State of South Carolina The Circuit Court of the Fourteenth Pudicial Circuit (Carmen Tevis Mullen ace teeee se December 17, 2014 Beulah G, Roberts CClarendoo County Clerk of Court Post Office Box 136 ‘Manuiag, SC 29102-0136 Re: State of South Carolina v. George Stinney, I ‘Mis. Roberts, Please see atticed order in regards (othe above referenced ease. To expedite the Bling of this order, Judge Mullen would ask that you file this copy and the original wil be placed inthe mail today. IF you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me, Thank you for your attention to this mater. fee G--——— tne rampean ‘imate Asan ‘To the Honorable Carmen T. Mullen Foustoznth Judiciat Cccuit epmFIED TRUE COPY oo at Nese orrce ar.STATEOF SOUTH CAROLINA ——-)_INTHE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS COUNTY OF CLARENDON, }TRIRDJUDICIAL cIRCUIT 5 ) 7 PY ‘eof Soth Carton CERTIIED TRUE SOP oe oe DRIGINAT oF oF \" = DER George Stinney, Je, Defendant, CH OS “This Orde follows January 21-22, 2014 hearing held in Sumter, South Corona on a ‘Motion for New Tia and Petition for Writof Coram Nobir brought by late Defendant George Svingey, Jes surviving siblings, Bishop Chases Stoney, Catherine Stinney Robinson and Amie Ruffner, At the coneluson of the two-day hearing, Defense counsel withew its Rule 298) Motion and esked io proceed only on the Writof Coram Mobi ‘The Defense argues thatthe conviction was based on numerous and serious errs and omissions denying Stinney Fundamental due process and that there is no other remedy avallable to sight the wrong commited by the State in 1944, ‘The Site argues thatthe Defense lacks standing to make this petition; that the Post Conviction elie Act effectively eliminated the we of esher wits in South Carotna; the Doctrine of Laches applies; and that he appropriate §uisditional veoue t hearths muster is atthe Circuit Court, but instead the South Carling Supreme Cour. “This Cout finds fundamental, Constiutiona violations of due process exist inthe 1944 prosecution of George Stinney, Jr. and hereby vacetes the judament.STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (On the sfemoon of March 25, 1944, Bety hue Binncker, ge 11, and Mary Erma ‘Thames, age 7, fled to retrn home ia the rua town of Aol, South Carolina, The next rmoming, thee bodies were discovered ing ina ich. Both gr’ skulls had been crashed and cone of the gil” bicycle was Iying ontop of their bos its front wheel detached, George Stinney Je was taken int eustody afew hours ner, an confessed to murdering the gis within hours of is apprehension. “The Defendant was tied forthe murder of Bet June Binncker on April24, 1944 just ‘one month ater being ten int custody, An allvhite male jury was selected and the il concluded that same day daring « special term of cour with Judge PLL Stoll presiding Appearing behalf ofthe State was Slictar Frank MeLead, whe presented evidene fem lew enforcement thatthe Defendant confessed tothe crime, While law enforcement testified that a confession aeured no writen confession exis in the record today Solicitor McLeod's tial notes ‘dentfy the murder weapon as « spike, While the coroner's inquest records do not describe the murder weapon the indictments identified the ‘weapon as an iron rod. Investigative nots taken by Deputy Shei H.S. Newman refer tthe ‘weapon at an approximately fiflen-inch long plese of ion. Dr. C.R.F. Baker tested on behalf of he Suate a8 toa writen extemal medal report of the ves signed by Dr A.C. Bozad but rot by Dt Baker himself. Nothing remains from documentary evidence indicating whether a ‘murder weapon, bloody clothes or other demonstrative evidence were admited a rial,(Charles H. Plowden, Esq. vas appointed to represent the Defendant. The capital murder tral, lasted one day. A such, 1am best eto conclude that few or no witnesses were called by the Defense and litle t0 no cross examination conducted. After ten minutes of deliberation by the jury of svelve, the Defendant was found pully of the murder of Bety June Binnicker and ‘was tht sume dey sentenced to death by eleetrocuton. No appeals were filed and no stays of ‘execution were requested by counsel. On June 16,1944, George Stnney, J was exeeted. He wa fourteen years od Less than tree months passed between the death of te gis and the Defendant's execution, Since tht dae, seventy years have passed. Tod no formal eas file exists nor ri transcip remains a5 testimonial ofthe criminal adjication hat tok place in 1944, The entire collection of documents mantined by the Clarendon County Clerk of Court and the South Caroline State Archives siting to the Defendant's amet, inctment, and teal are composed of the fll (@) Handwritten notes of pty SherfTH.S, Newnan (@) Handwsien Order iesved following the contusion ofthe cornet inquest (6) The acres warrant for Defendant George Stnney. (©) Inaictvens forte murders of Bey lune Binicker and Mary Emma Thames (6) Typevsien medical report signed by Dr. A.C, Bozard (8) Sworn affidavit of Beulah Roberts, Clarendon County Cesk of Court (g) Acta! photographs absined from Clarendon County Surveyors OfMet (bh) andwrinon notes of Solicitor Frank McLeodCounsel for both parties have consented to the admission of the aforementioned documents as evidence, as well as a stipulation of facts entered into by both pares, dted January 22, 2014. Despite the admission of these dauments ito evidence, the compilation doesnot offer a substantive account of the investigation and ajuieaton that cecurred in 194 Beceuse no trial transcript survives, the presentation of these dcuments fo the orginal trial, court and cros-xaminstion delving into thee completeness or validity cannot be established Whether or not physise! evidence from the trial was retined cant be said; howeve, its Inexistence today is due likely othe passage of time. Possibly, because no appeal was ile, the trial transcript may never have been completed or led wih ihe court (OF note, Defense counsel's motion and first supplemental memorandum and supplemental notion dated and filed Ociober 25, 2013, and November 7, 2013, include as sachments various newspaper articles spanning frm the incidents occurence in 194 10 ‘eciations published in 1989. Such ateles no doubt have been ceferenced by counsel as ‘means of attempting 10 establish a background and fctusl supplementation given the lack of ha evidence inthis ase. The weight to be given the newspaper atl offered wo the Court as attachments cannot be inthe form of the fets they may portray. Trustees of Erskine Coll.» (Cent, but fos. Co, 270 SC. 118, 123-24, 2 SE.24 160,162 (1978) (cing Cit Court Rule 44(), 6 Moore's Feder! Practice, Seton $6,22{1),N. 24 (1976) see generally Sate. Bluton, 342 SC, 500, $37 S24 291 (CL App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds by Sie. Blurton, 352 S.C. 203, 82 $6.24 802 (2002). They were simply reviewed bythe Court in ts tempt ta resonstruct a decades old prosecutionDEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS “The Writ of Coram Nobis is @ holdover of old English law which has been infrequently ‘sed in this country. The wrt“*wss avilable at common law to corteterors of fae” occuring in proceedings before the King’s Bench. United States v. Morgan, 346 US. 507 1954) (citation omitted). At its inception, the wit was uilize in both evil nd ermal cases and there was no tne limitation for presenting fs tat affected the “vaidty and regulaiy” of previous judgment, (cation omited). As recognized by the United States Supreme Cou in United States v. Morgan, the wei thas had a continuous although i use sao in or sntes with and without stastory authority bu aways with ference tits common lew scope...” {4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has also recognized this historic fnetion of core nobis: “The principal function of the wit of coram noble is to afford the Court an opportunity 0 corret its civn record with reference to a vital faet not known ‘when the judgment was rendered and which could not have been presented by a Imation for anew tal, appeal or ether exiting statuory proceeding. I is for an frror of fact not apparent on the record, not atsibuible to the appellant's regligence, and shih iF known by the Cour would have prevented renition of the judgment. It does nt lie for newly discovered evidence or newly arising facts fof facts adjudicated atthe wal tis not avelable where advantage could have been taken of the alleged error at the tril, as wheze the facts complained of were ‘known before ofa the trial or where atthe tal the aeused or his attorneys knew ofthe existence of such facts bat filed to preseat them... A person seeking elit by a writ of coram nobis has the burden of sustaining the allegations ot his petition bya preponderance of evidence. ‘State . Liles, 246 S.C. 59, 3-74, 12 SE.24 433,440 (1968 (ing Shelton v State, 239 S.C 535,129 SE.24 867 (1962). ‘Acdltionally, coram nobie was and isa limited remedy. Coram nobis reliefs appropriate ony io other remedy i available tthe applicant. Mendoza v. United Sate, 690F.3d 157 Ga Cir.2012), Thus, the writ cram nobis cannot be asented a an alternative fora motion for new tal a motion to vacate e judgment, an appeal. writ of habeas corpus, ot other avilable aston. Sor id ln other words, ian issue in the ese coneering which eet is sought by the defendant, could have been raised by a emedy ther than coram nobis, the issue cannot be reviewed ina coram nobis proceeding, 18 Am. Jur Trials 1 § 6 Uhimately, cram nobis is predicated on ustie. A wit of coram nobis must be allowed, where sucha remedy i available, when & ‘coavietion is wrongful because itis based on an enor of fact or was ned by Linfair oF unlavful methods and no other corrective judicial remedy is ‘available The vr of erorcoram nobis, which i eailale ona proper showing forthe purpate of reviowing a judgment after the time for an appeal as expired, reets the requirement of due process of law under te Fourteenth Amendment of the Unite States Constitution. Such a writ must be allowed where a convition is ‘wrongful because based on an err of factor oblained by unfir or unlawul ‘methods and no other corrective judicial remedy i available 16C.C.1S. Conetinional Law § 1693 (emphasis edded), [As aresult ofthe United States Supreme Cout’s decision in Mooney, Holohan, the use of corm nob today asus thatthe guarantees of due proces of aw under the Cont will not be denied due 10 technicalities of oter remedies. 284 U.S. 103 (1935) (finding that sinte cours mist furnish postconviction remedies for defendants whe have been convicts without de proces ofa). See also 18 Ar, Jur. Tas 1 § Standard of Review 'A potion forthe writ should be considered bythe court hat rendered the judgment Deeause the writ 5 to bring ta the trial cours sttetion an alleged factual ear and ask the tial judge to determine the validity of that petition. United Stores v, Densdo, 556 US. 904, 912-13 (2009). ‘The remedy for 9 successful ptition under the writ of coram nobis is not aretrial of the factual issues relating tothe defendant's guilt or innocence. Should the petition be ‘ranted, the judgment should be vacated based upon a showing of fundamen ero in the initial prosecution ‘The United States Four Cireuit Court of Appeals has st forth the standards for celief under the wrt of coram nabis as requiring @ showing that: 1) no other legitimate remedy is vailable 2) there are reasons for not atcking the conviction caer; 3) edvese consequences exist fiom the conviction that ae sufficient to sts he Article I case or controversy requirement and 4) the err alleged is ofthe mos fundamental character. Une ‘States y. Manel, 862 ¥.24 1067, 1077 (th Cie 1988). Stinney mess all four requirements for Stoding to Proceed Pursuant tothe Wri ef Coram Nobis ‘To addres the issue of standing. coram nobis isan extraordinary remedy, designed to protect fundamental due process rights. The United States Supreme Court has lng recognized that athitd-pary ftigant has standing to assert the constiutional rights of another whete the litigant “can demons that he o she assure «concrete, redressable injury that eo she has close relation wit he tid party, and thet ther exists sme hindrence othe thir party's ahilty to protect hs or her own interest." Edmond Leeslle Concrete Co Ine. 500 US. 64, £629 1991); See oso Powers». Ohio, 498 US. 400, 410-1 (1991). A wrt of coram nobis by its ‘very nature isnot encumbered by procedaral and legal hurdles like other writs and metions for post convitin relief. The standards ae differentStinney's execution rendered him unable to bring the challenge himself and assert his ‘own constitutional rights before the Coust today. Therefor, the only avalable means through which to challenge his prosseuton les in thid-party standing. Locke: Moving before this Cou, neatly seventy yer fir injury, begs the consideration that laches may bat such extreme postunous relief, “Laches is ‘neglect for an unreasonble and unexplained length of time, under creumstanes affording opportunity fr diligence, todo what in law should have been done.” Bray v. Ste, 366 SC. 137, 140, 620 S.E24 743,745 (2005) quoting Whitehead». Site, 352 SC. 215, $74 S.E2d 200 (2002), The standard for determining whether a claim is barred by laches shouldbe decided “in light of the facts ofeach case, taking into consideration whether the delay has worked injury, peje, or dissdventage tothe oer pany” Ja “The wrt proved successfl forty-five yeas after convition in Hirabayashi». Unlied ‘States, 828 F.2d 581 (Hh Ci 1987). In Hirabayashi an American cen of Jepanese ancestry was convicted in 1942 of violating the military's imposed curfew fr all persons of Japanese escent, Fortyfive yeas ltr, the Ninth Circuit reversed that eonviton and remanded with instructions to grant Hirabayashi’ petition to vacate and granted reli pursuant t a weit of coram nobis, Hihayahl», Unite Stats, supra, at $93, 608. The 1982 discovery of racial motivation behind the military curfew volaton that le to Mirsbaysshi's conviction predicated that wrt’ success, Had the Supreme Court known the tru prejudicial basis forthe eure, “the lkimate decision inthe case would probably have been different.” cls“Time-brrng an ction based upon a lengthy delay in pltionng fr relief unde a tt of coram nobis must be evaluated case-by-case, The circumstances in the instant case are usigue, “The prosecution that occured is wholly indieaive of another time in history. Since the tne oF un the Jon Crow era evolved int the Civil Rights era, Both have come and gone, resting in xeat social legal and administrative progres in this region. While this Court would have preferred this motion been brought swenty-five years earlier, when there were mere living wimesses wit could recount the investigation and adjudication tat tok place, ii only now that egal counsel has offered pro bono services in an attempt to remedy a potential injustice. As such, 1 feel compelled to review whether Defendant’ conviton was properly sought and acct, HEARING TESTIMONY [At the January 2014 hearing the ptt, the Defendant's ving relatives each off testimony oftheir recollection of the events leing up tothe Defenden's apprehension and offered alibi testimony though the sane, Each state they were withthe Defendant onthe te of te allege incident and that the Defendant ould not have stayed from thee home orathense ‘was unaccompanied long enough that aflemoon te commit such a time, Collectively, the testimony recounts that the Stinneys were forced 19 immediatly leave own o Pinewood and then Sumter following the Defendant's apprehension, fearful that Ioeals would seek valent revenge against the Stinney family, 4, Live testimony by Catherine Stinney Robinson (Ms. Robinson is 79 years old and has been a resident of New Jersey since graduating Mortis College. When questioned in 1 pase memory of what occurred on March 24, &1944, Ms. Robinson, wi was nine or ten years ole atthe ime tsi that she wes in the yard that day and saw the vitins” coming and going riding thir bikes, but did not know their identy, She offered conflicting testimony a8 to whether she had personal knowledge ofthe viesms sopping to talk to her brother and sister, the Defendant andl Amie RTs. When the Defendant was taken into cistody, Ms. Robinson was atthe beauty shop with her bother Charles, She furher testified tat neither Inw enforcement nor Stiney's attorney, Chases Plowsden, inerviewed her about the day's events. Ms. Robinson was at called a a witess in he 1944 ra. Sworn affidavit and lve testimony by Amie Rater “The youngest ofthe Stnney siblings a 7, eight years lin 1944, testified that she was ‘withthe Defendant grazing the family cow when te victims rose their path and thet se, he Defendant nd the family cow al etumed home together forthe remainder ofthe afeoon. ‘Ms, Ruffner testified thot when uniformed men avived at her family home, she hid in the chicken coop. resling their arval and thee departure with the Defendant in andeut. When asked if she spoke with her third brother, Johnny Gree, about hs interrogation in relation tothe sume incident, she testified tha attempts to speak with him about the March 1944 events proved fatile, Johny Green has since passed away. She also further testified hat neither law enforcement nor Stinney’s attorney, Charles Plovden, interviewed her about the day's events. Ms, Ruffner was not called asa witness inthe 1944 til, «. Swom affidavit and video depaition esimony by Bishop Charles Stianey Due to fisity and illness, it was relayed Bishop Stinney could not travel to Sumter forthe hearing, Video of his deposition testimony was played at the heering. Bishop Stnney testifiedthat he recalled law enforcement serching the family hone and recalled tht his isle sister, Catherine, was not at home a tht tne, te could ot recall i law enforcement took anything from the home 4. Sworn Affidavit of Seareh Paty Member Reverend Francis Batson “The matter current before the Court as resved lol and national news coverage peor to the hearing date. Aer witnessing such coverage, Reverend Francis Batson came forward to Defense counsel offering his resurfaced recoledon of his involvement inthe Aleoly search parry assembled to find the missing victims. He states shat he “ald not look fora murder ‘weapon and tat he “dofs] not remember assing very mach blood.” and that he “would guess” iat abou thes to four hundred yards spate the fl whee the vctims were found fam the Green Hill Baptist Church, Batson AA. at 2. Reverend Batson was fifteen at the time of the We further tesifes that Seott Loner, another serch party member with whoo the Reverend discovered the vitins, di testy at wal. The Reverend incues in his affidavit that ‘George W. Burke was another seach puty member. Other documents offered as part of the reso of the mater now before the court inieste that Mr. Burke was also involved inthe coroner's inquest and sted asa witness onthe Grand Jury Sworn affidavit fom Wilfod “Johnny” Hunter Much ike Reverend Batson, Wilford “Johnny” Hunter made himself available to Defense counsel, fllowing recognition of the pending matter though media coverage, The remaining aida includes Me, Hunter's observations and impressions of his interaction with the Defendant during their tm in jall between Stinney"s conviction at rial and his exeeution. Mr. Hunter recalls thatthe Defendant appeared small and fail, that he played games with theDefendant while in jail and that when he asked the Defendant why he was there, Stnney told him dat he was accused of Killing two white gil: “George told [Mr. Hunter] that they were going to elecroeute im tnd that he didnt Kill the girs, and that they made him say those things" Hunter Aff 3t2 Live Testimony by Pao! Fann ‘The State's witness, Me. Paul Fann, was bor 1Wo miles outside of Alco in 1935 and was bout nine years old in March 1944, Me. Fann worked fr his fathers grocery store eivering ce in Aeot and recalls being ar of the search party assemble to fin the vt. Mi Fann testified as to his presence outside the Stoney home at th time of the Defendant's apprcension, Mr. Fan witnessed » white man exittheStinney home wih “big ball” of tings in his ams and then pu those items in «eer auside the home: he then witnessed the Defendant being taken from te home, put into ear, and driven away from the home. Live Testimony by Robert Ridgeway Robert Ridgewny lived in Alcolu in 1948 at he age of thirteen, He went on to gamer over sinty years experience asa rlroad engineer, The State called Mr Ridgeway to identify what i ‘commonly referred 10 inthe raload industry a. di pin, the approximately twelverinch long. tworinch wide piece of metal or iron that hitches road ces together. According to Mr. Ridgeway, cit pins were commonplace on fg-earrying railroad ears inthe 19405, Log eats hauled logs from swamp to sail suchas the former Alderman lamber yard in Aleta. Deft pins would have been found along Hines running to and from lumber mills, and would mere likely be found in amber Norge yds, Such storage yards acording to Mr. Ridgeway, could only be accessed by individuals with mill access, Conversely, another typeof metal or iron, & ~‘tlkoad spike, could have been found near spurs, the location where tains can be switched from ‘cast trac. fh. Report and Depo mn by Forense Pathologist Dr. Peter. Stephens Dofense counsel offered Ds Stephens’ deposition testimony, which eaws eonelsions ‘fom Dr. A.C. Bozard's 1944 epont hough the lens of forensic pathologist and opines that the victims appeared (0 lack wounds indiative of both puting up a defense to an assault and of being dragged across brush or teal, Stephens Depo. at 26.29, His testimony sats tht due to lack of detail in the report provided, i is difficult to tell the numberof head wounds thatthe Vets sustained. Stephens Depo. at 4, 31-32. His testimony alsa states that without any laces of evidence used during the prosecution, he remsins unable to ascertain to a resonable degre of certainty what the murder weapon ataly was, Stephens Depo 14,3234, 37. ‘Also, deposition testimony incdes the opinion that Stoney and the alee vit were similarly matched in size, indeatng an atack from the ear, perhaps wit an element of surprise, in order for such head wounds tobe sus sd without evidence ofa sug. Stephens Depo. at 37,40 (objections omited). Adkitinally, Dr. Stephens explained thai the holes in the vietns” skull were round as if they fad been punched into the skull, that type of wound is more likely caused by @ hammer than by a rectangular spike. Stephens Depo. at 14-17, i. Live Testimony by Forensic Psychiatrist Dr. Amanda Salas ‘The Defense's final witness, Dr. Amand Salas, ofered exper testimony as to the ‘elibilty of Stinney's confession. Dr. Salas is # board-certified eld, adolescent and forensic psychiatrist and is familiar withthe Stinney case form her 2010 thesis onthe same topic.‘According to Dr. Salas’ testimony, fale confessions can be examined by looking at factors of teliablty inherent in a confession. Spefeally, De Salas looked to analyze whether 1) the confession fie die evidence; 2) the confession consis itera consistencies; 3) the characer ofthe intrrogator-suspect interaction; and 4) the eonfesor’s psychological make-up. Only the first two factors are described as objestive factors. Dr. Salas testi that without an adult present during the alleged confession, fourteen year old is highly suggestie during custodial interrogation, and may be more likly to give a false confession due to a desire to comply with law enforcement. Factors examined indicating suggeiility were the Defendant's age, the power diffrenat berween the Defendant and the iteogeter, and he custodial condition in which confession was obtained, Dr, Salas relied on racial interactions in ber analysis ofthe Defendant's suggesibility at the time ofthe confession. Recaise the Defendant was apprehended by white men and placed Jno custodial environment in a segregated, 1944 South Carolina, the fourteen-yer-old Defendant would not have heen accustomed t being in the presence of ether, ang pressure to comply by giving a confession and otherwise indicating a large power diferent between the sceused and authority figure. Based om all ofthe above, Dr Salas concluded toa reasonable degree of pacha cenanny tat any confession given vas ¢ coered, compliant false confession and is unrcible. In her analysis of motivation for he erime, Dr. Salas ste that besed pon interviews withthe Defendant’ sister, she determined that Stiney was likely of average education and inteigence for someone of his age and class in rural, 1944 South Caroli ‘Nothing she reviewed indicated a low IQ. She was informed of the Defendants intrest in art nd sirplanes‘According to Dr. Salas, nothing she reviewed about the Defendant's disposition pointe towards the Defendant being sexually motivated to commit the crimes that oecurted and noted that @ oureen year old 1944 didnot mature tthe sume speed us today's fourtcen year ol. LEGAL ANALYSIS Fundamental Deprvations of Due Process In 1922, ove Supreme Couct aimed the granting of @ new tris “under peculiar circumstances," not ently unlike the circumstances curently before the Court. In State v. ‘Thompson, 122 S.C. 407, [15 SE. 326 (1922): [The defendant contended that he had been rushed «0 tial, without any ‘opportunity to see his fiends or to engage counsel, oF fo in any way prepare for his defence, in consequence of the courtroom being crowded by a multitide hostile to him, whose exhibition af hostly was ealeulated t, and did, avesswe the jy, and that because of the presence of ths crowd, and of verbal threats, ‘whieh had come to dhe ears of counsel appointed by the court to defend the ‘defendant, such counsel did not demand the time fo which defendant was entitled ‘or preparation of his defense, for Fear thatthe defendant would be deat with by violence, and defendant was thus forced to til with his counsel hopelessly Lunprepaed and not having any proper leowledge of his defense, The motion was based on alidavte tending to show a Wal under such circumstances, and Was eae by the judge upon such affidavits and others eontaditory thereto. ARer considering them, along with his own recollection ofthe tral before him, the ial judge held “That he proceed while apparently tue tall formal requizements, were void of vitalizing justice: ‘State v. Thompson, supra, 115 SE. at 33 (intemal cations ome). ‘ground that the judgment against im was wrong on the merits, but thatthe courts have failed in 4 capital case to discharge their proper Funtions with due regard tothe constitutional safeguands QRinthe adoinistion of justice." at 395 (ching Stole v. MeNinch, 12 S.C. 89 (1879): State v ‘Washington, 13 S.C. 453 880}, Site». Gren, 48S. 147, 26 E234 (1897). In March of 1931, the ne young blk males who came tobe known athe Setsboro Boys were accused of raping two young white women on 8 tin traveling fo Memphis, ‘enesse, Michael J. Kaman, Scotsboo, $8 Maun L. Rev 379 (Winter 2003) They were ‘vied just twelve days later in thee separate rss of duce or four co-defendants, Id Each tial lasted no more than afew hous and cach defendant was sentenced to death wh the exception of the sole 13-yearold. Jd. Counsel led an sppe 1 say the exzcuton, despite zealous representation of thir len being labeled as meager in many aecouns. Id. After hree appeals to the United Stats Supreme Cour resulted in thee remands, the Seotisboro Boys were cexonerted by Alabama's governor in November 2013. Seotsboro Trials, ENcyCOHEDIA oF ‘Acassua, htphew eneyloneintnlahann orfce/Ancejapid-1456 (last visited May 1.2014) In each opinion, he United States Supreme Court found a violation of the defendants due proces ight a basis for vacating the conviton and eemanding for eral. The fst remand ‘ented fom the Cou’ determination that couse appointed on the eve of ial vas inffestve in defending the youn, iterate defendants in sucha high profile mater. Powel!» Alabama, 287 US, 45, 66 (1932), Two other opinions rested in vacating convictions and remanded for retial due tothe exclusion of lacks from Albama juries. Norris Alabama, 294 US. $87 (1935); Paterson y. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 (1935). In any death penalty case, itis now recognized ond estblished shat our Constitution places special constraints onthe procedutes used to conviet and sentence an accused ifcase, “Gres protection is afforded in capt cases due to the unique charter ofthe death penalty.” State » Stewart, 288 S.C. 232, 235, 341 SE2d 789, 791 (I986} Murray » Giarrantano, 492. US. 1, 89 (1989). In 8 death penalty al court must be “pariculesly sensitive to insce that every safeguned is observed.” Gregg ¥. Georg, 428 US. 153, 187 (1976) Because ofthe nature ofthe death penalty. a court must go “to extraordinary messues to ensure thatthe prisoner sentenced to be execute is afforded process that wil guarante, as much a is humanly possible, thatthe sentence was no imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice cor mistake.” Eddings v, Oltahoma, 485 US. 104, 118 (1982); Woadkon v. North Corotng, $28 Us. 280, 305 (1976); Ford ». Waimerigh, 477 US. 399, 411 (1986 (tating the ofe-quot “deh i itferen). 1 coram nobis oes amet of bringing eit wo the sittin than, ts best suited asa bess for vacating the Defendants convetion based upon consions violation proven by «preponderance ofthe evidence to have existed inthe Defendant's adjudication, Regardless of ‘whether the law surrounding prossdural de process vas filly developed in the spring of 1944, thece did exist a basis in the law protecting defendant fom certain prosecutorial ations, A sentence can “only be secued afer 9 trial surounded by every statutory and constitutional safeguard” State, Macs, 127 SC. 397,397, 120 SE. 596, 579(1923. Today in our Stat, cach capital case resting in sentence of capital punishment must be appealed to the Supreme Court. .C. Cede Ann. § 16: (A) (effective 1996). thas long ‘been the cours “duty in favorem vitae to closely soruinize the entire record forthe purpose oF determining whether all of the rights of the accused were protected on his tra.” Stave»: Seon, 209 SC. 61, 61, 38 S24 902, 903 (1946); State v. Sinmans, 208 S.C. 538, 38 S.E-2d 705(1946; State», Torence, 305 SC. 45, 406 SB.2¢ 315 (1991). The defendant must be given “the benefit of any eres in the conduct of thea which ffs the merits ofthe suse Sie Simmons, 208 S.C. 538, $44, 38 SE.24 705, 707 (1946). The following analysis of standard consttona protections touches upon fects known regarding the disposition of this case, and results in an overwhelming bass fo grant writ of eoram nobis. Miranda Rights, Custodio Inirragotion and Voluntarines of Confession ‘The Fith and Foursenth Amendmens tothe Cnstuin ofthe United States "stands 2s 4 bor against the conviction of any individual in an American court by means of a coereed confession.” sheraf v Tennesse, 322 U.S. 13, 155 (1944). At the time ofthe Defendant's deainment, interrogation and subsequent arrest, Mind. Arizona ha not eon desided, That cision serves as the benchmark for procedural safeguards that must tach fo any custodial interogation in order for an accused's inculparry statements to be used during his roseuton 384 U.S. 436,446 (1966, Even though Mirande's mandated vse ofthese procedural safeguards agunst an accused's selfinerimination had not yet been decided, the use in a state criminal wil of a defendant's confession obtsined by ecercion—whether physical or mental—is forbidden by the Fourteenth “Amendment” Payne ». Arkansas, 356 U.S. $60 (1958). If an involuntary confession is introduced at tral, the conviction must be reversed, even where there is athe evidence in the record to justify a guilty verdiet. Zyunsv, Olahome, 322 U.S. $96 (1944 (issued June 5, 1944, less han vee months afer a verdict was resched in the instant case). This i so because where @ coerced confession becomes part of the evidence before the jury and where a guilty vediet is‘retuned the cet and weight gven tat conession by the jury is unknown. Payne Arkansas sypr, 386 US. a 85. [As tesla defendant in stiminal ease is ented to an independent evidentiary heating to determine the voluntainss of statements made by the defendant prior to the submission of such statements tothe jury.” Sate. Salisbury, 330 S.C. 250,271,498 SE.28 1655, 666 (Ct. App. 1998); Jackson, Denno, 378 US. 368 (1964). The trie judge must determine if under the totaly ofthe circumstances and by & preponderance ofthe evidence wheter the defendant's statement was knowingly, inlligiby, and voluntarily made, Stotev. iter, 315 $C. 390,382, 652 S24 444, 450 (Ct App. 2007}; State ¥. Yon Doen, 322... 234,243, 471 SIE2U 689, 694-95 (1996). “The test of vluntarnes is “whether a defendant's will was overborne” bythe circumstances suounding th given [satement].” State. Miter, supra, 8 384, 652 SE 2d a 451 (quoting Dickerson Lined State, $50 U.S. 428, 434 (2000. ‘The jadge must consider among the totality ofthe cicumstances “both he characterises of the sccused and the det ofthe inteogation” fe ‘Also for consideration are “the crucial element of police coercion, the length of the Jterrogaton, its loatin, is comity, the defendas smarty, education, physical condition and mental heal as wel as he ilure of police to advise the defendant of his ight o remain silent nd to have counsel present ding eutodal inerogation. Wilow » Wiliams, SOT US. 80, 693-94 (1993) Ginna eitaionsomited). South Carolina's appellate courts hae farther delineated those considerations t inl the accused's background, experience and conduct length of estoy, police misepresenintions sltion af « minor frm his or er parent threts ‘af violence and promises of lenieney. Slate Miller, supra at 386, 652 S.E.24 at 452.Based on the facts presented to this Court, metieds employed by law enforcement in their questioning of the Defendant may have been unduly suggestive, unvestained, and noncompliant withthe standard of eiminalproedure ax equired by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Testimony by Dr. Amanda Salas, MD, suggests that iti highly thkely chat the Defendant was coerced into confessing tothe erimes duct the power diferent between his poston as fourteensyearld black male apprehended and questioned by white, uniformed law enforcement in & smal, sgtegted mil town in South Caroling, Harkening back o De Sales’ tesimony, a fourteen year ol is highly suggestbe during custodial inteopation, especially ‘without a adult by his side, and may be more likely to give a fake confession du oa desire to ‘comply with law enforcement. We know that a enforcement separate the Defeat rom his arent and otherwise took advantage of his age and stature to ame a esl they predetermined to be te an jst. This confession simply eannot he iat hen an voluntary, even the {ets and circumstances ofthis cae highlighting the Defendant's age and suggestibiity. Right 1o Efetive Assistance of Counsel ‘The Fifi, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments have long been interpreted by our courts 0 suarante aright to effective assistance of counsel a all critial stages in criminal prosecution. Powel v. Alabama, 287 US. 45, 65 (1952); Glasser. United States, 315 US. 60, 76 (1942); ‘Shave v, Willoms, 263 S.C, 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974); S.C. Code of Crim. P. Ch. 62, § 996 (1942), “Certain fundamental i 1s, safeguarded by the Fist eight amendments against federal seton, were also safeguarded apsint state ction by te due process clause of the Fourteenth ‘Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the seeused to the aid of eounsel in a ifoyghhncriminal prosecution” Gideon v. Wainoright, 372 US. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Grosiean » American Press Co, 297 US. 233, 24344 (1936), ‘The Gideon Court went on 10 state its ft Iandinat holding tht “any person holed Jno court, who is t00 poor to hite a lawyer, cannot be assured afr trel unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us tobe an obvious tuth fat 44, “Ie is the duty ofthe our, whether requested or nett astign counsel oa capital defendant ase necessary requis of doe process of law, and tha duty isnot discharged by an assignment at such time or unde such circumstances as to proce the giving of effective ai in the preperation and ral ofthe case.” Slate». Grant, 199 S.C, M12, 19 S.E.24 638, 640 (1941) (overled on other grounds, ‘Stotev Torrence, 305 8.0.45, 408 8.6.24 315 (981). Defense counsel has an obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation on bebe of his, fent, including, at avinimum, 9 duty to interview potential witnesses and to make an independent investigation ofthe facts rv. Coe, 372 $.C, 318, 31-32, 642 8.E.2d 590, 597 (2007). In order to aid in providing the best defense, counsel “should ever be mindful of their rave responsibility” during representation. Cummings v. Tweed, 95 S.C. 173, 187, 10 E.2d 322, 328 (1940). Assistance of counsel is measured as effective or inaetve fst by examining the rasonablenest of counsel's representation including whether counsel's assistance conforms to prevailing professional norms, ané second by examining whether the outsome of counsels representation would have been diffrent ut for ineffective assistance, Siiklend Washington, 466 US. 668, 68788 (1984); Wauson v. State, 287 S.C, 386, 357-58, 338 SE2d (636,638 (1985,We kaw that the Defendant was appointed a less one atomey, Charles. Plowden. However, it appears he di litle o nothing in defending Siney, Stinney'ssppoited counsel nade no independent investigation, did not request a change of venue of additional time 12 prepare the cae, he asked litle no question on eoss-examination ofthe Site's witnesses and presented few or no witnesses on behalf of his lint base onthe length of tia. He filet file an appeal of a tay of execution. ‘That i the essence of being ineffective an for these reasons the convietion cannot stand. 1. Pre-Trial Motions ‘Where public sentiment becomes aroused in prtcular ease, a motion for change of ‘venue proves a prudent, reasonable means of defending one’s client. Failing to grant a motion for change of venue where appropriate is reversible error. See State v. Jackson, 1108.C.273, 273, 96 SE. 416,416 (1918). In Jackson the court reversed the i ours denial of change of| ‘cove where tweny aids were smite fom “prominent and respectable citizen ofthe county othe effect that twas impossible for him to get frend impartial wal... on account of psjuice aginst him, he inflamed sate ofthe public mind ad he populeity and ifluence ofthe prosecutor Jd. In another case, file to grant change of ene constituted reversible ‘ror where the original motion was grounded by tht defendants being “hunted by bands of semed men, tense Sting beng manifested aginst him, and that members ofthese bands threstened him wits death on sigh hat the deceased was very popular, and a man of standing nd important in the county." Sar. Davis, 138 S.C 532,532,137 SE. 138,139 (1927. In short, & ation for change of venue often stems from pretial publicity and is appropriate upon a showing of actual juror prejudice, Soe Site v. Stanko, 402 S.C. 252, 241SE.24 708 (2013), Assistance of counsel may be ineffective if e motion for change of venue was appropiate yet aot mised, Iti a prevailing professional norm to move for change of venue wha pretrial publicity garners passionate espense in loclcizens. See eg, State. Jackson, supr,State» Das, supra. TTesimony shows actions were taken to recruit the small mill town of Alsoly for ‘organization int search pais, suggesting widespread local knowledge. Mr. Paul Fann tested 4 to ezllng group of adults and sildren alice gathering outside ofthe Stinney home and ‘watching the boy's apprehension. Me. Fann also csi as to staring with oer, watching te victims’ removal from the ditch, Both recllestions suggest an inflamed public sentiment regarding the nature ofthe allegation, The mere existence of vast newspaper coverage in 1944 of the events indicates prea publicity making # motion for change of venue an approprite clement of defending one’s lint. Artonly, that the Stoney family fled to nearby Pinewood and Sumter for fear of retribution futher highlights the community's senimeat regarding the ie? deat Simi 1 0 moving for change of venue, moving fora continuance wiere ony a shor time pases between appointment of counsel and being called for til isa prevailing profesional rox. A defendant must be afforded enough time for counsel to prepare his defense for il ‘particularly in a capital case, “A defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped his righ to have suficent time to advise with counsel and prepare is defense, To do thats not to proseed promplyin the ean spi of regulated justice but ogo forward with the haste of the mob." Powell. Alabama supra, 287 US. a 38.Defense counsel must hae ime to identify important issues which may areal fect the ‘outcome of his slen’s case so that thy may preset defense at 8 meingfl ime ad ina meaningful manner. Lankord»,ldao, $00 US. 110,127 (1981): Crone: Kentucky, 476US. 683, 690 (1986); Comeron & Bartey Ca». SIC: Procurement Review Panel, 317 S.C. 437,454 SE24 892 (1995); SC. Dept of Soe. Sore v, Holden, 319 S.C. 72, 489 S24 846 (1995); Universal Benefits, Ine. v. MeKinngy, 349 S.C. 179, S61 SE.2d 659 (Ct. App. 2002). “A} defendant ia ciminal case is not precuded from asking for 2 continuance of his case, when bie eting is o aroused against him 8 t eny him a fie an imparia wl by his iret move frst fr change of ven.” Sate, Rator 168 S.C. 221,221, 167 SE. 396,399 (1933), “The events giving rise to this ease expire in less than thee mnths: nw enforcement spprebended the Defendant on March 24, 1984, and bis wal occured just one mont later on ‘April 24,1944 duving a psc e of court ordted for parpses ofthe ila issue, Given the ature of the case, Defense counsel should move for 8 continuance at lest until the next regularly scheduled General Sessions term of court . Lack of Investigation and Presentation of Defense Case |A cefendant has the cight to erost-examine the witestes against im, State v. Bd , 349 SC. 326, 331, $63 SE2d 515, 317 (2002). “The Sivth Amendment right to notice éenfiontaton, and compulsory process guarantee that «criminal charge may be answered Ubrough the cling and iterrogtion of fivorable winetses, the erostexaminaton of adverse witnesses, and the ord introduction of evidence.” State v, Groom, 314 S.C. 383, 385, 444 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1994) (quoting State v. Schmid, 288 S.C. 301, 303, 382 SE. 24 401, 402,(1986), The Sith Amendment having been incorporated tothe sates through the Fourteenth “Amendment. Pointer» Texas, 80 US. 400 (1963) “The fact thatthe entire jury selection, tril and sentencing occured in less than one day demonsrates Defense counsel id litle to nothing to defend his lent. He didnot conduct an independent investigation, Defense counsel did not interview, nor call as 2 witness in the tri ‘any of the family members as potential alibi witnesses. He presented litle to no evidence and cross examined few to no witnesses. A fourceensyear-old hoy cannot conffont his secusers he needed his lawyer to help, Appeal and Stay of Execution “Today sn 1944 appeal stays an execution, SC. Code Ann. § 181-70 (1942 Code § 1031). Defense counsel's file to file an appeal constitutes inefetive assistance of couse “With only finy-three days passing between sentence and execution, and given the age ofthe Defendant, an appl shold have been filed inorder to preserve the constinttona rights ofthe Defendant Selection ofan Impartial ry of the Defondon’s Peers Improper jury composition is vialative of a dsfenden’s constiutiona right 19 an impartial jury of his peers, andi farther evidence of inefectve assistance of counsel, Fits a jy venite must represent fie eross-section ofthe community. Holland v. Minis, 493 US. 474 (1990), Additionally, » defendant has aright “tobe tied by a jury whose members ae selested pursuant to nondiseriminatory exter." Batson , Kentucky, 476 US, 79, 85-86 (1986) ‘Sirouder v, West Virginia, 100 US. 303, 309 (1879) (abrogated on other grounds) (holding it @‘unconstitutional for an Aftican American defendant to “submit to a trial fr his lf” by 2 jury selected on a racially diseriminatory basis) In a discriminatory environment, there isa ssk dat eacal bias may “infect the entire proceedings,” thus endangering reeipt ofa fir wal. JER. . Alabuma ex rel TB. SU US. 127, 140 (1994); Afller-BI » Drette, $45 U.S, 231, 23738 (2005) (“Racial minorities are harmed more generally, for proseeulors draing vical lines in picking juries establish state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of historical prejudice”). I is elear ‘Stinney was tied by a jury of twelve white men in violation of his constitutional right tobe tied bby an impartial jury of his peers. Execution of Minor ‘The execution ofan indiviuel who was 2 minor atthe ine of committing a capital erime is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Raper ¥. Simone, S43 US. 5 (2005); Thompson ». Oblahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding chat the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit execution of a defendant who was 15 years old atthe time of commiting the offense leading to his convietion}; Stave » Morgon, 367 S.C. 615, 626 8.8.24 888 (2006) (vacating # 17-year-old’ capital sentence in light of Roper v. Sinmons). At the time ofthe ‘events giving rise to this action, a minor was any person less than 16 years of age. Eg. S.C. Probete Code Ch. 4, §285(3) (1942). Du to the nate ofthe human life impscted by the Ropor opinion, the precedent it establishes cannot apply retroactively. Regardless, the Eighth Amendment prohibition agains uel and unusust punishment and the Fourteenth Amendments protection of fundamental notions of due process were the same in 1944 a today. Sentencing ourzen year old othe death pesalty constitutes cruel and unusuel punishment‘CONCLUSION ‘The circumstances serving es the impets for the motion now before the Court are indicative of a truly unfortunate episode in our history. As Judge, my responsibility to the court and this Stat isto apply the land see that justice is served, Tm min that in 1947 Itigation began in this very county in the mater of Briggs v. iit that cunt inthe lands decison Brown v. Board of Edcation, the preeminent casein our nation’s history ‘emanating equality forall 347 US, 483, 486.1 (1958), Regardless ofthat progres, fom tine to time we are called to ook back to examine ou stil recent history and correct njstice where pasible, Our common law provides forextanrinary ei equable in nature, where great and fundamental injustice has occured. “A void judgment gains no validity from the passage of tie” 18 Am. Ju. Tels 1 §27, 1Ffound void, corm nobis rele serves to ensure that “al legal disses attaching to {the defendant] or hi survivors as s result of his wrong comieton are forever removed nthe Matter af Cour of Inquiry, No. DI-DC 08-100-051, 16 299th Dist. Ct. Tex. Ape 7, 2008). 1 can think of no greater injustice than a violation oF one's Constttonal rights which bas been proven to me in his ease by » preponderance ofthe svidence standard |A scant trial record serves as a constant reminder that without newly discovered biological evidence, seeking relief fom a decades-old convition is impossible in most eases “The motion now before me cannot bscome a mechanism by which grieving families should ‘expend resources with hopes of redeeming a loved one that has since long passed. The extraordinary circumstances discussed herein simply do not apply in most casesGiven the patclarized ciccumstances of Stinney's ss, find by a preponderance of the evidence standard, tata violation of the Defendant's procedural due process rights ante his prosecution. For tat reason, the Cour herby gens eli in the form ofa wet oF eran nobis, “ot on the grounds thatthe jdgment gains: him was wrong on the merits, but that the courts have filed in a capital case to discharge their proper functions with due regard to the onsittiont! safeguards inthe adminisation of justice” Sia. Thompson, yp, 122 SC. 407, 118 SE, 326, 335 (1922). Based on the foregoing, | hereby vacate the Defendants AND ITIS SO ORDERED. Prevting Circuit Court Judge his | aay or Ne co 2014 Sunder, South Carona