Stephanie Riady

What is the problem of universals? Trace the development of this problem from Porphyry through
Boethius and Abelard (i) explaining the distinct definitions of a universal proposed by Boethius and
Abelard, (ii) presenting and explaining at least one argument set forth by Boethius and one set forth by
Abelard against realism, and (iii) explaining and evaluating the distinct solutions proposed by Boethius
and Abelard.

(i) the distinct definitions of a universal proposed by Boethius
and Abelard


Boethius (MODERATE REALISM - TAKES A PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH):


1. Definition of a universal: A universal is something common to or shared by several
things.
Criteria:
a. UNITY: As a whole (not part by part as a pie is shared by all who take a slice)
b. DIVERSITY: Simultaneously in several things (not in succession)
(18) 2 features of a genus; criteria: For it is supposed to be common in such a
way that both the whole of it is in all its singulars, and at one time, and also it is
able to constitute and form the substance of what it is common to."


Abelard (NOMINALISM - TAKES A LINGUISTIC ORIENTATION):

A nominalist in the Aristotelian sense but a realist in the Boethian sense.

1. Definition of a universal: A universal word (vocabulum) is one that on the basis of its
invention is apt to be predicated of several things one by one.
Invention: We impose these categories on particular things.
Aristotle's definition: What is naturally apt to be predicated of several.
Abelard's exposition:
"what":
i.Simplicity of the expression (sermo), distinguishing it from complex
phrases..
ii.Unity of signification (distinguishing it from equivocal terms)
To be predicated of several
i.Conjoinability to something truly by means of the expressive force of a
present-tense substantive verse.
Conjoined!!!!
ii.Conjoinability with respect to predication, i.e. conjoinability which:
Is syntactically (grammatically) correct
Pertains to the nature of things
Indicates the truth of their status
iii.Names (nomina) which:
Are in the nominative case only
Include nouns, verbs, infinite names
Of several:
i.Names diverse things (different res subjectas)

(ii) presenting and explaining at least one argument set
forth by Boethius and one set forth by Abelard against
realism

Boethius
Boethius: Genera and species cannot exist (11-19) because it fails to SIMULTANEOUSLY have
the two criteria of UNITY and DIVERSITY/MULTIPLICITY (which is what it means to be a
universal).
a. If genus/species exist, they are either:
1. Multiple, but not one (because there would be one in every singular, thus
amounting to many) (13).
a. If it is multiple, it can't be one.
(12) Then a genus cannot be one... For everything (meaning every
individual) that exists exists for the reason that it is one (12).
Thus, if genus existed in reality, in every individual, there would be
multiple genuses, not just one.
b. If it is multiple, it infinitely regresses (called the problem of the "third
genus").
(13) But even if genus and species do exist, but are multiple and not one in
number, there will be no last genus. - Thus, it falls into the absurdity of an
infinite regression where we don't come down to one genus (thus going
against the whole point of a genus).
2. Or one, but not multiple.
(14) For one thing, if it is common, is either:
(15) Common by parts. In that case the whole is not common. Instead its
parts belong to single things."
(17) It is common at one time to all, yet not so that it constitutes the
substance of what it is common to. (like Plato??)
ABELARD
1. Universals are only ascribed to words; universals signify things by naming them.
(63) Now that we have shown the reasons why things taken neither singly nor
collectively can be called "universals" insofar as they are predicated of several, it
remains to ascribe this kind of universality only to words.
Universals signify that which pertains to each of the individuals. (remember: invent
words, and impose on the words)
As opposed to signifying something that arises from each of the individuals.
(86) For they in a way "signify" diverse things by naming them, not by
establishing an understanding that arises from them but one that pertains to
each of them.
They signify that which pertains through common cause or status.
What is the common cause?
There can be no agreement in a thing's form, essence or matter.
Rather, common cause is an agreement in mode of being.
E.g. example of men: All of them are different in form/essence, but
they agree in the mode of being a man.
Not an agreement in thing but being.
How does a universal signify a common cause/status?
By imposition.


(iii) explaining and evaluating the distinct solutions
proposed by Boethius and Abelard.


BOETHIUS:
a. Thus, a universal is an incorporeal which the mind abstracts from
corporeals/incorporeals.
(28) Therefore, genera and species and the rest are found either in incorporeal things
or else in what are corporeal. If the mind finds them in incorporeal things, it at once
has an incorporeal understanding of the genus. But if it observes genera/species of
corporeal things it removes the nature of those incorporeals from the bodies, and
looks upon it alone and pure, as it is a form in itself."
Against idealists, not every incorporeal is false: For example, a line does not
exist in itself as a body, but only by having being in corporeals. Yet the idea of
the line in the understanding, extracted from the body, is valid.
(30) things like this exist in corporeals and sensibles, but they are
understood apart from sensibles, so that their nature can be gazed on and
their distinguishing peculiarity comprehended.
b. Universals subsist/exist in singulars.
(31) And so these things exist in singulars, but are thought of as universals. Species is
to be regarded as nothing else than the thought gathered from the substantial likeness
of individuals that are unlike in number. Genus is the thought gathered from the
likeness of species.
This likeness becomes sensible when it exists in singulars, and becomes intelligible
when it is in universals When it is sensible it stays in singulars, but when it is
understood it becomes universals. They subsist therefore in the realm of sensibles,
but are understood apart from bodies.
ABELARD:
Universals are not "things." They are real in a manner similar to that in which form
exists in matter - one can abstract form from matter, but form is never actually given
without matter. Similarly, universals can be abstracted from individuals - and one
must do so in order to think - but they are never given apart from concrete particular
things.





Q5
Aquinas holds that there is some single ultimate end for the sake of which all the human actions of
all persons are done. How does he defend this claim? Do you find it plausible? Why or why not?


CLAIM:
o All human action is done for the sake of an end.
Human action: Actions done qua human, i.e. through rational capacities.
"Deliberate willing" - volitional
o The end is the "last in execution" because it's the last thing we achieve; and "first in
intention."
o The ultimate end of human action is eudaimonia, which is God.

DEFENSE (Why question: how he argues for it - progressing from most simple to complex)
Each human action is for the sake of some end
Without ends, there would not be any act (no reason for choosing something over
another). From Q1A2
Acts themselves can't will; must be commanded by some will (A1). This gives species to
actions (a3).
Each human action is for the sake of an ultimate end
Distinguishes intention and execution (article 4).
Why there must be an ultimate end in intention: If there wasn't, nothing would be
desired.
What is an entry?
How we're motivated..
The hierarchy/structure of our subordinate and superordinate ends
(how our ends are ordered in themselves to one another), which
ultimately ends with a strong ultimate end completely fulfilling a
human being's rational desires.
An entry cannot be infinite; there must be some ultimate end.
Required to get the will going to desire anything at all.

An infinite regression is nonsensical.
Only one ultimate end in each person (There is some single ultimate end for the sake of
which all the human actions of an individual being are done)
Three reasons: (article 5)
1. (Each person wants fulfillment.) Each thing desires its own fulfillment and
therefore desires for its ultimate end a good that perfects and completes it. This
entirely satisfies a person's desire that there is nothing left for him to desire. (not
an ultimate end if sth additional is required).
2. (Having one end of our desire is natural (rational) because nature tends to only
one thing.) Just as we know (without justification; prolegomena) the functioning
of reason, the functioning of rational desires (the will) is also natural.
Further, this must be one because nature only tends to one thing.
(The genus of ends is one because the species are acts with their ends added to
them- all these ends must meet in one, and this is the genus. So the genus proves
that there is one ultimate end.) Since voluntary actions receive their species from
their end (because the end adds form to the matter that is the act), their genus
must be assigned from an ultimate end common to them all (thus must have one
ultimate end). (Explanation: the genus encapsulates the ends that are each of the
species. Thus, the genus is the ultimate end that includes all the species.)
Objections:
To say every human being has an end isn't the same as saying some end is in every
human being. (the latter implies that the end all humans share is the same end- i.e.,
eating cake.) He shifts, saying that every human being has eudaimonia as the ultimate
end, but people argue that his proofs only support that each person has an ultimate
end- Ruth wants money and Meredith wants cake and Stephen wants power. (see
immediately below)
The elicit quantifier shift (a fallacy):
To say every human being has and end isn't the same as saying some end is
in every human being.
The shift from B to C is accused for having this fallacy.

Response: This is not meant to be an empirical generalization about human behavior, but an
implication of the concept of rational human agency.
When we ask what a rational action is, we come to the conclusion that rational
human agency requires that our actions are done for the sake of some strong
ultimate end. And that it's rational to assume that the ultimate end that people
want is happiness.
Insert class notes on apprehended good
(part of what it means for an action to be ultimately rational)

Objection 2:
C' not true even of fully rational human agents, because each person may have two or
more ends (article 5; 1st objection) - Pleasure, tranquility, gifts of nature, v
Answer: The weak ultimate ends might together construct a stronger ultimate end
(aggregate)
Not a monolithic conception of a strong ultimate end (that it just consists in one
thing) but an aggregate conception.
Allows only one strong ultimate end
But non-reductive (each individual can have a weak ultimate end and a
strong ultimate end.
Response:
4 different ways ends are related to an ultimate end (not mutually exclusive):
Instrumental subordination (something not desirable in itself, but it serves a purpose),
e.g. flu shot
Subordinate as a weak ultimate end (also desired for itself, but also contributes to
strong ultimate end), e.g. sports - desirable in itself, but also for health.
Subordination as constituent parts - the strong ultimate end as an aggregate, having
constituent parts. E.g. running is constituent of a triathlon (involving running, biking, and
swimming).
(Subordination as specifications - Waidler didn't explain this in class)

Objection 3: Is this necessarily true? What about someone who has to choose between two
careers/desires? (having to abandon one for another)
Albert Schweitzer example in choosing ministry over music.