Quieting of Title Cases

I. G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY FARMS, INC., petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil Cases Division), HON.
RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII,
MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCING CORPORATION,
and COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are the subject of this petition
started in 1927 when an application for their registration under the Torrens System was first
filed. In the present petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
Realty) and Macondray Farms, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Macondray) seek a reversal of the
Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and an affirmance of the Court
of Appeals Decision of December 29, 1982.

Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, having an
aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF
Homes Parañaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:

1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21, 1958,
pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO
Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.

2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo,
which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970 pursuant to
decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-
32166.

3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of
Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No.
8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO
Record No. N-31777.

On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera
Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named
defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of
Land Registration. Subsequently, however, Carpo withdrew his complaint as against the last
named defendant, and the answer filed on behalf of said government official was ordered
stricken off the record. The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609
from which it was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by
Judge Andres Reyes (hereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued the order dated
May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration, was not sitting as a land
registration court, but as a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the issuance of
said order of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still
pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the issuance of a
certificate of title.

Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes Court was acting as a court of
land registration and in issuing the order of May 21, 1958, was actually performing a purely
ministerial duty for the registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 (and the two
other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and 976, with which said case had been jointly tried and decided)
which on August 19, 1935 had rendered a decision adjudicating the two (2) lots in question to
Estanislao Mayuga (father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty and
Macondray), which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. It was alleged that it is the title
of Carpo which is null and void, having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered
under the Torrens System in favor of another.

With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party complaint against the Quezon City
Development and Financing Corporation (hereafter referred to as QCDFC) and the
Commissioner of Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985 in the name of
QCDFC also covered the same parcels of land subject of the dispute between Carpo and the
two corporations, Realty and Macondray. They thus prayed that Decree No. N-135938 issued
on July 22, 1971, OCT No. 8931 issued on July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985 derived from OCT No. 8931 be declared null and void.

In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the validity of its own title alleging
that it is the title in the name of Realty which is null and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party
complaint against Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia, Felicisimo Alvendia, Josefina
Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa G. Miranda, Isabel G. Miranda, and Feliciano G. Miranda,
alleging that it bought said parcels of land from them. It prayed that in the event of an
unfavorable judgment against it, fourth-party defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase
price which the corporation paid to them. However, QCDFC failed to prosecute its case, and the
fourth-party complaint was dismissed for lack of interest.

After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20, 1981, sustaining the title of
Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in question and declaring the titles of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. and QCDFC null and void.

On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-
56471 questioning the decision of the lower court. It also asked that it be allowed to appear
directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. After respondents filed their
comments to said petition, this Court passed a resolution dated October 19, 1981 referring the
case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the
merits of the appeal."

In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals, through its Ninth Division, with
Justice Patajo as ponente, concurred in by Justices Gopengco and Kapunan, set aside the
decision of the trial court and rendered a new one upholding the validity of the title in the name
of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void the titles in the name of Carpo and
QCDFC.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. In the meantime, by virtue and
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court
of Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). As a consequence,
there was a re-raffling of cases and the case was assigned to the Second Special Cases
Division which, however, returned the records of the case for another re-raffling to the Civil
Cases Divisions as it deemed itself without authority to act on a civil case in view of the
allocation of cases to the different divisions of the IAC under Section 8 of BP 129. The case was
then assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division, composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia,
Zosa and Bartolome.

Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices Camilon and Bidin were
assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division.

On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases Division, with Justice Zosa
as ponente; concurred in by Justices Camilon and Bidin, promulgated its Resolution granting
Carpo's motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the decision of December 29,
1982, and affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No.
67451.

Petitioners assign the following errors:

The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the Intermediate Appellate

Court (for brevity, referred to herein as SPECIAL DIVISION) which promulgated
the disputed RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129 and, as such, not vested with
jurisdiction and adjudicatory power to pronounce any decision of final resolution
for the Court.

II

On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is legally vested with jurisdiction
and adjudicatory powers under the provisions of BP 129, it decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court
because:

(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION'S Resolution of May 2, 1984

amounted to a denial to the Petitioners of their right to appeal and
judicial review over fundamental issues of law duly raised by them
in their Petition for Review on certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as
authorized by the Constitution (Art. X, sec. 5 (2) (e), the provisions
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Rule 42, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court; and

(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984, it ruled that the decision

of the Court of Appeals could not have gained the nature of a
proper and valid judgment as the latter had no power to pass upon
the appealed judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the
Vera Court), as appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy;
 Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings by giving a perverted and obviously
unjustified and illogical interpretation of the RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of
the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, holding and declaring that "it has in
effect erased or cancelled the validity of (the DECISION of December 29, 1982),
when the said RESOLUTION merely "RESOLVED to return the records of the
case ... for re-raffling and reassignment ... in view of the allocation of cases to the
different Divisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court under Section 8 of BP 129.

III

The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed judgment of the lower court
in effect sanctioned the contemptible disregard of law and jurisprudence
committed by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise of the power of supervision;

IV

The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 a

deliberate falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith
and for value when there is absolutely no evidence, whether written or
testimonial, that was presented by Carpo, or by anyone else that he was, in fact,
a purchaser for value and in good faith — a material matter which was neither
alleged nor referred to in the complaint and in all the pleadings, nor covered by
any of the exhibits presented by all of the parties herein and solely on the bases
of which the case at bar was submitted by the parties for consideration and
decision.

1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court which promulgated the Resolution of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under
the provisions of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory power,
petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP 129, to wit:

Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.—The Intermediate Appellate Court

shall exercise its powers, functions and duties, through ten (10) divisions, each
composed of five members. The Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of
exercise administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions.

Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions.—Of the ten (10) divisions, of the Court, four (4)
divisions, to be known as Civil case Divisions, shall take cognizance of appeals
in civil cases originating from the Regional Trial Court; two (2) divisions, to be
known as Criminal Cases Divisions, of appeals in cases originating from the
Regional Trial Courts; and four (4) divisions, to be known as Special Cases
Divisions, of original actions or petitions, petitions for review, and appeals in all
other cases, including those from administrative agencies, except as provided in
Section 9 hereof.

Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate Justice, the appointment of a

member of the court should specifically indicate whether it is for the Civil Cases
Divisions, the Criminal Cases Divisions, or the Special Cases Divisions of the
Court. No member of the Court appointed to any of the three classes of
 conclusions shall be assigned to any of the other classes of division except when
authorized by the Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the Intermediate
Appellate Court en banc, if the exigencies of the service so require. . . .
(emphasis supplied)

As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was composed of Justice B.S. de la
Fuente, as Chairman, Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and Flores Bartolome, as
Members. In view, however, of the voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia and Bartolome from
taking part in the case, Justices Bidin and Camilon were reassigned to the Third Civil Cases
Division to form the Special Third Civil Cases Division.

Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases Division, not being one of the ten
(10) Divisions of the Court duly vested with jurisdiction, had no adjudicatory powers. It is also
alleged that the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is violative of the injunction against
appointment of an appellate Justice to a class of divisions other than that to which he is
appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)

This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily show that what BP 129 prohibits is
appointment from one class of divisions to another class. For instance, a Justice appointed to
the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to the Civil Cases Divisions.

Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases Division, while Justice Camilon was
reassigned from the Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the same class
of divisions to which they were appointed.

Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the Special Third Civil Cases
Division in view of the voluntary inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal
bounds. Otherwise, a situation would have arisen where a regular division could not decide a
particular case because some members thereof inhibited themselves from participating in said
case.

2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the correctness of the ruling of the IAC
that the CA Decision of December 29, 1982 could not have gained the nature of a proper and
valid judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the proper remedy) and that the Resolution
of July 25, 1983 had in effect erased or cancelled the validity of said Decision.

The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:

Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was effectively an acknowledgment
by the Division that promulgated it that the earlier Decision dated December 29,
1983 rendered in a Special Civil Action case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-
13530, was not appropriate and beyond the authority of the Ninth Division of the
Court of Appeals to promulgate. The said Resolution was actually a statement
that the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals had over-stepped its bounds by
reviewing in certiorari proceedings a decision in a purely civil case that should
have passed through the processes of an ordinary appeal. We are not aware of
any legal doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a petition for review on
certiorari upon purely questions of law, such as that filed by petitioners herein, as
an ordinary appeal. Neither can we find any legal basis or justification for the
election by the appellate court of the essential requisites then prescribed for the
 validity of an appeal, such as the submission of a formal notice of appeal, an
appeal bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of these mandatory
requisites, the appeal could not have been deemed perfected and ought to have
been dismissed outright.

The Court does not agree.

There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts of First Instance in their
original jurisdiction may be reviewed: (1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to
the Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court. To the latter category
belong cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have
different procedural requirements.

As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari with this Court docketed as G.R.
No. L-56471 questioning the decision of the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to appeal
directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. However, this Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper determination on the
merits of the appeal."

It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition first filed as an appeal, and not
as a special civil action for certiorari. After as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a form of
appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69 SCRA 35).

This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure outlined in Rule 45 which,
unlike ordinary appeals, does not require a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on
appeal.

Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera Court "cannot be passed upon
anymore in the Court of Appeals decision because appeal and not certiorari was the proper
remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court on appeal, albeit by way of
certiorari.

Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal. Those
cases are not in point. They refer to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and not to
appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45.

Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in interpreting the Resolution dated July 25,
1983 of the Second Special Cases Division (to which the case was assigned after the
reorganization under BP 129) as having "erased or cancellation" the validity of the Decision of
the Ninth Division. A perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely made clarification about the
nature of the case and why it should be reassigned to the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There
was not the slightest implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of the Decision of the
Ninth Division.

Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly admitted the validity of the Decision of
the Ninth Division when it granted Carpo's motion for reconsideration. It would have been
incongruous to grant a motion to reconsider a decision, reverse and set it aside, if in the first
place it did not have any validity. It would have been necessary only to decide its invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera Court, and the IAC Special Third
Civil Cases Division, erred in upholding the validity of the title in the name of Carpo and
declaring null and void the titles in the names of Realty and of QCDFC.

The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same basis for the of the Vera Court
and the IAC Special Division, is that the Reyes Court had no authority to issue the order of May
21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration in favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-
interest of Realty, as it was not sitting as a land registration court and also because the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost and/or destroyed during World
War II and were still pending reconstitution.

Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by Act No. 2347 (1914),
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to and was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.

Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the filing in
court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The
issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire land registration process; and as
such, does not constitute a separate proceeding.

In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga,
predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding
docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035.
(Lots 2 and 3 the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty and QCDFC.) Case No.
657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by
Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar,
as the three cases involved Identical parcels of land, and Identical applicants/oppositors.

On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration court issued a consolidated
decision on the three cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:

En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el registro de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del

plans PSU-47035 a nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desist oposicion de
Florentino Baltazar y Eduardo Guico con respects a dichos lotes....

On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
its decision dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of which reads:

Por todas last consideraciones expuestas confirmamos la decision apelada en

cuanto adjudica a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano y que
equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.

xxx xxx xxx

Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, but the petition was dismissed
and the Court of Appeals decision was affirmed (See Guico v. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).

Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name, Estanislao died.

On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a petition with the Reyes Court
docketed as Case No. 2689 alleging that he was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao
Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration over the property adjudicated in
favor of Estanislao. At this point, it cannot be overemphasized that the petition filed by
Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but a continuation of, the original
land registration proceedings initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo
Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
was continuing in the exercise of jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested in the
CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original applications.

On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the petition of Dominador Mayuga
and directing the Commissioner of Land Registration to issue a decree of registration over Lots
1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga in
liue of Estanislao.

Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of LRC Case No. 657 were not
properly reconstituted, then there was no pending land registration case. And since the Reyes
Court was acting without a pending case, it was acting without jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's
Memorandum, pp, 2-8.)

He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29, 1969, 27 SCRA 1119) where this
Court said that upon failure to reconstitute pursuant to law, "the parties are deemed to have
waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor and their only alternative is to file an
action anew for the registration in their names of the lots in question," citing the case of Ambat
v. Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases. The basis of said ruling is Section
29 of Act No. 3110, an Act to provide an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the
records of pending judicial proceedings and books, documents, and files of the office of the
register of deeds, destroyed by fire or other public calamities, and for other purposes.

However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of failure to reconstitute records on

the status of the case in its entirety, was modified in the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93) Phil.
595 [1953]). where this Court said:

(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat case) in the sense that
Section 29 of Act No. 3110 should be applied only where the records in the Court
of First Instance as well as in the appellate court were destroyed or lost and were
not reconstituted, but not where the records of the Court of First Instance are
intact and complete, and only the records in the appellate court were lost or
destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason for this view is that section 29
of Act 3110 is found among the sections and provisions dealing with the
reconstitution of records in the Court of First Instance in pending civil cases,
special proceedings, cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act (No.)
3110 ... who show that there are separate procedures for the reconstitution of
records in the Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53; for the
reconstitution of records in the Supreme Court, now including the Court of
Appeals, from Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records in the office of
the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75 to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of
destroyed records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1 to Sec. 47, under
which sections, Sec. 29 is obviously comprehended.
 The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or
destroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings may
continue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to the loss
of the records. The law contemplates different stages for purposes of
reconstitution. . . .

. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a civil case was pending

trial in the Court of First Instance at the time the record was
destroyed or lost; section 6 evidently refers to the stage where the
case had been tried and decided but was still pending in the Court
of First Instance at the time the record was destroyed or lost;
section 6 covers the stage where the case was pending in the
Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) at the time the record was
destroyed or lost. *

If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not
reconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next preceding age
where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignore and go
beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not
only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the court which must again
perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try the case and decide it
anew,-all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and
complete, and uncontroverted.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and
(suffer) the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the
conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that some of the witnesses may
have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on the
pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when an along and
all the time the record of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and
decision are there and are not disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly
logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court which
has not committed any negligence or fault at all.

The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and intention of the reconstitution law. As
stated therein, "Act 3110 was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or
invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit
litigants, so that when court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead
of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and
continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that
they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution law" (e.g. having the case at the stage
when the records were destroyed).

Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No. 657, the parties thereto did not
have to commence a new action but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records
are available. The land registration case itself re. mained pending and the Court of First
Instance of Rizal continued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an that remained to be done was
the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would
be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which
had become final (See Government v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla,
111 Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257
[1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the
Court of Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga.
Moreover, there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the
CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the issuance of a decree of
registration.

Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a land
registration court when it issued the order directing the issuance of a decree of registration,
"substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in hue of the original adjudicates,
Estanislao Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec.
4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Court in
the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and
November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said order and rule that Judge Vera
was without jurisdiction to set it aside.

4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and QCDFC, the Special Division
also relied on Carpo's being an innocent purchaser for value.

Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as an issue in the
trial court. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis exists to support
such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his being an innocent purchaser
for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil Code.

It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only if, relying on the
certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil.
367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon
its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)

Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue
of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9,
1970. However, it was only later, on October 13, 1970, that the decree of registration in favor of
the Baltazars was transcribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an
Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day, October 13, 1970, that the deed
evidencing the sale between the Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property,
and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 303961 in
the name of Carpo was issued. (Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)

Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon
so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value and
in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-in-interest.
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor
in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal
confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion
de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino,
they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings over the disputed parcels
of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when
as the decisions rendered therein.

Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty
derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in the name
of the Baltazars in 1970.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive registrations,
where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA,
Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)

TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to TCT No. 303961 derived from
OCT 8629.

5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC)
alleges that it has been improperly impleaded as thirty-party defendant inasmuch as Realty's
alleged cause of action against it is neither for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief in respect of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that Realty had no cause of
action against it since the third party complaint did not allege that QCDFC violated any legal
right of Realty, QCDFC also assails the Vera Court decision in that it declares QCDFC directly
liable to Carpo and not to Realty.

In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the Vera Court, nor from the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1982, nor from the resolution of the IAC
Special Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 — all of which voided QCDFCs title to the
disputed property. Hence, said decisions/resolution have become final and executory as
regards QCDFC.

Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the third-party complaint filed against it
by Realty was procedurally defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the former
is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations and the factual circumstances of the
case compel this Court now to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property. ** To
rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to put to rest these conflicting
claims over the property. After an, QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right,
to prove its claim over the land. It presented documentary as well as testimonial evidence. It
was even permitted to file a fourth-party complaint which, however, was dismissed since it failed
to prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the original registered owners. Original
Certificate of Title No. 8931 in the name of Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. was issued on
July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years after the issuance of Mayuga's title in 1958.

Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued earlier than OCT No. 8931 from
which QCDFC's title was derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of QCDFC.

6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a manifestation alleging that the case at
bar is closely connected with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of
Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc., et. al. and moved for
consolidation of the two cases involving as they do the same property. By Resolution of August
29, 1984, this Court denied the motion for consolidation.

In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by Carpo against Realty is in the
nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title to the
property in question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null and void instead, and by filing
the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove
clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of
Title, Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies,
Rules of Court.

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).

The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final determination of
G.R. No. L-46953.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court and the
Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and the Decision of
December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
II. G.R. No. 168943             October 27, 2006

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Br. 104, Quezon City, and HEIRS OF ENRIQUE G. SANTOS, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 72686 and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.

On October 24, 2001, Alicia, Alfredo, Roberto, Enrique and Susan, all surnamed Santos, and
Sonia Santos-Wallin, represented by Enrique G. Santos, filed a complaint3 for Quieting of Title
and/or Accion Reinvindicatoria before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against
the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC), defendant therein.

Plaintiffs alleged therein that, during his lifetime, Enrique Santos was the owner of a 936-
square-meter parcel of land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 57272 issued by the Register of Deeds on July 27, 1961 which
cancelled TCT No. 57193-289. He had been in possession of the owner’s duplicate of said title
and had been in continuous, open, adverse and peaceful possession of the property. He died
on February 9, 1970 and was survived by his wife, Alicia Santos, and other plaintiffs, who were
their children. Thereafter, plaintiffs took peaceful and adverse possession of the property, and of
the owner’s duplicate of said title. When the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was
burned on June 11, 1988, the original copy of said title was burned as well. The Register of
Deeds had the title reconstituted as TCT No. RT-110323, based on the owner’s duplicate of
TCT No. 57272. Sometime in February 1996, plaintiffs learned that defendant was claiming
ownership over the property based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 which,
on its face, cancelled TCT No. 320898, under the name of the Philippine National Bank, which
allegedly cancelled TCT No. 252070 in the names of the spouses Marcos and Romana dela
Cruz. They insisted that TCT Nos. 321744, 320898 and 252070 were not among the titles
issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and even if the Register of Deeds issued said
titles, it was contrary to law. Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and his heirs, after his death,
never encumbered or disposed the property. In 1996, plaintiffs had the property fenced but
defendant deprived them of the final use and enjoyment of their property.

Plaintiffs prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered

quieting the title of plaintiffs over and/or recover possession of their said property in the
name of deceased Enrique Santos, covered by said TCT No. RT-110323(57272) of the
Register of Deeds at Quezon City and that:

1. The title of defendant, TCT No. 321744 be ordered cancelled by the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City;
 2. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs’ claims for actual damages in the
sum of P100,000.00;

3. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory damages

in the sum of at least P1,000,000.00;

4. The defendant be ordered to pay plaintiffs’ claims for reimbursement of the

lawyer’s professional fees consisting of the aforesaid P50,000.00 acceptance fee
and reimbursement of the said success fee in par. 10 above; and lawyer’s
expenses of P2,000.00 for each hearing in this case;

5. The defendant be ordered to pay expenses and costs of litigation in the sum of
at least P200,000.00.

Other reliefs that are just and equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for.4

As gleaned from the caption of the complaint, plaintiffs appear to be the heirs of Enrique Santos,
represented by Enrique G. Santos. The latter signed the Verification and Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping which reads:

I, ENRIQUE G. SANTOS, of legal age, under oath, state that I am one of the children of
the late Enrique Santos and I represent the heirs of said Enrique Santos who are my co-
plaintiffs in the above-captioned case and that I directed the preparation of the instant
complaint, the contents of which are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
the attachments are faithful reproductions of the official copies in my possession.

I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency, and to the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that I shall notify this Commission within
three days from notice that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending
thereat.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby affix my signature this 23rd day of October 2001 at
Pasig City, Metro Manila.

(Sgd.)

ENRIQUE G. SANTOS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of October 2001 at Pasig City,
affiant exhibiting to me his CTC No. 07303074 issued at Sta. Cruz, Laguna on April 16,
2001.

(Sgd.)

PETER FRANCIS G. ZAGALA

Notary Public
 Until December 31, 2002
PTR No. 0287069
Issued on 1-10-01
At Pasig City5

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint on the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs failed to
faithfully comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) the action (either Quieting of Title or Accion Reinvindicatoria) had
prescribed, the same having been filed only on October 24, 2001 beyond the statutory ten-year
period therefor; and (3) that the complaint is defective in many respects.6

Defendant asserted that the case involved more than one plaintiff but the verification and
certification against forum shopping incorporated in the complaint was signed only by Enrique
Santos. Although the complaint alleges that plaintiffs are represented by Enrique Santos, there
is no showing that he was, indeed, authorized to so represent the other plaintiffs to file the
complaint and to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.7 Thus, plaintiffs
failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Defendant cited the ruling of this
Court in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.8

Defendant maintained that the complaint is defective in that, although there is an allegation that
Enrique Santos represents the other heirs, there is nothing in the pleading to show the latter’s
authority to that effect; the complaint fails to aver with particularity the facts showing the
capacity of defendant corporation to sue and be sued; and the pleading does not state the
address of plaintiffs. Defendant likewise averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the
ground of prescription. It argued that plaintiffs anchor their claim on quieting of title and
considering that they are not in possession of the land in question, their cause of action
prescribed after ten years. On the other hand, if the supposed right of plaintiffs is based
on accion reinvindicatoria, prescription would set in after 10 years from dispossession. In both
cases, defendant asserts, the reckoning point is 1984 when defendant acquired TCT No.
321744 and possession of the land in question.

In their Comment9 on the motion, plaintiffs averred that the relationship of a co-owner to the
other co-owners is fiduciary in character; thus, anyone of them could effectively act for another
for the benefit of the property without need for an authorization. Consequently, Enrique Santos
had the authority to represent the other heirs as plaintiffs and to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping.10 On the issue of prescription, plaintiffs argued that the
prescriptive period for the actions should be reckoned from 1996, when defendant claimed
ownership over the property and barred plaintiffs from fencing their property, not in 1984 when
TCT No. 321744 was issued by the Register of Deeds in the name of defendant as owner.

In its reply, defendant averred that absent any authority from his co-heirs, Enrique Santos must
implead them as plaintiffs as they are indispensable parties. In response, plaintiffs aver that a
co-owner of a property can execute an action for quieting of title without impleading the other
co-owners.

The trial court issued an Order11 denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. It declared that since
Enrique Santos was one of the heirs, his signature in the verification and certification constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. The court cited the ruling of this Court in Dar v. Alonzo-
Legasto.12 The court, likewise, held that prescription had not set in and that failure to state the
address of plaintiffs in the complaint does not warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court likewise denied in an Order13 dated
July 10, 2002.

Unsatisfied, defendant, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction14 before the CA,
raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED HER

DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING SIGNED BY ENRIQUE G. SANTOS ALONE IS A SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES OF COURT, AND THE
RULING IN LOQUIAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 1399396 (SIC),
AUGUST 16, 2000, 338 SCRA 62, AND ORTIZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
127393, 299 SCRA 708 (DECEMBER 4, 1998).

II.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED HER

DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DAR, ET. AL. V. HON. ROSE MARIE
ALONZO-LEGASTO, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 143016, AUGUST 30, 2000 TO THE INSTANT
CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED HER

DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE AUTHORITY OF ENRIQUE G. SANTOS
TO REPRESENT HIS CO-HEIRS IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
"INC" IS A MATTER OF EVIDENCE.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED HER

DISCRETION WHEN SHE HELD THAT THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE
AND/OR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA (CIVIL CASE NO. Q-01-45415) HAS NOT YET
PRESCRIBED.15

Petitioner averred that, of the plaintiffs below, only plaintiff Enrique Santos signed the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, all the plaintiffs must sign, unless one of them is authorized by a special
power of attorney to sign for and in behalf of the others. Petitioner argues that the bare claim of
Enrique Santos that he signed the verification and certification in his behalf and of the other
plaintiffs who are his co-heirs/co-owners of the property does not even constitute substantial
compliance of the rule. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the absence or existence of an
authority of Enrique Santos to sign the verification and certification for and in behalf of his co-
plaintiffs is not a matter of evidence. The defect is fatal to the complaint of respondents and
cannot be cured by an amendment of the complaint. The trial court erred in applying the ruling
of this Court in Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto.16
Petitioner maintained that the action of respondents, whether it be one for quieting of title or an
accion reinvindicatoria, had prescribed when the complaint was filed on October 24, 2001.
Petitioner asserts that this is because when respondents filed their complaint, they were not in
actual or physical possession of the property, as it (petitioner) has been in actual possession of
the property since 1984 when TCT No. 321744 was issued to it by the Register of Deeds. This
is evident from the nature of a reinvindicatory action itself – which is an action whereby plaintiff
alleges ownership over the subject parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. By
their action, respondents thereby admitted that petitioner was in actual possession of the
property, and as such, respondents’ action for quieting of title or accion reinvindicatoria may
prescribe in ten (10) years from 1984 or in 1994, it appearing that it acted in good faith when it
acquired the property from the registered owner, conformably with Article 555(4) of the New
Civil Code.

On April 7, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision17 dismissing the petition, holding that
the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. As the Court held in DAR v. Alonzo-Legasto18 and in
Gudoy v. Guadalquiver,19 the certification signed by one with respect to a property over which
he shares a common interest with the rest of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) substantially
complied with the Rules. As to the issue of prescription, the appellate court held that the
prescriptive period should be reckoned from 1996, when petitioner claimed ownership and
barred respondents from fencing the property.

Petitioner is now before this Court on petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY RESPONDENT ENRIQUE
G. SANTOS ALONE IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 5, RULE 7
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND IN APPLYING THE CASE OF
GUDOY V. GUADALQUIVER, 429 SCRA 723, WITHOUT REGARD TO MORE
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT ENRIQUE G. SANTOS TO REPRESENT HIS CO-
HEIRS IN THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS A
MATTER OF EVIDENCE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND/OR ACCION REINVINDICATORIA (CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-01-45415) HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.20

Petitioner reiterated its arguments in support of its petition in the CA as its arguments in support
of its petition in the present case.
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court on verification and certification against
forum shopping read:

Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information

and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.

The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition
(or complaint) have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not
a jurisdictional requirement.21

The issue in the present case is not the lack of verification but the sufficiency of one executed
by only one of plaintiffs. This Court held in Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo,22 that the
verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case,
only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification
is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping. The
general rule is that the certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that
the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance
with the provisions merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded.23

The substantial compliance rule has been applied by this Court in a number of cases: Cavile v.
Heirs of Cavile,24 where the Court sustained the validity of the certification signed by only one of
petitioners because he is a relative of the other petitioners and co-owner of the properties in
dispute; Heirs of Agapito T. Olarte v. Office of the President of the Philippines,25 where the Court
allowed a certification signed by only two petitioners because the case involved a family home
in which all the petitioners shared a common interest; Gudoy v. Guadalquiver,26 where the Court
considered as valid the certification signed by only four of the nine petitioners because all
petitioners filed as co-owners pro indiviso a complaint against respondents for quieting of title
and damages, as such, they all have joint interest in the undivided whole; and Dar v. Alonzo-
Legasto,27 where the Court sustained the certification signed by only one of the spouses as they
were sued jointly involving a property in which they had a common interest.

It is noteworthy that in all of the above cases, the Court applied the rule on substantial
compliance because of the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject
of the controversy.

Applying the doctrines laid down in the above cases, we find and so hold that the CA did not err
in affirming the application of the rule on substantial compliance. In the instant case, the
property involved is a 936-square-meter real property. Both parties have their respective TCTs
over the property. Respondents herein who are plaintiffs in the case below have a common
interest over the property being the heirs of the late Enrique Santos, the alleged registered
owner of the subject property as shown in one of the TCTs. As such heirs, they are considered
co-owners pro indiviso of the whole property since no specific portion yet has been adjudicated
to any of the heirs. Consequently, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of
Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance
of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority to inform the
RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any action or claim
involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action
or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Hence, the RTC correctly denied
the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner.

Considering that at stake in the present case is the ownership and possession over a prime
property in Quezon City, the apparent merit of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a special circumstance or compelling reason to allow the relaxation of the rule.

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are established to secure
substantial justice. Being instruments for the speedy and efficient administration of justice, they
may be used to achieve such end, not to derail it. In particular, when a strict and literal
application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification will result in a patent denial of
substantial justice, these may be liberally construed.28 The ends of justice are better served
when cases are determined on the merits – after all parties are given full opportunity to ventilate
their causes and defenses – rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.29

Indeed, this Court strictly applied the rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping as in the cases of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman30 and Tolentino v.
Rivera.31 However, in both cases, the commonality of interest between or among the parties is
wanting. In Loquias, the co-parties were being sued in their individual capacities as mayor, vice
mayor and members of the municipal board. In Tolentino, the lone signature of Tolentino was
held insufficient because he had no authority to sign in behalf of the Francisco spouses. In such
case, the Court concluded that Tolentino merely used the spouses’ names for whatever mileage
he thought he could gain. It is thus clear from these cases that the commonality of interest is
material in the relaxation of the Rules.

Anent the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent his co-heirs/co-plaintiffs, we
find no necessity to show such authority. Respondents herein are co-owners of the subject
property. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment,
forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject
properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.32

We uphold the validity of the complaint because of the following circumstances: (1) the caption
of the instant case is Heirs of Enrique Santos v. Iglesia ni Cristo;33 (2) the opening statement of
the complaint states that plaintiffs are the heirs of Enrique Santos and likewise names the
particular heirs of the latter who instituted the complaint below;34 (3) the case involves a property
owned by the predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs therein;35 and (4) the verification signed by
Enrique G. Santos clearly states that he is one of the children of the late Enrique Santos and
that he represents the heirs of said Enrique Santos.36

On the issue of prescription of action, petitioner avers that the action of respondents is one to
quiet title and/or accion reinvindicatoria, and that respondents asserted ownership over the
property and sought the recovery of possession of the subject parcel of land. It insists that the
very nature of the action presupposes that respondents had not been in actual and material
possession of the property, and that it was petitioner which had been in possession of the
property since 1984 when it acquired title thereon. The action of respondent prescribed in ten
years from 1984 when petitioner allegedly dispossessed respondents, in accordance with Article
555(4) of the New Civil Code.

The contention of petitioner has no merit. The nature of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in
effect when the action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to all or only some of such
relief.37 As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, the action of respondents was one for
quieting of title under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 476 of the New Civil
Code. The latter provision reads:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
 An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.

A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title, either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an interest in

land appearing in some legal form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or which it would be
inequitable to enforce.38 An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible until the claimant is
ousted of his possession.39

The owner of a real property, as plaintiff, is entitled to the relief of quieting of title even if, at the
time of the commencement of his action, he was not in actual possession of real property. After
all, under Article 477 of the New Civil Code, the owner need not be in possession of the
property. If on the face of TCT No. 321744 under the name of plaintiff, its invalidity does not
appear but rests partly in pais, an action for quieting of title is proper.40

In the present case, respondents herein, as plaintiffs below, alleged in their complaint, that their
father, Enrique Santos, was the owner of the property based on TCT No. 57272 issued on July
27, 1961; and that, after his death on February 9, 1970, they inherited the property; Enrique
Santos, during his lifetime, and respondents, after the death of the former, had been in actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property until 1994 when petitioner claimed
ownership based on TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 and barred respondents
from fencing their property.

Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984
when TCT No. 321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that
respondents had been in actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the
time they filed their complaint on October 24, 2001.

Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner.

An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material
possession of the property is on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such
possession from defendant. It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy
seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as
well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery
of its full possession.41 Thus, the owner of real property in actual and material possession
thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a parcel of
land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the possession thereof. In
this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership over the
property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they
sought to enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and
prevented them from fencing the property.

Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their
complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory
action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744
over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that

x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the
 nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can
be claimed only by one who is in possession.42

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72686 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
III. [G.R. NO. 143510 November 23, 2005]

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres, Petitioner, v. Heirs of Manuel Abella,

represented by MERCEDES N. ABELLA, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 4, 2000 denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47747 and the Resolution dated May 29, 2000 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.

The property in dispute is a parcel of land with an area of one hectare located beside the
Peñafrancia Basilica in Naga City. It is covered by Tax Declaration No. 004.1152 in the name of
herein respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I. Abella (respondents). According to herein
petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres (petitioner) said parcel of land had been
donated to him by respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to be offered once a
month in perpetuity for the eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I. Abella. Respondents, on
the other hand, vehemently deny such allegation and counter that petitioner encroached and
fenced off the subject parcel of land without their consent. The proceedings that transpired in
this case had been accurately narrated in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 94-3345 in this wise:

In the action for forcible entry instituted by the Heirs of Manuel Abella (ABELLA, for short)
against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres (ARCHBISHOP, for short) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Naga City, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 8479, a judgment was
rendered in favor of the ARCHBISHOP, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The complaint is ordered dismissed for lack of merit and the petition for preliminary
mandatory injunction is hereby denied for being already moot and academic.

2. The plaintiffs are hereby condemned jointly and severally to respect the ownership and
possession of the one-hectare lot they had donated, transferred, and conveyed to the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Caceres by way of onerous donation, and to desist from further
interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the same by the defendant Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Caceres and its representatives, and

3. To pay the defendants, jointly and severally, the amount of P5,000.00 as actual damages,
and the further sum of P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the respondent court's Decision was affirmed in toto by this Court (RTC 88-1615,
Branch 22) in its Decision dated August 19, 1988. The Decision was appealed by ABELLA to
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 17471. The Court of Appeals in its decision
(ANNEX B, Petition) dated July 3, 1990 affirmed the decision of this Court (Branch 22) by
denying Abella's Petition for Review .

While CA-G.R. SP No. 17471 was pending before the Court of Appeals, ABELLA filed another
case before this Court (Branch 24) against the ARCHBISHOP, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-
1802 for "Quieting of Title" involving the same property subject matter of MTC Civil Case No.
8479 (Forcible Entry).

This Court (Branch 24) rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 89-1802 in favor of ABELLA, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the herein plaintiffs as the rightful owners, as co-owners pro-indiviso, of the one (1)
hectare lot in question and that the herein defendant has no rightful claim of ownership over the
same. And, accordingly, the defendant is adjudged to recognize and respect the plaintiffs'
absolute ownership thereof.

2. Declaring the defendant as the absolute owner of the total area of 1,000 square meters
comprising of that 541 square meters previously donated by Manuel Abella in August, 1979
(Exhibit 2) and the additional 459 square meters donated verbally by Mrs. Abella sometime in
1982 which finds acceptance and recognized by the other owners thereof, Marianito Abella and
Ma. Teresa Abella Ballesteros, co-plaintiffs in the instant case.

3. Plaintiffs' other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit and/or insufficiency of evidence to
sustain them.

4. Defendant's counterclaim is hereby denied for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

The Decision in Civil Case No. 89-1802 was appealed by the ARCHBISHOP to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27370. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated
November 28, 1991 affirming this Court's Decision (ANNEX D, Petition).

The ARCHBISHOP appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27370 to
the Supreme Court which was docketed as G.R. No. 103123. The appeal was dismissed in a
minute resolution dated June 1, 1992 (ANNEX E, Petition) holding that there was "no reversible
error committed by the appellate court."
Both Decisions in the Forcible Entry case and in the Quieting of Title case are now final and
executory.

The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, but the
respondent court [Municipal Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 1 (MTC)] in its Order dated May
10, 1993 (ANNEX A, Petition) denied the motion for execution. ...2

Upon denial by the Municipal Trial Court of petitioner's motion for execution, he filed a Petition
for Certiorari and mandamus with this Court but pursuant to a Resolution dated February 13,
1995, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Naga City for raffle and was
eventually raffled to Branch 23 thereof. The RTC then promulgated the aforequoted Decision
dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, sustaining the validity of the respondent court's
Order dated May 10, 1993. Consequently, the petition is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Herein petitioner again elevated the case straight to this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari . Per Resolution dated May 13, 1998, the Court referred the petition to the CA, and on
February 4, 2000, the latter promulgated its Decision4 denying the petition. The CA held that:

... Admittedly, the decision in Civil Case No. 8479 for Forcible Entry has become final and
executory earlier than in Civil Case No. 89-1802 for Quieting of Title. The finality of the decision
in the quieting of title, declaring the respondents as the true owner of the subject property is a
supervening event that renders the judgment in the forcible entry, awarding possession to
petitioner, notwithstanding its finality, unenforceable by execution. A suspension or refusal of
execution of judgment or order on equitable grounds can only be justified upon facts and events
transpiring after the judgment or order had become executory, materially affecting judgment
obligation...

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision but on May 29, 2000, a Resolution was
issued denying the same.

Hence, the herein petition where the only issue for resolution is whether or not the final and
executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents were adjudged to be
the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-
enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry.

Petitioner insists that the judgment in the quieting of title case should not be considered as a
supervening event that bars the enforcement of the decision in the forcible entry case because
even if respondents had indeed been finally adjudged to be the absolute owners of the disputed
land, an owner of a property is not necessarily entitled to possession thereof, such as when the
owner leased out the property to another. Petitioner advances the theory that what respondents
had actually given him is perpetual usufruct over the subject property.

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is that he is entitled to possession of
the disputed property as the owner thereof because the property was transferred to him by
virtue of an onerous donation made by respondents. Thus, petitioner's alleged right of
possession is premised on his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case
is on review, by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during the
proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying first that respondents had
agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the property, only to say later that what
respondents granted to him was the right to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by the
statements he made while the case was being heard in the lower courts. As held in Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, to wit:

... The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. ...

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in a case for ejectment, any finding of the court
regarding the issue of ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive. This was stressed in
Umpoc v. Mercado, where the Court stated:

... we emphasize that our disquisition on the issue of ownership in ejectment cases, as in the
case at bar, is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of
possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject
matter of a separate case of annulment of title filed by respondent. x x x As the law now stands,
in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole
purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto.

Thus, the finding in the forcible entry case that petitioner had become the owner and rightful
possessor of the disputed property because respondents had donated the property to petitioner
is only provisional. It is the ruling in the case for quieting of title, adjudging herein respondents to
be the absolute owners of the subject property, which is conclusive. The finding in the case for
quieting of title that respondents never consented to petitioner's occupation of the subject
property has now become final and immutable. The CA, adopting the analysis of the trial court,
held thus:

4. The cause of the defendant [herein petitioner] is not served any better by the fact that
Monsgr. Balce had caused the fencing of the alleged one (1) hectare donated by the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] to the church, because as the record shows Mrs. Abellas was not aware of
said fencing which was done while she was abroad. And, when she returned from abroad and
that fact was reported to her by her encargado, Erwin Lara, she went to the premises. However,
she no longer did anything about it because the fence was already destroyed and/or turned
down. And, when Monsgr. Balce tried to reconstruct said fence in 1988 she went to the place
with a policeman and stopped the laborers from continuing with their work in fencing the
property. However, on the following morning, Monsgr. Balce ordered the same laborers to
continue their work. That prompted the plaintiffs to file a case against Monsgr. Balce before the
MTC in Naga City. x x x All these circumstances undertaken by the plaintiffs negate the idea
that they have already parted with the property in favor of the defendant by way of donation.

Necessarily, the finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate
the property or to allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the
forcible entry case.

The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioner's belated claim that even if title over the
property remained with respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to possession thereof. Since
respondents never made the alleged donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual basis for
petitioner to claim the right of possession over it.

Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision in the quieting of title
case constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the
forcible entry case. In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained thus:

... The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the
judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to
only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of
the court to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become final for the
purpose of enforcement of judgment.

...

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of
supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has
acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time.

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in
the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained
finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the
concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible
entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners
and rightful possessors of the disputed land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 4, 2000 and its Resolution dated May 29, 2000 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
IV. [G.R. No. 95748. November 21, 1996.]

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO

AVILES, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the special civil action of Quieting of Title under Rule 64 the proper remedy for settling a
boundary dispute? Did the respondent Court 1 commit a reversible error when it did not declare
the respective rights of the parties over the disputed property in said action?

These are the key issues raised in this petition to review on certiorari the Decision 2 of the
respondent Court promulgated on September 28, 1990 in CA-G.R. CV No. 18155, which
affirmed the decision dated December 29, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, 3
Lingayen, Pangasinan, dismissing a complaint for quieting of title.

The Facts

In an action for quieting of title commenced before the aforementioned trial court, the following
facts, "stripped of unnecessary verbiage" were established by the respondent Court:

"PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of land situated in Malawa,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and
residential land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by Malawa River, on the S by
Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square
meters and declared under Tax Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of their father,
Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents, Ireneo
Aviles and Anastacia Salazar.

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-described property. In fact,
the latter mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in
Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the
presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and
Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,) pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the
boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate mortgage was
foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by plaintiffs’ mother
and the land was subsequently transferred and declared in her name.

ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion
of the property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo
fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the agreement of partition (Exh.’1’)
executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total
area of the property of their parents which they divided is 46,795 square meters and the area
alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is
16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470
square meters more or less. The respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured
before the execution of the agreement but he was not present when the measurement was
made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother Eduardo asked him that he
wanted a bigger share because he has several children to support. The portion in litigation
however is part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition. At present, he is only
occupying an area of 12,686 square meters which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470
square meters. Tax Declarations Nos. 23575, 481 and 379 covering his property from 1958
(Exhs.’7’, ‘8’ and ‘9’) show that the area of his property is 14,470 square meters. The riceland
portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the
residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters. That the
topography of his land is not the same, hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not the
same."

In its decision dated December 29, 1987, the trial court disposed of the case thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands,
Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine the extent and the boundary limit
of the land of the defendant on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand four
hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be
determined;

2. Ordering the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos as
attorney’s fees and to further pay the costs of the proceedings;

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis."

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision, petitioners appealed to the respondent appellate
Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial
court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling
a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. The
dispositive portion of the impugned Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated December 29, 1987 dismissing the
complaint is hereby AFFIRMED but without necessarily agreeing with the ration d’etre (sic)
proferred by the Court a quo. The portion thereof ordering the parties to employ the service of a
land surveyor to relocate and determine the extent and boundary limit of the land of the
defendant on its southern portion in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy
(14,470) square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be determined is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

The Issues

Disagreeing with the respondent Court, petitioners now raise the following issues:

"a. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it opined that the . . . complaint for
quieting of title instituted by the petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is
not the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case for ejectment (sic).

b. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct in rendering a decision, now subject of
the instant petition, without fully determining the respective rights of the herein parties."

Petitioners deem to be "without basis" the respondent Court’s holding that quieting of title is not
the proper remedy in the case a quo. They assert that private respondent is occupying the
disputed lot because he claimed it to be part of his share in the partitioned property of his
parents, whereas petitioners are claiming the said lot as part and parcel of the land allotted to
Eduardo Aviles, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. They contend that they have been
occupying the aforesaid land as heirs of Eduardo Aviles in "open, actual, continuous, peaceful,
public and adversed (sic) (possession) against the whole world." Further, they argue that, if
indeed the disputed lot belonged to private respondent, why then did it take him "almost 26 long
years from June 27, 1957 or until March 27, 1983" to assert his ownership; why did he not
"assert his ownership" over the property when Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did he not
take any "action" when the mortgage over the disputed property was foreclosed?

Private respondent corrects the petitioners’ claim in regard to the date when he had the bamboo
fence constructed. He alleges that the petitioners maliciously concocted the story that private
respondent had purportedly encroached some 1,200 meters on their property when, in fact, "he
was merely repairing the old bamboo fence existing where it had always been since 1957."

The Court’s Ruling

First Issue: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy For Settling Boundary Dispute

We agree with respondent Court. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of
boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property.

The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

"Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or
any interest therein."

In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly
misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in
holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, . .
.", and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of
Partition executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners’ father and
predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were agreed
upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de
Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises
from the parties’ failure to situate and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court," (i)n fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the
existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed
area was alloted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were
properly measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently valid, but
is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and which constitutes a
cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence enclosing the disputed
property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be
removed in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the respondent Court in its Decision is
herewith reproduced in full:

"In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262, where the complainants’ predecessor in
title and the defendant had, during their occupancy, destroyed and obliterated the boundary line
between their adjoining tracts of land, and there was now a dispute as to its location, it was held
that a bill did not lie to remove a cloud on the complainants’ title. The court said: ‘There is no
allegation or evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, or paper showing
any color of title in the defendant, which could cast a shadow on the title of complainants to any
part of the land; there is no overlapping of description in the muniments held by either. The land
of complainants and defendant join. The line which separates them is in dispute and is to be
determined by evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has title up to his line wherever it
may be, and the title papers of neither fix its precise location. So that there is no paper the
existence of which clouds the title of either party, and nothing could be delivered up and
cancelled under the decree of the court undertaking to remove a cloud."

Another similarly instructive precedent reported in the same reference is also quoted below:

"In Kilgannon v. Jenkinson (1883) 51 Mich. 240, 16 N.W. 390, the court, dismissing a bill to
quiet title, said: "The fundamental dispute is about the correct position of the line between lots 3
and 7. The case is not one where a complainant in possession of a specific piece of land, and a
defendant out of possession, but claiming some right or title, are contending as to which one
has the better right to that same parcel; but it is a case where the titles are not opposed, and the
basis and existence of all right and claim depend simply upon where the original line runs.
When that is once settled. there can remain no semblance of claim or cloud to be passed on,
and the issue on that particular question is one regularly triable at law . . ."

Second Issue: Should Parties Rights’ Have Been Declared?

Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court) for not declaring the respective
rights of the parties with respect to the land in question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in
any form in his rights of property over an immovable by the unfounded claims of others, he has
the right to ask from the competent courts: . . . that their respective rights be determined . . .."
As support for their thesis, petitioners cite the ancient case of Bautista v. Exconde.

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for declaratory relief, specifies in Section 1
thereof the grounds, conditions precedent or requisites for bringing such petitions. This Court
has previously held that —

"Under this rule, only a person who is interested ‘under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for
a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.’ This means that the subject matter must refer to
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant
declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the
principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius."

Inasmuch as the enumeration of the causes, grounds or conditions precedent in the first
paragraph of said Sec. 1 is exclusive, by parity of reasoning, it follows that similar remedies
provided for in the second paragraph of the same section would also be marked with the same
exclusivity as to bar any other cause possibly clouding one’s title as a ground for such petitions.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the action to quiet title had been brought under Rule 64,
the same would still not have prospered, the subject matter thereof not referring to "a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance," but to a boundary dispute, and
therefore not warranting the grant of declaratory relief.

From another perspective, we hold that the trial court (and likewise the respondent Court)
cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed
property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed
property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’ interest or title in
and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial
proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and where evidence
aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be
introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70,
or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by
the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
V. G.R. No. 168222             April 18, 2006

SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA RUMARATE; deceased TEODULO

RUMARATE is represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely, ANASTACIA
RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE,
GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE, MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA
RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs.
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN
HERNANDEZ, LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO,
RODRIGOHERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA,
MARIO SALVATIERRA, ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 57053, which reversed and set aside the March 31, 1997 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964, declaring petitioners as
owners of Lot No. 379 with an area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio
Catimo,3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon.

The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses Teodulo Rumarate (Teodulo)
and Rosita Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title
with damages against respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta.4 Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 was previously possessed and cultivated by his
godfather, Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with the Rumarate family
in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred
residence to avail of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From 1925 to 1928,
Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag,
Lopez, Quezon in 1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo and
entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April
21, 1925 recognizing his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379.5 Since Teodulo was only 14 years
old then, his father helped him cultivate the land.6 Their family thereafter cleared the land, built a
house7 and planted coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon.8 In 1960, Santiago
executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)"9 ratifying the transfer of his rights over Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo. Between 1960 and 1970, three conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of
coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo testified in 1992, the
remaining portions of the land was almost entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee,
jackfruits, mangoes and vegetables.10 From 1929, Teodulo and later, his wife and 11 children
possessed the land as owners and declared the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.11

In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, respondents’
predecessors-in-interest, were able to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file
a case against respondents because he was advised to just remain on the land and pay the
corresponding taxes thereon.12
Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, 1964, Santiago sold the
questioned lot to their parents, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for
P9,000.00.13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a
Decision written in Spanish, declaring Lot No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as
claimant thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was issued to Santiago
because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a
motion to re-open Cadastral Proceeding No. 12, alleging that though no title was issued in the
name of Santiago, the same decision is, nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of
Lot No. 379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in the rights of Santiago,
the spouses prayed that Cadastral Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding
title over Lot No. 379 be issued in their name. On September 13, 1965, the CFI of Tayabas
rendered a decision adjudicating Lot No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1184414 was issued on the same date.15 Cipriano Hernandez
planted coconut trees on the land through the help of a certain Fredo16 who was instituted as
caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that he will no longer stay on the land
because there are people instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.17

After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of partition over the subject lot
and were issued TCT No. T- 237330 on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-11844.19

Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964, he accompanied his father in
inspecting the lot which was then planted with coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land
twice, once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he testified, his family
declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes due thereon.21 Joaquin explained that after the
death of his father in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when the complaint was
filed against them when he learned that petitioners are in actual possession of the
property.22 He added that his siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for
cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations then of the New People’s Army
between the years 1965-1970.23 1avvphil.net

On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. It held that since
the latter possessed the land in the concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners
thereof by acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to the Code of Civil
Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to respondents’ parents in 1964, the former no
longer had the right over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said respondents. The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision, reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, to wit:

1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the Cadastral Survey of
Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No. 12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated in Brgy.
Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently, deceitfully and mistakenly
registered in the names of the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;

2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta have no better rights than their parents/predecessors-in-interest, they having
stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
 3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and substitute plaintiffs-[heirs] of
the deceased Teodulo Rumarate are the true, real and legal owners/or the owners in fee
simple absolute of the above described parcel of land;

4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-described parcel of land to plaintiff

Rosita Victor Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased Teodulo
Rumarate;

5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province in Lucena City to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in
favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the
deceased plaintiff Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with law and settled jurisprudence;
and

6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED.24

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, 2005, reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court. It ruled that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either
by donation or acquisitive prescription; that Teodulo’s bare allegation that Santiago orally
bequeathed to him the litigated lot is insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and that
even assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to Teodulo in 1929, or in the
1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation
which require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to be embodied in a public
instrument. Both requirements, however, are absent in this case because in 1929, the alleged
donation was not reduced to writing while the purported 1960 donation was never accepted in a
public document by Teodulo. The appellate court thus surmised that since it was not established
that Santiago donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also failed to prove that
he possessed the land adversely, exclusively and in the concept of an owner, a vital requisite
before one may acquire title by acquisitive prescription. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals
ruled that even assuming further that Teodulo had a right over the property, his cause of action
is now barred by laches because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding knowledge as
early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta. The decretal portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed March 31,
1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-
964 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.25

Hence, the instant appeal.

The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be awarded? To petitioners who
possessed and cultivated the lot since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of
title over the property, or to respondents who have a certificate of title but are not in possession
of the controverted lot?
In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
parties so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever free from any
danger of hostile claim.26 Under Article 47627 of the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of
only when, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which
appears valid but is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby
cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any interest therein. Article 477 of the same
Code states that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the suit.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.28

In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property refers to that upon which
ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by
which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive possession and
enjoyment of the property.

In the instant case, we find that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession
and occupation of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested him
and his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable at the time Teodulo completed his 30-
year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942, effective June 22, 195730 which provides:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Property Registration
Decree), to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been, in

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of
title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the public domain. The confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings
would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such
conversion already effected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. 31

In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of Teodulo and
his witnesses that his (Teodulo’s) possession of the land since 1929 was open, continuous,
adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a settled rule in civil cases as well as in
criminal cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are
given great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court considering that the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.32

A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that Teodulo possessed and occupied
Lot No. 379 in the concept of an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land,
built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In 1957, he filed a homestead application
over Lot No. 379 but failed to pursue the same.33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
youngest being 28 years old,34 continued to till the land. From 1929 to 1960, Santiago never
challenged Teodulo’s possession of Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said
land. For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over Lot No. 379. And, in
1960, he confirmed that he is no longer interested in asserting any right over the land by
executing in favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.

Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the land as owner thereof since
1929. While the oral donation in 1929 as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to
Teodulo are void for non-compliance with the formalities of donation, they nevertheless explain
Teodulo and his family’s long years of occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of
their possession thereof.

In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a parcel of land in the name of
the successors-in-interest of the donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation inasmuch
as said donee possessed the property in the concept of an owner. Thus –

There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an immovable
property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the
old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning gifts propter
nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive
prescription when on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the property
adversely and in the concept of owner.

It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned
him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Considering that Lot
No. 379 became the private property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell the
same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in 1964. Consequently, the latter and
herein respondents did not acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their
name are void.

Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 not
from the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his rights over
said lot, but from his more than 30 years of possession since 1925 up to 1964 when he sold
same lot to their (respondents) predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and
Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an action for, and successfully
obtained, confirmation of imperfect title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act.

However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that Santiago’s alleged
possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature contemplated by the Public Land Act
which requires more than constructive possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the
Court in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:36

It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The
Director of Lands:

"x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of
Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it
should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is
subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is ‘one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to
the portion actually in possession of the claimant.’ While, therefore, ‘possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before
it can be said that he is in possession’, possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No.
926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim
of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership,
while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction x x x."

Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:

"x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it every
once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession."

In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not
vest him title. While he tilled the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the same
since 1928. He abandoned the property and allowed Teodulo to exercise all acts of ownership.
His brief possession of Lot No. 379 could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to another than he himself has.
Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not acquire
any right over the questioned lot and the title issued in their names are void, because of the
legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than the source.37

Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta cannot be considered as

purchasers in good faith because they had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.38 The Court notes that Santiago was not
residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate
and maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have prompted the spouses to
further inquire who was actually tilling the land. Had they done so, they would have found that
Teodulo and his family are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as owners thereof.

In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third persons or purchasers in good
faith and for value or those who buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the
same39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379 from spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta.

Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by virtue of the April 21, 1925
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and not on account of his alleged 30-year possession thereof,
we will still arrive at the same conclusion. This is so because the declaration of this Court that
petitioners are the rightful owners of the controverted lot is based on Teodulo’s own possession
and occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, regardless of the
manner by which Santiago acquired ownership over same lot.

On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the person seeking relief is in possession of the
disputed property. A person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of ownership
may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right, and that his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his title.40 Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed Lot No. 379
since 1929 up to the present, their right to institute a suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot
be barred by the statute of limitations.

Neither could petitioners’ action be barred by laches because they continuously enjoyed the
possession of the land and harvested the fruits thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and
without any interference from respondents. They cannot therefore be said to have slept on their
rights as they in fact exercised the same by continuously possessing Lot No. 379.

On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually guilty of laches. Though not
specifically pleaded, the Court can properly address the issue of laches based on petitioners’
allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor
[herein respondents] had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land from
the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the present."41 Such averment is
sufficient to impute abandonment of right on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need
not be specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider it in determining the rights
of the parties.42

The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law
that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession, it is likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner
may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.43
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a party allows the following number
of years to lapse from the emergence of his cause of action without enforcing his claim, laches
sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years; 32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11
years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years.44

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of which the other party seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting one’s rights, despite having had knowledge or notice of the other
party’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of a party that the person against whom laches is imputed would assert the
right; and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the event the suit is allowed to
prosper.45

All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners’ continuous possession and occupation
of Lot No. 379 should have prompted the respondents to file an action against petitioners, but
they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny knowledge of said possession by petitioners as
they even asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant they (respondents)
instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing of petitioners’ complaint in 1992, or after 22 years,
respondents never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent Joaquin
Hernandez testified that he and his siblings had a plan to convert the land into a grazing land for
cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations of the New People’s Army
between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years, respondents took no step to
implement their plan. Worse, among the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia
Zoleta who are all living in the Philippines,46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited the land and only
thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to
Lot No. 379, up to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified in 1996,47 despite the fact that two of
them are living only in Calauag, Quezon; one in Agdangan, Quezon;48 and two in Lucena
City.49 Neither did they send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right over
the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well
respondents, have neglected Lot No. 379. Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in
1992, their conflicting claims over the property could not have been settled. It goes without
saying that to lose a property that has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77
years will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to petitioners, especially so if
the same ancestral land will be lost under most unfair circumstances in favor of respondents
who appear to have no real interest in cultivating the same.

Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for respondents. Only a positive and
categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the application
of laches. It means taking the offensive by instituting legal means to wrest possession of the
property which, however, is absent in this case. Respondents’ payment of taxes alone, without
possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of ownership. What stands out is their
overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the
fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.

In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in favor of petitioners.

One last point. Notwithstanding this Court’s declaration that Lot No. 379 should be awarded in
favor of petitioners, their title over the same is imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the
proper application for confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, where the
State and other oppositors may be given the chance to be heard. It was therefore premature for
the trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
name of petitioners.

Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is enough to defeat the
certificate of title issued to respondents.50

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. GR. CV No. 57053, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 31, 1997
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C-964,
awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners and ordering the cancellation of respondents’ Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 237330, is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the trial
court’s order directing the Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
name of petitioners.

SO ORDERED.