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Through-out the summer, Abbas Momeni and I, Amber Mackintosh, have explored
mathematical applications to other realms of academia. In particular, we have refined our
research to mathematics in political science. This was based out of the second edition of the
book, Mathematics and Politics by Alan D. Taylor, Department of Mathematics at Union
College in Schenectady, NY, USA, and Allison M. Pacelli, Department of Mathematics at
Williams College in Williamstown, MA, USA.
Today, I will be presenting to you some of our more interesting findings. First, I would
like to begin my talk with applying mathematics to formal political science. By formal, I mean
what mostly everyone initially thinks of when the word politics is stated; that being voting,
election, and politicians. Specifically, I offer you quantitative calculations found for political
power of voting blocs that Taylor and Pacelli provide in chapter nine of their book. Let us study
the theorem providing the method for these calculation through an example.
Consider the U.S. Senate in the U.S. Federal System, which contains 100 voters, as a yes-
no voting system a system of voting in which voters simply has a choice of voting Yes or
No, and has a set of rules that specifies which collection of Yes votes allows passage of an
issue. Each of the voters in the Senate has one vote and with a quota of 51 Yes votes needed
for passage (ignoring the vice president, since they are a tie-breaker vote for the Senate). Then,
suppose that 12 senators from the 6 New England States decide to vote together as a bloc.
We illustrate this as so [ ], where the 12 is followed by (88) eighty-eight
1s representing the senators not in the bloc. Notice that there are 89 positions for the 12 person
bloc to be placed in the ordering of 1s. Thus there are 89 possible orderings, making the 12 vote
bloc pivotal only if it is pivotal for all ordering. By pivotal, we mean that if we were to not
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consider the bloc in a sequence 1s, the sequence of 1s would not have enough votes to give
passage of the issue. Therefore, to calculate the political power of this bloc, we must determine
how many of the 89 orderings the bloc is pivotal. Turns out that the sequence of 1s with length
39 to 50 is when the bloc is pivotal; note there are 12 numbers in this sequence.
Consequently we can calculate the political power of this bloc as so:

.
Thus, this bloc holds 13.5 % of the power in this voting system. Properly, the theorem is
as follows:
Theorem: Suppose we have n players (players meaning the number of voters) and that a
single bloc of size b forms. Consider the resulting weighted voting body (weights
meaning the quantitative influence that each vote holds):
[ ]
^ n b of these
Assume b 1 q 1 n b. Then the Shapley-Shubik index of the bloc is given by:
()

Shapley-Shubik Index is a method of calculating political power or political influence of
individuals that Taylor and Pacelli introduced earlier in their book. It is stated as follows:
()

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Through this we can see why the number of orderings that the New England bloc was
pivotal was important to our calculations. The proof for this theorem is simply a generalization
of the explanations provided in the example above. I refer you to Taylor and Pacellis book on
page 287.
To continue, I would like to shift this presentation to exploring historical international
conflicts through game-theory models. My main focus will be on the Arms Race 2x2 ordinal
game. The Arms Race was a period of conflict between the 1960s and 1980s where the United
States and Soviet Union were battling for nuclear superiority through military armament.
Nuclear capacity to destroy each other was high at this time.
The 2x2 ordinal game is shown here,

We are able rank the possible outcomes for the U.S. and Soviet choosing a strategy to either arm
or disarm. Each outcome is ranked from 1-4 for each party involved, with 4 being the best
possible outcome for them, and 1 being the worst possible outcome for them. Thus in this
circumstance, the outcome for each country are as follows:
4: Opponent disarm thus military superiority.
3: Mutual disarmament.
2: Arms race.
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1: Self disarmament thus military inferiority.

For an example, the outcome for U.S to arm and Soviet Union disarm is ranked the best possible
outcome for the U.S. and the worst possible outcome for the Soviet Union. So written as an
ordered pair, in the proper spot we have (4,1).
Please note that this ordinal game is extremely over simplified; it ignoring factors such as
political and economic influence of military industry.
This model for this event actually resembles a hypothetical game model called Prisoners
Dilemma. Since we are use game-theoretic models, based on this hypothetical game model, we
can determine that the Nash Equilibrium in the Arms Race is the outcome of (2, 2) or to mutual
engage in the Arms Race. Taylor and Pacelli define a Nash Equilibrium to be an outcome where
neither participants would gain by unilaterally changing their strategy. Though the most
dominant strategy in the Arms Race for both participants is to mutually disarm, the outcome is
then (3,3). This leads to a paradox called Prisoners Paradox that occurs in all Prisoners
Dilemma models. That being, the most stable outcome, (2, 2) is strictly worse than the outcome
resulting from the most dominant strategy. For the sake of time, I refer you to Taylor and
Pacellis book chapter four section four, for the proofs of my previous claims.
This particular game-theory model leads into the concept of deterrence. The Arms Race
formed a mutual deterrence called MAD or Mutual Assure Destruction. In the 1960s-1980s, the
U.S. and the Soviet Union both had the nuclear capacity to destroy the other by making first
strike. Thus, technically each was at complete mercy of the other. Though, their ability to destroy
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each other did not include the capacity to destroy each others ability to retaliate. It is that ability
to retaliate that was intended to deter each side from initiating a first strike.
Since we have shifted our talk from the act of building up military, to deterrence of
strikes, the game-theory model of Prisoners Dilemma fails to reflect the concept of deterrence.
Instead, we must consider the probability for an outcome to occur, or its expected value
calculation to display deterrence in the Arms Race. This model is properly called a probabilistic
model of deterrence, and is more suited for real-world conflicts.
For this model to be applied to the Arms Race, it would require large assumptions on
the likelihood that either the United States or the Soviet Union would retaliate to an initial strike.
Since neither Abbas nor I have the educational background to make these types of assumptions;
we have chosen to present this model to you as a generalization as Taylor and Pacelli do in their
book.
In this model we have two players (Row and Column), and two strategies (C not
strike/not retaliate or N strike/retaliate). The outcomes are labelled with cardinal utility for
each player, with the least preferred outcome as 0 and most preferred outcome as 1. Moreover,
we use rs for Rows utilities 0, r
2
, r
3
, 1, and cs for Columns utilities 0, c
2
, c
3
, 1. Note that
these utilities are fractional. Shown here, this game-theory model is played as so:


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- Row goes first and chooses either C or N
- If row chooses C, then so does column and the outcome is (r
3,
c
3
).
- If Row chooses N, then Column does that following:
a) With probability p, Column chooses C and the outcome is (1, c
2
). Since
Column is choosing not to retaliate they receive the next to worst outcome of
c
2
units, while allowing row to get their maximum utility of 1.
b) With probability 1-p, Column retaliates by choosing N as well, yielding (0, 0)
outcome.
It could be asked what may dictate Rows initial strategy choice. It comes down to rows
expected value in terms of utility which can be calculated as follows:
- If Row chooses C, then the utility for Row is r
3
.
- If Row chooses N, then the expected value of utility for Row is p. As seen here, this is
calculated by the following:
(Probability Column chooses C) x (Utility to Row of this choice) + (Probability
Column chooses N) x (Utility to Row of this choice) =
(p) x (1) + (1-p) x (0) = p + 0 = p
Hence, the rational action dictates that Row should
- Choose C if r
3
> p and capitalize on the high utility of the CC outcome
- Choose N if p > r
3
and capitalize on the high probability that Column will not
retaliate.
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As you can see applying this model to the Arms Race is next to impossible without some
background in history. Though, it is plain to see that this model would be able to fully represent
the deterrence that occurred during the Arms Race.
Lastly, I would like to talk about the concept of escalation a behavior that is driven at
least in part by the desire to keep previous investments from being wasted. Taylor and Pacelli in
their book felt that escalation in the context of historical events such as the buildup of American
troops in Vietnam and the Arms Race was best demonstrated in a model called the dollar
auction. My main concern with this topic is to present the concept of escalation through a
theorem called ONeills Theorem which relates to the dollar auction.
In a dollar auction there are two people bidding, with one designated to bid first. There is
a given unit of money which is fixed. Let s denote the number of units in the stakes or what the
bidders are bidding for, and b denote the bankroll or the same fixed amount of units of money
each bidder has to bid with. When bidding is concluded, guaranteed by the bankroll, the highest
bidder pays their bid and receives the stakes, while the second-highest bidder pays their bid and
receives nothing. Ultimately resembling escalation for it is worse to bid and lose than never to
bid in this auction. Furthermore, we assume that both bidders bid conservatively; meaning if
either bidder determines that 2 or more bids lead to the same outcome for themselves with no
better option, then they will choose to the smaller bid or a pass (zero bid).
Using ONeills Theorem, we can calculate the optimal opening bid in any particular
dollar auctions. The theorem is as follows:
Theorem: For s > 1, equal b > 0, and conservative bidding, the optimal opening bid in the
dollar auction can be calculated as so:
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One repeatedly subtracts (s - 1) from b until one more subtraction would yield zero or a
negative number. The result of the last subtraction is the optimal opening bid. Rationality
implies that if player 1 opens with this bid, the player 2 will pass.
To prove this theorem, Taylor and Pacelli offer a stronger version of it, using a specific
case where s = 20, b = 100 and the units are nickels. This stronger version is stated as follows:
Theorem: Suppose you are engaged in the dollar auction with s = 20, b = 100 and the
conservative convention. Assume that your opponents previous bid was x (rational or
irrational), and that from this point on your opponents will definitely be rational, knows
you will be rational, knows that you know that they will be rational, etc. Then the rational
course of action is for you to bid the smallest special number that is greater than x if one
exists and is rationally available to you, or pass otherwise.
The special numbers that are spoken of in this theorem are the sequence of numbers
acquired at each step of applying ONeills Theorem. Thus in this case the special numbers are
100, 81, 62, 43, 24, and 5, with 5 being the optimal bid.
Taylor and Pacelli also provide two Lemmas that aid in the proof:
The first of the two essentially states that we call a bid that is exceeding 20 units from
their previous bid to a bidder rationally unavailable. If it is not rationally unavailable, it is
rationally available.
The second of the two states that if there is a rationally available bid that will make your
opponent pass, it is better to make that bid than to bid higher or pass.
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Notice that the conclusion of the stronger version of ONeills Theorem is really a
sequence of 100 statements.
Statement 0: If x = 100, then you should pass.
Statement 1: If x = 99, then you should bid 100 if it is rationally available or pass
otherwise.

Statement 99: If x = 1, then you should bid 5 if it is rationally available or pass
otherwise.
This implies the proof technique of mathematical induction. To being, we much
generalize the statements:
Statement n: If x = 100 n, then you should bid the smallest special number that is
greater than x if it is rationally available to you, or pass otherwise.
The proof that Taylor and Pacelli provide is as follows:
PROOF:
Base Case: Assume n = 0. Statement 0 is certainly true, since the bank roll is 100, the
rules of the auction force the bidder to pass at this point, and passing is what the
statement prescribes in this case.
Inductive step: We want to show that Statement n + 1 is true. Assume n is an arbitrary
number between 0 and 98, and that Statements 0 to n are true. Thus we are assuming
1) Your opponents last bid was x = 100 n,
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2) It is now your bid, and
3) We know what rational play will yield when anyones last bid is between x and 100.
Let L
a
denote our last bid and S
p
denote the smallest special number greater than x. Thus:
L
a
< x < S
p
.
Induction Hypothesis: Notice that S
p
is rationally available to our opponent, being the
smallest special number greater than x, so it does not exceed x by more than 19.
Thus if we bid x + 1 to S
p
-1, we know from the inductive hypothesis that our opponent
will bid S
p
, and then we will pass. Hence bidding anything from x + 1 to S
p
-1 is worse
for us than passing. so it is irrational.
Though, if we bid S
p
, our induction hypothesis says it will definitely result in a pass by
our opponent, since the next special number is rationally unavailable to them; showing
that bidding anything greater than S
p
is irrational
Therefore, the only rational bids are to pass or bid S
p.
Lemma 1 and 2 yield the desired
result: If S
p
is rationally unavailable to us, we should pass by Lemma 1. If S
p
is rationally
available to us, we should not pass by Lemma 2.
Thus concludes my presentation to you. I thank you for coming and am willing to answer
any question to the best of my ability. I would also like to thank Abbas Momeni for giving me
this opportunity to present this to you, and guiding and assisting me through-out the summer on
my research.