Property & Succession Cases 1
BOOK II - PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS
(Arts. 414 – 773)
Title I.- CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY (Arts. 414 – 426)
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS (Art. 414)
See also: RA 349 as amended by RA 1056 (An Act to Legalize Permissions to Use
Human Organs or Any Portion or portions of the Human Body for Medical,
Surgical or Scientific Purposes under Certain Conditions); RA 7170 (An Act
Authorizing The Legacy or Donation of All or Part of a Human Body After Death
For Specified Purposes) as amended by RA 7875 (An Act to Advance Corneal
Transplantations in the Philippines)
Chapter 1. Immovable Property (Art. 415)
Chapter 2. Movable Property (Arts. 416-418)
Prudential vs. Panis
GR # L-50003/ Aug. 31, 1987
153 SCRA 391
Facts: On November 19, 1971, plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula
Baluyut Magcale secured a loan in the sum of P70,000.00 from the defendant Prudential
Bank. To secure payment of this loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of defendant on the
aforesaid date a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the Semi – concrete 2-storey
residential building with warehouse and a first class residential land evidenced only by
tax declaration in the name of Fernando Magcale, situated in Olongapo City. On the
Deed of Mortgage a rider typed at the bottom of the page in which case made Prudential
bank become aware that the mortgagee (defendant Prudential Bank) was at the outset
aware of the fact that the mortgagors (plaintiffs) have already filed a Miscellaneous
Sales Application over the lot, possessory rights over which, were mortgaged to it.
Plaintiffs secured an additional loan from defendant Prudential Bank in the sum of
P20,000.00. To secure payment of this additional loan, plaintiffs executed in favor of the
said defendant another deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties
previously mortgaged. For failure of plaintiffs to pay their obligation to defendant Bank
after it became due, and upon application of said defendant, the deeds of Real Estate
Mortgage were foreclosed. The auction sale aforesaid was held despite written request
from plaintiffs through counsel for the defendant City Sheriff to desist from going with the
scheduled public auction sale. In the decision of CFI, it declared that the Real Estate
Mortgage is null and void. Prudential file for an MR but was also denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building
erected on the land belonging to another. WON the supervening issuance in favor of
private respondents of miscellaneous sales patent have the effect of invalidating the
deeds of real estate mortgage.
Held: The answer is in the affirmative. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code, it is obvious
that the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct from the land, in said provision of
law can only mean that a building is by itself an immovable property. While it is true that
a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate
mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even if dealt with
separately and apart from the land. In the same manner, this Court has also established
that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the grantee, may be
validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage. Under the foregoing
considerations, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his
own building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is to all intents
and purposes a valid mortgage.
But it is a different matter, as regards the second mortgage executed over the same
properties on May 2, 1973 for an additional loan of P20,000.00 which was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City on the same date. Relative thereto, it is
evident that such mortgage executed after the issuance of the sales patent and of the
Original Certificate of Title, falls squarely under the prohibitions stated in Sections 121,
122 and 124 of the Public Land Act and Section 2 of Republic Act 730, and is therefore
null and void.
We believe that as in pari delicto may not be invoked to defeat the policy of the State
neither may the doctrine of estoppel give a validating effect to a void contract. Indeed, it
is generally considered that as between parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to
it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy.
Serg’s. vs. PCI Leasing
GR# 137705 /Aug. 22, 2000
338 SCRA 499
Facts: PCI Leasing, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for collection of sum of money
with an application of a writ of replevin. Upon an ex-parte application of PCI Leasing,
respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the
machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the
necessary expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s
factory, seized one machinery with *the+ word that he *would+ return for the other
machineries. Petitioner Serg’s filed a motion for special protective order invoking the
power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its
processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of
replevin. This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties
[were] still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. In their
Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized [were] immovable as
defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties’ agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement would be prejudicial
to innocent third parties. They further stated that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from
treating these machineries as personal because the contracts in which the alleged

agreement [were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical. The sheriff again sought to
enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He was
able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest. The CA
held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been
leased, not owned, by petitioners. It also ruled that the “words of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties.”
Issue: Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by SERG’S became
real property by virtue of immobilization and thus should not be subjected to the writ of
seizure.
Held: Under ART. 415. The following are immovable property:
Xxx - (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
Xxx
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were
placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although
each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become
“immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the
industry.”*16+ In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are
real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Be that as it may, we disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said
machines are not proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract
is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal
property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage
defendants-appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an
inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise. In the present case, the Lease Agreement
clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal
property. Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the
subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper
subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
Tsai vs. CA
GR# 1201098 /Oct. 02, 20
366 SCRA 324
Property & Succession Cases 2
Facts: Respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso
(P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As
security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel
Mortgage over the lot where the factory stands and a list of machineries and equipment.
After sometime, PBCom granted a second loan of P3,356,000.00 to EVERTEX. The
loan was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list
attached thereto. These listed properties were similar to those listed in the first mortgage
deed. After the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above,
EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. Due to business reverses,
EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings. All its assets were taken into the custody of the
Insolvency Court, including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two mortgages
as abovementioned. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On the first and
second public auctions, PB Com emerged to be the highest bidder. PBCom
consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. PB Com leased the
property to Rubi Tsai. On 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai
for P9,000,000.00, including the contested machineries. EVERTEX filed a complaint for
annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against
PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the
assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to
her, and should reconvey the assets. The RTC found that the lease and sale of said
personal properties were irregular and illegal because they were not duly foreclosed nor
sold at the December 15, 1982 auction sale since these were not included in the
schedules attached to the mortgage contracts. The CA affirmed the judgment.
Issue: WON the machineries listed are personal property outside the deed of real estate
mortgage and that it should be excluded from the real property forclosed, despite the
provision in the deed that all after-acquired properties during the lifetime of the mortgage
shall form part there and despite the undisputed fact that said machineries are big and
heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property.
Held: Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they
were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to
PBCom, make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil
Code. This assertion, however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not
foreclose the controversy. We have to look at the parties' intent.
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the
contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a
contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached the
same finding that the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat
machinery and equipment as chattels. We find no reversible error in the respondent
appellate court's ruling that inasmuch as the subject mortgages were intended by the
parties to involve chattels, insofar as equipment and machinery were concerned, the
Chattel Mortgage Law applies, which provides in Section 7 thereof that: "a chattel
mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or
substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same
depository as the property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary

notwithstanding. As the auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void, no valid
title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity under the
elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give what one does not
have.
Caltex Phils. v. CBAA
GR# L-50466 May 31, 1982
114 SCRA 296
Facts: Caltex installed machineries and equipment consisting of underground tanks,
elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps,
water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The
said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an
appropriate lease agreement or receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the
operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment in good
condition as when received, except ordinary wear and tear. Caltex retains the ownership
thereof during the term of the lease. The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the
said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The city board of
tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. On appeal the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals held that the said machines and equipment are real property within the
meaning of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential
Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, and that the definitions of real
property and personal property in articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not
applicable to this case.
Issue: WON the machines and equipment are subject to Real Property Tax
Held: We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and
which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas
station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the
gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within
the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when
so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61
Phil 709).
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes
they might be considered personalty (84 C.J.S. 181-2, Notes 40 and 41). "It is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal property" (Standard Oil Co. of New York
vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
Property & Succession Cases 3
This case is also easily distinguishable from Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila
Electric Co., 119 Phil. 328, where Meralco's steel towers were considered poles within
the meaning of paragraph 9 of its franchise which exempts its poles from taxation. The
steel towers were considered personalty because they were attached to square metal
frames by means of bolts and could be moved from place to place when unscrewed and
dismantled.
Nor are Caltex's gas station equipment and machinery the same as tools and equipment
in the repair shop of a bus company which were held to be personal property not subject
to realty tax (Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor, 116 Phil. 501).
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the city assessor's is imposition of the realty tax on Caltex's gas station and
equipment.
MERALCO vs. CBAA
GR# L-47943/ May 31, 1982
114 SCRA 273
Facts: This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks
installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in San Pascual, Batangas which it
leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery
compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants. According to
Meralco, the storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot.
Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost
layer, a sand pad as the intermediate layer and a two-inch thick bituminous asphalt
stratum as the top layer. The bottom of each tank is in contact with the asphalt layer,
The steel sides of the tank are directly supported underneath by a circular wall made of
concrete, eighteen inches thick, to prevent the tank from sliding. Hence, according to
Meralco, the tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the
concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by
bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Each empty tank
can be floated by flooding its dike-inclosed location with water four feet deep.
Meralco filed this special civil action of certiorari to annul the Board's decision and
resolution. It contends that the Board acted without jurisdiction and committed a grave
error of law in holding that its storage tanks are taxable real property.
Issue: WON the said fuel tanks are subject to Realty Tax.
Held: The tanks are considered real properties subject to Realty Tax. We hold that while
the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree

of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco
for its operations.
Oil storage tanks were held to be taxable realty in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs.
Atlantic City, 15 Atl. 2nd 271.
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which should
generally be regarded as personal property (84 C.J.S. 171, Note 8). It is a familiar
phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on
general principle might be considered personal property (Standard Oil Co. of New York
vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, 633).
The case of Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Company, 119 Phil. 328,
wherein Meralco's steel towers were held not to be subject to realty tax, is not in point
because in that case the steel towers were regarded as poles and under its franchise
Meralco's poles are exempt from taxation. Moreover, the steel towers were not attached
to any land or building. They were removable from their metal frames.
Nor is there any parallelism between this case and Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor,
116 Phil. 501, where the tools and equipment in the repair, carpentry and blacksmith
shops of a transportation company were held not subject to realty tax because they
were personal property.
Laurel v. Abrogar
GR# 155076/ Jan. 13, 2009
576 SCRA 41
FACTS: PLDT sued petitioner for violation of Art. 308 of the RPC, or theft, for allegedly
using, without its previous knowledge and consent, the international long distance calls
belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method
of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from
PLDT while using its facilities in the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage
and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)," on the ground
that the factual allegations in the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of
theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as well as
petitioner’s subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition for review with this Court. In his petition for
review petitioner argued that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the
context of the Civil Code’s definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of
real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not
Property & Succession Cases 4
included therein are personal properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
used the words "personal property" without qualification, it follows that all "personal
properties" as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges that the international calls
and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal
properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
In his Comment, petitioner Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the
phone or a communication carried out using the telephone. It is not synonymous to
electric current or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as personal property
susceptible of appropriation. He also insists that "business" is not personal property. It is
not the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a business." This right is
what is considered as property. Since the
services of PLDT cannot be considered as "property," the same may not be subject of
theft.
ISSUE: WON the international calls as well as the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
HELD: The court granted PLDT’s petition but remanded the case to the trial court and
the Public Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby DIRECTED to amend the Amended
Information to show that the property subject of the theft were services and business of
the private offended party because the international calls, although considered as
personal properties, are not owned by PLDT hence petitioner cannot be liable for theft
on that matter; but the business of providing telecommunication is a personal property
which is capable of being appropriated hence subject tot theft. In explaining its decision,
the court said:
Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the definition of
the term "personal property" in the penal code provision on theft had been established in
Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos,
and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible
or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of
theft.
Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term
"personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of
the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of
appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the
term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context
of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that
where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as
having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words
used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have
been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal
property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos.

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal
code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which
is defined as "carrying away."7 Jurisprudence is settled that to "take" under the theft
provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.9 The word "take" in the
Revised Penal Code includes any act intended to transfer possession which, as held in
the assailed Decision, may be committed through the use of the offenders’ own hands,
as well as any mechanical device, such as an access device or card as in the instant
case. This includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to deprive the owner
of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, as held in Natividad v. Court of
Appeals,10 use of a device to fraudulently obtain gas, as held in United States v.
Tambunting, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity, as held in the cases of United
States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Menagas.
As illustrated in the above cases, appropriation of forces of nature which are brought
under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with
any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully
redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to
fraudulently obtain such forces of nature. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with
engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and
completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air
wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where destined.
The right of the ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the
Penal Code; the application of these articles in cases of subtraction of gas, a fluid used
for lighting, and in some respects resembling electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid
down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of January 20, 1887, and April 1,
1897, construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the Penal Code
of that country, articles 517 and 518 of the code in force in these islands.
The acts of "subtraction" include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus
installed or used for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity,
telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking
any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus; and (c) using or enjoying
the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any current of
electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent
PLDT’s facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal
property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Property & Succession Cases 5
Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law),
hence, could be object of theft. Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as
personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered.
Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the
Civil Code provides that all things which are or may be the object of appropriation are
considered either real property or personal property. Business is likewise not
enumerated as personal property under the Civil Code. Just like interest in business,
however, it may be appropriated.
It was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the human voice is
converted into electrical impulses or electric current which are transmitted to the party
called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed
Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article
416 (3) of the Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under
control by science."
Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter
alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be
said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to
PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely
encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex
communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said
telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken
without its consent. It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of
PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone
services and business.
Chapter 3. Property In Relation to the Person to Whom it Belongs (Arts. 419-425)
Provisions Common to the Preceding Chapters (Art. 426)
Title II. Ownership (Arts. 427-483)
Chapter 1. Ownership in General (Arts. 427-439)
Acap vs. CA
GR# 118114 /Dec. 07, 1995
251 SCRA 30
FACTS: Felixberto Vasquez inherited a parcel of land from his parents, the ownership of
which he transferred in favor of Cosme Pido by executing a “Declaration of Heirship and
Deed of Absolute Sale.” Pido, however, died and was survived by his wife. All of their
heirs executed “Declaration of Heirship with waiver of rights” for the transfer of said land
to private respondent De los Reyes. It appeared however, that even during the time that

the land was allegedly transferred to respondent, petitioner Acap remained as the tenant
of the land. By reason of the transfer, respondent now wanted the lease rentals to be
paid to him. Initially both parties allegedly agreed but when respondent demanded for
the payment, petitioner regused to recognize respondent as owner of the land.
Respondent was thus prompted to file a complaint for recovery of possession of the land
against petitioner. It was, however, the contention of petitioner that he had no
knowledge of any sale or transfer of the land to respondent. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent and recognized the latter’s ownership over the land.
When petitioner appealed, CA affirmed the assailed decision, ruling that respondent
acquired ownership over the land through the document executed.
ISSUE: WON respondent had acquired ownership of the land through the Declaration of
Heirship and Deed of Absolute Sale.
HELD: No. In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature
and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a
contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price
certain in money or its equivalent. 9
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public
instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate
and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in
effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
10
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of
hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between
the parties. 11 The second is, technically speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership
where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who
are co-heirs in the succession. 12 Private respondent, being then a stranger to the
succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on
the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a
sale, 13 or a donation, 14 or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
It is even erroneous to state that a sale had transpired between the heirs of Pido and
respondent by virtue of said “declaration”.
On record, Exhibit "D", which is the "Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights" was
excluded by the trial court in its order dated 27 August 1990 because the document was
neither registered with the Registry of Deeds nor identified by the heirs of Cosme Pido.
There is no showing that private respondent had the same document attached to or
made part of the record. What the trial court admitted was Annex "E", a notice of
adverse claim filed with the Registry of Deeds which contained the Declaration of
Heirship with
Property & Succession Cases 6
Waiver of rights and was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title to the
land in question.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private respondent's
ownership over the tenanted lot. "A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a
claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in
court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice
of a case already pending in court." 15
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven, there is
no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs
and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of
private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot
remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the
land and title the same in private respondent's name.
Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. CA
GR# 112519/ Nov. 14, 1996
264 SCRA 181
FACTS: A conflict arose with respect to ownership of Lot 1272 located somewhere in
Balanga, Bataan. Said lot was allegedly ceded thru donation by the the then parish
priest of Catholic Archbishop of Manila, prior thereto or on August 23, 1936, in favor of
the predecessor of private respondent. Said predecessor, before her death, was able to
give said lot to private respondent, also through a deed of donation. The deed was
however, refused to be registered, for unknown reasons, by the Registered of Deeds.
Despite this, however, the latter, when his predecessor died in 1945 without an issu, had
allegedly been in open and continuous possession of said lot, built a house thereon and
declared it for tax purposes until his ownership was disturbed on November 5, 1985 or
more than 49 years after said donation, by petitioner (who obtained it from Roman
Catholic Bishop of Balanga, and the latter from Roman Catholic Bishop of Manila) when
petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent. In its complaint, petitioner alleged
that during the Japanese occupation, without its knowledge and prior consent, private
respondent entered and occupied the subject property; that despite requests by
petitioner, private respondent refused to vacate the property in question.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the action has
been barred by prescription for having been filed after more than 49 years after the
donation. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto alleging that the defense of prescription
was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the
answer.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the CA stated that private
respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through
acquisitive prescription because the same having been duly registered under the
Torrens system, title thereto was indefeasible.
Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of
laches, the consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the

deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of
an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its
rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its own
inexcusable negligence and grave lack of vigilance in protecting its rights over a
tremendously long period of time.
ISSUE: WON the ownership of the said lot by private respondent which is premised on a
duly accepted donation, although unregistered prevail over the titled ownership of
petitioner.
HELD: Yes. A just, fair and complete resolution of the present case necessitates the
consideration and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the same as but
is undoubtedly closely related to, the issue of prescription which was properly raised by
private respondent before the respondent Court of Appeals.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to
assert it. It has also been defined as such
neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right
when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense,
laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with
whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable neglect, he
should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
The following are the essential elements of laches:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise
to the situation complained of;
(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's
conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue;
(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant.
Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this
case.
Property & Succession Cases 7
On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the parish priest and
administrator of the church property in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, executed a
deed of donation over a 265-square meter church lot in favor of Ana de los Reyes and
her heirs in recognition of her long and satisfactory service to the church of Balanga,
Bataan. For some reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the
Register of Deeds. However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance in
the said deed, occupied the donated property, and exercised acts of ownership
thereupon.
In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the
subject property to her nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon
acceptance of the gift, private respondent immediately took possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and thenceforth paid land
taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.
The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus
clearly his occupation since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in
continuation of the occupation of the same nature regarding the same property by the
donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of laches
exists.
The second element also exists in this case. The second element is three-tiered: (a)
knowledge of defendant's action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such
knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the
trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and occupied the
subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore,
petitioner was clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject property
in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not also rebut the testimony of its own authorized
representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the subject property was so
proximately located to the rest of petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of
ignorance of private respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of
petitioner.
From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually
commenced suit against private respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to
file the appropriate action to have the donation of the subject property to Ana de los
Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said
property from its present occupants.
Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to
first pass by for petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such,
the second element of knowledge, opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is
undoubtedly present in the instant controversy.
The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that
impresses us as clear evidence of at least an inkling on the part of private

respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated property. There
was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed
private respondent of petitioner's intentions. In other words, private respondent
manifestly had every reason to believe that, with the passing of almost half a century
since his predecessor-in-interest accepted the donated property and without
unambiguous intimation of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure
in his possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.
In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer
irreparable injury under the most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner's
inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting its rights.
In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had
lapsed since the donation in its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's
predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for the long delay in the filing by
petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim
nullity of the donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified
inaction and as a basis for the assertion of a right on which they had slept for so long. 50
Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction,
knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land,
paying taxes and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to
spring an ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land
values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense. 51 Considerable
delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of
merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is
threatened or invaded; thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches
from questioning private respondent's ownership of the subject property. 52 At any rate,
petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from private
respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and
neglect, been converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might
have given rise to an action in court is visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance
resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain such failure to file
seasonably the necessary suit.
Chapter 2. Right of Accession. (Art. 440-475)
Pecson vs. CA
GR# 115814/ May 26, 1995
244 SCRA 407
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of a commercial lot with an apartment
building. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon, the lot was sold at a public auction to
Nepumoceno who in turn sold it to spouses Naguid. Petitioner challenged the validity of
the sale and alleged that the sale did not include the building. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of private respondent but ruled that there is no legal basis to conclude
that the sale included the building. When the case was appealed, the CA affirmed the
Property & Succession Cases 8
RTC’s decision and also agreed with the RTC that the sale of the lot did not include the
building. In the meantime, the spouses Naguid filed a motion for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building, citing article 546 of the Civil Code. In their
complaint, they admitted that the building was under lease by some tenants. They
further agreed to comply with the rules on reimbursement of the value of the building for
according to them, petitioner was a builder in good faith. The trial court rendered the
assailed decision ordering the spouses, among others, to reimburse the petitioner with
the value of the building; to offset the rental payments previously collected by petitioner
from the tenants of the lot, from the value of the building which will be reimbursed by the
spouses to petitioner. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to be reimbursed for the value of the building and the
improvements thereon.
HELD: Yes. By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is
claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted
something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad
faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in
determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. This Court said
so in Coleongco vs. Regalado:
Article 361 of the old Civil Code is not applicable in this case, for Regalado constructed
the house on his own land before he sold said land to Coleongco. Article 361 applies
only in cases where a person constructs a building on the land of another in good or in
bad faith, as the case may be. It does not apply to a case where a person constructs a
building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to good or bad faith on
the part of the builder.
Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,
the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.
Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless,
we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-
ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the
improvements may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
Article 546 does not specifically state how the value of the useful improvements should
be determined. The respondent court and the private respondents espouse the belief
that the cost of construction of the apartment building in 1965, and not its current market
value, is sufficient reimbursement for necessary and useful improvements made by the
petitioner. This position is, however, not in consonance with previous rulings of this
Court in similar cases. In Javier vs. Concepcion, Jr., this Court pegged the value of the

useful improvements consisting of various fruits, bamboos, a house and camarin made
of strong material based on the market value of the said improvements. In Sarmiento vs.
Agana, despite the finding that the useful improvement, a residential house, was built in
1967 at a cost of between eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) to ten thousand
pesos(P10,000.00), the landowner was ordered to reimburse the builder in the amount
of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00), the value of the house at the time of the trial. In
the same way, the landowner was required to pay the "present value" of the house, a
useful improvement, in the case of De Guzman vs. De la Fuente, cited by the petitioner.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila that the said provision was formulated in trying to adjust the rights
of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to administer complete
justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of
that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is therefore the current
market value of the improvements which should be made the basis of reimbursement. A
contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who would otherwise be
allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit apartment building for a
measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be allowed to adduce
evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon which the trial
court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by the
landowner.
The trial court also erred in ordering the petitioner to pay monthly rentals equal to the
aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. Since the private
respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus
entitled to the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the
proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been
constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land
on which it is built, planted or sown. 18 The petitioner not having been so paid, he was
entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
It follows, too, that the Court of Appeals erred not only in upholding the trial court's
determination of the indemnity, but also in ordering the petitioner to account for the
rentals of the apartment building from 23 June 1993 to 23 September 1993.
Narvaez v. Alciso
GR# 165907 /July 27, 2009
594 SCRA 60
FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of land situated in Benguet which she allegedly sold
with right to repurchase, first, to Sansano in 1979, which he later repurchased; and
second, to Baet in 1980. Baet in turn sold the land to spouses Narvaez in 1981. As per
demand of respondent, however, the deed of sale between Baet and Narvaez contained
a stipulation which allows respondent to repurchase said land from spouses Narvaez.
Property & Succession Cases 9
The Spouses Narvaez furnished respondent with a copy of the Deed. Corollary to the
said sale, spouses Narvaez built a commercial building on the said land. When
respondent was about to exercise its right to repurchase, she and the spouses Narvaez
did not agree with the selling price prompting respondent to file a complaint praying for
the cancellation of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 sale alleging that her true intention was to
mortgage the land and not to sell it and also praying that spouses Narvaez should
reconvey the land to her. The court rendered a decision declaring that the repurchase in
the 1979 sale becomes functus officio when she repurchased the property; the action to
annul the 1980 sale had prescribed; and that she had no legal personality to annul the
1981 sale but she could repurchase the land and appropriate the commercial building
after payment of the indemnity equivalent to one-half of its market value or sell the land
to spouses Narvaez. The spouses appealed. The CA rendered a decision applying Art.
448 of the Civil Code to the extent of declaring that the Spouses Narvaez were builders
in good faith and that respondent could either appropriate the commercial building after
payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land,
unless the price was considerably more than that of the building.
ISSUE: WON Art. 448 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case such that respondent
could either appropriate the commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige
the Spouses Narvaez to pay the price of the land, unless the price was considerably
more than that of the building.
HELD: No. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of
repurchase — it is inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or
planter. In Pecson v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court held that:
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder,
sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.
Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built
the commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy
the land, which they own, would be absurd.
In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles 1606 and
1616 of the Civil Code, not Article 448. Articles 1606 and 1616 state:
Art. 1606. The right referred to in Article 1601, in the absence of an express
agreement, shall last four years from the date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period cannot exceed ten years.
However, the vendor may still exercise the right to repurchase within thirty days from the
time final judgment was rendered in a civil action on the basis that the contract was a
true sale with right to repurchase.

Art. 1616. The vendor cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without
returning to the vendee the price of the sale, and in addition:
(1) The expenses of the contract, and any other legitimate payments made by
reason of the sale;
(2) The necessary and useful expenses made on the thing sold.
Under Article 1616, Alciso may exercise her right of redemption by paying the Spouses
Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate
payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made
on the thing sold. In the present case, the cost of the building constitutes a useful
expense. Useful expenses include improvements which augment the value of the
land.28
Under the first paragraph of Article 1606, Alciso had four years from 1981 to repurchase
the property since there was no express agreement as to the period
when the right can be exercised. Tender of payment of the repurchase price is
necessary in the exercise of the right of redemption. Tender of payment is the seller’s
manifestation of his or her desire to repurchase the property with the offer of immediate
performance.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in with MODIFICATION. Respondent Rose O. Alciso may exercise her
right of redemption by paying the petitioners Spouses Dominador R. Narvaez and Lilia
W. Narvaez (1) the price of the sale, (2) the expenses of the contract, (3) legitimate
payments made by reason of the sale, and (4) the necessary and useful expenses made
on the subject property. The Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 1,
Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, to determine the amounts of the expenses of the
contract, the legitimate expenses made by reason of the sale, and the necessary and
useful expenses made on the subject property.
Cheng v. Donini
GR# 167017/ June 22, 2009
590 SCRA 406
FACTS: There was an oral lease agreement between Cheng and Sps. Donini on the
former’s property in Mandaluyong City. Respondents Donini, put up a restaurant in the
leased property and agreed to pay a monthly rental of P17, 000 from December 1990.
Later on, respondents proceeded to introduce improvements in the premises. However,
before respondents’ business could take off and before any final lease agreement could
be drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its
terms and conditions. Petitioner Cheng thus wrote respondents on January 28, 1991,
demanding payment of the deposit and rentals, and signifying that he had no intention to
continue with the agreement should respondents fail to pay. Respondents, however,
Property & Succession Cases 10
ignoring petitioner’s demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17, 1991
when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner.
Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages before RTC
Pasig and prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract for five
years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of
P445,000, or to order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and
compensate for their unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorney’s
fees.
Petitioner, in his answer, denied respondents’ claims and sought the award of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. After trial, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which, in its
decision dated March 31, 2004, recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a
new one ordering petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P964,000 representing
the latter’s expenses incurred for the repairs and improvements of the premises.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the award of
reimbursement had no factual and legal bases, but this was denied by the CA in its
resolution dated February 21, 2005.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON respondents are builders or possessors in good faith?
HELD: NO. SC held that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code did not apply. Under
these provisions, to be entitled to reimbursement for useful improvements introduced on
the property, respondents must be considered builders in good faith. Articles 448 and
546, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith or one
who builds on land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is
one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he builds on it.
Herein, respondents cannot be considered possessors or builders in good faith. As
early as 1956, in Lopez v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., the Court clarified that
a lessee is neither a builder nor a possessor in good faith – x x x This principle of
possessor in good faith naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he
knows that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can he deny the
ownership or title of his lessor. Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues
only during the life of the lease contract and that he must vacate the property upon
termination of the lease or upon the violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces
improvements on
said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot recover their value from the
lessor, much less retain the premises until such reimbursement.
Being mere lessees, respondents knew that their right to occupy the premises existed
only for the duration of the lease. Cortez v. Manimbo went further to state that: If the rule

were otherwise, ‘it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord
out of his property. These principles have been consistently adhered to and applied by
the Court in many cases.
It appears, however, that as soon as respondents vacated the premises, petitioner
immediately reclaimed the property and barred respondents from entering it.
Respondents also alleged, and petitioner did not deny, that the property subject of this
case had already been leased to another entity since 1991. This is where
considerations of equity should come into play. It is obviously no longer feasible for
respondents to remove the improvements from the property, if they still exist.
Petitioner should, therefore, indemnify respondents the amount of P171,650.95. This is
in accord with the law’s intent of preventing unjust enrichment of a lessor who now has
to pay one-half of the value of the useful improvements at the end of the lease because
the lessee has already enjoyed the same, whereas the lessor can enjoy them
indefinitely thereafter.
Tuatis v. Escol
GR# 175399 /Oct. 27, 2009
604 SCRA 471
FACTS: In November 1989, Visminda (seller) and Tuatis (buyer), entered into a Deed of
Sale of a Part of a Registered Land by Installment (Deed of Sale by Installment) located
in Poblacion, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. Tuatis claimed that she had paid by
installment the agreed price of 10,000 pesos but Visminda countered that Tuatis made
no other payment to her but 4,000 pesos only, despite verbal demands.
In the meantime, Tuatis already took possession of the subject property and constructed
a residential building thereon.
On 18 June 1996, Tuatis filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
against Visminda before the RTC. Then, Tuatis requested Visminda to sign a prepared
absolute deed of sale covering the subject property, but the latter refused, contending
that the purchase price had not yet been fully paid. RTC rendered a Decision in
Visminda’s favor. When it was appealed to CA, it dismissed outright Tuatis’ Petition for
failure to completely pay the required docket fees, to attach a certified true or
authenticated copy of the assailed RTC Order and to indicate the place of issue of her
counsel’s IBP and PTR Official Receipts. Hence, Tuatis filed the instant Petition,
principally arguing that Article 448 of the Civil Code must be applied to the situation
between her and Visminda.
ISSUE: WON Article 448 of the Civil Code shall apply?
HELD: YES. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing
or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
Property & Succession Cases 11
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
According to the aforequoted provision, the landowner can choose between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity for the same, as provided for
in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or obliging the builder to pay the price of the
land, unless its value is considerably more than that of the structures, in which case the
builder in good faith shall pay reasonable rent.
The Court highlights that the options under Article 448 are available to Visminda, as the
owner of the subject property. There is no basis for Tuatis’ demand that, since the value
of the building she constructed is considerably higher than the subject property, she may
choose between buying the subject property from Visminda and selling the building to
Visminda for P502,073.00. Again, the choice of options is for Visminda, not Tuatis, to
make. And, depending on Visminda’s choice, Tuatis’ rights as a builder under Article
448
are limited to the following: (a) under the first option, a right to retain the building and
subject property until Visminda pays proper indemnity; and (b) under the second option,
a right not to be obliged to pay for the price of the subject property, if it is considerably
higher than the value of the building, in which case, she can only be obliged to pay
reasonable rent for the same.
The rule that the choice under Article 448 of the Civil Code belongs to the owner of the
land is in accord with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the
grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the land. The
raison d’etre for this provision has been enunciated thus: Where the builder, planter or
sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it
becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige
the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse
to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the
option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Esmaquel vs. Coprada
GR # 152423/ Dec. 15, 2010
638 SCRA 428

FACTS: In 1945, Maria Coprada (respondent) was able to persuade spouses Marcos
(petitioners Esmaquel and Victoria) to allow her and her family to use and occupy a
parcel of land in Laguna for their residence, under the condition that they will vacate the
premises should the owners/petitioners need to use the same. Respondent and her
family were allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners did
not oblige the respondents to pay rent and never made an attempt to drive them away
out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place to live in.
Respondent’s present circumstances have completely improved, i.e., some of her
children are already working; they are regularly sending her financial assistance; and
she has acquired her own residential house, also in Laguna. Because of this,
petitioners verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land, but the latter
refused.
On February 24, 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against respondent before
MCTC of Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna. MCTC dismissed the complaint as
laches had already set in. On appeal, the RTC reversed and ruled that respondent’s
occupation of the subject property was by virtue of petitioners’ tolerance and permission.
Hence, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will vacate the property
upon demand, thus ordered respondent and her family to vacate and surrender the
possession of the subject land to the petitioners and to remove any and all
improvements she introduced on the parcel of land. When brought to CA, the decision of
RTC was reversed and granted respondent’s petition. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject
property
HELD: YES. Since respondent’s occupation of the subject property was by mere
tolerance, she has no right to retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
She is aware that her tolerated possession may be terminated any time and she cannot
be considered as builder in good faith. It is well settled that both Article 448 and Article
546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in
good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the premises
in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief
that she is the owner thereof.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the
respondent’s unproven claim that she acquired a portion of the property from the
petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the
Torrens title of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners’ title over the subject property is
evidence of their ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that
the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old
Property & Succession Cases 12
rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
Benedicto vs. Villaflores
GR# 185020/ Oct. 6, 2010
632 SCRA 446
FACTS: Maria Villaflores (petitioner) owned a lot in Bulacan. On August 31, 1994, Maria
sold the same lot to Filomena as evidenced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan.
Filomena registered the sale with the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan on September
6, 1994. Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of land.
Meanwhile, Antonio (respondent and nephew of Maria) averred that in 1980, Maria sold
it to him and he eventually took possession and constructed a house thereon; that on
August 15, 1992, Maria executed in favor of him a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
covering the entire lot, though he failed to register it; and that Filomena was aware of
this prior sale; hence, the subsequent sale in favor of Filomena was rescissible,
fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated.
On September 28, 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation
of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and Attorney’s Fees against Antonio. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision sustaining Filomena’s ownership on the ground that it was
Filomena who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right than
Antonio. On their separate appeals with the CA, the latter affirmed the RTC for
upholding Filomena’s ownership of the lot in question and for declaring Antonio a builder
in good faith. However, it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings to
determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, and the amount due Antonio. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON respondent Antonio is a builder in good faith?
HELD: YES. Antonio is a builder in good faith. In this case, Antonio was not aware of
any flaw in his title. He believed being the owner of the subject premises on account of
the Deed of Sale thereof in his favor despite his inability to register the same. The
improvement was, in fact, introduced by Antonio prior to Filomena’s purchase of the
land.
Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the
land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in
good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses
incurred; it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. In this regard, this Court had long ago stated in Rivera vs. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila [40 Phil. 717 (1920)] that the said provision was formulated in

trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a piece of land, to
administer complete justice to both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other
may enrich himself of that which does not belong to him. Guided by this precept, it is
therefore the current market value of the improvements which should be made the basis
of reimbursement. A contrary ruling would unjustly enrich the private respondents who
would otherwise be allowed to acquire a highly valued income-yielding four-unit
apartment building for a measly amount. Consequently, the parties should therefore be
allowed to adduce evidence on the present market value of the apartment building upon
which the trial court should base its finding as to the amount of reimbursement to be
paid by the landowner.
Briones vs.Macabagdal
GR# 150666/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 300
FACTS: Respondent-spouses Macabagdal purchased from Vergon Realty Investments
Corporation (Vergon) Lot No. 2-R, a 325-square-meter land located in Vergonville
Subdivision No. 10 at Las Piñas City, Metro Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 62181 of the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City. On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot No. 2-S, which is
adjacent to Lot No. 2-R.
Sometime in 1984, after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of
Vergon, petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No.
2-S. After being informed of the mix up by Vergon’s manager, respondent-spouses
immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property.
Petitioners, however, refused to heed their demand. Thus, respondent-spouses filed an
action to recover ownership and possession of the said parcel of land with the RTC of
Makati City.
Petitioners insisted that the lot on which they constructed their house was the lot which
was consistently pointed to them as theirs by Vergon’s agents over the seven (7)-year
period they were paying for the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good
faith and impleaded Vergon as third-party defendant claiming that because of the
warranty against eviction, they were entitled to indemnity from Vergon in case the suit is
decided against them.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent-spouses, ordering petitioners to vacate. CA
affirmed the RTC’s findings. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are builders in good faith?
HELD: YES. CA erred in outrightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property
or to pay respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article
527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built
Property & Succession Cases 13
the house in good faith. When a person builds in good faith on the land of another,
Article 448 of the Civil Code governs. Said article provides that “the owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land
does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties
shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof.”
The above-cited article covers cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. The
builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating
the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the
land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
However, even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one.16 He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to remove the building from the land without first exercising either option. It is
only if the owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner may
remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and
useful expenses they may have made on the subject property in accordance with
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code. This case was remanded to the RTC to conduct
the appropriate proceedings to assess the respective values of the improvement and of
the land, as well as the amounts of reasonable rentals and indemnity, fix the terms of
the lease if the parties so agree, and to determine other matters necessary for the
proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.
Limense vs. Vda de Ramos
GR# 152319/ Oct. 28, 2010
604 SCRA 599
Facts: Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot
No. 12, Block No. 1074 located in Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila. He subdivided his
property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a
Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932,4 he donated the subdivided lots to his
daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad,
all surnamed Lozada. Lot 12-C, which was donated to Catalina, Isabel and Salud and
was issued TCT No. 40043. On Lot 12-D, which was donated to Salud, the respondents’
predecessors-in-interest constructed their residential building in 1932, adjacent to Lot
12-C.

In 1969, TCT No. 968866 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the very
same area of Lot No. 12-C. And in 1981, Limense secured a building permit for the
construction of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid property
and Lot 12-D. The fence, however, could not be constructed because a substantial
portion of respondents' residential building in Lot 12-D encroached upon portions of
Limense's property in Lot 12-C.
Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however, respondent ignored
both oral and written demands. The parties failed to amicably settle the differences
between them despite referral to the barangay. Thus, in 1983, Limense instituted a
Complaint against for removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco
Ramos, who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada. Lot No. 12-C was
donated in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married
to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of
Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C
has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since
1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin
Limense without causing damage and prejudice to respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ruling that an apparent easement of right of
way existed in favor of respondents, which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: W/N the respondents are builders in good faith and if so, what are the respective
rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house.
Held: (Note: the issue of W/N respondents were entitled to an easement of right of way
was also discussed by the Court and held that they are. Since Lot 12-C has
continuously been used as an alley since the time that Dalmacio Lozada donated the
property to his daughters, the same must be respected by the petitioners and also the
petitioners knew that said lot serves no other purpose than an alley since the time that
the TCT was issued to them. This issue, however, is not relevant under which this case
was assigned in our outline.)
Yes, the respondents are builders in good faith. Respondents’ right to have access to
the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually encroach upon the
latter’s property. It is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D
encroach upon Lot No. 12-C. 29 In order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the
encroachment, the Court deemed it proper to determine the issue above.
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time
the property was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The portions of Lot No.
12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length are all
within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there
Property & Succession Cases 14
was absence of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions
of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
The Court held that when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears
that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to
another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions of Article
448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. In this case, the co-
ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of
Joaquin Limense.
Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of
the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in
Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the
price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably
much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then
the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall then pay the reasonable
rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, respondents may
demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so
decide. The choice belongs to the owner of the land (petitioners), a rule that accords
with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other
way around.
Mores vs. Yu-Go
GR# 172292/ July. 23, 2010
625 SCRA 290
Facts: Yu-Go, et.al. filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against spouses
Antonio and Alida Mores. Respondents alleged that they co-owned a parcel of land
located in Sto. Tomas, Magarao, Camarines Sur on which a building of strong materials
was built. In March 1983, petitioners pleaded to respondents that they be allowed to stay
in the subject property in the meantime that they did not own a house yet. Since Antonio
Mores used to be an errand boy of respondents’ family, they readily agreed without
asking for any rental but subject only to the condition that the said stay would last until
anyone of the respondents would need the subject property. Forthwith, petitioners and
their children occupied the same as agreed upon.
In November 1997, respondents made known to petitioners that they were already in
need of the subject property. They explained that Shirley Yu-Go needed the same and,
besides, petitioners already have their own house in Villa Grande Homes, Naga City.
Yet, petitioners begged that they be given a 6-month extension to stay thereat or until
May 1998. However, even after May 1998, petitioners failed to make good their promise
and even further asked that they be allowed to stay therein until October 1998, which
was again extended until the end of the same year. Thus, sometime in the first week of
January 1999, respondents gave their final demand for petitioners to vacate the subject
property. However, instead of heeding such demand, petitioners hired some laborers

and started demolishing the improvements on the subject property on January 20, 1999
and even took away and appropriated for themselves the materials derived from such
unlawful demolition..
In their Answer to the complaint, petitioners averred that they were the ones who
caused the renovation to the property with the respondents’ consent. They also alleged
that what they removed were merely the improvements made on the property by them,
which removal had not caused any substantial damage thereto.
Issue: /N the spouses Mores were builders in good faith.
Held: No. The relationship between the Yu siblings and the spouses Mores is one
between a lessor and a lessee, making Article 1678 of the Civil Code applicable to the
present case. Tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good
faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the property. Indeed, full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where one’s only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the
power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.
Article 1678 reads “if the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance
of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee
one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should the lessor refuse to
reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though the
principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
When the spouses Mores demanded reimbursement, the Yu siblings should have
offered to pay the spouses Mores one-half of the value of the improvements. Since the
Yu siblings failed to make such offer, the spouses Mores had the right to remove the
improvements.
New Regent v. Tanjuatco
GR# 168800 /April 16, 2009
585 SCRA 329
Facts: New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint for Rescission/Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against respondent Tanjuatco and the
Register of Deeds of Calamba. NRSI alleged that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P.
Cuevas III, its Chairman and President, to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two
parcels of land by virtue of its right of accretion. Cuevas purportedly applied for the lots
in his name by paying P82, 400 to the Bureau of Lands. On January 2, 1995, Cuevas
and his wife executed a Voting Trust Agreement over their shares of stock in the
corporation. Then, pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands,
Property & Succession Cases 15
Cuevas assigned his right to Tanjuatco for the sum of P85,000. On March 12, 1996, the
Director of Lands released an Order, which approved the transfer of rights from Cuevas
to Tanjuatco. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-3694067 and T-3694078 were then
issued in the name of Tanjuatco.
Issue: W/N NRSI acquired the subject property by accretion and if so, W/N Tanjuatco is
an innocent purchaser for value.
Held: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or
sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers. Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner in order to enjoy the
benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant
evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed
in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites.
Also, it is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Said parcels of land formed part of the Dried San Juan River Bed, which
under Article 502 (1)34 of the Civil Code rightly pertains to the public dominion. Clearly,
the Republic is the entity which had every right to transfer ownership thereof to
respondent.
The law, no doubt, considers Tanjuatco an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the same,
at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some
other person in the property.
As regards the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights
to the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment merely vested upon Tanjuatco all of
Cuevas’s intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and not the
properties themselves. At the time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a
pending sales application before the Bureau of Lands. For, it was not until May 24,
1996, that titles were issued in Tanjuatco’s name. The assignment not being a sale of
real property, it was not surprising that Cuevas demanded from Tanjuatco only P85,000
for the transfer of rights.
Meneses vs. CA
GR# 83059/ July 14, 1995
246 SCRA 162
Facts: In 1977, Pablito Meneses was issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of
Title over two parcels of land located in Los Baños, Laguna. Pablito Meneses acquired

said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights
executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and
"some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses. After the execution of said
document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements
thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding
realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia
(Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956.
On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as
September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was
issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square
meters located in Los Baños, Laguna with the Laguna de
Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August
14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs:
Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and
Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing. The Quisumbings applied for registration and
confirmation of title over an
additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by
the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay.
The Quisumbings then filed a complaint against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio
C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to
Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Meneses, then the Mayor of Los Baños,
using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private
accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum
and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of
title to the land.
Issue: W/N the lands in question are accretion lands of the Quisumbings.
Held: Yes. Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers (or the sea coast). Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could
only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in controversy
Since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in
question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the
authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not
being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the
Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.
City Mayor of Parañaque v. Ebio
Property & Succession Cases 16
GR#. 178411/June 23, 2010
621 SCRA 555
Facts: Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in
Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek.
Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land
was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his
son, Pedro Vitalez, whose daughter Zenaida married Mario Ebio. On April 21, 1987,
Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over the entire parcel of
land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name
were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name.
On March 30 1999, Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a Resolution seeking
assistance from the City Government for the construction of an access road along Cut-
cut Creek, to which the respondents filed an opposition. As a result, the project was
temporarily suspended. In January 2003, however, several officials from the barangay
and the city planning office proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on the subject
property. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau
of Lands, DILG and Office of the Vice Mayor. Several meeting were conducted but no
definite agreement was reached.
However, on March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to respondents
ordering them to vacate the property within 30 days or be physically evicted.
Respondents filed a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners on April 21, 2005. In
the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have
a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC issued an Order denying the
petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to
prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has
not yet been granted. CA reversed.
Issue: W/N the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject
property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.
Held: Yes. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the
case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
Civil Code.
Under these provisions, its is clear that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do
not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public
dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of

sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of
law.
Since for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property through prescription.
Almagro vs. Kwan
GR# 175806/175810/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 250
Facts: Respondents are the successors- in- interest of the Lot No. 6278-M, a 17,181
square meter parcel of land located at Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. On 18
September 1996, they filed with the MTC an action for recovery of possession and
damages against the occupants, on of which are the Petitioners. MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of Lot No. 6278-M has become
foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain.
Respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC conducted ocular inspections of subject
lot on two separate dates: on 5 October 2001 during low tide and on 15 October 2001
when the high tide registered 1.5 meters. RTC concluded that the small portion of
respondent’s property which remains as dry land is not within the scope of the well-
settled definition of foreshore and foreshore land; the small dry portion is not adjacent to
the sea; thus Respondent have the right to recover possession of the remaining small
dry portion of the subject property in question. CA affirmed said decision.
Issue: WON the disputed portion of Lot is no longer private land but has become
foreshore land and is now part of the public domain?
Held: The disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be
shown that the land lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.[The land's proximity to the waters alone does
not automatically make it a foreshore land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two
corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land
since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water during high tide.
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even
during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed
portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore land but remains private land owned by
respondents.
Property & Succession Cases 17
Chapter 3. Quieting of Title (Arts.476-481) + Other Modes of Recovery
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic
GR# 179987 /April 29, 2009
587 SCRA 172
Facts: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
(land situated in Tibig, Silang Cavite). Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
more than thirty (30) years.
Velazco testified that the property originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property. In 1966, Esteban’s (1 of the sons) wife, Magdalena, had become the
administrator. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to
his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Velazco to Malabanan.
The Republic did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, (CENRO) DENR,
which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land approved as such under on March 15, 1982."
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republic interposed an appeal to
the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length
of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
CA reversed the RTC. It held that under Sec 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, it noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had
verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982,
the Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of
the period of possession. This interpretation of the CA was based on the Court’s ruling
in Republic v. Herbieto.
Malabanan died while the case was pending. Heirs appealed the decision
Issues: Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

Held: The Petition is denied. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that
“those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to,
such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
Property & Succession Cases 18
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Tan vs. Rep
GR# 177797/ Dec. 04, 2008
573 SCRA 89
Facts: Spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian citizens.
They seek to have the subject property registered in their names. The subject property
was declared alienable and disposable in 1925, as established by a Certification issued
by the DENR and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO),
Cagayan de Oro City. Spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and
Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Real Estate Property. The spouses Tan took immediate possession of the
subject property on which they planted rubber, gemelina, and other fruit-bearing trees.
They declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names. However, a
certain Patermateo Casiño (Casiño) claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting
spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC. RTC
rendered a Decision favoring the spouses Tan and declaring their title to the subject
property thus "quieted." Casiño appealed to the CA, which dismissed the appeal for lack
of interest to prosecute. Casiño elevated his case to the SC via a Petition for Review,
which was for being insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became
final and executory in 1991.
Refusing to give up, Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property
before the Bureau of Lands. Casiño’s application was ordered cancelled by DENR-
CENRO. In 2000, Spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to the
subject property before the RTC, invoking the provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. RTC granted the application of
Spouses Tan. CA reversed the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan
failed to comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject
property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the
spouses Tan to return the subject property to the Republic.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses Tan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title.
Ruling: The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, governs
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately
owned lands which reverted to the State. It explicitly enumerates the means by which
public lands may be disposed of, to wit:
(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization.
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Since the spouses Tan filed their application before the RTC, then it can be reasonably
inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or
incomplete title over the subject property. Judicial confirmation or legalization of
imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by
persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073 (b): Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, spouses Tan may only be
entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, the two requisites which the applicants must comply with for the grant of
their Application for Registration of Title are: (1) the land applied for is alienable and
disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and
possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 12 June
1945. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order or administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.
Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
A certification from the DENR that a lot is alienable and disposable is sufficient to
establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.44 Considering that no evidence was
presented to disprove the contents of the aforesaid DENR-CENRO Certification, this
Court is duty-bound to uphold the same.
Nonetheless, even when the spouses Tan were able to sufficiently prove that the subject
property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as early as 31
December 1925, they still failed to satisfactorily establish compliance with the second
requisite for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, i.e., open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12
June 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not
sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on 12 June
1945 or earlier.
In addition, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At
most, they constitute mere prima facie proofs of ownership of the property for which
Property & Succession Cases 19
taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. They may be good
supporting or collaborating evidence together with other acts of possession and
ownership; but by themselves, tax declarations are inadequate to establish possession
of the property in the nature and for the period required by statute for acquiring imperfect
or incomplete title to the land.
For failure of the Spouses Tan to satisfy the requirements prescribed by Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended, this Court has no other option but to deny their
application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to the subject property.
Rep vs. Tsai
GR# 168184/ June. 22, 2009
590 SCRA 423
Facts: Tsai filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject
property under PD 1529. Tsai stated that on 31 May 1993, she purchased the property
from Manolita Carungcong. Tsai declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject property for more than 30 years.
Republic opposed on the following grounds: (1) that Tsai and her predecessors-in-
interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence and (3) that the property forms part of
the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
Trial court granted Tsai's application for registration. The Republic appealed to the
CA. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue: Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack of
proof of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Held: The petition has merit.
In Tsai's original application before the trial court, she claimed that she was
entitled to the confirmation and registration of her title to the subject
property under PD 1529. However, she did not specify under what paragraph of Section
14 of PD 1529 she was filing the application. It appears that she filed her application
under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - xxx
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of

alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, there are three requisites: (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The right to file the application for registration
derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to 12 June 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or
more is not sufficient. Since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now
be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This
provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject
property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. Tsai's evidence was not enough to
prove that her possession of the property because the earliest evidence can be traced
back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the
year 1948. In view of the lack of sufficient showing that Tsai and her predecessors-in-
interest possessed the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier, her application for confirmation and registration of the subject
property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.
Tsai also failed to prove that the subject property has been declared alienable and
disposable by the President or the Secretary of the DENR.
Applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
Lim vs. Rep
GR# 162047/ Sept. 4, 2009
598 SCRA 247
Property & Succession Cases 20
FACTS: Joyce Lim (petitioner) filed on September 7, 1998 before the RTC of Tagaytay
City an Application for Registration of Title (LRC Case No. TG-857) over Lot 13687, a
9,638-square-meter and adjacent Lot 13686 containing 18,997-square-meters located in
Silang, Cavite.
Petitioner, declaring that she purchased both lots on April 30, 1997 from Spouses
Edgardo and Jorgina Pagkalinawan, sought the application of Presidential Decree No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree for both applications, claiming that she and
her predecessors-in-interest Trinidad Mercado, Fernanda Belardo, Victoria Abueg and
the Spouses Pagkalinawan have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupancy of the lots under a bona fide claim of ownership for more
than thirty (30) years. Petitioner alternatively invoked the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act as basis of her applications. However,
per Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), the land was said to be “within the Alienable or Disposable Land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982”.
The RTC granted petitioner's application. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Republic, appealed to the CA on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the
provisions of the Property Registration Decree and Article 1137 of the Civil Code both
laws of which require at least 30 years of adverse possession, counted from March 15,
1982 when it became part of the alienable and disposable land. This was granted.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of PD 1529 may defeat petitioner’s right that has already
been vested prior to promulgation thereof.
HELD: As for petitioner's invocation of the provisions of the Public Land Act to have her
applications considered as confirmations of imperfect titles, the same fails. When
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
which made June 12, 1945 as the cut-off date, the amendment made the law
concordant with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree vary, however, with respect to their operation since the latter operates when
there exists a title which only needs confirmation, while the former works under the
presumption that the land applied for still belongs to the State. While the subject lots
were verified to be alienable or disposable lands since March 15, 1982, there is no
sufficient proof that open, continuous and adverse possession over them by petitioner
and her predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Petitioner's
applications cannot thus be granted.
While a property classified as alienable and disposable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of at least 30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government

manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
use, public service or the development of national wealth. 42 And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
While the subject lots were declared alienable or disposable on March 15, 1982, there is
no competent evidence that they are no longer intended for public use or for public
service. The classification of the lots as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain does not change its status as properties of the public dominion. Petitioner
cannot thus acquire title to them by prescription as yet.
In Addition:
As gathered from the CENRO Certifications, the lots were verified to be alienable or
disposable lands on March 15, 1982. These Certifications enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. There is also no sufficient proof that
petitioner's predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and adverse
possession of the lots since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
As for petitioner's reliance on the tax declarations and receipts of realty tax payments,
the documents — tax declarations for Lot No. 13687 and Lot No. 13686 which were
issued only in 1991 and 1994, respectively, are indicia of the possession in the concept
of an owner. There is no showing of tax payments before these years.
Rep vs. Ching
GR# 186166/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 415
FACTS:
On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Antonio Ching, filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of
land with improvements, before the RTC. The subject lot is a consolidation of three (3)
contiguous lots situated in Banza, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229
square meters. Respondent alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject
land from the late former governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands.
Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause
why his application for registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state
the current assessed value of the subject land and his non-compliance with the last
paragraph of Section 17 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8
The OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte filed an
Opposition to the application for registration of title as well as the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondent’s application for
registration. The RTC was not convinced that respondent’s Deed of Sale sufficiently
established that he was the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered.
Property & Succession Cases 21
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion
for reconsideration with attached additional tax declarations. The RTC denied.
Respondent appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. CA reversed the RTC’s earlier
resolution and granted respondent’s application for registration of title.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent application for registration of title be granted.
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to
show that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, therefore the
application for registration should be denied.
Likewise, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that
there was no substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration
that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
does not measure up to the time requirement.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1)
of P.D. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. 1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of
the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that
the land belongs to the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is
doctrinal that, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the
State and the latter is the foundation of any asserted right to ownership in land.
Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, irrefutable evidence must be
shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has been declassified and
now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Rep vs. Dela Paz
GR# 171631/ Nov. 15, 2010
634 SCRA 610
FACTS:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with
the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land3 under Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The
application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural
land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their
parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired
the said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of
a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated
March 10, 1979. The respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject
property and they are in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession in the
concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration. On May 5, 2004, the trial court
issued an Order of General Default against the whole world except as against the
Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their
application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its Decision
dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been The CA found
that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who
have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents
were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
ISSUE: Whether or not the application for registration of the subject property should be
granted.
HELD: In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that
the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
Property & Succession Cases 22
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by
the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
The notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Forest Development is insufficient and
does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable.
Further, the pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land,
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Rep vs. Vega
GR# 177790/ Jan. 17, 2011
639 SCRA 541
FACTS: On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R.
Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega - namely, Francisco L. Yap, Ma.
Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr. (respondents
Vegas) - filed an application for registration of title. The application covered a parcel of
land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre 450 of Los Banos, Laguna, with a total area of
six thousand nine hundred two (6,902) square meters (the subject land).
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria
Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their

mother's siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without leaving any
offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas'
application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject land or portions
thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not subject to private
appropriation.
The trial court granted respondents Vegas' application and directed the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the
name of respondents Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays' predecessors, in
proportion to their claims over the subject land. CA affirmed in toto. Aggrevied by the
ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's
conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
HELD: Under Section 14 PD 1529, Property Registration Decree, applicants for
registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14 (1) of the law
requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration is filed.
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas' open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its
focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated
that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the
same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and
result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other
administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was
sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Property & Succession Cases 23
Rep vs. Roche
GR# 175846/ July 6, 2010
624 SCRA 116
FACTS: On December 5, 1996 Rosila Roche applied for registration of title1 of her
15,353-square-meter land in Barrio Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,2 denominated as
Lot 8698, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Roche
alleged that she inherited the land in 1960 from her father,
Miguel, who in turn had held the land in the concept of an owner when Roche was only
about six years old. She was born on that land on January 10, 1938 and had helped her
father cultivate it.3 Roche had also paid the realty taxes on the land, which had an
assessed value of P490,000.00.
To support her application for registration, Roche presented, among others, a certified
true copy of the survey plan of the land,4 its technical description,5 a Certification from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in lieu of the Geodetic
Engineer’s Certificate,6 tax declarations,7 and real property tax receipts.8 She also
presented certifications that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the National
Printing Office issued to show compliance with requirements of service of notice to
adjoining owners and publication of notice of initial hearing.9 As proof of her open,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the land, Roche presented Manuel
Adriano, a former resident of Napindan who owned an unregistered property adjoining
Lot 8698.
The Republic of the Philippines (the Government), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application on the grounds a) that neither Roche nor her
predecessor-in-interest had occupied the land for the required period; and b) that the
land belonged to the State and is not subject to private acquisition.13 The Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) also opposed14
On September 30, 1999 the RTC rendered judgment,17 granting Roche’s application.
On appeal by the Government,19 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC.20 The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same,
prompting the Government to file the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land subject of Roche’s application is alienable or disposable
land of the public domain.
HELD: CA decision is reversed and set aside.
The Government insists that the subject land forms part of the lake bed and that it has
not been released into the mass of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
As such, Roche cannot register title to it in her name.
Roche points out, on the other hand, that the lot could not possibly be part of the Laguna
Lake’s bed since it has always been planted to crops and is not covered by water. R.A.

4850 provides that the Lake is that area covered with water when it is at the average
maximum lake level of 12.50 meters. This presupposed that the lake extends only to
lakeshore lands. The land in this case does not adjoin the Laguna Lake.
An application for registration of title must, under Section 14(1), P.D. 1529, meet three
requirements: a) that the property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land;
and c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and the
latter is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land. Thus, the State
presumably owns all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by
the applicant that the land subject of registration is alienable and disposable.
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of
the land.25 In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of
land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO)26 or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO)27 of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is
within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified
as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map
and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s
classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification
from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with
all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
Since Roche was unable to overcome the presumption that the land she applied for is
inalienable land that belongs to the State, the Government did not have to adduce
evidence to prove it.
Calara vs. Francisco
GR# 156439/ Sept. 29, 2010
631 SCRA 505
Held: In the case at bench, respondents similarly claimed in their answer that they
stopped payments on Lot 23 in view of petitioners' failure to develop Lophcal (Calara)
Subdivision. Prior to the commencement of the case for unlawful detainer before the
Property & Succession Cases 24
MTC, respondent Jesus Francisco, along with other lot buyers at said subdivision, also
filed a letter-complaint for violations of P.D. 957 which was docketed before HSRC as
HSRC Case No. REM-060482-1043. In her answer to the complaint, petitioner
Clemencia Calara alleged that the subdivision was not covered by P.D. 957 and that she
was about to file complaints for ejectment against said buyers.
Unlike their contract with Gaudencio Navarro, moreover, petitioners appear to have
further agreed on the terms of payment of the price for the lot purchased by
respondents. Having allowed the latter to build a house on said lot after accepting their
initial payments in the aggregate sum of P7,948.00,[60] petitioner Clemencia Calara
significantly specified the terms of payment agreed upon by the parties in the following
20 March 1979 demand letter she sent respondent Teresita Francisco.
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.[63] Given the proven
justification for respondents' stoppage of further payments on Lot 23, We find that
respondents' alleged refusal to execute said contract only gives rise to a cause of action
for specific performance pursuant to Articles 1357[64] and 1357[65] of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Insofar as it concerns the sale of subdivision lots, jurisdiction over such
a case is vested with the HLURB under Section 8 (11) of E.O. 648. In the second
Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip[66] case which dealt with the complaint for
reconveyance and damages subsequently filed by the subdivision developer, this Court
ruled that "the HLURB is not deprived of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely
on the basis that it has been initiated by the developer and not by the buyer."
It bears emphasizing that more than 33 years have already elapsed from the time that
petitioners and respondents agreed on the sale of Lot 23 of the Lophcal (Calara)
Subdivision sometime in 1976. In the intervening period, the parties have not only filed
their respective complaints before the HLURB and the MTC but had already performed
acts and acquired rights, the myriad consequences of which could not possibly be
squarely addressed in the case for unlawful detainer where possession is unlawfully
witliheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied.
Carbonilla vs. Abiera
GR# 177637/ July 26, 2010
625 SCRA 461
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment against
respondents, Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Maasin City. The complaint alleged that petitioner is the registered
owner of a parcel of land, located in Barangay Canturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot
No. 1781-B-P-3-B-2-B PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is purportedly
covered by a certificate of title, and declared for assessment and taxation purposes in
petitioner’s name. Petitioner further claimed that he is also the owner of the residential
building standing on the land, which building he acquired through a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership. He

maintained that the building was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance of
the previous owners.
In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioner’s allegation that they
possessed the building by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Instead, they
asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having inherited the same from
Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelo’s parents and respondent
Maricris’ grandparents. They maintained that they have been in possession of the
building since 1960, but it has not been declared for taxation purposes.
The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that petitioner’s claim of
ownership over the subject parcel of land was not successfully rebutted by respondents;
hence, petitioner’s ownership of the same was deemed established. However, with
respect to the building, the court declared respondents as having the better right to its
material possession in light of petitioner’s failure to refute respondents’ claim that their
predecessors had been in prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they
have continued such possession up to the present.
The RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC that the land is
owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in their conclusion with respect to
the building. The RTC placed the burden upon respondents to prove their claim that they
built it prior to petitioner’s acquisition of the land, which burden, the court found,
respondents failed to discharge. The RTC held that, either way—whether the building
was constructed before or after petitioner acquired ownership of the land—petitioner, as
owner of the land, would have every right to evict respondents from the land.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Because of this, the CA, following this Court’s ruling in Ten Forty Realty and
Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the complaint as one for forcible entry. It
then proceeded to declare that the action had prescribed since the one-year period for
filing the forcible entry case had already lapsed.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.
HELD: The court held that while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land,
as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens
certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of
ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired
ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners of
the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents’
proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in comparison
and leaves us totally unconvinced. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real
property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
Property & Succession Cases 25
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to
prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents.
Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. For this reason, an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed
must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents’ possession of the building was by
mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer. Unlawful
detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real
property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s
right to hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession
must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially
lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession
must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents’ possession was based on his alleged
tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the Garcianos
attesting that they tolerated respondents’ entry to and occupation of the subject
properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at least, show
overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor’s permission to occupy the subject
property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent miserably failed to
prove his claim that petitioners’ possession of the subject building was by mere
tolerance as alleged in the complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered to be within the purview of unlawful detainer. Mere
tolerance always carries with it "permission" and not merely silence or inaction for
silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance. In addition, plaintiff must also show that
the supposed acts of tolerance have been present right from the very start of the
possession—from entry to the property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from
the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. Notably, no
mention was made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how
and when dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue recovering possession
of his property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action intended to
recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a suit to recover

ownership of real property. We stress, however, that the pronouncement in this case as
to the ownership of the land should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Modesto vs. Urbina
GR# 189859/ Oct. 18, 2010
633 SCRA 383
FACTS: In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land situated
at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272. According to Urbina, the
Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to occupy a portion of
this property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated
with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the parties could finalize the sale, the
Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership over the
lot. Urbina made several demands on the Modestos to vacate the property, the last of
which was through a demand letter sent on July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still
refused to vacate, Urbina filed the present action against them.
In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful owner of the
property because it was still government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation. The RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision in favor of Urbina on
April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners to immediately vacate and surrender the lot to
Urbina and to pay him P200.00 monthly as compensation for the use of the property
from July 22, 1983 until they finally vacate. The RTC noted that the petitioners
recognized Urbina’s possessory rights over the property when they entered into a
negotiated contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the Modestos were estopped
from subsequently assailing or disclaiming Urbina’s possessory rights over this lot.
Urbina’s claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous Sales Application), which he filed on July 21,
1966. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 53483 on January 26,
2009. The CA agreed with the RTC’s observation that the Modestos were estopped
from challenging Urbina’s right to possess the property after they acknowledged this
right when they entered into the negotiated contract of sale. The CA also gave
credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB order in LMB Conflict No. 110, ruling that this
LMB order bolstered Urbina’s possessory rights over the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Urbina’s had possessory rights over the property.
HELD: An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is also used to refer to
an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than
one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The
objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
Property & Succession Cases 26
As the court explained in Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court: We hold that the power
and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does
not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and
occupations. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management
Bureau] is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to
public lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to determine
who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession
over public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police
public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace
among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while
it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards.
The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal
competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. Consequently, while we
leave it to the LMB to determine the issue of who among the parties should be awarded
the title to the subject property, there is no question that we have sufficient authority to
resolve which of the parties is entitled to rightful possession.
On the issue of possessory rights
Prefatorily, the court observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has it
been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB. Therefore, the land remains part
of the public domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership
over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties have the right to
possess the property. Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property
since he has a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application, as well as tax declarations
over the property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess the
property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with him for
the sale of the lot in question. On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to
possess the same on their actual possession of the property. They also questioned the
legality of Urbina’s Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his tax declarations over the
property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not alienable
and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.
After reviewing the records of this case, the court finds the reasoning of the Modestos to
be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The court held that Urbina
utterly failed to prove that he has a better right to possess the property. Thus, the court
cannot sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce, must
dismiss the same for lack of merit.
Brito vs. Dianala
GR# 171717/ Dec. 15, 2010

638 SCRA 529
FACTS: On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon
Brito, Sr., together with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria
Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora
Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo,
assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros
Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 12887.
Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that they
are the heirs of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora,
Felicito and Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and
Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died
intestate and upon their death Vicente
and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and
Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso
shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No.
12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior
to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that
Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein
respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca's children; that they are in open,
actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than
30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner
and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs have already disposed of their
shares in the said property a long time ago.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise
Agreement wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one
hand, and the heirs of Vicente, namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the
other. It was stated in the said agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share
in the said lot to the mother of Golez. Thus, on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a decision approving the said
Compromise Agreement. On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed
another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages, this time against herein
respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as
Civil Case No. 548-C. Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court,
on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner
and his co-heirs.
ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred when it ruled that the lower court
has the jurisdiction to hear the reconveyance case of the herein plaintiffs-appellants
before the regional trial court.
Property & Succession Cases 27
HELD: The court held that it is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the present case,
when respondents filed their Answer-in-Intervention they submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons.
Respondents, thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents'
Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed without prejudice. From then on, they ceased to
be parties in the case so much so that they did not have the opportunity to present
evidence to support their claims, much less participate in the compromise agreement
entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the
defendant in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-in-
Intervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court and,
consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic that no man shall
be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not
bound by judgment rendered by the court. Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No.
12887, respondents are not bound by the judgment rendered therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents are barred by
prescription for having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight
years from the discovery of the fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs,
arguing that under the law an action for reconveyance of real property resulting from
fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from the discovery of the fraud.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner
and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the
Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the
property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years,
the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals,
this Court held as follows:
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261,
September 30, 1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the
prescriptive period for an action to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its
point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of
the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription.
It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real
property can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action
accrues:
x x x xx
3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the
right of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of
the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx

In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive
trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation
to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context,
and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
x x x x x x x x x. (Italics supplied.)
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note,
it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a
reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the
erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered
on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code
not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at
this juncture, that article 1144 and article 1456, are new provisions. They have no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being
then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, which provides: In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the
title thereto in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of
the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title. x x x. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner
and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for
reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period
has not yet expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that respondents are
guilty of laches and are already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground that they slept on their rights and allowed the said
decision to become final.
In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they are no longer parties to the case and,
Property & Succession Cases 28
as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment. Secondly, respondents' act of
filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive period does not
constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that,
unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive
period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief.
Laches is recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in
contravention, of statutory law.
Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the
property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.
Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not
commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless
filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by the one who is in
possession.
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the
subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate
action against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to
respondents' possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for
reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should respondents
not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up
to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
Tan vs. Ramirez
GR# 158929/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 327
FACTS: On August 11, 1998, the petitioner, representing her parents (spouses Crispo
and Nicomedesa P. Alumbro), filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Hindang-Inopacan, Leyte a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession
and/or quieting of title of a one-half portion of the subject property against the
respondents.
The petitioner alleged that her great-grandfather Catalino Jaca Valenzona was the
owner of the subject property under a 1915 Tax Declaration (TD) No. 2724. Catalino had
four children: Gliceria, Valentina, Tomasa, and Julian; Gliceria inherited the subject
property when Catalino died; Gliceria married Gavino Oyao, but their union bore no
children; when Gliceria died on April 25, 1952, Gavino inherited a one-half portion of the
subject property, while Nicomedesa acquired the other half through inheritance, in
representation of her mother, Valentina, who had predeceased Gliceria, and through her
purchase of the shares of her brothers and sisters. In 1961, Nicomedesa constituted

Roberto as tenant of her half of the subject property; on June 30, 1965, Nicomedesa
bought Gavino’s one-half portion of the subject property from the latter’s heirs, Ronito
and Wilfredo Oyao, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Agricultural Land;[7] on
August 3, 1965, Nicomedesa sold to Roberto this one-half portion in a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Agricultural Land; and in 1997, Nicomedesa discovered that since 1974, Roberto
had been reflecting the subject property solely in his name under TD No. 4193.
The respondents, on the other hand, traced ownership of the subject property to Gavino
who cultivated it since 1956; Roberto bought half of the subject property from
Nicomedesa on August 3, 1965, and the remaining half from Gavino’s heirs, Ronito and
Wilfredo Oyao, on October 16, 1972. On January 9, 1975, a certain Santa Belacho,
claiming to be Gavino’s natural child, filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Baybay, Leyte against Roberto, Nicomedesa, Ronito and Wilfredo Oyao, docketed as
Civil Case No. B-565, for recovery of possession and ownership of two (2) parcels of
land, including the subject property;[11] on September 16, 1977, Roberto bought the
subject property from Belacho through a Deed of Absolute Sale of Land; and on October
5, 1977, Roberto and Nicomedesa entered into a Compromise Agreement with Belacho
to settle Civil Case No. B-565. Belacho agreed in this settlement to dismiss the case and
to waive her interest over the subject property in favor of Roberto, and the other parcel
of land in favor of Nicomedesa in consideration of P1,800.00
The MCTC found that Catalino’s 1915 TD No. 2724 was not the source of Gavino’s
1945 TD No. 3257 because it involved the other parcel of land subject of Civil Case No.
B-565. . It held that Roberto was entitled to only three-fourths, as this was Gavino’s
entire share, while the petitioner was entitled to one-fourth of the subject property, and
gave the parties sixty days to effect the partition.
The RTC held that the shares of the parties shall be divided and apportioned in the
following manner: plaintiff shall own one-fourth (1/4) of Lot 3483 and defendants shall
collectively own three-fourth (3/4) of Lot 3483.
CA declared Roberto as the lawful owner of the entire area of the subject property. The
appellate court found that the October 5, 1977 Compromise Agreement executed by
Belacho gave Roberto’s possession of the subject property the characters of possession
in good faith and with just title; the respondents’ twenty-one years of possession, from
execution of the
compromise agreement in 1977 until the filing of the case in 1998, is more than the
required ten-year possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription. The CA also noted
that Roberto also enjoyed just title because Belacho executed a contract of sale in his
favor on September 16, 1977.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether the CA erred in relying upon the compromise agreement and the
contract of sale to conclude that the respondents had been possessors in good faith and
with just title and could acquire the subject property through ordinary acquisitive
prescription.
HELD: Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions
laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. The party who asserts ownership by
Property & Succession Cases 29
adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.
Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years.
In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property
are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of
title or of good faith.
Possession “in good faith” consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
the thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
There is “just title” when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
The court further held that the CA mistakenly relied upon the compromise agreement,
executed by Belacho to conclude that the respondents were possessors in good faith
and with just title who acquired the property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. In
Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, we held that the main purpose of a compromise
agreement is to put an end to litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it.
Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every compromise agreement. By
the nature of a compromise agreement, it brings the parties to agree to something that
neither of them may actually want, but for the peace it will bring them without a
protracted litigation.
In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and Nicomedesa paid
P1,800.00 in consideration of Belacho’s desistance from further pursuing her claim over
two (2) parcels of land, including the subject property. Thus, no right can arise from the
compromise agreement because the parties executed the same only to buy peace and
to write finis to the controversy; it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the
subject property. In executing the compromise agreement, the parties, in effect, merely
reverted to their situation before Civil Case No. B-565 was filed. Neither can the
respondents benefit from the contract of sale of the subject property, executed by
Belacho in favor of Roberto, to support their claim of possession in good faith and with
just title. In the vintage case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson,
we explained good faith in this manner: One who purchases real estate with knowledge
of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in
good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same
rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him
upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith, or the want of it, can be ascertained only
from the acts of the one claiming it, as it is a condition of mind that can only be judged
by actual or fancied token or signs.
In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesa’s knowledge or
participation, bought the subject property on September 16, 1977 or during the
pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore, had actual knowledge that
Belacho’s claim to ownership of the subject property, as Gavino’s purported heir, was
disputed because he (Roberto) and Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No.
B-565. Roberto even admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to

“avoid any trouble.”*35+ He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho.
Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period required for
ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Roberto’s favor. Even the thirty-year
period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has not been met because of the
respondents’ claim to have been in possession, in the concept of owner, of the subject
property for only twenty-four years, from the time the subject property was tax declared
in 1974 to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1998. Based on the foregoing, the CA
erred in finding that the respondents acquired the petitioner’s one-fourth portion of the
subject property through acquisitive prescription. As aptly found by the MCTC, the
respondents are only entitled to three-fourths of the subject property because this was
Gavino’s rightful share of the conjugal estate that Roberto bought from Ronito and
Wilfredo Oyao.
Lamsis vs. Dong-e
GR# 173021/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 154
FACTS: This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled
parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The
property is located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of
land with an area of 186,090 square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants
of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its
possession from petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her family’s ownership
and occupation of Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather,
Ap-ap. Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was inherited by his children, who obtained a
survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included Lot No. 1. On
the same year, they declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of “The
Heirs of Ap-ap.” The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: “Reconstructed
from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10, 1922 per true of same presented.”
Sometime between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis,
allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot
No. 1 together with their respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis
(Delfin) and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1.
Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000
square meters thereof. Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of
their first cousins. When Gilbert Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially
partitioned the property among themselves and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of
Margarita. Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. 1 and
occupied and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time,
tolerating her first cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began
expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof. Delfin
Property & Succession Cases 30
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing
(Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership,
possession, reconveyance and damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of
ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is
a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case). The Smiths
gave their permission for Delfin and Agustin’s parents to occupy the land sometime in
1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and
Agustin as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and
her parents. Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of ownership presented by
Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the Deed
of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap’s children, failed to include two – Rita
Bocahan and Stewart Sito. Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan and
Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they were excluded from
the quitclaim. In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned the subject
property, Margarita presented a certified copy of a Resolution from the Land
Management Office denying the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject
property as part of their ancestral land. The resolution explains that the application had
to be denied because the Smiths did not “possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of
the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not named in the resolution) whose
improvements are visible are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-heirs.” To
bolster her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an
unnumbered resolution of the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands
(CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-
square meter property.
The said resolution states:
The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants.
Well-established is the fact that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation
purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the applicant’s grandfather Ap-Ap
(one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during
the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of Tuba,
Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said
municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the tax
declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor’s office of
Baguio. On the matter of the applicant*s’+ indiguinity *sic+ and qualifications, there is
no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities, particularly the
Ibaloi tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along
the Asin Road area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita
Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert
Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of
their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early Ibalois. x x x
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to state
[that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir in 1964,

by way of a “Deed of Quitclaim” executed by the heirs in his favor. As to the respective
share of the applicants*’+ co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the
execution of an “Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights.”
The trial court found that it preponderates in favor of respondent’s long-time possession
of and claim of ownership over the subject property. The survey plan of the subject
property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax
declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support her claim
that her family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in possession of the
property to the exclusion of others. The CA held that the respondent was able to
discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Her
documentary evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witness.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by prescription.
HELD: The court held that they cannot accept petitioners’ claim of acquisition by
prescription. Petitioners admitted that they had occupied the property by tolerance of
the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim that they have
acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts of repudiation. It is
settled that possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession not in the concept of owner,
such as the one claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such
repudiation has been communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory character
executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes
of acquisitive prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and such possessory
acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the running of the period of
prescription. In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove
any act of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most,
the court can find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the
property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly
before respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year period necessary for
the operation of acquisitve prescription had yet to be attained. Whether the ancestral
land claim pending before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
should take precedence over the reivindicatory action
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the
NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one’s
claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the
purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an ancestral land. Just like a
registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the
applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by
virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time
immemorial. As aptly explained in another case: It bears stressing at this point that
ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the
Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over
the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then conduct
Property & Succession Cases 31
a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of
ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise apropos is the following explanation: The fact that the [respondents] were able
to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of the
property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished to assert
their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and
not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of
title do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied) A registration proceeding is not a
conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another case
(where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant is not the
owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title
transferred to his name.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a
conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a
reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership. “For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.” The third element is
missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be
conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no
litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or
dismissed in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ contention
that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that “forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other.”
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March
30, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26,
2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
Ney vs. Quijano
GR# 178609/ Aug. 4, 2010
626 SCRA 800
Facts: This is an appeal to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, setting aside the
Decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 45.
Petitioners Manuel and Romulo Ney are the registered owners of a residential lot
located at 1648 Main Street, Paco Manila, with an area of 120 square meters more or

less, covered by TCT No. 122489. A three (3) door apartment was constructed on the
subject lot – 1 for Manuel, the other for Romulo; and the last one for their sister,
Respondents Mina N. Quijano and her husband Celso Quijano.
On October 8, 1999, respondents filed with the RTC of Manila a suit for reconveyance,
partition and damages against petitioners. They averred that they are co-owners of the
subject property having paid part of its purchase price; that Celso’s name was
inadvertently omitted as one of the buyers in the execution of the deed of sale.
Consequently, TCT No. 122489 covering the subject property was issued only in the
names of Manuel and Romulo. To obtain a separate certificate of title, they requested
from petitioners the segregation of the portion allotted to them, but the latter refused.
They later discovered that the entire property was mortgaged with Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company, prompting them to execute and register their adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds; and to file the instant complaint.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied respondents’ allegation of co-ownership. They
averred that Celso Quijano was not a vendee of the subject lot; thus, his name did not
appear on the title. They asserted that respondents cannot validly maintain an action
against them because the latter possessed the property by mere tolerance; and even
assuming that respondents had a valid cause of action, the same had already been
barred by prescription and/or laches. Petitioners, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint. It rejected
respondents’ claim of co-ownership, and declared their documentary and testimonial
evidence unreliable. The RTC sustained petitioners’ assertion that respondents
possessed part of the property through mere tolerance; and that their cause of action, if
any, already prescribed. The RTC thus ruled that respondents can no longer demand
the segregation or reconveyance of the claimed portion of the property. Finally, the RTC
granted petitioners’ counterclaim and ordered the reimbursement of the expenses they
incurred in defending the case.
Respondents went to the CA. They faulted the RTC for dismissing their complaint and
insisted that they are co-owners of the subject lot; and that their share was erroneously
included in petitioners’ title. Citing Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, respondents
asserted that their right to institute an action for reconveyance is imprescriptible because
they are in possession of the claimed portion of the property.
On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision, reversing the RTC.
The CA considered respondents’ complaint as one for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible; and granted to respondents the reliefs that they prayed for.
The CA declared [respondents], spouses Celso and Mina Quijano, as co-owners of the
subject lot to the extent of one-third (1/3) thereof which corresponds to that portion
where their house stands.
Accordingly, [petitioners] are hereby ordered:
1) to partition the subject lot into three (3) equal portions of forty square meters (40
sq.m.) each, specifically allotting to [respondents] the portion where their house stands;
Property & Succession Cases 32
2) to reconvey to [respondents] the clean title to their portion of the subject lot;
3) to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. 122489 to the Register of Deeds of Manila
for the annotation of *respondents’+ share thereon; and
4) to pay *respondents+ attorney’s fees and the costs of suit in the reasonable amount
of P50,000.00.
Thus, this petition for review. They ascribe reversible error to the CA for treating
respondents’ action as one for quieting of title. They claim that nowhere in the complaint
does it state that respondents seek to quiet their title to the property. All that
respondents averred and prayed for in their complaint was for petitioners to surrender
their certificate of title, and for the partition of the subject property. Petitioners assert that
the CA ruled on an issue not raised in the pleadings; and substituted the respondents’
action with an entirely new action for quieting of title.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the CA erred in treating the complaint as quieting of title.
2. Whether the CA faulted in sustaining respondent’s claim for co-ownership.
HELD: The argument is erroneous. 1. These allegations make out a case for
reconveyance. That reconveyance was one of the reliefs sought was made abundantly
clear by respondents in their prayer.
Respondents did not only seek the partition of the property and the delivery of the title,
but also the reconveyance of their share which was inadvertently included in petitioners’
TCT.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered
by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Indeed, reconveyance is an action distinct
from an action for quieting of title, which is filed whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title
for purposes of removing such cloud or to quiet title. However, we find nothing
erroneous in the CA’s ruling treating respondents’ action for reconveyance as an action
to quiet title.
In Mendizabel v. Apao, we treated a similar action for reconveyance as an action to
quiet title, explaining, thus:
The Court has ruled that the 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the person
enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be its
owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in
effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason is that the one
who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be its owner may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
His undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

The ruling was reiterated in Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.,”An action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-year
prescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The
prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as
when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the real
owner of the property also
remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an
action that is imprescriptible.
Indubitably, the characterization by the CA of respondents’ action as in the nature of an
action for quieting of title cannot be considered a reversible error.
2. The Deed of Reconveyance executed by Manuel and Romulo explicitly states that:
[W]e acknowledge and recognized the rights, interests and participation of Celso P.
Quijano, Filipino, of legal age, married to Mina P. Ney and resident of 1648 Main Street,
Paco, Manila, as a co-owner of the one-third (1/3) portion of the said lot wherein his
residential house is now constructed at the above-stated address, having paid the
corresponding amount over the said 1/3 portion of the property for the acquisition costs
but whose name does not appear in the Deed of Sale executed in our favor, thus
resulting in the non-conclusion (sic) of his name in the above-stated Transfer Certificate
of Title when issued as a co-owner.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises WE, MANUEL
P. NEY and ROMULO P. NEY, do hereby transfer and convey unto said Spouses Celso
P. Quijano and MINA P. NEY their one-third (1/3) portion share of the aforedescribed
(sic) parcel of land where their residential house is now situated at their above-given
address with an area of forty (40) square meters more or less by virtue of this Deed of
Reconveyance.
Petitioners never denied the due execution of the Deed of Reconveyance. In fact they
admitted that the signatures appearing therein are theirs. The CA cannot, therefore, be
faulted for declaring respondents as co-owners of the subject property because it merely
confirmed and enforced the Deed of Reconveyance voluntarily executed by petitioners
in favor of respondents.
As aptly pronounced by the CA:
[T]he Deed of Reconveyance, duly signed by [petitioners] themselves, put to rest the
focal issue between the parties. There is no denying that it outweighs the evidence
relied upon by [petitioners] despite the fact that they have the transfer certificate of title
over the entire subject lot. It is settled that it is not the certificate of title that vests
ownership. It merely evidences such title.
In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner
or to one with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently
Property & Succession Cases 33
titled in another person's name. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield
and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in
bad faith. Thus, the CA acted correctly in rendering the challenged decision.
Toring vs. Boquilaga
GR# 163610/ Sept. 27, 2010
631 SCRA 278
Facts: For review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are
the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC except as to the land
covered by reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989 (T-16805) in the name of Enrique Toring
On October 10, 1996, the heirs of Enrique Toring (petitioners) filed before the trial court
a petition for "production, delivery, surrender of documents, annulment of document"
against the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga (respondents).
On June 3, 1927, Teodosia Boquilaga sold to Enrique Toring now deceased, parcels of
land for a consideration of Five Hundred and Eleven Pesos (P511.00), evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale written in Spanish
This deed of absolute sale was duly registered with the [Register] of Deeds, and the
fees for the registration were duly paid. Thereafter, new Transfer Certificates of Title
were issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds in the Province of Cebu, for all the
parcels of land, in the name of Enrique Toring.
From the issuance of TCT on August 20, 1927, plaintiffs have been in possession and
religiously paid the real taxes due on said described lots, and collecting the proceeds of
the fruits of the land. However, during World War II, the canceled Original Certificate in
the name of Teodosia [Boquilaga], and the Transfer [Certificates] of [Title] in the name of
Enrique Toring in the books of the Register of Deeds were destroyed;
Lately, while petitioners were exercising their right over the said lots, defendants refused
to share the fruits of the lot reasoning that they are the owners thereof. Petitioners
learned that defendants filed petition for the reconstitution of the OCTs of said land.
Petitioners thus sought the issuance of an order directing the defendants to deliver,
produce and surrender the reconstituted Original Certificates of Title. Should the
defendants refuse to deliver the said titles, it is prayed that the court (a) declare OCT’s
null and void; (b) direct the Register of Deeds to cancel said titles and in lieu thereof
issue new TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; and (c) declare OCT No. 13237 null and
void for being cancelled by TCT No. RT-3989.
As special and affirmative defenses, defendants contended that the RTC has no
jurisdiction in this case since the assessed value of the properties involved does not
exceed P20,000.00, and that petitioners are guilty of laches for failing to act and take

corrective measures with the Register of Deeds for sixty-nine (69) years on the alleged
destruction of the documents.
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of position papers,
memoranda/comment and other documentary evidence in support of their respective
claims.
On January 27, 1998, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that it cannot
interfere with or render null and void the decision made by a co-equal and coordinate
branch of the court which ordered the reconstitution of the OCTs in the name of
Teodosia Boquilaga. Under the circumstances, petitioners’ owner’s duplicate certificates
of title in the name of Enrique Toring are deemed "overtaken by the reconstituted
title[s]." Further, the trial court found petitioners guilty of laches in not reconstituting the
original TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring and in not making any opposition to the
reconstitution proceedings filed by the heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga. However, it was
declared that the dismissal of the case will not affect the reconstituted TCT No. RT-3989
in the name of Enrique Toring.
Petitioners appealed to the CA arguing that:
1. the trial court erred in concluding that the action is one for the annulment of the order
of the court which granted reconstitution, when in truth the petitioners merely sought the
delivery of the owner’s duplicate copies of the reconstituted OCTs.
2. the trial court faulted in failing to consider that the defendants’ predecessor-in-interest
had long ago sold the lots to Enrique Toring, which document of sale defendants have
not denied, and therefore defendant-heirs are no longer owners.
3. the trial court erred in finding them guilty of laches despite recognizing the existence
of the owner’s duplicate of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring; the submission by the
petitioners of annexes in their Comment/Reply to defendants’ memorandum showing
that there were previous cases wherein petitioners have asserted and defended their
right over the subject properties and prevailed; and the fact that the OCTs were
reconstituted by defendants only in 1995 and the petitioners instituted this case in 1996.
The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but the CA denied the same.
Petitioners submit the following arguments in this petition for review on certiorari:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS WERE ALREADY SOLD AS
EARLY AS JUNE 3, 1927 BY TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA, RESPONDENTS’
PREDECESSOR, TO ENRIQUE TORING, PETITIONERS’ PREDECESSOR, AS
EVIDENCED BY THE ANCIENT DEED OF SALE IN SPANISH LANGUAGE DATED
JUNE 3, 1927 – WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE
CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
II.
Property & Succession Cases 34
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED AND DISREGARDED CONCLUSIVE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION
OF THE ORIGINAL OWNERS’ DUPLICATE TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN
THE NAME OF ENRIQUE TORING WHICH ARE GOOD PROOF OF PETITIONERS’
OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT LANDS - WHICH EVIDENCE, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TITLES THAT
PETITIONERS HAD RECONSTITUTED WERE THE CANCELLED ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF TEODOSIA BOQUILAGA WHICH DO
NOT PROVE OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDS BECAUSE THEY WERE ALREADY
CANCELLED BY ENRIQUE TORING’S TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES
JUST BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO RECONSTITUTE TORING’S ORIGINAL
TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ON FILE IN THE RECORDS OF THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS, IT APPEARING THAT THEY AND THEIR PREDECESSOR
HAVE BEEN IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LAND SINCE 1927 AND ARE IN
POSSESSION OF THE ORIGINAL OWNER’S DUPLICATE TRANSFER
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN THE NAME OF THEIR PREDECESSOR, ENRIQUE
TORING.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT’S
RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT/PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE
TRIAL COURT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO AN ACTION TO ASSAIL THE DECISION OF
A CO-EQUAL COURT, IT APPEARING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT/PETITION WAS
MERELY TO COMPEL DELIVERY OR SURRENDER BY RESPONDENTS OF THE
RECONSTITUTED CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
Held: The issues raised are purely questions of fact that this Court cannot review in a
petition filed under Rule 45. Ultimately, we are asked to determine the ownership of the
subject lots originally registered in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, respondents’
predecessor-in-interest.
The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish any right over the lots other than
their bare assertion that their predecessor-in-interest purchased these properties from
Teodosia Boquilaga and subsequently titles in his name were issued but were lost
during the last world war. It agreed with the trial court in finding that whatever claim
petitioners have on the subject properties was lost by their unexplained neglect for more
than fifty (50) years since the destruction of the records in the registry of deeds during
the last world war, under the principle of laches. As to the nature of the action filed by
petitioners, the CA likewise affirmed the trial court’s ruling that it is one for annulment of
the reconstituted title, which essentially assails the judgment or order of a co-equal
court.

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.
In the case at bar, the records showed that the original petition was filed in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bogo-San Remigio, Cebu but was subsequently transferred to the
RTC on motion of the petitioners. TCT Nos. 16802, 16803, 16804 and RT-3989 (T-
16805) were attached to the petition together with annexes "A", "C" to "G" mentioned
therein.
However, upon elevation to the CA, the records transmitted had missing pages,
including the pages subsequent to the original petition where copies of the aforesaid
TCTs should have been attached. At any rate, there appears to be no indication from
the pleadings filed and orders/decision issued by the trial court throughout the
proceedings that such documentary evidence was not submitted by petitioners. Hence,
the CA could have been misled by the absence of these annexes from the records
transmitted on appeal. Petitioners submitted to this Court the photocopies of TCT Nos.
16802, 16803 and 16804 certified as true copy from the records by the RTC of Bogo,
Branch 61 Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rey Dadula Caayon.
It must be noted that petitioners presented before the trial court the owner’s duplicate
copies of the said TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Indeed, had these pieces of
evidence been duly considered on appeal, the resolution of the issue of ownership
would have tilted in petitioners’ favor.
But first, we resolve the issue of the propriety of the suit filed by the petitioners. The
nature of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action was filed
irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such relief. As gleaned from
the averments of the petition filed before the trial court, though captioned as for delivery
or production of documents and annulment of document, petitioners’ action was really
for quieting of title and cancellation of reconstituted titles.
Petitioners had prayed for the following reliefs before the trial court:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued;
a. Directing defendants to deliver, produce, and surrender Original [Certificates] of Title
Nos. RO- 13240, 13238, 13239, and Transfer Certificate of Title [No.] 97615 to plaintiffs,
and should defendants refuse to surrender these documents, to declare Original
Certificate of Titles Nos. – RO- 13238, 13239, 13240, and Transfer Certificate of Title
97615 null and void, and directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, to
cancel said Original Certificates of Title, and Transfer Certificate of Title and in lieu
thereof issue new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Enrique Toring;
b. Declare as null and void Original Certificate of Title 13237, being canceled by
Transfer Certificate of Title RT-3989;
c. Directing defendants heirs of Teodosia [Boquilaga] to pay P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
Property & Succession Cases 35
Plaintiffs, pray for other remedies just and equitable applicable to their case, pertinent
with law and equity.
Petitioners contend that the delivery of the reconstituted OCTs in the name of Teodosia
Boquilaga was necessary to confirm and register the 1927 sale in favor of their
predecessor-in-interest, Enrique Toring. It appears that the remedy contemplated is a
petition for surrender of withheld owner’s duplicate certificates provided in Section 107
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
SECTION 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. -- Where it is necessary to
issue a new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the
title of the registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot
be registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the
registered owner or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the
same, and direct the entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If
the person withholding the duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the
court, or if [for] any reason the outstanding owner’s duplicate certificate cannot be
delivered, the court may order the annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a
new certificate of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all duplicates thereof shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding duplicate. (Emphasis
supplied.)
However, petitioners themselves alleged that the 1927 sale had long been duly
registered – OCT in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga, as mentioned in the Escritura de
Venta Absoluta dated June 3, 1927, were cancelled and in lieu thereof TCTs have been
issued in the name of Enrique Toring on August 20, 1927. Their predecessor-in-interest
having already succeeded in registering the deed of sale as early as 1927, it is clear that
the procedure under Section 107 of P.D. No. 1529 is inapplicable.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its
purpose is to secure "… an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property,
adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming
under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In such
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to
make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the
one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly
introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property
as he deems fit.
In alleging that petitioners were not served any notice as actual possessors or adjacent
owners of the petition for reconstitution (Cad Case No. 7, Cad. Rec. No. 442, Decree
Nos. 230739, 230740, 231111 and 231112) filed by the respondents for reconstitution of
OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga which was granted by the court; and that the

said OCTs have already been cancelled by the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique
Toring by virtue of a deed of sale executed in 1927 by Teodosia Boquilaga – petitioners
did not just seek to remove any doubt or uncertainty in the title of their predecessor-in-
interest over the subject real properties, but also claimed irregularity and defects in the
reconstitution proceedings which resulted in the issuance of reconstituted OCT Nos.
RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-13239 and RO-13240 in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga.
If indeed, as petitioners claimed, the OCTs in the name of Teodosia Boquilaga were
already cancelled and new TCTs have already been issued in the name of Enrique
Toring as early as 1927, then the reconstituted OCT Nos. RO-13237, RO-13238, RO-
13239 and RO-13240 issued in Cad Case No. 7, Cad Rec. No. 442 are null and void.
It may also be noted that the petition for reconstitution filed by respondents and the
Certifications issued by the LRA stated only the registration decree numbers issued in
favor of Teodosia Boquilaga without mentioning the numbers of the OCTs and dates of
their issuance. The reconstituted OCTs on their face contained no entry whatsoever as
to the number of the OCT issued pursuant to the decrees of registration, nor the date of
its issuance. We have held that such absence of any document, private or official,
mentioning the number of the certificate of title and date when the certificate of title was
issued, does not warrant the granting of a petition for reconstitution. Moreover, notice of
hearing of the petition for reconstitution of title must be served on the actual possessors
of the property. Notice thereof by publication is insufficient. Jurisprudence is to the effect
settled that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the
land involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
The decision granting the petition for reconstitution filed by the respondents was
promulgated on May 9, 1996. There is no allegation or proof that petitioners availed of
the remedies of appeal, petition for relief, certiorari or annulment of judgment before the
CA questioning the validity of the said reconstitution order.
Notwithstanding petitioners’ failure to avail of the afore-mentioned remedies, the
decision in the reconstitution case is not a bar to the adjudication of the issue of
ownership raised in the present case. The nature of judicial reconstitution proceedings is
the restoration of an instrument or the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Its
purpose is to have the title reproduced after proper proceedings in the same form they
were when the loss or destruction occurred and not to pass upon the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
After a careful review, we hold that petitioners have satisfactorily established their claim
of ownership over the subject lots by preponderance of evidence. The existence and
due execution of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta was never disputed by the
respondents. Petitioners’ documentary evidence showed that the registration fees for
the transfer of the lots mentioned in the said deed of absolute sale was duly paid,
resulting in the issuance of TCTs in the name of Enrique Toring. Thereafter, petitioners
took possession of the land, sharing in the fruits thereof and paying the realty taxes due
on the lands. While the original owner’s duplicate TCTs were in the possession of
petitioners, the original transfer certificates of title on file with the registry of deeds were
Property & Succession Cases 36
lost or destroyed during the last world war. Petitioners were also able to judicially
reconstitute TCT No. T-16805 (RT-3989) on November 11, 1994, as per the annotation
thereon.
Laches means the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. This equitable
defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of
stale claims for the peace of society. Indeed, while it is true that a Torrens Title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover
the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
In this case, however, laches cannot be appreciated in respondents’ favor.
It should be stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The
following elements must be present in order to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant,
or the suit is not held to be barred.37
Only the first element was present in this case, which occurred from the moment
respondents refused to give petitioners’ share in the fruits and proceeds of the land,
claiming that they are owners thereof. In the ensuing
barangay proceedings, respondents presented the reconstituted OCTs prompting
petitioners to verify with the office of the registry of deeds. It was only then that
petitioners discovered that respondents indeed filed a petition for judicial reconstitution.
There being no personal notice to them as actual possessors or adjacent lot owners,
petitioners never had the opportunity to file their opposition. The order of reconstitution
was issued in May 1996. Petitioners’ filing of the present suit for the delivery and
cancellation of said reconstituted OCTs in the possession of respondents on October
20, 1996, after the lapse of only five months, cannot be considered as unreasonable
delay amounting to laches.
Additionally, petitioners showed that they were never amiss in asserting their rights over
the subject lots whenever any incident threatened their peaceful possession and
ownership.
Cañezo vs. Bautista
GR# 170189/ Sept. 1, 2010
629 SCRA 580
Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo are the registered owner[s] of a land with an area of
186 sq m. covered by TCT No. 32911. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista are
the registered owners of a land with an area of 181 sq m. covered by TCT No. 31727.
Both are located at Coronado Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to
that of appellees.
In 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on their lot. During the
construction, appellees discovered that their lot was encroached upon by the structures
built by appellants without appellees’ knowledge and consent. However, despite oral
and written demands, appellants failed and refused to remove the structures
encroaching appellees’ lot.
Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but to no avail.
Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of demolition.
Appellants were declared in default for failure to file an Answer within the extended
period granted by the court, Appellees were allowed to present their evidence ex parte
before an appointed commissioner. Thereafter the RTC rendered the assailed decision
in the terms earlier set forth.
On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the spouses
Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built structures encroaching on
the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The spouses Bautista also refused to remove
the structures and respect the boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A
referral to the Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court
thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that the spouses
Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with damages.
Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. A writ of
demolition be was issued directing the removal/demolition of the structures built by the
defendants upon the portion of land belonging [to] the plaintiffs at the former’s expense.
Further,
1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as and by way of
moral damages[; and]
2. the defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.
The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more
than a year before the filing of the complaint, the spouses Cañezo should have filed a
suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of demolition. A writ of
demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final judgment or order, hence the
spouses Cañezo’s complaint should be dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed to
specify the assessed value of the encroached portion of their property. Because of this
failure, the complaint lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the
Property & Succession Cases 37
appellate court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for
recovery of possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith, the market
value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine the appropriate
indemnity.
The CA granted the appeal and the case was DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
of the appropriate action with the proper forum.
Issues: I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the petition
of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of the Court a quo; [and]
II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating that the petitioners
should have filed recovery of possession and not writ of demolition.
Held: The petition has merit. The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an
action for a "Writ of Demolition with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel
of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the
Civil Code reads: "In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s
claim." Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus
utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria
is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery
of its full possession.
In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in
accordance with the precedents established by the courts that the party who prosecutes
it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the
same. However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be
established, if the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land,
and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the
defendant within the plaintiff’s property.
Given the efforts made by the spouses Cañezo to settle the present issue prior to the
filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling that the spouses Bautista were
in default and in not admitting their Answer. The Complaint was not the spouses
Bautista’s first encounter with the present issue. Moreover, the spouses Bautista failed
to file their Answer even after the expiry of the motion of extension granted to them.
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista were
aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a
corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Cañezo. This awareness of
the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses
Cañezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the
spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.
A writ of demolition of the encroaching structures should be issued against and at the
expense of Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this
judgment. Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo P30,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral

damages; and P30,000 as attorney’s fees. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall
apply from the finality of judgment until the total amount awarded is fully paid.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in
bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be
removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person
who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of
the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Title III. Co-Ownership (Arts. 484-501)
Republic v. Heirs of Sorono
GR # 171571, Mar. 24, 2008
549 SCRA 58
This is a Petition for review on certiorari to the aardecision of the CA affirming that of the
RTC Cadastral Survey of Opon, Lapu-lapu City were adjudicated on December 7, 1929
by the then CFI of Cebu in four equal shares. The two lots were not partitioned by the
adjudicatees.
It appears further that the heirs of Tito Dignos, who was awarded ¼ share in the two
lots, sold for P2,565.59 the entire two lots to the then Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA) via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on
October 11, 1957, without the knowledge of respondents whose predecessors-in-
interest were the adjudicatees of the rest of the ¾ portion of the two lots.
In 1996, CAA’s successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA), erected a security fence traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of
families, who had built their dwellings within the airport perimeter, to a portion of said lot
to enhance airport security in line with the standards set by the International Civil
Aviation Organization and the Federal Aviation Authority.
MCIAA later caused the issuance in its name of Tax Declaration No. 00548 covering Lot
No. 2296 and Tax Declaration No. 00568 covering Lot No. 2316. Respondents soon
asked the agents of MCIAA to cease giving third persons permission to occupy the lots
but the same was ignored.
Respondents thereupon filed on January 8, 1996 a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Legal
Redemption with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MCIAA before the
RTC of Lapu-lapu City, alleging that the existence of the tax declarations "would cast a
cloud on their valid and existing titles" to the lots. They alleged that "corresponding
original certificates of title in favor of the decreed owners were . . . issued but the same
could no longer be found and located, and in all probability, were lost during the Second
World War." (This claim was not specifically denied by petitioner in its Answer with
Counterclaim.)
Property & Succession Cases 38
Respondents further alleged that neither they nor their predecessors-in-interests sold,
alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots of which they have been in continuous
peaceful possession.
Respondents furthermore alleged that neither petitioner nor its predecessor-in-interest
had given them any written notice of its acquisition of the ¼ share of Tito Dignos.
The trial court found for respondents. It held that respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest were in peaceful and continuous possession of their shares in the lots, and were
disturbed of such possession only in 1996 when petitioner put up the security fence that
traversed Lot No. 2316 and relocated families that had built their houses within the
airport perimeter to a portion of said lot.
On petitioner’s claim that it had acquired ownership by extraordinary prescription, the
trial court brushed it aside on the ground that registered lands cannot be the subject of
acquisitive prescription.
Neither, held the trial court, had respondents’ action prescribed, as actions for quieting
of title cannot prescribe if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property in question, as
in the case of herein respondents.
On petitioner’s defense of laches, the trial court also brushed the same aside in light of
its finding that respondents, who have long been in possession of the lots, came to know
of the sale only in 1996. The trial court added that respondents could not be charged
with constructive notice of the 1957 Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the lots to CAA
as it was erroneously registered under Act No. 3344, the law governing recording of
instruments or deeds relating to real estate which are not registered under the Torrens
system. The subject lots being registered, the trial court found, the registration of the
deed should have been made under Act No. 496, the applicable law in 1957. In fine, the
trial court held that the registration of the deed under Act No. 3344 did not operate as
constructive notice to the whole world.
Concluding, the trial court held that the questioned sale was valid only with respect to
Tito Dignos’ ¼ share of the lots, and that the sale thereof was subject to the right of legal
redemption by respondents following Article 1088 of the Civil Code, reading:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before partition, any or all
of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time
they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In light of its finding that the heirs of Tito Dignos did not give notice of the sale to
respondents, the trial court held that the period for legal redemption had not yet lapsed;
and the redemption price should be ¼ of the purchase price paid by the CAA for the two
lots. The trial court thus disposed:
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION WHEN RESPONDENTS NO LONGER HAVE ANY RIGHT TO
RECOVER LOTS 2296 AND 2316 DUE TO THE PRIOR SALE THEREOF TO THE
REPUBLIC AND UPON THE EQUITABLE GROUNDS OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
Held: Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest CAA thus acquired only the rights pertaining to the
sellers-heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼ undivided share of the two lots.
Petitioner’s insistence that it acquired the property through acquisitive prescription, if not
ordinary, then extraordinary, does not lie. The trial court’s discrediting thereof is well
taken. It bears emphasis at this juncture that in the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
forged by CAA and Tito Dignos’ heirs in 1957.
The trial court’s discrediting of petitioner’s invocation of laches and prescription of action
is well-taken too.
As for petitioner’s argument that the redemption price should be ¼ of the prevailing
market value, not of the actual purchase price, since, so it claims, "(1) they received just
compensation for the property at the time it was purchased by the Government; and, (2)
the property, due to improvements introduced by petitioner in its vicinity, is now worth
several hundreds of millions of pesos,” the law is not on its side.
Thus, Article 1088 of the Civil Code provides:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the
time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
The Court may take judicial notice of the increase in value of the lots. As mentioned
earlier, however, the heirs of Tito Dignos did not notify respondents about the sale. At
any rate, since the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale stipulates, thus:
That the HEIRS-VENDORS, their heirs, assigns and successors, undertake and agree
to warrant and defend the possession and ownership of the property/ies herein sold
against any and all just claims of all persons whomsoever and should the VENDEE be
disturbed in its possession, to prosecute and defend the same in the Courts of Justice.
Property & Succession Cases 39
Petitioner is not without any remedy. This decision is, therefore, without prejudice to
petitioner’s right to seek redress against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their
successors-in-interest.
Cruz v. Catapang
GR # 164110, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 512
Facts:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision RTC, which had earlier affirmed the
Decision of the 7th MCTC ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a
portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel
of land covering an area of 1,435 square meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod,
Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the aforementioned co-
owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the
abovementioned parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a
portion of the co-owned property.
When petitioner Leonor B. Cruz visited the property during the first week of September
1995, she was surprised to see a part of respondent’s house intruding unto a portion of
the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish
the intruding structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The
respondent, however, refused and disregarded her demands.
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of
petitioner, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify
defendant’s construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in
question.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MCTC’s ruling and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Catapang.
Respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
RTC’s decision. The CA held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this
case because respondent’s entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-
owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry. The CA further held that
petitioner’s remedy is not an action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with
the appropriate forum.

After petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA, she filed the instant
petition and raised before us for consideration the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE
BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT
FROM THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES
PURSUANT TO THE CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND THE OTHER CO-
OWNER.
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF SIMPLE STRATEGY.
Petitioner contends that the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya
cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or
thing owned in common until partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum counters that the complaint for
forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through
strategy or stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that
since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession
de facto but also one of possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy
the property.
Issue: Whether consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct
a house on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against that person.
Held: As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the
dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-owner against the person who was
given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that a
co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of
the co-ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a
house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to
his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure
the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according
to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express
or implied.
Property & Succession Cases 40
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would result
therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is
clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does
so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to
injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-
owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-
owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to the making of
an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a
house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration
falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
entry filed against the builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of
the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any right to enter
into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the classification
"through strategy or stealth."
The CA held that there is no forcible entry because respondent’s entry into the property
was not through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-
owners. We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion. Respondent’s entry
into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and
clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent
allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the
knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by stealth.
Moreover, respondent’s act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister
Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be
considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property.
As such, respondent’s acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioner’s filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view, was within the one-year
period for filing the complaint. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time
the petitioner learned about it.21 Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it
was only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she visited the property.
Accordingly, she then made demands on respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to

get a favorable response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996, which is
within the one-year period from the time petitioner learned of the construction.
Santos v. Heirs of Lustre
GR # 151016, Aug. 06, 2008
561 SCRA 120
Facts: Lustre owned a lot which she mortgaged & later on sold to Natividad Santos who
subsequently sold it to her son
Froilan for which a TCT was issued in his name. Lustre’s heirs Macaspac & Maniquiz
filed w/ RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of
Contract, Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against Froilan Santos.
Lustre’s other heirs filed a Complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title and
Deed of Absolute Sale against spouses Santos, Froilan Santos, R Transport Corp,
Cecilia Macaspac with the same RTC.
Macaspac was impleaded as defendant in the 2nd case because she refused to join the
other heirs as plaintiffs.
Alleging that the plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed of Sale and TCT had
long prescribed and was
barred by laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, also on the ground of litis
pendentia. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. They then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue 1: Was there forum shopping?
Decision: No Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
when a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other. Its elements are identity of the subject matter,
identity of the causes of action and identity of the parties in the two cases. There is
substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest between a party in
the first case and a party in the second case.
There is no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff
in the 1st case (Macaspac) does not, in fact, share a common interest with the plaintiffs
in the 2nd case. Plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Lustre; they are therefore co-
owners of the property. However, the fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily
mean that a plaintiff is acting for the benefit of the co-ownership when he files an action
respecting the co-owned property. Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the
property owned in common. The test is whether the “additional” party, the co-owner in
this case, acts in the same capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action.
[28]
Macaspac filed the 1st case seeking the reconveyance of the property to her, and not to
Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the co-ownership which would
negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with the other heirs or that she filed the
Property & Succession Cases 41
complaint in behalf of the co-ownership. In contrast, respondents were evidently acting
for the benefit of the co-ownership when they filed the 2nd case wherein they prayed
that TCT Lustre be reinstated, or a new certificate of title be issued in her name. Issue
#1: Does prescription or laches apply?
Issue 2: Does prescription or laches apply?
Decision: No The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was
obtained by means of a fictitious deed
of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.
Moreover, a person acquiring
property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period applies
only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property,
prescription does not commence to run against him. Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
an action that is imprescriptible.
It follows then that the respondents’ present action should not be barred by laches.
Laches is a doctrine in equity, which may be used only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an
imprescriptible legal right.X
MBTC v. Pascual
GR # 163744, Feb. 29, 2008
547 SCRA 246
Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January
19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a
250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati
City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-
101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,TCT No.
156283[1] of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia,
“married to Nelson Pascual” a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision,[2]
declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter
alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of
gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating
their conjugal partnership.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros,
obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed
several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot
covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the
loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC
decision, and a document denominated as “Waiver” that Nicholson purportedly executed
on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal
properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in
question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation
when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings
under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City.
Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of
Remate.[3] At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest
bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before
the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the
court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged that the disputed
lot, being registered in Florencia’s name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was
subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
Issue: a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved
the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for
value.
Held: The Disputed Property is Conjugal It is Metrobank’s threshold posture that Art.
160 of the Civil Code providing that “*a+ll property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the
Property & Succession Cases 42
husband or to the wife,” applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not
be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Citing Manongsong v.
Estimo,[8] Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160
of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that
for the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to
prove that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal
funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank cites
Francisco v. Court of Appeals[9] and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,[10] among other
cases, where this Court held that a property registered in the name of a certain person
with a description of being married is no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses’ marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation[11] and Wong v. IAC,[12] contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the
legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that Metrobank’s
arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to
be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of
acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and
Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact
date of acquisition of the property alleged to be conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually
recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances. The first was
when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors
and when they were referred to as “spouses” in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was
again designated as co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter[13] to vacate the
disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as “spouses,” albeit the
finality of the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of
the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior
to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership
could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired
during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobank’s submission, the Court
did not, in Manongsong,[14] add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential
requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in
pointing out that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the
presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still
required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal
presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in
Castro v. Miat:

Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all property
of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof
that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies
even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.[15]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank’s theory. Metrobank would
thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the
property in the name of “Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual” operates to
describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of
the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of
acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the
spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.[16]
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholson’s arguments regarding Metrobank
having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal
ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure
proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt,
however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the
same having been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however
Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the
classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of
Conjugal Ownership Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CA’s holding, Art.
129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by
Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime,
vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does
not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there
was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
Property & Succession Cases 43
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital
bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired
before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply
Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnership’s assets and
liabilities which is generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV,
Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal
properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its
dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.[17]
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property
relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30,
1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on
July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what
governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is
the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her
one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of
Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not
having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his
share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995
deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of
the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged
signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does
not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of
an innocent buyer for value.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful
bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof
heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to
Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask
for the partition of the lot and its property rights “shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to *the bank+ in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”*18+
This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so––quando res non
valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.[19]
In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank,
there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in
good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking
institution, the general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look
beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.[20] Unlike private individuals, it
behooves banks to exercise greater care and due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered
as security and the validity of the mortgagor’s title must be standard and indispensable
part of the bank’s operation.*21+ A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be
accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,[22] as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobank’s failure to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach
of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA
dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65
in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is
hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is
concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT
No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon are
NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property
owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion
belonging to Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorney’s fees are DENIED for lack of
merit.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Arriola v. Arriola
Property & Succession Cases 44
GR # 177703, Jan. 28, 2008
542 SCRA 666
Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for
judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of
decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son
of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition of the parcel
of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3)
each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;
As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John Nabor sought
the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it. Said auction had to be
reset when petitioners refused to include the house standing on the subject land.
Issue: Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot and
should be included in the sale through public auction.
Held: The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject
house is deemed part of the subject land.
In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the
part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house
were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on
which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of
judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto,
otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the
house which is permanently attached thereto.
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the
deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the
subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by
the latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil
Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore,
respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of
all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the complaint for
partition.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as
part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by
public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two
phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second,
the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the
common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under
the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an
entirely different matter.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken
together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home
within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and
the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution
of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need
anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles
224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles
152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling
structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying
these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on
which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner
Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years
back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the
family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate
partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or
of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the
death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of
Property & Succession Cases 45
family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first,
that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot
judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the
RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by
physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home
has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any
one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property,
much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-
owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159
to the beneficiaries of the family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and
lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-
ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus,
for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still
a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be
partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set
aside the restriction and order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception from execution
or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the
sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion
of the subject house although for a different reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is
part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes
that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have
been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its
actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10
years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate
public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls
outside the specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006
Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that
the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is
DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction
within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

Padilla vs. Magdula
GR# 176858/ Sept. 15, 2010
630 SCRA 573
Facts: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Orders dated
8 September 2006[2] and 13 February 2007[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 2001-10-161.
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners, owned a piece of land located in San
Roque, Tanauan, Leyte. After Juanita’s death on 23 March 1989, petitioners, as legal
heirs of Juanita, sought to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word to their eldest
brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo) regarding their plans for the partition of the land. In a
letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo addressed to them, petitioners were
surprised to find out that Ricardo had declared the land for himself, prejudicing their
rights as co-heirs. It was then discovered that Juanita had allegedly executed a
notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property[4] (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4
June 1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The records do not show that the
land was registered under the Torrens system.
On 26 October 2001, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch
34, for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to
declare void the sale of the land by Ricardo’s daughters, Josephine Bahia and Virginia
Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The sale was made
during the lifetime of Ricardo.
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through misrepresentation, had the land transferred in
his name without the consent and knowledge of his co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that
prior to 1966, Ricardo had a house constructed on the land. However, when Ricardo
and his wife Zosima separated, Ricardo left for Inasuyan, Kawayan, Biliran and the
house was leased to third parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly
questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita executed a written instrument stating
that she would be leaving behind to her children the land which she had inherited from
her parents.
Dominador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
assessed value of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tanauan, Leyte.
In an Order dated 20 February 2006,[5] the RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the land in the amount of
P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over
the case.[6]
Property & Succession Cases 46
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners argued that the action was not
merely for recovery of ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for
annulment of deed of sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond
pecuniary estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Dominador filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.
In an Order dated 8 September 2006, the RTC reconsidered its previous stand and took
cognizance of the case. Nonetheless, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
and dismissed the case on the ground of prescription pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court. The RTC ruled that the case was filed only in 2001 or more than 30
years since the Affidavit was executed in 1966. The RTC explained that while the right
of an heir to his inheritance is imprescriptible, yet when one of the co-heirs appropriates
the property as his own to the exclusion of all other heirs, then prescription can set in.
The RTC added that since prescription had set in to question the transfer of the land
under the Affidavit, it would seem logical that no action could also be taken against the
deed of sale executed by Ricardo’s daughters in favor of Dominador. The dispositive
portion of the order states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the Court is reconsidered in so far as
the pronouncement of the Court that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
The dismissal of the action, however, is maintained not by reason of lack of jurisdiction
but by reason of prescription.
Issue: The main issue is whether the present action is already barred by prescription.
Held: At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal except under any of the
following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which
the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the
presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[8]
We find that the conclusion of the RTC in dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription based solely on the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo, the
alleged seller of the property from whom Dominador asserts his ownership, is
speculative. Thus, a review of the case is necessary.
Here, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by Dominador based on Section 1,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC explained that prescription had already set in since the Affidavit was executed
on 31 May 1966 and petitioners filed the present case only on 26 October 2001, a lapse
of more than 30 years. No action could be taken against the deed of sale made in favor
of Dominador without assailing the Affidavit, and the action to question the Affidavit had
already prescribed.
After a perusal of the records, we find that the RTC incorrectly relied on the Affidavit
alone in order to dismiss the case without considering petitioners’ evidence. The facts
show that the land was sold to Dominador by Ricardo’s daughters, namely Josephine
Bahia and Virginia Bahia-Abas, during the lifetime of Ricardo. However, the alleged
deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was it shown that Ricardo’s
daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of the land. No cogent evidence
was ever presented that Ricardo gave his consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale
made by his daughters to Dominador. In its 8 September 2006 Order, the RTC hastily
concluded that Ricardo’s daughters had legal personality to sell the property:
On the allegation of the plaintiffs (petitioners) that Josephine Bahia and Virginia Bahia-
Abas had no legal personality or right to [sell] the subject property is of no moment in
this case. It should be Ricardo Bahia who has a cause of action against [his] daughters
and not the herein plaintiffs. After all, Ricardo Bahia might have already consented to or
ratified the alleged deed of sale.[9]
Also, aside from the Affidavit, Dominador did not present any proof to show that
Ricardo’s possession of the land had been open, continuous and exclusive for more
than 30 years in order to establish extraordinary acquisitive prescription.[10] Dominador
merely assumed that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for 30 years based on
the Affidavit submitted to the RTC. The petitioners, on the other hand, in their pleading
filed with the RTC for recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages,
alleged that Ricardo left the land after he separated from his wife sometime after 1966
and moved to another place. The records do not mention, however, whether Ricardo
had any intention to go back to the land or whether Ricardo’s family ever lived there.
Further, Dominador failed to show that Ricardo had the land declared in his name for
taxation purposes from 1966 after the Affidavit was executed until 2001 when the case
was filed. Although a tax declaration does not prove ownership, it is evidence of claim
to possession of the land.
Moreover, Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs or co-
owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or co-
Property & Succession Cases 47
owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of
the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a trustee, in order that a co-owner’s
possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners, (2) that
such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.[11]
In the present case, all three requisites have been met. After Juanita’s death in 1989,
petitioners sought for the partition of their mother’s land. The heirs, including Ricardo,
were notified about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter dated 5 June 1998, notified
petitioners, as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the land solely for himself. Accordingly,
Ricardo’s interest in the land had now become adverse to the claim of his co-heirs after
repudiating their claim of entitlement to the land. In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera,[12]
we held that in order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be
clearly shown that he had repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period
begins to run.
However, in the present case, the prescriptive period began to run only from 5 June
1998, the date petitioners received notice of Ricardo’s repudiation of their claims to the
land. Since petitioners filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages with the RTC on 26 October 2001, only a mere three years had
lapsed. This three-year period falls short of the 10-year or 30-year acquisitive
prescription period required by law in order to be entitled to claim legal ownership over
the land. Thus, Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive prescription.
Further, Dominador’s argument that prescription began to commence in 1966, after the
Affidavit was executed, is erroneous. Dominador merely relied on the Affidavit
submitted to the RTC that Ricardo had been in possession of the land for more than 30
years. Dominador did not submit any other corroborative evidence to establish
Ricardo’s alleged possession since 1966. In Heirs of Maningding v. Court of Appeals,
[13] we held that the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact, upon which the
alleged prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to
establish the prescription. Here, Dominador failed to present any other competent
evidence to prove the alleged extraordinary acquisitive prescription of Ricardo over the
land. Since the property is an unregistered land, Dominador bought the land at his own
risk, being aware as buyer that no title had been issued over the land. As a
consequence, Dominador is not afforded protection unless he can manifestly prove his
legal entitlement to his claim.

With regard to the issue of the jurisdiction of the RTC, we hold that the RTC did not err
in taking cognizance of the case.
Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),[14] amending Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the “Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980”, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction.
“(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
“(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x
xx
On the other hand, Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property, or any interest, outside
Metro Manila where the assessed value does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). The provision states:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Trial Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
“(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.”
Property & Succession Cases 48
In the present case, the records show that the assessed value of the land was P590.00
according to the Declaration of Property as of 23 March 2000 filed with the RTC. Based
on the value alone, being way below P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the
case. However, petitioners argued that the action was not merely for recovery of
ownership and possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since annulment of contracts are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case.[15]
Petitioners are correct. In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,[16] we held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover ownership and
possession of the land by questioning (1) the due execution and authenticity of the
Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole
owner of the land to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and
entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed between
Ricardo’s daughters and Dominador. Since the principal action sought here is
something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[17]
In sum, we find that the Affidavit, as the principal evidence relied upon by the RTC to
dismiss the case on the ground of prescription, insufficiently established Dominador’s
rightful claim of ownership to the land. Thus, we direct the RTC to try the case on the
merits to determine who among the parties are legally entitled to the land.
Taghoy vs. Tigol, Jr
GR# 159665/ Aug. 3, 2010
626 SCRA 341
Facts: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in
1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by
her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman
(grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses
Aquino were able to acquire several properties.

Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres,
Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment, partition
and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman)
for the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the
Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had
a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses
and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the
conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all
the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who
is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his
mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-
half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being
the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs
further claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all
the properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since
they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of
the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that
during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had
already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose
Velasquez in the following manner:
(1) The third and sixth parcels were conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, by virtue of a Escritura de Donation Propter Nuptias
dated February 15, 1919;
(2) The second parcel was conveyed to defendants late parents Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman by virtue of a deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939, for which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15129 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
(3) The first parcel was likewise conveyed to defendants Jose Velasquez and Anastacia
Velasquez by virtue of a deed of conveyance (Donation Inter vivos) dated April 10,
1939;
(4) As to the fourth and fifth parcels, the same were owned and possessed by third
parties.
Property & Succession Cases 49
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and
plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants
grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to
divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they
did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof
has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all
others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already
barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which
was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents
covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as
agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the
parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and
recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years.
After trial, the decision was rendered on April 8, 1992 which ruled as follows:8
"From the evidence, the Court finds that the plaintiffs are brothers and sisters who are
the children of Estanislao Meneses and Anatalia de Guzman and the defendants are the
children of plaintiffs counsin Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman. The
defendants mother Tranquilina de Guzman and plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman
and Leoncia de Guzman are full blooded sisters. The subject six (6) parcels of land were
conjugal properties of Leoncia de Guzman and her husband Cornelio Aquino were in
their possession until their death in 1945 and 1947, respectively. After the death of
plaintiffs mother Anatalia de Guzman on September 14, 1978, plaintiff Santiago
Meneses came across an affidavit of Cesario Velasquez notarized by Atty. Elpidio
Barrozo stating that he is an adopted son of said spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia
de Guzman (Exhibit "A") which, is however, not supported by evidence (a court order).
The said affidavit mentioned, among other things, a house and a parcel of land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 699 located at Guiguilonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, (Exhibit
"B"). The sugar cane and coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
containing an area of 27,849 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. 978
(Exhibit "C") which was in the possession of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de
Guzman until their death. Sometime in
1944 Leoncia de Guzman called a conference among the plaintiffs and spouses Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman and told them that all their conjugal properties shall
be divided equally between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman and that
she did not sign documents regarding the conveyance of their properties; and that the
property (parcel B) in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, which yielding an annual
produce worth P15,000.00 was divided between Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina
de Guzman.
Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman who were childless had Anatalia de
Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman as their legal heirs. The latter succeeded the
former over the subject six (6) parcels of land in equal shares - belongs to Anatalia de
Guzman and the other half, to Tranquilina de Guzman."

This, notwithstanding the claim of defendants that the first parcel was donated to Jose
Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez by way of "Donation Intervivos."
The second parcel, sold to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman;
The third and 6th parcels, donated to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman; and
The 4th and 5th parcels, sold to third parties.
The claim of Cesario Velasquez that he was adopted by the Spouses Cornelio Aquino
and Leoncia de Guzman is not supported by evidence.
The Court finds plaintiff Santiago Meneses credible; and his testimony, credible by itself.
Santiago Meneses who is 80 years old testified spontaneously in a clear, straight
forward and convincing manner.
The version of the defendants to the effect that spouses Cornelio de Guzman and
Leoncia de Guzman left no properties cannot be given serious consideration. It is
incredible and unbelievable.
How did the spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman support and maintain
themselves if they disposed of their valuable properties, the six (6) parcels of land in
question, during their lifetime? Did they really leave no properties? These questions
remained unanswered.
The defendants failed to prove their allegations that the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and
Leoncia de Guzman disposed of their properties during their lifetime.
Defendant Eliseo Velasquez is a lawyer and his co-defendant brothers are retired
government officials.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs are simple, innocent country folks who have not
obtained substantial level of education.
The Court believes and so holds that the defendants manipulated the transfer unto
themselves all the properties of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman;
thus, depriving the plaintiffs their shares in the inheritance, to their prejudice and
damage.
Insofar as the issue of whether or not partition prescribes, the court believes and so
rules that it does not.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of
limitations.
Property & Succession Cases 50
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of
the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the
properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of
spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.
V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.
Held: Petitioners contend that public respondent erred when it held that the issue of res
judicata was never raised either in the Answer or at the Pre-trial such that it was not
under consideration. We agree with the petitioner. The records show that the defense of
res judicata was raised in the petitioners Amended Answer filed before the trial court
more particularly under paragraph 18, to wit:
"18. b. The case at bar is already barred by RES JUDICATA, there having been three
(3) previous cases involving either the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein or
of the present parties themselves, the same subject matter, and the same cause of
action, which were all dismissed, the last dismissal having been ordered by this very
same Honorable Court in Civil Case No. D-8811 on October 21, 1988 for failure to
prosecute which dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits and therefore
with prejudice as this Honorable Court did not provide otherwise (Sec. 3, Rule 17) and
the Plaintiffs in said case, who are the same plaintiffs in the present case did not appeal
from said order of dismissal."
Said Amended Answer was admitted by the trial court in its Order dated March 2,
199011 and was one of the issues stipulated for resolution in its Pre-trial Order dated
May 18, 1990. Thus, it was clear error for respondent court to conclude that res judicata
was never raised in the lower court.
The next question is whether res judicata is present in the instant case. We rule in the
affirmative. Petitioners in their Memorandum established that there were three (3) earlier
cases filed by private respondents against petitioners involving the same subject matter
and issues as in the instant case which were all dismissed, to wit:
"The first Complaint filed by Anatalia de Guzman, mother of private respondent Santiago
Meneses, against Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez, docketed as
Civil Case No. 11378 of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Said action was
dismissed on August 18, 1950.
Thirty four (34) years after, or on October 9, 1984, private respondent Santiago
Meneses filed a second Complaint similar to the Complaint of his mother (Civil Case No.
11378) which was docketed as Civil Case No. D-7584, entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de
Guzman, represented by Santiago Meneses vs. Cesario Velasquez, defendant. In the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, dated May 28, 1986, this
Complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute without prejudice (Exh. "16").

Private respondent Santiago Meneses refiled the Complaint allegedly joined this time by
his siblings on October 23, 1987; which was docketed as Civil Case No. P-8811 and
entitled "Heirs of Anatalia de Guzman, namely: Santiago Meneses, Apolonio Meneses,
Andres Meneses, Luis Meneses, Felicidad Meneses, Plaintiffs, versus Heirs of Cesario
Velasquez, namely: Anastacia Velasquez, Sofia Velasquez, Eliseo Velasquez, Jose
Velasquez, Leonora Velasquez, Nieves Velasquez, Defendants." (Exh. "17"). On
October 21, 1988, the Court a quo dismissed this Complaint as follows: "For failure to
prosecute, the case is hereby dismissed without costs." (Exh. "18")."
Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their Comment as
the only defense raised therein was that the application of the principle of res judicata
should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is within the power of the court to
suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third complaint filed by private
respondents on October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and we found
that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are
present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment
or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the
dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this ground
alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However, considering that
this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari, it
would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the parties
were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality in the light of
the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
Petitioners next contend that private respondent Santiago Meneses failed to prove the
nullity of the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses in favor of
petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez and their predecessors-in-interest Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman since he failed to adduce any evidence to support
his claim other than his bare allegations of its nullity. Petitioners claim that they were
able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime
disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint, to wit: (a) Escritura de
donation propter nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a
portion of the second parcel and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the
complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first
parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c) Escritura de
Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in
favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; (d) Deed
of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a
consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation
Property & Succession Cases 51
propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned. Petitioners claim that
the record is bereft of any evidence showing the infirmities in these formidable array of
documentary evidence but the courts below declared their nullity on the basis of the
"telltale" story of Santiago Meneses. They contend that in giving credence to the
testimony of Santiago Meneses that all the deeds of conveyances executed by the
Aquino spouses in favor of the petitioners were a nullity, Santiago would want to make it
appear that the spouses Aquino, in giving dowry thru escritura de donation propter
nuptias and donation inter vivos, were only fooling the innocent youngsters and then
future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and the innocent minors
donees Jose and Anatascia Velasquez respectively.
Petitioners submission is impressed with merit.
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence
adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below,
which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule, factual findings of the lower
courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14
However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the
evidence on record,15 in the instant case, we are not bound to adhere to the general
rule since both courts clearly failed to consider facts and circumstances which should
have drawn a different conclusion.
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must
initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.17 Needless
to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state
in his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless
the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the properties.
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been
adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners predecessor-
in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncias death; thus
private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties. There is no
preponderance of evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The
trial court declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the complaint, the deed of
sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed
of donation propter nuptias over the third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties
of fourth and fifth parcels insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which
"legitimately belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the
basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman
was still alive, she called a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their mother
Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother Tranquilina, telling them that all their
properties which are conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and

Tranquilina and not to believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did
not sign them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect that
Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject properties in favor of the
petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses testimony was never corroborated by any other
evidence despite his testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the
presence of third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944, a
year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of documents
revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged
intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina
de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the testimony of Santiago
Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was affirmed by the respondent
court which stated that the matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court.
However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a
guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a
person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared to him, and
at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient
documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had
already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the
year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter
nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of
donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners
Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated
August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of
Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to
overlook the probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The
donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively
was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and
acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764
and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
Property & Succession Cases 52
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and
the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for
the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all
their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not
one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July
14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance
executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed
of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of
the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat
the face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance.31 Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts
of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of
title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the
property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private
respondents asserted co-ownership claim over the subject property.
The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the
documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of
validity.32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago
Meneses with clear and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners were
able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the
Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the
spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners
alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right
thereto.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of partition cannot be maintained.
The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been
delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could
be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between private respondents
and petitioners, we find no reason to discuss the other arguments raised by the
petitioners in support of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City are SET ASIDE. The complaint in the trial court against petitioner is
ORDERED DISMISSED.
Monteroso v. CA
GR # 105608, Apr. 30, 2008

553 SCRA 66
Facts When Don Fabian died in 1948, he left behind as part of his estate 12 parcels of
land. Subject properties under dispute between Soledad Cagampang and her siblings
involved 6 lots designated as F1,F2,F3,F5,F7 and F8. Soledad alleged that she owned
these properties by acquisition through deeds of absolute sale excuted by her father
(Don Fabian) and her on 1939. However, evidence are presented by her siblings on the
invalidity of said sale such as: Don Fabian after the execution of the Deed never
relinquished possession over these properties. Thereby, parties never intended to be
bound. That there is no evidence to support that Don Fabian received valuable
consideration in exchange of his properties. TCTs are amended judicially, that only the
name of Soledad appear in the TCT’s and form part of her paraphernal property.
(sariling wonder lang: siguro naisip ni Don Fabian, kung nakapangalan lang sa anak
nya yung property hindi yun mahahabol ng manugang)
Based from the above, RTC decided for the invalidity of said sale which the CA affirmed.
Hence this case.
Issue: Provided that said sale is invalid, does this make Tirso and his sibling co-owners
over these properties.
If yes, is it fatal to the filed case of Partition by Tirso and his siblings his omission to
expressly indicate the fact that they are co-owners.
Held: Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of
the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his
hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all the
properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of his death
(1948). Until then, before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabian’s intestate
estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the
undivided estate of Don Fabian. And as a co-owner, his right is imprescriptible except
when he expressly repudiates his share. And Soledad, by invoking as defense of
prescription over Tirso and their other siblings, therefore admitted that co-ownership
existed.
Resolving the issue regarding the existence of co-ownership among the heirs, will Tirso
et al can avail the remedy of Partition, when co-ownership is not properly alleged.
SC held Yes. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership,
his demand from, and act of initiating Partition necessarily implies that he was asserting
his right as co-owner of the properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses and
that he is a co-owner of all said properties to the extent of his legal share or legitime
thereon. An action for partition is at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved.
Soriente vs. Concepcion
Property & Succession Cases 53
GR# 160239/ Nov. 25, 2009
605 SCRA 315
Facts: In 1978 Arsenio Concepcion, husband of Nenita, acquired the subject lot and
tolerated the occupancy of Soriente for free and on temporary basis. After Arsenio died
in 1989, his family initiated to develop the lot but Soriente refused to vacate the
property. In 2000, after Elizabeth, daughter of Nenita and Soriente failed to meet
settlement, a Complaint for unlawful detainer was filed in MeTC and prayed for monthly
rent and damages. After trial, said lower court decided in favor of Concepcion. Soriente
appealed to RTC on the ground, among others, that Concepcion have no legal capacity
to sue being not the registered owner appearing in the lot’s TCT. RTC upheld MeTC
and so did the CA. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife of the registered owner, whose name did not appear in the
subject lot’s TCT have the capacity to sue.
Held By all means of course. Nenita as the successor-in-interest of her husband
Arsenio Concepcion and co-owner of the subject property, is entitled to prosecute the
ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Art
487 of CC states …”Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment”.
Hulst v. PR Builders
GR # 156364, Sept. 25, 2008
566 SCRA 333
Facts Hulst filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration when he was ordered to return to
respondent the 2.12 M in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to him.
He contends that the Contract to Sell between him and the Respondent does not involve
land but merely shareholding over the Condominium Corporation that actually owned
the lots. By this set up, there is no violation on Constitutional prohibition of foreigners
owning land over our Country.
Issue
Whether or not a foreigner can acquire condominium unit, with its undivided interest
over the common properties of the Condominium Corporation without violating the
prohibition of Foreigners owning real properties in the Philippines.
Held Yes, although it is prohibited for foreigners to own real property in the Philiipines,
this is not without exception. One of which is the Condominium Act RA 4726 where
foreigners are allowed to own a unit, and thereby having an undivided right over the
common areas held by the Condominium Corporation.
The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling
the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interests in the condominium
corporation, and no one can buy shares in a condominium corporation without at the
same time buying a condominium unit. It expressly allows foreigners to acquire
condominium units and shares in condominium corporation up to not more than 40% of
the total outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or Controlled Corporation. Under

this set up, the ownership of the land Is legally separated from the unit itself. The land is
owned by a Condominium Corporation and the unit owner is simply a member in this
Condominium Corporation. As long as 60% of the members of this Condo Corp are
Filipino.
Title V. Possession
Chapter 1.Possession and the Kinds Thereof (Arts. 523-530)
Chapter.2 Acquisition of Possession (Arts.
531-538)
Bunyi v. Factor
GR # 172547, Jun. 30, 2009
591 SCRA 350
Facts Constantino and Maura Factor, husband and wife, had been in actual, continuous,
peaceful, public, adverse and exclusive possession and occupation of the subject 18
hectare of land in Las Pinas before 1906. In 1975, upon petition, their children granted
Original Registration and Confirmation of Imperfect Title thus making the 7 chilren co-
owners of the subject land. Enrique as one of the 7 children, instead of taking his share
over the proceeds of the land when it was sold, by agreement with his siblings, he
instead take the Factor Compound as his share.
He then constructed several houses over the property including the rest house under
dispute. Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi, petitioners, were tenants inside the compound
since 1999. When Enrique died, administration on the property was entrusted to Gloria,
his eldest child. She and her family (husband and son) lived in Taguig but oversaw the
property and visit it from time to time to collect rental payments. When she died, her
daughter, Fe Factor took over the administration as a co-owner. She also allowed
Ruben Labao married to Precy to stay for free on the property. When he died, she
asserted that the property was owned by Ruben Labao and questioned Fe’s ownership.
RTC ruled in favor of Fe Factor. CA affirmed the decision hence this case.
Issue Whether or not Fe Factor have better right over the property who visits it from time
time over Bunyi who actually residing in the property.
Held Fe Factor have the better right. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by
itself, does not result in loss of possession of the subject property. The law does not
require one in possession of a house to reside in the house to maintain his
possession.27 For, again, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.28 There is no cogent reason to deviate from this doctrine. Respondent’s
right to the property was vested in her along with her siblings from the moment of their
father’s death.23 As heir, respondent had the right to the possession of the property,
which is one of the attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since respondent
Property & Succession Cases 54
acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate
proceedings.
Ong v. Republic
GR # 175746, Mar.12, 2008
548 SCRA 160
Facts: Below is the history of Transfer of Ownership of the 574 sqm lot situated in Brgy
Anolid Mangaldan Pangasinan:
1971- Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista owned subject land. They have duly paid
Tax Declaration over the properties.
1979- Sold to Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro.
1997- Sold to Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen
1998- Sold to Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil.
1999- Sold to Ong and his brothers. As such they filed an Application for Registration
of Title over subject lot. They alleged that they are the co-owners of the said lot and that
it is their their exclusive property. That the property is unoccupied, and that their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of owners for more than 30 years.
Proved that subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain by:
1927- Bureau of Lands included said land as within alienable and disposable zone
1999- DENR and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office.
RTC ruled in favor of registration, which the CA reversed. Hence this case.
Issue: Whether or not Ong and his co-owners can register said property under their
name despite it being included in public domain.
Held: No. As a general rule, properties part of public domain cannot be privately
appropriated except when the applicants or their predecessors -in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject log since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by PD 1073. Petitioners failed to prove that
they and their predecessor in interest OCCUPY sad properties. Possession alone is not
sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession AND occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
own property.

People v. Peñaflorida
GR # 175604, Apr. 10, 2008
551 SCRA 111
FACTS: SPO3 Vicente Competente narrated that in his capacity as chief of the
Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana
was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then
organized a team composed of Competente as team leader; the team boarded the
police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They
overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down
and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other
grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant’s possession. The
police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof.
The trial court found appellant Salvador Peñaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting
marijuana and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of one million pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant had freely and consciously possessed the marijuana?
HELD: Yes.Appelant freely and consciously possessed the marijuana.
In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the
prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his
person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to
contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise
power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty,
resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be
determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its
existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular
case.
Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the
instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving.
Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana
leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask
Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery
errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one
kilogram.
Chua-Bruce v. CA
GR # 109595, Apr. 27, 2000
Property & Succession Cases 55
331 SCRA 1
FACTS: On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peñaflor,
Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which
should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered
a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling
P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as
against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a
total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a
shortage, a re-verification of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank
was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00. The bank initiated
investigations totalling four (4) in all. The first was by Ramon Rocamora, the Manager.
The second was by the bank’s internal auditors headed by Antonio Batungbakal. Then,
the bank’s Department of Internal Affairs conducted an independent investigation.
Thereafter, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came in to investigate. All of these
investigations concluded that there was a shortage of P150,000.00, and the person
primarily responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, Cristeta Chua-Burce, the herein
accused. JksmOn November 4, 1985, unable to satisfactorily explain the shortage of
P150,000.00, the accused’s service with the bank was terminated.
To recover the missing amount, Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) filed
a Civil Case for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment and
Garnishment docketed as Civil Case No. R-3733 against petitioner and her husband,
Antonio Burce. Esm Prior to the filing of the Answer, the following Information for Estafa
was filed against petitioner.The trial court found the appelant guilty as charged,
applelannt seasonably filed his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appelant was gulity or not.
HELD: No. yhe appalent was not guilty.
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of
the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under
any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
(3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(4) that there be demand for the return of the property.
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element
absent. When the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the
offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives
the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who was primarily responsible for
the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank is akin to that of a
bank teller, both being mere bank employees. Calrky

Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the
missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner
cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code
Daclag v. Del Rosario
GR # 159578, Feb 18, 2009
579 SCRA 556
FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision dated July 28, 2008
where the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision dated October 17, 2001 and the
Resolution dated August 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
48498.Records show that while the land was registered in the name of petitioner
Rogelia in 1984, respondents’ complaint for reconveyance was filed in 1991, which was
within the 10-year prescriptive period.
The Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners bought the property when it was still an
unregistered land, the defense of having purchased the property in good faith is
unavailing .It affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in finding that petitioners should
pay respondents their corresponding share in the produce of the subject land from the
time they were deprived thereof until the possession is restored to them.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners contend that the 10-year period for
reconveyance is applicable if the action is based on an implied or a constructive trust;
that since respondents' action for reconveyance was based on fraud, the action must be
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are possessor in good faith.
HELD: Yes the petitioners are possessor in good faith.
Article 528 of the Civil Code provides that possession acquired in good faith does not
lose this character, except in a case and from the moment facts exist which show that
the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to
the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the
true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that
the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be
considered sufficient to show bad faith. Such interruption takes place upon service of
summons.
Article 544 of the same Code provides that a possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted. Records show that
petitioners received a summons together with respondents' complaint on August 5,
1991; thus, petitioners' good faith ceased on the day they received the summons.
Consequently, petitioners should pay respondents 10 cavans of palay per annum
beginning August 5, 1991 instead of 1984.
Property & Succession Cases 56
Chapter 3.Effects of Possession (Arts. 539-561)
Laurora v. Sterling Techpark
GR # 146815, Apr. 9, 2003
401 SCRA 181
FACTS: In a [C]omplaint for Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27 September 1997
before the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and Gen. Mariano Alvarez,
plaintiffs therein, x x x Pedro Laurora and Leonora Laurora [herein petitioners] alleged
that they [were] the owners of Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the Yaptinchay Estate with an
area of 39,771 sq. meters and located in Carmona, Cavite. Pedro Laurora planted trees
and has possessed the land up to the present. On 15 September 1997, [respondents]
Sterling Technopark III and S.P. Properties, Inc. x x x through their Engr. Bernie
Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men
and by means of threats and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting [petitioners]. As
a result of their dispossession, [petitioners] suffered actual damages in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
“After summary proceedings in the MCTC, x x x, a judgment was rendered dismissing
the complaint. The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court. In due course, the
said court rendered a decision reversing the MCTC judgment. x x x”
The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and reinstated the Order of dismissal
issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). It held that there was no evidence to
support the claim of petitioners to the prior physical possession of the property. The
evidence allegedly showed that they had already sold the land with the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Accordingly, their subsequent entry into and
possession of the land constituted plain usurpation, which could not be the source of
any right to occupy it. Being planters in bad faith, they had no right to be reimbursed for
improvements on the land, in accordance with Article 449 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject petitioners from the
premises despite their resistance and objection, through the use of arm[ed] men and by
bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and plants planted by petitioners, without court
order, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.”
HELD: No. they do not.
The only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real
property -- possession de facto, not possession de jure. Only prior physical possession,
not title, is the issue. If ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon
such question, but only to determine the question of possession.
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it
is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that the question
of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who
the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us.
Since respondents’ claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior

possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue ofownership.
Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in
question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and summarily
or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.
Verily, even if petitioners were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still
they are entitled to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under
appropriate circumstances, respondents may file, other than an ejectment suit, an
accion publiciana -- a plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or
an accion reivindicatoria -- an action to recover ownership of real property.
EDCA Publ. v. Santos
GR # 80298, Apr. 26, 1990
184 SCRA 614
FACTS
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a person identifying himself as Professor
Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with the petitioner company for 406 books,
payable on delivery. 4 EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the
books as ordered, for which Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price 5
On October 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private respondent Leonor Santos
who, after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him.
It turned out the Cruz was not connected with De La sale College, and the account was
already closed.Police arrested Cruz and latter went to the store of Santos and seized
the 120 books without a warrant .
Protesting this high-handed action, the private respondents sued for recovery of the
books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. A writ of preliminary
attachment was issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, finally surrendered the
books to the private respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is unlawfully deprived of the lawfull possession
of the the books
HELD: Yes. Respondent is unlawfully deprived of her lawful possession of the books.
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a
title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived
has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he
Property & Succession Cases 57
had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not
impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
One may well imagine the adverse consequences if the phrase "unlawfully deprived"
were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on
the seller's title who buys a movable property from him would have to surrender it to
another person claiming to be the original owner who had not yet been paid the
purchase price therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be left holding the bag, so
to speak, and would be compelled to return the thing bought by him in good faith without
even the right to reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it.
It bears repeating that in the case before us, Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first
that the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The EDCA
invoice Cruz showed her assured her that the books had been paid for on delivery. By
contrast, EDCA was less than cautious — in fact, too trusting in dealing with the
impostor. Although it had never transacted with him before, it readily delivered the books
he had ordered (by telephone) and as readily accepted his personal check in payment. It
did not verify his identity although it was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to clear
the check of this unknown drawer. Worse, it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him,
by the printed terms thereon, that the books had been paid for on delivery, thereby
vesting ownership in the buyer.
Surely, the private respondent did not have to go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself
that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did. Although the
title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these
being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before
deciding to buy them.
It would certainly be unfair now to make the private respondents bear the prejudice
sustained by EDCA as a result of its own negligence. We cannot see the justice in
transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper
care, when they bought the books from Cruz.
While we sympathize with the petitioner for its plight, it is clear that its remedy is not
against the private respondents but against Tomas de la Peña, who has apparently
caused all this trouble. The private respondents have themselves been unduly
inconvenienced, and for merely transacting a customary deal not really unusual in their
kind of business. It is they and not EDCA who have a right to complain.
BPI Family v. Franco
GR # 123498, Nov. 23, 2007
538 SCRA 186
Facts: This case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner BPI
Family Bank (BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco (Franco) in conspiracy
with other individuals, some of whom opened and
maintained separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte (SFDM) branch, in
a series of transactions. On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc.
(Tevesteco) opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon thereafter, or on
August 25, 1989, First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit

account with the same branch of BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to mature
one year thence.
Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts, namely, a current,
savings, and time deposit, with BPI-FB. The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to
open these accounts is traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in
consideration of Franco’s introduction of Eladio Teves, who was looking for a conduit
bank to facilitate Tevesteco’s business transactions, to Jaime Sebastian, who was then
BPI-FB SFDM’s Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was
part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMIC’s time deposit account and
credited to Tevesteco’s current account pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly
signed by FMIC’s officers. It appears, however, that the signatures of FMIC’s officers on
the Authority to Debit were forged. On September 4, 1989, Antonio Ong, upon being
shown the Authority to Debit, personally declared his signature therein to be a forgery.
Unfortunately, Tevesteco had already effected several withdrawals from its current
account (to which had been credited the P80,000,000.00 covered by the forged
Authority to Debit) amounting to P37,455,410.54, including the P2,000,000.00 paid to
Franco.
On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests in light of FMIC’s
forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-President, Severino Coronacion, instructed
Jesus Arangorin to debit Franco’s savings and current accounts for the amounts
remaining therein. In the meantime, two checks drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB
current account were dishonored upon presentment for payment, and stamped with a
notation “account under garnishment.”
Issue: WON Franco had a better right to the deposits in the subject accounts which are
part of the proceeds of a forged Authority to Debit
Held: In this case, the deposit in Franco’s accounts consists of money which, albeit
characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible. The quality of being fungible
depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or the will of the
parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a distinct individuality.
Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully
deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI-
FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof,
which it had mistakenly debited from FMIC’s account and credited to Tevesteco’s, and
subsequently traced to Franco’s account. In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the
Makati Case against Franco, et al. It staked its claim on the money itself which passed
from one account to another, commencing with the forged Authority to Debit.
It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which involves money in a
banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a
medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.[35] Money, which had passed
through various transactions in the general course of banking business, even if of
traceable origin, is no exception.
Property & Succession Cases 58
Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate personal property,
BPI-FB’s illustrative example, ostensibly based on Article 559, is inapplicable to the
instant case.
There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of Franco, but
not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of FMIC’s deposits to
Tevesteco’s account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of money in banks is
governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or mutuum. As there is a debtor-
creditor relationship between a bank and its depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired
ownership of Franco’s deposits, but such ownership is coupled with a corresponding
obligation to pay him an equal amount on demand.[37] Although BPI-FB owns the
deposits in Franco’s accounts, it cannot prevent him from demanding payment of BPI-
FB’s obligation by drawing checks against his current account, or asking for the release
of the funds in his savings account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against
his current account, he had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be
honored by BPI-FB as debtor.
More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the accounts of
Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were proceeds of the multi-
million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To grant BPI-FB, or any bank for
that matter, the right to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes
are derived from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the
banking industry.
Our pronouncement in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals[38]
continues to resonate, thus:
XXXX
The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo,
and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given
time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the
bank will deliver it as and to whomever directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such
as the dishonor of the check without good reason, can cause the depositor not a little
embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of
its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. x x x.
Ineluctably, BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty bound to know the
signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the forgery in the Authority to Debit
and in the process inadvertently facilitate the FMIC-Tevesteco transfer, BPI-FB cannot
now shift liability thereon to Franco and the other payees of checks issued by
Tevesteco, or prevent withdrawals from their respective accounts without the
appropriate court writ or a favorable final judgment.

Further, it boggles the mind why BPI-FB, even without delving into the authenticity of the
signature in the Authority to Debit, effected the transfer of P80,000,000.00 from FMIC’s
to Tevesteco’s account, when FMIC’s account was a time deposit and it had already
paid advance interest to FMIC. Considering that there is as yet no indubitable evidence
establishing Franco’s participation in the forgery, he remains an innocent party. As
between him and BPI-FB, the latter, which made possible the present predicament, must
bear the resulting loss or inconvenience.
Title VI. Usufruct
Chapter 1. Usufruct in General (Arts. 562-565)
Chapter 2. Rights of the Usufruct (Arts. 566-582)
Chapter 3. Obligations of the Usufruct (Arts. 583-602)
Chapter 4. Extinguishment of Usufruct (Arts. 603-612)
Title VII. Easements or Servitudes
Chapter 1. Easements in General (Arts. 613-633)
Fajardo v. Freedom to Build
GR # 134692, Aug. 1, 2000
337 SCRA 115
Facts: Freedom To Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of low-cost
housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a house and lot in De la Costa Homes in Barangka,
Marikina. The Contract to Sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive
Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit:
1. Easements. For the homeowner must observe a two-meter easement in front. No
structure of any kind (store, garage, bodega, etc.) may be built on the front easement.
2. Upward expansion. Second storey expansion must be placed above the back portion
of the house and should not extend forward beyond the apex of the original building.
3. Front expansion: 2nd floor expansion, in front, is 6 meters back from the front
property line and 4 meters back from the front wall of the house, just as provided in the
60 sq. m. units.
The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot
issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.
Despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the
property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the
original front wall. Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, an
action to demolish the unauthorized structures.
Property & Succession Cases 59
The RTC directed the spouses Fajardo to immediately demolish and remove the
extension of their expanded housing unit that exceeds the limitations imposed by the
Restrictive Covenant, otherwise the Branch Sheriff of this Court shall execute this
decision at the expense of the defendants. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the restrictive covenant contained in the Contract to Sell and Transfer
Certificate valid.
Held:
Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it
may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or
character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create
easements or rights, it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on
the manner in which one may use his own property, do not result in true easements, but
a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or
reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the most common easement
created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land
from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do.
Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on
the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them where the covenants are
reasonable, not contrary to public policy, or to law, and not in restraint of trade. Subject
to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial
sanction to any other valid contractual relationship. In general, frontline restrictions on
constructions have been held to be valid stipulations.
The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected
are crafted not solely for the purpose of creating easements, generally of light and view,
nor as a restriction as to the type of construction, but may also be aimed as a check on
the subsequent uses of the building conformably with what the developer originally
might have intended the stipulations to be. In its Memorandum, respondent states in
arguing for the validity of the restrictive covenant that the -
"x x x restrictions are not without specific purpose. In a low cost-socialized housing, it is
of public knowledge that owners-developers are constrained to build as many number of
houses on a limited land area precisely to accommodate marginalized lot buyers,
providing as much as possible the safety, aesthetic and decent living condition by
controlling overcrowding. Such project has been designed to accommodate at least 100
families per hectare."
There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to
promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
The statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the
construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant is not intended

for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the building, i.e., to
ensure, among other things, that the structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision
would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision dwellers. The
argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to accommodate the
individual families of their two children must fail for like reason. Nor can petitioners claim
good faith; the restrictive covenants are explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and
annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title.
In sum, the Court holds that -
(1)....The provisions of the Restrictive Covenant are valid;
(2)....Petitioners must be held to be bound thereby; and
(3)....Since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive
Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent
that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits.
Goldcrest v. Cypress
GR # 171072, Apr. 7, 2009
584 SCRA 435
Facts: Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress
Gardens, a ten-storey building located at Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.
On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions
which constituted Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated
respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the
condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Goldcrest retained
ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the
ondominium. Following the turnover of the administration and management of the
Condominium to the board of directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain
common areas pertaining to Cypress were being occupied and encroached upon by
Goldcrest. Cypress filed a complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Cypress sought to remove the door
erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the
door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire
fence on the roof deck. Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the
roof deck’s limited common area by Section 4(c)4 of the condominium’s Master Deed. It
likewise argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security
purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and
inaccessible to other condominium unit owners. During the first inspection of the
HLURB, it was found that Goldcrest enclosed and used the common area fronting the
two elevators on the ninth floor as a storage room. It was likewise discovered that
Goldcrest constructed a permanent structure which encroached 68.01 square meters of
the roof deck’s common area. During the second inspection, it was noted that Goldcrest
failed to secure an alteration approval for the said permanent structure. Arbiter San
Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. HLURB Special Division modified the decision of
Arbiter San Vicente deleting the award for damages but still directed Goldcrest to
remove any or all the structures which obstruct the use of the stairway from the eighth to
Property & Succession Cases 60
tenth floor, the passage and use of the lobbies at the ninth and tenth floors of the
Cypress Gardens Condominium; and to remove any or all structures that impede the
use of the unlimited common areas. Cypress appealed to the Office of the President for
the inclusion of actual damages, OP denied. On appeal to the CA, Cypress was partially
favored. Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof deck’s common limited area
is for its exclusive use; building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons
do not impair the subject easement.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the third persons do not impair the subject
easement.
Held: Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the limited common area
despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did Goldcrest’s act
impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of
Section 22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit:
(1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the easement;
(2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated;
(3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established;
(4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation
of the easement;
(5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome;
(6) it must notify the servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on
the servient estate; and
(7) it should choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to
cause the least convenience to the owner of the servient estate.
Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
A careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the
office structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s
limited area. Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the
condominium’s foundation and on the roof deck’s common limited area, making the
easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium
unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the
intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project
plan and violated Section 4 of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.
Abellana v. CA
GR # 97039, Apr. 24, 1992
208 SCRA 316

Facts: The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the
Nonoc Homes Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a
subdivision road which, according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which
they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they
had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The
construction of a wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners
of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision residents access to the
public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and
cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be opened
to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place
before it was developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc
Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct
route from the petitioners' land to the public highway.
Issue: Whether or not easement may be acquired by prescription.
Held:
The appellate court did not err in holding that the road lots in a private subdivision are
private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation,
purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.
Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and
may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The
use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
(discontinuous) because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man. It can
be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land (4
Manresa 597; Haffman vs. Shoemaker, 71 SE 198, both cited on p. 454, Vol. 2, 6th Ed.,
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription (Cuaycong, et al, vs Benedicto, et
al., 37 Phil. 781; Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, et al., 103 Phil. 84; Ayala de Roxas vs. Case,
8 Phil. 197). Neither may petitioners invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a subdivision
without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public
road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained according to the
requirement of the government authorities concerned.
The above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which
petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.
Bicol Agro-Ind v. Obias
GR # 172077, Oct. 09, 2009
603 SCRA 173
Property & Succession Cases 61
Facts: Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed a road (“the
disputed road”) – measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers long. The
disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and
from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling
operations. On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers
Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of BISUDECO. petitioner filed a Complaint against
respondents alleging that they unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing
bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioner’s and the other
sugar planter’s vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing
serious damage and prejudice to petitioner. Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO
constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields
the road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children
and relatives of the landowners in exchange for the construction of the road on their
properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the
disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the
landowners, which right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s
assets. respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO
regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They alleged that
BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the
disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously
used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their repeated protests.
Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of the
road since BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the
entire country was then under Martial Law.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently
establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents
regarding the construction of the disputed road. Moreover, the CA also declared that an
easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by
prescription. The CA likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled
to a
compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the road is a valid right of way acquired by BISUDECO vis-à-vis
Bicol Agro-Industrial.
Held:
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will of the parties (a
voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way – the privilege of persons or a particular
class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually through one particular path or linen
– is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and
depends on the act of man. Because of this character, an easement of a right of way
may only be acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
In Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Costabella) the Court held that, “It is
already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot
be acquired by prescription.”
In Bogo-Medellin, this Court discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of right
of way and the rule that the same cannot be acquired by prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the
railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in nature. The
more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and they continuously
occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by
Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive
period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the easement of right of way over the
subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of
persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes
continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous
according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent
signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man,
like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and
depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if
a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of
vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous
because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes
over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon
the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert
the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement
into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only
classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a
right of way) and
Property & Succession Cases 62
a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an
easement of not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road in
dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be apparent.
To reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner
they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has
been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its
discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the
New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by
prescription militates against petitioner’s claim of laches.
Salimbangon v. Tan
GR # 185240, Jan. 20, 2010
610 SCRA 426
FACTS
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate . Twenty years later his children Benedicta, Guillermo,
Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and
partition, adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves as follows:
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW.
boundary in favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way
1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and gratuitous road right of way 1.50
m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot D of the subdivision.
Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being
interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs established in their
extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley
between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The
partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual
titles issued to the heirs.
But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs
modified their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D,
and E, and in its place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that
ran exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with Benedicta with the
result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city
street. Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on
this lot and built two garages on it.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought
Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that
spilled into the easement area. Spouses Salimbangon instituted an action against the
Tans. The trial court ruled in favor of the Salimbangons by upholding their easement of
right of way over the alley on Lot B, the lot that belonged to the Tans. The court pointed
out that since the easement in this case was established by agreement of the parties for
the benefit of Lots A, D, and E, then only by mutual agreement of the parties could such
easement be extinguished.
On Appeal, the CA reversed the decision, ruling that the sale had extinguished the
easement of right of way by operation of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement which was established by the partition agreement will also
be extinguished through an agreement.
HELD:
No.
As originally constituted in that agreement, each of Lots A and B was to contribute a
strip of 1.5 meters between them that when combined formed a 3-meter wide alley
leading from Lots D and E to the street. To the extent that
Lots A and B retained the right to use the 1.5-meter portion that they contributed to the
establishment of the easement, the agreement gave their owners the right to use the
common alley as well. As Eduardo testified, however, the true intent of the heirs was to
give Lots D and E access to the street. Lots A and B did not need this alley since they
were facing the street.1avvphi1
Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the
easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.8 The existence of
a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates
belong to the same person.
Also, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of
1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these
lots were already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of
Way, etc." that cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A,
D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot
B.
Although the "cancellation" document did not say so, it was implicit that the changed
location of the easement cancelled not only the 1.5-meter strip of easement imposed on
Lot A of the Salimbangons but also their right to use the new 3-meter easement alley
that lay entirely on Lot B. Strictly speaking, if the Salimbangons insist that their right as
dominant estate under the original partition agreement remains, then that would be
partly on a 1.5-meter strip of their own Lot A and partly on the equivalent 1.5-meter strip
on the side of Lot B, not on the new 3-meter alley established entirely on Lot B.
Property & Succession Cases 63
The point is that, obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs
intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected
Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended
beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common
owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to
have been extinguished by operation of law.
Chapter 2. Legal Easements (Arts. 634-687)
Quimen v. CA
GR # 112331, May 29, 1996
257 SCRA 163
FACTS:
Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of
Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road.
The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-
1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 14413-B-2.
Adjoining Sotero's property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally
owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain
Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of
their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two
(2) equal parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92
square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacia's Lot No. 1448-B-1,
while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio
through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. The latter
allegedly assured her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property at
a certain price.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda
finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the
payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her
property.
In the meantime, Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-
B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis
et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and Anastacia's perimeter fence. Although
the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The
municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path
so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach
the road.

For this reason, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way
through Anastacia's property. The court dismissed her petition. On appeal by
respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she
was entitled to a right of way on petitioner's property and that the way proposed by
Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: WON Yolanda may be given a right of way on the property of petitioner.
HELD: YES We find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court
granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioner's property. In fact, as
between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already
been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue
herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which
petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a
legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable,
whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do
or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by
causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant
or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another's property when
his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to
the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way
through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial
use of his property.
The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a
public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the
estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per
square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not
cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. 14 These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk
of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that "[t]he said properties of Antonio
Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally
isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement
of right of way to the public highway."
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of
way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We cannot
agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of
way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
Property & Succession Cases 64
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not
always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance;
while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. This is the test.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that
the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters
long at the extreme right of petitioner's property, will cause the least prejudice and/or
damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda's
father which would mean destroying the sari sari store made of strong materials. Absent
any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the
records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them.
Sta. Maria v. CA
GR # 127549, Jan. 28, 1998
285 SCRA 351
FACTS: Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a
piece of land, Lot No. 124. Said lot is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast
portion thereof; by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot
6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively by
Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest;
and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.
Plaintiff spouses Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Cesar and Raquel Sta.
Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the establishment of an easement of right of way.
Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to other
persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet
to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the
alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would
be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road;
that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of
defendants in going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she
acknowledged the absence of an access from their property to the road; and that
alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of way and referral of the
dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus, plaintiffs
prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their
favor.
The trial court decided in favor of respondents and found that based on the Ocular
Inspection Report there was no other way through which the private respondents could

establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road except by traversing directly
the property of the petitioners. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the private respondents had sufficiently established the existence of the four
requisites for compulsory easement of right of way.
ISSUE: WON a compulsory right of way can be granted to private respondents who
have two other existing passage ways other than that of petitioners and an alternative
vacant lot fronting the provincial road also adjacent to private respondents' property,
which can be used in going to and from private respondents' property.
HELD: YES. All told, the findings of fact of both courts satisfied the following
requirements for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under
the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet
to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649,
last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The property of the plaintiffs, spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo, is completely
surrounded with adobe fence without any point of egress and ingress to the national
road. It has been commented upon that where there are several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on any of them, the one
where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if
these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause
the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest. And if the conditions
of the various tenements are the same, all the adjoining owners should be cited and
experts utilized to determine where the easement shall be established.
In the case at bar, the ocular inspection disclosed that there are three options open to
the plaintiffs-appellees as a route to reach the national road, to wit:
(1) To traverse directly through defendants' property which is the shortest route of
approximately 20 to 25 meters away from the national road;
(2) To purchase a right of way from the adjoining property of Florentino Cruz on the left
side of their property; and
(3) To negotiate with Jacinto family on the right side of their property.
In all instances, no significant structures would be adversely affected. There is sufficient
vacant space between defendants' houses of approximately 11 meters. The distance of
defendant Florcerfida's house with the adjoining adobe wall separating that of the
property of defendants Cesar and Racquel Sta. Maria is about 4 meters, while the space
between the adobe wall and that of the latter's house is about 7 meters or a total of 11
meters vacant space for purposes of a right of way. On the other hand, plaintiffs may
negotiate with a right of way with Florentino Cruz on the left side of their property
although the same is quite circuitous. Lastly, the option through the property of the
Jacinto on the right side is very circuitous and longer. The route involves a total of about
Property & Succession Cases 65
50 yards as it has to go straight to the right of about 35 yards and turn left of about
another 15 yards before reaching the common right of way.
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that defendants-appellants'
property would afford the shortest distance from plaintiffs-appellees' property to the
provincial road. Moreover, it is the least prejudicial since as found by the lower court, "(i)t
appears that there would be no significant structures to be injured in the defendants'
property and the right-of-way to be constructed thereon would be the shortest of all the
alternative routes pointed to by the defendants"
Quintanilla v. Abangan
GR # 160613, Feb. 12, 2008
544 SCRA 494
FACTS: Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, (the dominant estate) from one Dionisio
Abasolo. Thereafter, Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito (petitioner),
her son, who is now the registered owner thereof. Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In
the conduct of their business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and
finished products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse
on their property (the dominant estate), they filed an action asking for a right of way from
respondent Pedro.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, (the servient
estate) and a lot near the dominant estate, had earlier sold the same to DARYL'S , and
thereafter, DARYL'S constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the
same with a concrete fence.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit ruling that held that petitioners
failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least prejudicial to the
servient estate. On appeal, the CA affirmed the adverse decision holding that the
criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest distance.
ISSUE: WON compliance with the preconditions set forth in articles 649 and 650 of the
new civil code is superior to the "mere convenience rule against the owner of the
dominant estate.
HELD: YES. As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil Code,
the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on
any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should
be chosen. But if these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in the
instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will
not be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the criterion of shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the
shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the servient tenement, such

as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way,
as in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong materials to provide
ingress and egress to a public highway and another right of way which although longer
will only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as
the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can
be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already a newly opened public
road barely fifty (50) meters away from the property of appellants, which only shows that
another requirement of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to
establish a compulsory right of way.
Valdez v. Tabisula
GR # 175510, July 28, 2008
560 SCRA 332
FACTS; Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from respondent-
spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land, bounded on the
North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a Creek and
on the West, by Lot No. 223-A. In their contract of sale, they have agreed that
petitioners shall be provided “a 2 1/2 meters *sic+ wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot which is not included in this sale.”
Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject
property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the
deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to attend the conferences scheduled by
the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages against respondents before the RTC.
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and
attorney’s fees), averred that the 2 ½-meter easement should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not from theirs;6 and petitioners and their family are
also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining
properties have access to two public roads or highways – the bigger one which adjoins
P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which abuts an existing barangay road
on the north.
The RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint and granted respondents’ Counterclaim. On
appeal, the CA, affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or
compulsory easement of right of way as they failed to present circumstances justifying
their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners may demand for a right of way based on the clause in their
contract of sale.
Property & Succession Cases 66
HELD: NO. Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons, and
without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the
proprietor’s own acts. (Underscoring supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3)
the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s own acts; (4) the right
of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites
lies on the owner of the dominant estate, herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their family are also the owners of
two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or
highways.
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have
no right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the "western side of
*respondents’+ lot."
Chapter 3. Voluntary Easements (Arts. 688 -693)
La Vista Assoc. v. CA
GR # 95252, Sept. 5, 1997
278 SCRA 498
Facts: Mangyan Road is the boundary between the La Vista Subdivision on one side
and Ateneo and Maryknoll (Miriam) on the other. The road extends to the entrance gate
of Loyola Grand Villas. The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally
part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons. The Tuasons sold to Philippine
Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings. The Philippine Building Corporation
transferred, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to Ateneo. The

Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building
Corporation into La Vista Subdivision.
La Vista seeks the issuance of a writ of injunction to finally enjoin private respondents
Solid Homes, Inc., developers of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, the latter’s
predecessor-in-interest, Ateneo, and the residents of the said subdivision from enjoying
an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
La Vista contends that “mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its (the easement of right-of-way) basis. To justify the imposition of this
servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it”
Issue: Whether or not La Vista may withhold from the private respondents the use of the
Mangyan Road
Held: The rule cited by La Vista, enunciated in Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way. A legal or compulsory
easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. A
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective
predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is
quite evident when:
(a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed
of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property herein sold and the
adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)meters wide, one-half of
which shall be taken from the property herein sold to theVENDEE and the other half
from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors;"
(b) the Tuasons expressly agreed and consented to the assignment of the land to, and
the assumption of all the rights and obligations by Ateneo, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter
wide roadway;
(c) the Tuasons filed a complaint against Maryknoll and Ateneo for breach of contract
and the enforcement the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that
Maryknoll set back its wall to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters,
after Maryknoll constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway;
(d) La Vista President Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified, in a letter to Ateneo
President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that "Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-
half of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista
Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created
Property & Succession Cases 67
in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our7 1/2 m. portion
of the road in your favor;"
(e) La Vista, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the Ateneo property, acknowledged
the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the mutual right-of-way
between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners' Association would
be extinguished if it bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the
owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and,
(f) La Vista President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
acknowledged that "one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to LaVista
Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo inequal
portions;"
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted
a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract;
the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate.
The argument of petitioner that there are other routes to Loyola Grand Villas from
Mangyan Road is meritless. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.
That there is no contract between La Vista and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court
could not have declared the existence of an easement created by the manifest will of the
parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both La Vista and Solid
Homes,Inc.,i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation, respectively,
clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road.
Unisource v. Chung
GR # 173252, Jul. 17, 2009
593 SCRA 230
Facts: Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 176253 of
the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a
memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over
from the Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico.
As Sandico’s property was transferred to several owners, the memorandum of
encumbrance of a voluntary easement in favor of Francisco M. Hidalgo was consistently
annotated at the back of every title covering Sandico’s property until TCT No. 176253
was issued in petitioner’s favor. On the other hand, Hidalgo’s property was eventually
transferred to respondents Joseph Chung, Kiat Chung and Cleto Chung under TCT No.
121488.
On May 26, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary
Easement of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate
access to a public road which is Matienza Street. The trial court dismissed the petition

on the ground that it is a land registration case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property. In an Order
dated November 24, 2000, the trial court granted the motion. In their Answer,
respondents countered that the extinguishment of the easement will be of great
prejudice to the locality and that petitioner is guilty of laches since it took petitioner 15
years from acquisition of the property to file the petition.
The trial court ordered the cancellation of the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way in favor of the dominant estate owned by respondents. It found that the
dominant estate has no more use for the easement since it has another adequate outlet
to a public road which is Matienza Street. Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals; the latter, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of right of way.
Issue: Whether or not the easement is personal since the annotation did not prove that it
is binding on the heirs or assigns of Sandico
Held: The petition lacks merit. As defined, an easement is a real right on another’s
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from
doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the
benefit of another person or tenement. Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owner. The former are called legal, and the latter, voluntary easements.
In this case, petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way exists in
favor of respondents. In its petition to cancel the encumbrance of voluntary easement of
right of way, petitioner alleged that “*t+he easement is personal. It was voluntarily
constituted in favor of a certain Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico, the owner of *the lot+
described as Lot No. 2, Block 2650.” It further stated that “the voluntary easement of the
right of way in favor of Francisco Hidalgo y Magnifico was constituted simply by will or
agreement of the parties. It was not a statutory easement and definitely not an
easement created by such court order because ‘*the] Court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties.” In its Memorandum dated September
27, 2001, before the trial court, petitioner reiterated that “*t+he annotation found at the
back of the TCT of Unisource is a voluntary easement.”
Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot now claim that what exists is a legal
easement and that the same should be cancelled since the dominant estate is not an
enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a public road which is Callejon
Matienza Street. As we have said, the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can
extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case
at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of
necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity. A voluntary easement of right of way, like any other
contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate.
It is settled that the registration of the dominant estate under the Torrens system without
the annotation of the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement.
On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free, that is, without the
annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes the easement.
Property & Succession Cases 68
The mere fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the
easement. Article 618 of the Civil Code provides that if the dominant estate is divided
between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety,
without changing the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way.
Title VIII. Nuisance (Arts. 694-707)
Telmo v. Bustamante
GR # 182567, Jul. 13, 2009
592 SCRA 552
Facts: Respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in Brgy.
Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-957643 of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos)
are the owners of the two (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C,
respectively, located at the back of respondent’s lot. When his lot was transgressed by
the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road, respondent offered for sale the
remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they said they would have no
use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the road’s 10-meter easement.
The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of
Lot 952-A in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos
encroached upon respondent’s lot. Petitioner then uttered, “Hangga’t ako ang municipal
engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa n’yo; hindi ko
kayo bibigyan ng building permit.”
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00
p.m. of the same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles.
The following day, respondent’s relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the
destruction of the concrete poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the
same, because he was present when the incident occurred. Consumo never recorded
the incident in the barangay blotter.
Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just
compensation from the government when it took a portion of their property for the
construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use
of the remaining part of their lot due to the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos
and Consumo. Respondent charged the latter criminally—for violation of Article 312 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019— and
administratively—for violation of Section 4 (a) (b), (c), and (e) of Republic Act No. 6713.
After submitting their own counter-affidavits, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon found petitioner and Danilo Consumo administratively liable, but dismissed the
charge against Elizalde Telmo for lack of jurisdiction over his person, he being a private
individual. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the Honorable Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon seriously erred when
he declared that there was no valid taking of respondent’s lot by means of expropriation
(2) Whether or not respondent’s concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se
Held:
(1) NO. Sec. 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings.—When any building or structure
is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the decree of danger to life, health, or
safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions
of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Sec. 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or Structures. Dangerous buildings are
those which are herein declared as such or are structurally unsafe or not provided with
safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are otherwise dangerous to human life,
or which in relation to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or public
welfare because of inadequate maintenance, dilapidation, obsolescence, or
abandonment, or which otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the community
to an intolerable degree.
A careful reading of the foregoing provisions would readily show that they do not apply
to the respondent’s situation. Nowhere was it shown that the concrete posts put up by
respondent in what he believed was his and his co-
owners’ property were ever declared dangerous or ruinous, such that they can be
summarily demolished by petitioner.
What is more, it appears that the concrete posts do not even fall within the scope of the
provisions of the National Building Code. The Code does not expressly define the word
“building.” However, we find helpful the dictionary definition of the word “building,” viz:
*A+ constructed edifice designed usually covered by a roof and more or less completely
enclosed by walls, and serving as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for animals, or
other useful structure – distinguished from structures not designed for occupancy (as
fences or monuments) and from structures not intended for use in one place (as boats
or trailers) even though subject to occupancy.
(2) NO. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently,
the concrete posts summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the
safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated immediate and
summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the
public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
BOOK III - DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
Property & Succession Cases 69
PRELIMINARY PROVISION (Art. 712)
Title I. OCCUPATION (Arts. 713-720)
Acap v. CA
GR # 118114, Dec. 7, 1995
251 SCRA 30
Facts: Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by
petitioner Teodoro Acap. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a “Declaration
of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private respondent Edy delos Reyes.
Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid the rental
to him in 1982. However in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which
prompted respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages.
Petitioner averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that
he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow upon her return from abroad. The
lower court ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issues: (1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” is a recognized
mode of acquiring ownership by private respondent (2) Whether the said document can
be considered a deed of sale in favor of private respondent
Held: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a
juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the
res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law.
Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process.
While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or
transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price
certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and
waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds
whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among
themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs
under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale
of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of
a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to
relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private
respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively
claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which
neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode
of acquiring ownership.

A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered
owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is
no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already pending in
court. It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly proven,
there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme
Pido's heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in
favor of private respondent. Private respondent's right or interest therefore in the
tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the
OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while
the transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both
parties, the right of petitioner as a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily
forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's ownership without the
corresponding proof thereof.
Heirs of Seraspi v. CA
GR # 135602, Apr. 28, 2000
331SCRA 293
Facts: Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his lifetime,
Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen
(15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into
three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of the heirs in each
marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold
the share of the heirs in the estate to Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second
marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage,
in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are
the present petitioners. Included in this sale was the property sold by Patronicio to
Dominador.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the
security of the lands in question to finance improvements on the lands. However, they
failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were
sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to
Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino’s child by his third wife, taking
advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who had been paralyzed due to a stroke,
forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a
complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property
through a sale and acquisitive prescription. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
Property & Succession Cases 70
reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of
limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had
passed away and was thus substituted by his heirs.
Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners’ action is barred by extinctive prescription; and
(2) Whether or not private respondent Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the
properties in question through acquisitive prescription
Held: SC ruled for petitioners. (1)Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals, it held that an
action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an interest therein can only
be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action
for recovery of possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987,
i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-in-interest had been allegedly deprived of
the possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed. This case involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the
facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the Civil Code. Accordingly, what was
applied was §41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by prescription
is acquired after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession may have been
commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with just title.
On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable
law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code which provides: Real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years. This provision is without prejudice to what is established for
the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary, depending on whether the property is possessed in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law. Private respondent contends that he acquired the
ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse
possession for ten (10) years.
(2) Respondent Simeon Recasa has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129
provides: For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through
any of the modes recognized by the Civil Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual
creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain
contracts, and (7) prescription.

Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through
occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, the ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the
property was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which
private respondent belongs.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was its
owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. Private respondent entered the
property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a
mere usurper.
Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership. The basis of petitioners’ claim
of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient to
make them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price,
the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or
constructive delivery of the property. Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione
dominia dominica rerum transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the
ownership of things).
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not been
delivered to them. At the time they bought the property from Rata in 1983, the property
was in the possession of private respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in possession of the
property. Petitioners’ title to the property prevails over private respondents’ possession
in fact but without basis in law. As held in Waite v. Peterson, when the property
belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action
against the latter for the recovery of the property. Such right may be transferred by the
sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action against
the wrongdoer.
Palero-Tan v. Urdaneta
AM # P-07-2399, Jun. 18, 2008
555 SCRA 28
Facts: Edna Palero-Tan a Court Stenographer charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. a Utility
Worker of the same court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing her
ring and bracelet. Edna claimed that it has been her practice to keep her and her sister’s
pieces of jewelry in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office because she fears
that they might be lost at the boarding house she is renting. And that the only person
who was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was
respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers. On 28 July 2005, an officemate, Anecito D.
Altone (Altone), confided to her that he heard from his landlady, Anastacia R. Nable
(Nable), that respondent and his wife, Milagros, had a quarrel because the latter
discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondent’s coin purse.
Property & Succession Cases 71
Urdaneta denied that he stole complainant’s jewelry. He claimed that he found a small
plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet under his table, at the side nearest the
adjacent table of the complainant, and thinking that the jewelry belonged to one of the
litigants who approached him that morning, he took them for safekeeping with the
intention of returning them to whoever was the owner. He thought that the ring and
bracelet were "fancy" jewelry as they were merely placed in an ordinary
plastic sachet. When nobody claimed the jewelry, he placed them inside his coin purse
and took them home. However, his wife, on 30 June 2005, found them and accused him
of buying the pieces of jewelry for his mistress, and to stop his wife’s nagging, he threw
the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house.
Issue: W/N finding a “lost property” charges the finder the duty to restore the same to its
owner.
Held: Yes. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner
takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become
vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the
obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to report to his
superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719,
explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:
Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous
possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor
of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the
way he deems best.
If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses which
considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the
publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the
thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall
be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.
Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the intention
to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his wife. His
claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is immaterial because the
basis for his liability is his act of taking something which does not belong to him.
Title III. DONATION (Arts. 725-773)
Chapter 1. Nature of Donations (Arts. 725-734)
Rep vs. Guzman
GR# 132964/ Feb. 18, 2000

326 SCRA 90
Facts: Simeon Guzman, a Naturalized American Citizen died intestate leaving an
American Wife, Helen and an American Son, David, the herein respondent. David and
Helen executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon in the Philippines.
Subsequently, Helen executed a Quitclaim leaving everything to the disposal of David.
David then owned everything.
A concerned Lawyer wrote the Office of the Solicitor General that the ownership of
David to the extent of ½ of the estate of Simeon was defective. The reason is that, being
a Citizen of America, he was prohibited to be a donee of properties in the Philippines.
The deed of Quitclaim was interpreted to be that of the Donation. The government filed
for Escheat Proceeding in so far as the ½ portion was concerned. Under Article 12 of
the Constitution, a foreigner is disqualified to have a property save in cases of hereditary
succession. Being a donee of the ½, the same is void and would necessarily pertain to
the republic of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the ½ ownership of the properties be escheated in favor of the
government?
Held: No, in order that a Donation is valid, the following requisites must concur: there
must be a decrease in the property if the donor, there must be an increase in the
property of the donee and there must be intent to donate. The Quitclaim made by Helen
negated the intent to donate that must be satisfied. Helen meant that the quitclaim was
not a donation because she was prohibited to donate under that Philippine Laws and
she sad that it was absurd for he to do that. There was no donation. It was merely a
waiver of right in favor of the donee, the son. Even if there has been that intent, the
same should not be a valid donation since the acceptance required for in Article 748
was absent. The escheat proceeding is not proper.
RP v. Silim
GR # 140487, Apr. 2, 2001
356 SCRA 1
Facts: Spouses Silim and Mangubat donated a 5,600 sq. m parcel of land in favour of
the Bureau of Public Schools, Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively
and forever for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio
Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or
Confirmation of Donation.
A school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan
school building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land could
not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare
parcel of land. To remedy this predicament Buendia was authorized to officially transact
for the exchange of the old school site to a new and suitable location which would fit the
specifications of the government. Pursuant to this, Buendia and Teresita Palma entered
Property & Succession Cases 72
into a Deed of Exchange whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot
owned by the latter. The Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new
school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled
and transferred to the new location.
The Silim spouses learned of the Deed of Exchange when thay learned that Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property. They filed a
complaint to annul the donation claiming that there was no valid acceptance made by
the donee and that there was a violation of the condition in the donation.
Issues: 1. Was there a valid acceptance based on Arts. 745 and 749 of the NCC? 2.
Was the condition in the donation violated?
Held: 1. Yes. There was a valid acceptance. The last paragraph of Art. 749 reads: “If
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.” The purpose of the
formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor.
Here, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed.
Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school building. It was when the
school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-
Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that
respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by
respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal
requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the
donor.
Under Art. 745, the law requires the donee to “accept the donation personally, or
through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general
and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.”
The respondents claim that the acceptance by Buendia of the donation was ineffective
because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the
Philippines. The donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such
being the case, Buendia’s acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987
Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for
and in behalf of the Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and
as long as the same are not prohibited by law.
2. No. The condition was not violated. The exclusivity of the purpose of the donation
was not altered or affected when Buendia exchanged the lot for a much bigger one. It
was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of
the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of Bagong

Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the
donated lot.
Quijada vs. CA
GR# 126444/ Dec. 4, 1998
299 SCRA 6
Facts: Trinidad Quijada with her siblings inherited a 2-hectare land in Agusan Del Sur.
On 1956, they executed a conditional deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of
Talacogon for the subject land. The donation was subject to the condition that the
donated property shall be used solely and exclusively as part of the campus of the
proposed Provincial High School. If such proposal be discontinued, the property shall
automatically revert to the donor. Despite this donation, Trinidad Quijada possessed the
land. On 1962, she sold 1-hectare of the land to Regalado Mondejar through a deed of
sale. The remaining area was sold to the same person verbally evidenced by receipts of
payment. In 1987, the Provincial High School failed to materialize. The Sangguniang
Bayan of the municipality enacted a resolution reverting the land back to the donors.
During that time, Mondejar subsequently sold portions of the property to buyers.Upon
the death of Trinidad Quijada, her heirs now seeks to recover possession and ownership
of the subject land by filing a petition for quieting the title. Petitioners contend that there
was no valid sale since the land was sold when ownership was already transferred to
the Municipality by the deed of donation. Respondents contend otherwise.
Issue: W/N there is a valid sale by the donor, Quijada to a third person, Mondejar, even
if it was conditionally donated to a donee, the Municipality of Talacogan.
Held: There is a valid sale by the donor. When the Municipality’s acceptance of the
donation was made known to the donor, the Municipality became the new owner of the
property despite the conditions in the deed of donation. Ownership is immediately
transferred and will only revert if the resolutory condition is not fulfilled.
When a person donates a land to another on the condition that the latter would build
upon the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory one.
Despite these and as provided for by the Law on Sales, ownership by the seller of the
thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract is not necessary. Ownership is
only relevant during its consummation where the thing sold will be delivered. Such
delivery, in this case, happened when the donor became the owner upon the reversion
of the property. Such title, in accordance to Article 1434 of the New Civil Code, passes
by operation of law to the buyer.
Note: Lands which were previously donated may still be sold to a third person. Such
sale is still valid even if at the time the sale was perfected, the donor-seller did not own
the land. It is upon the consummation of a perfected sale where the donor-seller is
obliged to deliver the thing sold.
Property & Succession Cases 73
Lagazo vs. CA
GR# 112796/ Mar. 5, 1998
287 SCRA 18
Facts: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of Tito Lagazo was the
grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent
resident therein and she appointed one Eduardo Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact on
October 3, 1977, to fix the requirements needed.
Failing to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as her new
attorney-in-fact in April 16, 1984. The grant was subsequently given and later, the land
was donated to Lagazo on January 30, 1985.
Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property. The latter claims ownership
over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol. He
claimed that the house and lot in controversy were his by virtue of the following
documents:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Catalina Jacob dated October 7, 1977 in favor of
Eduardo B. Español covering the residential house located at the premises;
2. Deed of Assignment over Lot 8W executed by Catalina Jacob in favor of Eduardo
Español dated September 30, 1980; and
3. Deed of Assignment executed by Eduardo B. Español over Lot 8W and a residential
house thereon in favor of defendant-appellant dated October 2, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lagazo while the CA reversed stating that Lagazo’s failure to
accept the donation whether in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument
renders the donation null and void. Lagazo contends that the formalities for a donation
of real property should not apply to his case since it was an onerous one because he
paid for the amortizations due on the land before and after the execution of the deed of
donation.
Issue: W/N the donation was simple or onerous.
Held: The donation was a simple, not onerous. A simple or pure donation is one whose
cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is
subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing
donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple
donation are not applicable.
Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have
been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a
condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:
“That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity and considering further that the
DONEE is a grandson of the DONOR, the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives,
transfer[s] and conveys, by way of donation unto said DONEE, his heirs, executors,

administrators and assigns, all the right, title and interest which the said DONOR has in
the above described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements
found therein, free from all lines [sic] and encumbrances and charges whatsoever;”
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the
donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts.
Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following
the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee." Furthermore, "[i]f the acceptance is made
in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments."
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence
makes the donation null and void.
Florencio v. De Leon
GR# 149570/ Mar. 12, 2004
425 SCRA 447
FACTS: Petitioner Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828
square meters located in San Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the
spouses Respondent Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to construct a house on the said
property and stay therein without any rentals therefore.
In November 1978, Pet. De Leon, died intestate. Her heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio
to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio died intestate. On April 26,
1995, the heirs of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio,
demanding that they vacate the property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.
The latter refused and failed to vacate the property. They filed a complaint for ejectment
against the heirs of Florencio before the MTC.
The heirs of Florencio, in their answer, alleged that the plaintiffs had no cause of action
against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976
over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter
accepted the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page
one of the deed. However, the original Deed cannot be produced by the latter. The lower
and the appellate court ruled in favor or Respondents.
ISSUE:1) WON there is donation?; 2)WON Petitioners, who appears to be the donee
under the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material
possession of the property over the respondents who is the registered owner of the
property?
HELD: There is no donation. Under the New Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the
property.
The essential elements of donation are as follows:
(a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and
Property & Succession Cases 74
(c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.
When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that the acceptance thereof be made in the
same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in
a separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic
form, to be noted in both instruments.
As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is
made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified
or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is
generally considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the
property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the
charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same
deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor.
In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a
public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the
Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration
does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are
affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their
predecessors-in-interest.
However, as pointed out by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there are cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which engender veritable doubts as to whether the
petitioners have a better right of possession over the property other than the
respondents, the lawful heirs of the deceased registered owner of the property, Teresa
de Leon, based on the Deed of Donation.
First. Teresa de Leon did not turned over the owner’s duplicate of TCT, to Florencio, to
facilitate the issuance of a new title over the property in his favor. At the very least, he
should have caused the annotation of the deed immediately after the donation or shortly
thereafter, at the dorsal portion of TCT.
Second. Florencio failed to inform the heirs of De Leon that the latter, before her death,
had executed a deed of donation on October 1, 1976 over the property in his favor. It
was only in 1996, or eighteen years after the death of De Leon when the respondents
sued the petitioners for ejectment
Third. In the meantime, the respondents consistently paid the realty taxes for the
property from 1978 up to 1996.
Fourth. The petitioners never adduced in evidence the owner’s duplicate of TCT.
Fifth. The respondents adduced in evidence the affidavit-complaint of Valeriana
Morente dated May 8, 1996, one of the witnesses to the deed, for falsification and
perjury against Florencio and Atty. Tirso Manguiat.
Sixth. A reading of the deed will show that at the bottom of page one thereof, Florencio
was to subscribe and swear to the truth of his acceptance of the donation before
Municipal Mayor Marcelo G. Aure of San Miguel, Bulacan. However, the mayor did not
affix his signature above his typewritten name.
Sevilla vs. Sevilla
GR# 150179/ Apr. 30, 2003

402 SCRA 501
Facts: On December 10, 1973, Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8
children, namely: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla, and Jimmy, all
surnamed Sevilla. William, Jimmy and Maria are now deceased and are survived by
their respective spouses and children, herein petitioners. Filomena left properties, one of
which a parcel of land which she co-owned with her 2 sisters, Honorata Almirol and
Felisa Almirol, who were both single and without issue.
When Honorata died in 1982, her 1/3 undivided share in Lot 653, was transmitted to her
heirs, Felisa Almirol and Filomena.
During the lifetime of Felisa and Honorata Almirol, they lived in the house of Filomena
Almirol de Sevilla, together with their nephew, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla and his
family. Leopoldo attended to the needs of his mother, Filomena, and his two aunts,
Honorata and Felisa.
On July 6, 1988, Felisa died. But prior thereto, on November 25, 1985, she executed a
last will and testament devising her 1/2 share in Lot No. 653 to Respondent Leopoldo
and his wife. On August 8, 1986, Felisa executed another document denominated as
“Donation Inter Vivos” ceding to Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653,
which was accepted by Leopoldo in the same document.
Petitioners filed a case against respondents Leopoldo for annulment of the Deed of
Donation and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, alleging that the Deed of Donation is
tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was then 81 years of age, was seriously
ill and of unsound mind at the time of the execution thereof.
RTC uphold the validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition unenforceable.
Issue: Whether the deed of donation is valid?
Held: Yes. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a
thing or right in favor of another who accepts it. Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, the
donor’s capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. Like
any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential, and the attendance of a vice
of consent renders the donation voidable.
In the case at bar, there is no question that at the time Felisa Almirol executed the deed
of donation she was already the owner of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653. Her 1/3
undivided share therein was increased by 1/2 when she and Filomena inherited the 1/3
share of their sister Honorata after the latter’s death. Hence, the 1/2 undivided share of
Felisa in Lot No. 653 is considered a present property which she can validly dispose of
at the time of the execution of the deed of donation.
The insistence that respondent Leopoldo Sevilla employed fraud and undue influence
on the person of the donor is not present in the case at bar. He who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.
Petitioners failed to show proof why Felisa should be held incapable of exercising
sufficient judgment in ceding her share to respondent Leopoldo. As testified by the
Property & Succession Cases 75
notary public who notarized the Deed of Donation, Felisa confirmed to him her intention
to donate her share in Lot No. 653 to Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was
old, she was of sound mind and could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is nothing in the
record that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to rebut said declaration of the
notary public.
Catalan vs. Basa
GR# 159667/ July 31, 2007
528 SCRA 645
Facts: On June 16, 1951, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) donated to his sister
MERCEDES CATALAN (Mercedes) one-half of the subject parcel of land.
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the same property in favor of her children Delia and
Jesus Basa. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on
February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of
respondents.
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano's guardian, filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages
against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to
Mercedes was void, as Feliciano was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of
giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab
initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be
nullified for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. On August
14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his
heirs, in lieu of BPI, as complainants.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he
executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared,
the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the
presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld. CA affirmed
the judgment of the trial court and held that all the elements for validity of contracts
having been present in the 1951 donation, Mercedes acquired valid title of ownership
over the property in dispute, and the subsequent sale of the property must be upheld.
Issue: Whether the trial court and the CA were correct in finding that the deed of
donation executed by Feliciano in favor of Mercedes was valid.
Held: Yes. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement
of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1)
it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should
be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties' intention must be clear and the
attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests

upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity
will be presumed.
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence
presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano
was competent when he donated the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners
make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be
suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of
Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of
Feliciano. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be
presumed capable of attending to his property rights.
From the scientific studies, it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that
at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his
mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind
at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was
adduced.
Gestopa v. Pilapil
GR# 111904, Oct. 5, 2000
342 SCRA 105
Facts: Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three deeds of donation mortis causa, two of which
are dated March 4, 1965 and another dated October 13, 1966, in favor of private
respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. The first deed pertained to parcels 1 & 2. The
second deed pertained to parcel 3. The last deed pertained to parcel 4. All deeds
contained the reservation of the rights of the donors (1) to amend, cancel or revoke the
donation during their lifetime, and (2) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties
donated during the donors' lifetime, if deemed necessary. On January 16, 1973, Diego
Danlag, with the consent of his wife, Catalina Danlag, executed a deed of donation inter
vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two other parcels (6 parcels in
all) again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two conditions: that
(1) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land during their lifetime,
and that (2) the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the lifetime of the said
spouses, without their prior consent and approval. Mercedes caused the transfer of the
parcels' tax declaration to her name and paid the taxes on them.
On June 28, 1979 and August 21, 1979, Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and
4 to herein petitioners, Sps. Gestopa. On September 29, 1979, the Danlags executed a
deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of
donation inter vivos. On March 1, 1983, Mercedes Pilapil filed with the RTC a petition
against the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of
land. In their opposition, the Gestopas and the Danlags averred that the deed of
donation dated January 16, 1973 was null and void because it was obtained by
Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
Property & Succession Cases 76
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor.
Further, the donation was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at
all. On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Gestopas
and the Danlags. Mercedes appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1993, the
appellate court reversed the trial court.
Issue: Whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa.
Held: The donation was inter vivos for the following reasons:
(1) The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and
affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos.
(2) The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals, what
was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the owners of
the properties?
(3) The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in accordance with his
standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of land.
(4) The donee accepted the donation. In the case of Alejandro vs. Geraldez, 78 SCRA
245 (1977), we said that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos.
Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in
the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees during the donors'
lifetime.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the right to dispose of
the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to give consent was merely
intended to protect his usufructuary interests. In Alejandro, we ruled that a limitation on
the right to sell during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the
donees and donation was already effective during the donors' lifetime. The attending
circumstances in the execution of the subject donation also demonstrated the real intent
of the donor to transfer the ownership over the subject properties upon its execution.
Prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, the Danlag spouses already executed
three donations mortis causa. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the Danlag
spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations. If they did not intend
to donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the four lots already donated mortis
causa.
Was the revocation valid? A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable,
except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges
imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The donor-spouses did not invoke any of these
reasons in the deed of revocation. Hence the revocation made was not valid. Finally, the
records do not show that the donor-spouses instituted any action to revoke the donation
in accordance with Article 769 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the supposed revocation
on September 29, 1979, had no legal effect.
Magat v. CA
GR # 106755, Feb. 1, 2002
375 SCRA 556

Facts: Basilisa Comerciante is a mother of 5 children, namely, Rosario Austria,
Consolacion Austria, petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat, Leonardo, and one of
respondents, Florentino Lumubos. Leonardo died in a Japanese concentration camp at
Tarlac during World War II.
In 1953, Basilisa bought a parcel of residential land together with the improvement
thereon covered in TCT No. RT-4036 (T-3268) and known as Lot 1, Block 1, Cavite
Beach Subd., with an area of 150 sq m, located in Bagong Pook, San Antonio, Cavite
City. On December 17, 1975, Basilisa executed a document designated as “Kasulatan
sa Kaloobpala (Donation)”. On February 6, 1979, Basilisa executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of the subject house and lot in favor of herein petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat
for P5,000.00. The TCT No. RT-4036 in the name of the donor was cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. T-10434 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite City in favor of
petitioner Apolinaria Austria-Magat.
On September 21, 1983, respondents Teodora Carampot, Domingo Comia, and Ernesto
Apolo (representing their deceased mother Consolacion Austria), Ricardo, Mamerto
and Segunda, all surnamed Sumpelo (representing their deceased mother Rosario
Austria) and Florentino Lumubos filed before the RTC Cavite an action against the
petitioner for annulment of TCT No. T-10434 and other relevant documents, and for
reconveyance and damages. RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the RTC.
Issue: WON THE CA GNORED THE RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE DONATION IN QUESTION AS INTER VIVOS.
Held: CA is affirmed. The provisions in the subject deed of donation that are crucial for
the determination of the class to which the donation belongs are, as follows:
xxx xxx
xxx(I)binibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na apat na
anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang residential o tirahan sampu
ng aking bahay nakatirik doon na nasa Bagong Pook din, San Antonio, Lungsod ng
Kabite
xxx xxx
Na ang Kaloob palang ito ay magkakabisa lamang simula sa araw na ako’y pumanaw
sa mundo, xxx.
xxx xxx
Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng
tirahan ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder
o possesion ng Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at
Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang
maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante xxx.
It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on
whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the characteristics of a donation mortis
causa, was enumerated, to wit:
Property & Succession Cases 77
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full
or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
Thus, the petitioner’s cited provisions are only necessary assurances that during the
donor’s lifetime, the latter would still enjoy the right of possession over the property; but,
his naked title of ownership has been passed on to the donees; and that upon the
donor’s death, the donees would get all the rights of ownership over the same including
the right to use and possess the same.
Furthermore, it also appeared that the provision in the deed of donation regarding the
prohibition to alienate the subject property is couched in general terms such that even
the donor is deemed included in the said prohibition. If the donor intended to maintain
full ownership over the said property until her death, she could have expressly stated
therein a reservation of her right to dispose of the same. The prohibition on the donor to
alienate the said property during her lifetime is proof that naked ownership over the
property has been transferred to the donees.
Another indication in the deed of donation that the donation is inter vivos is the
acceptance clause therein of the donees. We have ruled that an acceptance clause is
a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter
vivos.
Maglasang v. Cabatingan
GR # 131953, Jun. 5, 2002
383 SCRA 6
Held: The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in
case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20
one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should
be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should
take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be
transferred to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would
have not expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.1âwphi1.nêt
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake
of the nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in
accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805
and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and

subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them. (n)
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
Aluad v. Aluad
GR # 176943, Oct. 17, 2008
569 SCRA 697
FACTS: Spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad were childless but during their lifetime,
raised petitioners’ mother Maria (Aluad) and respondent Zenaido (Aluad). When Crispin
died, Matilde inherited from him 6 parcels of land, all of which, she donated to Maria.
The Deed provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the
DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the
DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the
DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present
donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should
survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of
land herein donated.
Because of the agreement in the deed of donation Matilde was still able to transfer in
her name the titles over 2 parcels of land (Lot 674 and Lot 676) out of the 6 donated to
Maria. 1 (Lot 676) of those two was later on sold by her to respondent.
A year after that, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising the remaining four
parcels of land to Maria while her remaining properties, including the land the title of
which was in her name (Lot 674), to respondent.
Matilde died. Maria followed her during the same year. Maria’s heirs, herein petitioners,
thereafter instituted a case before the RTC for the recovery of the two lots in
respondent’s possession. For his defense, respondent alleged that the first lot was
Property & Succession Cases 78
obtained by him through sale while the second lot through inheritance based on the will
executed by Matilde.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners explaining that it was impossible for
respondent to have a valid claim over the two lots as those were previously donated in
favor of the mother of petitioners.
The CA on appeal reversed the trial court’s decision ruling that the donation made to the
mother of petitioners was not inter vivos but a mortis causa hence invalid for failing to
comply with the requisites for its validity as provided under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Hence the present appeal.
ISSUE: WON the donation made to petitioners was inter vivos.
HELD: NO. As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death
of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend
to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’ mother during her (Matilde’s)
lifetime.
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right
to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an
attribute of ownership.The phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who
should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it
would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not
refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph
should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving
spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband –
Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975.
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:

x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor
provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further
force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and
effect" the logical construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation,
the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no
further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of
the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this
resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a
donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to
be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said
resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time
when the donee died?
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having
followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother.
But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course
to the qualification that her (Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No.
676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August
26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of
their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot
should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by
acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open,
and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts,
however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a
general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial
court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to
the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to
the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the
hearing before the trial court.
Sicad vs. CA
GR# 125888/ Aug. 13, 1998
294 SCRA 183
FACTS: A document denominated as "DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS," was
executed by Montinola naming as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino
Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a
parcel of land located at Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in
the name of Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in
acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. Said deed was registered.
Property & Succession Cases 79
Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as
well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10,
1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas
City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T-
16105 (in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding. Her petition was
founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis
causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the
donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT
No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622.
Her petition was opposed by her grandchildren (donees) alleging that it was an inter
vivos donation, having fully complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729
of the Civil Code. The case was subsequently changed into an ordinary civil action. The
court held that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora
Montinola's petition for lack of merit.
In the meantime, Montinola died. An appeal was made by herein petitioner-spouses
Sicad who substituted Montinola after her legal heirs had expressed their disinterest
over the case. The CA however affirmed the trial court’s decision hence the present
petition.
ISSUE: WON the deed of donation is in the character of inter vivos.
HELD: NO, it is in the character of a mortis causa disposition. The evidence establishes
that on December 11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer
(Atty. Treñas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed
her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that
the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a
new proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or
encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor."
The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is apparent on the face of
the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceived and identified — it was clearly typed
on a different machine, and is crammed into the space between the penultimate
paragraph of the deed and that immediately preceding it.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa.
In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive."
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation
in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get
possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof,
or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire
the right to dispose of the property — this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years

from Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to
the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these
circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation —
reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or
encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death — ineluctably lead to
the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating
a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise.
The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the
prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which,
if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they
have the right to make a disposition of the property, which they do not. The argument
also makes no sense, because if
they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a third
person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility or benefit to
the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the restoration of the
donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property.
It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter
vivos simply because founded on considerations of love and affection. In Alejandro v.
Geraldez, supra this Court also observed that "the fact that the donation is given in
consideration of love and affection ** is not a characteristic of donations inter vivos
(solely) because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the same reason."
Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the
conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services
rendered by the latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds,
Exhs. "1" and "2," constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have
identical motivation."
Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to
the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be
that entailing "the least transmission of rights and
interests".
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa; it
is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer
GR# 187056/ Sept. 20,2010
630 SCRA 683
Held: That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa"
is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.10
Property & Succession Cases 80
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability"
is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.12
(Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation is
the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." Here, the
donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable
and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter
vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But
this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an
irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance
the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.1awphi1 Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.15
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the
conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order
to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
Ganuelas v. Cawed
GR # 123968, Apr. 24, 2003
401 SCRA 447

Held: Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the
act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death
of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the
death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez
is illuminating:24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or
naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the
donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation
mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but
because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles
74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with
all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or,
what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that
any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior
to the death of Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29
Property & Succession Cases 81
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before
the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect
shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee.30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as
mortis causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of
donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and
every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her
presence and that of each other have in like manner subscribed our names as
witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of
love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the
donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular
significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not,
because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and affection
may also underline transfers mortis causa.
Central Phil. Univ. v. CA
GR #112127, Jul 17, 1995
246 SCRA 511
Held: Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of
rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend
upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person
donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a
school, the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition
but a resolutory one. It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed
before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the owner
of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. 5 If there was no
fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the
donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under
it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
Xxxx
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land
donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall
be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the

condition thereof. Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended
upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held that its absolute acceptance
and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private
respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of donation.
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of
circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50)
years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But,
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one
of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek
rescission and the court shall decree the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period
of the compliance, there are no more obstacles for the court to decree the rescission
claimed.
Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all
purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to
the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
Chapter 2. Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation (Arts. 735-749)
Chapter 3. Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereof (Arts. 750-759)
Heirs of Maramag v. Maramag
GR # 181132, Jun. 5, 2009
588 SCRA 774
Issue: (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine
Held: In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although
petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the
insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that
Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto,
being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—
Property & Succession Cases 82
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest
of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified
in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance
proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already
deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation
where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties
to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third
parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and,
thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and
Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The
revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as
beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription
exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the
shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers
themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said
illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is
only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
Insular Life v. Ebrado,
GR # 44059, Oct. 28, 1977
80 SCRA 181
Issue: Can a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life insurance policy of a
legally married man claim the proceeds thereof in case of death of the latter?
Held: Common-law spouses are, definitely, barred from receiving donations from each
other. Article 739 of the new Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of donation;
Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;

3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason of
his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by
the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
We do not think that a conviction for adultery or concubinage is exacted before the
disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. More specifically, with record to the
disability on "persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation," Article 739 itself provides:
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by
the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may be proved by
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Arangote v. Maglunob
GR # 178906, Feb. 18, 2009
579 SCRA 620
Held: In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation,
met the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument.
Nevertheless, it failed to meet the aforesaid second and third requisites. The acceptance
of the said donation was not made by the petitioner and her husband either in the same
Affidavit or in a separate public instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the
said donation, there was also no notice of the said acceptance given to the donor,
Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her
husband is null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance39 dated 23 September 2000, as well as
the notice40 of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect.
Moreover, it was only made by the petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed
in court, or when the RTC had already rendered its Decision dated 12 September 2000,
although it was still during Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere
afterthought, a belated attempt to cure what was a defective donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime
of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in
evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance
was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate
instrument embodying the acceptance.41 At the very least, this last legal requisite of
annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the
petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that
Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this
reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated
to the petitioner.
Property & Succession Cases 83
Quilala v. Alcantara,
GR # 132681, Dec. 3, 2001
371 SCRA 311
Held: The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation executed by Catalina in
favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must
be made in a public instrument in order to be valid,7 specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of
acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee,8 and is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee,9 provided the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law
from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable,10 and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.11 The
acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the
donee.12 It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document,13 and the
donor must know the acceptance by the donee.14
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as
well as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the
donation was made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE
inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity."15 This was sufficient
cause for a donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby
a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on
the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely
is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties.
The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has
already been duly executed by the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his
signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to everything that
is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact
that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public
does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in
another part.
Arcaba v. Batocael
GR # 146683, Nov. 22, 2001
370 SCRA 414

Facts: Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision of the CA, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, declaring as void a deed of donation
inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent
resolution denying reconsideration.
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot
No. 437-A in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte with a total lot area of 418 sq m. After
the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived
her share of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco. Francisco registered the lot in
his name with the Registry of Deeds.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba,
then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila
and Francisco. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. It appears that when
Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. Cirila
testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower
when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that
time; and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden. Erlinda
Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his
lot near the public streets. He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper,
though he provided her family with food and lodging.
A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos," giving 150 sq m of his lot, together with his house, to Cirila,
who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of
268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10)
years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by Cirila
as its absolute owner.
Francisco died without any children. On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews
and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-
law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding
the donation void under this provision of the Family Code based on testimonies and
certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille."
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. As already stated, the appeals court denied
reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and
Property & Succession Cases 84
Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's
surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as
Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash
wage.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case.
Held:
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband
and wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital
relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often
repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In
this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship
the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
legitimate children.
Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very
possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least,
their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but Francisco's common law
spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human
reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion
is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art 87 of the
Family Code.
Chapter 4. Revocation and Reduction of Donations (Arts. 760-773)
Zamboanga v. Plagata
GR # 148433, Sept. 30, 2008
567 SCRA 163
Facts: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA and its Resolution denying

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It likewise asked that the second alias writ of
execution issued by Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata, Executive Labor Arbiter of NLRC-RAB
IX, be annulled and declared without any legal effect, as well as the ensuing levy, sale
on execution of the subject property.
On 9 January 1973, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 93 which legalized
barter trading in the Sulu Archipelago and adjacent areas, and empowered the
Commander of the Southwest Command of the AFP to coordinate all activities and to
undertake all measures for the implementation of said decree.
On 17 June 1981, ZBTKBI, thru its President, Atty. Hassan G. Alam, donated to the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by Maj. Gen. Delfin C. Castro, Commander,
Southern Command of the AFP, and Chairman, Executive Committee for Barter Trade,
a parcel of land covered by CTC No. T-61,628 of the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga
City, identified as Lot No. 6 of consolidation subdivision plan Pcs-09-000184, situated in
the Barrio of Canelar, City of Zamboanga, containing an area of 13,643 sq m. The
Republic accepted the donation with conditions contained in the Deed of Donation.
With the acceptance of the donation, TCT No. T-61,628 in the name of ZBTKBI was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT. No. T-66,696 covering the same property was
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Pursuant to condition No. 1 of the Deed of Donation, the Government and the DPWH
RO IX constructed a Barter Trade Market Building worth P5,000,000.00 at the said Lot
No. 6. The building was completed on 30 March 1983 and was occupied by members of
ZBTKBI, as well as by other persons engaged in barter trade.
Prior to said donation, on 16 March 1977, private respondent Teopisto Mendoza was
hired by ZBTKBI as clerk. Subsequently, in a letter dated 1 April 1981, ZBTKBI, through
its President, Atty. Hasan G. Alam, informed Mendoza
that his services were being terminated on the ground of abandonment of work.
Mendoza filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with payment of backwages and
separation pay at the DOLE ROIX on July 29, 1981. The case was assigned to
Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
On 31 May, 1983, Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid rendered his decision finding the
dismissal of Mendoza illegal and ordered ZBTKBI to reinstate Mendoza to his former
position or any equivalent position, and to pay him backwages.
On 17 June 1983, ZBTKBI filed a Notice of Appeal with the NLRC. On 13 July 1983,
Mendoza filed with the NLRC a Manifestation with Motion for Execution praying that
petitioner’s appeal not be given due course, and that a writ of execution enforcing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter be issued.
Property & Succession Cases 85
On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued Memorandum Circular No. 1 which
totally phased out the Zamboanga City barter trade area effective 1 October 1988.
On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias Writ of
Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Julius Rhett J. Plagata
issued on 2 January 1990. Sheriff Anthony B. Gaviola levied whatever interest, share,
right, claim and/or participation of ZBTKBI had over a parcel of land, together with all the
buildings and improvements existing thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 66,696 (formerly TCT No. 61,628) in compliance of said writ.
On 13 June 1990, the afore-described property was sold at public auction for
P96,443.53, with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder. The property was not redeemed.
As a consequence, Sheriff Gaviola issued on 25 June 1991 a Sheriff’s Final Certificate
of Sale in favor of Mendoza over whatever interest, share, right, claim and/or
participation ZBTKBI had over the parcel of land.
Having failed to take possession of the land in question, Mendoza filed a Petition (for
Issuance of Writ of Possession) on 14 February 2000, which was granted on 5 May
2000, by Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata. The writ was issued to place the complainant
in possession (of) the rights, interests, shares, claims, and participations of Zamboanga
Barter Traders Kilusan Bayan, Inc. in that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-66,696 of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City, which were sold on
execution to the complainant on 13 June 1990, and in whose favor a final certificate of
sale for such rights, interests, shares, claims, and/or participation was executed and
issued on 25 June 1991.
Sheriff Tejada submitted a Sheriff’s Service Report dated 22 June 2000 informing
Executive Labor Arbiter Plagata that the writ of possession was returned duly served
and fully satisfied. On the same date, Mendoza, thru a letter, acknowledged that the writ
of possession had been satisfied and implemented.
A petition for review on certiorari filed on 27 June 2001 which was denied by this Court
on 15 August 2001, for failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 8 September 2001,
which Mendoza opposed.
Issue/s: Whether the CA erred that the donated property has already reverted to
petitioner-donor
Held: On the issue of ownership over the 13,643 square meters of land located at
Barrio Canelar, City of Zamboanga.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the donated property was
no longer owned by the Republic of the Philippines because ownership thereof had
already reverted to it (petitioner).

From the records, the subject property was donated by petitioner (donor) to the Republic
(donee) with the following conditions already adverted heretofore but are being
reiterated for emphasis:
1. That upon the effectivity or acceptance hereof the DONEE shall, thru the authorized
agency/ministry, construct a P5 Million Barter Trade market building at the afore-
described parcel of land;
2. That the aforesaid Barter Trade Market building shall accommodate at least 1,000
stalls, the allocation of which shall be determined by the Executive Committee for Barter
Trade in coordination with the Officers and Board of Directors the Zamboanga Barter
Traders’ Kilusang Bayan, Inc., provided, however, that each member of the DONOR
shall be given priority;
3. That the said Barter Trade Market building to be constructed as above-stated, shall
be to the strict exclusion of any other building for barter trading in Zamboanga City,
Philippines;
4. That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for
more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of
land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any further formality or
documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and
improvements thereon.
5. That the DONEE hereby accepts this donation made in its favor by the DONOR,
together with the conditions therein provided. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, when the property was levied and sold on 1 March 1990 and 13 June 1990,
respectively, it was already petitioner that owned the same. It should be clear that
reversion applied only to the land and not to the building and improvements made by the
Republic on the land worth P5,000,000.00.
Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was
automatic reversion of the land, because it put the Republic in a disadvantageous
situation when it had a P5 million building on a land owned by another.
This claim is untenable. The Court of Appeals merely enforced or applied the conditions
contained in the deed of donation. The Republic accepted the donation subject to
conditions imposed by the donor. In condition number 4, the Republic is given the right
to sell the building it constructed on the land and the improvements thereon. If ever such
condition is disadvantageous to the Republic, there is nothing that can be done about it,
since it is one of the conditions that are contained in the donation which it accepted.
There being nothing ambiguous in the contents of the document, there is no room for
interpretation but only simple application thereof.
We likewise find to be without basis petitioner’s claim that the Republic should be
reimbursed of the cost of the construction of the barter trade building pursuant to
condition number 4. There is nothing there that shows that the Republic will be
reimbursed. What is stated there is that petitioner has the first option to purchase the
buildings and improvements thereon. In other words, the Republic can sell the buildings
and improvements that it made or built.
Property & Succession Cases 86
Petitioner’s statement that neither party to the donation has expressly rescinded the
contract is flawed. As above ruled, the deed of donation contains a stipulation that
allows automatic reversion. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the parties to the donation.
As held in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of
Dumangas, citing
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals:
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper.
The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter
trading in Zamboanga City cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot be
averted, merely because petitioner-donor has not yet exercised its option to purchase
the buildings and improvements made and introduced on the land by the Republic; or
because the Republic has not yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise,
there would be gross violation of the clear import of the conditions set forth in the deed
of donation.
Petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Archbishop of Mla v. CA
GR # 77425, Jun. 19, 1991
198 SCRA 300
Facts: These two petitions for review on certiorari seek to overturn the decision of the
CA which reversed and set aside the order of the RTC, as well as the order
of said respondent court denying petitioner's motions for the reconsideration of its
aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs filed a complaint for
nullification of deed of donation, rescission of contract and reconveyance of real
property with damages against petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
Private respondents alleged that the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of defendant Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila covering a parcel of land located at Kawit, Cavite with an area of

approx 964 sq m. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee shall not
dispose or sell the property within a period of one hundred (100) years from the
execution of the deed of donation, otherwise a violation of such condition would render
ipso facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would revert to the estate
of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while still within the prohibitive
period to dispose of the property, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose
administration all properties within the province of Cavite owned by the Archdiocese of
Manila was allegedly transferred on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of
the property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio and Soledad C.
Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.00. As a consequence of the sale, TCT
No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 15, 1980 in the
name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its assailed decision. On
December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad C. Ignao filed a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds that (1) herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein,
have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus also filed a motion to
dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of
the motion to dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being that the
cause of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila likewise filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that he is not a real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint
does not state a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said motions to dismiss and
the petitioners had countered with their respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by
private respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1985, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action has prescribed.
Private respondents appealed to the CA raising the issues on (a) whether or not the
action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed;
and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of
donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of
the main action for reconveyance of real property.
CA held that the action has not yet prescribed, reinstated and remanded the civil case to
the lower court for further proceedings.
CA denied the separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, hence, the filing of
these appeals by certiorari.
Issue: whether or not the cause of action has already prescribed
Property & Succession Cases 87
Held: The Court does not agree. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil
Code an action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years
from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not applicable in
the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic
reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the condition therein, hence a
judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of
Appeals:
By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself that the violation of the
condition thereof would render ipso facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of
the opinion that there would be no legal necessity
anymore to have the donation judicially declared null and void for the reason that the
very deed of donation itself declares it so. For where (sic) it otherwise and that the
donors and the donee contemplated a court action during the execution of the deed of
donation to have the donation judicially rescinded or declared null and void should the
condition be violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto null and void"
would not appear in the deed of donation.
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on the rule that a judicial
action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it
may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. It called
attention to the holding that there is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its
cancellation even without court intervention, and that it is not always necessary for the
injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. It reiterated the doctrine that
a judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the
power of cancellation.
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts involved therein, but we
see no reason why the same should not apply to the donation in the present case.
Article 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in Title III,
Book III on donations. Now, said Title III does not have an explicit provision on the
matter of a donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an express
provision that the same shall be considered ipso facto revoked upon the breach of said
resolutory condition imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently in
question. The suppletory application of the foregoing doctrinal rulings to the present
controversy is consequently justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation providing for the automatic
reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance of the condition
was upheld in the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation,
judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the
rescission was proper.

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation
and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on
prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of
said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action
for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission
sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the CA committed no error in holding that the cause of
action of herein private respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a
written contract prescribes in ten (10) years. It is our view that Article 764 was intended
to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions
specified in the deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the
automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of the contingency
contemplated therein. That is not the situation in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private respondents may not be
dismissed by reason of prescription, the same should be dismissed on the ground that
private respondents have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the alleged breach by petitioners
of the resolutory condition in the deed of donation that the property donated should not
be sold within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of execution of the
deed of donation. Said condition, in our opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the
rights arising from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may impose
certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of
donation in the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction
on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be
valid, must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid policy may be considered
applicable by analogy. Under the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may
prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20) years. Article 870, on its
part, declares that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty (20) years are void.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the
alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable emasculation and
Property & Succession Cases 88
denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or
impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such condition shall be
considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory
paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the
deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the
deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for lack of cause of action,
the case for private respondents must fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision in the deed of donation
was not specifically put in issue in the pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but
such oversight or inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and resolving
the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation against alienation of the
land for one hundred (100) years was the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of
donation. At the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the motion to
dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained by the trial court and set aside by
respondent court, both on the issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court
interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the present petition. While the
issue of the validity of the same provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably
related to petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are grounded on
and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at
a just decision of the case: Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely related
to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error.
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the case to the lower court
for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on
the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as
where the ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the case. The
aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the present case with respect to the
matter of the validity of the resolutory condition in question.
Case is dismissed.
De Luna v. Abrigo
GR # 57455, Jan. 18, 1990
181 SCRA 150

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order of respondent judge Sofronio
F. Abrigo of the CFI of Quezon, dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the ground of
prescription of action.
On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of 7,500 square meters of
Lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1-
5775 to the Luzonian Colleges, Inc., (now Luzonian University Foundation, Inc., herein
referred to as the foundation). The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos
was subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to
the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation
failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. On April 9, 1971, Prudencio de Luna
"revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of
Donation Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others, required:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the DONEE shall construct at its own expense a Chapel, a Nursery and
Kindergarten School, to be named after St. Veronica, and other constructions and
Accessories shall be constructed on the land herein being donated strictly in accordance
with the plans and specifications prepared by the O.R. Quinto & Associates and made
part of this donation; provided that the flooring of the Altar and parts of the Chapel shall
be of granoletic marble.
4. That the construction of the Chapel, Nursery and Kindergarten School shall start
immediately and must be at least SEVENTY (70) PER CENTUM finished by the end of
THREE (3) YEARS from the date hereof, however, the whole project as drawn in the
plans and specifications made parts of this donation must be completed within FIVE (5)
YEARS from the date hereon, unless extensions are granted by the DONOR in writing;
As in the original deed of donation, the "Revival of Donation Intervivos" also provided for
the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the
conditions thereof, couched in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx.
11. That violation of any of the conditions herein provided shall cause the automatic
reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, assigns and representatives,
without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without
obligation whatever on the part of the DONOR.
The foundation, through its president, accepted the donation in the same document,
subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation. The donation was
registered and annotated on April 15, 1971 in the memorandum of encumbrances as
Entry No. 17939 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5775.
On August 3, 1971, Prudencio de Luna and the foundation executed a 'Deed of
Segregation" whereby the area donated which is now known as Lot No. 3707-B of
Subdivision Plan Psd-40392 was adjudicated to the foundation. As a result, transfer
certificate of title No. T-16152 was issued in the name of the foundation. The remaining
portion known as Lot No. 3707-A was retained by the donor.
On September 23, 1980, herein petitioners, Evelyn, Rosalina, Prudencio, Jr., Willard,
Antonio and Joselito, all surnamed de Luna, who claim to be the children and only heirs
Property & Succession Cases 89
of the late Prudencio de Luna who died on August 18, 1980, filed a complaint with the
RTC of Quezon alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not complied
with by the foundation. Among others, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and
the reversion of the donated land to the heirs.
The assailed order of the trial court stated that revocation (of a donation) will be effective
only either upon court judgment or upon consent of the donee as held in the case of
Parks v. Province of Tarlac, No. 24190, July 13, 1926, 49 Phil. 143. The trial court
dismissed the claim of petitioners that the stipulation in the donation providing for
revocation in case of non-compliance of conditions in the donation is tantamount to the
consent of the donee, opining that the consent contemplated by law should be such
consent given by the donee subsequent to the effectivity of the donation or violation of
the conditions imposed therein. The trial court further held that, far from consenting to
the revocation, the donee claimed that it had already substantially complied with the
conditions of the donation by introducing improvements in the property donated valued
at more than the amount of the donated land. In view thereof, a judicial decree revoking
the subject donation is necessary. Accordingly, under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions to revoke a donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions
of the donation shall prescribe in four years counted from such non-compliance. In the
instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint for revocation commenced on
April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on
September 23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was
already barred by prescription.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that Article 764 of the New Civil Code was adopted
to provide a judicial remedy in case of non-fulfillment of conditions when revocation of
the donation has not been agreed upon by the parties. By way of contrast, when there is
a stipulation agreed upon by the parties providing for revocation in case of non-
compliance, no judicial action is necessary. It is then petitioners' claim that the action
filed before the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not one for revocation of the
donation under Article 764 of the New Civil Code which prescribes in four (4) years, but
one to enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
Issue: Whether the action is to enforce a written contract instead of Art 764
Held: The petition is impressed with merit. From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or
cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is
one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation
is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of
future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less
than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens,
charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated.
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation
subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden
requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the
donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are
governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in cases
decided by the SC. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to
onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and
not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation
of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area
to the donor, his heirs, . . ., without the need of executing any other document for that
purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding
upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the
donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the
nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in
case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory
condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is
automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a
judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an
agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the recession was proper.
The trial court was not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred
by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not
apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, complaince with the terms and
conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its
execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within
the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract (Article 1144[1], New
Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.
Property & Succession Cases 90
Finally, considering that the allegations in the complaint on the matter of the donee's
non-compliance with the conditions of the donation have been contested by private
respondents who claimed that improvements more valuable than the donated property
had been introduced, a judgment on the pleadings is not proper. Moreover, in the
absence of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court cannot motu proprio
render such judgment. Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: "Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading." (Emphasis
supplied)
Petition is GRANTED, case is hereby ordered reinstated and respondent judge is
ordered to conduct a trial on the merits to determine the propriety of the revocation of
the subject donation.
Ty v. Ty
GR # 165696, Apr. 30, 2008
553 SCRA 306
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
against the Decision of the CA and the Resolution therein dated October 18, 2004.
On May 19, 1988, Alexander Ty, son of Alejandro B. Ty and Bella Torres, died of cancer
at the age of 34. He was survived by his wife, Sylvia Ty, and his only daughter, Krizia
Katrina Ty. A few months after his death, a petition for the settlement of his intestate
estate was filed by Sylvia Ty in the RTC of Quezon City.
Upon petition of Sylvia Ty, as Administratrix, for settlement and distribution of the
intestate estate of Alexander in the County of Los Angeles, the Superior Court of
California ordered the distribution of the Hollywood condominium unit, the Montebello
lot, and the 1986 Toyota pick-up truck to Sylvia Ty and Krizia Katrina Ty.
On November 23, 1990, Sylvia Ty submitted to the intestate Court in Quezon City an
inventory of the assets of Alexander’s estate, consisting of shares of stocks and a
schedule of real estate properties, which included the following:
1. EDSA Property – a parcel of land with an area of 1,728 square meters situated in
EDSA, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the name of Alexander Ty
when he was still single, and covered by TCT No. 0006585;
2. Meridien Condominium – A residential condominium with an area of 167.5 square
meters situated in 29 Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
registered in the name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 3395;
3. Wack-Wack Property – A residential land with an area of 1,584 square meters
situated in Notre Dame, Wack-Wack, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, registered in the
name of the spouses Alexander Ty and Sylvia Ty, and covered by TCT No. 62670.

On November 4, 1992, Sylvia Ty asked the intestate Court to sell or mortgage the
properties of the estate in order to pay the additional estate tax of P4,714,560.02
assessed by the BIR.
Apparently, this action did not sit well with her father-in-law, the plaintiff-appellee, for on
December 16, 1992, Alejandro Ty, father of the deceased Alexander Ty, filed a
complaint for recovery of properties with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order against Sylvia Ty as defendant in her capacity as
[Administratrix] of the Intestate Estate of Alexander Ty.
On February 26, 1993, the RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Plaintiff added that defendant acted in bad faith in including the subject properties in the
inventory of Alexander Ty’s estate, for she was well aware that Alexander was simply
holding the said properties in trust for his siblings.
On January 7, 2000, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff.
Respondent, Sylvia S. Ty, appealed from the RTC Decision to the CA.
The CA tackled "the critical, crucial and pivotal issue of whether a trust, express or
implied, was established by the plaintiff-appellee in favor of his late son and name-sake
Alexander Ty."
The CA proceeded to distinguish express from implied trust, then found that no express
trust can be involved here since nothing in writing was presented to prove it and the
case involves real property. It then stated that it disagrees with the court a quo’s
application of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code on implied trust, the so-called purchase money
resulting trust, stating that the very Article provides the exception that obtains when the
person to whom the title is conveyed is the child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one
paying the price of the sale, in which case no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The CA therefore reasoned that even assuming that plaintiff-appellee paid at least part
of the price of the EDSA property, the law still presumes that the conveyance was a
discretion (a gift of devise) in favor of Alexander.
As to plaintiff-appellee’s argument that there was no donation as shown by his exercise
of dominion over the property, the CA held that no credible evidence was presented to
substantiate the claim.
Regarding the residence condominium and the Wack-Wack property, the CA stated that
it did not agree either with the findings of the trial court that an implied trust was created
over these properties.
Property & Succession Cases 91
As a final point, the Court found that the plaintiff-appellee is not entitled to moral
damages, attorney’s fees and costs of litigation, considering that the instant case is
clearly a vexatious and unfounded suit by him filed against the estate of the late
Alejandro Ty. Hence, all these awards in the judgment a quo are hereby DELETED.
The CA therefore reversed and set aside the judgment appealed from and entered
another one dismissing the complaint.
On October 18, 2004 the CA resolved to deny therein plaintiff-appellee’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether an implied trust under Art 1448 was constituted over the subject
properties.
Held: The Court disposes of the petition, as follows: The EDSA Property. Petitioner
contends that the EDSA property, while registered in the name of his son Alexander Ty,
is covered by an implied trust in his favor under Article 1448 of the Civil Code. This,
petitioner argues, is because he paid the price when the property was purchased and
did so for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted
to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary.
However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate,
of one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably
presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
The CA conceded that at least part of the purchase price of the EDSA property came
from petitioner. However, it ruled out the existence of an implied trust because of the last
sentence of Article 1448: x x x However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a
child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied
by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, the CA departed from jurisprudence in that such
was not the theory of the parties.
Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he who invoked Article 1448 of the Civil Code to
claim the existence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself, in providing for the so-
called purchase money resulting trust, also provides the parameters of such trust and
adds, in the same breath, the proviso: "However, if the person to whom the title is
conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, NO
TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of
the child." (Emphasis supplied.)

Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessary consequence of petitioner’s theory and
argument and is inextricably linked to it by the law itself.
The CA, therefore, did not err in simply applying the law.
Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If the person to whom the title is conveyed is the
child of the one paying the price of the sale, and in this case this is undisputed, NO
TRUST IS IMPLIED BY LAW. The law, instead, disputably presumes a donation in favor
of the child.
On the question of whether or not petitioner intended a donation, the CA found that
petitioner failed to prove the contrary. This is a factual finding which this Court sees no
reason the record to reverse.
The net effect of all the foregoing is that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of
the estate of petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an advance of
Alexander’s share in the estate of his father, to the extent that petitioner provided a part
of its purchase price.
The Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property.
Petitioner would have this Court overturn the finding of the CA that as regards the
Meridien Condominium and the Wack-Wack property, petitioner failed to show that the
money used to purchase the same came from him.
Again, this is clearly a factual finding and petitioner has advanced no convincing
argument for this Court to alter the findings reached by the CA.
Among the facts cited by the CA are the sources of income of Alexander Ty who had
been working for nine years when he purchased these two properties, who had a car
care business, and was actively engaged in the business dealings of several family
corporations, from which he received emoluments and other benefits.
The CA, therefore, ruled that with respect to the Meridien Condominium and the Wack-
Wack property, no implied trust was created because there was no showing that part of
the purchase price was paid by petitioner and, on the contrary, the evidence showed
that Alexander Ty had the means to pay for the same.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, the Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that respondent is obliged to collate into the mass of the estate of
petitioner, in the event of his death, the EDSA property as an advance of Alexander Ty’s
share in the estate of his father, to the extent that petitioner provided a part of its
purchase price.
Eduarte vs. CA
GR# 105944/ Feb. 9, 1996
253 SCRA 391
Facts: A petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.Facts: Domingo Belda and
Estelita Ana were the registered owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 118
located at Sorsogon and covered by Original Certificate of TitleNo. P-4991 issued on
Property & Succession Cases 92
October 5, 1962.On March 1, 1963, a letter was sent by the Land Investigator Serafin
Valcarcel of theBureau of Lands to Domingo and Cipriano Bulan calling them to a
conference to settle the wrongful issuance of title to the property they both occupy. At
this conference, neither Domingo nor Bulan appeared but Teotimo Eduarte did. On
August 9, 1963, Eduarte wrote a letter to the Director of Lands requesting him not to
give due course to Domingo and Estelita’s application for a free patent title over lot
118since what Domingo and Estelita are occupying is Lot 138 which was titled in the
name of Bulan who refused to accept said title. After the Office of the Director of lands
took note of Eduarte’s protest, an investigation was conducted which revealed that
Eduarte is in actual possession of lot 118 while Domingo and Estelita occupy lot 138.
The District Land Officer recommended that the free patent application of respondents
should refer to lot 138 and the homestead application of
petitioner should refer to lot 118. Eduarte remained and continuously occupied lot 118
until on December 10, 1986Domingo and Estelita filed with the RTC of Irosin, a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Eduarte, averring that
sometime in August 1985, Eduarte by means of force, threats and intimidation entered
the subject to lot without their consent thereby depriving them of their possession of the
premises. Traversing the complaint, Eduarte asserts that he is the rightful owner of the
property in question; that he has been in possession of the same since 1942; that the
title relied upon by Domingo and Estelita was erroneously issued in their name which
was acknowledged by the Bureau of Lands; that Domingo and Estelita fully know that
they are not the owners of the lot in dispute.The lower court also ruled that petitioner can
attack the validity of respondents' title onlythrough a direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. Decision affirmed by CA, with modifications.
Issue: Whether or not Eduarte can, in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession
filed by Domingo and Estelita, the registered owners, assail the validity of their title.
Held: It must be stressed that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible
title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the
expiration of the one year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon
which it based, it becomes incontrovertible. The decree of registration and the certificate
of title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of fraud within one year
from the date of its entry and such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. In the case at bench, petitioner raised the following affirmative defense in
his answer:3. That the defendant is the true and lawful owner and in actual possession
of that certain parcel of land which is more particularly described as follows: xxx xxx
xxx5. That the sole basis of the plaintiff in adversely claiming the aforesaid property is
due to the erroneous issuance of OCT No. P-4991 in his name which covers said Lot
No. 118 and this mistaken and erroneous issuance has been duly acknowledged and
investigated no less by the Bureau of Lands;6. That plaintiff has never been in actual
possession of said Lot No. 118and therefore he is not lawfully entitled to such certificate
of title No. P-4991, which under the circumstances he is obliged to reconvey the same
to the defendant; The foregoing allegations attack the validity of the original certificate of
title issued in favor of private respondents by the Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. This is
not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue of the
validity of title, i.e.,whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can be raised in an action

expressly instituted for that purposes. Whether or not respondents have the right to
claim ownership of the subject land is beyond the province of the instant petition.
Velasquez vs. CA
GR# 126996/ Feb. 15, 2000
325 SCRA 552
Facts: Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in
1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by
her sisters Anatalia de Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman
(grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses
Aquino were able to acquire several properties.
Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres,
Felicidad and Apolonio, all surnamed Meneses filed a complaint for annulment, partition
and damages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez (son of Tranquilina de Guzman)
for the latters refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the
Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had
a talk with the plaintiffs mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses
and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the
conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario
Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband
earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all
the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her
sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother
allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half
(1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to of each of all the properties in question being the
children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further
claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all the
properties and despite plaintiffs repeated demands for partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since
they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of
the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the
defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time
defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.
Defendants filed their Amended Answer with counterclaim alleging among others that
during the lifetime of spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman, they had
already disposed of their properties in favor of petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman, and petitioners Anastacia and Jose
Velasquez.
Property & Succession Cases 93
Defendants denied that a conference took place between Leoncia de Guzman and
plaintiff Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants
grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants father), nor did the latter promise to
divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they
did not forcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof
has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse in character to the exclusion of all
others. By way of affirmative defenses, defendants claim that the instant case is already
barred by res judicata since there had been three previous cases involving the same
parties, subject matter and cause of action which were all dismissed, the last of which
was dismissed for failure to prosecute; that plaintiffs action to annul the documents
covering the disposition of the properties is also barred by the statute of limitations; that
the action for partition presupposes the existence of a property held in common as
agreed upon or admitted by the parties but the co-ownership ceases when one of the
parties alleges exclusive ownership, thus the action becomes one for a title and
recovery of ownership and the action prescribes in four years.
Issue: I. Whether or not the instant case is barred by res judicata and by the statute of
limitations.
II. Whether or not the properties mentioned in the complaint form part of the estate of
the Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia De Guzman.
III. Whether or not the petitioners have acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the
properties in question.
IV. Whether or not private respondent heirs of anatalia de guzman are legal heirs of
spouses cornelio aquino and leoncia de guzman.
V. Whether or not partition is the proper action in the instant case.
Held: Petitioners allegations were never rebutted by private respondents in their
Comment as the only defense raised therein was that the application of the principle of
res judicata should not sacrifice justice to technicality and it is within the power of the
court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purpose of justice requires it. We have examined the third complaint filed
by private respondents on October 23, 1987 and compared it with the instant case, and
we found that the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there
is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res
judicata are present, namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) there must be between the
first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
Since the dismissal of the third case did not contain any condition at all, it has the effect
of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood to be with prejudice.12 On this
ground alone, the trial court should have already dismissed this case. However,
considering that this case had already reached this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy
between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural

technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."13
After an examination of the records, we find that there is no preponderance of evidence
adduced during the trial to support the findings and conclusions of the courts below,
which error justifies a review of said evidence. As a rule, factual findings of the lower
courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is not expected nor required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.14
However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review and
reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the
evidence on record, in the instant case, we are not bound to adhere to the general rule
since both courts clearly failed to consider facts and circumstances which should have
drawn a different conclusion.
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must
initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to
state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the
subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state
in his complaint the "nature and the extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless
the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the properties.
We are unable to sustain the findings of the respondent Court that it has been
adequately shown that the alleged transfers of properties to the petitioners predecessor-
in-interest made by the Aquino spouses were repudiated before Leoncias death; thus
private respondents are still entitled to share in the subject properties. There is no
preponderance of evidence to support the findings and conclusions of both courts. The
trial court declared the nullity of the donation inter vivos in favor of petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land described in the complaint, the deed of
sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the second parcel and the deed
of donation propter nuptias over the third and sixth parcels and the sale to third parties
of fourth and fifth parcels insofar as the of these parcels of land are concerned which
"legitimately belong to plaintiff." It would appear that the trial court relied solely on the
basis of Santiago Meneses testimony "that in 1944 when his aunt Leoncia de Guzman
was still alive, she called a conference among them, the plaintiffs and their mother
Anatalia, Cesario Velasquez and his mother Tranquilina, telling them that all their
properties which are conjugal in nature shall be divided equally between Anatalia and
Tranquilina and not to believe the documents purportedly signed by her because she did
not sign them".19 Private respondent Santiago Meneses testimony is to the effect that
Leoncia never signed any deed of conveyance of the subject properties in favor of the
petitioners. However, Santiago Meneses testimony was never corroborated by any other
evidence despite his testimony that the alleged conference was also made in the
presence of third parties. Moreover, if the alleged conference really took place in 1944, a
year before Leoncias death, Leoncia could have executed another set of documents
revoking or repudiating whatever dispositions she had earlier made to show her alleged
intention of giving her properties in equal shares to her sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina
Property & Succession Cases 94
de Guzman but there was none. The trial court found the testimony of Santiago
Meneses who is eighty years old to be credible, and this was affirmed by the respondent
court which stated that the matter of ascribing credibility belongs to the trial court.
However, the fact that a person has reached the "twilight of his life" is not always a
guaranty that he would tell the truth. It is also quite common that advanced age makes a
person mentally dull and completely hazy about things which has appeared to him, and
at times it weakens his resistance to outside influence.20
On the other hand, petitioners were able to adduce the uncontroverted and ancient
documentary evidence showing that during the lifetime of the Aquino spouses they had
already disposed of four of the six parcels of land subject of the complaint starting in the
year 1919, and the latest was in 1939 as follows: (a) Escritura de donation propter
nuptias dated February 15, 1919 in favor of the future spouses Cesario Velasquez and
Camila de Guzman (petitioners parents) conveying to them a portion of the second
parcel in the complaint and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels;21 (b) Deed of
donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners
Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez;22 (c) Escritura de Compraventa dated
August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration;23 (d) Deed of
Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman
conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of
P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and
Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.24 It was reversible error for the court to
overlook the probative value of these notarized documents.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.26 And once a donation is
accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.27 The
donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and
Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively
was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was
incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was
signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and
acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764
and 765 of the Civil Code.28 The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second
parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of
donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and
the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code.29 The alleged reason for
the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all
their properties since Anatalia (Leoncias sister) had several children to support is not
one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias,
although the donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the
 Property & Succession Cases 95

remaining portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July
14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance
executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed
of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of
the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeat
the face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance.31 Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts
of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of
title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the
property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private
respondents asserted co-ownership claim over the subject property.

The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the
documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of
validity.32 Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago
Meneses with clear and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.33 Petitioners were
able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the
Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the
spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners
alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not claim any right
thereto.