6the tyranny of words6, 6the power of language6, 6man at
the mercy of language6, etc. has brought this 6science6 to the point of ridicule, despite the
efforts of genuine scholars such as 8aya#awa and others to uphold it.
+n the more general science of semiotics, the term semantics is used in two senses*
(a) theoretical (pure) semantics, which aims at formulating an abstract theory of meaning in
the process of cognition, and therefore belongs to logic, more precisely to symbolic logic-
(b) empirical *linguistic+ semantics, which studies meaning in natural languages, that is the
relationship between linguistic signs and their meaning. /bviously, of the two types of
semantics, it is empirical semantics that falls within the scope of linguistics.
0he most commonly agreed-upon definition of semantics remains the one given by
!rFal as 6the science of the meanings of words and of the changes in their meaning6. With
this definition, semantics is included under leicology, the more general science of words,
being its most important branch.
0he result of research in the field of word-meaning usually ta#es the form of
dictionaries of all #inds, which is the proper ob%ect of the study of leicography.
0he term semasiology is sometimes used instead of semantics, with eactly the same
meaning. 8owever since this term is also used in opposition to onomasiology it is probably
better to #eep it for this more restricted usage. Semasiology stands for the study of meaning
starting from the 6signifiant6 (the acoustic image) of a sign and eamining the possible
6signifiFs6 attached to it. /nomasiology accounts for the opposite direction of study, namely
from a 6signifiF6 to the various 6signifiants6 that may stand for it.
Since de Saussure, the idea that any linguistic form is made up of two aspects - a
material one and an ideal one -, the lingistic sign being indestructible union between a
signifiant and a signifi, between an e,pression and a content" +n the light of these concepts,
the definition of semantics as the science of meaning of words and of the changes in meaning,
appears to be rather confined. 0he definition certainly needs to be etended so as to include
the entire level of the content of language. .s 8%elmslev pointed out, there should be a
science whose ob%ect of study should be the content of language and proposed to call it
plerematics. Ievertheless all the glossematicians, including 8%elmslev continued to use the
older term - semantics in their wor#s.
B. $rieto ('(2D) calls the science of the content of language noology (from 4ree# noos
- 6mind6) but the term has failed to gain currency.
?
/bviously, a distinction should be made between le,osemantics, which studies leical
meaning proper in the traditional terminology and morphosemantics, which studies the
grammatical aspect of word-meaning.
With the advent of generative grammar emphasis was switched from the meaning of
words to the meaning of sentences. Semantic analysis will accordingly be re7uired to eplain
how sentences are understood by the spea#ers of language. .lso, the tas# of semantic analysis
is to eplain the relations eisting among sentences, why certain sentences are anomalous,
although grammatically correct, why other sentences are semantically ambiguous, since they
admit of several interpretations, why other sentences are synonymous or paraphrases of each
other, etc.
/f course, much of the information re7uired to give an answer to these 7uestions is
carried by the leical items themselves, and generative semantics does include a
representation of the meaning of leical elements, but a total interpretation of a sentence
depends on its syntactic structure as well, more particularly on how these meanings of words
are woven into syntactic structure in order to allow for the correct interpretation of sentences
and to relate them to ob%ective reality. +n the case of generative semantics it is obvious that we
can spea# of syntactic semantics, which includes a much wider area of study that leical
semantics.
#. Semantics an Semiotics
When the Stoics identified the sing as the constant relationship between the signifier
and the signified they actually had in mind any #ind of signs not %ust linguistic ones. 0hey
postulated a new science of signs, a science for which a term already eisted in 4ree#*
s-meiotik-" +t is however, only very recently, despite repeated attempts by foresighted
scientists, that semiotics become a science in its own right.
. first, and very clear presentation of semiotics is it to be found in this etensive
7uotation from =ohn &oc#e"s .n Essay Concerning /uman 0nderstanding. +n the chapter on
the 6division of the sciences6, &oc#e mentions 6the third branch (which) may be called
semiotic, or the doctrine of signs... the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs the
mind ma#es use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its #nowledge to others. @or,
since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, beside itself, present to the
understanding, it is necessary that something else, a sign or representation of the thing it
considers, should be present to it6 (&oc#e, '(2D* E)().
(
&ater, in the '(
th
century, the .merican philosopher :harles Sanders $eirce devoted a
life time wor#, which unfortunately remained unheeded for a long time, to the study of signs,
to setting up semiotics as a science, 6as the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental
varieties of possible JsemiosisK6. (A. =a#obson, '(2>* 33). @erdinand de Saussure too,
probably 7uite independently from $eirce, but undoubtedly inspired by the same 4ree#
philosophers" speculations on language, suggested that linguistics should be regarded as %ust
one branch of a more general science of sign systems which he called semiology. +n other
words he saw no basic difference between language signs and any other #inds of sings all of
them interpretable by reference to the same general science of signs.
$eirce distinguished three main types of signs according to the nature of the
relationship between the two inseparable aspects of a sign* the signans (the material suport of
the sign, its concrete manifestation) and the signatum (the thing signified)*
(i) cons in which the relationship between the signans and the signatum is one of
the similarity.
0he signans of an iconic type of sign, resembles in shape its signatum. ;rawings,
photographs, etc., are eamples of iconic signs. 5et, phisical similarity does not imply true
copying or reflection of the signatum by the signans. $eirce distinguished two subclasses of
icons-images and diagrams. +n the case of the latter, it is obvious that the 6similarity6 is hardly
6physical6 at all. +n a diagram of the rate of population or industrial production growth, for
instance, convention plays a very important part.
(ii) +ndees, in which the relationship between the signans and the signatum is the
result of a constant association based on physical contiguity not on similarity. 0he signans
does not resemble the signatum to indicate it. 0hus smo#e is an inde for fire, gathering
clouds indicate a coming rain, high temperature is an inde for illness, footprints are indees
for the presence of animals, etc.
(iii) Symbols, in which the relationship between the signans and the signatum is
entirely conventional. 0here is no similarity or physical contiguity between the two. 0he
signans and signatum are bound by convention- their relationship is an arbitrary one.
&anguage signs are essentially symbolic in nature. @erdinand de Saussure clearly specified
absolute arbitrariness as 6the proper condition of the verbal sign6.
0he act of semiosis may be both moti'ated and con'entional" +f semiosis is motivated,
than motivation is achieved either by contiguity or by similarity.
.ny system of signs endowed with homogeneous significations forms a language- and
any language should be conceived of as a miture of signs.
')
.nother aspect revealed by semiotics which presents a particular importance for
semantics is the understanding of the semiotic act as an institutional one. &anguage itself, can
be regarded as an institution (@irth, '(><), as a comple form of human behaviour governed
by signs. 0his understanding of language opens the way for a new, intentional theory of
meaning. Ceaning is achieved therefore either by con'ention or by intention.
$i!%io&raphy'
'. :hiLoran, ;umitru. '(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics. !ucureMti* B.;.$.
3. &eech, 4. '((). Semantics" The Study of Meaning. &ondon* $enguin !oo#s.
E. Saeed, =., +. '((<. Semantics. ;ublin* !lac#well $ublishers.
TO(ICS )OR DISCUSSION
'. ;efine semanti cs and its ob% ect.
3. 0he physei-thesei controversy.
E. 0ypes of signs.
''
Chapter II
THE (RO$*EM O) MEANI N+
+. 0he concept of meaning '.a bipolar relation
3. a triadic relation - .. referential approach
- !. conceptual approach
E. 8egerNs view.
++. ;imensions of meaning '. dimensions of meaning
3. types of meaning in &eechN s conception.
+.'. .ny progress in semantics is conditioned by a clearer understanding of meaning,
as the ob%ect of its analysis. Iumberless definitions of language meaning have been
postulated, some complementary in nature, some opposed. . linguistic account of meaning
would still be very difficult to give because of the plurality of levels at which meaning can be
discussed- the word level, the phrase level, the sentence level.
Bven if the morpheme is the minimum unit of language endowed with meaning, it is
the word, the net higher unit that traditional leicology has selected as its ob%ect of study and
to clearly understand the factors involved in meaning, itNs necessary to begin with an account
of meaning at word level.
0he concept of meaning, defined by @. de Saussure, was first regarded as a bipolar
relation between the two interdependent sides of a linguistic sign-significans OepressionN and
significatum OcontEentN and this is true for any sign, no matter to what semiotic system it
belongs.
3. /gden and Aichards have pointed out in '(3E that at least three factors are
involved in any symbolic act- the sym!ol itself Othe material aspect of the linguistic sign, be it
phonic or graphicN- the thought1reference Othe mental content that accompanies the occurrence
of the symbol in the minds of both the spea#er and the listenerN- the o!2ect itself1 the referent
Othe ob%ect in the real world designated by the symbolN.
0he triadic concept of meaning was represented by /gden and Aichards in the form of
a triangle.
'3
While the relation symbol- reference and reference- referent are direct and causal ones
in the sense that the symbol epresses or symbolises the reference which, in turn refers to the
referent, the relation symbol- ob%ect or referent is an imputed, indirect one.
/f the two sides of the triangle only the right-hand one can be left out P tentatively
and temporarily- in a linguistic account of meaning. 0he relationship between thought and the
outside world of ob%ects and phenomena is of interest primarily to psychologists and
philosophers, linguists directing their attention towards the other two sides. (:hiLoran, '(<E*
E)).
;epending on what it is understood by meaning, we can distinguish two main
semantic theories*
- the referential 1 denotational approach-meaning is the action of putting words into
relationship with the world-
- the representational 1conceptual approach-meaning is the notion, the concept or the
mental image of the ob%ect or situation in reality as reflected in manNs mind.
0he two basic types of meaning were first mentioned by S. Stati in '(<'- referential
definitions which analyse meaning in terms of the relation symbol- ob%ect 9referent-
conceptual definitions which regard the relation symbol- thought9reference.
.. $enotational 1Referential Theories of Meaning.
!efore describing the characteristics of these theories, a clarification of the terms used
is necessary. .ll languages allow spea#ers to describe or model aspects of what they perceive.
+n semantics the action of pic#ing out or identifying individuals9 locations with words is
called referring1denoting" 0o some linguists the two terms, denote and refer are synonymous.
=. Saeed ('((<* 3E) gives two eamples of proper names whose corresponding referents are
easily recognizable
e. g. sa3 Michael Jackson on T& last night"
%e ha'e 2ust flo3n !ack from Paris"
0he underlined words refer to9denote the famous singer, respectively the capital of @rance,
even if in some contets they may be used to designate a person different from the singer, or a
locality other than the capital of @rance.
0o =ohn &yons the terms denote and refer are not synonymous. 0he former is used to
epress the relationship linguistic epression- world, whereas the latter is used for the action
of a spea#er in pic#ing out entities in the world. +n the eample
A sparrow fle3 into the room"
'E
A sparrow and the room are I$s that refer to things in the world.- room, sparrow
denote classes of items. +n conclusion, referring is what spea#ers do and denoting is a
property of words. ;enotation is a stable relationship in a language, it doesnNt depend on
anyoneNs use of the word unli#e the action of referring.
Aeturning to the problem of theories of meaning, they are called referential1
denotational when their basic premise is that we can give the meaning of words and sentences
by showing how they relate to situations- proper names denote individuals, nouns denote
entities or sets of individuals, verbs denote actions, adverbs denote properties of actions,
ad%ectives denote properties of individuals-.+n case of sentences, they denote situations and
events. 0he difference in meaning between a sentence and its negative counterpart arises from
the fact that they describe two situations
e. g. There is a !ook on the shelf"
There isn4t a !ook on the shelf"
Aeferential theories consider meaning to be something outside the world itself, an etra-
linguistic entity. 0his means reducing the linguistic sign, i. e. the word to its material aspect,
be it phonic or graphic.
0he impossibility of e7uating meaning with the ob%ect denoted by a given word can be
eplained considering three ma%or reasons
a. the identity meaning-ob%ect would leave meaning to a large etent undefined because not
all the characteristic traits of an ob%ect as an etra- linguistic reality are identical with the
distinctive features of leical meaning-
b. not all words have a referent in the outside world- there are*
- non- referring epressions so5 'ery5 may!e5 if5 not5 etc.
- referring epressions used generically*
e. g. A murder is a serious felony"
- words li#e nouns, pronouns with variable reference depending on the contet*
e. g. The president decides on the foreign policy"
She didn4t kno3 3hat to say"
- words which have no corresponding ob%ect in the real world in general or at a
certain moment*
e. g. The unicorn is a mythical animal"
She 3ants to make a cake this e'ening"
- different epressions9words that can be used for the same referent, the meaning
reflecting the perspective from which the referent is viewed
'D
e. g. The morning star is the same thing as the evening star"
The president of the USA/ George ush/ ar!ara ush"s hus!and 3as to
deli'er a speech"
!esides the referential differences between epressions, we can ma#e useful
distinctions among the things referred to by epressions-referent , thing pic#ed out by
uttering the epression in a particular contet- e,tension of an e,pression Q set of things
which could possibly be the referent of that epression. +n &yonNs terminology the
relationship between an epression and its etension is called denotation"(Saeed '((<* 3<)
. distinction currently made by modern linguists is that between the denotation of a
word and the connotations associated with it. @or most linguists, denotation represents the
cognitive or communicative aspect of meaning (Schaff '(2>), while connotation stands for
the emotional overtones a spea#er usually associates with each individual use of a word.
;enotative meaning accounts for the relationship between the linguistic sign and its
denotatum. !ut one shouldnNt e7uate denotation with the denotatum.What is the denotation of
a word which has no denotatum.
.s far as the attitude of the spea#er is concerned, denotation is regarded as neutral,
since its function is simply to convey the informational load carried by a word. 0he
connotative aspects of meaning are highly sub%ective, springing from personal eperiences,
which a spea#er has had of a given word and also from his9her attitude towards his9 her
utterance and9 or towards the interlocutors (&eech, '(()* 'D). @or eample d3elling5 house5
home5 a!ode5 residence have the same denotation but different connotations.
4iven their highly individual nature, connotations seem to be unrepeatable but, on the
other hand, in many instances, the social nature of individual eperience ma#es some
connotative shades of meaning shared by practically all the spea#ers of a language. +t is very
difficult to draw a hard line between denotation and connotation in meaning analysis, due to
the fact that elements of connotation are drawn into what is referred to as basic, denotative
meaning. !y ta#ing into account connotative overtones of meaning, its analysis has been
introduced a new dimension, the pragmatic one.
0al#ing about reference involves tal#ing about nominals- names and noun phrases-.
0hey are labels for people, places, etc. :ontet is important in the use of names- names are
definite in that they carry the spea#erNs assumption that his9 her audience can identify the
referent (Saeed, '((<* 3?).
/ne important approach in nominalsN analysis is the description theory (Aussel, @rege,
Searle). . name is ta#en as a label or shorthand for #nowledge about the referent, or for one
'>
or more definite descriptions in the terminology of philosophers. +n this theory, understanding
a name and identifying the referent are both dependent on associating the name with the right
description.
e. g. Christopher Marlo3e 1 the 3riter of the play $r" 6austus 1 the Eli#a!ethan
play3right murdered in a $eptford ta'ern"
.nother interesting approach is the causal theory (;evitt, Sterelny, '(?<) and based on
the ideas of Grip#e ('(?)) and ;onnellan ('(<3). 0his theory is based on the idea that names
are socially inherited or borrowed. 0here is a chain bac# to the original naming9 grounding. +n
some cases a name does not get attached to a single grounding. +t may arise from a period of
repeated uses. Sometimes there are competing names and one wins out. Cista#es can be made
and subse7uently fied by public practice. 0his theory recognizes that spea#ers may use
names with very little #nowledge of the referent, so it stresses the role of social #nowledge in
the use of names. 0he treatment chosen for names can be etended to other nominals li#e
natural kinds (e. g. giraffe, gold) that is nouns referring to classes which occur in nature.

7" Conceptual1 Representational Theory of Meaning
+t proposes to define meaning in terms of the notion, the concept or the mental image of
the ob%ect or situation in reality as reflected in manNs mind. Semantic studies, both traditional
and modern, have used mainly such conceptual definitions of meaning, ta#ing it for granted
that for a correct understanding of meaning, it is necessary to relate it to that reflection in our
minds of the general characteristics of ob%ects and phenomena. Bven !loomfield refers to
general characteristics of an ob%ect9 situation which is Olinguistically relevantN.
/n the other hand, complete identification of meaning with the concept or notion is not
possible either. 0his would mean to ignore denotation and to deprive meaning of any
ob%ective foundation. Core than that, languages provide whole categories of words-proper
names, prepositions, con%unctions- for which no corresponding notions can be said to eist.
Bven in the case of notional words, the notion, the concept may be regarded as being both
OwiderN and OnarrowerN than meaning. . notion, concept has a universal character, while the
meaning of a word is specific, defined only within a given language (:hiLoran, '(<E* E3-EE).
Signification and Sense. Ceaning should be defined in terms of all the possible
relations characteristic of language signs. 0he use of a linguistic sign to refer to some aspects
of reality is a semiotic act. 0here are three elements involved in any semiotic act- the sign5
the sense5 the signification.
'2
0wo distinguishable aspects of the content side of the sign can be postulated- its
signification, the real ob%ect or situation denoted by the sign, i. e. its denotation and a sense
which epresses a certain informational content on the ob%ect or situation. 0he relation
between a proper name and what it denotes is called name relation and the thing denoted is
called denotation. O. name names its denotation and epresses its sense.N (.lonso :hurch)
E,tensional and ntensional Meaning" 0he definition of meaning by signification is
called e,tension in symbolic logic (:arnap, '(2)) and what has been called sense is
e7uivalent to intension. Btension stands for the class of ob%ects corresponding to a given
predicate, while intension is based on the property assigned to the predicate (B. Rasiliu, '(<)).
e. g. They 3ant to !uy a new car. (intensional meaning)
There is a car parked in front of your house" (etensional meaning)
:. The Trape#ium of /eger.
Glaus 8eger in his article (es !ases metodologiques de l4onomasiologie proposes a
trapezium- li#e variant, which allows him to introduce new distinctions. 8eger noticed P as
4reimas, adept of the triadic conception agreed- that signifiant 8 signifie i. e. concept is
different from the linguistic sign, because the content of an epression is a semasiologic field,
which is made up of more than one concept or mental ob%ect. +n its turn a concept can be
epressed by means of several signifiants"
0he model of 8eger gives him the possibility to analyse the content, ma#ing place
for sememes and semes" Btralinguistic reality has two levels- the logical and9or
psychological level and the level of the eternal world (:. !aylon, $. @abre, '(<?* 'E3).
0he term moneme (.. Cartinet) is also used by 8eger and represents the minimal
unit endowed with signification- a moneme is made up of morphemes which are in a limited
number and it also represents a leeme, the number of leemes in a language being virtually
infinite. +n conclusion, a moneme is at the same time form of epression li#e phonemes and
form of content li#e sememes. +t is significant and signified. 0he signified depends on the
structure of the language, but the concept on the right side of the trapezium is independent.
'<
0he onomasiology starts from the concept and tries to find the linguistic relations for
one or several languages. +t tries to find monemes which by means of their significations or
sememes epress a certain concept. .n onomasiological field reprewsents the structure of all
the sememes belonging to different signified, so to different monemes, but ma#ing up one
concept.
Semasiology analyses a signified associated by co- substantiality to one moneme- so
we deal with multiple significations or sememes.
Gurt !aldinger ('(?D* 'E') comments on 8egerNs trapezium, analysing the succesive
stages from the substance of epression level to the final content level.
++. Dimensions of Meanin&.
'. $imensions of Meaning" Ceaning is so comple and there are so many factors
involved in it, that a complete definition would be impossible. We are dealing with a plurality
of dimensions characteristic of the content side of linguistic signs (:hiLoran, '(<E* E<).
'?
0here is a first of all a semantic dimension proper, which covers the denotatum of the
sign including also information as to how the denotatum is actually referred to, from what
point of view it is being considered. 0he first aspect is the signification, the latter is its sense.
e. g. (ord 7yron1 .uthor of Child /arold have similar signification and different
senses.
/e is cle'er" 19ohn is cle'er . /e and 9ohn are synonymous epressions if the
condition of co- referentiality is met.
The logical dimension of meaning covers the information conveyed by the linguistic
epression on the denotatum, including a %udgement of it.
The pragmatic dimension defines the purpose of the epression, why it is uttered by a
spea#er. 0he relation emphasized is between language users and language signs.
The structural dimension covers the structure of linguistic epressions, the comple
networ# of relationships among its component elements as well as between it and other
epressions.
3. Types of Meaning" :onsidering these dimensions, meaning can be analyzed from
different perspectives, of which 4. &eech distinguished seven main types (&eech, '(()* ().
a. (ogical1 conceptual meaning5 also called denotati'e or cogniti'e meaning5 is considered
to be the central factor in linguistic communication. +t has a comple and sophisticated
organization compared to those specific to syntactic or phonological levels of language.
0he principles of contrasti'eness and constituent structure : paradigmatic and
syntagmatic aes of linguistic structure- manifest at this level i. e. conceptual meaning
can be studied in terms of contrasti'e features"
b. Connotati'e meaning is the communicative value an epression has by virtue of what it
refers to. 0o a large etent, the notion of reference overlaps with conceptual meaning. 0he
contrastive features become attributes of the referent, including not only physical
characteristics, but also psychological and social properties, typical rather than invariable.
:onnotations are apt to vary from age to age, from society to society.
e. g. 3oman ;capa!le of speech< ;e,perienced in cookery<
;frail< ;prone to tears<
;non- trouser- 3earing<
:onnotative meaning is peripheral compared to conceptual meaning, because
connotations are relatively unsta!le" 0hey vary according to cultural, historical period,
eperience of the individual. :onnotative meaning is indeterminate and open- ended that is
'(
any characteristic of the referent, identified sub%ectively or ob%ectively may contribute to the
connotative meaning.
c. +n considering the pragmatic dimension of meaning, we can distinguish between social
and affecti'e meaning" Social meaning is that which a piece of language conveys about
the social circumstances of its use. +n part, we OdecodeN the social meaning of a tet
through our recognition of different dimensions and levels of style.
/ne account (:rystal and ;avy, n'estigating English Style) has recognized several
dimensions of socio-linguistic variation. 0here are variations according to*
- dialect i. e. the language of a geographical region or of a social class-
- time , for instance the language of the eighteenth century-
- province9domain +. e. the language of law, science, etc.-
- status i. e. polite9 collo7uial language etc.-
- modality i. e. the language of memoranda, lectures, %o#es, etc.-
- singurality, for instance the language of a writer.
+tNs not surprising that we rarely find words which have both the same conceptual and
stylistic meaning, and this led to declare that there are no Otrue synonymsN. !ut there is much
convenience in restricting the term OsynonymyN to e7uivalence of conceptual meaning. @or
eample, domicile is very formal, official, residence is formal, a!ode is poetic, home is the
most general term. +n terms of conceptual meaning, the following sentences are synonymous.
e. g. They chucked a stone at the cops5 and then did a !unk 3ith the loot"
.fter casting a stone at the police5 they a!sconded 3ith the money"
+n a more local sense, social meaning can include what has been called The
illocutionary force of an utterance, whether it is to be interpreted as a re7uest, an assertion, an
apology, a threat, etc.
d. 0he way language reflects the personal feelings of the spea#er, his9 her attitude towards
his9 her interlocutor or towards the topic of discussion, represents affecti'e meaning"
Scaling our remar#s according to politeness, intonation and voice- timbre are essential
factors in epressing affective meaning which is largely a parasitic category, because it
relies on the mediation of conceptual, connotative or stylistic meanings. 0he eception is
when we use inter%ections whose chief function is to epress emotion.
e. 0wo other types of meaning involve an interconnection on the leical level of language.
Reflected meaning arises in cases of multiple conceptual meaning, when one sense of a
word forms part of our response to another sense. /n hearing, in a church service, the
synonymous epressions the Comforter and the /oly )host5 one may react according to
3)
the everyday non- religious meanings of comfort and ghost" /ne sense of a word Orubs
offN on another sense when it has a dominant suggestive power through fre7uency and
familiarity. 0he case when reflected meaning intrudes through the sheer strength of
emotive suggestion is illustrated by words which have a taboo meaning- this taboo
contamination accounted in the past for the dying- out of the non- taboo sense-
!loomfield eplains in this way the replacement of cock by rooster"
f. Collocati'e Meaning consists of the associations a word ac7uires on account of the
meanings of words which tend to occur in its environment9 collocate with it.
e" g" pretty girl1 !oy1 flo3er1 color
handsome !oy1 man1 car1 'essel1 o'ercoat1 type3riter "
:ollocative meaning remains an idiosyncratic property of individual words and it shouldnNt
be invo#ed to eplain all differences of potential co- occurrence. .ffective and social
meaning, reflected and collocative meaning have more in common with connotative meaning
than with conceptual meaning- they all have the same open- ended, variable character and
lend themselves to analysis in terms of scales and ranges. 0hey can be all brought together
under the heading of associati'e meaning" .ssociative meaning needs employing an
elementary OassociationistN theory of mental connections based upon contiguities of
eperience in order to eplain it. Whereas conceptual meaning re7uires the postulation of
intricate mental structures specific to language and to humans, and is part of the Ocommon
systemO of language shared by members of a speech community, associative meaning is less
stable and varies with the individualNs eperience. !ecause of so many imponderable factors
involved in it, associative meaning can be studied systematically only by approimative
statistical techni7ues. /sgood, Suci and 0annenbaum (The Measurement of Meaning5 =>?@),
proposed a method for a partial analysis of associative meaning. 0hey devised a techni7ue P
involving a statistical measurement device, - 0he Semantic ;ifferential -, for plotting
meaning in terms of a multidimensional semantic space, using as data spea#erNs %udgements
recorded in terms of seven point scales.
Thematic Meaning means what is communicated by the way in which a spea#er9
writer organizes the message in terms of ordering, focus or emphasis. Bmphasis can be
illustrated by word- order*
e.g. 7essie donated the first pri#e$
The first pri#e 3as donated !% essie$
by grammatical constructions*
3'
e. g. There4s a man 3aiting in the hall"
t4s $anish cheese that like !est"
by leical means*
e. g. The shop !elongs to him
/e o3ns the shop"
by intonation*
e. g. /e 3ants an electric ra#or"
Conc%-sions
a. meaning, as a property of linguistic signs, is essentially a relation- conventional,
stable, and eplicit- established between a sign and the ob%ect in referential definitions, or
between the sign and the concept9 the mental image of the ob%ect in conceptual definitions of
meaning-
b. an important aspect of meaning is derived from the use that the spea#ers ma#e of it
P pragmatic meaning, including the attitude that spea#ers adopt towards the signs-
c. part of the meaning of linguistic forms can be determined by the position they
occupy in a system of e7uivalent linguistic forms, in the paradigmatic set to which they
belong- differential9 connotative meaning-
d. e7ually, part of the meaning can be determined by the position a linguistic sign
occupies along the syntagmatic ais- distributional9 collocative meaning-
e. meaning cannot be conceived as an indivisible entity- it is divisible into simpler
constitutive elements, into semantic features, li#e the ones displayed on the epression level
of language.
'. :onceptual Ceaning &ogical, cognitive or
denotative content
.ssociative meaning 3. :onnotative Ceaning What is communicated by
virtue of what language refers
to
E. Social Ceaning What is communicated of the
social circumstances of
language use
D. .ffective Ceaning What is communicated of the
feelings and attitudes of the
spea#er9 writer
>. Aeflected Ceaning What is communicated
through association with
another sense of the same
epression
33
2. :ollocative Ceaning What is communicated
through association with
words tending to occur in the
environment of another word
<. 0hematic Ceaning What is communicated by the
way in which the message is
organized in terms of order
and emphasis
Topics for isc-ssion an e.ercises
'. :haracterize the referential theories of meaning.
3. ;efine the terms referent5 e,tension5 denotation5 connotation" 4ive eamples to illustrate
the definitions.
E. +dentify and comment on the type of meaning of the bold words in terms of etension and
intension
An &pera Theatre in her to3n is her dream"
They are signing the contract$
'/a'e you met the Pope ' A ha'e ne'er met Giovanni Paolo (("$
3anted to find a nice pair of glasses !ut there 3asn4t any cheap enough"
Since he sa3 that film5 he4s al3ays !een afraid of ghosts$
.nn 3as sad" She didn4t ans3er my greeting"
/e !ought a !ar of chocolate$
)orro is his fa'orite hero"
They ha'e no mone% to tra'el a!road"
E'ery year5 the ma%or deli'ers a speech in the to3n square"
%hat 3e need is a group of volunteers$
D. 4ive eamples for each type of meaning in &eechNs classification.
3E
Ch a p t e r I I I .
MOTI /ATI ON O) MEANI N+
@erdinand de Saussure"s apodictic statement* 6the linguistic sign is arbitrary6 in the
sense that there is no direct relationship between the sound se7uence (the signifiant) and the
6idea6 epressed by it (signifiF) is ta#en for granted in the study of language. 0he resumption
of the discussion on the arbitrary character of the linguistic sign in the late thirties and early
forties proved however that the problem is not as simple as it might seem. 0here are numerous
words in all languages in which a special correlation may be said to eist between meaning
and sound. 0hese words include in the first place inter%ections and onomatopoeia, which are
somehow imitative of non-linguistic sounds as well as those instances in which it can be said
that some sounds are somehow associated with certain meanings, in the sense that they
suggest them. 0his latter aspect is #nown as phonetic sym!olism.
!ut in addition to these cases which still remain marginal in the language, there is also
another sense in which the meaning of words may be said to be related to its form, namely the
possibility of analyzing linguistic signs by reference to the smaller meaningful elements of
which they are made up. +ndeed, derivative, comple and compound words are analyzable
from the point of view of meaning in terms of their constituent morphemes.
+t is obvious that while the general principle remains valid, namely that there is no
inherent reason why a given concept should be paired to a given string of sounds, it is the
linguist"s tas# to eamine those instances, when it is possible to say something about the
meaning of a linguistic sign by reference to its sounds and grammatical structure, in other
words, it is necessary to assess the etent to which there is some motivation in the case of at
least a number of words in the language.
1llmann ('(><) made a distinction between opaque and transparent words. +n the
latter case of transparent words, 1llmann discusses three types of motivation* phonetic,
grammatical and semantic (motivation by meaning, as in the case of 6brea#fast6, whose
meaning can be derived from the meaning of its component elements).
0here are two main types of linguistic motivation already postulated by de Saussure*
absolute and relative motivation.
3D
1. A!so%-te moti0ation
.bsolute motivation includes language signs whose sound structure reproduces certain
features of their content. 4iven this 7uasi-physical resemblance between their signifiant and
their signifiF, these signs are of an iconic or indeic nature in the typology of semiotic signs,
although symbolic elements are present as well in their organization*
0here are several classes of linguistic signs, which can be said to be absolutely
motivated*
(i) nter2ections. +t would be wrong to consider, as is sometimes done, that
inter%ections somehow depict eactly the physiological and psychological states they epress.
0he fact that inter%ections differ in sound from one language to another is the best proof of it.
:ompare Aomanian auB aoleuB 'aiB etc. and Bnglish ouchB, which may be used in similar
situations by spea#ers of the two languages.
(ii) Onomatopoeia. 0his is true of imitative or onomatopoeic words as well. ;espite
the relative similarity in the basic phonetic substance of words meant to imitate animal or
other sounds and noises, their phonological structure follows the rules of pattern and
arrangement characteristic of each separate language. 0here are instances in which the degree
of conventionality is highly mar#ed, as evidenced by the fact that while in Bnglish a dog goes
!o3-3o3, in Aomanian it goes ham-ham. .lso, such forms as Bnglish 3hisper and Aomanian
Copti are considered to be motivated in the two languages, although they are 7uite different in
form.
(iii) Phonetic sym!olism. $honetic symbolism is based on the assumption that certain
sounds may be associated with particular ideas or meanings, because they somehow seem to
share some attributes usually associated with the respective referents. 0he problem of
phonetic symbolism has been amply debated in linguistics and psychology and numerous
eperiments have been made without arriving at very conclusive results.
+t is 7uite easy to %ump at sweeping generalizations starting from a few instances of
sound symbolism.
=espersen attached particular attention to the phonetic motivation of words and tried to
give the character of law to certain sound and meaning concordances. 8e maintained for
instance, on the basis of ample evidence provided by a great variety of languages, that the
front, close vowel sound of the SiT type is suggestive of the idea of smallness, rapidity and
wea#ness. . long list of Bnglish words* little5 slim5 kid5 !it5 flip5 tip5 t3it5 pinch5 t3inkle5 click5
etc. can be easily provided in support of the assumption, and it can also be reinforced by
eamples of words from other languages* @r. petit, +t. piccolo, Aom. mic, etc. /f course, one
3>
can e7ually easily find counter eamples - the most obvious being the word !ig in Bnglish -
but on the whole it does not seem unreasonable to argue that a given sound, or se7uence of
sounds is associated to a given meaning impression, although it remains a very vague one.
Sapir ('(3() maintained that a contrast can be established between SiT and SaT in point
of the size of the referents in the names of which they appear, so that words containing SaT
usually have referents of larger size. Similar systematic relations were established for
consonants as well.
+nitial consonant clusters of the 9sn9, 9sl9, 9fl9 type are said to be highly suggestive of
7uite distinctive meanings, as indicated by long lists of words beginning with these sounds.
2. Re%ati0e moti0ation
Aelative motivation" +n the case of relatively motivated language signs, it is not the
sounds which somehow evo#e the meaning- whatever can be guessed about the meaning of
such words is a result of the analysis of the smaller linguistic signs which are included in
them. Aelative motivation involves a much larger number of words in the language than
absolute motivation. 0here are three types of relative motivation* motivation by derivation- by
composition and semantic motivation.
.n analysis of the use of derivational means to create new words in the language will
reveal its importance for the vocabulary of a language. 0he prefi U-inV, realized
phonologically in various ways and meaning either (a) not and (b) in, into, appears in at least
3,))) Bnglish words* inside5 irregular5 impossi!le5 incorrect5 inacti'e etc.
Similarly, the &atin capere (6ta#e6) appears in a great number of Bnglish words*
capture5 capti'ity5 capa!le5 reception5 e,cept5 principal5 participant, etc.
+t is no wonder that !rown ('(2D) found it possible to give #eys to the meanings of
over 'D,))) words, which can be analyzed in terms of combinations between 3) prefies and
'D roots. Some of his eamples are given below*
%ords Prefi, Common Meaning Root Common
Meaning
'. $recept pre- before capere ta#e, seize
3. ;etain de- away, down tenere hold, have
E. +ntermittent inter- between, among mittere send
D. /ffer ob- against ferre bear, carry
>. +nsist in- into stare stand
2. Conograph mono- alone, one, graphein write
<. Bpilogue epi- upon legein say, study of
?. .spect ad- to, towards specere see
32
0his table alone is sufficient to indicate the importance of relative motivation for the
analysis of meaning.
+t is obvious that the leicon of a language presents items which differ in the degree to
which their meaning can be said to be motivated- while some are opaque (their sound give no
indication of their meaning), others are more or less transparent, in the sense that one can
arrive at some idea of their meaning by recourse to their phonetic shape or to their
derivational structure or to some semantic relations which can be established with other words
in the language.
+n Prcis de smantique franDaise ('(>3), 1llman suggested several criteria of
semantic structure which enabled him to characterize Bnglish as a 6leical language6, as
opposed to @rench which is a more 6grammatical6 one* the number of arbitrary and motivated
words in the vocabulary- the number of particular and generic terms- the use of special
devices to heighten the emotive impact of words. 0hree other criteria are based on multiple
meaning (patterns of synonymy, the relative fre7uency of polysemy, and the incidence of
homonymy) and a final one evaluates the etent to which words depend on contet for the
clarification of their meaning. 0his is an area of study which could be continued with
profitable results for other languages as well.
$i!%io&raphy*
:hiLoran, ;umitru. '(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics, !ucureMti, Bd. ;idacticW
Mi $edagogicW.
E.ercises'
=" 4ive eamples of words which are absolutely motivated.
E" .nalyse the following words in terms of relative motivation* ro3!oat5 impermea!ility5
3holesaler5 pan-.frican5 childless5 playing-field5 incredi!le5 scare-cro35 counter-
attack5 imperfect5 o'erdose5 shareholder5 caretaker5 salesman5 foresee5
misunderstanding"
F" 4ive eamples of words build with the help of the following prefies* !i-5 in-5 mis-5
de-5 anti-5 non-5 out-5 super-5 dis-5 mal-5 a-5 en-5 o'er-"
G" .nalyze the following blends in point of their relative motivation* sportcast5 smog5
telescreen5 mailomat5 dictaphon5 motel5 paratroops5 ca!legram5 guestar5 transistor"
?" Write the word forms of the following words and analyze them in terms of relative
motivation* mo'e5 comment5 place" :onsider SaussureNs types of associations and find
possible associations among the word forms that you previously found.
3<
Chapter I/
STRUCTURA* A((ROACHES TO THE STUD1 O) MEANIN+
1. COM(ONENTIA* ANA*1SIS
0hough structuralism in linguistics should be connected to structuralism in other
sciences, notably in anthropology, it should also be regarded as a result of its own inner laws
of development as a science.
4enerally, structuralist linguistics may be characterised by a neglect of meaning, but
this must not lead to the conclusion that this direction in linguistics has left the study of
meaning completely unaffected. Structural research in semantics has tried to answer two basic
guestions*
a) P is there a semantic structure9system of language, similar to the systemic
organisation of language uncovered at other levels of linguistic analysis
(phonology and grammar) ?
b) can the same structure methods which have been used in the analysis of
phonological and grammatical aspects of languages be applied to the analysis of
meaning ?
+n relation to 7uestion a), the eistence of some #ind of systemic organisation within
the leicon of a language is ta#en for granted. @ de Sanssure pointed aut that the vocabulary
of a language cannot be regarded as a mere catalogue. !ut this aaceptance does not mean it
is an easy %ob to prove the systematic character of the leicon. @irst of all, it would mean the
study of the entire civilization it reflects and secondly, given the fluid and vague nature of
meaning, semantic reality must be analysed without recourse to directly observable entities as
it happens in case of sound and grammatical meaning.
/ne solution was to group together those elements of the leicon which form more or
less natural series. Such series are usually represented by #inship terms, parts of the human
body, the term of temporal and spatial orientation,etc, that can be said to reveal a structural
organisation. Structural considerations were applied to terms denoting sensorial perceptions*
colour, sound , swell, taste, as well as to terms of social and personal appreciation.
0he eistence of such semantic series, the organisation of words into semnatic fields
%ustified the structural approach to the study of leicon.
3?
8%elmslev conditioned the eistencee of system in language by the eistence of
paradignes so that a structural description is only possible where paradigmes are revealed.!ut
the vocabulary , as an open system, with a variable number of elements, does not fit such a
description unless the definition of system broadens. Celcu# ('(2') stated that a set of
structurally organised ob%ects forms a system if the ob%ects can be described by certain rules,
on condition that the number of rules is smaller than the number of ob%ects. :onstant
reference to phonology, in terms of distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant in the study
of meaning has led to applying methods pertaining to the epression level of language to its
content level as well.
Some linguistic theories, mainly the 4loosemantic School, ta#e it for granted that
there is an underlying isomorphism between the epression and content levels of language.
.ccordingly they consider it aiomatic to apply a uni7ue method of analysis to both levels of
language. 8%elmslev distinguishes between signification and sense and deepens this
distinction on the basis of a new dichotomy postulated by glossematics * form and su!stance.
While the sense refers to the substance of content, signification refers to its form or structure.
0he distinction signification9sense can be analysed in term of another structuralist dichotomy*
in'ariant1'ariant. Significations represent invariant units of meaning while the sense are its
variants. 0here is a commutation relation between significations as invariants, and a
su!stitution one between senses as variants. .n eample is given below *
Aomanian Bnglish Aussian
palma
mana hand py#a
brat arm
Since significations as invariants find their material manifestation in senses as their
invariants, in terms of glossematics, a theory of signification stands for content form alone, so
signification is no more semantic than other aspects of content form dealt with by grammar. +t
follows that only a theory of the sense (substance of content) could be the ob%ect of study of
semantics(:hitoran, '(<E*D?).
+n 8%elmslevNs opinion, sense is characteristic of speech, not of language, pertains to
an empirical level, so below any interest of linguistics. .ny attempt to uncover structure or
system at the sense level can be based on the collective evaluation of sense. @or 8%elmslev,
leicology is a sociological discipline which ma#es use of linguistic material * words. 0his
etreme position is in #eeping with the neopositivist stand adopted by glossematics, according
to which form has primacy over substance, that language is form, not substance and what
3(
matters in the study of meaning is the comple networ# of relations obtaining among
linguistic elements.
Geeping in mind the basic isomorphism between epression and content, it is essential
to emphasize some important differences between the two language levels*
- the epression level of language implies se7uentiality, a development in time
(spo#en language) or space (written language)- its content level is characterised by
simultaneity-
- the number of units to be uncovered at the epression level is relatively small, and
infinitely greater at the content level.
+t is generaly accepted that the meanings of a word are also structured, that they form
microsystems, as apposed to the entire vocabulary which represents the leical macrosystem.
0he meanings of a leical element display three levels of structure, starting from a basic
significative nucleus, a semantic constant (:oteanu, '(2)) which represents the highest level
of abstraction in the structuration of meaning. .round it different meanings can be grouped
(the 3
nd
level). (:hiLoran, '(<E*>')
0he actual uses of a leical item, resulting from the individualising function of words
(:oteanu, '(2)) belong to speech. Conolingual dictionaries give the meanings of a leical
item abstracted on the basis of a wide collection of data. .s far as the semantic constant is
concerned, its identification is the tas# of semnatics and one way of doing that is by means of
the :omponential .nalysis.
:omponential .nalysis assumes that all meanings can be further analysed into
distinctive semantic features called semes, semantic components or semantic primiti'es, as the
ultimate components of meaning. 0he search for distinctive semantic features was first limited
to leical items which were intuitively felt to form natural structures of a more ar less closed
nature. 0he set #inship terms was among the first leical subsystems to be submitted to
componential analysis *
father SXmaleTSXdirect lineT SXolder generationT
mother S-maleTSXdirect lineT SXolder generationT
son SXmaleTSXdirect lineT S-older generationT
daughter SYmaleTSXdirect lineT S-older generationT
uncleSXmaleTSYdirect lineT SXolder generationT
aunt S-maleT S-direct lineT SXolder generationT
nephe3 SXmaleT S-direct lineT S-older generationT
niece S-maleT S-direct lineT S-older generationT
E)
+t is evident than there eist the same hierarchy of units and the same principle of
structuring lower level units into higher level ones ($ottier, '(2E)*
Bpression :ontent
;istinctive feature pheme (f) seme (s)
Set of distinctive features phememe(@)
(a set of pheme)
sememe (S)
(. set of semes)
0he formalization of a set of
;istinctive features
phoneme($)
(the formalization of a
phememe)
leeme(&)
formalization of a sememe
0he sememes are arrived at by comparing various leical items in the language.
Starting from the dictionary definitions, the semantic features encountered in case of furniture
intended for siting are *
Semantic
feature9
&eical item
for sitting with bac# with support
for arms
for more
people upholstered
Stool X - - - Z
:hair X X - - Z
.rmchair X X X - Z
!ench X X Z X -
Sofa X X Z X X
Zthe given feature(present9absent)is not relevant .
/n the content level an archileeme will result from the neutralization of a leemic
opposition. +n this case the more general term chair can be the archileeme, or another
leical item can be chosen-seat.
4lossematies represents the point of departure for an .merican linguistic theory, the
statificational theory of language (Sidney (am!, '(2D,'(22). 8e included a semantic theory
in his general linguistic theory. 0his semantic component has the form of a separate level of
language (stratum) the sememic one. &ambNs semantic theory is based on the assumption that
there is a structuralization of meaning characteristic of all languages. While before him words
were related directly to their denotata or significata. &amb suggests the insertion of a new
statum Asememics4, between language and the outside world in order to delimit what is
linguistically relevant on the content level from what is not. 0he sememic statum is inserted
between the leemic (lower) and the semantic (higher) strata.+ts elementary unit is the
semon(Qthe minimal unit of the semantic stratum such that its components are not
representations of the components of the semantic statum sememes may be accounted for by
general construction rules, the combination of semons must be listed individually for each
E'
sememe. Bvidence is formed both for diversification (semo-leemic) and neutralization
(leosememic) between the two strata.
Sememic stratum S of colours- giving out9reflecting much light
&eemic stratum & bright & vivid & intense
Sememic stratum S 7uic#-witted, clever
&eemic stratum & bright &gifted & clever & capable
Sememeic statum S9piece of wood s9on the ship s9group of people s9(food)
&eemic stratum board
0he first is accounting for the semasiological direction, the second for the
onomasiological direction (from denotata and significata to a linguistic form-eplaining
synonymy). +n the process of neutalization which accounts for polysemy, one leema is
connected to several sememes in an either-or type of relationship. !ut the leeme9lamb9is
connected both to the sememe9sheep9 and the sememe 9young9. . given leeme may connect
first to several units in an either-or relationship, which in turn may connect to several
sememes in a both-and relationship. 0he intermediate units between the le,eme and the
sememes are called by &amb sememic signs.
9male9
Sememic stratum 9unmarried 9owner of the 9 [ male 9
person 9 '
st
.cad. ;egree9
(intermediate) 9unmarried 9university 9young
sememic sign man9 graduate9 #night9
(sememe)
leemic stratum bachelor
!y epressing the meanings of individual items in terms of combinations of features,
we obtain the componential definitions of the items concerned. 0hey can be regarded as
formalized dictionary definitions *
E3
man X 81C.I X .;1&0 X C.&B
0he dimensions of meaning will be termed semantic oppositions. 0he features of
opposition are mutually defining.
X (mar#ed)
- (negative, unmar#ed)
Iot all semantic contrasts are binary +n fact componential analysis assumes that
meanings are organised in multi-dimensional contrasts. 0aonomic (hierarchical arrangement
of categories) oppositions can be *
- binary * dead \ alive
- multiple * gold \ copper \ iron \ mercury etc.
0he lin# between componential analysis and and basic statements is made through the
mediation of hyponymy (inclusion) and incompatibility. So basic logical relationships
(entailment, inconsistency) can be defined in terms of hyponymy and incompatibility (&eech,
'(()*(<)*
e.g. The secretary is a 3oman entails The secretary is an adult.
meet t3o !oys entails met t3o children.
=ustifying componential analysis by following out its logical conse7uences in terms of
basic statements implies giving a certain priority to sentence meaning over word-meaning, so
truth-falsehood properties of sentence meanings are the surest basis for testing a description
of meaning* scared and frightened would be considered as synonyms in terms of their truth
value and would be perceived as differing in terms of stylistic meaning X9- collo7uial.
0he features of different semantic oppositions can be combined. +s it true that every
dimension is variable completely independent of all the other ?
9X human9 9X adult9 9Xmale9 are independently variable
9Xanimate9 combines with 9Xcountable9
9X animate9 combines with 9[ male9 but SXmaleT implies SXanimateT
Redundancy rules add features which are predictable from the presence of other
features and are therefore in a sense redundant to an economical semantic interpretation. Such
rules are found in phonology and synta. +ndirect relation of incompatibility and hyponymy
can be established through redundancy rules* man and !ook are incompatible in meaning.
8ence, H is a man and H is a !ook are inconsistent statements. Aedundancy rules are
important for etending the power of componential analysis to account for basic statements.
:ertain features and oppositions can be regarded as more important than others in the total
EE
organisation of the language. 0he oppositions [ concrete and X counta!le have many other
oppositions dependent on them and so they are in #ey positions as it happens with the feature
X animate. (4. &eech, '(()*''').
!inary oppositions fre7uently have marked and unmarked terms. 0hat is, the terms
are not entirely of e7uivalent weight, but one (the unmar#ed) is neutral or positive in contrast
to the other.
e.g. boo# boo#s
petit petite
duc# dra#e
long short
Car#edness is definable as a relation between form and meaning * if two words
contrast on a single dimension of meaning, the unmar#ed one is the one which can also apply
neutrally to the whole dimension. . positive-negative bias is inherent to the semantic
opposition. /ften the mar#ed term is indicated by a negative suffi or prefi * happy-unhappy,
useful-useless. $eople tend to respond more 7uic#ly to unmar#ed than to mar#ed terms. 0his
could be eplained by their tendency to loo# on the bride side of life and associate
unmar#edness with OgoodN evaluations and mar#edness with ObadN ones (&eech, '(()*''D).
0here is also a factor of bias in relative oppositions but this could be eplained in
terms of dominance rather than markedness. We prefer to use the dominant term before the
other or to use it alone.
parent9child see P
own9belong to hit P
in front9behind have P
Car#edness and dominance vary in strength (they can grow wea# even become
ineistent left9right) and are also sub%ect to contetual influences.
Criticisms of Componentia% Ana%ysis. :omponential analysis is considered by some
linguists as a useful and re'ealing techni7ue for demonstrating relation of meaning between
words. .t the same time, this theory of word-meaning has been criticised and 4.&eech has
tried to comment on the main criticisms *
'. +t is said that componential analysis (:.) accounts for only someparts of a
languageNs vocabulary (those parts which are neatly organi#ed). :omponential analysis can be
fitted into a more powerful model of meaning, with additional levels of analysis apart from
:.. Semantic features need not be atomic contrastive elements, but may have an internal
ED
structure of their own, that is, the semantic features can be derived from configurations of
other features. 0his recursive power of feature-creation is particularly important in
considering metaphor. So, there is no need to postulate an indefinite proliferation of semantic
oppositions.
3. +t is often ob%ected than :. suffers from a A'icious circle4 in that it merely eplains
one set of symbols (e.g. Bnglish words) by another set of symbols (which also turned out to
be Bnglish words). 0he notation of symbols is arbitrary and the eplanatory function of
features is solely their role in the prediction of basic statements.
E. .nother ob%ection is that :. postulates abstract semantic entities (semantic
features) unnecessarily. !ut the notation of :. is language-neutral, and so the same features,
oppositions redundancy rules may eplain meaning relation in many different languages.
D. :onnected to that, it has been postulated that :. implies universal features of
meaning and therefore relies on the strong assumption that the same semantic features are
found in all languages. :. fits in well with a Owea# universalistN position whereby semantic
oppositions are regarded as language-neutral i.e. as conceptual contrasts not necessarily tied
to the description of particular languages. Semantic analyses may be generalized from one
language to another, but only to the etent that this is %ustified by translation equi'alence.
>. +t has also been claimed that :. is uneplanatory in that it does not provide for the
interpretation of semantic features in terms of the real-world properties and ob%ects that they
refer to. @or eample X .$0(T remains an abstract uninterpreted symbol unless we can
actually specify what adults are li#e i.e. how decide when the feature X .$0(T refers to
something. 0o epect :. to provide an interpretation in this sense is to epect it to provide a
theory not only of meaning, but of reference, or not only of conceptual meaning, but also of
connotative meaning. :. cannot have this wider goal * it is meant to eplain word sense, not
the encyclopedic #nowledge which must enter into a theory of reference.
2. 0he view that word-meanings are essentially vague, that determinate criteria for the
reference of words cannot be given has received prominent support in philosophy and
linguisties. Wittgenstein eemplified this with the word game * he could find no essential
defining features of what constitutes a game and concluded that we #now the meaning by
virtue of recognizing certain Ofamily resemblances between the activities it refers to. . more
recent criti7ue of the deterministic view of meaning is given by &abov ('(<E) who conducted
an eperiment in which sub%ects were invited to label pictures of more-or-less cup-li#e
ob%ects. 0here was a core of agreement as to what constituted a cup but there was also a
peripheral gradient of disagreement and uncertainty. 0he conclusion is that cup5 mug5 !o3l
E>
and similar words are defined in terms of Afu##y sets of attri!utes4, that is sets of attri!utes of
'arying importance, rather than in terms of a clear-cut, unvarying set of features. We match
candidates for OcuphoodN against a prototype or standard notion of cup. 0he vagueness is
referential and does not affect componential analysis because it has to do with category
recognition* the mental encyclopedia rather than the mental dictionary.
.nother #ind of variability of reference is presented by &yons in case of three words*
!oy5 girl5 child in terms of a common feature P .;1&0. 0his feature will re7uire different
interpretations in the three cases. Within the-.;1&0 category there is a further binary
taonomy distinguishing child from adolescent. P.;1&0 stands as a common factor in the
meanings of !oy5 girl5 child5 puppy etc. but its referential interpretation is variable for reasons
which are eplicable in terms of the prototypic view of categories.
0here have emerged three different levels at which word-meaning can be analysed.
- the 3ord-sense as an entirety may be seen as a conceptual unit in its own right
prepackaged e,perience (&eech, '(()*'3')-
- this unit may be subdivided into components9features by :.-
- both word-senses and features, representing prototypic categories can be bro#en
down into fuzzy sets of attributes.
2 . (ARADI +MS I N *E2I C
Th e S e ma n t i c )i e % Th e o r y
0he idea of the organization of the entire leicon of a language into a unitary system
was for the first time formulated by =ost 0rier. .ctually, 0rier continued two lines of thought.
/n the one hand, he was directly influenced by W. von 8umboldt and his ideas of linguistic
relativism. Wilhelm von 8umboldt, influenced by the romanticism of the early '(
th
century
advanced the theory that languages are uni7ue, in that each language epresses the spirit of a
people, its &olksgeist. Bach language categorizes reality in different ways so that it may either
help or hinder its spea#ers in ma#ing certain observations or in perceiving certain relations.
4iven the principle of relativism, it follows that the vocabularies of any two languages are
anisomorphic, that there are no absolute one to one correspondences between two e7uivalent
words belonging to two different languages. 8umboldt made, also, the distinction between
language viewed statically as an ergon and language viewed dynamically, creatively, as an
energeia" 0rier"s semantic fields are, accordingly, closely, integrated leical systems in a
dynamic state of continuous evolution.
E2
0he other line of thought which 0rier continues springs from @erdinand de Saussure"s
structuralism, more specifically from the distinctions made by the latter between the
signification, and value of leical items. .ccording to de Saussure, words have signification,
in that they do mean something, positively, but they also have 'alue, which is defined
negatively by reference to what the respective words do not mean. &inguistic value is the
result of the structural relationships of a term in the system to which it belongs. 0hus, 0rier
postulated that no item in the vocabulary can be analyzed semantically unless one ta#es into
account the bundle of relationships and oppositions it enters with the other words in a given
subsystem or system. /ne cannot assess the correct meaning of 6green6 for instance, unless
one #nows the meaning of 6red6 and all the other colours in the system.
:olour terms are actually often used to illustrate the semantic field theory. &et us
suppose that the field of colours, which physicists assure us forms a continuum, is covered by
the following number of terms in two languages &
'
and &
3
*
&
'
* y z
&
3
* a b c d e
+t is evident that no single term in any of the two languages covers eactly the same
area of the spectrum- only 6z6 in &
'
can be said to incorporate the whole of 6e6 in &
3
although
it covers a small part of the area covered by 6d6 as well.
Bnglish and Shona, a language spo#en in Ahodesia, ehibit precisely the type of
structural segmentation of the colour spectrum postulated above. While Bnglish have seven
basic terms for colour (the first level of the hierarchy), red5 orange5 yello35 green5 !lue and
purple5 Shona has only three which are distributed roughly as follows* a first term 6covers the
range of Bnglish orange5 red and purple, and a small part of !lueI another term covers the
area of green and most of !lue6 (&amb '(2(* D2). +t is evident that the terms for colour are not
e7uivalent in the two languages.
Bvidently the linguistic field of colour terms is a favourable one for such an analysis.
0here is first of all a 6metalanguage6 provided by the science of physics to which one can
report the words for colour. Secondly, the number of words, is 7uite limited and thus
reductible to a restricted set of relationships.
!ut even in the case of the most elementary vocabulary one encounters a similar lac#
of correspondence. Bnglish sheep and @rench mouton are not the same since Bnglish ma#es
use of another term mutton, to cover the entire area of meanings and uses covered by @rench
mouton"
0rier advanced the idea, that vocabulary as a whole forms an integrated system of
leemes interrelated in sense, a huge mosaic with no loopholes or superposed terms since our
E<
concepts themselves cover the entire 1niverse. .ccording to his dynamic conception of
language viewed as 6energeia6, 0rier pointed out that the slightest change in the meaning of a
term within a semantic field brings about changes in the neighbouring terms as well.
.ny broadening in the sense of one leeme involves a corresponding narrowing in the
sense of one or more of its neighbours. .ccording to 0rier, it is one of the ma%or failings of
traditional diachronic semantics that it sets out to catalogue the history of changes in the
meanings of individual leemes atomistically, or one by one, instead of investigating changes
in the whole structure of the vocabulary as it has developed through time. (&yons '(<<* 3>3).
0he procedure followed by 0rier in diachronic semantics is not one of comparing
successive states of the total vocabulary (which would be hardly practicable). What he does is
to compare the structure of a leical field at time t
'
with the structure of a leical field at time
t
3
.
Semantic fields with a more restricted number of terms are incorporated into larger
ones, the latter are themselves structurated into even larger ones, until the entire leicon of a
language is integrated into a unitary system. +n 0rier"s opinion therefore semantic fields act as
intermediaries between individual leical entries, as they appear in a dictionary, and the
vocabulary as a whole.
;espite their revolutionary character, 0rier"s ideas on semantics found few followers
and were conse7uently slow in being pursued and developed. 0his is normal in view of the
important ob%ections which can be raised to his theory.
/ne of the ob%ections came from those who were reluctant to admit such a perfect
organization of vocabulary into an interdependent and perfectly integrated system of elements
which delimit each other li#e pieces in a %ig-saw puzzle. Secondly, the linguistic relativism of
0rier"s ideas, his contention about the influence of language upon thought was rightly
considered as an instance of linguistic solipsism.
Cuch of the criticism leveled at semantic field theory originated from less
philosophical considerations. +t is 7uite difficult to outline the actual limits of a field, its
6constant6, which subse7uently enables one to analyze the terms incorporated in it. .lso, the
semantic field theory, if valid, accounts for only one type of relations contracted by leical
items - the paradigmatic ones, or, a full semantic description should include syntagmatic
relations as well. +n addition 0rier"s theory does not seem to be related to any given
grammatical theory.
Ievertheless, there were numerous attempts at developing the semantic field theory,
most of them departing to a lesser or greater etent from 0rier"s original ideas. &. Weisgerber
E?
for instance, continued the analysis of the semantic field of #nowledge and understanding in
Codern 4erman while trying to incorporate the notion of semantic fields in his general theory
of language ('(>E).
$. 4uiraud ('(>2, '(23) developed the theory of the morpho-semantic field. 0he
morpho-semantic field includes all the sound and sense associations radiating from a word- its
homonyms and synonyms, all other words to which it may be related formally or logically,
metaphorically, etc., as well as casual or more stable associations which can be established
between ob%ects designated by these words.
Walter von Wartburg and A. 8allig ('(>3) undertoo# a more ambitious tas#. 0hey
suggested a method of analysis based on the system of concepts which was meant to cover the
entire vocabulary of a language and, since the general classification of concepts was supposed
to have a general character, the vocabulary of any language could be incorporated into such a
conceptual dictionary.
0he method is entirely reminiscent of Aoget"s Thesaurus in that it identifies leical
systems with logical systems of concepts. 0he outline of the system of concepts has three
main components* .* 0he 1niverse- !* Can- and :* Can and the 1niverse. Bach main
component includes several classes of concepts (and accordingly, of words designating these
concepts). 0hus, component . includes the following four classes* + 0he s#y and atmosphere-
++. 0he Barth- +++. 0he $lants- +R. 0he .nimals.
Semantic fields are structural organizations of leis which reflect a structuration of the
content level of language. 8%elmslev and B. :oseriu ('(2?) considered that any semantic
theory is valid only to the etent to which it arrives at paradigms on the content level of
language.
:oseriu defined the semantic field as a primary paradigmatic structure of the leic, a
paradigm consisting in leical units of content (leemes), which share a continuous common
zone of signification, being in an immediate opposition one to another. (+liescu, Wald '(?'* E()
. semantic field should be understood in 0rier"s original sense, namely as a #one of
signification covered by a number of closely interrelated leical items. +n this respect the
componential analysis of meaning (4oodenough, '(>2) seems to be nearer the true concept of
the semantic field.
0hree main ob%ections can be and have been raised with regard to the present state of
the semantic field theory.
(a) +s it possible to analyze the entire vocabulary into semantically structured fields, or
are they limited to certain parts of it only, namely to leical items designating aspects of
E(
reality (especially man-made reality, the reality of artifacts) which by their own nature possess
a certain structural organization?
(b) :losely related to ob%ection (a) one can doubt the linguistic nature of semantic
fields. ;o they correspond to an internal organization of the vocabulary or are they
organizations eternal to language?
(c) 8ow can semantic fields be delimited? +s there an ob%ective method of evaluating
the range of a given field and the number of elements it includes?
Componentia% Ana%ysis App%ie in the Ana%ysis of Semantic )ie%s
/ne of the most important tenets of modern semantics claims that the meanings of
leical items do not represent ultimate, indivisible entities- they are, on the contrary,
analyzable into further components. 0his led to a method of approach in semantic analysis,
appropriately called componential analysis, previously discussed in this chapter.
:omponential analysis originally started as a method of analysing units belonging to a
certain semantic field. 0he method was fruitfully applied in the study of #inship terms, colour
terminology, military ran#s and other fairly restricted domains of meaning.
.ssuming that the meaning of a word is not an undivided entity, componential
analysis provides for the decomposition of meanings into smaller significant features.
Codeled on the analysis of phonemes into distinctive features, componential analysis is
founded on the notion of semantic contrast* the units of a field are assumed to contrast
simultaneously on different dimensions of meaning. 0he meanings of the field units
complement each other constituing a paradigm. . paradigm will be defined as a set of
linguistic forms wherein*
a) the meaning of every form has, at least one feature in common with the meaning
of all other forms in the set-
b) the meaning of every form differs from that of every other form of the set, by one
or more additional features.
0he common feature of meaning of the set is called the root meaning. +t defines the
semantic area which is analyzed by the units of the field. 0he words in the field will be
arranged into contrastive sets along different dimensions of meaning. 0hus, %ust as 9t9 and 9d9
complement each other with respect to the dimension of 'oicing, old and young complement
each other with respect to the conceptual dimension of age.
D)
. dimension is an opposition of mutually eclusive features. 0he features of the
dimension se,, presumably relevant in an analysis of #inship terms, are SXCaleT and
SX@emaleT.
.ny term of the paradigm will be defined componentially in terms of its coordinates in
the paradigm. The componential definition of a word is a combination of features for several
(or for all) dimensions of the paradigm.
+n the componential definition of the meaning of a leical item the linguist proceeds
from etensional definition to intensional definitions. 0hat is, starting his analysis of say,
#inship terms, the linguist has to draw up the list of all the terms with #inship designation and,
than, to specify for each of them the set of possible denotata (the set of contetual meanings
or all the allosemes of the word).
0he componential definition of a term may be ta#en to be an epression of its
significatum. . componential definition is therefore an intensional definition, which specifies
the distinctive features shared in common by all denotata designated by a given term.
+t is a unitary, con%unctive definition implying that all the features are simultaneously
present in every occurrence of the word.
$i!%io&raphy'
'. :hiLoran, ;umitru. '(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics, !uc.* Bditura
;idacticW Mi $edagogicW.
3. +liescu, C. Wald, &. '(?'. (ing'istica modernJ Kn te,te. !uc.* Aeprografia 1niversitWLii
din !ucureMti.
E. &yons, =. '(<<. Semantics vol. +, :ambridge* :ambridge 1niversity $ress.
D. 8ulban, I. &uca-&WcWtuMu, 0. :reLescu GogWlniceanu, :. '(?E. CompetenLJ Ci
performanLJ" E,erciLii Ci teste de lim!J engle#J. !ucureMti* Bd. ]tiinLificW Mi
BnciclopedicW.
TO(ICS )OR DISCUSSION AND E2ERCISES
'. @or each of the following words try to establish sets of attributes that would
distinguish it from its companions in the group *
cake5 !iscuit5 !read5 role5 !un5 cracker5
!oil5 fry5 !roil5 saut5 simmer5 grill5 roast"
D'
3. @or each group of words given below, state what semantic property 9-ies distinguish
between the classes of a) and b) words. ;o a)words and b)words share any semantic
property ?
Bample* a) 3ido35 mother5 sister5 aunt5 maid
b) 3ido3er5 father5 !rother5 uncle5 'alet
a) and b) are human
a) words are female and b) male
.+ a) !achelor5 man5 son5 pope5 chief
b) !ull5 rooster5 drake5 ram
7+ a) ta!le5 stone5 pencil5 cup5 house5 ship5 car
c) milk5 alchohol5 rice5 soup5 mud
C+ a) !ook5 temple5 mountain5 road5 tractor
b) idea5 lo'e5 charity5 sincerity5 !ra'ery5 fear
$+ a) 3alk5 run5 skip5 2ump5 hop5 s3im
b) fly5 skate5 ski5 ride5 cycle5 canoe
E+ a) alleged5 counterfeit5 false5 putati'e5 accused
b) red5 large5 cheerful5 pretty5 stupid
E. ;efine the terms seme, sememe5 le,eme. 4ive eamples.
D. What is a semantic field?
D3
Chapter /
*AN+UA+E AS A CONCE(TUA* S1S TEM
&anguage is not only an instrument of communication. +t is far more than this - it is
the means by which we interpret our environment, by which we classify or 6conceptualize6
our eperiences, by which we are able to impose structure on reality, so as to use what we
have observed for present and future learning and understanding. &eech considers language,
in its semantic aspect, as a conceptual system" Iot as a closed, rigid, conceptual system which
tyrannizes over the thought processes of its users, but as an open-ended conceptual system,
one which 6lea#s6, in the sense that it allows us to transcend its limitations by various types of
semantic creativity.
0he first 7uestion which arises in whether language is a single conceptual system, or
whether there are as many conceptual systems as there are languages. .lthough much of
present-day thin#ing has tended to hypothesize a universal conceptual framewor# which is
common to all human language, common observation shows that languages differ in the way
they classify eperience. . classic instance of this is the semantics of colour words. Bnglish
(according to !erlin and Gay, 7asic Color Terms5 '(2() has a range of eleven primary colour
terms (blac#, white, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pin#, orange and grey), whereas
the $hilipine language of 8anun^o (according to :on#lein, /anunMo Colour Categories,
'(>>) ma#es do with four.
:onceptual boundaries often vary from language to language. &anguages have a
tendency to impose structure upon the real world by treating some distinctions as crucial, and
ignoring others. 0he way a language classifies things is sometimes blatantly man-centred.
*in&-istic Re%ati0ism an Semantic Uni0ersa%s
Semantic relativism and semantic universals are two conflicting points of view in
relation to meaning. !oth theses concern the relation between the structure of language and
the structure of the universe. 0hey represent in fact two different ways of interpreting the
relation between the universe, as eperienced by man, and language as a tool of epressing
that eperience. Bver since ancient times it has been maintained that the structure of language
reflects more or less directly the structure of the 1niverse as well as the universal structure of
the human mind (Counin, '(2E* D'). 0his was ta#en to be a precondition of interlingual
communication as well as of the act of translation.
DE
+n terms of 8%elmslevian distinction between su!stance and form of the content, it was
agreed that there may be different ways of segmenting substance, and an even richer variety
in its form but the content itself, the world of eperience remains basically the same.
(inguistic relati'ism. 0he aiomatic character of the statement which relates the
structure of language to the structure of the universe as reflected in man"s mind, ceases to be
commonly agreed upon when one begins to consider the nature of this relationship.
Wilhelm von 8umboldt in the first half of the '(
th
century, and many philosophers and
linguists after him, assigned language a much more active role, regarding it not as a passive
carrier of thought, but, in a very direct way as a moulder of it. +n their opinion, language
imposes upon thought its own system of distinctions, its own analysis of ob%ective reality.
0hese ideas remained unheeded by linguists until the advent of Buropean structuralism. 0he
#ey idea in Saussurean linguistics namely that language signs have no meaning or 6value6
outside the system to which they belonged, fits perfectly the principle of linguistic relativism.
0rier and particularly 8%elmslev consider that each language structures reality in its own way
and by doing so, creates an image of reality which is not a direct copy of it. &anguage is the
result of the imposition of same form upon an underlying substance.
_uite independently, and emerging mainly from current observation in linguistic
anthropological research on .merindian languages, conducted by @r. !oas, similar ideas were
epressed by B. Sapir and !. &. Worf in .merica. &inguistic determinism has come to be
often referred to as the Sapir-%orf hypothesis. @or Sapir ('(3') and Worf ('(>2) ob%ective
reality is an undifferentiated continuum which is segmented by each language in a different
way. We obtain a vision of nature, of reality which is by and large pre-determined by our
mother tongue. Bach language is a vast system of structures, different from that of others in
which are ordered culturally all forms and categories by means of which the individual not
only communicates but also analyzes nature, grasps or neglects a given phenomenon or
relation, in means of which he molds his manner of thin#ing and by means of which he builds
up the entire edifice of his #nowledge of the world. Worf provided ample evidence from
.merindian languages of how languages segment reality differently by neglecting aspects
which are emphasized in other languages. +n Burope linguists as !enveniste ('(>?) and
Cartinet, in analyzing the relationship between categories of thought and categories of
language, are unanimous not only in pointing out a basic parallelism between the two, but
also in assigning to linguistic categories a primary role. 0he linguistic structure conditions,
albeit in an unconscious way, man"s #nowledge of the world, his spiritual and philosophical
eperience.
DD
&inguistic relativism or determinism in its etreme variant, which maintains that
people"s #nowledge of the world, the categorization of eternal eperience is totally
determined by the structure of language which imposes its particular form upon it, has been
criticized. Rarious arguments can be advanced against the Sapir-Worf position. 0he idea that
language systems have no points in common at all, and are completely untranslatable is
refuted by empirical evidence. 0he fact that spea#ers of a given language are able to learn the
vocabularies of other language, and, indeed, other languages as a whole, is the best proof of it.
.lso, a single language often has alternative conceptualizations of the same phenomenon* in
Bnglish, for instance, human beings can be categorized by age into 6children6, 6adolescents6
and 6adults6 or alternatively, into 6ma%ors6 and 6minors6. @urthermore, if we draw a
distinction between meaning and reference, we can say that even though there is no
corresponding concept in one"s own language for a concept in another language, one can
nevertheless provide a description of its referent (&eech '(()* 3<). 0he differences in
environment, climate, cultural development, etc., among various linguistic communities may
be very great, but basically, human societies are lin#ed by a common biological history. 0he
ob%ective reality in which they live is definitely not identical but it is by and large similar.
Can"s universe is basically a 1niverse made up of things and he is constantly confronted with
them, obliged to communicate about them, to define himself in relation to them. 0his is basic
to all human societies. Rarious language systems are not therefore untranslatable.
0he problem of translatability or rather degrees of translatability may be discussed
appropriately with reference to the notion of cultural o'erlap. :ultures are not linguistically
bound- in other words, languages and cultures are not co-terminous. &inguistic boundaries do
not coincide with cultural ones. 0here is always a certain degree of cultural overlap between
two language communities.
/n the whole, similarities among languages are more important and more numerous
than the differences among them. 0hese differences can be eplained in terms of cultural
differences between the respective language communities.
Second language learning too seems to support this point of view. Words denoting
ob%ects, structures and features situated in an area of cultural overlap are among the first to be
learned, and with no apparent difficulty. 0heir ac7uisition seems to form the foundation on
which the other words in the new language are ac7uired and integrated into a dynamic
semantic system.
0ni'ersal semantics. +nterest in the study of language meaning shifted from what
#eeps languages apart to what all languages are said to have in common. 0he idea that the
D>
meanings of words in different languages can be analyzed, at least partially, in terms of a
given number of conceptual atoms identificable in the analysis of the vocabularies of all
languages has become once again a very popular one with linguistics. .s for the
6universality6 of grammar, it lies at the foundation of all linguistic wor# produced before the
advent of structuralism. &inguistic and philosophical speculation ever since the '<
th
century
has currently dealt with such problems. 0he current renewal of interest in language universals
is due mainly to generative grammar which has always laid emphasis on those features which
are shared by all languages ali#e.
0he universalist point of view is based on the idea that language is basically an innate,
or genetically inherited capability, which all human beings are 6programmed6 from birth to
develop. 0his implies the adoption of the position that languages share the same basic
conceptual framewor#. +t can be argued that there is a universal set of semantic categories (i.e.
categories concerned with time, place, causation, animacy, etc.) from which each language
draws its own subset of categories, and it is only in the choice from this subset, and in the
permitted combinations in which they are epressed, that languages differ.
The Chi%3s Ac4-isition of Concept-a% Cate&ories
8ow do we ac7uire conceptual categories in childhood? 0here are widely divergent
points of view, etending from the empiricism of those who would argue that the cognitive
system is learned entirely through eperience from one"s environment (which includes
cultural conditioning), and the etreme rationalism of those who would claim that the
cognitive framewor# does not have to be learned, as it is part of an inherited mental apparatus
specific to the human species. 0his polarity of views is obviously the universalist-relativist
controversy in a slightly different guise.
0wo prima facie arguments arising from modern linguistic research favour the
universalist-rationalist point of view* as linguistics probes more deeply and precisely into the
layers of linguistic structure, firstly it becomes more difficult to eplain how a child learns so
soon to manipulate the remar#able compleities of language, particularly on the semantic
level, without having a 6head-start6 in the form of some fairly specific language-learning
capacity- and secondly, it becomes easier to see how in a multi-layered analysis of language,
widely different structures in phonology and synta can be reconcided with identical, or al
least similar, structures on the semantic level.
/n the other hand, that at least part of concept learning runs according to empiricist
thin#ing is clear from the way we observe young children to ac7uire the conceptual categories
D2
of their language by a procedure of trial-and-error. +t has long been noted that learning a
concept such as 6cat6 involves two complementary processes* (') e,tension, i.e. etending the
name one has learned to apply to same referents (cat
'
, cat
3
, cat
E
, etc.) to all ob%ects sharing
certain attributes of those referents (cat
D
, .... cat
n
)- and (3) differentiation, i.e. restricting the
reference of a word to ob%ects sharing certain characteristics, but not others (e.g. not applying
the term cat to dogs, tigers, etc.). 0hese two processes go hand in hand in the learning of
category boundaries, but a child cannot learn both aspects simultaneously, so he tends either
to o'ere,tend (e.g. 6identifying 6daddy6 with all men) or to undere,tend (e.g. identifying
6man6 with all strange men wearing hats).
Creati0ity in *an&-a&e
;iscussion for and against semantic universals usually seems to assume that a
language forms a static, closed conceptual system, and that once the fied categories of the
language have been ac7uired, our semantic e7uipment is complete. +f this were true, it would
cause us to ta#e very seriously the sinister idea that our language is a mental strait -%ac#et,
which determines our thought processes and our assumption about the universe.
!ut fortunately for the human race, language is only a mental strait%ac#et if we allow it
to become one* the semantic system, li#e any other system relating to human society, is
continually being etended and revised. +n a language, new concepts are introduced in large
numbers day by day and wee# by wee#, and in very little time, owing to modern mass
communications, become familiar to many people. 0he techni7ue by which the new concepts
are introduced is leical innovation, which may ta#e the form of neologism and of transfer of
meaning.
&anguage has within itself anti-creative pressures, and the function of the literary
writer, in 0. S. Bliot"s words, is to 6purify the dialect of the tribe6 - to restore the currency to
its full value, and to resist the natural tendency to devaluation. Writers have always
considered themselves the determined enemies of %argon and clichF.
/ur linguistic competence (as :homs#y pointed out) is such that with a finite number
of rules, we can generate and interpret an infinite number of sentences. ;ay by day we
encounter and produce sentences we have never met in our whole life before. +n its semantic
aspect, this creativity of linguistic resource may be demonstrated by our ability to ma#e up
and ma#e sense of configurations which have virtually a nil probability of occurring in day-
to-day communication. !ut in performance, this creative or innovative power inherent in our
language competence is eroded by our tendency to rely on well-worn paths through
D<
theoretically infinite array of possible Bnglish utterances. 0hus not merely individual
concepts, but configurations of concepts, become stereotyped- %argon invades synta. 0he
writer who resists this principle of least effort, by eploring new pathways and ta#ing no
meaning for granted, is in a real sense 6creative6.
0here is an important notion of linguistic creativity which applies pre-eminently to
poetry* one which amounts to actually brea#ing through the conceptual bonds with which
language constrains us. +f one of the ma%or roles of language is to reduce eperience to order,
to 6prepac#age6 it for us, then the poet is the person who unties the string. +t is in this contet
that the 6irrational6 or 6counterlogical6 character of poetry becomes eplicable.
. very simple eample of poetic irrationality in the &atin poet :atullusN famous
parado Odi et amoN 6+ hate and + love6. 0he two-valued orientation of language ma#es us to
see love and hate as mutually eclusive categories. !ut the poet, by presenting a seeming
absurdity, shoc#s his reader into rearranging his categories- the stereotyped concept of love
and hate as contrasting emotions is destroyed. . #ind of conceptual fission and fusion ta#es
place.
0he 7uality %ust observed in poetic parado is also present in metaphor - a more
pervasive and important semantic feature of poetry. .gain, the mechanism can be
demonstrated by a very simple eample. +n an .nglo-Saon poem, the epression mere-
hengest (6sea-steed6) is used as a metaphor for 6ship6. 0he connection between steed and ship
lies in common connotations* both horses and ships convey men from one place to another-
both are used (in the heroic contet of the poem) for adventurous %ourneys and for warfare-
both carry their riders with an up-and-down movement. !y presenting the two concepts
simultaneously, as superimposed images, the poet dissolves those linguistically crucial criteria
which defines their separateness* the fact that a horse is animate whereas a ship is not- and the
fact that a horse moves over land, whereas a ship moves over water. Cetaphor is, actually, a
conceptual reorganization. 0hrough its power of realigning conceptual boundaries, metaphor
can achieve a communicative effect which in a sense is 6beyond language6. +t has a liberating
effect. .s a chief instrument of the poet"s imagination, metaphor is the means by which he
ta#es his revenge on language for the 6stereotyped ideas6 which have 6prevailed over the
truth6. (4. &eech '(()* E?). +t is not surprising that children"s language produces many
instances of semantic 6mista#es6 which stri#e the adult as poetic. 4. &eech gave two of such
instances* a child"s description of a viaduct as a 3indo3-!ridge and of the moon as that
shilling in the sky, both based, significantly, on visual analogy. 0he window-bridge eample is
very similar to the mere-hengest of the .nglo-Saon poet* the openings in a viaduct, when
D?
seen side on, are indeed very close in appearance and construction to the window openings of
a house. 1sing this generalizing ability, the child hits on physical appearance as a crucial
criterion, at the epense of the criterion of function, which the language regards as more
important. 0he difference between the two cases, of course, is that while the poet is familiar
with the institutional categories and is aware of his departure from them, the child is not.
Conc%-sions
6Bcept for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a world not of
things but of symbols6 ()eneral Systems Theory, p. 3D>). 0his statement by &udwig von
!ertalanffy is close enough to the truth to %ustify the concentration on the way language both
determines and reflects our understanding of the world we live in.
0hin#ing of a language as providing its users with a system of conceptual categories,
we may conclude*
'. 0hat the concepts vary from language to language, and are sometimes arbitrary in
the sense that they impose a structure which is not necessarily inherent in the data of
eperience.
3. 0hat it is a matter for debate how for concepts vary from language to language,
and how far it is possible to postulate semantic universals common to all human language.
E. 0hat although the conceptual system of a language predisposes its users towards
certain distinctions rather than others, the etent to which more is 6enslaved6 by his language
in this respect is mitigated by various forces of creativity inherent in the system itself.
$i!%io&raphy'
'. :hiLoran, ;. '(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics. !uc.* Bd. ;idacticW Mi
$edagogicW.
3. &eech, 4. '((). Semantics" The Study of Meaning. &ondon* $enguin !oo#s.
TO(ICS )OR DISCUSSION
:omment on the two different conceptions in semantics relativism and universalism.
D(
Chapter /I
SEMANTIC RE*ATIONS AND *E2ICA* CATE+ORIES
@. de Saussure directed the linguistsN attention to the necessity of studying the
multiple relationships among words in a systematic way. . particular leeme may be
simultaneously in a number of such relations, so the leicon must be thought as a networ#
rather than a listing of words. 8e suggested the eistence of a networ# of associative fields,
covering the entire vocabulary, and this structuring the huge mass of words. So an important
organizational principle in the leicon is the leical field. 0his represents a group of words
which belong to a particular activity or area of specialized #nowledge, such as terms in
coo#ing, sailing- the vocabulary of doctors, coal miners or mountain climbers. 0he effects are
the use of different senses for a word and also the use of specialized terms. +n fact, each word
is a center of a OconstellationN or Oseries of constellationsN, the point towards which other
terms associated with it converge.
Saussure established four ma%or types of associations among leical items*
- etymological- based on resemblances in form and meaning-
- derivational- based on identity of affies-
- semantic- based on meaning relations- formal- based on accidental form resemblances.
0he types of associations listed above are illustrated by ;. :hiLoran considering the eample
of the @rench word enseignement"
Enseignement
Enseigner apprentisage changement clement
Enseignons education armement 2ustement
$rogress in semantics was due mainly to leicographic practice, which continued to
bring together facts about meaning. $articular attention was paid to changes in the meaning of
words. 0raditional leicology deals with types of leical relations established considering
distinctions similar to those belonging to SaussureNs conception*
- semantic ties - based on the signification of words- such ties result in synonymic
and antonymic series of words-
- morpho-semantic ties obtaining among leical items derived from a common
basic element- they result in word families-
>)
- syntagmatic ties obtaining among leical items as they occur in actual utterance-
syntagmatic ties may be divided into free - relations among sit and chair1 ta!le1 do3n etc.-
and stereotype P relations among leical items part of set idioms and phrases, as a matter of
fact5 as mad as a hatter5 day and night5 etc.--
- phonetic ties based on similarities of phonic substance- the first two eamples
represent minimal pairs, i. e. words which differ in %ust one phoneme, and the net two
eamples are words which present a common grammatical mar#er, in this case, that for the
past participle
might - night flo3n- sho3n
to3n - do3n caught- taught"
0hese types of relations can be interpreted in terms of the distinction between
epression- signifiant- and content- signifie-, as the interdependent planes of a linguistic sign.
0here are*
- formal or phonological relations established between the signifiants, i. e. the
epression planes of linguistic signs- they account for homonymy-
- the relation of the type one signifiant- various signifies serves the designation of
polysemy-
- the relation one signifie- various signifiants epresses synonymy-
- relations between various contents of linguistic signs.
B. :oMeriu pointed out that semantic relations should be signification relations, rather
than relations between signs. /nly in this way semantic structures can be distinguished from
simple associative fields which are based on similarity relations between linguistic signs both
on the epression and on the content level. 0he primary tas# of linguistics is to study the
relational networ# encompassing the elements of language. 0he linguistic relational
framewor# is structured along two aes, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic ais. 0he
linguistic elements situated on the syntagmatic ais find themselves in a !othOand #ind of
relationship, i. e. they coeist within the same linguistic chain. 0hey are in contrast position *
.. Cartinet).0he syntagmatic relations are directly observable in the spo#en9 written chain.
/n the paradigmatic ais, the linguistic elements are mutually eclusive within one and the
same linguistic se7uence. 0hey are in eitherOor relationship, in opposition (.. Cartinet).
0hese relations are not observable within a linguistic chain.

>'
A. (arai&matic Re%ations
'. 0he primary semantic relation on the paradigmatic ais is that of incompati!i%ity, a
relation which is characteristic of all leical elements based on the substitution of items*
e. g. had tea at !reakfast"
had coffee/cocoa5milk$
$art of the meaning of a term belonging to a leical set is its compatibility with all the
other members of the same leical set in a given contet. 0he wider concept of meaning
incompatibility includes distinct types of oppositeness of meaning, each of them being
designated by a separate term (=. &yons).
a. Complementarity is a type of antonymic relation based on binary oppositions which do not
allow for gradations between the etreme poles of a semantic ais- they are two- term sets of
incompatible terms. Ralidity of one term implies denial of the other*
e. g. single - married
male - female
ali'e - dead"
b. .ntonymy. 0he term is used to designate those meaning oppositions which admit certain
gradations with regard to the meaning epressed*
e. g. young- oldI
young"""""""""childish12u'enil"""""""""""""adolescent"""""""""""""young"""""""""mature"""""""""middle"""""""""""
aged"""""""""""old"""""""ancient"""""""""
small- largeI """"microscopic""""tiny""""little""""small"""""!ig1large"""""spacious"""""immense""""
!eautiful - uglyI
"""""splendid"""""""3onderful""""!eautiful"""""attracti'e"""""handsome"""""good-looking"""""""
pretty"""""nice""""pleasant""""accepta!le""""""common"""""ordinary"""""plain"""unattrac
ti'e""""ugly""""horri!le"""a3ful""""frightening""""spooky""""terrifying
cle'er - stupidI
interesting - !oringI
fast - slo3"
c" Re'ersi!ility refers to two terms which presuppose one another*
gi'e- takeI !orro3- lendI !uy- sellI hus!and- 3ifeI offer- accept1refuseI employer-
employee" 0his type of binary opposition, a relation, involves a contrast of direction.
0he relation can be realized by #eeping the same leical item and reversing the syntactic
positions of the arguments*
e. g. 9ohn is the parent of 9ames"
>3
9ames is the parent of 9ohn"
or by #eeping the syntactic positions of the arguments constant and changing the leical form*
e. g. 9ohn is the parent of 9ames"
9ohn is the child of 9ames"
&eical pairs such as parent and child are called con'erses" !ecause of the alternative ways of
epressing the same contrast, there arise cases of synonymy,
9ohn is the parent of 9ames P 9ames is the child of 9ohn"
+n case of OparenthoodN relation, the directional contrast is mutually e,clusi'e, so there is an
asymmetric relation"
.lf is parent of )eorge" is incompatible with )eorge is parent of .lf"
.n eample of symmetric relation is 9ohn is married to Susan" which entails Susan is
married to 9ohn" +n this case we tal# about reciprocal relation"
d. &ess common types of semantic opposition include hierarchic oppositions5 which are
multiple taonomies, ecept that they include an element of ordering. Bamples are sets of
units of measurement- inch1 foot1 yard- 5 calendar units- month of the year- or the
hierarchy of numbers which is an open- ended, that is it has no OhighestN term. 0he days of
the 3eek opposition is a cyclic type of hierarchy, because it has no first9 last member.
e. &ast but not least, there is an interesting type of binary semantic contrast, called in'erse
oppositionN
e. g. all - some 3illing- insist
possi!le - necessary still- already
allo3 - compel remain- !ecome"
0he main logical test for an inverse opposition is whether it obeys a special rule of synonymy
which involves substituting one inverse term for another and changing the position of the a
negative term in relation to the inverse term
e. g. Some countries ha'e no coastline" P *ot all countries ha'e a coastline"
All of us are non+ smokers" P *ot an% of us are smokers"
%e 3ere compelled to !e non- smokers" P %e 3ere not allo3ed to !e smokers"
t is possi!l% true that 9ack is a hippy" P t is not necessaril% true that 9ack is a
hippy"
3. .nother type of paradigmatic relation is synonymy" 0here are words which sound
different, but have the same or nearly the same meaning. 0here is a tendency to limit
synonymic status to those elements, which given the identity of their referential, can be used
freely in a given contet. 0here are no perfect synonyms, since no two elements can be used
>E
with the same statistic probability in absolutely all contets in which any of them can appear.
Synonymy is always related to contet. 0wo leical items are perfectly synonymous in a given
contet or in several contets, but never in all contets. 0he term used to describe this is
relati'e synonymy. :ontet, that is the position on the syntagmatic ais, is essential for
synonymy.
e. g. deep 3ater Qdeep idea
profound idea Qprofound 3ater
deep 1 profound sleepI deep 1 profound thought"
We can notice that the distinction concrete9 abstract is not relevant here, since words
li#e idea and thought, both abstract, behave differently in relation to the pair of relative
synonyms deep and profound. 0al#ing about the terms used in describing synonymy, it is
necessary at this point to present &yonsN classification of synonyms into*
- a!solute synonymsI
- partial synonymsI
- near synonyms"
.bsolute synonyms should be fully5 totally and completely synonymous.
i" Synonyms are fully synonymous if, and only if, all their meanings are identical -
ii" synonyms are totally synonyms if and only if they are synonymous in all conte,tsI
iii" synonyms are completely synonymous if and only if they are identical on all rele'ant
dimensions of meaning"
.bsolute synonyms should satisfy all the three criteria above, whereas partial
synonyms should satisfy at least one criterion (&yons, '(?'* >)->').
;. .. :ruse ('(?<* 3(3) comments on &yonsN classification, arguing that identical and
synonymous are to be understood as completely synonymous- secondly, near- synonyms Omore
or less similar, but not identical in meaningN 7ualify as incomplete synonyms, and therefore as
partial synonyms, so the distinction between the two classes is not so clear as &yons claims.
Aeferring to absolute synonyms in language, :ruse states that there is no real motivation for
their eistence, and if they do eist, in time one of them would become obsolete, or would
develop a difference in semantic function. @or eample, sofa and settee are absolute
synonyms, but at a certain point in time sofa had the feature 9elegant9, which now seems to
have disappeared from the conscience of the spea#ers who use the two terms in free variation.
!ut according to :ruse, this state of affairs would not persist, since it is against the tendency
towards economy manifest in any language.
>D
Bamples li#e sofa and couch refer to the same type of ob%ect, and share most of their
semantic properties-9 piece of furniture9 9 used for sitting9 9with arms9 9 bac#ed9 9
upholstered9-, so they can be considered synonymous. 0here are words that are neither
synonyms nor near synonyms, yet they have many semantic properties in common. @or
eample, man and !oy imply 9Xmale9 9Xhuman9 features, but !oy includes the property 9
Xyouth9, so it differs in meaning from man" 0he 7uestion to be as#ed is how to determine all
relevant dimensions of meaning in order to establish the type of synonymy we are dealing
with. :ruse draws a distinction between su!ordinate semantic traits and capital traits"
Subordinate traits are those which have a role within the meaning of a word analogous to that
of a modifier in a syntactic construction (e. g. red in a red hat).@or instance, 9wal#9 is the
capital trait of stroll5 9good loo#ing9 of pretty and handsome" @or nag , 9worthless9 is a
subordinate trait.
Sometimes words that are ordinarily opposites can mean the same thing in a certain
contet, a good scare P a !ad scare" 0he apparent synonymy of two utterances that contain a
pair of antonyms hides opposite or at least different connotations.
e.. g. /o3 old are youR - neutral connotation- in7uiry about someoneNs age
/o3 young are youR Sou shouldn4t smoke" -negative connotation- itNs obvious you
are too young to do that-
don4t kno3 ho3 !ig his house is" - neutral
don4t kno3 ho3 small his house is" -negative connotation- + #now that it is too
small
Bven when using synonyms this implies not only a high degree of semantic overlap, but
also a low degree of implicit contrastiveness,
e. g. /e 3as murdered5 or rather1 more e,actly5 e,ecuted"
/e 3as cashiered5 that is to say5 dismissed"- the synonym is used as an eplanation
for another word.
Synonymy depends largely on other factors such as*
- register used, 3ife SneutralT, spouse Sformal, legal termT, old lady Shighly informalT-
- collocation, !ig trou!le Qlarge trou!leI
- connotation, notorious SnegativeT, famous SpositiveT- immature SnegativeT, young
SpositiveT.
- dialectal variations, which may be geographical ,- lift (!ritish Bnglish), ele'ator
(.merican Bnglish)-, temporal,- 3ireless became radio5 -5 and last but not least, social -
>>
toilet replaced la'atory5 settee became sofa-5though the last two subtypes of variations
cannot be always separated- (:ruse, '(?<* 3?3-3?E)
- morpho- syntactic behavior,
e. g. /e !egan1 started his speech 3ith a quotation"
Tom tried to start1 Q!egin his car"
.t the !eginning1 Qstart of the 3orldO
.ll the eamples above refer to leical synonymy, but there are also grammatical
synonyms5 operating at the level of morphology, means of epressing futurity, possibility, etc.
e. g. /e 3ill go 1 is going 1 is to go tomorro3"
/e can1 may 'isit us ne,t 3eek if the 3eather is fine"
E. /yponymy" .nother type of paradigmatic relation is hyponymy 1 inclusion" +t implies
as a rule multiple taonomies, a series of hypo-ordinate 9 subordinate terms being included in
the area of a hyper-ordinate9 super-ordinate term. 0his relationship eists between two
meanings if one componential formula contains all the features present in the other formula.
%oman contains the features 9Xhuman9, 9Xadult9, 9-male9.+n different contets, the emphasis is
on one of the features included in the meaning of 3omanN
e. g. Stop treating me like a child" 4m a 3oman SQ grown- upT
She is a 3oman SQ human beingT, not an o!2ect"
She is a 3oman S Q femaleT 5 so she 3ouldn4t kno3 3hat a man feels like in such a
situation"
/ne way to describe hyponymy is in terms of genus and differentia" We can discuss
about meaning inclusion5 that is all the features of adult are included in 3oman5 and about
reference inclusion5 that is all the ob%ects denoted by 3oman are included into the larger
category denoted by adult"
Sometimes we canNt have a super-ordinate term epressed %ust by one word*
musical instrument
clarinet guitar piano trumpet 'iolin drums
>2
$. Synta&matic Re%ations.
Aelations of the type !othOandO are fundamental in structuring our utterances.
0he connection between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations appears obvious, since
in choosing a certain term from a synonymic series, we must ta#e into account
selectional restrictions. . particular type of arbitrary co- occurrence restrictions are
collocational restrictionsN
e. g. .nn1 The cat1 The plant died"
.nn1 QThe cat1 QThe plant kicked the !ucket"
:ollocational restrictions vary in the degree to which they can be specified in terms of
re7uired semantic traits. When fully specifiable, they may be described as systematic
collocational restrictionsN
e. g. Pass a3ay 1animate9 and kick the !ucket 9human9
)rill 9meat9 and toast 1bread9
When there are eceptions to the general tendency in collocating, we may spea# of semi-
systematic collocational restrictionsN
e" g" Customer 1ac7uiry of something material in echange for money9
Client 1ac7uiry of a certain type of service9, but a client of a ban# is called
customer, too.
0he collocational ranges of some leical items can only be dscribed by listing
permissible collocants. Such items will be described as having idiosyncratic collocational
restrictions" (:ruse,'(?<* 3?')
unblemished spotless flawless immaculate impeccable
performance - - X X X
argument - - X - ?
compleion ? ? X - -
behavior - - - - X
#itchen - X - X -
0he table above represents :ruseNs own intuitions. Io semantic motivation can be discerned
for the collocational patterns. +t is debatable whether idiosyncratic restrictions are a matter of
semantics at all.
!ibliography*
'. :hiLoran, ;.'(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics5 !ucureMti* B.;.$.
3. :ruse, ;.'(?<. (e,ical Semantics5:ambridge* :1$.
E. &eech, 4.'((). Semantics5 &ondon* $enguin !oo#s.
><
D. &yons, =.'(<<. Semantics, :ambridge* :1$.
6-estions an e.ercises
'. ;iscuss the types of opposition relation.
3. +llustrate how various linguistic and etra- linguistic factors influence synonymy.
E. Catch the appropriate ad%ectives with the nouns to show how collocation wor#s.
calculated retirement
deli!erate risk
'oluntary 2udgement
premeditated mistake
considered murder
e,press ignorance
3ilful 3ish"
D. :ontet is essential in choosing from a pair of synonyms. 0hin# of contets in which the
following pairs of words cannot be interchanged*
hurry1 hasten pa'ement1 side3alk
consider1 regard e,it1 3ay out
in2ure1 damage spud1 potato
confess1 admit"
>. Synonymy and antonymy are associated when arranging words epressing different
degrees of the same 7uality9 concept. 0he result is a cline1 scale. 0ry to arrange the
following words according to their intensity*
a. immense5 !ig5 enormous5 large5 gigantic5 spacious5 colossal5 e,tensi'eI
b. little5 tiny5 microscopic5 small5 minute5 infinitesimal5 diminuti'eI
c. distinguished5 famous5 3ell- kno3n5 illustrious5 reno3nedI
d. mansion5 castle5 cottage5 hut5 house5 palace5 ca!in"
2. . word can have different opposites in different contets- which are they in case of*
(ight bag9 wind9 colors-
Rough sea9 teture9 area9 person9 calculation-
/igh mar#s9 opinion9 building9 price9 temperature9 wind-
/ard eam9 chair9 %ourney9 wor#9 person9 drugs.
<. :onstruct hyponymy trees for 'ehicle5 tomato5 !ench" 0hen complete diagrams li#e the
following*
vehicle9 feature powered carries people four- wheeled
>?
bus X X X
car ` ` `

Chapter /II
SEMANTIC THEOR1 7ITHIN THE )RAME7OR8 O) +ENERATI/E9
TRANS)ORMATIONA* +RAMMAR
0he development of generative-transformational grammar beginning with the late
fifties of the 3)
th
century has brought about a strong revival of interest in semantics. $articular
mention should be made of the distinction postulated by generative grammar between deep
structure and surface structure which is in many ways responsible for the recent developments
in the study of language meaning.
4enerative-transformational grammar resumes many of the concerns of traditional
semantics. 0hus, according to the theory, semantics should include an analysis of the way in
which words and sentences are related to ob%ects and processes in reality reintroducing into
the discussion the problems of reference, denotation etc. +ts second concern should be an
analysis of the manner in which words and sentences are related to one another. 0hese include
an account of synonymy, antonymy entailment, contradiction, paraphrase, implication,
presupposition, etc.
1. Semantics in the Stanar +enerati0e Theory of *an&-a&e
. grammar of language can be described as a system of rules that epress the
correspondence between sound and meaning in the respective language. Bvery spea#er
possesses a finite and relatively small set of simple rules, which enable the spea#er to produce
and the listener to understand an infinite number of sentences. 0he set of rules represents - in
the :homs#yan terminology - the linguistic competence, while the utterances produced on
their basis constitute the linguistic performance.
>(
4enerative grammars are thus, synthetic models, able to generate all well-formed
sentences in a language. !y 6synthetic6 it is meant that starting from a set of rules arranged in
a formalized construction, synthetic models lead finally to a set of utterances. 4.0. is first of
all, a model of competence, being-conceived as a model of language ac7uisition.
0he rules are mainly of two #inds* re3riting rules and transformational rules. 0hese
rules are applied to symbols which ma#e up the vocabulary of grammar.
Semantics will be concentrate on leical categories and formatives (corresponding to
words or full-leical meaning or content words).
The or&ani:ation of a &enerati0e &rammar. 4enerative transformational grammar is
defined in terms of E components* syntactic, semantic and phonological.
+n the standard theory, the syntactic component in the most important one. +t generates
both the deep structure - which is semantically interpreted by the semantic component - and
the surface structure which is further related to the sound aspect of language by means of the
phonological component. While the semantic and the phonological components are purely
interpretative, the syntactic component is basic to grammar since it represents the generative
source of the grammar.
0he syntactic component consists of a !ase syntactic subcomponent and a set of
transformations, i.e. it has two #inds of rules* 3riting rules or phrase-structure rules and
transformational rules. 0he first specify the form of constituent structure trees, and the second
convert one #ind of tree-structure into another (e.g. an active structure into a passive one).
0ransformations are rules that act on the phrase mar#ers generated by the base, mapping deep
structures onto the surface structures of sentences.
+n the earliest published version of transformational grammar - :homs#y"s Syntactic
Structures ('(><) - meaning was in effect ignored. +t was assumed that syntactic rules
operated in complete independence from meaning* their function was to 6generate6 or specify
by rule the grammatical sentences of a language, and to assign to these sentences their correct
structure. +n fact, many of the transformational rules, such as that which converted an active
sentence structure into a passive sentence structure, happened in general to preserve the
meaning of sentences unaltered (and therefore to be rules of paraphrase), but this was
considered an irrelevant side-effect of such rules. 8owever, after a pioneering article on
semantics by Gatz and @odor (60he Structure of a Semantic 0heory6, '(2E), transformational
grammar went through a period of conceding to semantics a more and more important
position in linguistic theory. (&eech '(()* EDE)
2)
Scope an o!"ect of a semantic theory in &enerati0e9transformationa% &rammar.
. semantic theory describes and eplains the interpretative competence of the spea#er. 0his
ability implies that a spea#er can interpret sentences in the sense that he can relate them
appropriately to 6states, processes and ob%ects in the universe6 (!ierwisch '(<'* '2<).
. spea#er can understand an infinite number of sentences, some of which he has never
heard before. 0his is because he #nows a number of rules on whose basis he can generate an
infinite number of sentences. 0he rules are said to pro%ect a finite set or rules on an infinite set
of sentences (Gatz and @odor, '(22* D?'). 0he problem of formulating such rules represent
the pro%ection problem.
0his problem re7uires for its solution rules which pro%ect the infinite set of sentences
in a way which mirrors the way spea#ers understand novel sentences. +n encountering a novel
sentence, the spea#er is not encountering new elements but only a novel combination of
familiar elements. Since the set of sentences is infinite and each sentence is a different
concatenation of morphems, the fact that a spea#er can understand any sentence must mean
that the way he understands sentences he has never previously encountered is compositional,
i.e. it is based on his #nowledge of the grammatical properties and the meaning of the
morphems of the language. 0he rules the spea#er #nows enable him to determine the meaning
of a novel sentence, by following the manner in which the parts of the sentence are composed
to form wholes. .s any spea#er is able to grasp the difference in meaning between any two
syntactically similar strings, this ability falling under the scope of semantic theory, it follows
that the pro%ection problem is fully solved only in as much as the grammar is supplemented by
a semantic theory.
0he aims and ob%ectives of a semantic theory as part of the transformational-
generative theory of language are*
a) to establish the meaning and the degree of ambiguity of a sentence-
b) to detect semantic anomalies-
c) to state the paraphrase relation between sentences-
d) to state other relevant semantic properties of sentences.
0hese ob%ectives are self-evident for the innovative character of this semantic theory
as compared to more traditional ones. While semanticists in the past were mainly concerned
with the analysis of meaning (usually of isolated elements), the change in the evolution of
meaning etc., the interest is now switched to the analysis of the meaning of sentences, and of
their semantic properties. (:hitoran, '(<E* '<3).
2'
The semantic component of &enerati0e9transformationa% &rammar. 0he semantic
component of a linguistic description is a pro%ective device consisting of*
') a dictionary that provides a meaning for each of the leical items of the language-
3) a finite set of pro%ection rules which assign a semantic interpretation to which
string of formatives (or string of words) generated by the syntactic component. 0o arrive at a
semantic interpretation it is necessary for each leical item in a string of formatives to be
assigned a meaning on the basis of the semantic information provided by the dictionary.
0he pro%ection rules then combine these meanings in a manner dictated by the
syntactic description of the string to arrive at a characterization of the meaning of the whole
string and of each of its constituents. 0his process reconstructs the way in which a spea#er is
able to obtain the meaning of a sentence from the meaning of its leical items and its syntactic
structure.
0he dictionary part of the semantic component offers information on a leical entry
which is analyzed at four distinct levels.
.t the first level, each leical entry is categorized grammatically by indicating its
syntactic marker, i.e. the grammatical class to which it belongs (noun, ad%ective, transitive,
etc.). 0he semantic information proper, i.e. the specification of the meaning or meanings of
the respective item is given under the form of semantic markers (as semantic categories of the
type* .nimate, 8uman, Cale, etc., which indicate the semantic relations obtaining
among various leical units and appearing therefore in the description of many of them) and
distinguishers, which reflect the idiosyncretic elements in the meaning of leical items.
Semantic mar#ers and distinguishers are the transformational analogues of semes in
the structural semantics (the first are similar to classemes and the second to semantemes). 0he
distinction between semantic mar#ers and distinguishers consists in the fact that semantic
mar#ers are used in the semantic description of more formatives (words), while distinguishers
occur only in the description of a certain formative, individualizing it. @or eample in the case
of the formative mammal the semantic mar#er is (X.nimate) and the distinguisher is Sthey
feed the young with their own mil#T. 0he first can appear in the description of many
formatives* mammal5 fish5 !ird and the second is applied only to mammal. (B. +onescu '((3* '(3).
0he fourth type of information provided by the dictionary refers to the combinatorial
abilities of leical items in a given syntactic construction to render a definite meaning. 0hese
rules of the combination of items in order to render a given meaning ta#e the form of
selectional restrictions in the dictionary suggested by Gatz and @odor. 0hus, handy means
23
cle'er 3ith the hands when said of persons, and easy to use5 con'enient to handle when used
of things and places.
0he syntactic mar#er of an item is indicated by the grammatical terms denoting it-
semantic mar#ers are enclosed between normal brac#ets (...), distinguishers are enclosed
between s7uare brac#ets S...T and selectional restrictions are given between angles <...>.
0he second constituent of the theory is represented by the pro2ection rules
(amalgamation), whose ob%ect is to account for the semantic relations among morphems and
the interraction between meaning and syntactic structure. $ro%ection rules are ultimately
responsible for assigning a semantic interpretation to a sentence.
0his they do in the first place by associating to the leical items of a given sentence S,
those readings which are compatible with their syntactic categorization as revealed by the
phrase mar#er of the respective S (Gatz and $ostal '(2D* '?). 0he net operation that
pro%ection rules perform is to combine the readings of inferior constituents into derived
readings of successively higher constituents until the readings for the whole sentence are
arrived at. 0he process by means of which composite readings are arrived at by combining
readings from each of the sets of readings dominated by a given node in a phrase mar#er, is
called amalgamation. 0here is an interplay of syntactic and semantic relations in regulating
the pairing of readings, since one condition for two items to be %oined in syntactic relation, is
that all selectional restrictions of one be included in the semantic mar#ers of the other.
. closer analysis of the dictionary component of Gatz and @odor semantic theory
reveals many similarities with previous approaches to the science of meaning. +n fact, what
Gatz and @odor do in their dictionary component of the theory is to rediscover the .ristotlean
reference to genres and species (semantic mar#ers and distinguishers) (Counin '(<3* '2?).
.s :oMeriu indicated ('(2?) what Gatz and @odor essentially do, is to study meaning
along the semasiological direction, that is starting from a given signifiant, proper signifiFs are
assigned to it in a given contet, following certain (syntactic) operations. +n its original form
the theory does not account for such well established facts as the eistence of primary
meanings and secondary ones, and in particular, it does not account for transferred meanings,
and, in general, for the widespread use of metaphor in language.
.n obvious criticism that was raised against the theory regards, as in the case of
componential analysis, the very hypothesis according to which linguistic signification and
semantic structure in general can be reduced to a relatively small set of 6atoms6 of meaning,
with no residue whatever because this hypothesis is far from having been accepted
unanimously (:hitoran '(<E* '<<).
2E
2. +enerati0e Semantics /ers-s Interpreti0e Semantics
0he generative-interpretative controversy raged in the early seventies, but had no
conclusive outcome. .fter a while the partisans of each side moved on the other topics of interest.
0he popular labels generati'e semantics and interpreti'e semantics refer not so much
to ways of studying semantics per se, as to ways of relating semantics to synta. !oth
developed out of the Standard 0heory of '(2> (.spects of the Theory of Synta,) in wich a
sentence was seen as organized syntactically on two chief levels* that of deep structure and
that of surface structure. 0he surface structure of a sentence was derived from the deep
structure by means of transformational rules involving such operations as the delition of
constituents, the movement of constituents from one part of a sentence to another, etc. 0he
rules which specified the ;S were phrase structure rules, which spelt out the basic
constituency of sentences in terms of categories li#e Ioun $hrases, Rerbs, etc. .s it was
previously mentioned, these rules made up the !ase component of synta, and had as their
output (after the insertion of leical items) deep structures and the transformational rules
made up the transformational component of synta, and had as their output surface structures.
.part from synta, which was the central part of the total grammar, these were two
interpretive components* the phonological and the semantic. 0he phonetic interpretation of a
sentence was derived from its surface structure by means of phonological rules, while the
semantic interpretation of a sentence was derived from the deep structure through the
operation of the so-called pro2ection rules of semantics. 0he whole theory, therefore, through
the interaction of its various components, provided a matching of phonetic outputs with
semantic outputs (4. &eech '(()* EDD). So, the theory provides an account of the pairing of
meanings with sounds which any complete linguistic theory must attempt. 0he syntactic
component has special status, being the point from which the derivation of both sounds and
meaning originates. .mong the special claims of Standard 0heory are (') that syntactic
surface structure is the only level of synta relevant to the specification of phonetic
interpretation- and (3) that syntactic deep structure is the only level of synta relevant to
semantic interpretation. 0his second point brings with it the important principle that
transformational rules are meaning-preser'ingI that is, they do not in any way alter the
meaning of the structures that they operate on. 0his means, in effect, that all sentences that
have the same deep structures have the same meanings.
We can see, Standard 0heory provides for an interpretati'e semantic component- that
is the meaning of a sentence is specified by the application of semantic rules to a syntactic
!ase. +t may be diagrammed as follows*
2D
Standard Theory
Transformational )rammar =>T?
Semantic +nterpretation
($ro%ection Aules)
(0ransformational Aules)
($honological Aules)
$honetic +nterpretation
&ater, an important modification to the interpretivist position was proposed. :homs#y
('(<)), =ac#endoff ('(<3), and others didn"t claim any more that all sentences with the same
deep structures have the same meaning. Within this revised theory, deep structure reverted to
being a level to be %ustified very largely on syntactic grounds alone.
)enerati'e semantics li#e interpretative semantic, arose out of Standard 0heory, but it
developed along a 7uite different path. &a#off, Cc:awley, Aoss, and others, 6deepened6 the
deep structure so as to ma#e it closer to a representation of a sentence"s meaning, and they
also 6lengthened6 the transformational process of derivation from deep to surface structure.
&eech considers that the logical terminus of this process was reached (Aoss and &a#off '(2<
and Cc:awley '(2?) when the deep structure of a sentence was declared to be so 6deep6 as to
be identical with its semantic representation. 0his now meant that !ase component, in the
sense of :homs#y ('(2>), was no longer syntactic, but semantic. .nd since the deep structure
3as the semantic interpretation, there was no longer any need for the pro%ection rules to
supply an interpretation of deep structure. $ro%ection rules therefore disappeared, and the
resulting diagram was*
)enerati'e Semantics Position

(0ransformational Aules)
2>
;BB$ S0A1:01AB
(!ase)
S1A@.:B S0A1:01AB
SBC.I0+: AB$ABSBI0.0+/I
(or deep structure)
S1A@.:B S0A1:01AB
($honological Aules)
$honetic +nterpretation
Since it eliminates the pro%ectional rule component, the generativist model has the
advantage of overall simplicity of design. !ut, the simplification is necessarily at the cost of
epanding the transformational component, and ma#ing the chain of transformational
derivation for each sentence considerably longer than was envisaged by :homs#y in '(2>.
(4. &eech '(()* ED<).
0he generativists, in the main, stayed commited to the view that transformational rules
do not change meaning. 0his proved the most vulnerable principle in their model, and was
sub%ect to the severest criticisms from interpretivists.
Within the framewor# of generative-transformational grammar, a 6battle6 is being
fought not only between two rival semantic theories - interpretive semantics and generative
semantics - but also between two versions of grammar* one which is syntactically based (the
6standard6 theory as developed by :homs#y, Gatz, @odor, $ostal, including interpretive
semantics) and another one which is semantically based (generative semantics).
+n the standard theory, synta is independent- it is the generative source of the
grammar, which provides a deep and a surface syntactic structure. 0he deep structure provides
all necessary information to the semantic component whose tas# is to assign semantic
interpretations (readings) to the deep structures generated by the syntactic component.
With the generative semantics models, the semantic component is the generative
source of the grammar. 0he semantic representations which initiate the derivation of sentences
are independently generated, and are then mapped onto surface (syntactic) structures by
means of transformations. (:hitoran '(<E* '?').
0hus there have been two ways heading to generative semantics*
'. the revision of the standard model particularly of the notions of deep structure, selectional
restrictions, etc.
3. a reappraisal of the semantic component, more specifically of semantic representation.
&eech ('(()) considers that a simple way of defining interpretive and generative
semantics is to say that in the one case the semantic representation of a sentence is derived
from a syntactic base, whereas in the other, the (surface) syntactic representation is derived
from a semantic base.
0he same author proposes a three-component model of language (semantics-synta-
phonology) in which epression rules would have the function of translating (or 6recoding6)
22
semantic representations as syntactic representations, or vice versa (no directional precedence
was assumed). 0hus we have two separate bases, with synta and semantics both having
independent well-formedness conditions. +n fact, various phonologists (Sampson '(<)) have
also argued for a phonological base. 8ence, &eech"s model differs from both the generative
and interpretative models in containing more than one base component (&eech '(()* ED(- E>').
!ibliography*
'. :hiLoran, ;. '(<E. Elements of English Structural Semantics5 !ucureMti* B.;.$.
3. &eech, 4. '((). Semantics" The Study of Meaning" &ondon* $enguin !oo#s.
TO(I CS )OR DI S CUS S I ON
'. What is the difference between semantic mar#ers and distinguishers? 4ive some eamples.
Ch a p t e r /I I I
NE7 SEMANTI C THEORI ES
1. Cate&ori:ation
0he process of categorization is essential because it represents 6the main way we
ma#e sense of eperience6 (4. &a#off '(?<* ,+). 0his mental operation, which consists in
putting together different things, is present in all our activities* thin#ing, perception, spea#ing
etc. :ategorization and categories are fundamental for the organization of human eperience.
Without this capacity of surpassing individual entities in order to reach a conceptual structure,
the environment would be chaotic and forever new. (B. :auzinille-Carmache, ;. ;ubois, =.
Cathieu, '(??).
Cost of the concepts or mental representations correspond to certain categories and
not to individual entities. 0herefore, it is fundamental to #now the mechanisms of
categorization, trying to give an answer to the 7uestion* What are the criteria which decide
that an entity belongs to a category? 0he ob%ectivist current gives a clear answer*
categorization is made on the basis of common characteristics. 0he eperiential realism
imposes a different view, based on prototype theory. 4. &a#off considers that the theory of
prototype changed our conception about categorization, reasoning and other human capacities
(4. &a#off '(?<* <).
Necessary an S-fficient Conitions Moe%. /ne traditional approach to
describing concepts is to define them by using sets of necessary and sufficient conditions"
0his approach comes from thin#ing about concepts as follows. +f we have a concept li#e
2<
W/C.I, it must contain the information necessary to decide when something in the world is
a woman or not. 8ow can this information be organized?
$erhaps as a set of categoristics or attributes, i.e.*
, is a woman if and only if &
where & is a list of attributes, li#e*
, is human-
, is 6adult6-
, is female, etc.
/ne can see these attributes as conditions* if something must have them to be a
woman, then they can be called necessary conditions. +n addition, if we can find the right set,
so that %ust that set is enough to define a woman, then they can be called sufficient conditions-
that means we have identified the right amount of information for the concept.
0his theory views concepts as lists of bits of #nowledge* the necessary and sufficient
conditions for something to be an eample of that concept.
0he .ristotleian model of necessary and sufficient conditions, very largely used in
philosophy, anthropology, psychology and linguistics is based on the following thesis*
'. :oncepts and categories are entities with very clear borderlines.
3. 0he model is based on truth and false system* +t is a dog provided that it fits the
criterial conditions of the category 6dog6.
E. 0he members of the same category have an e7ual status since each member has the
features re7uired by the definition of the category. So, each member is a good as any other.
/ne ma%or problem with this approach has been that it seems to assume that if
spea#ers share the same concept they will agree on the necessary and sufficient conditions* if
something has them, it is an - if not, not. !ut it has proved difficult to set these up even for
nouns which identify concrete and natural #inds li#e dog or cat" Saeed ('((<* E2) ta#es as an
eample the noun #e!ra. We might agree on some attributes* is an animal, has four legs- is
striped, is a herbivore. 0he problem we face, though is* which of these is necessary? 0he first
obviously, but the rest are more problematic. +f we find in a herd of zebra, one that is pure
white or blac#, we might still want to call it a zebra. /r if by some birth defect, a three-legged
zebra comes into the world, it would still be a zebra. Similarly, if a single zebra got bored with
a grass diet and started to include a few insects, would it cease to be a zebra? /f course, these
seem rather whimsical or strange 7uestions, perhaps problems for philosophers rather than
linguists, and indeed this zebra eample is %ust a version of Saul Grip#e"s eample about tigers
(Grip#e '(?)) or $utnam"s fantasy about cats ($utnam '(23). _uestions such as these have
2?
important conse7uences for our ideas about concepts* if we cannot establish a mutual definition
of a concept, how can we use its linguistic label?
.nother argument against necessary and sufficient conditions as the basis for
linguistic concepts is $utnam"s ('(<>) observations about ignorance. Spea#ers often use
words to refer #nowing very little, and sometimes nothing, about the identifying
characteristics of the referent. $utnam"s eamples include the tree names !eech and elmN li#e
$utnam, many Bnglish spea#ers cannot distinguish between these two trees yet use the words
regularly. Such a spea#er would presumably be understood, and be spea#ing truthfully, if he
said*
+n the '(<)s ;utch elm disease #illed a huge number of !ritish elms.
$erhaps as $utnam suggests, we rely on a belief that somewhere there are eperts who
do have such #nowledge and can tell the difference between different species of trees. +n any
case it seems, as with other natural #ind terms li#e gold or platinum, we can use the words
without #nowing very much about the referent. +t seems unli#ely then that a word is referring
to a concept composed of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or what amounts to the
same thing, a definition. 0he idea is that natural #ind terms, li#e names are originally fied by
contact with eamples of the #ind. 0hereafter, spea#ers may receive or borrow the word,
without being eposed to the real thing, or #nowing very much about its characteristics. .s
we have seen, philosophers li#e to use eamples of metals li#e gold or silver. .ny inability to
identify correctly or define the substance silver does not prevent one from using the word
sil'er. We assume that someone once had the ability or need to recognize the individual metal
and that somewhere there are eperts who can identify it empirically. $utnam spea#s about a
6division of labour6 in a speech community* between 6epert6 and 6fol#6 uses of a term. /nly
the epert or scientific uses of a word would ever be rigorous enough to support necessary
and sufficient conditions, but spea#ers happily go on using the word.
The (rototype Theory. !ecause of problems with necessary and sufficient
conditions, or definitions, several more sophisticated theories of concepts have been
proposed. /ne influential proposal is due to Bleanor Aosch and her co-wor#ers (Aosch '(<E,
'(<>, Aosch and Cevis '(<>, Aosch et al. '(<2) who have suggested the notion of
prototypes. 0his is a model of concepts which views them as structural so that there are
central or typical members of a category, such as !+A; or @1AI+01AB, but then a shading
off into less typical or peripheral members. So chair is a more central member of the category
@1AI+01AB than lamp, for eample. /r sparro3 a more typical member of the category
2(
!+A; than penguin or ostrich. 0his approach seems to have been supported by Aosch"s
eperimental evidence* spea#ers tend to agree more readily on typical members than on less
typical members- they come to mind more 7uic#ly, etc. .nother result of this approach and
similar wor# (e.g. &abov '(<E) is that the boundaries between concepts can seem to spea#ers
uncertain, or 6fuzzy6, rather than clearly defined.
4. Gleiber ('((() spea#s about two sciences of prototype theory* the standard theory
and the etended theory. 0he standard theory corresponds to the period when B. Aosch and
her team publish their wor#. .ccording to prototype theory, the category is structured on two
dimensions* the hori#ontal dimension (the internal structure) and the 'ertical dimension
(intercategorial relations).
The /ori#ontal $imension" 0he prototype is the best eemplar, the central instance of
a category. 0his new conception is based on the following principles (Gleiber '((<* >').
=" 0he category has an internal prototypical structure.
E" 0he borderlines of the categories or concepts are not very clearly delimited, they
are vague.
F" Iot all the members of a category present common characteristics- they are
grouped together on the basis of the family resem!lance"
G" .n entity is a member of a certain category if it presents similarities with the
prototype.
So, this approach allows for borderline uncertainty* an item in the world might bear
some resemblance to two different prototypes. 8ere we might give eamples of spea#ers
being able to use the word 3hale, yet being unsure about whether a whale is a mammal or a
fish. +n the prototype theory of concepts, this might be eplained by the fact that whales are
not typical of the category C.CC.&, being far from the central prototype. .t the same time,
whales resemble prototypical fish in some characteristic features* they live underwater in the
oceans, have fins, etc.
0here are a number of interpretations of these typicality effects in the psychology
literature* some researchers for eample have argued that the central prototype is an
abstraction. 0his abstraction might be a set of characteristic features to which we compare real
items. 0hese characteristic features of !+A; might describe a #ind of average bird, small,
perhaps, with wings, feathers, the ability to fly, etc. but of no particular species. /ther
researchers have proposed that we organize our categories by e.emp%ars, memories of actual
typical birds, say sparrows, pigeons and haw#s, and we compute the li#elihood of something
we meet being a bird on the basis of comparison with these memories of real birds.
<)
0here is another approach to typicality effects within linguistics, which is interesting
because of the light it sheds on the relationship between linguistic #nowledge and
encyclopedic #nowledge. Gleiber called this approach the etended version of the prototype
theory. :harles @illmore ('(?3) and 4. &a#off ('(?<) both ma#e similar claims that spea#ers
have fol# theories about the world, based on their eperience and rooted in their culture.
0hese theories are called frames by @illmore and iea%i:e co&niti0e moe%s (+:C;) by
&a#off. 0hey are not scientific theories or logically consistent definitions, but collections of
cultural views. @illmore gives an eample of how these fol# theories might wor# by using the
word !achelor. +t is clear that that some bachelors are more prototypical than others, with the
$ope, for eample, being far from prototypical. @illmore and &a#off ('(?<) suggests that
there is a division of our #nowledge about the word !achelorN part is a ictionary-type
definition (6an unmarried man6) and part is an encyc%opaeia-type entry of cultural
#nowledge about bachelorhood and marriage - the frame or +:C. 0he first we can call
linguistic or semantic #nowledge and the second real world or general #nowledge. 0heir point
is we only apply the word !ache%or within a typical marriage +:C* a monogamous union
between eligible people, typically involving romantic love, etc. +t is this idealized model, a
form of general #nowledge, which governs our use of the word !achelor and restrains us from
applying it to celibate priests, or people living in isolation li#e 0arzan living among apes in
the %ungle. +n this view, when using a word involves combining semantic #nowledge and
encyclopaedia #nowledge, and this interaction may result in typicality effects.
4. &eech ('(()) considers that one of the flaws of the prototype semantics is that it
reduces the role of conceptual semantics, in eplaining word meaning, to the minimum of
matching a word to a category. !ut the nominal view appears to be too restricted, because it
can only be easily applied to common nouns (rather than to ad%ectives, verbs, etc.).
+n addition to the category - recognizing ability, human beings also have a different
order of cognitive ability - something which is much more closely tied to language - which is
the ability to recognize structural relations between categories. (4. &eech '(()* ?>).
.lthough the prototype theory was considered a veritable revolution, it is not a
miraculous solution for all semantic problems and it cannot surpass all the difficulties which
remain unsolved in the classical model of necessary and sufficient conditions. !ut, the theory
brings three new elements of a great importance for leical semantics.
(i) 0his theory allows us to integrate in the meaning of a word, characteristics
ecluded by the classical model, being considered unnecessary, encyclopaedic features-
(ii) +t proves the eistence of an internal organization of the category.
<'
(iii) +t also eplains the hierarchical conceptual structure and intercategorial relations.
We also have to ta#e into account that this theory is a theory of categorization, first
intended for psychological goals.
The &ertical $imension" Relations !et3een Concepts" 0he relational nature of
conceptual #nowledge is an important issue in semantics. Words are in a networ# of semantic
lin#s with other words and it is reasonable to assume that conceptual structures are similarly
lin#ed.
Codels of conceptual hierarchies are fundamental in the cognitive psychology
literature. . model based on defining attributes was proposed by :ollins and _uillian ('(2().
+n this model, concepts are represented by nodes in a networ#, to which attributes can be
attached and between which there are lin#s.
$roponents of prototype theory, (Aosch et al. '(<2) have also investigated conceptual
hierarchies and have proposed that such hierarchies contain three levels of generality* a
superordinate level, a !asic le'el, and a su!ordinate le'el. 0he idea is that the levels differ in
their balance between informativeness and usefulness. +f we ta#e one of Aosch et al."s ('(<2)
eamples, that of furniture, the superordinate level is @1AI+01AB, which has relatively few
characteristic features- the basic level would include concepts li#e :8.+A, which has more
features, and the subordinate level would include concepts li#e .AC:8.+A,
;+I+I4:8.+A, etc., which have still more features and are thus more specific again. 0he
basic level is identified as cognitively important- it is the level that is most used in everyday
life- it is ac7uired first by children- in eperiments it is at which adults spontaneously name
ob%ects- such ob%ects are recognized more 7uic#ly in tests, and so on.
0his model has proved to be very robust in the psychological literature, though the
simple picture we have presented here needs some modifications. +t seems that the
relationship between the classic level and the intermediate term might vary somewhat from
domain to domain* man-made categories li#e @1AI+01AB differ somewhat from natural
#ind terms, and the relationship may vary depending on the person"s eperience of the
categories. So a person"s epert #nowledge of a domain might influence the relationship
between the basic and subordinate levels. 0anc#a and 0aylor ('((') suggest that eperts on
dogs and birds might have a different, richer structure at subordinate levels for these
categories from the average person.
2. Co&niti0e Semantics
0oward the end of the 3)
th
century, there is both a dissatisfaction with eisting formal
semantic theories and a wish to preserve insights from other semantic traditions. :ognitive
<3
semantics, the latest of the ma%or trends which have dominated the last decades, attempts to
do this by focusing on meaning as a cognitive phenomenon.
.s is often the case with labels for theories, the term cogniti'e semantics might be
ob%ected to as being rather uninformative* in this instance because in many semantic
approaches it is assumed that language is a mental faculty and that linguistic abilities are
supported by special forms of #nowledge. 8ence, for many linguists semantics is necessarily
a part of the in7uiry into cognition. 8owever, writers in the general approach called cogniti'e
linguistics, and other scholars who are broadly in sympathy with them, share a particular view
of linguistic #nowledge. 0his view is that there is no separation of linguistic #nowledge from
general thin#ing or cognition. :ontrary to the influential views of the philosopher =erry @odor
or of Ioam :homs#y, these scholars see linguistic behaviour as another part of the general
cognitive abilities which allow learning, reasoning, etc. So perhaps we can ta#e the label
cogniti'e linguistics as representing the slogan 6linguistic #nowledge is part of general
cognition6. (Saeed '((<* 3(().
:ognitive linguists often point to a division between forma% and f-nctiona%
approaches to language. @ormal approaches, such as generati'e grammar are often associated
with a certain view of language and cognition* that #nowledge of linguistic structures and
rules forms an antonomous module (faculty), independent of other mental processes of
attention, memory and reasoning. 0his eternal view of an independent linguistic module is
often combined with a view of internal modularity* that different levels of linguistic analysis,
such as phonology, synta and semantics, form independent modules.
@unctionalism, with which cognitive linguists identify themselves, implies a 7uite
different view of language* that eternally, principles of language use embody more general
cognitive principles- and internally, that eplanation must cross boundaries between levels
and analysis. 0hus, it ma#es sense to loo# for principles shared across a range of cognitive
domains. Similarly, it is argued that no ade7uate account of grammatical rules is possible
without ta#ing the meaning of elements into account.
0his general difference of approach underlies specific positions ta#en by cognitive
linguists on a number of issues* in each case their approach see#s to brea# down the
abstractions and specializations characteristic of formalism. Studies in cognitive semantics
have tented to blur, if not ignore, the commonly made distinctions between linguistic
#nowledge and encyclopaedic, real world #nowledge and between literal and figurative
language. :ognitive linguists consider that synta can never be antonomous from semantics
or pragmatics. So, the eplanation of grammmatical patterns cannot be given in terms of
<E
abstract syntactic principles but only in terms of the spea#er"s intended meaning in particular
contets of language use.
. further distinction that is reassessed in this framewor# is the traditional structuralist
division between, to use @erdinand de Saussure"s terms, iachronic (or historical) linguistics
and synchronic linguistics. +n his foundational lectures, de Saussure, attempting to free
linguistics from etymological eplanation, proposed his famous abstraction* a synchronic
linguistics, where considerations of historical change might be ignored, as if in describing a
language we could factor out or 6freeze6 time. 0his consideration has been accepted in many
linguistic theories, but is currently 7uestioned in functional approaches. &inguistic structures,
in a functionalist perspective, have envolved through long periods of use and the processes of
change are evident in and relevant to an understanding of the current use of language.
+f we turn to meaning, a defining characteristic of cognitive semantics is the re%ection
of what is termed o!"ecti0ist semantics. 4. &a#off ('(??) assigns to ob%ectivism the basic
metaphysical belief that categories eist in ob%ective reality, together with their properties and
relations, independently of consciousness. .ssociated with this in the view that the symbols of
language are meaningful because they are associated with these ob%ective categories. 0his
gives rise to a particular approach to semantics, /b%ectivist Semantics, which &a#off
characterizes under three 6doctrines6 (adapted from &a#off '(??* '3>-2)*
a. 0he doctrine of truth-conditional meaning* Ceaning is based on reference and
truth.
b. 0he 6correspondence theory6 of truth* 0ruth consists in the correspondence
between symbols and states of affairs in the world.
c. 0he doctrine of ob%ective reference* 0here is an 6ob%ectively correct6 way to
associate symbols with things in the world.
+n re%ecting these views, cognitive semanticists place themselves in opposition to the
formal semantics approach. @or these writers, linguistic truth and falsity must be relative to
the way an observer construes a situation, based on his or her conceptual framewor#. 0he real
focus of investigation should, in this view, be these conceptual framewor#s and how language
use reflects them.
+n the cognitive semantics literature meaning is based on conventionalized conceptual
structures. 0hus semantic structure, along with other cognitive domains, reflects the mental
categories which people have formed from their eperience of growing up and acting in the
world. . number of conceptual structures and processes are identified in this literature but
special attention is often given to metaphor.
<D
:ognitive linguists agree with the proposal by 4. &a#off and =ohnson ('(?)) that
metaphor is an essential element in our categorization of the world and our thin#ing
processes. Cetaphor is seen as related to other fundamental structures such as ima&e
schemas, which provide a #ind of basic conceptual framewor# derived from perception and
bodily eperience, and @auconnier"s notion of menta% spaces, which are mental structures
which spea#ers set up to manipulate reference to entities. :ognitive linguists also investigate
the conceptual processes which reveal the importance of the spea#er"s construal of a scene.
. conse7uence of this view of language is that the study of semantics and linguistics
must be an interdisciplinary activity. /ne result is that scholars wor#ing within this and
related framewor#s tend to stray across intra- and inter-disciplinary boundaries more easily
than most. 0he approach to metaphor has been applied not only to the study of grammar and
semantics, but also to historical linguistics, categories of thought, poetic language, rhetoric
and ethics amongst other areas.
$i!%io&raphy'
'. Gleiber, 4. '((). (a smantique du prototype. $aris. $resses 1niversitaires de @rance.
3. &eech, 4. '((). Semantics. 0he Study of Ceaning. &ondon. $enguin !oo#s.
E. Saeed, =. '((<. Semantics. !lac#well $ublishers.
TO(ICS )OR DISCUSSION
'. What is a prototype? 4ive eamples.
3. What are conceptual hierarchies? $rovide eamples.
E. State the main principles of :ognitive Semantics.
<>
)INA* TESTS AND 6UESTIONS

=" ;efine semantics and its ob%ect.
E" 0he relation between semantics and semiotics.
F" $hysei P thesei controversy.
G" :omment on the drawbac#s of referential theory of meaning.
?" .pply the description theory of naming to the following proper names- for each name
find two different descriptive sentences Uarl Mar,5 Ve3 Sork5 9ane .usten"
T" 4ive eamples of situations in which the causal theory of naming functions. :an the
descriptive and the causal theories of naming be combined?
@" .bsolute motivation.
W" Aelative motivation.
>" @ind the archileeme and the archisememe for the net series of words*
3allet5 !ag5 case5 purse5 suitcase5 knapsack "
=X" $oint out the advantages and drawbac#s of componential analysis.
==" ;efine the notion of semantic field and state the main elements of the semantic field
theory.
=E" &inguistic Aelativism versus Semantic 1niversals.
'E. 0wo or more words may be close in meaning and yet not collocate with the same
items. Which is correct*
The !a!y !egan to cry1 started to cry as soon as they had left"
couldn4t !egin 1 start my carI the !attery 3as flat"
7efore the 3orld started5 only )od e,isted"
'D. Words have distinct syntactic behaviour. .nalyse the differences*
The plane lea'es1 departs from )at3ick5 not /eathro3"
%e left the house at T"
%e Qdeparted the house at T"
'>. Car# the following words with positiveSXT, negativeS-T or neutral SnT connotation. +f
possible, try to establish relations of synonymy or antonymy between pairs of them
frugal5 famous5 e,tra'agant5 !oast5 generous5 miserly5 notorious5 careful5 !rag5
resolute5 strict5 ad'ertise5 o!stinate5 se'ere5 praise"
'2. What is the criterion that differenciates the following words belonging to the two
series*
a. partner5 colleague5 ally5 accomplice5 comradeI
b. pal5 mate5 associate5 companion5 !uddy5 friend"
<2
'<. :orrect the sentences if necessary*
There 3as a high difference !et3een the t3o teams"
am doing this e,am !ecause 3ant to achie'e a step in my career"
/is !ooks commanded criticism from many people"
/e had !een found guilty of some slight crimes"
She 3on many competitions5 forming fame in the process"
3as 'ery grateful5 !ecause he had rescued my life"
'?. What are the opposites of single5 3hite5 light5 hea'y" $rovide contets.
'(. +dentify the different types of oppositions*
The more the haste5 the less the speed"
Marry in haste and repent in leisure"
f you lie upon roses 3hen young5 you4ll lie upon thorns 3hen old"
7etter to gi'e than to take"
Spare 3hen you are young and spend 3hen you are old"
6aults are thick 3hen lo'e is thin"
. saint a!road and a de'il at home"
Pride goes !efore and shame follo3s after"
.n idle youth5 a needy age"
This 3orld is a comedy to those that think and a tragedy to those that feel"
. good !eginning makes a good ending"
0nselfish parents ha'e selfish children"
Promise little !ut do much"
. pair of lo'ers are like sunset and sunriseI there are such things e'ery day5 !ut 3e
'ery seldom see them"
3). What are the elements of the semantic component of 4enerative- 0ransformational
4rammar?
3'. 0he organization of a generative grammar.
33. 4enerative Semantics versus +nterpretive Semantics.
3E. Bplain the importance of the process of categorization.
3D. ;iscuss the main theses of the two opposite models* the model of necessary and
sufficient conditions and the prototype theory.
3>. 0he vertical dimension of categories. 4ive eamples.
32. ;iscuss the main theses of :ognitive Semantics.
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