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BOOK II - PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS

(Arts. 414 773)
Title I.- CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY (Arts. 414 426)
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS (Art. 414)
See also: RA 349 as amended by RA 1056 (An Act to Legalize
Permissions to Use Human Organs or Any Portion or portions of the
Human Body for Medical, Surgical or Scientific Purposes under
Certain Conditions); RA 7170 (An Act Authorizing The Legacy or
Donation of All or Part of a Human Body After Death For Specified
Purposes) as amended by RA 7875 (An Act to Advance Corneal
Transplantations in the Philippines)
Chapter 1. Immovable Property (Art. 415)
Chapter 2. Movable Property (Arts. 416-418)

Prudential vs. Panis

GR # L-50003/ Aug. 31, 1987
153 SCRA 391
Facts: On November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale
and Teodula Baluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00
from the defendant Prudential Bank. To secure payment of this loan,
plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the aforesaid date a deed of
Real Estate Mortgage over the Semi concrete 2-storey residential
building with warehouse and a first class residential land evidenced only by
tax declaration in the name of Fernando Magcale, situated in Olongapo
City. On the Deed of Mortgage a rider typed at the bottom of the page in
which case made Prudential bank become aware that the mortgagee
(defendant Prudential Bank) was at the outset aware of the fact that the
mortgagors (plaintiffs) have already filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application
over the lot, possessory rights over which, were mortgaged to it. Plaintiffs
secured an additional loan from defendant Prudential Bank in the sum of
P20,000.00. To secure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed
in favor of the said defendant another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the same properties previously mortgaged. For failure of plaintiffs to pay
their obligation to defendant Bank after it became due, and upon

application of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were

foreclosed. The auction sale aforesaid was held despite written request
from plaintiffs through counsel for the defendant City Sheriff to desist from
going with the scheduled public auction sale. In the decision of CFI, it
declared that the Real Estate Mortgage is null and void. Prudential file for
an MR but was also denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on
the building erected on the land belonging to another. WON the
supervening issuance in favor of private respondents of miscellaneous
sales patent have the effect of invalidating the deeds of real estate
mortgage.
Held: The answer is in the affirmative. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code,
it is obvious that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the
land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an
immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily
includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon,
buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on
which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate
mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property
even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. In the same manner,
this Court has also established that possessory rights over said properties
before title is vested on the grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed
as in a deed of mortgage. Under the foregoing considerations, it is evident
that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building
which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents
and purposes a valid mortgage.
But it is a different matter, as regards the second mortgage executed over
the same properties on May 2, 1973 for an additional loan of P20,000.00
which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City on the
same date. Relative thereto, it is evident that such mortgage executed after
the issuance of the sales patent and of the Original Certificate of Title, falls
squarely under the prohibitions stated in Sections 121, 122 and 124 of the
Public Land Act and Section 2 of Republic Act 730, and is therefore null
and void.
We believe that as in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of
the State neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a

void contract. Indeed, it is generally considered that as between parties to a

contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or
is against public policy.
Sergs. vs. PCI Leasing
GR# 137705 /Aug. 22, 2000
338 SCRA 499
Facts: PCI Leasing, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for collection of sum
of money with an application of a writ of replevin. Upon an ex-parte
application of PCI Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin
directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to
PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary
expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioners factory, seized one machinery with *the+ word that he *would+
return for the other machineries. Petitioner Sergs filed a motion for special
protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its
officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the
sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. This motion was
opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties [were] still
personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. In their
Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were]
immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect
to the agreement would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They
further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these
machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged
agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. The sheriff
again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the
remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by
the workers from taking the rest. The CA held that the subject machines
were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by
petitioners. It also ruled that the words of the contract are clear and leave
no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERGS
became real property by virtue of immobilization and thus should not be
subjected to the writ of seizure.

Held: Under ART. 415. The following are immovable property:

Xxx - (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works;
Xxx
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of
Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land.
Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their chocolatemaking industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry.*16+ In
that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are
real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that
the said machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real
property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation,
they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the
principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Although there is no
specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet
by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as
chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should
not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. In
the present case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines
in question are to be considered as personal property. Clearly then,
petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper
subjects of the Writ of Seizure.

Tsai vs. CA
GR# 1201098 /Oct. 02, 20
366 SCRA 324
Facts: Respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three
million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in
favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where
the factory stands and a list of machineries and equipment. After sometime,
PBCom granted a second loan of P3,356,000.00 to EVERTEX. The loan
was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated
in a list attached thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed
in the first mortgage deed. After the date of the execution of the second
mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and
equipments. Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency
proceedings. All its assets were taken into the custody of the Insolvency
Court, including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two
mortgages as abovementioned. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its
obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings against EVERTEX. On the first and second public auctions,
PB Com emerged to be the highest bidder. PBCom consolidated its
ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. PB Com leased the
property to Rubi Tsai. On 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock and
barrel to Tsai for P9,000,000.00, including the contested machineries.
EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and
damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed
that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of
insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets
sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. The RTC found that the lease
and sale of said personal properties were irregular and illegal because they
were not duly foreclosed nor sold at the December 15, 1982 auction sale
since these were not included in the schedules attached to the mortgage
contracts. The CA affirmed the judgment.
Issue: WON the machineries listed are personal property outside the deed
of real estate mortgage and that it should be excluded from the real
property forclosed, despite the provision in the deed that all after-acquired
properties during the lifetime of the mortgage shall form part there and
despite the undisputed fact that said machineries are big and heavy, bolted
or cemented on the real property.

Held: Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e.,
that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged
by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under Article
415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion, however, does not
settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We
have to look at the parties' intent.
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a
perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the
parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the
trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels. We find no reversible error in the respondent
appellate court's ruling that inasmuch as the subject mortgages were
intended by the parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and
machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law applies, which
provides in Section 7 thereof that: "a chattel mortgage shall be deemed to
cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted
property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same
depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage
to the contrary notwithstanding. As the auction sale of the subject
properties to PBCom is void, no valid title passed in its favor.
Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary
principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give what one does not
have.

Caltex Phils. v. CBAA

GR# L-50466 May 31, 1982
114 SCRA 296
Facts: Caltex installed machineries and equipment consisting of
underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks,
gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists,
truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The said machines and
equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an
appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract
that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and
equipment in good condition as when received, except ordinary wear and

tear. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. The
city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station
equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The city board of tax appeals
ruled that they are personalty. On appeal the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals held that the said machines and equipment are real property within
the meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, and that
the definitions of real property and personal property in articles 415 and
416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to this case.
Issue: WON the machines and equipment are subject to Real Property Tax
Held: We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject
to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas
station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have
been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded
therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only
becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property
or plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil 709).
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some
purposes they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40
and 41). "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property
for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil.
630, 633).
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals
vs. Manila Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where Meralco's steel towers were
considered poles within the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which
exempts its poles from taxation. The steel towers were considered
personalty because they were attached to square metal frames by means
of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and
dismantled.

Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools
and equipment in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be
personal property not subject to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City
Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on
Caltex's gas station and equipment.

MERALCO vs. CBAA

GR# L-47943/ May 31, 1982
114 SCRA 273
Facts: This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage
tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual,
Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The tanks are
within the Caltex refinery compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for
Meralco's power plants. According to Meralco, the storage tanks are made
of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a
foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer, a sand
pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt
stratum as the top layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact with the
asphalt layer,
The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular
wall made of concrete, eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from
sliding. Hence, according to Meralco, the tank is not attached to its
foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its
bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws
or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Each empty tank
can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location with water four feet
deep.
Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's
decision and resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction
and committed a grave error of law in holding that its storage tanks are
taxable real property.

Issue: WON the said fuel tanks are subject to Realty Tax.
Held: The tanks are considered real properties subject to Realty Tax. We
hold that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they
may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing
its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as
receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey vs. Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which
should generally be regarded as personal property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8).
It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered
personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil.
630, 633).
The case of Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Company,
119 Phil. 328, wherein Meralco's steel towers were held not to be subject to
realty tax, is not in point because in that case the steel towers were
regarded as poles and under its franchise Meralco's poles are exempt from
taxation. Moreover, the steel towers were not attached to any land or
building. They were removable from their metal frames.
Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co. vs.
City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501, where the tools and equipment in the repair,
carpentry and blacksmith shops of a transportation company were held not
subject to realty tax because they were personal property.

Laurel v. Abrogar
GR# 155076/ Jan. 13, 2009
576 SCRA 41
FACTS

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PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for
allegedly using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting
International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively
stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated
amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the
said amount.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)," on
the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not
constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the
Amended Information, as well as petitioners subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioners special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court.
In his petition for review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code
should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes definition of real and
personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the
Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal
properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words
"personal property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal
properties" as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the
subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges
that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can
be objects of theft.
In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a
conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using the
telephone. It is not synonymous to electric current or impulses. Hence, it
may not be considered as personal property susceptible of appropriation.
He also insists that "business" is not personal property. It is not the
"business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right
is what is considered as property. Since the
services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be
subject of theft.

11

ISSUE: WON the international calls as well as the business of providing

telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
HELD:
The court granted PLDTs petition but remanded the case to the trial court
and the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend
the Amended Information to show that the property subject of the theft were
services and business of the private offended party because the
international calls, although considered as personal properties, are not
owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be liable for theft on that matter;
but the business of providing telecommunication is a personal property
which is capable of being appropriated hence subject tot theft. In explaining
its decision, the court said:
Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the
definition of the term "personal property" in the penal code provision on
theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United
States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v.
Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8,
1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition
in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is
defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the
foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in
the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil
Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that
where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been
judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by
the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in
which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In fact,
this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in
interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.

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The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under
the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable
of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away."7 Jurisprudence is
settled that to "take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not
require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.9 The word
"take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer
possession which, as held in the assailed Decision, may be committed
through the use of the offenders own hands, as well as any mechanical
device, such as an access device or card as in the instant case. This
includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the
owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in
Natividad v. Court of Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas,
as held in United States v. Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert
electricity, as held in the cases of United States v. Genato, United States v.
Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which
are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be
achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or
measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of
nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain such
forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with engaging
in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and
completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to
the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and
518 of the Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of
subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects
resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of
the supreme court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897,
construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal
Code of that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these
islands.

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The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or
other apparatus installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or
measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or
otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such
wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of
any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of
electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs
telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route
international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs facilities
constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under
Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be object of theft.
Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property
in the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet,
interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real
properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are or
may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or
personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it
may be appropriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human
voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are
transmitted to the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical
energy. It was also held in the assailed Decision that intangible property
such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because it may be
taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416
(3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought
under control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls,"
the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of
electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance

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calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not
have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes,
augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of
said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls
were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft,
which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Chapter 3. Property In Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs

(Arts. 419-425)
Provisions Common to the Preceding Chapters (Art. 426)
Title II. Ownership (Arts. 427-483)
Chapter 1. Ownership in General (Arts. 427-439)

Acap vs. CA
GR# 118114 /Dec. 07, 1995
251 SCRA 30
FACTS
Felixberto Vasquez inherited a parcel of land from his parents, the
ownership of which he transferred in favor of Cosme Pido by executing a
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale. Pido, however, died
and was survived by his wife. All of their heirs executed Declaration of
Heirship with waiver of rights for the transfer of said land to private
respondent De los Reyes. It appeared however, that even during the time

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that the land was allegedly transferred to respondent, petitioner Acap

remained as the tenant of the land. By reason of the transfer, respondent
now wanted the lease rentals to be paid to him. Initially both parties
allegedly agreed but when respondent demanded for the payment,
petitioner regused to recognize respondent as owner of the land.
Respondent was thus prompted to file a complaint for recovery of
possession of the land against petitioner. It was, however, the contention of
petitioner that he had no knowledge of any sale or transfer of the land to
respondent. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent and
recognized the latters ownership over the land. When petitioner appealed,
CA affirmed the assailed decision, ruling that respondent acquired
ownership over the land through the document executed.
ISSUE: WON respondent had acquired ownership of the land through the
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale.
HELD:
No.
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature
and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the
same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. 9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates
as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the
intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between
the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract
or deed of sale between the parties. 11 The second is, technically
speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or
intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence
and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in
the succession. 12 Private respondent, being then a stranger to the

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succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the

subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites
the elements of either a sale, 13 or a donation, 14 or any other derivative
mode of acquiring ownership.
It is even erroneous to state that a sale had transpired between the heirs of
Pido and respondent by virtue of said declaration.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights" was excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990
because the document was neither registered with the Registry of Deeds
nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido. There is no showing that private
respondent had the same document attached to or made part of the record.
What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of adverse claim filed
with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of Heirship with
Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of
Title to the land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private
respondent's ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity
of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no
better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already
pending in court." 15
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights
of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private
respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an
adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the
land and title the same in private respondent's name.

Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. CA

GR# 112519/ Nov. 14, 1996

17

264 SCRA 181

FACTS
A conflict arose with respect to ownership of Lot 1272 located somewhere
in Balanga, Bataan. Said lot was allegedly ceded thru donation by the the
then parish priest of Catholic Archbishop of Manila, prior thereto or on
August 23, 1936, in favor of the predecessor of private respondent. Said
predecessor, before her death, was able to give said lot to private
respondent, also through a deed of donation. The deed was however,
refused to be registered, for unknown reasons, by the Registered of Deeds.
Despite this, however, the latter, when his predecessor died in 1945
without an issu, had allegedly been in open and continuous possession of
said lot, built a house thereon and declared it for tax purposes until his
ownership was disturbed on November 5, 1985 or more than 49 years after
said donation, by petitioner (who obtained it from Roman Catholic Bishop of
Balanga, and the latter from Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila) when
petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent. In its complaint,
petitioner alleged that during the Japanese occupation, without its
knowledge and prior consent, private respondent entered and occupied the
subject property; that despite requests by petitioner, private respondent
refused to vacate the property in question.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that
the action has been barred by prescription for having been filed after more
than 49 years after the donation. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto
alleging that the defense of prescription was not raised in a timely filed
motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA stated that
private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject
property through acquisitive prescription because the same having been
duly registered under the Torrens system, title thereto was indefeasible.
Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the
doctrine of laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years
since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently
undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner
from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its
rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its

18

own inexcusable negligence and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its

rights over a tremendously long period of time.
ISSUE: WON the ownership of the said lot by private respondent which is
premised on a duly accepted donation, although unregistered prevail over
the titled ownership of petitioner.
HELD: Yes.
A just, fair and complete resolution of the present case necessitates the
consideration and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the
same as but is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of prescription
which was properly raised by private respondent before the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has also been
defined as such
neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will
operate as a bar in equity.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not
really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the
character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of
the plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred
from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
The following are the essential elements of laches:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation complained of;
(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the
defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;
(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and

19

(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant.
Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are
attendant in this case.
On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the
parish priest and administrator of the church property in the Municipality of
Balanga, Bataan, executed a deed of donation over a 265-square meter
church lot in favor of Ana de los Reyes and her heirs in recognition of her
long and satisfactory service to the church of Balanga, Bataan. For some
reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the Register
of Deeds. However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance
in the said deed, occupied the donated property, and exercised acts of
ownership thereupon.
In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had,
however, given the subject property to her nephew who is the private
respondent in the instant case. Upon acceptance of the gift, private
respondent immediately took possession of the subject property in the
concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land taxes
therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.
The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present
action is thus clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in
the concept of owner in continuation of the occupation of the same nature
regarding the same property by the donee Ana de los Reyes starting in
1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches exists.
The second element also exists in this case. The second element is threetiered: (a) knowledge of defendant's action; (b) opportunity to sue
defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such
suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the trial court, alleged that without
its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the subject property
during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore, petitioner
was clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony
of its own authorized representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico,
that the subject property was so proximately located to the rest of

20

petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of ignorance of private

respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of petitioner.
From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner
actually commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly
all the opportunity to file the appropriate action to have the donation of the
subject property to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void
and to demand reconveyance of said property from its present occupants.
Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40)
years had to first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate
court proceedings. As such, the second element of knowledge, opportunity
to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is undoubtedly present in the instant
controversy.
The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the
record that impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part
of private
respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated
property. There was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any
person who actually informed private respondent of petitioner's intentions.
In other words, private respondent manifestly had every reason to believe
that, with the passing of almost half a century since his predecessor-ininterest accepted the donated property and without unambiguous intimation
of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure in his
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.
In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent
will suffer irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we
to disregard petitioner's inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting
its rights.
In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49)
years had lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to
private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation
for the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at
bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the
donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified
inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept

21

for so long. 50 Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their
silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort,
and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making
improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an
ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land
values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51
Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is
strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human
nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or
invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from
questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At
any rate, petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property
from private respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and
by petitioner's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in
court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from
inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file
seasonably the necessary suit.

Chapter 2. Right of Accession. (Art. 440-475)

Pecson vs. CA
GR# 115814/ May 26, 1995
244 SCRA 407
FACTS
Petitioner was the registered owner of a commercial lot with an apartment
building. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon, the lot was sold at a
public auction to Nepumoceno who in turn sold it to spouses Naguid.
Petitioner challenged the validity of the sale and alleged that the sale did
not include the building. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent but ruled that there is no legal basis to conclude that the sale
included the building. When the case was appealed, the CA affirmed the
RTCs decision and also agreed with the RTC that the sale of the lot did not
include the building. In the meantime, the spouses Naguid filed a motion for
delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building, citing article
546 of the Civil Code. In their complaint, they admitted that the building was
under lease by some tenants. They further agreed to comply with the rules

22

on reimbursement of the value of the building for according to them,

petitioner was a builder in good faith. The trial court rendered the assailed
decision ordering the spouses, among others, to reimburse the petitioner
with the value of the building; to offset the rental payments previously
collected by petitioner from the tenants of the lot, from the value of the
building which will be reimbursed by the spouses to petitioner. Petitioner
filed a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to be reimbursed for the value of the
building and the improvements thereon.
HELD: Yes
By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is
claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or
sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have
been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in
Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a
builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale
or donation. This Court said so in Coleongco vs. Regalado:
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado
constructed the house on his own land before he sold said land to
Coleongco. Article 361 applies only in cases where a person constructs a
building on the land of another in good or in bad faith, as the case may be.
It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a building on his own
land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on the part
of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his
own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to
avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the parties, including the two
courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code

23

are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although
they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful
improvements should be determined. The respondent court and the private
respondents espouse the belief that the cost of construction of the
apartment building in 1965, and not its current market value, is sufficient
reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the
petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous
rulings of this Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this
Court pegged the value of the useful improvements consisting of various
fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong material based on
the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs. Agana,
despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was
built in 1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten
thousand pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the
builder in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of
the house at the time of the trial. In the same way, the landowner was
required to pay the "present value" of the house, a useful improvement, in
the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice
between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated
in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that the said provision
was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in
good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them
in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which
does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current
market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of
reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private
respondents who would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued
income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a measly amount.
Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce evidence
on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial
court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid
by the landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals
equal to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment
building. Since the private respondents have opted to appropriate the

24

apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and

enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity,
as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed.
This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in
fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not
having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of the building
and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial
court's determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to
account for the rentals of the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23
September 1993.

Narvaez v. Alciso
GR# 165907 /July 27, 2009
594 SCRA 60
FACTS
Respondent owns a parcel of land situated in Benguet which she allegedly
sold with right to repurchase, first, to Sansano in 1979, which he later
repurchased; and second, to Baet in 1980. Baet in turn sold the land to
spouses Narvaez in 1981. As per demand of respondent, however, the
deed of sale between Baet and Narvaez contained a stipulation which
allows respondent to repurchase said land from spouses Narvaez. The
Spouses Narvaez furnished respondent with a copy of the Deed. Corollary
to the said sale, spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the said
land. When respondent was about to exercise its right to repurchase, she
and the spouses Narvaez did not agree with the selling price prompting
respondent to file a complaint praying for the cancellation of the 1979, 1980
and 1981 sale alleging that her true intention was to mortgage the land and
not to sell it and also praying that spouses Narvaez should reconvey the
land to her. The court rendered a decision declaring that the repurchase in
the 1979 sale becomes functus officio when she repurchased the property;
the action to annul the 1980 sale had prescribed; and that she had no legal
personality to annul the 1981 sale but she could repurchase the land and
appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity
equivalent to one-half of its market value or sell the land to spouses

25

Narvaez. The spouses appealed. The CA rendered a decision applying Art.

448 of the Civil Code to the extent of declaring that the Spouses Narvaez
were builders in good faith and that respondent could either appropriate the
commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses
Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably
more than that of the building.

ISSUE: WON Art. 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case such that
respondent could either appropriate the commercial building after payment
of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land,
unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.
HELD: No.
Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale
or donation.
Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses
Narvaez built the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides,
to compel them to buy the land, which they own, would be absurd.
In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles
1606 and 1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Articles 1606 and 1616
state:
Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express
agreement, shall last four years from the date of the contract.lawph!l
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty
days from the time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the
basis that the contract was a true sale with right to repurchase.

26

Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase
without returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made
by reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying
the Spouses Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the
contract, (3) legitimate payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the
necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold. In the present
case, the cost of the building constitutes a useful expense. Useful
expenses include improvements which augment the value of the land.28
Under the first paragraph of Article 1606, Alciso had four years from 1981
to repurchase the property since there was no express agreement as to the
period
when the right can be exercised. Tender of payment of the repurchase
price is necessary in the exercise of the right of redemption. Tender of
payment is the sellers manifestation of his or her desire to repurchase the
property with the offer of immediate performance.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in with MODIFICATION. Respondent
Rose O. Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying the
petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia W. Narvaez (1) the
price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate payments
made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses
made on the subject property. The Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court, Judicial Region 1, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, to determine the
amounts of the expenses of the contract, the legitimate expenses made by
reason of the sale, and the necessary and useful expenses made on the
subject property.

Cheng v. Donini
GR# 167017/ June 22, 2009
590 SCRA 406

27

FACTS: There was an oral lease agreement between Cheng and Sps.
Donini on the formers property in Mandaluyong City. Respondents Donini,
put up a restaurant in the leased property and agreed to pay a monthly
rental of P17, 000 from December 1990. Later on, respondents proceeded
to introduce improvements in the premises. However, before respondents
business could take off and before any final lease agreement could be
drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements
regarding its terms and conditions. Petitioner Cheng thus wrote
respondents on January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the deposit and
rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to continue with the
agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however,
ignoring petitioners demand, continued to occupy the premises until April
17, 1991 when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to
petitioner.
Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages
before RTC Pasig and prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a
written lease contract for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the
cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to order petitioner to return
their investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their
unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorneys fees.
Petitioner, in his answer, denied respondents claims and sought the award
of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. After trial, the RTC
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its decision dated March 31, 2004, recalled
and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner
to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing the latters
expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of
reimbursement had no factual and legal bases, but this was denied by the
CA in its resolution dated February 21, 2005.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON respondents are builders or possessors in good faith?
HELD: NO. SC held that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not
apply. Under these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful

28

improvements introduced on the property, respondents must be considered

builders in good faith. Articles 448 and 546, which allow full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement
is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one who builds on land
in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who
is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.
Herein, respondents cannot be considered possessors or builders in good
faith. As early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc.,
the Court clarified that a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good
faith x x x This principle of possessor in good faith naturally cannot apply
to a lessee because as such lessee he knows that he is not the owner of
the leased property. Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his
lessor. Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues only during
the life of the lease contract and that he must vacate the property upon
termination of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he
introduces improvements on
said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value
from the lessor, much less retain the premises until such reimbursement.
Being mere lessees, respondents knew that their right to occupy the
premises existed only for the duration of the lease. Cortez v. Manimbo went
further to state that: If the rule were otherwise, it would always be in the
power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property. These
principles have been consistently adhered to and applied by the Court in
many cases.
It appears, however, that as soon as respondents vacated the premises,
petitioner immediately reclaimed the property and barred respondents from
entering it. Respondents also alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that the
property subject of this case had already been leased to another entity
since 1991. This is where considerations of equity should come into play.
It is obviously no longer feasible for respondents to remove the
improvements from the property, if they still exist. Petitioner should,
therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is in
accord with the laws intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who
now has to pay one-half of the value of the useful improvements at the end
of the lease because the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas
the lessor can enjoy them indefinitely thereafter.

29

Tuatis v. Escol
GR# 175399 /Oct. 27, 2009
604 SCRA 471
FACTS: In November 1989, Visminda (seller) and Tuatis (buyer), entered
into a Deed of Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment (Deed of
Sale by Installment) located in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte. Tuatis claimed that she had paid by installment the agreed price of
10,000 pesos but Visminda countered that Tuatis made no other payment
to her but 4,000 pesos only, despite verbal demands.
In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property
and constructed a residential building thereon.
On 18 June 1996, Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against Visminda before the RTC. Then, Tuatis requested
Visminda to sign a prepared absolute deed of sale covering the subject
property, but the latter refused, contending that the purchase price had not
yet been fully paid. RTC rendered a Decision in Vismindas favor. When it
was appealed to CA, it dismissed outright Tuatis Petition for failure to
completely pay the required docket fees, to attach a certified true or
authenticated copy of the assailed RTC Order and to indicate the place of
issue of her counsels IBP and PTR Official Receipts. Hence, Tuatis filed
the instant Petition, principally arguing that Article 448 of the Civil Code
must be applied to the situation between her and Visminda.
ISSUE: WON Article 448 of the Civil Code shall apply?
HELD: YES. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper
rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof.

30

According to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between

appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity for the same, as
provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more
than that of the structures, in which case the builder in good faith shall pay
reasonable rent.
The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to
Visminda, as the owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis
demand that, since the value of the building she constructed is
considerably higher than the subject property, she may choose between
buying the subject property from Visminda and selling the building to
Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not
Tuatis, to make. And, depending on Vismindas choice, Tuatis rights as a
builder under Article 448
are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the
building and subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b)
under the second option, a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the
subject property, if it is considerably higher than the value of the building, in
which case, she can only be obliged to pay reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the
owner of the land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the
accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The raison detre for
this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the
owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of
the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has
provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire
the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the
builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He
cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is
authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because,
by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the
accessory thing.

31

Esmaquel vs. Coprada

GR # 152423/ Dec. 15, 2010
638 SCRA 428
FACTS: In 1945, Maria Coprada (respondent) was able to persuade
spouses Marcos (petitioners Esmaquel and Victoria) to allow her and her
family to use and occupy a parcel of land in Laguna for their residence,
under the condition that they will vacate the premises should the
owners/petitioners need to use the same. Respondent and her family were
allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners did
not oblige the respondents to pay rent and never made an attempt to drive
them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have
no other place to live in.
Respondents present circumstances have completely improved, i.e., some
of her children are already working; they are regularly sending her financial
assistance; and she has acquired her own residential house, also in
Laguna. Because of this, petitioners verbally demanded that respondent
vacate the subject land, but the latter refused.
On February 24, 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against
respondent before MCTC of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. MCTC
dismissed the complaint as laches had already set in. On appeal, the RTC
reversed and ruled that respondents occupation of the subject property
was by virtue of petitioners tolerance and permission. Hence, respondent
is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the property upon
demand, thus ordered respondent and her family to vacate and surrender
the possession of the subject land to the petitioners and to remove any and
all improvements she introduced on the parcel of land. When brought to
CA, the decision of RTC was reversed and granted respondents petition.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the
subject property
HELD: YES. Since respondents occupation of the subject property was by
mere tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448
of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated possession may be

32

terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith.
It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code,
which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance
of its owners are not possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built
the improvements on the premises in 1945, she knew that her possession
was by mere permission and tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she
cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she is
the owner thereof.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the
petitioners. As against the respondents unproven claim that she acquired a
portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the
Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners title over the subject
property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle
in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

Benedicto vs. Villaflores

GR# 185020/ Oct. 6, 2010
632 SCRA 446
FACTS: Maria Villaflores (petitioner) owned a lot in Bulacan. On August 31,
1994, Maria sold the same lot to Filomena as evidenced by a Kasulatan ng

33

Bilihang Tuluyan. Filomena registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds
of Meycauayan on September 6, 1994. Since then Filomena paid the real
property taxes for the subject parcel of land.
Meanwhile, Antonio (respondent and nephew of Maria) averred that in
1980, Maria sold it to him and he eventually took possession and
constructed a house thereon; that on August 15, 1992, Maria executed in
favor of him a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the entire lot, though
he failed to register it; and that Filomena was aware of this prior sale;
hence, the subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible,
fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated.
On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with
Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorneys Fees
against Antonio. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining
Filomenas ownership on the ground that it was Filomena who registered
the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than Antonio. On their
separate appeals with the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC for upholding
Filomenas ownership of the lot in question and for declaring Antonio a
builder in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles
448 and 546 of the Civil Code, and the amount due Antonio. Hence, this
case.
ISSUE: WON respondent Antonio is a builder in good faith?
HELD: YES. Antonio is a builder in good faith. In this case, Antonio was
not aware of any flaw in his title. He believed being the owner of the
subject premises on account of the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor
despite his inability to register the same. The improvement was, in fact,
introduced by Antonio prior to Filomenas purchase of the land.
Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity,
or sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546
provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all
the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of
retention until full reimbursement is made.

34

The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice

between the parties involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated
in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)]
that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the
owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer
complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other
may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this
precept, it is therefore the current market value of the improvements which
should be made the basis of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would
unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be allowed to
acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a
measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to
adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building
upon which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of
reimbursement to be paid by the landowner.

Briones vs.Macabagdal
GR# 150666/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 300
FACTS: Respondent-spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty
Investments Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land
located in Vergonville Subdivision No. 10 at Las Pias City, Metro Manila
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of
Deeds of
Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S,
which is adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the
approval of Vergon, petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which
they thought was Lot No. 2-S. After being informed of the mix up by
Vergons manager, respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners
to demolish the house and vacate the property. Petitioners, however,
refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an action to
recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC
of Makati City.
Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was
the lot which was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergons agents

35

over the seven (7)-year period they were paying for the lot. They interposed
the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded Vergon as thirdparty defendant claiming that because of the warranty against eviction, they
were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is decided against
them.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses, ordering petitioners to
vacate. CA affirmed the RTCs findings. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are builders in good faith?
HELD: YES. CA erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the
subject property or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the
land as compensation. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith,
and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners
in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good
faith. When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448
of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides that the owner of the land
on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have
the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or
trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a
claim of title thereto. The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to
make a choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper
indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land. The choice
belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant
to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for
instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the

36

land without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to
sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is
not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may remove
the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay
for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary
and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property in
accordance with Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. This case was
remanded to the RTC to conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the
respective values of the improvement and of the land, as well as the
amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of the lease if
the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the
proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the
Civil Code.

Limense vs. Vda de Ramos

GR# 152319/ Oct. 28, 2010
604 SCRA 599
Facts:
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as
Lot No. 12, Block No. 1074 located in Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila. He
subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932,4 he
donated the subdivided lots to his daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud,
Catalina, and Felicidad,
all surnamed Lozada. Lot 12-C, which was donated to Catalina, Isabel and
Salud and was issued TCT No. 40043. On Lot 12-D, which was donated to
Salud, the respondents predecessors-in-interest constructed their
residential building in 1932, adjacent to Lot 12-C.
In 1969, TCT No. 968866 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense
covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-C. And in 1981, Limense
secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence on the
boundary line between his aforesaid property and Lot 12-D. The fence,
however, could not be constructed because a substantial portion of

37

respondents' residential building in Lot 12-D encroached upon portions of

Limense's property in Lot 12-C.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however,
respondent ignored both oral and written demands. The parties failed to
amicably settle the differences between them despite referral to the
barangay. Thus, in 1983, Limense instituted a Complaint against for
removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that they were the surviving heirs
of Francisco Ramos, who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada.
Lot No. 12-C was donated in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to
Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to
Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,
respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has
served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada
since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or
fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to
respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ruling that an apparent
easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents, which was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
W/N the respondents are builders in good faith and if so, what are the
respective rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon
respondents' house.
Held:
(Note: the issue of W/N respondents were entitled to an easement of right
of way was also discussed by the Court and held that they are. Since Lot
12-C has continuously been used as an alley since the time that Dalmacio
Lozada donated the property to his daughters, the same must be respected
by the petitioners and also the petitioners knew that said lot serves no other
purpose than an alley since the time that the TCT was issued to them. This
issue, however, is not relevant under which this case was assigned in our
outline.)

38

Yes, the respondents are builders in good faith. Respondents right to have
access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually
encroach upon the latters property. It is not disputed that portions of
respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C. 29 In
order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the encroachment, the
Court deemed it proper to determine the issue above.
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12C at the time the property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in
1932. The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1
meter in width and 17 meters in length are all within the 1/3 share alloted to
them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a
showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their
house on Lot No. 12-C.
The Court held that when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and
it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a
portion pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good
faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the
respective rights of the parties. In this case, the co-ownership was
terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of
Joaquin Limense.
Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said
portion of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to
respondents, as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise,
petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by
their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than
the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then the
latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall then pay the
reasonable
rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In
case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course,
respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at
their own expense, if they so decide. The choice belongs to the owner of
the land (petitioners), a rule that accords with the principle of accession that
the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.

Mores vs. Yu-Go

39

GR# 172292/ July. 23, 2010

625 SCRA 290
Facts:
Yu-Go, et.al. filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
against spouses Antonio and Alida Mores. Respondents alleged that they
co-owned a parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur
on which a building of strong materials was built. In March 1983, petitioners
pleaded to respondents that they be allowed to stay in the subject property
in the meantime that they did not own a house yet. Since Antonio Mores
used to be an errand boy of respondents family, they readily agreed
without asking for any rental but subject only to the condition that the said
stay would last until anyone of the respondents would need the subject
property. Forthwith, petitioners and their children occupied the same as
agreed upon.
In November 1997, respondents made known to petitioners that they were
already in need of the subject property. They explained that Shirley Yu-Go
needed the same and, besides, petitioners already have their own house in
Villa Grande Homes, Naga City. Yet, petitioners begged that they be given
a 6-month extension to stay thereat or until May 1998. However, even after
May 1998, petitioners failed to make good their promise and even further
asked that they be allowed to stay therein until October 1998, which was
again extended until the end of the same year. Thus, sometime in the first
week of January 1999, respondents gave their final demand for petitioners
to vacate the subject property. However, instead of heeding such demand,
petitioners hired some laborers and started demolishing the improvements
on the subject property on January 20, 1999 and even took away and
appropriated for themselves the materials derived from such unlawful
demolition..
In their Answer to the complaint, petitioners averred that they were the
ones who caused the renovation to the property with the respondents
consent. They also alleged that what they removed were merely the
improvements made on the property by them, which removal had not
caused any substantial damage thereto.
Issue:
W/N the spouses Mores were builders in good faith.

40

Held:
No. The relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is
one between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code
applicable to the present case. Tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be
said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of
the property. Indeed, full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a
lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power
of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Article 1678 reads if the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements
which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause
any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu siblings
should have offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the
improvements. Since the Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses
Mores had the right to remove the improvements.

New Regent v. Tanjuatco

GR# 168800 /April 16, 2009
585 SCRA 329
Facts:
New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for
Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages
against respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRSI
alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and
President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by
virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots in his
name by paying P82, 400 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1995,

41

Cuevas and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares
of stock in the corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with
the Bureau of Lands, Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of
P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the Director of Lands released an Order,
which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas to Tanjuatco. Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-3694067 and T-3694078 were then issued in the
name of Tanjuatco.
Issue:
W/N NRSI acquired the subject property by accretion and if so, W/N
Tanjuatco is an innocent purchaser for value.
Held:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil
Code requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. Thus, it is not
enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.
One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence
that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably
failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has
satisfied the foregoing requisites.
Also, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried
San Juan River Bed, which under Article 502 (1)34 of the Civil Code rightly
pertains to the public dominion. Clearly, the Republic is the entity which
had every right to transfer ownership thereof to respondent.
The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another,
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such
property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such purchase
or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property.
As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the
assignment of rights to the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment

42

merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of Cuevass intangible claims, rights and
interests over the properties and not the properties themselves. At the time
of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a pending sales
application before the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24, 1996,
that titles were issued in Tanjuatcos name. The assignment not being a
sale of real property, it was not surprising that Cuevas demanded from
Tanjuatco only P85,000 for the transfer of rights.

Meneses vs. CA
GR# 83059/ July 14, 1995
246 SCRA 162
Facts:
In 1977, Pablito Meneses was issued Free Patent and Original Certificate
of Title over two parcels of land located in Los Baos, Laguna. Pablito
Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of
Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of
Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some monetary obligations" in favor
of Pablito Meneses. After the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses
took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared
the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty
taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt,
Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as
far back as September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles
Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989
covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baos,
Laguna with the Laguna de
Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered
on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the
names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla,
Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed

43

Quisumbing. The Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of

title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their
property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay.
The Quisumbings then filed a complaint against Lorenzo and Pablito
Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the
free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that
Lorenzo Meneses, then the Mayor of Los Baos, using his brother Pablito
as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an
August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum and
Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original
certificates of title to the land.
Issue:
W/N the lands in question are accretion lands of the Quisumbings.
Held:
Yes. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the
Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the
sea coast). Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only
benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in
controversy
Since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the submersion in water of a portion of the
land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna
de Bay from different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land
is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore
land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of
Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin
of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of
Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

City Mayor of Paraaque v. Ebio

GR#. 178411/June 23, 2010

44

621 SCRA 555

Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez
Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Paraaque City. Said land was an
accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant
and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez,
whose daughter Zenaida married Mario Ebio. On April 21, 1987, Pedro
executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire
parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations
under Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario
Ebios name.
On March 30 1999, Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a Resolution
seeking assistance from the City Government for the construction of an
access road along Cut-cut Creek, to which the respondents filed an
opposition. As a result, the project was temporarily suspended. In January
2003, however, several officials from the barangay and the city planning
office proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on the subject property.
Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Lands, DILG and Office of the Vice Mayor. Several meeting were
conducted but no definite agreement was reached.
However, on March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to
respondents ordering them to vacate the property within 30 days or be
physically evicted. Respondents filed a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners on April 21, 2005. In the course of the proceedings, respondents
admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for the
issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC issued an Order denying the petition
for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to
prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since
they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their
application for sales patent has not yet been granted. CA reversed.
Issue:
W/N the character of respondents possession and occupation of the
subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

45

Held:
Yes. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut
creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the
accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which
remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Under these provisions, its is clear that alluvial deposits along the banks of
a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a
property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part
of the public domain by clear provision of law.
Since for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor
the local government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity
sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are
deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription.

Almagro vs. Kwan

GR# 175806/175810/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 250
Facts: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M,
a 17,181 square meter parcel of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental. On 18 September 1996, they filed with the MTC an action for
recovery of possession and damages against the occupants, on of which
are the Petitioners. MTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become foreshore land and
should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular
inspections of subject lot on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during
low tide and on 15 October 2001 when the high tide registered 1.5 meters.
RTC concluded that the small portion of respondents property which

46

remains as dry land is not within the scope of the well-settled definition of
foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not adjacent to the
sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover possession of the
remaining small dry portion of the subject property in question. CA affirmed
said decision.
Issue: WON the disputed portion of Lot is no longer private land but has
become foreshore land and is now part of the public domain?
Held: The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land,
it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks
and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.[The land's
proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore
land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that
although the two corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot
be considered as foreshore land since it has not been proven that the lot
was covered by water during high tide.
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land
remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the
conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land
but remains private land owned by respondents.
Chapter 3. Quieting of Title (Arts.476-481) + Other Modes of Recovery

Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic

GR# 179987 /April 29, 2009
587 SCRA 172
Facts: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration (land situated in Tibig, Silang Cavite). Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous
adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years.
Velazco testified that the property originally belonged to a 22 hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Upon Linos death,
his four sons inherited the property. In 1966, Estebans (1 of the sons) wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator. After the death of Esteban and

47

Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the

properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Velazco to
Malabanan.
The Republic did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, (CENRO) DENR, which stated that the subject property was
"verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land approved as such
under on March 15, 1982."
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republic interposed an
appeal to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA reversed the RTC. It held that under Sec 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, it noted
that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession. This interpretation of the CA was based on the
Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.
Malabanan died while the case was pending. Heirs appealed the decision
Issues: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both?
Held: The Petition is denied. In connection with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of

48

the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,

since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,
such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.
Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless
of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The

49

earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Tan vs. Rep

GR# 177797/ Dec. 04, 2008
573 SCRA 89
Facts: Spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became
Australian citizens. They seek to have the subject property registered in
their names. The subject property was declared alienable and disposable in
1925, as established by a Certification issued by the DENR and
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Cagayan de Oro City. Spouses Tan acquired the subject property from
Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed
of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property. The spouses Tan took
immediate possession of the subject property on which they planted
rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees. They declared the subject
property for taxation purposes in their names. However, a certain
Patermateo Casio (Casio) claimed a portion of the subject property,
prompting spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him
before the RTC. RTC rendered a Decision favoring the spouses Tan and
declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted." Casio appealed
to the CA, which dismissed the appeal for lack of interest to prosecute.
Casio elevated his case to the SC via a Petition for Review, which was for
being insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final
and executory in 1991.

50

Refusing to give up, Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the
subject property before the Bureau of Lands. Casios application was
ordered cancelled by DENR-CENRO. In 2000, Spouses Tan filed their
Application for Registration of Title to the subject property before the RTC,
invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended. RTC granted the application of Spouses Tan.
CA reversed the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan
failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public
Land Act), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires
possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945.
Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan to return the subject
property to the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Tan have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title.
Ruling: The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar
lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly
enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed of, to wit:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be
reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the subject property.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073 (b): Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or

51

earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation

of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may
only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, the two requisites which
the applicants must comply with for the grant of their Application for
Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and
disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 12 June 1945. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order or administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act
or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable is
sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and
enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.44 Considering that no evidence was presented to disprove the
contents of the aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this Court is dutybound to uphold the same.
Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove
that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain as early as 31 December 1925, they still failed to
satisfactorily establish compliance with the second requisite for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of possession for thirty
years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and
occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of
the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual,

52

public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes
does not prove ownership. They may be good supporting or collaborating
evidence together with other acts of possession and ownership; but by
themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession of the
property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring
imperfect or incomplete title to the land.
For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other
option but to deny their application for judicial confirmation and registration
of their title to the subject property.
Rep vs. Tsai
GR# 168184/ June. 22, 2009
590 SCRA 423
Facts: Tsai filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the
subject property under PD 1529. Tsai stated that on 31 May 1993, she
purchased the property from Manolita Carungcong. Tsai declared that she
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more
than 30 years.
Republic opposed on the following grounds: (1) that Tsai and her
predecessors-in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier (2)
that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence and (3) that the property forms part of
the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
Trial court granted Tsai's application for registration. The Republic
appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration
despite the lack of proof of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Held: The petition has merit.

53

In Tsai's original application before the trial court, she claimed that
she was entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the
subject
property under PD 1529. However, she did not specify under what
paragraph of Section 14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. It
appears that she filed her application under Section 14(1) of PD 1529,
which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - xxx
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Thus, there are three requisites: (1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3)
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration derives from
a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by
PD 1073.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for
30 years or more is not sufficient. Since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25
January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and occupation of the
piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of
the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Tsai's
evidence was not enough to prove that her possession of the property
because the earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration
issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948.

54

In view of the lack of sufficient showing that Tsai and her predecessors-ininterest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, her application for confirmation
and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should
be denied.
Tsai also failed to prove that the subject property has been declared
alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.
Applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Lim vs. Rep

GR# 162047/ Sept. 4, 2009
598 SCRA 247
FACTS: Joyce Lim (petitioner) filed on September 7, 1998 before the RTC
of Tagaytay City an Application for Registration of Title (LRC Case No. TG857) over Lot 13687, a 9,638-square-meter and adjacent Lot 13686
containing 18,997-square-meters located in Silang, Cavite.
Petitioner, declaring that she purchased both lots on April 30, 1997 from
Spouses Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan, sought the application of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree for both
applications, claiming that she and her predecessors-in-interest Trinidad
Mercado, Fernanda Belardo, Victoria Abueg and the Spouses
Pagkalinawan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupancy of the lots under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more than thirty (30) years. Petitioner alternatively invoked the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land
Act as basis of her applications. However, per Certification from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), the land

55

was said to be within the Alienable or Disposable Land per Land

Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A FAO 41656 on March 15, 1982.
The RTC granted petitioner's application. The Solicitor General, on behalf
of the Republic, appealed to the CA on the ground that petitioner failed to
comply with the provisions of the Property Registration Decree and Article
1137 of the Civil Code both laws of which require at least 30 years of
adverse possession, counted from March 15, 1982 when it became part of
the alienable and disposable land. This was granted. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of PD 1529 may defeat petitioners right
that has already been vested prior to promulgation thereof.
HELD: As for petitioner's invocation of the provisions of the Public Land Act
to have her applications considered as confirmations of imperfect titles, the
same fails. When Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, which made June 12, 1945 as the cut-off
date, the amendment made the law concordant with Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the
latter operates when there exists a title which only needs confirmation,
while the former works under the presumption that the land applied for still
belongs to the State. While the subject lots were verified to be alienable or
disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no sufficient proof that
open, continuous and adverse possession over them by petitioner and her
predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner's applications cannot thus be granted.
While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of at least 30 years, public dominion lands
become patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable but also with an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use,
public service or the development of national wealth. 42 And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

56

While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15,
1982, there is no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for
public use or for public service. The classification of the lots as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain does not change its status as
properties of the public dominion. Petitioner cannot thus acquire title to
them by prescription as yet.
In Addition:
As gathered from the CENRO Certifications, the lots were verified to be
alienable or disposable lands on March 15, 1982. These Certifications
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence. There is also no sufficient proof that petitioner's predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the lots
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
As for petitioner's reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of realty tax
payments, the documents tax declarations for Lot No. 13687 and Lot
No. 13686 which were issued only in 1991 and 1994, respectively, are
indicia of the possession in the concept of an owner. There is no showing
of tax payments before these years.
Rep vs. Ching
GR# 186166/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 415
FACTS:
On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-inFact, Antonio Ching, filed a verified Application for Registration of Title
covering a parcel of land with improvements, before the RTC. The subject
lot is a consolidation of three (3) contiguous lots situated in Banza, Butuan
City, Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229 square meters. Respondent
alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from the late
former governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a
Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands.
Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to
show cause why his application for registration of title should not be
dismissed for his failure to state the current assessed value of the subject

57

land and his non-compliance with the last paragraph of Section 17 of

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8
The OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte
filed an Opposition to the application for registration of title as well as the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondents
application for registration. The RTC was not convinced that respondents
Deed of Sale sufficiently established that he was the owner in fee simple of
the land sought to be registered. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion for reconsideration
with attached additional tax declarations. The RTC denied. Respondent
appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. CA reversed the RTCs earlier
resolution and granted respondents application for registration of title.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent application for registration of title be
granted.
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent provided no competent and persuasive
evidence to show that the land has been classified as alienable and
disposable, therefore the application for registration should be denied.
Likewise, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is
clear that there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied with
the requirement of possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to incorporate in
his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration does not measure up to the
time requirement.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D. 1073 must sufficiently establish:
(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

58

Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property in
question, he must first prove that the land belongs to the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. It is doctrinal that, under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the State and
the latter is the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in land.
Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,
irrefutable evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of
registration has been declassified and now belongs to the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.
Rep vs. Dela Paz
GR# 171631/ Nov. 15, 2010
634 SCRA 610
FACTS:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R.
dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for
registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529)
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application
covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18,
1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a
"Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng
Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. The respondents claimed that they are
co-owners of the subject property and they are in continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of owner since they
acquired it in 1987.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration. On May
5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default against the

59

whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents

presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in
its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show
that they have been The CA found that respondents acquired the subject
land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of
an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents
were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject
property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration of the subject
property should be granted.
HELD:
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the
CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the

60

subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable
or disposable.
The notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Forest
Development is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable.
Further, the pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear
picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

61

Rep vs. Vega

GR# 177790/ Jan. 17, 2011
639 SCRA 541
FACTS:
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio
R. Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega - namely, Francisco L.
Yap, Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V.
Yap, Jr. (respondents Vegas) - filed an application for registration of title.
The application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191,
Cadastre 450 of Los Banos, Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine
hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land).
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their
mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her
father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother's siblings (two brothers and a
sister) died intestate, all without leaving any offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents
Vegas' application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject
land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not
subject to private appropriation.
The trial court granted respondents Vegas' application and directed the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in the name of respondents Vegas and respondentsintervenors Buhays' predecessors, in proportion to their claims over the
subject land. CA affirmed in toto. Aggrevied by the ruling, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's
conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
HELD:
Under Section 14 PD 1529, Property Registration Decree, applicants for
registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms

62

part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property
sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration is filed.
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas' open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present
Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically,
whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable,
occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to
have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the
inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they
call for proof. To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following:
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative
actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from
the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and
disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the
property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.

Rep vs. Roche

GR# 175846/ July 6, 2010
624 SCRA 116
FACTS:

63

On December 5, 1996 Rosila Roche applied for registration of title1 of her

15,353-square-meter land in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,2
denominated as Lot 8698, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 155. Roche alleged that she inherited the land in 1960 from
her father,
Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when
Roche was only about six years old. She was born on that land on January
10, 1938 and had helped her father cultivate it.3 Roche had also paid the
realty taxes on the land, which had an assessed value of P490,000.00.
To support her application for registration, Roche presented, among others,
a certified true copy of the survey plan of the land,4 its technical
description,5 a Certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) in lieu of the Geodetic Engineers Certificate,6
tax declarations,7 and real property tax receipts.8 She also presented
certifications that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the National
Printing Office issued to show compliance with requirements of service of
notice to adjoining owners and publication of notice of initial hearing.9 As
proof of her open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land,
Roche presented Manuel Adriano, a former resident of Napindan who
owned an unregistered property adjoining Lot 8698.
The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the grounds a) that
neither Roche nor her predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the
required period; and b) that the land belonged to the State and is not
subject to private acquisition.13 The Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) also opposed14
On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17 granting Roches
application. On appeal by the Government,19 the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the decision of the RTC.20 The OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the same, prompting the Government to
file the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land subject of Roches application is alienable or
disposable land of the public domain.
HELD:

64

CA decision is reversed and set aside.

The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and
that it has not been released into the mass of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. As such, Roche cannot register title to it in her name.
Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part
of the Laguna Lakes bed since it has always been planted to crops and is
not covered by water. R.A. 4850 provides that the Lake is that area
covered with water when it is at the average maximum lake level of 12.50
meters. This presupposed that the lake extends only to lakeshore lands.
The land in this case does not adjoin the Laguna Lake.
An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529,
meet three requirements: a) that the property is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; b) that the applicants by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land; and c) that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and the latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land.
Thus, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land
subject of registration is alienable and disposable.
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving
the status of the land.25 In this connection, the Court has held that he must
present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)26 or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)27 of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it
is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO
or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

65

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She
submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which
bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not bother
to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate
government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
Since Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she
applied for is inalienable land that belongs to the State, the Government did
not have to adduce evidence to prove it.

Calara vs. Francisco

GR# 156439/ Sept. 29, 2010
631 SCRA 505
Held: In the case at bench, respondents similarly claimed in their answer
that they stopped payments on Lot 23 in view of petitioners' failure to
develop Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision. Prior to the commencement of the
case for unlawful detainer before the MTC, respondent Jesus Francisco,
along with other lot buyers at said subdivision, also filed a letter-complaint
for violations of P.D. 957 which was docketed before HSRC as HSRC Case
No. REM-060482-1043. In her answer to the complaint, petitioner
Clemencia Calara alleged that the subdivision was not covered by P.D. 957
and that she was about to file complaints for ejectment against said buyers.
Unlike their contract with Gaudencio Navarro, moreover, petitioners appear
to have further agreed on the terms of payment of the price for the lot
purchased by respondents. Having allowed the latter to build a house on
said lot after accepting their initial payments in the aggregate sum of
P7,948.00,[60] petitioner Clemencia Calara significantly specified the terms
of payment agreed upon by the parties in the following 20 March 1979
demand letter she sent respondent Teresita Francisco.
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are
present.[63] Given the proven justification for respondents' stoppage of
further payments on Lot 23, We find that respondents' alleged refusal to

66

execute said contract only gives rise to a cause of action for specific
performance pursuant to Articles 1357[64] and 1357[65] of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Insofar as it concerns the sale of subdivision lots,
jurisdiction over such a case is vested with the HLURB under Section 8
(11) of E.O. 648. In the second Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip[66]
case which dealt with the complaint for reconveyance and damages
subsequently filed by the subdivision developer, this Court ruled that "the
HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on
the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer."
It bears emphasizing that more than 33 years have already elapsed from
the time that petitioners and respondents agreed on the sale of Lot 23 of
the Lophcal (Calara) Subdivision sometime in 1976. In the intervening
period, the parties have not only filed their respective complaints before the
HLURB and the MTC but had already performed acts and acquired rights,
the myriad consequences of which could not possibly be squarely
addressed in the case for unlawful detainer where possession is unlawfully
witliheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied.

Carbonilla vs. Abiera

GR# 177637/ July 26, 2010
625 SCRA 461
FACTS:
Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment against
respondents, Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Maasin City. The complaint alleged
that petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land, located in
Barangay Canturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot No. 1781-B-P-3-B-2-B
PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is purportedly covered by a
certificate of title, and declared for assessment and taxation purposes in
petitioners name. Petitioner further claimed that he is also the owner of the
residential building standing on the land, which building he acquired
through a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building)
with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. He maintained that the building
was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance of the previous
owners.

67

In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioners allegation that

they possessed the building by mere tolerance of the previous owners.
Instead, they asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having
inherited the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano,
respondent Marcelos parents and respondent Maricris grandparents. They
maintained that they have been in possession of the building since 1960,
but it has not been declared for taxation purposes.
The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that
petitioners claim of ownership over the subject parcel of land was not
successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioners ownership of the
same was deemed established. However, with respect to the building, the
court declared respondents as having the better right to its material
possession in light of petitioners failure to refute respondents claim that
their predecessors had been in prior possession of the building since 1960
and that they have continued such possession up to the present.
The RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC
that the land is owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in
their conclusion with respect to the building. The RTC placed the burden
upon respondents to prove their claim that they built it prior to petitioners
acquisition of the land, which burden, the court found, respondents failed to
discharge. The RTC held that, either waywhether the building was
constructed before or after petitioner acquired ownership of the land
petitioner, as owner of the land, would have every right to evict
respondents from the land.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of
petitioners complaint. Because of this, the CA, following this Courts ruling
in Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the
complaint as one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the
action had prescribed since the one-year period for filing the forcible entry
case had already lapsed.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is,
to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.
HELD:

68

The court held that while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the
land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence
than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the
building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of
Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired
ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the
owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged
against respondents proof of possession of the building since 1977,
petitioners evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally
unconvinced. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To
recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once
he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. For
this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of
one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the
building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from
another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled,
after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession
under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that
possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have
turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be
shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such
lawful possession

69

must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents possession was based on his
alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of
the Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents entry to and
occupation of the subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not
suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show overt acts indicative of his or his
predecessors permission to occupy the subject property. Thus, we must
agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably
failed to prove his claim that petitioners possession of the subject building
was by mere tolerance as alleged in the complaint. Tolerance must be
[present] right from the start of possession sought to be recovered to be
within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with
it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is
negligence, not tolerance. In addition, plaintiff must also show that the
supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very start of
the possessionfrom entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy. Notably, no mention was made in the complaint of how
entry by respondents was effected or how and when dispossession started.
Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue
recovering possession of his property by filing an accion publiciana, which
is a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an
accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We
stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case as to the ownership
of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the land.

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Modesto vs. Urbina

GR# 189859/ Oct. 18, 2010
633 SCRA 383
FACTS:
In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land
situated at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272.
According to Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and
machination, were able to occupy a portion of this property, designated as
Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the
sale of this lot. However, before the parties could finalize the sale, the
Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming
ownership over the lot. Urbina made several demands on the Modestos to
vacate the property, the last of which was through a demand letter sent on
July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still refused to vacate, Urbina filed the
present action against them.
In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful
owner of the property because it was still government property, being a part
of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation. The RTC of Pasig City rendered
a decision in favor of Urbina on April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners to
immediately vacate and surrender the lot to Urbina and to pay him P200.00
monthly as compensation for the use of the property from July 22, 1983
until they finally vacate. The RTC noted that the petitioners recognized
Urbinas possessory rights over the property when they entered into a
negotiated contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the Modestos
were estopped from subsequently assailing or disclaiming Urbinas
possessory rights over this lot.
Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous Sales
Application), which he filed on July 21, 1966. The CA affirmed in toto the
RTC decision in Civil Case No. 53483 on January 26, 2009. The CA
agreed with the RTCs observation that the Modestos were estopped from
challenging Urbinas right to possess the property after they acknowledged
this right when they entered into the negotiated contract of sale. The CA

71

also gave credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB order in LMB Conflict No.
110, ruling that this LMB order bolstered Urbinas possessory rights over
the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Urbinas had possessory rights over the
property.
HELD:
An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is also
used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not
among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when
possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be
maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff
in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
As the court explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court: We hold
that the power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and
dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their
jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants
against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations.
While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management
Bureau] is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival
claimants to public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public
lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with
the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to
prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is
clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes
over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The
ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within
the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend
protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell
social unrest. Consequently, while we leave it to the LMB to determine the
issue of who among the parties should be awarded the title to the subject

72

property, there is no question that we have sufficient authority to resolve

which of the parties is entitled to rightful possession.
On the issue of possessory rights
Prefatorily, the court observe that the subject property has not yet been
titled, nor has it been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB.
Therefore, the land remains part of the public domain, and neither Urbina
nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership over it. This does not mean,
however, that neither of the parties have the right to possess the property.
Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property since he has
a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application, as well as tax declarations over
the property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to
possess the property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that
they negotiated with him for the sale of the lot in question. On the other
hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same on their
actual possession of the property. They also questioned the legality of
Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his tax declarations over the
property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not
alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.
After reviewing the records of this case, the court finds the reasoning of the
Modestos to be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The
court held that Urbina utterly failed to prove that he has a better right to
possess the property. Thus, the court cannot sustain his complaint for
ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce, must dismiss the same for
lack of merit.

Brito vs. Dianala

GR# 171717/ Dec. 15, 2010
638 SCRA 529
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband,
Ramon Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo,
Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband,
Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio
Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Fausto

73

Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with

the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros
Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 12887.
Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco,
alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito,
Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of
one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of
Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon
their death Vicente
and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn,
Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate
leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance
of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention
claiming that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a
certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five
children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are
the heirs of Esteban and Francisca's children; that they are in open, actual,
public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more
than 30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over
those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs
have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a
Compromise Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between
Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely:
Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the
said agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot
to the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a decision approving the
said Compromise Agreement. On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and
his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages, this time against herein respondents. The case, filed with the
RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C.
Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court, on
August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against
petitioner and his co-heirs.

74

ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred when it ruled that the
lower court has the jurisdiction to hear the reconveyance case of the herein
plaintiffs-appellants before the regional trial court.
HELD:
The court held that it is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative
relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court. In the present case, when respondents filed their Answer-inIntervention they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents,
thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents'
Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then on,
they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the
opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less
participate in the compromise agreement entered into by and between
herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the defendant in Civil
Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-inIntervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court
and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not bound
by the judgment rendered therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents
are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance
only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly
committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an
action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in
four years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud. In their
complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property
through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of

75

which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held as follows:
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L33261, September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a
gray area on the prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to
real property and, corollarily, its point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the
effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the
recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods
after the right of action accrues:
x x x xx
3.
Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of
fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have
accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx
xxx
xxx
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or
constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1)
Upon a written contract;
(2)
Upon an obligation created by law;
(3)
Upon a judgment.
x x x x x x x x x. (Italics supplied.)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must
perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions
of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it
seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained
by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the

76

fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No.
190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30,
1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article
1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in
the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being
then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an
action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false
pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides: In all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original
petition or application.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section
53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the
Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten
(10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. x
x x. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and
his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint
for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that
respondents are guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning
the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they
slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final.
In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no
longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the
said judgment. Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for
reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that, unless
reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the
prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay

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that would bar relief. Laches is recourse in equity. Equity, however, is

applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law.
Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.
Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does
not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance
is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an
action that is imprescriptible. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps
to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the
one who is in possession.
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession
of the subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his coheirs filed a separate action against respondents for recovery of
possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the
disputed property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact,
imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should respondents not be held
guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set
up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.

Tan vs. Ramirez

GR# 158929/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 327
FACTS:
On August 11, 1998, the petitioner, representing her parents (spouses
Crispo and Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Hindang-Inopacan, Leyte a complaint for the recovery of
ownership and possession and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of
the subject property against the respondents.
The petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona
was the owner of the subject property under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD)

78

No. 2724. Catalino had four children: Gliceria, Valentina, Tomasa, and
Julian; Gliceria inherited the subject property when Catalino died; Gliceria
married Gavino Oyao, but their union bore no children; when Gliceria died
on April 25, 1952, Gavino inherited a one-half portion of the subject
property, while Nicomedesa acquired the other half through inheritance, in
representation of her mother, Valentina, who had predeceased Gliceria,
and through her purchase of the shares of her brothers and sisters. In
1961, Nicomedesa constituted Roberto as tenant of her half of the subject
property; on June 30, 1965, Nicomedesa bought Gavinos one-half portion
of the subject property from the latters heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao,
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land;[7] on August 3,
1965, Nicomedesa sold to Roberto this one-half portion in a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land; and in 1997, Nicomedesa discovered
that since 1974, Roberto had been reflecting the subject property solely in
his name under TD No. 4193.
The respondents, on the other hand, traced ownership of the subject
property to Gavino who cultivated it since 1956; Roberto bought half of the
subject property from Nicomedesa on August 3, 1965, and the remaining
half from Gavinos heirs, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, on October 16, 1972.
On January 9, 1975, a certain Santa Belacho, claiming to be Gavinos
natural child, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Baybay,
Leyte against Roberto, Nicomedesa, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, docketed
as Civil Case No. B-565, for recovery of possession and ownership of two
(2) parcels of land, including the subject property;[11] on September 16,
1977, Roberto bought the subject property from Belacho through a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Land; and on October 5, 1977, Roberto and Nicomedesa
entered into a Compromise Agreement with Belacho to settle Civil Case
No. B-565. Belacho agreed in this settlement to dismiss the case and to
waive her interest over the subject property in favor of Roberto, and the
other parcel of land in favor of Nicomedesa in consideration of P1,800.00
The MCTC found that Catalinos 1915 TD No. 2724 was not the source of
Gavinos 1945 TD No. 3257 because it involved the other parcel of land
subject of Civil Case No. B-565. . It held that Roberto was entitled to only
three-fourths, as this was Gavinos entire share, while the petitioner was
entitled to one-fourth of the subject property, and gave the parties sixty
days to effect the partition.
The RTC held that the shares of the parties shall be divided and
apportioned in the following manner: plaintiff shall own one-fourth (1/4) of

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Lot 3483 and defendants shall collectively own three-fourth (3/4) of Lot
3483.
CA declared Roberto as the lawful owner of the entire area of the subject
property. The appellate court found that the October 5, 1977 Compromise
Agreement executed by Belacho gave Robertos possession of the subject
property the characters of possession in good faith and with just title; the
respondents twenty-one years of possession, from execution of the
compromise agreement in 1977 until the filing of the case in 1998, is more
than the required ten-year possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription.
The CA also noted that Roberto also enjoyed just title because Belacho
executed a contract of sale in his favor on September 16, 1977.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether the CA erred in relying upon the compromise agreement
and the contract of sale to conclude that the respondents had been
possessors in good faith and with just title and could acquire the subject
property through ordinary acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and
under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be
in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.
The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with
just title for ten years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted
adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith.
Possession in good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership. There is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was
not the owner or could not transmit any right.
The court further held that the CA mistakenly relied upon the compromise
agreement, executed by Belacho to conclude that the respondents were
possessors in good faith and with just title who acquired the property

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through ordinary acquisitive prescription. In Ramnani v. Court of Appeals,

we held that the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end
to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Reciprocal
concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement.
By the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree to
something that neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it will
bring them without a protracted litigation.
In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and
Nicomedesa paid P1,800.00 in consideration of Belachos desistance from
further pursuing her claim over two (2) parcels of land, including the subject
property. Thus, no right can arise from the compromise agreement
because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write finis
to the controversy; it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the
subject property. In executing the compromise agreement, the parties, in
effect, merely reverted to their situation before Civil Case No. B-565 was
filed. Neither can the respondents benefit from the contract of sale of the
subject property, executed by Belacho in favor of Roberto, to support their
claim of possession in good faith and with just title. In the vintage case of
Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, we explained
good faith in this manner: One who purchases real estate with knowledge
of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired
title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has
knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the
title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only
from the acts of the one claiming it, as it is a condition of mind that can only
be judged by actual or fancied token or signs.
In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesas
knowledge or participation, bought the subject property on September 16,
1977 or during the pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore,
had actual knowledge that Belachos claim to ownership of the subject
property, as Gavinos purported heir, was disputed because he (Roberto)
and Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto
even admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to avoid
any trouble.*35+ He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under
the belief that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor,
Belacho.

81

Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period
required for ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos
favor. Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription has not been met because of the respondents claim to have
been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject property for
only twenty-four years, from the time the subject property was tax declared
in 1974 to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1998. Based on the
foregoing, the CA erred in finding that the respondents acquired the
petitioners one-fourth portion of the subject property through acquisitive
prescription. As aptly found by the MCTC, the respondents are only entitled
to three-fourths of the subject property because this was Gavinos rightful
share of the conjugal estate that Roberto bought from Ronito and Wilfredo
Oyao.

Lamsis vs. Dong-e

GR# 173021/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 154
FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled
parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square
meters. The property is located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is
part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 186,090 square meters.
While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is
claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from
petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys
ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922
to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death, the property was
inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the
186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1. On the same
year, they declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of The
Heirs of Ap-ap. The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads:
Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922
per true of same presented.
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife
Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma,
to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families.

82

They were allowed to erect their houses, introduce improvements, and

plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died
sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) and
Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1.
Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied
5,000 square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon
tolerated the acts of their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,
his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and
allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita. Since then, Margarita
allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and occupied and improved the
property together with her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her
first cousins occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly
began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling
portions thereof. Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No.
1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another
portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four
occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City. Petitioners denied Margaritas claims of ownership and possession
over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land
claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). The Smiths
gave their permission for Delfin and Agustins parents to occupy the land
sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who
testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective parents
who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents. Delfin and Agustin
also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as
fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed
of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-aps children, failed to include
two Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito. Margarita admitted during trial that
Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain
why they were excluded from the quitclaim. In order to debunk petitioners
claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a
certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying
the Smiths application for recognition of the subject property as part of
their ancestral land. The resolution explains that the application had to be
denied because the Smiths did not possess, occupy or utilize all or a

83

portion of the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in
the resolution) whose improvements are visible are not in any way related
to the applicant or his co-heirs. To bolster her claim of ownership and
possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of
the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a portion of the
186,090-square meter property.
The said resolution states:
The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein
applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first
declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by
the applicants grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was
reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during the war. These tax
declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba,
Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction
of the said municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x
x x transferred the tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is]
now with the City assessors office of Baguio. On the matter of the
applicant*s+ indiguinity *sic+ and qualifications, there is no doubt that they
are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi
tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived
along the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to
Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap,
married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba,
Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their father Semon, as it is
the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important
to state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became
the sole heir in 1964, by way of a Deed of Quitclaim executed by the heirs
in his favor. As to the respective share of the applicants*+ co-heirs, the
same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the execution of an
Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights.
The trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondents long-time
possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property. The survey
plan of the subject property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way
back in 1962 and the tax declarations thereafter issued to the respondent
and her siblings all support her claim that her family and their

84

predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the property to the

exclusion of others. The CA held that the respondent was able to
discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject
property. Her documentary evidence were amply supported by the
testimonial evidence of her witness.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by
prescription.
HELD:
The court held that they cannot accept petitioners claim of acquisition by
prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by
tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot
claim that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can
prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that possession, in order to ripen into
ownership, must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one
claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and
such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of
possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the
owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession
by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory acts, no matter how long
performed, do not start the running of the period of prescription. In the
instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act
of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At
most, the court can find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin
of parts of the property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was
done only in 1998, shortly before respondent filed a case against them.
Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitve
prescription had yet to be attained. Whether the ancestral land claim
pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
should take precedence over the reivindicatory action
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending
before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an
official recognition of ones claim to a particular land and is also in rem.
The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of officially establishing
ones land as an ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the

85

titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but
only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by
virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interests possession of the property
since time immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears
stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a
certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not
create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question
involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x
x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will
present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject
properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise apropos is the following explanation: The fact that the
[respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate
to vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not
create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they
should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not
merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x
Certificates of title do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied) A
registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In
fact, if it is later on found in another case (where the issue of ownership is
squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the owner of the property,
the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title transferred
to his name.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral
lands) is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis
pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case. The third element is missing, for any judgment in the
certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the

86

ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis

pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended
or dismissed in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with
petitioners contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled
is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

Ney vs. Quijano

GR# 178609/ Aug. 4, 2010
626 SCRA 800
Facts:
This is an appeal to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the
Decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 45.
Petitioners Manuel and Romulo Ney are the registered owners of a
residential lot located at 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila, with an area of
120 square meters more or less, covered by TCT No. 122489. A three (3)
door apartment was constructed on the subject lot 1 for Manuel, the other
for Romulo; and the last one for their sister, Respondents Mina N. Quijano
and her husband Celso Quijano.
On October 8, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a suit for
reconveyance, partition and damages against petitioners. They averred
that they are co-owners of the subject property having paid part of its
purchase price; that Celsos name was inadvertently omitted as one of the
buyers in the execution of the deed of sale. Consequently, TCT No. 122489
covering the subject property was issued only in the names of Manuel and
Romulo. To obtain a separate certificate of title, they requested from
petitioners the segregation of the portion allotted to them, but the latter
refused. They later discovered that the entire property was mortgaged with

87

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, prompting them to execute and

register their adverse claim with the Register of Deeds; and to file the
instant complaint.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondents allegation of coownership. They averred that Celso Quijano was not a vendee of the
subject lot; thus, his name did not appear on the title. They asserted that
respondents cannot validly maintain an action against them because the
latter possessed the property by mere tolerance; and even assuming that
respondents had a valid cause of action, the same had already been
barred by prescription and/or laches. Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. It
rejected respondents claim of co-ownership, and declared their
documentary and testimonial evidence unreliable. The RTC sustained
petitioners assertion that respondents possessed part of the property
through mere tolerance; and that their cause of action, if any, already
prescribed. The RTC thus ruled that respondents can no longer demand
the segregation or reconveyance of the claimed portion of the property.
Finally, the RTC granted petitioners counterclaim and ordered the
reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in defending the case.
Respondents went to the CA. They faulted the RTC for dismissing their
complaint and insisted that they are co-owners of the subject lot; and that
their share was erroneously included in petitioners title. Citing Heirs of
Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, respondents asserted that their right to
institute an action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because they are in
possession of the claimed portion of the property.
On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision,
reversing the RTC. The CA considered respondents complaint as one for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible; and granted to respondents the
reliefs that they prayed for.
The CA declared [respondents], spouses Celso and Mina Quijano, as coowners of the subject lot to the extent of one-third (1/3) thereof which
corresponds to that portion where their house stands.
Accordingly, [petitioners] are hereby ordered:

88

1) to partition the subject lot into three (3) equal portions of forty square
meters (40 sq.m.) each, specifically allotting to [respondents] the portion
where their house stands;
2) to reconvey to [respondents] the clean title to their portion of the subject
lot;
3) to surrender the owners copy of TCT No. 122489 to the Register of
Deeds of Manila for the annotation of *respondents+ share thereon; and
4) to pay *respondents+ attorneys fees and the costs of suit in the
reasonable amount of P50,000.00.
Thus, this petition for review. They ascribe reversible error to the CA for
treating respondents action as one for quieting of title. They claim that
nowhere in the complaint does it state that respondents seek to quiet their
title to the property. All that respondents averred and prayed for in their
complaint was for petitioners to surrender their certificate of title, and for the
partition of the subject property. Petitioners assert that the CA ruled on an
issue not raised in the pleadings; and substituted the respondents action
with an entirely new action for quieting of title.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the CA erred in treating the complaint as quieting of title.
2. Whether the CA faulted in sustaining respondents claim for coownership.
The argument is erroneous.
1. These allegations make out a case for reconveyance. That
reconveyance was one of the reliefs sought was made abundantly clear by
respondents in their prayer.

Respondents did not only seek the partition of the property and the delivery
of the title, but also the reconveyance of their share which was
inadvertently included in petitioners TCT.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Indeed,
reconveyance is an action distinct from an action for quieting of title, which
is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact,

89

invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to

said title for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title. However, we
find nothing erroneous in the CAs ruling treating respondents action for
reconveyance as an action to quiet title.
In Mendizabel v. Apao, we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an
action to quiet title, explaining, thus:
The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when
the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a
person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession of the property, the
right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one who is in actual
possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.,An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The
reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of registration
of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only
if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is
not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner
of the property also
remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover
title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a
case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents action as in the
nature of an action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible
error.
2. The Deed of Reconveyance executed by Manuel and Romulo explicitly
states that:
[W]e acknowledge and recognized the rights, interests and participation of
Celso P. Quijano, Filipino, of legal age, married to Mina P. Ney and
resident of 1648 Main Street, Paco, Manila, as a co-owner of the one-third

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(1/3) portion of the said lot wherein his residential house is now constructed
at the above-stated address, having paid the corresponding amount over
the said 1/3 portion of the property for the acquisition costs but whose
name does not appear in the Deed of Sale executed in our favor, thus
resulting in the non-conclusion (sic) of his name in the above-stated
Transfer Certificate of Title when issued as a co-owner.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises
WE, MANUEL P. NEY and ROMULO P. NEY, do hereby transfer and
convey unto said Spouses Celso P. Quijano and MINA P. NEY their onethird (1/3) portion share of the aforedescribed (sic) parcel of land where
their residential house is now situated at their above-given address with an
area of forty (40) square meters more or less by virtue of this Deed of
Reconveyance.
Petitioners never denied the due execution of the Deed of Reconveyance.
In fact they admitted that the signatures appearing therein are theirs. The
CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for declaring respondents as co-owners of
the subject property because it merely confirmed and enforced the Deed of
Reconveyance voluntarily executed by petitioners in favor of respondents.
As aptly pronounced by the CA:
[T]he Deed of Reconveyance, duly signed by [petitioners] themselves, put
to rest the focal issue between the parties. There is no denying that it
outweighs the evidence relied upon by [petitioners] despite the fact that
they have the transfer certificate of title over the entire subject lot. It is
settled that it is not the certificate of title that vests ownership. It merely
evidences such title.
In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to
the true owner or to one with a better right, where the property had been
erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person's name. After all, the
Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Thus,
the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision.

Toring vs. Boquilaga

GR# 163610/ Sept. 27, 2010
631 SCRA 278

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Facts:
For review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, are the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the
RTC except as to the land covered by reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 (T16805) in the name of Enrique Toring
On October 10, 1996, the heirs of Enrique Toring (petitioners) filed before
the trial court a petition for "production, delivery, surrender of documents,
annulment of document" against the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga
(respondents).

On June 3, 1927, Teodosia Boquilaga sold to Enrique Toring now

deceased, parcels of land for a consideration of Five Hundred and Eleven
Pesos (P511.00), evidenced by a deed of absolute sale written in Spanish
This deed of absolute sale was duly registered with the [Register] of Deeds,
and the fees for the registration were duly paid. Thereafter, new Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds in
the Province of Cebu, for all the parcels of land, in the name of Enrique
Toring.
From the issuance of TCT on August 20, 1927, plaintiffs have been in
possession and religiously paid the real taxes due on said described lots,
and collecting the proceeds of the fruits of the land. However, during World
War II, the canceled Original Certificate in the name of Teodosia
[Boquilaga], and the Transfer [Certificates] of [Title] in the name of Enrique
Toring in the books of the Register of Deeds were destroyed;
Lately, while petitioners were exercising their right over the said lots,
defendants refused to share the fruits of the lot reasoning that they are the
owners thereof. Petitioners learned that defendants filed petition for the
reconstitution of the OCTs of said land.
Petitioners thus sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to
deliver, produce and surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of
Title. Should the defendants refuse to deliver the said titles, it is prayed that
the court (a) declare OCTs null and void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds
to cancel said titles and in lieu thereof issue new TCTs in the name of

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Enrique Toring; and (c) declare OCT No. 13237 null and void for being
cancelled by TCT No. RT-3989.
As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the RTC
has no jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties
involved does not exceed P20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of
laches for failing to act and take corrective measures with the Register of
Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the alleged destruction of the
documents.
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position
papers, memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support
of their respective claims.
On January 27, 1998, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that
it cannot interfere with or render null and void the decision made by a coequal and coordinate branch of the court which ordered the reconstitution
of the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga. Under the circumstances,
petitioners owners duplicate certificates of title in the name of Enrique
Toring are deemed "overtaken by the reconstituted title[s]." Further, the trial
court found petitioners guilty of laches in not reconstituting the original
TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring and in not making any opposition to
the reconstitution proceedings filed by the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga.
However, it was declared that the dismissal of the case will not affect the
reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 in the name of Enrique Toring.
Petitioners appealed to the CA arguing that:
1. the trial court erred in concluding that the action is one for the annulment
of the order of the court which granted reconstitution, when in truth the
petitioners merely sought the delivery of the owners duplicate copies of the
reconstituted OCTs.
2. the trial court faulted in failing to consider that the defendants
predecessor-in-interest had long ago sold the lots to Enrique Toring, which
document of sale defendants have not denied, and therefore defendantheirs are no longer owners.
3. the trial court erred in finding them guilty of laches despite recognizing
the existence of the owners duplicate of TCTs in the name of Enrique
Toring; the submission by the petitioners of annexes in their
Comment/Reply to defendants memorandum showing that there were
previous cases wherein petitioners have asserted and defended their right

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over the subject properties and prevailed; and the fact that the OCTs were
reconstituted by defendants only in 1995 and the petitioners instituted this
case in 1996.
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts ruling.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the CA denied
the same.
Petitioners submit the following arguments in this petition for review on
certiorari:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS
WERE ALREADY SOLD AS EARLY AS JUNE 3, 1927 BY TEODOSIA
BOQUILAGA, RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR, TO ENRIQUE
TORING, PETITIONERS PREDECESSOR, AS EVIDENCED BY THE
ANCIENT DEED OF SALE IN SPANISH LANGUAGE DATED JUNE 3,
1927 WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD
HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED
CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE
IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERS DUPLICATE
TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF ENRIQUE
TORING WHICH ARE GOOD PROOF OF PETITIONERS OWNERSHIP
OF SUBJECT LANDS - WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE
TITLES THAT PETITIONERS HAD RECONSTITUTED WERE THE
CANCELLED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF
TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA WHICH DO NOT PROVE OWNERSHIP OF THE
LANDS BECAUSE THEY WERE ALREADY CANCELLED BY ENRIQUE
TORINGS TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS GUILTY
OF LACHES JUST BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO RECONSTITUTE
TORINGS ORIGINAL TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ON FILE IN
THE RECORDS OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS, IT APPEARING THAT

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THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSOR HAVE BEEN IN ACTUAL

POSSESSION OF THE LAND SINCE 1927 AND ARE IN POSSESSION
OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERS DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES
OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF THEIR PREDECESSOR, ENRIQUE
TORING.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE TRIAL
COURTS RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL COURT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN
ACTION TO ASSAIL THE DECISION OF A CO-EQUAL COURT, IT
APPEARING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT/PETITION WAS MERELY TO
COMPEL DELIVERY OR SURRENDER BY RESPONDENTS OF THE
RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
Held:
The issues raised are purely questions of fact that this Court cannot review
in a petition filed under Rule 45. Ultimately, we are asked to determine the
ownership of the subject lots originally registered in the name of Teodosia
Boquilaga, respondents predecessor-in-interest.
The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish any right over the lots
other than their bare assertion that their predecessor-in-interest purchased
these properties from Teodosia Boquilaga and subsequently titles in his
name were issued but were lost during the last world war. It agreed with the
trial court in finding that whatever claim petitioners have on the subject
properties was lost by their unexplained neglect for more than fifty (50)
years since the destruction of the records in the registry of deeds during the
last world war, under the principle of laches. As to the nature of the action
filed by petitioners, the CA likewise affirmed the trial courts ruling that it is
one for annulment of the reconstituted title, which essentially assails the
judgment or order of a co-equal court.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those
affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the
evidence on record.
In the case at bar, the records showed that the original petition was filed in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bogo-San Remigio, Cebu but was
subsequently transferred to the RTC on motion of the petitioners. TCT Nos.

95

16802, 16803, 16804 and RT-3989 (T-16805) were attached to the petition
together with annexes "A", "C" to "G" mentioned therein.
However, upon elevation to the CA, the records transmitted had missing
pages, including the pages subsequent to the original petition where copies
of the aforesaid TCTs should have been attached. At any rate, there
appears to be no indication from the pleadings filed and orders/decision
issued by the trial court throughout the proceedings that such documentary
evidence was not submitted by petitioners. Hence, the CA could have been
misled by the absence of these annexes from the records transmitted on
appeal. Petitioners submitted to this Court the photocopies of TCT Nos.
16802, 16803 and 16804 certified as true copy from the records by the
RTC of Bogo, Branch 61 Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rey Dadula Caayon.
It must be noted that petitioners presented before the trial court the owners
duplicate copies of the said TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Indeed,
had these pieces of evidence been duly considered on appeal, the
resolution of the issue of ownership would have tilted in petitioners favor.
But first, we resolve the issue of the propriety of the suit filed by the
petitioners. The nature of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by
plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed irrespective of
whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As gleaned from the
averments of the petition filed before the trial court, though captioned as for
delivery or production of documents and annulment of document,
petitioners action was really for quieting of title and cancellation of
reconstituted titles.
Petitioners had prayed for the following reliefs before the trial court:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued;
a. Directing defendants to deliver, produce, and surrender Original
[Certificates] of Title Nos. RO- 13240, 13238, 13239, and Transfer
Certificate of Title [No.] 97615 to plaintiffs, and should defendants refuse to
surrender these documents, to declare Original Certificate of Titles Nos.
RO- 13238, 13239, 13240, and Transfer Certificate of Title 97615 null and
void, and directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, to cancel
said Original Certificates of Title, and Transfer Certificate of Title and in lieu
thereof issue new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Enrique
Toring;

96

b. Declare as null and void Original Certificate of Title 13237, being

canceled by Transfer Certificate of Title RT-3989;
c. Directing defendants heirs of Teodosia [Boquilaga] to pay P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
Plaintiffs, pray for other remedies just and equitable applicable to their
case, pertinent with law and equity.
Petitioners contend that the delivery of the reconstituted OCTs in the name
of Teodosia Boquilaga was necessary to confirm and register the 1927 sale
in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Enrique Toring. It appears that the
remedy contemplated is a petition for surrender of withheld owners
duplicate certificates provided in Section 107 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529.
SECTION 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. -- Where it is
necessary to issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
instrument which divests the title of the registered owner against his
consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered by reason of
the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owners duplicate
certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing,
may order the registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate
certificate to surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or
memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the duplicate
certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if [for] any reason
the outstanding owners duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court
may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new
certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates
thereof shall contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate. (Emphasis supplied.)
However, petitioners themselves alleged that the 1927 sale had long been
duly registered OCT in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, as mentioned in
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated June 3, 1927, were cancelled and in
lieu thereof TCTs have been issued in the name of Enrique Toring on
August 20, 1927. Their predecessor-in-interest having already succeeded
in registering the deed of sale as early as 1927, it is clear that the
procedure under Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 is inapplicable.

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Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon
or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in
equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure " an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant,
is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In such action, the
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper
places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both,
so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the
improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property
as he deems fit.
In alleging that petitioners were not served any notice as actual possessors
or adjacent owners of the petition for reconstitution (Cad Case No. 7, Cad.
Rec. No. 442, Decree Nos. 230739, 230740, 231111 and 231112) filed by
the respondents for reconstitution of OCTs in the name of Teodosia
Boquilaga which was granted by the court; and that the said OCTs have
already been cancelled by the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique
Toring by virtue of a deed of sale executed in 1927 by Teodosia Boquilaga
petitioners did not just seek to remove any doubt or uncertainty in the title
of their predecessor-in-interest over the subject real properties, but also
claimed irregularity and defects in the reconstitution proceedings which
resulted in the issuance of reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238,
RO-13239 and RO-13240 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga.
If indeed, as petitioners claimed, the OCTs in the name of Teodosia
Boquilaga were already cancelled and new TCTs have already been issued
in the name of Enrique Toring as early as 1927, then the reconstituted OCT
Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 issued in Cad Case
No. 7, Cad Rec. No. 442 are null and void.
It may also be noted that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondents
and the Certifications issued by the LRA stated only the registration decree
numbers issued in favor of Teodosia Boquilaga without mentioning the
numbers of the OCTs and dates of their issuance. The reconstituted OCTs
on their face contained no entry whatsoever as to the number of the OCT
issued pursuant to the decrees of registration, nor the date of its issuance.

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We have held that such absence of any document, private or official,

mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the
certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for
reconstitution. Moreover, notice of hearing of the petition for reconstitution
of title must be served on the actual possessors of the property. Notice
thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect settled
that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of
the land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of
the petition.
The decision granting the petition for reconstitution filed by the respondents
was promulgated on May 9, 1996. There is no allegation or proof that
petitioners availed of the remedies of appeal, petition for relief, certiorari or
annulment of judgment before the CA questioning the validity of the said
reconstitution order.
Notwithstanding petitioners failure to avail of the afore-mentioned
remedies, the decision in the reconstitution case is not a bar to the
adjudication of the issue of ownership raised in the present case. The
nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is the restoration of an
instrument or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title which is
supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.
Its purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in the
same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass
upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
After a careful review, we hold that petitioners have satisfactorily
established their claim of ownership over the subject lots by preponderance
of evidence. The existence and due execution of the Escritura de Venta
Absoluta was never disputed by the respondents. Petitioners documentary
evidence showed that the registration fees for the transfer of the lots
mentioned in the said deed of absolute sale was duly paid, resulting in the
issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Thereafter, petitioners
took possession of the land, sharing in the fruits thereof and paying the
realty taxes due on the lands. While the original owners duplicate TCTs
were in the possession of petitioners, the original transfer certificates of title
on file with the registry of deeds were lost or destroyed during the last world
war. Petitioners were also able to judicially reconstitute TCT No. T-16805
(RT-3989) on November 11, 1994, as per the annotation thereon.

99

Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to

do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims
for the peace of society. Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his
right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of
laches.
In this case, however, laches cannot be appreciated in respondents favor.
It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse
of time. The following elements must be present in order to constitute
laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the
complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.37
Only the first element was present in this case, which occurred from the
moment respondents refused to give petitioners share in the fruits and
proceeds of the land, claiming that they are owners thereof. In the ensuing
barangay proceedings, respondents presented the reconstituted OCTs
prompting petitioners to verify with the office of the registry of deeds. It was
only then that petitioners discovered that respondents indeed filed a
petition for judicial reconstitution. There being no personal notice to them
as actual possessors or adjacent lot owners, petitioners never had the
opportunity to file their opposition. The order of reconstitution was issued in
May 1996. Petitioners filing of the present suit for the delivery and
cancellation of said reconstituted OCTs in the possession of respondents
on October 20, 1996, after the lapse of only five months, cannot be
considered as unreasonable delay amounting to laches.

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Additionally, petitioners showed that they were never amiss in asserting

their rights over the subject lots whenever any incident threatened their
peaceful possession and ownership.

Caezo vs. Bautista

GR# 170189/ Sept. 1, 2010
629 SCRA 580
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo are the registered owner[s] of a land
with an area of 186 sq m. covered by TCT No. 32911. Spouses Apolinario
and Consorcia Bautista are the registered owners of a land with an area of
181 sq m. covered by TCT No. 31727. Both are located at Coronado
Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants lot is adjacent to that of
appellees.
In 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During
the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon
by the structures built by appellants without appellees knowledge and
consent. However, despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and
refused to remove the structures encroaching appellees lot.
Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to
no avail. Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a
writ of demolition. Appellants were declared in default for failure to file an
Answer within the extended period granted by the court, Appellees were
allowed to present their evidence ex parte before an appointed
commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered the assailed decision in the
terms earlier set forth.
On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the
spouses Caezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built
structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Caezo. The
spouses Bautista also refused to remove the structures and respect the
boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to the

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Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court
thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that the
spouses Caezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with
damages.
Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
A writ of demolition be was issued directing the removal/demolition of the
structures built by the defendants upon the portion of land belonging [to]
the plaintiffs at the formers expense.
Further,
1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and
by way of moral damages[; and]
2. the defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees.
The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court. The appellate court ruled that since the last demand was made on 27
March 2000, or more than a year before the filing of the complaint, the
spouses Caezo should have filed a suit for recovery of possession and
not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of demolition can be
granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the spouses
Caezos complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Caezo failed to
specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property.
Because of this failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a
cause of action. Finally, the appellate court ruled that should there be a
finding of encroachment in the action for recovery of possession and that
the encroachment was built in good faith, the market value of the
encroached portion should be proved to determine the appropriate
indemnity.
The CA granted the appeal and the case was DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum.
Issues:
I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the
petition of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the Court a
quo; [and]

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II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that the
petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of
demolition.
Held:
The petition has merit.
The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a "Writ of
Demolition with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land
or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434
of the Civil Code reads: "In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendants claim." Accion reivindicatoria seeks the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi
brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.
In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts
that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of
the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same. However, although the
identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if
the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land,
and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the
portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiffs property.
Given the efforts made by the spouses Caezo to settle the present issue
prior to the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the
spouses Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer. The
Complaint was not the spouses Bautistas first encounter with the present
issue. Moreover, the spouses Bautista failed to file their Answer even after
the expiry of the motion of extension granted to them.
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses
Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot
15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the
spouses Caezo. This awareness of the two encroachments made the
spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Caezo are entitled to
the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the spouses
Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.

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A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be issued against

and at the expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista upon
the finality of this judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista
are further ordered to pay Spouses Elegio and Dolia Caezo P30,000 as
actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P30,000 as attorneys
fees. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall apply from the finality of
judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that
the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former
condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he
may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the
sower the proper rent.

Title III. Co-Ownership (Arts. 484-501)

Republic v. Heirs of Sorono
GR # 171571, Mar. 24, 2008
549 SCRA 58
This is a Petition for review on certiorari to the aardecision of the CA
affirming that of the RTC Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were
adjudicated on December 7, 1929 by the then CFI of Cebu in four equal
shares. The two lots were not partitioned by the adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded share
in the two lots, sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) via a public instrument entitled
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on October 11, 1957, without
the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-interest were the
adjudicatees of the rest of the portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAAs successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and
relocated a number of families, who had built their dwellings within the
airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot to enhance airport security in line
with the standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization and
the Federal Aviation Authority.

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MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548
covering Lot No. 2296 and Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No.
2316. Respondents soon asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third
persons permission to occupy the lots but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting
of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City, alleging that the
existence of the tax declarations "would cast a cloud on their valid and
existing titles" to the lots. They alleged that "corresponding original
certificates of title in favor of the decreed owners were . . . issued but the
same could no longer be found and located, and in all probability, were lost
during the Second World War." (This claim was not specifically denied by
petitioner in its Answer with Counterclaim.)
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-ininterests sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they
have been in continuous peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its
predecessor-in-interest had given them any written notice of its acquisition
of the share of Tito Dignos.
The trial court found for respondents. It held that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest were in peaceful and continuous possession of
their shares in the lots, and were disturbed of such possession only in 1996
when petitioner put up the security fence that traversed Lot No. 2316 and
relocated families that had built their houses within the airport perimeter to
a portion of said lot.
On petitioners claim that it had acquired ownership by extraordinary
prescription, the trial court brushed it aside on the ground that registered
lands cannot be the subject of acquisitive prescription.
Neither, held the trial court, had respondents action prescribed, as actions
for quieting of title cannot prescribe if the plaintiffs are in possession of the
property in question, as in the case of herein respondents.
On petitioners defense of laches, the trial court also brushed the same
aside in light of its finding that respondents, who have long been in
possession of the lots, came to know of the sale only in 1996. The trial

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court added that respondents could not be charged with constructive notice
of the 1957 Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the lots to CAA as it was
erroneously registered under Act No. 3344, the law governing recording of
instruments or deeds relating to real estate which are not registered under
the Torrens system. The subject lots being registered, the trial court found,
the registration of the deed should have been made under Act No. 496, the
applicable law in 1957. In fine, the trial court held that the registration of the
deed under Act No. 3344 did not operate as constructive notice to the
whole world.
Concluding, the trial court held that the questioned sale was valid only with
respect to Tito Dignos share of the lots, and that the sale thereof was
subject to the right of legal redemption by respondents following Article
1088 of the Civil Code, reading:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
In light of its finding that the heirs of Tito Dignos did not give notice of the
sale to respondents, the trial court held that the period for legal redemption
had not yet lapsed; and the redemption price should be of the purchase
price paid by the CAA for the two lots.
The trial court thus disposed:
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS DECISION WHEN RESPONDENTS NO LONGER HAVE
ANY RIGHT TO RECOVER LOTS 2296 AND 2316 DUE TO THE PRIOR
SALE THEREOF TO THE REPUBLIC AND UPON THE EQUITABLE
GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
Held:
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or

106

mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to
sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights
pertaining to the sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only undivided
share of the two lots.
Petitioners insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription, if not ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. The trial
courts discrediting thereof is well taken. It bears emphasis at this juncture
that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale forged by CAA and Tito
Dignos heirs in 1957.
The trial courts discrediting of petitioners invocation of laches and
prescription of action is well-taken too.
As for petitioners argument that the redemption price should be of the
prevailing market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it
claims, "(1) they received just compensation for the property at the time it
was purchased by the Government; and, (2) the property, due to
improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth several
hundreds of millions of pesos, the law is not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. As
mentioned earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify

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respondents about the sale. At any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake
and agree to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the
property/ies herein sold against any and all just claims of all persons
whomsoever and should the VENDEE be disturbed in its possession, to
prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without
prejudice to petitioners right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of
Tito Dignos and their successors-in-interest.

Cruz v. Catapang
GR # 164110, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 512
Facts:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision RTC,
which had earlier affirmed the Decision of the 7th MCTC ordering
respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a portion of the lot coowned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the coowners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located
at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma
Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M.
Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of
land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the
co-owned property.
When petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property during the first week of
September 1995, she was surprised to see a part of respondents house
intruding unto a portion of the co-owned property. She then made several
demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding structure and to
vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however,
refused and disregarded her demands.

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On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC
decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the coowners is not sufficient to justify defendants construction of the house and
possession of the portion of the lot in question.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MCTCs ruling and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Catapang.
Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the RTCs decision. The CA held that there is no cause of action
for forcible entry in this case because respondents entry into the property,
considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a
cause of action for forcible entry. The CA further held that petitioners
remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with
the appropriate forum.
After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, she filed
the instant petition and raised before us for consideration the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE
RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM THE
PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED
EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT
OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO
HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-OWNER.
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF
SIMPLE STRATEGY.
Petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma
Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic

109

principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim

title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the
complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the
property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of
the co-owners. She further argues that since Norma Maligaya is residing in
the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of
possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the
property.
Issue:
Whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to
construct a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a
forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against that person.
Held:
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant
the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the
person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned
property, we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In our view, a
co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the coowned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his
or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such
a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other
co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the coownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others,
make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for
all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by
one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest,
the courts may afford adequate relief.

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Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving
consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned property
will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily
follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other coowners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person,
such as respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any
act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house
on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no
consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to construct her house
on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The consent given by
Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz
did not vest upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property.
Her entry into the property still falls under the classification "through
strategy or stealth."
The CA held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into
the property was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to
her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this
sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the
permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act
done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent
allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely
without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as
possession by stealth. Moreover, respondents act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the
latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a
strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As
such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

111

Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the
one-year period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the
one-year period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.21
Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was only in
September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property.
Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the
premises. Failing to get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint
on January 25, 1996, which is within the one-year period from the time
petitioner learned of the construction.

Santos v. Heirs of Lustre

GR # 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
561 SCRA 120
Facts:
Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged & later on sold to Natividad
Santos who subsequently sold it to her son
Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name. Lustres heirs Macaspac
& Maniquiz filed w/ RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for Declaration
of the Inexistence of Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages against Froilan Santos. Lustres other heirs filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale
against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp, Cecilia
Macaspac with the same RTC.
Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2nd case because she
refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs.
Alleging that the plaintiffs right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale
and TCT had long prescribed and was
barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground
of litis pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
Issue 1: Was there forum shopping?

112

Decision: No
Ratio:
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
when a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other. Its elements are identity of the subject
matter, identity of the causes of action and identity of the parties in the two
cases. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case.
There is no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties because
the plaintiff in the 1st case (Macaspac) does not, in fact, share a common
interest with the plaintiffs in the 2nd case. Plaintiffs in both cases are the
heirs of Lustre; they are therefore co-owners of the property. However, the
fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff is acting
for the benefit of the co-ownership when he files an action respecting the
co-owned property. Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the
property owned in common. The test is whether the additional party, the
co-owner in this case, acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the
parties in the former action. [28]
Macaspac filed the 1st case seeking the reconveyance of the property to
her, and not to Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the
co-ownership which would negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with
the other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the co-ownership.
In contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the coownership when they filed the 2nd case wherein they prayed that TCT
Lustre be reinstated, or a new certificate of title be issued in her name.
Issue #1: Does prescription or laches apply?
Issue 2: Does prescription or laches apply?
Decision: No
Ratio:
The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed
of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not
prescribe. Moreover, a person acquiring

113

property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an

implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in
such case, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription
does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
It follows then that the respondents present action should not be barred by
laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity,
which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to
resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.X

MBTC v. Pascual
GR # 163744, Feb. 29, 2008
547 SCRA 246
Facts:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on
January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment
standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. S101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was cancelled and, in lieu
thereof,TCT No. 156283[1] of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was
issued in the name of Florencia, married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a.
Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City
rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision,[2] declaring the marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter
alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal

114

partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their

separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira
Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the
spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their
properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283.
Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy
of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision,
and a document denominated as Waiver that Nicholson purportedly
executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered
the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not
incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated
foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the
Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused
the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.[3] At the
auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28,
2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of
the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789
and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged
that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without
his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that
the disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence,
was subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
Issue:

115

a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal

by applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity
of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia
Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the
spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value.
Held:
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing
that *a+ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife, applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could
not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia
contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. Citing Manongsong v. Estimo,[8] Metrobank asserts that the
presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies
when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Metrobank adds, however, that
for the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be
adduced to prove that not only was the property acquired during the
marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden
Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property,
Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals[9] and Jocson v. Court of
Appeals,[10] among other cases, where this Court held that a property
registered in the name of a certain person with a description of being
married is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation[11] and Wong v. IAC,[12] contends that Metrobank

116

failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property is

conjugal. He asserts that Metrobanks arguments on the matter of
presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be shown for
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of
acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable,
Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no
indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged to be
conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had
virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three
instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil
Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as
spouses in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then
came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again
designated as co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter[13] to vacate
the disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as
spouses, albeit the finality of the decree of nullity of marriage between
them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code,
not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the
property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in
its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there
must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using
conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court did not, in
Manongsong,[14] add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an
essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise.
Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the
marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal.
Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary
condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set
forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v.
Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that
all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless
it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of

117

the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which
the property was acquired does not appear.[15] (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory.
Metrobank would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument
that the registration of the property in the name of Florencia Nevalga,
married to Nelson Pascual operates to describe only the marital status of
the title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the
acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson of
Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of
the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
spouse.[16]
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding
Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to
question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having
named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the
spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no
compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having
been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however
Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or
another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the
Nature of Conjugal Ownership Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to
the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in
part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall
constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and
wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the

118

marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or

forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver
executed by Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the
conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the
properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without
more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation
when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the
Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and
liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7,
Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the
subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both
Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime
of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the
other heirs of the deceased.[17]
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. (Emphasis supplied.)

119

In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot
on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the
partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the
former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493.
Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited
only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion
of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage
of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed
duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the
courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by
Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the
conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature,
not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver
does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid
title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as
the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia.
The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a
portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot
and its property rights shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to *the bank+ in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.*18+
This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
soquando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.[19]
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of
Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not
Metrobank was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce
that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a
purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners
of the title is inapplicable.[20] Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks

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to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property
offered as security and the validity of the mortgagors title must be standard
and indispensable part of the banks operation.*21+ A bank that failed to
observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona fide
mortgagee,[22] as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the
due diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some
moral obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that
partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision
of the CA dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision
of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by
TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared
valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is
concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property
covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all
proceedings thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2
portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with
respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are
DENIED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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Arriola v. Arriola
GR # 177703, Jan. 28, 2008
542 SCRA 666
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition of the properties of decedent
Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife
Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition
of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his
heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights
of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John
Nabor sought the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it.
Said auction had to be reset when petitioners refused to include the house
standing on the subject land.

Issue:
Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot
and should be included in the sale through public auction.
Held:
The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code,
the subject house is deemed part of the subject land.

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In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior

act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the
improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for
partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following
the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition
in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto,
otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without
dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto.
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was
built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is
then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased;
as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any
one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time,
demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's
recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of
all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the
complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the
subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of
authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears
emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the
declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the
actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of
the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the
subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore
susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by
the RTC is an entirely different matter.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on
his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their
residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record
establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation
of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

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Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic
constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family
residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes
provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule
106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically
extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in
which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,
applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion
of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family
home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code,
viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as
the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extrajudicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs
cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged

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by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the
partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment
to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much
less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual
co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted
under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject
house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if
it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent
Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until
March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set
aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception
from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house
although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the
subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The
same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of
the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family
home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and
immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10
years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to
the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by
TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30,

2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of
the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period
provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

Padilla vs. Magdula

GR# 176858/ Sept. 15, 2010
630 SCRA 573
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Orders
dated 8 September 2006[2] and 13 February 2007[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land
located in San Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanitas death on 23 March
1989, petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land
partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia
(Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a letter dated
5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were
surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself,
prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had
allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property[4]
(Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June 1966 making him the sole owner of
the land. The records do not show that the land was registered under the
Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban
City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and
damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the sale of the land by
Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made during
the lifetime of Ricardo.

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Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land

transferred in his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs.
Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed
on the land. However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima separated,
Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the house was leased to
third parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is
highly questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written
instrument stating that she would be leaving behind to her children the land
which she had inherited from her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
since the assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006,[5] the RTC dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land
in the amount of P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC
to acquire jurisdiction over the case.[6]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the
action was not merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition
and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to
annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary estimation, the case was well
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous
stand and took cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30 years since the
Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right of
an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs
appropriates the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then
prescription can set in. The RTC added that since prescription had set in to
question the transfer of the land under the Affidavit, it would seem logical
that no action could also be taken against the deed of sale executed by

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Ricardos daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive portion of the

order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered
in so far as the pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action. The dismissal of the action, however, is
maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction but by reason of
prescription.
Issue:
The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by
prescription.
Held:
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the
lower courts are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal
except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts
is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.[8]
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the
ground of prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in
favor of Ricardo, the alleged seller of the property from whom Dominador
asserts his ownership, is speculative. Thus, a review of the case is
necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states:

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Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and

objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit
was executed on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only
on 26 October 2001, a lapse of more than 30 years. No action could be
taken against the deed of sale made in favor of Dominador without
assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had already
prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the
Affidavit alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners
evidence. The facts show that the land was sold to Dominador by
Ricardos daughters, namely Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas,
during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged deed of sale was not
presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardos daughters
had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence
was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or
ratified the sale made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September
2006 Order, the RTC hastily concluded that Ricardos daughters had legal
personality to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and
Virginia Bahia-Abas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject
property is of no moment in this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has
a cause of action against [his] daughters and not the herein plaintiffs. After
all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or ratified the alleged
deed of sale.[9]
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show
that Ricardos possession of the land had been open, continuous and
exclusive for more than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary
acquisitive prescription.[10] Dominador merely assumed that Ricardo had
been in possession of the land for 30 years based on the Affidavit

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submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading
filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and
damages, alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife
sometime after 1966 and moved to another place. The records do not
mention, however, whether Ricardo had any intention to go back to the
land or whether Ricardos family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in
his name for taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed
until 2001 when the case was filed. Although a tax declaration does not
prove ownership, it is evidence of claim to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share
of the other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the coownership, as expressed in Article 494 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a coowners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or
other co-owners, the following requisites must concur: (1) that he has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other coowners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.[11]
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanitas
death in 1989, petitioners sought for the partition of their mothers land.
The heirs, including Ricardo, were notified about the plan. Ricardo,
through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners, as his co-heirs,
that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly, Ricardos
interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs
after repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v.
Prangan-Valera,[12] we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of
one of the co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had repudiated the

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claims of the others, and that they were apprised of his claim of adverse
and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only
from 5 June 1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardos
repudiation of their claims to the land. Since petitioners filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages with the
RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had lapsed. This threeyear period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive prescription
period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over
the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominadors argument that prescription began to commence in
1966, after the Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely
relied on the Affidavit submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years. Dominador did not submit
any other corroborative evidence to establish Ricardos alleged possession
since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that
the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other
competent evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive
prescription of Ricardo over the land. Since the property is an unregistered
land, Dominador bought the land at his own risk, being aware as buyer that
no title had been issued over the land. As a consequence, Dominador is
not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his legal entitlement
to his claim.
With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC
did not err in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),[14] amending Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the
following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

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Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
(2)
In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x

On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real
property, or any interest, outside Metro Manila where the assessed value
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). The provision
states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for

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taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the

assessed value of the adjacent lots.
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land
was P590.00 according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000
filed with the RTC. Based on the value alone, being way below
P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioners
argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of sale.
Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,[16] we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover
ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution
and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo
which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to the exclusion of
petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the land, and
(2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between Ricardos daughters
and Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is something other
than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted.[17]

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In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by
the RTC to dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently
established Dominadors rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we
direct the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who among the
parties are legally entitled to the land.

Taghoy vs. Tigol, Jr

GR# 159665/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 341
Facts:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime
in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman
was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs)
and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the
existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire several
properties.
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by
Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a
complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of
Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to
partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino.
The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a
talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago
Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in
attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman,
Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of
donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were
not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the
properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who
is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez
together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally
and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of
each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de
Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that
after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the

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properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants

refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the
properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the
Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs
and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an
accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants
forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among
others that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de
Guzman, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of
petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez in the following
manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants late parents
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de
Donation Propter Nuptias dated February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance
dated July 14, 1939, for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15129 was
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez
and Anastacia Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Inter
vivos) dated April 10, 1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed
by third parties.
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de
Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with
Tranquilina (defendants grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants
father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the
plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take
possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has
been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion
of all others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the

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instant case is already barred by res judicata since there had been three
previous cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of
action which were all dismissed, the last of which was dismissed for failure
to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents covering the
disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in
common as agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership
ceases when one of the parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the
action becomes one for a title and recovery of ownership and the action
prescribes in four years.
After trial, the decision was rendered on April 8, 1992 which ruled as
follows:8
"From the evidence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are brothers and
sisters who are the children of Estanislao Meneses and Anatalia de
Guzman and the defendants are the children of plaintiffs counsin Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The defendants mother Tranquilina de
Guzman and plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman and Leoncia de
Guzman are full blooded sisters. The subject six (6) parcels of land were
conjugal properties of Leoncia de Guzman and her husband Cornelio
Aquino were in their possession until their death in 1945 and 1947,
respectively. After the death of plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman on
September 14, 1978, plaintiff Santiago Meneses came across an affidavit
of Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio Barrozo stating that he is
an adopted son of said spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman
(Exhibit "A") which, is however, not supported by evidence (a court order).
The said affidavit mentioned, among other things, a house and a parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 699 located at Guiguilonen,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, (Exhibit "B"). The sugar cane and coconut land
situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of
27,849 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C")
which was in the possession of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de
Guzman until their death. Sometime in
1944 Leoncia de Guzman called a conference among the plaintiffs and
spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and told them that all
their conjugal properties shall be divided equally between Anatalia de
Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman and that she did not sign documents
regarding the conveyance of their properties; and that the property (parcel
B) in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which yielding an annual produce

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worth P15,000.00 was divided between Anatalia de Guzman and

Tranquilina de Guzman.
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman who were childless had
Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman as their legal heirs. The
latter succeeded the former over the subject six (6) parcels of land in equal
shares - belongs to Anatalia de Guzman and the other half, to Tranquilina
de Guzman."
This, notwithstanding the claim of defendants that the first parcel was
donated to Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by way of "Donation
Intervivos."
The second parcel, sold to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
The third and 6th parcels, donated to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman; and
The 4th and 5th parcels, sold to third parties.
The claim of Cesario Velasquez that he was adopted by the Spouses
Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman is not supported by evidence.
The Court finds plaintiff Santiago Meneses credible; and his testimony,
credible by itself. Santiago Meneses who is 80 years old testified
spontaneously in a clear, straight forward and convincing manner.
The version of the defendants to the effect that spouses Cornelio de
Guzman and Leoncia de Guzman left no properties cannot be given
serious consideration. It is incredible and unbelievable.
How did the spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman support and
maintain themselves if they disposed of their valuable properties, the six (6)
parcels of land in question, during their lifetime? Did they really leave no
properties? These questions remained unanswered.
The defendants failed to prove their allegations that the Spouses Cornelio
Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman disposed of their properties during their
lifetime.

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Defendant Eliseo Velasquez is a lawyer and his co-defendant brothers are

retired government officials.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs are simple, innocent country folks who
have not obtained substantial level of education.
The Court believes and so holds that the defendants manipulated the
transfer unto themselves all the properties of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and
Leoncia de Guzman; thus, depriving the plaintiffs their shares in the
inheritance, to their prejudice and damage.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not partition prescribes, the court
believes and so rules that it does not.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the
statute of limitations.
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the
estate of the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive
ownership of the properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal
heirs of spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.
V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.
Held:
Petitioners contend that public respondent erred when it held that the issue
of res judicata was never raised either in the Answer or at the Pre-trial such
that it was not under consideration. We agree with the petitioner. The
records show that the defense of res judicata was raised in the petitioners
Amended Answer filed before the trial court more particularly under
paragraph 18, to wit:

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"18. b. The case at bar is already barred by RES JUDICATA, there having
been three (3) previous cases involving either the predecessors-in-interest
of the parties herein or of the present parties themselves, the same subject
matter, and the same cause of action, which were all dismissed, the last
dismissal having been ordered by this very same Honorable Court in Civil
Case No. D-8811 on October 21, 1988 for failure to prosecute which
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and therefore with
prejudice as this Honorable Court did not provide otherwise (Sec. 3, Rule
17) and the Plaintiffs in said case, who are the same plaintiffs in the
present case did not appeal from said order of dismissal."
Said Amended Answer was admitted by the trial court in its Order dated
March 2, 199011 and was one of the issues stipulated for resolution in its
Pre-trial Order dated May 18, 1990. Thus, it was clear error for respondent
court to conclude that res judicata was never raised in the lower court.
The next question is whether res judicata is present in the instant case. We
rule in the affirmative. Petitioners in their Memorandum established that
there were three (3) earlier cases filed by private respondents against
petitioners involving the same subject matter and issues as in the instant
case which were all dismissed, to wit:
"The first Complaint filed by Anatalia de Guzman, mother of private
respondent Santiago Meneses, against Tranquilina de Guzman and his son
Cesario Velasquez, docketed as Civil Case No. 11378 of the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan. Said action was dismissed on August 18,
1950.
Thirty four (34) years after, or on October 9, 1984, private respondent
Santiago Meneses filed a second Complaint similar to the Complaint of his
mother (Civil Case No. 11378) which was docketed as Civil Case No. D7584, entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, represented by Santiago
Meneses vs. Cesario Velasquez, defendant. In the order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, dated May 28, 1986, this Complaint
was dismissed for failure to prosecute without prejudice (Exh. "16").
Private respondent Santiago Meneses refiled the Complaint allegedly
joined this time by his siblings on October 23, 1987; which was docketed as
Civil Case No. P-8811 and entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, namely:

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Santiago Meneses, Apolonio Meneses, Andres Meneses, Luis Meneses,

Felicidad Meneses, Plaintiffs, versus Heirs of Cesario Velasquez, namely:
Anastacia Velasquez, Sofia Velasquez, Eliseo Velasquez, Jose Velasquez,
Leonora Velasquez, Nieves Velasquez, Defendants." (Exh. "17"). On
October 21, 1988, the Court a quo dismissed this Complaint as follows:
"For failure to prosecute, the case is hereby dismissed without costs." (Exh.
"18")."
Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their
Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the
principle of res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is
within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the purpose of justice requires
it. We have examined the third complaint filed by private respondents on
October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and we found that
the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites
of res judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must
be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the
dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with
prejudice.12 On this ground alone, the trial court should have already
dismissed this case. However, considering that this case had already
reached this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be
more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the
parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural
technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be
"liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."13
Petitioners next contend that private respondent Santiago Meneses failed
to prove the nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino
spouses in favor of petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their
predecessors-in-interest Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since
he failed to adduce any evidence to support his claim other than his bare
allegations of its nullity. Petitioners claim that they were able to show by

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documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime

disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a)
Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of
then future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
(petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel and
the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the complaint; (b) Deed of
donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor
of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Escritura de
Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the
second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a
P500 consideration; (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor
of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the
remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and
confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. Petitioners claim that the
record is bereft of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable
array of documentary evidence but the courts below declared their nullity
on the basis of the "telltale" story of Santiago Meneses. They contend that
in giving credence to the testimony of Santiago Meneses that all the deeds
of conveyances executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of the petitioners
were a nullity, Santiago would want to make it appear that the spouses
Aquino, in giving dowry thru escritura de donation propter nuptias and
donation inter vivos, were only fooling the innocent youngsters and then
future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and the
innocent minors donees Jose and Anatascia Velasquez respectively.
Petitioners submission is impressed with merit.
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance
of evidence adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions
of the courts below, which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a
rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this
Court. This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14 However,
although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not
conform to the evidence on record,15 in the instant case, we are not bound
to adhere to the general rule since both courts clearly failed to consider
facts and circumstances which should have drawn a different conclusion.16

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In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide
the property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first
stage in an action for partition.17 Needless to state, an action for partition
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property.
In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in
his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the properties.18
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has
been adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were
repudiated before Leoncias death; thus private respondents are still entitled
to share in the subject properties. There is no preponderance of evidence
to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The trial court
declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose
and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the
complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
over the second parcel and the deed of donation propter nuptias over the
third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels
insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately
belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the
basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia
de Guzman was still alive, she called a conference among them, the
plaintiffs and their mother Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother
Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are conjugal in
nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and not to
believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did not sign
them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect
that Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject
properties in favor of the petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses
testimony was never
corroborated by any other evidence despite his testimony that the alleged
conference was also made in the presence of third parties. Moreover, if the
alleged conference really took place in 1944, a year before Leoncias death,
Leoncia could have executed another set of documents revoking or
repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged
intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters Anatalia and
Tranquilina de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the

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testimony of Santiago Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and

this was affirmed by the respondent court which stated that the matter of
ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court. However, the fact that a
person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a guaranty that he
would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a
person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared
to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.20
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and
ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the
Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land
subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in
1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February
15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b)
Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel
in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c)
Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another
portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July
14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying
to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter
nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible
error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized
documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.26 And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated.27 The donation of the first parcel
made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez
who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was
accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it,
and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was
delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly
and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the

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reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The
donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The
deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance
of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family
Code.29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the
Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since
Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and
the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and
Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also
valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses
ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed
by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such
deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the
names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939.
The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title30 and it
requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No.
15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.31
Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts
of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the
certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership
and control over the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after
more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-ownership claim
over the subject property.
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their
lifetime and the documents were duly notarized so that these documents
enjoy the presumption of validity.32 Such presumption has not been
overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear and
convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners
were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed
to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the
conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards

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the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also
conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of partition cannot be
maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents
have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of
the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no coownership exists between private respondents and petitioners, we find no
reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support
of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision and
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are SET ASIDE. The complaint in the
trial court against petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED.
Monteroso v. CA
GR # 105608, Apr. 30, 2008
553 SCRA 66
Facts
When Don Fabian died in 1948, he left behind as part of his estate 12
parcels of land. Subject properties under dispute between Soledad
Cagampang and her siblings involved 6 lots designated as F1,F2,F3,F5,F7
and F8. Soledad alleged that she owned these properties by acquisition
through deeds of absolute sale excuted by her father (Don Fabian) and her
on 1939. However, evidence are presented by her siblings on the invalidity
of said sale such as: Don Fabian after the execution of the Deed never
relinquished possession over these properties. Thereby, parties never
intended to be bound. That there is no evidence to support that Don Fabian
received valuable consideration in exchange of his properties. TCTs are
amended judicially, that only the name of Soledad appear in the TCTs and
form part of her paraphernal property. (sariling wonder lang: siguro naisip
ni Don Fabian, kung nakapangalan lang sa anak nya yung property hindi
yun mahahabol ng manugang)
Based from the above, RTC decided for the invalidity of said sale which the
CA affirmed. Hence this case.
Issue:

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Provided that said sale is invalid, does this make Tirso and his sibling coowners over these properties.
If yes, is it fatal to the filed case of Partition by Tirso and his siblings his
omission to expressly indicate the fact that they are co-owners.
Held:
Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel
partition of the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as
a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the
inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don
Fabian at the moment of his death (1948). Until then, before partition and
eventual distribution of Don Fabians intestate estate, a regime of coownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of
Don Fabian. And as a co-owner, his right is imprescriptible except when he
expressly repudiates his share. And Soledad, by invoking as defense of
prescription over Tirso and their other siblings, therefore admitted that coownership existed.
Resolving the issue regarding the existence of co-ownership among the
heirs, will Tirso et al can avail the remedy of Partition, when co-ownership
is not properly alleged.
SC held Yes. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of
co-ownership, his demand from, and act of initiating Partition necessarily
implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner of the properties
unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses and that he is a co-owner of
all said properties to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. An
action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.

Soriente vs. Concepcion

GR# 160239/ Nov. 25, 2009
605 SCRA 315
Facts: In 1978 Arsenio Concepcion, husband of Nenita, acquired the
subject lot and tolerated the occupancy of Soriente for free and on
temporary basis. After Arsenio died in 1989, his family initiated to develop

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the lot but Soriente refused to vacate the property. In 2000, after Elizabeth,
daughter of Nenita and Soriente failed to meet settlement, a Complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed in MeTC and prayed for monthly rent and
damages. After trial, said lower court decided in favor of Concepcion.
Soriente appealed to RTC on the ground, among others, that Concepcion
have no legal capacity to sue being not the registered owner appearing in
the lots TCT. RTC upheld MeTC and so did the CA. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife of the registered owner, whose name did not
appear in the subject lots TCT have the capacity to sue.
Held
By all means of course. Nenita as the successor-in-interest of her husband
Arsenio Concepcion and co-owner of the subject property, is entitled to
prosecute the ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a
real party-in-interest. Art 487 of CC states Any one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment.
Hulst v. PR Builders
GR # 156364, Sept. 25, 2008
566 SCRA 333
Facts
Hulst filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration when he was ordered to
return to respondent the 2.12 M in excess of the proceeds of the auction
sale delivered to him. He contends that the Contract to Sell between him
and the Respondent does not involve land but merely shareholding over
the Condominium Corporation that actually owned the lots. By this set up,
there is no violation on Constitutional prohibition of foreigners owning land
over our Country.
Issue
Whether or not a foreigner can acquire condominium unit, with its undivided
interest over the common properties of the Condominium Corporation
without violating the prohibition of Foreigners owning real properties in the
Philippines.
Held
Yes, although it is prohibited for foreigners to own real property in the
Philiipines, this is not without exception. One of which is the Condominium

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Act RA 4726 where foreigners are allowed to own a unit, and thereby
having an undivided right over the common areas held by the
Condominium Corporation.
The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same
time selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interests in
the condominium corporation, and no one can buy shares in a
condominium corporation without at the same time buying a condominium
unit. It expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and
shares in condominium corporation up to not more than 40% of the total
outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or Controlled Corporation.
Under this set up, the ownership of the land Is legally separated from the
unit itself. The land is owned by a Condominium Corporation and the unit
owner is simply a member in this Condominium Corporation. As long as
60% of the members of this Condo Corp are Filipino.

Title V. Possession
Chapter 1.Possession and the Kinds Thereof (Arts. 523-530)
Chapter.2 Acquisition of Possession (Arts.
531-538)

Bunyi v. Factor
GR # 172547, Jun. 30, 2009
591 SCRA 350
Facts
Constantino and Maura Factor, husband and wife, had been in actual,
continuous, peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and
occupation of the subject 18 hectare of land in Las Pinas before 1906. In

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1975, upon petition, their children granted Original Registration and

Confirmation of Imperfect Title thus making the 7 chilren co-owners of the
subject land. Enrique as one of the 7 children, instead of taking his share
over the proceeds of the land when it was sold, by agreement with his
siblings, he instead take the Factor Compound as his share.
He then constructed several houses over the property including the rest
house under dispute. Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi, petitioners, were
tenants inside the compound since 1999. When Enrique died,
administration on the property was entrusted to Gloria, his eldest child.
She and her family (husband and son) lived in Taguig but oversaw the
property and visit it from time to time to collect rental payments. When she
died, her daughter, Fe Factor took over the administration as a co-owner.
She also allowed Ruben Labao married to Precy to stay for free on the
property. When he died, she asserted that the property was owned by
Ruben Labao and questioned Fes ownership. RTC ruled in favor of Fe
Factor. CA affirmed the decision hence this case.
Issue
Whether or not Fe Factor have better right over the property who visits it
from time time over Bunyi who actually residing in the property.
Held
Fe Factor have the better right. The fact of her residence somewhere else,
by itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The
law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to
maintain his possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
the ground before he is deemed in possession.28 There is no cogent
reason to deviate from this doctrine. Respondents right to the property
was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their fathers
death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are
enforced and protected from encroachments made or attempted before the
judicial declaration since respondent acquired hereditary rights even before
judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.
Ong v. Republic
GR # 175746, Mar.12, 2008
548 SCRA 160

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Facts:
Below is the history of Transfer of Ownership of the 574 sqm lot situated in
Brgy Anolid Mangaldan Pangasinan:
1971- Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista owned subject land. They
have duly paid Tax Declaration over the properties.
1979- Sold to Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro.
1997- Sold to Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen
1998- Sold to Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil.
1999- Sold to Ong and his brothers. As such they filed an Application for
Registration of Title over subject lot. They alleged that they are the coowners of the said lot and that it is their their exclusive property. That the
property is unoccupied, and that their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of owners for more than 30 years.
Proved that subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by:
1927- Bureau of Lands included said land as within alienable and
disposable zone
1999- DENR and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office.
RTC ruled in favor of registration, which the CA reversed. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not Ong and his co-owners can register said property under
their name despite it being included in public domain.
Held:
No. As a general rule, properties part of public domain cannot be privately
appropriated except when the applicants or their predecessors -in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject log since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by PD 1073.
Petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessor in interest
OCCUPY sad properties. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title
to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession AND occupation. The law speaks of possession and

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occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as
a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

People v. Peaflorida
GR # 175604, Apr. 10, 2008
551 SCRA 111
FACTS:
SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the
Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that
a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon
from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Major Domingo
Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team
composed of Competente as team leader; the team boarded the police
mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.
They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged
appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00
was also found in appellants possession. The police officers confiscated
these items and took photographs thereof.
The trial court found appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty of
transporting marijuana and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant had freely and consciously possessed the
marijuana?
HELD: Yes.Appelant freely and consciously possessed the marijuana.
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction
unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the

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prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be

present together with his possession or control of such article. Animus
possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be
rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and
control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden
of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus
possidendi.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts
cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its
perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus
possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis
by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and
usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.
Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of
possession in the instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the
bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw
in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package.
Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask Obias what the package
contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the
package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram.

Chua-Bruce v. CA
GR # 109595, Apr. 27, 2000
331 SCRA 1
FACTS:
On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested
Fructuoso Peaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count
of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or
less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen
bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00.
The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as
against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary
Sheet, or a total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if
there was actually a shortage, a re-verification of the records and
documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a
shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated investigations totalling four (4)

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in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager. The second was by
the banks internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then, the
banks Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent
investigation. Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came
in to investigate. All of these investigations concluded that there was a
shortage of P150,000.00, and the person primarily responsible was the
banks Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein accused. JksmOn
November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of
P150,000.00, the accuseds service with the bank was terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank) filed a Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with
Preliminary Attachment and Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R3733 against petitioner and her husband, Antonio Burce. Esm
Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa was
filed against petitioner.The trial court found the appelant guilty as charged,
applelannt seasonably filed his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appelant was gulity or not.
HELD: No. yhe appalent was not guilty.
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art.
315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for
administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed
by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who
has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first
element absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on
commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or
physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case,
petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for the cash-

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in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of
a bank teller, both being mere bank employees. Calrky
Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession
over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being
absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article
315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code

Daclag v. Del Rosario

GR # 159578, Feb 18, 2009
579 SCRA 556
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision dated July
28, 2008 where the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision dated October
17, 2001 and the Resolution dated August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48498.Records show that while the land was
registered in the name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984, respondents
complaint for reconveyance was filed in 1991, which was within the 10-year
prescriptive period.
The Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners bought the property when it
was still an unregistered land, the defense of having purchased the
property in good faith is unavailing .It affirmed the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in finding that petitioners should pay respondents their
corresponding share in the produce of the subject land from the time they
were deprived thereof until the possession is restored to them.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contend that the 10-year
period for reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or
a constructive trust; that since respondents' action for reconveyance was
based on fraud, the action must be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are possessor in good faith.
HELD: Yes the petitioners are possessor in good faith.
Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good
faith does not lose this character, except in a case and from the moment
facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. Possession in good faith
ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the

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possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property

by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it
can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title
or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient to show bad faith.
Such interruption takes place upon service of summons.
Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is
entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted.
Records show that petitioners received a summons together with
respondents' complaint on August 5, 1991; thus, petitioners' good faith
ceased on the day they received the summons. Consequently, petitioners
should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum beginning August 5,
1991 instead of 1984.

Chapter 3.Effects of Possession (Arts. 539-561)

Laurora v. Sterling Techpark
GR # 146815, Apr. 9, 2003
401 SCRA 181
FACTS: In a [C]omplaint for Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27
September 1997 before the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona
and Gen. Mariano Alvarez, plaintiffs therein, x x x Pedro Laurora and
Leonora Laurora [herein petitioners] alleged that they [were] the owners of
Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the Yaptinchay Estate with an area of 39,771
sq. meters and located in Carmona, Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees
and has possessed the land up to the present. On 15 September 1997,
[respondents] Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. x x x
through their Engr. Bernie Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted the trees and
plants, and with the use of armed men and by means of threats and
intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting [petitioners]. As a result of their
dispossession, [petitioners] suffered actual damages in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
After summary proceedings in the MCTC, x x x, a judgment was rendered
dismissing the complaint. The case was elevated to the Regional Trial
Court. In due course, the said court rendered a decision reversing the
MCTC judgment. x x x

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The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and reinstated the Order
of dismissal issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). It held that
there was no evidence to support the claim of petitioners to the prior
physical possession of the property. The evidence allegedly showed that
they had already sold the land with the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Accordingly, their subsequent entry into and
possession of the land constituted plain usurpation, which could not be the
source of any right to occupy it. Being planters in bad faith, they had no
right to be reimbursed for improvements on the land, in accordance with
Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject
petitioners from the premises despite their resistance and objection,
through the use of arm[ed] men and by bulldozing, cutting, and destroying
trees and plants planted by petitioners, without court order, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter.
HELD: No. they do not.
The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession
of real property -- possession de facto, not possession de jure. Only prior
physical possession, not title, is the issue. If ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon such question, but only to determine
the question of possession.
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved
only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such
an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be
determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.
No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since
respondents claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior
possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue
ofownership. Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and
occupied the property in question, respondents had no right to take the law
into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject the occupants
therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by
respondents, still they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully
ejected therefrom. Under appropriate circumstances, respondents may file,

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other than an ejectment suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action

intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria - an action to recover ownership of real property.

EDCA Publ. v. Santos

GR # 80298, Apr. 26, 1990
184 SCRA 614
FACTS
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as
Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner
company for 406 books, payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the
corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for which Cruz
issued a personal check covering the purchase price 5 On October 7,
1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos
who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her,
paid him.
It turned out the Cruz was not connected with De La sale College, and the
account was already closed.Police arrested Cruz and latter went to the
store of Santos and seized the 120 books without a warrant .
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for
recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA.
A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial
refusal, finally surrendered the books to the private respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is unlawfully deprived of the lawfull
possession of the the books
HELD:
Yes. Respondent is unlawfully deprived of her lawful possession of the
books.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.

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If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been

unlawfully deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully
deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner.
A person relying on the seller's title who buys a movable property from him
would have to surrender it to another person claiming to be the original
owner who had not yet been paid the purchase price therefor. The buyer in
the second sale would be left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be
compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without even the
right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to
ascertain first that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to
purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the
books had been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA was less than
cautious in fact, too trusting in dealing with the impostor. Although it had
never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books he had
ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in
payment. It did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do
this. It did not wait to clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it
indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, by the printed terms thereon,
that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting ownership in
the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to
satisfy herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to
him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559
by his mere possession of the books, these being movable property,
Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy
them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the
prejudice sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. We cannot

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see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted
in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its
remedy is not against the private respondents but against Tomas de la
Pea, who has apparently caused all this trouble. The private respondents
have themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a
customary deal not really unusual in their kind of business. It is they and
not EDCA who have a right to complain.

BPI Family v. Franco

GR # 123498, Nov. 23, 2007
538 SCRA 186
Facts: This case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the
petitioner BPI Family Bank (BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado
Franco (Franco) in conspiracy with other individuals, some of whom
opened and
maintained separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte
(SFDM) branch, in a series of transactions. On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco
Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Tevesteco) opened a savings and current
account with BPI-FB. Soon thereafter, or on August 25, 1989, First Metro
Investment Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit account with
the same branch of BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to mature
one year thence.
Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts,
namely, a current, savings, and time deposit, with BPI-FB. The total
amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is traceable to a
check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration of Francos
introduction of Eladio Teves, who was looking for a conduit bank to
facilitate Tevestecos business transactions, to Jaime Sebastian, who was
then BPI-FB SFDMs Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for the
P2,000,000.00 check was part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB
from FMICs time deposit account and credited to Tevestecos current
account pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly signed by FMICs
officers. It appears, however, that the signatures of FMICs officers on the
Authority to Debit were forged. On September 4, 1989, Antonio Ong, upon
being shown the Authority to Debit, personally declared his signature
therein to be a forgery. Unfortunately, Tevesteco had already effected

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several withdrawals from its current account (to which had been credited
the P80,000,000.00 covered by the forged Authority to Debit) amounting to
P37,455,410.54, including the P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests in light
of FMICs forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-President, Severino
Coronacion, instructed Jesus Arangorin to debit Francos savings and
current accounts for the amounts remaining therein. In the meantime, two
checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB current account were
dishonored upon presentment for payment, and stamped with a notation
account under garnishment.
Issue: WON Franco had a better right to the deposits in the subject
accounts which are part of the proceeds of a forged Authority to Debit
Held:
In this case, the deposit in Francos accounts consists of money which,
albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The quality of
being fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its
nature or the will of the parties, being substituted by others of the same
kind, not having a distinct individuality.
Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been
unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the
current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent
amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited
from FMICs account and credited to Tevestecos, and subsequently traced
to Francos account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati
Case against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which
passed from one account to another, commencing with the forged Authority
to Debit.
It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership,
and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which
involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is
to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other
evidence of its title.[35] Money, which had passed through various
transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of traceable
origin, is no exception.

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Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate

personal property, BPI-FBs illustrative example, ostensibly based on
Article 559, is inapplicable to the instant case.
There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts
of Franco, but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of
FMICs deposits to Tevestecos account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that
the deposit of money in banks is governed by the Civil Code provisions on
simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a
bank and its depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Francos
deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding obligation to
pay him an equal amount on demand.[37] Although BPI-FB owns the
deposits in Francos accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding
payment of BPI-FBs obligation by drawing checks against his current
account, or asking for the release of the funds in his savings account.
Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against his current account, he
had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be honored
by BPI-FB as debtor.
More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the
accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were
proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in.
To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter, the right to take whatever
action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady
transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking
industry.
Our pronouncement in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[38] continues to resonate, thus:
XXXX
The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last
centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is
to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose
of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever
directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of the
check without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little
embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal
litigation.

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The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts
of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. x x x.
Ineluctably, BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty
bound to know the signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the
forgery in the Authority to Debit and in the process inadvertently facilitate
the FMIC-Tevesteco transfer, BPI-FB cannot now shift liability thereon to
Franco and the other payees of checks issued by Tevesteco, or prevent
withdrawals from their respective accounts without the appropriate court
writ or a favorable final judgment.
Further, it boggles the mind why BPI-FB, even without delving into the
authenticity of the signature in the Authority to Debit, effected the transfer
of P80,000,000.00 from FMICs to Tevestecos account, when FMICs
account was a time deposit and it had already paid advance interest to
FMIC. Considering that there is as yet no indubitable evidence establishing
Francos participation in the forgery, he remains an innocent party. As
between him and BPI-FB, the latter, which made possible the present
predicament, must bear the resulting loss or inconvenience.

Title VI. Usufruct

Chapter 1. Usufruct in General (Arts. 562-565)
Chapter 2. Rights of the Usufruct (Arts. 566-582)
Chapter 3. Obligations of the Usufruct (Arts. 583-602)
Chapter 4. Extinguishment of Usufruct (Arts. 603-612)

Title VII. Easements or Servitudes

Chapter 1. Easements in General (Arts. 613-633)

Fajardo v. Freedom to Build

GR # 134692, Aug. 1, 2000
337 SCRA 115

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Facts: Freedom To Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of

low-cost housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a house and lot in De la Costa
Homes in Barangka, Marikina. The Contract to Sell executed between the
parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to
wit:
1. Easements. For the homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in
front. No structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on
the front easement.
2. Upward expansion. Second storey expansion must be placed above the
back portion of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex
of the original building.
3. Front expansion: 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the
front property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just
as provided in the 60 sq. m. units.
The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title
covering the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.
Despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their
house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to
a point directly above the original front wall. Respondent filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, an action to demolish the unauthorized
structures.
The RTC directed the spouses Fajardo to immediately demolish and
remove the extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the
limitations imposed by the Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch
Sheriff of this Court shall execute this decision at the expense of the
defendants. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the restrictive covenant contained in the Contract to Sell
and Transfer Certificate valid.
Held:
Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with
easements. While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on
the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures

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thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can also be

contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which
one may use his own property, do not result in true easements, but a case
of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements
or reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the most common
easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude
the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he
would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a
restriction on the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them
where the covenants are reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to
law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject to these limitations, courts enforce
restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other
valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on
constructions have been held to be valid stipulations.
The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building
to be erected are crafted not solely for the purpose of creating easements,
generally of light and view, nor as a restriction as to the type of
construction, but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of
the building conformably with what the developer originally might have
intended the stipulations to be. In its Memorandum, respondent states in
arguing for the validity of the restrictive covenant that the "x x x restrictions are not without specific purpose. In a low cost-socialized
housing, it is of public knowledge that owners-developers are constrained
to build as many number of houses on a limited land area precisely to
accommodate marginalized lot buyers, providing as much as possible the
safety, aesthetic and decent living condition by controlling overcrowding.
Such project has been designed to accommodate at least 100 families per
hectare."
There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive
covenants aimed to promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent
overcrowding.
The statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not
opposed the construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive
covenant is not intended for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe

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the uses of the building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the
structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent
overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision dwellers. The
argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to
accommodate the individual families of their two children must fail for like
reason. Nor can petitioners claim good faith; the restrictive covenants are
explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and annotated at the back of the
Transfer Certificate of Title.
In sum, the Court holds that (1)....The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid;
(2)....Petitioners must be held to be bound thereby; and
(3)....Since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the
Restrictive Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be required to demolish the
structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits.

Goldcrest v. Cypress
GR # 171072, Apr. 7, 2009
584 SCRA 435
Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer
of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street,
Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a
Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress
Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress
Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium
project and to hold title to all the common areas. Goldcrest retained
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of
the ondominium. Following the turnover of the administration and
management of the Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in
1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress
were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Cypress filed a
complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Cypress sought to remove the door
erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as
well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal
of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck. Goldcrest averred that it was
granted the exclusive use of the roof decks limited common area by

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Section 4(c)4 of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise argued that it

constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and
that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and
inaccessible to other condominium unit owners. During the first inspection
of the HLURB, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common
area fronting the two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was
likewise discovered that Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure
which encroached 68.01 square meters of the roof decks common area.
During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest failed to secure
an alteration approval for the said permanent structure. Arbiter San Vicente
ruled in favor of Cypress. HLURB Special Division modified the decision of
Arbiter San Vicente deleting the award for damages but still directed
Goldcrest to remove any or all the structures which obstruct the use of the
stairway from the eighth to tenth floor, the passage and use of the lobbies
at the ninth and tenth floors of the Cypress Gardens Condominium; and to
remove any or all structures that impede the use of the unlimited common
areas. Cypress appealed to the Office of the President for the inclusion of
actual damages, OP denied. On appeal to the CA, Cypress was partially
favored. Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof decks common
limited area is for its exclusive use; building structures thereon and leasing
the same to third persons do not impair the subject easement.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the third persons do not impair the
subject easement.
Held: Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited
common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not
only did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the
condominium plan, in violation of Section 22 of Presidential Decree No.
957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following
prescribed restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit:
(1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;
(2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally contemplated;
(3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that
previously established;
(4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and
preservation of the easement;

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(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;

(6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make
necessary works on the servient estate; and
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said
works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient
estate.
Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
A careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of
the aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and
the lease of the office structure were neither necessary for the use or
preservation of the roof decks limited area. Second, the weight of the office
structure increased the strain on the condominiums foundation and on the
roof decks common limited area, making the easement more burdensome
and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners.
Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved
condominium project plan and violated Section 4 of the condominiums
Declaration of Restrictions.

Abellana v. CA
GR # 97039, Apr. 24, 1992
208 SCRA 316
Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the
northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an
easement of right of way over a subdivision road which, according to the
petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had
been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired,
through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction
of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners
of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents
access to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls
enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision road
be removed and that the road be opened to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in
the place before it was developed into a subdivision. They alleged

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furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a
public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the
public highway.
Issue: Whether or not easement may be acquired by prescription.
Held:
The appellate court did not err in holding that the road lots in a private
subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first
acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be
utilized as a public road.
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and
apparent and may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil
Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is
not a continuous easement (discontinuous) because its use is at intervals
and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man
passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land (4 Manresa 597;
Haffman vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs
Benedicto, et al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al., 103 Phil.
84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case, 8 Phil. 197). Neither may petitioners invoke
Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a
subdivision without access to any existing public road or street must secure
a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be
developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision
(which petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.

Bicol Agro-Ind v. Obias

GR # 172077, Oct. 09, 2009
603 SCRA 173
Facts: Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed a
road (the disputed road) measuring approximately 7 meters wide and

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2.9 kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling
and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has
thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations. On October 30,
1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired
the assets of BISUDECO. petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents
alleging that they unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing
bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioners and
the other sugar planters vehicles from passing through the disputed road,
thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner
alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The
agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and
relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on
their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous
use of the disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it
when it bought BISUDECOs assets. respondents denied having
entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction
and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO,
surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the
disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and
discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their
repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the
construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a governmentowned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under
Martial Law.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof
to sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO
and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road.
Moreover, the CA also declared that an easement of right of way is
discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription. The CA
likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to
respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the road is a valid right of way acquired by
BISUDECO vis--vis Bicol Agro-Industrial.
Held:

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Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable

for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its
creation, easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use,
easement may either be continuous or discontinuous. The easement of
right of way the privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to
pass over anothers land, usually through one particular path or linen is
characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals
and depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an easement of
a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar,
viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
In Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Costabella) the Court held
that, It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous
and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription.
In Bogo-Medellin, this Court discussed the discontinuous nature of an
easement of right of way and the rule that the same cannot be acquired by
prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue
of a title or by prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the
reason that the railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous
and apparent in nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were
visually apparent and they continuously occupied the subject strip of land
from 1959 (the year the easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to
petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period
in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of right of way over
the subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or
the passage of persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the
right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is
erroneous.

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Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
such easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be,
incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of
drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on
the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is
exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody elses land.
Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of
way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if
and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In
other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or
intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any
way, convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is
continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications
showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise
thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous.
The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into
apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and
a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent
easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is
non-apparent.
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that
the road in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the
same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been improved
and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous
nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the
New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

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The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be
acquired by prescription militates against petitioners claim of laches.

Salimbangon v. Tan
GR # 185240, Jan. 20, 2010
610 SCRA 426
FACTS
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate . Twenty years later his children Benedicta,
Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial
declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among
themselves as follows:
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide
along its NW. boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide along its
SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road
right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of
the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right
of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the
subdivision.
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not,
they being interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the
heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way
consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on
between Lots A and B and on to the street. The partition that embodied this
easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued to
the heirs.
But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the
property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of
right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter
wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the
southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

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Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with

Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of
the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband (the
Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built two
garages on it.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the
Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built
improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. Spouses
Salimbangon instituted an action against the Tans. The trial court ruled in
favor of the Salimbangons by upholding their easement of right of way
over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed
out that since the easement in this case was established by agreement of
the parties for the benefit of Lots A, D, and E, then only by mutual
agreement of the parties could such easement be extinguished.
On Appeal, the CA reversed the decision, ruling that the sale had
extinguished the easement of right of way by operation of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement which was established by the partition
agreement will also be extinguished through an agreement.
HELD:
No.
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to
contribute a strip of 1.5 meters between them that when combined formed
a 3-meter wide alley leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent
that
Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they
contributed to the establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their
owners the right to use the common alley as well. As Eduardo testified,
however, the true intent of the heirs was to give Lots D and E access to the
street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they were facing the
street.1avvphi1
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of
Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of
law.8 The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is
incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.

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Also, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to
take strips of 1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of
right of way when these lots were already small, the heirs executed a
"Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that cancelled the
easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in
its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
Although the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the
changed location of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of
easement imposed on Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to use
the new 3-meter easement alley that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking,
if the Salimbangons insist that their right as dominant estate under the
original partition agreement remains, then that would be partly on a 1.5meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip
on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on
Lot B.
The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of
way, the heirs intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on
Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that
only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of
Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans,
then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to have been
extinguished by operation of law.

Chapter 2. Legal Easements (Arts. 634-687)

Quimen v. CA
GR # 112331, May 29, 1996
257 SCRA 163
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio,
Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi,
Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves,
as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road.
The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot
No. 1448-B-1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero
designated as Lot. No. 14413-B-2. Adjoining Sotero's property on the right

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are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and
Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina
Santos. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the
share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the
latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is
located behind Anastacia's Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is
behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle
Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix. The latter allegedly assured her that she would give her a
right of way on her adjoining property at a certain price.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as
her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property.
But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway
Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.
In the meantime, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot
No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who
provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending
about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari
store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The
municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself
obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and
the facade of the store to reach the road.
For this reason, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a
right of way through Anastacia's property. The court dismissed her petition.
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's
property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least
damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: WON Yolanda may be given a right of way on the property of
petitioner.
HELD: YES

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We find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court

granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioner's property.
In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their
agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the
determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary
easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but
which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement
or an easement by necessity constituted by law.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal
and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or
allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for
the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable,
indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A
right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by
law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when
his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an
adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate
can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way
are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an
adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to
pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the
dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is
hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that
she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed
between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate.
14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of
court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of
Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen
Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway."
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that
the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the
parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states

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that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of
judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures
obstructing the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest
distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to
pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where
the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. This is the test.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals
declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter
wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioner's property,
will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the
suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's father which would
mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent any
showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in
the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts
them.

Sta. Maria v. CA
GR # 127549, Jan. 28, 1998
285 SCRA 351
FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of
a piece of land, Lot No. 124. Said lot is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on
the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the
southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by

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Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the
southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.
Plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Cesar and
Raquel Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is
surrounded by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the
defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the provincial
road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the
alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial
road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and
from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been
passing through the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot;
that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest
to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the
absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative
defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the
dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus,
plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants
be established in their favor.
The trial court decided in favor of respondents and found that based on the
Ocular Inspection Report there was no other way through which the private
respondents could establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial
road except by traversing directly the property of the petitioners. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the private respondents
had sufficiently established the existence of the four requisites for
compulsory easement of right of way.
ISSUE:
WON a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents who
have two other existing passage ways other than that of petitioners and an
alternative vacant lot fronting the provincial road also adjacent to private
respondents' property, which can be used in going to and from private
respondents' property.

HELD:
YES. All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following
requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right
of way under the Civil Code, to wit:

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1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no

adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The property of the plaintiffs, spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo, is
completely surrounded with adobe fence without any point of egress and
ingress to the national road. It has been commented upon that where there
are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement
may be established on any of them, the one where the way is shortest and
will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if these two
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause
the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if
the conditions of the various tenements are the same, all the adjoining
owners should be cited and experts utilized to determine where the
easement shall be established.
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three
options open to the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the national
road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly through defendants' property which is the shortest
route of approximately 20 to 25 meters away from the national road;
(2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of Florentino
Cruz on the left side of their property; and
(3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their property.
In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely affected.
There is sufficient vacant space between defendants' houses of
approximately 11 meters. The distance of defendant Florcerfida's house
with the adjoining adobe wall separating that of the property of defendants
Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the space between
the adobe wall and that of the latter's house is about 7 meters or a total of
11 meters vacant space for purposes of a right of way. On the other hand,
plaintiffs may negotiate with a right of way with Florentino Cruz on the left
side of their property although the same is quite circuitous. Lastly, the
option through the property of the Jacinto on the right side is very circuitous
and longer. The route involves a total of about 50 yards as it has to go

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straight to the right of about 35 yards and turn left of about another 15
yards before reaching the common right of way.
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that defendantsappellants' property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffsappellees' property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the least
prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t appears that there would
be no
significant structures to be injured in the defendants' property and the rightof-way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the alternative
routes pointed to by the defendants"

Quintanilla v. Abangan
GR # 160613, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 494
FACTS:
Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, (the dominant estate) from one
Dionisio Abasolo. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to
Apolinardito (petitioner), her son, who is now the registered owner thereof.
Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their
business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished
products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a
warehouse on their property (the dominant estate), they filed an action
asking for a right of way from respondent Pedro.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1,
(the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, had earlier sold the
same to DARYL'S , and thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse
over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a concrete fence.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit ruling that held that
petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the
least prejudicial to the servient estate. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
adverse decision holding that the criterion of least prejudice to the servient
estate must prevail over the shortest distance.
ISSUE:

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WON compliance with the preconditions set forth in articles 649 and 650 of
the new civil code is superior to the "mere convenience rule against the
owner of the dominant estate.
HELD:
YES.
As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code,
the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest. Where there are several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be
chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
as in the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be
used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the
servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance. The
court is not bound to establish what is the shortest; a longer way may be
established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such as when there
are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way, as
in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials
to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way
which although longer will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the
second alternative should be preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly
opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of
appellants, which only shows that another requirement of the law, that is,
there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to establish a compulsory
right of way.

Valdez v. Tabisula
GR # 175510, July 28, 2008
560 SCRA 332

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FACTS;
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from respondentspouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land,
bounded on the North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251,
on the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A. In their
contract of sale, they have agreed that petitioners shall be provided a 2 1/2
meters *sic+ wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot which is
not included in this sale.
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the
subject property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way
mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported
the matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents
failed to attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however,
drawing petitioners to file a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against respondents before the RTC.
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages
and attorneys fees), averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken
from the western portion of the subject property and not from theirs;6 and
petitioners and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining
the subject property, which adjoining properties have access to two public
roads or highways the bigger one which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the
north, and the smaller one which abuts an existing barangay road on the
north.
The RTC dismissed petitioners complaint and granted respondents
Counterclaim. On appeal, the CA, affirmed the trial courts decision.
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a
legal or compulsory easement of right of way as they failed to present
circumstances justifying their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners may demand for a right of way based on the
clause in their contract of sale.
HELD:
NO.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under
Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:

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Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may
cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to
the proprietors own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649,
the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the
result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the
extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the
existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate,
herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their family are also
the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have
access to two public roads or highways.
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public
roads, they have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an
easement on the "western side of *respondents+ lot."

Chapter 3. Voluntary Easements (Arts. 688 -693)

La Vista Assoc. v. CA
GR # 95252, Sept. 5, 1997
278 SCRA 498
Facts: Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision
on one side and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road

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extends to the entrance gate of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising
the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned
by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a
portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to
Ateneo. The Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion
sold to Philippine Building Corporation into La Vista Subdivision.
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private
respondents Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision, the latters predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents
of the said subdivision from enjoying an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road.
La Vista contends that mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the
imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial,
necessity for it
Issue: Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents
the use of the Mangyan Road
Held: The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian
Realty, Inc., concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way. A
legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public
use or for private interest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and
their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as
dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when:
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation stipulated in par. 3
of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the
property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a
road fifteen (15)meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the
property herein sold to theVENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the vendors;"

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(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the
land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by Ateneo,
including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the
property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll and Ateneo for breach
of contract and the enforcement the reciprocal easement on Mangyan
Road, and demanded that Maryknoll set back its wall to restore Mangyan
Road to its original width of 15 meters, after Maryknoll constructed a wall in
the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified, in a letter
to Ateneo President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road
fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your property and the
other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-ofway on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an
easement of right-of-way was created on our7 1/2 m. portion of the road in
your favor;"
(e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the Ateneo property,
acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested
that the mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and
La Vista Homeowners' Association would be extinguished if it bought the
adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the
dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice, acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan
Road) belongs to LaVista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam
(Maryknoll) and the Ateneo inequal portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had
indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan
Road and, like any other contract; the same could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand
Villas from Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet
to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not
voluntary easements.

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That there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus
the court could not have declared the existence of an easement created by
the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-ininterest of both La Vista and Solid Homes,Inc.,i.e., the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a
contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.

Unisource v. Chung
GR # 173252, Jul. 17, 2009
593 SCRA 230
Facts: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is
the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title
contains a
memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been
carried over from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.
As Sandicos property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum
of encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo
was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering Sandicos
property until TCT No. 176253 was issued in petitioners favor. On the
other hand, Hidalgos property was eventually transferred to respondents
Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No. 121488.
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of
Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant
estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it is a land
registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, the trial
court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an Order dated
November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion. In their Answer,
respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of
great prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it
took petitioner 15 years from acquisition of the property to file the petition.
The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by
respondents. It found that the dominant estate has no more use for the
easement since it has another adequate outlet to a public road which is

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Matienza Street. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter,

however, reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the petition
to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.
Issue: Whether or not the easement is personal since the annotation did
not prove that it is binding on the heirs or assigns of Sandico
Held: The petition lacks merit.
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal
and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or
allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for
the benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established
either by law or by the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and
the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of
way exists in favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the
encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way, petitioner alleged that
*t+he easement is personal. It was voluntarily constituted in favor of a
certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of *the lot+ described as
Lot No. 2, Block 2650. It further stated that the voluntary easement of the
right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted
simply by will or agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement
and definitely not an easement created by such court order because *the]
Court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
parties. In its Memorandum dated September 27, 2001, before the trial
court, petitioner reiterated that *t+he annotation found at the back of the
TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what
exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled since the
dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to
a public road which is Callejon Matienza Street. As we have said, the
opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar.
The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an
easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement
of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

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It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens
system without the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does
not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, it is the registration of the
servient estate as free, that is, without the annotation of the voluntary
easement, which extinguishes the easement.
The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not
extinguish the easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the
dominant estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them
may use the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use,
or making it more burdensome in any other way.

Title VIII. Nuisance (Arts. 694-707)

Telmo v. Bustamante
GR # 182567, Jul. 13, 2009
592 SCRA 552
Facts: Respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters
in Brgy. Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two (2)
parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located
at the back of respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed by the
construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for
sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said
they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the
roads 10-meter easement.
The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the
resurvey of Lot 952-A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed
that the Telmos encroached upon respondents lot. Petitioner then uttered,
Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo
makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng
building permit.
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However,
around 7:00 p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly
destroyed the concrete poles. The following day, respondents relatives
went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete

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poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he
was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the
incident in the barangay blotter.
Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just
compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property
for the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they
could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive,
Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo. Respondent charged
the latter criminallyfor violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and administrativelyfor
violation of Section 4 (a) (b), (c), and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713.
After submitting their own counter-affidavits, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo
administratively liable, but dismissed the charge against Elizalde Telmo for
lack of jurisdiction over his person, he being a private individual. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the Honorable Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon seriously
erred when he declared that there was no valid taking of respondents lot
by means of expropriation
(2) Whether or not respondents concrete posts were in the nature of a
nuisance per se
Held:
(1) NO.
Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.When any building or
structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building
Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
decree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further
action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to
707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures. Dangerous
buildings are those which are herein declared as such or are structurally
unsafe or not provided with safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard,

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or are otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation to existing

use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or public welfare because of
inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment, or
which otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community to
an intolerable degree.
A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they
do not apply to the respondents situation. Nowhere was it shown that the
concrete posts put up by respondent in what he believed was his and his
coowners property were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they
can be summarily demolished by petitioner.
What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the
scope of the provisions of the National Building Code. The Code does not
expressly define the word building. However, we find helpful the dictionary
definition of the word building, viz: *A+ constructed edifice designed
usually covered by a roof and more or less completely enclosed by walls,
and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or other
useful structure distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy
(as fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one
place (as boats or trailers) even though subject to occupancy.
(2) NO.
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner
did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which
would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they
did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by blocking the
free passage of people to and from the national road.

BOOK III - DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

PRELIMINARY PROVISION (Art. 712)

Title I. OCCUPATION (Arts. 713-720)

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Acap v. CA
GR # 118114, Dec. 7, 1995
251 SCRA 30
Facts: Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land
is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs
executed a Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights in favor of
private respondent Edy delos Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his
claim over the land, and petitioner paid the rental to him in 1982. However
in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages.
Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the
land, and that he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pidos widow upon her
return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights is a
recognized mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent
(2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of
private respondent
Held: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing
arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give
rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by
fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real
rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is
the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or
transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other
party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand,
a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate
heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between
the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked
difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary
rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale
between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and

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intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of
Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on
the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring
ownership.
A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the
registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at
some
future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of
a case already pending in court. It is to be noted that while the existence of
said adverse claim was duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that
a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and private
respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of
private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the
tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to
cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's
name. Consequently, while the transaction between Pido's heirs and
private respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as
a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere
allegation of private respondent's ownership without the corresponding
proof thereof.

Heirs of Seraspi v. CA
GR # 135602, Apr. 28, 2000
331SCRA 293
Facts: Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his
lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death
in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his
intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part
corresponding to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first
marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an
heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing
the heirs of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to
Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners.

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Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador.

Sdaad
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc.
(KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on
the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest
bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata,
brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his third
wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been
paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took
possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and
afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of
possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired
the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the
Seraspis was barred by the statute of limitations. Hence, this petition filed
by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus
substituted by his heirs.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners action is barred by extinctive prescription;
and
(2) Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership
of the properties in question through acquisitive prescription
Held: SC ruled for petitioners.
(1)Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, it held that an action for recovery of
title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only be
brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since
the action for recovery of possession and ownership was filed by
petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their
predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of the possession of
the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed. This case involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What
is more, the facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, what was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure
which provides that title by prescription is acquired after ten (10) years, in

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whatever manner possession may have been commenced or continued,

and regardless of good faith or with just title.
On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the
applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides: Real actions
over immovables prescribe after thirty years. This provision is without
prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other
real rights by prescription.
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed
in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Private respondent
contends that he acquired the ownership of the questioned property by
ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years.
(2) Respondent Simeon Recasa has neither just title nor good faith. As Art.
1129 provides: For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real
rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the
property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1)
occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession,
(6) tradition in consequence of certain contracts, and (7) prescription.
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property
through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership
of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his
ownership on succession for the property was not part of those distributed
to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor
received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership
thereof. Private respondent entered the property without the consent of the
previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper.

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Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through
any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The
basis of petitioners claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with
Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to make them owners of the property.
For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price, the ownership
of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or constructive
delivery of the property. Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione
dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition
transfers the ownership of things).
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has
not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata
in 1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in
possession of the property. Petitioners title to the property prevails over
private respondents possession in fact but without basis in law. As held in
Waite v. Peterson, when the property belonging to a person is unlawfully
taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the
recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or
assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action
against the wrongdoer.

Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta
AM # P-07-2399, Jun. 18, 2008
555 SCRA 28
Facts:
Edna Palero-Tan a Court Stenographer charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. a
Utility Worker of the same court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court
Personnel, for stealing her ring and bracelet.
Edna claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and her sisters
pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office
because she fears that they might be lost at the boarding house she is
renting. And that the only person who was present and saw her take out
the jewelry from her table drawer was respondent, whose table is adjacent
to hers.
On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D. Altone (Altone), confided to her
that he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable (Nable), that

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respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter
discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse.
Urdaneta denied that he stole complainants jewelry. He claimed that he
found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under his
table, at the side nearest the adjacent table of the complainant, and
thinking that the jewelry belonged to one of the litigants who approached
him that morning, he took them for safekeeping with the intention of
returning them to whoever was the owner. He thought that the ring and
bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely placed in an ordinary
plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his
coin purse and took them home. However, his wife, on 30 June 2005,
found them and accused him of buying the pieces of jewelry for his
mistress, and to stop his wifes nagging, he threw the pieces of jewelry at a
grassy lot beside their house.
Issue:
W/N finding a lost property charges the finder the duty to restore the
same to its owner.
Held:
Yes. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the
owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and
does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody,
the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It
is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he
found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the
finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it
to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall
immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the
finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive
weeks in the way he deems best.
If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the
expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public
auction eight days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The

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finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the
expenses.
Contrary to respondents claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had
the intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been
discovered by his wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless
"fancy" jewelry is immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of
taking something which does not belong to him.

Title III. DONATION (Arts. 725-773)

Chapter 1. Nature of Donations (Arts. 725-734)

Rep vs. Guzman
GR# 132964/ Feb. 18, 2000
326 SCRA 90
Facts:
Simeon Guzman, a Naturalized American Citizen died intestate leaving an
American Wife, Helen and an American Son, David, the herein respondent.
David and Helen executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon in the Philippines. Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim
leaving everything to the disposal of David. David then owned everything.
A concerned Lawyer wrote the Office of the Solicitor General that the
ownership of David to the extent of of the estate of Simeon was
defective. The reason is that, being a Citizen of America, he was prohibited
to be a donee of properties in the Philippines. The deed of Quitclaim was
interpreted to be that of the Donation. The government filed for Escheat
Proceeding in so far as the portion was concerned. Under Article 12 of
the Constitution, a foreigner is disqualified to have a property save in cases
of hereditary succession. Being a donee of the , the same is void and
would necessarily pertain to the republic of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the ownership of the properties be escheated in favor of
the government?
Held:

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No, in order that a Donation is valid, the following requisites must concur:
there must be a decrease in the property if the donor, there must be an
increase in the property of the donee and there must be intent to donate.
The Quitclaim made by Helen negated the intent to donate that must be
satisfied. Helen meant that the quitclaim was not a donation because she
was prohibited to donate under that Philippine Laws and she sad that it was
absurd for he to do that. There was no donation. It was merely a waiver of
right in favor of the donee, the son. Even if there has been that intent, the
same should not be a valid donation since the acceptance required for in
Article 748 was absent. The escheat proceeding is not proper.

RP v. Silim
GR # 140487, Apr. 2, 2001
356 SCRA 1
Facts:
Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in
favour of the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In
the Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said
property should "be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only."
This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of
BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the
Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the
donated parcel of land could not be released since the government
required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of land. To remedy
this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact for the
exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would
fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and
Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot
was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. The Bagong
Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school site and the
school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and
transferred to the new location.
The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned
that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated
property. They filed a complaint to annul the donation claiming that there
was no valid acceptance made by the donee and that there was a violation
of the condition in the donation.

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Issues:
1. Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC?
2. Was the condition in the donation violated?
Held:
1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance.
The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: If the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. The purpose of the
formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such
acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.
Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was
executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school
building. It was when the school building was being dismantled and
transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was
constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to
know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of
the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be
communicated to the donor.
Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to accept the donation
personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the
purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation
shall be void.
The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was
ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the
Republic of the Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau
of Public Schools. Such being the case, Buendias acceptance was
authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be
executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches,
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the
exigency or exigencies of the service and as long as the same are not
prohibited by law.
2. No. The condition was not violated.
The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation was not altered or affected
when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The

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acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be
accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.

Quijada vs. CA
GR# 126444/ Dec. 4, 1998
299 SCRA 6
Facts:
Trinidad Quijada with her siblings inherited a 2-hectare land in Agusan Del
Sur. On 1956, they executed a conditional deed of donation in favor of the
Municipality of Talacogon for the subject land. The donation was subject to
the condition that the donated property shall be used solely and exclusively
as part of the campus of the proposed Provincial High School. If such
proposal be discontinued, the property shall automatically revert to the
donor. Despite this donation, Trinidad Quijada possessed the land. On
1962, she sold 1-hectare of the land to Regalado Mondejar through a deed
of sale. The remaining area was sold to the same person verbally
evidenced by receipts of payment. In 1987, the Provincial High School
failed to materialize. The Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality enacted a
resolution reverting the land back to the donors.
During that time, Mondejar subsequently sold portions of the property to
buyers.Upon the death of Trinidad Quijada, her heirs now seeks to recover
possession and ownership of the subject land by filing a petition for quieting
the title. Petitioners contend that there was no valid sale since the land was
sold when ownership was already transferred to the Municipality by the
deed of donation. Respondents contend otherwise.
Issue:
W/N there is a valid sale by the donor, Quijada to a third person, Mondejar,
even if it was conditionally donated to a donee, the Municipality of
Talacogan.
Held:
There is a valid sale by the donor.
When the Municipalitys acceptance of the donation was made known to
the donor, the Municipality became the new owner of the property despite

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the conditions in the deed of donation. Ownership is immediately

transferred and will only revert if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.
When a person donates a land to another on the condition that the latter
would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory
one.
Despite these and as provided for by the Law on Sales, ownership by the
seller of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract is not
necessary. Ownership is only relevant during its consummation where the
thing sold will be delivered. Such delivery, in this case, happened when the
donor became the owner upon the reversion of the property. Such title, in
accordance to Article 1434 of the New Civil Code, passes by operation of
law to the buyer.
Note: Lands which were previously donated may still be sold to a third
person. Such sale is still valid even if at the time the sale was perfected,
the donor-seller did not own the land. It is upon the consummation of a
perfected sale where the donor-seller is obliged to deliver the thing sold.

Lagazo vs. CA
GR# 112796/ Mar. 5, 1998
287 SCRA 18
Facts:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of Tito Lagazo
was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to
become a permanent resident therein and she appointed one Eduardo
Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact on October 3, 1977, to fix the
requirements needed.
Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as
her new attorney-in-fact in April 16, 1984. The grant was subsequently
given and later, the land was donated to Lagazo on January 30, 1985.
Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property. The latter claims
ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him
by Espanol. He claimed that the house and lot in controversy were his by
virtue of the following documents:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7,
1977 in favor of Eduardo B. Espaol covering the residential house located
at the premises;

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2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina Jacob in favor of

Eduardo Espaol dated September 30, 1980; and
3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Espaol over Lot 8W and a
residential house thereon in favor of defendant-appellant dated October 2,
1982.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lagazo while the CA reversed stating that
Lagazos failure to accept the donation whether in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument renders the donation null and void.
Lagazo contends that the formalities for a donation of real property should
not apply to his case since it was an onerous one because he paid for the
amortizations due on the land before and after the execution of the deed of
donation.
Issue:
W/N the donation was simple or onerous.
Held:
The donation was a simple, not onerous. A simple or pure donation is one
whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services
equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the
Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules
on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are
not applicable.
Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the
lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed
explicitly stated:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity and
considering further that the DONEE is a grandson of the DONOR, the
DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives, transfer[s] and conveys, by
way of donation unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR has in the
above described real property, together with all the buildings and
improvements found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and
charges whatsoever;
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge
petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure

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donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made by

petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The
donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is
perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee." Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments."
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its
absence makes the donation null and void.

Florencio v. De Leon
GR# 149570/ Mar. 12, 2004
425 SCRA 447
FACTS: Petitioner Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an
area of 828 square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s,
De Leon allowed the spouses Respondent Rosendo and Consuelo
Florencio to construct a house on the said property and stay therein without
any rentals therefore.
In November 1978, Pet. De Leon, died intestate. Her heirs allowed
Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995,
Florencio died intestate. On April 26, 1995, the heirs of De Leon, through
counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate
the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused
and failed to vacate the property. They filed a complaint for ejectment
against the heirs of Florencio before the MTC.
The heirs of Florencio, in their answer, alleged that the plaintiffs had no
cause of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of
Donation on October 1, 1976 over the said parcel of land in favor of their
predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted the donation, as
shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the
deed. However, the original Deed cannot be produced by the latter. The
lower and the appellate court ruled in favor or Respondents.
ISSUE:1) WON there is donation?; 2)WON Petitioners, who appears to be
the donee under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to
the physical or material possession of the property over the respondents
who is the registered owner of the property?

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HELD: There is no donation. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of
the modes of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the
right to possess the property.
The essential elements of donation are as follows:
(a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and
(c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further
requires that the donation be made in a public document and that the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public
instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from
the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee,
provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply
with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to
be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.
It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and
the donees acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must
be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the
Register of Deeds or in the Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be
considered valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely
evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity of
registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are
affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts
executed by their predecessors-in-interest.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which engender veritable
doubts as to whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over
the property other than the respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased
registered owner of the property, Teresa de Leon, based on the Deed of
Donation.

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First. Teresa de Leon did not turned over the owners duplicate of TCT, to
Florencio, to facilitate the issuance of a new title over the property in his
favor. At the very least, he should have caused the annotation of the deed
immediately after the donation or shortly thereafter, at the dorsal portion of
TCT.
Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter,
before her death, had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976
over the property in his favor. It was only in 1996, or eighteen years after
the death of De Leon when the respondents sued the petitioners for
ejectment
Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently paid the realty taxes
for the property from 1978 up to 1996.
Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owners duplicate of
TCT.
Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the affidavit-complaint of
Valeriana Morente dated May 8, 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for
falsification and perjury against Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat.
Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one
thereof, Florencio was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his
acceptance of the donation before Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San
Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor did not affix his signature above his
typewritten name.
Sevilla vs. Sevilla
GR# 150179/ Apr. 30, 2003
402 SCRA 501
Facts: On December 10, 1973, Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died intestate
leaving 8 children, namely: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria,
Luzvilla, and Jimmy, all surnamed Sevilla. William, Jimmy and Maria are
now deceased and are survived by their respective spouses and children,
herein petitioners. Filomena left properties, one of which a parcel of land
which she co-owned with her 2 sisters, Honorata Almirol and Felisa Almirol,
who were both single and without issue.
When Honorata died in 1982, her 1/3 undivided share in Lot 653, was
transmitted to her heirs, Felisa Almirol and Filomena.
During the lifetime of Felisa and Honorata Almirol, they lived in the house
of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, together with their nephew, respondent
Leopoldo Sevilla and his family. Leopoldo attended to the needs of his
mother, Filomena, and his two aunts, Honorata and Felisa.

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On July 6, 1988, Felisa died. But prior thereto, on November 25, 1985, she
executed a last will and testament devising her 1/2 share in Lot No. 653 to
Respondent Leopoldo and his wife. On August 8, 1986, Felisa executed
another document denominated as Donation Inter Vivos ceding to
Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653, which was
accepted by Leopoldo in the same document.
Petitioners filed a case against respondents Leopoldo for annulment of the
Deed of Donation and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, alleging that the
Deed of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was
then 81 years of age, was seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of
the execution thereof.
RTC uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition unenforceable.
Issue: Whether the deed of donation is valid?
Held: Yes.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a
thing or right in favor of another who accepts it. Under Article 737 of the
Civil Code, the donors capacity shall be determined as of the time of the
making of the donation. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential, and the attendance of a vice of consent renders the
donation voidable.
In the case at bar, there is no question that at the time Felisa Almirol
executed the deed of donation she was already the owner of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot No. 653. Her 1/3 undivided share therein was increased by
1/2 when she and Filomena inherited the 1/3 share of their sister Honorata
after the latters death. Hence, the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No.
653 is considered a present property which she can validly dispose of at
the time of the execution of the deed of donation.
The insistence that respondent Leopoldo Sevilla employed fraud and
undue influence on the person of the donor is not present in the case at
bar. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
Petitioners failed to show proof why Felisa should be held incapable of
exercising sufficient judgment in ceding her share to respondent Leopoldo.
As testified by the notary public who notarized the Deed of Donation, Felisa
confirmed to him her intention to donate her share in Lot No. 653 to
Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was old, she was of sound
mind and could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is nothing in the record

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that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to rebut said declaration of

the notary public.
Catalan vs. Basa
GR# 159667/ July 31, 2007
528 SCRA 645
Facts: On June 16, 1951, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) donated to his
sister MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half of the subject parcel of
land.
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the same property in favor of her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered
with the Register of Deeds on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No.
12911 was issued in the name of respondents.
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership, as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI
alleged that the Deed of
Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void, as Feliciano was not of sound
mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed
that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent
Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified
for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was
amended to substitute his heirs, in lieu of BPI, as complainants.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and
competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of
Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or
competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due
execution of the donation in question must be upheld. CA affirmed the
judgment of the trial court and held that all the elements for validity of
contracts having been present in the 1951 donation, Mercedes acquired
valid title of ownership over the property in dispute, and the subsequent
sale of the property must be upheld.
Issue: Whether the trial court and the CA were correct in finding that the
deed of donation executed by Feliciano in favor of Mercedes was valid.

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Held: Yes. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes

gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any
other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or
with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free;
and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and
the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However,
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it;
if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that
the evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early
as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by
the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By
itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his property rights.
From the scientific studies, it can be deduced that a person suffering from
schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation,
June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental
faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the
contrary was adduced.
Gestopa v. Pilapil
GR# 111904, Oct. 5, 2000
342 SCRA 105
Facts: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels
of unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis
causa, two of which are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October
13, 1966, in favor of private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. The first
deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2. The second deed pertained to parcel 3.

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The last deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds contained the reservation of
the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated
during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973,
Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a
deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land
plus two other parcels (6 parcels in all) again in favor of private respondent
Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that (1) the Danlag spouses shall
continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the
donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said
spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the
transfer of the parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on
them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold
parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Sps. Gestopa. On September 29,
1979, the Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels
of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos. On March 1,
1983, Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition against the Gestopas
and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of land. In their
opposition,
the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of donation dated
January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by Mercedes
through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of
the donor. Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego
Danlag, without any property at all. On December 27, 1991, the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of the Gestopas and the Danlags. Mercedes
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1993, the appellate court
reversed the trial court.
Issue: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.
Held: The donation was inter vivos for the following reasons:
(1) The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love
and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
(2) The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to
transfer the naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the
Court of Appeals, what was the need for such reservation if the donor and
his spouse remained the owners of the properties?

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(3) The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in

accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended
to part with the six parcels of land. (4) The donee accepted the donation. In
the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245 (1977), we said that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is
a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the
donors' lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right
to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to
give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In
Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors'
lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was
already effective during the donors' lifetime. The attending circumstances in
the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent of
the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its
execution. Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag
spouses already executed three donations mortis causa. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag spouses were aware of the
difference between the two donations. If they did not intend to donate inter
vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis
causa.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to
comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The
donor-spouses did not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of
revocation. Hence the revocation made was not valid. Finally, the records
do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the
donation in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
the supposed revocation on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.

Magat v. CA

210

GR # 106755, Feb. 1, 2002

375 SCRA 556
Facts: Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of 5 children, namely, Rosario
Austria, Consolacion Austria, petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat,
Leonardo, and one of respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in
a Japanese concentration camp at Tarlac during World War II.
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together with the
improvement thereon covered in TCT No. RT-4036 (T-3268) and known as
Lot 1, Block 1, Cavite Beach Subd., with an area of 150 sq m, located in
Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Cavite City. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa
executed a document designated as Kasulatan sa Kaloobpala (Donation).
On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the
subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat
for P5,000.00. The TCT No. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was
cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register
of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat.
On September 21, 1983, respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia,
and Ernesto Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion
Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo
(representing their deceased mother Rosario Austria) and Florentino
Lumubos filed before the RTC Cavite an action against the petitioner for
annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for
reconveyance and damages.
RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the RTC.
Issue: WON THE CA GNORED THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DONATION IN QUESTION
AS INTER VIVOS.
Held: CA is affirmed. The provisions in the subject deed of donation that
are crucial for the determination of the class to which the donation belongs
are, as follows:
xxx xxx
xxx(I)binibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit
na apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang
residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong
Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng Kabite
xxx xxx

211

Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na akoy

pumanaw sa mundo, xxx.
xxx xxx
Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay
sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan,
ay mananatili sa poder o possesion ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante
habang siya ay nabubuhay at
Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang
lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa
depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,
the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, was enumerated, to wit:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
Thus, the petitioners cited provisions are only necessary assurances that
during the donors lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of
possession over the property; but, his naked title of ownership has been
passed on to the donees; and that upon the donors death, the donees
would get all the rights of ownership over the same including the right to
use and possess the same.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation
regarding the prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in
general terms such that even the donor is deemed included in the said
prohibition. If the donor intended to maintain full ownership over the said
property until her death, she could have expressly stated therein a
reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the
donor to alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked
ownership over the property has been transferred to the donees.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is
the acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an
acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance
is a requirement for donations inter vivos.

212

Maglasang v. Cabatingan
GR # 131953, Jun. 5, 2002
383 SCRA 6
Held:
The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated
in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20 one of the decisive characteristics of a donation
mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in
her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect
during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be
transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her
death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the subject
deeds.1wphi1.nt
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the
same partake of the nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said
deeds must be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities
of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page
thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express

213

direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall
be interpreted to them. (n)
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.

Aluad v. Aluad
GR # 176943, Oct. 17, 2008
569 SCRA 697
FACTS:
Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime,
raised petitioners mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad).
When Crispin died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of
which, she donated to Maria. The Deed provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and
convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property abovedescribed, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them
who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or
even all of the parcels of land herein donated.
Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to
transfer in her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676)
out of the 6 donated to Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by
her to respondent.
A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the
remaining four parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties,
including the land the title of which was in her name (Lot 674), to
respondent.

214

Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Marias heirs, herein
petitioners, thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of
the two lots in respondents possession. For his defense, respondent
alleged that the first lot was obtained by him through sale while the second
lot through inheritance based on the will executed by Matilde.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was
impossible for respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those
were previously donated in favor of the mother of petitioners.
The CA on appeal reversed the trial courts decision ruling that the donation
made to the mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa
hence invalid for failing to comply with the requisites for its validity as
provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos.
HELD:
NO.
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners
mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to
petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.

215

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated" means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in
her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without
other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of
ownership.The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who
should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly
stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said
phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners
themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed
paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was
the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead
as early as 1975.
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period
when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event
that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor
provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect"
the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject
donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a
resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur
before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term
or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what
donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and
effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no
donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa,
not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no
right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the

216

formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos.
674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot
No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to
the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to
Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to
respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No.
674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could
devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to
them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having
been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of
it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the
lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of
inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and
issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the
new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of
the hearing before the trial court.

Sicad vs. CA
GR# 125888/ Aug. 13, 1998
294 SCRA 183
FACTS:
A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was
executed by Montinola naming as donees her grandchildren, namely:
Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio
Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land located at Capiz, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The
deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of
their acceptance of the donation. Said deed was registered. Montinola
however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622),
as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years
later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

217

Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the
reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case being docketed
as Special Proceeding. Her petition was founded on the theory that the
donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus
had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the
donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No.
T-16622.
Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was
an inter vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor
set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently
changed into an ordinary civil action. The court held that the donation was
indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack
of merit.
In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitionerspouses Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had
expressed their disinterest over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial
courts decision hence the present petition.
ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos.
HELD:
NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition.
The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of
donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and
explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the
donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the
deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period.
Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the
donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10
years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent
insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the
intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a

218

different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate
paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the
donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of
disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible
donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the
property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the
property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from
Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of
title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated
property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit
provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of
ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the
property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the
conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa,
contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's
demise.
The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and
that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is
merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation,
begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition
of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense,
because if
they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a
third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no
utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily
result in the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the
property.
It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be
deemed one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love
and affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that
"the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection **

219

is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers

mortis causa may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato
v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the
conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the
services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in
determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter
vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation."
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the
Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous
contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of
rights and
interests".
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have
not been complied with.

Del Rosario vs. Ferrer

GR# 187056/ Sept. 20,2010
630 SCRA 683
Held:
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis
Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms
is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it
mortis causa.10
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability"
is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis
causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation
mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

220

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the
donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that
this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by
the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable
becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality
a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,
possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation
operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such
reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only
beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which
acceptance the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance
clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a
requirement only for such kind of donations.1awphi1 Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee
during the donors lifetime.15
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,16 in case of
doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.

Ganuelas v. Cawed
GR # 123968, Apr. 24, 2003
401 SCRA 447

221

Held:
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former,
the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be
deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed
to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.23 The
following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminating:24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that
the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee
only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation
takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in
a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently
of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda
proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the
donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of
donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important
as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the
donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the
formalities prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code,
except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If
it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the
formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;

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3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.28
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which
indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be
transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of
no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership
of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should
die before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no
further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem
disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the
donor should survive the donee.30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the
donation as mortis causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this
deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who
at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like
manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on
considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was
prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services
rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether
the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may
have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and affection may also
underline transfers mortis causa.

Central Phil. Univ. v. CA

223

GR #112127, Jul 17, 1995

246 SCRA 511
Held:
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition
of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired,
shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the
condition. Thus, when a person donates land to another on the condition
that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed
was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory
one. It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed
before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could
become the owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property
rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the
condition. 5 If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition,
such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation may now be revoked
and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed
lost and extinguished.
Xxxx
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school
upon the land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as
to when this condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the
donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition thereof. Since the time
within which the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive
will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance and the
acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of
private respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of
donation.

This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of
circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period
of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make
the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so.
Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of the obligors

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cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the
court to determine the period of the compliance, there are no more
obstacles for the court to decree the rescission claimed.
Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time.
Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation
already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor,
private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.

Chapter 2. Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation (Arts. 735749)

Chapter 3. Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereof (Arts. 750-759)

Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag

GR # 181132, Jun. 5, 2009
588 SCRA 774
Issue:
(A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine
Held:
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that,
although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named

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as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife.

The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and
a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as
beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto,
being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of
the policies.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the
proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made
unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the
insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if
the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The
exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was
intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the
form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties
may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and
Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries
in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the
insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by
the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the
insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the
designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases
where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that
the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of
the insured.

226

Insular Life v. Ebrado,

GR # 44059, Oct. 28, 1977
80 SCRA 181
Issue: Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance
policy of a legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death
of the latter?
Held:
Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from
each other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of donation;
Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants by
reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted
before the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More
specifically, with record to the disability on "persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation," Article 739 itself
provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

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Arangote v. Maglunob
GR # 178906, Feb. 18, 2009
579 SCRA 620
Held:
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of
Donation, met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a
public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and
third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not made by the
petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate
public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation,
there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of
petitioner and her husband is null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September
2000, as well as the notice40 of such acceptance, executed by the
petitioner did not cure the defect. Moreover, it was only made by the
petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the
RTC had already rendered its Decision dated 12 September 2000,
although it was still during Esperanzas lifetime. Evidently, its execution
was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what was a defective
donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during
the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may
still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a
formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in
both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in
both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the
petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact
that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by
petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanzas one-third share in the subject
property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner.

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Quilala v. Alcantara,
GR # 132681, Dec. 3, 2001
371 SCRA 311
Held:
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by
Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the
donation of an immovable must be made in a public instrument in order to
be valid,7 specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of
the acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or
prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes
the absolute owner of the property.11 The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.12 It may be
made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and the donor
must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the
certificate of title as well as the technical description of the real property
donated. It stipulated that the donation was made for and in consideration
of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as
an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.
Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses
should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The
intendment of the law merely is to ensure that each and every page of the
instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly
executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on
each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that
is written thereon at the time of signing.

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Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely

directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the
page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating the
page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially
complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a
private document in part and a public document in another part.
Arcaba v. Batocael
GR # 146683, Nov. 22, 2001
370 SCRA 414
Facts:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision of the CA,
which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, declaring as void
a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in
her favor and its subsequent resolution denying reconsideration.
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte with a total
lot area of 418 sq m. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his motherin-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share of onefourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco. Francisco registered the lot in his
name with the Registry of Deeds.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked
his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and
petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as
the store inside.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship
between Cirila and Francisco. She denied they ever had sexual
intercourse. It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married,
only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. Cirila testified that she was a

230

34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she
began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at
that time; and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became
bedridden. Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of
income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. He did not
pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he provided her
family with food and lodging.
A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," giving 150 sq m of his lot,
together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same
instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his
name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration
of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10)
years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
Francisco died without any children. On February 18, 1993, respondents
filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents,
who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and
the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article
87 of the Family Code.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of
respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of the Family
Code based on testimonies and certain documents bearing the signature of
one "Cirila Comille."
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. As already stated, the appeals
court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the
testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents
purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a pleading in
another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's
common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Issue:

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Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art 87 of the Family Code
to the circumstances of this case.
Held:
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together
as husband and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also
having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more
than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is
public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and
dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together,
even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are
merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as
sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of legitimate children.
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since
Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the
same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs
was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife.
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash
wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular
cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with
Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would
thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor
of Cirila is void under Art 87 of the Family Code.

Chapter 4. Revocation and Reduction of Donations (Arts. 760-773)

Zamboanga v. Plagata

232

GR # 148433, Sept. 30, 2008

567 SCRA 163
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA and its
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. It likewise asked
that the second alias writ of execution issued by Hon. Julius Rhett J.
Plagata, Executive Labor Arbiter of NLRC-RAB IX, be annulled and
declared without any legal effect, as well as the ensuing levy, sale on
execution of the subject property.
On 9 January 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 93
which legalized barter trading in the Sulu Archipelago and adjacent areas,
and empowered the Commander of the Southwest Command of the AFP to
coordinate all activities and to undertake all measures for the
implementation of said decree.
On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Hassan G. Alam,
donated to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Maj. Gen. Delfin
C. Castro, Commander, Southern Command of the AFP, and Chairman,
Executive Committee for Barter Trade, a parcel of land covered by CTC
No. T-61,628 of the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga City, identified as Lot
No. 6 of consolidation subdivision plan Pcs-09-000184, situated in the
Barrio of Canelar, City of Zamboanga, containing an area of 13,643 sq m.
The Republic accepted the donation with conditions contained in the Deed
of Donation.
With the acceptance of the donation, TCT No. T-61,628 in the name of
ZBTKBI was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696 covering the
same property was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the Deed of Donation, the Government and
the DPWH RO IX constructed a Barter Trade Market Building worth
P5,000,000.00 at the said Lot No. 6. The building was completed on 30
March 1983 and was occupied by members of ZBTKBI, as well as by other
persons engaged in barter trade.

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Prior to said donation, on 16 March 1977, private respondent Teopisto

Mendoza was hired by ZBTKBI as clerk. Subsequently, in a letter dated 1
April 1981, ZBTKBI, through its President, Atty. Hasan G. Alam, informed
Mendoza
that his services were being terminated on the ground of abandonment of
work.
Mendoza filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of backwages
and separation pay at the DOLE ROIX on July 29, 1981. The case was
assigned to Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
On 31 May, 1983, Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid rendered his
decision finding the dismissal of Mendoza illegal and ordered ZBTKBI to
reinstate Mendoza to his former position or any equivalent position, and to
pay him backwages.
On 17 June 1983, ZBTKBI filed a Notice of Appeal with the NLRC. On 13
July 1983, Mendoza filed with the NLRC a Manifestation with Motion for
Execution praying that petitioners appeal not be given due course, and that
a writ of execution enforcing the decision of the Labor Arbiter be issued.
On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued Memorandum Circular
No. 1 which totally phased out the Zamboanga City barter trade area
effective 1 October 1988.
On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second)
Alias Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter
Julius Rhett J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990. Sheriff Anthony B.
Gaviola levied whatever interest, share, right, claim and/or participation of
ZBTKBI had over a parcel of land, together with all the buildings and
improvements existing thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 66,696 (formerly TCT No. 61,628) in compliance of said writ.
On 13 June 1990, the afore-described property was sold at public auction
for P96,443.53, with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder. The property was
not redeemed. As a consequence, Sheriff Gaviola issued on 25 June 1991
a Sheriffs Final Certificate of Sale in favor of Mendoza over whatever
interest, share, right, claim and/or participation ZBTKBI had over the parcel
of land.

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Having failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a

Petition (for Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000, which
was granted on 5 May 2000, by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata. The writ
was issued to place the complainant in possession (of) the rights, interests,
shares, claims, and participations of Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusan
Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-66,696 of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City, which were sold on
execution to the complainant on 13 June 1990, and in whose favor a final
certificate of sale for such rights, interests, shares, claims, and/or
participation was executed and issued on 25 June 1991.
Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriffs Service Report dated 22 June 2000
informing Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata that the writ of possession was
returned duly served and fully satisfied. On the same date, Mendoza, thru a
letter, acknowledged that the writ of possession had been satisfied and
implemented.
A petition for review on certiorari filed on 27 June 2001 which was denied
by this Court on 15 August 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error
had been committed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on 8 September 2001, which Mendoza opposed.
Issue/s:
Whether the CA erred that the donated property has already reverted to
petitioner-donor
Held:
On the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at
Barrio Canelar, City of Zamboanga.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donated
property was no longer owned by the Republic of the Philippines because
ownership thereof had already reverted to it (petitioner).
From the records, the subject property was donated by petitioner (donor) to
the Republic (donee) with the following conditions already adverted
heretofore but are being reiterated for emphasis:

235

1. That upon the effectivity or acceptance hereof the DONEE shall, thru the
authorized agency/ministry, construct a P5 Million Barter Trade market
building at the afore-described parcel of land;
2. That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market building shall accommodate at
least 1,000 stalls, the allocation of which shall be determined by the
Executive Committee for Barter Trade in coordination with the Officers and
Board of Directors the Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc.,
provided, however, that each member of the DONOR shall be given
priority;
3. That the said Barter Trade Market building to be constructed as abovestated, shall be to the strict exclusion of any other building for barter trading
in Zamboanga City, Philippines;
4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or
suspended for more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the
afore-described parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without
need of any further formality or documentation, and the DONOR shall have
the first option to purchase the building and improvements thereon.
5. That the DONEE hereby accepts this donation made in its favor by the
DONOR, together with the conditions therein provided. (Underscoring
supplied)
Thus, when the property was levied and sold on 1 March 1990 and 13 June
1990, respectively, it was already petitioner that owned the same. It should
be clear that reversion applied only to the land and not to the building and
improvements made by the Republic on the land worth P5,000,000.00.
Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there
was automatic reversion of the land, because it put the Republic in a
disadvantageous situation when it had a P5 million building on a land
owned by another.
This claim is untenable. The Court of Appeals merely enforced or applied
the conditions contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted
the donation subject to conditions imposed by the donor. In condition
number 4, the Republic is given the right to sell the building it constructed
on the land and the improvements thereon. If ever such condition is
disadvantageous to the Republic, there is nothing that can be done about
it, since it is one of the conditions that are contained in the donation which it
accepted. There being nothing ambiguous in the contents of the document,
there is no room for interpretation but only simple application thereof.

236

We likewise find to be without basis petitioners claim that the Republic

should be reimbursed of the cost of the construction of the barter trade
building pursuant to condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows
that the Republic will be reimbursed. What is stated there is that petitioner
has the first option to purchase the buildings and improvements thereon. In
other words, the Republic can sell the buildings and improvements that it
made or built.
Petitioners statement that neither party to the donation has expressly
rescinded the contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation
contains a stipulation that allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not
being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
is valid and binding on the parties to the donation. As held in Dolar v.
Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas,
citing
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.
The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of
barter trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic
reversion cannot be averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet
exercised its option to purchase the buildings and improvements made and
introduced on the land by the Republic; or because the Republic has not
yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise, there would be
gross violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the deed of
donation.
Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

Archbishop of Mla v. CA
GR # 77425, Jun. 19, 1991
198 SCRA 300

237

Facts:
These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of
the CA which reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, as well as the
order
of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the
reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint
for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and
reconveyance of real property with damages against petitioners Florencio
and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite,
together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the RTC of
Imus, Cavite.
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and
Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land
located at Kawit, Cavite with an area of approx 964 sq m. The deed of
donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not dispose or sell the
property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the execution of
the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render
ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert
to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the
prohibitive period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic
Bishop of Imus, in whose administration all properties within the province of
Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred on
April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property subject of
the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao in
consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale,
TCT No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on
November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed
decision. On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad
C. Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein
private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal capacity to sue; and
(2) the complaint states no cause of action.

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On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also

filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of
which were identical to that of the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao
spouses, and the third ground being that the cause of action has
prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest
and, therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to
dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with
rejoinders thereto by private respondents, the trial court issued an order
dated January 31, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
cause of action has prescribed.
Private respondents appealed to the CA raising the issues on (a) whether
or not the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of
sale) has prescribed; and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for
rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground
of prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for
reconveyance of real property.
CA held that the action has not yet prescribed, reinstated and remanded
the civil case to the lower court for further proceedings.
CA denied the separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, hence,
the filing of these appeals by certiorari.
Issue: whether or not the cause of action has already prescribed
Held: The Court does not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not
applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein
expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case
of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking
the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:

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By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation
of the condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of
donation, WE are of the opinion that there would be no legal necessity
anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the
reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it
otherwise and that the donors and the donee contemplated a court action
during the execution of the deed of donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be violated, then
the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void" would not
appear in the deed of donation.
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that
a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any
of its terms and conditions. It called attention to the holding that there is
nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement
that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation
even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the
injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the
doctrine that a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a
special provision granting the power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved
therein, but we see no reason why the same should not apply to the
donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that
donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on
contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III, Book III on
donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the
matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an
express provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked
upon the breach of said resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor,
as is the case of the deed presently in question. The suppletory application
of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the
automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon noncompliance of the condition was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et
al. vs. Abrigo, et al.

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The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic
revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic
revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and
the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the
Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a
contract to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are
of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial
action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety
of the rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of
the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself
the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the CA committed no error in holding that
the cause of action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed
since an action to enforce a written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It
is our view that Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in
case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the deed
of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the automatic
revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents
may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be
dismissed on the ground that private respondents have no cause of action
against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach
by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the
property donated should not be sold within a period of one hundred (100)
years from the date of execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in
our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising from
ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.

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Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer

of title over the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation,
the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the
case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction
on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is
an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against
alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or for an
unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may
be considered applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article
494, a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for
more than twenty (20) years are void.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership,
should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically
stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said
proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action
for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth violative of the
latter hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents
must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed
of donation was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties.
That may be true, but such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court
from passing upon and resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against
alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for
the action to nullify the deed of donation. At the same time, it was likewise

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the controverted fundament of the motion to dismiss the case a quo, which
motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by respondent court,
both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court
interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition.
While the issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely
raised, it is ineluctably related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error
since both issues are grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case: Thus, we have held
that an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or
upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error.
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it.
On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and for the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with
respect to the matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
Case is dismissed.

De Luna v. Abrigo
GR # 57455, Jan. 18, 1990
181 SCRA 150
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order of respondent judge
Sofronio F. Abrigo of the CFI of Quezon, dismissing the complaint of
petitioners on the ground of prescription of action.
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500
square meters of Lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by

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Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1-5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now
Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein referred to as the foundation).
The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to
certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to
the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance.
The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. On
April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the
foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation Intervivos" subject
to terms and conditions which among others, required:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a Nursery
and Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica, and other
constructions and Accessories shall be constructed on the land herein
being donated strictly in accordance with the plans and specifications
prepared by the O.R. Quinto & Associates and made part of this donation;
provided that the flooring of the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall be of
granoletic marble.
4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery and Kindergarten School
shall start immediately and must be at least SEVENTY (70) PER CENTUM
finished by the end of THREE (3) YEARS from the date hereof, however,
the whole project as drawn in the plans and specifications made parts of
this donation must be completed within FIVE (5) YEARS from the date
hereon, unless extensions are granted by the DONOR in writing;
As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of Donation Intervivos" also
provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in
case of violation of the conditions thereof, couched in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx.
11. That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the
automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns
and representatives, without the need of executing any other document for
that purpose and without obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR.
The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same
document, subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation.
The donation was registered and annotated on April 15, 1971 in the
memorandum of encumbrances as Entry No. 17939 of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-5775.

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On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a

'Deed of Segregation" whereby the area donated which is now known as
Lot No. 3707-B of Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the
foundation. As a result, transfer certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued
in the name of the foundation. The remaining portion known as Lot No.
3707-A was retained by the donor.
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio,
Jr., Willard, Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be
the children and only heirs of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on
August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon alleging that the
terms and conditions of the donation were not complied with by the
foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and
the reversion of the donated land to the heirs.
The assailed order of the trial court stated that revocation (of a donation)
will be effective only either upon court judgment or upon consent of the
donee as held in the case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. 24190, July
13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial court dismissed the claim of petitioners that
the stipulation in the donation providing for revocation in case of noncompliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount to the consent of the
donee, opining that the consent contemplated by law should be such
consent given by the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation or
violation of the conditions imposed therein. The trial court further held that,
far from consenting to the revocation, the donee claimed that it had already
substantially complied with the conditions of the donation by introducing
improvements in the property donated valued at more than the amount of
the donated land. In view thereof, a judicial decree revoking the subject
donation is necessary. Accordingly, under Article 764 of the New Civil
Code, actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with
any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four years counted
from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for
filing the complaint for revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired
on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on September 23, 1980
or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was already
barred by prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code
was adopted to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of
conditions when revocation of the donation has not been agreed upon by

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the parties. By way of contrast, when there is a stipulation agreed upon by

the parties providing for revocation in case of non-compliance, no judicial
action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action filed before
the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the
donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four
(4) years, but one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10)
years.
Issue:
Whether the action is to enforce a written contract instead of Art 764
Held:
The petition is impressed with merit.
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1)
simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the cause
of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is
one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or
because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services,
burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services
equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated.
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that
the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was
made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a
nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years
from execution of the deed of donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous
cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on
contracts, as held in cases decided by the SC. On the matter of
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held
that the general rules on prescription applies.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on contracts.

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In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on
prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at
bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the
right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of
Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions
(herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the
donor, his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for
that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said
stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily
consented thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic
reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance
cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the
right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of
going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of noncompliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically
revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes
of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed
rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without
judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the recession
was proper.
The trial court was not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at
bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code
because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the
terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five
(5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September
23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to

247

enforce a written contract (Article 1144[1], New Civil Code), counted from
April 9, 1976.
Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of
the donee's non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been
contested by private respondents who claimed that improvements more
valuable than the donated property had been introduced, a judgment on the
pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the absence of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio render such judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading."
(Emphasis supplied)
Petition is GRANTED, case is hereby ordered reinstated and respondent
judge is ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the propriety
of the revocation of the subject donation.

Ty v. Ty
GR # 165696, Apr. 30, 2008
553 SCRA 306
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
against the Decision of the CA and the Resolution therein dated October
18, 2004.
On May 19, 1988, Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro B. Ty and Bella Torres,
died of cancer at the age of 34. He was survived by his wife, Sylvia Ty, and
his only daughter, Krizia Katrina Ty. A few months after his death, a petition
for the settlement of his intestate estate was filed by Sylvia Ty in the RTC
of Quezon City.
Upon petition of Sylvia Ty, as Administratrix, for settlement and distribution
of the intestate estate of Alexander in the County of Los Angeles, the
Superior Court of California ordered the distribution of the Hollywood
condominium unit, the Montebello lot, and the 1986 Toyota pick-up truck to
Sylvia Ty and Krizia Katrina Ty.

248

On November 23, 1990, Sylvia Ty submitted to the intestate Court in

Quezon City an inventory of the assets of Alexanders estate, consisting of
shares of stocks and a schedule of real estate properties, which included
the following:
1. EDSA Property a parcel of land with an area of 1,728 square meters
situated in EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the
name of Alexander Ty when he was still single, and covered by TCT No.
0006585;
2. Meridien Condominium A residential condominium with an area of
167.5 square meters situated in 29 Annapolis Street, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of the spouses
Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 3395;
3. Wack-Wack Property A residential land with an area of 1,584 square
meters situated in Notre Dame, Wack-Wack, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
registered in the name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and
covered by TCT No. 62670.
On November 4, 1992, Sylvia Ty asked the intestate Court to sell or
mortgage the properties of the estate in order to pay the additional estate
tax of P4,714,560.02 assessed by the BIR.
Apparently, this action did not sit well with her father-in-law, the plaintiffappellee, for on December 16, 1992, Alejandro Ty, father of the deceased
Alexander Ty, filed a complaint for recovery of properties with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Sylvia Ty
as defendant in her capacity as [Administratrix] of the Intestate Estate of
Alexander Ty.
On February 26, 1993, the RTC granted the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff added that defendant acted in bad faith in including the subject
properties in the inventory of Alexander Tys estate, for she was well aware
that Alexander was simply holding the said properties in trust for his
siblings.
On January 7, 2000, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff.

249

Respondent, Sylvia S. Ty, appealed from the RTC Decision to the CA.
The CA tackled "the critical, crucial and pivotal issue of whether a trust,
express or implied, was established by the plaintiff-appellee in favor of his
late son and name-sake Alexander Ty."
The CA proceeded to distinguish express from implied trust, then found
that no express trust can be involved here since nothing in writing was
presented to prove it and the case involves real property. It then stated that
it disagrees with the court a quos application of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code
on implied trust, the so-called purchase money resulting trust, stating that
the very Article provides the exception that obtains when the person to
whom the title is conveyed is the child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one
paying the price of the sale, in which case no trust is implied by law, it
being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The CA therefore reasoned that even assuming that plaintiff-appellee paid
at least part of the price of the EDSA property, the law still presumes that
the conveyance was a discretion (a gift of devise) in favor of Alexander.
As to plaintiff-appellees argument that there was no donation as shown by
his exercise of dominion over the property, the CA held that no credible
evidence was presented to substantiate the claim.
Regarding the residence condominium and the Wack-Wack property, the
CA stated that it did not agree either with the findings of the trial court that
an implied trust was created over these properties.
As a final point, the Court found that the plaintiff-appellee is not entitled to
moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of litigation, considering that the
instant case is clearly a vexatious and unfounded suit by him filed against
the estate of the late Alejandro Ty. Hence, all these awards in the judgment
a quo are hereby DELETED.
The CA therefore reversed and set aside the judgment appealed from and
entered another one dismissing the complaint.
On October 18, 2004 the CA resolved to deny therein plaintiff-appellees
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

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Issue:
Whether an implied trust under Art 1448 was constituted over the subject
properties.
Held:
The Court disposes of the petition, as follows:
The EDSA Property
Petitioner contends that the EDSA property, while registered in the name of
his son Alexander Ty, is covered by an implied trust in his favor under
Article 1448 of the Civil Code. This, petitioner argues, is because he paid
the price when the property was purchased and did so for the purpose of
having the beneficial interest of the property.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the
purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the
trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom
the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of one paying the
price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed
that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The CA conceded that at least part of the purchase price of the EDSA
property came from petitioner. However, it ruled out the existence of an
implied trust because of the last sentence of Article 1448: x x x However, if
the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate,
of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being
disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, the CA departed from jurisprudence
in that such was not the theory of the parties.
Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he who invoked Article 1448 of the
Civil Code to claim the existence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself,
in providing for the so-called purchase money resulting trust, also provides
the parameters of such trust and adds, in the same breath, the proviso:
"However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate
or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST IS

251

IMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor

of the child." (Emphasis supplied.)
Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessary consequence of
petitioners theory and argument and is inextricably linked to it by the law
itself.
The CA, therefore, did not err in simply applying the law.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is
conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this
case this is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law,
instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child.
On the question of whether or not petitioner intended a donation, the CA
found that petitioner failed to prove the contrary. This is a factual finding
which this Court sees no reason the record to reverse.
The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate
into the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA
property as an advance of Alexanders share in the estate of his father, to
the extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price.
The Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property.
Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as
regards the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property,
petitioner failed to show that the money used to purchase the same came
from him.
Again, this is clearly a factual finding and petitioner has advanced no
convincing argument for this Court to alter the findings reached by the CA.
Among the facts cited by the CA are the sources of income of Alexander Ty
who had been working for nine years when he purchased these two
properties, who had a car care business, and was actively engaged in the
business dealings of several family corporations, from which he received
emoluments and other benefits.
The CA, therefore, ruled that with respect to the Meridien Condominium
and the Wack-Wack property, no implied trust was created because there
was no showing that part of the purchase price was paid by petitioner and,

252

on the contrary, the evidence showed that Alexander Ty had the means to
pay for the same.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of
the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an
advance of Alexander Tys share in the estate of his father, to the extent
that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price.
Eduarte vs. CA
GR# 105944/ Feb. 9, 1996
253 SCRA 391
Facts:
A petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.Facts: Domingo
Belda and Estelita Ana were the registered owners of a parcel of land
denominated as Lot 118 located at Sorsogon and covered by Original
Certificate of TitleNo. P-4991 issued on October 5, 1962.On March 1, 1963,
a letter was sent by the Land Investigator Serafin Valcarcel of theBureau of
Lands to Domingo and Cipriano Bulan calling them to a conference to
settle the wrongful issuance of title to the property they both occupy. At this
conference, neither Domingo nor Bulan appeared but Teotimo Eduarte did.
On August 9, 1963, Eduarte wrote a letter to the Director of Lands
requesting him not to give due course to Domingo and Estelitas application
for a free patent title over lot 118since what Domingo and Estelita are
occupying is Lot 138 which was titled in the name of Bulan who refused to
accept said title. After the Office of the Director of lands took note of
Eduartes protest, an investigation was conducted which revealed that
Eduarte is in actual possession of lot 118 while Domingo and Estelita
occupy lot 138.
The District Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of
respondents should refer to lot 138 and the homestead application of
petitioner should refer to lot 118. Eduarte remained and continuously
occupied lot 118 until on December 10, 1986Domingo and Estelita filed
with the RTC of Irosin, a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Eduarte, averring that sometime in August 1985, Eduarte
by means of force, threats and intimidation entered the subject to lot
without their consent thereby depriving them of their possession of the
premises. Traversing the complaint, Eduarte asserts that he is the rightful

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owner of the property in question; that he has been in possession of the

same since 1942; that the title relied upon by Domingo and Estelita was
erroneously issued in their name which was acknowledged by the Bureau
of Lands; that Domingo and Estelita fully know that they are not the owners
of the lot in dispute.The lower court also ruled that petitioner can attack the
validity of respondents' title onlythrough a direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. Decision affirmed by CA, with modifications.
Issue:
Whether or not Eduarte can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession filed by Domingo and Estelita, the registered owners, assail the
validity of their title.
Held:
It must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. After the expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. The
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto may
be attacked on the ground of fraud within one year from the date of its entry
and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding. In the
case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in his
answer:3. That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual
possession of that certain parcel of land which is more particularly
described as follows: xxx xxx xxx5. That the sole basis of the plaintiff in
adversely claiming the aforesaid property is due to the erroneous issuance
of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot No. 118 and this
mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and
investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;6. That plaintiff has never been
in actual possession of said Lot No. 118and therefore he is not lawfully
entitled to such certificate of title No. P-4991, which under the
circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same to the defendant; The
foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of title
issued in favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of
Sorsogon. This is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a
Torrens title. The issue of the validity of title, i.e.,whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can be raised in an action expressly instituted for that
purposes. Whether or not respondents have the right to claim ownership of
the subject land is beyond the province of the instant petition.

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Velasquez vs. CA
GR# 126996/ Feb. 15, 2000
325 SCRA 552
Facts:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime
in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman
was survived by her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs)
and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the
existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire several
properties.
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by
Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a
complaint for annulment, partition and damages against the heirs of
Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters refusal to
partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino.
The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a
talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago
Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in
attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman,
Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of
donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were
not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the
properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one
of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together
with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to
give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of
all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full
blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the
death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the properties
and despite
plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray
for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since
they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order
the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal
shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce

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of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession
until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among
others that during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de
Guzman, they had already disposed of their properties in favor of
petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose Velasquez.
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de
Guzman and plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with
Tranquilina (defendants grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants
father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the
plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did not forcibly take
possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has
been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion
of all others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the
instant case is already barred by res judicata since there had been three
previous cases involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of
action which were all dismissed, the last of which was dismissed for failure
to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents covering the
disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in
common as agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership
ceases when one of the parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the
action becomes one for a title and recovery of ownership and the action
prescribes in four years.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the
statute of limitations.
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the
estate of the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive
ownership of the properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal
heirs of spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.

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V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.

Held:
Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their
Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the
principle of res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is
within the power of the court to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the purpose of justice requires
it. We have examined the third complaint filed by private respondents on
October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and we found that
the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites
of res judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must
be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the
dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with
prejudice.12 On this ground alone, the trial court should have already
dismissed this case. However, considering that this case had already
reached this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be
more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the
parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural
technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be
"liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."13
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance
of evidence adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions
of
the courts below, which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule,
factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court.
This Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and
documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14 However, although this
Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to

257

the evidence on record,15 in the instant case, we are not bound to adhere
to the general rule since both courts clearly failed to consider facts and
circumstances which should have drawn a different conclusion.16
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide
the property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first
stage in an action for partition.17 Needless to state, an action for partition
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property.
In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in
his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until
and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the properties.18
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has
been adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the
petitioners predecessor-in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were
repudiated before Leoncias death; thus private respondents are still entitled
to share in the subject properties. There is no preponderance of evidence
to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The trial court
declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose
and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the
complaint, the deed of sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
over the second parcel and the deed of donation propter nuptias over the
third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties of fourth and fifth parcels
insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which "legitimately
belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the
basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia
de Guzman was still alive, she called a conference among them, the
plaintiffs and their mother Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother
Tranquilina, telling them that all their properties which are conjugal in
nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and Tranquilina and not to
believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did not sign
them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect
that Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject
properties in favor of the petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses
testimony was never corroborated by any other evidence despite his
testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the presence of
third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944,
a year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of

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documents revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier

made to show her alleged intention of giving her properties in equal shares
to her sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina de Guzman but there was none. The
trial court found the testimony of Santiago Meneses who is eighty years old
to be credible, and this was affirmed by the respondent court which stated
that the matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court. However,
the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a
guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced
age makes a person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which
has appeared to him, and at times it weakens his resistance to outside
influence.20
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and
ancient documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the
Aquino spouses they had already disposed of four of the six parcels of land
subject of the complaint starting in the year 1919, and the latest was in
1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias dated February
15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b)
Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel
in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c)
Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another
portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July
14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying
to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter
nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible
error for the court to overlook the probative value of these notarized
documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer
of title over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.26 And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated.27 The donation of the first parcel
made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez
who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was
accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was

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incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it,
and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was
delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly
and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the
reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The
donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The
deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance
of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family
Code.29 The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the
Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since
Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not one of the
grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and
the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and
Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also
valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses
ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed
by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such
deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the
names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939.
The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title30 and it
requires more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No.
15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.31
Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts
of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the
certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership
and control over the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after
more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-ownership claim
over the subject property.
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their
lifetime and the documents were duly notarized so that these documents
enjoy the presumption of validity.32 Such presumption has not been
overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear and
convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof

260

must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners

were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed
to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the
conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards
the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also
conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right thereto.

261

SUCCESSION

General Provisions [Arts. 774-782]

Alvarez v. IAC
GR# 68053, May 7, 1990
185 SCRA 8
Facts:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora.
Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children
of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio
and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her
child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. It is not clear why the latter is not included as a
party in this case.

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Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three
hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two
lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does
not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the
lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to
settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According
to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the
parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went
there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in
possession of Lot 773.
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with
an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A
as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally
registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was
also registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938
Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also
contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered
under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B.
Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently,
on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in
Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the
administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in
Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. By
virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia
Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9
Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots
773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her
brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato

263

Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds

of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of
Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of
the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the
defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or
money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that
defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of
attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961,
Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued
to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for
assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in
behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a
manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs
"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise,
against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the
above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo
Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral
Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and
thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was
not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to
Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated
that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and
773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased

264

them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs
as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a
hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965,
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT
Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the
court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering
Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots
773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a
valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances
against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19
could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that
the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him
not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had
long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be wellfounded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its
previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title
mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order
of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that
the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in
question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against
Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of
real property with damages. 24
Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora
Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291
and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a
new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the
sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of
possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be

265

effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the
Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of
P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the
fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint;
and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral
damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus
attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to
Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of
September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were
estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated
in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res
judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason,
who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in
Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a
valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure
to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in
Civil Case No.
5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land
because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was
without court approval.
Issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been
timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private
respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated
February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil Case
No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or
prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No.
5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the
waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where

266

the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived,

renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever
there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as
appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits
"4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly
denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from
the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted by
operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due
process . 33
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that
matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No.
5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private
respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and with
the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties
thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision
against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every
litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there
must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled
license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the
administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in
question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by

267

the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses
have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in
question.
In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to
execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed
to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the
pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not
know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the
titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a
purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by
Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained
it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil
Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in
dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that
the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is
one thing
to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one
devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the
perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed
by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot
now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of
prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower
court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not.
They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be
heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a
judgment which has longing become final and executory.

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Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No.
773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should
be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his
death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this
jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of
the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance,
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the
case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not
altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a
deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is
distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever
payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights
and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has

269

characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of

a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is
strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape
the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the
present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property
involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their
totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent
of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering
petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased
which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

Ventura vs. Militante,

GR# 63145, Oct. 5, 1999
316 SCRA 226
Facts:
There is no dispute as to the following relevant facts:
Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages
against petitioner which reads:
PLAINTIFF, thru counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
states that:
He is of legal age, Filipino and proprietor of Cebu Textar Auto Supply
whose postal address is at 177 Leon Kilat St., Cebu City, while the
defendant is the estate of Carlos Ngo as represented by surviving spouse
Ms. Sulpicia Ventura with residence and postal address at Back of Chong

270

Hua Hospital, Cebu City where summons and other processes of the Court
could be effected.
During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo he was indebted with the plaintiff in the
amount of P48,889.70 as evidenced by the hereto attached statement
marked as Annexes A and A-1 which account was obtained by him for the
benefit of his family.
Said obligation is already due and demandable and the defendant thru Ms.
Ventura who is ostensibly taking care of the properties/estate of deceased
Carlos Ngo, refused, failed and neglected and still continues to refuse, fail
and neglect to pay despite repeated demands;
As a consequence of the refusal to pay the plaintiff was compelled to retain
the services of counsel with whom he contracted to pay P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees. Upon institution of this complaint, he has further incurred
initial litigation expenditures in the sum of P4,000.00.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that "the
estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality," the same being "neither a
natural nor legal person in contemplation of law" 4.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 8 of the order of public
respondent permitting private respondent to amend his complaint. First,
she argued that the action instituted by the private respondent to recover
P48,889.70, representing the unpaid price of the automotive spare parts
purchased by her deceased husband during his lifetime, is a money claim
which, under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not
survive, the same having been filed after Carlos Ngo had already died.
Second, she claimed that the public respondent never acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case which, being an action to recover a sum
of money from a deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court.
Private respondent opposed the foregoing motion. 9 He insisted that
petitioner, being the wife of the deceased Carlos Ngo, is liable to pay the
obligation which benefited their family.
Public respondent issued an Order giving private respondent twenty four
(24) hours to file his amended complaint "so that the Court can determine
for itself whether there is really a cause of action against the defendant who

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would be substituted to the Estate of Carlos Ngo," considering that "it would
seem from the arguments of counsel for plaintiff . . . that the debt incurred
by the deceased Carlos [sic] Ngo was in behalf of the conjugal partnership
so that the wife of Carlos Ngo might be liable to pay the obligation." 10
Private respondent then filed his Amended Complaint 11 with the new
allegations.
Petitioner filed a Comment to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 13 She
reiterated that whether the unsecured debt was contracted by her husband
alone or as a charge against the conjugal partnership of gains, it cannot be
denied that her husband was now deceased, the said debt does not survive
him, the conjugal partnership of gains is terminated upon the death of one
of the spouses, and the debts and charges against the conjugal partnership
of gains may only be paid after an inventory is made in the appropriate
testate or intestate proceeding.
Private respondent filed a Rejoinder to Defendant's Comment. 14 He
countered that the defendant in his amended complaint was now petitioner
and that she was not deceased, hence the inapplicability of the legal rules
on
the abatement of money claims in case the defendant dies pending their
prosecution.
In its order of November 16, 1982, the Court in the interest of justice
advised the plaintiff to make the proper amendment so that the proper party
defendant may be impleaded considering that the motion to dismiss then
was anchored on the ground that the estate of Carlos Ngo was not a
natural nor juridical person, hence it could not be sued. On December 23,
1982, the plaintiff amended its complaint and this time the defendant is
already Sulpicia Ventura. The defendant now argues that even the
amended complaint would show that this is really a collection of a debt of
the conjugal partnership of deceased Carlong [sic] Ngo and his wife.
Perusing the amended complaint, the Court finds that in Paragraph 2 the
allegation states: "During the lifetime of Carlos Ngo, he and his wife, the
defendant, are indebted with the plaintiff in the amount of P48,689.70, (sic)
etc.," so that the indebtedness was incurred by Carlos Ngo and defendant
Sulpicia Ventura and since Carlos Ngo is now dead that will not preclude
the plaintiff from filing a case against the living defendant, Sulpicia Ventura.

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Issue:
Whether there is really a cause of action against the defendant who would
be substituted to the Estate of Carlos Ngo," considering that " that the debt
incurred by the deceased Carlos [sic] Ngo was in behalf of the conjugal
partnership so that the wife of Carlos Ngo might be liable to pay the
obligation.
Held:
First. Sec. 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that "only
natural or judicial persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action". This was the rule in 1982 at the time that private respondent
filed his complaint against petitioner. In 1997, the rules on civil procedure
were revised, but Sec. 1, Rule 3 remained largely unaltered, except for the
change of the word, "judicial" to "juridical".
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is
the party complaining, and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer
jurisdiction on the court. 17 In order to maintain an action in a court of
justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it
must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural
or an artificial person, and no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the
name of such a person. 18
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a
plaintiff, when he institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party
defendant to his cause of action. 19 In a suit or proceeding in personam of
an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the
purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally
exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. 20 It has
even been held that the question of the legal personality of a party
defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court
and not one of procedure. 21
The original complaint of petitioner named the "estate of Carlos Ngo as
represented by surviving spouse Ms. Sulpicia Ventura" as the defendant.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the defendant as
named in the complaint had no legal personality. We agree.

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Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court
action. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary
to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should
be denied by the court. 22 An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot
be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an estate is not a legal
entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party plaintiff
will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. 23
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue,
to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and
may not be named a party defendant in a court action. 24
Second. It is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against
the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was
already dead at the time of the filing of said complaint. At that time, and this
private respondent admitted, no special proceeding to settle his estate had
been filed in court. As such, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate.
To cure this fatal defect, private respondent amended his original
complaint. In his amended complaint, private respondent deleted the estate
of Carlos Ngo
and named petitioner as the defendant. When petitioner, in her comment to
the amended complaint, reasoned that the conjugal partnership of gains
between her and Carlos Ngo was terminated upon the latter's death and
that the debt which he contracted, assuming it was a charge against the
conjugal property, could only be paid after an inventory is made in the
appropriate testate or intestate proceeding, private respondent simply
reiterated his demand that petitioner pay her husband's debt which, he
insisted, redounded to the benefit of everyone in her family.
It is true that amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance
of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on
its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of causes or prevent the
circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. 25 But amendments cannot
be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in
the first place. 26 When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter and that the pleading is so fatally
defective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that to permit such
amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of the action,

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then the court should refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and
order the dismissal of the case. 27
Moreover, as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership
terminates upon the death of either spouse. 28 After the death of one of the
spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the conjugal property
in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such sale must
be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of
Court for the sale of the property of deceased persons. 29 Where a
complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an
indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property, any judgment
obtained thereby is void. 30 The proper action should be in the form of a
claim to be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. 31
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. 32 And private
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased Carlos
Ngo if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.

Sumaljag v. Literato
GR# 149787, June 18, 2008
555 SCRA 53
Facts:

275

On November 16, 1993, Josefa D. Maglasang ("Josefa") filed with the

Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte a complaint3
(docketed as Civil Case No. B-1239) for the nullity of the deed of sale of
real property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the spouses
Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the "respondent spouses") as vendees.
The complaint alleged that this deed of sale dated October 15, 1971 of Lot
1220-D is spurious. Josefa was the sister of Menendez Maglasang Literato
("Menendez"). They were two (2) of the six (6) heirs who inherited equal
parts of a 6.3906-hectare property (Lot 1220) passed on to them by their
parents Cristito and Inecita Diano Maglasang.4 Lot 1220-D was partitioned
to Josefa, while Lot 1220-E was given to Menendez.
The respondent spouses' response to the complaint was an amended
answer with counterclaim5 denying that the deed of sale was falsified. They
impleaded the petitioner with Josefa as counterclaim defendant on the
allegation that the petitioner, at the instance of Josefa, occupied Lot 1220D and Lot 1220-E without their (the respondent spouses') authority; Lot
1220-E is theirs by inheritance while 1220-D had been sold to them by
Josefa. They also alleged that the petitioner acted in bad faith in acquiring
the two (2) lots because he prepared and notarized on September 26, 1986
the contract of lease over the whole of Lot 1220 between all the Maglasang
heirs (but excluding Josefa) and Vicente Tolo, with the lease running from
1986 to 1991; thus, the petitioner then knew that Josefa no longer owned
Lot 1220-D.
Civil Case No. 12816 is a complaint that Menendez filed on April 4, 1996
with the RTC for the declaration of the inexistence of lease contract,
recovery of possession of land, and damages against the petitioner and
Josefa after the RTC dismissed the respondent spouses' counterclaim in
Civil Case No. 1239. The complaint alleged that Josefa, who had
previously sold Lot 1220-D to Menendez, leased it, together with Lot 1220E, to the petitioner. Menendez
further averred that the petitioner and Josefa were in bad faith in entering
their contract of lease as they both knew that Josefa did not own the leased
lots. Menendez prayed, among others, that this lease contract between
Josefa and the petitioner be declared null and void.
Josefa died on May 3, 1999 during the pendency of Civil Case Nos. B-1239
and B-1281.

276

On August 13, 1999, Atty. Zenen A. Puray ("Atty. Puray") - the petitioner's
and Josefa's common counsel - asked the RTC in Civil Case No. 1239 that
he be given an extended period or up to September 10, 1999 within which
to file a formal notice of death and substitution of party.
The submission alleged that prior to Josefa's death, she executed a
Quitclaim Deed9 over Lot 1220-D in favor of Remismundo D. Maglasang10
who in turn sold this property to the petitioner.
Menendez, through counsel, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging
that Atty. Puray filed the notice of death and substitution of party beyond
the thirty-day period provided under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. She recommended instead that Josefa be
substituted by the latter's full-blood sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo
("Michaeles").
The RTC denied Atty. Puray's motion for substitution and instead ordered
the appearance of Michaeles as representative of the deceased Josefa.
Issues:
Whether or not: (a) the property under litigation was no longer part of
Josefa's estate since she was no longer its owner at the time of her death;
(b) the petitioner had effectively been subrogated to the rights of Josefa
over the property under litigation at the time she died; (c) without an estate,
the heir who was appointed by the lower court no longer had any interest to
represent; (d) the notice of death was seasonably submitted by the counsel
of Josefa to the RTC within the extended period granted; and (e) the
petitioner is a transferee pendente lite who the courts should recognize
pursuant to Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by Section
16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. -Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such

277

death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this
duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives
to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party,
or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased,
and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased.
The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. (Emphasis ours)
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of
every party to the litigation who may be affected by the intervening death.
The deceased litigant is herself or himself protected as he/she continues to
be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate.15
Application of the Governing Rule.
a. Survival of the pending action
A question preliminary to the application of the above provision is whether
Civil Case Nos. B-1239 and B-1281 are actions that survive the death of
Josefa. We said in Gonzalez v. Pagcor:16
"The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a
plaintiff or petitioner was elucidated upon in Bonilla v. Barcena (71 SCRA
491 (1976). as follows:
. . . The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the
nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which

278

survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property
and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while
in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to
the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. . . .
Since the question involved in these cases relate to property and property
rights, then we are dealing with actions that survive so that Section 16,
Rule 3 must necessarily apply.
b. Duty of Counsel under the Rule.
The duty of counsel under the aforecited provision is to inform the court
within thirty (30) days after the death of his client of the fact of death, and to
give the name and address of the deceased's legal representative or
representatives. Incidentally, this is the only representation that counsel
can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any
further lawyer-client relationship.17
In the present case, it is undisputed that the counsel for Josefa did in fact
notify the lower court, although belatedly, of the fact of her death.18
This notification, although filed late, effectively informed the lower court of
the death of litigant Josefa Maglasang so as to free her counsel of any
liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. In our view, counsel satisfactorily explained to the lower
court the circumstances of the late reporting, and the latter in fact granted
counsel an extended period. The timeliness of the report is therefore a nonissue.
The reporting issue that goes into the core of this case is whether counsel
properly gave the court the name and address of the legal representative of
the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. We rule that he did not.
The "legal representatives" that the provision speaks of, refer to those
authorized by law - the administrator, executor or guardian19 who, under
the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons,20 is constituted to
take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule 3 likewise expressly
provides that "the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator . . .". Significantly, the person - now the present petitioner that counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned under

279

Section 16, Rule 3. Rather, he is a counterclaim co-defendant of the

deceased whose proferred justification for the requested substitution is the
transfer to him of the interests of the deceased in the litigation prior to her
death.
Under the circumstances, both the lower court and the CA were legally
correct in not giving effect to counsel's suggested substitute.
First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a
substitute. Section 16, Rule 3 speaks for itself in this respect.
Second, as already mentioned above, the reason for the Rule is to protect
all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly
the deceased and her estate. We note in this respect that the Notice that
counsel filed in fact reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased
through the transfer of her remaining interest in the litigation to another
party. Interestingly, the transfer is in favor of the very same person who is
suggested to the court as the substitute. To state the obvious, the
suggested substitution effectively brings to naught the protection that the
Rules intend; plain common sense tells us that the transferee who has his
own interest to protect, cannot at the same time represent and fully protect
the interest of the deceased transferor.
Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in
interest that transpire in the course of litigation. Thus, counsel could have
validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa's interests in the
subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3.21 But this can
happen only while the client-transferor was alive and while the manifesting
counsel was still the
effective and authorized counsel for the client-transferor, not after the death
of the client when the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. The fact
that the alleged transfer may have actually taken place is immaterial to this
conclusion, if only for the reason that it is not for counsel, after the death of
his client, to make such manifestation because he then has lost the
authority to speak for and bind his client. Thus, at most, the petitioner can
be said to be a transferee pendente lite whose status is pending with the
lower court.
Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records
disclose that the subject matter of the Quitclaim allegedly executed by

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Josefa in favor of Remismundo is Lot 1220-E, while the subject matter of

the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in the petitioner's favor is Lot
1220-D. This circumstance alone raises the possibility that there is more
than meets the eye in the transactions related to this case.
c. The Heirs as Legal Representatives.
The CA correctly harked back to the plain terms of Section 16, Rule 3 in
determining who the appropriate legal representative/s should be in the
absence of an executor or administrator. The second paragraph of the
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, is clear - the
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator. Our
decisions on this matter have been clear and unequivocal. In San Juan, Jr.
v. Cruz, this Court held:
The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals x x x that
priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or
administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the
appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs
resort to an extra-judicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt
the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for
the deceased, is no longer true.22 (Emphasis ours)
We likewise said in Gochan v. Young: 23
For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in
previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the
decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the
court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is
all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of
the deceased.
Josefa's death certificate24 shows that she was single at the time of her
death. The records do not show that she left a will. Therefore, as correctly
held by the CA, in applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving
sisters (Michaelis, Maria, Zosima, and Consolacion) and the children of her
deceased sister, Lourdes (Manuel, Cesar, Huros and Regulo) who should
be her legal representatives. Menendez, although also a sister, should be
excluded for being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.

281

DBP v. Gagarani
GR# 172248, Sept. 17, 2008
565 SCRA 54
Facts:
Spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok are husband and wife who owned
several parcels of land. Upon their death, their 11 children inherited their
properties which were subsequently settled extrajudicially. Subject
property acquired through free patent is a parcel of land located at
Pagawan, Manticao Misamis Oriental. This was adjudicated to Denison
being 1 of the 11 heirs. He was married to Ella. Thereafter, the lands
OCT was cancelled and TCT in his name was issued. Denison and Ella,
upon borrowing P100K from DBP subjected said land as colatteral. Upon
failure if the spouses to repay the loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed. It was sold to DBP being the highest bidder and an eventual
TCT was issued in its name. When Denison died, he was survived by Ella
and their children. They filed a complaint for repurchase of the said lot in
RTC invoking their right to repurchase as provided in Sec 119 of CA 141
which reads, Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper , shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of 5 years from date of
the conveyance. RTC dismissed the complaint and denied the MR filed on
the ground that filing of the complaint was beyond the 5 year period. (Nov
28, 1992 and May 15,1998 as the periods used). Upon appeal to CA, RTC
decision was reversed on the ground that the 5 year period should be
counted from the registration of the certificate of sale (Dec 24, 1992) and
not from Nov 28, 1992. Filing of the complaint on May 1998 is still within
the redemption period.
Issue
Whether or not the daughter in law and grandchildren of the patentees
have the right to redeem the properties.
Held
Yes, The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee
every chance to preserve and keep in the family the land that the State has
gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and
cultivating it.17 Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the

282

patentees son (and a new title in his name issued) does not bring it outside
the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled
because the land remains in the family of the patentee. As we explained
inFerrer v. Mangente it was held that The term "legal heirs" is used in
Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who
is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of
law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending
upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs
are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves
a legitime for them. Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed
under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the
Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into
the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal
heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the
restrictive construction given it by the lower court is more in keeping with
the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the
jurisprudence laid down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive
at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in accordance with its
purpose xxxx22
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father,
who in turn inherited it from his parents. Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok,
as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal
heirs who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA.23
In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-in-law of the patentees to
repurchase the property because this would be "more in keeping with the
spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail."24 Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to
carry out its purpose.
Bonilla vs. Barcena,
NO. L-41715, June 18, 1976
71 SCRA 491
Facts:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla
and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action
in the Court of First Instance , to quiet title over certain parcels of land
located in Abra. However, she died during the pendency of the case and

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RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead person cannot be a
real party in interest and has no legal capacity to sue. Substitution of the
children as legal heirs for Fortunata was filed but denied, and so with the
MRs. Hence this petition for review.
Issue
Whether or not the complainant, who died during the pendency of a case
can be substituted by his/ her heirs.
Held
Yes. Before the death of the deceased, the court already acquired
jurisdiction upon her person, as such, the case may proceed substituting
the heirs as a real party in interest (Rules of Court prescribes such the
procedure in Rule 3 Section 16). This is in compliance with Article 777 of
the CC which provides that that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of
the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being
heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. The deceaseds claim, upon
his/her death does not extinguished by his/her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case.
Cruz vs. Cruz
GR# 173292/Sept. 1, 2010
629 SCRA 605
Facts
During the lifetime of Memoracion Cruz, she filed with RTC a complaint
against her son, Oswaldo Cruz, an Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and
Damages. She claimed that she acquired the subject land located in
Tabora Tondo Mla through purchase and its TCT was duly registered under
her name. However, it was transferred to her son Oswaldo and wife by
virtue of a fraudulent Deed of Sale. Pending said case, Memoracion died.
Oswaldo moved for a Motion to Dismiss and was granted by RTC. Another

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son-heir of Memoracion, Edgardo Cruz filed an MR representing his

deceased mother but was denied. CA affirmed RTC upon appeal. Hence
this case.
Issue
Whether or not the complaint filed can survive complainants death.
If yes, whether or not an heir can substitute the deceased in pursuing the
case.
Held
Yes to both questions. Since the complaint affects property and property
rights and the injuries to a person is only incidental, the causes of action
will survive death. As such, complainant can be substituted by her heirs.
And although Oswaldo was an heir, he is disqualified to represent the
deceased being the adverse party to the complaint. Edgardo Cruz, also a
son-heir, without the disqualifications provided by law, by all means could
represent Memoracion. As provided in Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the
decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to
the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of
their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment
of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the
heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial
declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x
x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no
reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff. The Motion to dismiss by RTC and as
affirmed by CA was reversed by SC and the case was remanded to RTC
for further proceedings.

Heirs of Sandejas vs. Lina,

GR # 141634, Feb. 5, 2001
351 SCRA 183
Facts

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Eliodoro Sandejas Sr., husband of the deceased Remedios Sandejas was

appointed administrator of her estate. As such, he bound and obligated
himself, his heirs, administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely
and in their entirety 4 parcels of land, of which half of each, as Remedios
conjugal share belonged to the her estate. However, Eliodoro died before
a Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into by him and Lina. Lina moved
that he be appointed as Eliodoros substitute to represent estate of
Remedios since their children-heirs have not yet appointed one. Lower
Court granted the motion. Sixto, being son-heir eventually replaced Lina
upon court approval, as administrator. Lina moved that a deed of absolute
sale now be executed in his favor. RTC granted the petition which the CA
overturned holding that since the nature of the contract between Sandejas
and Lina is not a perfected Contact of Sale. As such, said 4 lots must still
form part of the deceaseds estate. Hence this case.
Issue
Whether or not Eliodoro Sandejas, spouse of the deceased could sell the
properties of the estate still undergoing probate proceedings
Held
While it may not render the contract invalid, it still needed a court approval
is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely
affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso
shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership.12 In other words, they can sell
their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the
effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the
property may be taken out ofcustodia legis, but only with the court's
permission.13 It would seem that the
suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for
this reason.
Balus v. Balus
GR# 168970, Jan. 15, 2010
610 SCRA 178
Facts
The petitioner and respondents of this case are the children of Rufo and
Sebastiance, husband and wife. During the lifetime of Rufo, he mortgaged
his own parcel of land, as security for a loan obtained from the Rural Bank

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of Maigo Lanao del Norte. In his failure to pay the loan, the mortgaged
property was foreclosed and sold subsequently at public auction, where it
was sold to Rural Bank as the sole bidder. Certificate of Sale was warded
to the Bank and TCT was issued under its name upon failure of the heirs of
Rufo to repurchase the property within the redemption period. However, in
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufo, said land was adjucated
to the heirs who remained in possession of the lots and refused to
surrender to respondents. RTC hold that the petitioner have the right to
purchase said property to respondents as provided in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate. On appeal to CA, the decision was reversed and
ruled that co=ownership was extinguished when petitioner and respondents
did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and
allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Bank. Hence this case.
Issue
Whether or not petitioners still have the right of redemption after subject
property was already sold and transferred to the buyer (Bank).
Held
No more. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death.14 In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of
the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the
subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his
death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to
which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents
never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they
became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass
into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at
any given point in time.
Arellano vs. Pascual
GR# 189776/ Dec. 15, 2010
638 SCRA 826

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FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as

heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented
by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of
Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M5034, filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land
(the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by
Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of
which donation respondents assailed, may be considered as an advance
legitime of petitioner.
Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati,
which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it
may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the
validity of the donation.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate, the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil
Code which reads:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the case was remanded to the lower
court, motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the honorable Court of Appeals is Correct in declaring:
THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED
TO LEGITIMES.

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IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR.

EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL
OR INTESTATE HEIRS.
HELD: Petion granted. The decision ordering the collation of property
donated to Amelia Arellano is set aside. Case was remanded to lower court
for further proceedings. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first,
it is a mere mathematical operation by the addition of the value of
donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate; and
second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by
lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.The purposes of collation are
to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible, and
to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and
the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that
part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory
heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.The decedent not
having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at
liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblingscollateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it
was valid, is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against
the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however,
the donated property is not subject to collation. The decedents remaining
estate should thus be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral
relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of

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the Civil Code, viz:Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,

illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and
sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Reyes vs. Enriquez
GR# 162956/April 10, 2008
551 SCRA 86
Facts:
Petitioners are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject
parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera. They executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes involving a portion of
the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, petitioners and the known heirs
of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale over the same property.
Respondents, on the other hand, allege that their predecessor-in-interest
Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the
Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso share in the subject parcel of
land. They later filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the
affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs
of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel
the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned
documents.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs
were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera since they cannot demand the partition of the real property without
first being
declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil
action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically
instituted for the purpose.
On appeal, CA reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed
with the hearing of the case.
Issue:

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Whether the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to

determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an
ordinary civil action to nullify the aforementioned documents.
Held:
Yes.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property
was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an
ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition, or
nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto, this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding."
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations,
have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in
the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to
have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been
instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a
lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real
parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the
complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the
respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the
registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new
transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need
to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario

GR# 124320/ Mar. 2, 1999
304 SCRA 18
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of
520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 96,235 square meters, more or
less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.On March 17, 1994, petitioners

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executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido

and Isabel Yaptinchay.
On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the
aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay
Realty and Development Corporation (Golden Bay) under Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. (TCT) 225254 and 225255. With the discovery of
what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for
ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363,
493364, 493665, 493366, 493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative
Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH
DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127 before Branch 21 of the
Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.Upon learning that Golden Bay sold
portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with the RTC
an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to
mention the TCTs to be annulled. But the respondent court dismissed the
Amended Complaint.On August 12, 1995, the private respondents
presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they
have not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is
different from that of the defendants, and that plaintiffs claim was barred by
laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the respondent court in
its Order dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it - except the allegations that they are
the legal heirs of the above-named Yaptinchays - that they have been
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the issue of heirship should first be determined
before trial of the case could proceed.
HELD: To begin with, petitioners Petition for Certiorari before this Court is
an improper recourse. Their proper remedy should have been an appeal.
An order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order, which is subject
to appeal and not a proper subject of certiorari. Where appeal is available
as a remedy, certiorari will not lie.
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint
of petitioners, as it aptly ratiocinated and ruled:

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But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays - that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property.
he trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Limos vs. Odones
GR# 186979/ Aug. 11, 2010
628 SCRA 288
FACTS: On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco
Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed,
Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes
and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as
Civil Case No. 05-33 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling,
Tarlac, Branch 68.
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940square meter parcel of land located at Pao 1st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of
an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale dated, January 29, 2004,
executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in
whom the original title to the land was registered. These heirs were
Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca
Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of
conveyance; and when they did, they found out that the lands Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein
petitioners.Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a

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Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her

husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972.
Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No.
329427 cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No.
392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes
and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos
Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa Delos
Reyes.Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the
ground that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in
the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because they died on June
30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively.
In their answer, petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also
constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1)
failure to state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents
alleged title is void, since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale
was not published and it contained formal defects, the vendors are not the
legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal, and respondents are not the real partiesin-interest to question the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever
occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata
Lardizabal as indispensable Trial court parties; and (3) respondents claim
is barred by laches. In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC
denied the Motion and held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for
Admission were earlier pleaded as affirmative defenses in petitioners
Answer, to which respondents already replied on July 17, 2006. Hence, it
would be redundant for respondents to make another denial. The trial court
further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for Admission
were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale appended to the complaint. On August 14, 2008, the CA
dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative defenses raised by
petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a full-blown
hearing.Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners
are now before this Court seeking a review of the CAs pronouncements.
ISSUE: Whether the affirmative defenses raised in their Motion are
indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they
failed to respond to the Request for Admission.
HELD: Petition denied. As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters
set forth in petitioners Request for Admission were the same affirmative
defenses pleaded in their Answer which respondents already traversed in

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their Reply. The said defenses were likewise sufficiently controverted in the
complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners sought to compel
respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already denied,
a redundancy, which if
abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the proceedings and thus defeat
the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of discovery which is to
expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not
be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry.
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate
the allegations of the requesting partys pleading but should set forth
relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose
purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it
serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for
Admission were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the
requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them
anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to
the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the
implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff
prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and
(2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the
status of petitioners predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata
Lardizabal, these issues go into the merits of the parties respective claims
and defenses that can be best determined on the basis of preponderance
of the evidence they will adduce in a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing,
the objective of which is for the court to determine whether or not the case
should proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address such issues.
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the
non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the
complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court.Equally

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settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in
a motion to dismiss.

Alfonso vs. Andres

GR# 166236/ July 29, 2010
626 SCRA 149
FACTS: The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana
with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres
against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal. Petitioners
contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required
period was due to their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no
justification for the dismissal of their appeal specially since the PAO had
just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as directed by
the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. They contend
that appeal should be allowed since the brief had anyway already been
prepared and filed by the PAO before it sought reconsideration of the
dismissal of the appeal and is already part of the records. They contend
that the late filing of the brief should be excused under the circumstances
so that the case may be decided on the merits and not merely on
technicalities. On the other hand, respondents contend that failure to file
appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may dismiss an
appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound
discretion when it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners failure to file their
appellants' brief within the extended period of 75 days after the original 45day period expired.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal should be allowed beyond the period
prescribed on ground of poverty.
HELD: overty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners'
complacency in allowing months to pass by before exerting the required
effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a justification for
delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their
case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have
the case finally settled without delay. Furthermore, the failure to file a brief
on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due

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to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite

their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented
to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent
lawyers too late.
It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue
the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. They could
also have requested the said lawyer to file the required appellants' brief
before consenting to his withdrawal from the case. But they did neither of
these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging their
replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not
poverty, are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in.
It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices to
respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward
procedural requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty,
has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of justice,
in the present case.
The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. The extrajudicial settlement of estate,
even though not published, being deemed a partition of the inherited
property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of
the property that was assigned to him. The records show that Jose did in
fact sell to respondents the subject property. The deed of sale executed by
Jose in favor of the respondents being a public document, is entitled to full
faith and credit in the absence of competent evidence that its execution
was tainted with defects and irregularities that would warrant a declaration
of nullity. As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or
irregularities in the execution of the deed of sale. They failed to prove by
strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the sale of the
subject real property. As found by the RTC, although Jose was suffering
from partial paralysis and could no longer sign his name, there is no
showing that his mental faculties were affected in such a way as to negate
the existence of his valid consent to the sale, as manifested by his
thumbmark on the deed of sale. The records sufficiently show that he was
capable of boarding a tricycle to go on trips by himself. Sufficient
testimonial evidence in fact shows that Jose asked respondents to buy the
subject property so that it could be taken out from the bank to which it was
mortgaged. This fact evinces that Joses mental faculties functioned
intelligently.
Acap vs. CA,

297

GR# 118114, Dec. 7, 1995

251 SCRA 30

Facts: Spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma owns a lot in

Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. After both spouses died, their only son
Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized
document entitled "Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale" in
favor of Cosme Pido. Petitioner Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a
portion of the said land, covering an area of nine thousand five hundred
(9,500) meters. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to
Cosme Pido, Acap continued to be the registered tenant thereof and
religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter, upon Pido's
death, to his widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when Pido died
intestate and on 27 November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a
notarized Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights of the lot. With a
provision do hereby waive, quitclaim all our rights, interests and
participation over the said parcel of land in favor of Edy delos Reyes not
a legitimate heir.
Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his
favor, private respondent Edy de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry
of Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original
certificate of title. Thereafter, private respondent sought for petitioner
(Acap) to personally inform him that he (Edy) had become the new owner
of the land and that the lease rentals thereon should be paid to him. Private
respondent further alleged that he and petitioner entered into an oral lease
agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay ten (10) cavans of palay per
annum as lease rental. In 1982, petitioner allegedly complied with said
obligation. In 1983, however, petitioner refused to pay any further lease
rentals on the land, prompting private respondent to seek the assistance of
the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. During the meeting, an officer of the Ministry informed Acap's
wife about private respondent's ownership of the said land but she stated
that she and her husband (Teodoro) did not recognize private respondent's
claim of ownership over the land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four
(4) years, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against petitioner, alleging in the main that as his leasehold
tenant, petitioner refused and failed to pay the agreed annual rental of ten
(10) cavans of palay despite repeated demands.

298

Issues: Whether or not the Petitioner is correct refusing to recognize Edy

Reyes as the owner of the land.
Held:
We find the petition impressed with merit.
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over
a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient
to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed
by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real
rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is
the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or
transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a
waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or
deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of
Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on
the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring
ownership.
Arriola v. Arriola
GR# 177703, Jan. 28, 2008
542 SCRA 666
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition of the properties of decedent
Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife
Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.

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On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition
of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his
heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights
of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John
Nabor sought the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it.
Said auction had to be reset when petitioners refused to include the house
standing on the subject land.

Issue:
Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot
and should be included in the sale through public auction.
Held:
The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code,
the subject house is deemed part of the subject land.
In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior
act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the
improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for
partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following
the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition
in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto,
otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without
dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto.
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was
built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is
then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased;
as such, it is owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any
one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time,
demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's
recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of

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all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the
complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the
subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of
authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears
emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the
declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the
actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of
the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the
subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore
susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by
the RTC is an entirely different matter.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on
his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their
residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record
establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation
of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they
and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic
constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family
residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes
provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule
106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically
extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in
which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus,
applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion

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of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family

home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it
stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is
shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code,
viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as
the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the
following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extrajudicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs
cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court
finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged
by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the
partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment
to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the
immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This
signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the coownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact
alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much
less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual
co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted
under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject
house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if
it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent

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Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until
March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned,
much less when no
compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction
and order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception
from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.
Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house
although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the
subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The
same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of
the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family
home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and
immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10
years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to
the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by
TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30,
2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of
the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G.
Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period
provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.
Reyes v. RTC Makati
GR# 165744, Aug. 11, 2008
561 SCRA 593

Facts: Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two
of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro,

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Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith

Insurance Corporation (Zenith), a domestic corporation established by their
family. Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. Although Pedro's
estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs sometime in the 1970s, no
similar settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacia's
estate, which included her shareholdings in Zenith. As of June 30, 1990,
Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith; Oscar and Rodrigo owned
8,715,637 and 4,250 shares, respectively. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a
complaint with SEC, to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of
ZENITH and to etermine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro
and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by
Oscar] for himself.
Issue: Whether or not Rodrigo shall automatically become the owner of the
shares in proportion to his succession share.
Held: No. We point out at the outset that while Rodrigo holds shares of
stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with
respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs
of Anastacia Reyes with respect to the 136,598 shares registered in her
name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the
allegations of the complaint is Rodrigo's interest as an heir since the
subject matter of the present controversy centers on the shares of stocks
belonging to Anastacia, not on Rodrigo's personally-owned shares nor on
his personality as shareholder owning these shares. In this light, all
reference to shares of stocks in this case shall pertain to the shareholdings
of the deceased Anastacia and the parties' interest therein as her heirs.
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon
Anastacia's death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate's
partition, deemed co-owners thereof.[25]This status as co-owners,
however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of
the corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the
Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not
become registered stockholders of the corporation.
Rodrigo must, therefore, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered
a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings originally
belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings
that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a

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settlement of the decedent's estate. No such proceeding has been

commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares
allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot
demand that this be done unless and until he has established his specific
allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement
of Anastacia's estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of
the estate to the heirs. Without the partition and distribution, there can be
no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot
consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate
controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.
Puno v. Puno Enterprises
GR# 177066, Sept. 11, 2009
599 SCRA 585
Facts: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of
respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito
Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint
for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is
the son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno.
As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his
late father as stockholder of respondent. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to
sue because his birth certificate names him as Joselito Musni Muno.
Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that Joselito Musni
Puno and Joselito Musni Muno were one and the same.
Issue: WON Petitioner has the right on the stockholder of the decedent.
Held: Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent
corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos
L. Puno. Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased
stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner
was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder;
thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third

305

person.[10] As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother

supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no
evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become
stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the
deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed
first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must
be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation
Code provides that no transfer shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.[16]
During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being
vested with the legal title to the stock.[17] Until a settlement and division of
the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor.[18] Consequently, during such time, it is the
administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the
deceased as stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish
that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent,
absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by
Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if
petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.

DKC Holdings Corp. vs. CA

GR# 118248, April. 5, 2000
329 SCRA 666
Facts: The subject of the controversy is a 14,021 square meter parcel of
land located in Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was originally
owned by private respondent Victor U. Bartolome's deceased mother,
Encarnacion Bartolome. This lot was in front of one of the textile plants of
petitioner and, as such, was seen by the latter as a potential warehouse
site. Petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with
Encarnacion Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease
or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be exercised
within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract. In

306

turn, petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for

the reservation of its option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall
serve formal written notice upon the lessor
Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. Petitioner
regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to
Encarnacion until her death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed
its payment to private respondent Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of
Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Victor and the Register of Deeds,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 3337-V-90
which was raffled off to Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession
of the subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of
title for registration and annotation thereon of the Contract; and the
payment of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Issue: WON DKC holdings can compel Victor to accept the contract
entered into between his mother and DKC Holdings.
Held: The general rule, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations
arising therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or
(3) provision of law.
In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision
making the rights and obligations under the contract intransmissible. More
importantly, the nature of the rights and obligations therein are, by their
nature, transmissible.
The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an
eminent civilist, is as follows:
Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely
personal, either by provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and
agency, or by the very nature of the obligations arising therefrom, such as
those requiring special personal qualifications of the obligor. It may also be
stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not transmitted to
the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where
the client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving
minor heirs, and the lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional

307

services under the contract to the probate court, substituted the minors as
parties for his client, it was held that the contract could not be enforced
against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of
quantum meruit.9
In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require
the exercise of special knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience,
judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal qualification of one or both
parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death
of the party who is required to render such service." 10
It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a
contract terminates upon the death of one of the parties is whether it is of
such a character that it may be performed by the promissor's personal
representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well
performed by others are discharged by the death of the promissor.
Conversely, where the service or act is of such a character that it may as
well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows
that performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate
the contract or excuse nonperformance. 11
In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late
Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the obligation of Encarnacion in the
contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner upon the
exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be
performed by her heir Victor.
As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself
and his heirs." 12 In 1952, it was ruled that if the predecessor was dutybound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the reconveyance had
not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for
reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot
escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to
the liability affecting their common ancestor. 13
It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of
the clear provision of Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir
of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest between him and his deceased
mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is valid
and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him. 14 This is
clear from Paraaque Kings Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where
this Court rejected a similar defense
With respect to the contention of respondent Raymundo that he is not privy
to the lease contract, not being the lessor nor the lessee referred to therein,

308

he could thus not have violated its provisions, but he is nevertheless a

proper party. Clearly, he stepped into the shoes of the owner-lessor of the
land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed all the obligations of the
lessor under the
lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in the form of rental
payments. Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for
the annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both pleadings also
alleged collusion between him and respondent Santos which defeated the
exercise by petitioner of its right of first refusal.
In order then to accord complete relief to petitioner, respondent Raymundo
was a necessary, if not indispensable, party to the case. A favorable
judgment for the petitioner will necessarily affect the rights of respondent
Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which petitioner would like to
assert its right of first option to buy.
In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease,
which is a property right. The death of a party does not excuse
nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the
party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contract. 16
Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore,
Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
Reyes v. Enriquez
GR# 162956, April 10, 2008
551 SCRA 86
FACTS:
Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes co-owned a parcel of land evidenced
by (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). Anacleto was survived by his two
daughters, Etta (Peter-respondents wife) and Graciana, who died single
without any issue and who during her lifetime had sold her interest over the
land to Etta. Dionisia Reyes on the other hand, was survived by herein
petitioners.
Prior to the present controversy, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial
Settlement) involving a portion of the subject parcel of land. Also, together
with heirs of Anacleto, petitioners executed a Segregation of Real Estate
and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the

309

same property. By virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551

(T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued in the names of
Anacleto Cabrera, petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr., petitioner Faustino Reyes,
petitioner Esperidion Reyes, petitioner Julieta G. Rivera, Felipe Dico, and
Archimedes C. Villaluz.
Meanwhile, Etta died leaving Peter and their daughter Deborah as her
heirs. Peter and Deborah, believing that they own of the co-owned land
of Anacleto, sold a portion of said land to Spouses Fernandez. When
Spouses Fernandez was about to register their share in the subject land,
they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1)
Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share
in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2)
Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only
owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the
rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes,
Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of
title in the name of the herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of
Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by
the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the
foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a
complaint before the RTC for annulment or nullification of the
aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the
"repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property.
The RTC denied dismissed their complaint alleging that since they are not
the heirs of Anacleto, they cannot demand for the partition of the property
without first being declared as heirs of Anacleto in a special proceedings.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs decision. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an
ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia
Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia
Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of
Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by
virtue of the above-questioned documents.
HELD:

310

YES.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property
was registered sue to recover the said property through the institution of an
ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18
or nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto,19 this Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the
exclusive competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the
recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the occasion
to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the
special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are
pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of,
among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for
his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition
or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased.22
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for
the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the
right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and not
merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to
annul.
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations,
have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in
the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to
have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been
instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a
lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real
parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the

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complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the
respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the
registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new
transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to
establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Testamentary Succession [Arts. 783-959];

Wills In General;

Vitug vs. Court of Appeals,

GR# 82027, Mar. 29, 1990
183 SCRA 755
FACTS:
Dolores Luchangco Vitug, died in in New York, U. S.A., and was survived
by widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug. She left a will and designated
Rowena Faustino-Corona as executrix as well as Nenita Alonte as cospecial administrator. During the pendency of the probate of her two wills,
Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court
to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to
cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus
interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of
Appeals, the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the
payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and
P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the
sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038
of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
Rowena opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground
for reimbursement. Romarico justified his act by insisting that the said
funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June
19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to
as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or
either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the

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property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or

withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death
of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the
survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of
either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the
survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our abovementioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of
the BANK for such payment or withdrawal.
The trial court upheld the validity of the agreement but the Court of
Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private respondent,
held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a
valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code, and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation
under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis
causa which needs to comply with the formalities of a valid will.
HELD: NO.
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally
bind themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the
other shall give or do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or
which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract
depends on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2)
"which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the
sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of
currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category,
while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia,
has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of
risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx

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But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its
operation or effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown
in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious
donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime
of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No
such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement
involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been
executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court,
in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having
predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested
right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank
of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate
of the deceased.

Sicad vs. CA,

GR# 125888, Aug. 13, 1998
294 SCRA 183
FACTS:
A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was
executed by Montinola naming as donees her grandchildren, namely:
Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio
Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land located at Capiz, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of Montinola. The
deed also contained the signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of
their acceptance of the donation. Said deed was registered. Montinola
however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622),
as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years
later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the

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reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name), the case being docketed
as Special Proceeding. Her petition was founded on the theory that the
donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus
had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the
donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No.
T-16622.
Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was
an inter vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor
set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently
changed into an ordinary civil action. The court held that the donation was
indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack
of merit.
In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitionerspouses Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had
expressed their disinterest over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial
courts decision hence the present petition.
ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos.

HELD:
NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition.
The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of
donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and
explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the
donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the
deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period.
Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the
donees shall not sell or encumber the properties herein donated within 10
years after the death of the donor." The actuality of the subsequent
insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of the instrument: the
intercalation is easily perceived and identified it was clearly typed on a
different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate
paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it.

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A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the
donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of
disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible
donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the
property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the
property this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from
Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of
title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated
property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit
provisions of the deed of donation reserving the exercise of rights of
ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the
property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to the
conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa,
contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's
demise.
The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and
that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is
merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation,
begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition
of the property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense,
because if they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact
dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of
would be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would
not necessarily result in the restoration of the donor's ownership and
enjoyment of the property.
It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be
deemed one inter vivos simply because founded on considerations of love
and affection. In Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that
"the fact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection **
is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos (solely) because transfers
mortis causa may also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato
v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the
conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the

316

services rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in

determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter
vivos or not, because a legacy may have identical motivation."
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the
Civil Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous
contract, the construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of
rights and
interests".
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have
not been complied with.

Aluad v. Aluad
GR# 176943, Oct. 17, 2008
569 SCRA 697
FACTS:
Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime,
raised petitioners mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad).
When Crispin died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of
which, she donated to Maria. The Deed provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and
convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property abovedescribed, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them
who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or
even all of the parcels of land herein donated.
Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to
transfer in her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676)
out of the 6 donated to Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by
her to respondent.
A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the
remaining four parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties,

317

including the land the title of which was in her name (Lot 674), to
respondent.
Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Marias heirs, herein
petitioners, thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of
the two lots in respondents possession. For his defense, respondent
alleged that the first lot was obtained by him through sale while the second
lot through inheritance based on the will executed by Matilde.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was
impossible for respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those
were previously donated in favor of the mother of petitioners.
The CA on appeal reversed the trial courts decision ruling that the donation
made to the mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa
hence invalid for failing to comply with the requisites for its validity as
provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos.
HELD:
NO.
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners
mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to
petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.

318

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber
or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated"
means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.The
phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is
of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would
take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such
phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed
paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was
the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead
as early as 1975.
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period
when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event
that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor
provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect"
the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject
donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a
resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur
before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term
or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what
donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and
effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no
donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa,
not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no

319

right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the

formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos.
674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot
No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to
the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to
Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to
respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No.
674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could
devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to
them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having
been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of
it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the
lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of
inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and
issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the
new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of
the hearing before the trial court.

Forms of Will

Suroza vs. Honrado,

AM No. 2026-CFI, Dec. 19, 1981
110 SCRA 388
FACTS:
Mauro Suroza was married to Marcelina Salvador. They did not have a
child but they reared one, in the name of Agapito, also surnamed as
Suroza. Agapito married Nenita and they had a child in the name of Lilia.
Mauro Suroza died. Agapito, who was a soldier, became disabled and was
declared incompetent in a special proceeding where his wife was appointed
as his guardian.

320

Meanwhile, Arsenia, the alleged girlfriend of Agapito had reared a child

named Marilyn, who was later delivered to Marcelina who brought her up
as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter Marilyn used
the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito.
It appeared that during the lifetime of Marcelina, she allegedly executed a
notarial will when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was
thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the
Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that wig,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter
Marilyn.
Subsequently, however, Marcelina died. Thereafter, Marina Paje, alleged to
be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed
with the Court of First Instance, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's
alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, and after hearing Judge Honrado issued
several orders among which instructed a deputy sheriff to eject the
occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza,
and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding
for the settlement of Marcelina's estate. She opposed said proceeding by
filin in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary
injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was
a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and attested,
that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and
Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or
trick.
Despite her opposition, respondent judge allowed the probate of the will.
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the
executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had
been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978,
filed in this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the
fraudulent will of Marcelina.

321

ISSUE: WON the will was void for the reasons that it was written in English,
a language not know to the illiterate testatrix and that the attesting
witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary
himself.
HELD:
YES. In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it
was written in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate
testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and
translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That
could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in
a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English,
which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed
(Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly
referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted
not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress
and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of
court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have
personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could
have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

322

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to

be inexcusable.

Lee v. Tambago
A.C. No. 5281, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 393

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B.

Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal
profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in
containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr.
and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated
Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective
voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and
acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence
Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never
submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management
and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts
(NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are
falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public
with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had
complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and
that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a
criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.
However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the
Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court referred the case to the
IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the
respondent and in favor of the complainant
Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law
and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and
testament
Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of
professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial
Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one

323

year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition, because he has not
lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an
officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a
Notary Public.

Guerrero v. Bihis
GR#174144, April. 17, 2007
521 SCRA 394
The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses at the
testatrixs witnesses in QC before a notary public who was commissioned
for and in Caloocan City.
Held: Invalid. Notary public was acting outside the place of his commission,
and this did not satisfy Art 806. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

Caneda vs. CA,

GR# 103554, May. 28, 1993
222 SCRA 781
Facts: On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any
children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and
testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting
witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano
Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio
Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of
that last will. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator
was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal
properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo,
Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom
do not appear to be related to the testator.
Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a
petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and
testament. The probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20,
1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were postponed

324

for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away
before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. On February
25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sough his
appointment as special administrator of
the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he
was so appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981.
Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the
testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965R, before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On
October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate
proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and opposed thereat the probate of
the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his
estate.
Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now
known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, appointed
William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on
July 20, 1983, it issued an order for the return of the records of Special
Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceeding for the
probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984
the case was reraffled and eventually assigned to Branch XII of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of the
probate proceedings.
In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein
petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of the
testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the
testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to
the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and
the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified that the testator executed
the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing
mind and that, contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero
was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the
execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses
attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the probate
hearing as the had died by then.

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On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in
question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero. Thus,
petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed
that of the trial courts ruling on the ground that the attestation clause in the
last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the
Civil Code.
Issue: WON the attestation clause may be considered as having
substantially complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code
Held: No
What appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim to be
defective is: " We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences
and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we
do certify that the testament was read by him and the attestator, Mateo
Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE
PAGES, including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively
in letters of the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament,
and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of
the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.
SC argued that the present petition is meritorious.
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the
attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before
them and to the manner of the execution the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution
and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a
record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in
case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty,
such facts may still be proved.
Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack
of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state (1) the
number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the
testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the
attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all
its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

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The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages
on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or
decrease in the pages; whereas the subscription of the signature of the
testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very
same instrument executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses.
Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby
declare the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the
due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it
appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed
only by them. Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of
the will as it would be possible and easy to add the clause on a subsequent
occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses.
In this case, an examination of the last will and testament of Mateo
Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which have been
numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing
the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses.
The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in
the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the
testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other hand, is recited in
the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three
attesting witnesses hereto
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
"Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the
latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published as
such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal
publication; but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on
the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of
identification.
While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the
end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting
witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the
said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the
testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed
signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to

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the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a
will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses
sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will
cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.
In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been
performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic
evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will
yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced.
What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses
alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the
instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he is thereby resorting to
extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by
the indirection what in law he cannot do directly.

Abangan vs. Abangan,

Gr # 13431, Nov. 12, 1919
40 Phil 476
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to
probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the
opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two
sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly
signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin
by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the
will was duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on
the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each
other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has
for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution
of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But
when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their
signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely

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purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into
consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and
must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do
not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that
the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed
twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these
signatures must be written by the testator
and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the
signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another
signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not
guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would
add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such
importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on
the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom
do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin,
give sufficient security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise
clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the
will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are
written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the
removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore,
without considering whether or not this clause is an essential part of the
will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the
signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the
numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the
statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we
can add that same is not necessary in the attestation clause because this,
as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator
since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the
first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only
the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their
margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws

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on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these

primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that
the testarix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the
circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city
of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor
is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she
knew this dialect in which this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Celada v. Abena
GR# 145545, June. 30, 2008
556 SCRA 569
Facts: Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent
Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was the decedents
lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor
descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased
her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay,
Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on
February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of
a real property to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M.
Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed
one-half of her undivided share of a real to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena,
and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. Margarita
also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed
as SP Proc. No. M-1531.

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On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati and the latter consequently rendered a
decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as the executor of the will. Petitioner appealed to CA but the
latter only affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. Hence, the instant petition.
Issues:
(1) WON CA erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with
the formalities required by law
(2) WON CA erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured
through undue influence and pressure, and
(3) WON CA erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal
heirs of Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner
Held: SC ruled in favor of respondent. Since SC is not a trier of facts, they
found no reason to disturb the findings of RTC, to wit:
(1)With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz SamaniegoCelada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally
capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is
without merit. The oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of
evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the testator
was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for
the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to
the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could
engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the
testator does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors
witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the
testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of
mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak but
it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The]
testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
(2) Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the
reason that its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three
pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two pages only because
the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate.
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court,
after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error
in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not
material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a

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sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the

pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that
the will is the whole instrument consisting of three pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The position of the court is in
consonance with the "doctrine of liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article
809 of the Civil Code which reads: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed
and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article
805."
(3) The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the
signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions based on their
observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size,
texture and appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding
pages. After examination of the signatures, the court does not share the
same observation as the oppositors. The picture shows that the testator
was affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature was
procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
(4) Finally, the court finds that neither pressure nor undue influence was
exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture
reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other
witnesses while executing the subject will. In fine, the court finds that the
testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution,
that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was
executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil
Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the
subject notarial will.
Javellana vs. Ledesma
GR#. L-7179, June. 30, 1955
97 Phil 258
Facts:
The Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in
the Visayan dialect as the testament and codicil duly executed by the
deceased Ma. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950,
and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de
Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses.

332

The contestant, Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of

said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits
were not executed in conformity with law. Ledesma is questioning the
validity of the codicil contending that the fact that the notary did not sign the
instrument in the presence of the testator and the witness made the codicil
was not executed in conformity with the law
ISSUE:
W/N the codicil was validly executed.
HELD:
The instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who
attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by
the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was
signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the
other hand, Gimotea
affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and
signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply
conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears
rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in
recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs
slightly from it.
Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgment in
the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity
of the codicil.
The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator,
witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A
comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while
testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is
thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter
should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and
the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary disposition.
This was done in this case.
The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that
the testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part
of the acknowledgment itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their
separate execution out of the presence of the testatrix and her witnesses
cannot be said to

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violate the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption. It

is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain words
requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the
testament on the same day or occasion that it was executed.

Cruz vs. Villasor,

GR# L-32213, Nov. 26, 1973
54 SCRA 31
Facts:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and
testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of
the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation
and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the
testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to
what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and
testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita appealed the
allowance of the will by certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805
and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to
attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and
the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.).
Held:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty.
Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the
will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the
will.
To acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v.
Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front
or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were
the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he
cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other
to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a

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situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the

function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if
the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would
place
him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may,
in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has
notarized. There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a
will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not
serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the
issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these
cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and
not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as
attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not
envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.

Azuela v. CA
GR# 122880, April. 12, 2006
487 SCRA 119
Facts:
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial
will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and
notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was
written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages
and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The
said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both
pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery.
She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent's signature did not
appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in
accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate. According to the trial
court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng
Mga Saksi," comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,

335

and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also
held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the
second page of the will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied
the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision and
ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering
the will void and undeserving of probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that
"the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation
clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to
what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."
Issue:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law
and, hence, should be admitted to probate
Held:
No. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages
on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And
perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is
just aching for judicial rejection.
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal
requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Extant therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of
pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of
interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation
clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the
said Section 618. Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission
opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial
compliance rule."
However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule "must be limited to
disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing
witnesses are three or the will was notarized...But the total number of

336

pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of
each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate proceedings."
The Court suggested in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554,
May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781) that there is substantial compliance with this
requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case,
however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in
the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of
pages which comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply
with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by
the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at
the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from
the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that
the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the
will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand
margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed
towards a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, "Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng
Maynila. " By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed
as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible to construe the
averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that
before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor. It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is

337

fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary

public.
The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the
fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805
and entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement
of Art. 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed
and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the
instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the
criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious
wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also
provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she
had designated in the will.

Garcia vs. Vasquez,

GR# L-26615, April. 30, 1970
32 SCRA 489
Facts:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the
will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise,
this is also an appeal to remove the
current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( Consuelo) as special
administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo possesses interest
adverse to the estate and to order the RD of
Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or sisses
and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be
the administratrix of the properties. The court approved this because
Consuelo has been was already managing the properties of the deceased
during her lifetime. What the respondents allege is that in the last years of
the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land
valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud
and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors presented evidence that
Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to certain
parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory to be used in the

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probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for
certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo
should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed
because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to
establish that the deceased was not of sound mind,
that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared another
will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing another
will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses prove their truthfulness.
Issue:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
Held:
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and
the due execution of her will would have
required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of
reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is
not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution
of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which
show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will
created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was
proof given by the testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read
at near distances because of cataracts. (Testatrixs vision was mainly for
viewing distant objects and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof
that it was read to the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not
expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate
alleged to have been transferred by the
deceased to her own husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an
action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.

Alvarado vs. Gaviola, Jr.,

339

GR # 74695, Sept. 14, 1993

226 SCRA 348
Facts:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial
will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son,
petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when
the said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will
himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud
before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5,
1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye
operation. Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was
read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally
incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under
duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature
of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
Issue:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite
allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as testator
was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading
requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not complied with.
Held:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements

340

of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections
should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind
(of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but
he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. However, in the
case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the
law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the testator
who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate)
and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing
and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. With four
persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word
with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually
appearing on the typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he
is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate),
is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose
and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
Roxas vs. De Jesus,
GR #. L-38338, Jan. 28, 1985
134 SCRA 245
Facts: A specialproceeding for the settlement of the estate of Andres de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was fileds by Simon Roxas. During
such proceeding he delivered to the court a notebook purporting to be the
holographic will of deceased Bibiana. Said will was dated Feb. 61 to which
the court admitted to probate. Luz Roxas then questioned thisa act of the

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court contending that said will should not be probated because it is not
properly dated as required by law.
Issue: Whether the said will indicating only the month and year (Feb. 61) is
properly dated and hence must be probated.
Held:Yes, the said will must be probated as there is substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law. As a general rule, the date in a
holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its execution.
However, when in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad
faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is
established, and the only issue is the date FEB/61 appearing in the said
holographic will, probate of said will should therefore be allowed under the
principle of substantial compliance.
Labrador vs. CA,
GR# 83843-44, April. 5, 1990
184 SCRA 170
FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died leaving behind a parcel
of land and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus,
Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador,
and a holographic will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his
heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed a petition for the
probate the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the
petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by
implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, before
Melecio's death, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling
in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio the parcel of land. Earlier
however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only
Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos.
Sagrado filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and
Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a
parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise

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from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on

March 17, 1968.
The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null
and void the Deed of Absolute sale. On appeal the CAmodified said
decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the
will for being undated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio
Labrador is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
HELD: The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated
into English,
I First Page
.xxxxx
II Second Page
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this
being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision
and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
..xxxxx
III THIRD PAGE
.xxxx
The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really
dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph
of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this
being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision
and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
(emphasis supplied)
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be
placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will

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itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are
present in the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the
testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves
about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the
said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will;
hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the
beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the
respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which
defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date
of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words
of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement
but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was
executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal
that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property
to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means
to control the disposition of his estate.

Kalaw vs. Relova,

GR #. L-40207, Sept. 28, 1984
132 SCRA 237
Facts: Natividad K. Kalaw died with a holographic Will which, as first
written, named her sister Rosa K. Kalaw as her sole heir. However, there is
an alteration (crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother
Gregorio Kalaw" as sole heir) without the proper authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code.
Gregorio filed for the probate of the Will, but it was opposed by Rosa. The
trial court denied the probate of the Will. Rosa, on the other hand, filed a
petition for review
claiming that the Will in its original form must be probated and that she be
declared as the sole heir.

344

Issue/s: Whether the Will be admitted to probate although the alterations

and/or insertions or additions were not authenticated by the full signature of
the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code; or whether the Will in its
original unaltered form declaring Rosa Kalaw as sole heir be probated.
Held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been
noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected
or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in
dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason
that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state
that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the
seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can
neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Probate of the radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir
is properly denied, since the same was not duly authenticated by the full
signature of the executrix as mandatory required by Article 814 of the Civil
Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot,
however, be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding that the
testatrix had by her own handwriting substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that
there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net result is that
the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kin
succeed to her intestate estate.

Echavez vs. Dozen cons.

GR# 192916/ Oct. 11, 2010
632 SCRA 594
Facts: Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of subject lots in
Cebu City. On September 7, 1985, he donated the subject lots to petitioner
Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Manuel accepted the donation.

345

In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in
favor of Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen
Corporation). A Deeds of Absolute Sale was executed over the same
properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.
On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicentes nephew,
filed a petition for the settlement of Vicentes intestate estate. On the other
hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicentes donation mortis causa in
his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in
favor of Dozen Corporation.
The RTC dismissed Manuels petition to approve the donation and his
action for annulment of the contracts of sale. The RTC found that the
execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente
had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the
donation. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that since
the donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance
with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The
CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause
and was therefore void.
On Appeal to SC, he argues that CA erred ignoring the Acknowledgment
portion of the deed of donation, which contains the import and purpose of
the attestation clause required in the execution of wills. The
Acknowledgment reads:
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at
Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert.
No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me
to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the
foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the
presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed.
Issue: WON the Acknowledgement in the Deed of donation be considered
as an Attestation clause in a will?
Held: No. The purported attestation clause embodied in the
Acknowledgment portion does not contain the number of pages on which
the deed was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino
and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal cannot be applied to the present case, as the
facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In
those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to

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state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of
pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation
in the present case.
The SC ruled, that even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what
the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an
attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one
statement.
That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in
two separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806,
respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that
serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a
deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is
his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the
instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the
instrument before them and to the manner of its execution.
An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article 805
requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses
themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the
Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Ajero vs. CA,
GR# 106720, Sept. 15, 1994
236 SCRA 488
FACTS: The late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982, executed a
holographic will before her death. In the will, decedent named as devisees
among others, the petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero and private
respondent Clemente Sand. On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp.
Proc. No. Q-37171 in the QC RTC, for allowance of decedent's holographic
will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through
improper pressure and undue influence. Notwithstanding the oppositions,
the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On
appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of
decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that
the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either

347

unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE: WON the holographic will is valid.
RULING: Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a
will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of
fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5
Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to
be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the
decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities
include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements
under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In the case of
holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A
reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement

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affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but
not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise,
a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the
unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does
not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In
the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic
will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H.
Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the
same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she
cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her
father's other heirs.
Codoy vs. Calugay,
GR# 123486, Aug. 12, 1999
312 SCRA 333
Facts:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate of the holographic will of the
deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will
on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress
employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedents property, including all real and
personal property was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.

349

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an
opposition 5 to the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will
was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an impression
that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on
the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was
the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the
signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly
done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic
will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through
fraud and trickery.
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in
support of their appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the
testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2)
Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5)
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal
Binanay and other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified
that the handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the
testator herself.Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant
Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of
Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the
handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate. In this
petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil
Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement
for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the
testator.

Issue:
Whether or not the provision of Article 811 is permissive or mandatory.
Held:

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We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil
Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We
have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory."
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil
or mischief that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to
give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ
means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased, which she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not
declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note. In her
testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will
from petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions
put in issue her motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and
revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal. So, the
only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth.
She never declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a
document.
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the
will to be probated and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in
case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs.
Singson, ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject
should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But,
on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will."
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is

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contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in
the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the personal
belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it
even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay,
she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five
years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the
handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by
her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the
cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms.
Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the
deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting
expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes
are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable.
There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33
and the signatures in several documents such as the application letter for
pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and a letter dated June 16,
1978, 35 the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows
of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of
the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic
will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

Rodelas vs. Aranza,

No. L-58509, Dec. 7, 1982
119 SCRA 16
Will may be allowed. The only question here is whether a holographic will
which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic
copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills
is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least
one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts

352

may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are

required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no
other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary
that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the
testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with
the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL.
509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said
decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
may be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the
photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased
can be determined by the probate court.

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete,

GR# 76714, June. 2, 1994
232 SCRA 722
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in
New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the
event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband
shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family
perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named
trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in
Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to
New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New
York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York

353

law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled
to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and
that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she
could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court
already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
HELD:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens,
will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in
which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will
has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of
Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

354

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very
glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr.
Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir
of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing
of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded
respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA
876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
"cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
"original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's
claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills.
Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence
needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to
it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices
and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Witnesses to Wills

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Codicils and Incorporation by Reference

Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Disposition

Adriana Maloto vs. CA,

No. L-76464, Feb. 29, 1988
158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs the parties (Aldina, Constantcio,
Panfilo and Felino) in this case who are her niece and nephews. Believing
that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the four
(4) heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their
aunts estate which was instituted in the then CFI. However, while the case
was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial
settlement of Adrianas estate which provides for the division of the estate
into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court,
said agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio
Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document
entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and
purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino
are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are
bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares
in the estate that what they have received by virtue of the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to
other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and
Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the
allowance of the will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came
before the Supreme Court by way or petition for certiorari and mandamus
which were dismissed because they were not the proper remedies. The
appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of
Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was
seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked.

356

RULING:
Article 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
1. By implication of law; or
2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of
wills; or
3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of
revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or
obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the
testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in
accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its
unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established
according to the Rules of Court.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be
conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express
direction of Adriana and was not done in her presence.

Gago vs. Mamuyac,

No. L-26317, Jan. 29, 1927
49 Phil. 902
Facts:
On the 21st day of February, 1925, the present action was commenced.
The purpose of this action was to obtain the probation of a last will and
testament of Miguel Mamuyac, who died on the 2d day of January, 1922, in
the municipality of Agoo of the Province of La Union. It appears from the

357

record that on or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said Miguel
Mamuyac executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A). In the month of
January, 1922, the said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of La Union for the probation of that will. The
probation of the same was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio
Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac (civil cause No. 1144,
Province of La Union). After hearing all of the parties the petition for the
probation of said will was denied by the Honorable C. M. Villareal on the 2d
day of November, 1923, upon the ground that the deceased had on the
16th day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament, stating:
"That Exhibit A is a mere carbon copy of its original which remained in the
possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it
before his death as per testimony of witnesses Jose Fenoy, who typed the
will of the testator on April 16, 1919, and Carlos Bejar, who saw on
December 30, 1920, the original of Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually
cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that
inasmuch as he had sold him a house and the land where the house was
built, he had to cancel it the will of 1919), executing thereby a new
testament. Narcisa Gago in a way corroborates the testimony of Jose
Fenoy, admitting that the will executed by the deceased (Miguel Mamuyac)
in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel Mamuyac. The
opponents have successfully established the fact that father Miguel
Mamuyac had executed in 1920 another will. The same Narcisa Gago, the
sister of the deceased, who was living in the house with him, when crossexamined by attorney for the opponents, testified that the original of Exhibit
A
could not be found. For the foregoing consideration and for the reason that
the original of Exhibit A has been cancelled by the deceased father Miguel
Mamuyac, the court disallows the probate of Exhibit A for the applicant."
From that order the petitioner appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate of the old will shall be allowed.
Held:
With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is
positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that the
will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any

358

evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It

therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation
of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be
found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where
it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the
testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the
testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the
will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the
death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that
the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the
conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence.

Molo vs. Molo,

No. L- 2538, Sept. 21, 1951
90 Phil 37
Facts: Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without any compulsory heir
in the direct line. He was survived by herein petitioner Juana Molo and by
his nieces and nephew who are the oppositors. Mariano left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939. The
second will contains a clause which expressly revokes the first will. Juana
Molo filed for the probate of the second will which was denied by the court
on the ground that it was not executed according to the requirements
prescribed by law. She then also filed for the probate of the first will which
was granted by the court, hence this appeal by the oppositors on the
ground that the second will had expressly revoked the first will; therefore,
the first will should have not been probated.

359

Issue: Whether the second will containing an express revocation of the first
will can be given effect
Held: No, the second will cannot be given effect and the first will can be
admitted to probate. A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a
previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in conformity with the provisions of the law as to the making of
wills , cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, in as much
as the revocatory clause is void. The earlier will can still be admitted to
probate under the principle of dependent relative revocation, predicated
on the testator' intention not to die intestate. That is why he executed two
wills on two different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir.
NOTE: DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION - The doctrine that
regards as mutually interrelated the acts of a testator destroying a will and
executing a second will. In such cases, if the second will is either never
made or improperly executed, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
testator would have preferred the former will to no will at all, which allows
the possibility of probate of the destroyed will.
Some jurisdictions decline to apply the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation to cases to eliminate a written revocation of a will, but apply it to
declare the ineffectiveness of a physical act of revocation. The justification
for the distinction is that the physical act is inherently equivocal. The court
has the
power to interpret the ambiguous act to ascertain what the testator did but
not to disregard an express statement of the testator and substitute its own
conception of what the testator should have done.
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation contravenes the strict
interpretation of and demand for rigid adherence to the specific language of
the statutes concerning the execution and revocation of wills and the theory
of the parol evidence

Diaz vs. De Leon,

No. L- 17714. May. 31, 1922
43 Phil 413
FACTS: The petitioner denies there was revocation of the will, while the
contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked his will by
destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former.

360

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon was revoked by
him?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the
deceased is not cloth with all the necessary requisites to constitute a
sufficient revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the
destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient
revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)lvvph1n+
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator,
shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same
be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who
ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence
and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator,
being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been
destroyed.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that
the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made
in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the
witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was
confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with
animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of
Jesus de Leon.

Republication and Revival of Wills

Disallowance of Wills
Dorotheo vs. CA,
GR# 108581, Dec. 8, 1999
320 SCRA 12

361

Facts: Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro Dorotheos death, petitioner, filed

a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. However, in 1983, they
filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void.
The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes
not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors (herein private respondents) as the only heirs of the Alejandro
Dorotheo .
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some
compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although
she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her
motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but
the same was dismissed. This dismissal became final and executory. A writ
of execution was thereafter issued.
Consequently, when petitioner refused to surrender the TCTs, (covering
the properties of the late Alejandro), private respondents filed a motion for
cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion. The lower court ruled for petitioner but the
same was reversed by the CA.
Hence, the present petition where petitioner assails the Order of the Court
of Appeals which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandros will that was
earlier admitted to probate.
Issue: Whether a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be
given effect.
Held: A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It has been consistently held
that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial
court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in
such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings
or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot
again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed.

362

However, the intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the
same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it
does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament
is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the
testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of
their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession,
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will
no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should
no longer be reevaluated.
In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically
valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

Santos vs. Buenaventura

GR No. L-22797, Sept. 22, 1966
18 SCRA 47
FACTS: Herein petitioner Rosalina Santos, one of the nieces of the
deceased Maxima Santos Vda de Blas, filed on October 22, 1956 with the
CFI of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September
22, 1956 by the deceased. Among the devisees mentioned in the will is
Flora Blas de Buenaventura, herein respondent, is not related by blood to
the deceased.
On November 28, 1956, Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed
an opposition to the probate of said will. However, after the probate court
had received the evidence for both petitioner and oppositors, but before the
latter could close the evidence, Flora Blas withdrew her opposition to the
probate of the will and joined the proponent of the said will for the
legalization of the same. The proceedings continued however as to the
opposition of Justo Garcia.
On December 24, 1957, the probate of the will was allowed. Flora,
thereafter filed a petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as
specific devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6, of the will.
Rosalina opposed the said petition on the ground that said specific devise

363

in favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant
to a provision of the will that should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees
contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her right to receive
any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the
other heirs, devisees and legatees.
The court sustained that the no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will
was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora of her devise in view of her
previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified under the
circumstances.
ISSUE: WON Floras filing of her opposition was justified which precluded
violation of the no contest and forfeiture clause.
HELD: The factor that preponderates in favor of Flor is that, after realizing
her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith
because grounded on strong doubts she withdrew her opposition and
joined the Santos in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must
not now be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the
testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate
within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property can
now be effected.
It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to
Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or
opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the
will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so because the questioned
clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa" instead of
"pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa.This furnishes a significant index into
the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned in
insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding
any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which Flor
brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done into the intention of the
testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out.
The most that can be said, if at all, is that Flora Blas' actuations were also
impelled by some desire to gain. But who among the heirs can assume a
posture of innocence and cast the first stone? None of them can safely
claim that he is not thus similarly motivated.
From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations
impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and
forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before
she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will.

364

Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded
the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through
said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions
of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a
whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's
intention.
Institution of Heirs

Reyes vs. Baretto-Datu,

GR # L-17818, Jan. 25, 1967
19 SCRA 85
Facts: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died he left his share of these
properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of Tirsos wards, and Lucia
Milagros (Milagros) Barretto. The usufruct of a fishpond, however, was
reserved for his widow, Maria. Maria was appointed administratrix. By
virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition which was approved by
the CFI of Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the
shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence, Salud took immediate
possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the OCTs and the
issuance of new titles in her own name.
Everything went well until Maria died. Upon her death, it was discovered
that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud
and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and
left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was
allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso
the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria
by her husband Bibiano. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate
of Maria, Tirso now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria. Hence,
the action for the recovery of one-half portion thereof. This action afforded
Milagros an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the
fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the
estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the
project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
Milagros contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired

365

the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire any valid
title thereto.
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros, the lower court
declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the
distributee, Salud, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a
daughter of the spouses Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of the project of
partition was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889
(then in force) providing as follows: A partition in which a person was
believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null
and void.
Issue: Whether Art. 1081 of the Old Civil Code was correctly applied by the
lower court.
Held: Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old
Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below.
The reason is obvious: Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in the late
Bibiano's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence,
the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who
was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and
void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of
children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a
daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for
Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. Nor does the fact that Milagros was
allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the
institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total
ommission of a forced heir.

Aznar vs. Duncan,

GR # L- 24365, June 30, 1966
17 SCRA 590

366

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled in
the Philippines, left a will devising unto Maria Helen (Christensen Garcia)
the amount of P3, 600.00, and leaving the rest of his estate to his daughter,
Maria Lucy (Christensen Daney). During partition, Helen opposed, saying
that she is deprived of her legitime as acknowledged natural child of the
testator. She further argued that Section 946 of the California Civil Code
provides that the laws of the domicile of the decedent should be applied.
The trial court ruled that since Edward E. Christensen was a US citizen at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions of his will are to be governed by the law of California.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Renvoi Doctrine should be applied
HELD:
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But
there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in
the Philippines.
Meaning of Domicile and Residence
Goodrich: The terms residence and domicile might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which
he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he
went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the
place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving
up his former home, he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition
of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a

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given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile. Residence, however, is a term used
with shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only
proper one.
Nationality Principle
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined
in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination
of the meaning of the term national law as used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Codecannot,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
of personal property?
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 if the Civil Code of
California: If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
.It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was
a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof should govern
the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article
946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision
in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile,
which is the Philippines.
Renvoi Doctrine

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One type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws

rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers back the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
Ruckverweisung. (Renvoyer to send back; or Weiterverweisung)
Another theory, known as the doctrine of renvoi, has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining
the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities.
Renvoi Doctrine as Applied by the Court in this case
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In Re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In Re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained, the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for
its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in
other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e.,

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apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities
cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

Acain vs. IAC

GR #L- 72706, Oct. 27, 1987
155 SCRA 100
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the
probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the
latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters

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were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower
court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter
and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute
the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and
the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well
as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez
and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to
the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongsons
petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the
will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been
pretirited.
RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally
adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she
was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case
of preterition of the legally adopted child.

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The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any
other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written.
Nuguid vs. Nuguid
GR # L- 23445, June 23, 1966
17 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will
stated as follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,
having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by
the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided
in favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of
compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively
disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:

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May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to
still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of
the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her
parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing
by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were
they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are
therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that
the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the
legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is
without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees
must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form
of disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be
proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will.
Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
Seangio v. Reyes
GR # 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006
508 SCRA 172
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and
Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very
healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most

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competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4)

Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents.
Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was
filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should
take precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents because
testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate
proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, of
which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then
issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to
petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
2. Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need to be witnessed.
Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir
to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the
Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein
the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for

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the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court
believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article
919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.

Substitution of Heirs

Palacios vs. Ramirez

GR # L- 27952, Feb. 15, 1982
111 SCRA 704
Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
Issue: WON partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de
Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski is valid.
Held:
1. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate."
And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half
of his estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil
Code.)
2. As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants
are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:

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(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino
as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the
first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the
word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed
this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond
one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation
from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation
or degree from the fiduciary
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to
the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners."
3. The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the
ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law
but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the
Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be
for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a
devise of a piece of land.

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This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda

because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is
hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with
a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez.

PCIB vs. Escolin

GR# L-27860, 27896, Mar. 29, 1974
56 SCRA 265
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her
husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was,
however domiciled in the Philippines. To see whether the testamentary
provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should
beapplied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
RULING:
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven
whether a renvoi willhappen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary
provisions valid. In line with Texas law,that which should be proven is the
law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time.The
Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her
brothers and sisterscould be more than just stated, but this would depend

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on (1) whether upon the proper applicationof the principle of renvoi in

relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent laws of Texas,it will
appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2)
whether or not it canbe held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently
obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,the Court
is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of
these twoissues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further
proceedings and resolution in the firstinstance by the court o quo, as
hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending suchfurther
proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that
it is beyondcavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anywaylegally adjudicated or caused to be
adjudicated to himself her whole share of their conjugalpartnership, albeit
he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the resulting
estateof Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix,
cannot be less than one-fourthof the conjugal partnership properties, as of
the time of her death, minus what, as explainedearlier, have been
gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons
sincethen, for even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under
Article 16 of the Civil Codeand applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines
are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband
under Article 900 of the Civil Code.

Conditional Testamentary Disposition and Testamentary Disposition

with a Term

Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals

GR# 113725, June 29, 2000
334 SCRA 522
Facts:

378

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; anappendix) of

Aleja Belleza, was instituted devisee of Lot No.1392 with an area of
511,855 square meters with theobligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to
herein privaterespondent every year during the latter's lifetime.
The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not onlyon the instituted
heir but also to his successors-in-interestand that in case of failure to
deliver, private respondent shallseize the property and turn it over to the
testatrix's "near descendants."
Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom
is herein petitioner.
Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to complywith their
obligation, filed a complaint with the RTC prayingfor the reconveyance of
the subject property to the survivingheirs of the testatrix.
During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement wasconcluded between the
parties wherein the lessee of theproperty assumed the delivery of 100
piculs of sugar toprivate respondent; however, only partial delivery was
made.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating
that, While there may be the non-performanceof the command as
mandated, exaction from them (thepetitioners), simply because they are
the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question,
doesnot warrant the filing of the present complaint.
The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla
is in the nature of a modal institution and acause of action in favor of
private respondent arose whenpetitioner failed to comply with their
obligation under thecodicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to
theestate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent has a legally demandableright against
the petitioner, as one of the compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla.
Held:
YES. It is a general rule under the law on succession thatsuccessional
rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called tosucceed by operation of law.
The legitimate children anddescendants, in relation to their legitimate
parents, and thewidow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus,
thepetitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of theinstituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter byoperation of law, without

379

need of further proceedings, andthe successional rights were transmitted to

them from themoment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.Under
Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritanceincludes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person,not extinguished by his death.
Conformably, whatever rightsDr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject
Codicil weretransmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death.
Andsince obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate
of the decedent; corollarily, the obligationsimposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,were likewise transmitted to his compulsory
heirs upon hisdeath.In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot
No.1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that theusufruct
thereof would be delivered to the herein privaterespondent every year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights andtitle over said
property, and they also assumed his(decedent's) obligation to deliver the
fruits of the lot involvedto herein private respondent. Such obligation of the
institutedheir reciprocally corresponds to the right of privaterespondent over
the usufruct, the fulfillment or performanceof which is now being demanded
by the latter through theinstitution of the case at bar. Therefore, private
respondenthas a cause of action against petitioner and the trial courterred
in dismissing the complaint below.

Legitime
Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso,
GR# 138774, March 8, 2001
354 SCRA 112
Facts:
Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of
spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both
deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late
Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom
he begot seven (7) children.
Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential
land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT
Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in
1990, he confided

380

to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the
possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual.
After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of
title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the
land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there
was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and
Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two
parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the
sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina
Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a
complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She
alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the
Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint.
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision reversing that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her
father to his illegitimate children?
Held:
First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the
contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos,
testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any
source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time
when Felicitas testified in 1991.
As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was
engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club

381

as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of

1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She
did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings
other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.
Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw,
earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property
from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of
P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay
P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent
statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as
to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market
value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that
would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a
simulation and hence, null and void.
Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil
Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime.
The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and
rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

382

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of
land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact
would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is
entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper
testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His
compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by
disinheritance as prescribed by law.

Capitle v. Elbambuena
GR# 169193, Nov. 30, 2006
509 SCRA 444
Petitioners argument that *i+t would be absurd for *Olar+ to bequeath his
property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him
in tilling the property and *took+ good care of his needs,*15+ is a virtual
admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners, they
having merely helped in tilling the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar
was the actual possessor and tiller.
Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public
officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties,
including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides:
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered
by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents
of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the
same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

383

(f)
(g)

collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and

others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified

under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of
the land of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenant-tillers in
the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold,
disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become
beneficiaries under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR
shall adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance of each
beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the
land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as
such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit reports on the performance of the
beneficiaries to the PARC.
x x x x,

thus stands.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual
tillers of the lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in
favor of Olar would not bind respondents as they were not impleaded.
Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his
wife and legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.[16] Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars
son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be injured or
benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars
name.

See also Arts.103, 130,F.C./ Family Home 158,159, 26, 36, 49, 43, 44,
59 -54, SCAM. No. 91-11-19: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

384

Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; Articles 63, 65,

SCA.M. No. 92-11-11: Rule on Legal Separation;
Articles 192-193; 129-139; 147-148 of the Family Code

Edroso vs. Sablan

GR # L-6878, Sept. 13, 1913
25 Phil. 295
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro
whoinherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father.
Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of
land passed through inheritance tohis mother. Hence the hereditary title
whereupon is based the application forregistration of her ownership. The
two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan(legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either theregistration be
denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them berecorded in
the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration deniedthe
registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of
propertyrequired by law to be reserved and that in such a case application
could only bepresented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles. Hence, thisappeal.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a
reservableproperty.2.Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute
title of the property tocause its registration.
RULING:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without
avaluable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article
968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for whathe receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that
the uncles are withinthe third degree of blood relationship.

385

Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from hisdescendant property which
the latter acquired without avaluable consideration from another
descendant, or forma brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what
hehas acquired by operation of law for the relatives who arewithin the third
degree and belong to the line where the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two
parcelsof land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration
that is, byinheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquire them byoperation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong tothe line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), wherethe lands proceeded. The trial
courts ruling that they partake of the natureproperty required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the
righthas, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use and usufruct. He has,
moreover, thelegal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he hasunder an express provision of the law the right
to dispose of the property reserved,and to dispose of is to alienate,
although under a condition. He has the right torecover it, because he is the
one who possesses or should possess it and have titleto it, although a
limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
requiredby law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine ownercan do.On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third
degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or
formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they haveno title of
ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on
thehypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should
die beforethem will they acquire it.

Sienes vs. Esparcia

GR #L-12957, March 24, 1961
1 SCRA 750
Facts:
Saturnino
Francisco

Father
(died 1932)
-

Origin
Son

Propositus

386

Andrea Gutan
(died 1951)
Mother
Reservor/ Reservista
Cipriana and Paulina
(died 1952)
Half-sisters
Reservee/ Reservatarios
Constancio Sienes and Genovava Silay Buyer of
Andrea
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes
Buyer of
Cipriana and Paulina
Saturnino upon his death left 1 lot to each of his children. Subject Lot 3368
was particularly bequeathed to Francisco, his only child from his 2nd
marriage with Andrea. As Francisco died in 1932 with no descendant, her
mother became her sole heir and inherited the land by operation of law. As
such, she sold the property to Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay.
However, Cipriana together with sister Paulina sold the same property in
Jan 1, 1951 to Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. They were able to
transfer said lot in their name under TCT No. 2141. Paulina (sister) died
first followed by Andrea in Dec 1951 leaving Cipriana as the lone reservee
who died a month later. RTC and CA upheld the sale of the property to
Fidel and Paulina Sienes. Constancio and Genoveva appealed. Hence
this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the property could be adjudicated to the buyers of the
reservor, Andrea.
Held:
No. RTC and CA are correct by deciding in favor of the buyer of the
reservees. Heres how:
Although the reservor has a legal title and dominion to the reservable
property, it is subject to a resolutory condition as follows;
1. That he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property
2. That he may alienate the same but subject to reservation that said
alienation transmits only his revocable and conditional ownership
As such, the rights acquired by the transferee is revoked by the survival of
reservees at the time of death of the reservor.
The sale made by Andrea in favor of Constancio (appellant) was
subject to the resolutory condition that they will acquire definite ownership,
ONLY if she is not survived by any person entitled to the reservable

387

property. Since Cipriana was still alive on her death, comes the
inescapable conclusion that said sale became no legal effect for said
resolutory condition did not happen.
Vis--vis, the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana to Esparcia was
subject to a similar condition in that, the reserve instituted by law in favor of
the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservees may
alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee ONLY IF and when the
reservees survives the reservoir.
Since it was the reservee who survived the reservor, it was then the
reservees buyer who would acquire absolute ownership.

Gonzales vs. CFI

GR #L-34395, May 19, 1981
104 SCRA 479
Facts
Benito Legarda y Tuason+ (died 1939)
Origin
Filomena Races+
(died 1967)
Reservor
Benito +, Alejandro, Jose
Reservees
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Reservees
Filomena+
(died 1943)
Propositus

Father
Mother
Sons
Daughters
Daughters

On July 12, 1939, Benito (father) died leaving real properties to his heirs.
His daughter Filomena followed on March 19, 1943 leaving Filomena
(mother) as her sole heir on several properties including cash, shares of
stocks and interests in lands co-owned with her siblings.
On March 6, 1953 Filomena (mother) disposed these properties in favor of
her 16 grandchildren. She died on September 22, 1967 and admitted to

388

probate her holographic will. In the proceedings, Beatriz filed a motion to

exclude from
the inventory of her mothers estate the properties she inherited from her
dead sister Filomena on the ground that these are reservable properties
which should be inherited by the siblings. It was opposed by Benito (Son).
On June 20, 1968, without awaiting for its resolution, she filed an ordinary
civil action against her brother, nephew, nieces and Her mothers estate for
the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are
reservable which Mother Filomena could not bequeath to her grandchildren
to the exclusion of her own children. Said action was dismissed by trial
court. Hence this case.

Issue:
WON the holographic will of Mother Filomena (reservor) bequeathing the
reservable property to the 3rd degree of consanguinity (nephews and
niece-reservatarios/ reservees) of the prepositus is valid at the exclusion of
the 6 alive 2nd degree relatives (brothers and sistersreservatarios/reservees)
Held:
No. The phrase in Art 891 within the 3rd degree means the nearest
relative exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But
the representative should be within the 3rd degree from the propositus.
In the instant case, Mommy Filomena, being the reservor, could not
convey the reservable properties at her selection. It must be inherited by
all the nearest relatives within the 3rd degree of the propositus who in this
case, the brothers and sister falling in the 2nd degree. She could not
dispose of in her will the properties in question EVEN if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the 3rd degree from daughter (nieces and
nephews). The said properties, by operation of Art 891, should go to the
brothers and sisters, who are within the 3rd degree from daughter
Filomena.

389

Cano vs. Director

GR #L-10701, Jan. 16, 1959
105 Phil. 1
Facts
Evaristo Guerrero
Father
Origin
Maria Cano+
(1955) Mother
Reservor
Lourdes
Daughter
Propositus
Eustaquia Guerrero
Daughter
Reservee
Relative from Propositus
Jose and Teotimo
Grandchildren
Degree Relative form Propositus

2nd Degree
3rd

Evaristo Guerrero husband of Maria Cano bequeathed Lot No. 1799 to

Lourdes. Thereafter, Lourdes died with no descendant hence said property
was inherited by her mother Maria. Maria, 71 yrs old registered the lot with
the understanding that it is subject to the right of reservation in favor or
Eustaquia pursuant to Art 891 of CC. Upon the death of Cano on 1955,
Lourdes filed a motion with the Cadastral Court praying that Certificate of
Title in the name of Maria be cancelled and a new one issued in her favor.
It was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez (grandchildren). However,
the lower court decided in favor of Eustaquia and granted the issuance of a
new certificate of title. Jose and Teotimo again opposed on the ground that
an intestacy proceeding is still necessary to transmit ownership from Maria
to Eustaquia.
Issue
Whether or not in reservable properties, intestacy proceedings is still
necessary to revert to the reservatarios ownership of the reserved
properties.
Held
No. The reserved property is not part of the estate of the reservor, and
does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservees may be entered in the property records without the necessity
of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefore appear of
record. Further proceedings is necessary when the registration decree
merely specifies the reservable character of the property, without

390

determining the identity of the reservee, or where several resevees dispute

the property among themselves. But in this case, the rights of Eustaquaia
as reservees have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed
that there are other reservees of equal or nearer degree.
Vizconde vs CA
Facts:
Rafael
(died 1992) Father
Salud
Mother
Estrellita
(died 1991)
Daughter
Ramon
Son
Lauro
Son-in-Law, Husband of
Estrellita
Carmela and Jennifer
(died 1991) Granddaughter, daughter of
Estrellita
Rafael and Salud Nicolas are husband and wife with 5 children as follows:
Estrellita, Antonio+, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo, an incompetent. On
May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her father a land from Valenzuela
Bulacan with TCT 36734 for P135,000.00 as evidenced by Deed of
Absolute Sale. TCT No. V-554 thereof was issued to Estrellita. On 1990,
or 11 years therafter, said property was sold for P 3.4 M. Said proceeds
was used in purchasing a parcel of land in BF Homes Paranaque, a car
and the remaining balance was deposited in a bank. In 1991, Estrellita and
her daughters were killed in what was popularly known as the Vizconde
Massacre. Investigation revealed that Estrellita died ahead of her
daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and Lauro, succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmel and Jennifer, Lauro
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered
into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with Estrellitas parents. Said
settlement divided the property of Estrellita and daughters to Lauro and
Rafael and Salud. 50% of the cash deposit was given to Rafael while the
remainder was to Lauro. The Paranaque Property and the car was given to
petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heirs.
In 1992, Rafael died with heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and Antonios+ wife
and children. Sometime in 1994, RTC released an Order giving Lauro 10

391

days to file a petition or motion related to the pending settlement of Rafaels

estate. Lauro, in response, filed a manifestation that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael, and that he has no interest
to participate in the proceedings. Despite such, Ramon moved to include
petitioner and asked that the Paranaque property, the car and the balance
of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property be collated. RTC
granted the motion and likewise denying Lauros MR. Such order provided
in part that:
1.
Vizconde spouses are not financially capable to purchase the
Valenzuela property to Rafael.
2.
There is no sufficient evidence that the acquisition of the property
was for valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property in Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita
by her father was gratuitous and that subject Paranaque property which
was purchased out of the proceeds of the sale of the said property is
subject to collation.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which
affirmed RTC decision upholding that the jurisdiction of the probate court
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased( Sec 1
Rule 90 of Revised Rules of Court). Hence this case.
Issue:
WON the subject Paranaque Property is subject to collation.
Held:
No on the following grounds:
1.
Lauro, as the decedents son-in-law is not a compulsory heir within
the ambit of Art 887 of the Civil Code.
2.
Determination on the title or ownership of a property is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In this case, RTC went
beyond its jurisdiction when it decided that the transfer of the Valenzuela
from Rafael to Estrellita is gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed, the
true intent of the parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction and must
be ventilated in an appropriate action.
3.
The order subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is
premature since proceedings of the intestate estate is still in its initiatory
stage. There is still no indication that the legitime of Rafael heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.

392

4.
Even assuming that collation is appropriate in this case, what should
have been collated was the Valenzuela property and not the Paranaque
property, and in doing so is without statutory basis. Moreover, Rafael in a
public instrument, voluntarily waived any claims, rights, ownership and
participation in said property.
5.
Finally, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. As such, it was actually
Rafael who inherited from Estrellita. Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the
value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter
serves no valid and binding purpose.
Vizconde v. CA
GR# 118449, Feb. 11, 1998
286 SCRA 217
FACTS:
Spouses Lauro Vizconde and Estrellita Nicolas had two children namely,
Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita is one of the five children of spouses
Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales. The private respondent herein is a
brother of Estrellita.
Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land which was afterwards sold
to Amelia Lim and Natividad Chiu. Estrellita purchased again from Premier
Homes a parcel of land with improvements. Thereafter, an unfortunate
event happened when Estrellita and her daughters were killed.
Consequently, Lauro entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with
his wifes parents. The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total
amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael and
the other fifty percent (50%) to Lauro. The car and the property were given
to Lauro and to Estrellitas parents but the latter waived all their claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties. Not long
after, Rafael died and to settle his estate, Teresita (one of his children)
instituted an instestate estate proceeding and prayed to be appointed
Special Administratix of Rafaels estate. Further, she sought to be
appointed as Salud and Ricardos guardian of which Ramon filed an
opposition. Private respondent filed another opposition alleging that
Estrellita was given the Valuenzela property and subsequently, he filed his
own petition averring that the legitime of Salud and Ricardo should come
from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael

393

during his lifetime. Ramon stated that Lauro is one of Rafaels children by
right of representation as the widower of the deceased legitimate daughter,
Estrellita. In a consolidated order, RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian
of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita was appointed as the Special
Administratix of Rafaels estate however, Ramon was afterwards removed
as guardian for selling his wards property without the courts knowledge
and permission.
RTC then ordered Lauro to file any appropriate petition or motion related to
the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any
opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by Ramon and
Teresita. Lauro fied a Manifestation stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. However, despite this manifestation, Ramon
moved to include Lauro in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that
the Paraaque property, the car and the balance of the proceeds of the
sale of the Valenzuela property be collated, which the trial court granted.
Lauro filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Lauro filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals but the
same was denied. Hence, this action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Paraaque property is subject to collation.
RULING:
Basic principles of collation:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs
who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into
the common mass the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation
is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory
heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title
during the lifetime of the decedent.
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation: 1) The probate
court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate

394

proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of the latters

compulsory heirs; 2) As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and
determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be
included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in
character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve
title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went
beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the
transfer between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation
of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the
presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate
courts jurisdiction; 3) The order of the probate court subjecting the
Paraaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the
intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage; 4) Even on the
assumption that collation is appropriate in this case, the probate court,
nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Paraaque
property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita by way of deed of
sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paraaque property which Estrellita
acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does
not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the
Paraaque property has no statutory basis; and 5) it is futile for the probate
court to ascertain whether or not Valenzuela property may be brought to
collation. It should be stressed that Estrellita died ahead of Rafael.

Disinheritance
Seangio v. Reyes
GR# 140371-72, Nov. 27, 2006
508 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian
ad litem of Dy Yieng Seangio. However, petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and
Virginia opposed the petition contending that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very
healthy; 2) Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and

395

supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most

competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate; and 4)
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents.
Thereafter, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was
filed by the petitioner and reiterating that the probate proceedings should
take precedence over the petition filed by the private respondents because
testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over the intestate
proceedings. The two petitions were then consolidated. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code, of
which petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. RTC then
issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings. Due to
petitioners denial of motion for reconsideration, hence this present action.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the holographic will is valid.
2. Such that, whether or not the disinheritance is valid.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need to be witnessed.
Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably
showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir
to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was
disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the
Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein
the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for

396

the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court
believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article
919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated, it is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.

Legal or Intestate Succession [Arts. 960-1014]

General Provision
Bagunu vs. Piedad,
GR# 140975, Dec. 8, 2000
347 SCRA 571
FACTS: On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu
moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the matter
of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad," pending
before the RTC of Pasay City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate
of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of
the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad
contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities,
including an incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of
personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the
disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate. The trial court denied the motion, prompting petitioners to raise her
case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the
appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involving
nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 which was
granted. Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate
court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. The Court finds no
reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the
alleged procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue.

397

ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit
alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find
application among collateral relatives?
RULING: No. Augusto H. Piedad without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a thirddegree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The rule
on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus, Article 962 of the
Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as
that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative
thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not
from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented
would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded." In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending
line, but never in the ascending. "In the collateral line, it takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half
blood.
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of
the estate shall be made per stripes, in such manner that the

398

representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the

person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "others collateral relatives
within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent
belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the
legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and
ascendants,
thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving
spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, fourth
decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews
and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an
absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral
relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. xxx "In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made ancestor and then descent is made to
the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is
two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the
brother of his father, four from his first cousin and so forth." Accordingly---Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late
Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding an intestato to the estate of the decedent.
"Article 1009, Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the
fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." Invoked by petitioner do
not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other
collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or
distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half
blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the
cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the
latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED.

399

Right of Representation
Sayson vs. CA,
GR# 89224-25, Jan. 23, 1992
205 SCRA 321
Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 1030)
for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson,
who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint
(Civil Case No. 1042), this time for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four
surviving children.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents. In Civil
Case No. 1042, the trial court found that Delia and Edmundo were the
legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel. Doribel was their legitimate
daughter. Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from
Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation. In dismissing Civil Case No.
1030, the court ruled that the three children, being the legitimate heirs of
Teodoro and Isabel as, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, the respondent
court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No.

400

12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo

Sayson are disqualified from
inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
Hence, the this petition where petitioners contend that Delia and Edmundo
were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on
February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The
pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those
who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Issue: (a) Whether or not petitioners may still challenge the validity of the
decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo. (b) Whether or not the CA erred
when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson.

Held:
It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became
final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming the petitioners
were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal
the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In
fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge
to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action
for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial
courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's
birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of
the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate
offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
The birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,
where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be

401

sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its

falsity or nullity."
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate
estate of the deceased couple, conformably to Article 979 of the Civil Code.
Now to the right of representation. There is no question that as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. But a different
conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the
latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents
and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

See also Domestic Adoption Act

Order of Intestate Succession

Descending Direct Line
Sayson vs. CA,
GR# 89224-25, Jan. 23, 1992
205 SCRA 321

402

Facts: similar to case above.

ISSUE: Who has the better right over the properties of the spouses the
mother of the deceased Isabel or her children?
HELD:
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate
estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of
the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first
to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that
one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to
his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Ascending Direct Line

Illegitimate Children

Corpus vs. Corpus

GR # L-22469, Oct. 23, 1978
85 SCRA 567
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 29, 1939. Yangco had no forced
heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half
brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel
Osssorio, (3) Amelia Corpus, Jose A.V. Corpus and Ramon l. Corpus, the
children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus.
The daughter of his half brother Jose Corps, Juanita died in October, 1944.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael
Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of

403

whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose corpus. On October 6,
1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in
the CFI of Manila to recover bar supposed share in Yangco intestate
estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangcos will
imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under
Article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and
therefore, the descendants estate should be distributed according to the
rules on intestacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juliana Corpus the mother of appellant Tomas
Corpus, was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action
to recover his mothers supposed intestate share in Yangcos estate?
HELD: It is disputably presumed that a man and a women deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, that a child born in Lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bad and board, is legitimate, and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life. Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural
child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child
of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas
Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary
share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangcos estate.

Leonardo vs. CA
GR #L-51263, Feb. 28, 1983
120 SCRA 890
Facts: On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to
be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of
properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the
deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said
deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria Cailles,
(2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the
complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to
have an accounting of all the income derived from said properties from the
time defendants took possession thereof until said accounting shall have
been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.

404

Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted

exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation. For
his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed
that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale
which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These
properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of
Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
Issue: Can Cresenciano inherit from Francisca Reyes?
Held: No. Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that
petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of
representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on
September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet
married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed
in this petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.

Diaz vs. IAC

GR #L-66574, June 17, 1987
150 SCRA 645
Facts: Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children
of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. Juliana married
Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow
of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero. Pablo Santero was
the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children

405

to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa. Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)? Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of
the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new
Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not
merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain
successional rights.
Held: The Supreme Court do not dispute the fact that the New Civil Code
has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that
time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as
compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in
the order of intestate succession). These are only some of the many rights
granted by the new Code to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful
evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles 902, 982,
989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children
the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate
grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does
not exist. Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon
their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named
provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance
of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that
the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by
virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate
succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or
mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992.
Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss
to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

406

"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation and in Article 902 that
the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation
prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother."' "Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but
this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by
the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further ground of resentment." It is therefore clear from Article 992
of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person
spoken of. The record reveals that from the commencement of this case
the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural
or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.
Diaz vs. IAC
GR #L-66574, Feb. 21, 1990
182 SCRA 427
Held: We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of
succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the
provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial
change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil

407

Code of Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify

the matters which are now the subject of the present controversy. While the
New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate
children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit
the right of representation from being exercised where the person to be
represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person
to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be
represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him
because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may
exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article
992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue,
even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to
the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not
consist of giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural
parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their grandparents
(legitimate).
the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it
embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person
spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case
at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which
goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased by
present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and
illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family Code of
1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and
illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-classification
of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say
that illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or
clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane,
p. 12).
Suntay v. Suntay

408

GR # 183053, June 16, 2010

621 SCRA 142
Facts: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In
1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by
her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent,
Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is
marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter,
Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively. Despite the
illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere
baby, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for
visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and
Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted the
petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially
reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents. Significantly, Federico, after the death
of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico
filed his opposition. Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle
the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13,
1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the
one with a better right to the letters of administration. Subsequently, the
trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-InIntervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers
opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better
equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the

409

decedent, Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications

that: "[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was trained
by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the activities of
the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory
of her grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the
family group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with management
degree.In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
died.
Held: Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court,
*respondents immediate+ family and that of the decedent are apparently
estranged.The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would
go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in
her home as her own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the
surviving spouse who nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator. As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the
latter is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule
78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed
the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III], his
grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid and
justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to
give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the
viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically
meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as
well as heirs, the administrator should be one who is prepared,
academically and by experience, for the demands and responsibilities of
the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it
is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate and
the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore,
is in a position to better handle the preservation of the estate. The pivotal
issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is
better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate. From the
foregoing facts, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III
from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted
son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would

410

have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are
puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative
by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long
held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the
trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil
Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives
of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably
demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their
own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses,
and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original
oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession: The law
[of intestacy+ is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it
is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus,

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the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the
collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he
manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession
or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance
with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The
peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and
illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Surviving Spouse
Verdad vs. CA
GR# 109972, April. 29, 1996
256 SCRA 593
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to
petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
Art. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same
terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who
acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other
transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in
case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a
third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the

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Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners 5 required under Article 1623 of

the Civil
Code
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
safe shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when
private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on
31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the
City Treasurer
of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before
the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the
rule that notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still
entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order to remove all
uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions, as well as its efficacy
and status.

Cabales v. CA
GR# 162421, Aug. 31, 2007
531 SCRA 691
Facts: Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of
land in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely,
Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the
brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to
Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972,
prior to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife
and son, Nelson, herein petitioner.
Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and
their mother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido.
Subsequently, Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino,

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Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano. It was
provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being
minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust by thevendee and will paid
upon them reaching the age of 21. In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143
pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his share from the proceeds
of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson learned of the
sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property
in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption
against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the
petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already
received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the
redemption price.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Spouses Feliano on the ground
that Nelson was no longer entitled to the property as his right was
subrogated by Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also
alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since Saturnina, being his
legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right to
alienate the same. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial
court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson
were unenforceable.
Issue: Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in
behalf of the minors were binding upon them
Held: With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid.
Under Section 1, Rule 96 A guardian shall have the care and custody of
the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the
management of the estate only. x xx Indeed, the legal guardian only has
the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not
include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when
Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latters pro indiviso
share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified
it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him. With
respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor
at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were
not his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by
the courts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently,
petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share in the said

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property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the
thirty day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner
of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

Collateral Relatives
Heirs of Uriarte vs. CA
GR# 116775, Jan. 22, 1998
284 SCRA 511
Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is
not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula's daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but
by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is
not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private
respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa's halfsister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephew. A nephew is considered a
collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent. 23 That private respondent is only a half-blood
relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his
aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The
determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is
important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.

Gonzales vs. CA
GR# 117740, Oct. 30, 1998
298 SCRA 322
Facts: On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de
Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the
intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their petition,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad,
as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972, petitioners
amended their petition by alleging that the real properties listed therein as
belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter,
the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. The trial court

415

appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate

of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila
de Mesa. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the abovementioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof,
TCT in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT in the name of Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco and TCT in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three
promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of
Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola. On July 7,
1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado,
and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and
for leave to file opposition. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria
Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twentyseven years before his death, and that during this period, their union had
produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad
Empaynado. Private respondents also disclosed the existence of
Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another
woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the
surviving children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private
respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence
of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the
estate of Ricardo Abad. On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a
motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for
reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator
instead of Cesar Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents'
motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to
appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of
Ricardo Abad. Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had
managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the
stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly,
on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extrajudicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482,
108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos.
13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the
latter on said properties. Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and
Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that the husband of
Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian
Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.It is undisputed that prior to
her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar,

416

and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian. But while private
respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the
latter died sometime in 1971.
Held: With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children
of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their
brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Emphasis supplied).
As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad
actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private respondents
proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated
earlier,
the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should
not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion,
their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether
the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.

The State
Republic vs. CA,
GR# 143483, Jan. 31, 2002
375 SCRA 484
Facts: For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private
respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around personal domestic
helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During
Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her
life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant
companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for
the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was

417

filed by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio

Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for
the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the
properties in question." Since it was established that there were no known
heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower
court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines. n the meantime, private respondent claimed that she
accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been looking for a long
time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28
January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of
the lower court's decision.
Held:
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is
claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the
first comers."5 Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the
state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time
within which a claim to such property may be made. The procedure by
which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by
statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be
brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city
shall be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but
a claim not made shall be barred forever."6 The 5-year period is not a
device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the
contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be
punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever
in a final judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower
court as early as 27 June 1989 but it was only on 28 January 1997, more or
less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Obviously, private respondent's belated

418

assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against

recovery.
As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive
upon persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. Absolute
lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the
appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of
law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year
period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim
and the supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough
justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession [Arts. 1015 1105]

Right of Accretion

Parish Priest of Victoria, Tarlac vs. Rigor

GR# L-22036, April 30, 1979
89 SCRA 493
Facts: A devise of ricelands was made in the will of the late Father Pascual
Rigor, in favor of his nearest male relative whowould study for the
priesthood.Probate court approving the project of partition, directed that
after payment of the obligations of the estate theadministratrix should
deliver to the devisees their respective shares.It may be noted that the
administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and
implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator
claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed
that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the
same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testateproceeding
remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the parish
priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying
for the appointment of a new administrator, who should deliver to thechurch
as trustee the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors
thereof be ordered to render anaccounting of the fruits. The probate court

419

granted the petition. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a
petition praying that the bequest that they be adjudged as thepersons
entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of
Victoria, "no nearest male relativeof" the testator "has ever studied for the
priesthood"RTC declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the
ricelands to the testator's legal heirs.
CA reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor had created a
testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy
orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to
enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It
ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after
the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles
888 and 912(2) of theold Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that the testator created apublic charitable trust and in not
liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the
trustoperative and to prevent intestacy.The will of the testator is the first
and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly
and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain
and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that
his intention was different from that literally expressed.
In Father Rigor.s will, it may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest malerelative who would become a
priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if
he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated, and whowould be obligated to say
annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the
testator and hisparents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of
time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he
was excommunicated.
HELD:

420

What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempoque no

hayalegatarioacondicionado", or how long afterthe testator's death would it
be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. Itis that patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy
between the parish priest of Victoria and thetestator's legal heirs.We hold
that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at
the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter.
"In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
livingat the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" ( A rt. 1025, Civil Code).The said
testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to thetestator's nearest male relative at anytime
after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and
createuncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have
been his intention.Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male
relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who
would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he
could not prognosticatethe exact date of his death or state with certitude
what category of nearest male relative would be living
at thetime of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative
would be his nephew or grandnephews (theson of his nephew or niece)
and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".Inasmuch as the
testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is thatthe bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the
parishpriest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute
devisee. That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary
provisionsregarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the
parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event
that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.It
should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having
been ordained as priest and he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because
no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or

421

ever became apriest.There being no substitution nor accretion as to the

said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal
heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said
ricelands.

Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance

Guy v. CA
GR# 163707, Sept. 15, 2006
502 SCRA 151
FACTS
SIma Wei (Rifino Guy Susim) died intestate on October 29,1992 leaving an
estate valued at 10M. His known heirs are his surviving spouse and their 5
children. On June 1997, minors Karen and Kamille Wei, as represented by
their mother, alleging as the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the
decedent, filed a petition of administration before the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the two alleged children of the deceased are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.
HELD
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their
wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, in Bernabe v. Alejo that
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the
right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the
passage of the Family Code.

422

Citing Bernabe v Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at
the time the FC took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the FC.
Art 172 provides, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
1.
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment
2.
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
1.
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
2.
Any other means allowedby the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art 172 provides, the action claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5 yrs within which
to institute the action.
Art 175 provides further that illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established
by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may
be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.However, if the action is
based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends
on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving
their filiation. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgement,
but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may retain partition
proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs; and the
same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate
of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has

423

it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason

Executors and Administrators

Collation

Zaragoza vs. CA,

GR# 106401, Sept. 29, 2000
341 SCRA 309
FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels
of land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all
surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was
survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private respondent
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and
Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting
of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a
natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She
further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister
were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid
consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was
not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her
marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason,
no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these
lots during her father's lifetime.
Held: It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of Lots
943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has
no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the
transfer. Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the
lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties
among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of

424

sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent

because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution
prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were
inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual
determinations of the CA, based on documentary and testimonial evidence.
Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid.
We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos
may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the
Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined
after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
Nazareno vs. CA,
GR# 138842, Oct. 18, 2000
343 SCRA 637
Held:
Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the
notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first
place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto.
The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract.
There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the
Civil Code states:
There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it
appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he
nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

425

There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to
collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
As held by the trial court, the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing,
Corp. on April 20, 197935 will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is
an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. The
rule is settled that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will
in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition
of the property.
Vizconde vs. CA,
GR# 118449, Feb. 11, 1998
286 SCRA 217
Facts:
Rafael
(died 1992) Father
Salud
Mother
Estrellita
(died 1991)
Daughter
Ramon
Son
Lauro
Son-in-Law, Husband of
Estrellita
Carmela and Jennifer
(died 1991) Granddaughter, daughter of
Estrellita
Rafael and Salud Nicolas are husband and wife with 5 children as follows:
Estrellita, Antonio+, Ramon, Teresita and Ricardo, an incompetent. On
May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her father a land from Valenzuela
Bulacan with TCT 36734 for P135,000.00 as evidenced by Deed of
Absolute Sale. TCT No. V-554 thereof was issued to Estrellita. On 1990,
or 11 years therafter, said property was sold for P 3.4 M. Said proceeds
was used in purchasing a parcel of land in BF Homes Paranaque, a car

426

and the remaining balance was deposited in a bank. In 1991, Estrellita and
her daughters were killed in what was popularly known as the Vizconde
Massacre. Investigation revealed that Estrellita died ahead of her
daughters. Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and Lauro, succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmel and Jennifer, Lauro
was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered
into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde with Waiver of Shares with Estrellitas parents. Said
settlement divided the property of Estrellita and daughters to Lauro and
Rafael and Salud. 50% of the cash deposit was given to Rafael while the
remainder was to Lauro. The Paranaque Property and the car was given to
petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heirs.
In 1992, Rafael died with heirs, Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and Antonios+ wife
and children. Sometime in 1994, RTC released an Order giving Lauro 10
days to file a petition or motion related to the pending settlement of Rafaels
estate. Lauro, in response, filed a manifestation that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael, and that he has no interest
to participate in the proceedings. Despite such, Ramon moved to include
petitioner and asked that the Paranaque property, the car and the balance
of the proceeds of the sale of
the Valenzuela property be collated. RTC granted the motion and likewise
denying Lauros MR. Such order provided in part that:
1.
Vizconde spouses are not financially capable to purchase the
Valenzuela property to Rafael.
2.
There is no sufficient evidence that the acquisition of the property
was for valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property in Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita
by her father was gratuitous and that subject Paranaque property which
was purchased out of the proceeds of the sale of the said property is
subject to collation.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA, which
affirmed RTC decision upholding that the jurisdiction of the probate court
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased( Sec 1
Rule 90 of Revised Rules of Court). Hence this case.
Issue:
WON the subject Paranaque Property is subject to collation.

427

Held:
No on the following grounds:
1.
Lauro, as the decedents son-in-law is not a compulsory heir within
the ambit of Art 887 of the Civil Code.
2.
Determination on the title or ownership of a property is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In this case, RTC went
beyond its jurisdiction when it decided that the transfer of the Valenzuela
from Rafael to Estrellita is gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed, the
true intent of the parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration are matters outside the probate courts jurisdiction and must
be ventilated in an appropriate action.
3.
The order subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is
premature since proceedings of the intestate estate is still in its initiatory
stage. There is still no indication that the legitime of Rafael heirs has been
impaired to warrant collation.
4.
Even assuming that collation is appropriate in this case, what should
have been collated was the Valenzuela property and not the Paranaque
property, and in doing so is without statutory basis. Moreover, Rafael in a
public instrument, voluntarily waived any claims, rights, ownership and
participation in said property.
5.
Finally, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. As such, it was actually
Rafael who inherited from Estrellita. Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated, collation may not be allowed as the
value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter
serves no valid and binding purpose.
Ty v. Ty
GR# 165696, April. 30, 2008
553 SCRA 306
Held: To belabor a point, we are not persuaded that an implied trust was
created concerning the subject properties. On the assumption, as
elsewhere indicated, the plaintiff-appellee at the very least, paid for part of
its purchase price, the EDSA property is presumed to be a gift, or donation,
in favor of Alexander Ty, defendant-appellants late husband, following the
saving clause or exception in Art. 1448 of the Civil Code. To repeat, it is the
saving clause, or exception, not the general rule, that should here apply,
the late Alexander Ty being the son of Plaintiff-appellee.

428

Nor are we convinced, given the state of the evidence on record, that the
plaintiff-appellee paid for the price of the Meridien Condominium and the
Wack-Wack property. Therefore, the general rule announced in the first
sentence of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code has no application in this case. Or,
if the article is to be applied at all, it should be the exception, or the saving
clause, that ought to apply here, the deceased Alexander Ty being the son,
as stated, of plaintiff-appellee.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is
conveyed is the child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this
case this is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law,
instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor of the child.
The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate
into the mass of the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA
property as an advance of Alexanders share in the estate of his father,11
to the extent that petitioner provided a part of its purchase price.
Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as
regards the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property,
petitioner failed to show that the money used to purchase the same came
from him.
See also Art. 1448 NCC

Partition and Distribution of the Estate

Effect of Partition
Rescission and Nullity of Partition

Noceda vs. CA,

GR# 119730, Sept. 2, 1999
313 SCRA 504
Facts: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent CA, affirming with
modification the decision of the RTC in an action by private respondent

429

against petitioner for recovery of possession and ownership and

rescission/annulment of donation.
Celestino Arbizo died in 1956, his daughter, grandson and widow (Aurora
Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo) extrajudicially
settled a parcel of land.
On November 6, 1991, the RTC of Iba, Zambales decision on the case:
(a) Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition dated August 19, 1981,
valid;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981, revoked;
(c) Ordering the defendant to vacate and reconvey that donated portion of
Lot 2, Lot 1121 subject of the Deed of Donation dated June 1, 1981 to the
plaintiff or her heirs or assigns;
(d) Ordering the defendant to remove the house built inside the donated
portion at the defendants expense or pay a monthly rental of P300.00
Philippine Currency;
(e) Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the amount of
P5,000.00; and
(f) To pay the cost.
CA affirmed the trial courts judgment and ordered defendant Rodolfo
Noceda to VACATE the portion known as Lot C of Lot 1121, which was
allotted to plaintiff Aurora Arbizo Directo.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
. The respondent Court exceeded its judicial authority when it sustained the
lower courts findings that the subject property actually contains an area of
127,289 square meters.
The argument is unmeritorious. The records disclose that the trial court in
an Order dated June 8, 1987 gave both parties to this case the chance to
have the subject property re-surveyed by a licensed surveyor to determine
the actual area of Lot 1121.
The circumstances show that the lower court ordered the re-survey of the
lot to determine the actual area of Lot 1121 and such survey was done with
the conformity and in the presence of both parties. The actual land area
based on the survey plan which was conducted in the presence of both

430

parties, showed a much bigger area than the area declared in the tax
declaration but such differences are not uncommon as early tax
declarations are, more often than not, based on approximation or
estimation rather than on computation. We hold that the respondent court
did not err in sustaining the trial courts findings that the actual area of Lot
1121 is 127,289 square meters.
. Petitioner also contends that said judicial determination improperly
encroaches on the rights and claims of third persons who were never
impleaded below; that the subject lot was also declared in the name of one
Cecilia Obispo and a Free Patent over the said lot was also issued in her
name and that there are several residential houses constructed and
existing on Lot 8 of lot 1121, thus these possessors/occupants of Lot 8
should be joined as defendants for their non-inclusion would be fatal to
respondents cause of action.
There is no merit in this argument. The respondent Court correctly
ratiocinated on this issue as follows: The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax
declarations in her name over Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a
portion thereof did not make them indispensable parties in the present
case. Defendant Noceda merely presented the tax declarations in the
name of Cecilia Obispo without the alleged free patent in her name.
Moreover, no evidence was presented showing that Cecilia Obispo
possessed or claimed possession of Lot 1121. Tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for tax purposes are not conclusive evidence of
ownership of property.
It was not necessary that the occupants of a portion of Lot 1121,
designated as Lot 8, be impleaded in the present case. The result of the
present suit shall not in any way affect the occupants of Lot 8, since the
issues involved in the present case are the usurpation by defendant
Noceda of the land adjudicated to plaintiff Directo and the propriety of the
cancellation of the deed of donation in favor of defendant Noceda due to
his ingratitude to plaintiff Directo.
A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or
subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties
and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete
justice to the parties in court. Private respondent is not claiming the entire
area of Lot 1121 but only a portion thereof which was adjudicated to her
based on the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement and which was

431

denominated in the survey plan as Lot C of Lot 1121; thus there was no
need to implead the occupants of Lot 8.
. Petitioner further claims that the subject property could not be partitioned
based on the extrajudicial settlement-partition dated August 17, 1981, since
the distributive share of the heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo and the area
of Lot 1121 stated therein were different from the extrajudicial settlement
executed on June 1, 1981; that the discrepancies between the two deeds
of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of
the parties therein indicated that they never intended that any of the deeds
to be the final determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them;
that the extrajudicial settlement-partition of August 17, 1981 could not
effectively subdivide Lot 1121 because it partitioned only 29,845 square
meters, and not its actual area of 127,298 square meters.
There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court
as follows: The discrepancies between the extrajudicial settlements
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June
1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to
supersede the former. The signature of defendant Noceda in the
extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 would show his conformity to
the new apportionment of Lot 1121 among the heirs of the late Celestino
Arbizo. The fact that defendant Noceda occupied the portion allotted to him
in the extrajudicial settlement, as well as the donated portion of the share of
plaintiff Directo, presupposes his knowledge of the extent of boundaries of
the portion of Lot 1121 allotted to him. Moreover, the statement in the
extrajudicial settlement of August 17, 1981 with respect to the area of Lot
1121, which was 29,845 square meters, is not conclusive because it was
found out, after the relocation survey was conducted on Lot 1121, that the
parties therein occupied an area larger than what they were supposed to
possess per the extrajudicial settlement- partition of August 17, 1981.
Although in the extrajudicial settlement dated August 17, 1981 the heirs of
Celestino Arbizo partitioned only a 29,845 square meter lot to conform with
the area declared under tax declaration 16-0032 yet the heirs were each
actually occupying a bigger portion the total area of which exceeded 29,845
square meters. This was confirmed by Geodetic Engineer Quejada in his
report submitted to the trial court where he stated among other things: 7.
that upon computation of actual survey, it is informed (sic) that the area
dated (sic) as per extrajudicial settlement-partition in the name of Celestino

432

Arbizo was smaller than the computed lots of their actual occupancy as per
survey on the ground;
The survey conducted on Lot 1121 was only a confirmation of the actual
areas being occupied by the heirs taking into account the percentage
proportion adjudicated to each heir on the basis of their August 17, 1981
extrajudicial settlement.
. Petitioner further alleges that the said partition tries to vest in favor of a
third person, Maria Arbizo, a right over the said property notwithstanding
the absence of evidence establishing that she is an heir of the late
Celestino Arbizo since Maria Arbizo was never impleaded as a party in this
case and her interest over Lot 1121 was not established.
Such contention deserves scant consideration. We find no compelling basis
to disturb the finding of the trial court on this factual issue, as follows: In
effect, the defendant denies the allegation of the plaintiff that Maria Arbizo
was the third wife of Celestino Arbizo and Agripina is her half sister with a
common father. On this point, the Court believes the version of the plaintiff.
The Court observes that in the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition, Maria
Arbizo is named one of the co-heirs of the defendant, being the widow of
his grandfather, Celestino Arbizo. The names of Anacleto and Agripina do
not also appear in the Extra-judicial Settlement and Partition because
according to the plaintiff, they had sold their shares to Maria Arbizo. And
the defendant is one of the signatories to the said Deed of Extra-judicial
Settlement-Partition acknowledged before Notary Public Artemio Maranon.
Under the circumstances, the Court is convinced that the defendant knew
that Maria Arbizo was the widow of Celestino Arbizo and he knew of the
sale of the share of Anacleto Arbizo his share, as well as that of Agripina.
When the defendant signed the Extra-Judicial Settlement, he was already
an adult since when he testified in 1989, he gave his age as 50 years old.
So that in 1981, he was already 41 years old. If he did not know all of
these, the defendant would have not agreed to the sharing and signed this
document and acknowledged it before the Notary Public. And who could
have a better knowledge of the relationship of Agripina and Maria Arbizo to
Celestino Arbizo than the latters daughter? Besides, at the time of the
execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement-Partition by the plaintiff and
defendant, they were still in good terms. There was no reason for the
plaintiff to favor Maria Arbizo and Agripina Arbizo over the defendant.

433

Furthermore, the defendant had failed to support his allegation that when
his grandfather died he had no wife and child.
. We likewise find unmeritorious petitioners claim that there exist no factual
and legal basis for the adjudication of Lot C of Lot 1121 to private
respondent Aurora Directo. It bears stress that the relocation survey plan
prepared by Geodetic Engineer Quejada was based on the extrajudicial
settlement dated August 17, 1981, and the actual possession by the parties
and the technical description of Lot 1121. It was established by the survey
plan that based on the actual possession of the parties, and the
extrajudicial settlement among the heirs the portion denominated as Lot C
of Lot 1121 of the survey plan was being occupied by private respondent
Aurora Directo and it was also shown that it is in Lot C where the 625
square meter area donated by private respondent Directo to petitioner is
located. There is no obstacle to adjudicate Lot C to private respondent as
her rightful share allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement.
. Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo
since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their
predecessor in interest, Celestino Arbizo, are still undetermined since no
final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the parties
herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
We do not agree.
In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate
succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to
the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to
co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each coowner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each
one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
other. And one way of effecting a partition of the decedents estate is by the
heirs themselves extrajudicially.

The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A.
Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to

434

adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-ininterest in the following manner:
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an
area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;
and To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion. In the
survey plan submitted by Engineer Quejada, the portions indicated by red
lines and numbered alphabetically were based on the percentage
proportion in the extrajudicial settlement and the actual occupancy of each
heir which resulted to these divisions as follows:
Lot A; the area is 2,957 sq.m.- goes to Rodolfo A. Noceda (1/5)
Lot B; 38,872 sq.m Maria Arbizo (3/5)
Lot C 12,957 sq.m. Aurora Arbizo (1/5)
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the
survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely
determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said
portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not
make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one
from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
We also find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no
effective and real partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the
charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude
against him. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the
portion donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he
also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent
Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion pertaining to private
respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law
does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be
proved in the action for revocation. Finally, petitioner contends that granting
revocation is proper, the right to enforce the same had already prescribed
since as admitted by private respondent, petitioner usurped her property in
the first week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation was
filed on September 16, 1986, thus more than one (1) year had passed from

435

the alleged usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot

1121. We are not persuaded.
The respondent Court rejected such argument in this wise:
Article 769 of the New Civil Code states that: The action granted to the
donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
action prescribes within one year to be counted from the time the donor
had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. As
expressly stated, the donor must file the action to revoke his donation
within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the
donee. Also, it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute
the said action within the same period. The concurrence of these two
requisites must be shown by defendant Noceda in order to bar the present
action. Defendant Noceda failed to do so. He reckoned the one year
prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation of the property of
plaintiff Directo in the first week of September, 1985, and not from the time
the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. Moreover, defendant
Noceda failed to prove that at the time plaintiff Directo acquired knowledge
of his usurpation, it was possible for plaintiff Directo to institute an action for
revocation of her donation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year
to be counted from the time (a) the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b)
provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is incumbent
upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in
order that the one (1) year period for bringing the action be considered to
have already prescribed. No competent proof was adduced by petitioner to
prove his allegation. In Civil Cases, the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence
on record are final and conclusive on the parties and carry even more
weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial
court; for it is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over again the
oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record
or the judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The jurisdiction
of this court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a
showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the

436

record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious

abuse of discretion. We find no such showing in this case.
We find that both the trial court and the respondent Court had carefully
considered the questions of fact raised below and the respondent Courts
conclusions are based on the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to
present any substantial argument to justify a reversal of the assailed
decision.
Petition for review is DENIED.
Silverio v. CA
GR# 178933, Sept. 16, 2009
600 SCRA 1
Held:
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in common by
such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a
co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his
co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate
as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law
allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.22 (Emphasis supplied.)

437

Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the
subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings
before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate
to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after
the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the
estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court,
the properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court.
And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is
part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she
allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific
property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such,
the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory
and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.1avvphi1
Avelino vs. CA,
GR# 115181, March 31, 2000
329 SCRA 369
Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir
of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent
Angelina Avelino. The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr.,
Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise
compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of
Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma.
Socorro.The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio
Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be
appointed the administrator of the estate. On December 3, 1992, Angelina,
and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said
judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly
opposed. On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.

438

Held: When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an

executor in his will or the executorso named is incompetent, or refuses the
trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court
shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6
of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 74 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the
gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or
intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to
appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the
petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not
less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of
the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court
may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of
an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons
legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court
shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are
lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally
appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to
them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments
made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of
the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall
be recorded in the proper register's office.
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the

439

Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without
need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without
leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the
property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.

Zaragoza vs. CA,

GR# 106401, Sept. 29, 2000
341 SCRA 309
FACTS: Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels
of land. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all
surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was
survived by his four children. On December 28, 1981, private respondent
Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and
Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting
of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a
natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She
further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited
properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers and sister
were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid
consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was
not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred that because of her
marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason,
no formal deed of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these
lots during her father's lifetime.
Held: It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of Lots
943 and 871 in favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has
no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the
transfer. Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the
lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties
among his three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of

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sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent

because she had become an American citizen and the Constitution
prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were
inheritance shares of the private respondent. These are factual
determinations of the CA, based on documentary and testimonial evidence.
Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid.
We think so. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos
may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the
Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined
after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Arrogante v. Deliarte
GR# 152132, July. 24, 2007
528 SCRA 63
Facts: It appears that the lot in controversy was originally conjugal property
of the spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr. and Gregoria Placencia who had nine
children, including herein respondent Beethoven Deliarte and petitioner Fe
Deliarte Arrogante. The other petitioners, Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr.,
all surnamed Arrogante, are the children of Fe and, thus, nephews of
Beethoven. Respondent Leonora Duenas is the wife of Beethoven. A
series of misfortunes struck the Deliarte family. The first tragedy occurred
when a brother of Beethoven and Fe was hospitalized and eventually died.
Beethoven shouldered the hospitalization and other related expenses,
including the transport of the body from Davao to Cebu and then to
Daanbantayan. The next occurrence took place a year after, when

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Gregoria was likewise hospitalized and subsequently died. Once again,

Beethoven paid for all necessary expenses. Soon thereafter, it was
Bernabe, the parties ailing father, who died. Not surprisingly, it was
Beethoven who spent for their fathers hospitalization and burial. In
between the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe, the Deliarte siblings agreed
to waive and convey in favor of Beethoven all their rights, interests, and
claims to the subject lot. At the signing of the deed of absolute sale, the
siblings who failed to attend the family gathering, either because they were
dead or were simply unable to, were represented by their respective
spouses who signed the document on their behalf. Bernabe, who was
already blind at that time, was likewise present and knew of the sale that
took place among his children. Thus, from then on, Beethoven occupied
and possessed the subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the concept of
owner. He exercised full ownership and control over the subject lot without
any objection from all his siblings, or their heirs, until 1993 when the
controversy arose. In fact, on March 26, 1986, all of Beethovens siblings,
except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of sale in favor of Beethoven to
ratify the 1978 private deed of sale. Sometime in August 1993, petitioner
Lordito Arrogante installed placards on the fence erected by respondents,
claiming that the subject lot was illegally acquired by the latter. The
placards depicted Beethoven as a land grabber who had unconscionably
taken the subject lot from Lordito who claimed that the lot is a devise from
his grandfather. Allegedly, the bequeathal was made in Bernabes last will
and testament which was, unfortunately, torn up and destroyed by
Beethoven. Thus, on November 10, 1993, respondents filed an action for
quieting of title and damages against the petitioners.
Held: The 1978 private deed of sale, insofar as it disposed of Bernabes
share in the conjugal partnership prior to his death, is void for being a
conveyance of the Deliarte siblings future inheritance. Article 1347,
paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a contract entered into upon
future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the
contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with
respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature. In this case, at the time the contract was entered into, succession to
Bernabes estate had yet to be opened, and the object thereof, i.e.,
Bernabes share in the subject lot, formed part of his childrens inheritance,
and the children merely had an inchoate hereditary right thereto. True, the
prohibition on contracts respecting future inheritance admits of exceptions,

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as when a person partitions his estate by an act inter vivos under Article
1080 of the Civil Code. However, the private deed of sale does not purport
to be a partition of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the application
of Article 1347. Nowhere in the said document does Bernabe separate,
divide, and assign to his children his share in the subject lot effective only
upon his death. Indeed, the document does not even bear the signature of
Bernabe. Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe undertook an
oral partition of his estate. Although we have held on several occasions that
an oral or parole partition is valid, our holdings thereon were confined to
instances wherein the partition had actually been consummated, enforced,
and recognized by the parties. Absent a showing of an overt act by
Bernabe indicative of an unequivocal intent to partition his estate among
his children, his knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the private
deed of sale does not equate to an oral partition by an act inter vivos.
Besides, partition of property representing future inheritance cannot be
made effective during the lifetime of its owner. Considering the foregoing, it
follows that the 1986 deed of confirmation of sale which sought to ratify the
1978 sale likewise suffers from the same infirmity. In short, the 1986 deed
is also void.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that Bernabe treated his share in the subject lot
as his childrens present inheritance, and he relinquished all his rights and
claim thereon in their favor subject to Beethovens compensation for the
expenses he initially shouldered for the family. The records reveal that
Bernabe, prior to his hospitalization and death, wanted to ensure that his
children attended to the expenditure relating thereto, and even articulated
his desire that such
surpass the provision for both his son and wife, Beethovens and Fes
brother and mother, respectively. Their arrangement contemplated the
Deliarte siblings equal responsibility for the familys incurred expenses. We
take judicial notice of this collective sense of responsibility towards family.
As with most nuclear Filipino families, the Deliarte siblings endeavored to
provide for their parents or any member of their family in need. This was
evident in Florenda Deliarte Nacuas, the youngest Deliarte siblings,
remittance to her parents of her salary for two years so they could redeem
the subject lot.

Orendain Jr. vs. Rodriguez

GR# 168660/ June 30, 2009
591 SCRA 285

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FACTS: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez, died
in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September 23, 1960, the
will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 3845. On August 27, 1962, the CFI Manila
approved the project of partition presented by the executor of Doa
Margarita Rodriguezs will. At the time of her death, the decedent left no
compulsory or forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to
dispose of her properties, without regard to legitimes,3 as provided in her
will. Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her
properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will.
As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the alienation or
mortgage of the properties specified therein, we had occasion to hold, in
Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,5 that the clause, insofar
as the first twenty-year period is concerned, does not violate Article 8706 of
the Civil Code. Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr.
and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was mentioned in
Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the
decedents estate, which they argued had been in existence for more than
twenty years, in violation of Articles 8678 and 870 of the Civil Code, and
inconsistent with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.9On April 18,
2005, the RTC issued the herein assailed Order that: (a) only the perpetual
prohibition to alienate or mortgage is declared void; (b) the trust over her
properties stipulated by the testatrix in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will
remains valid; and (c) the trustees may dispose of these properties in order
to carry out the latters testamentary disposition.10
ISSUE: WON the trusteeship over the properties left by the decedent can
be dissolved applying Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.
Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a
trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom.
Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of
the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The
decedents will did not institute any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the
following:
1. Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;

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2. Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from specified properties,

after the necessary deductions for expenses, including the estate tax, be
deposited in a fund with a bank;
3. Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in trust for perpetual
administration (pangasiwaan sa habang panahon);
4. Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the properties ought to
be divided among, and distributed to the different beneficiaries; and
5. Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide medical support to
certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the fund deposits in the bank
mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.
Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners motion to dissolve
and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause 10 according to the
testatrixs wishes. As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as
the decedent did not institute an heir therefor. Article 782, in relation to
paragraph 2, Article 960 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision
of a will or by operation of law.
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place
only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed;
We find as erroneous the RTCs holding that paragraph 4,14 Article 1013 of
the same code specifically allows a perpetual trust, because this provision
of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to state that the article is among the Civil
Code provisions on intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting
from a decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this
article, the allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law,
covers property
inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not
cure a void testamentary provision which did not institute an heir.
Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedents
properties.
The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to
a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with
her even in the afterlife.
In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrixs properties
must be dissolved and this case remanded to the lower court to determine
the following: (1) The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting
the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed

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of as yet; and (2) The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest
relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties.