Comisionamiento de Plantas Mineras

SHE MANUAL
COMMISSIONING
LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED
E & C DIVISION
SAFETY CONTROL DEPARTMENT
POWAI
E & C Division
SHE Manual (Commissioning)
Contents
Part III: Commissioning of plant
1. Corporate Policy
2. Safety responsibilities
2.1 Safety Control Department
2.2 Commissioning Team Leader
2.3 Commissioning Team members
3. Rules and regulations
3.1 Safety practices operating personnel
4.
5.
3.2 Safety Rules Contractors/Sub Contractors

Safety during Pre-commissioning
Technical Measures for common Refinery Operations
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
Plant Layout
Alarms / Trips / Interlocks
Control Systems
Corrosion / Selection of Materials
5.5
5.6
5.7
Drum / Cylinder Handling

Pressure Plants/Reactors
Static Electricity
5.8 Causes of Plant failure

5.9 Explosion Relief
5.10 Hazardous Area Classification / Flame proofing
5.11 Inerting
5.12 Isolation
5.13 Leak / Gas Detection
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
Active / Passive Fire Protection

Quench Systems
Raw Materials Control / Sampling
Reaction / Product Testing
5.18 Reliability of Utilities

5.19 Relief Systems / Vent Systems
5.20 Roadways / Site Traffic Control
5.21 Secondary Containment
5.22 Segregation of Hazardous Materials
5.23 Warning Signs
5.24 Protective Devices
Contents
E & C Division
6.
Material Safety Data Sheet

6.1 MSDS Contents
6.2
6.3
7.
8.
National Fire protection Association (NFPA) Hazard diamond

Interpretation
MSDS of various chemicals generally used in refinery
On site Emergency plan

The Environmental Preservation Acts in India
8.1 The Water prevention and Control of pollution Act, 1974
8.2 The Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Cess Act, 1974
8.3
8.4
8.5
The Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1981

The environmental Protection Act,1986
Hazardous Waste Management and Handling Rules,1989
8.6
9.
The Manufacturer Storage and Import of hazardous Chemical

Rules,1989
Procedural Control
9.1
9.2
9.3
Procedure for Sample Collection

Procedure for the disposal of Waste
Procedure for pipeline cleaning, gas freeing, purging, draining
of equipment and lines.
10.
9.4 Procedure for isolation of flare header, safety valve

9.5 Permit to work system
Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE)
11.
10.1 Non Respiratory

10.2 Respiratory
Gas Detection Devices
11.1 Combustible/Combustible gas Detector
11.2 Toxic gas detectors
11.3 Oxygen Indicator
Contents
LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED
Engineering & Construction Division

CORPORATE POLICY
1.
To Engineer and Execute projects with consistent quality, cost and delivery in
line with the requirements of our customers, and to exceed or meet their
expectations, whilst enhancing our shareholder value.
2.
To set and review quality objectives for Continual Improvement of our

products and services, whilst implementing the globally recognised
management systems for Quality, Safety, Environment and Information
Technology, and integrating these systems with our business partners and
customers.
3.
To design / operate and maintain safe and environmentally friendly plants

which meet all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.
4.
To advance / ensure the use of better and cleaner technology to minimise

adverse environmental impacts.
5.
To continually reduce the risk of pollution through setting environmental

objectives in our design / operation and maintenance processes, based on the
feedback.
6.
To deploy Information Technology for increasing the efficiencies of our

business processes, while ensuring its security by protecting information as
valuable assets and ensure availability, integrity and confidentiality of all
information.
7.
To comply with all applicable occupational Health & Safety legislation and
continually improve safe working practices through setting health and safety
objectives and ensure good health, safety and security of all our people, our
biggest asset.
8.
To encourage enthusiasm, innovation and empowerment whilst developing

inspiring leaders to make working at L&T a rich experience and create new
global benchmarks in whatever we do.
9.
To promote a culture of mutual trust, caring and sharing achievements, with

our people, our society, our stakeholders and our customers for the growth
and benefit of our Nation.
10.
As an undisputed leader in the Indian context, we continue to make things

that make India proud, and shall strive to be amongst the globally
outstanding companies, which the World is proud of.
Issue : Jan , 2002
_____________________________
K . VENKATARAMANAN
( Member of the Board & President )
E & C Division
2.
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1
The
Responsibility of the safety control department

responsibility
of
the
Safety
Control
is
to
develop
safety
consciousness amongst the commissioning team. The Safety Control will

function in an advisory capacity. The Safety Control Department will
ensure that:
-
The commissioning team members have access to and are familiar

with the HSE Manual for Commissioning.
The commissioning team is familiar with the process hazards and the
hazards of chemicals being used / handled during commissioning. The
Safety Control will assist SBU for the procurement of Personnel
Protective Equipment.
The Safety Control will co-ordinate with the Safety Department of

client / owner on the safety related issues in consultation with the
commissioning team leader.
A representative from the Safety Control will be present during the

commissioning of the plant. His responsibilities would include :
-
Identifying
the
requirement
of
safety
equipment
and
Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE), ensuring its

availability at site, and enforcing use of the PPE as the job
requirement.
-
Ensure functioning of the Fire and Safety equipment.
Ensure functioning of Fire Alarm System and Gas Detector

System before entry of Hydrocarbons into the unit.
Check availability of proper emergency lighting and wind

cock.
Ensure availability of Display Boards at site, detailing the

safety precautions, the important telephone numbers, the
escape route in case of any emergency like fire or emission
of toxic gases etc.
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Responsibility
1
E & C Division
Enforcement of Safety Procedures in dealing with hazardous

jobs like Hot Work, entry / work in Confined Space / Vessels
etc.
Ensure availability of First Aid kit. In consultation with the

Commissioning Team Leader, will co-ordinate for the medical
assistance for the commissioning team.
Monitoring the environment as and when necessary for

toxicity level and noise level. The HSE department of the
client can be asked for assistance in this regard.
Formulation of proper evacuation plan in co-ordination with

client safety department.
Organise
regular
safety
meetings
with
client
safety
department and the commissioning team.

-
Carryout Emergency Mock Drill in co-ordination with the

client's fire fighting / safety / operation departments.
Organise training of the commissioning team with respect to

use of fire fighting equipment and first aid measures.
Will carry out the Safety Audit before start of commissioning

activities.
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Responsibility
2
E & C Division
2.2
Responsibility of the commissioning team leader
1. Person responsible for overall commissioning, regardless of his

designation, will be designated as Commissioning Team Leader to
ensure safety during commissioning.
2. The Commissioning Team Leader (CTL) will be responsible to ensure
safety
of
the
commissioning
team
and
the
facility
being
commissioned.
3. The CTL will ensure that:
a) The HSE manual for commissioning is accessible to the
commissioning team.
b) The Personnel Protective Equipment necessary for the safe
execution of job is inspected and is in order.
c) The
commissioning
team
members
are
briefed
on
the
availability and use of PPE.

d) The commissioning team members are briefed on process
hazards and that they are following the safe method of
working.
4. Co-ordinate with the safety department of the client.
5. Obtain copies of the safety manual and other safety related
documents from the client. This is more so in case of project site
within or near an operating plant.
6. Ensure availability of medical help and facility for the treatment in
case of:
a) Exposure to hazardous chemical.
b) Physical Injury
c) Asphyxiation
7. The CTL will, before the start of commissioning, ensure that the
safety audit (Check) of the plant is completed and the checklist
neutralized (Corrective action completed).
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Responsibility
3
E & C Division
8. The CTL will ensure that the commissioning team members are
aware of overall plot plan and familiar with the emergency escape
routes.
9. The CTL will ensure that a mock emergency drill is conducted and
emergency procedures followed.
10. The CTL will ensure before undertaking the commissioning that he
has all emergency phone numbers with him.
11. The CTL will ensure that he has the copy of the "On-site Emergency
Management Plan " and is conversant with its requirements.
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Responsibility
4
E & C Division
2.3
Responsibility of the commissioning team members
All the members of the commissioning team will ensure that:

1. They have read and familiarized themselves with the HSE
commissioning manual.
2. They have read the HSE protocol of the Operations Manual.
3. They have read and have access to the Material Safety Data
Sheet of the Hazardous Chemicals being handled.
4. They are aware and conversant with the Process Hazard of the
Plant being commissioned.
5. They have the list of PPE and familiar with the use of these
equipments.
6. They have read and understood the safety procedure of the
operating plant.
7. They are familiar with the plant layout and knowledge of the
escape routes.
8. They are using the right PPE.
9. They are familiar with the exposure symptoms of the hazardous
chemicals being handled.
10. They have access to the emergency telephone numbers.
11. They are physically fit and mentally alert during the work.
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Responsibility
5
E & C Division
3.0 BASIC SAFETY RULES OPERATING PERSONNEL

Basic Safety rules to be followed by the operating personnel within the
plant limits are given below. The commissioning team is required to know
and observe these rules.
Whenever
specific
safety
rules
are
provided
by
the
client,
(the
commissioning team leader is required to procure such rules) the same

shall be adhered to. This will ensure safety of the personnel, plant and
equipment.
1.
Smoking is not permitted in any part of the operating plant / areas

except in smoking booth / locations specifically designated and
permitted for smoking.
2.
Wearing of loose clothes is unsafe.
3.
Walk through or across operating plants not to be practiced.
4.
Operation of machine / equipment by authorized personnel only.
5.
Use of personnel protective equipment to comply with.
6.
To take proper precautions and use of fall protection equipment

when working at heights.
7.
Compliance to confined space entry procedures when entering

empty tanks / vessels / reactors or closed locations.
8.
To obtain necessary safety permit before start of any repair

maintenance work.
9.
To provide and maintain protective guards on moving machinery

and parts to replace protective guards after completion of
maintenance work.
10.
Not to use compressed air for blowing dust, drying of clothes it is

unsafe.
11.
Use of empty drums / barrels as support or workbench is unsafe.
12.
Removal of left over material / junk after completion of work.
13.
Keep plant area clean and free of junk.
14.
Keep stairways / platforms / walkways clean.
15.
Use of approved safety lights and torches. Use of only flame proof
24 V portable lamps inside tanks / confined locations.
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Rules & Regulations
1
E & C Division
16.
In case of contamination of clothes with chemicals to follow proper

safety instructions according to the chemical's Material Safety Data
Sheet (MDDS) supplied by the manufacturer / supplier
17.
Not to use solvents for cleaning clothes / hands.
18.
Use of only authorized vehicles only with in the plant premises and
to driven by licensed persons within the speed limits.
19.
Use of photo Flash unit in the operating plant is unsafe .
20.
Use of camera only on authorization.
21.
Use of drugs / alcoholic drinks / narcotic within the premises

prohibited.
22.
Carrying of arms and ammunition prohibited.
23.
In case of accident / injury follow the procedure as per the E&C

HSE Manual.
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Rules & Regulations
2
E & C Division
SAFETY CODES FOR CONTRACTOR / SUB-CONTRACTOR

Following are the general safety codes to be imposed on contractors /
subcontractors to ensure safety within the operating plant. These codes
should be followed by the commissioning team. In case specific safety
codes are available from the client for any specific job, the same should
be governing.
1.
Smoking and smoking requisites within the plant B/L is strictly

prohibited.
2.
No spark or flame-producing gadgets like lighter, photo-flash, torch

light, electronic equipment is allowed inside the plant area.
3.
Entry of automotive vehicles within the plant is restricted.
4.
Safety clearance procedure: Any work carried out within the plant
must be covered by the work permit system prevailing in the
plant- Following types of work normally require work permits.
A.
Any work involving open flame and sparks such as welding, gas
cutting, soldering, grinding (hot working).
B.
Sand blasting (cold working)
C.
Use of gasoline, diesel, electric power driven engine and tools.
D.
Entry of vehicles inside the battery limits of process area, tank

dykes, pump house, API separators and loading gantries.
E.
Entry of personnel into hazardous areas like TEL building,

floating roof of storage tanks.
5.
F.
Entry of personnel into confined space.
G.
Radiography
H.
Working on Electrical lines/equipment
All conditions stipulated in the safety permit must be read carefully

and complied with.
6.
When using gas cylinders they should be used in upright position

and complied with safety rules for use of gas cylinders.
7.
All personnel to use personnel protection equipment suitable for

the job.
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Rules and Regulations
3
E & C Division
8.
All personnel to follow dress code.
9.
All personnel to follow personnel conduct rules.
10.
Vehicles to comply with traffic rules regarding speed limit, parking,

number of passengers and vehicle fitness with regard to breaks
horns, lights, muffler etc.
11.
Vehicle to be driven by authorized person only.
12.
When welding is being done proper screen must be provided to

proven? Eye injury and guards against fire hazard due to sparks
and hot slugs.
13.
All electrical equipment used are properly grounded and fitted with
proper 3 pin plugs. All cables in one piece preferable.
14.
Workplace to be clean and tidy good housekeeping to be practiced.
15.
Ensure that existing fire fighting equipment are not to be

obstructed and no material is piled to cause blockage or hindrance
to operation.
16.
Use barricades during (i) excavation (ii) hoisting (iii) areas

adjudged hazardous by shift in charge (iv) existing property
subject to damage by work.
In addition to above basic safety codes, the commissioning team may

have to undergo safety induction training, which will be imparted by the
Safety Control.
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Rules and Regulations
4
E & C Division
4.
Safety during Pre-commissioning
Pipework erection
All pipes shall be inspected before erection to ensure that they are free
from loose contamination.
Pipework shall be erected on permanent supports designated for the
line. Temporary supports shall be kept to an absolute minimum, but to
an extent sufficient to protect nozzles and adjacent piping from
excessive loads during the erection.
Pipework shall be fitted in place without springing or forcing to avoid
undue stressing of the line or strain being placed on a vessel or item of
equipment, etc.
All temporary pipe spools and supports that are an aid to erection,
testing/flushing, sea fastening, etc. are to be specially marked for
removal identification.
Flanged joints
Before assembly flanges shall be clean and free from any detritus
matter (e.g. rust, dirt or other contamination). The joints shall be
brought up flush and square without forcing so that the entire mating
surfaces bear uniformly on the gasket and then mated-up with uniform
bolt tension.
Valve and equipment flange connections

Flange covers shall be retained on all flange connections to valve or
equipment, until ready to connect the mating piping.
All equipment shall be blanked, either by pressure test blanks, spades
or blinds, to stop the ingress of internal pipe debris.
Flanges connecting to strain sensitive mechanical equipment e.g.
pumps, compressors, turbines, etc. shall be fitted-up in close parallel
and lateral alignment prior to tightening the bolting.
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Precommissioning Activities
1
E & C Division
In general, flange connections to equipment shall be the last

connection made on completion of a line or interconnecting system of
lines.
With the piping flange fitted and prior to bolting-up the joint, the
following tolerances shall be maintained:
Bolting shall move freely through accompanying bolt-holes at

right angle to the flange faces.
There shall be a clear gap between two flange faces before

gasket installation. There shall be sufficient flexibility to install
and replace gaskets.
Gaskets
Gaskets
shall
be
treated
in
accordance
with
manufacturers'
instructions. Gaskets shall be replaced after opening or dismantling of

flange connections.
RTJ gaskets are to be lightly smeared on the mating surface with a
propriety anti-friction lubricant prior to fitting between the flange
grooves. Anti-friction lubricant, compatible with the flange material
and process fluid shall be used.
Bolting
Bolting shall be in accordance with the requirements in the Piping and
valve material standard.
Manually pulled flange bolts and studbolts shall extend fully through
their nuts with minimum one, maximum five threads.
All flanged stud bolts shall be progressively controlled to equalise bolt
pressure on the gasket. A detailed procedure shall be developed prior
to start.
Hydraulic bolt thigthening shall be used on all bolts greater than 1"
diameter.
Calculation of the required bolt tension value shall be in accordance
with the DIN 2505, with the following exeptions:
Minimum required bolt tension value shall be multiplied with 1.5.
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2
E & C Division
Maximum bolt tension value shall not exceed 2/3 of the specified
yield of the bolt or maximum allowable stress for the gasket.
Nuts and bolts shall have their grade marks visible after installation.
Studbolts cut from long lengths of studding shall have material grade
stamped on end of each cut.
Bolts larger than 1" shall be protected against mechanical damage and
corrosion.
Pipe support
Pipe supports shall be in accordance with the relevant pipe support
detail drawings developed for the project.
Piping shall not be forced to fit with support locations in such a manner
that additional stress is introduced.
Where spring support are installed the spring shall locked gagged until
commissioning/start up.
All piping shall be arranged to facilitate supporting, and shall be
planned for ease of removal of equipment for inspection and servicing.
Pipes shall not normally be supported by other pipes, i.e. individual
supporting is required.
Vent holes in wear plates and trunnions are generally not required.
However, when the wear plate or a trunnion covers a circumferential
weld that has not been pressure tested, a vent hole is required for leak
detection.
Global tolerances, installation

Hook-up termination points shall be within 25mm in all directions.
Over length may be provided where required.
Installation tolerances of piping components shall be as required by
the individual service of the piping component including requirements
for:
Maintenance access.
Position relative to surrounding steelwork, equipment, cable tray
and HVAC duct routings.

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3
E & C Division
Positioning of pipe supports relative to the structural steel.
Pipe stress.
FLUSHING
General
The initial flushing shall be carried out prior to pressure testing. For
austenitic steelwork flushing can be performed after pressure testing,
upon agreement.
General requirements for flushing for specific systems are listed in
table 1, annex B.
Procedures for flushing shall be developed prior to start.
All pipework shall be free from dirt, grease and temporary protective
coating upon completion of flushing.
Hydro flushing
Items of equipment that would be sensitive to damage during hydro
flushing shall be removed, blocked off or isolated. A list shall be
prepared and be part of the flush & test procedure.
Ball valves shall be flushed in fully open position.
All piping systems shall be flushed using high-pressure jet flushing
equipment, such as rotating hose or rotating nozzle. Minimum
pressure shall be 600 bar.
Below 4", High Velocity Water Flushing (HVWF) may be used. Water
velocity shall be a minimum of 10m/s. On systems where high
pressure jet flushing cannot be used due to complicated shapes and/or
long runs HVWF may be used.
The flushing medium shall in general be fresh water. When flushing
stainless steel lines, the chloride ion content shall be less than 200
ppm.
After flushing, the piping systems shall be completely drained and
protected against corrosion.
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E & C Division
Ball valves shall be flushed fully open.

Pressurised air shockblowing
This method may be used as an initial cleaning method for instrument
air, plant air and as an alternative method for initial cleaning of smallbore pipe (less than 2 inch). This method may also be used when
there are problems removing trapped liquid in the circuit, or to verify
cleanliness of small-bore pipe where video inspection is impossible or
inadequate due to pipe dimension or configuration.
When using PAS method for cleaning or verification the procedure shall
be repeated until cleanliness is acceptable.
The air shocking pressure shall never exceed the working pressure of
the system and shall never be more than 8 bar. Safety precaution shall
be taken like warning to all the personnel working nearby as well as
effective barrication to avoid unauthorised entry when this method is
used.
Pneumatic flushing
In cases where water is not desirable in the piping system (e.g.
instrument/utility air), flushing by pressurised air or PAS shall be
carried out. When pressurised air is used, the minimum velocity shall
be 35m/s. Procedure covering all safety aspects shall be established.
PRESSURE TESTS
General
The test pressure shall, unless otherwise specified, be in accordance
with ASME B31.3.
Testing shall not take place with system temperatures 4C or less or
where the ambient temperature during test falls by 5C or more, nor
during rain or fog unless under suitable cover. Hydrostatic pressure
test may however be performed under a lower temperature with a
proper frost preventive added to the test water.
The following are excluded from pressure tests:
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5
E & C Division
All small bore instrument control piping downstream of the first

piping block valve.
Open drains and vents to atmosphere (leak test only).
Test preparation
Pressure, temperature and time recorders shall be used for all
hydrostatic tests. The pressure shall be shown in bar. Pressure gauges
and recorders used to indicate and record test pressure shall be dead
weight tested for accuracy according to a procedure, dependent of
type of equipment.
Minimum of one gauge shall be positioned at the highest point and one
recorder to be positioned at the lowest point. Accuracy of pressure
gauge shall be at least 1-2% at full scale and 1-2% for the recorder.
The test pressure shall be within 60% of the gauge range (20% from
top and 20% from bottom).
If there is a deviation of more than 2% between gauge and recorder
during test, the test shall be stopped and the equipment recalibrate.
Piping joints and welds shall not be insulated or physically covered
until satisfactory completion of testing in accordance with this
specification, except for painting of prefabricated welds.
All piping shall be adequately supported before the pressure test.
Spring or other variable type supports shall be blocked to prevent
movement.
Unless otherwise noted, all valves are to be through body tested. First
block valve for pressure instruments shall be included in the test.
Piping containing check valves shall have the source of test pressure
on the upstream side. If this is not possible, the check valve disc shall
be removed or jacked open.
Ball valves shall be pressure tested in the half open position. Other
valves shall be tested in the fully open position.
Where the test pressure to be applied to the piping is greater than the
maximum allowable test pressure for valves, the valves shall be
blinded off on the side to be tested, or removed and replaced by
dummy spools.
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E & C Division
Turbines, pumps, compressors and vessels shall be blinded off prior to

pressure testing.
A list shall be prepared for sensitive equipment that shall be removed,
blocked off or isolated during testing, such as relief valves, inline
instruments, turbines, pumps, compressors and vessels. This list shall
be a part of the test procedure.
Test media
For hydrostatic testing the test medium shall in general be fresh
water, except that other suitable liquid may be used if:
The piping or inline equipment would be adversely affected by

water.
If the liquid is flammable, it's flash point shall be at least 49C

and consideration shall be given to the environment.
The liquid is approved to be used.
The chloride ion content of the water used for pressure testing
stainless steel lines shall be less than 200 ppm and the line shall be
properly drained soon after testing. pH value of the water shall be
between 6.5 and 7.5.
Carbon steel systems as defined in table 1, annex B shall be tested
with an acceptable preservation fluid. The preservation fluid shall be a
water impellent and emulsifiable rust preventive lubricating oils that
contain detergents and inhibitors that have been specially formulated
to prevent rust.
For pneumatic testing, the test media shall be oil free, dry air or any
inert gas. The use of air for testing shall be limited to a maximum
pressure of 7.0 barg. Above this pressure nitrogen shall be used. The
extent of pneumatic testing shall be approved.
For instrument/utility air systems, where the introduction of water is
undesirable, test media shall be air or inert gas.
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E & C Division
Hydrostatic testing
The test pressure shall be maintained for a sufficient length of time to
permit visual examination to be made of all surfaces, welds and
connections, but not less than thirty minutes. A one hour test duration
shall apply for piping systems with pressure rating class 600# and
above. Care shall be taken to ensure that overpressuring due to static
head does not take place.
The piping systems shall not show any sign of plastic deformation or
leakage.
Pneumatic testing
The sequence of test pressuring installed systems shall be as follows:
A pressure of 0.5 bar shall be introduced in the system and a

leak test performed. The pressure shall gradually be increased to
50% of the specified test pressure and kept for minimum 10
minutes to equalise strain.
The pressure shall then be increased in steps of 10% of the

specified test pressure, until the specified test pressure is
reached. At each step, the pressure shall be kept for 10 minutes
minimum to equalise strain.
The specified test pressure shall be kept for one hour. The
pressure shall than be reduced to the design pressure before
examining for leakage.
The piping systems shall not show any sign of plastic deformation or
leakage.
After completion of test

The
tested
systems
shall
be
depressurised
by
opening
the
depressurising valve in the test rig. After depressurisation, all vents

and low point drain valves shall be opened and the system shall be
thoroughly drained where the test medium is water. Where required,
blowing by dry air or Pressurised Air Shock Blowing to remove any
trapped water to be performed.
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E & C Division
Systems with drying requirement as defined in table 1, annex B shall

be dried out after hydrotesting with dry oil free air with a dew point of
-10C. Drying can be terminated when the dew point at the outlet is
equal to the dew point at the inlet.
Other methods, such as vacuum drying or air shocking, may also be
used if the same dryness can be documented.
Requirement for drying as defined in table 2, annex C shall take in to
consideration the time for start up of system. If more than 3 months
to commissioning, drying shall be followed by preservation with
nitrogen to keep the pipe system completely dry and to avoid
condense. Other alternatives are subject to agreement.
Reinstallation of the system shall be performed in accordance with the
test procedure.
Where permanent or temporary strainers have remained in place for
the hydrostatic pressure test, they shall be removed following the test
and thoroughly cleaned before reinstalling.
Ends of pipes and nozzles shall be fully protected against the ingress
of foreign material by the use of caps, plugs or plate blinds sealed with
gaskets. These shall not be removed until just prior to final assembly.
Flange parallellity and alignment to equipment shall be checked prior
to reinstatement.
Vent holes in reinforcing pads shall be sealed upon completion of
pressure test.
Verification of cleanliness
All systems shall be internal visual inspected for acceptable cleanliness
by spot check. Internal visual inspection includes the use of
Boroscope, video etc.
If pipe configuration in critical parts of systems as defined in table 1,
annex B is too complicated for visual inspection, the PAS method or
other suitable methods shall be used for verification of cleanliness.
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E & C Division
CHEMICAL CLEANING
Lines to be chemical cleaned shall be identified on the P&ID's and Line
Index.
A procedure shall describe in detail the steps for chemical cleaning.
Chemical cleaning shall include:
Degassing.
Chemical cleaning/descaling.
Neutralisation.
Passivation.
Water flushing.
Drying.
The end result shall be a clean smooth surface.

Maximum temperatures used during these operations shall not exceed
maximum design temperature for the systems as listed in the Line
Index.
For equipment such as turbines, generators, pumps and compressors,
the piping to be cleaned shall have all sensitive items that can be
damaged by the cleaning medium removed or blanked off.
Generally, the following items shall not be chemically cleaned (items
shall be identified on chemical cleaning are):
All instrument tubing downstream the first piping block valve.
Piping systems with copper alloy materials.
Flexible hoses.
Vessels.
Exchangers.
Pumps.
All bolted/screwed valves and instruments.
Removed or blanked off items shall be cleaned separately prior to

reinstallation.
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The systems to be cleaned shall have high and low point vents and
drains installed. "Dead legs" shall be avoided.
Cleaning shall be carried out after pressure testing unless otherwise
specified.
If more than 3 months to start up of commissioning activities, system
shall be preserved with nitrogen. Overpressure shall be 0.5 bar.
HOT OIL FLUSHING

General
Required cleanliness for systems subject to hot oil flushing shall be in
accordance with table 1, annex B.
A detailed procedure for hot oil flushing shall be developed out prior to
start.
Filters used for hot oil flushing shall be:
3m ABS for hydraulic systems.
<=10m ABS for lube and seal oil.
Filling of lubricant oil shall take place through filters with 10m ABS.
Flushing and sampling to verify cleanness shall take place at turbulent
flow, upstream any filters.
The Reynolds number shall be min. 4000.
The level of cleanness shall be documented from an automatic particle
counter or a membrane checked in a microscope before a flushing
operation is considered finalised.
A flowmeter shall be installed to verify flow used during flushing
operation.
Maximum water content in oil used for flushing shall be less than
500ppm.
Marking
Piping spools or systems that have been chemical cleaned or hot oil
flushed shall be marked in a unique manner.
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5.1
Plant Layout
This Technical Measures Document refers to Plant Layout.

General Principles
Plant layout is often a compromise between a number of factors such as:
The need to keep distances for transfer of materials between

plant/storage units to a minimum to reduce costs and risks;
The geographical limitations of the site;

Interaction with existing or planned facilities on site such as
existing roadways, drainage and utilities routings;
Interaction with other plants on site;

The need for plant operability and maintainability;
The need to locate hazardous materials facilities as far as possible
from site boundaries and people living in the local neighbourhood;
The need to prevent confinement where release of flammable

substances may occur;
The need to provide access for emergency services;
The need to provide emergency escape routes for on-site

personnel;
The need to provide acceptable working conditions for operators.
The most important factors of plant layout as far as safety aspects are
concerned are those to:
Prevent, limit and/or mitigate escalation of adjacent events

(domino);
Ensure safety within on-site occupied buildings;
Control access of unauthorised personnel;
Facilitate access for emergency services.

In determining plant layout designers should consider the factors in
outlined in the following sections.
Inherent Safety
The major principle in Inherent Safety is to remove the hazard
altogether. The best method to achieve this is to reduce the inventory of
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hazardous substances such that a major hazard is no longer presented.

However, this is not often readily achievable. Other possible methods to
achieve an Inherently Safer design are:
Intensification to reduce inventories;

Substitution of hazardous substances by less hazardous
alternatives;
Attenuation to reduce hazardous process conditions i.e.

temperature, pressure;
Simpler systems/processes to reduce potential loss of containment
or possibility of errors causing a hazardous event;

Fail-safe designs e.g. valve position on failure.
Plant layout considerations to achieve Inherent Safety are mainly those
concerned with domino effects (see below).
The Dow / Mond Indices
These hazard indices are useful for evaluating processes or projects,
ranking them against existing facilities, and assigning incident
classifications. They provides a comparative measure of the overall risk of
fire and explosion of a process, and are useful tools in the plant layout
development stage since they enable objective spacing distances to be
taken into account at all stages.
Although these are useful rule-of thumb methodologies for first
consideration of plant layout, they do not replace risk assessment. The
distances derived between plant units using these systems are based
upon engineering judgement and some degree of experience rather than
any detailed analysis.
Domino Effects
Hazard assessment of site layout is critical to ensure consequences of
loss of containment and chances of escalation are minimised. Domino
may be by fire, explosion (pressure wave and missiles) or toxic gas cloud
causing loss of control of operations in another location.
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Fire
A fire can spread in four ways:
Direct burning (including running liquid fires);
Convection;
Radiation;
Conduction.
The spread of fire from its origin to other parts of the premises can be
prevented by vertical and horizontal compartmentation using fireresisting walls and floors. Consideration should also be given to the
spread of flammable material via drains, ducts and ventilation systems.
Delayed ignition following a release may result in spread of flames
through such systems via dispersed flammable gases and vapours.
Protection against domino effects by convection, conduction and radiation
can be achieved by inherent safety principles i.e. ensuring that the
distances between plant items are sufficient to prevent overheating of
adjacent plants compromising safety of those plants also. Where this is
not possible due to other restrictions, other methods such as fire walls,
active or passive fire protection may be considered.
Explosion
Explosion propagation may be directly by pressure waves or indirectly by
missiles. As for fires, inherently safe methods that should be
considered are:
arranging separation distances such that damage to adjacent plants
will not occur even in the worst case;
provision of barriers e.g. blast walls, location in strong buildings;

protecting plant against damage e.g. provision of thicker walls on
vessels;
directing explosion relief vents away from vulnerable areas e.g.
other plants or buildings, roadways near site boundaries.
Toxic Gas Releases

Toxic gas releases may cause domino effects by rendering adjacent
plants inoperable and injuring operators. Prevention/mitigation of such
effects may be affected by provision of automatic control systems using
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inherently safer principles and a suitable control room (see section below
on Occupied Buildings).
Reduction
of
Consequences
of
Event
On
and
Off
Site
In addition to the measures described above, Plant Layout design

techniques applicable to the reduction of the risks from release of
flammable or toxic materials include:
Locating all high-volume storage of flammable / toxic material well

outside process areas;
Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways through the
site;
Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high inventories of
hazardous materials may be released into vulnerable areas;
Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping terrain to
contain and control releases and limit the safety and environmental
effects;
Siting of plants within buildings as secondary containment;
Siting of plants in the open air to ensure rapid dispersion of minor
releases of flammable gases and vapours and thus prevent
concentrations building up which may lead to flash fires and
explosions;
Hazardous area classification for flammable gases, vapours and
dusts to designate areas where ignition sources should be
eliminated.
Risk management techniques should be used to identify control measures
that can be adopted to reduce the consequences of on or off site events.
See references cited in further reading material.
Positioning of Occupied Buildings
The distance between occupied buildings and plant buildings will be
governed by the need to reduce the dangers of explosion, fire and
toxicity. In particular, evacuation routes should not be blocked by poor
plant layout, and personnel with more general site responsibilities should
usually be housed in buildings sited in a non-hazard area near the main
entrance. Consideration should be given to siting of occupied buildings
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outside the main fence. In all cases occupied buildings should not be
sited downwind of hazardous plant areas.
Aggregation / Trapping of Flammable Vapours
To avoid aggregation and trapping of flammable / toxic vapours which
could lead to a hazardous event, buildings should be designed so that all
parts of the building are well ventilated by natural or forced ventilation.
Flammable storages should be sited in the open air so that minor leaks or
thermal outbreathing can be dissipated by natural ventilation.
Segregation of Incompatible Substances (particularly in warehouses /
storage areas)
This is detailed in the Technical Measures Document on Segregation of
Hazardous Materials.
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5.2
Alarm Systems
Alarm systems alert operators to plant conditions, such as deviation from
normal operating limits and to abnormal events, which require timely
action or assessment.
Alarm systems are not normally safety related, but do have a role in
enabling operators to reduce the demand on the safety-related systems,
thus improving overall plant safety.
However, where a risk reduction of better than 10-1 failures on demand is
claimed then the alarm system, including the operator, is a safety related
system,
which
requires
a
suitable
safety
integrity
level.
EEMUA 191 Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and
procurement considers alarm settings, the human interface (alarm
presentation), alarm processing and system management controls for
both safety related and other alarm systems. It provides the following
guidance in regard to safety related alarm systems:
The alarm system should be independent from the process control

system and other alarms unless it has also been designated safety
related;
The operator should have a clear written alarm response procedure

for each alarm which his simple, obvious and invariant, and in
which he is trained;
The alarms should be presented in an obvious manner,

distinguishable from other alarms, have the highest priority, and
remain on view at all times when it is active;
The claimed operator workload and performance should be stated

and verified.
Alarms which are not designated as safety should be carefully designed
to ensure that they fulfil their role in reducing demands on safety related
systems.
For all alarms, regardless of their safety designation, attention is required
to ensure that under abnormal condition such as severe disturbance,
onset of hazard, or emergency situations, the alarm system is remains
effective given the limitations of human response. The extent to which
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the alarm system survives common cause failures, such as a power loss,
should also be adequately defined.
Alarm settings
The type of alarm and its setting should be established so as to enable
the operator to make the necessary assessment and take the required
timely action. Settings should be documented and controlled in
accordance
with
the
alarm
system
management
controls.
Human interface (alarm presentation)

The human interface should be suitable. Alarms may be presented either
on annunciator panel, individual indicators, VDU screen, or programmable
display device.
Alarms lists should be carefully designed to ensure that high priority
alarms are readily identified, that low priority alarms are not overlooked,
and that the list remains readable even during times of high alarm
activity or with repeat alarms.
Alarms should be prioritised in terms of which alarms require the most
urgent operator attention.
Alarms should be presented within the operators field of view, and use
consistent presentation style (colour, flash rate, naming convention).
Each alarm should provide sufficient operator information for the alarm
condition, plant affected, action required, alarm priority, time of alarm
and alarm status to be readily identified.
The visual display device may be augmented by audible warnings, which
should at a level considerably higher than the ambient noise at the signal
frequency. Where there are multiple audible warnings, they should be
designed so that they are readily distinguished from each other and from
emergency alarm systems. They should be designed to avoid distraction
of the operator in high operator workload situations. Where both constant
frequency and variable frequency (including pulsed or intermittent)
signals are used, then the later should denote a higher level of danger or
a more urgent need for intervention.
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Alarm processing
The alarms should be processed in such a manner as to avoid operator
overload at all times (alarm floods). The alarm processing should ensure
that fleeting or repeating alarms do not result in operator overload even
under the most severe conditions.
The presentation of alarms should not exceed that which the operator is
capable of acting upon, or alternatively the alarms should be prioritised
and presented in such a way that the operator may deal with the most
important alarms without distraction of the others. Applicable alarm
processing techniques include grouping and first-up alarms, eclipsing of
lower grade alarms (e.g. suppression high alarm when the high-high
activates) suppression of out of service plant alarms, suppression of
selected alarms during certain operating modes, automatic alarm load
shedding and shelving.
Care should be taken in the use of shelving or suppression to ensure that
controls exist to ensure that alarms are returned to an active state when
they are relevant to plant operation.
Alarm system management procedures
Management systems should be in place to ensure that the alarm system
is operated, maintained and modified in a controlled manner. Alarm
response procedures should be available, and alarm parameters should
be documented.
The performance of the alarms system should be assessed and monitored
to ensure that it is effective during normal and abnormal plant conditions.
The monitoring should include evaluation of the alarm presentation rate,
operator acceptance and response times, operator workload, standing
alarm count and duration, repeat or nuisance alarms, and operator views
of operability of the system. Monitoring may be achieved by regular and
systematic auditing.
Matters which are not worthy of operator attention should not be
alarmed.
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Logging may be a suitable alternative for engineering or discrepancy

events to prevent unnecessary standing alarms. A system for assessing
the significance of such logged events to ensure timely intervention by
maintenance personnel may be required.
Protection
Systems
(Trips
and
Interlocks)
Protective tripping systems provide a defense against excursions beyond

the safe operating limits by detecting a excursions beyond set points
related to the safe operating limits (i.e. the onset of a hazard) and taking
timely action to maintain or restore the equipment under control to a safe
state. Trips should not be self-resetting unless adequate justification has
been made. Protective interlocks prevent those control actions which
might initiate a hazard from being undertaken by an operator or process
control system, and are by nature self-resetting.
Protection systems should indicate that a demand to perform a safety
function has been made and that the necessary actions have been
performed.
Independence
Protective systems should be sufficiently independent of the control
system
or
other
protective
systems
(electrical/electronic
or
programmable). Where there is an interface between systems (e.g. for
indication, monitoring or shared components) or shared utilities (e.g.
power), environment (e.g. accommodation, wiring routes) or
management systems (maintenance procedures, personnel), then the
method of achieving independence should be defined, and common cause
failures adequately considered.
Measures to defend against common mode failures due to environmental
interactions may include physical separation or segregation of system
elements (sensors, wiring, logic, actuators or utilities) of different
protective systems.
Independence will also be required for protection against systematic and
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common mode faults. Measures may include use of diverse technology

for different protective systems. Where more than one E/E/PES protective
system is used to provide the required risk reduction for a safety
function, then adequate independence should be achieved by diverse
technology, construction, manufacturer or software as necessary to
achieve the requires safety integrity level.
Dependence on utilities
The action required from the protective system depend upon the nature
of the process. The actions may be passive in nature, such as simple
isolation of plant or removal of power, or they may be active in that
continued or positive action is required to maintain or restore a safe
state, for example by injection of inhibitor into the process, or provision
of emergency cooling.
Active protective measures have a high dependence upon utilities, and
may be particularly vulnerable to common mode failures. The scope of
the protective system therefore includes all utilities upon which it
depends, and they should have an integrity consistent and contributory to
that of the remainder of the system.
Measures taken to defend against common mode failure of utilities will be
commensurate with the level of safety integrity required, but may include
standby or uninterruptable/reservoir supplies for electricity, air, cooling
water, or other utilities essential for performance of the safety function.
Such measures should themselves be of sufficient integrity.
Survivability and external influences
The protective system should be adequately protected against
environmental influences, the effects of the hazard against which it is
protecting, and other hazards which may be present. Environmental
influences include power system failure or characteristics, lightning,
electromagnetic radiation, flammable atmospheres, corrosive or humid
atmospheres, ingress of water or dust, temperature, rodent attack,
chemical attack, vibration physical impact, and other plant hazards.
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Degradation of protection against environmental influences during

maintenance and testing should have been considered and appropriate
measures taken. e.g. Use of radios by maintenance personnel may be
prohibited during testing of a protective system with the cabinet door
open where the cabinet provides protection against EMR.
Protection against random hardware faults
The architecture of the protective system should be designed to protect
against random hardware failure. It should be demonstrated that the
required reliability has been achieved commensurate with the require
integrity level. Defensive measures may include high reliability elements,
automatic diagnostic features to reveal faults, and redundancy of
elements (e.g. 2 out of 3 voting for sensors) to provide fault tolerance.
Protection common mode failures
Diversity of elements is not effective for protection against random
hardware faults, but is useful in defense against common mode failures
within a protective system.
Protection systematic failures
Protection against systematic hardware and software failures may be
achieved by appropriate safety lifecycles.
Sensing
Sensors include their connection to the process, both of which should be
adequately reliable. A measure of their reliability is used in confirming the
integrity level of the protective system. This measure should take into
account the proportion of failures of the sensor and its process
connection, which are failures to danger.
Dangerous failures can be minimised by a number of measures such as:
Use of measurement which is as direct as possible, (e.g.
pneumercators provide an inferred level measurement but actually
measure back pressure against a head and are sensitive to changes
in density due to temperature variations within the process, and to
balance gas flow, upon which they are dependant);
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Control of isolation or bleed valves to prevent uncoupling from the

process between proof tests or monitoring such that their operation
causes a trip;
Use of good engineering practice and well proven techniques for
process connections and sample lines to prevent blockage,

hydraulic locking, sensing delays etc.;
Use of analogue devices (transmitters) rather than digital
(switches);
Use of positively actuated switches operating in a positive mode
together with idle current (de-energise to trip);
Appropriate measures to protect against the effects of the process

on the process connection or sensor, such as vibration, corrosion,
and erosion;
Monitoring of protective system process variable measurement (PV)

and comparison against the equivalent control system PV either by
the operator or the control system.
Proof testing procedures should clearly set out how sensors are
reinstated and how such reinstatement is verified after proof testing.
Maintenance procedures should define how sensors/transmitters are
calibrated with traceability back to national reference standards by use of
calibrated test equipment.
Other matters which will need to have been considered are:
Cross sensitivities of analysers to other fluids which might be
present in the process;
Reliability of sampling systems;

Protection against systematic failures on programmable
sensors/analysers.
The measures taken will depend on the level of variability and track
record of the software. Smart transmitters with limited variability
software which are extensively proven in use may require no
additional measures other than those related to control of
operation, maintenance, and modification, whereas bespoke
software for an on-line analyser may require a defense in depth
against systematic failures ;
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Signal conditioning (e.g. filtering) and which may affect the sensor
response times;
Degradation of measurement signals (distance between sensor and
transmitter may be important);
Accuracy, repeatability, hysteresis and common mode effects (e.g.

effects of gauge pressure or temperature on differential pressure
measurement);
Integrity of process connections and sensors for containment

(sample or impulse lines, instrument pockets are often a weak link
in process containment measures).
Use of SMART instruments requires adequate diagnostic coverage and

fault tolerance and measures to protect against systematic failures
(software
design/integration,
inadvertent
re-ranging
during
maintenance). Measures may include use of equipment in non-smart
mode (analogue signal output, no remote setting) and equipment of
stable design for which there is an extensive record of reliability under
similar circumstances.
Actuators and signal conversion
Actuators are the final control elements or systems and include
contactors and the electrical apparatus under control, valves (control and
isolation), including pilots valves, valve actuators and positioners, power
supplies and utilities which are required for the actuator to perform its
safety function, all of which should be adequately reliable. A measure of
their reliability is used in confirming the integrity level of the protective
system. This measure should take into account the proportion of failures
of the actuator under the relevant process conditions which are failures to
danger.
Actuators are frequently the most unreliable part of the tripping process.
Dangerous failures can be minimised by a number of measures such as:
Use of fail-safe principles so that the actuator takes up the tripped
state on loss of signal or power (electricity, air etc.). e.g. held
open, spring return actuator;

Provision of uninterruptable or reservoir supplies of sufficient
capacity for essential power;
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Failure detection and performance monitoring (end of travel

switches, time to operate, brake performance, shaft speed, torque
etc.) during operation;
Actuator exercising or partial stroke shutoff simulation during
normal operation to reveal failures or degradation in performance.
Note this is not proof testing but may reduce probability of failure
by improved diagnostic coverage
Overrating of equipment.
Other matters which should have been considered are:
Valves should be properly selected for their duty, and it should not
be assumed that a control valve can satisfactorily perform isolation
functions;
Actuators may also include programmable control elements (e.g.

SMART instruments) particularly within positioners and variable
speed drives and motor control centers. Modern motor control
centers may use programmable digital addressing. This introduces
a significant risk of introduction of systematic failure and failure
modes which cannot be readily predicted. Such an arrangement
should be treated with caution. It is normally reasonably practicable
for trip signal to act directly upon the final contactor;

Potential for failure due to hydraulic locking between valves (e.g.
trace-heated lines between redundant shutoff valves).
Logic
systems
Commonly, the logic systems for protective systems are electronic, but
programmable
and
other
technology
fluidic/pneumatic) have been used.
systems
(magnetic
or
The architecture of the logic system will be determined by the hardware

fault tolerance requirements, for example dual redundant channels.
Where a high level of integrity for the system is required (SIL3 or SIL4)
then diverse hardware between channels may be employed. This should
not be confused with diversity of independent protective systems.
Logic systems are likely to incorporate provisions for fault alarms and
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overrides, for which there should be suitable management control

arrangements. They may also provide monitoring of input and output
signal lines for detection of wiring (open circuit, short circuit) and
sensors/actuators (stuck-at, out of range). Such monitoring may initiate
an alarm, a trip action or, in a voting arrangement, disable the faulty
element.
Software based systems should be adequately protected against
systematic failures, for example by an appropriate hardware and software
safety lifecycles, and suitable techniques and quality systems.
Wiring
and
communications
(signal
transmission)
Transmitters, communications devices and wiring systems should be
arranged to meet the requirements for survivability, protection against
External
influences
and
independence.
Independent systems or redundant channels should not share multicore
cables with each other or power circuits, and may require diverse routes
depending upon the safety integrity level to be achieved.
Measures to protect against failures include:
Use of fail-safe principles such as DC model (e.g. 4-20 ma loop) for
analogue signal transmission diagnosis and alarm of out of range,
abnormal, or fault states (such as stuck-at) with defined control

system responses for both the sensor and transmitter;
Cable selection (screening etc.);
Protection of cables against fire, chemical attack, physical damage
etc.;
Physical separation or segregation of cables and cable routes;
Routing in benign environments;
Use of optical fibres to protect against electrical interference;
Careful attention to lightning protection of data links between
buildings.
Use of fieldbus or other digital communication protocols in protective

systems should be considered a novel approach requiring a thorough
evaluation
and
demonstration
of
the
safety
integrity.
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Utilities
Utilities which are required for the protective system to perform its safety
function may include power supplies such as electricity, air, inhibitor
materials and their propellants, inert gas such as nitrogen, cooling water,
steam, pilot flames and their gases all of which should be adequately
reliable. Measures such as redundancy, and uninterruptable/reservoir
supplies, and availability monitoring (e.g. loss of air alarm) may be
required. Confirmation that the designed capacity of reserves is adequate
should
be
demonstrated
by
test.
Utilities may also introduce external influences into the protective
systems
(e.g.
from
electrical
supplies).
Measures
to
protect
against
external
influences
may
include:
Under/Over voltage protection;

Overcurrent and short circuit protection;
Use of an uninterruptable power supply or voltage conditioning or

filtering;
Careful attention to lightning protection and equipotential bonding.
Proof testing
The probability of failure on demand, or the failure rate of a protective
system is critically dependent upon the frequency of proof testing and its
ability to detect previously unrevealed failures of the system. The proof
test interval should therefore be established accordingly, and as a rule of
thumb for low demand systems, should be an order of magnitude less
than the mean time between failure of the system and the demand rate.
Proof
test
procedures
should
be
available
which
specify
the
success/failure criteria and detail how the test will be performed safely,
including any management arrangements, operating restrictions and
competence of personnel.
The tests should be arranged to reveal all dangerous failures which have
been unrevealed in normal operation including the following measures:
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Tests performed at the conditions which would be expected at trip.

(Where test under trip conditions cannot be performed, for example
for safety reasons, then measures to ensure that potential failures
at trip conditions will be revealed should be clarified);
End to end tests at appropriate intervals, including proving

sample/impulse lines. (Different elements of the protective system
may require proof testing at different intervals).
Operation
Procedures should be available which detail the operation of the
protective system including:
Override
management
(authorisation,
security,
recording,
monitoring and review of overrides, reset requirements);
Operating instruction for trips;

Instructions for response to equipment faults including fault alarms.
(There should be procedural arrangements in place to ensure timely
repair so that mean time to repair criteria can be met).
Maintenance
Procedures should be available for maintenance activities including:
Maintenance instructions;
Control of spares (segregation of faulty or non-conforming parts,
identification to prevent interchange of similar parts etc.);
Competence of maintenance personnel;

Operating restriction during maintenance;
Control of software back-ups and memory media (floppy disks, files
on hard disks on portable PCs etc.);

Post maintenance reinstatement and proof testing.
For systems where a high diagnostic coverage is claimed, for example
high integrity high systems, the probability of failure (expressed as
failure rate) is critically dependent upon the mean time to repair the
faults revealed. For such systems, the repair performance should
monitored and reviewed against the design criteria.
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Modification
A management system for control of modifications should be available to
ensure that:
Unauthorised modifications are prevented;
Authorised modifications are not ill conceived;

Safety verification to confirm that the required safety function and
integrity have been maintained;
Designed and implementation is carried out by competent persons.
Remote diagnostic systems

Remote diagnostic systems have the potential to cause danger by
initiating unexpected operations or by affecting safety functions by
software/parameter modification or by diverting the control system
processor from time critical functions.
The need for remote diagnosis should be justified, a risk assessment
completed, and measures taken to ensure that safety is not affected by
normal operation or malfunction of the diagnostic system, including the
remote diagnostic terminal and software, communication link, and the
control system diagnostic interface and software.
Consideration should be given to:
Security and control of access;
Communication between diagnostician and plant personnel;

Restricted mode of operation; passive (monitoring only), active
(control/operator functions), interactive (software change
possible);
Potential for operation outside restricted mode under fault
conditions;
Protection of safety functions from unauthorised modification;
Change control;
Competence of personnel.
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5.3
Control Room Design
This Technical Measures Document refers to codes, standards and best

practice applicable to the design of control rooms.
General Principles
There are two major aspects of control room design that should be taken
into account in the Safety Report these are:
the suitability of the structure of the control room to withstand
possible major hazards events; and
the layout of control rooms and the arrangement of panels, VDUs
etc to ensure effective ergonomic operation of the plant in normal
circumstances and in an emergency.
Control Room Structure
For large plants, control rooms are likely to be situated in separate
buildings away from the process plant which they serve. For medium or
small plants control rooms may be within the plant building or control
panels may be located local to the plant. Whatever the location, control
rooms should be designed to ensure that the risks to the occupants of the
control room are within acceptable limits and that it is suitable for the
purposes of maintaining plant control, should the emergency response
plan require it, following any foreseeable, undesirable event within the
plant.
Events that may affect the control room are:
Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs)
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions (BLEVEs)
Pressure bursts
Exothermic reactions
Toxic gas releases
Fires, including pool fires, jet fires, flash fires and fire balls.
The threat from explosions and pressure bursts should be considered in
the structural design of control building. A methodology for this is
presented in the recent CIA/CISHEC guidance CIA Guidance for the
location and design of occupied building on chemical manufacturing sites.
This considers the vulnerability of the building to possible overpressures
associated with particular events. Buildings should be designed to
withstand an overpressure that will ensure that risks to individuals within
the building are below acceptable limits. Particular attention should be
given to the provision of windows, the presence of heavy equipment on
roofs (e.g. air conditioners) and the ability of internal fixtures to
withstand the building shaking. If windows are present, consideration
should be given to the use of laminated or polycarbonate glass, to
prevent serious injury to occupiers of the control room in the event of an
overpressure. ALARP principles should be applied in these considerations
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and cost benefit used to determine if additional measures should be
applied.
In consideration of toxic gas releases the control room should provide a
safe haven for its occupants. This will include arranging that the building
is adequately sealed to prevent ingress of gases to levels of concentration
that will affect the health and thereby the ability of the operators to
maintain control of the plant. Careful consideration of the building
ventilation system is required to ensure that air intakes are situated away
from areas that may be affected or to arrange that there is no air intake
during an incident, preferably by closure of an automatic valve linked to a
gas analyser.
Measures for protection from fires should ensure the control room will
withstand thermal radiation effects without collapse and that smoke
ingress is controlled. Materials of construction should be fire resistant for
the duration of any possible fire event. Smoke ingress may be controlled
in a similar manner to toxic gas ingress.
Each of these methodologies should be applied to control rooms within
buildings as well as separate control buildings. Control panels on the
plant itself cannot be so easily be protected, therefore diversity and
redundancy should be applied to ensure that plant control can be
maintained in an emergency. Risk Assessments should be undertaken to
demonstrate that primary and secondary (domino) risks are within
acceptable limits.
Human Factors/Ergonomics
Operators should be able to demonstrate that appropriate human factors
considerations have been given to the design, commissioning, and
operation of control rooms under both normal and abnormal plant
operating conditions to reduce the frequency of human error due to
control room deficiencies.
It is vitally important that a control room and its operators are considered
as a whole system and not in isolation of each other. For example a well
designed control room for use by 4 operators is dangerous when staffed
by 3 operators. Similarly, the best-trained operators cannot guarantee
high reliability in a poorly designed control room.
Factors to be taken in account are included on the following paragraphs.
Environmental issues
Layout
Control room dimensions should take into account the 5th and 95th
percentile user.
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The design of the control room should be derived from an

appropriate task analysis method, such as link analysis or
hierarchical task analysis.
Emergency exits should accommodate egress by the 99th
percentile user.
Access and egress should be considered for disabled operators.
Adequate access should be provided throughout the control room.
However, the layout should discourage flow from general circulation
areas to ensure that necessary lines of sight are not obscured.
If there are a number of control rooms operating on the same
system they should adopt similar layouts to ensure consistency.
Operational links between control room operators, such as
communications and lines of site should be considered during the
design stage.
The layout should not hinder verbal and non-verbal communication
and should facilitate team working.
The layout of the control room should reflect the allocation of
responsibility and the requirements for supervision.
The layout should be effective under high and low staffing levels.
Circulation of all personal should be achieved with the minimum of
disruption to operators.
Where supervisory positions will increase the amount of personnel
circulation, it is recommended that these positions are located close
to main entrances.
Distances between workstations should mean that operators are
not sitting within each others intimate zones. As a guide the
minimum spacing distance should be between 300 - 700 mm.
Maintenance
Adequate access should be provided so that inadvertent operation
of equipment during maintenance is not possible.
Behind panel equipment should be appropriately coded to reduce
the potential for human error.
Thermal environment
Temperature and airflow should be adjustable. As a guide,
comfortable temperature for office work should be between 18.3C
and 20.0C with airflow between 0.11 and 0.15 m/s.
Visual
environment
Lighting should be such that it does not create veiling reflections on VDUs
or
other
reflective
surfaces
that
require
monitoring.
The type of lighting should be adequate for the task. i.e. for office work a
lux (lux is the unit of illuminance - measured using a light meter at the
work surface) figure of between 500 - 800 is suggested.
There should be no perceptible flicker from strip lighting.
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It is desirable to provide adjustable lighting for control rooms that are
manned 24 hours a day. During night-time operation lighting is often
dimmed.
Windows in control rooms should not cause veiling reflections on
reflective surfaces. Adequate means of blocking out direct sunlight should
be provided.
Auditory environment
The average noise level within the control room shall not exceed 85
dB(A) during the length of the working day.
For office work a noise level below 40 dB(A) is not desirable as it can
cause interference between operators.
Prolonged, very low or very high frequency noises should be avoided.
Noise levels should not interfere with communications, warning signals,
mental performance (i.e. be distracting).
Man Machine Interface (MMI)
For mental workload, conditions of over and under-arousal should be
avoided. The duration of tasks that have an associated low or high level
of mental workload should be limited. Both these extremes will increase
the likelihood of human error affecting the system. The design of the MMI
should be based on a full Task Analysis.
An interface should provide the operator with the general following
information:
After initiating an action within a system the operator should be
clearly informed of the result of their action.
If there is a delay in the system that prevents the operator from
being informed of the result of his/her action, the system should
inform the operator of this fact.
If an action is made in error then it should be possible to reverse
such an action where it would not be detrimental to plant safety to
do so.
The system should inform the operator of any deviations from safe
operating levels.
Alarms
All employees and contractors on site should know what each alarm
means and what the required response is, if the cause of the alarm
has the potential to affect them.
An alarm should reset automatically if the fault that generated it is
rectified.
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Alarm messages should be presented in a standard format, based

upon existing conventions.
Alarm messages should clearly inform the operator of the reason
for the alarm.
Following an alarm response required by the operator should be
clear.
The coding of alarms should not be based purely on colour, as
colour blind operators will be unable to recognise what the alarm
indicates.
Alarm signals should be at least 10 dB(A) over the background
noise of the control room.
Alarms should not prevent effective communication within the
control room.
An alarm log should be provided to for diagnostic purposes.
The design of the alarm system should prevent masking and
flooding of alarms. Masking is where one alarm noise masks a
similar sounding alarm preventing the operator from detecting the
signal. Flooding happens when a system alarms which has a knock
on effect on other related systems, the result of which is the
triggering of myriad other alarms - flooding the control room with
sound.
Coding techniques
Coding should follow international conventions. Arbitrary coding by
operators can actually propagate, rather than mitigate, human
error if not carried out correctly.
Coding should be consistent across plant.
Coding should be used appropriately.
Example methods of coding are:
Colour
Flash
Brightness
Inverse video/highlighting
Sound frequency
Sound type
Shape 2D/3D
Symbols
Coding should be used redundantly where colour is one of the
coding methods.
Designing displays
Text
The language used should always be capable of being easily
understood by the operator.
Active rather than passive language should be used.
Text should be left justified.
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Sans serif fonts should be used as these have been found to be the
most legible. An example of a sans serif font is Ariel.
Labels
Labelling should be used consistently across plant.
Labels should be used appropriately.
The relationship between labels and the equipment they refer to
should be clear.
Labels should be easily read.
Standard abbreviations should be used where abbreviations are
required.
Display devices
Display devices should be appropriate for the type of information
they are presenting.
Display devices should be grouped logically to improve signal
detection. It is recommended that formal task analysis methods be
performed to determine the optimum arrangement for displays and
their associated controls.
The relationship between a control and its associated display should
be obvious.
The operator should be able to easily understand display feedback.
The response to this feedback should be obvious, wherever
possible.
The control method provided for navigation around displays should
be appropriate for the task.
Graphics
Appropriate presentation methods should be used for information.
A simple guide is presented below:
Method
Numeric
Bar
charts/analog
ue dials
Advantage
Accurate
quantitative
information
Quickly read
Easy to check
whether data is
within limits
Possible to mark
alarm limits
Displays rate of
change well.
Easily compared to
other similarly
presented data.
Disadvantage
Cannot illustrate rate of change or
approach to limit
Rapidly changing data is unreadable
Difficult to locate individual data
items if presented in a list or table.
Movement can potentially distract
operators.
Slow read time.
Inaccurate if numerical value has to
be derived.
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Pictorial
displays
Trend
displays
Provides at a glance
appreciation of
operating conditions
Ideal for showing
plant configurations.
Can improve
operator situational
awareness of plant.
Ideal for presenting
continuously
changing
information.
Operators mental model of the

plant may differ from the mimic.
Can be very difficult to learn.
Inaccurate if numerical value has to

be derived.
Only four parameters can be

displayed
Presents rate of
change in an easily
understood format.
Good for comparing
data plots
Provides historical
data over time
Mimics should follow current conventions for symbols etc.

Mimics should be user tested prior installation to ensure that they
are compatible with the end users mental model of the plant.
Anthropometry
Reach
Control desk/panels should conform to reach distances for the 5th
percentile operator.
Seating
Seating should be anthropometrically sound and should be usable
by both 5th and 95th percentile operators.
Adjustment should be provided to allow the operator set up the
chair to a configuration that is comfortable.
Seating should not promote a slumped posture.
Posture
The workstation should be designed so that it allows the operator to
regularly change their posture or move around the room. This
should not however, be during primary control duties or during an
emergency scenario.
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5.4
Corrosion / Selection of Materials
This Technical Measures Document covers the corrosion of materials and

the selection of materials of construction. Reference is made to relevant
codes of practice and standards.
Introduction
Corrosion is the largest single cause of plant and equipment breakdown
in the process industries. For most applications it is possible to select
materials of construction which are completely resistant to attack by the
process fluids, but the cost of such an approach is often prohibitive. In
practice it is usual to select materials which corrode slowly at a known
rate and to make an allowance for this in specifying the material
thickness. However, a significant proportion of corrosion failures occur
due to some form of localised corrosion, which results in failure in a much
shorter time than would be expected from uniform wastage. Additionally,
it is important to take into account that external atmospheric corrosion
leads to many instances of loss of containment and tends to be a greater
problem than internal corrosion. All these aspects of corrosive behaviour
need to be addressed both at plant design time and during the life of the
plant.
General Principles
The operator should demonstrate that procedures are in place to ensure
that corrosion and the selection of the correct materials of construction
are considered at the process design stage. Additionally the operator
should demonstrate that it has appropriate inspection and maintenance
programmes in place in order to prevent corrosion causing loss of
containment from its process operations. In doing so the following should
be considered:
Process Fluid Corrosion
Corrosion in metallic components occurs when pure metals and their
alloys form stable compounds with the process fluid by chemical reaction
or electrochemical processes resulting in surface wastage. Appreciable
corrosion can be permitted for tanks and piping if anticipated and allowed
for in design thickness, but essentially no corrosion can be permitted in
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fine mesh wire screens, orifice plates and other items in which small
changes in dimensions are critical. Rates of corrosion can be heavily
affected by temperature changes and whilst a material of construction
may be suitable at one temperature it may not be appropriate for use at
a higher temperature with the same process fluid.
The corrosion of non-metallic materials is essentially a physiochemical
process that manifests itself as swelling, cracking or softening of the
material of construction. In many instances nonmetallic materials will
prove to be attractive from an economic and performance view.
The use of various substances as additives to process streams to inhibit
corrosion has found widespread use and is generally most economically
attractive in recirculation systems, however it has also been found to be
attractive in some once through systems such as those encountered in
the petroleum industry. Typical inhibitors used to prevent corrosion of
iron or steel in aqueous solutions are chromates, phosphates, and
silicates. In acid solutions organic sulphides and amides are effective.
Localised Corrosion
There are many forms of localised corrosion than can lead to early failure
of equipment. The prevention of corrosion should be addressed at the
mechanical design stage and proper design to minimise local corrosion
should include free and complete drainage, minimising crevices, no dead
spots in pipework and ease of cleaning and inspection. Some of the more
common types of local corrosion are briefly discussed in this section.
Pitting often occurs where certain impurities such as chlorides are present
in process streams and cooling waters. This is an extreme form of
localised corrosion. Once initiated pits are usually self-accelerating and
can result in rapid failures.
Many
metals
suffer
from
stress
corrosion
cracking
under
certain
conditions. In piping the most frequent failures from stress corrosion

cracking occur with austenitic stainless steels in contact with solutions
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containing chloride. Even trace quantities of chlorides can cause problems

at temperatures above 60C.
Crevice corrosion may occur where liquid is trapped between close fitting
metal surfaces, or between a metal surface or a non metallic material
such as a gasket. Attention to detail at the design and fabrication stage
should be given to areas such as jointing to prevent crevice corrosion.
Localised erosion can occur where equipment orientation causes fluid
velocities to accelerate such as at bends. Some chemicals can be handled
in carbon steel piping because they form protective coatings of ferric
compounds in pipework. Careful design to ensure the coating is not
eroded is necessary.
External Corrosion
Exterior surface corrosion or rusting of pipework occurs by the formation
of iron oxides. Painting to an appropriate specification will significantly
extend the period to the onset of corrosion but the durability of the paint
finish is largely dependent on the quality of the surface preparation.
Improperly installed insulation can provide ideal conditions for corrosion
and should be weatherproofed or otherwise protected from moisture and
spills to avoid contact of the wet material on equipment surfaces.
Application of an impervious coating such as bitumen to the exterior of
the pipework is beneficial in some circumstances.
Cathodic protection is an electrochemical method of corrosion control
which has found widespread application in the protection of carbon steel
underground structures such as pipelines and tanks from soil corrosion.
The process equipment metal surface is made the cathode in an
electrolytic circuit to prevent metal wastage.
Anodic protection is less commonly used and relies on an external
potential control system to maintain the metal in a passive condition. This
form of corrosion protection has found practical application in the
sulphuric acid manufacturing industry.
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Materials Selection
Corrosion rates are expressed in terms of inches per year of surface
wastage and are used to provide a corrosion allowance in the design
thickness of equipment such as vessels and pipework. Operators will
often use data based on historical experience from plant operations to aid
them in determining appropriate corrosion allowances. Alternatively
corrosion charts are widely available that give corrosion rates for many
combinations of materials of construction and process fluids and normally
a range of values will be provided for various process temperatures. In
some instances, particularly where there is a mixture of chemicals
present, appropriate data may not exist and corrosion tests may be
necessary in order to determine the suitability of equipment. Operators
should be able to demonstrate the use of corrosion allowances in
equipment specification and design. The sources of data used should be
traceable.
Whilst carbon and stainless steels are commonly used materials of
construction, increasing use is being made of nonmetallic and lined or
plastic process equipment. The selection of the material of construction
should taken into account worst case process conditions that may occur
under foreseeable upset conditions and should be applied to all
components including valves, pipe fittings, instruments and gauges. Both
composition (e.g. chlorides, moisture) and temperature deviations can
have a significant direct effect on the rate of corrosion. The operator
should demonstrate that procedures are in place to ensure that potential
deviations in process conditions such as fluid temperature, pressure and
composition are identified by competent persons and assessed in relation
to the selection of materials of construction for pipework systems.
A wide range of plastics are available for use as materials of construction
and can be used in areas such as handling inorganic salt solutions where
metals are unsuitable. The use of plastic linings is widespread in
equipment such as tanks, pipes, and drums. However, their use is limited
to moderate temperatures and they are generally unsuitable for use in
abrasive duties. Some of the more commonly used plastics are PVC, PTFE
and polypropylene.
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Special glasses can be bonded to steel, providing an impervious liner.

Glass or 'epoxy' lined equipment is widely used in severely corrosive acid
duties. The glass lining can be easily damaged and careful attention is
required. The thin paint like coatings are unlikely to give full protection
due to defects and the most dependable barrier linings are those which
are built up in multiple layers to a depth in the region of 3 mm.
Performance Tests
Normally testing is carried out in order to determine the suitability of a
material of construction for handling a process fluid. However, testing can
be used for different purposes. Typically this might be to justify a
modified inspection frequency of equipment on an existing plant.
There are a variety of test methods available. Commonly test specimens
consisting of a small strip or 'coupon' of the material of interest are
exposed to the process fluid. The weight loss of the test specimen over a
time period is measured in order to determine the corrosion rate. Testing
can be carried out on the plant, in the laboratory, or on a pilot plan
depending on the situation.
Where laboratory testing is carried out using standard test methods there
are difficulties in interpreting results and translating them into plant
performance. Care is required to ensure that the test fluid is exactly the
same as on the process plant. Discrepancies in test conditions such as
trace impurities, dissolved gases, velocity, and turbulence can lead to
erroneous results.
Maintenance Requirements
Process equipment handling hazardous materials should be inspected at
regular frequencies, both internally and externally. Localised corrosion
can be unpredictable and fabrication defects such as poor welds can be
present. Linings can deform or be damaged. Typically the glass lining on
a jacketed reactor can suffer thermal shock or a static discharge may
occur through the lining. The frequency of inspection can be amended
once an inspection history has been built up and the condition of a piece
of equipment can be reasonably predicted. The operator should
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demonstrate that it has inspection and maintenance programmes in place

for hazardous process equipment including lagged systems. Where
equipment is lined electrical continuity tests for lining defects should be
carried out where appropriate. Cathodic and anodic protection systems
should
be
regularly
checked
to
ensure
continued
protection.
Control of Operating Conditions

Where control of corrosion is dependent on the concentration of
contaminants or moisture the operator should demonstrate that
procedures and the necessary controls are in place to maintain a safe
operating condition. Similarly where inhibitors are added or systems such
as cathodic protection are used the operator should demonstrate that
these systems are inspected and adequately maintained to ensure
continued protection of the process.
Industry Applications
Chlorine
The flow rate of liquid chlorine through pipework is restricted to 2 m/s to
avoid removing the ferric chloride coating on the pipe surface which
protects against erosion / corrosion of carbon steel. Wet chlorine gas
corrodes mild steel and ebonite or rubber lined steel is used for this duty.
Chlorine gas handled at temperatures in excess of 200C in carbon steel
can result in chlorine / steel fires. Zinc can be used for this duty, but for
low temperature
embrittlement.
Bromine
chlorine
special
steels
are
required
to
avoid
PVDF pipework and PVDF lined steel are commonly used for handling
bromine. If the bromine is 'dry' then metals such as monel and hastelloy
can be used. Vessels are normally constructed of either lead, PVDF or
GRP lined steel.
Sulphuric Acid
Corrosion protection of mild steel vessels occurs by the formation of an
iron sulphate coating. Any condition leading to excessive turbulence can
result in the removal of the coating and corrosion. Additionally the
temperature influence on corrosion rate varies with different strengths of
acid and consequently it is necessary to define maximum operating
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temperatures. Chemical lead is widely used where steel is unsuitable and

PVC can be used in certain applications.
Hydrochloric Acid
This acid is very corrosive towards most of the common metals and
alloys. This is exacerbated where aeration or contamination by oxidising
agents is present. Copper is particularly prone to this problem. Also many
failures occur due to the presence of minor impurities such as ferric
chloride. Plastics and rubber-lined steel are widely used for pipework and
small vessels.
Ammonia
Materials of construction for ammonia are dependent on the operating
temperature. Whilst mild steel may be used at ambient temperature
special steels are required at low temperatures to avoid embrittlement.
Impurities in liquid ammonia such as air or carbon dioxide can cause
stress corrosion cracking of mild steel. Ammonia is highly corrosive
towards copper and zinc.
Hydrofluoric Acid
Bulk storage of 70% acid or greater may be in mild steel or PVDF tanks.
Polyethylene, polypropylene, and PVDF are commonly used for
construction of major components. PTFE is often used for smaller
components such as gaskets. Glass or GRP should never be used.
Oxygen
Materials suitable for liquid oxygen service are nickel steel, austenitic
stainless steels, and copper or aluminium alloys. Carbon steels and
plastics are brittle at low temperatures and should not be used on liquid
oxygen duty. PTFE is the most widely used sealant.
Hydrogen
At temperatures below 120C carbon steel can be used up to high
pressures. At elevated temperatures and significant pressures hydrogen
will penetrate carbon steel and react with the carbon to form methane.
This results in a loss of ductility and cracking or blistering of the steel. For
high temperature applications steel alloys containing molybdenum and
steel are satisfactory.
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5.5
Introduction
A variety of toxic and flammable chemicals are frequently stored and
transported in drums and cylinders. Although individual containers hold
relatively small inventories, a single cylinder of a compressed or liquefied
toxic gas can present a significant hazard to personnel. Additionally large
quantities of drums and cylinders are often stored together giving rise to
potentially large inventories of hazardous materials. The movement and
connection / disconnection of drums and cylinders to process plant
requires the direct involvement of operating personnel giving rise to the
potential for human error to cause incidents.
General Principles
Storage Location
Both the hazards of the material and the size of the inventory need to be
considered in determining where a store should be located.
Considerations should include the distance from other stored materials,
process plant, traffic routes and occupied buildings.. Where separation
distances are inadequate measures such as fire walls can be employed to
reduce the impact of incidents. The operator should demonstrate that the
storage location and design has taken into account site specific security
requirements and the potential for vandalism.
Ventilation
The preferred location for the storage of drummed flammable liquids and
compressed / liquefied gases is in the open air, to allow vapours to be
dispersed effectively. When located in buildings, the operator should
demonstrate that there is an adequate level of ventilation achieved by
either the presence of a sufficient size and number of permanent
openings such as louvres or mechanical ventilation. If stored indoors,
flammable gases such as LPG may only be stored in purpose built
compartments or buildings constructed with fire resistant walls and
explosion relief.
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Compatibility With Other Stored Materials

Toxic, flammable or self reactive materials should not in general be
stored in the same location (see Technical Measures Document
(Segregation of Hazardous Materials). The operators risk assessment
should demonstrate the compatibility of the substances stored and the
suitability of the arrangements.
Layout
Drums and cylinders should be stored in a safe manner. Both the height
and method of stacking should take into account the hazard of the
material stored and the construction of the container. Racking or freestanding multi layer stacks can be used for drummed materials storing
low hazard liquids. Consideration should be given to the detection of
leaks from containers and the method for collection and disposal of such
spills to reduce the possibility of cross-contamination and domino effects.
Training should be provided to operators on dealing with spills and
emergency procedures. Adequate access for fork lift trucks should be
provided. Pressurised cylinders and drums should be stored with their
valves uppermost in secure manner. The size of any particular stack
should be limited and separation distances should be provided between
stacks. Drums should not be filled or emptied within the storage area.
Transportation
Whilst drums containing flammable liquids can be transported securely on
a simple pallet, cylinders and drums containing compressed or liquefied
gases require careful and appropriate means of transport such as cylinder
trolleys or purpose designed attachments for fork lift trucks should be
used at all times. The operator should maintain records demonstrating
that personnel involved in the movement of drums and cylinders have
received training in the hazards involved in handling them and in the
operation of any machinery involved such as cranes and fork lift trucks.
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Containment of Spills
Suitable precautions should be in place for the containment of leaked
materials. Where liquids are handled suitable spillage containment such
as bunding and drainage sumps should be in place. Arrangements should
be in place for the routine drainage of rainwater from sumps. Where
materials that react with water are stored outdoors, the operators risk
assessment should demonstrate the suitability of the arrangements For
the storage of toxic gases, location of the containers in a purpose
designed indoor store will reduce the rate at which gas is released to the
environment.
Control of Ignition Sources
Where flammable liquids or gases are stored, the area should be subject
to hazardous area classification for the control of ignition sources. This
requirement should be reflected both in the equipment installed and in
the control of operational and maintenance activities in the location. The
movement of drums and cylinders often involves the use of fork lift
trucks, which can provide a source of ignition for flammable vapours. Any
vehicle operating in a zoned area should be protected to an appropriate standard.
Flammable Liquids
Containers should be stored in the open air where practical, but if stored
inside five air changes per hour is considered a sufficient ventilation rate.
Standard 205 litre metal drums should be stacked no more than three
high and preferably on pallets or racking. The maximum stack size should
be 300,000 litres with at least 4 metres between stacks. Storage should
be on an impervious surface such as concrete and be bunded with
drainage towards a sump or other suitable handling system.
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LPG Cylinders
Cylinders should be stored preferably in the open air on a concrete or
load bearing surface. Flammable liquids, combustible, corrosive, oxidising
materials, toxic materials or compressed gas cylinders should be kept
separate from LPG containers in general. Containers should be stored
with their valves uppermost. The maximum size of any stack should not
exceed 30,000 kg. For storage indoors, no more than 5000 kg may be
stored in each purpose designed building compartment and a maximum
of
five
compartments
may
exist
in
a
single
building.
Chlorine Cylinders
The vast majority of chlorine cylinder and drum stores are located
indoors and should be solely used for storing chlorine. Access doors
should fit closely to help contain any leak. These stores should be
protected from any nearby radiant heat hazards. The store should be at
least 5 m from any roadway. A cylinder store should be at least 20 m
from the site boundary and a drum store 60 m. Chlorine gas detectors /
alarms should normally be provided.
Risk assessments should be carried out to consider hazards arising from
mishandling (dropping of containers in transport/handling), incorrect
operation of valves and failure to connect correctly, maintenance errors
and damage by external sources (domino, vehicle impacts, etc.)
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5.6
Pressure Plants / Reactors
Introduction
If pressure equipment fails in use, it can seriously injure or kill people
nearby and cause serious damage to property.
To minimise the risks when working with systems or equipment which
contain a liquid or gas under pressure. It does not cover gas cylinders
(now called transportable pressure receptacles or transportable pressure
vessels), or tanks and tank containers.
As an employer or self-employed person, you have a duty to provide a
safe workplace and safe work equipment. Designers, manufacturers,
suppliers, installers, users and owners also have duties. Employers have
a further duty to consult any safety or employee representatives on
health and safety matters. Where none are appointed, employers should
consult the workforce direct.
Examples of pressure systems and equipment are:
boilers and steam heating systems;

pressurised process plant and piping;
compressed air systems (fixed and portable);
pressure cookers, autoclaves and retorts;
heat exchangers and refrigeration plant;
valves, steam traps and filters;
pipework and hoses; and
pressure gauges and level indicators.
Principal causes of incidents are:
poor equipment and/or system design;

poor maintenance of equipment;
an unsafe system of work;
operator error, poor training/supervision;
poor installation; and
inadequate repairs or modifications.
The main hazards are:

impact from the blast of an explosion or release of compressed
liquid or gas;
impact from parts of equipment that fail or any flying debris;
contact with the released liquid or gas, such as steam; and
fire resulting from the escape of flammable liquids or gases.
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Reduce the risk of failure:

The level of risk from the failure of pressure systems and equipment
depends on a number of factors including:
the pressure in the system;
the type of liquid or gas and its properties;
the suitability of the equipment and pipe work that contains it;
the age and condition of the equipment;
the complexity and control of its operation;
the prevailing conditions (eg a process carried out at high
temperature); and
the skills and knowledge of the people who design, manufacture,
install, maintain, test and operate the pressure equipment and
systems.
Provide safe and suitable equipment
To reduce the risks you need to know (and act on) some basic
precautions,
When installing new equipment, ensure that it is suitable for its
intended purpose and that it is installed correctly. This requirement
can normally be met by using the appropriate design, construction
and installation standards and/or codes of practice.
The pressure system should be designed and manufactured from
suitable materials. You should make sure that the vessel, pipes and
valves have been made of suitable materials for the liquids or gases
they will contain.
Ensure the system can be operated safely without having to climb
or struggle through gaps in pipe work or structures,
Example.
Be careful when repairing or modifying a pressure system. Following a
major repair and/or modification, you may need to have the whole
system re-examined before allowing the system to come back into use.
Know the operating conditions
Know what liquid or gas is being contained, stored or processed (eg
is it toxic/flammable?).
Know the process conditions, such as the pressures and
temperatures.
Know the safe operating limits of the system and any equipment
directly linked to it or affected by it.
Ensure there is a set of operating instructions for all the equipment
and for the control of the whole system including emergencies.
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Ensure that appropriate employees have access to these

instructions, and are properly trained in the operation and use of
the equipment or system (see the section on training).
Fit suitable protective devices and ensure they function properly
Ensure suitable protective devices are fitted to the vessels, or

pipework (eg safety valves and any electronic devices which cause
shutdown when the pressure, temperature or liquid or gas level
exceed permissible limits).
Ensure the protective devices have been adjusted to the correct
settings.
If warning devices are fitted, ensure they are noticeable, either by
sight or sound.
Ensure protective devices are kept in good working order at all
times.
Ensure that, where fitted, protective devices such as safety valves
and bursting discs discharge to a safe place.
Ensure that, once set, protective devices cannot be altered except
by an authorised person.
Carry out suitable maintenance
All pressure equipment and systems should be properly maintained.

There should be a maintenance programme for the system as a
whole. It should take into account the system and equipment age,
its uses and the environment.
Look for tell-tale signs of problems with the system, eg if a safety
valve repeatedly discharges, this could be an indication that either
the system is overpressurising or the safety valve is not working
correctly.
Look for signs of wear and corrosion.
Systems should be depressurised before maintenance work is
carried out.
Ensure there is a safe system of work, so that maintenance work is
carried out properly and under suitable supervision.
Make provision for appropriate training

Everybody operating, installing, maintaining, repairing, inspecting and
testing pressure equipment should have the necessary skills and
knowledge to carry out their job safely so you need to provide suitable
training. This includes all new employees, who should have initial training
and be supervised closely.
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Additional training or retraining may be required if:

the job changes;
the equipment or operation changes; or
skills have not been used for a while.
Have the equipment examined
You must not allow your pressure system to be operated (or hired out)
until you have a written scheme of examination and ensured that the
system has been examined.
The written scheme of examination must cover all protective

devices. It must also include every pressure vessel and those parts
of pipelines and pipework which, if they fail, may give rise to
danger.
The written scheme must specify the nature and frequency of
examinations, and include any special measures that may be
needed to prepare a system for a safe examination.
The pressure system must be examined in accordance with the
written scheme by a competent person.
For fired (heated) pressure systems, such as steam boilers, the
written scheme should include an examination of the system when
it is cold and stripped down and when it is running under normal
conditions.
The key steps are:

Decide what items of equipment and parts of the plant should be
included in the scheme. This must include all protective devices. It
must also include pressure vessels, and parts of pipework, which if
they failed could give rise to danger.
The scheme must be drawn up (or certified as suitable) by a
competent person. It must specify whether the examination is inservice or out-of service and how often the system is to be
examined.
The system must be examined by a competent person in
accordance with that scheme.
Choose a competent person
You must assure yourself that the competent person has the
necessary knowledge, experience and independence to undertake
the functions required of them.
The competent person carrying out examinations under a written
scheme does not necessarily need to be the same one who
prepares or certifies the scheme as suitable.
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A competent person may be:

a company's own in-house inspection department; an individual
person (eg, a self-employed person); or
an organisation providing independent inspection services.
The competent person undertaking an examination of a pressure system
in accordance with the written scheme of examination takes the
responsibility for all aspects of the examination. For example, on systems
where ancillary examination techniques (eg non-destructive testing) are
undertaken, the competent person must assume responsibility for the
results of these tests and their interpretation even though the tests may
have been carried out by someone else.
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5.7
Earthing
This Technical Measures Document refers to codes and standards

applicable to earthing of plant.
General Principles
Earthing can classified in two ways:
System earthing;
Equipment earthing.
System earthing is essential to the proper operation of the system,

whereas equipment earthing concerns the safety of personnel and plant.
A key function of equipment earthing is to provide a controlled method to
prevent the build up of static electricity, thus reducing the risk of
electrical discharge in potentially hazardous environments. Generally, a
resistance to earth of less than 106
electricity in all situations.
will ensure safe dissipation of static
Flammable Liquids Transfer

The major hazard involved with the transfer of flammable liquids is the
build up of static due to charge separation with potential for discharge
resulting in fire and subsequent loss of containment. Certain non-polar
liquids can be charged, e.g. while flowing through pipelines. Detectable
and hazardous charges must be expected if the specific resistance of the
liquid exceeds 108 .m.
The potential for accumulation of static charges may strongly increase if
the liquid contains a non-miscible component or a suspended solid.
Examples include:
Crystallisation processes in toluene;
Quantities of water in toluene.
With the presence of a second phase, velocities less than 1 m/s should be
employed.
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Measures that can be employed to reduce these hazards include:

Ensure that the pipe transferring the liquid is completely filled to
exclude the formation of explosive mixtures;
Wherever possible ensure no contaminants / solids are present;
Utilise inert gas blanketing;

When transferring flammable liquids by blowing across use an
inert gas;
Avoid mechanical mixing or agitation of low conductivity liquids

wherever possible;
Use of ball valves with earthed metal spheres;
Employ low transfer velocities. For only partially filled pipes, or

pipes which discharge into containers, the velocity is to be limited
as follows:
For chargeable esters: maximum 10 m/s;

For mineral oil products (e.g. gasoline, petrol, kerosene, paraffin,
jet fuel) and for other chargeable liquids (excluding carbon
disulphide and ether):
Nominal pipe
diameter, mm
Velocity, m/s
Quantity, l/min
40
7.0
50
80
6.0 3.6
100
200
400
600
3.0
1.8
1.3
1.0
600 800 1100 1600 3500 10000 17000
If these velocities are adhered to, no hazardous charges will be generated

within homogenous liquids. But when suspensions of crystals in nonconductive liquids are conveyed, hazardous charges may always be
generated, even at velocities below 1 m/s.
For ether and carbon disulphide in pipelines up to a diameter of 25

mm, the maximum velocity should not exceed 1m/s. Larger pipes
require lower velocities;
A general rule for all homogeneous liquids (except carbon
disulphide and ether) and all pipelines: at velocities below 1 m/s,

no dangerous charges will be generated;
Flanges should be earth bonded;
Use sub-surface dip pipes or bottom entry filling when discharging

into vessels;
Ensure regular inspection and testing of earth bonding.
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Powder Transfer
Powder transfer can be carried out by several different methods:
Screw conveying;
Vacuum transfer;
Pneumatic conveying;
There are two distinct types of pneumatic conveying used for powder
transfer, namely low pressure / dilute phase or high pressure / dense
phase. Low pressure / dilute phase systems tend to employ high system
velocities ranging from 10 to 25 m/s, whereas high pressure / dense
phase systems tend to employ low system velocities ranging from 0.25 to
2.5 m/s.
Intensive charging of the conveyed material and pipeline is possible
during pneumatic powder transfer potentially resulting in:
Electrostatic discharge between conductive parts (e.g. between

metal flanges and a part of the steel structure of the building);
Entrapment of considerable charges into receiving containers.
Powders can be divided into three groups depending upon the volume
resistivity of the material of which the particles are composed. These
groups are:
Low resistivity powders, e.g. metals having volume resistivities up

to about 106 .m;
Medium resistivity powders, e.g. many organic powders, such as
flour, having volume resistivities in the approximate range 106 .m
to 109 .m;
High resistivity powders, e.g. certain organic powders, many
synthetic polymers and some minerals, such as quartz, having volume

resistivities above about 109 .m.
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Measures that reduce these hazards include:

Ensure pipelines used for pneumatic conveying are made from
metal with good earth bonding. Resistance to ground for all
conductive components should be < 10 ohms;
Ground all operators loading powder so that their resistance to

ground is < 1 x108 ohms;
Avoid use of insulating coatings on the inner surfaces of metal
containers and pipelines;

Use plastic flanges with plastic transfer lines;
Avoid use of coating or sheathing on pipelines constructed of
insulating material;
Use antistatic plastic or paper bags in or around flammable gases,
vapours or dusts having minimum ignition energies of < 4 mJ;
Discharge powder into the container or silo via intermediate loading
equipment, e.g. a cyclone fabricated from conductive material to
reduce velocities and earth charge. (Alternatively rotary valves, bag
dump hoppers or scroll feeder systems can be employed).
Offloading
Stringent precautions are required to prevent accumulations of static
electricity and to give protection against lightning. Standard copper strip
(25 mm x 3 mm section or equivalent) is usually employed for the main
earthing system. This should be connected to at least one copperearthing rod that has been tested and shown to have a total resistance to
earth of <10 ohms.
The operator should employ a bulk loading and offloading procedure. This
should include written instruction that state when offloading flammable
liquids, the driver must first connect the tanker to the earthing
connection at the off-loading point. The electrically conducting discharge
hose can then be connected to the liquid intake point on the storage. The
electrical resistance between the two couplings on a flexible hose must
not be higher than 106 ohms.
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Temporary Storage
Before temporary storage is brought on line for storage of flammable
liquids or explosible powders, an assessment of earthing provision with
associated earth testing should be undertaken. This should encompass
the
storage
vessel
and
all
supporting
ancillary
equipment.
Flexible Pipelines
When flexible hoses are employed, measures that can be adopted
include:
Where velocities exceed 1m/s hoses should be made of conductive

material or non-conductive material with embedded fine wire mesh.
The mesh should be bonded to the metal flanges or coupling of the
hose;
If a metal hose with a liner is employed, the metal mantle and

flanges or couplings must be bonded to each other;
The electrical resistance between the two couplings must not be
higher than 106 ohms. This resistance is to be measured at regular

intervals;
Use of ball valves with earthed metal spheres.
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5.8
Causes of Plant Failure

Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Corrosion
Erosion
External Loading
Impact
Pressure
Temperature
Vibration
Wrong Equipment
Defective Equipment
Human Error
1. CORROSION
Corrosion is caused by electro-chemical processes in which a metal reacts
with its environment to form an oxide or compound by the formation of
cells comprising an anode (the deteriorating metal), a cathode (adjacent
metal) and a conducting solution (acid / salts). It can occur both
internally and externally to pipelines, vessels, plant, machinery,
structures and supports.
The materials selection philosophy aspect of the design phase of all plant
and structures should take into account the anticipated conditions
(pressure, temperature and atmosphere) and the contents of the system
in order to either minimise corrosion or to make adequate allowances for
it in the form of additional material thicknesses.
The initial corrosion on some metals creates an impervious coating, which
prevents further corrosion taking place.
Corrosion can be exacerbated by utilising different materials which then
set up an electrochemical cell which in turn causes wastage of the anode.
1.1 Types
1. Oxygen pitting, bi-metallic (internal and external).
2. Water lines, low velocity/stagnant conditions, under millscale
deposits, crevice-type corrosion (differential aeration), localised at
areas of dissimilar metals (galvanic action).
3. Carbon dioxide uniform loss, specific through turbulence, wet gas
Mesa type (internal). Note: Mesa type corrosion is a descriptive
word emanating from the Mesa region of Spain which is noted for
its table top sharp edged plateau with shallow broad valleys.
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4. Hot aerated water lines, where CO2 partial pressure is 0.2 barg,
areas of turbulence (bends, tees, weld upsets), wet gas lines.
5. Hydrogen Sulphide (internal).
6. Sour service, partial pressure > 0.003 barg, bacterial attack on
sulphates in low acid conditions.
7. Stress Corrosion Cracking (internal and external).
8. Chloride SCC in austenitic steels at temperatures above 60C,
combined corrosive and tensile stress, externally.
9. Can be associated with damaged / wet coverings and insulation
material, inadequate or maloperating cathodic protection.
1.2 Prevention
Adequate design parameters.
1. Choice of materials, taking into accounts all envisaged conditions
and contained fluids or products.
2. Avoiding the use of dissimilar metals.
3. Suitable corrosion allowances.
4. Joint design and configuration.
5. Applied coatings (internal and external).
6. Drainage facilities.
7. Inspection and monitoring facilities.
8. Installation considerations.
1.3 Monitoring
a) Condition Monitoring (containment system):
i) Planned inspection procedures.
ii) Planned corrosion monitoring procedures, by ultrasonic thickness
measurement, probes, coupons, cathodic
protection,etc.
b) Condition Monitoring. (contained fluids):
i) Continuous process and operation monitoring.
ii) Planned application of inhibitors to contained fluids.
iii) Regular checks and monitoring that the contained fluids are
within the design parameters.
c) Monitoring at manufacture and installation:
i) Storage and protection of pipework and plant at fabrication
stage and prior to commissioning.
ii) Correct selection and usage of fabrication methods and
consumables.
iii) Satisfactory installation to avoid deadlegs, moisture traps,
environmental hazards.
iv) Proper selection and application of monitoring and inspection
procedures during fabrication and installation.
v) Suitable insulation and protection during installation. Equipment
and installation drainage points etc.
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1.4 Examples
1. External Chlorine induced SCC of Oil/Gas HP Separator due to
warm, (90C) wet insulation attached to solid stainless steel
(duplex).
2. Stress Corrosion Cracking in duplex stainless steel pipe welds due
to low pH, high chloride and high hydrogen sulphide environment
(Acid washing downhole safety valves).
3. Pin-point corrosion of heat exchanger tubes in fin-fan coolers on
closed circuit cooling water systems due to inadequate addition of
corrosion inhibitors and tested alkalinity of the medium.
4. External corrosion of pipework, vessels and storage tanks in places
that usually are covered, but where insulation breaks have
occurred, particularly in harsh environments. e.g. coastal locations,
(gas terminals etc.)
5. External corrosion of boiler blowdown elbows and associated
pipework, located in floor sumps, which become fouled with wet
warm debris.
6. Cavitational corrosion caused by bubble collapse in process systems
and more commonly in boiler water tubes as scab pitting.
7. Internal corrosion occurring in dead-legs on systems which do not
have adequate draining facilities, or are not operated as frequently
as required.
8. Floor plate and lower shell plate corrosion due to smothering with
wet acidic/chlorinated waste material and debris.
9. Preferential corrosion attack in the heat affected zone (HAZ) of
welds in carbon steel gas flow lines, initiated from a fairly benign
gas output at start up of production to an inclusion of degrees of
corrosive trace elements without proper degrees of inhibition being
implemented.
1.5 Key Words
Trace elements, corrosive extraction products, oxygen bubbling, H2S
attack, damp warm conditions (under insulation), sub-surface (soil),
acidic, chlorine content, preferential attack, drainage, design, monitoring.
2.EROSION
Caused by internally by excessive fluid velocity, change in phase,
cavitation, change in flow direction, presence of particulates.
Caused externally by sand, salt, water (rain and sea), wind, cavitation,
venturi effect round buildings etc. Pressure leaks can cause impingement
and have a lancing effect at the leak itself and at areas where the leaking
fluid strikes another surface.
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2.1 Prevention
Adequate design parameters:
i)
Choice of materials.
ii)
Plant layout and siting.
iii)
Coverings and coatings.
iv)
Filtration.
v)
Reduction of dissolved gases in fluids.
vi)
Avoidance of abrupt changes in pipe section and short radius
bends.
2.2 Monitoring
Routine inspection programmes (visual supported by ultrasonic thickness
measurements where appropriate).
i) Non-intrusive internal inspection and monitoring at suspected
system sites (bends, Tees, elbows etc.).
ii) Intrusive inspection and monitoring at areas where erosion is
probable.
2.3 Examples
1. Failure of bends on 50 mmNB pipework carrying pulverised
anthracite to the combustion chamber of a fluidised bed steam
generator at the Grimesthorpe European power station project.
2. Thinning of swept bends of flowlines carrying first oil from offshore
extraction due to the scouring effect of sand particulates.
3. Perforation of U bends in tubular heat exchangers.
4. Rapid perforation of adjacent boiler downcomer tubes from
tubewall leak through cracking.
5. Thinning of exposed pipe through sand blasting in desert and
seaside locations.
6. Turbulence effect created by incorrectly fitted / incorrectly sized
flange gaskets.
3. EXTERNAL LOADING
Can be caused by the effects of snow, winds, ice, floods, support failure,
system/equipment failure, environmental failures (earth movements),
filling / emptying, change in contained fluids.
3.1 Prevention
Adequately considered design parameters.
i) Adequate consideration of environmental factors, (wind, snow, ice
formations, earth tremors).
ii) Provision of spiral deflector vanes on pipework, tall vessels etc.
iii) Provision of guyed supports for tall structures.
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iv) Design considerations for supports and hangers (to include

perceived environmental loadings).
v) Golfballing of large spherical or cylindrical storage and process
vessels.
vi) Adequate foundations provision.
vii) Provision of trace heating for the prevention of ice or snow buildup.
3.2 Monitoring
1. Regular, scheduled external inspection regimes with dedicated
methods and reviews.
2. Regular scheduled maintenance of trace heating facilities etc.
3. Documented procedures for information sharing in the event of a
change of use, including change in contained fluids.
4. IMPACT
From road and rail vehicles, failed equipment, or other sources, including
aircraft, and dropped or swinging loads or objects.
4.1 Prevention
1. Adequate provision to ensure surrounding equipment, building
attachments, are safe and secure.
2. Avoid siting plant within the arc of cranes, winches, gantries, etc.
3. Avoid crossing roads with pipelines, and ensure sufficient clearance
for all foreseeable vehicle travel (including JCBs with elevated
buckets).
4. Employ rigid guarding where necessary (likelihood, possibility).
5. Adequate distance between plant and road, railways, rivers and
canals etc.
6. Careful siting of small bore pipework in relation to walkways and
access points.
4.2 Monitoring
Surveillance of plant, surroundings and adjacent equipment.
4.3 Examples
Distorted and ruptured pipelines on overhead pipetrack resulting from
impact by JCB raised bucket during travel (illegal).
Indented
pipelines
from
equipment
miss-handling
during
removal/replacement for refurbishment or inspection during refinery
downtimes (numerous).
Sheet steel cladding of crane structures becoming detached and
impacting on pipework during fall.
Distortion and severance of unprotected small bore pipework in way of
regular human access.
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5. PRESSURE
Failure due to over-pressure caused by control failure, external fire,
internal explosion, excessive reaction rate, liquid expansion, exothermic
reaction, or collapse caused by vacuum.
5.1 Prevention
1. Design parameters to include suitable process pressure controllers
for systems, particularly where multi-system inter-action is
required.
2. Installation of suitable additional pressure controlled shutdown or
warning devices where operational environments deem this a
necessity (Gas terminals, chemical plant etc.).
3. Design parameters should ensure conditions where there may be a
potential for internal explosion (e.g. through mixture of gasses) are
fully considered.
4. Design and operating procedures should take account of the
possibility of excessive reaction rates and limit the resulting rises in
pressure and / or temperature to acceptable limits.
possibility of liquid expansion to limit the resulting rises in pressure
and / or temperature to acceptable limits.
possibility of exothermic reaction and limit the resulting rises in
pressure and / or temperature to acceptable limits.
7. Design parameters should include suitable prevention devices
(vacuum breakers) and structural strength where vacuum
generation is possible unless the plant has been designed to safely
withstand vacuum conditions.
8. Fitting of suitable relieving devices to the systems and vessels
(pressure safety valves, bursting discs, fusible plugs) which have
adequate margin between system operating pressure and actuation
pressure and which prevent design parameters being exceeded.
9. System dump facilities in case of over-pressure.
5.2 Monitoring
1. Regular programmed and audited testing and calibration of
pressure control, relieving, indicating and warning devices.
2. Regular review of design codes and guidance for pressure systems.
3. Regular review of safety notices regarding incidents to pressure
systems.
4. Regular review of the operators awareness and skills.
5. A formal procedure to review operating procedures in the event of
change of use or contents of a pressure system.
6. Regular and formal testing and maintenance of vent and flare
headers.
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6. TEMPERATURE
Excessive excursions of high and low temperatures due to process
upsets, fire, adverse weather conditions, fouling, blockages or phase
changes can lead to failure due to rapid or large temperature variations.
Rapid temperature changes or low temperatures can lead to cracking.
High temperatures can lead to failure due to loss of structural strength
without the design pressure being exceeded.
6.1 Prevention (internal)
1. Adequate thermostatic control of the system contents.
2. Design parameters adequate for predictable temperature
variations.
3. Provision of insulation where required.
6.2 Prevention (external)
1. Temperature sensors, gas sensors.
2. The provision of blast and fire walls where required.
3. Deluge systems provision.
4. Insulation to the systems vessels and pipe work.
6.3 Monitoring
1. Implement regular inspection and testing of all alarm, control and
shut down devices.
2. Regular surveillance and monitoring of insulation, fireproofing etc.
7. VIBRATION
Vibration can be generated through changes in phase, water hammer,
liquid slugs in gas systems, gas bubbles or pockets in liquid systems,
high pressure drop, cavitation, incorrect siting of rotating machinery,
incorrect pipe supports, loss of buffer gas in damper vessels, damaged
supports and hangers, all of which can give rise to fatigue failure.
7.1 Prevention
1. Ensure that system operation and contained fluid flow
characteristics are constantly monitored for prevention of
mechanical shocking caused by fluctuations.
2. Ensuring that provision is made for liquid systems to be vented to
prevent gas entrainment.
3. Accurately determined siting of mechanical and rotating machinery.
4. Pipelines and pipework layout is are such that the effect of vibration
is minimised.
5. All pipelines and pipework is properly supported, and such supports
and hangers are suitable for the purpose.
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6. All equipment and piping holding down devices are adequate and
secure.
7. Adequate shock / vibration mountings are fitted to plant and
machinery.
8. There is adequate provision of damper vessels at pump/compressor
discharges, (especially reciprocating type).
7.2 Monitoring
1. Adequate, programmed, audited surveillance by visual and
electromechanical means.
2. Machinery vibration analysis exercises carried out, results reported
and acted on.
3. Monitoring and recording of damper vessel precharge pressure.
8. WRONG EQUIPMENT
Wrong equipment can be fitted at installation or be supplied as a
replacement during the life of the plant or at a modification. The
equipment may be wrong because it has been incorrectly specified, or
because the supplier has not supplied in accordance with the
specification.
Wrongly supplied equipment can lead to failure due to incompatible
materials, wrong design, or it may have a rating or duty other than that
which it is intended to fulfil.
8.1 Prevention
1. Formal system for ensuring that only equipment specified under the
design approval process is supplied and fitted.
2. Adequate system design parameters from inception to first
fabrication.
3. Audited and auditable TIPS (Technical Integrity Procurement
System) in place for new and replacement items, including
pipework, steelwork, fixtures and fittings.
4. Auditable obedience to design procedures during build, to include
formal design change procedures and engineering query routes to
fulfilment.
5. Manufacturer, supplier, installer, operator and maintainer
knowledge assessment and awareness systems are in place and
audited.
6. Auditable maintenance procedures, check lists, equipment lists in
place.
7. Permit to work systems in place.
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9. DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Defective equipment can be supplied when the plant is initially installed
or subsequently as a replacement or during a modification.
This category covers circumstances where the equipment was correctly
specified, but was defective in some way, such as the materials, the
duty, or it may have been wrongly assembled. It may not work in
accordance with the specification, in terms of performance, or the trips,
interlocks, protective devices etc. may not function as required.
The materials of construction may not be as per the specification, or it
may be intended for a duty other than that which was specified.
Such defects can lead to the system failing or at least not perform as
required.
9.1 Prevention
1. Formal system for ensuring that only equipment specified under the
design approval process is supplied and fitted.
2. Plant and equipment purchased from approved suppliers only.
3. Audited and auditable TIPS (Technical Integrity Procurement
System) in place for new and replacement items, including
pipework, steelwork, fixtures and fittings .
4. Recorded vendor inspections at the suppliers or manufacturers
works on all major plant and equipment.
5. Adequate and recorded commissioning tests on all new and
repaired equipment.
6. Manufacturer, supplier, installer, operator and maintainer
knowledge assessment and awareness systems are in place and
audited.
7. Auditable maintenance procedures, check lists, equipment lists in
place.
8. Permit to work systems in place.
10. HUMAN ERROR
Many of the causes of plant failure already discussed have elements of
human error built in to them, from the design stage through to operation
and maintenance. The types of failure directly covered here are those
associated with the operation of the plant, where errors of judgement or
ignorance form a major hazard.
Human error can cause overfilling, overloading through lack of or misplaced judgement and/or information giving rise to incorrect decisions by
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operators. Lack of knowledge or training of operations staff giving can

also give rise to failure due to operational errors.
10.1 Prevention
1. Formal written training schemes are in place with performance
tests and assessments where required.
2. Formal written operating procedure manuals are available covering
normal and emergency operations.
3. Formal written operating instructions with check lists as required
are on hand / displayed and signed up.
4. Regular auditing of procedures to account for changes in operating
parameters etc.
5. Formal permit to work systems in place.
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5.9
Explosion Relief
This Technical Measures Document refers to the explosion relief measures

that can be adopted in plant design to ensure safe operation.
General Principles
Operators should demonstrate that appropriate measures are in place
either to prevent explosions from taking
against/minimise the effects of explosions.
place,
or
to
protect
Explosion prevention is always preferable to explosion protection,

particularly where an explosion is likely to result in emission of toxic
material.
In the event of an explosion, consideration must be given to flame
propagation, pressure effects, recoil forces and the possible toxic nature
of relieving components. These factors will have a significant impact on
plant layout, design of plant and supporting structures and explosion
relief routes. Relief points from explosion protection devices should be
located in an area typically outside the plant, but certainly not in the
vicinity of plant or personnel. Restriction of explosion relief routes may
result in system back-pressures compromising the effectiveness of the
explosion relief device.
Standard relief systems are inadequate for explosion relief conditions
because explosions :
Are too fast for a safety valve to open in time;
Cannot be relieved through piping only through large explosion

panels or doors with short ducts;
Do not have uniform conditions throughout each phase at any one

moment;
Further reaction in vent flow is important;
Steady state flow equations may not be applicable.
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Explosion prevention can be achieved by:
Inerting (exclusion of oxygen by use of inert gases);
Elimination of ignition sources (segregation);
Monitoring and detection of smouldering particles with automatic

quench systems (specific to dust explosions);
Control of concentration, i.e. outside explosive limits by ventilation;
Replacement of combustible materials.
Explosion protection and control can be achieved by:
Containment (explosion-resistant construction);
High speed isolation;
Segregation;
Explosion pressure relief (venting);
Explosion suppression.
Sizing of Explosion Panels

General principles that relate to sizing methods for bursting discs and
relief valves are covered in the Technical Measures Document Relief
Systems / Vent Systems. Rates of pressure rise of dust explosions are
generally slower than those of gas or vapour explosions, therefore design
requirements are different for each case.
Explosion Panels for Gases and Vapours
The size of vent area required for effective control depends upon a
number of factors including:
The type of gas or vapour;
The concentration;
The geometry of the hazardous region;
The distance of the ignition source from the vent.
Various general rules are available for predicting vent areas based on
plant or vessel volumes. However, there is some discrepancy between
these general rules, so they should only be used with utmost caution.
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These methods also depend upon the physical properties of the material
in the vessel. Two of the most common general rules are:
The Fire Protection Association suggest 1 ft 2 of vent area should be

allowed for every 20 ft3 of plant volume (equivalent to 1 of vent
area per 7 m3 of plant volume);
API RP 521 suggests a relief area of 6.6 m2 per 100 m3 of vessel

volume as an empirical guide.
Explosion Panels for Dusts and Powders

HS (G) 103 quotes 1 m2 per 6 m3 of plant volume for up to 30 m3, and 1
m2 per 25 m3 of plant volume for greater than 300 m3 as a rule of thumb
for dusts.
For more considered sizing of vent areas for dust explosion, several basic
methods exist. These include:
The Kst Nomograph Method;
The ST Group Nomograph Method;
The NFPA 68 Method;
The Vent Ratio Method
The K-Factor Method
The NFPA Randstadt Alternative Method;
The Scholl Method.
Selection of the appropriate explosion panel sizing method is dependent

upon the configuration of the vessel to be protected, the physical
properties of the dust or powder being handled, the prevailing process
conditions, whether pneumatic conveying is involved (homogeneous or
heterogeneous dust distribution), and whether vent ducting is employed.
Each individual method outlines the requirements that need to be fulfilled
for the method to be valid.
Any attempt to apply a single method indiscriminately may lead either to
uneconomic and impracticably large vents or, more seriously, to
inadequate vents which could result in extensive damage and injury. It is
good practice to undertake sizing of explosion panels by implementation
of
several
methods
to
corroborate
the
ultimate
size
selected.
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Explosion Relief from Buildings

Consideration should be given to the provision of lightweight roofs and
relief panels in walls which vent to a safe place so as not to injure people
or damage neighboring property. This is particularly relevant to
warehouses
storing
drums/cylinders
of
flammable
substances
Dust Explosions (especially in powder transfer and dryers)
A dust explosion can take place only if a number of conditions are
simultaneously satisfied:
The dust must be explosible (refer to table on dust explosion

classes);
The dust must have a particle size distribution that will allow the
propagation of flame;
The atmosphere into which the dust is dispersed as a cloud or

suspension must contain sufficient oxidant to support combustion;
The dust cloud must have a concentration within the explosible

range;
The dust cloud must be in contact with an ignition source of

sufficient energy to cause an ignition.
Dust may be grouped into dust explosion classes as determined using

standard
test
apparatus.
These
groupings
are
as
follows:
Dust Explosion Kst (bar m s-1) Characteristics

Class
St 0
Non-explosible
St 1
0 < Kst < 200 Weak to moderately

explosible
St 2
200 < Kst
Strongly explosible
<300
St 3
300 < Kst
Very strongly explosible
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Separate ignition prevention precautions for dryers are detailed in

references although typical precautions include:
Maintaining the temperature of flammable materials below the

relevant ignition temperatures;
Regulating heat input during the start-up and shut-down to prevent

the exhaust air temperature exceeding a predetermined value;
Earthing of equipment;
Elimination of points where dust can accumulate;
Regular cleaning of dust spills and accumulation;
Avoidance of non-conducting or low conductivity materials.
Dryers may present specific fire or explosion risk due to:
The combustion of the fuel used for heating them;
The ignition of the material being processed in them;
The proximity of hot surfaces to other processes and materials.
Where explosion protection measures have to be adopted, in some cases

it may be more appropriate to employ explosion suppression instead of
explosion venting. These cases typically include:
When equipment is located indoors;
The dust is particularly explosible or a hybrid mixture (i.e. dust and

flammable vapour);
The vessel has insufficient area for vent installation;
The dust is toxic and emissions are unacceptable;
There is no safe vent discharge point;
To prevent propagation of the explosion from one piece of

equipment through the interconnection to other equipment.
A combination of preventative and protective measures should be

employed to minimise risk of escalation due to flame propagation
between interconnected vessels. A common approach is to employ
isolation methods.
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Separation Distances (Layout)

Consideration should be given to the location and layout of plant areas in
which potentially explosive conditions could develop to ensure reduction
of on-site and off-site risks.
Exothermic Reactions
Overpressurisation of reactors is addressed in the Technical Measures
Documents Relief Systems / Vent Systems.
Hazards from exothermic reactions occur in the event of thermal runaway
of the reaction mixture in which the rate of generation of heat is greater
than the available cooling capacity of the system.
Various testing strategies and experimental methods are commonly
available for determination of thermal decomposition hazards. The
operator should have shown due consideration of these hazards and
taken appropriate measures to provide pressure relief. Measures for
provision of pressure relief in these cases are addressed in the Technical
Measures Document on Relief Systems / Vent Systems.
Unstable Substances
When unstable substances are in use, the operator should demonstrate
that at the research stage of the product a systematic approach to the
identification of hazards relating to the nature of the materials has been
followed. These hazards should be identified and documented, with
subsequent evidence of implementation of control measures. Hazards
that merit consideration include:
Explosibility;
Thermal and pressure conditions;
Flammability;
Toxicity;
Environmental problems.
The assessment is specifically concerned with the physical properties of

the products, and possible by-products.
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5.10
Hazardous Area Classification / Flameproofing
This Technical Measures Document refers to the classification of plant into

hazardous areas, and the flameproofing measures that can be adopted
for electrical apparatus.
General Principles
The methodology for classification of hazardous areas is covered by
appropriate British and European standards. All likely ignition sources
must be considered, and only equipment designed to an appropriate
standard should be employed in designated zones.
Catastrophic failures, such as vessel or line rupture are not considered by

an area extent and classification study. These abnormal events should be
considered by a Preliminary Hazard Analysis and a Hazard and Operability
Study.
Zoning
A hazardous area may be defined as an 'Area in which an explosive
atmosphere is, or may be expected to be, present in quantities such as to
require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of
electrical apparatus'.
Area classification is a method of
analysing
and
classifying
the
environment where explosive gas atmospheres may occur so as to

facilitate the proper selection an installation of apparatus to be used
safely in that environment, taking into account gas groups and
temperature classes.
Hazardous areas are classified into zones based on an assessment of the
frequency
of
the
occurrence
and
duration
of
an
explosive
gas
atmosphere, as follows:
Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present

continuously or for long periods;
Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to

occur in normal operation;
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Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely

to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs, will only exist for a
short time.
When the hazardous areas of a plant have been classified, the remainder
will be defined as non-hazardous, sometimes referred to as safe areas.
An area extent and classification study involves due consideration of the
following:
The flammable materials that may be present;
The physical properties and characteristics of each of the flammable

materials;
The source of potential releases;
Prevailing operating temperatures and pressures;
Presence,
degree
and
availability
of
ventilation
(forced
and
natural);
Dispersion of released vapours to below flammable limits;
The probability of each release scenario.
These factors enable appropriate selection of a grouping, temperature

class, zone type and zone extent.
This information may be summarised in Hazardous Area Classification
data sheets, supported by appropriate reference drawings.
The zone so designated is a three-dimensional area of space, and thus
will extend above and below the plant item under consideration (if
appropriate), as well as horizontally.
Electrical Equipment Design Codes/Selection

The classification of hazardous areas where flammable gas or vapour
risks may arise allows the selection and subsequent installation of
electrical apparatus that is appropriate for use in such hazardous areas.
Design codes related to classification of electrical apparatus are listed in
the table shown on next page
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Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Ex ia Intrinsic safety
(IEC 79-11)
Methods suitable for Zone Methods suitable for

0
Zone 0 or 1
Ex s Special protection Ex d Flameproof

if specifically certified for enclosure (IEC 79-1)
Ex n Type of
protection N (IEC
Zone 0
79-15)
Ex p Pressurised or
purging (IEC 79-2)
Ex q Powder filling (IEC
79-5)
Ex o Oil immersion (IEC
79-6)
Ex e Increased safety
(IEC 79-7)
Ex ib Intrinsic safety
(IEC 79-11)
Ex m Encapsulation (IEC
79-18)
Ex s Special protection
It should be noted that references in the table are to the equivalent IEC
79 standard Selection of electrical equipment for hazardous areas
requires the following information:
classification of the hazardous area (as in zones shown in the table

above);
temperature class or ignition temperature of the gas or vapour

involved according to the table next page:
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Temperature Maximum Surface

Classification Temperature, C
Ignition Temperature of gas or

vapour, C
T1
450
>450
T2
300
>300
T3
200
>200
T4
135
>135
T5
100
>100
T6
85
>85
Where applicable, gas or vapour classification in relation to the

group or sub-group of the electrical apparatus as in the table
below.
Group
Representative Gas
Methane
IIA
Propene
IIB
Ethylene
IIC
Hydrogen
For particular gases, the group classification provided in BS EN 50014: 1998

should be used. This is based upon the comparison of the Maximum
Experimental Safe Gaps (MESG) for flameproof enclosures or Maximum
Ignition Currents (MIC) for intrinsically safe equipment with Group I
methane. The sub-groups in Group II are derived as shown in the table
below:
Sub Division
MESG
MIC Ratio
> 0.9 mm
> 0.8
0.5 - 0.9 mm 0.45 - 0.8
< 0.5 mm
< 0.45
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If several different flammable materials may be present within a

particular area, the material that gives the highest classification dictates
the overall area classification. Consideration should be shown for
flammable material that may be generated due to interaction between
chemical species.
Ignition Sources Identification and Elimination
Ignition sources may be:
Flames;
Direct fired space and process heating;
Fires involving waste materials allowed to accumulate;
Use of cigarettes/matches etc;
Internal combustion engines;
Cutting and welding flames;
Large scale fires started elsewhere on site
Hot surfaces;
Heated process vessels such as dryers and furnaces;
Hot process vessels;
Space heating equipment;
Mechanical machinery;
Electrical equipment and lights
Spontaneous heating;
Friction heating or sparks;
Impact sparks;
Electric sparks;
Electrostatic discharge sparks:
Lightning strikes.
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Sources of ignition should be eliminated from all hazardous areas by:
Avoidance of the use of direct fired heating;
Prohibition of smoking/use of matches;
Control of the use of internal combustion engines (see Technical

Measures Document on Permit to Work Systems;
Control of cutting and welding activity through a Permit to Work

system;
Elimination of surfaces above autoignition temperatures of

flammable materials being handled/stored (see above);
Using electrical equipment classified for the zone in which it is

located (see above);
Control of maintenance activities that may cause sparks/hot

surfaces through a Permit to Work System;
Earthing of all plant/ equipment
Provision of lightning protection.
Lightning Protection
Protection against lightning involves installation of a surge protection

device between each non-earth bonded core of the cable and the local
structure.
Dust Explosions
Hazardous area classification for flammable dusts may be undertaken in
the same manner as that for flammable gases and vapours. Zoning as
described above may be applied, replacing 'gas atmosphere' with
'dust/air mixtures'.
Classification of dusts relating to autoignition and minimum ignition
current is undertaken similarly to gases/vapours, but involves additional
complications.
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The explosibility of dusts is dependent upon a number of factors:
chemical composition;
particle size;
moisture content;
oxygen concentration;
inert dust admixture.
In general, dusts with a particle size greater than 500 m are unlikely to
cause an explosion, and particle sizes below 50-74 m do not result in a
reduction of explosibility as size reduces. For this reason, most tests are
carried out on 75 m samples as the worst case.
Ignition due to a hot surface is particularly likely to occur. The minimum
surface temperature which can cause ignition is about 100-200C in most
cases.
Factors for assessor to consider
Identification of Hazardous Areas
Effectiveness of management and control of hazardous areas, with

respect to elimination of ignition sources;
Demonstration that by design, operation and location extent of

hazardous areas has been minimised;
Completeness of existing area extent and classification studies;
All flammable substances present have been considered during area

classification, including raw materials, intermediates and by
products, final product and effluents;
The appropriateness of the standards adopted for area

classification;
Reference to impact upon area extent and classification due to

plant modification Control measures in hazardous areas required
during maintenance;
Procedures for change/temporary works
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5.11
INERTING
General Principles
The partial or complete substitution of the air or flammable atmosphere
by an inert gas is a very effective method of explosion prevention.
Inerting is normally only considered when the flammable or explosive
hazard cannot be eliminated by other means i.e. substitution of
flammable material with non-flammable, adjustment of process
conditions to ensure substances are below flammable limits. Typical uses
are within storage tanks where a material may be above its flashpoint
and within reactor systems when excursions into flammable atmospheres
may occur. Inert gases are also used to transfer flammable liquids under
pressure. Inerting is applicable to enclosed plant, since plant that is
substantially open to atmosphere cannot be effectively inerted because
the prevailing oxygen concentration is likely to vary.
A major risk associated with use of inerting is that of asphyxiation,
particularly in confined spaces. In those events where people are required
to enter a confined space, a formal management control system in the
form of a Permit to Work should be in place so that appropriate
precautions and control measures can be implemented. The Permit to
Work system is covered separately.
Gases that can be used for inerting include:
Nitrogen;
Carbon Dioxide;
Argon;
Helium;
Flue gases.
The practice of inerting is also employed in explosion suppression

systems, where typically a quick acting pressure switch responds to the
initial comparatively slow increase in pressure due to initiation of
explosion conditions. This in turn triggers injection of an explosion
suppressant such as chlorobromomethane or carbon dioxide into the path
of the advancing flame front. This technique can also be employed to
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provide protection to interconnected plant by inerting plant items

downstream of the explosion.
In most inerting systems a slight positive pressure should be maintained
within the enclosed plant to reduce the possibility of air ingress. Inert
gases may be generated on site, or via bulk storage of cylinder facilities.
Flammable Limits
To
produce
an
explosion,
three
key
'ingredients'
are
required
simultaneously. These are:
Fuel;
Ignition;
Oxygen.
The fuel must be within its range of flammability, i.e. at a concentration

above the lower flammable limit, but below the upper flammable limit.
This means that it is perfectly acceptable to have an environment with
the flammable material above the upper flammable limit provided
appropriate control protocols are in place since the potential for further
dilution
If
the
would
fuel
bring
cannot
the
be
material
eliminated
within
or
its
flammable
minimised,
steps
range.
must
be
implemented to eliminate or minimise the source of ignition (see the

Technical Measures documentation on Hazardous Area Classification). The
final measure that can be adopted involves reducing the oxygen levels
necessary to sustain combustion. This can be achieved by pressurising /
purging with an inert gas such as nitrogen.
The flammable limits for individual materials with air are readily available
in standard references, however appropriate methods should be
employed to determine the flammable limits for mixtures of materials.
Where flammable dusts are handled in an atmosphere containing
flammable gas or vapour, determination of flammable limits is difficult
and use of inerting should be considered wherever possible.
Reliability / Back-up / Proof Testing
In many applications, the maintenance of an inert atmosphere is a
safety-critical measure, in the absence of which many potential hazards
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could be realised. Reliability of the supply of inert gas is therefore of vital

importance, and the system should be regularly inspected and
maintained.
Consideration should be given to the possibility of failure of the inert gas
supply and the acceptable unavailability. This will involve calculations to
determine the rate of leakage / replacement in all process conditions
encountered
to
find
the
worst
case
that
must
be
considered.
Back up of supplies with alarm systems to bring about operator

intervention or automatic change-over should be provided as required to
meet the required availability determined. Consideration should also be
given to the reliability of the control systems employed for operation and
change-over. Back-up facilities may be via alternative bulk storage or
cylinder provision.
A major consideration when designing plant to be protected by inerting is
the need for continuous monitoring of oxygen and flammable gas or
vapour concentrations.
Operating / Maintenance Procedures

Inert gases are often used to purge tanks and vessels which normally
contain flammable substances prior to maintenance, commissioning or
decommissioning. The presence of inert atmospheres should always be
taken into consideration during operational or maintenance activities
since potential hazards could arise from:
Asphyxiation;
Loss of inert atmosphere.
Control systems based upon the use of explosimeters and oxygen

analysers should protect against asphyxiation if entering such areas.
Maintenance activities should only be undertaken by suitably trained and
authorised personnel, and controlled by a Permit to Work system.
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5.13
LEAK / GAS DETECTION
This Technical Measures Document refers to issues surrounding the

detection of leaks and gases and what type of containment control
systems have been designed to manage unplanned releases.
General Principles
The following aspects should be considered with respect to Leak/Gas
Detection:
Human Factors;
Objectives of leak/gas detection systems;
Types of leak/gas detectors required;
Maintenance of leak/gas detectors; and
Management of leak/gas detector systems.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard:
Unrecognised high-risk areas, where detectors could be used;
No detectors or the wrong types in place in high risk areas;
Detectors incorrectly positioned and installed on site;
Poor level of maintenance and control of detection systems;
Too heavy a reliance on ineffective detectors.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning

Leak/Gas Detection
The Report should address the following points:
The appropriateness of the types of detectors being used (UV

detectors,
IR.
detectors,
smoke
detectors,
intrinsically
safe
detectors,
heat
detectors,
specific
substance
detectors,
explosimeters) in terms of the environment in which they are
located and to perform the duty expected;
The effectiveness of using the detectors in terms of their

positioning relative to the possible leak sources, taking account of
dispersion and dilution of the released gases/vapours;

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The effectiveness of the detectors for the types of substances to be

detected (flammable substances, acid gases, smoke, explosive
substances, toxic substances) at the concentrations required.
Detectors may be chosen to react to more than one substance;
The types of protective devices linked to the detection systems

(alarms, warning lights, reaction quenching systems, isolation
systems, fire retardant systems, plant shutdown systems, trip
devices, emergency services);
The reliability of each detector (range of detection, response time

of detection, level of maintenance, calibration
performance testing frequency, proof testing);
The
detectors
can
be
clearly
seen,
heard
and
frequency,
understood,
(appropriate warning signs, lighting, noise recognition), on plant, in

the control room and off-site (if appropriate);
The procedures to respond to alarms, as a result of a leak/gas

being detected (emergency evacuation plans, fire drills, risk
assessing existing emergency evacuation plans), to confirm that
the release has actually occurred and to record and investigate
false alarms and take action to change the system to maintain the
confidence of operators;
The level of risk associated with each potential leak source (risk
assessments, risk-rating systems) and the reduction in that
assessed risk value achieved by the use of detectors;
The provision and accessibility (to operators, maintenance staff

etc)of a sufficient site plan which maps all potentially hazardous
areas (zones 0, 1 & 2, segregation of compatible hazardous
substances);
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning Fire

Detection and Control
The types of fire detector systems in place (infrared detectors,

ultraviolet light
detectors);
detectors,
temperature
detectors,
smoke
The area covered by the detection system;
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The reliability of the fire detection systems (fail-to-danger faults,

spurious alarms); and
The types of fire protection systems in place (fire proofing, water

sprays, foam/filming agents, monitor guns, combustible gas
monitors, foam on tanks, fire walls/barrier walls, emergency relief
venting for buildings, dust explosion control).
Major Hazards
Detector fails to detect in time (i.e. response time of instrument

and/or response to high reading/alarm failing to prevent a major
accident),
Detector fails in undetected unsafe state (reading zero),
Alarms, warning devices and protective devices fail to operate on

demand,
A leak occurs which cannot be detected (due to position of sensor

or weather conditions), and
Maintenance procedures not followed, increasing unavailability of

system or rendering system ineffective.
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5.14
Active/Passive Fire Protection
Introduction
Active fire protection systems such as water sprinkler and spray systems
are widely used in the process industries for protection of storage
vessels, process plant, loading installations and warehouses. The duty of
the fire protection system may be to extinguish the fire, control the fire,
or provide exposure protection to prevent domino effects. For some
applications foam pourers or fixed water monitors may be a more
appropriate method of delivery than sprays or sprinklers. Other more
specialised systems using inert gases and halogen based gases are used
for flooding enclosed spaces.
Passive fire protection can provide an effective alternative to active
systems for protecting against vessel failure. This generally consists of a
coating of fire resistant insulating media applied to a vessel or steel
surface. It is often used where water or other active protection media
supplies are inadequate, such as in remote locations, or where there are
difficulties with handling firewater run-off. Firewalls are another form of
passive fire protection that are used to prevent the spread of fire and the
exposure of adjacent equipment to thermal radiation. An important
criterion in deciding which system is most appropriate for fire exposure
protection is the likely duration of the exposure to fire as passive fire
protection is only effective for short duration exposure (1-2 hours).
General Principles
The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has an effective and
practical plan for the containment and fighting of fires on its process
installations. The following site factors should be considered in
determining whether active and passive fire protection measures are
required:
fire hazard posed by substance;
toxicity of substances and the smoke produced;
inventory size;
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frequency of hazardous operations;
distance to other hazardous installations;
available access to fight fire;
fire fighting capability of on site emergency response team;
response time of nearest fire brigade;
resources available to fire brigade.
Design of System
Active fire fighting systems need to be reliable and the design of the
system should demonstrate this. The design of fire fighting systems
should conform to specified standards such as Teriff Advisory Committee
(TAC) and Fire Offices Committee 'Tentative rules for medium and high
velocity spray systems'.
The location of items such as the foam and water sources should be a
safe distance from any hazardous installation. Critical valving and
instrument cabling located on the protected installation should be capable
of withstanding the effects of fire and heat.
The system should be supplied by a secure water supply, which should
include items such as backup diesel pumps where appropriate. The
design must ensure that the active fire protection system is not starved
of water due to other demands on the water supply system during a fire.
Choice of Fire Fighting Media
The selection of media will depend on the required duty. This may be to
extinguish the fire, control the fire, or provide exposure protection. Types
of fire fighting media are:
Water;
Foams;
Inert gases;
Chemical powders;
Halons.
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Water is not recommended as an extinguishing media for low flash point

liquids, but it is used widely throughout industry for fire control and
exposure protection.
Foam is a more effective extinguishing media for low flash point
substances and is widely used against liquid fires. There are various types
of foam available, but the most widely used is protein foam. Alcohol
resistant foam is used for application on polar solvents where the foam
stability is affected. Other more specialist foams have been developed to
give improved extinguishing properties such as fluoro-protein and
aqueous film forming foams. Foam can be delivered as low, medium or
high
expansion
depending
on
the
required
duty.
Other agents such as inert gases, chemical powders and halogen based
gases (Halons) can be delivered by active fire protection systems, but
these tend to be installed where process equipment is contained within
an enclosure such as a gas turbine enclosure. A common use for these
systems is in the protection of switch rooms and control panels. There
has been movement away from the use of Halons over recent years due
to their potential effect upon the ozone layer and other undesirable
environmental effects.
Standard Material Safety Data Sheets should also specify appropriate fire
fighting media.
Choice of Passive Fire Protection

For the protection of vessels from fire exposure there are a number of
types of passive fire protection that can be applied.
1.
mortar based coating
2.
intumescent coating
3.
sublimation coating
4.
mineral fiber matting
5.
earth mounds
The protective systems based on coatings are normally sprayed onto the
surface following mixing of the required components. A reinforcing glass
fiber scrim or steel wire gauze is applied to prevent cracking and peeling
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of the coating under fire conditions and to provide additional strength to

resist the impact of high pressure water jets. The fire protective coating
is further protected by a weather protective top layer. The fire resistant
performance of the coatings is dependent on the thickness of the coating.
Fiber matting systems consist of fireproof mineral fiber matting clad with
a protective galvanised steel sheet. The protective capability of the
system is provided by the poor heat conductivity of the system.
Earth mounds are commonly used in the LPG industry, where vessels are
either fully or partially buried in an earth mound. The presence of the
earth mound effectively prevents a fire from developing around the
vessel.
Fire walls are sometimes employed in process and storage areas to
prevent the spread of fire and protect adjacent equipment from thermal
radiation. These may be an integral part of a process building or
warehouse structure or may consist of a free-standing wall specifically
built for the purpose. Firewalls are normally built of brick, concrete or
masonry and the number and size of openings should be kept to a
minimum.
Performance of the Protective System
For active fire protection systems required delivery rates and durations
for various types of application are specified in BS 5306. For fire
engulfment protection a water rate of 9.81 litres/min/m2 over the
exposed vessel surface and its supports is standard. For protection from
lower levels of thermal radiation from fires on adjacent units lower rates
of water application are allowable.
For passive fire protection systems the operator should have supplier or
manufacturer information demonstrating that the fire protective system
employed meets defined performance criteria based on standard tests
that replicate the fire conditions likely to be encountered in the work
place. Typically the criteria will be that a protected surface will not reach
a certain temperature in a defined time period during a standard test.
The protective system should meet the requirements of a pool fire test or
a jet fire test .Jet Fire resistance for Passive Fire Protection Materials'.
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Active fire protection systems require to be well maintained to ensure
reliability. In particular systems using water and water based foam are
prone to rust deposits which can block sprinkler heads and spray nozzles.
Procedures should be in place to ensure regular maintenance and testing
of systems. Maintenance contracts are often placed with the supplier of
the fire protection system. Records of these activities should be kept by
site operators.
The performance of passive fire protection systems can deteriorate in
time due to weathering and corrosion. Plant operational and maintenance
activities may damage or remove the fire protection. Additionally the
protected surface itself can corrode beneath the fire protection.
Procedures should be in place to ensure that both the passive fire
protective system and the protected surface are regularly inspected and
repaired as appropriate.
Containment of Firewater
Foam and water based active fire protection systems can generate
considerable amounts of effluent with significant potential environmental
damage. Where active fire protection systems are installed the overall
design of the facility should cater for the collection of fire fighting
effluents. Operating sites should have effluent disposal plans in place as
part of their emergency plans.
Supporting Measures
Where active or passive fire protection is installed, these systems should
be supported by hydrants at suitable locations as specified in BS 5908.
Suitable portable fire fighting equipment should also be located on the
plant.
Mortar based fire protection fire protection is commonly used to protect
load bearing steel work from collapse under fire exposure. The application
of this to vessel supports and supporting structures for process
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equipment is standard where flammable substances are handled in

quantity.
LPG Industry
The use of water deluge systems for the protection of bulk LPG storage
vessels and loading bays is standard in the industry for all but the
smallest installations. Passive fire protection is used as an alternative and
in particular earth mounding of LPG vessels is an established practice.
Large LPG cylinder compounds covered by canopies are normally
provided with either fixed water monitors or a sprinkler system.
Flammable Liquids / Solvent Bulk Storage
Whilst active fire protection is not a standard requirement for vessels
containing flammable and highly flammable liquids, site factors such as
inadequate separation distances from other plant or the proximity of
occupied buildings may necessitate the use of active or passive fire
protection to prevent escalation of a fire event. Where protection of
remote storage tanks is required, passive fire protection is commonly
used. However, it is not normal practice to protect storage tanks in
locations that do not represent a hazard to people directly or by domino
effect.
Process Operating Units
Both the material handled, the size of the flammable inventory and the
local fire fighting capability will influence the requirement for active fire
protection on a process structure. In particular, where process equipment
handling significant quantities of flammable material are located inside a
building and fire fighting access is poor, then fixed fire protection systems
should be provided.
Warehousing
Some significant fires have occurred in chemical warehouses, The
considerations are much the same as those for process operating units.
For the storage of high hazard materials such as organic peroxides in
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warehouses, fixed sprinkler systems using either foam or water should be

provided. However, it should be noted that the effectiveness of sprinkler
systems in warehouses may be limited if stocking densities are high.
Particular care is required in designing such systems.
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5.15
QUENCH SYSTEMS
This Technical Measures Document covers the design and use of quench
systems
Introduction
Quenching can either be used to directly control a chemical reaction or in
the treatment of an emergency vent stream. For the direct quenching of a
chemical reaction when loss of control has occurred, the quench material
both cools and dilutes the reactants, thereby slowing down the reaction
rate and the rate of heat generation to a controllable level. Quenching
may be carried out by adding the quench liquid to the reactor or by
discharging the reactants to a dedicated dump tank.
Quench systems are used in vent disposal systems for the treatment of
streams that can not be discharged directly to atmosphere or where
continuing reaction is taking place. The process involves the mixing of a
solvent with the relief stream. This results in the condensation and
removal of volatile components from the relief stream and / or the cooling
of the vent stream which prevents further reaction from taking place.
General Principles
The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has evaluated the
options for emergency protection of an uncontrolled exothermic reaction.
Where venting has been chosen as the means of protection, the operator
should demonstrate that it has considered the consequences of a vent
emission directly to atmosphere and installed appropriate vent treatment
measures where necessary.
Reactor Quenching
Where a quench system for the control of a reaction is installed the
following should have been considered:
compatibility of the quench material with the reactants;
reliability of the quench delivery system;
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availability of space in the reactor / dump tank to accommodate

quench material in addition to the reactor contents;
the effects of level swell and foaming on quench addition;
rate of mixing of the quench material with reaction fluids;
the effectiveness of quenching for all conditions leading to loss of

control.
The operator should demonstrate the validity of the approach used by

appropriate test work. Consideration of the conditions leading to loss of
control of the reaction are particularly important. For instance if loss of
agitation can initiate this, the use of quenching to control the exotherm is
questionable as the cooling and dilution effects are reliant on effective
mixing. The pressure relief arrangements will need careful consideration
where a dump tank is employed.
Vent Stream Quenching

For the treatment of a vent stream there are a variety of arrangements
possible. The duty of the system to either condense volatiles or control
further reaction in the vent system will dictate the arrangement. A
commonly used arrangement for handling two phase discharge from a
reactor is a simple knockout drum containing an inventory of an
appropriate quenching agent. The vent stream is sparged into the
knockout drum below the liquid surface. The knockout drum itself then
vents to atmosphere, a scrubber or a flare stack. Alternatively the
quenching agent can be sprayed into the vessel from which the discharge
arises, or it can be injected into the vent stream in a quench nozzle to
effect partial condensation of the stream. Where a quenching agent is
used in a vent disposal system the following should be considered:
the duty condensation or control of reaction;
compatibility of the quench material with the vent stream;
reliability of the quench delivery system;
the effects of level swell and foaming in the reactor and/or

knockout drum.
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Design of Quenching Systems

Data produced from adiabatic tests will strongly influence the design
requirements and form the basis for mass and heat balances. The
operator should be able to show how these have been used in the design.
The design should ensure effective mixing of the quenching agent and
cater for the effects of level swell where appropriate.
As an emergency protective measure the operation of a quench system
needs to be reliable. The instrument and control features of a quench
delivery system should demonstrate this and features such as voting
systems and hard wiring of trips should be included for critical duties.
Other support systems, such as utilities, that are critical to delivery of the
quench system need similar high integrity.
Quenching systems require to be well maintained to ensure reliability.
Procedures should be in place to ensure regular maintenance and testing
of relevant instrument and control systems. The inspection and
maintenance of pipe work and vessels should be carried out to written
procedures on a regular basis. Where the quality or specification of
quenching agents may deteriorate over time so as to reduce
effectiveness, the inventory should be replenished at set frequencies.
Effluent Disposal
Control of a reaction with a quenching agent may cause irreversible
contamination of the reactants. Where a quenching agent has been used
in a vent disposal system, this will need to be removed before plant
operations can recommence. Plans should be in place for the safe
handling and disposal of effluents generated from the use of a quench
system.
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5.16
Raw Materials Control / Sampling
This Technical Measures Document refers to the cradle to grave

approach to prevent an unwanted chemical being used in a plant
resulting in a major accident or hazard. A chemical can be a contaminant,
raw material, reactant, intermediate, by-product or product.
See also Technical Measures Documents on Corrosion / Selection of
Materials
General Principles
The following aspects should be considered with respect to Raw Materials
Control/Sampling:
Human factors;
Poorly skilled work force;
Unconscious and conscious incompetence;
What would happen if the wrong material was used in the wrong
place; and
What would happen if contaminated or out of specification material
was used.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard.
Human error during acceptance of delivery and sampling;

Incompetent quality control staff;
Contaminant entering the plant for example, flammables in non-
flameproof areas, oxidisers mixing with flammable solvents;

Failure to understand the properties of substances handled;
Failure of quality assurance procedures; and
Failure to identify all credible contaminants and resultant reaction

pathways that could disrupt the integrity of the plant involved.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning Raw

Material Delivery, Test and Storage
The Safety Report should address the following points:
Whether there is are sufficient management systems in place to

control the handling and use of all raw materials on site (Quality
Safety Management, Quality Control/Assurance Procedures);
Raw Material Control/Sampling
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Whether staff is sufficiently informed, instructed, trained and

supervised to minimise a potential human failing during raw
material delivery, test and storage;
Whether there a sufficient chemical inventory of all chemicals used
on site;
The procedures in place to vet the suppliers of raw materials
(Audits, supplier history, reputation);
The amount of information with each raw material delivery (Trem
Cards, Certificate of Analysis, Safety Data Sheets, representative
samples);
The suitability of quality assurance procedures in place to test all
incoming raw materials on site if deemed necessary (Quarantine
procedures, quality control procedures, representative sampling
procedures);
The suitability of validated quality control test methods and
equipment in place to identify any potentially hazardous
contaminants present within a raw material delivery; and
The effectiveness of the systems of work in place to prevent
contamination of raw materials once placed in storage, after QC
approval (Storage procedures,
chemicals before use).
QC
tests
to
approve
stored
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider During Plant

Production
The
Safety
Report
should
address
the
following
points:
The possibility of a major accident as a result of a change in the process
reaction kinetics due to contaminants in the raw materials (R&D data,
safety reliability data, engineering constraints);
Whether all raw materials, reactants, intermediates, products and

by-products known and can be retained safely without a
deterioration in plant integrity (R&D data, analytical data, safety
reliability data, engineering constraints); and
Identification of required emergency procedures, systems and
provisions in place to deal with events resulting from raw materials
control failure.
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Major Hazards
Static discharge during sampling of flammable substances;
Exposure to head-space gases during profile sampling of raw

material tanker;
Overfilling of storage vessels;
Non-compliance of quality and safety procedures resulting in a
Domino effect;
Failure of safety systems manual or automatic.
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5.17
This Technical Measures Document covers the identification and control of

reaction hazards
Related Technical Measures Documents are Relief Systems / Vent Systems, Raw
Materials Control / Sampling, Trips / Interlocks, and Secondary Containment.
Introduction
Chemical reaction hazards may result from loss of control of an
exothermic chemical synthesis reaction, or an undesired reaction
occurring in the reaction mixture such as the decomposition of a chemical
present. So called 'runaway reactions' are normally associated with batch
reactors however an uncontrolled exotherm may occur in many types of
equipment. Storage vessels, batch distillation units and drying operations
are some of the more common types of process equipment where
undesired exothermic reactions have resulted in severe incidents.
Thermal runaway begins when the heat generated by a reaction exceeds
the rate at which heat is lost to the surroundings. The heat generation
rate is a function of temperature and chemical composition. Whilst the
temperature of the reactants may not directly constitute a major hazard,
the pressure developed as a result of thermal runaway in a vessel or
other item of process equipment can cause catastrophic failure of the
equipment.
General Principles
The operator should be able to demonstrate that it has evaluated the
potential reaction hazards of a process and carried out reaction hazard
studies as part of an overall hazard assessment of a process. This should
involve the following activities:
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Preliminary Reviews
As a starting point for a reaction hazard assessment a literature

survey and some theoretical calculations are useful, but are no
substitute for chemical hazard testing. Thermochemical calculations
based on bond energies or heats of formation can be used to calculate
a heat of reaction or a decomposition energy. The structure of
individual molecules can be reviewed to identify potentially reactive
groups such as acetylenic compounds, peroxides and nitro
compounds. An oxygen balance of an organic compound such as
propylene oxide can give an indication of the chemicals propensity to
decompose on heating.
Screening Tests
The simplest and most common apparatus used are Differential

Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA).
These apparatus use a sample size of a few milligrams and are used to
for purposes such as identifying at what temperature materials
involved in a reaction decompose and the possible effects of
contaminants on thermal stability.
Worst Case
To define the worst case foreseeable upset conditions consideration of

failure of equipment, instrumentation, utility supplies, etc is required
to identify the scenarios that could result in uncontrolled process
temperature rise and subsequent over pressurisation of process
equipment.
Adiabatic Tests
Adiabatic calorimeters are used to mimic plant conditions and give

accurate data on rates of heat production and gas evolution under
runaway conditions. Commonly used apparatus are the Dewar
Calorimeter, the Vent Sizing Package, the Phi-Tec Calorimeter and the
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Reactive Systems Screening Tool. The data from these tests is used to
determine the Time to Maximum Rate and whether the pressure
developed is sufficient to cause failure of the vessel or relevant
process equipment. The data can be used to calculate a vent size
where appropriate. The Time to Maximum Rate is the time taken from
onset of the runaway to its maximum rate of heat generation.
Basis for Safe Operation
Where reaction hazard studies identify that a thermal runaway can

occur, the studies should clearly define the technical measures in place
to ensure the safe operation of the process. For a reaction the
important parameters of the reaction such as temperature, cooling
conditions and time of addition should be defined in order to maintain
the reaction within safe limits. The requirement for protective
measures, such as emergency relief or quench systems, should be
detailed.
Chemical Reactors
Chemical reactions are widely used in the process industries and are the
process operation commonly associated with thermal runaway. Surveys
have shown that the following types of reaction have been involved in
incidents:
Polymerisation
Nitration
Sulphonation
Hydrolysis
Salt formation
Halogenation
Alkylation
Amination
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The screening test programme and the adiabatic tests should show
whether the normal reaction or a secondary reaction or decomposition
are capable of over pressurising the reactor. The test work should be
used as the basis for determining whether additional protective measures
need to be included in the plant design such as:
emergency pressure relief devices
redundant systems / high integrity controls and trips
emergency cooling
quench systems
reaction inhibition
containment
Typically for a batch or semi batch reactor, failures such as cooling

failure, loss of agitation, addition rate of reactants, and reactant
temperature are considered to determine the worst case scenario. In
deciding whether emergency protective measures are appropriate it is
necessary to taken into account the time available to carry out
emergency preventative measures and rectify the situation. Where
emergency relief devices are employed, the toxic and flammable hazards
of the materials in the process may require additional features to limit the
consequences of a release. Depending on the severity of the hazard these
may include liquid catchpots, scrubbing systems, quench pools or
secondary containment vessels.
Other Process Operations

The situations in which the handling of self-reactive materials may result
in thermal explosion are numerous. This can be due to the decomposition
of an energetic substance or due to contamination causing an undesired
reaction. Some of the situations common to the process industries are
given below:
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Batch Distillation
In a batch distillation process loss of vacuum may result in increased
temperatures
that
could
initiate
decomposition.
Additionally
batch
distillation residues can be prone to thermal explosion due to the thermal

ageing process that takes place during distillation. In 1993 a severe
incident occurred at a plant in southern Ireland when an operational
change to a batch distillation process resulted in a thermal explosion
followed by a large fire.
Storage
The slow decomposition of a reactive material in storage may cause an
increase in temperature over a period of leading to a thermal explosion.
This process can occur in a variety of situations from large-scale storage
in vessels to small transport packages. Accidental contamination of
materials in storage has resulted in some significant incidents, notably
the Bhopal incident.
Drying Operations
Loss of temperature control in a powder drier may expose a self-reactive
powder to a temperature that causes it to decompose. Similarly when a
drier is shut down the thermal cladding may cause heat to be retained for
a long period and a powder build-up or residues may start to decompose
after a period of time.
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5.18
RELIABILITY OF UTILITIES
This Technical Measures Document covers the reliability of utility services

and reference is made to relevant codes of practice and standards.
Introduction
The reliable supply of utilities on sites operating hazardous plant is
necessary in order to prevent events that may lead to multiple failures of
equipment and potentially hazardous events. The modes of failure of site
wide utility systems are numerous and may lead to site wide or local loss
of supply or even only partial failure on a particular plant. Whilst most
plant are designed to 'fail safe' on loss of utility supplies, there are those
where failure to operate correctly will almost certainly result in a
hazardous event and local back-up facilities are required. Particular care
is required in the design of site power systems as loss of power can also
result in loss of supply of all other site utility systems as well.
General Principles
Risk Assessment
The company should demonstrate that it has assessed the risk of loss of
utility supplies to its plants and identified the hazardous events that could
occur following such loss (e.g. using relevant techniques such as
HAZOP/HAZAN). These events should not only include fire and toxic gas
emissions, but also the release of process streams hazardous to the
environment such as the overflow of effluent sumps. The numerous ways
in which loss of supply of a utility can occur total site, part of a site, a
single plant unit, part of a plant should all be taken into consideration
in order to identify which process streams will continue to flow or not and
any potential hazards or domino effects arising as a consequence.
Site utility systems may include:
1.
Electrical Power;
2.
Steam / Condensate;
3.
Inerting Gases normally nitrogen;
4.
Compressed Air;
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5.
Vacuum Systems;
6.
Cooling Water;
7.
Fire Water / other Extinguishing Agents (e.g. BCF, foam,

etc.);
8.
Process / Service Water;
9.
Fuel (oil, gas, etc.);
10.
Refrigeration.
On some sites other more specialised utility systems may exist such as
the supply of oxygen through a distribution system from a cryogenic
plant unit.
Where a hazard assessment identifies that a plant may not continue to
operate or may not shutdown safely then back-up features may be
necessary to ensure its continued safe operation. Normally, such back-up
supplies are provided local to the plant, e.g. bottled gas supplies, but
may be via a redundant or diverse system arrangement, e.g. a parallel or
alternative supply.
Design
Based on risk assessment the operator should demonstrate that utility
systems have been designed with an appropriate level of redundancy
within the system to cope with failures and maintain the required
integrity (availability) of supply. Items such as pumps and compressors
can be expected to fail occasionally and typically this would mean the
availability of back-up pumps, compressors, or steam boilers available on
an auto start basis. To improve availability diverse equipment can be
used to avoid common mode failures.
Routing of critical utility supplies should take into account the hazards on
site and the potential for fire and impact damage on the distribution
system. Appropriate shielding should be used where necessary. The loss
of supply of a utility such as steam to a plant can often be handled safely
by appropriate trip systems, but where the continued operation of a
utility system is more critical, the design of the distribution system should
demonstrate the availability of various routes to achieve supply. Routes
for duplicate distribution lines should be segregated. Often a 'ring main'
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approach is used for the distribution of fire water in hydrant systems.

Compressed air and inert gases should be supplied through local receiver
vessels with sufficient volume to ensure safe shutdown or continued
operation until normal supplies have been reinstated.
Electrical power supply systems involve much complex equipment and
deserve special consideration as failure can also impact on the supply of
other utilities and directly on process equipment. Typically a system for a
high hazard site may consist of two independent Grid supply points, both
fed from different circuits. Power may be fed to sub stations in duplicate
lines with cross over connections. The distribution from local substations
to various plant switch rooms can be switched between substations.
Nominated critical drives should be capable of being fed from a standby
emergency diesel generator and should auto start-up on receiving power.
An uninterruptable power supply (often referred to as an UPS) should
feed critical control and instrumentation systems.
The operator should demonstrate an appropriate level of availability for
critical utility systems using methods such as fault tree analysis.
Preferably for such calculations site specific data should be used,
however, where this is not possible generic data may be used. Where this
is the case some consideration of its appropriateness to the actual site
should be provided. Regular reviews of the systems should be undertaken
to ensure the required availability is being achieved in practice.
Training / Emergency Plans
The operator should demonstrate that site personnel understand the
implications of loss of a utility system and that emergency plans are in
place for the safe reinstatement of critical supplies where necessary.
Competent persons should be trained in the requirements of the
emergency plans and exercises should take place to test those plans.
Maintenance / Testing
Programmes should be in place for inspection and maintenance of utility
systems at regular intervals to written procedures. The intervals for proof
tests should be based upon the required availability of the utility system.
Where back-up systems are in place the operator should demonstrate
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that the test routine involves 'end to end' testing of the system. As an
example, it is insufficient to test a diesel power generator set without
testing that the auto start-up facility works and that the switchgear in the
distribution system works properly.
Examples of Industry Applications
Emergency Absorption Plants
Emergency absorption plants must be able to handle vents under all
circumstances. These plants are built with standby recirculation pumps
and suction fans. Emergency power is provided by a standby diesel
generator. This approach is used in the handling of chlorine and other
toxic gases. Operating procedures should include the shutdown of plant in
the event of failure of such systems.
Flammables Handling
Where site operations involve the handling of flammable liquids a fire
hydrant system should be provided that preferably encircles the plant and
is provided with cross over connections at appropriate points. The ring
should be maintained under pressure by e.g. 'jockey' pumps. Any fall in
pressure should automatically start the main fire pump. A diesel powered
pump should be provided on high hazard sites in case of power failure.
Centrifuging of Flammable Materials
Many industrial processes involve the centrifuging of a powder from a
flammable liquid. Centrifuges are well known for providing an ignition
source due to their high speed moving parts and a secure nitrogen source
is necessary. A local emergency back-up supply of nitrogen is often
provided
from
local
cylinders
in
case
of
site
nitrogen
failure.
Steam Heating
Where a hazard can arise from the solidification of a liquid chemical on
loss of steam heating, back-up heating is often provided by an electrical
heater or trace heating. Whilst there are not many instances of this being
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a direct hazard, the exposure of personnel during the process of dealing

with a solid tank of a substance such as sulphur can represent a hazard.
Reactor Cooling
Loss of water cooling to a reactor can be hazardous where the reactions
involved are exothermic. The use of site utility water supplies to back-up
a local purpose designed cooling tower-based system is common. Where
a refrigerant is used for cooling, loss of power supply to the refrigeration
package can be critical.
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5.19
RELIEF SYSTEMS / VENT SYSTEMS
General Principles
Process
plant
can
be
subjected
to
excessive
overpressure
or
underpressure due to:
External fire;
Process abnormality or mal operation;
Equipment or service / utility failure;
Changes in ambient conditions;
Excess chemical reaction.
To achieve a more inherently safe design, and to arrive at the most

economical solution overall consideration should always be given to:
Can the overpressure or underpressure hazard be eliminated by

changes in process or plant design?
Can the overpressure or underpressure hazard be reduced by

reducing inventories or changing process conditions?
Can the overpressure or underpressure be contained by designing

equipment to withstand maximum feasible pressure?;
Can alternative protection to a relief system be considered?;
Can the required relief system be minimised by mechanical or

instrumented systems?.
Explosion Relief is considered in a separate Technical Measures Document.

Relief systems considered in this document are based on systems where
pressure rise occurs over several seconds or longer, and there is no
reaction front. In these cases we may assume:
Safety valves can open in time;
Piping is adequately sized to provide pressure relief;
Relief flow may be determined by steady-state flow equations;
Conditions are approximately uniform throughout each phase at

any moment;
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Further pressure generation by reaction in the relief piping is

negligible.
General principles applicable to relief systems include:
In all cases, relief devices must be selected and located to minimise

disturbance to plant and environment;
Relief devices must not be isolated from equipment they protect

while the equipment is in use;
The discharge from a relief device should pass to a safe location

which may be:
A dump tank;
Upstream in the process;
A storage tank;
A quench vessel or tower;
A sewer;
The atmosphere;
A knockout drum;
A scrubber;
An incinerator;
A flare stack.
Design basis and methodology of all relief stream packages must be

documented, and incorporated into plant modification and change
procedures to ensure that relief stream invalidation does not occur.
Sizing of Vents (Especially Exothermic Reactions, Storage Tanks)
One of the biggest problems in sizing vents is the availability and
accuracy of physical property data for the reaction components. It is good
practice when sizing a relief system to utilise several design methods to
achieve consistency in design.
When sizing pressure / vacuum relief systems for storage, if several
tanks are connected up to a single relief system the relief device should
be capable of accommodating the simultaneous vent loading at a
relieving pressure less than the lowest tank design pressure.
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Venting can either be normal or atmospheric venting or emergency

venting. Different measures may be adopted to provide protection for the
vessel or tank in each case. The worst case scenario is generally
experienced when tanks are exposed to fire.
Normal venting requirements may be met by installation of pressurevacuum relief valves. Emergency venting may be accomplished by
installation of a bursting or rupture disc device. Depending upon the tank
contents and the physical characteristics of these contents consideration
should be given to the vent discharge point and configuration. Guidance
is provided in recognised industry standards.
There are various recognised methods for sizing vents. These include:
API Methods;
NFPA Methods;
Vapour / Gas Only method;
Leungs method;
Level Swell method;
Stepwise method;
Nomogram method;
Fauskes method;
Two-phase method;
DIERS method;
Huffs method;
Boyles method.
The use of DIERS (Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems)

methodology is becoming increasingly widespread. Detailed analysis of
relief systems using this methodology, together with experimental
testing, is now the accepted practice.
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Flame Arresters
Flame arresters are commonly installed on the vent outlet of tanks
containing liquids with flashpoints below 21C, generally where pressurevacuum vent valves are not in use. Their prime function is to prevent the
unrestricted propagation of flame through flammable gas or vapour
mixtures, and secondly to absorb heat from unburnt gas.
Flame arresters should be designed for each specific application, and due
to the likelihood of progressive blockage a rigorous inspection and
maintenance schedule should be in place.
Relief Valves
Relief valves are characterised by:
Slow response times (tenths of a second up to > 1 second);
Risk of blockage;
Trace leakage.
Design considerations for relief valves include:
The pressure drop before the safety valve must be low to avoid
instability;
The design must take into consideration differences between gas

and liquid duties;
Back pressure can affect opening / closing pressures, stability and

capacity;
The
relief
valve
usually
solely
determines
relief
capacity
if
appropriate piping is used.

Regular proof checks are required to check lifting pressure, particularly if
located in a corrosive environment. Also valve seating checks should be
undertaken to ensure that the valve is not passing.
Bursting Discs
Bursting discs are characterised by:
Very fast response times (milliseconds);
Less risk of blockage than relief valves;
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Cheap to install and maintain;
Available in a wide range of materials;
No leakage;
Non re-closing hence may allow large discharges even when

pressure falls below relieving (rupture) pressure;
Potential for premature failure due to pressure pulsation, especially

if the rupture pressure is close to the operating pressure;
Rupture pressure affected by back pressure;
Risk of incorrect assembly.
Design considerations for bursting discs include:
Protection against reverse pressure (vac dials);
Differences between disc temperature and vessel temperature;
Main factor affecting relief capacity is piping configuration;
The rupture pressure of a bursting disc is a function of the prevailing

temperature. It is common practice for an operator to specify the
required rupture pressure at a specific operating or relieving temperature
however, if the temperature cycles or changes during the process
operation the degree of protection of the vessel can be compromised.
This is because as the prevailing temperature decreases the rupture
pressure of the bursting disc will increase potentially resulting in the
rupture pressure at temperature being greater than the design pressure
of the vessel. Thus if the pressure increases at this condition, vessel
failure will occur. The converse case can also apply if the rupture
pressure is quoted for ambient temperatures, since the actual rupture
pressure will decrease under normal operating conditions which can
cause premature failure of bursting discs.
The
surrounding
vent
pipework
should
be
adequately
sized
to
accommodate relief flows in the event of bursting disc failure.

Bursting discs are a common method for fulfilling emergency venting
requirements, although a routine maintenance programme should cover
bursting disc installations.
Bursting disc installations should incorporate vent pipework that is the
same diameter as the bursting disc itself.
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Combinations of bursting discs and relief valves are occasionally

employed for specific applications. Double bursting discs (back to back
arrangements) are often provided with a pressure indicator/alarm
between them in aggressive environments where failures of the initial
disc may occur. In such instances the second bursting disc is reversed to
withstand the initial shock pressure.
Scrubbers (Design for Maximum Foreseeable Flow)
In many installations, scrubbing systems provide one of the major lines
of defence against release of toxic gas. Several key factors must
therefore be taken into consideration when designing and sizing the
scrubbing system. These include:
Composition of gas load;
The composition of the gas load must be known with respect to:
Solids loading, particle size distribution and chemical

composition;
Water vapour loading;
Toxic gas loading;
Inerts loading.
Variations in gas load;
The basis of the scrubber design should take into consideration the
peak gas loading, the minimum gas loading and the mean gas
loading in addition to corresponding variations in inert gas loading.
Depletion / saturation of scrubbing liquor;
Analysis of the reaction stoichiometry between the gas and the

scrubbing liquor will give some indication of the minimum scrubbing
liquor strength at which the absorption process can occur for a
recirculatory system. A methodology must be in place that ensures
replenishment of the scrubbing liquor at an appropriate point.
Hence monitoring of depletion of scrubber liquor and modelling of
breakthrough concentrations is critical. Furthermore, the process
may specify a maximum concentration of absorbed gas in the
scrubbing liquor at which the scrubber liquor should be replenished.
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Provision of Back-up systems;
In the vent of scrubber failure, it is sometimes possible to isolate

plant and process to prevent toxic gas emission by implementation
of appropriate interlocks and control systems. However, if
temporary isolation of plant and process is unfeasible a back up
system should be provided.
Control systems;
The control system for the scrubber operation should be interlocked

with the plant and processes that the scrubber services such that in
the event of scrubber failure process operations can be isolated and
/ or suspended. The control system should feature scrubber
diagnostics that verify and indicate that the scrubber is healthy and
working.
Monitoring and instrumentation;
Typical instrumentation on a toxic gas scrubbing system should

include:
Stack gas analyser;
Scrubbing liquor flow indicator;
Scrubbing liquor tank level indication;
Flow indication or DP instrumentation across scrubbing

fan;
Process interlocks for event of scrubber failure.
Stack Heights
The concentration of waste gases at ground level can be reduced
significantly by emitting the waste gases from a process at great height,
although the actual amount of pollutants released into the atmosphere
will remain the same.
The basis for design begins with determination of an acceptable groundlevel concentration of the pollutant or pollutants. If the waste gas is to be
discharged through an existing stack, or the stack size is restricted the
ground-level concentration should be determined and if it is unacceptable
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appropriate control measures should be adopted. Steps in the design

methodology include:
For a given stack height, the effective height of the emission can be
determined by employing an appropriate plume-rise equation;
Application
of
atmospheric
dispersion
formula
enables
the
downward path of the emission to be modelled. Various formulae

may be employed. These include:
Bosanquet-Pearson model;
Gaussian model employing Briggs formulae;
Wilson model
Pasquill-Gifford model;
Sutton model;
TVA model.
Factors affecting stack design include:
Composition of waste gas (and changes in composition);
Physical and chemical properties of waste gas;
Topography (buildings, hills, lakes and rivers etc.);
Seasonal changes in weather;
Prevailing winds (direction and speed);
Humidity;
Rainfall
Flaring
Flaring may be used to destroy flammable, toxic or corrosive vapours,
particularly those produced during process upsets and emergency
venting.
Key design factors to ensure flare safety and performance include:
Smokeless operation;
Flame stability;
Flare size and capacity;
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Thermal radiation;
Noise level;
Reliable pilot and ignition system;
Flashback protection.
The major safety issues are the latter two items.
BS 5908: 1990
recommends that permanent pilot burners should be provided with a

reliable means of remote ignition. An additional means of ignition, e.g. a
piccolo tube should be provided, independent of power supplies. Flare
header systems should be provided with an inert gas purge sufficient to
provide a positive gas flow up the stack to prevent back diffusion of air.
Forced Ventilation (Especially to Control Direction of Flow and
Dilution)
Non-pressurised systems in which fumes and vapours are generated
should have adequate ventilation to remove those fumes to a safe place.
This may be a scrubber or a stack for discharge. Consideration should
also be given to the venting of discharges from relief systems. Both
dedicated enclosed forced ventilation systems and area forced ventilation
will need to be considered.
A further purpose of ventilation is to dilute and remove the hazardous
substance to such an extent that the concentration in the protected space
is kept to acceptable levels. Ventilation rates are generally designed to
reduce the concentration to about one-quarter of these levels.
The use of forced ventilation has an impact on the area extent and
classification of hazardous areas. The methodology for assessment of
type and degree of ventilation is covered in British Standards. Although
mainly applied inside a room or enclosed space, forced ventilation can
also be applied to situations in the open air to compensate for restricted
or impeded natural ventilation due to obstacles.
Spot Ventilation
General ventilation is applied to the room or compartment as a whole
(see forced ventilation above). It may also be applied locally to the plant
or process as spot or local ventilation. Basic design principles include:
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Fume extraction inlet should be as close to the source of gas or

vapour as possible;
The rate of extraction of fume should be greater than or equal to

the rate of generation of fume in the particular area;
Air supply inlets should be located to provide ventilation for other

regions that may become contaminated;
General air movement should be from areas surrounding the

emission source, across the contaminated zone and thence through
the fume extraction inlet;
A velocity of 0.5 to 2 m/s is generally recommended (Lees 25.7).

Trunking is often used to allow operators to move the point of
extraction as required.
Special Cases: Chlorine, LPG Storage

In the event of overpressure in liquid chlorine storage tanks, the
discharge line from the pressure relief system should enter a closed
expansion vessel with a capacity of nominally 10% of the largest storage
vessel. This expansion vessel should then be manually relieved at a
controlled rate to an absorption system.
In the event of overpressure of LPG storage tanks, the tank should be
fitted with a pressure relief valve connected directly to the vapour space.
Underground or mounded vessels affect full flow capacity of pressure
relief valves.
In the event of overpressure in anhydrous ammonia storage tanks, the
tank should be protected by a relief system fitted with at least two
pressure relief valves should be fitted.
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5.20
ROADWAYS / SITE TRAFFIC CONTROL
Introduction
The good design of roadways and the control of traffic on-site are
important factors in the prevention of road traffic accidents and an
important consideration in the prevention of major accident hazards onsite. Collisions between moving vehicles, collisions between pedestrians
and moving vehicles, or the impact of a vehicle with stationary plant,
vehicles or equipment can lead to physical injuries and damage or a loss
of containment of chemicals. The detailed design and construction of
roadways is outside the scope of this technical measures document but
some of the important considerations relating to roadway design are
highlighted below.
In addition the safe and correct immobilisation of vehicles during tanker
loading and unloading operations and at other times when on site is also
an important factor in the prevention of site major accident hazards.
This technical measures document considers the following elements:
Design Codes Roadways;
Site Traffic Control;
Operational Issues.
General Principles Design Codes Roadways

In principle the road layout, signing and marking should be such that all
road users can reasonably understand what is required of them. Roads
should be designed to accommodate the largest vehicles that may have
to use them in respect of strength, width, radius, gradient, clearance and
visibility.
Access routes on-site are required for pedestrians, cyclists and road
traffic. Access is required for the transport of equipment and materials,
for emergency vehicle access and maintenance purposes. Roadways and
access routes should be designed to avoid congestion and hence reduce
the likelihood of road traffic accidents occurring.
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Road Layout & Geometry

The following are important considerations in the design of road layout:
The surface should be firm, level and of an appropriate material;
Consideration should be given to other physical characteristics of

the road such as the camber, width, headroom, visibility, drainage,
gradient and radius of bends etc;
Road layouts should be carefully planned and clearly marked;
There should be appropriate segregation between pedestrians and

road traffic;
Parking and loading/unloading areas on site should be separated;

and
Hazards, restrictions and directions should be clearly identified and

communicated by signs, signals and instructions.
However, for the majority of industrial sites with an existing infrastructure

road layouts cannot be readily amended.
Layout
Depending on the size of the site the road layout should preferably be a
looped arrangement, which avoids the need for reversing. In smaller sites,
a street with only one way in or out may be acceptable subject to the
provision of adequate turning facilities, which may be in the form of a
hammerhead but preferably a turning circle.
In larger sites, individual access roads should feed to the main industrial
distributor road, which should not provide direct access to individual
factory units. All two-way industrial roads should have a minimum width
of 7.3 meters with local widening on bends to cater for the swept path of
HGV vehicles. Individual premises should have an access of minimum
width of 6.1 meters.
When designing a new or improved layout it is helpful to use a design
vehicle to achieve efficient and uniform layouts. Most designs will operate
satisfactorily if they can cope with the requirements of a 15.5 metre long
design articulated vehicle and a 10.0 metre long design rigid vehicle.
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Gradient
The maximum longitudinal gradient should be 1 in 12 and the minimum
channel gradient should be 1 in 125. A crossfall or camber of 1 in 40
provides adequate drainage. If minimum gradients are not provided,
surface water will tend to pond, which will be hazardous in freezing
conditions. Standing water can also obscure road markings and lead to an
increased likelihood of accidents.
Materials of Construction
Different types of road pavements are available including flexible
pavement where surface materials are bound with a bituminous binder, a
rigid pavement which utilises pavement quality concrete for the surfacing
layers, or a flexible pavement surfaced with block paviors.
Bituminous surfacing will degrade if exposed to oil products and other
chemical spillages. Areas where spillages are likely such as loading and
unloading areas should utilise a resistant surfacing, such as concrete or
some other appropriate material, with drainage facilities that can intercept
hazardous chemicals.
The design of the road pavement will be dependent on the ground
conditions at sub-grade level and the expected traffic flow and vehicle
type during the design life of the pavement.
Kerbing
Kerbing to roadways should be provided wherever possible to clearly
define the roadway and provide a measure of protection. Dropped kerbs
should be provided at pedestrian crossing points.
Height Restrictions
Areas that are vulnerable such as pipebridges, overhead gantries etc
should be clearly identified and height restrictions clearly marked.
The standard minimum clearance over every part of the carriageway of a
public road is 16 feet 6 inches (5.03 meters). When the clearance over
any part is less than this standard, a warning sign both on and prior to the
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structure should be provided which should be at least 75mm less than the
measured height.
Heights of vehicle likely to be encountered are 4.2 meters high (i.e. A
standard container on a suitable flatbed vehicle). Minimum headroom
provided should be 4.65 meters exclusive of any additional space required
for lighting units. Additional clearance will be required if there is a
requirement for an overlay in the future. Changes in gradient may also
reduce the effective headroom for long vehicles.
Visibility
Consideration should be given to road traffic visibility. Road traffic should
have adequate forward visibility on bends to enable a driver to stop
before an obstruction in the road. In addition, there should be adequate
visibility at junctions so those drivers emerging can see and be seen by
approaching drivers.
Visibility requirements are related to vehicle speed and stopping
distances.
Lighting
There should be adequate lighting of site locations and vehicles at all
times to enable all persons to carry out their work tasks safely and in
safety.
Lighting should be provided for junctions, plant and buildings, pedestrian
routes and areas where loading/unloading is to be carried out. Signs
should either be illuminated for night-time visibility or adverse weather
conditions, or be suitably reflective. Vehicles on site should use
lights/beacons etc in darkness or poor visibility to aid detection by other
vehicles.
Consideration should be given to the difference in light levels between
internal and external areas at the points of access to and from buildings
that may hinder detection of vehicle movement.
Adequate lighting should be provided to all areas and especially to those
areas used in darkness hours.
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Drainage
Roadways on site should be adequately drained to ensure that standing
water is not present on-site. Connections for rainwater run-off from roads
into drainage systems may have to include interception facilities in the
case of chemical contamination.
Bridges
Bridges and other structures, which have maximum weight restrictions,
should be clearly identified.
Parking
Parking areas on site for employees, visitors and delivery vehicles should
be clearly identified and marked. Staff and visitor car parking areas
should be separate from site access routes wherever possible. Provision
for disabled users should also be made.
Parking bays should be clearly identified by surface markings in order to
avoid random parking arrangements.
Lay-bys or similar should be considered to avoid obstruction of the main
site access roads.
Secure, convenient and adequate parking areas should be provided onsite for vehicles such that the general roadway is not obstructed. Off-road
pull-in areas that are clearly identified should be provided wherever
possible. Random parking should be avoided and discouraged wherever
possible since this can introduce additional hazards and increase the
likelihood of a road traffic accident.
Loading/Offloading
Areas for loading and unloading should preferably be separate from
general access areas and loading bay edges should be clearly marked and
protected by barriers. Adequate space for vehicle manoeuvring should be
available in loading/unloading and delivery areas.
If reversing or manoeuvring into position is required consideration should
be given to the provision of physical barriers or the attendance of another
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person to supervise the movements. In some instances audible warnings

for vehicles reversing or manoeuvring may be appropriate.
Operators in unloading areas should be provided with suitable refuges
and drivers of vehicles should be segregated from dangerous working
areas.
Special coatings to road surfaces may be required to provide resistance
against chemical attack from spillages. Raised kerbing and other
containment measures may also be required to ensure that spillages do
not spread across adjacent areas. In these areas special drainage
channels may also be required that drain to collection sumps for
reclamation purposes.
Pedestrian Walkways
Pedestrians should be kept away from access routes for vehicles
wherever possible in order to avoid possible conflict. Separate pedestrian
pavements that are clearly identified should be provided. Guard rails or
fencing should be provided where appropriate and additional protection
should be provided at pedestrian exits and entrances from buildings.
Normal road crossing points for pedestrians should be clearly identified
and consideration should be given to clearly identifying walkways by
zebra markings or other such systems. Zebra crossings can also be
incorporated into layout design. Zebra crossings are normally only
considered when traffic flows do not provide adequate gaps in the traffic
for pedestrians to cross.
Consideration should be given to the provision of pedestrian walkways
clearly segregated from adjacent roadways wherever possible.
The positioning of pedestrian crossing points should be considered
carefully to ensure the pedestrian and road user have adequate visibility.
It may be necessary to erect guardrails to stop pedestrians crossing on
corners where visibility is reduced. Guardrails should be set back a
minimum of 500mm from the kerb. Where road crossings are wide, it is
appropriate to provide central refuges to allow the roadway to be crossed
safely in two or more movements. In some circumstances overhead
pedestrian
footbridges
or
subways
may
be
considered
necessary
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The movement of pedestrians onto/off and around site should be

considered, not only for routine access between plants during the working
day but also for mass movements which may occur at the beginning or
end of the working day, during shift changeovers, at lunchtime and under
emergency evacuation conditions.
The interaction between pedestrians, cycle traffic and vehicles should be
evaluated.
Railways
Rail deliveries are generally only applicable for the bulk transfer of raw
materials or product onto or off site. Specially designed facilities for
loading/offloading are generally available. Special consideration needs to
be given to rail car movements onto and off-site in co-ordination with the
relevant railtrack operator. Whilst on-site, rail car movements may
restrict normal traffic flow arrangements, either whilst moving into
location or whilst being loaded. Special consideration should be given to
the segregation of rail traffic from other areas and the provision of
suitable barriers and warning signals for locations where rail tracks cross
pedestrian footpaths or roadways.
The legislative requirements for rail traffic are outside the scope of this
document.
Areas where road and rail lines interact should be given special
consideration to ensure that suitable signing and barriers, if required, are
provided between road and rail.
General Principles Site Traffic Control

Site traffic control relies upon a combination of physical features such as
road layout and marking, signs and signals and other considerations such
as systems, procedures and training.
Site traffic control should typically consider the following types of traffic:
Road traffic commercial delivery vehicles (including road tankers,

wagons, couriers etc), internal vehicles (including fork lift trucks,
mobile cranes, bicycles), visitor and staff cars/motorbikes/bicycles
etc;
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Rail traffic some sites may receive and dispatch goods by rail.
Rail routes may cross site access roads for vehicles or affect
pedestrian areas; and
Pedestrian traffic site employees, contractors and visitors either

on their way to or from their normal place of work at the beginning
or end of the working day, or as part of their work during the day.
Road users, both drivers and pedestrians, should know exactly what is
expected of them. This can be achieved by establishing a Road Hierarchy,
which is used to provide a consistent standard for each road type in
terms of design standard, signing, access constraints etc.
Traffic routes should be determined and can be classified as either
access/through routes to site for deliveries, shuttle routes between
buildings for on-site activities, or emergency access routes for fire
engines, ambulances etc. Careful planning and consideration of site traffic
control issues can result in a reduction in the likelihood of collisions
between vehicles and/or equipment.
Incompatible types of traffic should be segregated as far as possible to
avoid potential interactions between chemicals in the event of a collision
between road traffic vehicles or between road traffic and stationary
storage facilities or pipelines carrying chemicals.
This guidance is not concerned with traffic control within buildings such
as warehouses or process plant areas where special consideration needs
to be given to the potential interaction between forklift trucks and/or
pedestrians.
Road Traffic
Consideration should be given both to the hazards introduced by the
loads being conveyed and the mode of transport used. Chemical hazards
are considered elsewhere. Consideration should be given to the physical
size, the presence of ignition sources and hot surfaces, the presence of
flammable fuels, the possibility of impact caused by size or speed, and
loading/unloading issues.
The purpose of the presence of vehicles on site should be assessed.
Some vehicles may be used simply for access and the transportation of
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personnel and others for the delivery of materials (solids, liquids and
gases) and equipment to/from site.
Some of the items that may be transported are given below:
Bulk deliveries of liquids or solids;
Small packages, containers, drums etc of solids or liquids;
Gas cylinders;
Mechanical equipment;
Letters, parcels etc; and
Personnel.
Some of the different modes of road traffic transport which may be

present on site on either a routine or an irregular basis are given below
and consideration should be given for any possible implications due to
variation in height, length, width, weight etc.
Bulk delivery tankers;
Wagons, trucks, lorries and vans;
Mobile cranes;
Cars;
Mini-buses;
Cyclists; and
Fork lift trucks.
Each type of vehicle has different characteristics and introduces different

potential problems to site.
An assessment of the risks of transportation of each material/load on site
should be carried out, an estimate of the frequency of each delivery
made and the access route carefully defined in relation to the hazards
present.
Traffic Flow
In order to assist in controlling traffic flow on-site a number of additional
measures can be incorporated in order to manage traffic flow in
congested areas and reduce speeds on-site. Such techniques include:
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Traffic lights can be used to control flow at busy junctions, in

narrow locations and at entry and exit locations to the site;
One-way systems should be considered where necessary to reduce

the likelihood of collision, reduce congestion and improve traffic
movement;
Roundabouts may smooth traffic flow and avoid road traffic turning
directly in front of on-coming traffic;
Traffic calming devices such as speed humps, rumble strips, width

restrictors etc can be incorporated into road design to encourage a
reduction in speed. (Such devices are not appropriate in areas
where forklift trucks routinely operate since they introduce
additional hazards for this type of vehicle). The design of such
features must be appropriate for the type of traffic envisaged;
Physical barriers should be incorporated into road design to protect

vulnerable and hazardous installations such as storage tanks,
pipework systems, buildings or pedestrian access areas;
Signs and road markings; and,
Site speed limits.
Physical Barriers
Physical barriers should be installed, wherever practical, adjacent to
roadways to reduce the potential impact of road traffic accidents.
Consideration should be given to the protection of vulnerable pipework,
storage tanks and other plant and equipment.
When considering the installation of barriers it is important that visibility
is not reduced
pedestrians.
below
acceptable
standards
for
road
users
and
Signs/Road Markings
Signs and signals should be used on-site to clearly identify hazards,
restrictions and to give directions. Chemical hazards should be identified
along with height, width and loading restrictions for pipebridges, arches,
bridges etc.
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Road markings should be used to designate traffic routes, non-parking

areas, give way areas etc in accordance with standard road markings. All
signs should be unambiguous, conspicuous, clean and unobstructed.
Speed sensors and flashing warning signs can be used to improve
communication of information to traffic on-site.
A site plan should be available at the site entrance, the site speed limit
should be clearly identified and adequate sign posting to assist delivery
vehicles unfamiliar with the site layout should be provided to assist
navigation.
Speed Limits
Speed limits should be imposed on larger industrial sites to limit the
possibility and severity of accidents. A suitable site speed limit (s) should
be determined based upon consideration of what is a safe speed on-site
accounting for the layout, bends etc. Limits of 10, 15 or 20 mph may be
appropriate depending on the site layout and hazards. This should then
be effectively communicated to drivers of all vehicles who require access
to the site, sign-posted at appropriate intervals and locations to remind
drivers of the speed limit and enforced. To be effective the limits should
be enforced by site security. Speed limits should be included in the Site
Rules
with
appropriate
disciplinary
action
taken
as
necessary.
Operational Issues
A number of on-going measures should be considered when considering
roads and traffic control.
Spillage Clean-up
Adequate facilities and materials should be readily available on-site for
clean-up of spillages. Any materials used should not directly affect the
road surface.
Maintenance
Roads on site should be adequately maintained and free from pot-holes
and other surface defects which may affect vehicles
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Adequate equipment grit/sand etc should be readily available on-site

for snow and icy conditions.
Systems and Procedures
Systems and procedures should be in place to ensure that site traffic
control issues are adequately considered and incorporated into site safety
management systems. Consideration should be given to segregating
incompatible traffic loads and organising deliveries outside busy periods.
Systems should be in place for assessing the transport requirements,
vehicles and routes to be used. Consideration should be given to the
necessity for transport, and to a vehicle selection system for the site that
considers the design, maintenance and operability of the vehicles to be
used.
Procedures for accidents to be reported and investigated should exist.
Lessons for improving traffic flow and reducing accidents should be
learnt.
Normal requirements of Road Traffic Acts should be adhered to on-site.
This includes seatbelt and alcohol policies.
Procedures should exist to deal with the increased hazards caused by
adverse weather conditions. Procedures for routine clearance of debris
from roadways and road cleaning along with adequate resources should
be available.
Standard access routes should be defined and prepared. In the event of
site roadwork, temporary construction work or other reasons why areas
may be temporarily out of use (cranes, rail delivery etc) a system needs
to be in place to ensure that alternative routes are developed, temporary
access signs installed etc. Under all circumstances access for emergency
vehicles to all facilities should be maintained.
For those sites where offloading/loading can result in temporary road
closures being necessary care should be taken that a combination of
more than one road closure at a time does not lead to areas of site
becoming temporarily inaccessible for pedestrians, or emergency
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vehicles.
Visitors should be the subject of suitable reception and security checks
prior to access to site. Visitor vehicles should be separated from site
operations as far as possible. Prior to access to site visitors should be
made aware of vehicle restrictions and safety considerations. Pedestrian
visitors should be accompanied whilst on-site in operational areas.
Site based vehicles should be routinely inspected and maintained to set
standards and procedures to ensure roadworthiness and the effectiveness
of safety systems such as brakes, lights, horns, indicators etc. Daily preuse checks for site based vehicles such as fork lift trucks should be
considered. There should be a clear procedure for reporting and
correcting defects in vehicles and maintenance records should be
available for inspection.
Systems should be in place to ensure effective communication between
gatehouse and operators accepting delivery on-site to warn of the arrival
of delivery vehicles.
CCTV systems can be considered as a mechanism for managing and
controlling road traffic systems.
Training
Training is an essential component of site traffic control and should cover
not only those engaged in driving vehicles on site, but also pedestrians
and those responsible for monitoring and enforcing traffic control on site.
Training of site personnel engaged in driving site-based vehicles is an
essential part of the prevention of site traffic accidents. Site based
personnel should be made aware of the hazards of driving fork lift trucks
for example and should be routinely checked for competence and licensed
as appropriate. Unauthorised personnel should not be allowed to drive
vehicles on site.
Training for all site staff should cover technical issues such as vehicles,
equipment, hazard awareness, speed limits, parking and loading
requirements, safe operating practices etc, site layout, traffic routes,
reporting procedures etc.
The competence of third party delivery drivers on site can be assessed by
checking the health & safety standards of contractors and their subcontractors in relation to their selection and training procedures,
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maintenance of vehicles, use of regular or ad-hoc drivers, accident and

safety records etc. The company may undertake spot checks and
inspections of delivery vehicles to ensure suitable road safety standards,
driver competence and vehicle maintenance is being carried out.
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5.21
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
This Technical Measures Document refers to secondary containment.

Temporary or mobile systems which are required to be put in place in
response to an emergency e.g. booms, absorbent materials, sandbags
are considered under the Technical Measures Document on Emergency
Response / Spill Control. Also water sprays/curtains and foam blankets are
considered under the Technical Measures Document on Active / Passive Fire
Protection.
Related Technical Measures Documents are Emergency Response / Spill Control,
Active / Passive Fire Protection, Drum/Cylinder Storage/Handling and Relief Systems /
Vent Systems.
General Principles
Secondary containment is used on plant as a second line of defense for
preventing, controlling or mitigating major hazards events. It can take a
number of forms, the most common are:
Bunds
Drip trays
Off-gas treatment systems
Interceptors/Sumps
Expansion vessels
Double skinned tanks/vessels
Concentric pipes
Building structures/ventilation
Bunds
Bunds are generally used around storage tanks or drum storage areas
where flammable or toxic liquids are held. Alternative measures may be
earth dikes (usually for very large tanks), sumps and interceptors. Bunds
are also sometimes used within plant buildings for reactors and other
process vessels. For materials that are normally gases at ambient
conditions, bunds are used where flash fractions are sufficiently low to
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merit them. Therefore they are often used for refrigerated gases but not
for the same gases stored under pressure.
It is normal to limit the number of tanks in a single bund to 60,000 m3
total capacity. However, incompatible materials should have separate
bunds. Tanks often have individual bunds.
Bunds should be sized to hold 110% of the maximum capacity of the
largest tank or drum. This will allow some latitude for the addition of
foam during response to the emergency. There are no set rules on the
ratio between wall height and floor area and codes vary greatly with
respect to recommendations of bund wall height. Low wall heights (1-1.5
m) are often used to facilitate firefighting but are poor defense against
spigot flow (where a leak in the wall of a tank passes over the bund wall)
or the tidal wave effect of a catastrophic tank failure. In some cases
bunds up to height of the tank are used, but these are quite unusual. For
high walled bunds, consideration will need to be given to the possibility of
tanks floating as the bund fills, causing catastrophic failure.
Bunds are generally fabricated from brick/mortar or concrete but where
liquids are being stored above their boiling point additional insulation,
e.g. vermiculite mortar, may be added as cladding to reduce the
evaporation rate. Such materials provide adequate chemical resistance to
most liquids.
Maintenance of bunds is an important aspect, often overlooked,

particularly in remote locations. A system of inspection should be in place
to ensure the integrity of the bund. Also due consideration should be
given to drainage to allow the removal of rainwater. This is normally
achieved by incorporating a drain at a low point of a sloping floor with a
manual valve, normally kept closed. Operating schedules should include
daily opening of the valve to remove accumulated water, this will also
assist in identifying minor leaks. However, with this system there is the
problem that the valve may be left open or fail, thus reducing the
effectiveness of the bund if a tank failure occurs. Also in winter
conditions, ice may form blocking the drain. Failure to remove rainwater
will reduce the capacity of the bund and may result in overtopping and if
the substance to be contained is incompatible with water e.g. oleum, may
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result in an increased airborne release. Consideration of these scenarios

should be included in the Safety Report.
Drip Trays
Drip trays are often used beneath equipment liable to small leaks, such
as pumps, in process buildings and are effectively mini-bunds. They are
intended to prevent the spread of toxic or flammable substances to other
plant areas or to sumps and drains where secondary effects resulting in a
major accident could occur by domino effect. Drip trays vary greatly in
size and design. They are normally tailored to the individual item of
equipment but may serve a number of items. Materials of construction
are often metals such as stainless steel or strong rigid plastics that can
be readily moved. Drainage is not normally provided and liquid collected
is normally removed using absorbent material, after neutralisation or
dilution (if required).
One variation on this theme is the use of sumps on drum stillages. These
are intended to hold the total contents of a drum in the event of a
catastrophic failure. They are normally limited to 1 or 2 drums and may
be used in drum transport by forklift truck.
HAZOP/HAZAN studies should determine where drip trays are required.
Off-Gas Treatment Systems
Off-gas treatment systems which may act as secondary containment
include:
Scrubbers
Flares
Catchpots/Knock-out drums
Electrostatic precipitators
These systems may be used to reduce concentrations of hazardous gases

and vapours prior to discharge of the stream to atmosphere. Apart from
scrubbers, often such systems are part of the normal process but they
may be used in a secondary containment role. The latter two are used
when discharge streams may contain liquids or solids e.g. from reactor
emergency venting, which need to be removed, prior to further
treatment. Catchpots may be chilled or contain an absorbent liquid to
remove contaminants. The worst credible case discharge rate and volume
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should considered when designing such systems. HAZOP/HAZAN should

be used to establish the worst case scenario. The Technical Measures
Document Relief Systems / Vent Systems provides more detail.
Interceptors/Sumps
Design of drainage systems both within and outside process buildings
should take account of the need to segregate spillages of hazardous
materials. Drains systems to be considered may include:
Sewers
Stormwater drains
Process effluent systems
Firewater drainage systems
In many cases these functions are combined and often firewater and
process effluents are drained into main sewerage systems. Where there
is a possibility that hazardous substances could be discharged into a
drainage system, interceptors or sumps should be provided of sufficient
capacity to ensure that an offsite major accident does not occur. HAZOP
studies or an alternative hazard identification methodology should be
used to identify such hazards.
For process effluents arising from leaks or plant washdown, good practice
is to provide a local sump which is sampled before emptying. Such sumps
normally incorporate level indicators/alarms for monitoring. Discharge
can be to drums via submersible or mobile pumps for onward disposal or
via manual or manually operated automatic valves into main drainage
systems if the contents are non-hazardous. As for bund drainage
consideration will need to be given in the Safety Report on the possibility
of valves being left open.
A particular concern is the discharge of non-water miscible flammable
liquids, which form a top layer. These could ignite considerable distances
from the plant after discharge. More sophisticated interceptors can be
provided to facilitate removal of floating flammable liquids. These tend to
be designed to meet individual needs and may incorporate conductivitybased level sensors to distinguish between layers.
Firewater run-off is likely to involve very large quantities of contaminated
water (Lees quotes 900-2700 m3/hr). Risk Assessments should be
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undertaken to consider the requirement for segregation of these streams

into lagoons or other catchment systems.
Expansion Systems
Expansion systems are used to prevent pressure build up, leading to loss
of containment, in the event of overfilling or temperature increases. They
are used mainly on liquefied gas storage systems, reactors and long runs
of pipelines.
Codes of practice for chlorine systems include the use of an expansion
vessel to allow for overfilling of the main storage tank. Depending upon
the arrangement, pressure, level or weight detection/alarms on the
expansion vessel may included to alert operators if liquid reaches this
point. Capacity of the expansion vessel is recommended as 10% of the
capacity of a storage tank.
Expansion vessels are sometimes provided for atmospheric storage
tanks, particularly where substances are particularly toxic or noxious. A
liquid scrubbing medium may be included in the expansion vessel to
provide for removal of fumes from air displaced on filling. The vent
stream is sparged into vessel below the liquid surface. The expansion
vessel itself then vents to either atmosphere or a scrubber. An
alternative, where a number of tanks are used for the same substance, is
to arrange overflows from one tank to another.
Expansion tanks for reactors are described in the Technical Measure
Document Quench Systems.
Long pipelines containing liquids that have a high coefficient of expansion
should be provided with relief systems or expansion chambers to prevent
loss of containment due to overpressure. Relief systems should be
discharged into expansion vessels or off gas treatment plant if discharge
rates are within the design limits for such systems. Expansion chambers
should have a capacity of 20% of the pipeline volume. Chlorine is a
particular case to consider. Codes of practice recommend pressure relief
valves or bursting discs for liquid chlorine pipelines venting to the
expansion vessel or use of expansion chambers.
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Double Skinned Vessels

Where there is particular concern about leakages occurring from tanks,
an alternative to bunding is to provide a second skin to collect material
lost. Monitoring of the annulus using specific analysers or level detection
can alert operators to the problem. Such systems are sometimes used for
underground or tanks in remote areas, where undetected leaks to the
environment may occur. Similarly tanks within process buildings may also
be doubled skinned.
Jacketed vessels including reactors and other process vessels are
primarily used to provide cooling or heating (using water, steam,
refrigerants, heating fluids etc.) to maintain temperatures of contained
substances. In some cases monitoring of the heat transfer medium is
used to detect loss of containment.
Concentric Pipes
Pipes are sometimes provided with an outer shell or secondary pipe to
protect against loss of containment. As for double skinned tanks, these
tend to be used where the substance contained is particularly hazardous
and no alternative means i.e. bunding is available to contain any release.
Such methods are used in particular to protect pipes of less robust
materials of construction such as glass or plastic which are being used for
very corrosive substances e.g. bromine, strong acids. The outer pipe may
be of much stronger material, e.g. steel, which is sufficient to provide
further containment for a short duration without failure. Again monitoring
of the annulus is used to detect the initial failure and alert operators.
Such systems are often used where there are long runs of pipe on
overhead pipebridges. Pipes can be sloped to allow drainage to a
collection pot provided with level detection/alarms.
As for jacketed vessels, coolant/heating medium flow through jacketed
pipes may be used to detect leaks also.
Building Ventilation
Building ventilation systems can be arranged such that flow is maintained
from less contaminated to areas that may become contaminated
following a loss of containment, before discharge via off-gas systems, to
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provide some degree of secondary containment. Such systems are used

routinely in the nuclear industry.
The Technical Measures Document Relief Systems / Vent Systems considers
ventilation systems.
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5.22
SEGREGATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
This Technical Measures Document refers to issues surrounding the

storing and segregation of hazardous materials and how it can be used to
minimise the foreseeable risks of a major accident or hazard.
General Principles
The
following
aspects
should
be
considered
with
respect
to
the
Segregation of Hazardous Materials:
Human factors;
Poorly skilled work force;
Ignorance towards physical and chemical properties of stored

substances;
Plant lay-out; and
Plant siting.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard:
Failure to understand the properties of substances handled;
Failure to identify hazards associated with mixing substances and

domino events;
Failure of quality assurance procedures;
Insufficient recording of chemical inventories at each location on

site;
Insufficient labelling of chemical storage containers (raw materials,

reactants, intermediates, products, by-products and waste);
Poor warehousing management systems;
Poor house keeping.
Contributory Factors for an Assessor to Consider Concerning All Aspects

of Segregation of Hazardous Materials
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Whether formal hazard identification and risk assessment has been

used to determine the need for segregation (e.g. HAZOP, HAZAN,);
Whether there is a chemical inventory system sufficient to address

and categorise hazardous materials into compatible groups;
Whether there is a sufficient site plan illustrating a compact block

layout system with designated zones/plots for compatible
hazardous materials (zones 0, 1 & 2, oxidising agents, flammable
substances,
explosive
compounds, LPG);
substances,
strong
acids,
cyanide
Whether hazardous areas are classified and sufficient to segregate

compatible, hazardous materials to avoid overlap of these areas.
(oxidising agents and flammable substances areas should not
overlap, strong acids and cyanide compound areas should not
overlap, peroxides should not be stored near any metallic
compounds that could cause decomposition and the liberation of
oxygen);
Whether there are sufficient warning signs in place to inform

employees and visitors of the potentially, hazardous environments
they are approaching (no smoking signs, flammable area,
intrinsically safe zone);
Whether there are sufficient traffic routes for the emergency

services to safely access and egress a hazardous area in the event
of an emergency;
Whether the emergency services are aware of all risks associated

within and around the segregated areas;
Whether the designated plots for containing hazardous substances

are sited on impervious ground with an adequate drainage slope, (1
in 40 to 1 in 60);
Whether mixing of incompatible substance can occur within the

drainage system or anywhere that leaks/spills may accumulate (in
particular consideration of the location and routing of
pipelines/pumps etc from which hazardous substances may leak);
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Whether the processes and plant operating procedures minimise

the inventories of hazardous substances stored, handled or in
process;
Whether plots containing flammable and toxic chemicals are

sufficiently ventilated;
Whether enclosed plots containing flammable chemicals have

sufficient explosive relief systems within the building structure to
allow for safe relief ventilation;
Whether the bund facilities are sufficient to contain a maximum

volume of spillage from a hazardous chemical storage vessel;
Whether there are sufficient emergency provisions in place to

control the risks associated with leaks and spills
extinguishers/blankets/hydrants,
absorbent
materials,
emergency services, emergency evacuation procedures); and
(fire
PPE,
Whether there are sufficient escape routes in place in the event of a

major accident or hazard (minimum of two escape routes, no dead
end should exceed 8 metres).
Major Hazards
Major hazards could arise from the following:
Storing incompatible substances together;
Domino effects (e.g. thermal radiation from fires);
Direction of leaks to common sumps/manifolds;
Incorrect labelling/delivery of raw materials, intermediates and

products;
Introduction of ignition sources into segregated areas containing

flammable, combustible and explosive substances (e.g. smoking,
mobile equipment and vehicles, power tools);
Use of non-intrinsically safe equipment within intrinsically safe

zones;
Poorly managed inventory control and identification systems for

hazardous chemicals stored in drums and vessels;
Poor house keeping.
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5.23
WARNING SIGNS
This Technical Measure Document refers to issues surrounding physical

and electronic warning signs and how they can be used to minimise the
foreseeable risks of a major accident and hazard.
General Principles
For warning signs and alarm indications, the first requirement is to alert
the operator to the situation, and then to aid his/her accurate and prompt
diagnosis.
The following aspects should be considered with respect to Warning
Signs:
Human factors;
Ergonomic design;
Inadequate/lack of warning signs;
Unidentifiable warning signs;
Misinterpretation of warning signs; and,
Wrong warning signs used.
General Issues
Appropriate management systems should be in place to ensure that

areas of plant and plant items (valves, pipes, etc.) are identified
which require warning or instructional signs and that signs are
provided as appropriate. This also includes temporary works, such
as restricted areas e.g. for tanker offloading, lifting operations, hot
works, confined space etc.
Appropriate risk assessments should be conducted to determine

hazardous areas/zones on site.
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All site staff (including contractors) should be informed, instructed,

trained and supervised as appropriate to minimise a potential for
human error when recognising the meaning of warning signs.
The system of housekeeping should ensure that all damaged or

missing labels, signs, etc are replaced swiftly
The maintenance and calibration of electronic warning signs need to

be considered (noise/visual warning systems).
A warning sign should be compelling but not startling.
Visual Warning Signs
Where possible, accepted warning signs should be used so that

they conform to the readers assumptions.
The types of warning signs required to be in place within the

designated zones should be appropriate for the hazard, i.e.
mandatory, warning, caution, electronic, physical, intrinsically safe,
chemical/heat resistant.
The long-term visibility of the warning signs, i.e., lighting,

degradation due to exposure to UV, corrosion, size, positioning,
orientation should be considered.
Improvised signs, that are laminated to protect them, are

susceptible to veiling reflections. In certain positions this can mean
that they are unreadable.
Colour should not be used as the sole means of coding. It should

always be used redundantly. For example, apart the issue of colour
blindness, red is extremely difficult to detect under sodium lighting.
New designs or icons or pictograms should conform to accepted

codes and widely used systems and should be user tested prior to
being put into use to ensure that the designers mental model of
what the icon or pictogram means is compatible with that of the
user.
The variability in human dimensions should be considered when

placing warning signs. For example, a warning sign that is clearly
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visible to someone who is 5 ft 5 might not be visible to someone

who is 6 ft 5, or vice versa. Signs should be placed so that all the
people who need to, can see them.
Warning signs should contain no more information than is

necessary to inform the reader of the its meaning.
Dyslexic
or
illiterate
employees
should
be
considered
when
considering the use of purely text based warning signs.
Colour warning signs and labels are perceived as representing a

greater hazard than achromatic labels.
If signs are used to indicate direction, there should be no ambiguity

as to the route the sign indicates. Wherever it is possible to take
the wrong route a sign should be positioned to reduce the likelihood
of this happening.
The typeface used for text on warning signs should be a sans-serif

type. For example Ariel.
All types of viewing conditions should be considered when deciding

on what types of warning sign to use.
If the warning message is more than a couple of words long do not

use all capitals. This is because it slows down the reading time of
the message.
The minimum size of letters within warning signs should be based

on the following:
For Non VDU applications use this table:
Viewing
Height
distance (mm) in mm
501-900
901-1800
1801-3600
18
3601-6000
30
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Or if the viewing distance exceeds in 6000 mm use the formula: Height in

mm = Viewing distance in mm/200
For VDU applications use the following table:
Viewing
Height
distance (mm)
in
mm
500
700
4 .3
1000
4.8
The preferred colour contrasts on VDUs are presented in the table

below:
Character
Background
Black
White
Yellow
Dark Blue
White
Green
Black
Light Grey
White
Dark Grey
White
Red
Non-Verbal Auditory Warnings
All employees and contractors on site should know what each alarm
means and what the required response is, if the cause of the alarm
has the potential to affect them.
When an alarm triggers it should provide enough time to effect

recovery where applicable.
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Alarms should prioritised, where appropriate.
An alarm should reset automatically if the fault that generated it is

rectified
Following an alarm, the response required by the operator should

be clear.
Alarm signals should be at least 10-dB (A) over the background

noise.
Do not use alarms that have a frequency of 1 kHz if the source of

the sound needs to be detected.
Alarms should not prevent effective communication across the site.
The design of the alarm system should prevent masking and

flooding of alarms. Masking is where one alarm noise masks a
similar sounding alarm preventing the operator from detecting the
signal. Flooding happens when a system alarms which has a knock
on effect on other related systems, the result of which is the
triggering of myriad other alarms, flooding the site with sound.
There should be a noticeable difference between alarm sounds used

to alert, than for routine signals.
Verbal Auditory Warnings

Consider using verbal auditory warnings in combination with visual
warnings. Use of both methods has been found to improve compliance
with the warning message.
Verbal warnings can be more effective in crowd situations when signs can
become obscured.
Major Hazards
The safety report should address the following points:
Adequacy
of
management
systems
to
identify
when/where
warnings signs are required;
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Adequacy of management systems to deal with human failings to

obey warning signs;
Adequacy of risk assessments programmes, which may identify the

requirement for warning signs;
Adequacy of warning signs for emergency response, particularly for

local fire brigades/police;
Adequacy of warning signs for visitors or intruders to site;
Suitability of warning signs for the area in which they are located
e.g. use of non-flameproof electric/electronic signs in flameproof
areas;
Maintenance/review of warning signs; and
Mis-information included on warning signs.
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5.24
PROTECTIVE DEVICES
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Pressure
3. Level
4. Temperature
1. INTRODUCTION
Process equipment, including storage tanks and vessels, are usually
provided with protective devices in order that system safe operating
limits are not exceeded. In addition to protective devices, other devices
will perform a controlling function (e.g. pressure control, level control or
temperature control) and others will perform an alarm and / or shut down
function (e.g. high-pressure alarm, high level alarm, emergency
shutdown etc.). The latter function is usually actioned as a result of the
failure of a controlling function (e.g. emergency shutdown of a process
vessel due to high liquid level). The protective devices as described here
are the ultimate devices which are the last line of defense against safe
operating limits being exceeded.
The most common processing parameters that require to be controlled,
or against which process equipment needs to be protected are:
pressure (positive pressure and vacuum)
temperature
level
A range of protective devices, and protective functions (i.e. alarms,

shutdown etc.), are utilised for these parameters and these are
discussed, together with their merits, settings, installation locations etc.,
in the following sections.
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2. PRESSURE
All pressure systems must be provided with protective devices to prevent
the system being subject to pressures in excess of the safe operating
pressure. The safe operating pressure is the pressure quoted on the last
report of thorough examination made by the competent person, which
must be the same as or below the design pressure. Where the current
condition has deteriorated since manufacture, the safe operating pressure
may have been reduced below the design pressure by the competent
person. This applies equally to positive pressure and to negative pressure
(vacuum) - some large storage tanks and vessels can fail due to
inadvertently experiencing a vacuum. The only exception to the provision
of pressure protection/relief is in the case of a vessel (or system) that
has been specifically designed to withstand the maximum (or minimum)
pressure that can be generated within it - inherently safe (pressure)
design.
Over pressure protection for process pressure vessels usually involves a
hierarchy of passive and reactive protection devices. These devices range
from simple pressure indicators or gauges, through pressure transmitters
providing alarms, to pressure switches providing alarms and invoking
automatic shutdowns, and finally through to mechanical pressure relief
devices (e.g. pressure safety valves and bursting discs). Pressure
monitoring via gauges and automatic alarms is typically used to check
that the process system is operating at, or close to, the intended
operating pressure. Automatic shutdown systems are designed to shut
the system down before the Safe Operating Pressure is reached, or to
react to loss of pressure situations (e.g. vessel leakage). Pressure relief
(protective) devices are designed to prevent the system exceeding the
Safe Operating Pressure.
2.1 Pressure Relief Devices
Pressure relief devices typically take the form of a pressure, vacuum or
pressure/vacuum relief device. There are 2 types of common relief
devices - relief valves and bursting (or rupture) discs. These devices are
normally installed at the top of the vessels or tanks that they are
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protecting. However, it is permissible to mount these devices on pipework

which is directly attached to the item. It should not normally be possible
to isolate the pressure protective device from the vessel/tank which it is
protecting, however, it is quite common for a pressure vessel to be
protected by a pair of pressure relief valves set in parallel with interlock
controlled lockable isolation valves fitted between these relief valves and
the vessel. This arrangement allows individual relief valves to be
removed, tested, reset and refitted without shutting down the vessel.
2.2 System Operating Pressure and Relief Pressure
In order to ensure effective seating/sealing of the pressure relief device it
is necessary to have an adequate margin between the system operating
pressure and the set pressure of the pressure relief device. Conventional
pressure relief valves can simmer when the system pressure approaches
the set pressure of the valve. This pressure setting margin is normally
not less than:
5% for gas service
15% for liquid service
2.3 Relief Capacity

Of paramount importance is for the pressure relief device to have an
adequate discharge capacity in order to limit the pressure to within the
safe operating limits. When two-phase or multi-phase flow conditions can
occur, the relief device should be designed to deal adequately with the
dynamic flow conditions of such fluids. In situations where a pair of relief
valves are fitted in parallel, and where each relief valve can be separately
isolated from the vessel, each individual relief valve must have sufficient
discharge capacity on its own.
2.4 Discharge Systems
Pressure relief devices, when they operate, discharge into either an open
system (i.e. directly to atmosphere), a containment vessel, or into a
disposal system such as a flare. Discharge systems associated with
pressure relief devices used for hazardous fluids (e.g. toxic or highly
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flammable) require careful design and consideration. Fluids such as

chlorine, ammonia and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) present hazards
when discharged through pressure relief systems. Chlorine, in particular,
requires the pressure relief discharge to be directed into a dedicated
expansion vessel or to a chlorine absorption system. Dual bursting discs,
placed back to back, are the preferred overpressure protection
arrangement, however, a pressure relief valve may be used for chlorine
systems if the valve is protected from exposure to the chlorine by the use
of an upstream bursting disc. Whichever system is used, a pressure
alarm and indication should always be fitted between the bursting discs
and the bursting disc and the relief valve. Use of a pressure relief valve
on its own is NOT recommended. For ammonia and LPG applications, the
discharge system should be designed to discharge the fluids safely,
typically by use of vertical extension pipework.
2.5 Back Pressure

When a pressure relief device is designed to relieve into a disposal
system, due consideration must be given to the superimposed or back
pressure within the disposal system. Conventional pressure relief valves
are typically used in situations where the back pressure does not exceed
10% of the set pressure. In situations where the back pressure is high or
variable (e.g. in a relief valve discharge header routed to a flare) a
balanced bellows pressure relief valve will typically be used. This type of
pressure relief valve utilises a bellows to isolate the effect of the back
pressure on the valve disc, and therefore the lift pressure. Pilot operated
relief valves can also be used for pressure relief into disposal systems
subject to back pressure. Pilot operated relief valves use a pressure
tapping or pressure impulse pipe, which is connected to the underside of
the relief valve disc, to supply a pilot valve which, once activated, opens
the main valve.
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2.6 Thermal (Pressure) Relief

When parts of a pressure system can be isolated from a protective device
and where the contents may be subject to a pressure rise due to a
temperature rise (e.g. LPG trapped in piping between shut-off valves)
then that part of the system should be protected against excessive
pressure by fitting a thermal relief valve (sometimes referred to as a
hydrostatic relief valve).
2.7 Conventional Relief Valve
A conventional pressure relief valve consists essentially of a nozzle and
disc assembly which is held together to effect a seal by means of an
adjustable spring. The seal is usually a metal to metal seal. The sealing
surfaces are lapped to a high degree of flatness and surface finish to
achieve a good quality of seal. Elastomeric seals can be used, but are
usually limited to low (ambient) temperature service applications in order
to take advantage of the use of a resilient seal.
When in service, the pressure retaining parts (i.e. nozzle and disc) of a
conventional pressure relief valve will encounter the process fluids and,
as such, require to be trimmed (i.e. furnished in suitable material)
accordingly. Bursting (or rupture) discs can be fitted upstream
(underneath) pressure relief valves in highly corrosive or toxic services
thus enabling the pressure relief valve to be furnished with a
conventional trim. The discharge side of the pressure relief valve will be
subject to the environment into which the valve would relieve.
2.8 Balanced Bellows Relief Valve
Balanced bellows pressure relief valves are so-called because of their use
of a bellows to isolate the valve sealing components from the discharge
systems environment and because they equalise (balance) the back
pressure forces acting on both sides of the valve disc. Their relieving
capacity is largely unaffected up to around 30% of the set pressure. Most
manufacturers limit the back pressure on balanced bellows pressure relief
valves to around 45/50% of the set pressure.
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2.9 Pilot Operated Relief Valve

Pilot operated relief valves use a pressure tapping or pressure impulse
pipe, which is connected to the underside of the relief valve disc, to
supply a pilot valve which, once activated, opens the main valve. Pilot
operated relief valves are commonly used in clean, low-pressure service
and where a large relieving area is required. Because of the use of the
pilot valve to effect opening of the main valve, these valves do not
simmer when the system operating pressure approaches the set
pressure of the valve. The set pressure, therefore, of pilot operated relief
valves can be close to the system operating pressure - they are often
used when the system operating pressure is higher than 90% of the set
pressure of the valve.
2.10 Vacuum Relief Valve
Certain conditions may prevail (e.g. excessive condensation, process
upset) to cause a vessel to experience a vacuum. Unless the vessel has
been specifically designed to withstand partial or full vacuum, a vacuum
relief valve must be provided. Vacuum relief valves operate along the
same principle of a conventional relief valve.
Special care must be exercised when utilising vacuum relief valves on
highly flammable service since the introduction of air into a vessel, to
prevent a vacuum from developing, can present hazardous conditions.
Systems are available which supply nitrogen or fuel gas to the vessel to
prevent a vacuum occurring thus preventing hazardous conditions.
2.11 Pressure/Vacuum Relief Valve
For atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks, pressure/vacuum relief
valves are typically used to provide the necessary pressure relief. These
devices incorporate a pressure relief valve and a vacuum relief valve
within a single assembly which will be mounted onto a single
nozzle/flange on the top of the tank. These valves allow the tanks to
operate within their normal working conditions, as caused by filling,
emptying and reacting to temperature and product variations. It is often
found that an additional, independent, pressure relief valve will be fitted
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to the tank in order to provide pressure relief in emergency situations.

2.12 Bursting (Rupture) Disc
A bursting disc assembly consists of a circular membrane which may be
made of metal, plastic, or graphite and which is sandwiched between two
plates or holders. This assembly is usually installed between a pair of
flanges. Bursting discs operate by simply bursting the membrane and
thus allowing instantaneous relief. The burst tolerance of bursting discs is
typically around 5% of the set pressure unlike the tolerance of pressure
relief valves which have a typical tolerance of around 3% of the set
pressure. Tighter burst pressure tolerances are possible, however,
manufacturing tolerances of the membrane tend to dictate the achievable
burst pressure tolerance. Bursting discs are sensitive to temperature
variations.
Pressure relief valves may be removed and tested to check for correct
operation (methods do exist to check valves in situ), however, bursting
discs cannot be tested without destroying them.
The major disadvantage of bursting discs is that once activated they
cannot reseat and, therefore, the process must be shutdown, the vessel
isolated, or the bursting disc isolated, to allow for replacement of the
disc.
The major advantage of bursting discs is that they are more effective
than pressure relief valves in protecting equipment from sudden
explosions. They are more resistant to corrosion or potential plugging
than relief valves and are, therefore, often used upstream of relief valves
in toxic or corrosive services. Bursting discs only burst when the set
pressure of the disc is reached which prevents any seepage or leakage of
the product during normal operation of the process.
2.13 Pressure Monitoring, Alarms and Trips
As mentioned previously, a hierarchy of alarms and trips will typically be
found on process vessels. These actions provide layers of protection
between the manual monitoring of pressure and the ultimate lifting of a
pressure relief valve or bursting of a bursting disc. These alarms and trips
are provided with pressure measurements from simple pressure sensors
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Protective Device
E & C Division
(e.g. Bourdon tubes, diaphragm sealed sensors, differential pressure

gauges/sensors). A hierarchy of monitoring and automatic shutdown is
employed with vessels typically being provided with high pressure and
low pressure alarms and high/high pressure and low/low pressure
alarms/shutdown. These pressure alarm and shutdown protective
devices/systems are typically found on the process and instrumentation
diagrams (P&IDs) designated as PSLL, PSHH, PSL, PSH, PALL or PAHH
P indicating pressure, S indicating switch, A indicating alarm, and L&H
indicating low or high.
3. LEVEL
Correct level control, and indication, is often critical to the safe and
efficient operation of process plant. Many process vessels, such as
separators and distillation columns, require liquid levels to be strictly
controlled in order to effect product separation (e.g. separation of oil, gas
and water) and to prevent product carry over.
Level indication is usually accomplished by displacer/float instruments
and sight glasses. Other level indicators include differential pressure
gauges, ultrasonic, microwave, radiological, and fibreoptic instruments.
Providing that it is appropriate for the particular application, the method
of level indication is of less importance than the use of the level
information and / or measurement for control and protection purposes.
A typical level control function would be accomplished by using a level
transmitter which feeds control signals to a level control valve (LCV). The
LCV will open or close (modulate) to maintain the level within, say, the
vessel within pre-defined limits.
When it has not been possible to control the correct level within, say, a
process vessel, protective devices are provided to prevent hazardous
conditions arising. These protective devices, which usually take the form
of level transmitters and level switches, provide alarms and/or effect
shutdown of the process or individual vessel. A hierarchy of monitoring
and automatic shutdown is employed with vessels typically being
provided with high level and low level alarms and high/high level and
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Protective Device
E & C Division
low/low level alarms/shutdown. These level alarm and shutdown

protective devices/systems are typically found on the process and
instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) designated as LSLL, LSHH, LSL, LSH,
LALL, LAHH
L indicating level, S indicating switch, A indicating alarm, and L&H
indicating low or high.
Dedicated level switches may be found on vessels to protect pumps from
losing suction caused by low liquid levels and to protect compressors
from liquid carry over caused by high liquid levels. These protective
devices/systems are independent of the level control system, utilising
separate level bridles or standpipes.
Level measurement or control using differential pressure gauges should
not be used for fluids which can be subject to variations in specific gravity
since the change in the weight of the material column will affect the
operation of the instrument.
Sight (level) glasses are used for manually monitoring the levels within
the process plant. Sight glasses are, however, not recommended for
fluids which are toxic or highly flammable unless they are armoured or of
high pressure, robust design. Use of sight glasses for ammonia is not
recommended due to incompatibility.
Vessel tappings and nozzles used for level indication and control must be
located to provide accurate indication or measurement of the actual
levels within the vessels or tanks. Level indications can be affected by
movement of the product within the vessel and, therefore, tappings
should not be placed in areas that could be affected (e.g. close to outlet
piping).
4. TEMPERATURE
Temperature plays an important part in processes involving product
separation and refining. Many processes involve chemical reactions and
this reaction is sensitive to temperature variations. Materials used for
process equipment can impose temperature limitations and the structural
strength of equipment can be dramatically reduced at elevated
temperatures. Likewise, low temperatures can present material problems
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Protective Device
E & C Division
through embrittlement. Temperature monitoring and control is, therefore,

crucial to the safe and efficient operation of process plant.
Temperature measurements are typically accomplished by using sensors
such as thermocouples. In order to protect the sensor itself from the
harmful effects of the process stream (e.g. corrosion, erosion) the sensor
is usually installed within a thermowell. A thermowell is a tube which
protrudes into the vessel or pipework through a sealed opening. The
thermowell is closed at the protruding end but is open at the other end.
The sensor can, therefore, be readily inserted or removed. The
thermowell itself may be furnished in suitable material to prevent
corrosion, however, since the thermowell protrudes into the product
stream it can be subject to structural loading due to fluid dynamics.
Failures of thermowells have been experienced due to vibration fatigue
cracking caused by vortex shedding at the thermowell.
Temperature measurements must be taken at the areas within the
process plant that are of interest. Sensors must be located in areas that
are subject to continuous movement of the process fluids and must not
be located in stagnant areas. If liquid temperature is of interest then the
thermowell complete with sensor must project into the liquid phase and if
gas temperature is of interest then the thermowell complete with sensor
must project into the gas phase.
In very much a similar way to pressure and level monitoring and control,
temperature monitoring and control may use a hierarchy of alarms and
trips to ensure safe and efficient operation of process plant.
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Protective Device
10
E & C Division
6.0
MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET (MSDS)

6.1
MSDS CONTENTS
The MSDS for the chemicals are part of the process and Basic
Engineering Design Document of the licensor. As per OSHA (USA)
manufacturers, importers and distributors are required to provide the
MSDS for each hazardous chemical they produce or handle. The
purchaser of these chemicals (Client) is entitled to receive these MSDS
from the supplier.
Each member of the commissioning team is required to read the MSDS
carefully before undertaking the commissioning activity. Although the
format of MSDS can vary, they should all include the following
information:
1. Chemical and common name
2. Ingredient information
3. Physical and chemical characteristics
4. Physical hazards - Potential for reactivity, fire and/or explosion.
5. Health hazard
6. Symptoms of exposure
7. Primary route of likely entry into the body upon exposure.
8. OSHA permissible exposure levels.
9. Precautions for use
10.
Waste disposal
11.
Protective measures and equipment including during spills

and maintenance.
12.
Emergency and first aid procedures
13.
Date of MSDS preparation and last revision
14.
Emergency contact of manufacturer
The OSHA standard requires that the manufacturer or distributor provide

quick and easy access to all MSDS applicable to their work place.
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Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)
1
E & C Division
MSDS for chemicals generally handled during Refinery / Petrochemical /

Fertilizer plant commissioning are enclosed at the end of Chapter .
For more data on MSDS, following sites in the Internet may be

used :
1.
University of California MSDS Resources at
http://www.ucop.edu/riskmgt/ohp/msds.html
2.
MSDS SEARCH
http://www.msdssearch.com
3.
Occupational Safety & Health Administration, OSHA, Data Base
http://www.osh.nct
4.
Safety links: Material Safety Data Sheets
http://www.ksu.edu/area/irml/safetv/msds.html
5.
The
Hong
Kong
Occupational
Safety
&
Health
Association
http://www.hkosha.org.hk/weblinks.htm This site has the following

resources other than MSDS :
a. Safety related web sites.
b. Safety Magazine
c. Occupational health
d. Fire
e. Related Chemical Resources
f. Emergency
g. Lessons learnt from Accidents
h. Safety Equipment Supplies
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E & C Division
CODE SYMBOL: NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION

ASSOCIATION (NFPA) DIAMOND
H Health
1 - Low
F Fire
2 - Medium
R Reactivity
3 High
4 - Extreme
Note: More information can be had from the following site:

http://vvww.orcbs.msu.edu/Chemical/nfpa/nfpa.html
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RATING SUMMARY:
Health (Blue):
4 Danger
May be fatal on short exposure. Specialized

protective equipment required
3 Warning
Corrosive or toxic. Avoid skin contact or

Inhalation
2 Warning
May be harmful if inhaled or absorbed
1 Caution
May be irritating
0 - No unusual hazard
Flammability (Red):
4 Danger
Flammable gas or extremely flammable liquid
3 - Warning
Flammable liquid flash point below 100 F
2 Caution
Combustible liquid flash point of 100 to

200F
Combustible if heated
Not combustible
Reactivity (Yellow):
4 Danger
Explosive material at room temperature
3 Danger
May be explosive if shocked, heated under

confinement or mixed with water
2 Warning
Unstable or may react violently if mixed with

Water
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1 Caution
May react if heated or mixed with water but not

violently
0 Stable
Not reactive when mixed with water
Special Notice Key (White):
Water Reactive
Oxy
Oxidizing Agent
Note: More information can be had from the following site:

http://www.orcbs.msuedu/chemical/nfpa/nfpa.htrnl
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5
E & C Division
MSDS OF VERIOUS CHEMICALS COMMONLY USED IN REFINERY
Material Safety data Sheets of verious chemicals which are generally

used in refinery are given in Annexure 1 for ready reference.
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E & C Division
7.0
ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
It is recommended that the commissioning team leader and other

members of the commissioning team read and familiarize themselves
with following two documents available with the client.
These two documents are prepared and submitted to the authority in
compliance to the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals Rules, 1989. The formats of these two documents are given as
Schedule 8 and Schedule 11 of the rules.
1.
Safety Report (Schedule 8, Manufacture, Storage and import of

hazardous chemicals rules 1989).
2.
On site emergency Plan (Schedule 11, Manufacture. Storage and

import of hazardous chemicals rules, 1989).
It is recommended that the commissioning team leader procures

a copy of the On-site Emergency Plan and keeps the same at site
with access to team members.
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On site Emergency Plan
1
E & C Division
8.0
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION ACTS IN INDIA
1. THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT,

1974.
2. THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) CESS
ACT, 1975.
3. THE AIR (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT,
1981.
4. THE ENVIRONMENT (PROJECTION) ACT, 1986.
5. THE HAZARDOUS WASTES (MANAGEMENT AND HANDLING)
RULES. 1989.
6. MANUFACTURE,
STORAGE
AND
IMPORT
OF
HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS RULES. 1989.
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Environmental Preservation Acts in India
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ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION FOR INDUSTRY IN INDIA

India is the first country, which has provided for the protection and
improvement of the Environment in its Constitution. Article 51 -(g) of
the Constitution states:
"It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the
natural / environment including forest, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to
have compassion for all living creatures".
The Directive Principles of State Policy, an integral and significant
element of our democratic set-up, also contains a specific provision
enunciating the State's commitment for protecting the environment.
These constitutional provisions are implemented through environmental
protection laws of the country.
Table 1
Represents various specific legislation and regulations

dealing
with
protection
and
improvement
of
the
environment.
Table 2
Represents the air emission standards in India.
Table 3
Represents the ambient air quality standards.
Table 4
Represents the Minimum National Standards (MINAS) for the

refinery effluents.
Table 5
Represents the Minimum National Standards (MINAS) for the

petrochemical Plants.
Table 6
Represents the General standards for Discharge of Effluent.
Table 7
Represents the effluent sample preservation conditions.
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E & C Division
Table 1
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN INDIA
The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, as amended up

to 1988 The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules, 1975
The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 as
amended upto 1991
-
The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1978 as

amended up to 1992
The Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 as amended up

to 1987
The Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules, 1982 and 1983
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
The Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1986
The Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous chemical Rules, 1989
Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and Storage of Hazardous MicroOrganisms, Genetically Engineered Micro-organisms of Cells Rules,
1989
The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
The Public Liability Insurance Rules, 1991
Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1992 and 1993 - "Environmental

Statement"
Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1993 - "Environmental Standards"
Environmental (Protection) Rules, 1994 - "Environmental Clearance"
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1.0
THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF

POLLUTION) ACT, 1974
Following are the specific obligations, under this Act, which are to be
complied with:
Obligations
-
Provide the Pollution Control Board (PCB) any information which is

sought for preventing or controlling pollution of water regarding the
construction, installation, operation or the treatment and disposal
systems of an industrial establishment
Provide access to the PCB, or any officer empowered by it, for taking
samples of water or effluents from the industrial establishment for
the purpose of analysis
Allow entry to the PCB or any person empowered by it, at any time,
for the purpose of performing any of the entrusted functions; or for
seizing of any plant, records, registers, documents or any material
object, in case there are reasons to believe that provisions of the Act
are being contravened
Not to discharge, knowingly, of any effluent into the stream, sewer or

on land, of quality which is not conforming to the standards
prescribed by the PCB
Furnish information to the PCB and other designation agencies, of any

accidental or unforeseen event, in which effluents not conforming to
the prescribed standards are being discharged, or likely to be
discharged into a stream or sewer or on land
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Comply with the directions issued in writing by the PCB, within the
specified time, as mentioned in the order. The directions may
include:
1. the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry,
operation or process; or
2. the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water
or any other service
Comply with the conditions as prescribed in the "Consent to

Establish" or "Consent to Operate" for discharge of effluents into a
stream or sewer or on land
Responsibilities
Obtain "Consent to Establish", prior to taking any steps to establish

any industry, operation or process or any treatment and disposal
system which is likely to discharge effluents
Obtain "Consent to Operate" prior to commencing operations of any

industry, or any treatment and disposal system, which is likely to
discharge effluents.
Apply for renewal of the "Consent to Operate" before the expiry of

validity period, as specified in the consent granted earlier, in the
prescribed form and along with the prescribed fees
Rights
Industry to ensure that specified effluent sampling procedure is being

followed by the PCB or any officer empowered by it, in case results of
analysis are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings
A prior "Notice of Inspection" for the purpose of making an enquiry

for grant of consent to be served by the Board to the industry in the
prescribed form.
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PCS to maintain "Consent Register" containing particulars of the

consent issued, and to provide access to industry, at all reasonable
hours
Consent to be deemed as granted automatically and unconditionally

after four months from the date of application which was complete in
all respects unless already given or refused before this period
Refusal of "Consent" to be recorded in writing, by the PCB
"Right to Appeal" to the "Appellate Authority" under the Act, in

case of grievance against the order of the PCB, in the prescribed form
of appeal, within the specified time limit (30 days from the date of
the order) The Appellate Authority is a grievance redressal forum,
appointed by the government, and consists of a single person or
three persons as its members
Opportunity to file objections with the PCB against notice of proposed

directions for closure or stoppage of any essential service to the
industry, within the Specified time (15 days from the date of service
of the notice)
PCB to record reason(s), in writing, in case it is not providing an

opportunity to the industry to file objections.
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THE WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION)

CESS ACT, 1975
Obligations
Pay water cess, as prescribed within the specified time as indicated in

the assessment order, if the industry is included in the specified
schedule under title Act.
Affix meters of the prescribed standards for water consumption

measurements at places specified by the PCB
Provide access to PCB, at all reasonable times, for implementing the

provisions of the Act, including testing of the meters for their
accuracy.
Pay interest at the prescribed rates, in case of delay in paying the

water CESS.
Pay penalty for non-payment of cess, within the specified time, not
exceeding the amount of cess, in arrears, after being given a
reasonable opportunity of hearing.
Responsibilities
Submit the " Water Cess Return" in the prescribed form, at specified
intervals, to the PCB.
Right
Industry is entitled to 25% rebate in Water Cess payable, provided :

i)
it consumes water, in quantity less than or equal to the

maximum specified quantity in the Schedule and
ii)
it complies with the provisions of "Consent to Operate" as

well as the prescribed standards under the Environment
(Protection Act), 1986
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Opportunity for hearing before imposing penalty for non-payment of

cess within the specified time.
Right to appeal to the "Appellate Authority" in case of any

grievance(s) against any Order of Assessment in the prescribed form
and along with the prescribed fee.
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E & C Division
THE AIR (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION)

ACT, 1981
Obligations
Comply with the conditions, as prescribed in the "Consent to

Establish" or "Consent to Operate" for emissions
Not to discharge air pollutant(s) in excess of the standards prescribed

standards by the PCB
Furnish information to the PCB and other designated agencies, of any

accident or unforeseen act or event in which emissions of air
pollutant(s) occurred in excess of the prescribed standards or are
likely to occur
Allow entry to the PCB or any official empowered by it to the

industrial establishment, at all reasonable times, for the purposes of
carrying out any of the entrusted functions or for inspecting to
ascertain that provisions of the Act are being complied with; or for
seizing any equipment, plant, records registers, documents or any
other material object if there are reasons to believe that provisions of
the Act are being contravened
Provide the PCB any information to enable it to implement the

provisions of the Act.
Provide access to the PCB or any officer empowered by it, for taking
samples of air or emissions from the industrial plant for the purpose
of analysis
Comply with the directions, issued in writing by the PCB, within the
specified time as indicated in the order. The directions may include :
1. the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry,
operation or process or
2. the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or
any other service
Industry to provide all facilities required by the PCB official for the
purpose of sampling.
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Responsibilities
Obtain "Consent to Establish" prior to establishing any industrial plant

in an air pollution control area, which is likely to emit air pollutanl(s)
Obtain "Consent to Operate" prior to commencing operation of any

industrial plant which is likely to emit air pollutant(s) in an air
pollution control area
Apply for the renewal of "Consent to Operate" before expiry of the

validity period, as specified in the consent granted earlier, in the
prescribed form, along with the prescribed fees
Rights
Consent to be deemed as granted, automatically and unconditionally,

after four months, from the date of receipt of application, which is
complete in all respects, unless it is given or refused earlier than this
period
Refusal of consent to be recorded in writing, by the PCB
Opportunity for hearing before withdrawing the consent, already

granted, or in case renewal of consent is refused
PCB to maintain "Consent Register" containing particulars of consent

issued and provide access to the industry, at all reasonable hours
Right to appeal to the Appellate Authority, in case of a grievance

against an order by the PCB, under the Act, in the prescribed form
within the specified time limit (30 days from the date of order)
A prior "Notice of Inspection" for the purposes of making an enquiry

for granting consent, to be served by the PCB to the industry, in the
prescribed form
Industry to ensure that specified emission sampling procedure is

being followed by the PCB or any officer empowered by it, in case,
results of analysis are to be used as evidence in legal proceedings
Opportunity to file objections with the PCB against notice of proposed

directions for closure or stoppage of any essential service to the
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industry, within the specified time (15 days from the date of service
of notice)
PCB to record reasons, in writing, in case it does not provide an

opportunity to the industry to file objections.
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ENVIRONMENT (PROTECTION) ACT, 1986
Obligations
Comply with the directions issued in writing by the Central

Government within a specified time as mentioned in the order. The
directions may include:
1.
closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or

process or
2.
stoppage or regulation of the supply of electricity, water or

any other service
Prevent discharges or emissions of environmental pollutants in

excess of the prescribed standards
Furnish information to the prescribed agencies of any accidental or

unforeseen event in which environmental pollutant(s) not
conforming to the prescribed standards are being discharged, or are
likely to be discharged into the environment
Allow entry and inspection by any person empowered by the Central

Government into the industrial establishment at all reasonable
times, for the purpose of performing any of the functions entrusted,
or to ascertain compliance with the provisions of the Act; or for
seizing of any equipment, plant, registers, records or documents in
case there are reasons to believe and any provision of the Act is
being contravened
Allow Central Government or any official empowered by it, to take

samples of air, water, soil or any other substance from the industrial
establishment for the purpose of analysis
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Responsibilities
Submit an "Environmental Statement" every year, before 30th

September, to the PCB, in case consent is required under the
Water/Air Act or authorization under the Hazardous Wastes
(Management and Handling) rules or both
Obtain prior "Environmental Clearance" from MoEF, in case of a

new project or for modernization/expansion of the existing
project, if it falls under the specified schedule, subject to certain
conditions
Rights
Ensure that specified procedure is being followed by Central

Government or any officer empowered by it, for taking samples
of air, water, soil or other substance form the industrial
establishment, in case results of the analysis are to be used as
evidence in legal proceedings
Opportunity to file objections against the proposed directions of

closure or stoppage of any essential services to the industry, with
the Central Government, within the specified time (15 days form
the data of service of notice)
Central Government to record reasons, in writing, in case it does

not provide an opportunity to the industry to file objections
against the proposed directions.
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THE
HAZARDOUS
WASTES
(MANAGEMENT
AND
HANDLING) RULES, 1989

Obligations
Ensure packaging, labeling and transportation of hazardous wastes in

accordance with the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Comply with the conditions specified in the authorization granted for

handling of hazardous wastes.
Responsibilities
Ensure proper collection, reception, treatment, storage and disposal

of hazardous wastes by the owner himself or through an operator of
the facility for specified hazardous wastes
Obtain "grant of authorization" for handling hazardous wastes form

PCB Apply for renewal of authorization before expiry of the validity
period as specified in the authorization granted in the prescribed
form
Maintain records of hazardous wastes handling, at the site, in the

prescribed form
Submit "Annual Returns" to the PCB regarding disposal of hazardous

wastes in the prescribed form
Report to the PCB any accident at site, or during transportation,

while handling hazardous wastes, in the prescribed form
Rights
An authorization that is granted would be in force for a period of two

years form the date of issue, unless suspended or cancelled earlier
Opportunity of hearing given to the industry before refusing grant of an

authorization
PCB to give show cause notice to industry, stating reasons before
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suspending or canceling any authorization granted under the rules
State Government to identify sites for disposal of hazardous wastes

and publish an inventory periodically
Import of hazardous wastes to follow specified procedures given

below :
- Exporting country or exporter to apply to the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India, in the
prescribed form for grant of permission
- Exporter and importer to follow prescribed conditions laid
down by the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Government
of India, and the PCB
- Importer to keep records of imports of hazardous wastes, in
the prescribed form
Note: Import of hazardous wastes from any country to India is not

permitted for dumping. Import of such wastes may only be allowed for
processing or reuse as raw material on a case to case basis
-
Right to appeal in writing, against an order of suspension, cancellation

or refusal of authorization, to the State Government, in case of the
State Pollution Control Board and to the Central Government, in case of
the Central Pollution Control Board, within the specified time (30 days
form the date of the order).
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6
MANUFACTURE,

STORAGE
AND
IMPORT
OF
HAZARDOUS
CHEMICALS RULES, 1989

Obligations
Occupier to identify major accidents, hazards related with industrial

activity involving hazardous chemicals, and to take adequate steps for
the prevention and control of such hazards
Occupier to provide relevant information to the persons liable to be

affected by a major accident
Occupier to develop information in the form of a safety data sheet

Occupier to label the specified information on every container of a
hazardous chemical
Occupier to follow specified procedures for importing hazardous

chemicals
Responsibilities
Occupier to furnish information required to notify the concerned

authorities of a major accident occurred at the site or in a pipe line in
the prescribed form
Occupier to furnish information regarding "Notification of Sites" for

industrial activity involving hazardous chemicals to the concerned
authority in the prescribed form at least 3 months before commencing
activity
Occupier
to
submit
"Safety
Report"
containing
the
prescribed
information to the concerned authority at least 3 months before

commencing activity
Occupier to send further information, within the specified time, as

mentioned in the notice, if so desired, by the concerned authority
relating to the "Safety Report" ( refer Schedule - 8 appended here)
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Occupier
to
prepare

up-to-date
on-site
"emergency
plans"(refer
Schedule - 11 appended here) in case of a major accident, before

commencing an industrial activity involving hazardous chemicals
Occupier to maintain records of imports of hazardous chemicals in the

prescribed form
Ensure transportation of hazardous substances as per the provisions of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
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SCHEDULE 8 See rule 10(1) 1

INFORMATION TO BE FURNISHED IN A SAFETY REPORT
1.
The name and address of the person furnishing the information.
2.
Description of the industrial activity, namely
Site,
Construction design,
Protection zones explosion protection, separation distance,
Accessibility of plant.
Maximum number of persons working on the site and particularly

of those persons exposed to be hazard.
3.
4.
Description of the plant design, namely,
Technical purpose of the industrial activity.
Basic principles of the technological process.
Process and safety-relating data for the individual process stages,
Process description,
Safety-related types of utilities
Description of the hazardous chemicals, namely
Chemicals
(quantities,
substance
data,
safety-related
data,
toxicological data and threshold values.)
The form in which the chemical may occur on or into which they
may be transformed in the event of abnormal conditions.
5.
6.
The degree of purity of the hazardous chemical.
Information on the preliminary hazard analysis, namely
Types of accident
System elements or events that can lead to a major accident
Hazards
Safety-relevant components.
Description of safety-relevant units, among others:
Special design criteria,
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Controls and alarms.
Special relief systems,
Quick-acting valves.
Collecting tanks/dump tank,
Sprinkler system,
Fire - fighting etc.
7. Information on the hazard assessment, namely
Identification of hazards,
The cause of major accidents,
Assessment of hazards according to their occurrence frequency.
Assessment of accident consequences,
Safety systems,
Known accident history.
8. Description of information on organizational systems used to carry on

the industrial activity safety, namely
Maintenance and inspection schedules,
Guidelines for the training of personnel.
Allocation and delegation of responsibility for plant safety,
Implementation of safety procedures.
9. Information on assessment of the consequences of major accidents,

namely
Assessment of the possible release of hazardous chemicals or of

energy,
Assessment of the effects of the released (size of the affected

area, health effects, property damage)
10.
Information on the mitigation of major accidents, namely
Fire brigade
Alarm systems,
Emergency plan containing system of organization; used to fight

the emergency, the alarm and the communication rules,
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19
E & C Division
guidelines for fighting the emergency, information about

hazardous chemicals, examples of possible accident sequence,
Coordination with the District Emergency authority and its off site emergency plan,
Notification of the nature and scope of the hazard in the event of

an accident,
Antidotes in the event of a release of a hazardous chemicals.
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20
E & C Division
TABLE 2: ATMOSPHERIC EMISSION STANDARDS

I.
Concentration based Standard
Suspended Particular Matter (SPM)
150mg/Nm3
Sulfur dioxide
50mg/Nm3
II.
Load / Mass - Based Standards - Oil Refineries
Distillation
0.25 Kg/MT of feed*
(Atmospheric and Vacuum)

Catalytic cracker
2.5 Kg/Mt of feed*
Sulfur Recovery Unit (SRU)
120 Kg/MT of sulfur in the feed*
Feed
indicates
the
feed
for
that
part
of
the
process
under
consideration
III.
Equipment Based Standards
For dispersion of Sulfur- dioxide, a minimum stack height has been

prescribed as:
a) Power Generation Capacity
>500MW
Stack height 275 m
200/210 - 150 MW
Stack height 220m
<200/210 MW
Stack height H = 14 (Q) 3 meters
b) Steam generation capacity

>30 Tone / Hr
Stack height H = 14 (Q) 3 meters
Here Q is Emission rate of SO 2 in Kg/Hr. however, the minimum stack

height of 30 m shall be maintained in case it is less by computation using
above formula.
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21
E & C Division
TABLE 3: NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
Pollutants
Time
Concentration in ambient air
Method of
weighted
average
measurement
Industrial
Residenti Sensitive
area
al , Rural Area
& other
Sulfur dioxide
Annual
average*
80 pg/m3
50 pg/m3 15 pg/m3
1. Improved West &
120 pg/m 80 pg/m3 30 pg/m3
Gaeke
24
2. Ultraviolet
hours**
Oxides of
Nitrogen (as
N02)
Annual
average*
Fluorescence
80 pg/m3
60 pg/m3 15 pg/m3
3
120 pg/m 80 pg/m
1. Jacob & Hochheiser
30 pg/m
(Na-Arsenite) method
24
2. Gas phase
hours**
Suspended
Particulate
Matter (SPM)
Respirable
Particulate
matter (size)
less than
Annual
average*
Chemiluminescence
360 pg/m3 140
3
70 pg/m3
3
150 pg/m pg/m
24
200
hours**
pg/m3
Annual
average*
100 pg/m sampling

(Average flow rate not
less than 1.1 m3/min
3
120 pg/m 60 pg/m

3
150 pg/m 100
2. Respirable
particulate Matter
50 pg/m
75 pg/m
24
1. High volume
3
pg/m
sample
hours**
10pm)(RPM)
Lead (Pb)
Annual
average*
1.0 pg/m3 0.75

3
1.5 pg/m
0.50
3
pg/m
pg/m
24
1.00
0.75
hours**
pg/m3
pg/m3
Carbon Monoxide 8 Hours* 1 5.0 pg/m3 2.0

I(CO)
hour
1.00
3
10.0
pg/m
pg/m
2.sampling using EPM

2000 or equivalent
filter paper
1. Non- dispersive
pg/m 4.0 pg/m

3
1. AAS method after

3
infrared Spectroscope
2.00
Annual arithmetic mean of minimum 104 measurements in a year

taken twice a week 24 hourly at uniform interval.
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22
E & C Division
**
24 hourly / 8 hourly values should be met 98% of the time in a
year. However, 2% of the time, it may exceed but not on two

consecutive days.
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23
E & C Division
TABLE 4: MINIMUM NATIONAL STANDARDS (MINAS) FOR OIL REFINERIES
Pollutant Characteristics
Max. Permissible
Max. Permissible Quantum in
Concentration*
Kg/1000 Tonnes Crude

Processed
6.0-8.5
Suspended solids
20
14.
BOD 5 days, 20C
15
10.5
Oil and grease
10
Phenols
0.70
Sulphides
0.5
0.35
PH
All values except pH are in mg/L

Note: MINAS are the Minimum National Standards or the concentration
and quantitative limits that are to be complied with. The respective state
pollution control board can specify more stringent standards than these.
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E & C Division
TABLE: 5
MINIMUM NATIONAL STANDARDS (MINAS) FOR

PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
The standards proposed by the Central Board were reviewed by the Core
and Peer Groups constituted by the Central Board. The Standards
recommended by the Core and Peer Groups are presented below:
Parameter
Concentration not to exceed (mg/1 except pH)
PH
6.5-8.5
*BOD5, 20C
50
COD
250
**Phenol
Cyanide as CN
0.2
Sulphide as S
***Fluoride as F
15
****Hexavalent Chromium as Cr
0.1
Total chromium as Cr
Total suspended solids
100
State Board may prescribe the BOD value of 30mg/l, if the recipient
system so demands
**
The limit for phenol shall be conformed to at the outlet of effluent

treatment of phenol-cumene plant however, at the final disposal
point, the limit shall be less than 1mg/l
***
The limit for fluoride shall be conformed to at the outlet of fluoride

removal unit. However, at the disposal point fluoride concentration
shall be lower than 5mg /1
**** " The limits for total and hexavalent chromium shall be conformed
to at the outlet of the chromate removal unit. This implies that in
the final treated effluent, total and hexavalent chromium shall be
lower than prescribed herein
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25
E & C Division
Table: - 6 GENERAL STANDARDS FOR DISCHARGE OF ENVIRONMENT

POLLUTANTS: EFFLUENT (Gazette Notification of MoEF- May 1993)
S. No.
Parameter
Standards
Inland surface
Waters
Public
Sewers
Land for
Irrigation
Marine coastal Areas
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Colour and odour
2.
Suspended solids,
100
600
200
a) For process waste water100

b) For cooling water effluent
10% above total suspended
matter of influent
3.
Particular size of Suspended

solids
Shall pass 850

Micron Sieve
a) Floatable solids, max.3

mm
b) Settleable solids, max
850 microns
4.
pH value
5.5 to 9.0
5.5 to 9.0 5.5 to 9.0
5.5 to 9.0
5.
Temperature
Shall not exceed

5C above the
Shall not exceed 5C above

the receiving water
receiving water
temp.
6.
Oil and residual chlorine,

Max.
7.
10
temperature
20
10
20
Total residual chlorine, mg/l, 1.0

Max.
1.0
8.
Ammonical nitrogen (as N),

mg/l, Max.
50
50
50
9.
Total Kjeldahl nitrogen (as

NH3),mg/l, Max.
100
100
10.
Free ammonia (as

NH3),mg/l, Max.
5.0
5.0
11.
Biochemical Oxygen
Demand(5 days at 20C),
Mg/l, Max.
30
350
100
100
12.
Chemical Oxygen Demand,

mg/l, Max.
250
250
13.
Arsenic (as As) mg/l, Max.
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
14
Mercury (as Hg), Mg/l, Max.
0.01
0.01
0.01
15.
Lead (as Pb), mg/l, Max.
0.1
1.0
2.0
16.
Cadmium (as Cd), mg/l, Max. 2.0
1.0
2.0
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26
E & C Division
Table: 6 Contd.....
S. No. Parameter
Standards
Inland surface
Public Sewers
Waters
17
Hexavalent chromium (as
Land for
Marine
Irrigation
coastal
Areas
0.1
2.0
2.0
Cr+6),mg/l, Max.
18.
Total chromium (as Cr), mg/l,

Max.
2.0
2.0
2.0
19.
Copper (as Cu), mg/l, Max.
3.0
3.0
3.0
20.
Zinc (as Zn), mg/l, Max.
5.0
15
15
21.
Swiwnium (as Se), ing/I, Max.
0.05
0.05
0.05
22.
Nickel (as Ni),mg/l, Max.
3.0
3.0
5.0
23.
Cyanide (as CN), mg/l, Max.
0.2
2.0
0.2
0.2
24.
Fluoride (as F), mg/l, Max.
2.0
15
15
25.
Dissolved phosphates (as P),

mg/l, Max.
5.0
26.
Sulphide (as SO), mg/l. Max.
2.0
5.0
27.
Phenoilic compounds, (as

CgHsOH), mg/l, Max.
1.0
5.0
5.0
28.
Radioactive materials
(a)
Alpha emitter - micro curie/ml
10-7
10-7
10-8
10-7
(b)
Beta emitter - micro curie/ml
10-6
10-6
10-7
10-6
29.
Bio-assay test
90%survival of
fish after 96
hours in 100%
effluent
90%survival of
fish after 96
hours in 100%
effluent
90%survival of
fish after 96
hours in 100%
effluent
90%surviv
al of fish
after 96
hours in
30.
Manganese(as Mn) mg/l.<ax.
31.
Iron (as Fe) mg/l, Max.
32.
Vanadium (as V)
0.2
0.2
0.2
33
Nitrate Nitrogen, mg/l, Max.
10
'
20
100%
Wastewater Sources, Characterization and Quantification of Pollution Loads
__________________________________________________
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E & C Division
TABLE 7: PRESERVATION OF WASTE WATER SAMPLE

Parameters
Preservative
Maximum holding period
Acidity-alkalinity
Refrigeration at 4 "C
24hrs
BOD
6hrs
Calcium
None required
COD
2 ml/LH2S04(Conc.)
7days
Chloride
24hrs
Cyanide
NaOH to pH 10
24hrs
Dissolved oxygen
Determine onsrte
Fluoride
None required
Metals, total
5 ml/L HN03
6months
Metals .dissolved
Filtrate, 3 mi/11 HNOs
6months
Nitrogen .Ammonia
40 mg/l HgCh, 4 "C
7days
Nitrogen, Kjeldahl
40 mg/l HgCl2,4 "C
Unstable
N itrogen-N itrate-N itrite
40 mg/l HgCb, 4 "C
7days
Oil and grease
2 ml/L H2S04, 4 "C
24hrs
Organic carbon
2 ml/L H2S04,
7days
PH
None available
Phenolics
1.0 g CuS04 + H3P04 to
24hrs
pH 4.0, 4 "C
Solids
None available
Specific conductance
None available
Sulfate
7days
Sulfide
2 ml/L Zn acetate
7days
Threshold odour
7days
Turbidity
None available
*a : Slow-freezing techniques (up to 250"C) can be used for preserving samples to be

analysed for organic content.
**b : for some methods of determination, 4 to 8 hrs preservation can be accomplished
with 0.7 ml cone. H2S04 and 20 mg NaN02. Refer to Standard Methods for prescribed
applications.
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E & C Division
9.0 SAFETY PROCEDURES
Safety Procedures
Note: Some of the safety procedures followed in operating chemical
complex are given here these are for information purpose. The activities are
generally carried out by the maintenance personal of the plant in
consultation with operations department.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
9.1
PROCEDURES FOR SAMPLE COLLECTION
Many a times the commissioning team will be required to collect process

stream samples. Following precautions are to be observed for safe sample
collection and disposal.
1.
It is preferred to obtain help from the clients analytical laboratory for

sample collection. The scientific staff is well trained for this purpose.
2.
The samples should be collected from sampling points specially

provided for.
3.
The person collecting the sample should be fully aware about the
hazards of the plant and also the properties of chemical being collected.
4.
When sampling hot or corrosive liquids the person collecting the sample
must wear safety equipments like face shield, gloves, goggles, apron
etc.
5.
Ensure that the sampling point system is not damaged and physically in
good shape. Damaged sampling lines could be hazardous.
6.
The sampling valve should be opened slowly and in stages to avoid

splashing / gushing of sample.
7.
In case of plugged sampling line proper unplugging procedure to be

followed. Unplugging not to be done on open sample valve.
8.
While unplugging personnel to stand upwind direction to avoid

exposure. Personnel to wear protective gear.
9.
Sample collector to have unobstructed view of the sampling point. Do

not collect sample from points that are not visible.
10. Purge volume of the sampling line of toxic should be collected in sample
bottle or bladder to be disposed in a controlled manner as per
procedure 8.2.
11. While collecting toxic sample wear gas mask specified for the chemical
or use breathing apparatus.
12. While collecting samples under pressure care should be taken to avoid
splashing of liquid or toxic gas jet formation.
13. Samples should be labeled and dispatched for analysis promptly.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
9.2
DISPOSAL OF WASTE
The waste material during commissioning may contain flammable, toxic and
hazardous chemicals it is recommended that the waste is disposed in
consultation with the environmental control department of the plant.
Handling precautions are as follows:
Solid Waste
Solid flakes, pellets or powder should be collected separately in appropriate

inert containers. Intermixing of waste should not be done. The waste is to
be labeled, sealed and handed over to the environmental department for
proper disposal.
Liquid
Waste samples etc., should be kept in a separate container specially made

for the purpose, duly labeled and handed over to the environmental
department for disposal when disposing liquid waste into the OWS it is to be
diluted effectively to avoid shock loading to the effluent treatment plant.
Disposal of liquid waste into the OWS done after consultation and with the
knowledge of the plants environmental central department.
Gases
Waste samples contained in SS bombs or rubber bladders should be

discharged out door in a manner to effectively dilute the contents. There
should not be a source of ignition when disposing flammable gases. Toxic
gases should be disposed extremely carefully avoiding possibility of
exposure.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
9.3
PROCEDURE

FOR
PIPELINES
CLEANING,
GAS
FREEING
PURGING. DRAINING OF EQUIPMENT AND LINES.
To avoid accidents of toxic gas inhalation, fire and explosion of splashing c

harmful chemicals it is essential to prepare equipment, tank or pipe line to
make free from hazardous substances.
PROCEDURE:
Media used for freeing / purging and precautions to be observed:

a) Water
b) Inert gas or N2
c) Steam
d) Air (with precautions)
Tank Cleaning:
a) Drain/pump out the contents
b) Fill the tank with water & drain.
c) Purge with steam if containing solvents or hydrocarbon liquids.
d) Purge with inert gas if containing fire hazardous gases.
e) Purge with air after purging with inert gas before entry. (Entry
with fire Safety Permit only).
f) Remove all sludge, deposits inside the tanks.
When closed piping systems are parted for replacing valves, servicing pump
replacing sections of lines etc this is called "Opening Lines". This type of
work not properly planned can lead to serious accidents.
To protect against such accidents the following rules must be followed while
performing such work:
1
Familiarize yourself with the piping system to be worked on.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
2
Check to make sure all valves are properly positioned. All drain valves
should be opened.
Any pump on the system that could be accidentally started shall be

electrically isolated.
Although the previous steps have been taken, the job should be
performed as though the line is full and under pressure.
a)
A sloping line may have a plug, a valve and another plug. You can
open the valve to drain the line, but it could still be full between
the plugs.
b)
A horizontal line may have sag or dip in it. You can open the line
up and blow it out, but there could still be acid or other material
where the line is sagging, if that section of the line is taken out
and tilted, the material will run out.
c)
You can't drain a line if the valve, you are trying to use is lower
than the discharge end of the line.
d)
If a line is plugged, it may be from corrosion, which can produce

gas under pressure.
5.
The area around the possible spray release of material should be

roped off.
6.
Personnel performing this work shall wear protective clothing as

follows:
a)
Protective suit.
b)
Face shield.
c)
PVC gloves.
Since opening a flange is the most common procedure used to open a

line, the procedure to follow is:
a)
If the flange is horizontal, you want any sprays to be away from

you. If it is vertical a spray should be downward,
b)
These are the edges of the flanges that should be opened first.
c)
Keep the bolts near, you tight, and slowly open the ones away
from you. A quarter of a turn at a time is not too little.
d)
If the flange stays tight, start a wedge between the flange on the
side where the bolts were loosened.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
e)
When you are sure the flange is open and that any drip is over,
remove the rest of the bolts and nuts.
Lines taken out or brought to the shop can also be hazardous. Further
handling or dismantling in the shop could release material. The only
fitting or section of line that is safe is one that has been blowout,
washed out and looked through and tested.
After a section of line has been removed the remaining open flanges
should be blinded.
Draining Of Equipment / Lines

Draining of lines, vessels and tanks is a common operation. Work of this
nature is primarily required when units or portion of unit are shut down for
the purpose of inspection and /or repair. This operation or type of work
normally can be accomplished without encountering any hazards, however,
consideration must be given to several factors, each and every time when
such work is to be performed.
The following is to serve as a guide in determining the safe method to be

used when draining materials from lines, vessels, tanks and like equipment.
1.
The wind draining of toxic materials to atmosphere are prohibited

when there is the possibility of personnel over exposure.
2.
The direction can be an important factor in determining personnel

exposure when releasing (draining ) toxic or obnoxious material.
3.
The rate at which the material is being drained can be a factor in

determining personnel exposure.
4.
The careful control of releasing (draining) flammable materials cannot

be overemphasized. Careful and thorough consideration must be
given to:
a)
Rate of release.
b)
Sources of ignition
c)
Wind direction
d)
Type of material being released, (whether it is heavier

lighter then air, as vapour will readily disperse).
Procedural Control
or
E & C Division
5.
The use of protective equipment shall be evaluated prior to starting

the job. The supervisor shall specify the equipments required for the
safety of personnel and/or equipment.
6.
When draining toxic, flammable, hot or obnoxious material, the

hazardous area involved shall be restricted (roped off). All personnel
who work in and around the area involved shall be notified of the work
being performed /precautions to be taken to avoid accidents.
7.
The waste material to be drained if containing Arcylonitrile or

Hydrocyanic acid then it should be put in chemical sewer only looking
towards the possibility of the hazard involved.
8.
If a hose is used to drain material from a piece of equipment or line,

the proper type of hose must be used. Many materials will deteriorate
the hoses such as these used for water and air. If this is done, serious
accidents can & will occur.
9.
When draining is to be performed on/or close to ground level, the

protection of personnel must be considered, If draining through a
hose, the free end must be secured to prevent swinging action. The
direction of material release shall be downward not horizontal to the
ground.
10.
Permanent and Temporary drains or bleeds on equipment such as

pumps shall be directed in a downward position. The material when
released should not be in a direction, which is horizontal to the
ground.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
9.4
PROCEDURE FOR UNPLUGGING OF LINES
A plugged line is an abnormal condition. These plugs develop from some

mechanical failure and also from polymerization / or salting / congealing.
Although care is taken to avoid these conditions they still occur occasionally.
Since a plugged line is an abnormal condition it must be treated as
unpredictable.
A plug in a line is adhering to the inner surface of the pipe. This blocking
however is not firm and some change in the condition might cause it to
loosen and spray materials out of a previously dear opening. There is always
a hazard associated with the plugged line and care needs to be taken in
dealing with them
Tracing or Jacketing in a line is great help in melting out of a plug. But when
line is opened, the heat applied can cause pressure to build up and hot or
corrosive material to spray out on to anything in its path.
Due to various piping arrangement and materials handled, procedure can
not be set up to handle each specific condition, however, from past
experience we have learned many facts that must be applied when
unplugging lines.
The following are the rules to be followed when performing such a job:
1.
Since a plugged is an abnormal condition and unusual hazards might

exit, the job of clearing a line should be preplanned.
2.
The procedure outlined shall be to first try to clear the line by applying
a solvent directly in to the closed line. Normally this is done with
steam or water applied to permanent connection of hose.
Compatibility of the de-plugging liquid with the fluid contents
of the pipe should be verified before using the technique
(remember Bhopal)
3.
The most effective means of cleaning in this manner is to pressurize

this line & then drain, repeating this process frequently. This cyclic
process helps to clear the clog. It also drains the solution from the
area of the plug facilitating unplugging.
4.
Heat should be applied to the outside of the line if it is possible, this

can be in the form of steam tracing or steam applied safely from the
open hose.
Procedural Control
E & C Division
5.
If the plug does not respond to the above clearing procedure, probably
it will be necessary to dismantle the line.
6.
The line must be depressurized as completely as possible.
7.
All tracing and jacketing should be shut off and the line allowed to
cool.
8.
Since the line may still be under pressure in spots or pockets,

protective equipment must. be worn when parting a line. This
equipment consist of:
a.
Protective suit.
b.
Face shield over the helmet and glasses (if a full cover one piece
suit is available the same should be used).
c.
PVC and gloves.
This equipment is worn to protect against unexpected splashes or

released material.
9.
After opening the line, the condition should be considered hazardous,

even if no material is released from the opening.
10.
If the cleaning can be carried out by attaching valves and hoses and in
a closed manner the same should be attempted.
11.
If the cleaning at the point must be conducted openly it should be

performed by the use of a suitable lance so that close exposure to the
opening is not required. Those performing the lancing operation shall
wear the same protective clothing used in opening the line.
12.
In case of fouling / choking of the tubes of heat exchangers, following

is the procedure for caustic cleaning:
a.
Isolate the fouled/choked exchanger.
b.
Depressurize drain and flush the exchanger.
c.
Dismantle the exchanger tube bundles using personnel protective

safety equipment.
d.
Carefully put the exchanger tube bundle in caustic cleaning tank

and start heating the caustic by stream coils to 80 - 90c. Keep
the exchanger bundles soaked for overnight preferable 24 hours.
e.
Remove the exchanger carefully after caustic has cooled down.

Use all safety precautions as far as handling not alkalis is
Procedural Control
E & C Division
concerned.
f.
Flush he exchanger tubes bundles with large quantities of water,

till the entire caustic is washed out.
13.
For de-choking of column and in case of partial choking of heat

exchanger tubes:
In process like ACN, suction/discharge lines 2" caustic connections are
provided which are normally kept blinded. In case choking problem is
experienced, a particular type of operation is isolated / by-passed as
per the procedures laid down, then the column drained / flushed out to
toxic sewer. Caustic connection can be made by hose connecting a
loop circulation and established for a period of time till choking is
removed. Than the contents can be drained out in to proper sewer and
flushing with water carried out-This is normally used in case of
polymerized material or fouling material which are responsible for
plugging of process equipments.
Procedural Control
10
E & C Division
9.5
PROCEDURE FOR ISOLATION OF FLARE HEADER, SAFETY

VALVE Etc.
Isolation of Flare Header or Safety Valve connected to flare header requires

special safety precautions due to the following hazards associated with the
job. (Same hazards are present while installing back the isolated valve).
1.
Entry of air in the flare header.
2.
Fire hazard due to leakage of gases.
3.
Inhalation of toxic vapors.
The following safe maintenance procedures are followed for undertaking the
job.
1.
Keep the sealing plate (as per figure 1 below) and special bolts ready,
suitable for the size of the flare pipe to be isolated. The special bolts
have a small head, which will pass through the bolt-holes of safety
valve flange, but not through the holes of sealing plate.
2.
Keep gaskets, nuts & bolts & proper size of spanners & tools ready for
the job.
3.
Rouse one by one all the bolts & nuts of the flange of the pipe.
4.
Remove all the bolts marked A in Fig. 1 in attached drawing.
5.
Slacken the bolts marked 'B' in attached drawing.
6.
Quickly insert the sealing plate (shown in Fig. 2) in between the

flanges.
7.
Tighten bolt 'B' to stop gas escaping.
8.
Insert special bolts in the holes where bolts 'A' were to hold the seal
plate tight to the flare pipeline.
9.
When the small bolts are tight remove bolts 'B' Ensure that seal plate is
holding property.
The reverse procedure as mentioned below, is to be followed while removing

slip plate and re-fixing the safety valve:
a)
Position safety valve and fix bolts 'B' tightly.
b)
Remove all special bolts marked "A".
Procedural Control
11
E & C Division
c)
Slacken bolts 'B' to remove slip plate.
d)
Remove slip-plates quickly & tighten bolts "B" immediately.
e)
Insert & tighten original bolt 'A'.
f)
Ensure that no gas leak after tightening.
Special Precautions
Before undertaking removal of S. V., ensure proper access and working
platform or scaffolding.
1.
Before isolation or installations work is undertaken of flare header,

ensure that plant operations are smooth (no up sets) and flare
header is on normal load.
2.
Isolation & Installation work to be undertaken in the personal

supervision of responsible engineer with minimum two technicians.
3.
Ensure flare header under positive pressure.
4.
The job is to be undertaken under "Fire -Safety Permit".
5.
Make use of Air Line gas Mask/Self contained breathing equipment or

Gas Mask organic canister while removing the bolts and putting the
sealing plate (Select safety equipment as per toxic conditions of
escaping gases).
6.
Make use of Brass hammer if required or Non sparking Tools for such
jobs.
7.
Do not allow any welding / cutting or spark producing job near by

while the above job is being undertaken.
8.
Keep water hose & fire extinguishers ready for use, in case of any
emergency.
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9.6
WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
Note:
Work Permit system specified in Oil Industry Safety Directorate guidelines is
reproduced here. The purpose is to familiarize with the work permit system
prevailing in Hydrocarbon industry. The actual formats may vary; however,
the procedure is to be based on the OISD -105 guidelines.
9.6.1
INTRODUCTION
The Work Permit System is an important tool for safety in hydrocarbon

processing / handling. In the following pages the recommended Work Permit
System is described covering various aspects like when a work permit is
required, type of permits, responsibilities, check lists, validity, etc. The
success of a work Permit System depends upon the training, motivation and
participation of all individuals concerned with its implementation. Since
several maintenance / construction jobs are often carried out with
assistance from contractors, it is essential to provide sufficient exposure to
contractor and his employees as well.
If work has to be performed in a hydrocarbon processing / handling

installation by any person other than the operating personnel of that area, a
duly authorized written permit shall be obtained by the person / agency
executing the work before commencement of the work. However, even for
operating personnel, where work has to be performed outside their normal
routine, an exclusive permit to that effect by the authorized person shall be
obtained.
9.6.2
SCOPE
The Work Permit System shall cover all hydrocarbon processing / handling
installations such as onshore / offshore processing platforms, gas treating
units, crude terminals, refineries, pipelines, marketing installations, and LPG
bottling plants.
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9.6.3
a)
DEFINITIONS
Hot work: Hot work is an activity, which may produce enough heat to
ignite a flammable air hydrocarbon mixture or a flammable substance.
b)
Cold Work : Cold Work is an activity which does not produce sufficient
heat to ignite a flammable air hydrocarbon mixture or a flammable
substance.
9.6.4
TYPE OF WORK PERMITS
Two types of permits, one for cold work and the other for hot work, are the
minimum requirements, which must be fulfilled before commencing work.
Based on the nature of the work that is to be undertaken, permit should be
obtained either under Hot Work Permit or Cold Work Permit. For jobs like
excavation, road / dike cutting, electrical lockout / energizing etc. where the
work permit issuing authority may have to take clearances from other
sections / personnel, organizations may introduce supplement formats
for these purposes. If they wish, format for electrical lockout energizing
is given in OISD-Std. 137 (on Inspection of Electrical Equipment).
9.6.5
PROCEDURE FOR WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
Following is the procedure for the implementation of Work Permit System:

a)
The Work Permit System shall always operate on Owner / In-charge

concept. (Example : Process Unit - Shift In-charge; Laboratory - Chief
Chemist; Depot - Depot Manager). The concerned management shall
issue the appropriate authority limits for various installations and type
of permits based on this concept.
b)
The permit shall be in printed form.
c)
Separate forms shall be used for Hot Work and Cold Work.
d)
For
simplification
of
procedure,
Hot
Work
Permit
also
covers
permission for vessel entry, vessel boxing up and excavation. Cold

Work Permit shall cover all activities outside the scope of Hot
Work Permit.
e)
No hot / cold work shall be undertaken without a work permit except

in the areas pre-determined and designated by the owner in-charge.
All work permits shall be issued by the person who is designated as
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responsible person for the operation of the area where work is to be

carried out. In respect of work permits for handling highly critical
types of work and also for long duration work such as in construction
jobs in a running installation, the authorizing level should be elevated.
f)
The work to be done may be planned either departmentally or

through a contractor. In either case, the work permit should be
received and signed by the maintenance project / construction
supervisor of the company as he is responsible for the work of the
contractor also. Where no such independent supervisor exists, for
example in small installations, the owner in-charge can issue the
permit to the contractor's supervisor directly and obtain his signature.
g)
Permit should be issued only for a single shift and its validity should
expire at the termination of the shift. However, where the work has to
be continued, the same permit may be revalidated in the succeeding
shift by authorized person, after satisfying the normal checks.
In instances like plant turnaround or an activity where work is of

continuous nature involving round the clock activity, Blanket Hot Work
Permit could be given if the owner in-charge is fully satisfied that the
conditions are totally safe for the multiple jobs to be performed. But
this should not be resorted to, especially in highly integrated units.
Even when construction activity has to be undertaken in non

operating areas in integrated units, it is recommended that approval
be obtained from designated senior management for issuing Blanket
Hot Work Permit.)
h)
It is recommended that both Hot Work Permit as well as Cold Work

Permit be made in the form of books with tear off facility. In the case
of Hot Work Permit the authorized Original copy shall be given to the
receiver, the Duplicate to the Fire and Safety Section and Triplicate
retained in the book. In case of Cold Work Permit, the authorized
Original shall be issued to the receiver, retaining the Duplicate in the
book.
It is recommended that plot plans of the installation and the operating
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blocks should be displayed in the Fire and concerned Unit Control

Rooms respectively, and site of hot jobs under progress should be
indicated on these plot plans with fed pins. This helps the incoming
supervisor (in Fire and operating departments) to get a quick idea of
the hot jobs being undertaken and help in identifying the areas which
require inspection / attention, depending upon the criticality of the
area and job.
i)
As a prerequisite to permit issue, particularly in the case of hot work /

vessel entry permit, gas test for hydrocarbons / oxygen deficiency
toxic gases shall be conducted as applicable.
j)
Where gas free conditions are not fully assured for the duration of hot
work, a system of monitoring either by automatic or by manual
periodic verification shall be resorted to depending upon the prevalent
conditions of the operating area.
k)
After completion or stoppage of the job, the person to whom the

permit was issued, should thoroughly check the area for clearing of
debris, removal of temporary electrical installations etc., and then
shall sign the work permit and return it to the issuer.
9.6.6
SPECIMEN WORK PERMIT FORMS
Specimen Work Permit forms for the two types of permits illustrating the
suggested colour code, layout, and size are exhibited in pages 5-14 of OISD
105.
9.6.7
EXPLANATORY NOTES TO WORK PERMIT FORMS
The check-listed items in the Work Permit Forms are elaborated below to
amplify the underlying concepts and highlight their significance.
i)
Equipment / Area inspected

Equipment or area where work is to be conducted, should be
inspected to ensure that it is safe to carry out work and assess
other safety requirements / stipulations. In case of vessel box-up
permit, the inspection is required to ensure work is complete, all
personnel are out, no maintenance gear is left behind and debris is
removed.
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ii)
Surrounding area checked / cleaned.

Unsafe
conditions
for
performance
of
work
may
arise
from
surrounding area. It should be cleaned up to remove flammable

material such as oil, rags, grass.
iii)
Sewers, Manholes, CBD etc., and Hot Surfaces covered.

Flammable
gases
may
be
released
from
nearby
sewers.
Hot
uninsulated surfaces, pipelines may provide a source of ignition.

Therefore, these are to be properly covered to prevent fires.
iv)
Considered hazard from other routine / non-routine operations

and persons alerted.
Other activities (routine / non routine) being carried out near by,
which can create conditions which are unsafe for performance of the
permit work, should be taken into consideration and the concerned
persons should be alerted accordingly.
v)
Equipment electrically isolated and tagged.

Before issuing permit for mechanical / electrical work in the operating
area, it should be ensured that electrical switches are locked out and
cautionary tags duly signed with date and time are attached.
Wherever local locking arrangement is provided in the field, the same
should be used. Refer format for electrical lockout / energizing given in
OISD-STD- 137 on Inspection of Electrical equipment.
vi)
Running water hose / Portable extinguisher provided

Running water hose and portable fire extinguisher are required
respectively to flush / dilute in case of release of any hazardous
chemical or to quench sparks and to put out small fires immediately.
vii)
Fire water system checked for readiness

In order to meet any contingency, it should be ensured that the fire
water system including fire water pumps, storage, network, etc. is
checked and kept ready for immediate use.
viii)
Equipment blinded / disconnected / closed-isolated / wedged

open
Equipment / Vessel on which Work Permit is being issued, should be
completely isolated from the rest of the plant with which it is
connected during normal operation, in order to ensure that there is no
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change in the work environment with respect to presence of toxic /

flammable gases, solids, hazardous chemicals etc., in the course of
the work. Blinding is one of the most effective ways of isolation. Blinds
should be installed as close to the vessel as possible. If lines cannot
be blinded, they should be disconnected and the open ends should be
made safe by installing pipe caps plugs, blind flanges, mud packing
etc.
ix)
Equipment properly drained / depressurized

Equipment under pressure should be depressurized after isolation.
This will be followed by draining, purging, water flushing etc., as the
case may be.
Equipment
containing
liquid
hydrocarbons
should
be
drained
completely. There may be a possibility of overlooking liquid collected

in pockets or inaccessible areas such as level gauges, small nozzlebleeders on vessels, laterals in pipe work etc. All low point drains
should be in unplugged condition.
x)
Equipment properly steamed / purged

Purging of equipment (vessels, pipelines, compressors etc.) is done to
free them of flammable hydrocarbons and toxic gases. Steam is used
for gas-freeing of vessels and pipes in refineries and processing units,
but it may not be available at other locations. Other means of purging
is by displacement with water and final traces of gas removed by air
eductor. All high point vents should be unplugged while purging.
Purging may be done continuously or in batches to conserve purge
medium. It should be done in a systematic manner to cover the entire
equipment/plant and continued till the allowable level of toxic
flammable gas concentration is attained.
xi)
Equipment water flushed

Water flushing is an effective means of cooling, cleaning and even
gas-freeing of equipment. It is also employed to remove traces of
acids/chemicals. Equipment metallurgy must be considered before
using sea / saline water. Sometimes flushing with demineralised water
would be necessary depending upon the metallurgy of the equipment
xii)
Gas / Oxygen deficiency test done and found OK.

Gas test includes measurement of:
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(a)
Hydrocarbons by Explosivity Meter
(b)
Oxygen Deficiency by Oxygen Meter
(c)
Toxic gases like Hydrogen Sulphide, Carbon Monoxide, Nickel

Carbonyl, Chlorine, etc. by techniques like Indicator Tube
method, Lead Acetate Paper etc.
Measurement of Lead in air is required for entering Leaded tanks.

Octal Ethyl regulations are to be followed while handling leaded
gasoline. Gas tests may be specified for vessel entry including open
excavation where head of a man will be below ground level and when
hot work is being carried out. The person carrying out gas test must
wear proper protective gear. No hot work shall be permitted unless
the explosivity meter reading is zero. Vessel entry where no hot work
is to be carried out may be permitted if combustible gases are up to
5% of lower explosivity limit (LEL). Entry with an air supplied mask,
may be permitted with LEL of up to 50%. The oxygen level should be
at least 19.5 % by volume and the concentration of toxic gases below
the threshold limits.
xiii)
Shield against sparks provided

In order to protect against welding sparks, which can provide ignition
in operating areas, shields are to be provided. The shield material
should be non-flammable. In case tarpaulins are used, they should be
kept wet with water.
xiv) Proper ventilation and lighting provided

Where natural ventilation is not available, fans / air eductors are
provided. Some types of works like welding, may generate fumes.
Facilities may be required for the speedy dispersal of these fumes.
Only approved reduced voltage extension lights (24 volts) are to be
allowed for work inside vessels, from consideration of personal.
xv)
Proper means of exit provided

Proper means of exit is required in case of emergencies developed on
account of the work or otherwise. Availability of an alternate route of
escape should be considered.
xvi) Precautionary tags / boards provided

To prevent any unwarranted entry in the work area and also to
caution other personnel taking actions, which may endanger people
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working on the permit job, precautionary tags / boards are to be

provided. Example: "No Entry" sign on roads or "Caution Men At
Work Inside" on the manhole of a vessel etc.
xvii) Portable equipment / Hose nozzles properly grounded
As
precaution
against
static
electricity
generation,
portable
equipment hose nozzles, example: nozzle of a sand blasting gun is to

be grounded. Use of hydrocarbon lines for earthing should be avoided.
xviii) Standby person provided for vessel entry
Whenever a vessel is being entered or work is being carried out in
confined space, it may be necessary to keep standby persons
(minimum 2) at the manhole or entry point holding the rope
connected to the safety belt of the person inside. In case of any
emergence inside or outside the vessel, the standby will be able to pull
the person out.
xix) Standby personnel provided for fire watch from Process /
Maintenance / Contractor Fire Department
Depending on criticality of the job work permit issuer shall decide the
type of standby to be provided i.e., from which department, of what
level, how many and also additional fire fighting support facilities.
xx)
Iron Sulphide removed / kept wet

Pyrophoric substances may be present in operating area / equipment
handling hydrocarbon. Iron sulphide scale is the most common
pyrophoric substance encountered. These should be either removed to
safe locations or kept wet all the time to prevent their auto-ignition.
xxi) Area cordoned off

In order to prevent the unauthorized entry of people and to avoid
accidents during excavation jobs. work area is to be cordoned off.
xxii) Precaution against public traffic taken
In case hot work is to be carried out in the close proximity of a public
road, for example, in the case of a trunk pipeline, it may be desirable
to block-off / divert public traffic for the duration of the job as a
precautionary measure.
xxiii) Clearance obtained for excavation from Technical / concerned
departments
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For any excavation work which may affect underground sewers /

telephone lines / cables / pipelines etc. Technical Services Dept. and /
or other concerned departments should be consulted for obtaining the
co-ordinates and the depth to which excavation can be resorted to
without damaging the existing facilities. Markers should be put around
the area where excavation can be done, and the depth can be
indicated in the work permit.
xxiv) Clearance obtained for road cutting from Technical / Fire /
concerned departments
Since road cutting can hamper the movement of the fire trucks, initial
clearance should be obtained from Fire Department, and final approval
from the higher designated authorities. If the road is wide, preferably
the road should be cut half at a time. Duration of cut road should be
restricted as far as possible.
xxv) Clearance obtained for dyke cutting
When the dyke is cut. Any mishap in the tank farm can lead to a free
flow of oil to outside the bund. A high level authority should be
designated for authorizing dike cutting. Further, it should be ensured
that dike would be reconstructed in the shortest possible time. For
example, if pipes have to be laid through the dikes, the pipes should
be laid quickly and plugged / capped so that the dike can be dosed.
Thereafter, balance of pipe fabrication can continue without any risk.
Standby personnel should be available at the work site, who should
possess a suitable size steel plate for blocking the opening in case of a
mishap / tank failure. If no work is undertaken in evening and night
shifts, invariably the gap should be dosed with steel plate and mud
packing at the end of day's work.
xxvi) Checked the flame arrester on mobile equipment
Although only certified vehicles engines are permitted in operating
areas, it should be ensured that the flame arrester is not inadvertently
removed.
xxvii) Checked for oil / gas trapped behind lining in equipment
Before undertaking hot jobs a check should be done for oil / gas
trapped behind lining in the equipment. Many times oil / gas trapped
behind lining depicts itself in the form of swelling and can be
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confirmed h y way of drilling holes.

xxviii) Hot tapping
While it is presumed that modification jobs will be undertaken
always with the approval of the designated authority, it is further to
be noted that hot tapping shall be undertaken only after an
approval by Inspection Personnel. Continuous flow in the line
should be ensured.
9.6.8
E&C WORK PERMIT SYSTEM
E&C division has an elaborate work permit system and has following work
permits:
1. Hot Work Permit
2. Cold Work Permit
3. Confined Space Entry Permit
4. Electrical Lines / Equipment Work Permit
5. Radiography Work Permit.
Formats:
Formats for each type of work permit are reproduced of at the end of this
Chapter.
Validity:
The permit is to be renewed each day only after checking all the compliance
jointly by the E&C Site Engineer and the contractor site-in-charge. The
permit can be renewed for not more than 7 times including the issue date.
Safety Instructions:
Specific Safety Instructions to be followed strictly during the work are
printed on the backside of the work permit and are reproduced here.
Hot Work:
1.
Combustible / inflammable materials shall be removed within 30 feet of

the place of the work and also from opposite side of the partition /
structure.
2.
Materials which can catch fire / get damaged due to sparks, metal
globules falling on them during Hot Work shall be covered with "Fire
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blanket".
3.
One DCP type 5 Kg. Capacity portable fire extinguisher shall be kept
near Hot Work Place.
4.
All persons engaged in "Hot Work" shall be provided with all necessary
Personal Protective Equipment like; Welding Screen; Asbestos hand
gloves; Safety Shoes; respiratory mask; and Apron and they shall wear
these while working.
5.
While doing Hot Work in confined space one stand-by person shall be
kept outside the vessel, to assist in case of emergency, and the
emergency exit shall be kept open.
6.
If Hot Work is to be carried on tank / drum which contained explosive

flammable or other dangerous substances then following precautions
shall be taken:
a)
Decontaminate the container by steaming or other similar method.
b)
Flush / Purge the container with water having detergents.
7.
Empty drums shall not be used instead of ladder for standing on it.
8.
After completing the Hot Work, materials / substances shall be

removed from the working place.
9.
Supervisor shall be available at welding site during the period of work.
10. This permit shall be cancelled if any deficiencies are noticed during the
work.
11. Explosimeter reading shall be taken before starting of hot work and
must be entered in the space provided in the permit.
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10.0 PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENTS

INTRODUCTION
In industrial accident prevention, in spite of all the best efforts, there
are some activities where exposure of persons to hazards can only be
minimised but cannot be totally eliminated. Hence there rises a need
for protection of our valuable body parts from injuries, even in case of
such exposure to hazard either due to nature of job or accidental.
Personal protective appliances of various types are now available in
our country and with proper planning, selection, training and use, a lot
of injuries can be avoided. Statistics prove that a high percentage of
all injuries arising out of industrial construction accidents are caused
due to non-compliance of wearing safety equipment.
SELECTION AND USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE APPLIANCES
In order to have the best utilisation of available personal protective
appliances, we should have knowledge and information on the
following:
a) The nature of hazards against which a particular equipment
is required to be used.
b) Standards and occupational safety & health requirements
on various hazards in the work area.
c) Selection, procurement and inspection of different
equipments as per the required quantity.
d) Methods of procuring / maintaining and storing of
equipments.
e) Effective methods of training and motivation of employees,
so that they use as and when required.
TYPES OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Personal protective equipments are mainly divided into two main
categories:
(A) Non-Respiratory
(B) Respiratory
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1
E & C Division
10.1
NON-RESPIRATORY
These equipment are used to protect following non-respiratory body
parts
10.1.1
HEAD PROTECTION : INDUSTRIAL SAFETY HELMET:
Presently available with cushioned end adjustable suspension cradles
and two-three different sizes with IS certificates. These helmets are
impact resistant, electrical shock-proof & comparatively light in weight
(400 to 500 gms). This gives protection for common hazard of striking
objects, falling objects as well as chemical splashes.
Up-keep and maintenance
Safety helmets are individually issued to all employees. The
suspension cradles are washable and replaceable. Drilling of holes or
tampering with the shell is unsafe, as this will reduce the strength of
the helmet against impact. For proper fitting and grip, the chin-straps
should also be tied after wearing the helmet.
10.1.2
EYE - PROTECTION :
Industrial eye injuries are caused due to flying objects like chips,
splinters, etc. dusts, liquid chemical splashes, glares due to harmful
radiation etc. Following charts show the requirements of specific type
of goggles / eye protection for specific use:
Types
Safely spectacles with
frame
clear lens
glass
Brief Description
Combustion resistant plastic
or
metal
with or without side shields and toughened

or plastic lenses.
Recommended use :
Babbiting, butting, chipping, minor dust hazards, grinding machine
shop
operations, spot and butt welding, etc.
Safety spectacles with
frame
coloured or filter lens
Combustion
resistant
plastic
or
metal
with side shield and toughened glass.
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2
E & C Division
Impact goggles
Combustion resistant plastic or metal cups,

adjustable nose-bridge. The cups may be
shallow or deep and are shaped to fit the
contours of the face. Clear toughened
glass or
plastic
lenses.
Ventilation
is
provided
through
sides of the cup and slots in the lens
retaining
rings.
Recommended use
Chipping, fitting, grinding, riveting, boiler & other fabrication work,
hand & power tools, machine shop operations, wood working, spot
and butt welding, dusts etc.
Welding goggles
adjustable
Combustion
resistant
plastic
cups
and
nose-bridge. The cups may be shallow or

deep
and are shaped to fit the contours of the
face.
Filter glass of suitable grade has to be
used.
Clear cover glass is provided to protect the
filter
glass from pitting, ventilation is provided
through indirect ports.
Recommended use
Glare, furnace operations, infra red and ultraviolet radiation, molten
and red hot metals, gas welding and cutting etc.
Dust goggles
Fabric cups with tufted cord binding to
provide
dust tight fitting. Clear toughened glass or
plastic through the fabric of the cups.
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E & C Division
Recommended use
Extremely fine dusts and particles.
Chemical Goggles
rolled
One piece moulded rubber frame with

edge for comfortable and air tight fit. Clear
toughened glass or plastic through the
fabric of
the cups.
Recommended use
Acids, caustic and other chemicals, dusts and particles, light impacts
etc.
Eye screens and face shields
the
A single screen suspended in front of

face from a head band or cap. The
visor may
be clear or tinted plastic or fine wire
mesh or
a combination of tinted plastic and wire
mesh.
Recommended use
Babbiting, Chemicals, furnace operations spot and butt welding, flying
particles, frontal splashes, glare molten metals etc. and for additional
protection over the gogglesWelding shields
window
A shell of fibre-glass provided with a

for fitting suitable grade of fitter glass
with
clear cover glass to protect the filter
glass
from pitting. The shield may be held in
hand
or suspended in front of the face by a
head
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E & C Division

band or bracket on a safety cap. The
shield
can
be
raised
off
the
face
when
protection is
not required and dropped back into
position
by a sharp downward motion of the
wearer's
head.
Recommended use
Arc welding, atomic hydrogen welding.
10.1.3
HAND PROTECTION
About 22% of industrial accidents injure hands.
The following chart gives an idea of how to select the proper type of
gloves for the
specific job and hazard.
HAZARDS
Sustained heat
MATERIALS
Asbestos
Asbestos
reinforced
with
leather
Aluminium faced fabric
Sparks
Asbestos
Asbestos
reinforced
with
leather
Fire resistant fabric
Leather
Glass fibre
Hot metal splash
Leather
Fire resistant fabric
Glass fibre
Dust
Fabric
Coated fabric
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E & C Division

Plastic
Natural rubber
Synthetic rubber
Sharp object
Fabric
Abrasion
Leather
Coated fabric
Teflon
NBR
(Nitric
Butadiene
Rubber)
Cuts
steel
Leather
reinforced
with
staples
Metal Mesh
Electric Circuit
Rubber
Moisture
Coated fabric
Natural rubber
Synthetic rubber
Plastic
Glass
fibre
Acids, alkalis and other natural
materials
rubber chemicals
Petroleum products
plastic
X-ray
In
some
cases
synthetic
like neoprene, Teflon etc.

Synthetic rubber, neoprene,
Rubber, leather or plastic with

lining.
10.1.4
FOOT & LEG PROTECTION
Manual as well as mechanical handling of materials are part of the
day-to-day industrial activities. The statistics on occupational injuries
show that about 23% of the accidents occur during material handling.
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E & C Division
Toe and foot injuries are common in industry while handling materials
or getting struck on obstructions while working.
Adequate foot protection against impact on toes as well as exposure of
foot to chemicals, dusts, dirty materials etc. will go long way in
reducing injuries. Most common foot protection in industries are :
1) Safety shoes and boots
2) Legging
3) Foot guards and leg guards
1)
Safety (Toe) Shoes:
They appear just like any other normal leather shoes except for the
additional provision of a concealed steel cap above the toe portions.
This provides additional protection from impact and crushing force. In
few cases a steel innersole is provided for protections against
punctures from nails, glass pieces etc. But, now a days, sturdy rubber
soles are available which serve the above purpose. Common utility of
safety shoes is in construction sites, engineering industries, foundries
as well as chemical operating plants. The soles are also provided with
Non-Slip strips at the bottom.
2)
Natural rubber, synthetic rubber, neoprene or plastic

(PVC) shoes :
These can be with or without (overshoe type) steel toes providing
protection up to ankles knee, or same times up to thigh.
Recommended in construction sites fishing, food processing, chemicals
petroleums, water/ sewage plants, tanneries, breweries, laundries etc.
3)
Rubber boots for fire fighting :
These are having felt lining thick clealed soles and metal or wood
shanks to relieve pressure of ladder rungs. They may have steel toe
caps and steel inner soles too.
4)
Rubber boots with conductive soles :
These are designed to ground static charges build up in potentially
explosive atmospheres of grain, metal dusts, oil and petroleum,
chemical fumes and vapours, solvent extractions plants. It may be
noted that use of talcum powder on feet and wearing of synthetic fibre
socks will adversely affect the conductivities of the charge.
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7
E & C Division
5)
Asbestos overshoes:
These may be with leather sole and recommended for protection
against heat, sparks and for operation at coke, asphalt & steel plants.
6)
Leggings:
The leggings may be knee high or hip high or they may be spats which
shield the lower shin, ankle and instep. Knee leggings are held in place
by metal spring clip or may wrapped round the leg and fastened with a
snap button or similar quick release device. Hip leggings are
suspended by straps from waist belt. The spats are generally held in
position by straps. The leggings and spats are made of appropriate
material depending upon the hazard as choosing gloves and shoes.
7)
Foot guards & leg guards :
Foot guard is a steel / plastic guard, which may be attached to the
shoe when circumstances require. Foot guard is held in place by a heel
strap. Leg guard is similar to a foot guard. It is a metal sheet, which
protects the skin and ankle. This is strapped to the leg and offers
protection against falling weights & impacts from striking objects.
10.1.5
BODY PROTECTION :
Even after protecting head eyes, face, ears and limbs, some times
injury may occur to the trunk portion of the body. Aprons, overalls
jackets and some time complete head to toe suits are used to protect
the trunk.
Aprons :
These may be bib type, covering the chest, waist, knees, or ankles or
up to waist only. Aprons may be used to protect against heat, sparks,
hot metal splashes, impact cut hazards and liquid splashes or
radiations.
Jackets and coats:
Jackets are for protection of the general upper section of the body.
covering the body and attending to the hips. Coats are longer then
jackets and may be of knee or ankle length.
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8
E & C Division
Complete suits :
These units cover the wearer from head to foot. Generally this consists
of overalls or trousers topped by short jackets and hoods. Suits may
be made of materials such as oiled fabric, plastic coated fabric, glass
fibre, conductive plastic, natural rubber, synthetic coated fabric
asbestos and fire resistant fabric.
10.1.6
EAR PROTECTION :
Continuous exposure to excessive noise can often result in serious
hearing impairment or deafness. High noise levels endured over long
period also result in fatigue, loosening of efficiency and making
persons irritable and may even result in loss of hearing. Hearing loss
varies with the type of exposure and the total duration of exposure. A
committee formed under the American Conference of Government
Industrial Hygienists in USA have agreed to the following points to
establish threshold limit values for noise :
1.
Exposure to 90 dBA (i.e. 'A' scale reading of sound level meter)
for an eight hours per day, five days a week is not injurious to
about 90% of the people exposed. It may be stated here that 'A'
scale reading is used for hazard rating only but if studies are
made for the purpose of engineering control, the octave band
analysis should be made of the noise.
2.
Equal energy will produce equal damage to the ear. Based on
this assumption if sound level is increased by 3 decibels the
exposure time should be reduced to half. If noise is intermittent,
ear can tolerate more acoustical energy than for a single
exposure to continuous noise.
3.
Considering these two factors, the limit is increased to 5 decibels
for each halving of the exposure time.
The following table may be taken as a guide to control the noise
hazard. The
exposure should not exceed the duration shown below against each
sound level:
Duration per day (hours)
Sound level (dBA)
8
90
6
92
4
95
3
97
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9
E & C Division
2
1
1

100
102
105
107
110
115 ceiling value
When noise levels exceed the above values, ear protectors have to be
used.
Common types of ear protectors are ear plugs and ear muffs. Ear
plugs attenuate a large part of the noise when properly fitted in the
outer portion of the ear canal. These are usually made of rubber,
plastic or similar non-porous pliable material. It is important that ear
plugs fit properly and remain correctly seated because even the
slightest leakage will lower the amount of attenuation. Ear plugs if
properly fitted and used, generally reduce noise reaching the ear by
25-30 dB in the higher frequencies, which are more harmful.
EARMUFFS
Earmuffs are designed to cover the external ear. These are suspended
from
adjustable head band or nape bands. The attenuation provided by ear
muffs varies due to difference in size, shape, sealing material, shell
mass and type of suspension. The type of cushion used between the
shell and the head has a great deal to do with attenuation efficiency.
Liquid or grease filled cushions give better results than plastic or foam
rubber type Better type of ear muffs may have 10-15 dB better
attenuation than that of ear plugs.
10.2
RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE APPLIANCES
INTRODUCTION
There are three modes of entry of matter into human body.
(1) Inhalation through nose / mouth.
(2) Ingestion through mouth.
(3) Skin absorption.
In the simplest physiological term, respiration is "taking oxygen from
atmosphere, converting it into energy by circulation through blood and
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10
E & C Division
venting out carbon dioxide, the by product and waste in this reaction."
The tireless lungs do this function at a rate of 20-24 times a minute
and repeats through out our life term. Since this is such an automatic
function proceeding unknowingly, many of us take it for granted that
there is nothing particular. The fact is reverse. Even a slightest change
in the flow of quality or quantity of air we breathe makes lot of
difference. As we all are aware the air we breathe is a mixture of about
22% oxygen and remaining Nitrogen with traces of carbon dioxide,
moisture, rare gases etc. A difference of 10-12%, oxygen below 20%
for about 6-8 minutes means a difference between life and death. The
chart shown below illustrates this fact in a better way.
Signs and symptoms from reduced level of oxygen in atmosphere are
as below :
% O 2 in air
Effect
Above 20
Normal
12-15
Muscular co-ordination for skilled
movements is lost.
10-14
Consciousness
continues,
but
judgement
is faulty and muscular effect leads to
fatigue.
6-8
Collapse occurs rapidly but quick
treatment
prevents
fatal
outcome.
Below 6
Death occurs in 6-8 minutes.
In a chemical industry where different types of toxic gas, vapours,
dusts, fumes, etc and asphyxiating gases like Nitrogen, Carbon
dioxide, etc. are likely to be present the importance of identifying the
hazards, controlling / confining and using proper effective breathing
protective gears need not be over emphasized.
10.2.1
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDS :
i)
Type of hazard-whether toxic/poisonous or asphyxiating.
Toxic / poisonous - Chlorine Ammonia, Cyanides, hydrocarbon, etc.
which react with blood and makes it impure.
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11
E & C Division
Asphyxiating - Nitrogen, C02 etc. which do not react with blood but
obviously stop the oxidation process in the blood by reducing oxygen
content.
ii)
Dusts, fumes, etc
Asbestos, Catalyst fine, Glass-wool Insulation fines, silica, carbon, etc.
which block the respiratory track and deposit foreign particles in the
lungs.
While choosing a personal protective equipment for respiration we
should consider the type of hazards as mentioned above and select
the correct type equipment. Remember using a wrong equipment may
mean immediate danger to life. That is why invariably respiratory
protective equipment are known as emergency equipment also.
10.2.2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESPIRATORY SAFETY

EQUIPMENTS
Canister type Gas Mask - Mask with separate canisters for

different chemicals, Organics, Acid fumes, Ammonia & Chlorine,
etc.
1 Hr. MSA CHEMOX Mask.
Hr. MSA -401 compressed air cylinder breathing apparatus.
10 minutes Escape Mask with compressed air - DRAGER, SABRE
& SCOTT make.
Hand operated blower hose mask - MSA make.
On-line air hose mask.
Resuscitator - both, hand-operated (balloon type) and with
pressurized medical oxygen cylinder.
Compressed air Pressurized head to toe suits.
10.2.2.1 Canister Type Gas Mask:

Gas mask gives some emergency protection in the acid gas, organic
vapours and other poisonous gaseous atmosphere. But it does not
provide protection against oxygen deficiency. For most of the hazards
universal gas mask is provided which gives protection against organic
vapours, acid, fumes, fog, rust, etc. For Cl 2, NH3 & CO separate gas
mask canisters are available. Gas masks with chemical cartridge for
__________________________________________________
12
E & C Division
organic vapours are also available, covering mouth & nose portion,
which is lighter and easy to wear.
Limitations :
i)
It shall not be used where oxygen content in the
atmosphere is less than 18% by volume in the air.
ii)
The gas mask should not be used where gases are
present at more than 2% by volume or the figure
indicated by the manufacturer.
Operation and Use:
i)
Check for proper type of canister to be used.
ii)
Remove the seal from the bottom of the canister and put
on the headpiece.
iii)
Adjust the head strap until the mask fits closely and
comfortably to avoid leaking.
After Use:
Enter in the card the duration of use of canister Gas Mask.
CAUTION: NEVER USE A CANISTER WHOSE SELF LIFE (MENTIONED
ON
THE SHELL) HAS BEEN EXPIRED.
10.2.2.2
One Hour MSA CHEMOX Breathing Apparatus:
The 'Chemex' oxygen breathing set is a complete independent

breathing
apparatus, which provides oxygen. It can be used for a duration of 60
minutes (1 hour) only.
The chemical filled into the canister comes in contact with moisture
and carbon dioxide in the exhaled breath, removes the carbon dioxide
and provides oxygen for breathing. It can be used in any gaseous
atmosphere containing carbon monoxide. Phosgene, Hydrogen
Sulphide, Chlorine, Ammonia, etc. where normal breathing is
restricted.
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13
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Limitations:
1. It has got the service life of maximum one hour.
2. It can be used only at a temp. above 32F, provided hard
work is not to be performed.
3. It can not be used in the explosive atmosphere where the
auto-ignition temp. is 600F.
4. This equipment cannot be used under water and in open
fires.
Preparation for use:
Install canister into apparatus before wearing the apparatus.
i)
Installing Standard Type Canister:
Be sure that the copper foil seal must be fully exposed before
inserting Canister. Lift up on tip of plastic cap until seal is broken
completely. Remove the remaining of the cap exposing the air
tight copper foil canister seal. With the hand wheel screwed
down far enough for the bail to be swung outward, and insert
canister fully into canister holder with the smooth side to the
front.
It is to be inserted in a way so that the copper foil seal is
punctured and the rubber gasket fits against the V-shaped
recess in the plunger casting. Screw the hand wheel clockwise
until it is tight against the canister.
ii)
Remove candle cover by rotating swivel plate 180 Pull swivel

plate down, push cover towards centre of canister and let the
cover dangle. DO NOT PULL LANYARD UNTIL READY FOR
USE.
iii)
The canister will produce more oxygen than needed and hence
the breathing bags will become over inflated and resist
exhalation. The excess volume can be vented out by depressing
the button valve on the face piece, but do not over vent.
iv)
There are two indications in addition to the timer that the

canister is becoming expended.
a)
b)
Fogging of the lenses on inhalation and

Increased resistance of exhalation.
__________________________________________________
14
E & C Division
If either of these two indications appear, return to fresh air.

The following are the important steps in putting on the apparatus
before entering a toxic atmosphere. It must be put on in fresh air
only.
i)
ii)
Unfasten and straighten all harness straps.

Hold the apparatus by the plunger casting with one hand. Let
the face piece drop over the hand, holding the apparatus.
iii)
With other hand the D-ring assembly where the two large web
straps join and place the breast plate of the canister holder on
the chest. Pass the head through V-shaped opening, formed by
two web straps.
iv)
With one hand, continue to hold the apparatus on the chest and
with other hand grasp the free end of the web strap. Bring the
end of the strap under the arm & join with D-ring located on
the top side of the breast plate. Repeat the same for other
strap.
v)
Adjust the position of the apparatus on the body in such a way
with the help of metal straps so that when the face piece is put
on, the breathing tubes will permit free head movement.
vi)
Join waist strap to the small D-ring, located on the lower comer
of the breast plate and pull up to a "Smart fit".
vii) Grip face piece between thumb and fingers, after pulling out all
the head band straps ends towards buckles. Insert chin welt
into the lower part of the face piece and pull the head-bands,
extreme back over the head and get properly fitted.
viii) This must be done in fresh air.
(a) Pull lanyard straight out away from the body. Removal of
cotter pin fires candle, inflating breathing bag with oxygen
within 15 seconds.
Note : If candle fails to fire, insert new canister.
(b) Starting of the candle may be accompanied by a slight
amount of harmless smoke. The breathing bag will be
inflated with oxygen.
Note: Do not attempt to restart and reuse of any type of
canisters.
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15
E & C Division
The apparatus must always be put on in trash air.

i)
Check every part before use.
ii)
Use only if you are a trained personnel.
iii)
Do not enter any explosive atmosphere where the auto-ignition
temp. is lower than 600 F.
iv)
Never allow any substance to enter the neck of the canister,
especially oil, water & gasoline, grease etc.
v)
Do not use it in atmosphere where gases and vapours can effect
by skin absorption.
vi)
When not in use the apparatus should be kept in the carrying
case provided and canisters should be stored in a dry place.
After Use:
Remove the canister by turning the hand wheel down. Swing bail
outward and remove the canister with the hand suitably protected by a
gloves or other covering since the canister may be hot.
"DO NOT RE-USE THE CANISTER"
To dispose off canister remove out side, punch a small hole in front,
back and bottom, and place in bucket of clean water sufficient deep to
cover the canister at least three inches. When bubbling stops, any
residual oxygen will be dissipated and the canister will be expended.
Pour the residual water, which is caustic, in drain or any other suitable
manner and then discard the canister.
This is having a multi-purpose design, i.e. (1) either direct air supply
can be taken from the outside air line by passing the cylinder or (2) air
can be drawn directly from the cylinder by-passing the air supply line.
In both cases there is an automatic provision of one of the supplies
entering into the breathing mask when the other one fails, either due
to pressure reduction or any other mechanical or instrument failure.
10.2.2.3
1/2 HR. MSA 401 Breathing Apparatus.
Compressed
Air
Cylinder
MSA 401, compressed air cylinder breathing apparatus is a complete

independent breathing protection. It can be used in any gas such as
Carbon-Monoxide, Phosgene, Hydrogen Sulphide, Chlorine, Ammonia
etc. where normal breathing is restricted. This apparatus can be used
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16
E & C Division
in the full range of temperature endured by man. It can only be used

for the duration of 30 minutes at 2216 psi. pressure.
Limitations :
i)
This equipment can not be used in open fires and under water.
ii)
At the full pressure, it can last for 30 minutes only but the
service life may vary or may change on wearer's breathing
condition and the nature of job.
Preparation for Use:
Before use check the following for order.
i)
Pressure gauge for full air in the cylinder.
ii)
The high pressure tube is securely attached to the regulator and
cylinder valve.
iii)
Check Audio-Alarm Device before going to Hazardous Area.
Operation and Use
i)
Wear the complete apparatus so as the cylinder should be on
the back and cylinder valve should be in downward position.
ii)
Close the by-pass valve (if opened), red hand-wheel on the
demand regulator and then open the cylinder valve fully.
iii)
Open fully the yellow valve (Main line) and observe the pressure
gauge on the demand regulator. The pressure should read
approximately 20 Atm if fully charged.
iv)
Wear the mask and pull the straps, so mask should be tight fit
on the face.
WARNINGS :
i)
To warn the user about the scarcity of air in cylinder, an Audio
Alarm is given. Leave the hazardous area immediately after the
alarm.
ii)
Never remove the face piece except in a safe and nonhazardous and non-toxic atmosphere.
iii)
Cylinder is pressurized. In case of fall the cylinder may damage
and it may create a hazard.
10.2.2.4
Escape Mask with Compressed Air
There are three types of different escape masks with compressed air
cylinder which are kept in plant areas. They are as follows :
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17
E & C Division
a) Saver Set (Drager Escape Mask)

b) Sabre Set
c) SKA-PAK Set.
All these sets are having face mask assembly with corrugated tube,
pressure demand regulator & compressed air cylinder. The duration of
first two types of escape mask is 6 minutes and the third one is of 5
minutes duration.
Limitation :
i)
It can not be used in open fires and under water.
ii)
These equipment are especially meant for escape purpose only
and having short duration.
Operation & Use:
i)
Check the cylinder pressure, the condition of corrugated tube,
facemask & headband (all rubber components).
ii)
Clean the visor of the facemask with wet handkerchiefpreferably with Dettol.
iii)
Put the bag on shoulder, wear the facemask & start respiration.
a)
Saver Set: 6 minutes duration; Cylinder pressure : 2840
psi
Special feature : Cylinder valve is not provided on
cylinder. Airflow regulates with the help of high pressure
demand regulator.
b)
Sabre Set: 6 minutes duration; Cylinder pressure : 2900
psi
Special feature : It has got a provision (which is
optional) to attach the audio alarm device which operates
when pressure in the cylinder is reduced up to certain
extent. It has also got the additional provision to connect
the 'on line air connection."
c)
SKA-PAK Set: 5 minutes duration; cylinder pressure :
2216 psi
Special feature : Additional provision of online air
connection is available.
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18
E & C Division
10.2.2.5
Hand operated Blower Hose Mask (Blowman's

Breathing Apparatus)
These masks are designed to provide fresh air to the wearer from
outside the gaseous area by keeping the air intake end in fresh air.
The use is restricted for a maximum of two hose lines, each originating
at the blower and not exceeding 30 feet length.
Limitation:
There should not be any entanglement of the hose which restricts the
movement of the person.
Points to remember.
i)
Blower should be kept in the open atmosphere where
contamination of any dangerous vapours are not present.
ii)
Blower must be operated continuously during use of the mask
and the man who operates should not leave the place.
iii)
Life line should be provided.
iv)
The face piece should be properly adjusted and tested before
using it.
v)
The use of this apparatus is restricted for a maximum of two
hose lines, each originating from the blower and not exceeding
30" length.
vi)
The proper functioning of the blower to discharge the air is to be
ensured.
vii) Safety harness & belt should be properly fastened to provide
comfortable movement of personnel.
10.2.2.6
On Line Air Hose Mask:
Normally a breathing airline connection from the compressor to the
plant area will be provided. The header pressure of the compressor is
8 to 9 kg/cm3g and at the plant battery limit is normally 1.5 kg/cm3g.
Tapping is taken to concern plant areas. At the end of the service air
line, an assembly known as the norozen filter along with pressure
indicator is provided. To this assembly, a provision of two " dia.
tappings is made with quick fix / release coupling 'Female end'.
In the plant areas where these facilities are provided, the following
assemblies are available:
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19
E & C Division
i)
ii)
Face mask with headbands and a corrugated tube with

couplings.
An air line regulator along with leather belt & the upstream
of the regulator is fitted with the coupling & corrugated
tube & the downstream with a rubber tubing of 3/8" dia.
The length of the rubber tubing is generally 15 to 30 Mts.
and the end of the tubing is provided with a 'Male end' of
the quick fix / release coupling.
Use:
i)
ii)
iii)
Push the 'Male end' of quick fix coupling into the

'Female end'.
Open the isolation valve.
Wear the mask.
Limitation :
This is not a completely dependent system.
10.2.2.7 Resuscitator:
To restore normal breathing when accidents or illness interferes with
respiration, two different devices / equipments are used. They are as
follows:
a) LA-IF resuscitator.
b) Pneolator.
a) LA - IF resuscitator :
This is a bellow type hand operated equipment used for giving artificial
respiration. It has also got a provision at one end of the aspirator bulb,
to connect extra 02 cylinder so that pure oxygen can also be
administered.
Limitation :
i)
Limited quantity of air-blow can be achieved.
ii)
Continuous manual administering of compressed air is
required without any interruption.
Operation and use:
i)
Before use, remove the air from the aspirator bulb by
squeezing it. Repeat the same 2 to 3 times.
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20
E & C Division
ii)
Squeeze the aspirator bulb, by holding the mouth piece on

victim's mouth. Remove it for victim's exhalation. Repeat
the procedure.
Precaution :
The aspirator bulb should be checked and cleaned prior to use of
equipment.
b) Pneolator:
Introduction:
Pneolator is an instrument that automatically performs artificial
respiration with a gentle predetermined pressure on inhalation and
without suction on exhalation. When the victim is breathing, this
instrument is very much effective for applying Oxygen by a simple
adjustment. If the air passage is obstructed by mucous or any foreign
material, immediately a warning is given by a chattering sound from
the valve. This obstruction can be removed by using the ejector
provided with the Pneolator.
Operating instructions (for the non-breathing victim) :
i)
Open the lid of the case and turn on cylinder valve
fully.
ii)
Remove cycling valve assembly from holder and
select and attach the proper size of mask.
iii)
Turn the pressure adjusting knob, so that the low
pressure gauge needle is set (at Infant, Child or
Adult) as required. The pressure increases as the
knob is turned anti-clockwise.
iv)
Place the mask on the victim's face holding it
secured, so that air tight seal is obtained. The
exhalation valve cover murt be hand tight for the
purpose of cycling valve.
Caution:
i)
The use of Aspirator and Airways by laymen is

subject to a difference of opinion medically.
Therefore the Aspirator of the airways should be
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21
E & C Division
ii)
used only with approval of a physician and subject

to his instructions.
Replace the mask on victim and continue the
artificial respiration until breathing is re-established.
Operating Instructions ( for the breathing victim ) :

If the victim is breathing when the Pneolator arrives after the
restoration of breathing on a non-breathing victim, Oxygen should be
administered for therapeutic support until a physician decides it is no
longer necessary. Turn the pressure adjusting knob so that low
pressure gauge needle is set at "ASSISTER" position. This provides a
small constant flow of Oxygen at a slight positive pressure so that
easier breathing results. Whenever more Oxygen than the constant
flow is delivered, he automatically obtains all the desired Oxygen by
actuating the inhalator valve.
10.2.2.8 Pressurised Head-to-Toe Suits :
Special pressurised head-to-toe suits are provided in plant areas,
which can protect the external body parts as well as internal
respiratory system. These are commonly used during the maintenance
and repair jobs for the acids, caustic, chemical vapour service. Mainly
two types of chemical resistance air pressurised head-to-toe suits are
used, namely "Class C Suit" and "Class D Suit".
Class C Suit:
This is a gralite mode synthetic rubber air pressure suit made for
corrosive acids and hydrocarbon services.
Class D Suit:
Two types of Class D type suits are available :
a) It is complete air fed PVC suit made of double coated thick and
flexible PVC to resist hydrofluoric acid. The suit comprises of
jacket, combined with hood and pant having air line regulator
connection.
b) It is a complete air fed suit made up from Butyl coated nylon
fabric to be impervious to liquids and vapours. It covers neck-totoe and has got a separate provision of chemical resistance hood.
__________________________________________________
22
E & C Division
11.0
GAS TESTING / DETECTION DEVICES
General
Besides the fixed installations for identifying, monitoring and
controlling hazards such as flammability, toxicity and Oxygen
deficiency, portable and robust instruments are needed during the
commissioning period as well.
Various types of portable instruments such as Explosive meter, Toxic
Gas detector are available. They are to periodically checked and
ensured that they are in good working conditions, before being put
into actual use by the commissioning team.
11.1
COMBUSTIBLE / EXPLOSIVE GAS DETECTOR
For detection of combustible gases, the instrument known as the

Explosimeter is used. It is an instrument by means of which an area /
atmosphere can be conveniently and quickly tested for the presence of
combustible gases / vapours within their flammable limits.
For areas of Hydrogen / Hydrocarbon and pure oxygen mixtures, the
instrument should be ordered specific as per the requirement. They
should be weather proof and pertaining to the Hydrogen / Hydrocarbon
ambience requirement.
Few Important Hints:
a) The instrument assembly, sampling line and the aspirator bulb
assembly should be proof and tested before each set of
sampling.
b) Always keep the sampling line combustion chamber free of
choking.
c) Never dip the -sampling tube into a liquid and always use a flash
trap assembly.
d) Check the instrument whether in use or not at least once in a day.
e) Replace the battery cells immediately if found leaky.
f) While in doubt, have the instrument serviced and calibrated.
__________________________________________________
1
E & C Division
Technical Brochure and the operating instruction sheet for the

combustible gas detector available with the safety cell is enclosed here
11.2
TOXIC GAS DETECTORS
Accurate measurement of toxic gases and vapours present at very low

concentrations (ppm) is necessary for monitoring of plant / work areas
and confined spaces before jobs are taken up. The toxic gas detectors
helps us in knowing the concentrations of the given chemical, which
can be matched against the Threshold Limit Value of that chemical,
based on which we can judge whether it is safe for routine operations /
work / maintenance requirements etc.
Each detector tube packet comes with an instructions sheet and
readings and interpretations done exactly as per the same.
11.3
OXYGEN DEFICIENCY INSTRUMENTS
Prior oxygen measurement in areas suspected to be deficient in

oxygen, like process vessels, pits, tanks and other confined areas
which are to be worked on is a mandatory safety requirement before
authorizing the work. Even after commencement of jobs this should be
repeated at regular intervals to ensure oxygen content is a minimum
of 18% by volume in the areas where work is going on. Before the
usage of the instrument, it should be checked for the calibration.
Technical Brochure and the operating instruction sheet for the oxygen
level monitor available with the safety cell is enclosed here.
__________________________________________________
2

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Comisionamiento de Plantas Mineras

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SHE MANUAL

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

3.2 Safety Rules Contractors/Sub Contractors

Drum / Cylinder Handling

5.8 Causes of Plant failure

Active / Passive Fire Protection

5.18 Reliability of Utilities

Material Safety Data Sheet

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

National Fire protection Association (NFPA) Hazard diamond

On site Emergency plan

The Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act 1981

The Manufacturer Storage and Import of hazardous Chemical

Procedure for Sample Collection

9.4 Procedure for isolation of flare header, safety valve

10.1 Non Respiratory

LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED

Engineering & Construction Division

To set and review quality objectives for Continual Improvement of our

To design / operate and maintain safe and environmentally friendly plants

To advance / ensure the use of better and cleaner technology to minimise

To continually reduce the risk of pollution through setting environmental

To deploy Information Technology for increasing the efficiencies of our

To encourage enthusiasm, innovation and empowerment whilst developing

To promote a culture of mutual trust, caring and sharing achievements, with

As an undisputed leader in the Indian context, we continue to make things

Issue : Jan , 2002

( Member of the Board & President )

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Responsibility of the safety control department

consciousness amongst the commissioning team. The Safety Control will

The commissioning team members have access to and are familiar

The Safety Control will co-ordinate with the Safety Department of

A representative from the Safety Control will be present during the

Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE), ensuring its

Ensure functioning of the Fire and Safety equipment.

Ensure functioning of Fire Alarm System and Gas Detector

Check availability of proper emergency lighting and wind

Ensure availability of Display Boards at site, detailing the

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Enforcement of Safety Procedures in dealing with hazardous

Ensure availability of First Aid kit. In consultation with the

Monitoring the environment as and when necessary for

Formulation of proper evacuation plan in co-ordination with

department and the commissioning team.

Carryout Emergency Mock Drill in co-ordination with the

Organise training of the commissioning team with respect to

Will carry out the Safety Audit before start of commissioning

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Responsibility of the commissioning team leader

1. Person responsible for overall commissioning, regardless of his

availability and use of PPE.

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

Responsibility of the commissioning team members

All the members of the commissioning team will ensure that:

SHE Manual (Commissioning)

3.0 BASIC SAFETY RULES OPERATING PERSONNEL

commissioning team leader is required to procure such rules) the same

Smoking is not permitted in any part of the operating plant / areas

Wearing of loose clothes is unsafe.

Walk through or across operating plants not to be practiced.

Operation of machine / equipment by authorized personnel only.

Use of personnel protective equipment to comply with.