Principles of rational behavior in society and business

55

For a different view on the foundations of cooperations, see online Perspective 2,

Evolutionary foundations of cooperation.

Online Perspective 2
Evolutionary foundations
of cooperation

Part B Organizational economics and management

The logic of group behavior in business and elsewhere
In following chapters, we introduce the usefulness of markets as means of generating a form of cooperation, through trades, or buying and selling. However, as is
evident inside firms, not all human cooperation is through markets. People often
act cooperatively in groups or, as the case may be, in firms. In this section, we
make use of the rationality principles developed in Part A, applying them to the
organization of groups and firms. The focus of our attention is on the viability of
groups such as families, cliques, communes, clubs, unions, and professional
associations and societies, as well as firms, in which individual participation is
voluntary to cohere and pursue the common interests of the members.
We consider two dominant and conflicting theories of group behavior, both of
which take a partial view of complex life and yield insight about groups. They are
the common-interest theory and the economic theory of group behavior, with
the economic theory the focus of the rest of the chapter because it is founded on the
premise of rational behavior developed in Part A. This economic theory of groups
helps us understand why firms are organized the way they are and why owners and
workers alike can share a common interest in firms employing tough bosses.

Common-interest logic of group behavior

All theories of group behavior begin by recognizing the multiplicity of forces
which affect group members and, therefore, groups. This is especially true of what
we term the common-interest theory. Many present-day sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists generally share this point of view, which has been prominent
at least since the time of Aristotle in the fourth century BC. The determinants of group

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behavior most often singled out are the leadership quality of specific group members and the need among group members for affiliation, security, recognition,
social status, or money. Groups such as clubs or unions form so that members can
achieve or satisfy a want that they could not satisfy as efficiently through individual
action. All these considerations are instrumental in affecting group cohesion,
which, in turn, affects the strength of the group and its ability to compete with
other groups for the same objectives. From the perspective of this theory, when people
join firms, they accept the firms objective and pursue it because everyone else wants
the same thing, leading to self-enforcing group cohesion.
The common-interest theory views the group as an organic whole, much like an
individual, as opposed to a collection of individuals whose separate actions appear
to be group action. According to the theory, the group has a life of its own that is
to a degree independent of the individuals who comprise it. Herbert Spencer, a
nineteenth-century sociologist, often described the group as a social organism or
as a superorganic entity (Spencer 1896). It was probably the social-organism view
of groups that Karl Marx had in mind when he wrote of the class struggle and
predicted that the proletariat class would bring down bourgeois capitalism and, in
its place, erect a communist society. Aristotle probably had the same view of groups
in mind when he wrote, Man is by nature a political animal.
Two major reasons are given for viewing groups as social organisms. First, a group
consists of a mass of interdependencies, which connect the individuals in the group.
Without the interdependencies, there would be only isolated individuals, and the term
group would have no meaning. Individuals in groups are like the nodes of a spiders
web. The spiders web is constructed on these nodes, and the movements in one part of
the web can be transmitted to all other parts. Similar to the process of synergism in
biology, the actions of individuals within a group combine to form a force that is
greater than the sum of the forces generated by individuals isolated from one another.
The group must, so the argument goes, be thought of as more than the sum total of its
individuals. This argument is often used to arouse support for labor unions, for
example. Union leaders argue that unions can get higher wage increases for all
workers than individual workers can obtain by acting independently. The reason is
that union leaders efficiently coordinate the efforts of all. Environmental groups
make essentially the same argument: with well-placed lobbyists, the environmental
group can have a greater political impact than all the individuals they represent could
have by writing independent letters to their representatives at different times.
Second, groups tend to emerge because they satisfy some interest shared by all the
groups members. Because all share this common interest, individuals have an
intrinsic incentive to work with others to pursue that interest, sharing the costs as
they work together. Aristotle wrote, Men journey together with a view to particular
advantage (Ethics, 1160a) and Arthur Bentley (18701957), recognized as an

Principles of rational behavior in society and business

intellectual father of contemporary political sciences and group theorist, mused,

There is no group without its interest The group and the interest are not
separate If we try to take the group without the interest, we simply have nothing
at all (Bentley 1967, 21113).
Having observed that a common interest can be shared by all of a groups
members, the adherents of this theory of group behavior argue that a group can,
with slight modification, be treated as an individual, meaning that the group can
maximize its well-being. The implicit assumption is made that this will be true of
large as well as small groups. This latter deduction prompts many economists to take
issue with this approach to analysis of group behavior.

The economic logic of group behavior

Mancur Olson (193298), on whose (1971) work this section largely rests, agrees
that the common interest can be influential and is very important in motivating
behavior but mainly the behavior of members of small groups. However, he, like so
many other economists, insists that a group must be looked upon as a composite of
rational individuals as opposed to an anthropomorphic whole, and that the common
interest, which can be so effective in motivating members of small groups, can be
impotent in motivating members of large groups: Unless there is coercion in large
groups rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or
group interest (Olson 1971, 2, emphasis in the original). Furthermore, he contends,
These points hold true when there is unanimous agreement in a group about the
common goal and the methods of achieving it (1971, 2). To understand this theory,
we first examine the propositions upon which it is founded, and then consider some
qualifications.

Basic propositions
Using economic analysis, people are assumed to be as rational in their decision to
join a group (a firm or club) as they are toward doing anything else; they will join a
group if the benefits of doing so are greater than the costs they must bear. These
costs and benefits, like all others relevant to any other act, must be discounted by the
going interest on borrowed funds to account for any time delay in the incurrence of
the costs and receipt of any benefits and by the probability that the costs and
benefits will be realized.
There are several direct, private benefits to belonging to groups, such as companionship, security, recognition, and social status. A person also may belong to a
group for no other reason than to receive mail from it and, in that small way, to feel
important. A group may serve as an outlet for our altruistic or charitable feelings. If
by common interest we mean a collection of these types of private benefits, it is

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easy to see how they can motivate group behavior.

Entrepreneurs can emerge to sell these types of
private benefits, as they do in the case of private
golf clubs or WeightWatchers. The group action is
then, basically, a market phenomenon that is, based in straightforward exchange
of private goods.
However, the central concern of this theory is a common interest that is separate
and detached from the diverse private interests of members of the group. The
problem arises because the public, or common, benefits that transcend the entire
group cannot be provided by the market, and can be obtained only by some form of
collective action. That is, a group of people must band together to change things
from what they would otherwise be. Examples include the common interest of
an environmental group in getting antipollution
A public good is a good or service the
legislation passed; the interest of labor unions to
benefits of which are shared by all members
secure higher wages and better fringe benefits than
of the relevant group if the good is provided
could be obtained by the independent actions of
or consumed by anyone.
laborers; the interest of students to resist tuition
increases, etc. These are examples of the common interest being a public (or collective)
good, as distinguished from a private good.

A private good is any good or service the

benefits of which are received exclusively by
the purchaser.

Small groups
Small groups are not without their problems in pursuing the common interest of
their members. They have a problem of becoming organized, holding together, and
ensuring that everyone contributes her part to the groups common interest. This
point is relevant to Fred and Harrys (or Crusoe and Fridays) problems of setting up
a social contract considered in chapter 1, and it can be understood in terms of all
those little things that we can do with friends and neighbors but that will go undone
because of the problems associated with having two or three people come together
for the common good. For example, it may be in the common interest of three
neighbors Fred, Harry, and now Judy for all to rid their yards of dandelions. If one
person does it, and the other two do not, the person who removes the dandelions may
find his yard full of them the next year because of seeds from the other two yards.
Even though Fred, Harry, and Judy may not ever agree to work out their common
problem (or interest) cooperatively, there are several things that make it more likely
that a small group will cooperate than a large group. In a small group everyone can
know everyone else. What benefits or costs may arise from an individuals action are
spread over just a few people and, therefore, the effect felt by any one person can be
significant. (Fred knows that there is a reasonably high probability that what he does
to eliminate dandelions from the border of his property affects Harrys and Judys
welfare.) If the individual providing the public good is concerned about the welfare

Principles of rational behavior in society and business

of those within his group and receives personal satisfaction from knowing that he
has in some way helped them, he has an incentive to contribute to the common
good; and we emphasize that before the common good can be realized, individuals
must have some motivation for contributing to it. Furthermore, so-called free riders
are easily detected in a small group. (Harry can tell with relative ease when Fred is
not working on, or has not worked on, the dandelions in his yard.) If one person tries
to let the others shoulder his share, the absence of his contribution will be detected
with a reasonably high probability. Others can then bring social pressure (accompanied by the sting of a cost) to bear to encourage (if not force) him to live up to his
end of the bargain. The enforcement costs are low because the group is small. There
are many ways to let a neighbor know you are displeased with some aspect of his
behavior.
Finally, in small groups, an individual shirking her responsibilities can sometimes be excluded from the group if she does not contribute to the common good
(although this would be difficult in the dandelion example) and joins the group
merely to free ride on the efforts of others. In larger groups, such as nations,
exclusion is usually more difficult (more costly) and, therefore, less likely.
The problem of organizing group behavior to serve the common interest has
been a problem for almost all groups, even the utopian communities that sprang up
during the nineteenth century and in the 1960s. Rosebeth Kanter, in her study of
successful nineteenth-century utopian communities, concluded:
The primary issue with which a utopian community must cope in order to have the
strength and solidarity to endure is its human organization: how people arrange to do the
work that the community needs to survive as a group, and how the group in turn manages to
satisfy and involve its members over a long period of time. The idealized version of
communal life must be meshed with the reality of the work to be done in the community,
involving difficult problems of social organization. In utopia, for instance, who takes out the
garbage? (Kanter 1973, 64)

Kanter found that the most successful communities minimized the free-rider problems by restricting entry into the community. They restricted entry by requiring
potential members to make commitments to the group. Six commitment mechanisms distinguished the successful from the unsuccessful utopias:
1 sacrifice of habits common to the outside world, such as the use of alcohol and
tobacco or, in some cases, sex
2 assignment of all worldly goods to the community
3 adoption of rules that would minimize the disruptive effects of relationships
between members and nonmembers and that would (through, for example, the
wearing of uniforms) distinguish members from nonmembers

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4 collective sharing of all property and all communal work

5 submission to public confession and criticism
6 expressed commitment to an identifiable power structure and tradition.
Needless to say, the cost implied in these commitment mechanisms would tend to
discourage most potential free riders from joining the society. By identifying the
boundaries to societies, these mechanisms made exclusion possible. As Kanter
points out, the importance of these commitment mechanisms is illustrated by the
fact that their breakdown foreshadowed the end of the community.
The cattlemens associations formed during the nineteenth century suggest other
means of bringing about collective behavior on the part of group members. At that
time, cattle were allowed to run free over the ranges of the West. The cattlemen had a
common interest in preventing a tragedy of the commons i.e. ensuring that the
ranges were not overstocked and overgrazed (remember the discussion of the tragedy
of the commons in chapter 1) and in securing cooperation in rounding up the cattle.
To provide for these common interests, cattlemen formed associations that sent out
patrols to keep out intruders and that were responsible for the roundups. Any cattleman who failed to contribute his share toward these ends could be excluded from the
association, which generally meant that his cattle were excluded from the roundup or
were confiscated by the association if they were rounded up (Dennen 1975).
The family is a small group, which by its very nature is designed to promote the
common interest of its members. That common interest may be something called
a happy family life, which is, admittedly, difficult to define. The family obviously
does not escape difficulties, given the prevalence of divorces and even more common
family feuds. At present its validity as a viable institution is being challenged by
many sources; however, it does have several redeeming features that we think will
cause it to endure as a basic component of the social fabric. Because of the smallness
of the group, contributions made toward the common interest of the family can be
shared and appreciated directly. Family members are able, at least in most cases, to
know personally what others in the group like and dislike; they can set up an
interpersonal costbenefit structure among themselves that can guide all members
toward the common interest. Most collective decisions are also made with relative
ease. However, even with all the advantages of close personal contact, the family as a
small group often fails to achieve the common interest. Given the frequent failure of
the family, realized in divorces or just persistent hostilities, the failure of much larger
groups to achieve their expressed common objectives is not difficult to understand.

Large groups
In a large-group setting, the problems of having individual members contribute
toward the development of the common interest are potentially much greater. The

Principles of rational behavior in society and business

direct, personal interface that is present in small groups is usually lacking in larger
groups; and because of the size of large groups, the public good they produce is
spread over such a large number of people that no one sees his actions as having a
significant effect on anyone, even themselves. As a result, no one perceives either
personal benefits from his contribution, or benefits for others.
Even when an individual can detect benefits from his actions, he must weigh
those benefits against the costs he has to incur to achieve them. For a large group,
the costs of providing detectable benefits can be substantial. This can occur not only
because there are more people to be served by the good but also because large
groups are normally organized to provide public goods that are rather expensive to
begin with. Police protection, national defense, and schools are examples of very
costly public goods provided by large groups. If all people contribute to the public
good, the cost to any one person can be slight; but the question confronting the
individual is how much he will have to contribute to make his actions detectable,
given what all the others do.
In the context of a nation (a very large group indeed) suppose there are certain
common objectives to which we can all subscribe, such as a specific charitable
program. It is, in other words, in our common interest to promote this program (by
assumption, for purposes of argument). Will people be willing to voluntarily contribute to the federal treasury for the purpose of achieving this goal? Certainly some
people will, but many may not. A person may reason that although he agrees with
the national objective, or common interest, his contribution will have no detectable
effect in achieving it. This explains why compulsory taxes are necessary, and why
philanthropic contributions are an almost nonexistent source of revenues for all
governments worldwide (Olson 1971, 13).
The general tenor of the argument also applies to contributions that go to
organizations such as World Vision, a voluntary charitable organization interested
mainly in improving the diets of impoverished people around the world. Many
readers of these pages will have been disturbed by scenes of undernourished and
malnourished children shown in TV commercials for World Vision. But how many
people ever actually contribute so much as a dollar? Needless to say, many do give.
They are like Harry, who is willing to dig, voluntarily, some of the weeds from his
yard. On the other hand, a very large number of people who have been concerned
never make a contribution. There are many reasons for people not giving, and we do
not mean to understate the importance of these reasons; we mean only to emphasize
that the large-group problem is one significant reason.
True, if all members of a large group make a small contribution toward the
common interest, whatever it is, there may be sizable benefits to all within the
group. But, again, the problem that must be overcome is the potential lack of
individual incentives from which the collective behavior must emerge. In large

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groups, the Prisoners Dilemma problems we highlighted in talking about a twomember group, Fred and Harry, are ever present and magnified, again because the
larger the group, the less detectible are the consequences of individual behavior and
the less monitoring of behavior can be done.
Through appropriate organization of group members, the common interest may
be achieved, even if the membership is large. The organization of a large group can
be construed as a public good, and making the organization workable is likely to
incur costs for two reasons.
First, there are a large number of people to organize, which means that even if
group members are not resistant to being organized, there will be costs associated
with getting them together or having them work at the same time for the same
objectives.
Second, some individuals may try to free-ride on the efforts of others, which
means it will cost more to get people to become members of the group. Further, each
free-rider implies a greater burden on the active members of the group. If everyone
waits for the other guy to take the initiative, the group may never be organized.
Organizational costs often prevent students who complain about the instructional
quality of the faculty or some other aspect of university life from doing anything
about it. The same costs block people who are disgruntled with the two major
political parties from forming a party among those who share their views. The
probability of getting sufficient support is frequently very low, which is another
way of saying the expected costs are high.
The free-rider problem may emerge in the workplace as worker absenteeism for a
variety of reasons, including sickness, real or feigned (Barham and Begum 2005,
157). The Confederation of British Industry found that, in 2006, the British economy
lost 175 million days of work from absenteeism, which continued to escalate beyond
what could be attributable to understandable reasons, such as illness.2 Not surprisingly, the rate of absence for sickness was higher in the public sector than in the
private sector (perhaps attributable in part to the pressure of private firms to avoid
losses and make a profit). Consistent with the logic of collective action as developed in this chapter, another study found that the rate of absences for illness during
the survey week was 29 percent higher in private firms with 500 workers than in
firms with fewer than twenty-five workers (Barham and Begum 2005, 154).
Economist Stephen Levitt and journalist Stephen Dubner (2005) report on their
findings from the sales data collected by Paul Feldman, who sold bagels on the
honor plan for many years in Washington, DC. Feldman would leave bagels early
in the morning at gathering places for office workers. The workers were initially
2

As reported by the consulting firm of Smith & Williamson in 2008, with the report accessed
on January 7, 2009 from www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=52770.

Principles of rational behavior in society and business

asked to leave their payments in open baskets. Because the money often was
taken from the baskets, Feldman made wooden boxes with slits in the top for
depositing payments. Initially, in the early 1980s, when he started his bagel business, Feldman suffered a 10 percent loss of bagels (that is, he received no payment
for 10 percent of the bagels he left). After 1992, his losses of bagels began a slight
but steady rise. By 2001, he reached 13 percent over all companies, only to go back
down to 11 percent during the two years following 9/11. (Levitt and Dubner
speculate that the 15 percent decline in the nonpayment rate possibly could be
attributed to the fact that many of his DC customers were connected to national
security with a heightened sense for doing what was right.) Relevant to the logic of
collective action, Feldman found that honesty measured by payments received for
bagels was marginally affected by firm size: An office with a few dozen employees
generally outpays by 3 to 5 percent an office with a few hundred employees (Levitt
and Dubner 2005 and 2006, 49). We have to suspect that the difference in the
payment rate between small and large offices might be greater were the required
payment higher than the price of a bagel.

The relevance of market prices in large-group settings

Of course, because of scarcity, people everywhere share the common interest of
ensuring that the available resources are used efficiently, which means for those
things people desire most and in the most cost-effective manner. If resources are
used efficiently, most wants can be satisfied than otherwise. How do you get
large groups of consumers to contribute to the common good of efficiently using
resources through their buy decisions? One means of encouraging conservation
and smart purchases in large-group settings is the pricing system. As to be
discussed in chapter 3, when electricity or gasoline becomes scarce and the
market supply contracts, the prices of those products rise, and consumers are
induced to curb their consumption of those goods by reducing their purchases for
those uses that are valued more highly than the higher prices. Restrict prices from
rising when products become more scarce, and consumers will fall into the largegroup trap: they will continue to buy as if nothing had happened to the scarcity of
the products. Consumers can reason that their continued consumption at old
levels will have no impact on the overall availability of the product, which
means they will not conserve when the greater scarcity of the good indicates
that they should.
In December 2003, for a variety of reasons, California suffered through a
serious reduction in the supply of electricity, with threatened brownouts.
Peoples common interest was to conserve on electricity consumption, but government authorities held the price of electricity at its old level. The result was to be
expected: very little in the way of conservation. People lit up their Christmas trees

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and other decorations as if nothing had happened. However, when oil supplies
dropped sharply in the first half of 2008, the average price of gasoline in the country
soared in the state to nearly $5 a gallon, and guess what happened? People did what
was really in their common interest; they curbed their consumption of gasoline in a
multitude of large ways (driving less and parking their large SUVs and RVs) and
small ways (reducing the frequency with which they accelerated rapidly when
stoplights turned green).

Qualifications to the economic theory

Obviously, there are many cases in which people in rather large groups appear to be
trying to accomplish things that are in the common interest of the membership.
Early in the civil rights struggle, the League of Women Voters pushed hard for
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution; labor unions work for
minimum wage increases; the American Medical Association lobbies for legislation
that is in the common interest of a large number of doctors; and many charitable
groups work fairly effectively for the public interest. Several of the possible
explanations for this observed behavior force us to step outside the standard
economic arguments about public goods.
First, as Immanuel Kant, an eighteenth-century philosopher said, people can
place value on the act itself as distinguished from the results or consequences of
the act (1781). The act of making a charitable contribution, which can be broadly
defined to include picking up trash in public areas or holding the door for
someone with an armful of packages, may have a value in and of itself. This is
true whether the effects of the act are detectable to the individual making the
charitable contribution or not. To the extent that people behave in this way, the
public good theory loses force. Notice, however, that Olson, in formulating
his argument, focused on rational, economic man (or woman) as opposed to the
moral man (or woman) envisioned by Kant. We expect that as the group becomes
larger, a greater effort will be made to instill people with the belief that the act
itself is important.
Second, when the Homo sapiens brain was forming eons ago, people lived in
small to moderate-size groups, with maybe 25 to 150 members, for purposes of
protection, survival, and sharing shelter and food supplies. The human brain can be
hardwired to cooperate with other tribe members, perhaps inclined to think of the
relevant group as small, no matter its actual size, which can lead to viable voluntary
cooperative behavior in groups larger than the economic theory of groups would
suggest.
Third, the contribution that a person has to make in group settings is often so
slight that, even though the private benefits are small, the contribution to the
common interest is also small and can be a rational policy course. This may explain,

Principles of rational behavior in society and business

for example, student membership in groups such as a local Chamber of Commerce.

All one has to do in many situations is to show up at an occasional meeting and
make a small dues payment. Further, the private benefits of being with others at the
meetings and finding out what the plans are for the association can be sufficient
incentive to motivate limited action in the common interest.
Fourth, all group members may not share equally the benefits received from
promotion of the common interest. One or more persons may receive a sizable
portion of the total benefits and, accordingly, be willing to provide the public good,
at least up to some limit. Many businessmen are willing to participate in local
politics or to support advertising campaigns to promote their community as a
recreational area. Although a restaurant owner may believe that the entire community will benefit economically from an influx of tourists, he is surely aware that a
share of these benefits will accrue to him. Businessmen may also support such
community efforts because of implied threats of being socially ostracized.
Fifth, large organizations can be broken down into smaller groups. Because of the
personal contact with the smaller units, the common interest of the unit can be
realized. In promoting the interest of the small unit to which they belong, people can
promote the common interest of the large group. The League of Women Voters is
broken down into small community clubs that promote interests common to other
League clubs around the country. The national Chamber of Commerce has local
chapters. The Lions Club collectively promotes programs to prevent blindness and to
help the blind; members do this through a highly decentralized organizational
structure.
Quite often, a multiplicity of small groups is actually responsible for what may
appear to be the activity of a large group. Large firms almost always divide their
operations into divisions and then smaller departments. The decentralization that is
prevalent among voluntary and business groups tends to support the economic view
of groups.
Sixth, large groups may be viable because the group organizers sell their members a service and use the profits from sales to promote projects that are in the
common interest of the group. The Sierra Club, which is in the forefront of the
environmental movement, is a rather large group that has members in every part
of North America. The group receives voluntary contributions from members
and nonmembers alike to research and lobby for environmental issues. However,
it also sells a number of publications and offers a variety of environmentally
related tours for its members. From these activities, it secures substantial resources
to promote the common interest of its membership. The American Economic
Association (AEA) has several thousand members. However, most economists do
not belong to the AEA for what they can do for it; they join primarily to receive its
journal and to be able to tell others that they belong both of which are private

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benefits. The AEA also provides economists with information on employment

opportunities.
Seventh, the basic argument for any group is that people can accomplish more
through groups than they can through independent action. This means that there are
potential benefits to be reaped (or, some may say, skimmed off) by anyone who is
willing to bear some of the cost of developing and maintaining the organization.
A business firm is fundamentally a group of workers and stockholders interested in
producing a good (a public good, to them). They have a common interest in seeing a
good produced that will sell at a profit. The entrepreneur is essentially a person who
organizes a group of people into a production unit; she overcomes all the problems
associated with trying to get a large number of people to work in their common
interest by providing workers with private benefits that is, she pays them for their
contribution to the production of the good. The entrepreneur-manager can be
viewed as a person who is responsible for reducing any tendency of workers to
avoid their responsibilities to the large-group firm.
The general point that emerges from our discussion of incentives within small
and large groups is that, as a group grows in size, shared values can become
progressively inconsequential in motivating people to act cooperatively. This means
that as a group grows, alternative mechanisms incentives and organizational and
financial structures must be developed to supplant the power of shared values in
achieving the shared goals (with the shared goals including such matters as firm
profitability, worker job security, social and environmental ends). Effective management can be construed as finding ways to overcome the large-group problems,
which often reduce to Prisoners Dilemmas.
Of course, disincentives that discourage people from doing anything working or
contributing to a groups welfare can be as important for management and public
policies as incentives. Online, we provide several additional readings that complement the analyses developed in this chapter:
*

In online Reading 2.1 for this chapter, we show how disincentives can affect, and
even limit, public benefits going to disadvantaged groups.
In online Reading 2.2, we show how rational-behavior precepts can be used to
conceptualize optimum management snooping on workers who may be using
work time to play games and shop online.
In online Reading 2.3, we explain how the varying risk aversion across people
helps explain why firms tend to be owned by capital investors, not workers.
Finally, in Reading 2.4, you will find an explanation from economists and
political scientists, specializing in public choice economics (or the application
of economic theory to politics), for why so few eligible voters vote and why many
voters are ill-informed about prominent policy issues.