MONCUPA v ENRILE

G.R. No. L-63345

GUTIERREZ, JR; Jan 30, 1986
FACTS:
- Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22,
1982, 10:50 P.M., at Quezon Avenue, QC. He was detained at MIG15 Camp Bago Bantay. Next day, Apr 23, on the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and 8 other
persons.
- After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that Moncupa
was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal possession
of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under PD
33.
- Two separate informations were filed against Moncupa, one for
illegal possession of firearms before CFI Rizal, and the other for
violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of QC. Against the other
accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as
amended.
- Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised AntiSubversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, his
arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. As his
motions for bail were denied by the lower court, Moncupa filed this
petition for habeas corpus.
- Respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of
Moncupas detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had
been suspended as to Moncupa.
- However, on Aug 30, 1983, respondents filed a motion to dismiss
stating that on May 11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the
approval of the President, and that since the petitioner is free and no
longer under the custody of the respondents, the petition may be
deemed moot and academic...
- It should be noted that attached to Moncupa's temporary release
are restrictions imposed on him:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
Moncupa gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside
Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case he wants to change his place of
residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should
not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign
mass media representatives nor give any press release or
information that is inimical to the interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.
- Moncupa argues that although admittedly his temporary release is
an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed
by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on
his freedom, and his temporary release "merely shifted the inquiry

from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the

conditions imposed by the respondents."
ISSUE:
WON the petition has become moot and academic in view of
Moncupa's temporary release.
HELD:
NO
Ratio A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become
arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may
still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
- Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell, but the
restraints attached to his temporary release preclude freedom of
action. The reservations of the military in the form of restrictions
constitute restraints on his liberty, and limit his freedom of movement.
It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of
habeas corpus. The latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus,
as held in Villavicencio v Lukban, has, in law, remained undiminished
up to the present.
- Villavicencio v. Lukban: A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient....
- Caunca v. Salazar: (case involving employment agencies restricting
freedom of movement of prospective employees/maids) Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the
actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of
justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
deprived or physical coercion.
- Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.: Ordinarily, a petition for
habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on
the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or
permanently. The question to be resolved is whether the State can
reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative
answer (on the ground that) the release being merely
'temporary', it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite
their acquittal is repugnant to the government of laws and not of
men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted
on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for
the same offense.

Disposition Petition granted. The conditions attached to the

temporary release of Moncupa are declared null and void. The
temporary release is declared absolute.

CHAVEZ V CA
24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Habeas Corpus as remedy in cases of violation of the right against
self-incrimination.
FACTS:
Roger Chavez, Actor Ricardo Sumilang, Edgardo Ging Pascual,
Pedro Rebullo, Luis Baby Asistio and Lorenzo Meneses and three
John Does were accused of car napping a Thunderbird car form
Johnson Lee.
The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy and acquitted all of the
accused except for Roger Chavez. He was found guilty of qualified
theft. His guilt was proven basing heavily on his testimony when he
was called as witness in the proceedings in the trial court by the
prosecution on the first day of trial for which he stated that he will not
testify.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal and the related MR.
Chavez now comes to the Supreme Court alleging that he was
forced to testify against himself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of the writ habeas corpus is available.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that clearly Chavez protested against
being asked to be presented as witness. The Court also ruled that
there was no waiver of his right against self-incrimination.
On the issue of the propriety of the writ the Court stated:
The course which the petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a
high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional
remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such
as when the accused's constitutional rights are discarded. Such
defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused
whose fundamental right is violated. The void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. The writ may issues even if another
remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant.
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final.
Roger Chavez is ordered released.

GUMABON V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

37 SCRA 420 (1971)
The SC ruled that the 5 petitioners who continued to languish in jail
could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of their
continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez.
FACTS: 1. Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio
Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer
the same penalty in decisions rendered. The last petitioner, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other offenses and penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of them has served more than 13 years.
2. The other accused, however, appealed their conviction, resulting in
a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the effect that there can be no
complex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these
common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a result, while those
who appealed were now free, those who did not remained in jail.
3. Petitioners now premise their stand on the denial of equal
protection if their plea would not be granted. They also invoke the
codal provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines, necessarily resulting in the conclusion that
the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive
effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code Art. 22
as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their
application a final sentence has been rendered and the convict is
serving the same.
ISSUE:
Is the writ of habeas corpus available under the circumstances?

3. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the

court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction
and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of
the detention.
4. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection. In the case at bar, the
petitioners were convicted for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. Contrary to the
mandate of equal protection, people similarly situated were not
similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment
both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
5. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when
such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed,
is fraught with implications at war with equal protection.
Teehankee, concurring and dissenting:
The rule of prospective and non-retroactive operation of judicial
doctrines, and its corollary rule of the law of the case, have no
application here. Here, the whole question turns simply on the nature
of the crime of rebellion as defined in section 134 of the Revised
Penal Code and the maximum penalty imposable therefor under
section 135 of the same Code. The case at bar presents a clear case
of an excess in penalty imposed beyond twelve years of prision
mayor which has become illegal by virtue of this Court's settled
doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other
common crimes. On this ground, a crime that the law at the time of
their conviction as well as now punishes only with prision mayor
which they have more than fully served, would be to deny them their
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law.

ABADIA V CA
September 23, 1994; KAPUNAN, J.

HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
1. The write of habeas corpus is the writ of liberty, "the most
important human rights provision" in the fundamental law, and one of
the principal safeguards to personal liberty. In Villavicencio v. Lukban,
the remedy challenged the validity of the order of the then
respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without
legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150
inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. In the opinion of Justice
Malcolm: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. ANY restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is SUFFICIENT.
2. Range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding: No writ if person
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
magistrate.

FACTS
- Respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested in
connection with the December 1989 coup attempt.
- He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio,
Makati where he was detained for nine months without charges.
- A charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of
the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and
97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman, respectively.
- A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent
with the Court of Appeals on March 7, 1991 which was, however,
dismissed by the said court's Fourth Division on the ground that pretrial investigation for the charges against the respondent was already
ongoing before a Pre-Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the Judge
Advocate General's Office (JAGO).
- Three months after these charges were filed, the Pre-Trial
Investigative Panel came out with a Resolution finding no evidence of

direct participation by the private respondent in the December 1989

coup.
- Said panel nonetheless recommended that respondent be charged
with violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy
and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) and the 96th
Article of War in relation to the 94th Article of War.
- Consequently, all existing charges against respondent were
dismissed and a new charge for violation of Article of War No. 96 for
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman for having
allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military
officers for the purpose of overthrowing the government, carrying
with it the penalty of dismissal from service was filed with the General
Court Martial (GCM) No. 8.
- Additionally, the Judge Advocate General's Office endorsed the
filing of charges for violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code
to the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. The City Prosecutor
eventually came out with a resolution dismissing the charges.
- Upon private respondent's arraignment (and before entering his
plea) in General Court Martial No. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of
War, private respondent entered a special motion to dismiss the case
on grounds of prescription under AW 38. The private respondent
contended that the offense was supposed to have been committed
between August to November, 1989, more than two years before his
arraignment on April 22, 1992.
- Favorably resolving the motion to dismiss for being "substantial . . .
meritorious and legally tenable," the General Court Martial dropped
the last remaining charge against private respondent.
- The Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted a report to the Chief
of Staff quoting the Resolution of GCM No. 8 for "info/notation".
- Respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the
Court of Appeals where he assailed his continued detention at the
ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all charges against
him. He contended that his continued confinement under the
circumstances amounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty" correctable
only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus."
- The 12th Division of the Court of Appeals ordered petitioners Lt.
General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile, Commanding General of
the Philippine Army "(t)o produce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q.
Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued
detention.
- 12th Division of CA promulgated the questioned decision issuing a
writ of habeas corpus and commanding herein petitioners to release
the private respondent.
- Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE
WON the Resolution of the 12th Division of CA contravenes a
previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special 4th Division of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed respondent's petition for habeas
corpus.
HELD

- NO. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are

different.
- First, at the time of the first petition, the private respondent was
being held in the detention center for eleven months without charges
being filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet
been constituted. Because of his confinement without charges, a
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed in his
behalf on the basis of respondent's averment that his arrest and
continued detention without charges violated his constitutional rights.
- The Fourth Division found adequate support upholding military
jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles
of War. It also noted that the case against the private respondent was
ongoing and that it would be difficult to order respondent's release on
a writ of habeas corpus without giving military authorities reasonable
time within which to investigate and try the case. The Court
nonetheless urged the Chief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case
"with all deliberate speed, consistent with his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of his case."
- Second, by the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was
before the court's Twelfth Division (herein respondent court), the
JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against
the petitioner and endorsed the filing of charges (under Article 136 of
the Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
The latter subsequently dismissed the case.
- Moreover at the time the Twelfth Division rendered its assailed
decision, respondent was already languishing in a military detention
center for three years, half of those spent in the limbo between the
GCM's decision dismissing the cases filed against him and the
uncertainty of when the military appellate process would finally come
around in either exonerating him or overturning the GCM's findings.
This in spite of the fact that even during the first petition before the
Fourth Division, the court had already urged speedy disposition of
the case.
- Finally, in dismissing the cases against the private respondent, the
General Court Martial had made a determination that the charges
against respondent had prescribed under Article 38 of the Articles of
War. Conformably with this conclusion and with this Court's ruling in
Domingo vs Minister of National Defense, the lower court was
correct in stating that the respondent could no longer be tried b the
General Court Martial if a period of two years had elapsed prior to the
arraignment of the accused.
- Clearly, the circumstances, noted above, had changed so radically
in the intervening period that the appellate court's Twelfth Division
had no choice, given the incredible delay in forwarding the
documents to the military appellate authority, but to issue the writ.
- The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto."
- Petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules
relating to review of cases dismissed by military tribunals in violating
the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his
continued confinement. Court uphold the proposition that courts

should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the law itself provides

no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general
court martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean that
we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit in petitioners'
argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available
not to all of the people but only to most of them.
Disposition Petition is hereby DENIED.

ORDOEZ V. VINARAO
[In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Oscar De Guzman]
239 SCRA 114; J. Romero; Dec 8, 1994
NATURE:
Original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before SC
FACTS:
-Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez was tried and convicted by RTC San
Jose City Br. 39 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman willfully and unlawfully
sold two (2) sticks of marijuana. He was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs.
This decision was affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court.
-Several years after his conviction, SC in People v. Simon (July 29,
1994), interpreted Sec.20 of RA6425 as last amended by RA7659
[effective Dec 31, 1993] to mean that if the quantity of the marijuana
involved is less than 250grams, imposable penalty shall be w/in
range of prision correccional (6mos and 1day to 6yrs).
-De Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more
than 10yrs now. Petitioners allege that his continued detention in the
National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that,
therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In
aid of judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all
prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison.
ISSUE:
WON de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law.
HELD: YES.
-The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a
verified petition setting forth: (see Rule 102.3)
1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;
2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or
restrained;
3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and
4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.
Disposition Petition is granted. Writ of habeas corpus issued.
Director of New Bilibid Prisons commanded to forthwith execute the
writ for de Guzman's discharge from confinement unless he is being
detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ,
and to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein

similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further

confinement.

GORDULA V ENRILE
125 SCRA 152
ABAD SANTOS; October 24, 1983
NATURE
Petition for habeas corpus
FACTS
- The petition for alleges that Yolanda Gordula was arrested without
warrant by elements of the Metrocom Intelligence Service Group
[MISG] under the command of respondent Abadilla. petitioners
exerted efforts to locate her. Among other steps, they visited the
Constabulary Security Group [CSG], the PC-INP Stockade, PC 12,
MISG, M-2, Special Operations Group [SOG], and the Metrocom
Investigation Unit [MIU]. They said they did not detain Yolanda.
Petitioners also made inquiries with the Ministry of National Defense,
the Office for Detainee Affairs and the Civilian Relations Division. Her
detainment was neither confirmed nor denied.
- On April 19, 1983, petitioner Leticia H. Gordula went to M-2
[intelligence Unit], Camp Crame, Quezon City. There she was
allowed to see M-2's log book. On page 41 of said log book was
written: #1831 18-13-15/83 MISG SCR
- Petitioner Leticia was told that the above numbers refer to her sister
YOLANDA. She was further told that YOLANDA was had been
brought to MISG sometime in the evening of April 18, 1983, and that
YOLANDA was now detained at MISG.
- A writ of habeas corpus was issued and asked respondents to file a
return. Respondents, in their return asked for the dismissal of
petition, averring that Yolanda is not in the custody of the military and
that the logbook entry referred to by the petitioners does not relate to
the detention of Yolanda but rather to the letter-communication of
petitioners dated April 11, 1983, requesting the Honorable Minister of
National Defense to locate the whereabouts of Yolanda.
ISSUE/S
1. WON petition should be dismissed
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning Considering that the respondents have persistently
denied having Yolanda H. Gordula in their custody and absent
convincing proof to rebut their denial, the Court is constrained to
dismiss the petition.
The writer has received a letter from Mrs. Lolita Gordula who lives in
Virginia Beach, Virginia, U.S.A. Mrs. Gordula, who is Yolanda's
mother, asks that the case be decided.
This is the response to the request. Mrs. Gordula, I commiserate with
you but this is the best that can be done under the circumstances

Disposition Petition is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of

another as may be warranted by new factual circumstances

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

GR 132601
Puno; 19 January 1999
FACTS:
For resolution are public respondents Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4,
1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the
submission of public respondents that: the Supreme Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar after the judgment attained finality
and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
This came because of:
a. the public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto
any law repealing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against
the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only
bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
ISSUES
1. Whether the court loses all its powers over the case upon
attainment of finality of its own judgment?
2. Whether the issuance of the TRO by the SC suspending the
execution of petitioner encroaches upon executive prerogatives?
HELD:
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution7 [Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.] vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be estabished by law. To be
sure, the most important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal,
is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events
may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It
is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts
have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of
its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice.8 [Section 5(f), Rule 135.] For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule
135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears
repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution
of its own Decision to give it reasonble time to check its fairness in
light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The

Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the

effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
The Court through the 1987 Constitution for the first time was given
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for
the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In
fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so
with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control
the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and
which it has exercised since time immemorial.
2..No Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution is only the source of power
of the President to grant reprieves commutations and pardons and it
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after finality. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral
rights and the same can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an
exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effect is the same -- the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend R. A No.
7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect
of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But
by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by Congress of its
plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

MARTINEZ V MARTINEZ
BADILLO V FERRER
152 SCRA 407
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1987
FACTS
-Macario Badillo died intestate on Feb 4, 1966, survived by his
widow, Clarita Ferrer, and 5 minor children: Alberto 16, Nenita 14,
Hilly 12, Cristy 9, and Maria Salome 5. He left a 77sqm land in
Lumban, Laguna with a house erected thereon, valued at P7,500
(PROPERTY). Hence, each minor plaintiff inherited a 1/12 share or
P625 each.
-Jan 18, 1967: Ferrer, in her own behalf and as natural guardian of
minor plaintiffs, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale of
the PROPERTY through which the PROPERTY was sold to

defendant-appellants. Register of Deeds recorded such and issued

new TCT.
-Nov 11, 1968: Modesta Badillo, Macarios sister, was able to obtain
guardianship over minors and their property, without personal notice
to their mother, who was alleged could not be located inspite of the
efforts exerted.
-July 23, 1970: Modesta, as guardian, filed for annulment of the sale
of minors share, conceding the validity of the sale of widows share,
and asked that as co-owners, they be allowed to exercise the right of
legal redemption. TC completely ruled in favor of minor-plaintiffs,
herein appellees.
ISSUES
1. WON appellees can still exercise legal redemption
2. WON sale was valid and binding upon appellees
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within 30 days from notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not
be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible
redemptioners. (Art. 1623, CC)
The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than P2,000, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. (Art. 320,
CC)
When the property of the child under parental authority is worth
P2,000 or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of
court appointment, shall be his guardian. When the property of the
child is worth more than P2,000, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the petition
required by section 2 hereof. For good reasons the court may,
however, appoint another suitable person. (Rule 93.7)
Reasoning Using these provisions and relying on Villasor v Medel
(an analogous case; minor plaintiff received property together with
cousins by donation from grandmother), SC concluded:
After Macarios demise, Ferrer automatically became the minors
legal guardian, their property being less than P2,000 each. As
such, she acquired the plenary powers of a judicial guardian
except that power to alienate or encumber her childrens
property without judicial authorization.
When Ferrer signed and received on Jan 18, 1967, her copy of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale, such document
served as the required written notice in Art. 1623 and she
received it also on behalf of her children. The period of
redemption commenced then.
Right after Modestas appointment as guardian (Nov. 11, 1968), she
tried to redeem the widows portion of the PROPERTY but the period
for legal redemption has clearly expired.
2. NO.

Reasoning Appellants contend that the sale is voidable. If it is

annulled, restitution of things received by both parties is proper. But
they concede that the minors can only be required to restore partially
to the extent of benefits to them.
SC said that voidable contracts arise from vice of consent. In this
case, however, appellee minors were not even parties. Their names
were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed to
represent them. This contract is unenforceable having been
executed by one who has acted beyond her powers. Ferrer was
only granted the power of administration, not disposition.
The appellee minors never ratified the sale. In fact, they
question its validity. Hence, the contract remains unenforceable.
No restitution may be ordered from them because the law does
not sanction any.
In sum, appellants can retain the 7/12 of the PROPERTY but must
return the 5/12, representing appellee minors share.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby
modified accordingly and appellants are directed to deliver
possession of above appellees share (5/12), with no pronouncement
as to costs.

GUERRERO VS TERAN
13 Phil 212
JOHNSON; March 19, 1909
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI
FACTS
- Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela and
Maria del Carmen Sanchez Munoz, filed an action against Leopoldo
Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 on the theory that Teran had
been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez Munoz from
1901-1906.
- Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that the
latter owed him P482.14.
- CFI found that Teran, as administrator of said estate, owed
Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46.
ISSUE
WON Leopoldo Teran is liable.
HELD
NO.
Reasoning Teran was the duly appointed and recognized
representative of the minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen in
the administration of their interests in the estate of Antonio Sanchez
Munoz from Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902.
- Teran was appointed as administrator of said estate on Sept.17,
1901. He entered into a bond of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful
performance of his duties as such representative.

- On March 18, 1902, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y

Gomez as guardian for said minors and she gave the required bond
for the faithful performance of her duties as such guardian.
- While there are some indications that Teran continued to act as the
administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria Munoz y
Gomez, up to Oct. 6, 1906, yet the fact exists that said Maria Munoz
was the actual representative of the minors from and after March 18,
1902 until Oct.6, 1906, and therefore she, must be held responsible
for the property belonging to said minors during the period.
- Maria Munoz, for the reason that she was not a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her apppointment, was removed as
guardian by the CFI. Felix Samson was then appointed as guardian.
The mere fact that she was removed as guardian did not relieve her,
nor her bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she
was duly acting as said guardian. If during the time that she was the
guardian she allowed other persons to handle the property of her
wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her. Therefore, if any loss occurred to
the minors between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906, they have a
right of action only against said Maria Munoz y Gomez as their legal
guardian and under the law the administratrix of the property of their
estate.
- Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting
as the legal representative of the said minors in the management of
their estate, from Sept.17, 1901 up to the time that he was
superseded by Maria Munoz y Gomez, on March 18, 1902. There is
no proof showing that any of the losses claimed by Guerrero
occurred within this period. Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount
of P188.39, the amount he admitted he owed the plaintiff.
- On appointment of administrators or guardians:
Maria Munoz was removed on the theory that her appointment was
void because she was not a resident of the Philippines. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only
as administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact
that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of
deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty
in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and
guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. The
courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.
Dispositive Reversed.

YANGCO v CFI MANILA

29 Phil 183
MORELAND; January 6, 1915
FACTS
- Luis Yangco was 21 years of age, the owner of property valued at
nearly P1M, a resident of the Philippines and temporarily traveling
abroad at the time the proceedings were had which terminated in the

declaration that he was a spendthrift and the appointment of a

guardian of his property.
- The proceedings were begun by Teodoro R. Yangco, as a relative
and friend. No notice was given to the petitioner personally, the only
notice of any kind in the proceedings was required by the CFI to be
sent to Julia Stanton de Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, the motherin- law and brother-in-law, respectively, of Luis, the latter being the
acting manager of the business of Luis.
ISSUE
WON the CFI decree is void
HELD
YES. The decree declaring the petitioner a spendthrift and appointing
a guardian for his property was and is void for lack of jurisdiction. In
proceedings of this case notice as required by the statute is
jurisdictional and the lack of it deprives the court of power to make a
valid decree in the premises. Sec 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure
requires personal notice to the alleged spendthrift when he is a
resident of the Philippine Islands. It provides that notice is to be
given to the supposed insane or incompetent person of the time and
place of hearing the petition, not less than five days before the time
so appointed; and such person, if able to attend, must be produced
on the hearing.
- The statute does not authorize a substitute service except in cases
where, as in Sec 572, the person for whose property the guardian is
sought to the appointed is a resident of a foreign country. Personal
notice being essential under the statute, the notice to the mother-inlaw and brother-in-law of the alleged spendthrift was of no legal
value.
- To declare a person of full age to be imcompetent to manage his
affairs and thereby deprive him of the possession of and right to hold
and manage his property is a serious thing. It takes from him one of
the greatest privileges of life in contravention of those fundamental
rights which all men naturally have to possess, control, manage and
enjoy their own property. It is for this reason that the courts generally
hold that the statute permitting a declaration incompetency and the
appointment of guardians for the property of incompetents must be
strictly followed, and any material departure therefrom, especially
with respect to notice, results in a loss of jurisdiction. So careful was
the Legislature to see to it that no one should be declared an
incompetent and deprived of his property without full opportunity to
be heard that, in framing Sec 559, it not only required personal
notice to the alleged incompetent but also provided that he shall be
present in court during the proceedings, if he be able to attend; and
the ability to attend does not, in our judgment, relate to absence but
to physical condition.
-It has been urged that sec 572 permits the practice adopted in this
case. It provides: "When a person liable to be put under
guardianship, according to the provisions of this chapter, resides
without the Philippine Islands, and has estate therein, any friend of
such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or
otherwise, may apply to the judge of Court of First Instance in any
province in which there is any estate of such absent person, for the

appointment of a guardian, and if, after notice given to all interested,

in such manner as such court orders, by publication or otherwise,
and a full hearing and examination, it appears proper, a guardian for
such absent person may be appointed....
- The word "resides" as used has, as a matter of language, a
meaning perfectly clear and definite and requires no interpretation or
construction to give it full significance. That the petitioner in this case
did not reside "without the Philippine Islands" is unchallenged by the
facts in this case. He resided here and his absence was for travel
and not for residence.
- Even if sec 572 is applicable, still the notice required by the section
has not been given. No notice whatever was given to the alleged
incompetent, either by publication or otherwise, and he certainly is
one of the parties "interested."
- Although no personal notice was given to the alleged spendthrift,
the only notice given at all being solely to his mother-in-law and
brother-in-law, the court, nevertheless, made a decree declaring him
a spendthrift and appointing a guardian of his property without taking
any evidence and with absolutely nothing before it to justify such a
decree except the petition and the answer thereto of Julia Stanton de
Regidor and Cristobal Regidor, which says that according to our
information and belief the facts stated in said petition are true, and
we do not oppose the petition made by the said Teodoro R. Yangco.
- No evidence of any kind was taken in the case so far as appears of
record, and the court, in making the order of prodigality and
decreeing the appointment of a guardian, had no more knowledge of
the alleged spendthrift's incompetency to manage his affairs that he
had before the petition was presented.
- Sec 560 provides that the court shall appoint a guardian of his
person and estate only "after a full hearing and examination upon
such petition" and where "it appears to the court or Judge" from such
full hearing and examination "that the person in question is incapable
of taking care of himself and managing his property."
- It is not a full hearing and examination to have A allege that B is an
incompetent and to have C come in and admit the allegation. The
court, before it can make the decree as provided for in the law, must
have before it competent evidence demonstrating the facts
necessary to sustain the decree, and that evidence must be clear
and definite. The law is not satisfied unless the court has before it
facts which will justify the decree. In proper cases, of course, the
admissions made by way of answer or otherwise by the party alleged
to be a spendthrift may be taken into consideration by the court in the
determination of the question involved and, under certain
circumstances, will doubtless be sufficient to sustain a decree of
incompetency; but even such admissions should be received with
caution, for in cases of this character the foundation of the petition is,
in a way, the incompetency of the person against whom the petition
is directed and the court should accept his admissions with
considerable hesitation. If there is doubt the court should, in spite of
his admissions, proceed with the hearing of the case and require the
production of evidence substantiate the allegation of incompetency.
Except by his own consent, it is legally impossible to declare a and
incompetent and deprive him of his property without clear and

positive evidence upon which the declaration and the deprivation are
based.
Dispositive Proceedings to declare the petitioner an incompetent
and all orders, judgments, and decrees made and entered in said
proceedings are null and void.

SANTOS V. LOPEZ
1 SCRA 1332
PAREDES; Apr 29, 1961
FACTS
- Doa Justina is 93. Afflicted w/ infirmities, bed-ridden, blind and all
alone.
- Faustino asserts Wong Heng is exploiting Justina and appropriated
use, enjoyment, ownership of her properties by fraud.
- Faustino presented petition for appointment of guardian over
person & prop of Justina.
- Judge Lopez authorized Faustino to bring doctors. The doctors
recommended transfer of Justina to hospital.
- Justina was confined.
- Dec 1, 1951. Justina expressed desire to go back home.
- Dec 11. Lopez decreed continuous confinement.
- Dec 21. Lopez appointed Gochangco as special guardian over
person of Justina.
- Faustino presented alleged affidavit of Justina that she desires to
stay in hospital and she doesnt want a guardian except Faustino.
- Lopez insisted in carrying out her order, saying there are 57
contending parties claiming to be relatives, that Justina has no will,
that other relatives charge Faustino w/ selfish motives. She says it
was w/in power of court, in guardianship proceedings, to appoint
special / temporary guardian.
- Faustino went to SC.
- Dec 24. Lopez appointed Gochangco as regular guardian.
Faustino appealed to the CA, which certified the case (appointment
as regular guardian) to the SC and is now pending.
ISSUE
WON court has authority to appoint Gochangco as special guardian
HELD
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED. Because of appointment of Gochangco as
regular guardian, present petition is MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

SINGCO V LONGA
MARGATE V RABACAL
ENRIQUEZ ET v A. S. WATSON & CO.
141 SCRA 436
Trent; March 30, 1912
FACTS

The eight plaintiffs (Rafael, Antonio, Trinidad, Cayetano, Rosario,

Gertrudis, and Carmen Enriquez, and Antonio Gascon ) each have a
one-eighth undivided interest in 3 properties in Escolta, City of
Manila. The properties were leased to the defendant for a period of
twelve years with permission to renew the lease for a further period
of six years. Seven of these plaintiffs were of age when they
executed this contract of lease. The other, Antonio Gascon, was a
minor. At the time this contract of lease was executed, the minor was
represented by his judicial guardian. The guardian having obtained
authority or permission of the court to enter into this contract of lease
for and on behalf of his ward, the action of the guardian in executing
said contract was approved by the probate court.
Plaintiffs filed an action against defendant for the rescission and
declaration of nullity of the contract of lease. The RTC ruled in favor
of defendants.
Other Facts
Defendant commenced destruction of a wall of a building in the
leased premises, writ of preliminary injunction prayed for.
Philippines Drug Company intervened. It alleged that it is the actual
owner of the pharmacy situated in the leased premises, which
formerly belonged to the defendant.
ISSUE
WON the contract of lease is voidable because of the minority of one
of the lessors
HELD
NO
Article 1548 of the Civil Code reads:
The husband can not give in lease the property of the wife, the father
and guardian, that of the son or minor, and the administrator of
property, not having a special power, for a period exceeding six
years.
Article 398 of the same code provides:
The decision of a majority of the coowners as to the management
and better enjoyment of the thing owned in common shall be
obligatory.
There shall be no majority, unless the resolution has been adopted
by the coowners representing a majority of the interests which
constitute the object of the community.
Should there be no majority, or the resolution of the latter is seriously
prejudicial to the parties interested in the thing owned in common,
the judge, at the instance of a party, shall decree what may be
proper, including the appointment of an administrator.
- Counsel for the plaintiffs do not claim that the contract of lease
which was made for a period of more than six years is seriously
prejudicial to the interests of the minor, nor do they claim that said
contract, of itself, prejudices in any way the minor's interest.
- In the execution of the contract of lease under consideration, the
minor was represented by his judicial guardian, who not only asked
the court for and obtained authority to execute this contract of lease
on behalf of his ward, but his act, after the execution, was approved
by the court. The interest of the minor has not been prejudiced by
reason of the fact that this contract of lease was executed for a term

of more than six years. Under the doctrine laid down by the supreme
court of Spain, it would appear that this contract of lease would not
be valid if the minor had not been represented by his guardian. The
minor having been represented by his duly appointed guardian, there
can be no question about the validity of this contract of lease.

LICHAUCO V TAN PHO

LIM CHU LAN v. LIM CHU KUN
G.R. No. 31316
STREET; December 28, 1929
NATURE
Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila removing the appellant, Lim
Chu Kun, from the position of guardian of the minor, Lim Chu Lan
and appointing in his stead one Chin Chong Gui, husband of Lim
Chu Lan.
FACTS
- Lim Chu Lan is now over 20 years of age and the wife of Chin
Chong Gui.
- A motion was filed by Lim Chu Lan where it is stated that the estate
of the minor is in the hands of Lim Chu Kun, a brother of Lim Chu
Lan, in the character of guardian.
- The value of the estate of the petitioner ending with the year 1927
was in the amount of P333,496.04 and that the annual average
income of the petitioner's property has been more than P15,000.
- Lim Chu Lan contracted marriage with Chin Chong Gui and since
that date, the guardian, Lim Chu Kun, has supplied no maintenance
to the Lim Chu Lan. She therefore asks that her guardian be required
to supply maintenance in the amount of P500 per month and that he
be substituted in the guardianship by the petitioner's husband, Chin
Chong Gui.
ISSUE
WON there is sufficient ground to remove Lim Chu Kun as the
guardian of Lim Chu Lan.
HELD
YES. The order appealed from was a proper exercise of the
discretion vested in the Court of First Instance in such matters, since
it is clear that in the language of section 574 of the Code of Civil
Procedure the appellant had shown himself to be unsuitable for the
position of guardian of the petitioner.
- The fact of marriage alone introduces a change in the conditions of
guardianship over a minor woman, and although the marriage of a
girl who is under guardianship does not ipso facto abolish the
guardianship over the property, it does terminate the guardianship
over the person.
- Moreover, the existence of a guardianship over the estate of a
married woman in other hands than those of the husband is in certain
respects undesirable, since the husband is legally entitled to the
management of conjugal property, and the earnings of the

paraphernal property of the wife constitute community property.

Therefore, if the husband is found to be a suitable person, he is the
proper individual to fill the office. In the case before us it is not shown
that the husband is unfit for the office to which he was appointed by
the trial court.
- The sum of P500 per month is not improper for a person having the
standing of the petitioner in the community, in view of the size of the
capital of her estate and its earning capacity.
Disposition The order appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF

CARMEN PADILLA VDA. DE BENGSON V
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
3 SCRA 751
JBL REYES; December 28, 1961
FACTS
- 1957 - Carmen Padilla Vda. de Bengson, mother of a veteran who
died in World War II, became entitled to certain accrued insurance
benefits worth P10,738 and a monthly death compensation for the
rest of her life extended by the United States Veterans
Administration. CFI La Union found Carmen to be an incompetent
and appointed PNB as guardian of her estate comprising the monies
due from the Veterans Administration.
-1960 Carmen alleged she had regained her competence and filed
a petition for terminating the guardianship and delivery of the
residuary estate. Attached was a medical certificate attesting that she
was mentally competent and possessed full knowledge of her
environmental surroundings. This was opposed by Veterans
Administration that by reason of her advanced age (78), physical and
mental debility, she was still an incompetent within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court.
- Francisco Bengson, the son of the ward, filed a "Manifestation" to
the effect that he was the personal guardian of the incompetent; that
if appointed guardian of her estate instead of PNB, he will comply
with all the provisions of the Rules of Court, will not ask any
remuneration for his services, and will file a nominal bond.
- CFI - ordered Francisco Bengson to be appointed guardian of the
ward's estate to substitute PNB upon filing a P1,000 bond with proper
sureties. The required bond was filed and letters of guardianship
issued to Francisco Bengson.
- MFR - denied but raised the bond to P13,000, based on a finding
that the cash balance of the estate then amounted to P11,464.34
plus the monthly income estimated at P134, or P1,608 per annum.
Hence, this joint appeal by the Philippine National Bank and the
Veterans Administration.
ISSUE
WON PNB should be removed as guardian of Carmen
HELD
NO

Ratio Since the Rules enumerate the grounds for removal of a

guardian, a guardian cannot be legally removed from office except
for the causes therein mentioned (Alemany vs. Moreno).
Accordingly, conflict of interest (Ribaya vs. Ribaya) has been held
sufficient ground for removal, premised on the logic that antagonistic
interests would render a guardian unsuitable for the trust. To the
extent that a court uses its discretion in appraising whether a person
is unsuitable or incapable of discharging his trust, that much it can be
said that removal is discretionary. But the discretion must be
exercised within the law, and when the latter has laid down the
grounds for removal of a guardian, discretion is limited to inquiring as
to the existence of any of those grounds.
Reasoning
- The grounds for which a guardian may be removed are found in
Section 2, Rule 98 of the Rules.
"When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of
discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or
mismanaged the estate, or failed for thirty days after it is due to
render an account or make a return, the court may, upon
reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him
to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be
lawfully entitled thereto . . ."
- No pretense is made in this case, and nothing in the record would
indicate, that there was any legal ground upon which the removal of
PNB as guardian was founded.
- Neither in Francisco Bengson's manifestation nor in the orders of
the lower court is it made to appear that PNB had become incapable
of discharging its trust or was unsuitable therefor, or that it had
committed anything which the Rules includes as grounds for
removal. On the contrary, it appears incontestable that all throughout,
PNB has discharged its trust satisfactorily.
- That it has received commissions allowed by law for its services is
no ground to remove it, especially since the Bank's commission
averages no more than P100.00 a year and is offset by interest on
the ward's deposit and the sum that the son would probably have to
disburse in bond premiums.
- Neither is it sufficient to base removal on the unsubstantiated
opinion that it would be more beneficial to the interests of the ward
and more convenient for the administration of the estate.
- A guardian should not be removed except for the most cogent
reason; otherwise, the removal is unwarranted and illegal.
Disposition Orders are reversed

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF INCHAUSTI
IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA
C. BOBILES
205 SCRA 356
REGALADO; January 24, 1992

FACTS
1. NO.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to
adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living
with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional
Trial Court of Legaspi City,
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the
petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. The order was duly
published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor
General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador
Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the
court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of the
court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody
appeared to oppose the petition.
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved
at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together
with that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz
Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
were taken and admitted in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment granting the
petition for adoption. CA affirmed. Hence, this recourse.
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C.
Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was
Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the
spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its
decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect
on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by
husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition
for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by
private respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article
185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses.
It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the
petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested
right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for
adoption.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Family Code requirement of joint adoption by
the H and W should be applied retroactively.
2. Whether or not, on the assumption that the non-inclusion of the H
as co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, only the W would be
deemed to be the sole adopter.
HELD

RATIO
From a procedural standpoint, we start with the premise that Article
185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are
ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that
they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as
to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat
procedural steps completed before their enactment.
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise,
and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to
pending proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their
enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they
affect only procedural steps taken after their enactment.
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act
excludes them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be
used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at
the time the question of procedure arises.
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect
of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent
rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply
with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long
as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time
it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it
fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings
or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
REASONING
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the noninclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional
defect, hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It
could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since
petitioner must be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. We further
apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time on
appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's
misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification

that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested

or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.The term
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason
and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action,
or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened free
society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations created after the right has vested. Under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition
for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When
Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was
already vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No.
1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance
with the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law,
the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
2. NO
RATIO
The H, Dioscoro, submitted an affidavit of consent which he affirmed
in Court when he testified on the same.
Under the circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that
an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed to make him a party
to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit.
Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of
substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural
rules on the form of pleadings.
REASONING
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law
should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It
is a settled rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as
matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption
institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption. The modern

tendency of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a
substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the
validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a
narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its
intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where
every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to
bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that
every slight defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason
may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before,
but rather to approach the case with the inclination to uphold such
acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the
statute. 20 The technical rules of pleading should not be stringently
applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important
that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its
parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it
should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally
held that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies
with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the
court jurisdiction.
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made
is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and,
to bring those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to
accomplish that end. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in
the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised
in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the
natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the
absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion
by the approving official will not be disturbed.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the
decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His
adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. The
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the petition for adoption
and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living
with the adopting parents since infancy. 27 Further, the said petition
was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the
petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As
found and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and
circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the
foregoing doctrine, We are of the opinion and so hold that the decree
of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards
promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life."

REPUBLIC V TOLDENO
REPUBLIC V MILLER
LAZATIN v CAMPOS
GR No. L-43955-56
TEEHANKEE; July 30, 1979
FACTS:
- Jan 13, 1974, Dr. Mariano Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City,
survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters, respondents Nora and Irma. Margarita commenced an
intestate proceeding before CFI. Several persons intervened,
claiming to be admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano.
- April 11, 1974, Margarita also died, leaving a holographic will.
During her lifetime, Margarita kept a safety deposit box at the
People's Bank and Trust Company, which either she or Nora could
open. Five days after Margarita's death, Nora opened the box and
removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers
and those of her sister Irma; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to
her mother. Nora claims that she opened the box in good faith,
believing that it was held jointly by her and her mother. Her sole
reason for opening it was to get her stock certificates and other small
items. When she was to close it, the bank personnel informed her
that she needed court authority, in view of her mother's death and so,
she removed everything.
- June 3, 1974, private respondents filed a petition to probate the will
of Margarita. Ramon, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato
Sta. Clara, filed a motion claiming that Margarita had executed a
subsequent will and demanding its production. He also prayed for the
opening of the safety deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the
box but there was no will or any document resembling a will therein.
- Upon order of the probate court, the deposit box was opened on
Nov 6, 1974, at which time it was found to be empty, because Nora
had already removed its contents.
- Nov 22, 1974, seven months after Margaritas death, petitioner
Renato intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the
estate of Mariano as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child. On
the same date, petitioner's son, Ramon, filed a petition in the estate
proceedings of Margarita to examine private respondents on the
contents of the safety deposit box. Probate court ordered Nora to
deliver the properties taken from the box to the Clerk of Court.
- The two cases were then transferred to the sala of Judge Campos,
Jr., who issued an order requiring Nora to produce all those papers
and items removed from the safety deposit box within one week.
Nora deposited with the Clerk of Court, not the items themselves, but
two keys to a new safety deposit box which could only be opened
upon order of the court. (She was later held in contempt.)
- Aug 20, 1975, Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of
Margarita as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed
by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of Mariano, which stated that Renato
was an "illegitimate son" of Mariano and was later adopted by him.

This affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner was adopted
by both Mariano and his wife Margarita.
- Lower court allowed Renato to intervene as adopted son in the
estate of Margarita. But Renato presented no decree of adoption in
his favor. Instead he attempted to prove that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them
until their death; formerly he was known as "Renato Lazatin" but was
compelled to change his surname to "Sta. Clara" when the deceased
spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife;
that at first, he and his wife stayed at the residence of Engracio de
Asis, father of Margarita, but a few months later, they transferred to
the Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue, Manila, owned by the deceased
spouses, where they continuously resided up to the present.
Photographs were also intended to be presented, e.g., photo of Irma
where she addressed herself as his sister; photo of him and
Margarita when he was a boy; document showing that his real name
is "Renato Lazatin."
- Lower court barred the introduction of Renatos evidence as they
do not prove or have no tendency to prove the existence of any
judicial proceeding where the adoption was taken up by any court.
Neither do the evidence tend to establish the presence of any record
of a proceeding in court where the adoption was held. The
evidence, however, tends to prove a status of a recognized natural
child which, however, is not the legal basis for which Renato and
Ramon seek to intervene.
- Renato then filed in both cases a motion to declare as established
the fact of adoption in view of Nora's refusal to comply with the
orders of the court to deposit the items she had removed from the
safety deposit box of Margarita, invoking Rule 29.3 ROC. Court
denied motion.
- April 26, 1976, Nora deposited with the court the items she had
removed from the safety deposit box. An inventory was conducted,
and the items surrendered consisted only of pieces of jewelry and
stock certificates.
- The lower court, ruling on Renatos motion for definite resolution on
his previous motion to declare as established the fact of adoption,
issued an order stating that he has failed to establish such status.
ISSUE:
WON Renato has established his status as adopted child of the
deceased spouses.
HELD:
NO
- Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 is
valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and
entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements
must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute
nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively proved by the person claiming its existence. The
absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a

presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the

statute, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such
court constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be
established.
- Renato's proofs do not show or tend to show that at one time or
another a specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an
adoption proceeding initiated by the late spouses an order approving
his adoption as a child of the latter. No judicial records of such
adoption or copies thereof are presented or attempted to be
presented. He merely claims that he was judicially adopted between
the years 1928 and 1932. He did not show which court decreed such
adoption, and he cited no witnesses to such proceeding. The
certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that pre-war records
were destroyed or burned does not furnish any legal basis for a
presumption of adoption in his favor. This is because there was no
proof that he was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition
was filed in CFI Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after
hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court.
Moreover, if there was really such adoption, he could have
conveniently secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the
adoption as required under Rule 99.4 or a certification of the
publishing house to that effect. The one who gave the written consent
to the adoption (Rule 99.3), whether the parents or orphanage, also
does not appear.
- The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court cannot
be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a person,
not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such
adoption. Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his
lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had
adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased,
as a member of his family, from infancy until he attained his majority,
is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact
that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and
referred to Renato as an adopted child necessarily establish
adoption. Withal, the attempts of Renato to prove his adoption by
acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the
mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust
of his evidence is rather to establish his status as an admitted
illegitimate child.
- Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records
of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of
proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents; although this
order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The
sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court
under all the circumstances of the particular case. Here, Renato
failed to establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its
subsequent loss or destruction.
- Renato is also mistaken in claiming Rule 29 should be applied to
consider as established the fact of his adoption due to the refusal of
Nora to produce the document of adoption, because first, the fact or
real existence of his adoption had not been established; second,

there is no proof that such document of adoption is in the possession

of Nora; third, the motu proprio order of the court for Nora to produce
the items retrieved from the safety deposit box cannot be treated as
a mode of discovery of production and inspection of documents
under Rule 27; and fourth, the items deposited in the box have
already been surrendered by Nora and no document of adoption in
his favor was listed as found in the box.
- As a necessary consequence, Renato cannot properly intervene in
the settlement of the estate of Margarita as an adopted child because
of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in an estate proceeding,
it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either as one
who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the
parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict
accord with the statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by
the child and neither the supposed adopting parent or adopted child
could be bound thereby. The burden of proof in establishing adoption
is upon the person claiming such relationship. He must prove
compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction
where the adoption occurred. A fortiori if no hereditary interest in the
estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof
thereof, whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be
denied as it would merely result in unnecessary complication. To
succeed, a child must be ligitimate, legitimated, adopted,
acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural child by legal fiction
or recognized spurious child.
Disposition Petition dismissed.

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